Union Tactics and Economic Change: A Case Study of Three Philadelphia Textile Unions [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512805079

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
I. THE PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY
II. THE ECONOMIC SETTING
III. THE CARPET WORKERS LOSE THEIR UNIONS
IV. THE UPHOLSTERY WEAVERS FACE AN ECONOMIC CRISIS
V. THE HOSIERY WORKERS EXPERIMENT WITH NEW TACTICS
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX
INDEX

Citation preview

INDUSTRIAL WHARTON

RESEARCH

SCHOOL

UNIVERSITY

OF

DEPARTMENT

FINANCE

OF

AND

COMMERCE

PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA

RESEARCH STUDIES XIX

UNION TACTICS A N D ECONOMIC C H A N G E

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH DEPARTMENT I. Earnings and W o r k i n g O p p o r t u n i t y in the U p h o l s t e r y W e a v e r s ' T r a d e in 25 Plants in P h i l a d e l p h i a , by A n n e Bezanson, $ 2 . 5 0 . II. C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining A m o n g Photo-Engravers in P h i l a d e l p h i a , by Charles Leese, $ 2 . 5 0 . I I I . T r e n d s in F o u n d r y Production in the Philadelphia Area, by A n n e Bezanson and Robert G r a y , $ 1 . 5 0 . I V . Significant Post-War Changes in the Full-Fashioned Hosiery Industry, by G e o r g e W . T a y l o r , $2.00. V . Earnings in Certain Standard M a c h i n e - T o o l Occupations in P h i l a delphia, by H . L . Frain, $ 1 . 5 0 . V I . A n Analysis o f the Significance and Use o f H e l p - W a n t e d A d v e r tising in P h i l a d e l p h i a , by A n n e Bezanson, $2.00. V I I . A n Analysis o f Production of W o r s t e d Sales Y a r n , by A l f r e d H . W i l l i a m s , M a r t i n A . Brumbaugh and H i r a m S. Davis, $ 2 . 5 0 . V I I I . T h e Future M o v e m e n t of Iron O r e and C o a l in Relation to the St. L a w r e n c e W a t e r w a y , by Fayette S. W a r n e r , $3.00. I X . G r o u p I n c e n t i v e s — S o m e Variations in the Use o f G r o u p Bonus and G a n g Piece W o r k , by C . C . Balderston, $ 2 . 5 0 . X . W a g e M e t h o d s and S e l l i n g Costs, by A n n e Bezanson and M i r i a m Hussey, $4.50. X I . W a g e s — A Means o f T e s t i n g T h e i r A d e q u a c y , by M o r r i s E . Leeds and C . C . Balderston, $ 1 . 5 0 . X I I . Case Studies o f U n e m p l o y m e n t — C o m p i l e d by the U n e m p l o y ment C o m m i t t e e of the National Federation of Settlements, edited by M a r i o n Elderton, $3.00. X I I I . T h e Full-Fashioned Hosiery W o r k e r — H i s C h a n g i n g E c o n o m i c Status, by G e o r g e W . T a y l o r , $3.00. X I V . Seasonal Variations in E m p l o y m e n t in M a n u f a c t u r i n g Industries, by J. Parker Bursk, $2.50. X V . T h e Stabilization o f E m p l o y m e n t in Philadelphia through the L o n g - R a n g e P l a n n i n g o f M u n i c i p a l Improvement Projects, by W i l l i a m N . Loucks, $3.50. X V I . H o w Workers F i n d J o b s — A Study o f Four T h o u s a n d H o s i e r y Workers, by Dorothea de S c h w e i n i t z , $2.50. X V I I . Savings and E m p l o y e e Savings P l a n s — A n Analysis o f Savings and T y p e s o f Plans to Encourage Savings and T h r i f t among Employees o f Industrial Firms in Philadelphia, by W i l l i a m J. Carson, $ 1 . 5 0 . X V I I I . Workers' Emotions in Shop and H o m e — A Study o f I n d i v i d u a l Workers f r o m the Psychological and Physiological Standpoint, by R e x f o r d B. H e r s e y , $3.00.

UNION TACTICS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE A

CASE STUDY

OF THREE

TEXTILE

PHILADELPHIA

UNIONS

BY

GLADYS L. PALMER, PH.D. Research Associate Industrial Research Department IVbarton School of Finance and Commerce University of Pennsylvania

PHILADELPHIA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

1932

Copyright, 1931 by the UNIVERSITY

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

PRBSS

Printed in the UNITBD

STATES

OF

AMERICA

PREFACE This study is addressed to students of labor union problems and tactics, and to those interested in understanding the background of labor relations in the unionized textile industries. It should prove of particular interest to the members and officers of the Philadelphia textile unions and the textile manufacturers. T h e i r cooperation and interest made possible this analysis of the full-fashioned hosiery, upholstery weaving, and carpet weaving trades as type-situations of union tactics in a changing economic setting. While the recent difficulties of the Philadelphia textile unions and the textile industries have been more acute than those in less competitive trades, they are the fundamental economic problems ΊΪ any old industrial community, and their historyshould therefore be of general interest. T h e project for studying the effect of industrial changes on union tactics and policy arose out of the writer's interest in the recent problems of the textile industries and the textile unions. T h e data f o r the study were obtained with the aid of a fellowship from the Social Science Research Council. T h e preparation of the manuscript for publication was undertaken with the assistance of the Industrial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania. T h e w.'iter is indebted to many individuals and groups of individuals for cooperation in securing the data for this study. It would be impossible to mention all who have given assistance. Particular acknowledgment should, however, be made to the following Philadelphia textile manufacturers and their representatives: Messrs. A . Vinton Clarke, W i l liam Griffiths, Sr., J o h n Snowden, Benjamin Jacobs, William D r e x e l , R o y E . Tilles, and Gustave Geiges. A m o n g the officers of Philadelphia textile unions, grateful ; acknowledgment is made to Messrs. J o h n Edelman, W i l V

vi

PREFACE

liam Smith, Emil Rieve, Alexander McKeown, Charles Seifert, Fred Lauterwasser, George Creech, William Pollock, Robert Gaffney, William Casey, Joseph Steiner, W i l liam Kelly, Andrew Vance, and Robert Lowrie. T h e suggestions of D r . Joseph H . Willits, director, D r . Anne Bezanson, associate director, and Dr. George W . T a y lor, of the Industriai Research Department, have been most helpful throughout the study. D r . Willard Hotchkiss of Leland Stanford University has also given valuable criticism. M y colleagues in the Department, M r . H . S. Davis, M r . W . E . Fisher, D r . A. H . Williams, and Miss Miriam Hussey, have given helpful advice in the last stages of the preparation of the manuscript for publication. GLADYS L .

PALMER.

CONTENTS CHAPTER

PAGE

I

THE

PURPOSE

II

THE

ECONOMIC

III

THE

CARPET

IV

THE

UPHOLSTERY

V

THE

HOSIERY

VI

SUMMARY

AND M E T H O D

OF T H E S T U D Y

Ι

SETTING

WORKERS

5 LOSE

WEAVERS

WORKERS

THEIR

UNIONS

22

F A C E AN ECONOMIC

EXPERIMENT

WITH

NEW

CRISIS

51

TACTICS

78

AND CONCLUSIONS

129

APPENDIX

A

F i f t y - N i n e Y e a r s at C a r p e t W e a v i n g , b y A r t h u r Mitchell

. . .

138

A u t o b i o g r a p h y of a C a r p e t W e a v e r , b y E d w i n C o o k e

142

F i f t e e n Y e a r s at T o p p i n g , b y F r e d a M a u r e r

146

T h e H . C . A b e r l e C o m p a n y S t r i k e , by L . Griggs Pierce

. . . .

T h e S t o r y of a H o s i e r y B o a r d e r , b y C h a r l e s S e i f e r t , S r

153 170

T h e 1 9 3 1 H o s i e r y S t r i k e , by J a m e s H . T w i s t

174

T h e M a s t e r Silk H o s i e r y Strike, b y B e r t h a L a m b

178

Decision of the B o a r d of A r b i t r a t i o n — U p h o l s t e r y W a g e D i s p u t e — J a n u a r y 2, 1 9 3 1

182

T h e A b e r l e Strike A r b i t r a t i o n A w a r d , April 14, 1 9 3 0 R e p o r t to the H o n o r a b l e M a y o r H a r r y A . M a c k e y by the

187 Fact-

F i n d i n g C o m m i t t e e on the Philadelphia H o s i e r y S t r i k e , M a y 29, '93·

"95

T h e N a t i o n a l A g r e e m e n t by and between the

Full-Fashioned

H o s i e r y M a n u f a c t u r e r s of A m e r i c a , Inc., and American F e d eration of F u l l - F a s h i o n e d H o s i e r y W o r k e r s Β

205

Tables ι . C a r p e t and R u g M a n u f a c t u r e in P h i l a d e l p h i a

219

2. P r o d u c t i o n of C o t t o n T a p e s t r i e s in P e n n s y l v a n i a and the United S t a t e s

219

3. M e m b e r s h i p of Philadelphia District T e x t i l e Council

. . .

220

4. P h i l a d e l p h i a T e x t i l e Strikes, J a n u a r y 1 9 2 0 to December 1 9 3 0

222

INDEX

126

vii

CHAPTER I T H E PURPOSE AND METHOD OF T H E STUDY Considerable interest is evinced by economists and others in the ability of the American labor movement to survive the rapid changes of modern industry. M a n y new economic factors have affected the demand for labor and hence the bargaining power of the established unions. Among these influences are technological improvements which displace skill, changes in consumers' demand for articles, competition o f old with new low-cost manufacturing centers, and the migration of industry from one area to another. Changes which result in an economic situation adverse to the aims of the labor movement have precipitated the search by union leaders for new ways of developing the union program or holding union ground. Some unions have been successful in meeting changed economic conditions by developing new tactics; others have failed to meet this test and have lost their original control. T h e i r cxpcricncc can best be studied by an analysis of type-situations in an old industrial community with an established labor movement. Such a situation is found in the textile trades of Philadelphia. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the effects of recent industrial changes in the textile trades of Philadelphia upon the problems and policies of three Philadelphia textile unions. T h i s will be done by building a picture of the economic background of the industries and o f the history of the unions, their tactics and philosophy. T h e workers in the carpet and upholstery weaving, and full-fashioned hosiery trades, which were among the largest textile industries in the city, organized the largest and most successful textile trade unions. T h e s e three unions have, therefore, been studied in detail. Each union pursued different tactics in ι

2

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

the face of a rapid decline in the textile trades of P h i l a delphia. T h e success or failure of their program is of i m portance to the labor movement as a whole and to the economic and social welfare of the textile industries. T h e data for the study come primarily f r o m union records and from personal interviews with union leaders and members and with textile manufacturers who have had experience in dealing with the unions. T h e s e have been supplemented by attendance at union meetings and conventions and at strike hearings, and by visits to textile mills. T h e Philadelphia textile unions have given generous cooperation in granting access to records and in helpful discussion o f union problems. T i m e did not allow for a complete survey of the opinion of every Philadelphia textile manufacturer who had ever had any experience with a labor union. But a selected group of manufacturers, whose opinions on labor questions are valued in the textile trades studied, gave generously of their experience and time to the questions raised by this study. Some were opposed to the unions operating in their trade or objected to certain of their policies; others were favorably disposed. T h e interpretation of the material obtained was not a l ways easy. Manufacturers and workers differed in their explanation of particular events or the reasons for the development of special policies. Union officers and members differed in their ability to recall historical data and in their explanation of what had happened. W h i l e the union records studied had been well preserved and were unusually complete, as records go, they did not tell the whole story. T h e y were silent on many questions which were so important or so catastrophic at the time they happened that only the briefest mention of them occurred in the records. C o m plete data on all strikes and stoppages occurring in the industries studied, for example, would be practically impossible to secure. E v e n t s moved so rapidly in some of the unions that record-keeping had to take a very minor place. F o r this reason, the story of the Philadelphia textile unions is

THE

PURPOSE

AND

METHOD

3

told only in broad outline, with emphasis upon m a j o r factors in the historical development of the unions. Similarly, the absence of detailed information concerning the rapid changes which have taken place in the P h i l a d e l phia textile trades necessitates treatment in outline only. T h e r e is real danger that generalizations about complex industrial phenomena and varying trends may have oversimplified the real situation. I n the absence o f more detailed studies of the economic situation in the specialty textile trades characteristic of Philadelphia, reliance must be placed upon the available published data and opinion in the trades. T h i s study makes no claim to having developed new scientific techniques or standards of objectivity in industrial r e search. O n e might well question what is "ascertainable f a c t " in a study of this kind. I t is the writer's belief that what can be agreed upon by a sufficient number of witnesses to be called a " f a c t " is, in industrial relations, relatively unimportant. I t is much more important to know what people believe to be the " f a c t s . " Although the writer has made an attempt to distinguish between gossip, report, opinion, and documentary evidence, many of the data of this study necessarily consist of " f a c t s " in the light of interpretation by the industry. An attempt has been made to carry over into the story as much as possible of the interest o f the manuscript records themselves and the point of view of rank-and-file workers as well as of union leaders. Interesting sidelights on the discussion in the text will be found in the first-hand autobiographical information contributed by workers in the trades. I t is the opinion of the writer that one of the most interesting sources of information concerning the psychological attitudes of workers in any industrial situation is found in trade stories, autobiographies, and strike stories written by the workers themselves. W h i l e time did not allow for the accumulation of a large number of such case-studies, the selected stories presented in Appendix A should prove as h e l p f u l as the text itself in developing an understanding

4

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

of the problems of the Philadelphia textile unions. N o better statement exists of "what is on the [Philadelphia textile] workers' mind." It should be pointed out at the beginning that there is no steady march of events over a long period of time which shows a well-defined line of action on the part of either manufacturers or union leaders in the Philadelphia textile trades. T h e trends in the situation are confused. An industry, for example, sells all of its product through jobbers for many years and then decides to try "direct" selling and national advertising. Still later, the manufacturers decide that possibly the jobber is coming back into his own, and they had better sell through him. Unions likewise have reversed themselves on important questions of union policy, such as the negotiation of wage reductions, within a short space of time. T h e line of action is therefore zigzag rather than straight. It is the result of opportunist solution of immediate problems rather than the working out of any ultimate, longtime objectives in the minds of leaders. Nor is there a close and clear-cut association of particular economic events with particular union policies. On the contrary, generally adverse economic conditions have, after some lapse of time, precipitated a struggle for survival, or resulted in the development of a new program by the unions. Considerable emphasis will of necessity be placed upon historical and economic factors as a necessary background for understanding the decline of the Philadelphia textile industries and the resulting problems of the textile unions. These constitute the subject-matter of the next chapter.

CHAPTER

II

THE ECONOMIC SETTING ECONOMIC

FACTORS

IN T H E

DECLINE

PHIA T E X T I L E

OF T H E

PHILADEL-

INDUSTRY

A history of growth, overexpansion, and decline has characterized every textile trade in Philadelphia. This evolutionary movement has been accentuated by such economic factors as variation in the amount of tariff protection, abrupt changes in fashion and living habits, new developments in textile machine equipment, and competition from other manufacturing centers in this country and abroad. In the years just preceding and following 1900, the textile industries in Philadelphia were especially prosperous, possibly more prosperous than in any period since that time. It was during this period that the American consuming public was persuaded to carpet its floors, decorate its rooms, and clothe itself with the products of Philadelphia's textile mills. B y 1905, however, changes had occurred in the demand for floor coverings, for example, which brought depression to the carpet industry, then localized in Philadelphia. Carpet and rug mills had expanded rapidly while profits were large, and later, when hardwood floors and linoleum decreased the demand for woven carpetings, found themselves with a greater manufacturing capacity than was necessary. Except for occasional spurts of activity with changing styles in the interior decoration of homes, this trade has declined steadily since 1900. T h e same history was repeated a few years later, when Philadelphia woolen and worsted goods enjoyed a wide market and a considerable prestige in the industry. T h e i r prosperity was invaded by the increasing use of rayon and silk 5

6

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

as substitutes and a change in living habits which decreased the demand for wool-fibre products as clothing. T h e upholstery weaving industry likewise expanded rapidly in the years following 1 9 1 9 to meet a style change which favored upholstered furniture and a rapid rise in building, with the consequent demand for decorative products. But by 1 9 2 9 , style changes in furniture had decreased the demand for all upholstery goods, and the yardage of cotton tapestry, the major product of the industry, had dropped to the levels of 1 9 0 4 . A similar history is found in the f u l l - f a s h ioned hosiery industry. T h i s trade expanded rapidly in the years following 1 9 2 5 , when short skirts demanded a fashioned stocking of silk of varied colors to match the costume, in place of former somber hues in cotton and rayon. W h a t appeared to be a relatively inelastic market was overreached by this expansion, and the older mills in the industry, situated in Philadelphia, suffered severely in the recent competitive struggle in the trade. T h e timing of these movements of rise and decline was such that while one textile trade declined, another appeared to be expanding. T o a limited extent, this allowed the transfer of capital and labor between trades. Firms which once made lace curtains, f o r example, turned to the manufacture of full-fashioned hosiery or carpets as the demand for the first product declined. Workers left the declining trades to try their fortunes and skill in the expanding industries. T h e extent of this transfer is not known, but there is no doubt that it occurred in particular instances. T h u s , while one textile trade in the city after another has experienced a decline relative to its original expansion, the number of workers in all of the Philadelphia textile trades combined, has remained approximately the same in the four decades from 1 8 9 0 to 1 9 2 7 . 1 A l l of the specialty textile trades characteristic of Phila1 T h e number of workers in the m a j o r textile trades in Philadelphia was 5 7 , 1 8 3 in 1 8 9 0 , 5 7 , 6 3 5 in 1 9 0 0 , 5 9 , 1 7 9 in 1909, 5 5 , 2 8 1 in 1 9 1 9 , 57,287 in 1 9 2 7 . D u r i n g this same period the demand f o r textile products in the country as a whole was increasing.

THE

ECONOMIC

SETTING

7

delphia have at one time or another been localized in the city, and the city's mills have dominated the markets for their products. T h e type of product manufactured in the Philadelphia textile mills has, in general, been of the finest grades, a product for which skilled designers and skilled workmen and old-established trade-marks have been for many years a sufficient guarantee of quality. T h e city became a center for the most highly skilled textile workers in the industry, and the localization of the specialty trades in this area was probably the direct result of the presence of skilled labor in the market. M a n y of the early mills were started by workers who used their families or friends as the original nucleus of operators in the mill. Once established, each trade continued to expand here as long as nearness to a skilled labor supply was essential to the success of the industry. Most of the textile mills of Philadelphia started as relatively small-scale enterprises, and most of them continue so at the present time. T h e r e is a considerable degree of specialization in the Philadelphia textile industry even today. Very few textile mills in the city carry the raw material of the trade through all of the processes to the finished product. F o r example, few mills do their own spinning and dyeing in addition to weaving. On the other hand, a large number of spinning mills and dye houses do a specialized business in carpet yarns, upholstery and drapery yarns, worsted and woolen dress goods or men's suiting yarns, and hosiery yarns. T h e r e are special machine-equipment repair shops and textile design agencies serving each specialty trade. As a result of this specialization of process, Philadelphia mills have enjoyed in the past, and to some extent still enjoy, a differential advantage in production costs. Philadelphia, therefore, has certain advantages and disadvantages arising from its position as one of the earliest textile centers in the country. Its advantages lie in the variety o f high-grade specialty textile products which it manufactures, its nearness to style centers, to the market, and to specialized production facilities, and in the labor supply of

8

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

skilled workers available in the community. T h e city can therefore continue to produce advantageously the novelty types of product in which nearness to style centers and labor skill give advantage. Its disadvantages lie in the presence of obsolete machine equipment in certain mills and old producing and merchandising methods which fail to meet present demands in particular trades. Its major disadvantage lies in the necessity of meeting keen competition from newer industrial centers operating with lower costs of production, in a market which may be declining because of general style changes or overexpansion of the industry. B y reason of its early start in the industry, Philadelphia may have reaped the greatest advantage of the earlier prosperity in the trade, but it has probably suffered the most severely in the recent competitive struggle and decline of the trades. Interesting illustrations of the effect of economic factors in the decline of the textile industries are found in the carpet, upholstery weaving, and full-fashioned hosiery trades. I n these three textile trades, which have been chosen for special analysis, Philadelphia remains the largest single manufacturing center of the country, although its relative importance is considerably less than in earlier years. 2 Changes in style and in living habits appear to have been the most spectacular economic factors in the prosperity or decline of the specialty textile trades. One interesting development of recent years has been a general change in consumer-demand in favor of cheaper goods which are wellstyled but will not " w e a r a lifetime." Textile manufacturers are impressed by the fact that the last consideration of the consumer appears to be the wearing qualities of goods, and that style and price have become the most important. T h i s is particularly true of the full-fashioned hosiery and ' In the carpet and rug- industry Philadelphia manufactured 4.8 per cent of the total value of the product in the country in 1890, and 21.6 per cent in 1927. Philadelphia manufactured 90 per cent of the country's yardage of cotton tapestry production in 1904 and 66.3 per cent in 1929. The city manufactured 22 per cent of the total value of hosiery and knit goods in 1890, and 13.8 per cent in 1927 (Sec Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B, compiled from Census of Manufactures).

THE

ECONOMIC

SETTING

9

upholstery weaving trades. It might be more accurate to say that there is a demand on the part of consumers for better styling in all grades of goods, and that in the more expensive fabrics, finer quality and texture are also demanded.® In general, however, a larger proportion of the less expensive types of goods is sold than formerly. It is important to realize that the less expensive types of product usually require less skilled labor and can therefore be produced in new manufacturing areas competing with Philadelphia mills. In the case of carpets and rugs, a shift in living habits in favor of hardwood floors and the use of linoleum has required less yardage of carpeting than earlier custom did. Competition between the various types of rugs produced has brought about lower prices and to some extent better styling and designing in all grades. The textile industries have experienced fewer technological changes than many other industries, but the few changes which have occurred have seriously affected the relative competitive position of Philadelphia mills. One such change was the invention of the broadloom for making seamless rugs. This invention improved the appearance and the wearing qualities of rugs and required less skill in the weaving process than was formerly needed in order to match patterns in seamed rugs. Broadlooms were introduced in all the New England rug mills when these started operations, but were only slowly installed in the older carpet mills of Philadelphia.4 In the full-fashioned hosiery industry, knitting machines of finer gauge, higher speed, and more sections have gradually replaced the older, slower, and smaller machines. In the newer mills outside of Philadelphia most of the equipment is of the recent type. In Philadelphia, however, there * Where the cheapening of textile goods can come only at the expense of quality, as in the production of carpets and upholstery goods, the cheaper products are less desirable f o r consumers. While wool and worsted goods and full-fashioned hosiery now offer finer texture than in earlier years, this is largely the result of style change rather than of competitive pressure on price and quality. 4 It is reported that there is one carpet mill in the city today of which the owner prides himself on his refusal to allow a broadloom in the building.

10

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

is a larger proportion of old equipment than in other areas.® In the upholstery weaving industry, few improvements in machine equipment have occurred. The old equipment in the city's mills appears to be able to produce the heavier upholstery fabrics demanded. Light-weight drapery fabrics are, in increasing measure, produced on automatic looms in areas outside of the city. None of the technological changes mentioned, however, has displaced large numbers of workers or eliminated much of the skill necessary for the operations, as in the revolutionary equipment changes in the more staple textile industries. There has been some "doubling up" of equipment, where hosiery knitters have been asked to run two machines and weavers have been asked to tend more than one loom. The basic skill required, however, has remained the same. Another type of technological change which has affected the Philadelphia textile industries is the development of synthetic products. For example, rayon yarn has replaced mercerized cotton and silk yarn to a large extent in many textile products. Silk and rayon products have been substituted by consumers for wool products. Recently, a rubberbacked rug, in which fibres are inserted into the rubber by a chemical process, has further threatened the market for woven wool carpetings. In addition to changes in style, in equipment, and in the development of substitute products, there have been important changes in the organization of the textile business which have been associated with the decline of the Philadelphia textile trades. The first of these is the change from the older type of small-scale, specialized plant, typical of Philadelphia, to the larger-scale plant carrying on all the manufacturing processes, characteristic of the new manufacturing areas in New England and the south. The merchan* de Schweinitz, How Workers Find Jobs, p. 40. The question whether this equipment is obsolete or not remains to be answered. A recent style change in favor of mesh hose has given orders to 39-gauge equipment in the Philadelphia area. It ran at as large a percentage of capacity as finer-gauge equipment in 1931-2.

THE

ECONOMIC

SETTING

11

dising of the product has also undergone some change. J o b bers formerly distributed practically the entire output of Philadelphia textile mills. At the present time, it is estimated that they distribute less than one-half of the output in the three specialty trades discussed. Changes in retail selling such as the development of chain stores and the success of branded merchandise and national advertising, or changes in the type of product manufactured, have necessitated new sales outlets. Another element in the marketing problem is the size of the order, for the general policy of hand-to-mouth buying has reduced the size of orders and narrowed the time limits for delivery. In an industry like the upholstery weaving industry, where small orders prevail because of the decorative type of fabric produced, the size of the average order is now too small for economical production. Although normally the position of the jobber is important in such a small-order business, other economic factors have tended to eliminate the jobber in this and other specialty textile trades. T h e general effect of these changes in the distribution of textile products has been to increase the risks of the manufacturers. T h e competitive struggle in the Philadelphia textile trades in recent years has been one in which " f a i r " trade practices and control of output have practically disappeared. T h e textile trade associations have as yet been unable to cope with the problems of setting up standards of quality production and the elimination of copying of designs. T h e s e problems are of especial importance in the carpet and upholstery weaving trades. I n the full-fashioned hosiery industry, surplus machine equipment® has made the problem of control of stocks the most important aspect of recent competition. Some progress has been made in curtailing production by agreement among hosiery manufacturers. 7 But the general prob" The industry is estimated to be about 30 per cent overdeveloped. Taylor, The Full-Fashioned Hosiery Worker, p. 53. 7 Hosiery stocks declined 2 1 . 2 per cent from January, 1 9 3 1 to January, 1932 (Industrial Research Department Hosiery Release #5, p. 2) as the result of a campaign among hosiery manufacturers toward this end.

12

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

lems of " u n f a i r " competition and unrestricted output in these overexpanded textile trades cannot be said to have been solved. A l l of these economic factors are interwoven with the most important element in the situation. T h i s is the recent movement toward decentralization of the textile industry, and the resulting competition between mills in the old localized center of the specialty trades, namely Philadelphia, and mills in new manufacturing areas. T h i s movement gained headway when it was found that new machine equipment and the types of products demanded by consumers required less skilled labor. A l t h o u g h the textile trades had originally located in Philadelphia to be near a skilled labor supply, when a less skilled labor supply could be used, they migrated to rural areas in which lower l i v i n g costs and lower wage rates prevailed. O n l y a few full-fashioned hosiery, carpet, and upholstery weaving mills actually m o v e d out of the city, although some mills established branch plants in other areas. But all new expansion took place in the rural districts and the liquidation of many of the older mills in the city led to no replacements. T h e relative importance of the city as a manufacturing center declined as competition between the old and new areas increased. A l t h o u g h adequate statistical evidence is not available, it is probable that a larger proportion of idle machine equipment has been characteristic of the Philadelphia textile mills in recent years than would be found in the new manufacturing areas. A l t h o u g h all textile centers have been hit by the 1930 depression, it is probable that the oldest center has suffered the most severely. N o study of the advantages and disadvantages of localization and specialization versus decentralization of the specialty textile trades has been made. 8 M i l l s in recently developed competing areas enjoyed advantages in new and improved equipment, cheaper labor, and occasionally lower taxes, * Such a study is planned as part of a research project by the Industrial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania.

THE

ECONOMIC

SETTING

13

rentals, and cheaper power. These were offset by disadvantages arising from distance from the markets and style centers, and the absence of facilities available in a specialized industrial center. T h e disadvantages were minor. The most important advantage in production cost was cheaper labor. This resulted from longer hours of work and lower rates of pay than prevailed in Philadelphia and, in particular trades, from the operation of more than one machine per worker. T h e differential in labor costs came to be a point of focus in all discussions of the problem of textile migration. In the Philadelphia trades which were unionized, attention became centered on the problem of union versus non-union competition. Labor costs in the specialty textile trades studied vary considerably with the grade of product manufactured. 9 They average approximately one-third of the production costs and offer an important channel of saving. Labor costs have been the point at which the greatest pressure has been exerted for reduction. It can readily be seen that the Philadelphia textile mills which once dominated their respective trades have been faced in recent years by important problems of competition with new industrial centers. All old mills, no matter where they are located, find competition with newer mills increasingly difficult. It is doubtful whether Philadelphia has fared worse than other old textile centers, although the decline has been very marked in the past decade and, for trades like the manufacture of certain types of carpet and woolen goods, has extended over a long period of years. The economic factors in this decline are primarily of a general sort affecting all textile industries. General consumer-demand for cheaper products, rapid style changes, the development of improved high-speed machine equipment, changes in the * In hosiery, labor costs v a r y f r o m 20 to 30 per cent, in carpets, f r o m 20 to 40 per cent, and in upholstery w e a v i n g , f r o m 25 to 50 per cent o f the total costs o f production. T a y l o r , o f . cit., p. 2 7 ; T a r i f f Information on Survey on T a r i f f A c t of 1 9 1 3 , Schedule K , Washington, 1 9 2 1 , p. 6 6 ¡ and a recent survey of the upholstery w e a v i n g industry by the Industrial Research Department to be published shortly.

14

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

status of the jobber in the industry, and the impotence of voluntary manufacturers' associations to secure quality standards of production and a stabilized output have all been important. E v e n more important have been the problems of overexpansion of equipment in the industries when profits were large, with a resulting decline in business, and insufficient profits to keep the industry alive. T h e effects of the decline of Philadelphia's textile trades could be observed by any one riding through the Kensington or Manayunk districts of the city. Before the depression began in 1930 unemployed men walked the streets looking for work or congregated on street corners. Workers who retained their jobs suffered from wage cuts and irregular employment. Sheriff's sale signs plastered the doors of workers' houses in the neighborhood of the mills. M a n y mill buildings were empty and " f o r sale." One example of this situation is found in the complete shut-down, in 1927, of the Dobson mills. These were first established in the city in 18 55, and at the height of their prosperity operated 1,400 looms and employed 6,000 workers. T h e Dobson mills once manufactured carpets, blankets, woolen and worsted yarns, velvets, and woolen goods famous throughout the country. Such a shut-down may symbolize what has been developing on a more extensive, if less dramatic, scale in all textile trades in the city. T h e economic and social l i f e of large groups in the textile communities of Philadelphia has been thrown into disorder by these changes, and it is impossible to appraise adequately the ultimate effects of this economic crisis on the community life. CHARACTERISTICS

OF T H E

PHILADELPHIA

TEXTILE

WORKERS

T h e workers who have spent most of their lives in Philadelphia's textile mills have interesting characteristics of their own. T h e y usually come from families who have had a tradition of working in the textile mills. T h e father and

THE ECONOMIC

SETTING

15

son may be weavers and the daughter a mender or examiner, or, again the men in the family may be full-fashioned hosiery knitters, and the mother and daughter, toppers working in the same or other work "crews." Usually the tradition goes back for more than one generation. The older group of workers in the industry are Germans, Englishmen, and Scotchmen who came directly to Philadelphia from the textile centers of Europe. The younger workers in the trades are American-born. Except in the full-fashioned hosiery industry, in which a majority of the workers are young, the Philadelphia textile trades employ a large group of older workers. In some trades, such as lace or lace curtain weaving and upholstery weaving, workers over 40 years of age constitute a majority. In these occupations, experience and skill, if combined with good eyesight and sensitive touch, make age no handicap to workers. A l l textile workers in the more skilled occupations consider that their trades call for a high degree of skill and take pride in good workmanship. Although technological improvements in the machine equipment of textile plants are constantly making skill a less necessary factor in the industry, the workers hold to their traditions with pride. Wherever textile workers congregate they talk over the "good old times" when each trade in turn constituted the "aristocracy" of the textile labor world. A tradition of unionism in the "old country" was probably responsible for early experimentation with trade unions in the textile mills of Philadelphia. The movement is fully as old as the industry itself, and adds a dramatic chapter to American labor history. The sacrifices of early pioneers and the tradition of historic labor battles fought in the interests of the movement have given it an emotional as well as an economic significance to present-day textile workers. T h e y have inherited a hard-won philosophy and program which is centered on job security in an industry characterized by tremendous economic insecurity. B y almost imperceptible gains, the movement has continued. Many individuals were

16

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

sacrificed in strikes, but the movement gained momentum and survived. Philadelphia, as one of the oldest textile centers in the country, bore the brunt of many of the most serious fights over working standards in the textile trades, for as early as 1828 Philadelphia textile workers were striking against wage cuts inaugurated to enable the city's mills to compete with outside mills. Sporadic organization continued throughout the nineteenth century. T h e Knights of Labor were active in the Kensington district of Philadelphia in the eighties. Preliminary struggles in the nineties paved the way for one of the most important textile strikes in the city, the fifty-five-hour strike of 1903. T h e unions assert that the entire textile industry in the city was closed down by this strike. 10 A t that time, the hours of work in southern mills were said to be seventy-two a week, as against the sixtyhour week prevalent in Philadelphia. T h e strike was lost, but in the following years, the fifty-five-hour week was gradually introduced through state legislation and trade union agreements. A second historical event of major importance in the background of the textile unions was the sympathetic strike with the street-car men in 1910. T h e unions claim that 15,000 textile workers were on strike at this time, and that the organizing campaign after the strike revived the textile labor movement in the city. From 1910 through the war period, the Philadelphia textile unions grew in membership and power 1 1 and achieved considerable gains through collective bargaining. T h e wages of textile workers were raised to meet the increased cost of living during the war period. T h e most highly skilled men's trades received a " l i v i n g " or " s a v i n g " 10 Newspaper reports of the 1903 textile strike indicate that there were delegates f r o m 41 textile trade unions, representing 18,000 workers, on the strike committee. Approximately 75,000 workers were reported to have gone on strike, June i , 1903. A f e w trade unions gained the shorter hours, but the majority lost the strike and returned to w o r k in A u g u s t or September. {North American, June-Sept., 1903.) 11 For membership figures of the textile unions affiliated with the United T e x t i l e Workers of America in 1920 and 1930, see T a b l e 3, A p p e n d i x B.

THE

ECONOMIC

SETTING

17

12

wage. These gains were shared by unorganized workers in the textile industries in Philadelphia, and to some extent, outside the city, for the city's wage scale frequently set the rates for the entire country in union trades localized in Philadelphia because of their control of the most highly skilled group. The 48-hour week was secured in the organized textile trades in 1 9 1 9 . Just as important, however, as gains in wages and shorter hours of work was the feeling of security obtained through the labor organization. Not only was the worker protected against arbitrary discipline in the shop and insured freedom and independence, but economic changes in the industry were introduced more slowly and with some protection of the workers' "rights" in the shop through the joint negotiation of working rules and trade agreements. Collective bargaining in the textile trades had advantages for the manufacturers as well as the workers, in terms of standardization of labor costs between competing mills, guaranteed skilled workmanship, and, in most instances, stable industrial relations. The depression of 1 9 2 1 and the "open shop" drive of manufacturers in Philadelphia was accompanied by many strikes and the loss of several textile unions. Among these were the unions of woolen cloth weavers, woolen yarn workers, cloth dyers and finishers, art square weavers, and Wilton carpet weavers. An analysis of the causes of textile strikes occurring in the decade from 1920 to 1 9 3 1 1 3 indicates that the majority arose over wage disputes and organizing activities. Most of these strikes were lost. B y 1930, the thirty-seven local textile unions which had, at one time or another, been affiliated with the United Textile Workers " T h e r e are f e w adequate studies of wages in the Philadelphia textile trades. F r o m the available evidence, average earnings in the f o l l o w i n g union trades were more than the "health and decency" budget set by government experts as the minimum cost o f living f o r a f a m i l y of five (in terms of Philadelphia prices) : beamers, twisters, warpers, and loom-fixers in the upholstery trade ( 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 3 0 ) , leggers and footers in full-fashioned hosiery ( 1 9 2 9 ) , and tapestry carpet weavers ( 1 9 2 7 ) . " S e e table on textile strikes in Philadelphia, 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 3 1 . T a b l e 4, A p pendix B .

18

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

of America and the Philadelphia District T e x t i l e Council were reduced to twelve, and the membership in these unions was reduced to 13,000. T h e surviving unions f o u n d the economic situation to be increasingly adverse as one P h i l a delphia textile trade after another declined. O n e of the most interesting characteristics of the P h i l a delphia textile unions is their traditional militancy. A fighting spirit has been characteristic of a m a j o r i t y of the organized textile workers in the city, even w h e n their organization was small. T h i s spirit has borne little or no relation to a radical economic philosophy but has accompanied a relatively conservative union program. In the period before 1920, when the economic situation was more favorable, militant tactics were usually successful. W h e n the economic situation changed, however, a majority of the strikes and organizing campaigns of the textile unions were lost. Interesting differences appear in the attitude of the public to textile strikes and to strikebreakers, and in the tactics used by employers to prevent unionization of workers in recent as compared with earlier strikes. F o r m e r l y the odium attached to being a "scab" invited a lasting social ostracism in the textile districts of the city. A l t h o u g h this has by no means disappeared, it has broken down considerably with the gradual decline of the power of the textile unions and the break-up of the old neighborhood groups near the mills. T h i s is not to say that demonstrations are not effectively staged in front of strikebreakers' homes by strikers and strike sympathizers, or that an occasional strikebreaker's home in Kensington is not painted with a coat of y e l l o w paint of lasting hue, even today. But the public has much less sympathy with these demonstrations than in the old days. A t the present time, textile strikebreakers not only receive f u l l protection of the police and private company detectives, but have occasionally been upheld in the carrying of arms by the local courts. T h e attitude of the police appears to have undergone a considerable change f r o m earlier days, when policemen are considered to have been more friendly

THE

ECONOMIC

SETTING

19

to the cause of textile strikers. Today's textile strikes are characterized by a large number of arrests, court cases, and injunction hearings. Prior to 1 9 2 0 , few injunctions were issued in strikes, but, since that time, there has not been a year in which several injunctions against local textile unions have not been issued. 14 " L a b o r spies" were first heard of in the Philadelphia textile unions in 1 9 1 4 , but their number increased considerably after 1 9 2 1 . Another weapon of the employers against labor unions which has been used to a greater extent in recent years is the so-called " y e l l o w d o g " or individual contract. Strikes and organizing campaigns called against this contract have been declared illegal by the courts and the unions have developed no new weapon against this device. T h e Philadelphia textile unions have thus been placed increasingly on the defensive with regard to the legal status of their tactics and program, in addition to suffering losses f r o m the undermining of their economic control. T h e textile unions have not only lost ground in Philadelphia but they have failed to secure permanent gains in the new manufacturing centers outside of the city. T h e loss of control by the textile unions over working conditions and job standards in Philadelphia has come primarily through their inability to organize the workers in rural and semirural communities in the surrounding districts of Pennsylvania and in the south as these districts became new competing centers. T h e individualistic philosophy of the farmer, the economic combination of farm and industrial life, and the isolation of the new centers from older industrial communities has prevented the rapid spread of labor organization among this new group of industrial workers. T h e wage and hour standards of Philadelphia's textile workers were thus undermined by a group of competitors to whom the wages offered were frequently higher than the prevailing scale in these communities for other kinds of work. This is particularly true of hosiery workers and upholstery weavers 14

See legal aspects of strikes, Table 4, Appendix B.

20

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

in suburban towns in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey district and in the south. Other Philadelphia workers, like the cloth and tapestry carpet weavers, found a new group of competitors in the immigrants from rural districts of southern and eastern Europe who worked in New England textile mills for lower wages and longer hours than prevailed in Philadelphia. Despite the expenditure of considerable money and effort on the part of the textile unions, particularly the hosiery workers, the outside manufacturing centers have remained, for the most part, unorganized, and a labor cost differential has persisted between union and non-union mills. Recent economic conditions in the textile industries have therefore challenged the whole program and accomplishments of the Philadelphia textile labor movement. T h e methods by which the surviving unions have attempted to solve their problems need more careful study, and it is the purpose of the following chapters to develop this analysis more fully. The three largest and strongest textile unions in the city have been chosen for detailed study. T h e carpet workers offer an opportunity to study two powerful closed shop unions which were lost as the result of tactics ill-adapted to the economic situation in the industry. The upholstery weavers secured the closed shop and many other collective bargaining gains with a minimum of strife. But after seventeen years of peaceful collective bargaining, the union became involved in an "outlaw" strike against an arbitration award during an economic crisis in the trade. It is now faced with the difficult problem of preserving its status in a rapidly declining trade. T h e third case study concerns a union composed of younger workers in the full-fashioned hosiery industry, who have left no stone unturned in their effort to secure an effective and powerful trade union organization. Their influence in the industry, however, has steadily diminished in the last five years as the result of factors largely beyond their control. They have been forced to accept the challenge of "open shop" competition in labor costs and have experimented with new tactics in an effort to meet an

THE ECONOMIC

SETTING

21

adverse economic situation. O l d working rules were changed, a p r o g r a m of waste elimination was inaugurated, wage reductions w e r e negotiated, and a constructive policy for helping the industry out of its economic difficulties was promoted. T h e s e three unions offer, therefore, an opportunity to study a variety of tactics and policies in a rapidly changing economic setting.

CHAPTER

III

THE CARPET WORKERS LOSE THEIR UNIONS A l t h o u g h sporadic labor organizations have existed a m o n g the carpet weavers f r o m the early days of the handloom industry down to the present, f e w groups have been able to maintain continuous and permanent organized activities. O n l y two of the carpet unions which laid the foundations for the modern labor movement in this field have l e f t any records. T h e s e two unions, in the W i l t o n and tapestry carpet branches, were the strongest and largest permanent organizations in recent years and their history will therefore be discussed in some detail. F e w records are available for the story of the Brussels or W i l t o n union, since most of t h e m w e r e lost w h e n the organization was broken in 1 9 2 1 . M o r e complete records are available for the tapestry workers' union, however, in spite o f the fact that this union has not been dominant in the trade since 1926. Both unions achieved a considerable degree of closed shop control in their respective trades and made many gains through collective bargaining. T h e i r history can best be understood through an analysis of the collective bargaining agreements, their control of working conditions in the shop, and the detailed story of their loss of control in the industry. THE

WILTON

CARPET

WEAVERS1

Organization among the h i g h l y skilled Brussels or W i l ton carpet weavers is reported to have started as early as 1876. Sporadic beneficial associations were easily broken, 1 Unless otherwise specified, data on the history o f the W i l t o n carpet w e a v e r s come f r o m the constitution and national l a w s and the reports o f officers o f the P o w e r L o o m B o d y Brussels C a r p e t W e a v e r s ' M u t u a l D e f e n s e and Benefit Association o f the United States, and f r o m interviews w i t h f o r m e r officers o f that organization.

22

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

23

however, and it was not until after this group had joined the Knights of Labor and become identified with other elements in the Philadelphia labor movement that some chance of permanent organization appeared. In 1 8 9 1 the Power L o o m Body Brussels Carpet W e a v e r s ' Mutual Defense and Benefit Association was formed according to its constitution, to secure " a uniform price list, to procure reasonable and uniform hours of labor, to render assistance in case of death or accident, and generally to promote and protect the interest of its members." This organization had thirty years of successful collective bargaining and eventually attained a high degree of closed shop control of the trade and many improvements in working conditions. T h e Brussels or Wilton weavers in the early days of the trade were mainly English. M a n y of them had come directly from Kidderminster, the carpet manufacturing center of E n g l a n d , and started to work in the earliest mills in this country making Brussels carpets. T h e first Wilton carpet mill was located in L o w e l l , Massachusetts, in 1 8 4 2 . In later years the industry spread to N e w Y o r k , Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and N e w Jersey. A f t e r 1900, the industry may be said to have been localized in Philadelphia. While the trade was still young and expanding, the English weavers f o l lowed the English custom of training their sons to the trade. T h e greatest expansion in the trade occurred during the period f r o m 1 8 9 6 to 1 9 1 0 when Wilton rugs, with borders woven on the rug, were introduced as a novelty to displace carpets. T h e s e enjoyed a great vogue and were successful in displacing ingrain and other cheaper grades of carpet f r o m the market. It is said by workers that the annual amount of full-time employment enjoyed by weavers during this early period has never since been equalled. T h e Wilton union, if we may use its commonly accepted name, was in many respects like the Amalgamated Lace Operatives' Society. 2 Both were "independent" unions and 3 The history of collective bargaining in the lace and lace curtain industry will be found in Palmer, Labor Relations in tite Lace ani Lace Curtain

24

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

never joined the United Textile Workers of America. 3 Both were composed mainly of English workers. Both groups were accused by other textile workers of showing partiality to English weavers or the sons of English weavers who had served their apprenticeship and were ready to go on machines, although there seems little evidence to support this claim in either case. Both unions stressed their beneficiary features and, most important of all, both groups attained the closed shop early in their history and enjoyed many years of successful collective bargaining, without recourse to strikes. T h e Wilton union, therefore, constituted a craft union of the more conservative type, stressing its beneficiary program and exercising control of jobs and the labor supply by means of the closed shop. T h e similarity between the two unions ceases after 1921, however, because the lace workers were able to retain their organization in the decade from 1920 to 1930, while the Wilton weavers lost their union. W h e n the W i l t o n union was first formed, wages are reported by workers to have averaged about $9 a week for a sixty-hour week in the best shops. T h e fifty-five-hour week was first gained as the result of the general textile strike of 1903. In the period between 1906 and 1912 many minor improvements in working conditions were secured as well as advances in wages. B y the end of this time, weavers averaged $18 a week, although there was no uniformity in rates between shops. A movement was set on foot in 1912 to secure a uniform price list and the eight-hour day. As a result of prolonged negotiations and a strike in one Philadelphia plant, the union secured the forty-eight-hour week Industries in the United States, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin, #399· * The term "independent" union is commonly used to refer to a union not affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. It may offer workers the same type of conservative economic program as would be found by unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Many of the "independent" textile unions have lost their affiliation because of "outlaw" strikes and jurisdictional disputes rather than because of a fundamental difference in economic philosophy.

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

25

and a uniform price list in 1 9 1 2 . B y this time all of the Wilton carpet mills in the vicinity of Philadelphia had been organized, although the mills "down east" were not unionized until the following years. T h e union reported a membership of 726 fully paid-up members in 1 9 1 5 . B y 1 9 1 9 the number had increased to 1 5 4 0 and at the height of its power in 1920 the organization had 1 7 4 4 members (all men weavers). At this time there were locals in Worcester and Palmer, Massachusetts, Amsterdam, N e w York, Thompsonville, Connecticut, and Freehold, New Jersey, as well as locals for each shop in Philadelphia. T h e Brussels or Wilton weavers controlled entrance to the trade by apprenticeship regulation and initiation fees. Apprentices to weaving had to be hired directly as helpers, "creeler boys," "altering boys," or "spare hands" on the looms. They had to serve a four-year term just preceding the age of twenty-one years. Youths who had served three consecutive years might become probationary members and operate looms for "sick work." 4 T h e maximum number of spare hands to be employed in any shop was in the ratio of one to six looms, and no one over the age of seventeen might be so employed. Even after the apprenticeship period was over, it took some years to develop what was considered in the trade the high grade of skill of an experienced weaver who could make Wilton rugs or carpets of any size, shape, or pattern. A number of shop rules controlled the opportunity to work in the shop and the conditions of job tenure. Shop committees handled all grievances in the shop, divided the work among the weavers, kept records of apprentices, and arranged for substitutes for weavers who were out sick. Because of the large amount of irregular employment in the trade, no overtime was permitted except for the making of samples, and even this was limited to three weeks. Weavers had a right to the individual loom upon which they started to 1 When a weaver was out sick the boy w h o had served the longest term was placed on his loom during his absence.

26

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

work, and were not permitted to hold two looms in the trade, except in the case of "sick work." Weavers were required to receive written instructions for the making of rugs and to measure the first length to see if they were making it correctly. Whenever a length of carpet was spoiled by accident or by a breaking of the loom over which the weaver had no control, he was to be paid for the part he had woven. T h e rule with regard to fines or docking of pay was explicit: " N o weaver shall be permitted to be fined, docked of pay for his work, nor be compelled to buy any carpet ; neither shall he be obliged to work for nothing to rectify any mistakes he has made." The principle of equal division of work was not practised. Each man was entitled to do the work that was to be made on his loom, but there was no rotary system of lay-offs or distributing work on looms. If a weaver was discharged "unjustly" he might apply to his local and national officers for support in getting reinstated. During the course of negotiation on his case, no member of the union might operate his loom. It is said by the weavers who were active in the union at the time that there were few shop grievance questions and very few discharge cases to be settled. The union agreements ran for six months, and no strikes could be called during the course of the agreement. As a matter of fact, few strikes occurred in the Wilton carpet trade, and these, with one exception,6 occurred only when negotiations on wage agreements failed to bring the desired results. A short strike of the entire trade in January 1 9 1 8 secured a 1 5 per cent increase in wages. This wage increase was followed by others amounting to 45 per cent in the period between M a y 1 9 1 9 and April 1920. It is estimated by former union officers that by this time, an "average good weaver" working full-time could earn between $60 and $70 a week. In January 1 9 2 1 the employers proposed a wage reduction of 25 per cent. A trade strike was called to oppose this, but in August of the same year a compromise settle* Sympathetic strike with the street-car men, 1 9 1 0 .

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

27

ment was reached in which a 20 per cent reduction was accepted. During the next year conditions in the trade appeared to become worse, and in June 1922 a strike was precipitated in one Philadelphia shop by the discharge of active union men "without cause." During the course of the strike, factionalism which had been developing over several years of the union's history came to a head. T o a large extent, this was the result of political and personality differences, although there were philosophic differences between the groups as well. T h e local and national officers who were discharged in 1921 had been arbitrary and high-handed in their dealing with both the employers and the rank-andfile membership. T h e y lost the confidence of the majority group in the trade and, with the resulting division in the ranks, the protest strike was lost. T h e loss of this strike resulted in the complete breaking up of the union in other shops and cities. Within a relatively short period of time, the union had gained complete closed shop control of all the mills producing Wilton rugs in the country, together with a high wage scale, only to lose this control even more quickly. T h e story of what happened to the Wilton weavers after they lost their union is best told by the men who organized the 1931 strike in the Hardwick and Magee carpet mill (see trade stories by Edwin Cooke and Arthur Mitchel, A p pendix A ) . According to their account, further wage reductions in weavers' rates, amounting to about 30 per cent, followed the 1922 reduction before the general 10 per cent reduction of January 1931 which precipitated the recent strike. In addition to the wage reductions, cheaper grades of yarn and a speeding-up of the machinery made the work more difficult. B y 1928, weavers were said to be earning on the average about $34 a week, and with the increase of part-time employment and unemployment in 1930, few weavers averaged more than $20 a week. As work became scarce, weavers claimed that they lost their individual looms and were shifted

28

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

from place to place, and that men had to report for work and wait hours, if not days, to see if there were any orders. W h e n there were orders for work, the men complained of having to wait for yarn or for machine-fixing despite the installation of an "efficiency system." Individuals were played off against each other in the shop and changes in the old shop customs and wage rates invariably followed the competition between individuals for the small amount of work available. T h e wage cut which precipitated the strike in January 1931 appeared to be the "straw that broke the camel's back," since minor and major shop grievances had been accumulating for some time past. Some 250 W i l t o n weavers came out on strike from the plant on January 5, 1931. A still later wage cut in certain departments brought out 45 girls on strike February 26.* T h e strikers joined the Carpet Workers' Union, Local #890 of the United Textile Workers, and held out for union recognition because their experiences as the result of the loss of their union had seemed to them so disastrous. It was their belief that the kind of exploitation to which they had been subjected where every individual was against every other individual could be prevented only by a labor organization. T h e y pointed to the thirty-year record of their earlier Philadelphia union to demonstrate that they could cooperate effectively with employers for the mutual benefit of both employers and workers, even under difficult trade conditions. T h e company, on the other hand, had expressed itself to the strikers as opposed to dealing with a union. Several of the men on strike had worked for this particular company for as long as forty or more years, and many more had relatively long service records. Y o u n g hosiery workers on strike may get other jobs or jobs in other trades when they lose strikes, but this group of carpet weavers ran the risk of losing their trade altogether, and many of the older men faced the risk of inability to secure any work again. Although 'Philadelphia Record, February 27, 1931; New Leader, March 14, 19311 Trade Union News, February 13, 1931.

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

29

an opportunity was offered the strikers to settle the strike without union recognition several months after it had been called, the strikers voted to continue to " f i g h t " for recognition of the union. T h e strike was called off in December 1 9 3 1 and many of the active strikers have been unable to secure work in the trade again. THE

TAPESTRY CARPET

WEAVERS7

The Early History of the Union Labor organization among the tapestry carpet weavers arose later than among the Wilton carpet weavers, since the industry itself was of later development. Tapestry carpets and rugs came into prominence in the market for cheaper grades of floor covering in the years between 1902 and 1908. Occasional spurts of activity and recurrent declines characterized the industry down to the most recent depression period beginning in 1925. Tapestry carpet workers, like other carpet workers in the early days, were mainly of British stock, some English and some Scotch. They were a much more militant group than the Wilton carpet weavers, engaging in many prolonged strikes to achieve a strong closed shop union. Although all departments were eventually organized in the same industrial union, including even the loom-fixers, who usually form a separate organization, the weavers who were the original nucleus of the union organization continued to dominate its policies. They developed strongly centralized control within the union under a militant leadership. A high degree of job security was established through joint negotiation of agreements and shop grievances and the development of shop rules. A relatively high standard of living and the shorter work day were also obtained. Most of these gains were lost, however, when the ' Data on the history of the Tapestry Carpet Workers' Union, unless otherwise specified, come f r o m the "History of the Tapestry Carpet Workers' Union, 1 9 0 2 - 1 9 1 8 , " a record kept by the union, "minutes" of the Executive Board and the local, 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 2 8 , shop and union rules, 1 9 2 5 , constitution, 1920, and f r o m interviews with present and former officers of the union.

30

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

decline in the industry undermined union control and factionalism within the union broke its strength. Between 1899 and 1901 several attempts were made to start an organization among the tapestry carpet weavers. These attempts were short-lived and it was not until a strike was won in four tapestry carpet mills in 1901 that permanent organization developed. The weavers who had conducted the strike met in the back room of a West Philadelphia saloon, known as "Bucker's G l o r y , " and organized the first local of the Tapestry Carpet Workers' Union. In 1902 locals were also formed in Kensington and the Falls of Schuylkill, and the membership increased to 200 weavers. A second strike for a wage increase was won in this year. Following this strike, a widespread campaign brought about complete organization of the tapestry carpet weavers in the city by 1905. During this three-year period the Kensington branch of the union, Local #2, continued to grow while the other locals diminished in power, and eventually the other locals and later other groups in the trade were absorbed into the Kensington local. Tapestry Carpet Workers' Union #2 had been legally incorporated in 1902, and retained this legal status until 1928, when it became the Carpet Workers' Union, Local #890, of the United Textile Workers of America, an unincorporated group. This is its present status. Two shops of the tapestry carpet weavers participated in the fifty-five-hour strike in 1903, and three of the five mills in the trade at the time granted the fifty-five-hour week without a strike. During 1906 and 1907, when trade conditions were depressed, two strikes occurred on wage questions, each of which lasted about four months. A strike called by tapestry carpet printers in another mill occurred in 191O, the settlement of which was extended to include all crafts in the trade. These workers had returned to work just one week when the sympathetic strike with the street-car men was called. All tapestry carpet workers in the city responded to this call and were on strike for three weeks. Three indi-

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

31

vidual plants were lost during the next few years as the result of strikes, and were declared to be "open shop" mills. 8 Other mills attempted to introduce the open shop in 1 9 1 2 , but the union retained its control in these plants. Heretofore the union had dealt with individual employers, although a manufacturers' association had been in existence since about 1905. In 1 9 1 3 the first general conference was held with the manufacturers to agree upon prices for the following year. A movement was then under way to secure uniform working conditions throughout the city, although these were not obtained in all details until 1 9 1 7 , when a uniform piecework price list and uniform shop rules were adopted. No strikes occurred between 1 9 1 3 and 1 9 1 7 , although wage increases were granted by the manufacturers in 1 9 1 5 , 1 9 1 6 , and 1 9 1 7 as the yearly agreements were negotiated. It is estimated that the union received wage increases amounting to about 165 per cent in the five-year period from 1 9 1 5 to 1920. The eight-hour day, as well as other shop concessions which will be discussed later, was obtained in 1 9 1 9 . B y 1 9 1 9 a minimum rate of $23 a week was in force for all unskilled workers in the industry. Weavers earned on the average about $55 a week with fulltime employment, and had a guaranteed weekly wage of $48. These gains were not made without strikes, despite the general prosperity of the war period and the making of war orders by many carpet mills. A strike called by the art square and high spire weavers in one mill in 1 9 1 7 , where there had been continuous "trouble" with the various textile unions in the employ of the company, was extended to the tapestry carpet division. The strike was won after a total of 21 weeks had elapsed. A general market strike of tapestry carpet weavers for a 1 5 per cent wage increase and the eighthour day was called in November 1 9 1 8 . This was won in April 1 9 1 9 . At this time the union had about 2000 members " T h e term "open shop" is used in its non-technical sense to mean a nonunion or an anti-union shop.

32

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

employed in 11 mills in Philadelphia. Following this strike, the union reorganized its structure and included all workers in the trade in one industrial union—printers, setters, starchers, burlers and menders, winders, loom-fixers, and the unskilled groups who were called the "workers." Some of the more skilled of these groups had been organized prior to this time, but in separate unions. From this time on, control was increasingly centralized in the hands of the officers of the union, with strong internal discipline within the group. T h e market strikes which secured higher wages and shorter hours and closed shop control of a majority of the tapestry carpet mills in the city made necessary and possible the reorganization of the union into a stronger functioning unit. T h e year 1919 marks the height of the power of this union, although it continued to be an important factor in the trade until 1926. Job Security in Unionized

Mills

N o understanding of the strength of the tapestry carpet workers' union is complete without a picture of the kind of job security they achieved in the shop. For this reason an analysis of the trade agreements and of the shop rules will be given in greater detail. Possibly no textile union in the country, certainly none in the city of Philadelphia, approached the degree of shop control secured by the tapestry carpet workers. T o many observers this was the cause of their downfall while other textile unions, apparently less strong, survived. T h e wage scale in the tapestry carpet industry followed the custom of other textile trades in establishing base prices for goods made on carpet looms of certain size and equipment, with fixed differentials for all variations in size and equipment. For example, the piecework price per yard varied with the width of the carpet to be made, the height of the pile of the carpet, and the compactness or looseness with which the threads were woven together. There were, in addition, time-work rates for weavers when changing from

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

33

one grade of goods to another and special rates for weaving "bad stock." When a weaver claimed that he had "bad stock" which required additional time and attention on his part, the shop committee and the superintendent of the mill decided whether it was "bad stock" or not and thus entitled to additional compensation. If a weaver had to wait more than one hour for a fixer without being sent home by the foreman in the meantime, he was entitled to payment for time lost. Weavers were also entitled to pay for "smashes" and "cutouts" which occurred when work was spoiled through no fault of the worker. Many of these provisions had been customary in the trade for years before, but were formally embodied in the uniform price list and agreements of 1 9 1 7 and 1 9 1 8 . Shop rules and customs covered such points as working in the noon hour and overtime, jurisdiction of workers, seniority rights, and equal division of work. In the early days of the union, members were fined by the union for breaking the union rules but in later years the manufacturers agreed to discharge workers who did not abide by the rules. Overtime work could be arranged only through the shop committee, and when two or more workers were working overtime, all such work had to be equally divided. The jurisdiction of various workers in the shop, whether weavers, printers, setters, or floor-boys, was carefully guarded. One instance occurs in the early union records of a weaver's being fined by the union for rolling a beam to his loom. This was considered the work of floor-boys. Fining by employers for bad work has always been prevalent in the textile trades and is opposed by all textile unions. This was apparently eliminated from the tapestry carpet trade by 1 9 1 1 when the last case of this kind is recorded. Seniority rights in the shop were developed with respect to the "loom list." This was a list of men in the shop in order of seniority. When, for any reason, a loom was vacant, a notice was passed around the shop "advertising the loom to be given away." The man at the head of the list had the

34

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

right to change from his loom to the vacant loom, but if he did so, his name dropped to the bottom of the "loom list." Possibly the most interesting shop custom in the trade was the development of machinery for applying the principle of equal division of work. Equal division of work, although common in other organized trades, is not easily arranged in the textile industry. T o the knowledge of the writer, no textile trade developed so elaborate a system for carrying this into effect as was developed by the tapestry carpet workers' union. Usually textile workers are entitled to the work that comes to their looms (as determined by seniority) and may or may not share work on "spare" looms. Carpet looms are not interchangeable and orders cannot be shifted around to equalize the opportunity to work. The tapestry carpet workers elaborated a system for genuinely equal division of work, or more accurately speaking, equal division of time. In addition to a "loom list" based on seniority, there was a "pitch list" 9 for equalizing earnings on different grades of goods. The weaver who had been longest on any particular grade of goods was the first to change. Weavers tended to average about three changes of "pitch" in a year. Since higher earnings were obtained on the finer grades of goods, this system for changing grades of goods acted as a medium for equalizing earnings among all weavers. In addition to these arrangements, there was a further system for equalizing work opportunity during dull seasons. A list for sharing work was made up from the chance drawing of numbers in the shop. When slack times came, the foreman notified the shop committee that so many less weavers would be needed, and the weavers with the first names on the list would be "laid off to share work," as the records put it. Weavers did not work on their regular looms during slack times, but all work available " " P i t c h " refers to the number of " e n d s " of warp yarn in the reed o f the loom. T h i s varies f r o m 1 6 0 to 256 ends f o r goods 27 inches in width. T h e l a r g e r the number of ends, the finer the grade of goods.

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

35

was equally divided among all members of the shop. If it happened that one factory was slack and another was busy and required new workers, the union usually arranged to supply workers from the shop that was slack rather than hire new workers. Such a rotary system of lay-offs was undoubtedly complicated to work, and workers said that they did not always know when it was their turn to go back to work after a lay-off. Since it was controlled by the shop committee along with other fairly extensive powers over shop questions, it gave considerable prestige to the shop committee in relation to other members of the shop. Various disputes arose from time to time involving these shop rules, disputes over alleged unfair sharing of work, interpretations of the working of the "loom list" or "change of pitch list," questions of discharge and the weaver's responsibility for poor work. W h i l e workers had the right to appeal to the shop committee for assistance if they were discharged, the shop committee did not always support them. I f the committee believed that the workers' grievances were just, they would be carried through to the officers of the local union for adjudication. Workers received no official support when discharged for intoxication, for incompetence or poor work, and in one instance, f o r repeated tardiness. In addition to the measures of shop control already discussed, the union secured two other advantages after 1 9 x 8 . T h e first of these was the somewhat unusual right to choose foremen from the seniority list of union weavers when vacancies occurred. T h e second privilege they secured was the requirement that all new employees be hired through the union office. I f the union could not secure such workers within twenty-four hours, the manufacturer was free to employ whom he saw fit, but the union was usually able to supply him with workers in the required time-limit. T h e union officers reserved the right to change workers from shop to shop for organization work or other union activities, irrespective of seniority rights in the shops. T h e

36

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

shop committees were appointed by the central union officers rather than elected by members of the shop. These powers gave the local union officers control over the shop committees. A l l of these elements of shop control were potential points of friction with the manufacturers and in some instances developed friction within the union membership as well. For the union manufacturers, such a high degree of shop control restricted their ability to effect production economies and weakened their discipline in the mill. With this restriction of the employer's rights in the shop, there was also a wage scale which set relatively high levels for both skilled and unskilled workers in the industry. 10 Development of an Economic Crisis While a high degree of job security was being obtained for unionized workers in the Philadelphia mills, very different conditions existed in the new non-union mills in the districts outside Philadelphia. T h e tapestry carpet mills in New York and Connecticut, in contrast to the Philadelphia mills, which, with one exception, employed English, Scotch, and American-born workers, employed all nationalities. The tapestry carpet workers' union, like other textile unions, found the mixed nationalities of the outside areas difficult to organize. This was true for several reasons. Many of the English and Scotch weavers had belonged to unions in the " o l d country" or were influenced by a family tradition of belonging to the union in one's trade. The immigrants from other eastern and southern European countries, many of whom came from agricultural districts, had no such tradition. Social class distinctions in these European countries also made them easily dominated by their employers. Organizers from Philadelphia described them as "too afraid u No adequate wage data f o r the carpet industry are available, although figures have been compiled f o r the earnings of men and women in one tapestry carpet mill in Philadelphia in 1927. Average (median) earnings f o r workers who worked as much as 46 weeks during the year were $2,100 f o r men weavers and $1,060 f o r girl winders. These averages suggest the wage level in union mills in the industry.

THE CARPET

WORKERS

37

of the bosses to fight for their rights." M o r e careful planning of this outside organization campaign with the assistance of organizers of different nationalities might have secured better results. Little organization work was undertaken until 1920, when the union became involved in two long strikes in Amsterdam, N e w Y o r k , and Thompsonville, Connecticut. These strikes were lost, and with them the entire organization campaign "down east." A wage differential had always existed between the N e w York and N e w E n g land mills on the one hand and the Philadelphia mills on the other. It is estimated by the union that this differential amounted to from ten to twenty per cent in the years f r o m the beginning of the union until 1910. From 1910 to 1920 the differential rose to 25 per cent. It was believed by the union that with a differential of 10 or 15 per cent the Philadelphia mills could readily compete because of savings through more skilled workmanship and less need for supervision in the Philadelphia area. W h e n the differential rose above this figure, however, competition favored the outside mills. T h e organization campaign had been undertaken to narrow this differential and to standardize labor conditions throughout the country, but it had failed. W a g e cuts in the N e w York and N e w England mills after 1921 increased the wage differential so that by 1926 it amounted to almost fifty per cent. In the Philadelphia area, in the meantime, a long shutdown in 1921, which lasted from four to eleven months in different plants, was followed by a demand for a twenty per cent reduction in wages. Joint negotiations were undertaken and a fifteen per cent wage reduction was accepted to go into effect in September 1921, with an additional five per cent reduction to go into effect in November 1921. T e n per cent of this reduction was later withdrawn during a short spurt of activity in the industry. By 1924, however, another request for a wage reduction came from the manufacturers, who asserted that outside competition was ruining their trade. This request was refused by the union. In looking

38

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

back at the history of this period, the union believes that it made a serious mistake in not accepting part or all of the reduction asked at this time. It is clear in retrospect that the union leaders misinterpreted the relative strength of the union in the trade, the tremendous shrinkage in the market for their labor, and the relative competitive position of the Philadelphia mills. A l t h o u g h the union had had i , 8 o o members at work in eleven Philadelphia mills in 1920, only 800 members were employed in five mills in 1926. Seasonal unemployment in the mills still operating became increasingly long, and the "laying-off of weavers to share w o r k " is reported more frequently in the union records during 1925 and 1926. A majority of the union membership were out of work entirely or were irregularly employed. The Factional Dispute

and. Break-up

of the

Union

T h e story of the break-up of the union will be given in some detail because it illustrates how easily a union may misjudge its relative strength in the industrial market and how quickly the results of strong closed shop control of working conditions may be lost. Because factionalism in a union, like factionalism in a church or political party, is accompanied by much bitterness of feeling and misinterpretation, the thread of the story is difficult to unwind. T h e usual interpretation of the break-up of the Tapestry Carpet W o r k e r s ' Union, by other textile workers and by many members of the union, is stated in terms of political, or more commonly, religious factionalism within the union. T h i s interpretation appears to the writer to neglect certain basic economic factors in the situation which were ultimately responsible. Political aspirations and religious differences occur in every trade union. T h e y do not, however, become the basis for factions which ultimately split the union unless there is a widespread and basic discontent of the rank-andfile membership with the economic conditions under which they work. W h e n this occurs, union leaders are criticized

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

39

f o r inefficiency, favoritism, unfair treatment of members, mismanagement of funds, or on any other score which will lend the charge a plausible appearance to the rank-and-file membership. N e w leaders develop cliques which may eventually control elections to major offices or lead an opposition movement which may develop into a final division of the union's forces. Again and again in the history of the labor movement, workers in declining industries, or in trades where unusually difficult economic conditions prevail, have turned their dissatisfaction with economic conditions back into their own organization and divided forces at the time when the greatest unity was needed. From the point of view of the survival of the labor movement, such factionalism is usually ill-timed. Where major philosophic differences exist and where new factions are later found to be more capable of conducting the affairs of the union for the majority groups in the industry, as in the famous division between the United Garment Workers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, the labor movement gains in the long run. T o o often, however, unions are lost or never regain their former prestige in the industry. This happened to the tapestry carpet workers. T h e beginning of the end of the old tapestry carpet workers' union arose in the accumulation of internal union grievances in the burling room of one of the city's large carpet mills. I n January 1 9 2 6 the union, in accord with a custom established in 1 9 1 8 , chose a new foreman for the burling department from its seniority list with the express purpose of improving the quality of the work done in this department. T h e burlers and menders, also members of the same union, were asked to cooperate in this program. Considerable complaint had been made about their work from time to time, and a series of changes to bring about improvement of production had been planned by the organization committee of the union, which was then handling all shop grievances as well as organization work. Delays occurred after the appointment of the foreman. T h e burlers made several com-

40

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

plaints about the new demands made of them and then went out on an illegal strike in June 1926, stating that the new conditions of work were "unbearable." T h e y were ordered back to work pending an investigation of the dispute by officers of the union, but were not admitted to the mill by the superintendent, who had placed new workers on the jobs in the meantime. This action challenged the accepted right of the union to place workers on the job. Opinion in the shop was divided. M a n y loyal union workers supported the girls in their walk-out because they believed that their complaints against the quality of work required by the new foreman had not received sufficiently prompt attention. Other groups in the shop used the occasion to develop hostile criticism of the officers of the union. A request to the union president by the shop committee for a shop meeting was at first denied and the shop was invited to appear before an executive board meeting. T h i s action was again used by the opposition faction in the shop to discredit the union officers. Eventually shop meetings and mass meetings of the union were held to discuss the dispute. These meetings voted to support the union officers in their disposal of the case, for, by this time, the opposition faction in the shop had attracted a large following and had presented certain "demands" for changes in the union rules and organization, on threat of secession. T h e "demands" of the opposition group were presented in July 1926. Some of these were obviously written to effect adjustments of grievances in the interests of members of this group. Others, such as the demand for elimination of the organization and internal law committees and the executive board, showed mistrust of the officials undertaking these duties, but also a lack of understanding of the necessity of having these functions performed by some officials. T h e most interesting of the "demands" concerned the powers of the shop committee and questions of shop control. T h e opposition group were interested in seeing that the shops

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

41

had the power to form shop associations, elect their own committees, and control all questions affecting the shop. T h e "demand" which raised the greatest amount of discussion was that the firm's representatives be responsible for all hiring and firing. T o the other members of the union the request for extensive shop control savored of "company unionism," and the request that the firm do all the hiring and firing, without reference even to the shop committee, appeared to the union as completely disruptive of conditions they had enjoyed for many years. As far as they could visualize the results of such a program, it meant the open shop. W h i l e they admitted that there might have been some justifiable criticisms of union policy or union politics back of the program, it favored what they considered to be the employers' interests too much to merit serious consideration. T h e "demands" were refused, and the opposition group formed a rival union, known as the American Carpet W o r k ers' Union. This factional movement was short-lived, however, because it was later involved in the tapestry carpet strikes against the real open shop campaign of the manufacturers beginning in the fall of 1926. It happened that some of the leaders of the opposition group in the union were members of the K u K l u x Klan, and the religious aspects of the dispute became more and more prominent as time wore on. Protestant workers in the shop asserted that officers of the union who happened to be Catholics had used their control of working opportunity in the shops in favor of members of their own religious denomination. T h e Catholic members, in turn, insisted that the K u Klux Klan was trying to break up the union. T h e r e appears to be little evidence of favoritism in the allotment of jobs by the union officers. O n the contrary, it is evident that the religious issue was used to convert adherents to what started as a purely political fight. T o the writer it is clear that none of the arguments used by the opposition group would have carried much weight if times had been prosperous. It was because there were so few jobs and so little

42

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

work that it was possible to raise the question of j o b favoritism to any importance. Workers in the shop in which the opposing faction gained the largest number of followers are reported to have averaged only two days' work a week in the eighteen months just preceding the dispute. It was because the plant in which the factional fight originated had been losing orders that the union undertook to improve the quality of work in the burling department and thus became involved in the dispute. W i t h due allowance for mismanagement by the union foreman and by the union officers in handling the case, it is clear that this question could not possibly have split the shop and the union in normal times. It is equally clear that if the factory management alone had been responsible for the appointment and conduct of the foreman, as is true in most unionized industries, such a question would never have arisen as an important factor in internal dissension within the union. It was said by union officers at the time that the factional dispute was directly fostered by the manufacturers and that the "demands" of the opposing group were actually written in the mill office. Be that as it may, the manufacturers were doubtless interested in the new turn of events. T h e general attitude of many of the loyal union workers was expressed by one active member in a speech made during the controversy. H e said: D o n ' t lose sight o f the fact that the bosses are b e h i n d all this. B y our fighting among ourselves, w e are simply p l a y i n g into their hands. In the last f e w years n e w men w h o never f o u g h t f o r a union in their lives have come into our trade and e n j o y e d the conditions f o r w h i c h w e suffered, and n o w they are t e l l i n g us that the bosses are right.

T h e events which followed in the fall of 1926 indicate that a majority of the tapestry carpet manufacturers were anxious to get rid of union control whenever an opportunity offered. T h e factional dispute offered such an opportunity. In September 1926, two of the five remaining union mills in the city notified their employees (not through the

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

+3

union) of the fifteen per cent wage cut. One plant insisted upon the "open shop" during the negotiations which followed. The arguments of the manufacturers in favor of the wage cut stressed the wide labor cost differential between the Philadelphia area and outside cities, and the manufacturer who insisted upon breaking with the union said that the union had been "too strict" with him. T h e union argued that outside competitors did not affect the Philadelphia industry to any appreciable extent and that this claim was being used as a pretext for reducing wages and increasing profits. A reading of the workers' discussion of the situation and its economic background brings out clearly the union's lack of scientific information upon which it could base its decisions. Any union is in need of accurate information on the financial rating of firms, their costs, their marketing problems as well as the general status of the trade in a crisis of this kind. There was, for example, a considerable disagreement in the union as to exactly why other union mills had gone out of business, why the mills then operating differed over what type of work they considered most profitable "best sellers," why some mills succeeded in running the greater part of the year and others were shut down the greater part of the year, and whether Philadelphia competed heavily with outside markets or not. Such questions could not be answered without expert knowledge. The lack of such knowledge was partially responsible for the failure of the union leadership to meet the crisis in the trade. There is no question that the union now recognized it was fighting for its existence under very difficult circumstances, whatever the reason for the crisis. The following excerpts from the remarks of different speakers in the mass meeting to consider the demands of the manufacturers will show how well they recognized this point. T h e y [ t h e manufacturers] will not be satisfied with a fifteen per cent reduction. . . . T h e y want to break our union so they will be free to do whatever they wish. . . . T h e y speak o f a fifteen per cent reduction. I tell you that it is a ninety per cent reduction; fifteen per cent wages and seventy-five per cent conditions.

44

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

N o longer will your committee be able to see that you are f a i r l y treated. . . . T h e y [the manufacturers] will be able to purchase poor material and make you use it. . . . T h e older men know that if the reduction is enforced and the union broken, there w i l l be nothing l e f t f o r them, f o r the firm will replace them with younger men. It has been the union which has kept the older men in jobs. . . . T h e time has come when we must act, even if we lose our organization in so doing. It would be much better to fight and lose than to allow them to destroy us gradually by wage reductions and curtailment of our power.

If the reductions had come without the demand for the open shop the workers could have accepted them, but they voted unanimously to strike against the demand for the open shop. One hundred and seventy-five workers came out on strike and remained on strike for eighteen months. An injunction secured by the company in the early days of the strike at first restricted and later prohibited all picketing. A second shop went on strike in October, and a third shop remained closed and eventually went out of business. The strikes were lost and officially called off in May 1929, when the only remaining union mill insisted upon a policy of the open shop. Former union members now at work in the tapestry carpet mills in the city say that the predictions made in 1926 have come true. Wage rates have been further reduced; extra pay for "bad stock" and other "conditions" have been so changed that further reductions of earnings have been effected. They say that equal division of work is no longer practised and that there is little or no regulation of hours of work. A man on a "rush" order may work from 1 2 to 22 hours at a stretch and then be out of work entirely for a week or more. In the eyes of former union members, working conditions have grown steadily worse since the loss of the union. Although there is reason to believe that the old union is still feared, it has as yet been unable to regain a foothold in the carpet mills of the city. The Government and Philosophy of the Union Brief mention should be made of the structure of the tapestry carpet workers' union and its industrial philosophy and

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

45

affiliations with the general labor movement before closing its history. A l t h o u g h originally a craft union of weavers, it reorganized in 1 9 1 8 as an industrial union, including all workers in the trade f r o m the most skilled to the unskilled. Representation on the executive board of the union was arranged by departments. T h e executive board had considerable power throughout the union's history. It appointed all m a j o r committees from its own membership, and up until 1 9 2 4 heard and settled all shop grievances. A f t e r 1924 the organization committee of the union, appointed by the executive board, was given the power to settle grievances along with other rather extensive powers. Control thus remained fairly w e l l centralized throughout the union's history. T h e president of the union had the power to appoint all shop committees j there were no shop associations with power to elect their own shop committees as in other textile unions. A l t h o u g h the local meeting of the union had originally passed on shop grievances, the alleged "uncertain" character of such legislation led to turning this function over to the executive board. W h i l e the union gained extensive shop control administered through the shop committees, these in turn were controlled b y the president of the local union. A f t e r 1 9 1 9 the secretary of the union, w h o acted as a business agent, served for a two-year term and had power to " s e t t l e " disputes which he was called in to adjudicate. It was and still is the belief of many of the active members of this union that autocracy in a union is the best form of government despite its potential dangers. T h e y have little patience with the " t o w n m e e t i n g " kind of d e mocracy which characterized many other textile unions. N o t only was power centralized in the hands of the m a j o r officers of the union, but the internal discipline of the union was v e r y rigid. Fines and other penalties were enforced for the breaking of union rules. M e n were sometimes kept f r o m going to work or otherwise penalized. T h i s rigidity of discipline tended to make for dissatisfaction and internal dissension within the union. A l l went smoothly as l o n g as the leaders " d e l i v e r e d the g o o d s " in term of higher wages or

UNION

46

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

better conditions of work, but when things went badly and unemployment became chronic in the trade, discipline broke down and dissension developed. T h e tapestry carpet workers were affiliated with the United Textile Workers of America from 1903 to 1906, from 1913 to 1915, and after 1926, when they became the Carpet Workers' Local #890. During the other years they were "independent" of all affiliations or were allied with the I. W . W . for a short time in 1912 and the Federated T e x tile Unions in the period from 1918 to 1926. 11 This constituted their longest continuous affiliation. T h e y usually found the leadership of the United Textile Workers "too s l o w " or "too conservative" for them, and were therefore outside of the organization for longer periods than they were inside. Affiliation with the United Textile Workers did bring them into closer touch with the general labor movement through the American Federation of Labor, however, and this advantage won in the end. T h e general philosophy of the tapestry carpet workers is interesting because it was more radical than that of many other textile unions. Excerpts from the preamble of the constitution of 1920 will give a general picture of the philosophy of the workers. Backed by the general philosophy of "natural rights," they say: W e are opposed by the solidly organized p o w e r f u l forces o f

all

industrial employers and managements, by the united resources o f capital; by the corrupt politicians controlled by the m o n e y interests; by the h i g h l y developed propaganda

of

a capitalistic press.

forces combine to debase labor and d e n y political

it economic,

These

social

and

justice.

T h e r e f o r e , w e solemnly p l e d g e this organization to e f f e c t one common

Brotherhood

and

Sisterhood

of

all

industrial

carpet

workers

f o r the h i g h purpose o f securing f o r each worker, and f o r all, f o r generations y e t unborn, the just f r u i t s o f their labor. " F r o m 1921 to 1923, the Federated T e x t i l e Unions included in their affiliation the Amalgamated Textile Workers, a militant industrial union first organized in Lawrence in 1919. A f t e r 1923, the Amalgamated Lace Operatives and the Mule Spinners were the only major trade groups outside of the tapestry carpet weavers.

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

47

On the whole, this represents the program of a progressive industrial union committed to political and economic action in the general interests of the labor movement. Their history demonstrates the belief of the union in militant aggressive tactics for the protection of their bargaining interests. An interesting illustration of the attitude of the union members and the tactics of the leaders occurred in 1921. A labor parade had been organized to protest against the open shop campaign of the manufacturers in the city. This was participated in by all but two of the workers from one tapestry carpet mill in Philadelphia where workers of many nationalities were employed. T h e other workers in the shop refused to work with the two weavers concerned, and a strike ensued which lasted fourteen months. A great deal of bitterness developed during this strike. The union asserted that picketers were arrested as soon as they went on the picket line, and that the mass picketing which they usually attempted was not allowed. The strike was finally broken, according to the union account, when the firm succeeded in playing off one nationality against another, and brought back first the Hungarian, then the Polish, and finally the Austrian workers. For a period of some twenty years this particular firm had tried to run an open shop and the union had tried to organize the various groups of workers employed there. At least six long strikes had been waged to force union recognition in the mill. Following the 1921 strike, the firm moved part of its equipment to a new location in upstate Pennsylvania to manufacture under open shop conditions. From the point of view solely of union tactics, the wisdom of forcing the 1921 strike on a minor grievance with an employer who had for many years been antagonistic to the union seems very dubious. This was one of several strikes which appear to have been called hastily and without due consideration for all the consequences involved. A militant rank-and-file membership would naturally tend to develop leaders who were "scrappers," and it is

48

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

characteristic of the leadership of the tapestry carpet workers in the years up to 1 9 2 7 or 1 9 2 8 that they were trained primarily in the arts of warfare. It is only fair to say that in the early days of the trade, discrimination against union officers by employers brought the fighters into power of necessity. Later, however, when the union had gained power, it continued to reelect the same type of officers. Fighting the manufacturers was therefore the major activity of the union leadership and if they occasionally fought an employer into bankruptcy, well and good. T h e leaders were accustomed to gaining their points by force or threat of force, and never learned other tactics, although many other union leaders, during this period, were finding that the old-fashioned tactics were out of date and that they must experiment with new methods. E n e r g y that should have gone into meeting the economic conditions of the industry or helping the employers meet them was thus expended in the wrong direction, for, in the end, the union found that there were scarcely any employers left to offer employment to union workers and no other jobs readily available. It was said by some of the union members that the leadership used a " r u l e or ruin" policy. Consciously or unconsciously, the union leaders consistently maintained their militant position. Although over a period of years, numerous occasions were offered when they might, by concessions in rates, have saved the union or salvaged some employment for their members while unemployment was steadily increasing in the trade, they steadfastly refused to do so. T h e y "went down fighting." In fairness to former officers of the union, it should be said that some of them believe that no conceivable tactics could have saved the union. T h e y believe that even if they had foreseen in 1 9 2 0 that by 1 9 3 0 there would be employment in the city for less than one-fifth of their 1 9 2 0 membership, they could not have salvaged the union by any possible means. This is particularly true because of their accepted principle of equal division of work and the protection of the jobs of older men in the trade. It is possible that

THE

CARPET

WORKERS

49

these principles might have had to be dropped in view of the tremendous shrinkage experienced in the labor market of this trade. It is also possible that more of the industry might have been saved to the Philadelphia manufacturers and hence more employment if the union leadership had been willing to make concessions in rates and other shop conditions during the decade from 1 9 2 0 to 1 9 3 0 . But "hindsight is always better than foresight," especially when, as in this case, the union lacked expert knowledge upon which to base its policies. This position of the former leaders, however, raises the general question of what obligations a union has to its membership and to the labor movement in the face of a rapidlyshrinking labor market in the trade. In some of the needle trades, for example, the unions have recently allowed the manufacturers the chance of complete reorganization of their work-force once or twice a year, and unions which once insisted that all workers displaced by the introduction of machinery must be reemployed in some department of the shop have been forced to drop this provision. While these changes in former work rules have met tremendous opposition from the rank-and-file membership, the union leaders believe that they have at least retained a labor organization where it might otherwise have disappeared altogether. It is possible that all of the trade unions in the country will be faced with this problem more and more as technological improvements in machine equipment and changes in the demand for goods continue to displace skilled workers at a rapid rate. One may well raise the question whether a union does more service to itself and to the labor movement by "going down fighting" for a principle than it would by an attempt to preserve its organization as long as possible. In other words, is the preservation of organization more or less important than the program? Possibly the most significant conclusion from the experience of the tapestry carpet workers' union is the importance of adequate economic data—or the lack of them—to a union.

50

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

I t is not certain that different action would have been taken by the union if more facts had been known. But the lack of information is apparent at all important stages in the union's history after the trade had started to decline. The conflict of opinion among the manufacturers and among the workers as to the causes of the decline of the Philadelphia trade naturally led to a conflict of opinion in the union as to the best policy to pursue. While political factionalism was immediately responsible for the break-up of the two carpet unions, the underlying economic conditions in the trades and the failure of the union leadership to understand the trends and to experiment with tactics adapted to the new economic situation are fundamentally responsible. Any union control is good only so long as the industry is economically sound enough to keep alive. Fundamentally, therefore, a trade union must take into account the problems of the industry in which its members work, because, in the long run, there will be no economic security for its members unless the industry is in a sound economic condition.

C H A P T E R

IV

THE UPHOLSTERY WEAVERS FACE AN ECONOMIC CRISIS 1 T H E

EARLY

HISTORY

OF T H E

UNION

The upholstery weaving trade was the last weaving trade in the city to expand in recent years, and thus it attracted many weavers from other textile trades which were declining in importance. The trade is, therefore, composed of workers who have had a long and varied experience in other kinds of textile weaving, such as weft and chenille weaving, art square weaving, cloth and carpet weaving, in addition to a nucleus of workers trained in jacquard weaving of upholstery goods from the beginning. The average age of upholstery weavers is high as compared with that of workers in many other trades, since the workers have had a long experience in this and other textile industries. Although the original workers in the industry were of British and German stock, in recent years a majority have been American-born. The present group of foreign-born workers in the trade learned the craft of jacquard weaving in the tapestry and fine fabric centers of Belgium, France, and England before coming to this country to work. Many of the older weavers in the trade learned to weave on hand-looms, both here and abroad. All have a wide knowledge of the construction of fabrics and a skill in the handling of looms. The most skilled weavers can weave many types of beautiful fabrics, and 1 Unless otherwise specified, data on the history of Upholstery Weavers' and Workers' Union, Local # 2 5 come f r o m delegates' reports to the District T e x tile Council, the minutes of Local # 2 5 , 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 3 0 , and the constitution, shop rules, and trade agreements. T h i s has been supplemented by interviews with members and officers of the union and manufacturers who have had experience in dealing with the union.

51

52

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

pride of workmanship is an important element in the psychology of jacquard weavers. A tradition of labor organization in the trade of jacquardwoven upholstery goods over some fifty years has made labor an important factor in this industry. T h e upholstery weavers formed an important nucleus in the Knights of Labor and early fraternal organizations of German and English textile workers. A f t e r waging several successful strikes in the eighties, they secured a uniform price list and wage advances. When the Knights of Labor movement declined, small nuclei of former active members continued the tradition of unionism in the industry. In 1 9 0 1 the present union of upholstery weavers was organized as Local #25 of the United Textile Workers of America. This has been the oldest existing local of the international union in the city of Philadelphia. Although the union dropped its affiliation with the international organization in 1 9 0 2 , it reaffiliated in 1 9 0 3 , and continued this affiliation until its charter was revoked in 1 9 3 1 as the result of an " o u t l a w " strike. In the earlier days of the trade, other rival unions claimed jurisdiction over many of the upholstery weavers, and it was only after some years of struggle that Local #25 secured unquestioned control of the weavers in the trade. A shop strike in the largest upholstery goods mill in the city in 1 9 1 4 decided this issue eventually, and after Local #25 secured a closed shop agreement in this mill, its control spread more rapidly to other mills. It was not until 1 9 2 0 , however, that a closed shop agreement was reached in a majority of the mills in the city. At this time the union claimed a membership of 1,600 workers in sixteen mills. T h e union continued to grow until in 1 9 2 6 it claimed a membership of 2,000 workers with complete closed shop control of all of the 26 upholstery goods mills in Philadelphia. At the present time, its membership has declined to 1,800. During the long period prior to 1 9 1 3 , when the union did not control the shops, its membership was very small and annual strikes characterized the trade. U p to 1 9 1 5 , some 1 5 0

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

53

or 200 weavers were responsible for the m a j o r organizing and strike activities in the trade. A n n u a l l y on A p r i l first, a strike was called to "celebrate the anniversary of the union." Its immediate cause might be to protest a wage cut, shorten the hours of work, secure a wage increase, or organize the trade. A s many as 1,000 workers might come out on strike, but, a f t e r the strike was over, many of them d r i f t e d away f r o m the union because it had no machinery for shop control. Some mills conceded the demands of the workers without strikes; others took a chance on a strike. B y playing one manufacturer off against another, the union frequently maneuvered into a position of advantage. T h e s e strikes may be said to have been neither won nor lost, but a nucleus of organization and some shop privileges were preserved. W i t h the securing of closed shop control in the largest mill in the city in 1 9 1 4 , better arrangements for collective bargaining with the employers were instituted. T h e e m p l o y ers agreed upon a representative who negotiated the first trade agreement in the industry. A n interesting feature of the collective agreements in this trade is that until recent years they were never signed by either party. It is much to the credit of the leaders of both the manufacturers' g r o u p and the upholstery weavers' union that they were able in the years f o l l o w i n g 1 9 1 4 to develop successful collective bargaining without recourse to the annual strikes which had characterized the trade up to this time. M a n y manufacturers have formerly been weavers and informal and amicable labor relations were, and still are, characteristic of the upholstery trade in the city. M o s t of the mills in the city have the reputation of being " f a i r " to organized labor, and a few e n j o y the reputation of being the "best mills in the c i t y " in which to work. F r o m the point of view of the weavers, many gains f o l l o w e d the development of more stable industrial relations in the industry through collective agreements for the entire trade. W a g e rates more than doubled in the decade from 1 9 1 1 to 1 9 2 1 . T h e forty-eight-hour week was obtained in

54

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

1 9 1 9 and the closed shop for practically all workers in the trade in 1920. It is important to realize that all of these gains were secured without recourse to strikes, for no m a j o r strikes occurred in the trade between the years 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 3 1 . T h e gains made during the war period were halted for a short time in the trade depression of 1921 when a w a g e reduction of eight or nine per cent was negotiated. T h i s d e pression was short-lived, however, and the former wage scale was renewed. T r a d e recovery brought as great prosperity as the industry had ever known in the years 1923 and 1924. T h e piecework price list adopted in the trade agreement of 1923, representing approximately a ten per cent increase over 1922 prices, remained in force in the trade until 1 9 3 1 . U n i f o r m shop rules for weavers were adopted in 1923, and a uniform price list f o r winders and spoolers as well as weavers was secured in the agreement of 1924. UNION

POLICIES

T h e weavers' piecework price list adopted in the agreement of 1923 2 is, like earlier w a g e scales, based upon the price per " p i c k " for plain and jacquard-wo ven materials. T h i s price is dependent upon the size of the loom, the number of " e n d s " or threads in the warp, the counts and kinds of yarn, the number of shuttles operating, and the number of changes in the jacquard " c a r d s " which determine the pattern to be woven. Each change of shuttle, pattern card, or adjustment of weights requires extra work and additional skill on the part of the weaver and therefore receives additional compensation. T h e same is true for yarns which are considered to be difficult to work with, such as metal threads. A basic loom speed was adopted at the time the " l i s t " was first accepted in 1900, and prices were originally set at a high enough rate to cover "normal d e l a y s " of production. It is probable that in the original establishment of the price list an attempt was made to set rates which would tend to yield fairly equal total earnings on different grades of fab' Printed in f u l l in Bezanson, Earnings of Ufholstery

Weavers, p. xvii.

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

55

rics. In order to compensate the skill required for difficult fabrics, the "extras" were introduced in the list. As time went on, however, percentage increases on the original 1900 scale tended to increase the rates on the less difficult fabrics disproportionately to the increases on the more difficult fabrics. This has given rise to certain "inequalities" in the scale. A number of variables enter into the earnings available under a given piecework price list in addition to "inequalities" inherent in the scale itself. In upholstery weaving, the most important of these variables appear to be the number of short runs per weaver, variety of fabrics produced, differences in machine equipment and production delays, as well as differences in the skill of individual weavers. A clause of the agreement states that when a weaver is working on piecework and difficulties arise that are not his fault so that the piecework pay falls below the time-work rate in the trade, he may apply for an allowance at the time-work rate of pay. H e is not guaranteed the time-work rate, but a settlement of his application is made by the shop committee and a representative of the firm. Because the price list rates were set to cover "normal delays," no time allowances are possible except for what are admitted by both sides to be "abnormal" delays. Considerable difference of opinion is possible 011 this point. The lack of definition of normal or abnormal delays, except in the minds of the individual foreman, worker, or shop committeeman, allows the accumulation of a good many shop grievance questions. Such applications for time-work "allowance" occur when imperfect yarn or " b a d " stock, poor machine-fixing and " b a d " harness can be proved to have delayed the weaver so that his earnings fall below a normal rate of pay. Other clauses in the weavers' trade agreement concern primarily questions of hours of work and the employer's right to discharge " f o r cause." The agreement provides for a 48-hour week to be divided into hours on five days and 4 % hours on Saturday, with rates of time and a half for overtime work, and a fifteen per cent differential for men

56

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

working on shifts. T h e employer's right to discharge " f o r cause" has resulted in surprisingly f e w discharge cases in this as compared with other industries. Most of these have occurred as penalties for serious mistakes in work. Weavers may not be fined, but they may be laid off or discharged for poor workmanship. T h e weavers' shop rules provide for equal division of work in dull seasons, although each shop is allowed to plan the system by which this is to be arranged. In a few mills a rotary system of lay-off is in force. This gives the weaver the right to work on any loom during slack seasons, and incidentally allows the weaver a wider range of experience with different looms and different grades of goods. In most of the mills, however, weavers are entitled to all orders for their " o w n " looms (as established by seniority) and share work on "spare" looms only. T h e weavers prefer some adaptation of the rotary system of sharing work, but many of the manufacturers are opposed to this plan, because they say that all weavers cannot weave all types of fabrics equally well. Certain rules concern the workmanship of weavers. W e a v ers must care for "cards" and "card wires" properly -, they may not waste yarn or injure bobbins ; looms must be kept properly oiled, although they are repaired by the loom-fixers. Weavers may not read while their looms are in motion, and they may not work during the noon hour or out of regular hours except on regular overtime work. A trade rule of considerable importance in the Philadelphia trade is the one-man-one-loom rule. T h e establishment of this rule dates from 1913. Prior to this time a number of upholstery mills in the city ran two looms to a weaver on certain grades of work. A breakdown of the classification of goods to be run on a two-loom basis led to a protest against the system by the weavers. Gradually the one-loom policy was extended to all shops making upholstery goods on both shaft and jacquard looms. Although the manufacturers continued to protest against this change, especially for weaving

THE

UPHOLSTERY

t h e s i m p l e r types o f

WEAVERS

57

fabrics, the union h e l d to the

one-

l o o m principle. W h e n t h e upholstery trade expanded o u t side o f t h e city, m a n y of the fabrics were produced by weavers w h o ran two, t h r e e , and f o u r looms each. T h i s had an i m portant effect on t h e labor cost differential which d e v e l o p e d between P h i l a d e l p h i a and outside mills and was partially responsible for the loss o f considerable business to the o u t side centers o f m a n u f a c t u r e . T h e administration in t h e m i l l of the shop rules and t h e provisions o f the trade a g r e e m e n t is the work of the shop committee. T h i s c o m m i t t e e is elected by the shop association to h a n d l e all shop grievances, and its powers are much m o r e extensive than in the tapestry carpet workers' union,

or

other textile unions with centralized responsibility in union g o v e r n m e n t . T h e work o f t h e shop committee deals with t h e negotiation o f prices on n e w goods not covered in the a g r e e m e n t , correcting mistakes in pay, adjusting requests for t i m e allowances, s e t t l i n g claims about the sharing o f work, p r e v e n t i n g a l l e g e d favoritism in the shop, and representing t h e workers in shop discipline or discharge cases. A high d e g r e e o f j o b security for the individual worker has been up in upholstery weaving shops as the result of the

built de-

v e l o p m e n t o f shop and trade custom, the trade a g r e e m e n t s , and t h e continuous w o r k o f the shop committees. T h e t r a d e a g r e e m e n t makes provision for arbitration in the event o f disputes between t h e e m p l o y e r and employees which cannot be settled b y t h e shop committee and the

individual

manufacturer. A board o f arbitration composed of two r e p resentatives f r o m each side, with provision for an u m p i r e or r e f e r e e to be j o i n t l y a g r e e d upon, has power to m a k e decisions which shall be " f i n a l and binding on both p a r t i e s . " T h i s particular clause of t h e agreement had never been called into use d u r i n g the history o f the union until a wage dispute arose in 1 9 3 1 . T h e dispute in question will be discussed in detail later, but it is i m p o r t a n t to point out at this time that while arbitration m a c h i n e r y for the trade had existed " o n

58

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

paper," it had never been called into use, and many of the workers were unprepared for its initial operation in 1 9 3 1 . T h e concentration of union power in the shop committees is the result of two historical factors in the trade. The first is the wide range of equipment and type of fabric produced in the mills, which necessitates considerable variation in the actual interpretation of the agreement from shop to shop. Long standing custom has given the shop committees considerable leeway in negotiations with employers and the larger share of responsibility for union discipline. A second factor in the situation is the presence in the local union of the remnants of other textile union groups. These came from other textile trades during the expansion era of the upholstery trade. Many have become members of this union only in recent years. T h e y developed political factions which consciously kept control in the union government decentralized in order to offset the power of other factional groups and to secure office. This force has brought about extreme democracy in the local union government. Thus the interpretation of an old trade agreement is left primarily to the individual shop committees and this interpretation varies from shop to shop. T h e negotiation of a new agreement, while technically in the hands of a special committee, is subject to constant check from the union floor. T h e business agent8 and executive officers are given relatively little power, and were subject to change or reelection every six months until 1 9 3 1 . Now they hold office for one year only. The vote of a mass meeting of 2,000 members is not usually considered the most efficient method to decide on many important union questions, nor the way to negotiate with employers, except at the final stages when an agreement is in sight. T h e effect of decentralized responsibility in union government has been to place obstacles in the way of the develop* A full-time business agent was first elected by the local in 1 9 1 3 , but was later dropped from the list of officers until 1 9 1 9 . Since that time there has always been a "man on the street," as they say in the trade.

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

59

ment of the best type of leadership. W h i l e trade conditions were good and there were no strikes or difficult situations to be met, no challenge to the old forms of union government occurred, but when trade conditions changed and a crisis developed, the old machinery was soon found to be inadequate. It is a commentary on this situation that there were three changes of personnel in the important office of local president during the recent crisis in the trade. Extreme democracy in the form of union government, when combined with a check in the union program because of adverse economic conditions, is apt to result in chaos in a crisis. M e n weavers constitute a majority in the trade and have always dominated Local #25. Girls and older women employed in the winding and spooling departments of the small number of mills doing this work were organized when complete closed shop control of the trade was secured. Although sincere efforts were made by the men in the trade to interest the girls in the activities of the union, these efforts were as unsuccessful as they were in other old textile unions. F e w girls attend union meetings and very few have ever held office, except as shop association secretaries or in other minor offices. T h e girls, like the men, have to hold a union card and pay their dues three months in advance in order to work at the trade, and to them the union is apt to be primarily a "meal ticket." W h e n the union was first organized, there were a small number of women jacquard weavers in the trade. T h e manufacturers agreed not to take on any more women weavers and not to give any assistance to women which would not be given to men weavers. In this way the employment of women as jacquard weavers was discouraged. It is reported that there are a few women jacquard weavers still at work in Philadelphia mills today in addition to a larger number of women shaft weavers in the mills equipped with shaft looms. Collective bargaining in the upholstery trade has always been complicated by the fact that there are five unions each with separate trade jurisdictions and separate wage scales

UNION

60

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

4

and agreements. The loom-fixers, warpers and warp dressers, and dyers are all organized in separate locals of the United Textile Workers of America. T h e beamers and twisters have always had an "independent" organization. The Upholstery Weavers and Workers' Union #25 was formerly affiliated with the United Textile Workers, but has since joined the ranks of the "independent" textile unions as the result of the loss of its local charter in 1 9 3 1 . The weavers are the largest single occupational group, and their union includes the crafts of shaft and jacquard weaving, winding, spooling, burling, mending, and harness building. The other crafts include only men. With the exception of the dyers, they have a higher wage scale and more regular employment than the weavers. They claim that their work requires more skill than weaving and is, therefore, compensated at a higher rate. The presence of five unions in the trade leads to several difficulties in addition to the rivalries between the groups with regard to wage scales. In the language of the shop, five union groups necessitate a "lot of arguments" for the manufacturer, and needlessly prolong shop and trade negotiations. In addition, questions of trade jurisdiction create conflicts between the unions. Agreements concerning trade jurisdiction define in some detail the mutual division of the work of weavers, harness builders, and loom-fixers. Conflict arises in a period of depression when all groups are irregularly employed and some workers have been laid off. Loom-fixers, for example, would like to weave samples, but weavers claim this as their proper division of work. The manufacturers complain that there is "too much division of labor" and would like to be able to transfer certain workers, such as loom-fixers, to various odd jobs about the mill that need doing, irrespective of trade jurisdictions. The presence of five craft unions in the trade dominated 4

The unions in the trade are the Dyers' Local #702, Warpers and Warp Dressers' Local # 1 0 2 5 , Jacquard Loomfixers' Beneficial Union, Local # 1 2 7 0 , Beamers* and Twisters* Mutual Protective and Beneficial Association, and Upholstery Weavers and Workers' Union #25.

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

61

by the older type of craft union philosophy is of importance in understanding the tactics of the weavers' union. T h e latter dominates the situation because of its numerical strength. Unlike the tapestry carpet weavers, who eventually organized in their union all crafts including the most highly skilled loom-fixers, the upholstery weavers have always had to work with the four other unions in the trade. T h e division of the workers in the industry into five separate craft unions has preserved wage scale differentials and uneconomical trade rules which would probably have disappeared in an industrial union. W h i l e other trade unions, therefore, were experimenting with new forms of union structure and government, the upholstery workers continued to use the forms prevalent in the industry thirty or forty years ago. As long as the trade remained localized in Philadelphia and the city's mills dominated the market, the union policies of the closed shop agreement and the restriction of the labor supply by restriction of union membership were successful. As has been shown earlier, these resulted in increased wages, shorter hours of work, and a high degree of job security for the individual worker in the shop. It was the rapid expansion of the trade in outside manufacturing centers and the undermining of the competitive position of Philadelphia mills which eventually challenged the union's control of the trade, its tactics, and the gains of years of collective bargainings. T h e story of the development of this challenge to the program of the upholstery weavers' union is important enough to be given detailed consideration. THE

RECENT

CRISIS

T h e Philadelphia upholstery trade had become well established at an early date in the development of textile manufacturing in the city. A dozen or more Philadelphia mills dominated the market and to some extent determined trade styles in the years preceding 1910. By 1913? it was reported to the union that new mills were starting outside of the city in N e w Jersey and Pennsylvania. Although these

62

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

new mills took some years in becoming established factors in the trade, by 1920 their place was secure and their number had increased. T h e Philadelphia mills had originally specialized in the manufacture of a high grade of drapery fabrics, but this market was invaded by cotton and silk mills operating under lower costs of production in outside manufacturing areas. W h e n the volume business in drapery goods was lost to the city's mills, its place was taken by a style change which popularized cotton tapestries and other heavy upholstery fabrics as covering for upholstered furniture. T h e trade as a whole expanded rapidly to meet this demand in the years from 1919 to 1925. T h e greatest expansion took place in outside manufacturing centers, and several Philadelphia mills bought outside branch plants. B y 1929, style changes had adversely affected the prosperity of the trade to such an extent that the total volume of business was steadily declining, and very keen competition developed between Philadelphia and outside mills for the available business. T h e effects of the most recent expansion era in the trade were twofold. N e w mills purchased the newest and most improved types of machine equipment, a fact which eventually gave them competitive advantages over mills operating old equipment such as is found in the Philadelphia area. Expansion of the machine equipment of the industry beyond the requirements to meet the demand of the most prosperous year the trade has ever known, undermined all trade practices for regulating competition in the industry, and eventually jeopardized the standards of working conditions for the workers in the only unionized center. Upholstery workers in the outside centers worked longer hours for lower rates of pay, and, in addition, weavers usually worked on more than one loom each. A wide differential in labor costs soon developed between Philadelphia mills and their outside branch plants or mills in other areas. T h e weavers' union did not attempt to organize the southern upholstery goods workers directly, but it did make an effort to organize the workers in M t . H o l l y and other towns

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

63

in N e w Jersey to which the industry had spread. T h e campaign was successful for a short period, during which hours were reduced from 72 to 60 per week and wages raised. A labor cost differential, however, was still maintained, and the union gradually lost ground. T h e N e w Jersey workers were recruited from the agricultural districts where few industrial j o b opportunities obtained. T h e y were, like other rural workers, difficult to organize and not used to working collectively. Several small strikes occurred during this organization campaign, but they were lost. T h e campaign, as a whole, thus failed to make any permanent headway in organizing the districts outside of Philadelphia. T h e failure of the campaign to equalize labor costs in the two adjacent communities weakened the bargaining strength of the upholstery unions when the Philadelphia trade lost its competitive advantages in the market. If the workers in the outside districts had been organized, the unions could have maintained their wage levels and other standards as long as there was a demand for their labor. But when the competitive position of the Philadelphia mills was threatened, the union workers were in the position of having " a high wage scale and good working conditions, with no work," as one weaver aptly expressed it. Although the volume of business of the Philadelphia mills shrank rapidly in the years following 1925, the union membership did not recognize that this decline involved a more serious situation than earlier declines which were the result of style changes or general business depression. Irregular employment had always been characteristic of the trade. It was subject to two well-defined seasons, being slack in the early summer months and in the late fall. In years of general trade depression, the slack seasons became longer, and the delegates of the union would report, for example, that 70 per cent of the members of the local were "on the street." Unemployment became chronic in the trade in the years following 1927, and it has been estimated by union members that not more than one-third of their number have

64

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

been w o r k i n g at any one t i m e since that date.

T h e union

t u r n e d to u n e m p l o y m e n t relief f r o m its o w n f u n d s , as it did in 1 9 2 1 . I n the shorter depression of 1 9 2 1 , the union h a d spent about $4,000 in u n e m p l o y m e n t r e l i e f , but in the f o u r years f r o m 1 9 2 7 to 1 9 3 1 it spent about $36,000. W h e n the u p h o l s t e r y trade was slack or on strike in the years b e f o r e 1 9 2 0 , the members w h o h a d come f r o m art square, w e f t , carpet, or cloth w e a v i n g w e n t back to these trades to w o r k t e m p o r a r i l y . B u t now t h e w e a v e r s say that " t h e r e is n o t h i n g l e f t " to which t h e y can g o back to w o r k , f o r all P h i l a d e l p h i a textile industries have declined and trades like w e f t chenille w e a v i n g h a v e practically disappeared. T h e

and

decline

in the upholstery w e a v i n g trade h a d reached serious p r o p o r tions b e f o r e the rank-and-file union m e m b e r s h i p , w h i c h cont r o l l e d union policy, was r e a d y to r e c o g n i z e the c h a l l e n g e of non-union competition in the areas in which t h e t r a d e was e x p a n d i n g . T h e necessity of m e e t i n g that competition was not accepted b y the union until t h e union

manufacturers

threatened to m o v e out of the city and the union h a d lost a strike in protest against the first w a g e reduction in 1 9 3 1 . T h e slowness of the union m e m b e r s to r e c o g n i z e the crisis in the trade and to make h e a d w a y in m e e t i n g it s h o u l d not be c o n d e m n e d o f f h a n d . A g o o d m a n y factors e x p l a i n the caution on the part of the union in the situation. T h e r e was a natural confusion in the minds of the w o r k e r s as to the correct interpretation of the trends in the trade. N o r was this confusion confined to the w o r k e r s o n l y . S o m e m i l l s d i d a h i g h - g r a d e specialty business w h i c h appeared to be entirely d e p e n d e n t on general business prosperity and style changes f o r its success. W a g e cuts or other union concessions w o u l d s o l v e no p r o b l e m f o r either w o r k e r or e m p l o y e r in these mills. I n other mills, a cheaper g r a d e of business was in severe competition with m i l l s in outside centers operating under l o w e r costs of production, particularly l o w e r

labor

costs. A m a j o r i t y of the m i l l s tried to d o both types of business—novelty

expensive

fabrics, w h e n

they

could

secure

orders, and cheaper " v o l u m e " fabrics, w h e n they c o u l d secure

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

65

orders. T h e mills in the city had enough machine equipment and a sufficient number of skilled workers on their pay-rolls to produce all the goods the country would buy, but the outside centers were gradually cutting in on their volume of business. If the city became a center of high grade novelty fabric manufacture only, there would be employment for only a small part of the union membership. I f the city tried to retain its competitive position against the new centers, tremendous sacrifices had to be made on the gamble of securing more business. In addition to lack of knowledge of the basic trends in the trade, the union was handicapped by extreme democracy in procedures and the lack of the necessary leadership to meet such difficult problems. M a n y union members, too, had a definite belief that the skill of the workers in Philadelphia could not be matched in other areas and that, sooner or later, superior skill would demonstrate its value in the market. This position overlooked the fact that, in time, less skilled workers in outside centers would acquire greater skill as they worked in the trade. It also overlooked the fact that recent trends in the industry had lessened the demand for the expensive novelty fabrics which were difficult to make and increased the demand for cheaper goods which could be made with less skilled labor. A further factor in the situation was the general feeling on the part of the union that they had never charged " w h a t the traffic would b e a r " in " h i g h " wages during prosperity, and should not, therefore, be asked to share the burden of reductions in costs to meet competition in depression. T h e weavers argued, with some justification, that their trade had never been a " h i g h wage trade," despite the skill required for their work. It is variously estimated by workers and manufacturers that maximum earnings in the trade as late as 1 9 i o were only about $ 1 5 a week for a fifty-eight-hour work week. Although piecework prices doubled or tripled in the period between 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 2 3 , a study of earnings in Philadelphia tapestry mills in 1 9 2 6 and 1 9 2 7 reveals

66

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

average median earnings with full-time employment (fortynine weeks during the year) of $35 a week. This was the average for a year of unusual prosperity in the trade. N o r did average earnings give the entire picture, according to the weavers. T h e study showed that there was a wide range of earnings between mills operating under the same piecework price list. Median annual earnings ranged from $1,696 in the lowest group of mills to $2,874* in the highest group of mills. It was asserted by the weavers that earnings of the same weaver vary if he moves from mill to mill, that earnings on the same grade of goods vary from mill to mill and occasionally from loom to loom, with due allowance for differentials in individual skill. It was the belief of the workers that improvements in shop management and machine equipment might well lead the way to lower costs of production as well as to higher average earnings for workers.® According to them, the burden of reducing costs of production rested on the manufacturers. T h e story of the 1931 wage dispute and its results will be told here in some detail because it illustrates interesting points in arbitration as a mechanism for settling labor disputes, and interesting attitudes on the part of rank-and-file members with regard to an economic crisis and an internal union political situation. Further than that, it illuminates the general problems confronting the Philadelphia textile unions and textile manufacturers in an unusually vivid picture. Several incidents occurred prior to the recent crisis in the upholstery weavers' trade which had an important bearing upon the attitudes of both parties to the dispute. Some of the older union leaders had for several years been aware of * Bezanson, of, cit., pp. 126, 127. " T w o surveys of the upholstery industry, one undertaken by the Labor Bureau, Inc., f o r the union, and one undertaken by the Industrial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania, f o r both the manufacturers and the unions, have demonstrated that the percentage of possible economies in production was not large, and that other channels of reduction in costs were more important. Such channels are savings in the cost of yarns, selling, and labor.

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

67

the new trends in the trade. T h e y had, of their own initiative, started a study of weavers' earnings. Following this, they attempted to secure the cooperation of the manufacturers in a general economic survey of the industry by an impartial fact-finding agency. This was to serve as the basis for development of future collective bargaining policies. T w o conferences over a period of six months were held upon this question, but no agreement was reached on the exact subjects to be covered by such a survey or the agency to make it. T h e union then decided to have a preliminary survey made at its own expense and without the cooperation of the majority of the manufacturers. In July 1930, while the discussion of a survey of the industry was pending, one of the Philadelphia upholstery goods mills posted a notice announcing a 25 per cent wage cut and the open shop policy. A strike called against this shop was settled in September, and the union believed that it had won the first round in the coming battle on wage cuts which had been threatening for some time. This settlement was, however, followed by a request by all the Philadelphia manufacturers for a 25 per cent wage cut. In the course of negotiations on this point in September, the manufacturers offered "to settle" for a 15 per cent reduction, but this was rejected by the union. A manufacturer in one of the oldest and largest mills in the city, when he found that the union appeared to be unwilling to make any concessions, threatened to move his machinery to an upstate Pennsylvania town. T h e trade agreement was due to expire the first of January, 1931, and thirty days before this date, fourteen of the twenty-six manufacturers in the city posted a notice of a 25 per cent reduction of wages. Negotiations on this move continued but appeared to secure no results, and unofficial representatives of both the manufacturers and the union turned to the Industrial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania in December to seek advice concerning the possibility of arbitration. Official representatives of both groups later con-

68

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

sidered the question of arbitration and a proposal to this effect was eventually made to both parties to the agreement. T h e manufacturers agreed to arbitrate on condition that the decision would be made before January i , to enable them to set prices on the new season's orders. The arbitrators agreed to settle the dispute on condition that the union would take a temporary cut, with a final decision in six months, during which time a survey could be made to develop facts for union-management cooperation in the industry. T h e local union at first voted not to accept arbitration. This action was later rescinded, after pressure was brought to bear by the officers of the international union. T h e question of arbitration was left to be decided by the international officials of the United Textile Workers of America and the Conference Committee of the local union. They eventually decided that since a provision for arbitration was embodied in the trade agreement, the local should "live up to its agreement." These preliminary arrangements took some time, however, and when the official hearings on the wage arbitration were held, only two days of the original three weeks were left before the trade agreement expired. T h e arbitrators hesitated to give even an emergency award in such a short space of time as forty-eight hours. T h e representatives of the unions involved, the loom-fixers, the dyers, and the upholstery weavers, agreed that they had the power to act for their locals in accepting such an emergency award. T o avoid conflict in the industry, the arbitrators agreed to make an award to run for one season (six months). In the course of this time a survey would be undertaken, upon the basis of which a final arbitration award would later be made. A formal brief was presented for the union. This outlined working conditions under the existing agreement. It was maintained by the union, first, that a survey of the facts should be made before wage cuts were introduced. Average earnings of the weavers, even with full-time employment, were shown to be less than the cost of the minimum "health and decency" budget, revised according to Philadelphia

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

69

prices. It was said that irregularity of employment in the past f e w years had further reduced these earnings until they were inadequate to meet the cost of living. T h e proposed twenty-five per cent wage cut, according to the union, would not solve the problem of competition by Philadelphia mills with outside areas because the wage differential w o u l d be retained by further cuts in these areas, and the relative amount of business for Philadelphia unchanged. T h e union brief stated that the balance sheets of some of the P h i l a d e l phia mills showed that the industry was in an essentially sound financial position, although, like other industries at this time, it was not making any profits. It was argued that the lack of business in the Philadelphia area was due to general economic conditions and not to local wage rates. A final claim was made that l o w e r costs of production might be obtained through some channel other than wage cuts, and that careful consideration should be given to these elements in the situation first. T h e brief for the manufacturers was informal. T h e manufacturers stated that the differential in labor costs between Philadelphia and outside mills made it impossible for them to compete. T h e y quoted piecework wage rates in the south for a fifty-five hour week as compared with Philadelphia time-work rates for a forty-eight hour week as follows: Loom-fixers Twisters Beamers Winders. Burlers and menders Weavers

Philadelphia . . >52.80 . . 48.00 . . 50.40 23.00 . . 21.00 38.40

South >25-30 15-20 18-23 10-12 10-12 15-23

T h e y asserted that under present conditions of competition the differential in labor costs was the most important item of variable cost. T h e referee of the arbitration board handed down a decision in which a 14 per cent wage cut was inaugurated for one season, to be f o l l o w e d by a final award based upon a six months' survey of " a l l elements which enter into and

70

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

affect manufacturing costs in Philadelphia and elsewhere." (See the complete text of the decision in Appendix A . ) This reduction was made as a flat reduction to all occupations in the trade because time did not allow for the determining of adequate differentials between occupations. Regret was expressed in the decision that a wage cut was necessary because it could not be an ultimate solution of the problems of the industry. In support of the reduction, the following points were made: the decline in wholesale and retail prices of food and other elements in the cost of living, and the necessity of making a sufficient reduction to affect the selling price of the goods, and thus putting up squarely to the manufacturers the necessity of proving that a cut in wage rates would materially increase business in the Philadelphia area. The factors back of the decision were undoubtedly the desire to arrest the movement of the industry out of Philadelphia, pending a proposed survey which, it was hoped, would lay a sound basis for the ultimate development of union-management cooperation in the industry. The arbitrators believed that while the immediate decision was in favor of the manufacturers, the ultimate results would favor the union as much as the manufacturers. The arbitration award was accepted by the loom-fixers' and the dyers' unions but rejected by the upholstery weavers. This was done despite the protests of local and international officials, who believed that the weavers' union had agreed to abide by the arbitration decision and should not reject it by going on strike. The rank-and-file members asserted that their representatives had assumed powers which had not been delegated to them in agreeing to abide by the emergency award. But the fact remains that if they did not have that power, they should have had it, as representatives of the other unions had it. Again, the extreme democracy of the union prevented effective representation by officers. The action of the weavers was, as many other textile workers pointed out, a reversion to the "tactics of 1 9 0 3 , " when most labor groups acted on the impulse of the moment with-

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

71

out exercising sufficient judgment on the effects of their action. The criticisms made of the decision by the weavers were that it was unfair on two counts: first, because it was admittedly made in too short a time to allow consideration of all the factors in the situation, and second, because it made no provision for a lower reduction for the lower paid workers in the industry, who were obviously not receiving a " l i v i n g " wage. Many rumors developed about different aspects of the situation. Much was made of the fact that the award gave a reduction of only one per cent less than the manufacturers' proposal rejected by the union in September. An erroneous impression was created to the effect that one of the manufacturers had received word concerning the terms of the arbitration award before the hearings were held. Another rumor which did much harm, and was not adequately explained in the decision itself, concerned the possible change of shop rules as a result of the survey. It came to be the belief of the workers that the ultimate award based on the survey would involve the two-, three-, or four-loom system, and other changes in working conditions as well as wage rates. Local #25 went on strike February 1. The international officers refused to endorse the strike and it thus became an "outlaw" strike. A statement by the manufacturers said that "strikebreakers" would not be introduced because the manufacturers had no demand for their goods, and that the industry had been working on a 30 per cent working-time basis only. 7 As time went on, however, three mills attempted to operate with strikebreakers. T h e largest mill in the city, which had threatened to move at an earlier date, began moving its looms to a former silk weaving town in Pennsylvania, and eventually began operating this plant. A second large mill purchased a fully equipped plant in New England and began outside operations. During the course of the strike, friction between the local and the international union reached the breaking point. Two 'Quoted by Philadelphia Record, January 3 1 , 1931.

72

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

new proposals with respect to the arbitration award were presented to the union but were rejected. One called for setting aside three per cent of the wage reduction in an unemployment fund which would accumulate during the season, and become the basis for an unemployment insurance arrangement in the industry. Another provided that whatever upward revision in the wage scale should be made at the end of the survey would be retroactive to the date when the local went back to work. Pressure was then brought to bear upon the international union by the manufacturers to coerce the local union into accepting the award. Five weeks after the strike had started, the international union threatened to revoke the charter of the local union and attach its property and funds. The carrying out of this threat was delayed in the hope that some settlement of the situation could be effected. Dissatisfaction in the local union, which had originally centered on the poor trade conditions, and then had centered on what was considered an unfair arbitration award, now came to be centered on the action of the international officials. Criticisms were made of the officials which were similar to those made in other textile strikes in Philadelphia, although the individuals holding office were no longer the same. The criticisms were typical of those found in any local union's rebellion against its international officers. While there seems to be little doubt that the international officials were technically right in their position in not endorsing the strike, they were responsible for several serious mistakes in handling the situation, both before and after the arbitration award was made. These mistakes were partly responsible for the union's going on strike in the first place, and for its later refusal to reaffiliate with the international union. Political factionalism, which had been characteristic of the local for some years, broke up the discipline of the union in this crisis. It is probable that the rejection of the action of the local's accredited representatives to the arbitration board was primarily the result of political factionalism in the union

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

73

and, secondarily, the result of general dissatisfaction with economic conditions in the trade. This was aided by the extreme democracy in the union set-up. T h e r e were, however, in addition, a f e w " l e f t - w i n g " sympathizers who lost no time in capitalizing the situation for the Communists. W h i l e this group was never large, it was active in spreading dissatisfaction with the international officers and the arbitration award. Propaganda put out by the Communist union, the National Textile Workers, asserted that the union officials had "sold o u t " the workers. Typical of this attitude is the following quotation f r o m an official Communist paper: T h e rank a n d file d i d not agree to the arbitration a w a r d . T h e f a k e r s w e r e f o r it. T h e statement [ o f the m a n u f a c t u r e r s ] shows the b o n d b e t w e e n the bosses and the union misleaders, against w h i c h the workers are fighting.8

It was claimed by the National Textile Workers' Union that, while they had had no members from Local #25 before the strike, they soon had a growing membership of over one hundred upholstery weavers. T h e weavers continued the strike until they settled it as a local group on M a y 4, 1 9 3 1 . T h e manufacturers and the international officers had held out for the local's reaffiliation with the United Textile Workers, but the eventual settlement was with the local union as an "independent" labor organization. T h e terms of the settlement were, to a slight extent, less favorable than the original arbitration award. On the economic front, therefore, the strike was lost, and from any angle of consideration, appears to have been a great mistake. It is possible that the very fact that the upholstery weavers had had no strike for seventeen years was responsible for their misjudging their relative strength in the industry and their willingness to take such a chance on their own survival as a trade union organization. M a n y members of the union believe that a trial of strength was inevitable before or a f t e r the arbitration award was put into effect. T h e union was placed, however, in the precarious * The Daily

Worker,

February 3,

1931.

74

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

position of having been responsible for the loss of orders to other areas during the strike, when the trade situation was already critical. There is no question that the union lost prestige by its strike against the arbitration award. It lost prestige among other trade unions, the employers, and the public. T h e strike made it particularly difficult for other groups of newly organized textile workers on strike in Philadelphia at the same time. It was the opinion of other textile workers that all strike settlements were endangered by the fact that an old established textile union had gone on strike against an arbitration award which it had agreed to accept. The leadership of the local union has made much of the fact that in a very complex internal political situation they have succeeded, up to the present time, in keeping the local intact as a group. It is a tribute to the intense loyalty of the members of the organization that even those who felt that a serious mistake was being made when the union rejected the arbitration award decided to go along with the others and help salvage the union from its difficulties, in the hope that eventually the union might regain its former status and prestige. Many of these members now feel that the union is a stronger unit for having had this experience despite its disastrous immediate effects. One interesting aspect of this controversy is that it offers one of the few illustrations of a fight between an international union and one of its locals in which the local won. Usually, in such a struggle, the "cards are stacked" in favor of the international union because of its contacts with employers, its ability to bring in official strikebreakers to an illegal strike situation, its greater treasury and holding power, and its facilities for publicity. It is a commentary on certain inherent weaknesses in the organization of the United Textile Workers and on certain psychological characteristics of the older group of rank-and-file textile trade unionists in Philadelphia that this was an immediate victory for the local workers against the international leaders. Another fac-

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

75

tor in the situation is the presence in Philadelphia of several examples of successful "independent" textile unions, one of which, the beamers and twisters, is an auxiliary union in the upholstery weaving trade. It is, therefore, quite possible for the upholstery weavers to "carry o n " without affiliation with the rest of the labor movement. Following the return of the strikers to work and the acceptance of the terms of the arbitration award, arrangements were made for an economic survey of the industry. T h e union and the manufacturers agreed to cooperate in undertaking this research program and asked the Industrial Research Department of the University of Pennsylvania to make the survey. A complete statement of the findings and recommendations of the survey investigators to the manufacturers and unions in the upholstery weaving industry will be published shortly. While recommendations were made concerning all phases of the industry's problems, those concerned with collective bargaining arrangements are especially pertinent to this study. T h e most important of these recommendations advised a differential wage scale in terms of the size of manufacturing order as well as the difficulty of weaving, and the two-loom system on the classes of fabrics in which it was found to be feasible. It was also recommended that the collective bargaining machinery be strengthened and a program for unemployment insurance be adopted for the trade. All of these recommendations have been accepted in the new agreement which has been negotiated by the upholstery weavers and the manufacturers. 9 T h e new trade agreement represents a constructive step since it recognizes present economic realities and yet lays the foundation for a future program of greater economic security for workers in the upholstery weaving trade. T h e experience of the upholstery weavers' union may be summarized briefly. I n past years, the union maintained * T h e full text of the agreement and the findings and recommendations of the survey will be printed in a forthcoming publication of the Industrial Research Department.

76

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

closed shop control of the market in which the major part of the upholstery industry was localized. T h e type of goods manufactured at this time was such as to require a high grade of skill, but when changes in the quality and type of goods demanded allowed less skilled workmanship, the industry shifted ground. Plants moved out of the city or started branches in other areas, notably in semi-rural towns of N e w Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the South. T h e union failed to push its organization campaign vigorously in these areas. W a g e and hour differentials widened between the Philadelphia market and outside mills. T h e multiple-loom system was also used extensively outside of the city. Gradual encroachment on the business of the Philadelphia area followed. This decline in the relative importance of the city's share of the entire industry was heightened by a general decline in the demand for upholstery goods due to style changes, a severe business depression, and increased imports from abroad. Overexpansion of the industry and the loss of orders to the Philadelphia market led to declining earnings and profits for the city's manufacturers and decreased employment and declining earnings for the city's upholstery workers. N o major strikes or other critical collective bargaining situations had occurred in the trade since 1 9 1 3 . This absence of major disputes had allowed older forms of union government, and an old philosophy and attitude on the part of some of the leaders and rank-and-file members, to continue unchallenged. A crisis developed early in 1 9 3 1 , when the union refused to accept an arbitration award which involved a fourteen per cent wage reduction. T h e loss of the strike which followed this action awakened the union to the necessity of meeting the problem of non-union competition in labor costs. T h e union recognized that since it had failed to organize the workers in competing areas, the employment and working conditions of its own members were now at stake. One keen observer of the labor movement has said that

THE

UPHOLSTERY

WEAVERS

77

a " k n o c k o u t b l o w , " like a lost strike, is the most effective f o r m o f workers' education. I n his opinion, it takes such a blow to awaken a union membership to the dangers o f its position under adverse economic trends. T h e union has, as a result, used the tools o f economic research in an endeavor to understand f u l l y the problems of the industry, and has assumed, j o i n t l y with the manufacturers, some responsibility for t h e f u t u r e economic w e l f a r e of the P h i l a d e l p h i a holstery weaving trade.

up-

CHAPTER

V

THE HOSIERY WORKERS E X P E R I M E N T WITH NEW TACTICS 1 Ια contrast to many Philadelphia textile unions, the hosiery workers have a membership composed almost entirely of young people, with a small nucleus of leaders who have had considerable experience in the trade. T h e y have also had a larger treasury to back their struggle to maintain standards in the industry because their members, for many years, were an unusually highly paid group of textile workers. A combination of intelligent leadership, a full treasury, and a young, enthusiastic rank-and-file membership has resulted in considerable experimentation in trade union tactics in the face of an increasingly difficult economic situation. T h e way in which the union has endeavored to solve its problems can best be studied through an analysis of its policies and changing tactics in a particular area. T h e story of the Philadelphia branch of the hosiery workers' union in a sense typifies the entire life-history of the national union. Like other elements of union control, policies and tactics are materially affected by the relative strength of the union at different periods of its history. T h e period from the beginning of the hosiery workers' union in 1909 2 to 1 9 2 0 is 1 T h e data upon which this chapter is based, unless otherwise specified, come f r o m the minutes o f Local JÍ/706-Branch # 1 , of the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers, 1 9 0 9 - 1 9 3 2 , Federation convention proceedings, 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 3 2 , and Rules Governing Shop Associations in Philadelphia. This has been supplemented by discussion with members and officers of the Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers and manufacturers who have had experience in dealing with the union, and attendance at union meetings. 2 A group of 49 hosiery boarders, now known as the " O l d Forty-Niners," were responsible f o r organizing the hosiery workers' local ^696 in 1 9 0 9 . T h e full-fashioned hosiery knitters' local # 7 0 6 later separated f r o m this group.

78

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

79

characterized by a struggle to develop and maintain certain standards of shop control in the various organized mills in the Philadelphia area. During this time the union was establishing itself as a factor in the industry with which employers must reckon in their future plans. Philadelphia was then the major center of hosiery manufacture, and by 1 9 2 0 the union had secured control of about 90 per cent of the knitting departments in the city. In the period from 1 9 2 0 to 1 9 3 0 , on the other hand, the industry expanded rapidly in other areas and gradually slipped out from under union control, until by 1 9 3 2 only twenty-two per cent of the productive capacity of the industry was found in union mills. 3 In Philadelphia, the oldest organized center in the industry, the union has control of workers in one-third of the mills with over one-third of the productive capacity in the city. But only one-third of the entire full-fashioned hosiery industry is now located in Philadelphia. T h e rapid development of hosiery mills in new areas has necessitated new organizing tactics by the union on a nation-wide scale. Most of the new mills started in small semi-rural towns where there was no local labor movement to assist in organizing campaigns. E v e n non-union hosiery workers have been unusually prosperous compared with other workers in the same areas, and were, therefore, not interested in a program of unionization. With the development of nation-wide organizing problems has come the growing hostility of employers to working with the union, and new strike tactics have, of necessity, been developed to meet injunctions, the " y e l l o w d o g " contract, and extensive open shop campaigns. Problems originally of shop and local control, such as the single versus the double machine system, the regulation of hours and shifts, and the training of helpers, have developed national rather than local significance. T h e policies of the union in this changing industrial situation may be roughly classified under six headings for further analysis: ( 1 ) the development of machinery f o r handling shop grievances ; ( 2 ) * Industrial Research Department, Hosiery Release, #6.

80

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

the evolution of shop custom ; ( 3 ) the control of the labor supply of knittersj ( 4 ) the evolution of a national w a g e scalej ( 5 ) strike and organizing tactics} and ( 6 ) the structure and industrial philosophy of the hosiery workers' union. T h e union showed material progress in its development of improved methods for handling shop disputes and in the j o b and shop control it secured for knitters and other w o r k ers in the hosiery industry. T h e stabilization of industrial relations policies secured through the present arbitration arrangements on a national scale is as striking an achievement as any trade union in the textile industries can claim credit for. T h e union's policies to control the labor supply of knitters were successful as l o n g as the industry remained localized in Philadelphia where the union had control. W i t h the tremendous expansion of the industry in other areas within a v e r y short space of time, however, the union was unable to cope. T h e power o f controlling the supply of knitters through apprenticeship regulation and limitation of the number of machines to be surpervised by a knitter was lost after a skillful battle. T h e strikes and organizing campaigns of the full-fashioned hosiery workers have met with but limited success. T h e reasons for the success or failure of these different types of policy and tactics w i l l be discussed in greater detail later. T h e pressure of competition f r o m outside non-union areas g r a d u a l l y forced the union to develop new tactics to meet this situation. A program of waste elimination was inaugurated and an attempt made to increase the productivity and skill of union workers. A national wage scale was inaugurated in 1929, and this was f o l l o w e d by the negotiation of a series of wage reductions to secure l o w e r labor costs. T h e s e d e velopments have been accompanied by changes in union g o v ernment to give greater responsibility to union leadership. A l t h o u g h the methods used by the union to preserve its organization and program changed to meet changing economic conditions, the program continued to focus on questions of j o b and wage security for hosiery workers.

THE

T H E

HOSIERY

DEVELOPMENT

OF

SHOP

WORKERS

MACHINERY

81

FOR

SETTLING

GRIEVANCES

T h e knitters, like many other Philadelphia textile workers, have always had a reputation for being very "independent." In the old days, both organized and unorganized shops stopped work frequently to force adjustment of grievances. It is said by some that the unorganized shops had more stoppages and walkouts than the organized shops. Shop meetings were often called during working hours to discuss some important grievance. When knitters came to work in the morning they would feel the machines to see whether they thought they were too cold or too hot to work properly. I f too cold or too hot, they might walk out.4 If there was no ice water for drinking purposes in hot weather, they might walk out. Knitters can remember seeing superintendents walking hastily up the street with small express wagons for ice. Other grievances than weather conditions f o r which walkouts were reported are questions relating to yarn shortage, holidays, weekly payment, and fines for bad work. As late as 1 9 2 0 the executive board of the Philadelphia local, asked one shop to " s h o w more consideration before walking out under yarn conditions." Again in 1 9 2 6 , the floor of one shop was summoned before the executive board for "walking out because they had no ice water." T h e steps by which a more orderly procedure for handling grievances was worked out are of particular interest f o r those who think that industrial relations in the textile industries are difficult, if not impossible, to stabilize. T h e first step in the process occurred when shops met to vote on whether they would walk out or not in an attempt to secure settlement of some dispute. Standing shop committees to discuss grievances were appointed by the local branch of the union in 1 9 1 3 . These were later elected by the shop * Knitters say that the old German and early Reading knitting; machines, which were common in the industry at this period, were more subject to unf a v o r a b l e temperature conditions than are the modern machines.

82

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

associations, and came to have considerable power in the industry. F o r a period, roughly from 1 9 1 3 to 1 9 2 1 , they had more power than the local executive officers. Union dues were collected by shop collectors. A l l price negotiations, holiday, overtime, and shift negotiations, as well as other shop grievances, were originally handled by individual shop committees. T h e manufacturers aided each other by refusing to settle or discuss certain grievances or negotiations with the union while one shop was on strike, or until the price on certain grades of goods was settled. Eventually the executive board of the local branch and the business agent came to have the power of approving all shop negotiations and settlements of shop disputes, and later more power in initiating legislation or negotiation on major questions. This was not gained without a struggle, however, and the local officers sometimes made themselves v e r y unpopular with members of particular shops. Afterwards, a permanent price committee and local conference committees undertook wage negotiations until these were taken over by the national organization. During this period of extensive power in the shop committees with differing shop rules in different factories, the union necessarily depended upon strict internal discipline for the enforcement of the rules. T h e early records of the union are, therefore, filled with references to fines for not attending meetings, refusing to pay assessments, or not abiding by the rules of the organization. In the last category, fines for paying helpers more than the union scale, fines for working overtime without extra pay, and fines for working too early or staying late are most frequent. T h e shops experienced considerable difficulty in preventing members from working early or late, or during the lunch period. T h e i r attempt to regulate this, however, led to what are now admitted to be ridiculous extremes. One might cite, as an example, the case of a knitter who was fined five dollars by the shop committee for not dropping a pulley he held for a machine fixer at the minute the whistle blew. This case

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

83

marks the climax of extremity in internal union discipline in the shop. T h e executive board of the local union reversed the decision, and ordered that all shop rules must thereafter be approved by the local executive board. T h e strike or lockout of 1 9 2 1 makes a convenient dividing point in the local union's history on many counts. F o r immediate purposes, it marks the end of the old type of more or less undisciplined shop control. T h e manufacturers then insisted that the local union assume responsibility for the action of its members. In 1 9 2 0 the local branch had passed a regulation that all shop rules must be ratified by the local meeting. L a t e r a movement for uniform shop rules in the Philadelphia area resulted in the standard rules drawn up in 1 9 2 5 which still govern shops in this market. T h e rapid expansion of the industry in the period following 1 9 2 2 broke up the old shop groups as knitters left to go into new mills. A f t e r the local union had secured new headquarters, shop meetings were held at the headquarters rather than in the shops. As the industry grew, the problems necessitated experienced handling by business agents who made it a full-time job. A l l of these factors combined to decrease the power of the shop committees and to increase the power of the local, and later, the national officers. At the present time, shop committees are elected by shop associations, although their organization may differ from shop to shop. Usually there is a representative from each department in the mill. While the knitters' committee, representing the largest and most skilled occupation in the industry, is the most important group, representatives of other departments, especially where girls are employed, are beginning to take a more active part in shop negotiations. T h e number of shop disputes per week or per month varies with the size and the equipment of the mills, the personnel of the employing and employed groups, and trade conditions at the time. T h e last step in the development of machinery for stabilizing industrial relations in the union mills in the industry

84

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

was taken in 1929 w h e n the first national agreement was signed. T h i s provides that there shall be no stoppages, strikes, or lockouts in union mills during the l i f e of the agreement. A l l disputes that cannot be settled in a shop are referred for adjudication to the officials of the union and the manufacturers' association. In case they do not come to an agreement, the question is referred to an impartial chairman w h o must decide any case referred to him in a period not longer than ten days. H i s compensation and expenses are borne jointly by the union and the manufacturers' association. Cases are, therefore, referred to one impartial chairman f r o m hosiery mills all over the country and his decision in one area is binding in other areas. A l t h o u g h this method of settling disputes has been tried in other industries, such as the needle trades and the coal industry, it has not been extensively tried in the textile industries. T h e only experiment of this kind in the silk ribbon w e a v i n g industry in N e w Y o r k was short-lived. A l l of these other experiments have been on a local or market rather than a national scale. O n e important effect of this new procedure has been the decline in ill-feeling on the part of both the union and the manufacturers when the results have gone against them. I n the early days, old " g r u d g e s " to be settled frequently took precedence over the merits of particular cases in dispute. T h i s method, therefore, works with less friction and is considered successful by both the manufacturers and the union. In the words of the shop, there are f e w e r " a r g u m e n t s . " T H E E V O L U T I O N OF S H O P AND T R A D E

CUSTOM

T h e gradual accumulation of settlements of individual shop grievance questions by means of the various types of machinery just described came eventually to have the force of shop custom in the industry. Omitting, temporarily, questions relating to control of the labor supply (which w i l l be given detailed consideration l a t e r ) , such shop custom regulated the f o l l o w i n g matters of shop discipline and control of work:

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

R i g h t o f w o r k e r t o i n d i v i d u a l m a c h i n e or Seniority

in p r o m o t i o n

Division o f

t o best

work-place.

machine.

work.

Penalties f o r bad work and shop

discipline.

Restriction o f output and the introduction o f

machinery.

T h e r i g h t of the w o r k e r or crews of workers to a particular machine or w o r k p l a c e , and the right of the oldest knitter, other things

b e i n g equal, to the best or

newest

knitting machine in the shop, have a p p a r e n t l y been r e c o g n i z e d as shop custom f r o m the inception of the industry in P h i l a d e l p h i a . I n a recent case c o m i n g before the executive board of B r a n c h # i , it w a s decided that the union could not enforce the principle of seniority rights to the detriment of the efficient m a n a g e m e n t of the shop. In the particular case at issue, a m a n w h o h a d been only three months in the shop w a s p r o m o t e d to a n e w f o o t e r o v e r other men of l o n g e r terms of service. T h e firm contended that he was the best knitter in the shop, and a f t e r considerable discussion of the case, he was a l l o w e d to stay. T h e principle of division of w o r k is less i m p o r t a n t in the knitting than in the

finishing

departments of t h e mills. E q u a l division of w o r k in the knitting d e p a r t m e n t s , in the nature of the case, is l i m i t e d f o r knitters and toppers b y the g a u g e s and equipment of machines and t h e rights of workers to individual machines. In the auxiliary d e p a r t m e n t s , h o w e v e r , several cases of a l l e g e d unfair distribution of w o r k h a v e f u l l y established t h e principle of e q u a l division of w o r k . Recent cases coming bef o r e the impartial chairman have established the principle, f u r t h e r , that union firms m a y not divert

finishing

w o r k to

outside n o n - u n i o n shops w h e n there are union workers and idle e q u i p m e n t capable of d o i n g the w o r k in their

own

plants. 5 P o s s i b l y t h e most interesting d e v e l o p m e n t in shop custom was the b r e a k d o w n of fining b y e m p l o y e r s f o r bad w o r k . F r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g of the union, the knitters maintained t h a t bad w o r k must be h e l d for

had

investigation

s Decisions o f the i m p a r t i a l c h a i r m a n o f the f u l l - f a s h i o n e d hosiery i n d u s t r y , Series B , # 1 1 , 12 ¡ Series F , # 2 9 .

86

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

by the shop committee. In 1 9 1 2 the principle obtained that the knitters w o u l d not accept responsibility for bad w o r k which had been d y e d and finished (unless the fault showed unusual carelessness in the knitting process). In the same year, the local branch m o v e d that " t h e firm is to n o t i f y a man doing bad work, and then if he continues to do bad w o r k , to discharge h i m . " A l t h o u g h some time elapsed before this regulation was enforced in all shops, it came to be the accepted policy of the union. E m p l o y e r s could no longer force workers to b u y work on which some mistake had occurred, nor could they fine workers. T h e y w o u l d hesitate to discharge them, especially if there were a scarcity of trained workers in the knitting departments, as frequently happened during this period. A f t e r the 1920 strike, w h e n the union had to make good its claims that union workers were more efficient and could do better work than nonunion workers, local and shop officers discussed the elimination of bad work and ways of improving workmanship. I n one instance the executive board endorsed a shop association r u l i n g to penalize a knitter who made a "bad s e t " and did not show it to the foreman. In another instance the union expelled a member for throwing away bad work. T h i s automatically resulted in his discharge and was an important object-lesson in the adoption of the new policies. It is estimated b y the local union that possibly a dozen cases of discharge f o r poor workmanship have occurred during the ten years prior to 1930, certainly not more than that number. A f e w cases of discharge for carelessness or defective work have recently come 'before the impartial chairman.® In one case of the discharge of a pairer for passing very defective w o r k at the point of final examination, the discharge was sustained on grounds similar to those prevailing in the men's clothing trade cases. H e r e the firm's right to determine standards of final examination is w e l l established. E m p l o y e r s have 'Decisions of the impartial chairman of the full-fashioned hosiery dustry, series Β # i 8 , series D #3, Series E, ff 1, 3, 14, 19, 24.

in-

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

87

also been sustained in the right to lay off hosiery workers temporarily as a penalty for defective workmanship. T h e present policy of the union with regard to poor w o r k manship has gone even further by the initiation of a program of waste elimination. T h e reasons for the development of this program were well expressed in the words of the secretary at the 1925 convention: I am a firm believer that this industry is just as much ours, i f not more so, than it is our employers'. . . . A union man is e x pected to be above a non-union man in ability to make the best f a b r i c that it is possible to make.

A n d on another occasion: T h e union, f o r some time past, has, through a series of developments, come to recognize the need f o r assuming more efficient operation in the mills w h e r e its members w e r e e m p l o y e d . . . . In one instance the president o f the Philadelphia branch spent several weeks in a local m i l l as a sort o f production manager. A f t e r painstaking efforts in the plant and a series o f conferences w i t h the m e n , the union president succeeded in e f f e c t i n g considerable reduction in wastage o f expensive silk and in increasing the output o f perfect work.7

A high point in the union's program to assume greater responsibility with regard to management problems was reached in 1927 when a former official of the union was asked to speak before the T a y l o r Society on the subject o f waste elimination. O n this occasion he stressed the fact that full-fashioned hosiery was a product in which quality and style rather than price were the important selling factors, and that it was a sound economic policy for a union in such an industry to be interested in waste elimination and maintenance of quality. 8 W h i l e these conditions are less true of the present period when price has become a dominant selling factor, the union still retains its pride of craftsmanship and interest in quality production. I t may be said with regard to other questions of shop dis' W i l l i a m Smith, "Hosiery Workers' New Agreement," TextiU January 1 9 3 1 , p. 629. " Geiges, "Waste Elimination in Full-fashioned Hosiery," Taylor Bulletin, January 1927, p. 410.

Worker, Society

88

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

cipline that the union has always refused to handle cases of workers discharged for proved theft, cheating, throwing away yarn, and similar causes. Under the present agreement, past policy is followed in the provision that the employer has " t h e right to employ or discharge any worker in accordance with the necessity of his or its business, provided in the case of discharge f r o m employment, such discharge is in good faith and without discrimination against union workers." It is interesting to note that there seem to be few cases of discharge in the hosiery industry in contrast to the large number coming before impartial chairmen in the needle trades. T h i s discrepancy may be the result of differences in nationality and temperament in the employing and working groups in the textile industries as contrasted with the needle trades. It is probably the result of a difference in the scale of operations and in the degree of seasonality of operation in the industries. A s the clauses of the agreement concerning "hiring and firing" have come to be interpreted, a firm must give p r e f erence in hiring to union members, and must reëmploy former employees after a temporary shut-down, even when more competent union workers are available. Further than that, under the present closed shop arrangement, the manufacturers may place no obstacles in the way of the complete organization of all workers in their plants and must discharge workers who refuse to join the union. Another feature of shop or trade custom which is usually of great importance in a unionized industry is the question of restriction of output by workers and the attitude taken by the union to the introduction of machinery. Although no settled policy of restricting output was generally enforced by hosiery workers in the period before 1 9 2 0 , the shops undoubtedly had such policies when production of fairly staple styles was characteristic. This was, however, unofficial shop policy. T h e r e are just two instances of charges preferred against members of the local for "handing in too much work in one day as being detrimental to the trade."

THE HOSIERY

WORKERS

89

A f t e r 1 9 2 0 , with the introduction of new high-speed machines of more sections and finer g a u g e , the new variety of work broke up the old " s t a n d a r d s " of production and the policy of restricting output was less consciously pursued. R e striction of output had had, in addition, the drawback of developing, among the manufacturers, the policy of discharging workers who could not maintain the maximum " s t a n d a r d . " G r a d u a l l y the attitude of the union toward the policy of restriction of output changed. T h e newer method was to restrict hours of work rather than individual production. T h e reasons f o r this change of policy were succinctly explained by the president of the P h i l a d e l p h i a branch of the union when he was a delegate to the 1 9 2 7 convention: T h e old idea o f restricting production is the w r o n g t h e o r y f o r m a n y reasons. O n e is that you give w o r k to the n o n - u n i o n shops. Y o u create the influx o f m a c h i n e r y that o f t i m e s leads to o v e r d e v e l o p m e n t in the industry. . . . T h e w a y to regulate production is not by restricting it but by r e g u l a t i n g hours.

In addition to changing its old policy of restricting output, the union has gone even further in a constructive program by cooperating in time and effort studies f o r the adequate determination of rates and standards of production under the national agreements of 1 9 2 9 and 1 9 3 0 . T h e r e has been no major change in the knitting process, although considerable improvements have taken place in the length, speed, and fineness of gauge of the machines and in the introduction of additional equipment. M a n y employers contend that the improved machine has so changed the character of the work that an intelligent boy can be trained to do knitting in less than a year, although the union maintains its four-year apprenticeship period. Certainly less skill is required today than in the early days of the industry. T h e r e has been some discussion of a new machine which would knit the entire stocking in one continuous process, thereby eliminating the present skilled process of topping which now constitutes an intermediate step between the knitting of the l e g and the foot. T h i s has, however, not been d e v e l o p e d

90

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

to a practicable stage as yet. Other technological improvements are in process of development which threaten to reduce still further the skill required in the knitting process. T h e one hosiery operation in which the introduction of machinery has been an important factor, up to this time, is boarding. M e n boarders who worked on wooden forms were exclusively employed in union hosiery mills in Philadelphia and other old centers of the industry in its earlier stages. T h e metal forms came into the Philadelphia industry in 1 9 1 7 - 1 8 . Still later the Proctor Dryers or " f l y i n g machines," as the boarders called them, came into the industry. During the long 1 9 2 1 strike the boarders were out several months longer than the knitters and lost a larger number of union firms than the other group. At that time, some of the shops which broke away from the boarders' union eliminated their finishing departments entirely, or began introducing women on the metal forms at considerably lower rates of pay. T h e boarders say that they would have been willing to try out the metal forms at the same rates of pay, but were unwilling to take lower rates. T h e boarders' union made the mistake that numerous craft unions have made in similar circumstances. Because women were introduced at the lower rates, the union came to object to women's doing the work. Several strikes were called on this issue and lost. F o r many years the boarders' union refused to accept women members. A f t e r 1 9 2 7 , however, the boarders' local in Philadelphia attempted to retrieve lost ground. It undertook to organize all workers in the finishing departments, both men and women, and endeavored to secure uniform rates of pay for men and women doing the same kind of work. Differentials on work on the metal forms were accepted at this time. T h e boarders' local joined the Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers and was included in the negotiation of later national agreements, which provided for the closed shop in all departments of union mills. Shop grievances and shop custom in the early period of the union's history concerned questions analogous to those

THE

HOSIERY

91

WORKERS

raised in cases coming before the impartial chairman today. T h e s e deal with such problems as equal division of work, hours of work, shop discipline, diversion of work from union to non-union plants, and the " r i g h t s " of the parties to the collective agreement. M o r e than half of the cases arising in the period f r o m September 1929, when impartial chairmanship machinery was inaugurated, to December 1 9 3 1 , deal with adjustments of wage rates. T h i s is a natural development in a piecework industry, in which many types of product and considerable variations in yarn and equipment prevail. In the early days, it required a strike or the threat of a strike (individual, shop, or local) on the part of the union to secure adjustment of shop grievances. T h e n as now, some were very real grievances; others were customary protests. T h e n as now, manufacturers had grievances concerning the care of equipment and the quality of workmanship and the maintenance of shop discipline. T h e evolution of shop and trade custom in the course of years, furthered by the development of the impartial chairmanship machinery, has resulted in an extensive body of "common l a w " in the f u l l fashioned hosiery industry. T h e j o b security offered union hosiery workers and the stabilized labor relations and skilled workmanship secured to union hosiery manufacturers as a result of this development are important elements in the success of collective bargaining in the industry. POLICIES

TO

CONTROL

THE

LABOR

SUPPLY

OF

KNITTERS

Full-fashioned hosiery workers attempted to control the labor supply of knitters by regulating the number of machines a knitter could run, the number of apprentices or helpers to be trained, and the length of their apprenticeship. T h e first union policy of importance in this connection was the attempt to eliminate the " d o u b l e - j o b " system which had originated in the Philadelphia market. It is the recollection of knitters w h o have had a long experience in the trade that the doubling-up of machines in Philadelphia began about 1903, w h e n there was considerable importation of

92

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

machines from Germany and a recognized shortage of trained knitters. H i g h e r earnings were also possible for knitters on double jobs. T w o , and in some cases three or four, leggers would be run by a knitter and helpers, and frequently two or more footers were run by one knitter. These machines were short-section machines as compared with the knitting machines of today. From the very beginning of the activities of the nucleus of knitters who organized Local #706, Branch #1 of the Full-Fashioned H o s iery Workers, there was protest against the double-job system. In October 1910, the local union passed a ruling that " a l l brothers must refuse to run two footers." It took some time, however, for the singling up of footers to become general, because in March 1912 there is a record of men being discharged for refusing to run two footers. T h e objective of this program was not only to eliminate the surplus group of helpers being trained in the trade, but also to divide the work among the available workers in the industry. As the footers were singled, the large number of helpers remaining in the Philadelphia industry required some special provision. T h e policy was adopted of having helpers on single footers, although footers in other areas did not have helpers. A t this time a period of four years was required for apprenticeship. T h e next step in the movement for singling machines was taken in March 1913 when a ruling was passed that " m e n on black ingrain are not to work more than one machine hereafter." D y e d silk yarn was a new material at this time and the bulk of production was still cotton and wool hosiery. During 1 9 1 4 the attempt was continued to single all machines working on silk. T h e union, in dealing with a wellestablished condition in the trade such as the double-job system, followed the policy of gradual change by checking its spread as the introduction of new materials or new machines gave opportunity. In November 1 9 1 8 a recommendation was made to the union that, in the future, " n o single jobs be doubled and no new machines be started as double

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

93

jobs." In December of the same year, the union ruled that "in the future, all idle legger jobs should be started as single jobs, except for veterans returning to old double jobs." During the period from 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 9 , when the drive to single machines was well under way, the Philadelphia knitters had split into two groups. One group, known as Branch #14, was affiliated with the Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers, but not affiliated with the United Textile Workers and the general labor movement. Branch #14 controlled three shops in the city which made ingrain silk work for the most part, operated on the "single j o b " basis. T h e branches of the federation outside of Philadelphia also operated on a single-job basis for a variety of reasons, chief among which was the fact that they too made ingrain silk hosiery. T h e other manufacturers in Philadelphia made gum silk (thrown silk) hosiery and cotton and woolen hosiery. The rivalry between the two union groups in Philadelphia centered, to some extent, on the single-job system. Local #706 of the United Textile Workers controlled nine shops in the hosiery manufacturers' association and several "independent" shops and had as large a membership as the federation branches all over the country. B y 1 9 1 9 the manufacturers' association had agreed that they would not double up any new machines in the Philadelphia area. In the f a l l of that year, a union ruling was passed that "double jobs which were run: as single jobs must stay single, unless the shop committee was notified that the change was to be temporary." During the same year the union ruled that men starting new machines as double jobs were to be expelled from the union. By gradual encroachment of control, therefore, the union worked its way toward the single-job system. In order to secure its objective the union tried to equalize the total labor cost on single and double machines by allowing no differential in rates. T h e long strike (technically a lockout) in 1 9 2 1 interrupted the drive for the single-job system. Although there was cooperation between the two rival union groups, several

94

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

shops were lost during the strike and the union found itself faced with the necessity of handling the problem of double jobs started by strikebreakers, who later came into the union, and an increase in the number of double jobs in the shops where they had lost control. During 1 9 2 2 there was considerable discussion of this problem. B y this time, the rival union factions had adjusted their differences, and Local #706 joined the Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers, and the federation affiliated with the United T e x tile Workers. Both groups united in an effort to solve this problem in the Philadelphia market. T h e drive for the single-job system would have been successful if the industry had not expanded so rapidly in the period following 1 9 2 3 . M a n y mills opened in the nonunion areas around Philadelphia and Reading, operating on a double-machine basis, with one knitter supervising the work of unskilled helpers on two or more knitting machines. B y 1 9 2 6 the fight against the double-machine system was no longer limited to Philadelphia but had become a problem of national scope. M a n y members of the union felt that it threatened the very existence of the union in the long run, because too many knitters were being trained for the jobs available in a normal period of production. In each national convention after 1 9 2 6 considerable attention was given to the discussion of this problem, and the national union undertook an extensive publicity campaign to acquaint the public with the issues at stake in the controversy. E x cerpts from the address of the vice-president at the 1 9 2 7 convention give an excellent picture of the situation as the union leaders viewed it. A s you know, d u r i n g the past y e a r at least t w e n t y shops have started in this vicinity [ P h i l a d e l p h i a ] and all of them on an open shop basis. M a n y e f f o r t s are m a d e by the n e w e r e l e m e n t — b y that I mean both e m p l o y e r and e m p l o y e e — t o tear d o w n the standards established in this industry. . . . I n these shops men are w i l l i n g to work any number of hours. T h e y are w i l l i n g to accept a double s h i f t without any extra compensation. T h e y are w i l l i n g to work

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

95

o v e r t i m e without any extra compensation. T h e y operate two machines at a l o w e r rate. . . . W h i l e w e are concerned about the south and w h i l e w e are interested in m a n y o f the open shop centers, yet I f e e l that P h i l a d e l p h i a is g o i n g to be the battle g r o u n d if any serious changes are to be m a d e in the industry in so f a r as standards are concerned. . . . L e t us not lose sight o f the conditions that prevail in the industry. L e t us r e m e m b e r that w e are in a competitive industry and that w e can o n l y succeed p r o v i d e d the e m p l o y e r f o r w h o m w e work is successful. . . . T h e m a n u f a c t u r e r s have figures to prove that they can get out a better quality o f work and more o f it on some of their double j o b s than they can on some o f the single jobs. . . . T h e y say that the m a c h i n e r y is easier to operate than it was a f e w years ago. . . . T h e argument presented is this: that if the two-machine system is a more efficient method o f operation then neither this organization nor any organization that e v e r has or may exist can overcome it. . . .

T h e union's main objection to the new system of operation centered on the fact that it made of knitting a " b l i n d a l l e y " job for helpers, that it therefore became impossible to regulate apprenticeship or the number of men entering the trade. T h e sequel to an oversupply of knitters would naturally be a breakdown of the wage and hour standards in the industry and eventually of the union organization. T h e union contended, too, that the system made machine operators instead of mechanics. Other objections put forth by the union emphasized the fact that the double-machine system was not economical in the operation of certain types of jobs, and that considerable waste resulted from it. It pointed out that the producers of knitting machines were naturally interested in the multiple-machine system because it w o r e out the machines faster than the older method. T h e i r program for combating the rapid extension of the system emphasized the necessity of efficiency on single jobs, as expressed by the president of the federation at the convention in 1 9 2 8 : T h e o n l y t h i n g f o r us to do is to really show in actual practice, in dozens o f hosiery, that over a period o f time, production is better and quality superior in a single-machine shop than in a two-machine shop. W e must actually e l i m i n a t e waste so that the m a n u f a c t u r e r

96

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

w i l l find his overhead and material costs going down. W e must, in all shops, where union workers are employed, bring down the percentage of seconds and spoiled work to a minimum. T h e singlemachine system is the most efficient if we make it so.

It was also in the 1928 convention of the union that considerable discussion took place upon the question of the ratio of helpers to knitters in the trade. Philadelphia was found to have more helpers than the other areas because helpers had been put on footers when these were singled in the earlier days of the union. It was estimated that there were about 900 helpers to 4,500 knitters in Philadelphia at this time. Other areas had a smaller ratio of one helper to ten knitters. There were usually no helpers on footers in the other markets. In the 1928 convention a resolution was passed to adopt a national policy of working toward the ratio of one helper to ten knitters. T w o strikes in Philadelphia called on the issue of the double-machine system at the Brownhill & Kramer and E m meth mills, in 1926 and 1928 respectively, were lost. Strikes called on other issues at the Rodgers and Quaker mills were lost, and were later followed by an introduction of the double-job system. An intensive organizing campaign in the Philadelphia area during these years brought more members into the union, but failed to check the spread of the two-machine system. B y 1929, the union was forced to concede that it could not control or check this new method of operation, and would have to make concessions to union employers in order to allow them to compete in the market against goods made in non-union mills where all standards of working conditions were much lower than in union mills. A special convention was called to consider the important question of how the union would face the problem of non-union competition of more than half of the total production in the country. Union mills in Philadelphia in particular were demanding drastic wage cuts and the double-machine system, and threatening to move out of the city. It was agreed at this convention that

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

97

knitters should take a reduction, on " e x t r a s , " although the basic knitting rates were to remain the same. T h e experiment of doubling 25 per cent of the total machine equipment in a factory was to be a l l o w e d (but only in the 39- and 4 2 - g a u g e up to and including 20-section e q u i p m e n t ) . Certain provisions protected the union members f r o m being discharged to enable the manufacturer to effect this change. T h i s was the first agreement to be negotiated on a nation-wide scale and was signed by 52 employers controlling 4,000 machines. T h e 1930 agreement extended the percentage of equipment which might be d o u b l e d in an effort to reduce labor costs without materially disturbing the levels of earnings of knitters on a f u l l - t i m e basis. 9 T h e manufacturers, faced with the problem of manufacturing a cheaper product, introduced the new system as rapidly as possible to take advantage of the lower rate on the double j o b . T h i s caused considerable disruption of older working arrangements such as shifts, work crews, location and number o f . helpers, and production and earnings of all workers. M a n y new helpers were introduced in the markets outside of Philadelphia. In P h i l a d e l p h i a , on the other hand, helpers w e r e shifted f r o m single footers to double leggers. T h e widespread introduction of the system in 1930 and 1931 took place at the same time as general u n e m p l o y ment was increasing because of the decline of business prosperity, and a large number of hosiery workers therefore became u n e m p l o y e d . T h e r e is some question w h e t h e r the double-machine system in union mills had a fair trial. Some employers contend that the union placed obstacles in the w a y of its successful operation. M e m b e r s of the P h i l a d e l p h i a branch of the union assert that it succeeded only w h e r e the best knitters and knitter-helpers o f considerable experience w e r e at work. Some contend that there should not have been differential " T h e complete texts of the 1929 and 1910 national agreements w i l l be found in the appendix sections of T a y l o r , The Full-Fashioned Hosiery Worker.

98

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

rates between single and double jobs, in order that those knitters who could not run two machines might not be forced out of the industry, and to take care of certain types of work more efficiently produced as a single job. T h e r e is reason to believe that on work which has many extras, for example, the cost of the increase in idle machine time for the manufacturer more than offsets the saving effected by the lower double-machine rate. M a n y workers say that it is a physical impossibility to work two knitting machines efficiently. A s a result of considerable agitation in the local unions during 1931, a movement was inaugurated to return to the single-job system. Many workers believed that a mistake had been made in giving up the principle of the single-job system in order that the individual knitter's earnings might not suffer from the wage reductions negotiated in the earlier agreement. It was recognized that in the non-union shops where union control was impossible there were large numbers of helpers being trained in the trade in any case. T h e labor supply of knitters in an area like Philadelphia, for example, is already larger than the production demands for a normal period. 10 T h e knitters are younger, on the average, than many other textile workers, and face a lifetime experience in the trade. T h e possibility of a shrinking labor market in hosiery such as we find in other textile industries, because of the bankruptcy and financial reorganization of Philadelphia firms, not to mention possible changes in technological improvements of equipment in the industry, looms menacingly on the horizon. T h e union therefore decided to reverse its position on the two-machine system. T h e return to the single-job system was accomplished only by granting major price concessions to the manufacturers on the single-machine rate in the 1931 agreement. This was done in the middle of the year during which the agreement was in operation. It is the hope of the union leaders that if it should ever become necessary to adjust to " It was estimated that there were 5,000 surplus knitters in the Philadelphia market early in 1931. Daily Nevis Record-, February i 6 , 1931, p. 17.

THE

HOSIERY

99

WORKERS

the double-machine system again, that time will come when there is less general unemployment and unemployed knitters can secure jobs in other trades more easily than they could in 1 9 3 1 . THE

E V O L U T I O N OF T H E W A G E

SCALE

T h e evolution of the wage scale in any union industry is an important aspect o f union policy. T h i s development in the full-fashioned hosiery industry has received such detailed treatment in a recently published study that only the important steps in the process which indicate m a j o r changes in union attitudes, or points not previously covered, will be mentioned here. 1 1 T h e analysis of the method of wage payment and scale of negotiations is as important as the question of the l e v e l s of wages in any understanding of union tactics and policy. L i k e other textile industries, the hosiery industry pays according to a piecework w a g e scale for all m a j o r occupations. A s in other textile trades, also, it is probable that the E n g lish piecework w a g e scales were used as the basis of the Philadelphia hosiery price lists when these were originally developed. T h e present basis of payment for the knitting operations appears to be the same as in the earliest days of the Philadelphia industry. A " s t a n d a r d " rate for a "standa r d " knitting machine of a certain size and equipment, running at a " s t a n d a r d " rate o f speed to make hosiery of specified fineness of yarn, is agreed upon as the base rate. A n y variation f r o m this " s t a n d a r d " is accompanied by a d i f ferential rate, a l l o w i n g more compensation for more difficult work and less compensation for less difficult work. T h u s , like other textile piecework price lists, the hosiery scale is literally a book of rates a p p l y i n g to all the known variables in the fineness of the yarn and the size and g a u g e of the machine, with " e x t r a s " f o r the making of picots, stripes, special heels, lace clocks, and other features of style in hosiery. T h e variables in such an industry, however, change u

Taylor, The Full-Fashioned

Hosiery Worker, Chap. III.

100

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

rapidly. Improvements in machine equipment add more sections to the machine, finer gauges, and higher speeds, and equipment for making fancy tops or heels. N o v e l t y goods are put on the market each season and special adjustments in rates have to be made to take care of new materials and new styles. M i l l s in a given area, such as P h i l a d e l p h i a , differ w i d e l y in the variety of equipment they use and the types of product manufactured. W a g e rate questions are, therefore, of continuing interest in the industry. T h e method by which such questions have been settled in the industry has passed through an interesting evolution. In the early period of the union's development, all negotiations with employers were handled by the shop committees for individual shops. I f the committee was unable to secure what they considered to be a fair price for a new type of goods, they w o u l d "strike the j o b " by taking off all workers making the same grade of goods or w o r k i n g on the same g a u g e of machine. Sometimes this affected only one or two knitters. W h i l e they were on strike for the price, no other knitter might run their machines. I f the manufacturers thought that the price of a particular grade of goods was too high, they w o u l d notify the shop committee or the union that they intended to discontinue the manufacture of that particular line unless an adjustment were made. T h e manufacturers' association, w h e n it was f o r m e d , improved upon this method by refusing to discuss certain questions with the union until a wage adjustment had been made in a particular shop or until a shop strike had been settled. F r o m 1 9 i o to 1920, the local executive board set minimum knitters' rates in the industry after examining samples submitted by the shop committees. Knitter members of the union were then instructed not to w o r k under the minimum union rate. D u r i n g most of this period a wide range of rates existed between shops in the P h i l a d e l p h i a area and many mills paid above the minimum union rate. A l t h o u g h price list committees had existed in the union f r o m 1 9 1 2 on, an active demand for a uniform price list for

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

101

all mills in the city did not get under way until 1 9 2 0 . T h e depression of that period caused the manufacturers to become interested in equalizing labor costs in the Philadelphia mills and to demand uniform rates. T h e union had found that in a period of rising prices it was easier to secure wage increases for certain operations by obtaining them first in one or two shops and later bringing other shops up to that standard. In an expanding and prosperous industry, in which there is a shortage of skilled workers, manufacturers bid against each other by offering increases in wage rates and thus gradually raise the entire level of rates in the area. T h i s method had apparently proved successful in hosiery, for wage increases in knitters' rates on staple service-weight hosiery approximated 90 per cent in the period between 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 2 0 and 20 per cent between 1 9 2 0 and 1 9 2 8 . On chiffon hosiery, wage rates increased 90 per cent between 1 9 2 0 and 1 9 2 8 . U n i f o r m wage rates for most occupations were not obtaihed in the Philadelphia area until 1 9 2 8 . B y 1 9 2 4 , agitation was under way to secure uniform wage rates on a national scale. As there had been considerable variation in rates between the mills in Philadelphia, there was also variation in rate levels between Philadelphia and the other districts of the country in which full-fashioned hosiery was produced. U n i f o r m rates for knitters and leggers were obtained on a national scale in 1 9 2 9 , and for most of the other occupations in 1 9 3 0 and 1 9 3 1 , when the so-called "national agreements" were negotiated. A change in the competitive position of union mills when the industry became overexpanded brought pressure from union manfacturers for a more flexible wage scale and lower wage rates. A n attempt by the union to lower labor costs by the doubling of machines was not successful as far as the workers were concerned because of the severe unemployment crisis in the textile trades and other industries. W a g e rates were eventually reduced in a series of negotiations in the years following 1 9 2 8 . These reductions averaged about 5 0 per cent f r o m the highest rates to the 1 9 3 2 wage

102

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

level. 1 2 T h e reduction in labor costs f o l l o w i n g these reductions in rates must have been f u l l y as great proportionately. Additional reductions in labor costs w e r e secured by the elimination of footers' helpers and of a differential rate for the operation of more than one shift. T h i s program of rapid retreat on the part of a militant, progressive union was not easily effected. W i t h each yearly convention to discuss the competitive position of union mills and union workers, the union reviewed its history and its relative strength in the industry in the light of current developments. T h e r e was considerable discussion, each time, of whether the past year's agreement had benefited the union and whether district or national w a g e scales were better adapted to the situation. M o s t of the discussion centered on whether the union should strike f o r improved conditions, endeavor to maintain the status quo, or negotiate another wage cut. It was pointed out in the 1929 convention that the national union had expended three millions in strike pay since 1 9 1 4 , in addition to strike expenditures by local branches and organizing expenditures by both local and national offices. T h e president said at the time: W e have lost rather than g a i n e d in c o n t r o l o f the i n d u s t r y ; it is t i m e to t r y s o m e t h i n g else besides

fighting.

A n d again: We

are not

wages, to

fight

in a position

to

fight

f o r hours, or to

fight

fight

for

f o r a n y t h i n g else e x c e p t

for

conditions,

to

for

" On a zo-section, 4-thread chiffon, 42-gauge, all silk picot edge, curved French heel operation, prices per dozen are as f o l l o w s : Operation

Legging Footing (plated foot) Topping Looping Seaming Boarding (metal forms)

(rçiS)

$1 60 .52 .38 .19 .25 .21

Rale

$

77 .22, .22 .10 ,13 .11

Reduction

SI-9 57 7 42.1 47-4 48.0 47 6

Figures supplied by M r . B e n j a m i n Jacobs, T r e a s u r e r o f the Minisac M i l l s , and M r . E m i l Rieve, President o f the Federation o f Full-Fashioned Hosiery W o r k e r s . A v e r a g e annual earnings o f union hosiery w o r k e r s w h o w o r k e d 48 weeks in 1929 ranged f r o m $1,071 to $1,361 f o r girls and f r o m $1,665 to $3,965 f o r men. T a y l o r , The Full-Fashioned Hosiery Worker, Chapter I V .

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

103

the maintenance of our organization. Probably on this convention hinges the whole question of whether a year from today there will be a convention of full-fashioned hosiery workers or not.

In the 1 9 3 1 convention, delegates pointed out that there was no precedent in labor history to support the idea that a labor union could maintain its position by reducing wages as drastically as the new agreement contemplated. But it was also pointed out that the maintenance of high wage levels did not keep unions alive either, and that, on the contrary, such a policy was usually disastrous. T h e proposals of the 1 9 3 1 - 3 2 agreement which allowed the greatest rate reductions met the greatest opposition. T o counterbalance these concessions, the manufacturers agreed to the check-off system of dues payment and to the prohibition of the contracting-out of work f r o m union to non-union mills. T h e y agreed also to guarantee certain minimum weekly rates, $ 2 0 for knitters, $ 1 6 for boarders, and $ 1 2 for other piecework operators. In addition, the manufacturers agreed to submit a certified statement of earnings f o r each six months' period, and to revise rates upwards if average profits in the industry exceeded six per cent during the l i f e of the agreement. 1 3 It was the hope of the union leaders that such drastic wage cuts as were involved in this agreement would precipitate reductions in non-union mills which would create a demand on the part of non-union workers to become organized. Both the union and the manufacturers expected that this action would force non-union manufacturers to join in a program for stabilization of the industry under penalty of loss of position in the competitive market. T h e stabilization of the industry thus became indirectly an objective of union policy. Whether these hopes were chimerical or not, it was anticipated that the agreement would give enough advantage to union manufacturers to enable them to compete more e f fectively in the market and thus secure more employment to union hosiery workers than they had had in recent years. " F o r the f u l l text of the 1 9 3 1 agreement, see Appendix A.

104

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

S T R I K E AND ORGANIZING TACTICS

Union policies for establishing job security in the shop and controlling the labor supply of knitters were successful only so long as the hosiery workers' union controlled a greater part of the industry. As one speaker in the 1928 national convention said, " W e can speak of policies until doomsday, but unless we can induce the workers to see the need for unionism and collective action, we are at the mercy of every economic current." Many obstacles to the rapid spread of organization among hosiery workers developed in the period from 1920 to 1 9 3 1 . These have been mentioned earlier, but should be restated here for emphasis. T h e first difficulty arose when the industry expanded at an unusually high rate of speed in districts where no labor movement existed and where labor was notoriously "cheap." In union centers or in places where the union showed some success in organization work, the employers adopted tactics designed to defeat organizing activities. High wages were offered to knitters to work under conditions contrary to the union rules, at lower rates and for longer hours. This tended to make many workers indifferent to the need for unionization. The individual or "yellow dog" contract was introduced to keep workers from joining the union. Private detectives were hired to " s p y " on the activities of workers and to prevent organization. When strikes came, injunctions were asked by employers to prohibit picketing or other organization activities. Although few mills once organized were lost by the union, the union's control of the industry in the Philadelphia area and in the rest of the country steadily declined, especially in the years from 1925 to 1930. Most of the hosiery strikes called in Philadelphia in the years between 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 2 1 were considered by the union to have been successful, but a majority of the strikes called after 1 9 2 1 were compromised or lost. T h e average duration of the strikes was sufficiently long to constitute a costly item in the union's budget. Many of the Philadelphia strikes,

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

105

such as the Aberle strike, were dramatic events in the recent history of textile unionism in Philadelphia. Possibly the most interesting was the 1 9 3 1 strike of 4,000 hosiery workers in 42 open shop mills in the city in 1 9 3 1 . The strikes which were originally responsible for establishing the Philadelphia hosiery workers' unions (boarders and knitters) as important factors in the industry were the Peerless strike of 1 9 1 0 and the Minura strike of 1 9 1 3 . Both were called against wage cuts: the first was lost after a year's fight, and the second was won after a two years' fight. In the second case, the firm went out of business, but the machinery was soldy to union mills, so that the union considered it had won the strike. These long strikes established the fact that the hosiery unions were willing to put up a prolonged fight to maintain their standard of living. Between 1 9 1 0 and 1 9 2 1 some twenty hosiery strikes were called in the Philadelphia area. Fourteen of these were called by the boarders' Local #696, and four by the knitters' Local #706. Two were called jointly. Most of the boarders' strikes were called to demand wage increases. Two of the knitters' strikes concerned a jurisdictional fight between Branch #14 and Local #706 during the time that these two groups were separated. The most important strikes which involved all the groups in the hosiery industry took place in 1 9 1 9 and in 1 9 2 1 . 1 4 Negotiations on the wage question which had been under way in the fall of 1 9 1 8 had failed to effect a settlement and some 1 5 shops with several thousand workers went on strike in January 1 9 1 9 . Then the hosiery workers, in common with other textile workers, demanded the 48-hour week in February 1 9 1 9 . Some of the mills "settled" during February and all had come to an agreement by April. T h e 48-hour week was granted together with an increase in wages. The wage increase ranged from 1 5 to 20 per cent for knitters and the boarders were offered a 1 0 per cent increase with arbitration for the additional increase demanded. T h e arbitration award later gave an additional 8 " B r a n c h # 1 4 did not participate in the 1 9 1 9 strike.

106

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

per cent increase to the boarders' rates. A picture of working conditions at the time of this strike may be obtained from the trade history of Freda Maurer in Appendix A. This strike was the first general market strike in the city and fully established the economic power of the union. It was followed in a few years by the longest and most memorable market strike in the union's history, the lockout of January 1 9 2 1 . T h e local hosiery manufacturers' association is reported to have joined the ranks of the general manufacturers' groups seeking wage reductions and the open shop at the beginning of the industrial depression in 1 9 2 1 . It attempted to break off negotiations with the union and demanded a 1 5 per cent wage cut. A l l of the full-fashioned hosiery mills in the city except the Gotham and Lehigh mills were closed down or crippled by this lockout. T h e strike dragged on for almost a year. Eventually, through the intervention of the Chamber of Commerce, settlements were effected in October and the following months. T h e boarders, however, were out until M a y 1 9 2 2 , and lost more shops than were lost by the knitters. The wage scale was left unchanged as a result of this strike and once again the union demonstrated its effective economic power in the market. For a four-year period between 1 9 2 2 and 1926 there were no strikes in the full-fashioned hosiery industry in Philadelphia. T h e city's hosiery workers were apparently making up for lost time after the long strike of 1 9 2 1 . But the industry, in the meantime, was constantly shifting ground and, especially from 1 9 2 5 on, rapidly expanding in small suburban towns around Philadelphia, in upstate Pennsylvania, and in the south. A few of the new mills were organized, but the number of mills increased very rapidly and most of them employed young, inexperienced workers who were dominated in larger measure by the employers' policies than were the older workers in the trade. Some employers definitely tried to avoid the union by moving to outside centers or using intimidating tactics, such as the "yellow d o g " contract and "labor spies."

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

107

Although there were no strikes in Philadelphia during this four-year period, the union was active both here and outside of the city. Following the 1 9 2 1 strike, organization work was immediately pushed in Reading, in the New YorkNew Jersey district, and later in the south and west. T h e first full-time organizer was elected by the federation in 1 9 2 2 and by 1 9 3 0 there were five full-time organizers in addition to the regular full-time officials of the national union who helped in all local situations. The organization work in the Philadelphia district during this time centered on an attempt to eliminate the double-machine system which, as was stated earlier, was considered to be a menace to the union's development. New mills offered as high as $200 a week for operators of two high-speed leggers. 15 The union found it difficult to prevent the spread of the system under such inducements and also found it difficult to organize the workers who accepted these inducements. The Philadelphia branch of the union increased its membership, but was unable to prevent the spread of the double-machine system in open shops. Local #706, the Philadelphia branch, which now included all hosiery workers except the boarders, had had a fully paid-up membership of 1 , 1 5 0 members in 1 9 2 0 (see Appendix B , Table 3 ) . The organization campaign of the year 1 9 2 5 alone added 3,000, new members, but the drive failed to check the expansion of the doublemachine system and added but few union mills to the former group. 1 6 Beginning with the fall of 1926, the union found itself involved in a number of strikes which, though called on various issues, were primarily the result of organization campaign work. Most of these strikes were called in open shop mills and most of them were lost. Details of Philadelphia hosiery strikes in the period between 1 9 2 0 and 1 9 3 1 will be found in Table 4, Appendix B. It is interesting to note that " Textile Worker, A p r i l 1 9 2 6 , p. 24. M T h e new members secured in this campaign were recruited primarily f r o m the a u x i l i a r y departments o f the mills, many of which had not previously been organized.

108

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

between October 1926 and December 1 9 3 0 seventeen strikes were called against hosiery mills in Philadelphia. The expense of this campaign may be estimated from the fact that, at one time during the early part of 1930, hosiery workers from nine mills in the Philadelphia area were receiving strike pay. In seven of the seventeen strikes, injunctions, which drastically limited peaceful picketing or prohibited it altogether, were issued by the courts. A report of the Philadelphia situation to the national convention of the union in 1926 asserted that there were also six private detective agencies at work "undermining the organization at every opportunity." It was said by the union that one of these detective agencies was responsible for the introduction of the individual contract called the "yellow d o g " contract by the union into several Philadelphia hosiery mills. This type of contract was introduced into the Cambria, Apex, and Brownhill & Kramer mills during this period. Under the terms of the contract a worker is required to sign a statement saying that he will not join the hosiery workers' union while in the employ of a particular mill, although he is not guaranteed employment or given any other consideration. During a strike at the Cambria mill in 1929, an injunction was issued against the union which declared that the strike had been called for an illegal purpose—i.e., to break the individual contracts—and was therefore illegal. A l l picketing was originally prohibited, although a later court order allowed four pickets.17 As in similar cases in other parts of the country, many arrests for contempt of court followed this injunction. Injunctions tend to demoralize strikers at the most strategic point of their campaign by prohibiting or limiting their only means of carrying on a strike, namely picketing, and by extensive arrests and fines if they disregard a court injunction which infringes their legal and constitutional rights. In addition, the expenses of legal suits arising out 17

Court of Common Pleas June T e r m 1929, No. 7081. Cambria Silk Hosiery Co. vs. American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers.

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

109

of injunction hearings and cases following arrests add considerable cost to the ordinary expenses of strikes. B y what methods have the hosiery workers tried to push their organization work in the face of such obstacles? T h e y have hired good lawyers, a good publicity and research expert, and some of the best labor organizers in the field. T h e y use the radio, pamphlet publications, mass demonstrations, mass picketing, mill gate meetings, advertising of unionmade hosiery, and every other legitimate device which will get their story before the public. T h e y also use the data of economic research as a tool of policy determination. Most of the hosiery workers are young American-born workers, the product of the American school system. T h e y may be difficult to organize at first, but once organized their fighting spirit is unsurpassed. On the whole the spirit of the girls is more lively and more enduring than that of the men. T h e hosiery workers say quite frankly that the girls carry their strikes. Despite the obstacles in their path, therefore, they have put up an intelligent and aggressive fight to organize the industry, not only in Philadelphia but throughout the country. T h i s extensive campaign was undertaken by a union which is not large, for there were only 14,000 members in the entire national union in 1930. T h e hosiery workers claim to have spent more per capita on organizing work than any other union in the country. A n interesting illustration of the problems met by the Philadelphia hosiery workers and their tactics in strikes is found in the Aberle strike of January 7, 1930. A brief story of this strike will, therefore, be given. 18 T h e Aberle mill had formerly been a union mill, but in the years following 1921 ran as an open shop. Although many of the knitters were still members of the union, wage rates varied from the union scale to some extent. Grievances arose from time to time and were handled by the knitters' shop committee, 18 Data on the Aberle strike come f r o m the reports of the Citizens' Committee, files of the Hosiery Worker, the story of the Aberle strike by L . G r i g g s Pierce (Appendix A ) and the Aberle Arbitration A w a r d (Appendix A ) .

110

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

which kept the union in touch with the situation. A strike had threatened the shop in 1928, but had been averted. T h e strike of January 1930 was brought on by wage cuts in certain departments, and an accumulation of minor grievances in other departments. T w e l v e hundred of the fourteen hundred employees came out on strike. T h e y were a group of young workers who made enthusiastic strikers. An injunction was secured which, at first, limited the number of pickets and later prohibited all picketing and following of workers to their homes, the calling of insulting names, etc. M a n y arrests followed the issue of this injunction. 19 A f t e r the picket line came off, riots started near the mill and during the course of the strike, a sympathizer, Carl Mackley, was shot by an armed strikebreaker. T h i s death aroused public opinion in the community and pressure began to be exerted to bring about a settlement of the strike. In an effort to keep down further violence, the union agreed to patrol the mill and keep order. T h e intervention of federal and state mediators and of the Chamber of Commerce was of no avail. Through the good offices of a citizens' committee composed of representatives of prominent social and religious organizations, the mill owner eventually agreed to arbitrate the dispute. This was done, however, on condition that the union would withdraw the question of union recognition and the signing of a union agreement. Eventually an agreement to this effect was reached, and arbitrators were appointed. T h e full text of the arbitration award handed down April 14, 1930 is given in Appendix A . In only one operation was the full wage reduction considered justified by the arbitrators. In the other operations it was adjudged only partially or not at all justified. T h e board also made recommendations concerning improvement of the personnel relations " T h e r e w e r e ι , ο ο ο arrests during· the A b e r l e s t r i k e ; 7 5 0 o f these cases concerned members o f the union and the others i n v o l v e d w e r e strike s y m pathizers. A l l o f the cases w e r e dismissed except 65. T w e n t y - f i v e o f the latter resulted in s m a l l fines, ten others w e r e d r o p p e d and about 30 c r i m i n a l cases w e r e l e f t f o r later hearing·. O f these, by A p r i l 1 9 3 1 , one had come to j u r y t r i a l and the striker w a s acquitted. ( F i g u r e s supplied by one o f the union's l a w y e r s responsible f o r the h e a r i n g s in the A b e r l e strike cases.)

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

111

of the plant. A continuing arbiter was agreed upon to administer the details of the award and settle any question arising out of this dispute. According to the terms of the award, all former employees were to be taken back, but the general business depression made it difficult to put this stipulation into effect. Provision was made for equal division of work to take care of this problem. A l l but seven of the former employees were reinstated. A ballot of the Aberle Company employees in the f a l l of 1 9 3 0 with regard to the attitude of the workers to the union showed that 77 per cent of the workers were in favor of the union agreement. N o settlement was arrived at between the union and the Aberle Company, however, and the continuing arbiter resigned in October 1 9 3 0 . It was not until the strike of February 1 9 3 1 brought the swing toward unionism in the industry in the city that contractual relations between the union and the Aberle Company were negotiated. These included, as the other union agreements include, a provision with respect to the arbitration of disputes by an impartial arbitrator. T h e story of the Aberle strike has been recorded in some detail because it shows the pressure that can be exerted by public opinion in important strike situations when it works through the channels of organized social groups. Although the union had more to lose by its original agreement to arbitrate, in the long run it gained public support in the strike and eventual success in the negotiation of a union agreement. T h e securing of the court injunction by the company acted as a direct incentive to violence and disorder, as the newspaper accounts and the strikers' own story clearly show. T h e general feeling of the workers about the strike, their hesitation in accepting arbitration, and their attitude towards the outcome of the strike are interestingly expressed in the story by Griggs Pierce (Appendix A ) . T h e compromise of the Aberle strike, and the loss of other strikes, as the organization campaign progressed are evidences of the gradual loss of control of the industry by the union. T o what causes is this attributable? Part of the

112

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

explanation, as has been said before, lies in the rapid expansion of the industry and its great prosperity. Unorganized workers were well paid and saw no immediate reason for joining a union. Like other workers, not to mention business men and even economists, they believed that the "new era of prosperity" had come to stay and saw no dark clouds on the horizon. More important than this effect of the "prosperity psychology," however, is the influence of the general decline in the labor movement of the country. In attempting to organize hosiery workers in the south and west, the union had to work single-handed or revive what labor movement existed. Even in Philadelphia the general decline of the labor movement led to apathy or lack of support on the part of other unions. The early failure of the American labor movement to organize on the political front and protect its legal interests eventually resulted in the kind of injunctions, "yellow dog" contracts, and wholesale arrests of picketers met by the hosiery workers. A progressive labor paper states the case succinctly: . . . We must have a militant and progressive as well as an intelligent and idealistic labor movement on every front, trade union, political, cooperative, and educational. Because we have not had that kind of a general labor movement in recent years, the Hosiery Workers, despite their power, wealth, courage and intelligence have suffered a trying reverse. N o union can advance or even in the long run maintain itself if it has to fight almost singlehanded. 20

While the hosiery workers helped to revive local labor movements or start labor parties during the campaign, their own immediate status was not helped. As a result of the loss of its extensive organizing campaign, the union was forced to effect a strategic retreat to maintain its organization. This resulted in agreements by which the union took wage cuts and changed its working rules so that union mills might more readily compete with nonunion mills. These concessions were followed by further wage reductions in non-union mills. But the wage cuts in 20

"The Dilemma of a Militant Union," Labor Age, September 1930, p. 4.

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

113

non-union mills had one important effect on the Philadelphia industry. T h e y brought unrest in the open shops and in the latter part of 1930 and the early part of 1931, eight non-union Philadelphia mills came out on strike, before the general open shop strike of February 16, 1931, was called. T h e union in its new agreements had said, in effect, that it was no longer able to keep up the wage and hour standards in the industry by itself. If non-union workers wanted any help they would have to help themselves. Although the union had formerly given generous strike benefits, only necessary relief was now available. T h e results of the 1931 strike call amazed every one, not excepting the union officials, and marked an important point in the recent history of the union. M a n y workers who had acted as strikebreakers in earlier strikes became ardent strikers in this crisis. Over 4,000 young workers in 42 open shop mills scattered all over the city and its suburbs answered the strike call. 21 A m o n g these new strikers were many high school graduates, former office workers, and one civil engineer. T h e y were an intelligent, enthusiastic group ready to do battle for what they considered to be their "rights." An editorial in the Hosiery Worker, entitled " T h e Salvation of the Industry," presents the union opinion of the 1931 strike: T h e p r e s e n t g e n e r a l strike in t h e n o n - u n i o n m i l l s in a n d s u b u r b s has s e r v e d as a n e e d e d for

the

entire

industry.

Trade

Philadelphia

and almost l i f e - s a v i n g

journals

report

prices

stimulus

as

"stiffen-

i n g , " s u r p l u s stocks s o m e w h a t r e d u c e d a n d t r a d e p i c k i n g u p

slightly

a l l a r o u n d . M o r e t h a n t h a t , t h e r e v o l t o f t h e n o n - u n i o n w o r k e r s has g i v e n n e w h o p e a n d e n c o u r a g e m e n t b o t h to t h e o r g a n i z e d a n d

unor-

g a n i z e d w o r k e r s t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r a d e . E v e r y w h e r e t h e r e is a r e v i v a l o f enthusiasm f o r unionism. If

the

leaders o f

ground

and

the

picked

as t h e

officers h a v e fight.

Union

the union

time o f

scene

of

selected leaders

battle, the

of

have

the south or some other so-called Until

the

workers

in

the

a b l e to select

Philadelphia

present

a period would

had been

depression preferred

in

have

battlebeen

nor

would

the

in

which

to w a g e

a large-scale

shops a c t u a l l y eight

the

not

l o w - w a g e center o f

non-union

21 T h e n u m b e r 42 includes strikes progress b e f o r e F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1 9 3 1 .

strike;

would

open

the quit

shops

union

strike

a in

industry. work,

which

no

were

in

114

UNION

TACTICS

AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE

one in the industry really became aware of the fact that southern wage scales are actually being paid in the Philadelphia district; f e w were w i l l i n g to believe that such wretched conditions as were uncovered could have crept up on the industry so near to a unionized center of the trade. . . . . . . Success in Philadelphia, now largely assured, w i l l spell success in other centers. T h e tide has definitely turned in f a v o r of the union, with the workers finally roused to a fighting mood. In some sections where fear, apathy and hopelessness still prevent the spread of unionism, a new mood and a new spirit can quickly be generated when the real facts of the situation are made known to these workers. . . . E v e r y employer w h o has normal powers of perception realizes the necessity f o r some control in the industry and will accept union control if that is necessary. But the manufacturer will not be convinced until he sees his workers are finally and absolutely determined to have a union and all that this implies. T h e industry can be saved; the Philadelphia strike proves that. T h e issue is squarely before the workers themselves. 2 2

T h e 1 9 3 1 strike presents an interesting picture of conditions in the Philadelphia hosiery industry and of the attitudes of

open shop employers,

rank-and-file strikers, and

the

hosiery union officials. 23 T h e s e receive considerable light in the report of the M a y o r ' s F a c t - F i n d i n g Committee and the stories of the strike written by strikers which

appear in

Appendix A of this volume. T h e first interesting event of the strike was the A p e x injunction case, which concerned one of the largest nonunion mills in the city. T h e hearings brought out the fact that the " y e l l o w d o g " contract had been installed in this mill in 1 9 2 6 , and had been signed by all the workers, including 3 0 0 minors. Testimony was introduced to show that three different crews of private detectives or "undercover m e n " were employed to report on the loyalty of the workers to the company. W h e n the strike was first called, the company had maintained that there was no strike on at that plant. Police forces had been active in arresting pickets as soon as they went on the picket line at this mill, arresting M The Hosiery Worker, March 16, 1 9 3 1 , p. 4. " D a t a on the 1 9 3 1 strike, unless otherwise specified, came from the files of the following papers f o r the months of February to J u l y . 1 9 3 1 : The Philadelphia Record, The Daily News Record, The Hosiery Worker, Women's Wear Daily, and The Labor Union Record.

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

115

as many as 80 or 1 0 0 pickets a day in the first week of the strike. A preliminary injunction granted to the company permitted the use by the union of ten pickets at the mill. At a later hearing, the union's officials were adjudged in contempt of court and all picketing of the mill was prohibited. The attitude of the city's Department of Public Safety at the opening of the strike created considerable stir in labor circles. The Director of Public Safety said that the present unemployment crisis was the wrong time for calling a strike and that he would "stop all picketing" and would allow "no parades and no protest meetings." H e is quoted as saying, " I ' m not interested in the merits of the strike. This is no time to strike." 24 Wholesale arrests of peaceful picketers occurred for a few days after this declaration, 392 occurring in the course of three days. Labor demonstrations against this action resulted in a change of policy and the number of arrests declined materially within a week's time. The attitude of the police department as shown in that of its director and superintendent and in the attitude of district captains tended to enrage strikers, who believed that their actions were within the legal right of peaceful picketing. Although all disorders and violence can not be attributed to this action, they increased directly as the police challenged the workers to picket. In a period of two months after the calling of the strike over 1,200 arrests had been made.25 Possibly the most interesting feature of the 1 9 3 1 strike were the hearings before the Fact-Finding Committee appointed by the mayor. This is interesting not only because of the opportunity afforded to obtain first-hand evidence from both sides with regard to the issues at stake, but because this is the only instance known to the writer of public hearings on a strike while it was being conducted. The brief for the workers was an extensive document outlining some of the economic problems confronting hosiery workers in " P h i l a d e l p h i a Record, F e b r u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 3 1 . " F i g u r e s compiled f r o m arrests reported daily in the Philadelphia February 1 3 to A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 3 1 .

Record,

116

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

relation to the stabilization of the industry. T h e strike was called "primarily a strike to bring about 'controlled production' in the industry." 26 For whatever reasons a strike might be called, however, workers would respond only if there were grievances against which they held it necessary to strike. Strikers from various mills described working conditions in the mills and particularly those against which they were striking. Probably the most important cause of the strike was the number of drastic wage cuts which had taken place in the industry over a period of from six months to two years. A trade journal, discussing this matter, states that mills had cut wages "recklessly" and it was reported that several mills had even asked workers to work for no wages for a short period of time, to tide them over the worst of the depression. L o n g hours, excessive fines, unsanitary wash and work rooms, the "yellow d o g " contract, the use of private detectives in the mills, and other disciplinary measures were also brought up as important grievances by the strikers. N o attempt was made by the mills to answer any of the specific charges brought, with one notable exception. Here an honest attempt was made to present one firm's side of all the strike issues. For the rest of the mills a lawyer representing eight or ten firms (exact number never stated) introduced evidence to show that the most skilled workers in the industry were receiving high wages, and that the workers were satisfied with their conditions. According to the manufacturers, it had been only through intimidation and fear of violence that the workers had come out on strike. The open-shop manufacturers stated that they did not agree that "complete unionization would stabilize the industry in this period of world-wide depression" and that they were "unalterably opposed to recognition of the union or any plan which has for its object the arbitration of the strike, and that many hosiery mills are prepared to vacate Philadelphia rather than submit to unionization." 27 This group of manuM 21

Briefs presented by union, and Daily News Record, February 16, 1 9 3 1 . Quoted by Women's Wear Daily, March 20, 1 9 3 1 .

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

117

facturers later declared that they would withdraw from the hearings until disorders and violence arising from the strike had ceased.28 Since the Fact-Finding Committee had no powers with respect to keeping the peace, the hearings were continued without further assistance from this group of manufacturers. B y the time the hearings had been completed and the Fact-Finding Committee's report published ( M a y 29, 1 9 3 1 ) , the union had negotiated settlements of the strike in 16 mills employing about 2,000 workers. It had, in addition, concluded agreements with four plants in which there had been no strike, but where no agreements for 1 9 3 1 had been signed previous to this time. The strike was called off in the remaining 26 mills in September 1 9 3 1 . T h e report of the Mayor's Fact-Finding Committee (for the full text, see Appendix A ) reviewed the events leading up to the strike and its causes. It recommended that the strike be called off, first, because the stabilization of wage rates by complete unionization of the industry was a national rather than a local problem, and second, because "rates and conditions approximate or equal the union scale in many mills at which strike conditions exist." " O n l y the most cogent reasons could justify the continuance of the present strike in view of the present unemployment emergency." The committee also recommended that "an effort be made by employers to reinstate as many former employees as possible" in order to promote good will in "liquidating the controversial situation represented by this strike," although this point was not made a condition of the strike settlement. T h e y recommended, finally, that the employers engage a competent staff to direct their industrial relations policies, in view of the obvious lack of a genuine personnel program in the industry. As if in anticipation of the necessity of further readjustments of wages and prices in the industry, the committee characterized the recent strike situation as follows: " Women's Wear Daily, March 27, 1 9 3 1 .

118

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

T h e industry is in a period o í serious readjustment. It has e n joyed large profits and high wages. Over-production has resulted, and competition is forcing readjustments. It would seem that an organization o f the manufacturers, aided by a competent staff would be helpful, and even necessary, in effecting these readjustments without the continuing friction which has characterized the industry in recent years.

T h e report of the Fact-Finding Committee was so delayed in publication that, when it appeared, the public had lost much of its original interest in the strike. T h e strike had already been won on the economic front in twenty mills and appeared deadlocked or lost in the remaining mills on strike, so that the report had no immediate effect in bringing about any settlement of the strike. T h e report was unfavorably received by labor, as might be expected. A review in a local labor paper characterized it in these words: A thinly veiled endorsement o f company unions, the report recognizes the right o f a rugged individual to "run his shop without any i n t e r f e r e n c e " and expresses a childlike faith in the fatherly wishes o f hosiery mill employers toward their employees. . . . Unashamed and adorned with high motive the company u n i o n — the personnel man, and the efficiency system—there they stand! T h a t was the best the committee could offer to correct the grievances o f the strikers which the committee called " m i n o r . " 2 8

W h i l e the report does not endorse company unions, it emphatically states the necessity of a personnel program in the industry. T h e intimidation and violence which occurred during the strike are strongly condemned by the committee, although intimidating tactics used by the employer, such as the "yellow d o g " contract and the use of private detectives, are not condemned. T h e committee appeared to be more interested in proposing the! setting up of machinery for handling shop grievances in which the union had no recognized function than in definitely answering the union's claim that the stabilization of working conditions in the industry could come only through unionization and a program of unionmanagement cooperation in the industry. On the face of it, the committee apparently believed that a personnel pro" Union Labor

Record,

June 5, 1931.

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

119

gram was the next constructive step for the non-union mills to take in order to avoid the kind of shop grievances which had precipitated the 1931 strike. T h e hearings and report of the Mayor's Fact-Finding Committee on the 1931 hosiery strike, therefore, added little, if anything, to the settlement of the strike. T h e y answered a public need in bringing to light certain information which was of interest to the public. T h e y acted as an indirect channel of public opinion to the manufacturers and to the strikers. T h e y may have had some slight influence in the direction of stressing the public's interest in better labor conditions in hosiery mills, and less violence in strikes by workers against poor working conditions. But, on the whole, the results were negligible. S T R U C T U R E AND I N D U S T R I A L P H I L O S O P H Y

T h e changes in the policies and tactics of the hosiery workers' union over some twenty years of experience have been accompanied by important changes in the structure of the union. Although originally a craft union composed only of skilled male knitters, it has now become an industrial union accepting all workers in the auxiliary departments as members. A majority of these workers are women. T h e union has also experimented with greater centralization of responsibility in its government. Whereas power formerly resided in the shop committees, who negotiated and adjudicated all differences with individual shops, this has, in the course of time, been transferred first to local and later to national officers as collective agreements came to be negotiated on a wider scale. Such a centralization of responsibility has increased the efficiency of the union as an organization and has, in turn, made possible many of the changes in policy and tactics already described. New leaders have also been developed to meet new needs. T h e program or general industrial philosophy of the hosiery workers appears to the writer to have remained unchanged during this period. This program focuses, at present

120

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

as it has in the past, on job security in the broadest meaning of that term. Such a program involves the maintenance of a high standard of living and a progressively shorter work day on a national basis. In the shop, j o b security includes protection against arbitrary discipline or discharge through representation by counsel in hearings on grievances. In the language of the shop, this means protection of the workers' " r i g h t s " in the mill. Although the hosiery workers have concentrated on achieving job and wage control in the industry, they have also been active in labor politics. T o some extent this activity has been the result of the motivation of a Socialist philosophy on the part of an active minority of hosiery workers. T o a larger extent, however, it is the result of the hostile attitude of the courts and other public agencies in hosiery strikes. In various localities, the hosiery workers' union has supported or initiated independent political action by labor, but primarily in order to attain its immediate economic g o a l — j o b security. Reconstruction of the economic or social system as a motivating concept influences only a minority group in the union. T h e history of the structure and government of the hosiery workers' union repeats the story of the development of organization in most trade unions. Membership in the early local union in Philadelphia was small and the rank-and-file membership controlled the policies of the union. A l l shop grievances were reported to the local meeting, and, since the possibility of a strike was involved in each dispute, the vote of that group was final. This custom of democratic procedure in discussing and determining policy is continued down to the present day, although most important shop grievance questions are now settled by the business agents or referred to the national officers and to the impartial chairman for adjudication. It is but natural that a local group which has always considered that it held the power to decide such local issues would give up that power only gradually and under some pressure. A local of 9,000 or more members would appear to be unwieldy to handle by such a democratic

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

121

procedure. In reality, it offers primarily an opportunity for discussion—seemingly endless though intelligent discussion —of shop grievances and trade problems, although control is centralized in the local executive board and business agents. 30 The first important delegation of responsibility in the Philadelphia branch came with the election of a full-time business agent in 1 9 1 3 . Thereafter, grievances which arose between local meetings were referred to him and to the local executive board. As uniformity in rates and shop rules developed in the Philadelphia area, the once powerful shop committees became less important in the conduct of the union's business and the local officers became more powerful. Extensive power has come into the hands of the national officers only since 1 9 2 5 . After the present national secretary took office in that year, uniform methods of record-keeping and other machinery were set in operation to keep the officers continuously informed of what was happening in the local branches. National organizers were elected and helped to organize new branches and assumed charge of local strikes. These officers were elected until 1929, and after that year, appointed. A labor paper devoted to the interests of the national union had been published for some years, but nationwide publicity was now undertaken on a larger scale than before. Although the national officers had, technically speaking, always held considerable power, they were not in a position to exercise it until recent years. On the basis of this preliminary work, the present national agreements were negotiated. These provide for uniform trade policies, the closed shop, and uniform piecework rates throughout the country. As previously described, the adjudication of all disputes arising under the terms of the national agreement is in the hands of an impartial chairman. It is important to " T h e old executive board o f the local has recently been departmentalized into the f o l l o w i n g divisions: men's advisory council, organization committee, grievance committee, and board of trustees. In addition, there is a girl's advisory council. T h e men's advisory council, however, has taken over the powers of the old executive board.

122

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

note that the negotiation of the national agreements and a uniform wage scale has happened to coincide with the necessity of accepting wage reductions and other concessions to reduce labor costs. This coincidence has made the national agreements unpopular with the rank-and-file membership. The national character of the agreements—and the national officers—have frequently been blamed for the economic conditions of the industry which have necessitated a retreat in the union's program. Another evidence of increasing centralization of power is found in the recent constitutional change which creates a national conference board to represent the Federation in negotiations with employers and in hearings before the impartial chairman. Proposals brought to the national convention by the conference board may now be accepted or rejected by it or referred to a referendum ballot for final action. Heretofore all important questions, such as negotiations with employers, have been decided by referendum ballot only, although the percentage of the membership voting on such ballots was never large. An interesting point in the organization of the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers is its relationship to the United Textile Workers of America, the organization through which it is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The hosiery workers are the only group in the United Textile Workers of America who have trade autonomy, and, to all practical purposes, their own international union. They pay the required per capita tax to the older organization, but waive all strike benefits. Contrary to the usual procedure in other branches of the textile trade, the hosiery workers have full power to organize locals and to call and settle strikes. The officers of the United Textile Workers serve in an advisory capacity only. T h e hosiery workers in their relationship to the United Textile Workers have been able to accomplish what other local textile groups have wanted, but have had insufficient strength to realize. Girls were first admitted to the Philadelphia branch of the

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

123

union after the Minura strike of 1 9 1 4 — a strike in which they had been very active. They did not become a permanently active group in the organization, however, until more recent years. The reasons for this lack of activity on the part of the girls may be interesting to note, because they reflect problems in the organization of women in all the textile trade unions. Since there is a difference of opinion on this subject somewhat conditioned by sex, it becomes necessary to summarize "what the girls say" and "what the men say." T h e girls say that there were so few of them at first and so little attention was paid to their special needs or problems that they became discouraged in attending meetings and dropped out or became inactive. T h e y still say, in fact, that the knitters dominate the organization to such an extent that it is difficult for them to get speedy action on their grievances in the shop and local. 31 The appointment of a woman organizer a few years ago and the development of a special program of girls' activities in the local have helped to solve some of these problems. Girls now serve as strike committee secretaries, as convention delegates, and as local officers in minor capacities in the Philadelphia branch as in other districts. T h e y act as shop chairmen of departments where girls are employed, but general shop grievances are usually handled by the knitters' shop committee or by the business agent of the local. The men say that the girls are excellent fighters on the picket line, but that they weary of the routine union work and drop out after the dramatic part of the work is finished. According to officials of the union, the girls are no more difficult to organize in the first place than American-born boys, but they are considered to be more difficult to interest in the every-day activities of the union. T h e criticism of their lack of interest in routine union business may disappear as they are given more responsibility in connection with that business. As yet they 11 T h e nationality of the workers may account in part f o r the f a c t that the g i r l s have not f o u g h t f o r their " r i g h t s " in the hosiery workers' union, as they have in the needle trades unions.

124

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

hold no positions of real responsibility in the local union. In fact, their representation in the national union has been on a par with that of men only since 1929, when a constitutional change permitted "lady hosiery workers" the same numerical basis as men in the election of convention delegates. This marks the beginning of the disturbance of the old balance of power in favor of the knitters. A constitutional requirement concerning membership in the National Executive Committee continues the balance of power in that group in favor of knitters working at the trade and allows only one possible seat to a worker in the auxiliary departments (unless the major national officers happen to be workers in auxiliary departments). So far few girls have served on the local executive board of the Philadelphia branch, and none has served on the national executive board. T h e y do have an unofficial local advisory board, the members of which are all girls, for the specific consideration of their own problems and interests, but this is not the equivalent of having departmental representation on a local executive board of the union with power to make important decisions. In 1930, out of a total local membership of 9,000 workers, about 4,000 were girls. T h e changes in the union's structure and government have resulted in greater efficiency in the conduct of the union's business and the development of new qualities of leadership in the union's officials. A different type of leader was needed in the early days when every shop grievance might have to be settled only with a strike or the threat of a strike. As union officers and the manufacturers developed certain procedures for settling grievances, more amicable relations resulted and a new type of union leader came to the front. This development has been described by one of the officers of the union in these words: Instead o f being a small bunch o f m e n e n g a g e d in a r u n n i n g battle w i t h the employers, w e settled d o w n to the j o b o f b r i n g i n g about an era o f cooperation between e m p l o y e r and e m p l o y e e in the f u l l - f a s h i o n e d industry. . . . O u r workers got the chip off their

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

125

shoulders. . . . T h e result of, this in our particular industry was certainly to stabilize the whole trade. 3 2

Possibly the most important element in building up a n e w attitude on the part of the rank-and-file membership with respect to their industrial responsibilities as members of a union in the trade was the necessity of dropping the " c h i p f r o m the shoulders." It was not easily done, because years of exploitation or hard bargaining on the part of textile e m ployers had made textile workers suspicious, and the hosiery workers not less so than others. In breaking down their suspicion and in building up a more cooperative spirit, the union's leaders exhibited skill and intelligence. T h e i r

ex-

pressions of opinion g i v e excellent illustrations of the d i f ferences between the o l d and new attitudes on the part of trade union leaders. T o

quote f r o m one speaker at

the

national conventions of 1 9 2 7 and 1 9 2 8 : W e imagine that we are stronger than we really are. W e are not taking the competitive market into consideration. I f the manufacturer cannot manufacture goods in a union shop, we don't work. It [trade unionism] is not merely a strike proposition any longer. It is a question of . . . understanding your own position that makes f o r success. . . . T o o o f t e n men who join a labor union imagine that it is merely an organization through which they can use their power, if they care to, to force certain conditions on the employers. . . . I do not know of any organization that is really successful that has used the method of force only. It has so o f t e n been said that unions lack vision and understanding of modern industrial developments. . . . that they are stubborn, slow and impossible to do business with in a changing industrial world. W e have been able to prove that a labor union with proper organization is equipped to meet any situation f a i r l y , sensibly and e f fectively. W e demonstrated that we were quite aware of the necessity of having the full-fashioned business profitable for the employer as well as f o r the employees.

H o w w i d e l y the concept of the union's joint responsibility for economic conditions in the industry is accepted by the rank-and-file members is problematical, but there is no doubt that it is more widespread than formerly. Certainly the e f ™ Textile Worker, J u l y 1 9 2 7 , p. 2 1 0 .

126

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

fort to eliminate waste, to develop standards of production, and to lower costs of production in other ways constitutes evidence in this direction. T h e new attitude of the union involved new tactics and policies and new methods of arriving at the ultimate goal of the union, as this chapter has demonstrated. T h e goal, however, remained the same. And what is the goal of the average member of the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers? T h e union is primarily a business investment to the average hosiery worker. H e or she wants a job that offers good earnings—a "saving wage" with "decent" hours, and freedom from arbitrary discipline in the shop. For the older workers in the hosiery trade, the union represents a fraternity as well as an economic organization, and for a small but growing minority, the union is the expression of a social philosophy as well as an immediate step toward greater economic security. T h e labor movement offers to this group a channel for functioning as a social unit and for the ultimate development of a program of social reorganization. T h e average union hosiery worker is willing to pay high dues and assessments to organize the rest of the trade 5 he is generous in support of other labor movements or groups in distress, and he is always willing to put up a battle when his program is threatened or blocked. If the truth be told, he probably enjoys a fight as well as anything, and since the new tactics reduce strikes to a minimum, they are less popular than the old. When the program of the hosiery workers is blocked on the economic front by court injunctions or other legal weapons of the employer, they experiment on the political front. From 1911 on, the Philadelphia local has from time to time favored political action by labor. Hosiery workers have recently developed live labor parties in South Langhorne, Pennsylvania, and in Kenosha, Wisconsin. In Philadelphia, too, the preliminary work of the Northeast Progressive League laid the foundation for an active independent political Labor Party in 1931. In an interesting

THE

HOSIERY

WORKERS

127

speech b e f o r e t h e L e a g u e f o r I n d e p e n d e n t P o l i t i c a l A c t i o n , t h e p r e s i d e n t of t h e h o s i e r y w o r k e r s ' F e d e r a t i o n d r e w

the

f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e of his u n i o n : N o one need look much farther than his own doorstep to have all the arguments he needs in favor of independent political action [by labor]. M y experience convinces me that unless the trade union movement engages in political activity along independent lines it may not be able to survive the assaults now being made upon it. In the face of the fact that both old political parties have planks in their platform pledging legislation to m o d i f y the power of judges to issue injunctions in labor disputes, the courts in this state, through use of the injunctive power, are actually being used as strike-breaking agencies. When we seek to enact legislation which will give back to the citizen who is working f o r wages in industry his or her constitutional rights, those who actually control the political machine in our state or national governments, either oppose or delay such reforms. In addition to the courts, we must fight the sheriffs, the sheriff's deputies, city police, state police, and a small army of private detectives. . . . T h e so-called forces of law and order in this so-called commonwealth are little else but implements f o r imposing the will of the low-wage, long-hour, anti-union employing class upon the unorganized mass of wage earners. Experiences such as this [in 1 9 3 1 strikes] have convinced the textile workers of the Northeast, at any rate, that it is absolutely necessary that they engage in independent political action if their economic organization is to be able to survive as an effective agency. 3 3 T h e hosiery workers, along with other P h i l a d e l p h i a textile w o r k e r s , h a v e t h u s c o m e to take t h e position of B r i t i s h l a b o r of a g e n e r a t i o n a g o . T h i s position is, b r i e f l y , t h a t u n d e r t h e conditions of m o d e r n i n d u s t r y , t h e t r a d e u n i o n

movement

cannot b e e f f e c t i v e in r e a c h i n g its g o a l w i t h o u t a w i n g or i n d e p e n d e n t political action b y

political

labor.

I t h a s b e e n t h e c o n t e n t i o n of t h e w r i t e r in a n o t h e r nection

34

con-

t h a t c r a f t a n d i n d u s t r i a l u n i o n s not c o m m i t t e d

to

a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h i l o s o p h y d i f f e r in tactics a n d s t r u c t u r e b u t not in g o a l . T h e h o s i e r y w o r k e r s ' u n i o n a p p e a r s to o f f e r a case in point. W h i l e it w a s a c r a f t u n i o n , it e f f e c t e d j o b s e c u r i t y b y c o n t r o l l i n g t h e l a b o r s u p p l y of knitters, b y

developing

™ Rieve, " I f Unionism is to Survive," Nevi Leader, April 25, 1 9 3 1 . ** "Job-Conscious Unionism in the Chicago Men's Clothing Industry," American Economic Review, March 1930, p. 28.

128

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

working rules and shop custom to offer protection on the job, and by strong internal discipline within the union. When these methods were no longer economically feasible, the union changed its structure and policies to meet the new economic conditions. As an industrial union it developed a program of militant organization drives, participation in independent political action by labor, and most important of all, the accumulation of expert knowledge of the economic conditions in the industry as a basis for bargaining power. The hosiery workers have come, therefore, like the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and other progressive national or local unions, to new tactics and procedures to effect their program. Despite their relatively small size, they are putting up a skillful battle to maintain their organization under difficult economic conditions.35 * It should be added that the drastic curtailment of the union p r o g r a m in the 1 9 3 1 - 3 2 agreement has been responsible f o r the beginnings of factionalism in the hosiery union. Several districts went on strike, and locals threatened to turn in their charters a f t e r the agreement was signed. A n opposition movement started in the Philadelphia local in the f a l l of 1 9 3 1 . T h i s group is organizing to secure office and to change the p r o g r a m of the local and national union. T h e cause of factionalism in the hosiery union, as in the other textile unions studied, thus appears to be primarily economic in origin.

CHAPTER

VI

S U M M A R Y AND CONCLUSIONS I t is generally accepted that the decade from 1 9 2 1 to 1 9 3 1 has been a test of strength for the entire American labor movement. M a j o r strikes, with but a few exceptions in the men's clothing and printing trades, have been lost. T h e trade unions have declined steadily in membership and power. T h e Philadelphia textile unions, operating in a highly competitive economic situation in a declining market, have been no exception to this trend. M a n y of these unions failed to survive the depression of 1 9 2 1 . Membership in all but two of the surviving Philadelphia textile unions showed a marked decrease in the following decade. Most of the textile strikes in Philadelphia during these years were compromised or lost. T h e unions not only failed to hold ground in the Philadelphia area but also failed to make any headway in organizing the workers in new textile manufacturing ccntcrs in the rural districts of Pennsylvania, N e w Jersey, N e w E n g l a n d , and the south. In the major specialty textile trades, which had once been localized in Philadelphia and in which successful collective bargaining arrangements had obtained f o r many years, the unions found that their control of standards of working conditions was undermined or lost by the end of the decade. Several textile unions, like those of the full-fashioned hosiery and upholstery goods workers, are now facing the most severe test of their existence in the depression of 1 9 3 1 - 3 2 . T h e causes of the decline of the Philadelphia textile labor movement are fundamentally of two kinds: economic factors in the decline of Philadelphia's textile industries, and inherent weaknesses in the labor movement itself. One important economic factor in the decline of Philadelphia's spe129

130

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

cialty textile trades is a general change in the demand for textile products. In former years, the high-grade products of the city's mills commanded a " g o o d " price and a large market. Today, cheaper goods, well styled but of poorer quality, constitute the major part of the textile industry's business. T h e development of substitute products and changes in consumption habits have also affected the demand for the products of Philadelphia's textile mills. Improvements in machine equipment have rendered obsolete certain types of equipment in use in particular Philadelphia trades, and have enabled manufacturers in other areas using the newer machinery to secure a considerable advantage in production costs. T h e new machine equipment and the cheaper types of textile products demanded by consumers require less skilled labor. Recent expansion in the specialty textile trades has taken place for the most part outside of Philadelphia, where cheaper labor was available. Surplus machine capacity for the trades as a whole resulted in very keen competition between old and new manufacturing centers when style changes or business depression brought a declining market. The item of textile production costs which appeared to have the least resistance to pressure, except in unionized mills, was the item of labor costs. A widening labor cost differential between Philadelphia and outside mills resulted in pressure on the standards of working conditions within the city. These standards had been established by collective agreements between trade unions and employers who had once dominated the markets for their products, or were influenced by the presence of the textile labor movement in the city. Textile workers outside of the city worked for longer hours and less pay, and frequently on more than one machine per worker. The city's disadvantage in the labor cost differential more than offset the advantages enjoyed by Philadelphia mills in high grade workmanship and designing and in established trade-marks, except for the highest grade of "quality" products. And for these goods there was relatively less demand. T h e textile unions have

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

131

therefore been faced with a shrinking demand for their labor and with pressure by manufacturers to reduce labor costs. In addition to the economic situation in the textile industries, there were general difficulties facing the labor movement which handicapped the Philadelphia textile unions. They made an honest effort to organize the workers in the new manufacturing areas outside of the city. That they were unsuccessful is due primarily to their lack of support by the rest of the labor movement, and to the fact that workers in rural areas, but newly come from agriculture to industry, were extremely difficult to organize. In certain instances also, the tactics developed by textile employers defeated the organizing campaigns of the textile unions. These included extensive "welfare work" activities which rivaled the union's program, and intimidating tactics, such as the use of "labor spies," "yellow dog" contracts, and court injunctions, which prevented the unions from securing a foothold in the open shop mills. Many textile unions failed to develop new organizing tactics to meet these new situations, but the hosiery workers, for example, made many sacrifices and tried unusual procedures in an effort to solve their organizing problem. They, too, were unsuccessful because they were working almost single-handed. The failure of the American labor movement to develop a strong political and legislative wing has rendered its legal status uncertain and organizing activities of all trade unions subject to legal suit. T h e Philadelphia textile unions have therefore been forced to expend considerable money and effort to insure their legal right to exist as collective units and to organize the workers in their trades. Another factor of importance in the American labor movement which affects this situation is the recent increase of factionalism within the unions. Political factionalism is both a cause and an effect of weakness in the labor movement. Many once-powerful unions have been split in two or more factions as their influence in their trades has been undermined in recent years. As control of the trade is lost by

132

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

style changes which lessen demand for the product, or by the migration of an industry from its original location, union leaders lose their influence over rank-and-file workers. W h e n division occurs in the ranks of a union, weakened trade control is further undermined. Although factional disputes may arise over a number of incidents, economic pressure sharpens the differences and may result in open hostilities. Union leaders may, for example, recognize the importance of meeting non-union competition in labor costs in order to secure work for their members, or to keep an organization alive until trade conditions change. Rank-and-file workers, on the other hand, do not always have sufficient information or understanding of economic conditions to make intelligent decisions with respect to their future program. It is easy for the rank-and-file worker to believe that a change of officers or a division in the ranks would, at any rate, produce nothing worse than the proposed program for retrenchment under the present leadership. Perhaps this explains why not a single Philadelphia textile union, or any other trade union for that matter, has succeeded in retreating from the high prosperity levels of the trade without precipitating a factional dispute. In the textile labor movement, differences in economic philosophy appear to have been less important in this development than pressure of economic conditions. As a result, the factional disputes have not as yet developed a large following in the "left-wing" or Communist textile union. But they have weakened the older trade unions in a period of severe economic crisis. T h e most interesting effect of adverse economic trends in the textile industries, and the resulting challenge to the program of the Philadelphia textile unions, has been the search for new union tactics to meet the changed situation. T h e goal of the unions has remained the same. Their program has centered on job security in industries economically insecure to a high degree. But, as the industries declined, they have had to seek new methods of securing that goal. W h e n quality of workmanship was still important in a trade,

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

133

considerable emphasis could be placed by the unions on skill and the elimination of waste as a differential advantage for the city's mills. But when price became a dominant demand factor in a highly competitive market, the unions were forced to offer a wage rate structure which did not allow too wide a differential in labor costs between Philadelphia and outside manufacturing centers. T h e textile unions which have adapted their tactics to meet changes in economic conditions have, on the whole, had the most skillful leadership and the best informed rank-and-file membership. They have usually had centralized responsibility in union government and a flexible type of program. They have endeavored to organize the workers in competing non-union areas and, when this program failed, they have openly accepted the challenge of meeting non-union competition in labor costs. T h e unions which refused to make any concessions in their wage rates or trade rules as the differential in labor costs widened between Philadelphia and outside textile mills followed what appears to many observers to have been a suicidal policy. They "stood pat" at high wage levels and "went down fighting" for these and other standards. They went down with little prospect of coming back. T h e strikes which accompanied these declines were long and bitterly fought because both the manufacturers and the unions felt that much was at stake. Great hardships were suffered by the workers and extensive losses by the manufacturers. In retrospect, the "old line" militant tactics appear to have been necessary to secure strong unions in the early days of industrial growth and prosperity and to have been successful as long as the prices of textile products were rising. Militancy was less successful when prices fell in an acute competitive struggle, followed by the decline of the Philadelphia trades. But one's interpretation of the success of union tactics depends fundamentally upon one's philosophy concerning the function and future program of the labor movement. This, in turn, depends upon one's pessimism or optimism as to the ability of the worker to gain immediate economic security

13+

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

under the present economic system. If one accepts the philosophy of class conflict and struggle for power as the only means of workers' attaining economic security, a program of militancy is the one which must eventually be successful. According to this philosophy, "no strike is ever lost." All strikes are in a sense rehearsals for the development of a revolutionary spirit among workers. T h e preservation of a tradition of militancy is therefore more important than the loss of former achievements of collective bargaining, and, in the last analysis, more important than the loss of a union. In accord with the revolutionary theory of the labor movement, the tapestry carpet workers succeeded because they preserved a militant tradition to the bitter end. T h e hosiery workers, on the other hand, failed because they recently accepted wage cuts and made drastic concessions to employers in an effort to preserve their organization. "That's no kind of a union," in the opinion of the militant unionist. If, on the other hand, one accepts the theory that the function of the labor movement is to attain economic security for workers under the present economic system, or some parliamentary modification of it, extension of union control and preservation of union organization become all-important factors. Tactics are adapted to the economic situation, sometimes militant, sometirries defensive. T h e struggle for economic power becomes a game of strategy. A union is successful if it maneuvers into a position of power during the upswing of the business cycle and retains control of the trade or maintains its organization during business depression. According to this philosophy, the hosiery workers were more progressive than the other unions and their tactics were more successful. Although the upholstery weavers appear to have been slow in realizing the necessity of developing new tactics to meet an adverse economic situation, they, too, eventually recognized the magnitude of their problem and adopted unusual techniques in a policy of strategic retreat. T h e policy of strategic retreat by a union through concessions to employers and various forms of what may be

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

135

loosely called "cooperative" or defensive, as opposed to militant, tactics is much criticised by the more radical unionists. T h e radicals, in opposition groups 1 within the more conservative unions, and in the "left-wing" unions, 2 maintain that trade unions lose their militant spirit after using cooperative tactics. This claim is well expressed in the old French syndicalist maxim that "feet which meet under a mahogany table don't kick." Such a view tends to ignore the fact that a battle of wits may be equally as effective as a battle of kicks in modern economic life. Just as deadly weapons have been developed in international economic conflict which use no armaments, so the age-old struggle of workers and employers for division of the spoils of industry has developed more sophisticated forms of struggle for power. And when the spoils of industry disappear, and both workers and employers are caught in an intricate network of economic changes which threaten their existence, and yet are outside their sphere of control, something may be gained for both sides by a combination of forces to meet a common problem. This is not to say that labor should bear all the burdens of revolutionary technological and style changes and the migration of industry to new geographical centers ; nor that, pending great economic changes in industry, employers should be free to exploit labor as they will. On the contrary, the major social function of labor unions in such an economic revolution as that taking place in the Philadelphia textile trades becomes clearly apparent. Their function is to preserve socially desirable labor standards intact, as long as possible, against competitive pressure. If retreat becomes necessary their function is to secure an orderly retreat in those standards, with a minimum sacrifice to workers. In the situation presented by the Philadelphia textile trades, it is claimed by many textile manufacturers that the 1 Members group of the " Affiliated International

of the Conference f o r Progressive Labor Action, the majority Communist Party, and the Socialist Party. with the Trade Union Unity League and the Red (Communist) of Trade Unions.

136

UNION

TACTICS

AND

ECONOMIC

CHANGE

textile unions were responsible for the decline of the industries. T h e manufacturers cite the inflexibility of union rules and wage scales as the major cause of the loss of competitive advantage. T h e unions reply to the manufacturers' claim that old and obsolete machine equipment and lack of progress in developing new products are primarily responsible for the decline of the Philadelphia textile trades. Both sides are following the natural desire to blame the "other fellow." T h e r e is evidence that many Philadelphia textile trades declined after the unions were destroyed or where there were no unions. T h e r e is evidence that the economic conditions which precipitated the decline of Philadelphia as a textile center would have operated in any event. It is true that in particular instances the textile unions have been slow in recognizing the need for flexibility in certain aspects of their program. Caution in making changes is, however, the social function of the trade unions, and in these instances, the unions usually lacked data clearly demonstrating the need for change. Economic research thus becomes actually an instrument of successful unionism in a competitive industry. It is equally an instrument of the successful trade association or individual manufacturer. Accurate and continuous trade information is not available for most textile industries, and in some cases, practically no data are available. Both unions and manufacturers in the Philadelphia textile trades were handicapped by the lack of adequate information upon which to base policy determination. Even if the economic trends of the recent decade could not have been changed, the economic hardships attendant upon the rapid decline of such trades as the carpet industry might well have been mitigated. In too many cases the trends of the industry were not fully recognized until it was too late to undertake any program to change or meet them. This does not mean that information alone will automatically save a declining industry or a dying union, but that it is a necessary basis for any constructive program. Manufactur-

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

137

ers may have to change their designing and merchandising methods, purchase new equipment, or overhaul their plant layout, and unions may have to change their long-established trade policies and try entirely new ideas to meet a changed situation. But the need for change has to be established by factual analysis. As a matter of record, the Philadelphia textile unions were alive to the total significance of the problems presented by competition in new low-cost manufacturing centers even before the manufacturers. Their conferences, convention, discussions, publications, and organizing campaigns are evidence of their awareness of the necessity of meeting these problems by a comprehensive program based upon all the facts. But it is probably fair to say that in only two cases was a genuine program of research and policy planning worked out. While in these instances the initiative was taken by the unions, the manufacturers also cooperated in analysis of the problems and in a program for meeting the new competitive situation. T h e upholstery weaving and full-fashioned hosiery industries offer an interesting example of the use of fact-finding by impartial agencies as a basis for economic planning in union industries.

APPENDIX FIFTY-NINE

A

YEARS

AT

CARPET

ARTHUR

MITCHELL1

WEAVING

I was born in Kidderminster, England, a town of about 27,000 inhabitants, on the 9th day of March, 1862. M y father, grandfather, uncle, and in fact all of the family as far back as I can remember, were carpet weavers before me. I entered the weaving industry at i o years of age. Conditions at that time were different from today. I had to go to school half a day and I worked half a day until I was 1 3 years of age. I remember a strike in Kidderminster in 1884, in which I was a sympathizer. A young striker by the name of Wheeler was picked up for disorderly conduct and put in jail. At that time there were no pickets on the line. I had never seen pickets in strikes until I came to America. Wheeler was in the Worcester County Prison, 1 4 miles away, for 1 4 days. The day he came out, we got wagonettes, and a "wooden band," to greet him. This band was composed of a number of instruments, all made from parts of the carpet looms, such as shuttles, picking sticks, iron washers, and bolts. These were used to create a lot of noise. Wheeler had the grandest reception ever given a striker on that day. I landed in this country in June 1885, at the age of 23. I worked for twelve months at the factory of Kitchenman and Neil and in J u l y 1886, I became employed at Hardwick & Magee's in Philadelphia. I have been there ever since. Magee started with 1 2 looms in 1885. In 1886 he had twelve more. I helped to build the second twelve. At 1

Union offices held: Master workman, Knights of Labor, Local # 3 2 6 6 , 1886. President (Philadelphia local) Brussels Carpet Weavers, 1 9 1 0 . President ( N a t i o n a l ) Brussels Carpet Weavers, 1 9 1 1 . 138

FIFTY-NINE

YEARS

AT

CARPET

WEAVING

139

the present time they have approximately 300 looms. A t that time the Philadelphia carpet trade was the coming thing. M a n y English carpet weavers came here to work. M y father came to Philadelphia in 1886. H e had also worked at Palmer, Massachusetts. I have been active in labor organization activities for over 25 years. A local of carpet weavers was formed in 1892. This Brussels Carpet Weavers' Union was on a sympathetic strike for the 55-hour week in 1903. T h e only major strike we had in the industry was in 1918 when we were on strike for three months. T h e strike was called for a 20 per cent advance in wages, but when the strike was settled we compromised on a 15 per cent advance in wages. Conditions in the trade at that time were different from today because of the union, which was organized 100 per cent. T h e manufacturers in the early days always worked in conjunction with the unions. W e won the 48-hour week in 1912 and increased our wages IOO per cent from 1914 to 1920. S H O P C O N D I T I O N S IN E A R L Y

DAYS

Back in 1900 we used to work 60 hours per week. A t 8:30 in the morning, we would stop off and have a little lunch. Sometimes the boys got together and played ball for a few minutes. Wages in 1900 were approximately $45 in two weeks—which made a weekly wage of from $20 to $22. There were about 99 per cent English-born in the mill. There were very f e w Scotch and few Germans. There were friendly relations with the bosses then, and very few shop grievances. E v e r y six months the employers and the workers met and settled grievances and solved problems, so that there was very little trouble between them. W e had little trouble in dealing with a man like our manager. H e was fair, but stern. H e would let you gain your point if you had one. H e was very just. It was he who consented to let us have Saturdays off when we explained the advantages. One day while talking with us he told us that he knew he had the best weavers in the country, and praised us. It

140

APPENDIX

A

was compulsory for a boy to serve as a creeler boy for four years consecutively before he was able to operate a loom. T h i s plan was very successful because boys really learned the trade in those days. From 1892 until 1922 we had Organization. A f t e r 1921 there was a 25 per cent wage reduction, causing a big strike which busted the union up. Prior to this we had fine working conditions and also a great increase in wages at different times. W h e n the union broke, everything collapsed. Conditions became very bad and they went from bad to worse 5 until in January of this year ( 1 9 3 1 ) we came out on strike against another 10 per cent reduction for weaving, and 40 per cent on some other grades. These reductions had brought down the wages considerably—until just before the present strike our earnings were about $20 a week. W e had received wage reductions almost every two or three months. S H O P CONDITIONS T O D A Y

Although we are now supposed to work 48 hours a week, there is no basis to figure hours of labor today. T h e r e is no steady work. Some months, you'll work from 7 to 7, and then for about six months you won't have any work. In the past few years we have had to wait around for yarn for hours and sometimes days, whereas we could have been out and come in when the yarn was ready so we wouldn't have had to waste so much time. T h e introduction of light weight yarn and bad stock made the work much harder and kept people from earning money. Under the present system, the firm will have orders and some men will be working overtime to fill these orders while forty men will be walking the streets. T h e r e is no equal division of work. T h e efficiency system put in changed the whole system of the plant. In the old days when a weaver needed yarn the yarn boss, who made daily rounds to see what was needed, had it ready by the time it was actually needed. T h e r e was, therefore, little waste of time and no waiting.

FIFTY-NINE

YEARS

AT

CARPET

WEAVING

141

N o w , there is no one to see about the yarn. T h e yarn is never there when it is needed. W e are not allowed to go up to see about it and sometimes we wait perhaps two or three hours. This is a terrible waste of time. T h e n , too, the machines have been speeded up to such a point that the men running them can't be efficient. T h e firm invented a new yarn of a cheaper grade, twisted to such an extent it would not work. T h e old system of workers keeping the same loom has been changed. T h i s actually works against the firm because the men lose interest in keeping their looms in good condition. T h e y become careless and lose their interest in craftsmanship. There used to be ten fixers in the weave shed and now they have 20 and want more. N o r is there a system for apprenticeship now.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

OF

A

CARPET

WEAVER

EDWIN COOKE

I was born in Kidderminster in the county of Worcestershire, England, September 14, 1867. M y father was a carpet weaver, one of the first to weave on a power loom, and his father was a hand-loom weaver. A t the age of four years I was sent to infant school, for which my parents paid twopence per week. H e r e I was taught my alphabet, and numbers, colors, and discipline— mostly the latter as I remember. A t the age of six I was graduated to the St. George's boys' school, where I received the rest of my education. A f t e r school I would help my uncle in his work shop winding the " f i l l i n g " by hand, as he had two hand looms, on which he made small rugs, mostly 36 χ 60 inches. These he sold from house to house, as he could not get work from any of the manufacturers owing to his aggressive unionism. T h e manufacturers finally deprived him even of this means of livelihood by refusing to sell him their waste from which he made his "finger rugs." W h i l e he was respected in the town, he was blacklisted by every employer because of his antagonism to their methods towards their employees. H e and my father had been presidents of the Kidderminster Union, which was very powerful, and is to this day. T o help my parents, who were poor, with seven children to keep, I got my first job in a carpet mill at the age of ten. I worked on half time, that is half day at work and half day at school, as was the rule at that time. W h e n thirteen years old, I was allowed to work full time. M y wages for half time were two shillings per week at the start, sixpence additional after one year. After I was thirteen years old, I was put on piecework, creeling for two looms. 142

A CARPET

WEAVER

143

I was paid a percentage on the number of yards my weavers produced. M y first experiences were not so good, as one weaver was a drunken brute and very cruel and I was only a little slim boy. I think he took advantage of me, for it was a common occurrence for him to bounce a bobbin off my head if anything went wrong with the loom. H e was not a steady worker and lost a lot of time through drink j so my wages were very small—not more than six or seven shillings per week for sixty hours of work. I was afraid to complain to my foreman for fear I would lose my job, but one day the weaver struck me because I refused to go out and get him a pint of ale. W h e n I returned home in the evening my mother saw that my face was cut and when she learned the cause she would not let me work for him any longer. I immediately got another job as I was an experienced creeler. M y new weavers were good workmen and very sober men; so I earned good wages while trade was good, averaging fourteen or fifteen shillings per week. W h e n I was between seventeen and eighteen years of age, trade got very bad all through the town and I could earn very little, so I applied for an altering job. It was supposed to be an advancement, as it was a step nearer a loom, but it paid less wages, as ten shillings per week was the standard pay for that work, but as it was steady work I liked it better. In 1886 several of my friends emigrated to America, and I urged my parents to let me go. Eventually they conceded to my wishes, and furnished the money for my passage, and I sailed from Liverpool on February 15, 1887, at nineteen years of age. T w e l v e days later I arrived in Philadelphia. After a few days' rest I procured my first loom at M c Callum, Crease, and Sloan, in Germantown. I was very successful there for two years. There were remnants of a union in Philadelphia from the disastrous 1884 strike and there were a few union men in our mill. So I joined up, as was natural coming from strong union stock, and persuaded my boarding boss to join also. Toward the end of the second

144

APPENDIX

A

year there, trade fell off very badly and as I was of a roving disposition I sold my pay (for they only paid once a month), quit my job, and went to Lowell, Massachusetts. I arrived there September 14, 1889, and got a job the same day with the Lowell Manufacturing Company, the largest carpet works in the United States. T h e y spun their own yarns, both worsted and cotton, besides weaving all grades of Wilton carpets. There was a union of the weavers there and conditions in the shop were very good. Although the price paid per yard was a little less than in Philadelphia, weekly wages were much about the same, owing to other conditions being more favorable. L i v i n g conditions were very cheap, since, apart from the carpet mill, the other mills, mostly large cotton mills, paid very low wages. I soon took an active part in the union, and in 1902 became its president and held that position successfully till 1905, when I resigned to go to Amsterdam, N e w Y o r k . H e r e I organized a union of weavers and was elected its first president. I resigned in 1907 to move to Philadelphia. I got employment again at Hardwick & Magee's and was instrumental in forming the national organization in 1910 and served as vice-president and president. In 1 9 1 4 I moved back to Lowell. T h e union here was very much demoralized, as the result of an eleven months' strike over conditions. I endeavored to form a new union, which was partly successful, but before it functioned properly the company merged with the Hartford Carpet Company and moved the looms and other machinery to Thompsonville, Connecticut. T h a t was the end, in my estimation, of the most up-to-date plant in the carpet industry up to that time and the easiest for the employee. I next moved to Worcester, Massachusetts. Working conditions here were fairly good, but trade was very bad. T h e war was on in Europe and things didn't look so good; so I quit and went to Thompsonville. In a few months I found it

A CARPET

WEAVER

14;

was no place to raise m y f a m i l y since there were no prospects of w o r k except at the carpet mill, as that was the only industry there. I again moved to Philadelphia to work at H a r d w i c k & M a g e e ' s and have been there up to this strike, which is still on at this date, J u n e 7, 1 9 3 1 .

FIFTEEN

YEARS AT

TOPPING

FREDA MAURER

I l e f t school on December u , 1914, my fourteenth birthday, hoping that I could help with the bread-winning, but after a few trials found that the proposed bill forcing the manufacturers to allow children under sixteen to go to school one day a week made it impossible for me to get work. I had started work in a spinning mill, but was laid off because I was under sixteen. After several other jobs I was afraid I would have to go back to school. H o w glad I was when a neighbor told my mother that I was to learn hosiery topping with her. It was in M a y that I started to learn topping in Brown and Aberle's mill. T h e season was dull and we worked only two or three days a week. This meant that I earned very little as my weekly pay was just $3.50 for a full week, but I was glad to have woric. In those days a learner had to do all the loose-coarsing and if she finished before time to go home she was allowed to try to top a stocking once in a while. T h e stands were behind the machines, which were near the windows; so it was some time before I really saw a machine from the front. A f t e r I knew how to top I was allowed to work in a girl's place when one stayed out. T h e first time I topped two, then four bars every set. I was to go back to the girl who had asked for me and was teaching me. W h e n business picked up late in the summer I was transferred from the second to the first floor. This is where I really learned the trade. T h e machine that I was to top for was an 18-section, 27-gauge Shubert and Seltzer. W e got five cents per dozen and could do twenty dozen a day. M y first day was very trying and by noon I was almost in tears, but the boss, a fatherly soul, told me to try it a while and even though it 146

FIFTEEN

YEARS

AT

TOPPING

147

was hard everything w o u l d be all right in a little while. A f t e r that I didn't even mind the Polish men who were knitters and changed their shoes and socks behind the machines. H o w afraid I was of them when they ate their lunch and spoke Polish ·, although they never spoke to us, the w a y they looked at us made me uncomfortable. A f t e r a w h i l e I really got used to the work and the men. W h e n there were no more calls for 27-gauge work I was transferred to a 33-gauge machine. H e r e three girls topped 12 bars a set for two 18-section machines instead of t w o girls doing 9 bars each. O n this j o b one knitter and two helpers operated two machines. T h e toppers sat in the aisle and topped six bars f o r each machine. T h i s work was a little finer and paid 6 cents a dozen. M y knitter on this j o b offered me two dollars a week extra for fixing bars and dropping in bars. I n January all the children under sixteen were sent to continuation school. T h i s meant that we would lose our jobs because, if we had off, the knitter would lose time while we were in school. W e were then made "extra g i r l s " w h o had to work in other girls' places when they were out. Some of the girls l e f t to g o to the German-American for $8.00 a week. T h a t meant that our firm had to pay the same wages or we would leave. In the meantime, the machines that w e had worked on had to be scrapped because it was impossible to get needles through from Germany for these G e r man-made machines. T h e hosiery manufacturers in R e a d i n g got busy and replaced these German Shubert and Seltzer machines with their machines. T h e needles taken out of the scrapped machines were used up in the other Shubert and Seltzer machines. T h i s meant the Polish knitters lost their jobs and were later replaced by American boys. O n m y sixteenth birthday another girl w h o was to be sixteen in January and I were given steady jobs on the first R e a d i n g machine installed. It was a 20-section, 36-gauge machine. W e made mercerized stockings and did about 45 dozen a day at 8 cents a dozen. W e worked fairly steadily,

148

APPENDIX

A

but during the summer and fall we frequently went on strikes. Sometimes they lasted a day or two or even a week. W e were not organized and as a rule we had few victories because we had no leaders. W e would walk out, then have a meeting. When it was cold, we went in a store across from the factory—if it was warm, we stayed in the street. Sometimes representatives came from the union, but we never joined. After we had worked on this machine for almost a year we had our biggest strike. W e paraded around other hosiery mills in an effort to have them join our formation, and small American flags just gave them something to laugh at as they shouted for us to get back to work. We stayed in formation until out of sight of the mills, then went on separate ways. After about a week of it we just went back. T h e men realized by this time that it was necessary to belong to a union. T h e y got busy and started to organize. M y knitter, who had come from another shop, asked me to carry the cards in the pocket of my cover-all apron to the knitters in other rooms. This was easy for me to do because, as spare hand, I worked all over the plant, and so no« one noticed the cards as I silently laid them on the machine and moved off. I knew nothing of trade unions, but realized that if I was caught it would mean my job. In September of 1 9 1 7 two other toppers and I left the Fidelity to work in Richter's place in Torresdale on men's silk socks, 39-gauge ingrain. After a winter of doing all kinds of work besides the topping, I quit and got a job in H . C. Aberle's. This was my first steady 39-gauge silk job. It was one of the Reading machines, which, by this time, had replaced the old Shubert and Seltzer machines in most plants. Our wages, by this time, had gradually been increased through our fitful strikes. Men were operating single footers, double leggers and had to have helpers. The girls also had to help on machines for $ 1 . 0 0 a week extra. The firm guaranteed us $24.00 a week, but when we made over that we got it. Conditions were greatly improved, but by this time we

FIFTEEN

YEARS

AT

TOPPING

149

wanted shorter hours. Government workers had them and our increased efficiency made it seem necessary for us to have them, too. Our men were organized too by this time; they also had a shop association. W e usually knew when they met and decided to ask the firm for some improved conditions. W e girls got so mad because we were ignored when the men stopped the machines to hold a meeting to take a vote on some motion made in the shop meeting. These meetings were held in the shop; a committee was selected to go to the office. If the request was granted the men started up the machines. It was war time; so we usually got what we asked for, but we had to strike for an eight-hour day. T h e girls had been organizing by this time and we were all set for the strike when it was called on January i , 1918. T h e r e were 13 shops represented. W e wanted a 48-hour week, recognition of the union, and an increase of 25 per cent in wages. W e met at the union every day and held demonstration parades in an effort to get out the remaining shops. Often we sat opposite a mill and called to them whenever they were brave enough to come to the window. T h e police talked to us, but some of the mean ones just watched us from the corner. T h e neighbors sometimes gave the men coffee; on the whole the spirit was good. It was better to go with your friends and know what was going on than it was to sit home with the little cheer and happiness that our strike pay of $4.00 a week could give. M y brother, who was a helper, and I got $8.00, which was to buy food, etc. for six people. A t that time our local was not affiliated with the United Textile Workers and we struck without endorsement from the international, which meant that we had a small treasury to fight with. W e had to report every day to get it. This was so that no one could work somewhere else and call at the local occasionally to get strike pay. T h e international did help us later. In March we went back to work; we had won the 48-hour week with no increase in wages. W e did prove that we could produce as much in a 48-hour weeik as we could in the 54-

150

APPENDIX

A

hour week. W e limited our production to 40 dozen a day on 39-gauge heavy silk, which was the usual stocking worn then. T h e knitters also limited the number of knitters turned out by increasing the years of apprenticeship from two or three years to four years. Things ran smoothly for a while. W e were getting good wages, buying bonds, giving a day's wages for the war chest, observing heatless, meatless, wheatless, and other days. As our boys left for camp we went to see them off. W e laid down our tools and paraded with our boys to the railroad station, then ate our lunch when they were gone, and took the afternoon off to show our patriotism. T h e next day we went back to show our patriotism. Didn't Uncle Sam need hosiery to help win the war? Our firm had us insured and all was well until the " f l u " came along. This took off many of the men and their families. It meant sacrifices for those who could work. M e n who were sick had families to support and each week it meant baskets of food to be sent. There was much talk about a general strike on January 1, 1919, but with our present trouble nothing was done. W o r k became slack, some of our boys came back from France, and the men had organized the loopers, seamers, and menders preparatory to going on strike. June 1919, after a few months of working two or three days a week, trouble brewed over organizing the loopers in Aberle's. T h e firm discriminated against girls thought to be with the union. Some of the firms locked out their workers before a strike could be called, but this time we had all the shops and departments out. Some twenty-six shops were out striking against a i o per cent wage reduction. T h e firms just posted a notice telling us that they could no longer pay us the wages we were getting. Our notice was posted next to one telling us about how much we would receive if death overcame us while in their employ. T h e men discussed the loss of our insurance if we went out, but soon forgot it when the trouble arose downstairs. T h e men picketed from the start ; some of them got in

FIFTEEN

YEARS

AT

TOPPING

151

the shop to get their tools after a few weeks and it began to look as though we would be out for the summer. T h e y reported that there was unfinished work from Germany piled on the floor. This made the strike seem hopeless. W e stood around looking for things to happen; if they didn't happen some of the boys went out to start something, but on the whole there was little violence. W e had meetings to keep us in touch with happenings of other shops. Thomas Brown left for the islands and told his help that he didn't care if we never started, but secretly had his machines moved to 21 st & Clearfield Streets. T h e moving was easy, but no one was there who could erect them. H e never started again. In other shops "scabs" from out of town replaced the union men. Things looked bad and by fall were serious. Some of us who thought that it would be over by the end of the summer had not applied for strike pay. This meant that we had no money and found it necessary to get work. Rather than apply for strike pay at so late a date, I tried other work—silk-winding, work in a cake factory, loom-fixing, and other odd jobs. As the winter wore on the men were advised to take any work they could get so that our neediest men could have help. Even the large treasury and the help from the United Textile Workers' Union with which we became reaffiliated, was becoming depleted. Strike relief was given rather than strike pay; coal and food were given to those who needed it. Many felt sure that it wasn't given fairly and left the union to "scab it." Movies were given at the Labor League free for the strikers and there were many speeches about the "darkest hour just before the dawn." " Y o u can fool the people some of the time, some of them all of the time, but not all of the people all of the time." In the spring we gained new hope; some few new mills were started. One of the girls who had left the Fidelity at the same time that I had to go to Richter, paid me a visit and offered me a job teaching toppers at $28.00 per week. She told me little about the place, but said if I accepted she would let me know all about it. She had left the Fidelity

152

APPENDIX

A

to avoid joining the union and was still at it. There was little change in the strike situation, but we realized by now that it was to be a long strike. We were determined to win and did suffer many privations. There was little picketing done and the meetings held with the manufacturers never came to anything. We always waited hopefully at the local until one of these was over, but were always disappointed. The manufacturers were not willing to open their books to prove that they could not pay the same wages. That summer my brother, whose four years of apprenticeship were up now, my sister who was a mender, and I went to a small town in New Jersey to work. We managed to keep ourselves through the summer with an occasional visit to the local to get the news. In September we came back all expectant. The Chamber of Commerce was forcing the manufacturers either to open their books or operate. Also there was the presidential election in the fall and this usually brings results. Some plants were full of "scabs" and we wanted to be early and ready for the word. At last the strike was over—October 1920—no reduction of wages, recognition of the union, all single jobs; all our hardships were forgotten. Nothing mattered now except that we won and were at work. The Fidelity was the first to start working. M y brother and I both got jobs there, he as a knitter and I a topper on 39-gauge silk, 20-section Reading machines. Later I went to work in a plant which had just started in business since the strike. This was on silk and wool, 3 3-gauge, 18-section, second-hand Shubert and Seltzer machines. We finished over 1 2 0 dozen by Friday and did not work Saturday. The toppers made about $39.00 per week. The trade on the whole progressed rapidly j on account of the style for shorter skirts, lighter weight and finer weave stockings were introduced. The machines were improved, made faster and longer sectioned. There seemed to be no limit to our prosperity until the bottom dropped out in 19291930.

THE

H. C . A B E R L E

COMPANY

STRIKE

L . GRIGGS PIERCE PART

I—BEFORE

1930

T h e H . C. Aberle shop has been an open shop since the 1921 strike and they have had their differences ever since. O n quite a few occasions, this shop had been on the verge of a strike because of many outbursts of the employees concerning conditions and wages. T h e footers have always been paid in the neighborhood of union rates and on some styles have; been paid above union rates. T h e leggers have been receiving from 5 per cent to 15 per cent below the rates paid in union shops, while the girls have received practically union rates in the topping, looping, and seaming departments. Very few girls were in the union; the footers were about 95 per cent union and the leggers were below 50 per cent. I believe most of the workers in the shop were American-born with the exception of about 25 knitters. Quite a number of the knitters are of Polish and German descent and a large number of the girls are also of Polish descent. Although about 200 of the workers were over 35, the majority were young girls and men. T h e last time a strike threatened this shop was early in 1929 when the firm sought an 11 per cent reduction. T h e shop committee, composed mostly of union members, attempted to negotiate with the firm, but to no avail. T h e treasurer and general manager refused to negotiate with the union officials when the committee asked this of him. Finally a strike endorsement was granted and the strike was to have come off the next day. T h a t evening the manager met a representative of the national union together with the shop committee. T h e meeting lasted over four hours and the manager offered to open up his books to the union, permit153

154

APPENDIX

A

ting them to examine them and put an engineer in the plant for a time study to prove that he was making more than 8 per cent profit. If this could be proved the workers would get everything over 8 per cent. This was agreed to, averting the strike. T h e rank and file were not so pleased that the strike was averted as they believed a union shop could have been won had the strike taken place as scheduled, and some members neglected the continuation of their weekly payment on their union initiation fees of $ 2 5 . It was believed, at this time, that every knitter on the night shift had agreed to answer the call, but the day shift was a guess. Y e t , we believe, few knitters would have refused to come out at this time as animosity was rising high. T h e outcome of this settlement brought a five per cent increase for the 45-gauge leggers. Later in the spring, about April, the firm set a piece rate for the 48-gauge leggers who had been working time work for more than a year pending a setting of piece rates. T h e i r time rate was $65 a week. T h e piece rate given was refused because it would be impossible f o r a legger to make over $ 5 5 a week. When both night and day shifts refused even to give it a tryout, they were laid off for ten days. When they returned the firm still insisted that they should start up at the rate given and try it for a month and then they would see just what was right. T h e y started up and worked one week and notified the firm at the end of the week that they would not run the machines at this rate. Their tools were packed to go out. T h e committee was called to the office and a 1 0 per cent increase was added to the rate given. During the period these knitters were laid off, the chairman notified the firm that if knitters were put on these jobs, the shop would take action. N o one ran them during the lay-off except a fixer who was making samples. Things were running smoothly then until December 1 9 2 9 , when work got slack again and the firm gave a notice to the chairman of the shop on the fifth floor of a reduction of from 8 per cent to 3 3 1 / 3 per cent—8 per cent on footers and

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

155

double leggers, while the helpers were to receive more drastic cuts which on some styles amounted to 33 1/3 per cent. T h e leggers on the 4 5 - and 48-gauges who had received the 5 and 10 per cent increase early in 1929, the notice read, were subject to a loss of this increase at any time. T h e possible good that this reduction could bring was debated f o r some time on the floor and the firm was asked to g i v e us a longer time to deliberate on this reduction so that each employee might study it more thoroughly. T h e superintendent, speaking f o r the firm, argued that this was not necessary and they needed an immediate answer. T h e leggers strengthened the protest against this reduction by pointing out that if the footers and double leggers took this cut, their increase of 5 and 10 per cent respectively w o u l d automatically come off whenever the firm so desired. T h e cut was voted down unanimously when no longer time was given for the employees to think it over. T h e n the shop decided to call another meeting M o n d a y and consider it again. T h e firm said that unless this cut went into effect, they w o u l d have to shut down until further notice. O n M o n d a y it was again turned down unanimously. D u r i n g that w e e k , o n l y a f e w of the knitters were working. O n Friday, they paid off f r o m two o'clock until five and as the workers came f o r their pay they stood around in groups discussing the situation. Some, after receiving their pay, went on their w a y . T h o s e in groups were conversing thus: " P e r h a p s we should have taken the c u t — w e might have gotten some w o r k ; this w a y we have nothing, w e ' l l be out on the street." " I t is better to take a little than nothing at a l l ; I think we should h a v e taken i t . " Several were whispering, " I hear we are g o i n g to take the cut w h e n we go back a n y h o w ; they're g o i n g to g i v e it to us. L e t ' s have a meeting now; and see w h a t w e can d o . " Several decided to have a meeting right away and the superintendent granted them permission to use the fifth floor for the meeting. Q u i t e a number of the knitters and helpers went to this meeting, but there were less than h a l f , although one f e l l o w was stationed at the window

156

APPENDIX

A

where the pay envelopes were given out to tell each one of the meeting being held then. Some had not lingered at the mill after receiving their pay and others felt that it was unnecessary to attend such a meeting as the cut had already been voted down twice. From the conversations on the sidewalk I was afraid the meeting would be almost unanimous for the cut. But after deliberating for more than an hour pro and con, another vote was taken of those present and again it was voted "no cut." This still did not satisfy those who were anxious for the cut. They began to get together in groups buzzing and whispering. H a r d l y before we knew it, some eight or ten went out the door with the chairman— several of us inquired concerning this as it looked rather suspicious. W e were told they were going to the office to see if they might get back a bonus which had been taken off recently—or at least part of it. ( T h e bonus was for the. number of years of service, so much per cent on total earnings.) On their return we understood that they had agreed to take the cut and ι per cent of the bonus would be returned. T h e chairman was criticized severely for his action. H e had not picked the committee. While they were in one of the groups this was decided and several volunteered to go along to the office. After bitter denunciation of the committee and the chairman by some of the workers, of whom several were younger than most of them, M "threw up the sponge"—he was "through." H e was criticized for this action also; but it was final that he was "through." T h e next week a large number of knitters went to work and the feeling in the shop was they didn't know whether they were working under the cut or not. As the shop had voted it down twice on a full meeting and once at the rush meeting on Friday afternoon, we could see no reason why the firm should expect us to take it because of the group meeting which we considered unofficial. Several members sought advice from the union and a special meeting was arranged for Thursday evening, January i . It was decided that no action could be taken unless the night

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

157

shift had a chance to express their feelings, so a joint meeting was held on Saturday afternoon, January 4. Definite information was given that the firm accepted the cut. Almost every one in this meeting seemed to see things the one way, expressing themselves that they were tired of playing tag with the firm, feeling that in times past their leniency with the management was not appreciated. Finally a motion was made to declare strike on M o n d a y , later it was changed to Tuesday to enable the committee to inform the firm on M o n day and to inquire if the cut was to remain. Our request was a union shop with union rates or strike Tuesday, January 7, 1 9 3 0 at 1 0 a . m. A f t e r this motion to strike was seconded, several of the active union workers pleaded for an expression of views from those in the meeting differing concerning this action. T h e y were assured that they would get an attentive ear and that we would ponder seriously over this motion and then accept it or reject it. I t was pointed out that a strike is not something that lasts but a day or two. "Perhaps this strike will last a week, perhaps a month, or six months—maybe a year. W h e n you take this vote keep that in mind. W e are going in this fight to a finish if it is a year, two years or five. I f you do not go in with that determination, then don't go in at all. Some of you will lose your cars, some your homes, perhaps." Only one took the floor to remark that perhaps w e had better try and organize more thoroughly before we took this action; no other one voiced an opinion opposed to striking. This brother's remarks were answered by another worker who said, " T h e time has come for the workers in the Aberle shop to declare whether they are going to uphold their high standard of living or lose it. W e have tried f o r a long time to make a union shop of this mill and the workers have only responded when their envelopes were being reduced. T h e y would pay dues a while and then forget the union until another cut came along." T h e vote on the strike question was taken by secret ballot of workers in this shop only. There were but three girls at this meeting

158

APPENDIX

A

and helpers did not vote. T h e vote was 163 to strike, 7 not to strike. T h e union officials, although present at the meeting, withheld their comments until the vote was taken ; then they assured us that the union would support us in our fight. Nominations were then opened for chairman and committees. Russell Bowker was elected chairman and six others were chosen for the official committee, most of whom were under 30. Seven more were elected as a strike committee to assist the official shop committee. O n M o n d a y , January 6, at noon, the chairman and three others went in to see the general manager to inform him of the action of the shop. T h e y were in for some time and then the chairman came out for the rest of the committee. M r . Aberle went over some of the things he had been telling the committee before, referring to conditions in the south and to the fact that his firm could not compete with the present wage scale. Our committeeman played a good part; he referred M r . Aberle to wage scales here in Philadelphia just around the corner where wages are higher than ours and yet those shops were meeting the competition. H e also referred to the stock quotations in our newspapers. W h e n M r . Aberle stated, " Y o u cannot believe everything you see in the paper." " A l l right," said Andy, "then we cannot believe this southern propaganda here in these papers you show us." T h e chairman again informed M r . Aberle that we were requesting union rates and a union shop. M r . Aberle said, " Y o u can have a union shop; I don't care what kind of a shop you have, but this is the rate of wage you are going to work for here," pointing to the wage scale that included the cut. H e said, " Y o u are going to pull the shop, all right, but remember I will always be one j u m p ahead of you." H e went out of our presence into the outer office, swearing as he left, for he was in somewhat of a fit of rage. W e waited about five minutes and then returned to our respective jobs, informing the committee to tell each worker of the strike to take place the next day. A n d y and another member were to inform the night shift. About a half hour after we told the

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

159

workers the superintendent asked some one the verdict and he was told that the strike would go through. At 4 : 4 5 P.M. the foreman of each floor told most of the leggers that they were laid off until sent for. T h e committee told each worker immediately thereafter to be on the outside at 1 0 A.M. on Tuesday till all came out. T h e night shift were not permitted to start their machines when they came in M o n d a y night. This gave us the opportunity, unintentionally, to declare it a lockout. Tuesday morning, 1 0 o'clock, J a n u a r y 7, the workers started to file out like they were going to a picnic, laughing and kidding each other, although there was no shouting, yelling, or throwing brickbats, as some people expect to see on such occasions. T h e committee told everyone to go to the union headquarters and register. Some did not go because they did not belong to the union, feeling that they were not included. T w o hours later, twenty pickets were put around the mill with white banners on their arms with " H . C. Aberle striker" written on it. M a n y of the girls in the seaming, looping, and wareroom departments were unaware of the strike until they came out to lunch at noon, at which time they remained out or went back to get their belongings. B y 1 : 3 ο P.M. the union hall was packed with one thousand strikers, and some were unable to get in. Speeches were delivered by union officials through the amplifiers installed because of the enormous crowd. T h e whole afternoon strikers kept coming to the union headquarters some 1 5 blocks away from the mill. T h e workers' response to the call was amazing considering that less than 200 voted in the meeting to call the strike and 1 0 0 per cent came out. M o r e than 1 , 1 0 0 out of 1 , 4 0 0 workers registered at the union headquarters. As the strikers walked out, the firm laid some others o f f , perhaps thinking that they would return to work when sent for. T h e committee, together with M r . Callaghan, the representative in charge of this strike, worked fast in getting other committees working. Committees were formed for picketing, for registering, and a committee to carry the story

160

APPENDIX

A

throughout the state and nation if need be. An investigating committee for the sick was formed. The meetings were orderly, during the first few months especially. The picket line was A No. ι with fine weather all the first week. The second week was bitter cold for the pickets, with ice and slush on the ground, yet they kept their vigil, getting coffee at the corner store, supplied by the union. Pickets were given two hours on duty about every fifth day so that all would share in this responsibility. The Official Committee was on the job at 5:30 each morning the first few weeks to be sure that there would be pickets, especially at the mill entrance to see that no one went in unnoticed. Only a few knitters returned when the firm sent cards out to return to work. On Saturday, January 1 0 , in the afternoon, we staged a monster parade, some 5,000 members in line going past several large non-union mills, every one walking throughout the eight-mile route. Several riots broke out near the mill when some one took a punch at a "scab" who was walking out with his chest a little higher than it should have been. Several girls were stripped of their clothing the same evening. The only reason that could be learned for such action was that these girls were "scabs." These minor riots, however, were started by labor sympathizers and hardly any damage was done. People throughout the neighborhood gathered at 5 o'clock to see the workers that "scabbed it" come out of the plant. T h e y wanted to see what a "scab" looks like and, true enough, many stated that they look just like what the name implies. These neighbors seemed to take a keen delight in booing and yelling "scab" as they came out of the mill and drove away in their cars with a police escort. In the early days of this strike there was supposed to have been a robbery in the mill. The watchman was bound and gagged and about $10,000 worth of property destroyed. T h e firm stated that stockings were cut and slashed and acid scattered over dozens of pairs of hosiery. Several of our strikers were arrested but later released on bail. At the

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

161

hearing they were dismissed. W e believed that this was the work of a private detective or strike-breaking agency of Philadelphia. N o more, however, was heard of the case after our strikers were dismissed. There was never any trouble along our picket line. Each one behaved himself and obeyed the orders of the captains with the exception of a few girls who just couldn't help telling their former associates what " r a t s " they turned out to be as they were going into the mill one day. But M r . Aberle wanted an injunction as he didn't like the pickets around the mill. T h e y were told by the union to tell everyone going into the mill that a strike was on there. So he went to see J u d g e McDevitt or his lawyer did; anyhow, he knew the old judge wouldn't fail. H e never does when it comes to injunctions! So the Aberle lawyer sent us all a copy of the complaint notifying us to come to McDevitt's court, where we heard the Aberle side of the story; some things were terrible according to the testimonials. There sat J u d g e McDevitt, our first glimpse of him, this arch enemy of organized labor, this injunction judge. W e were not disappointed in the decision. It couldn't be any other way. H e told us practically what he was going to do before he heard from any of our strikers. M r . Aberle got the temporary injunction, January 20, and what an injunction! It cut the pickets down to eight, two on each street. W e couldn't call a "scab" a " s c a b " ; we were not permitted to go near the mill, nor speak to the workers going in or coming out. A n d the judge says, " I f you don't behave out there, I ' l l take those eight pickets o f f . " And he did. H e sent his tipstaff out to catch somebody doing something they could be restrained from and he, thinking he had strikers, arrested four fellows from the Hancock mill who were looking f o r a friend's boarding house. Then the pickets came off and the trouble started. W e could maintain order on the picket line when our pickets were there, but shortly after their removal, riots started. Homes were stoned; doors broken, mobs in the streets; people from all classes marching to destroy. A l -

162

APPENDIX

A

though many "scabs' " homes were stoned, windows broken, and occupants beaten, innocent people, not connected in any way with the labor dispute, were also the victims of attacks by people who took it upon themselves to avenge. Sympathizers on a wild rampage and strikers! Yes, strikers were among them. Strikers who had been warned against violence by union officials. But the injustice handed down by the court of Common Pleas, the Court of Equity, caused them to forget obedience, for the present time at least. While at the union hall, new speakers were given the floor; new songs were sung. Poems were read; everything the committee could think of to keep up the spirit of the strikers was on the program. Dances every Wednesday afternoon were started the third week after the strike. T h e strikers formed their own orchestra. Strikers often ventured near the mill after the meetings in spite of the injunction issued against them. On the streets near the mill they would parade up and down the sidewalks singing the strike song. They always kept moving, but only because the police insisted on this. T h e Public Speaking Committee went to only a few locals in Philadelphia and four Y.W.C.A.'s where they told the story to the Women's Trade Union League. Quite a number of the strikers were exceptionally good singers, which made the strike song ring out along Allegheny Avenue. Along about the first of March large crowds were gathering on this street as the "scabs" had to pass that way to get the street car. Many of the "scabs' " cars had been followed by sympathizers. On several occasions these sympathizers would stop and try to encourage them to stay out of the mill. Carl Mackley, a sympathizer, had a pistol drawn on him one evening while talking to one of four in their car. Not being afraid of such things, Carl told him to put it away, which he did, and continued to converse until he had finished his discourse. The next evening, he was driving in front of a "scab's" car. Stopping at a red light, at Roosevelt Boulevard, he got out of his car to look at his left rear tire, when William Pfeiffer and three other "scabs" in his

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

163

car fired on M a c k l e y and the occupants of his car, killing C a r l M a c k l e y , injuring two others ; one escaped injury. A large crowd gathered as a park guard arrested the four "scabs." T h e y were held without bail. M a c k l e y was one of many enthusiastic sympathizers of the Aberle strike always ready to aid in any capacity. H i s body was laid in state at the union hall on Saturday f r o m 6 P.M. until midnight for many admirers to view. T h e lines of people gathered went to as far as 6th Street and policemen were at 6th and L e h i g h to stop automobiles as they couldn't get through. Fifteen hundred people were turned away at about Χ A.M. unable to see his body. T h i r t y - f i v e thousand appeared at M c P h e r s o n Square the next day, where a very beautiful ceremony was held. About 65,000 lined the sidewalks from the home to the square. O n M o n d a y the hall was draped in black and a poem entitled " O u r M a r t y r " by L . G r i g g s Pierce was dedicated to Carl M a c k l e y by the strikers. T h e opening of the meeting was a standing moment of silence. T h e f o l l o w i n g pledge was taken by the great crowd at the M a c k l e y funeral: " I hereby solemnly promise that I will continue the struggle against low wages, poverty and oppression, and that I will not falter nor be intimidated by hired assassins, nor discouraged by a subservient and ofttimes tyrannical judiciary. " T h a t if necessary, w e too will lay down our lives in order that all those who toil may be delivered from industrial enslavement by the un-American, avaricious industrial despots. " T o all of which I, at the grave of our martyred Brother C a r l M a c k l e y , d o pledge m y most sacred word of honor." PART I I

A f t e r the death of Carl M a c k l e y , the feeling against the "scabs" by the strikers and strike sympathizers was more bitter than ever. F l a g s draped in black or at half mast were put out throughout Kensington as a last tribute to the y o u n g martyr for the cause of labor. T h e strikers were sure now that the public was with them wholeheartedly. Crowds began to gather at A l l e g h e n y A v e n u e and A Street each evening;

164

APPENDIX

A

larger were the crowds with each passing day. Nearly two hundred police were on duty for blocks around the mill. The sidewalks were lined with people from all parts of the city, gathering to see the excitement each evening as the "scabs" came out from the mill. M r . Aberle appealed to the police department, saying that he did not have enough protection for his loyal workers. The Honorable Mayor Mackey had issued a statement a few days before that he would lay the blame for future trouble at the door of the Aberle Company since this company would not submit to arbitration for settlement of the strike. Dr. Billikopf and other public-spirited citizens were appealing to the manager to submit to arbitration. T h e union was always willing to have their disputes arbitrated. Before adding more police to this district, Superintendent Mills wished to make a personal investigation together with the director of public safety, Schofield. There seemed to be more there that particular evening than ever before. On previous evenings, people were not permitted to go to their homes or stores within the four blocks surrounding the mill, but tonight Allegheny Avenue was crowded; porches were filled. The intersection at Allegheny and A Street was a mass of curious people who had not witnessed the "scabs" coming out on other nights. Several of the "scabs" came out and were standing on the southeast corner waiting for a street car to get near the stop before crossing to board it. A stranger to most of us walked over to one of the "scabs," a knitter, and put his arm around his neck. This was witnessed by several thousand in the crowds that were held back. Police were standing near the mill workers to escort them to the street car. This fellow, as he stood with his arm around the "scab's" neck, looked as though he might be friendly, but in a few seconds he took his fist and started to poke it in the "scab's" face. Yet he did not seem to put any force in it. Then the "scab" released himself and started to slug in earnest. As the crowds from every side saw this they all made for the fight. The cops could not hold them

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

165

back. A mass of people swamped down on the "scabs." T h e police put a stop to the fight and permitted the stranger that started the riot to go on his way. T h e crowds were now charging on the police that were trying to save the "scabs." A street car came to the intersection, but the workers could not board it. T h e crowds jammed the door, the "scabs" were beaten as they stood there with the cop; the girls had their dresses partly torn o f f ; cops had been beaten in the mob. Clubs were flying. A mass of people had scarred heads; some of the crowd nearly upset one of the patrol wagons as three of the crowd were put in. Finally, the police managed to get the people back from the car stop. Detective Hanlon charged into the crowd trying to drive them off the porches. T h e residents opened the door and they were permitted to go inside. As they made for the door, he was socked a number of times by those who felt they were permitted to be spectators by law if they chose to be. Hanlon said, " L o a d them u p " ; the crowd rushed to get in the car; several "cops" were pushed aside as the mass of people rushed for the door; this one was packed and the next one was several minutes later getting there and in the meantime, the people were being driven further down the street. T h e patrol across the street, however, was cheerfully greeted when the porches were charged for a ride. M o r e than 60 people had been hauled to the district police station. Soon a crowd had gathered there. T h e street was so thick with people, no motor traffic could get through. Someone threw a rock through the station house window. T h e crowd rushed back, but nothing happened; so they were calmer. Those arrested were released on copies of the charge and dismissed the next morning. T h e next morning, in the meeting hall, everybody was talking about the excitement and the chairman rapped for order, time and time again, but all in vain, for about a half hour. A s the strikers who were among those arrested came in the hall, cheers went up and the strike song burst upon the air in melody. T h e meetings, day after day, were more

166

APPENDIX

A

interesting. Public officials were bearing down on M r . Aberle and he finally consented to arbitrate the dispute and abide by the decision rendered. T h e strikers were happy, but there was a doubt concerning the outcome. W e had agreed with our union and ourselves that we would not go back unless we went back together; everyone for union rates and recognition of the union by the firm. These pledges were made time and again and were cherished deeply by the strikers. T h e y had long hoped for a union shop. A union shop seemed to appeal to them more than the mention of higher wages and regulated hours. But now all this was to be given over to arbitration. Perhaps the arbitrators would not feel about it as we did. T h e crowds continued to gather in the neighborhood of the mill even though it had been announced in the papers that the strike was practically over, as both sides agreed to abide by the decision. M r . Callaghan, while talking over the situation with Superintendent of Police Mills, asked if the union workers were given buttons to wear as deputies whether or not that would quiet the crowds, who at times were attacking people not even connected with the workers in the mill. Superintendent Mills thought it was a good plan and said he would deputize iOO union men to patrol the neighborhood. This plan, when laid out to the strikers, met strong protest by many of the strikers. But it was finally agreed upon when we were assured that we could place one of these deputies at the entrances, to assure ourselves that the firm was not hiring new workers. Our sympathizers, however, thought the plan was all wet and the activities that had helped us so throughout the strike were no longer resumed. Many today yet rub it in on us for sending the 100 men on the streets. It had looked to them as though we intended to help the "scabs" or make their safety more secure, but this was not the case. Several days later the Arbitration Committee suggested that the strikers return to their jobs while the investigation was going on. Since both sides had agreed to abide by

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

167

the decision, there should be no protest, thought the Arbitration Committee. But the strikers did protest about going in to work with the "scabs." But if the arbitrators decided that way, we would have to abide after their decision anyhow. Again it would be better for the strikers to be on the machines during the time study. There were many of the strikers who protested this move. And for hours, the arguments pro and con were debated. T h e union officials, however, felt that they should have something definite to say considering the settlement of the strike since this organization financed the strike. And the officers were asking the strikers to vote to go back pending the decision of the arbiters. T h e vote was taken 5 the strikers followed the advice of the union officials. Quite a number of the strikers were called to answer questions at the hotel where the arbitration committee sat for the hearing. Only one at a time would be called in. T h e Arbitration Committee got a great kick out of Andy and his Scotch brogue. T h e arbiters had finished its findings and made its report. (See " T h e A w a r d " by Leeds, Squires, and Cooke.) M r . Aberle seemed pleased with the decision, and the union felt justified as the girls' pay was restored and part of the knitters and helpers' cut. T h e strikers had quite some arguments because of the decision stating that all employees would receive their former positions, yet none of the "scabs" were fired. And it was an impossibility for all strikers to get their respective jobs with the "scabs" working. Nevertheless, as was agreed beforehand, it was accepted. D r . Fineshriber was to sit as arbiter in the settling of any disputes. T h e r e were some hundred and forty strikers that the firm stated they would not take back because of their activities during the strike. T h e strikers' committee that had been chosen from those who had already returned to work took this up with the firm at each meeting. T h e firm was slow to take action on these cases and the workers were anxious and wanted immediate hearings. Sometime later D r . Fine-

168

APPENDIX

A

shriber, on leaving the city, left the firm and the union to set up a successor to him during his vacation and D r . T a y lor was chosen to act. M r . Aberle was trying to get the committee to agree on a temporary reduction. This, after many meetings, was ruled out as the committee would not advise the workers to accept a reduction unless the union granted every shop the same privilege. Finally, on August i , the union and manufacturers agreed on a reduction. M r . Aberle was allowed to do this when he stated it was reasonable to believe that the H . C. Aberle Company would sign up with the union on September i . D r . T a y l o r insisted on an answer at the end of such time. During the conference with M r . Aberle, the union officers together with the officials from the Aberle firm and D r . Taylor tried the discrimination cases and the list of 146 was reduced to eight remaining strikers and the two foremen and the forelady who had come out in sympathy. In almost every strike, there are some strikers who are laid on the altar of sacrifice in the settling of the dispute. T h e firm used the argument that the foremen and the forelady had quit and could not be classed as strikers. W i t h regard to the others,, it was because of activity and remarks made by them that the firm had reason to believe that these workers would not cooperate with the management. T h e workers were very disappointed that a few were discriminated against, and they have expressed their sorrow on numerous occasions. T h e union kept these strikers on strike pay and then on relief until December of 1930. T h e two foremen were hired as foremen by one of the other union shops. E v e r y member of the strike committee was returned as eligible to work when orders permitted. T h e strikers were a fine clean group of workers, w e l l behaved on every occasion. T h e Strike Executive Board, although most of them were new in this duty, proved true stewards in the disbursements of the organization's contributions. Although there was considerable delay in securing a union

THE

ABERLE

COMPANY

STRIKE

169

agreement with the Aberle Company, it was finally negotiated in February 1931, and the mill is, practically speaking, a union mill with union conditions. Dr. Taylor served as an arbitrator to settle all disputes arising and of the terms of the union agreement for a six-months period.

THE

STORY OF A HOSIERY

BOARDER

CHARLES SEIFERT, SR.

M y father and mother came from Saxony, Germany, from the textile district. M y mother had to wind enough spools on a hand spooler each day before she went to school in the morning to keep her father and oldest brother in spools to keep their hand-looms going until she came home from school at noon,—and she had to do the same thing at noon and at night, until the carpet was all woven and taken to market to be sold. W h e n it was sold, she received one cent from her father to buy some sugar to spread on her bread. M y father's people were in the same business, but they had four looms in an outer building and better conditions. H e learned how to weave and how to fix the looms. W h e n power looms came in, my father came to this country with my mother and settled in Hartford, Connecticut, where he became a loom-fixer on the old ingrain carpet looms. H e came to Philadelphia and was a loom-fixer up until the Knights of Labor were organized, when he lost his job for joining the union. H e then became a butcher, and worked at this j o b until he died in 1884. I was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 1881, in the textile district better known as Kensington. I went to school at the age of 6 and had a grammar school education, leaving school at the age of 12, to take a job in a slaughter house to' help my mother. M y hours were from 6 o'clock in the morning until 7 o'clock at night six days a week and on Sunday I worked from 7 o'clock in the morning until Ι P.M. and received the large sum of $1.50 a week. I worked at this j o b until I became 13 years of age, so I could get my working papers, to go to work in a mill. This happened to be a seamless hosiery mill at Hancock and 170

THE

STORY

OF A HOSIERY

BOARDER

171

Somerset Streets. I started there some time in March of the year 1894 and have been working at the hosiery business up until this day. From time to time the hosiery business changed in styles. First I worked on so-called "cut feet," then came seamless, then came fashion—in other words, full-fashioned hosiery. I am a hosiery boarder by trade. When I first went to work we had what were called " d r y rooms." The men put the stockings on wooden boards and carried them to the dry-room and hung them up in racks. We boys had to keep the fire going in the stoves, also straighten out the work for the boarders. Then came the hand-presses. The men boarded the stockings on the wooden boards and put them in a hot iron press to dry. Then came the dry boxes where the men boarded the work on wooden boards and put them in drawers in the dry box which slide out and in. Some of these boxes are still working today. Then, in 1 9 1 7 , came the metal form boards. These are made of metal with a high polish so that the work can slide on and off easily; they are hollow inside and the steam that heats them goes up inside, making the stocking dry from the inside, where the other processes dryed from the outside of the stocking. Later came the Proctor Dryers where two men work one machine; one man pulls the stocking on the form and places the foot, the other man fixing the leg and welt. It moves on a revolving chain into the dryer and when it comes out on the other side it automatically strips off the form itself where, in the other processes, the men had to strip the stocking from the boards. From time to time, also, the trade has been changing styles and gauges, and in all of these changes there is something new to learn. In fact, you are always learning something new. In 1 9 1 8 when the metal forms came into the trade the manufacturers started to put girls in on our jobs and at this time about 80 per cent of the hosiery boarding is being done by women, with the men taken off the job. The only places where men are working is where they still have the

172

APPENDIX

A

wooden boards and the Proctor machines, with a few exceptions of men working on metal forms. O u r union was formed in June 1909 at Kensington A v e nue and Β Street. A, meeting was called, and Frank M c Cusker, then business agent for the Upholstery Workers' Local #25, presided at this meeting. Forty-nine men put in their fees that night and formed the union. These members are called the "old forty-niners" today by the old membership. Our local at this time took in all hosiery workers and we grew so fast that later on we granted the knitters permission to get a charter of their own. T h e first large strike I remember was the trolley strike in 1910 when all of our textile locals came out in sympathy with the car men. This only lasted about two weeks, when the men went back to work. T h e next big strike came in 1912 when all of the girls in the Taubel mills in Philadelphia came out on strike. A t this time Taubel had six or eight different mills in Philadelphia. B y this I mean he had floors in these different mills and they were spread all over the city. This strike lasted for about 7 weeks before it was settled and all got back to work. T h e strike was settled by the international secretary-treasurer, who came in and arbitrated the question. Later on came the big strike of the Minura shop, which lasted for almost two years and was settled by the firm going out of business. There were other strikes and lockouts from time to time. Then in 1917 came out the first universal price list for the boarders. This lasted until the big strike in 1920 and 1921 when the manufacturers wanted us to take a reduction. T h e strike lasted for about 15 months before it was all settled, and all went back to work. T h e n came the 48-hour week, which was granted without much trouble in the hosiery trade. A f t e r a few years of peace, other strikes occurred, although they were small. I took part in two of these. T h e y were lost and I had a lot of trouble getting another job at boarding, although I finally landed one. T h e trade then

THE

STORY

OF A HOSIERY

BOARDER

173

went along fairly w e l l — " s p a t s " here and there, but nothing much to talk about up until 1930. A l l kinds of trouble began then—reductions, lay-offs, walk-outs, and I don't know what all—because the manufacturers cut the wages almost in h a l f — w e l l , about a 40 per cent cut to make it right. T h e n they introduced new machinery which displaced six men in m y shop. I was among the last six to be hired and was laid off from the only place that would hire me. H o w is that for a textile worker's luck? I am one of the so-called " f o r t y - n i n e r s " of our local. I have been in office almost f r o m the beginning of the local, taking office about four or five months after we started. I have served in the office of warden, conductor, vice-president, trustee, and financial secretary, which office I hold today. I am also the recording secretary of the T e x t i l e District Council which is a part of the United T e x t i l e W o r k e r s and the American Federation of Labor.

T H E 1931 H O S I E R Y

STRIKE

JAMES H. TWIST

When the hosiery industry was in its infancy, silk stockings were sold in shoe and clothing stores, as a by-product, or as an accommodation for customers. Owing to the different changes of style in women's wearing apparel, such as short skirts, hosiery became one of the main products of the clothing trade. This necessitated a growing demand for silk stockings; thus new mills sprang into existence. A union of the full-fashioned hosiery workers was formed to stabilize the industry and protect the workers. This union, after a hard struggle, made itself felt, and brought about good working conditions and good pay for both skilled and unskilled hosiery workers. T h e more economical workers, often union men, making good wages at that time, saved enough to pool their savings and start a factory of their own. Most of these mills were managed under the open shop plan, for they had little capital and were pressed to reduce costs. The open shop, in an endeavor to make more profit and fast production, paid less money, worked longer hours, ran a day and night shift, and placed one knitter running two machines. Beginning in 1928, the union workers were forced to take cut after cut in wages in order to compete with the open shops, but to no avail, as the open shops slashed their wages still lower. This caused discontentment in the industry, especially among the open shop workers, who were forced below a living wage and had to work twelve to fourteen hours daily. The depression started in 1928, and became steadily worse, until the general strike was called on February 16, 1 9 3 1 . The response to the call was just another instance where red-blooded American citizens will 174

THE

1931 HOSIERY

STRIKE

175

fight for their rights. T h e strike was called on Monday and we came out about iOO per cent. T h e firm asked for a meeting of the strikers and the union officials, to be held on Wednesday afternoon. T h e weaker element, being afraid of their jobs, went in to work Wednesday morning, thus turning a quick victory into a siege. H a v i n g been an employee of the Whitehall Knitting M i l l s up until the general strike was called, I will point out to you, in the order of their importance, why we walked out of that shop: PRICES

These prices were far below the union scale, even before the cuts were made. Footers—22per per doz.

doz.

before

io

per

cent

cut.

Union

price—45ÇÎ

L e g g e r s — $ 1 . 0 8 p e r d o z . b e f o r e t w o 10^ cuts. U n i o n p r i c e — $ 1 . 3 1 doz.

per

T o p p e r s — 3 1 τ/2φ p e r d o z . U n i o n p r i c e — 3 3 ^ per d o z . L e g g e r s , P l a i n — 9 3 φ p e r d o z . cut to 70Φ. U n i o n p r i c e — $ 1 . 1 4 . P a i r e r s — 4 - ^ Φ per doz. U n i o n p r i c e — S 1 / 2 ^ P e r doz. H e l p e r s on footers $ 1 1 p e r w e e k . U n i o n price 8