The Philadelphia Printing Industry: A Case Study [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512818659

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Preface
Table of contents
Introduction
CHAPTER I. The Characteristics of the Industry
CHAPTER II. A Brief Resume of Labor Relations in the Printing Industry at Large
CHAPTER III. The Philadelphia Association
CHAPTER IV. The Typographical Union Strike
CHAPTER V. Conclusions and Observations
Appendix

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THE PHILADELPHIA PRINTING INDUSTRY A Case Study

J o h n W. S e y b o l d

Published for the LABOR RELATIONS COUNCIL of the WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE by the

UNIVERSITY

OF P E N N S Y L V A N I A Philadelphia 1949

PRESS

Copyright 1949 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS Manufactured

in the United States

of

America

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For the entire contents of this document, including all matters, whether of fact or of opinion, I wish to assume full responsibility. I also wish to make it clear that, although I have been engaged for some time as Industrial Relations Director of the employer association whose group bargaining activities are discussed in this monograph—and have thereby been afforded an opportunity which could not otherwise have been made available, to study the labor relations problems of this industry at first hand—the views expressed herein do not purport to be those of the association, or of any of the employers who are members thereof, and may frequently be at variance with the consensus of industry opinion. Numerous persons holding key positions in the printing industry have been good enough to discuss with me some or all of the material of this monograph. Because of the controversial nature of the subject matter, however, I do not wish to embarrass any of them by associating their names with this document, but I nevertheless wish to express my deep gratitude and appreciation for their assistance and helpful suggestions. I should like, also, to give public thanks to Dr. George W. Taylor in particular, and to other members of the Industrial Research Council of the University of Pennsylvania, for inspiration, insight, and patient, scholarly review of these pages. JOHN W. SEYBOILD

Preface The central theme of John Seybold's carefully prepared study is the sustained effort of employing printers, over many years, to organize themselves in order to overcome what they consider an inequality of bargaining power in their dealings with the printing unions. A certain pattern has emerged out of these efforts. Areawide association of employers to engage in multi-employer bargaining with the unions has been generally achieved. Nation-wide organization of employers for the determination of nation-wide policies has not been successful—nor are there any indications that this is a possibility in the future—although many union policies are made on a national basis. The experiences of the employers in the Philadelphia printing industry have been analyzed to show the nature of more or less typical collective bargaining problems that prevail in the industry as a whole under the system of joint dealings that has emerged. One unique thread runs through this analysis. Since their very inception more than a century ago, the printing unions have defined certain conditions of employment as not determinable by collective bargaining at all but by unilaterally-developed union rules. So-called International Law of the union, which embodies such rules, is usually subject neither to negotiation nor to voluntary arbitration. The area of collective bargaining in printing is accordingly restricted. In emphasizing this situation, from the employer's point of view, the author provides a new appreciation of collective bargaining problems in the printing industry. For the past several years, John Seybold has been intimately associated with the Philadelphia printing employers' association. He draws from a vast store of practical experience in his discussion of the conflicting forces that drive toward cohesion and toward division and which, in the last analysis, determine the effectiveness of the "united front" program of employers. It is the balancing of these forces which has, with few exceptions, made national organization of employers for collective bargaining impractical and area organization the standard method. Usefulness of the study in showing this balancing is greatly enhanced by the brief [iii]

but incisive attention, given at the outset, to the economics of the printing industry and the historical development of collective bargaining in that industry. A well filled-in background is thus provided before which the story of the Philadelphia association unfolds. The most recent part of that story concerns the 1948 strike of the International Typographical Union against the employers in Philadelphia. For students of industrial relations, it is, indeed, fortunate that John Seybold has made available an objective analysis of that strike. It was one of the important series of I.T.U. strikes precipitated by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. The observations made in this study, on the basis of the 1948 experience with a protracted shut-down, give a basis for appraising the usefulness and the limitations of labor legislation which regulates the collective bargaining process. These findings deserve careful examination and considered thought. Once more the old lesson was relearned and, again, after a costly work stoppage: Legislation cannot provide a substitute for mutual respect and confidence as the basis of sound industrial relations. During the 1948 strike, as well as before and after the strike, John Seybold served as industrial relations director of the employers' association. His report has an authenticity that can come only from close participation. At the same time, the study is objective. That is the only kind which John Seybold would prepare. The rare combination of depth of historical treatment, of intimate knowledge of the subject, and of clear and objective analysis makes John Seybold's contribution a notable one in this series. GEORGE W . TAYLOR

Philadelphia April 12, 1949

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I

1 T H E CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDUSTRY

Definitions The Size of the Printing Establishment The Market for the Product Cost Components Characteristics of Craft Unionism Summary CHAPTER I I

A BRIEF RESUME OF LABOR RELATIONS I N THE PRINTING INDUSTRY AT LARGE

CHAPTER I I I

CHAPTER I V

CHAPTER V

7 10 11 15 17 21

23

T H E PHILADELPHIA ASSOCIATION

35

Its History The Structure of Printing Industries of Philadelphia, Inc How Negotiations Are Conducted The Extent of the Bargaining Relationship. . Subject Matter for Bargaining a. Typographical Union b. Pressmen's Union c. Bookbinders' Union d. Stereotypere' Union Summary

35 39 43 50 51 54 57 58 59

T H E TYPOGRAPHICAL U N I O N STRIKE

62

Events Preceding the Strike The Period of the Strike How Did the Employers Survive the Strike?.. How Did the Union Survive the Strike? The Lessons of the Strike Questions of National Policy

62 71 85 88 92 93

CONCLUSIONS A N D OBSERVATIONS

APPENDIX

98

105

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Introduction The printing industry has had a long history of unionization. Many years before most other manufacturing establishments were organized, and even substantially prior to the unionization of many handicraft occupations, trade unions existed and flourished among the commercial printers of the United States. The basic objectives of printing unions may be presumed not to differ in any material degree from those of unions in other fields. Like most contemporary labor organizations, which are not anti-capitalistic or primarily political in character, printing trades unions have sought to improve working conditions, provide employment opportunities, raise wages, reduce hours, and lend increased dignity to the position of their members. It should be emphasized at the very outset that these objectives may sometimes be secured, or at least sought, through unionism without collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, fundamentally, is a process whereby two parties—union and employer— submit to joint negotiations all matters having to do with terms and conditions of employment, and endeavor to reach a meeting of minds in such fashion as to satisfy at least the most basic requirements of each. Unionism and collective bargaining are thus not necessarily co-extensive terms. In fact, the recent history of labor relations in the printing industry, not only in Philadelphia but throughout the entire United States, is illustrative of the efforts of employers to bring about a higher degree of true collective bargaining than has existed heretofore. They have sought to effectuate multi-employer or industry-wide bargaining in order to secure for themselves a greater participation in the determination of the terms of employment to be observed in their plants. Unions in the printing industry wer^ not established, even in the first instance, to serve as collective bargaining institutions. Workers associated with one another in order to better their lot. Where this could be accomplished by unilateral action, through the establishment of "price lists," coupled with boycotts directed against non-complying employers, it was so accomplished. Where employers, in self-protection, also functioned as a unit, it became [i]

necessary for the union to seek its gains by utilizing the techniques and paraphernalia of collective bargaining. The distinction just made is extremely important to an understanding of labor relations in the printing industry. Too frequently it is assumed that the sole or major purpose of unions is to engage in collective bargaining. Actually, in all cases, the purpose is to secure recognition and economic gains, and bargaining is only a means toward that end. This truth was more generally accepted in the early days of unionism than it is today, as is evidenced by the application of the so-called "conspiracy" doctrines to labor organizations in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. In those days employers determined working conditions unilaterally, as many of them have done even more recently, and it was thus inevitable that workers should follow their example. Probably in many instances where collective bargaining was not directly fostered by law it emerged as a technique to reconcile differences arising out of the unilateral acts of the two contesting parties. But in the nineteenth century, courts of law, in applying commonlaw conspiracy criteria to unions, found in the concerted activities of workers the same control devices which were utilized by employers in their efforts to reduce the full impact of competition. Over a period of many years public policy has shifted, in realization of the fact that the mere organization of employees does not constitute a monopoly, and that unilateralism in labor relations, either on the part of employer or union, has given way for the most part to the discussion and consideration of common problems on a mutual basis. Among the printing trades unions, however, this unilateralism has not disappeared. Its evidence is still conspicuously present in these unions' "international laws," which are convention-framed regulations calculated to remove certain so-called "fundamentals" from the area of collective bargaining. Because of this tradition of unilateralism, which still persists among the printing unions, many of the customary collective bargaining concepts have not been embraced, and it has been the employer, rather than the union, which has sought to extend the scope and significance of the bargaining relationship, particularly with respect to the conditions now prescribed by the unions' laws. This thread runs through the entire history of joint employer efforts since the formation of the earliest associations. Employer [2]

groups need not be credited, however, with any far-flung idealistic or honorific intentions in seeking to establish collective bargaining. In many instances employers may not have been aware of any ideology implicit in their endeavors. All that mattered was that by such steps they believed their position might be enhanced. The small unit character of most printing plants, especially in past decades but even today, readily lends itself to unilateralism by unions. This is particularly so when the labor organization possesses a substantial control over the market for and supply of labor. This control increases the employer's dependence upon the union and its good will, and it also tends to perpetuate the inequality relationship. It was therefore only natural that the first steps taken by printing employers to meet their labor relations problem were in the direction of creating local, city-wide associations for bargaining purposes. This has become the typical pattern of organization among these employers in their dealings with unions. But as this study will show, equality of bargaining power does not generally exist even on this basis. At any event, the employers have not gained the right, as yet, to participate in the determination of conditions of employment covered by the unions' "International Law." Various efforts have been made by employers to strengthen their position through the formation of national bodies vested with varying degrees of authority. Further progress by employers toward achieving their objectives might be won by a broadening of the scope of the negotiations' unit to include regional or national bargaining over some or all issues. Any program of legislation to limit or prevent such a development of multi-employer bargaining could only tend to jeopardize the employers' potential bargaining position, unless it were coupled with artificial restraints calculated to weaken the control exercised by national union groups. Employers in the printing industry have had some experience with legislation designed to restore a greater balance in bargaining power as between themselves and the several unions with which they deal. The Taft-Hartley Act, in particular, held out great promise. Certain of its provisions were aimed precisely at those elements which gave the national unions in the printing industry their greatest authority. Some employers doubtless hoped that what could not be gained directly through improved organization and self-discipline for the enhancement of their bargaining strength [3]

might be won indirectly through an enforced deterioration of the unions' controls. As a result of their experience during the past year, however, printing employers have learned that the potential benefits of legislation do not accrue automatically. They were forced into a virtual life-and-death struggle for the right to give effect to their new legislatively-created prerogatives. The superior power of the Typographical Union manifested itself and, in some measure, the edges of those very features of the law which were most inimical to its interests were blunted. Failure of the employers to secure the full benefits of their enhanced position under the Taft-Hartley Act was due, finally, to the absence of an effective national body with controls comparable to those possessed by the union. Despite the limitations of printing employer organization, all the advantages derivable from the Taft-Hartley Act were not lost. Some net gain, in retaining at least the bare minimum of their rights under the Act notwithstanding union opposition, was the product of cooperation by the employers at a national level. One conclusion suggested by the pages to come is that an attempt by legislation to redress balances in bargaining power is bound to fail unless accompanied by sufficient bargaining strength on the part of the group affected so that it is able to assert its rights. But if such strength exists, the redress contemplated might prove to be unnecessary. In the absence of a bargaining position powerful enough to enable the benefited party to hold on to its gains, a change by governmental edict in the balance of bargaining power, to be effective, would require eternal and effective vigilance to assure that the beneficiary of this legislated redress will not sell its new birthright "down the river," either to obtain other temporary concessions or as a result of coercion. Such an order of supervision seems hardly practicable, and is probably not desirable politically. One might conclude, therefore, that legislation may be directed more successfully toward the creation of an environment favorable to collective bargaining than to alter the balances usually struck in such bargaining by undermining or exaggerating the fundamental economic factors which tend to determine this given balance. Beyond this, even a perfect compliance with the law's provisions on both sides would not guarantee that the fruits of collective bargaining, with joint appraisal of the terms of employment, could be harvested. These fruits are the product of mutual [4]

respect rather than that of a common concern to avoid entanglements with some third party, such as government. Mutual respect includes, among other components, an acute awareness of the economic power which can be exercised by the other party. Collective bargaining can only flourish where this power is sufficiently great on both sides so as to provide an inducement to each to come to terms through a meeting of the minds. Where the power is insufficient on one side or the other, unilateral action by the advantaged group is tempting unless it be restrained by a consideration of the social, economic or political implications which might flow from such action. Despite the general superiority of bargaining power on the union side in the printing industry, certain of the unions have been motivated by considerations apart from an exercise of economic power. They have permitted a high degree of local collective bargaining to exist. But even in these cases, the observer with a penetrating eye may detect in some instances the form rather than the genuine substance of effective bargaining. It is in this light that the arbitration policy of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union may be appraised.1 A prior commitment to arbitrate new contract issues is almost certain to interfere with the bargaining process.2 Employers in the printing industry, however, have preferred to expose themselves to such limitations on their bargaining, and the accompanying risks of arbitration, as the lesser evil to the sufferance of a strike against a local employer group financed by an international union body. Whether there will be an increasing reliance upon arbitration in the future or a developing environment more favorable to collective bargaining on either a purely local or a national basis remains to be seen. *On several occasions during this union's history, national pacts have been signed with employer groups, the most recent of which was instituted in 1948. Under the terms of Buch pacts, if previously endorsed by the local union and employer groups, disputes with respect to the terms of new contracts would be submitted to arbitration, either before a local or a national board. Experience has demonstrated that in most instances where a prior commitment to arbitrate the terms of new contracts exists, each party finds it impossible or unwise to depart f r o m its prepared stand f o r fear that its position in arbitration might thereby be jeopardized. Hence a meeting of the minds is never reached, and it becomes the task of the arbitrator to resolve even the most minor matters ''thrown i n " f o r bargaining purposes. Although this experience has not been paralleled in the printing industry, i t may be simply because these national arbitration pacts have not been widely accepted by the various local areas. However, at the present writing, not only the Philadelphia employers but those in many other cities as well have accepted national arbitration as the machinery to reconcile differences over new contract issues which may arise with the Pressmen's Union during the next five years.

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The experience of Philadelphia printing employers over the past year is a significant chapter in the history of employer efforts to win for themselves the right of equal participation with labor in the settlement of the terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining with the Typographical Union. The account of the Philadelphia incident can only be understood, however, in the light of the efforts of printing employers in other cities simultaneously to improve their lot. From this contest, which was precipitated by the Taft-Hartley Act, although not necessarily caused by it, there emerged no clear-cut victory on either side. The officers of the International Union gained greater power and control over their local membership, but they may be required, for reasons of expediency in the near future, to exercise this power more sparingly. Employer groups, in Philadelphia and elsewhere, although disillusioned by the ineffectiveness of their cooperation at a national level, may have learned that only through such cooperation can they achieve the enhanced bargaining position which they desire. If such effective national cooperation among employers should develop, it will only be with the greatest difficulty. Multi-employer collective bargaining cannot be achieved easily in an industry so highly competitive, so highly individualistic, characterized as it is by small firms engaged in small-scale production. The absence of union control, or even union domination, could readily lead to chaos unless it were supplanted by an equally effective set of controls established through the processes of arbitration or collective bargaining. Possibly it has been in partial recognition of this fact, in view of the difficulties in developing a practicable alternative, that union unilateralism has been suffered to exist. This case study of the Philadelphia printing industry will, it is believed, reveal a pattern which is more or less typical of the collective bargaining experiences of other printing centers. It will thus be possible, through this investigation, to gain some insight into the general character of the bargaining relationship throughout the entire industry and also to draw conclusions which may conceivably have some application wherever a similar set of facts exists in other industries.

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CHAPTER I The Characteristics of the Industry N the major metropolitan printing centers throughout the United States, collective bargaining is carried on by employers through their trade associations, or through similar organizations specifically established for this purpose. Multi-employer bargaining prevails. There are some "open," or non-union, shops in the industry. Some of them are large and significant competitively, but for the most part the industry is highly unionized along craft lines.1 In general terms, the printing industry is characterized by small units. They are highly competitive and sell a product which cannot be stored. The manufacturing operations involve a high proportion of labor cost to total cost and require the use of scarce, relatively skilled labor in a labor market which is highly unionized and in which some artificial restraints have been imposed with respect to the entry of additional increments of labor. Limitation on apprentices has long been effected by the printing trades unions.

I

DEFINITIONS

As used in this study, the term "printing industry" refers to a group of firms primarily engaged in the sale of printing rather than in the publication of books, newspapers, and magazines. These establishments derive their revenue not from advertising or circulation, but from the application of labor and machinery to the creation of printed matter according to the specifications of customers. The buyers, in turn, will market the product or utilize it for internal record-keeping, sales, correspondence, or promotional purposes. Newspapers are excluded from this definition. So are "captive" printing plants, whether operated by publishers or by other types of establishments, such as pharmaceutical or electrical appliance 1

According t o the B u r e a u of L a b o r Statistics, f r o m 60% to 79% of w a g e e a r n e r * i n t h e "Book a n d job p r i n t i n g and p u b l i s h i n g " i n d u s t r y were employed u n d e r the t e r m s of o n i o n a g r e e m e n t * in 1946. (Monthly Labor Reviev, May 1947, p . 766.)

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manufacturers. However, publishers who do printing for others, if such work amounts to a substantial portion of their printing business, would probably be included in our definition. The distinction between the commercial, book and job printers on the one hand and the publication house on the other is significant. The commercial printer has no source of income other than printing. It may be true, of course, that the publisher, in the operation of his printing department, will keep separate books and will measure the cost of that department as against the cost of contracting his work out or otherwise purchasing the printing of his publications, but in many instances, as in the case of the daily newspaper, such contracting out would normally not be feasible. Definitions of the industry used by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics do not strictly correspond to the definition given above, since these statistical agencies group "newspapers and periodicals" into one category and "book and job" printing into a second, with a third classification for lithography or offset printing. In so f a r as periodicals are printed not by publishers but by merchant establishments, they should properly be separated from newspapers and classed with book and job printing, for both types of work are frequently performed in the same plant. Moreover, even where periodical printing is produced by the publisher himself, scales of wages and working conditions are determined more by reference to the commercial market than to the newspapers. However, the printing industry includes not only those firms which perform the entire printing process, but also those engaged solely in one branch of the printing business. The following outline will assist the reader to visualize the structure of the industry. 1. Integrated printers will perform most, or all, of the following functions: a. typesetting b. photo-engraving c. plate-making (stereotype and/or electrotype) d. printing—letterpress, offset, gravure e. binding f. mailing 2. The smaller, semi-integrated printer will buy his plates and his photo-engravings; he may also buy some or most of his composition (typesetting); he may contract out some of his binding; he may not need to perform the mailing function. In other words, he may simply operate a pressroom with a few auxiliary processes. In such case he [8]

will probably be either a letterpress or offset printer, although he may use both methods. 3. Photo-engravers. 4. Trade composition houses (trade typesetters). 5. Advertising composition houses (composition confined largely to the setting of ads for use either by newspapers or by periodicals). These establishments may also operate plate-making facilities, especially for the manufacture of stereotype matrices. 6. Plate-making houses (stereotype or electrotype or both). 7. Trade binderies—pamphlet or edition or both. F r o m the point of view of the labor unions in the industry, the following jurisdictional breakdown indicates the nature of organization: 1. Typesetting—largely under the jurisdiction of the International Typographical Union, AFL. 2. Plate-making—largely under the jurisdiction of the International Stereo typers' and Electrotypers' Union, AFL, except for offset plate making, which frequently comes under the jurisdiction of the Amalgamated Lithographers' Union, CIO. 3. Printing—letterpress printing is largely under the jurisdiction of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union of North America, AFL. This union also embraces certain miscellaneous classifications such as ink makers and paper handlers, and also covers offset printing departments of certain plants. The Amalgamated Lithographers' Union, CIO, represents a substantial number of employees in the offset pressrooms, especially where the employer prints exclusively by this process. Gravüre printing, used infrequently in the commercial printing industry, is usually performed by members of the Pressmen's Union. 4. Photo-engraving—largely under the jurisdiction of the International Photo-Engravers' Union, AFL. 5. Binding—largely under the jurisdiction of the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, AFL, which also claims jurisdiction over certain mailing and handling operations. 6. Mailing—two unions compete for jurisdiction, in addition to the Bookbinders; one is an affiliate of the International Typographical Union, AFL; the other is an independent union. In addition to the unions mentioned above, there a r e others of lesser significance to the industry, such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, A F L ; the Steel and Copper Plate E n g r a v e r s ' L e a g u e ; the International Association of Siderographers; the International Brotherhood of Electrical W o r k e r s ; the International Association or Machinists; the Building Service Employees' Union, and certain CIO unions which have organized miscellaneous groups of workers not unionized along c r a f t lines, or which have accomplished a ver[9]

tical organization of an entire printing plant, such as the United Paper Workers, or federally-chartered CIO affiliates. The multiplicity of unions in the printing industry has posed a real problem to the integrated printer. A moderately-sized firm may be required to enter into contract negotiations with from five to ten or more unions, and to observe the varying conditions set forth in their contracts. The employer's interest may be greater with respect to some negotiations than others from the point of view of numbers of employees affected, but unless he participates in all negotiations—when afforded the opportunity—or belongs to an Association which effectively represents his interests, he may find himself being "whipsawed" back and forth in his efforts to maintain a semblance of uniformity of terms and conditions, even as to those relating to such relatively minor matters as call-in pay, amount of notice of layoff required, eligibility for vacations, holidays, and bases for discharge, not to mention differences in the length of the working day or week or as to rates of pay. And if a majority of the members of a given union are employed in "trade" shops, such as photo-engraving establishments, which shops may dominate the employer bargaining and which will be used as a point of reference for the determination of working conditions, neither the printing employer nor the Association to which he belongs may be given the chance to play any part in framing the contract which he must perforce observe. T H E SIZE OP THE PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT

The printing industry as a whole does a gross dollar volume of business which ranks it among the major industries of the United States. Its sales are estimated to be in excess of four billions of dollars a year. The typical employer, nevertheless, is small in size. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,2 printing and publishing and allied industries employ a total of 718,000 workers. However, a detailed breakdown 3 accounts only for 430,000, of which 146.8 thousand are employed in "newspapers and periodicals"; 183 thousand in "printing, book and job"; 31.2 thousand in lithography, and 33.4 thousand in bookbinding. So f a r as this writer has been able to ascertain, figures are not available as to the size of the average printer's work force, but it can 'Monthly Labor Review, October 1948, p. 423. 'Ibid., p. 427.

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be safely stated that the total number of such establishments employing more than one thousand workers would probably not exceed fifty throughout the entire United States. At the other extreme, it is known that there are literally thousands upon thousands of employers of five or less workers. The average "goodsized" establishment probably employs somewhere between 75 and 250 employees. In a given plant the labor force holds membership in various craft unions. There may be as many as five, six, or more unions representing the employees of any plant except in specialized shops such as trade composition houses or trade binderies. Even where the "chapel" * of a given union is relatively large, it tends to be small in proportion to the total number of union members in a single local union. In Philadelphia, for example, the largest commercial composing room has never employed a total of more than 180 card holders, whereas more than 1200 members of this union have been employed under union contracts in the commercial printing establishments of the city, and the entire union membership, including those employed on newspapers, is in the neighborhood of 1800. Although a union's membership is thus fairly well dispersed throughout the industry, a given "chapel" can exercise considerable influence upon the union's policies should it choose to act as a bloc. In certain of the unions, newspaper employees are members of the same local with commercial employees and may be represented on the "scale committee" which negotiates the commercial contract. In such cases the final contract must be approved by a majority of all local union members, and in the event of a strike against either the newspaper or the commercial group those not affected would continue to work and would thus be enabled to assist in financing their fellow members engaged in the labor dispute. T H E M A R K E T FOR T H E PRODUCT

The market for printing is both local and national. The smaller printers depend almost exclusively upon local work, including stationery, calling cards, envelopes and forms, as well as more ambitious print jobs. This "purely local" work can go "out of town" if a great price disparity develops, but service and convenience 4

A " c h a p e l " consists of the members of a (riven union employed in a p a r t i c u l a r p l a n t . T h e "chapel c h a i r m a n " ie the union's representative in the p l a n t . Some unions r e f e r t o t h e c h a i r m a n of t h e " c h a p e l " ae the Shop Steward.

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weigh so heavily in the decision of a customer to place his work locally as to overcome modest price differentials. Much of the local business is inclined to be marginal, however, and there is often severe competition with other duplicating processes. Larger printers handle work not only for the local market but for regional and national markets as well. There is probably very little national printing in the sense that the customer is completely indifferent as to whether his demands are satisfied in New York or New Orleans. Customer convenience and "deadlines" are always important considerations. So are mailing costs and other expenses of delivery. There is a very substantial volume of printing, however, which will be placed in markets a considerable distance apart because of price considerations. A larger volume will move even more readily to neighboring areas in response to minor price differentials. Consider, for example, the printing of a periodical which has a national circulation. If the customer determines that all of the printing needed for the periodical should be done in one location, he would tend, other things being equal, to select a printing plant central to the area served by the publication. The mailing expenses of distributing the periodical would be such an important factor that the assignment of the printing work would depend not entirely upon the cost estimates he received. The location of his printing with respect to the item of distribution cost would thus be determined by the dispersion of his circulation relative to the postal rates to the different zones in which his customers resided. The publisher would also consider, however, the cost of getting his "copy" to the printer and the time element involved in receiving proofs in return so that corrections may be made. If mailing costs are an important consideration to such a publisher, if his circulation is large and relatively evenly distributed throughout the entire United States, and if speed of delivery to the newsstand or consumer is vital, he may elect to do business with two, three, or more plants, located in different regions, even at the price of duplicating printing plates. Considerations of a similar nature may also be important in the reproduction of large mail order catalogues. Railroad time tables, tariff schedules, insurance forms, and other similar items will tend to be placed reasonably near the firm's main office so that [12]

copy and proofs may be readily accessible and better delivery may be secured. Composition and plate work for advertising copy will be largely purchased in those metropolitan centers in which large advertising agencies are located, and the cost of maintaining contacts and providing service for such accounts will impose a limit to the distance such work can migrate. The composition, printing, and binding of books, particularly where speed and service are not significant factors, may be done in virtually any location in which the price is favorable, even abroad, except where copyright laws are applicable or state statutes confer an advantage to domestic printers.5 The competitive picture is thus highly complex. Generalizations are accordingly difficult. Nevertheless, rates of pay and working conditions in other cities, particularly major printing areas, are watched closely by unions and employers alike. New York City was, historically, the major printing center, but as wage rates rose there more than proportionately to the rise in other cities, and as national circulations with their mailing cost considerations became more of a factor, New York lost a considerable share of its "national" or "regional" business, and Chicago became the major area. Chicago also enjoyed the advantage of favorable mailing costs relative to the dispersion of periodical circulation. Other centers developed, however, on the basis not only of purely local work, but as a result of price and customer factors, and these cities claimed a share of the work lost by New York. Printing unions have come to believe that it is desirable to prevent too wide a spread between the rates of pay in the major areas and rates in other centers or outlying localities which are potential sources for new plants or for the expansion and development of existing printing facilities. In some cases the unions have come to regard certain differentials as customary; in other instances they are intent upon "narrowing the gap." Employers with favorable wage differentials will argue for a purely local determination of their wage rates; employers in cities with higher rates will usually cite lower-paying localities as a basis for resisting further wage increases. 6

Various states have passed laws tutions supported in whole or in such texts be printed within the Trades Council, or some other manufactured by union labor.

relative to the use of text books in schools and other instipart out of taxes. In certain cases these laws require that state and that they bear the imprint of the Allied Printing appropriate designation, to indicate that they have been

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Competition exists not only between firms in the same area, between areas and even nations, but also between various methods of duplicating or reproduction, and between various sources of advertising revenue. Many jobs which are customarily printed by letterpress processes may also be reproduced by lithography (offset) or by gravure. Methods of photographic reproduction, mimeographing, duplicating, hectograph, and dittograph are all competitive with printing for certain classes of work. Substitute typesetting devices have experienced a very marked development in the last several years. As a matter of fact, great strides have been made in the development and improvement of many techniques which may be utilized to by-pass one phase of printing or to supplant the entire process. Whenever the cost of printing rises relatively to the cost of such other methods of reproduction, some shift in business occurs. Similar shifts have been made from time to time because of customer dissatisfaction with delivery delays as a result of labor disputes with printing trades unions.6 Beyond all this, if the cost of printing rises relatively to the cost of radio (or television) time and talent, advertisers, who provide one of the most important sources of printing revenue, may elect to rely more heavily upon such other media. Very little is actually known about the elasticity of demand for printing. It is generally believed in the trade, however, that an increase in the price of printing will adversely affect revenues and employment in the industry at any given time. Over a period of time the volume of printing rises and declines with the volume of general business activity and prosperity, and the fluctuations in this respect seem somewhat more marked than is the case with many other types of non-durable goods. In the face of these competitive conditions, association bargaining by employers is fraught with complications. Even at the local level the highly competitive character of the industry tends to create mutual suspicion and distrust, so that employers may feel they actually have more in common with the unions representing their employees than they have with other employers. At the national level the difficulties inherent in multi-employer bar6

An interesting example of efforts to r e f u t e the impression t h a t delays in p r i n t i n g are likely because of labor s t r i f e is a c a m p a i g n i n a u g u r a t e d in the w i n t e r of 194&-49 by Chicago employers and unions, to " P r i n t it in Chicago." Assurances a r e given of the h a r m o n y which prevails in this city's p r i n t i n g labor relations. This c a m p a i g n was preceded by three y e a r s of turmoil, f e a t u r i n g m a n y w o r k s t o p p a g e s a n d labor disputes.

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gaining would be magnified many times, for such bargaining, if it were to encompass wage rates and wage differentials, might be tantamount to the allocation of revenue as between the different areas, and if it were simply confined to conditions of employment, there would still be many localities with some particular advantage which would be guarded jealously and thrown into a national bargaining "pot" only with the greatest reluctance. COST COMPONENTS

Increases in wages and so-called "fringe" 7 concessions have occasioned substantial rises in the labor cost and in the price of printing in recent years. F o r the most part, increased printing prices have so far not drastically reduced the volume of printing, except on a selective basis. Employers in the industry generally believe, however, that the industry has become more vulnerable to a substantial decline in business in the near future. They reason that advertising appropriations are fixed, and that an increase in the cost of printing will reduce the physical volume of such activity. They also argue that non-advertising printing, particularly in the book area, is very substantially limited by the willingness of the reading public to pay higher prices in view of the other claims on the consumer's dollar. At the time of this writing, 8 a recession is in evidence for the printer whose business is closely identified with the book publisher. Costs of non-labor items have also risen in recent years. Paper has become more expensive. Inks, metals, and other components have risen, and the replacement cost of equipment, as well as prices of new printing machinery, have shown the most substantial increases of all. Attention in this particular study, however, is primarily confined to the wage cost factors. In the printing industry, wage costs account for a very high proportion of the total cost of doing business. Yet the labor cost fraction will vary markedly from shop to shop with the nature of the work performed. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make precise estimates of the relative importance of wages in the cost total. Labor cost, for example, would naturally be a higher proportion in a trade house (composition or bindery) than in an " F r i n g e " practices in labor agreements have to do with items o f labor cost to the employer which are n o t directly included in the hourly wage r a t e , such as paid holidays, vacations, call-in pay and the like. » M a r c h 1949. 7

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integrated print shop. In the former instance no major raw material cost (paper for printing) is entailed. In the latter instance the cost of paper will be a major item of total cost. A trade house, primarily engaged in the sale of the services of its employees, will be concerned almost entirely with overhead and labor cost, and the labor cost may well run in excess of 70 per cent of total cost. In contrast, the labor cost in integrated printing operations will run in the neighborhood of 35 per cent or more of total cost, except for those printers whose customers furnish their own paper. When labor cost is considered as a price in dollars per unit of output on a given type of equipment, significant competitive differences from firm to firm result not only from differences in wage rates but also from variations in the efficiency of the employee, in the equipment, and supervision and management. The cost per unit of output for a standard job may vary substantially from firm to firm, depending upon the type of equipment in use and the cost of that equipment. A four-color "job" may be run on a four-color press, as two separate runs on a two-color press, or as four separate runs on a single color press. When actually running, not counting the "down time" for "makeready" purposes, a press may turn out from 1,000 to 15,000 or more sheets per hour, depending again upon the type of press and the printing processes involved. Older presses may be completely depreciated; new presses of identical or virtually identical character may represent a major item of current investment. Wage rates will vary according to the type of press, the size of the sheet, the complement of men on the equipment, and the number of colors required on the job.9 Notwithstanding these factors which tend to create differences in costs as between firms in the printing industry, union unilateralism has tended, in some measure, to stabilize competition. Among smaller firms in particular, selling prices are based upon a percentage markup over labor costs. Estimates to customers are prepared on the basis of the number of "chargeable hours" the job will require, at hourly rates determined by the equipment to be utilized. Employers who could not legally, or practicably, get together to set prices can accept wage costs imposed by a union, which costs exercise a profound influence upon selling prices. •Ill the composing room a single r a t e generally prevail« f o r all " j o u r n e y m e n . " T h i s also tends to be t r u e f o r photo-engravers and plate-makers. P r e s s r o o m and bindery rates of pay f r e q u e n t l y vary, a m o n g journeymen, according to the e q u i p m e n t operated.

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On the other hand, some employers will be more willing to absorb wage increases than others. A printer employing five compositors, members of the Typographical Union, but operating a large pressroom with possibly fifty or more members of the Pressmen's Union, will not be so inclined to resist a wage adjustment to his compositors as he will to his pressmen, since his profits are derived more largely from the operation of the latter department. Y e t he will be concerned as to the effect of a wage adjustment to the compositors on the negotiation of his pressroom labor contract. The owner of a trade composition house, on the other hand, will not be likely to give much thought to the repercussions of his Typographical negotiations upon other unions, and if his business is largely advertising typography, which business is not readily inclined to migrate in response to price differences, he may be more willing to reconcile himself to substantial increases in his Jabor costs than would the printer members of his association. Thus differences as to cost, coupled with differences in the competitive situation of different firms having bargaining relations with a given union, tend to complicate the problems of multiemployer bargaining, either on a local or a national level, while creating an environment not entirely hostile to union unilateralism. CHARACTERISTICS OF C R A F T

UNIONISM

Since the printing industry is organized by craft unions, a brief description of the characteristics of such unions is necessary as an introduction to a discussion of collective bargaining in the Philadelphia printing industry. In particular, certain of the salient differences between c r a f t and industrial unionism should be noted in order to gain a better understanding of the economic and psychological considerations which become significant in the collective bargaining relationship. A member of a c r a f t union, of the type to be found in the printing industry, will generally have stronger ties to his union than is frequently the case with the so-called industrial unions. To a c r a f t union member his "card" is not only proof of union membership but also of "journeyman" status. The card is regarded by the union as an indication that the holder is a craftsman—proficient, presumably, in all branches of his "trade" and specifically trained by diligent union members to carry on its skills and traditions. The card represents not only a "prestige factor," but also a [17]

badge of craftsmanship which entitles the member to greater security of employment and to greater ease of employment. In any city in which the union is firmly entrenched, hiring has been done—at least prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act— through the employment services or hiring halls of the union. The union in turn guarantees that it will supply competent craftsmen to the employers. Although the union card is not necessarily proof of an employee's competency, especially since it is usually agreed that each employer may, through his union foreman, set standards of performance for his firm's particular class of work, it is presumed to indicate that the employee is eligible for a fair trial and is likely to have a greater chance of success than one who cannot thus display his credentials. The "journeyman" concept of the craft union carries with it many other implications to collective bargaining. An inelasticity and a perverse elasticity in the supply of labor are usually consequences which flow from the acceptance of this concept in the relationships of the parties. Certain jurisdictional considerations are also involved, and there are effects upon the feasibility of introducing technological improvements. An employee becomes a journeyman member of a printing union in one of three ways. He may serve a formal apprenticeship. Or he may be employed by a shop prior to its organization and be taken into membership during the unionization process. Or he may apply for membership in the union and be given a "card." In the latter instance the union may test the candidate in order to ascertain whether or not he has sufficient knowledge and competency to merit union membership as a journeyman. In other cases the fact that an employee has been hired to do a journeyman's work may be regarded by the union as sufficient evidence of his eligibility for union membership. Apprenticeship is generally held to be the normal method of "making" journeymen. A "quota" of apprentices is set through collective bargaining, subject to the over-all limitations which may be imposed by a union's "international laws." To the extent that this is the sole method of obtaining skilled employees, the employer is thus obligated to bargain with the union about the size of his labor supply. Moreover, such bargaining may not be completely "free" because of the restrictions of the international union. The union's objective—local or international—may purport to be a [18]

regulation of the supply of labor in a way that will assure a steady flow of competent personnel, but differences will inevitably arise between employer and union as to the probable future course of business activity, the expansion needs of the firm or industry, the probable loss of personnel through mortality, superannuation, morbidity, or migration. It is inevitable that the union will tend to underestimate the manpower requirements of the industry, and the employer is likely to overestimate them. When the only means of obtaining new labor is through the apprentice system, union members will tend to be better protected against unemployment than is the case when the employer has free access to the labor market. Such protection would thus appear to be another of the benefits of union membership in a highly organized craft-oriented industry. Ratio or quota limitation of apprentices may also serve other union purposes. It may be possible, by restricting the supply of labor, to regulate the amount of overtime available to union members. Employers have accused certain unions of restricting the supply of labor in this fashion while insisting upon shorter straight-time working hours, solely f o r the purpose of increasing take-home pay. To the extent that apprentice-making does not afford the sole source of new labor supply, apprenticeship regulations may be regarded simply as devices for training. In the past, however, many of the craft unions in the printing field have obtained closed shop contracts with their employers. In certain of these contracts the employer is prohibited from hiring non-union members under any circumstances. A t the same time the unions have been reluctant to confer "cards" upon potential employees who have not served a formal apprenticeship. In other instances employers have been permitted to hire non-union employees when the union is unable to supply them with union members, but only until such time as a union member becomes available. The combination of the closed shop and the apprenticeship system, where especially restrictive, has produced certain other results. If the union hiring hall or employment office be the sole source of supply of existing labor, and if new labor is unavailable or difficult to obtain, the union is to some degree enabled to "ration" scarce labor as between the various competing firms. Entry of new firms into a particular market may be restricted, and the size of existing firms may be limited. Employers have sometimes accused [19]

one another of making "deals" with the union to gain favor and thus to secure more ready access to the union's labor supply. And it is often claimed that employers have paid over-the-scale premiums in order to "pirate" from the labor supply of some competitor. Beyond all of these implications may be a tendency for an employer to accept a union member supplied to him who is not a desirable employee, simply because there may be no alternative. Another possible consequence of the apprenticeship system stems from the length of the apprenticeship period. Even where such a system is administered with a reasonable degree of flexibility, the supply of labor may tend to become perversely elastic. Employers and unions will frequently agree not to "make" new journeymen in time of depression when unemployment among union members is a problem. Consequently, in prosperity, with increased demand for labor, supply will be exceptionally short. This insufficiency of labor may exist over many years because of the length of the training program.10 If, on the other hand, employers and unions agree to a relaxation of quotas and an increase in the number of apprentices in a period of prosperity, these new apprentices may become journeymen during a later phase of the business cycle when they will be confronted with depression unemployment. Such perverse elasticity is inevitable to some degree whenever a training period of four to six years or more is involved. But it is a moot question as to whether training time of such duration is actually required in the printing industry. Employers generally agree among themselves that for most of the unions more than a one- or two-year period is necessary to make "all-around craftsmen." It is also obvious that many of the tasks could be performed by "specialists" who could be trained over a period of less than a year. If the "journeyman concept" were modified to allow for a greater use of specialists, the supply of labor could be more immediately adjusted to variations in demand. Thus, a union's insistence upon the maintenance of its "jurisdiction" and upon its craft concepts creates a bar against the employment of specialists and has direct consequences in the inevitable maladjustment of the supply-demand relationship. 10

The period of apprenticeship will v a r y f o r t h e different c r a f t a f r o m f o u r to six, o r even eight or more, years and the t i m e required is determined as much by the customs of t h e industry as by the level of skill called f o r .

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Another significant set of problems stemming from c r a f t unionism has to do with the jurisdictional implications. The numerous c r a f t unions in the industry are each naturally jealous of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional controversies with respect both to present methods of operation and to the introduction of new processes are a constant prospect. To some degree the employer may be able to assign jurisdiction over certain operations in the first instance to the union which he believes most appropriate under the circumstances, but in his collective bargaining he must nevertheless cope with each union's insistence upon its right to claim jurisdiction—and to assert that claim—with respect to such processes as may tend to jeopardize its status. SUMMARY

Small firms, highly competitive in character, make up the bulk of the printing industry. They turn out a product in which labor is the single most important element of cost. The product cannot be stored since it is made to order for a specific, timely demand. These concerns must work out their labor relationships with strong international unions, organized along c r a f t lines, which exercise a substantial degree of control over the labor market through closed shop arrangements and apprenticeship quotas. The distribution of union members throughout the industry, plus the f a c t that more than one union generally bargains for the employees of a particular establishment, tends to encourage a situation in which the employee's loyalty is cemented strongly to his union body and not so strongly to the employer. Over a period of years, the "journeyman concept" has developed, and this concept has profound implications to the industry. To the extent that "craftsmen," rather than "specialists," are preferred or must be employed, the unions' position is enhanced in that their members have more to gain from union affiliation and the employers have less free access to alternative sources of labor supply. Printing trades unions, through the role they play in the determination of wage rates and conditions of employment, have the power to exercise considerable influence over the allocation of national or regional business as between various areas. Through their control over the labor supply within an area they may likewise affect the distribution of business within a given locality. [21]

Rather than endeavor to put up a strong resistance to union policies, employers may therefore be inclined to "curry favor" with those unions whose decisions may so profoundly affect the enterprise. In any event, these considerations are extremely pertinent in connection with their influence upon the bargaining process. Multi-employer bargaining is obviously the only alternative to union unilateralism under these circumstances, yet such bargaining is not easily accomplished because of the numerous disparate factors which are present, both on the national and the local levels. Such factors, to mention only a few, are differences in markets and in the extent to which price increases affect these markets, differences in labor cost as a proportion of total cost, differences in the degree of economic interest manifested by various firms in a given set of labor negotiations, and acute competition between firms for markets and for scarce labor. Since these opposing forces have complicated the problem of employer cooperation in the printing industry, unions have contributed much of the organization which exists. Thus, one of the major tasks confronting multi-employer bargaining is seen to lie in the creation of techniques for resolving differences between the employers themselves in order to present to the unions a united front comprised of the common denominator of employer interest.

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C H A P T E R II

A Brief Resume of Labor Relations in the Printing Industry at Large OME of the printing industry's basic characteristics have been discussed in the preceding chapter. A brief historical review of its labor relations now becomes pertinent. Although the Philadelphia association has been selected as the focal point of this investigation, the functions, successes, and failures of this local group of employers can only be appraised in the light of the experiences of the entire industry. In large measure the story is one of employer efforts to secure full collective bargaining rights as respects all terms of employment and to create a condition in which bargaining might be conducted on a relatively equal footing with the unions. The growth of local association bargaining represents the first step in this development, followed by a few, not too successful, efforts to resolve basic controversies by policy negotiations on a national level. Disagreements as to objectives, internal disputes between open- and closed-shop employers, and the absence of any real national authority, largely explain the industry's failures. With the possible exception of the 44-hour strike in the early 1920's, each failure did much to enhance the unions' position. Throughout this entire period employers have sought, as a panacea, arbitration of new contract terms. The Pressmen's union, from time to time, has also been willing to experiment with this kind of arbitration as a device to afford employers some element of self-protection and to husband those union funds which might otherwise be dissipated by economic strife. The major obstacle to framing an arbitration pact with the International Typographical Union has been the persistent refusal of that body to submit its International L a w s to arbitration. These laws provide the machinery whereby this union's unilateral policies are enforced.

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Unionization in the printing industry dates back for more than a century. Labor organizations in this field were among the [23]

earliest in the United States. There is no reason to believe that working conditions among printers were more intolerable than they were in other industries. The basic reasons for the early unionization of the industry cannot be explained in terms of the working conditions which prevailed, but rather by a combination of factors having to do with the degree of literacy of the employees, the fact that many employers came from the ranks of labor, and the disorganized small-scale character of production, carried on under conditions of sometimes excessive competition. Historians of the labor movement record a strike by employees of New York printing plants in the year 1776, and in Philadelphia in 1786. In 1795, New York printing employees formed the Typographical Society, and this enterprise, in the brief years of its existence, embraced most of those working at the trade in the city. It was successful in establishing a wage scale of one dollar per day. In these early years there was little continuity to such labor organizations. They were born, grew, encountered difficulties, and died. It was not until the early 1830's that they became established on a basis conducive to their survival. Even then, at times, their functions were purely beneficiary,1 although at other times they were more successful in establishing a uniform "scale of prices" for their members' labor.2 The typographical unions of the present day date their organization from the late 1840's, and the International Typographical Union came into being in the year 1852.3 In the early years these 1

These beneficial f u n c t i o n s have continued to be a n i m p o r t a n t aspect of p r i n t i n g t r a d e unionism even t o the p r e s e n t day. Pension» m o r t u a r y a n d i n s u r a n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s a r e usually provided to u n i o n members t h r o u g h t h e i r labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a n d over a period of y e a r s a m e m b e r m a y build u p a substantial equity in these p l a n s . 2 T h e local t r a d e association f o r p r i n t e r s in t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n district of P h i l a d e l p h i a has in i t s possession a copy of t h e 4 'Constitution a n d By-laws of t h e J o u r n e y m e n Bookbinders' T r a d e Society of P h i l a d e l p h i a / ' passed N o v e m b e r 16, 1833, including a list of prices a d o p t e d S e p t e m b e r 24, 1835, and p r i n t e d by o r d e r of t h e Society in t h e y e a r 1836. T h e Constitution of this Society provided (Article X I I I ) t h a t " E v e r y p e r s o n becoming a m e m b e r of t h i s Society pledges himself f a i t h f u l l y t o m a i n t a i n such list of prices as m a y be e s t a b l i s h e d ; on f a i l u r e of which f o r t h e first actual offense he shall be fined t h r e e dollars, f o r t h e second offense five dollars, and f o r t h e t h i r d h e shall be disgraced by expulsion." Article X I V of t h e s a m e d o c u m e n t specifies t h a t " T h e r e shall be a house of call a p p o i n t e d f o r t h e t r a d e , a t which a book shall be k e p t f o r m u t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n . Employers s t a t i n g vacancies in t h e i r e s t a b l i s h m e n t s required t o be filled; J o u r n e y m e n o u t of employ, s t a t i n g t h e i r n a m e a n d b r a n c h in the t r a d e . " 9 T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l T y p o g r a p h i c a l U n i o n embraced all p r i n t i n g c r a f t s f o r almoet a h a l f · c e n t u r y , b u t gradually it was forced to s u r r e n d e r jurisdiction over non-composing room processes. T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r i n t i n g P r e s s m e n ' s U n i o n w a s the first t o split off, in 1889, followed by t h e Bookbinders in 1892, the P h o t o - E n g r a v e r s in 1898, a n d t h e Stereotypere and E l e c t r o t y p e r s in 1902. T h e I.T.U. still claims jurisdiction over mailing operations. Its claim t o broad jurisdiction over the e n t i r e i n d u s t r y has recently been r e s t a t e d . Article I of its Constitution, as amended in 1946, r e a d s as follows: " T h i s body shall be k n o w n as t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l T y p o g r a p h i c a l Union of N o r t h America. I t s jurisdiction shall include all b r a n c h e s of t h e p r i n t i n g a n d kindred t r a d e s , o t h e r t h a n those over which jurisdiction h a s

[24]

printing unions sought to establish wage scales and working conditions by unilateral action. Union members agreed among themselves to work only for a certain price. In some cases such endeavors were successful and in others they met defeat which led to the dissolution or desuetude of their organizations. Trade associations among employers in the industry were only slightly later in origin. Two primary factors were influential in bringing about their development. One was so that prices might be fixed as a means of reducing the full impact of competition;4 the other was the need for united action in resisting union labor's unilateral efforts to determine wages and working conditions. The earliest master printers' association which has persisted up to the present time, although it has experienced periods of inactivity and successive reorganizations, was established in the year 1862. It was called Typothetae of New York. In 1869 this association opposed a demand on the part of Typographical Union No. 6 for an increase in the wage scale. The strike that followed was settled by a compromise arrived at in negotiations between the two organizations. In those days collective bargaining agreements of a prescribed duration were not consummated, but in this particular instance the employers were successful in reaching an understanding that the union would, in the future, give the Typothetae notice a month in advance of scale changes desired, and would confer jointly with the employers on matters in dispute. Organizations similar to the New York Typothetae soon came ,into being in other cities. St. Louis organized an association in 1866 and was followed by Chicago, Milwaukee, Memphis, St. Paul, Grand Rapids, and Cincinnati. The Philadelphia association dates from the year 1888. The United Typothetae of America, the employers' national organization, came into existence in 1887.5 been conceded by a g r e e m e n t . In it alone is vested p o w e r t o establish subordinate unions of p r i n t e r s ( a n d all o t h e r skilled employees not otherwise herein excepted) mailers and kindred trades, and its m a n d a t e s m u s t be obeyed a t all times and under all circumstances. T o t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l T y p o g r a p h i c a l Union of N o r t h America is reserved the r i g h t to fix, regulate and d e t e r m i n e all m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g to the fellowship in its branches of t h e p r i n t i n g a n d kindred t r a d e s ; while to subordinate unions is conceded the r i g h t to m a k e all necessary laws f o r local g o v e r n m e n t which do not conflict with t h e laws of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n . I n cases where allied trades have formed district unions, the powers h e r e i n a f t e r specified shall be delegated to said t r a d e district unions. The International Typographical Union reserves the right to reestablish jurisdiction over any branch of the industry when the vital interests of the union are affected. The Executive Council is hereby authorized to take such action when deemed necessary to the welfare of the International Typographical Union." (Italics supplied) 4 I n New Y o r k City in 1815 the m a s t e r p r i n t e r s met and set a scale of charges to c u s t o m e r s ; in 1848 p r i n t e r s in western New Y o r k S t a t e a t t e m p t e d t o c a r r y o u t a similar p r o g r a m . I n 1835, Philadelphia p r i n t e r s established a society which promulgated a price list, t h e violation of which exposed a m e m b e r to expulsion. 5 I n 1945 t h e U.T.A. was reorganized a n d revitalized as " P r i n t i n g I n d u s t r y of A m e r i c a . "

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An immediate impetus for the formation of the national association, and the stimulus to the creation of many local groups, was the drive by the International Typographical Union for an eight-hour day. For more than a decade agitation for a shorter work day was virtually continuous. In the year 1898 an effort was made to deal with this problem on a national basis. The executive council of U.T.A. consummated the so-called Syracuse Agreement with the various printing unions. The understanding provided for a nine and one-half-hour day as of the fall of 1898, and a nine hour day in the fall of 1899. The Unions agreed, in turn, to attempt to equalize the scale of wages in the various competitive districts. In the year 1903 a national agreement was negotiated between the U.T.A. and the International Printing Pressmen and Assistant's Union of North America. It provided for the arbitration of all disputes over wages and shop conditions arising under contracts or at the expiration of contracts. This agreement was binding only after ratification by the local employer and union bodies. It provided that a strike was not to be engaged in unless the employers failed to abide by their contractual obligations, "it being understood that the employer fulfills all the terms of this contract by paying the scale of wages and living up to the shop practices as settled by the committee, regardless of his employees' union affiliations." This national agreement, which lasted from 1903 to 1907, was not the first of such scope. In 1901 a national arbitration document had been worked out between the I.T.U. and the American Newspaper Publishers' Association. In 1902 this agreement was renewed for a five-year period. In contrast to the U.T.A.-Pressmen's understanding, the I.T.U. agreement specifically provided for a closed shop. Efforts on the part of the U.T.A. to negotiate a national arbitration agreement with the I.T.U. were unsuccessful, since the union would not accept an open shop provision similar to that incorporated into the Pressmen's agreement. Difficulties also arose over the matter of submitting the International Union's "General Laws" to arbitration. During this period, negotiations were carried on between the various unions and associations of employers in many localities. In some of the smaller centers, however, the unions still endeavored to establish their scales and conditions unilateraly. One striking difference between the type of collective bargaining [26]

engaged in at that time and its modern counterpart is that in those early days the union acted only for its members and not as the agent of all employees in a particular department, plant, or locality. Thus, until the closed shop became the rule, there was no clear-cut distinction between union and non-union shops. Nor was there any obligation on the part of the employer to afford to non-union workers the same wages and conditions enjoyed by the union member. Unionism was thus accepted by printing employers well in advance of its acceptance by employers generally. In part this may be explained by the fact that in many, if not most, instances the employer "rose from the ranks of labor." In some cases, failing in his business venture, the employer returned again to his status as a worker. It is significant to remember, also, that the rate of business failures in small printing establishments, like those in other small-scale ventures, has always been high. Employees in the printing industry have generally been literate, progressive, and persuasive. Unionization has been received favorably because it tended to assist in the establishment of a competitive plane since, as has already been observed, the small employer customarily sets his selling price on the basis of a standard percentage mark-up over his labor cost. Once the techniques of collective bargaining came to be utilized in place of the unilateral determination of wages and working conditions by unions or employers, the major contentions arose not so much over union recognition or wage scales but as to hours of work, the closed shop, and union laws. Seldom has the industry been dominated or even appreciably influenced by anti-union sentiment. Even the "open shop" movement which began in the second decade of the twentieth century was anti-closed shop in character rather than anti-union, and the phrase "open shop" today means little more than non-discrimination in hiring as between union and non-union men. With respect to hours of labor, the eight-hour day had become the rule in the newspaper end of the industry by 1904. Nearly half of the membership of the I.T.U. was working on an eight-hour schedule at that time. In the merchant printer field, where there was a closer relationship between the worker's production and the length of his day than was the case in the newspapers, there was greater resistance to shorter hours. Notwithstanding the

opposition of commercial employers, or possibly because of it, the I.T.U. resolved to secure the eight-hour day throughout the industry. This drive on the part of the I.T.U., along with its policy of permitting only closed shop agreements, which was made a General Law in 1899, resulted in a rash of strikes in the years 1905 and 1906. In these strikes the union was largely successful in achieving its objectives. In 1907 a new arbitration agreement was drawn up between the officials of the U.T.A. and the Pressmen. It provided that the eight-hour day was to be effective in 1909. However, in view of the gains already won by the compositors, the agreement was rejected by the Pressmen's convention in 1907, and George L. Berry was elected to the union's presidency on the platform of the closed shop and an immediate eight-hour day. Like the I.T.U., the Pressmen were largely successful in carrying out their program and in this instance with very few strikes. By the end of 1907, the 48-hour week and the closed shop were well established within the unionized section of the industry. The U.T.A. had been outspoken in its opposition to the closed shop, and had not carried the support of its members with this policy in the various localities. In consequence, the U.T.A. resolved to take a less active part in industrial relations, although local Typothetae and similar organizations did continue to negotiate labor agreements. Locally and nationally, employers began to display a great deal of interest in price maintenance and cost education activities. Printers' boards of trade and Ben Franklin clubs were established as rival organizations in this work. In some areas, printers' leagues were formed to deal with unions. There was, then, a general movement away from Typothetae organizations on the ground that this name now had an open-shop stigma, and it was certainly true that the leaders and officers of the national Typothetae had become open shop men.6 The structure of the U.T.A. was recast in 1913. • T h i s Bchiem waa a p p a r e n t before t h e t u r n of the c e n t u r y . When t h e S y r a c u s e A g r e e m e n t wae executed in 1898. it was first hailed by p r i n t e r s as a n event of t h e y e a r r a n k i n g w i t h t h e Spanish-American W a r in i m p o r t a n c e — a n " e v e n t of f a r - r e a c h i n g i n f l u e n c e , " t h e " d a w n of a new era f o r the t r a d e t h r o u g h ability t o settle labor differences amicably." However, a t t h e n e x t convention of U n i t e d T y p o t h e t a e , t h a t of 1899 in New H a v e n , when t h e recommendation waa m a d e t h a t t h e Executive Committee a c t as a p e r m a n e n t board of c o n f e r e n c e a n d conciliation w i t h the unions, t h e debate proved t o be acrimonious, and the p r o j e c t w a s defeated. Open shop m e m b e r s protested t h a t t h e association had no r i g h t to t a k e action f o r p e r m a n e n t official recognition of the unions so long as a n u m b e r of T y p o t h e t a e members refused to recognize unions in a n y w a y . Sty Leona M a r g a r e t Powell, History of the United Typothetae of America (University of Chicago Press, 1926), p. 41. This w r i t e r also r e p o r t s

[28]

Two divisions were created, one of union shop employers and the other of non-union or open-shop employers. Neither organization was particularly effective at this juncture. In 1917, an arbitration agreement was drawn between the Closed Shop Division of U.T.A. and the Pressmen's Union, to be effective from 1917 until the close of 1926. Although this agreement was formally consummated, it was actually effectuated in very few areas. In 1919, hours of work again came to the fore. An International Joint Council of the Commercial and Periodical Branches of the Printing Industry was formed, consisting of representatives from the closed shop branch of U.T.A., the Printers' League of America, the International Association of Electrotypers, the International Typographical Union, the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union, the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, and the International Stereotypere' and Electrotypers' Union. This conference drew up a resolution calling for a 44-hour week to begin May 1, 1921, with no reduction in wages per week. Shortly thereafter, notwithstanding the action of the closed shop branch, the United Typothetae of America and the open shop branch adopted resolutions disapproving any reduction in hours. In order to resolve this contradiction, the Typothetae convention in 1920 gave complete autonomy to both the open and closed industrial relations divisions. In the months which approached the deadline for the 44-hour week, strenuous efforts were made by members of the open shop group to perpetuate the 48hour week. It soon became clear that the closed shop branch could not guarantee the acts of its members. In 1921, the closed shop group partially reversed its position, at least so far as wages were concerned, and decided that the question of wages for the 44-hour week should be left to local autonomy "notwithstanding the fact that the International Joint Conference Council did recommend that there should be no reduction in wages because of the installation of the 44-hour week." Thus, the closed shop branch, through circumstances beyond its control, discredited itself both with the unions and with many of its members. The opportunity for an effective national program of t h a t " T h e m a i n cause, however, f o r t h e d e f e a t t h a t it waa reported to the convention t h a t t h e a l a w t h a t foremen m u s t be m e m b e r s of t h e employers to be so u n j u s t a n d unreasonable t h a t w i t h t h e unions."

of the proposition undoubtedly wae t h e fact I n t e r n a t i o n a l T y p o g r a p h i c a l Union had made union. This r e q u i r e m e n t was felt by union they were in no mood f o r f u r t h e r conferences

[29]

negotiation and conciliation disappeared and chaos took its place. In May of 1921 a series of strikes broke out in the printing industry throughout the country over the union demand for a reduction in the hours of work. These strikes were carried on in some areas for several years. In some localities they were successful ; in others the unions lost their membership.7 The famous strike of 1921 represented the last important nationwide controversy in the commercial branch of the printing industry until the year 1948. The unions involved required some considerable period of time to heal their wounds. For example, the International Typographical Union expended for "defense" purposes, during the years 1921 through 1925, the sum of $16,079,671, of which $8,708,320 was disbursed in 1922 and $5,134,616 in 1923. A total of 9,287 union members were suspended by this union, and 1,334 were expelled in the years 1923 and 1924, mostly for alleged "ratting." Yet despite the strike and the resultant "underground" status of the union in various localities, union membership declined only slightly more than 6,500 out of a total, in 1921, of 74,496 members. In certain cities collective bargaining continued more or less unimpaired after the strike of 1921, but in other areas it was a period of ten years or more before bona fide bargaining relationships were reinstated. Not until the passage of the National Recovery Act and the Wagner Act was there a strong impetus to the recognition of unions in the various localities in which the bargaining relationship had disappeared. The absence of areawide bargaining in various cities during the twenties had stimulated the practice of written agreements where such agreements could be obtained. N.R.A. and Wagner Act requirements encouraged this trend, so that the unions not only withstood the pressures of depression but actually held ground quite well during this period so far as membership was concerned. Membership in the I.T.U., 7

A N a t i o n a l F o r t y - E i g h t H o u r League was organized by t h e employers in order not to involve t h e T y p o t h e t a e in t h e controversy. As a result of r e s i g n a t i o n s of union shop employers, a n d t h e conversion of o t h e r union shops i n t o open shops, the m e m b e r s h i p of U . T . A . became largely n o n - u n i o n in c h a r a c t e r . In 1922, T y p o t h e t a e of A m e r i c a resolved t h a t " t h i s Association believes in a n d endorsee t h e Open Shop of A m e r i c a P l a n of E m p l o y m e n t in t h e shops of its m e m b e r s . " T h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e Association was changed so t h a t t h e open a n d closed shop divisions w e r e to become affiliated associations, m e m b e r s h i p in which was to be limited to members of U . T . A . T h e membere of the open shop divieion f o r m e d a n organization known as t h e " O p e n Shop P r i n t e r s of A m e r i c a , " a n d t h e closed shop division took the n a m e " P r i n t e r s ' L e a g u e of A m e r i c a . " T h e P r i n t e r s ' League, and its successor, t h e P r i n t e r s ' N a t i o n a l Association, confined its p r o g r a m to t h e level of an i n t e r c h a n g e of i n f o r m a t i o n on wage rates, c o n t r a c t t e r m s , etc., u n t i l i t lost its identity in t h e reorganization of t h e U . T . A . as the n e w n a t i o n a l association, P r i n t i n g Industry of America.

[30]

for example, declined from 77,115 to 1929 to 72,514 in 1933, but was back to 79,457 by 1937. In the most general terms, however, the Wagner Act made relatively little change in the collective bargaining picture. It did provide the machinery for organizing the unorganized less expensively. It did serve to formalize employer-employee relationships; but even today labor union contracts in the printing industry are surprisingly free from the customary labor-act verbiage. The so-called "recognition" clauses, in particular, are conspicuously lacking simply because the occasion never arose for their inclusion. During World War II, growing opposition developed on the part of employers to the acceptance of union-promulgated laws governing certain conditions of employment. The I.T.U. was the primary instigator of such rules and bore the brunt of the attack. The newspaper industry, as well as the commercial employers, resented these laws because they were not the product of collective bargaining and because they were regarded as uneconomical and unsound. The I.T.U. successfully defied the War Labor Board in an instance in which the status of its "General Laws" was at stake. The Government declined to seek enforcement, even though the Board's prestige was thereby impaired, for fear of risking challenge to the constitutionality of its authority to seize and operate industries not directly associated with the war effort. Employers, given the right under the War Labor Disputes Act to institute damage suits, refrained from doing so since they apparently were not prepared to engage in an all-out battle against union unilateralism when it became apparent that the War Labor Board was not disposed to assist them in pulling chestnuts out of the fire. In the first two years following the termination of the war, and the accompanying relaxation of wage controls, employees in the printing industry experienced increases as to rates of pay as great or greater than those of any other industry. In large measure these gains were the product of the Typographical Union's insistence upon a shorter work week—a demand which was formulated as part of a nationally-integrated collective bargaining strategy. In New York, for example, the first postwar negotiations resulted in an increase of $4.00 per week, with a simultaneous reduction in hours from 40 to 36 which meant a total hourly increase of approximately 27 cents. A similar adjustment was effectuated in [31]

Chicago and in many other printing centers. The following year, a new pattern increase of 39 cents per hour was established after a strike in the Chicago market brought the employers to terms. These adjustments, totaling 66 cents per hour in an interval of a little over one year contrasted with the 18 cents and 12 to 15 cents first and second "round" wage hikes in industry generally. Employers were also obligated to incur very large increases in cost because of the additional amount of overtime work required at premium rates as a consequence of shorter working hours and a manpower shortage. The bargaining stategy followed by the I.T.U. in these two years of negotiations was quite similar in all major centers. In the first year, hours were the major subject of the attack. In the second year, there was agitation for severance pay, pension arrangements and accident and health insurance, all of which were regarded by the union as a part of "wages" and appropriately the subject matter for bargaining under the wage-reopening clauses which generally prevailed at that time. These demands, which may have been camouflage for the major "money" offensive, were later withdrawn when money settlements were reached. That the I.T.U. bargaining strategy was dictated from the top was particularly evident in the second set of postwar negotiations. Demands served upon the employers in each major city were virtually identical. They called for an increase in the hourly rate of 50 per cent or more, coupled with severance pay arrangements which were to be computed on the basis of past service with the employer and which, in most cases, represented a contingent liability equal to or in excess of the employer's total assets, both fixed and current. Although the employers were accustomed to receiving "demands" substantially in excess of the probable outcome of joint bargaining, they had never before in their history been asked for adjustments of such magnitude. During this same period various changes were made in I.T.U. laws, all of which tended to strengthen international control over the local unions. Shocked by the audacity of the union's demands, and its apparent success in carrying the field the previous year, the employers began to work toward an improvement in their defenses. Printing Industry of America had succeeded the old United Typothetae in the fall of 1945. A much more effective organization than any of its predecessors was its Union Employers' Section. [32]

Under its auspices, rival centers like New York and Chicago began to do more than to compare notes. Confronted with identical negotiations' strategy on the part of the Typographical Union, they and other members of U.E.S. began to work out common bargaining techniques of their own. It seemed certain to the employers that the I.T.U.'s dynamic offensive would have to be checked for the sake of the future of the industry, but no one knew just how this was to be accomplished. Resistance by the Chicago employers to the second round demand proved abortive, and once Chicago had settled, New York offered no further opposition, but accepted the same terms. Other cities, such as Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Atlanta, made comparable settlements either in anticipation of or subsequent to the Chicago settlement. In Philadelphia, despite the opposition of the I.T.U., employers forced the issue into arbitration under the terms of its more specific wage-reopening provision, and won a lesser increase on the basis of cost-of-living considerations. In any event, in the spring of 1947, immediately after the second round settlements had been effected, the storm was still brewing, and it culminated, finally, in the controversy of 1948, which will be discussed in a succeeding chapter. Meanwhile the International Printing Pressmen and Assistant's Union had evidenced its desire to cooperate with employers both on the national and the local level. Discussions were proceeding as to the terms of a national arbitration pact, and a model apprenticeship agreement was also formulated and accepted by representatives of the union and the U.E.S. SUMMARY

Union unilateralism is as old as unionism in the printing trades. Associations were developed by employers in order to negotiate on an equal basis, but in the major programs that have been carried on by the unions over the past sixty or seventy years or more, the employers have almost invariably demonstrated their inferior bargaining position. From time to time policy discussions at a national level between union and employer bodies have taken place. On each such occasion employers have succeeded in postponing a union drive for a particular objective in exchange for promises or pledges of cooperation in effectuating the achievement of this objective at a later date. This has been national bargaining [33]

after a fashion, but the employers' association has not always been able to "deliver" as to its promises. Efforts to promote national arbitration arrangements have not been successful with the International Typographical Union because of that union's unwillingness to agree to any course which might compromise or temper its "International Laws." Such agreements have been entered from time to time with the Pressmen's Union. The failure of employer groups to present an effective united front cannot be regarded simply as a token of the unwillingness of the industry to stand with the forces of reaction. At no time have the employers opposed a trend well established in other sectors of the economy. Rather have they sought to moderate or to postpone the impact of changes which were, at the time, precedent-making. Developments of the last several years were especially alarming because there seemed to be no limit to the demands of the Typographical Union. Commercial employers, confronted with the growing prestige of the executive council of the I.T.U. among its own members, and observing the development of controls which continually tended to reduce the area of bargaining and the autonomy of the local union, began to wonder just where such trends would end. As we shall see, the final step taken by the I.T.U. was one so forthright that its challenge could not be ignored. On the one hand, the employers saw an opportunity at long last to create a more favorable balance in their collective bargaining relationship. On the other hand, they saw in a failure to resist this program a capitulation so devastating that it would have meant complete and abject surrender, for all time, perhaps, to union unilateralism.

[34]

CHAPTER

III

The Philadelphia Association

T

HE extent, scope, and nature of collective bargaining in the printing industry, and the general character of labor r e f lations in that industry can most clearly be discerned by a study of one specific area. The city of Philadelphia provides an excellent example. Although its experiences are similar to those of more important printing centers, such as New York and Chicago, its smaller size enables diverse elements to be brought into focus more readily. On the other hand, the Philadelphia industry is not so small that its story would be simply the history of one or two establishments. Philadelphia has not been a pioneer so far as either the unions or the employers are concerned. New programs and new policies have usually been initiated in the largest centers of employment and production. Thereafter, efforts have been made to extend their effects "down the line." On the other hand, Philadelphia employers have views of their own, and have continually sought to retain autonomy and status in their relations with the various unions. In general, the unions in Philadelphia have not been unusually militant. On the contrary, they have almost always demonstrated a real inclination to "work things out" if at all possible. Thus, the extent of unilateralism, generally in the form of policies imposed by the unions without negotiations, is all the more significant. The restraints upon collective bargaining which have come into being have also reflected the fundamental differences in the power of the unions as contrasted with that inherent in the employers' position. *

*

*

*

*

*

ITS HISTORY

In Philadelphia, the early pattern of collective bargaining and employer organization was quite similar to that of other cities. The Typothetae of Philadelphia met and "bargained" with certain of the unions in the printing industry more or less continuously from the time of its organization in 1888 until the 44-hour strike [35]

in 1921.1 The agreements consummated contained the following elements: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Scale of prices and piece-work rates, day and night. Hours of work and overtime. Ratio of apprentices. Duration of the agreement Procedure for settlement of disputes (not incorporated in the Typographical agreement). 6. Special provisions relating to the particular work performed, such as complement of men on machinery. 7. Procedure for national arbitration, if any.

These early agreements were binding upon union members only. They contained a provision along the following lines: "Members of the Typothetae shall, during the continuance of this agreement, pay to members of the Union employed by them wages at the said scale, and members of the Union shall, during the continuance of this agreement, work for and accept wages at said scale, and shall make no demands for increases of wages, for changes in hours of employment, or for any other change whatsoever in the terms of their employment upon any member of the Typothetae except in accordance herewith." Firms covered by the agreement were not enumerated, it being understood that its terms would apply to all members of the Union wherever employed in association shops, but not to members of the association employing no union members. Relationships of employers to the Typographical Union were governed as much by the provisions of the local and international union's laws as by the provisions of any local labor agreement. These local agreements, for example, contained nothing on the prosecution of grievances; the International Laws of the Union provided for a unilateral method of adjustment. An aggrieved employee could appeal to his union representative. If the representative was unsuccessful in adjusting the grievance, an appeal could be taken to the International Union, whose decisions were final. Employers were under no contractual obligation to abide by this decision, but they ran the serious risk of having their union employees "called out" if they did not accept it. Union members were also enjoined not to work on boycotted work. The By-Laws of the Philadelphia Typographical Union provided, as early as 1

However, negotiations between the T y p o t h e t a e and the P h i l a d e l p h i a T y p o g r a p h i c a l Union were disrupted d u r i n g t h e l a t t e r ' s s t r i k e f o r s h o r t e r hours in 1907, a n d w e r e n o t t h e r e a f t e r resumed on a f o r m a l basis until the y e a r 1933.

[36]

1899, that "The willful violation of a boycott ordered by the American Federation of Labor, the International Typographical Union, the United Labor League of Philadelphia, the Allied Printing Trades Council, or this union, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, and upon proof of such charge, made in writing, which shall be fully investigated by a committee appointed by the union for that purpose, a fine of one dollar shall be inflicted for the first offense. A subsequent offense shall render a member liable to a higher fine, suspension, or expulsion, as the Union may decide." The labor agreement negotiated in those early days differed from labor contracts as customarily considered in at least two important respects: (1) The collective bargaining relationship was not clearly defined. Negotiations were between representatives of an association whose members might or might not employ union labor, and a union on behalf of its members wherever employed. (2) The contract did not cover all the terms of employment, since many such terms were governed by union laws. In passing, it may be observed that these labor agreements were not scrupulously adhered to by either party. In various instances employers were known to pay union members considerably less than the agreed scale. To some extent, therefore, the labor agreements negotiated in the Philadelphia area during these early days of union-employer dealings set forth certain objectives rather than the basic minimum requirements of a bargaining relationship. Nevertheless, during this period, labor relations was one of the primary activities of Typothetae of Philadelphia. In the records of that Association may be found occasional rumblings of discontent among the various members of the group who felt that other aspects of trade association work were being neglected. From time to time, rival organizations were created, especially for the purpose of setting prices and restricting competition, until such practices were outlawed by anti-trust legislation. The Association's group-bargaining activities were disrupted by the dispute over the 44-hour week in May of 1921. Open-shop sentiment was largely controlling in the United Typothetae of America as well as in the Philadelphia association. Philadelphia emerged from the strike more largely an open-shop city than many others of comparable size. Group bargaining as well as individual company bargaining was discontinued. There were no formal [37]

meetings between employers and representatives of the Typographical and Pressmen's unions for more than a decade. A major task of the union officials was simply to hold the union together. The Philadelphia Printing Pressmen's Union disassociated itself from its national organization and did not reaffiliate until the early 1930's. In the year 1932 group bargaining reappeared. It is highly significant that its reintroduction was occasioned by the need for a reduction in the scale of wages as a result of depression conditions. A meeting of employers was called for the purpose of discussing joint action to effect a wage reduction. Certain of the employers felt that the proposed wage cut was excessive. They entered into discussions with the various unions in order to effectuate a uniform reduction of a lesser amount. The understanding which was reached between the unions and those firms employing largely union labor was not reduced to writing, but a formal agreement was entered in the year 1933. At that time the employers formed an organization known as the Union Employing Printers' Association. This organization was separate and distinct from the Typothetae of Philadelphia. Thereafter collective bargaining sessions were conducted at periods of contract expiration, and grievances were prosecuted through the Association continuously until 1945. The Union Employing Printers' Association had no paid staff and no office space. Its business was transacted from time to time, as the occasion required, by membership meetings and through elected or appointed agents. However, during this period most of the procedures now in effect were developed. Some of these employers also retained membership in a national organization known as the Printers' National Association, whose sole purpose was to exchange information regarding contract scales and practices in effect in the various localities. The budget of this national body was generally less than one thousand dollars a year for all purposes. In the fall of 1945, the Union Employing Printers' Association, many of whose members were also members of Typothetae of Philadelphia, joined forces with Typothetae and formed a new organization known as Printing Industries of Philadelphia, Inc. This merger took place concurrently with a similar merger and reorganization of the national association, at which time Printing Industry of America was formed. The objectives, both locally and [38]

nationally were the same. The goal was a revitalized organization, supported by union and non-union employers, to utilize the resources of the industry in order to meet and successfully cope with the common problems confronting the industry. At the same time, a clear-cut separation of functions was allocated between the union and non-union branches so far as labor policy was concerned. T H E STRUCTURE OP PRINTING INDUSTRIES OF PHILADELPHIA,

INC.

Printing Industries of Philadelphia, Inc., consists of more than two hundred firms engaged in printing, either by letterpress or offset, binding, trade typesetting, advertising typography, photoengraving, electrotyping, and stereotyping. Its membership includes such service establishments as ink manufacturers, machinery manufacturers and dealers, paper houses, and waste paper dealers. Each of these groups elects representatives to the Association's Board of Directors, and has its own separate division for the purpose of considering matters of concern to its particular group. Thus, there is a printers' division, a trade binders' division, a trade typesetters' division, etc. Printing Industries of Philadelphia is also divided into two sections for industrial relations purposes. The Allied Printing Employers' Association is the organization which is successor to the Union Employing Printers' Association and consists of all those member firms, regardless of their type, which have contractual relations with one or more unions. The Master Printers' Association is composed largely of those firms which have no union relations. It is possible for a single member firm to belong to both groups. If a printer member had a unionized composing room and a non-union pressroom, for example, he would be eligible for membership in the Allied Printing Employers' division by reason of his relations with the Typographical Union, and for membership in the Master Printers' group because of his interest in those labor relations matters of concern to the non-union department. Each of these labor divisions has its own group of officers and its executive committee. It will not be necessary here, however, to discuss the operations of the Master Printers' Section, except to state that this division was not organized for the purpose of combating unions, but to provide for such exchange of informa[39]

tion and discussion as might be of benefit to the members of this group. Because of the newness of the Allied Printing Employers' organization, many of its problems have yet to be ironed out. For example, all members of Printing Industries of Philadelphia, Inc., whose employees in any department are unionized, are eligible for membership, whether they be ink manufacturers, paper merchants, machinery supply houses, or any other type of employer. As a practical matter, only the printer members are active in the Allied Association, and only those of this group who are party to one of the Association contracts. The major task of the Allied Printing Employers' Association is the negotiation of labor agreements for its printer members. A master contract is negotiated with each of the following unions: Philadelphia Typographical Union No. 2, Philadelphia Printing Pressmen and Assistants, Locals 4 and 11, Bookbinders and Bindery Women's Union, Local No. 2, and Philadelphia Stereotypers' Union, Local No. 7. The Association does not bargain for its members with other unions in the printing field. A collective bargaining relationship worked out with a union by the Association is not binding upon all of its members, but only upon those members who: (1) have contractual relations with that particular union, and (2) wish the Association to represent them and to bargain for them. Many members of the Allied group do not have contractual relations with a particular union, and some concerns still elect to sign an individual contract or to enter into an individual understanding with the union rather than to bargain through the Association. This fact has led the Allied Association to a consideration of the desirability of limiting membership to those employers who are party to one or more of the Association's labor agreements. Notwithstanding these characteristics, the Allied Printing Employers' Association represents a substantial majority of the employees in the unionized portion of the industry with respect to each of the contracts it negotiates. The terms and conditions agreed upon are customarily accepted by those who "negotiate" separate contracts. The wage scale and basic "fringe" practices extend beyond the organized shops over virtually the entire industry, since it is necessary for the open shop employer to observe substantially the same conditions in order to retain or attract em[40]

ployees or, if he desires to preserve his non-union status, to avoid provocation for unionization. As indicated above, the Allied Printing Employers' Association does not bargain with all unions in the printing field. At this writing, offset printers bargain independently with the Amalgamated Lithographers' Union, C.I.O., through an informal organization of their own. The Photo-Engravers' Union bargains with the Manufacturing Photo-Engravers' Association, and the Philadelphia Electrotypers' Union No. 72 bargains with an informal organization of employers known as the Employing Electrotypers' Trade Association. In addition to these unions there are others which do not have contractual relationships with a sufficient number of firms to warrant group bargaining. For example, one or two establishments have collective bargaining relationships with the United Paper Workers of America; another has a contract with the Warehouse Union, A.F.L.; one or two offset departments of printing plants have individual contracts with the Printing Pressmen's Union, and at least one firm has contractual relations with the Mailers' Union. Wage rates and \vorking conditions negotiated by individual employers or by groups outside of the Association will tend to have some impact upon Association bargaining, particularly in those instances in which new fringe practices are instituted in the shop of an Association member. For example, at the present writing the contractual work week in effect under the Amalgamated Lithographers' contract is thirty-six and one-quarter hours. An employer with an offset department under the jurisdiction of this union may also have a letterpress pressroom, the employees of which are covered by the Association's 40-hour contract with the Printing Pressmen's Union. The Association hopes that over a period of time it will become the responsible contracting agency for all master contracts with printing unions. This can be accomplished, however, only when all substantial employers in the various branches of the industry have become members of Printing Industries of Philadelphia, Inc., and its Allied Printing Employers' Division, and also when or if these groups come to believe that they can negotiate more successfully on such a basis. One further consideration would be pertinent should a consolidation of this character appear to be feasible, and that is as to whether the bargaining position of the Allied Printing Employers' Association [41]

would be improved thereby, or whether it would become more difficult to ignore or disclaim responsibility for the existence of various concessions and practices now provided for in certain of these non-Association contracts. Although the Allied Printing Employers' Association is loosely organized, as is demonstrated by the preceding discussion, it still provides a reasonably effective agency for local multi-employer collective bargaining. The Association is governed by an Executive Committee elected from the membership at large and headed by a president, vice-president, a secretary-treasurer, and an international representative. The negotiating committees are appointed by the President and report back, at least in theory, to the Executive Committee, to the member firms covered by a particular contract, and occasionally to all of the members of the Allied group. Each negotiating committee consists of approximately six regular members, and three or four alternates, each appointed for a period of one year. Each member of the committee is an owner or a principal in one of the firms party to the particular contract. In addition, the Industrial Relations Director of the Association, who is a full-time paid employee, serves on each committee as a major spokesman for the group, and possesses an equal vote with the other members. The Industrial Relations Director, the officers, and the Executive Committee are responsible for mapping out the negotiations' strategy and for keeping each of the negotiating committees and its constituent group of employers in line. Experience has demonstrated that concessions made to any particular union have a tendency to spread to the other unions over a period of time. In order to operate any printing plant efficiently, a fair degree of uniformity of contract terms is necessary. The employer must also treat each union group with equal fairness and consideration regardless of the relative strength or weakness of the union. The problem of avoiding being "whipsawed" back and forth between the various unions, in the face of their differing demands, strategies, international policies, and local union political conditions is a major task for the Association. Since negotiations are conducted separately with each union, a full exchange of information and the maximum cooperation between each of the negotiating committees must be effected. However, a fair degree of [42]

consistency is achievable by virtue of the presence on all committees of the Industrial Relations Director, and the added fact that one employer may serve on two or more committees. Consequently, each move made by any committee is usually fully appraised in the light of its possible impact upon other unions. The Association is also responsible for the adjustment of grievances which arise under its contracts, and for the general administration and enforcement of the contracts. Each labor agreement provides that a grievance not satisfactorily disposed of at the shop level may be brought to the Association, and the President of the Association, or the Industrial Relations Director as his proxy, together with the appropriate union representative, has full power to render a decision which shall be binding upon any individual firm or all of them. Failing agreement, the grievance may be submitted to arbitration. Any decision rendered with respect to any basic matter of policy or contract interpretation is applicable to all firms party to the agreement. H o w NEGOTIATIONS A R E CONDUCTED

The Association bargains with each union separately. Negotiations take place between the Association and Philadelphia Typographical Union No. 2, the Philadelphia Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Unions No. 4 and 11 (these are two local unions, of pressmen and assistants, which bargain as one), the Bookbinders and Bindery Women's Union (there are two separate contracts, one for men and one for women), and the Philadelphia Stereotypere' Union. On some occasions the Association bargains concurrently with two or more unions whose contracts have the same or approximately the same expiration dates. In other instances some period of time may elapse between negotiations. The timing of the expiration of the various contracts with respect to each other is, from the Association's point of view—and probably also from the unions'—a matter of bargaining strategy. Some degree of cooperation and exchange of information obtains between the unions themselves as to the status of bargaining and bargaining strategy. These various A.F.L. unions are formally banded together in the Allied Printing Trades' Council, and their officers and members have frequent, or continuous, unofficial contacts with one another. The extent of such inter[43]

union cooperation will vary from time to time, depending upon the personalities and policies of the union leaders, and the nature of the issues at stake. The Allied Trades' Council, mentioned above, also has the responsibility for determining the circumstances under which its union label may be used. The structure of the Allied Printing Employers' Association is similarly designed to effect some degree of coordination with respect to the negotiations' policies and strategies of the various negotiating committees. When the time of contract expiration draws near, the Association convenes its negotiating committee to discuss the existing contract and formulate the changes which it wishes to present to the union. Recommendations or proposals are advanced by the Industrial Relations Director, who has given the contract continuing study over a period of time and who has usually prepared a complete draft of a proposed contract for discussion purposes. A meeting of the entire body of employers who are party to the contract in question may be convened. In any event, as soon as the Union's proposals are known, the membership (that is, the group of employers who are party to the contract) is usually called together and the Union's requests are discussed. The negotiating committee is thus able to secure guidance as to how to proceed. Usually no specific instructions are given to the Committee, but it has obtained a general impression of how far the body is willing to go, what concessions it may be prepared to make, and what changes are, in turn, desired by the employers. Such discussion, before the entire membership, is usually couched in vague terms since experience has demonstrated that the business transacted at such meetings and the decisions made do not remain unknown to the union. During the course of negotiations it is not usual for the employers' committee to report back to the membership or to the full Executive Committee, although officers of the Association are kept informed of developments. An agreement reached between the two sides will, as a standard practice, be taken back to the general membership of each group for ratification. Negotiations will thus normally be continued until each committee is prepared to recommend the acceptance of the terms arrived at. Occasionally it may be necessary for either the union or the employer committee, or both, to go back to its members, or its Executive Committees, for further instructions or guidance. [44]

Approval of the terms of a new contract must, technically, be secured from a majority of the members of the negotiating committee, a majority of the employers under the contract, and a majority of the members of the Executive Committee. As a matter of practice, it is usually not necessary to "count noses." A submission of the proposed terms of settlement for ratification by the firms to be governed by it, as well as to the Executive Committee, may be perfunctory. So far, in only one instance have the terms of the proposed settlement been acceptable to the negotiating committee and to the firms party to the agreement but not to the Executive Committee. In that instance, by mutual consent, the employers, who were negotiating under Association auspices for the first time, withdrew from the Association and completed their own negotiations. Since that time this group—the electrotypers— has continued to bargain separately from the Association. For the most part, therefore, the bargain struck between the two committees becomes the final bargain. Were it to be repudiated by the Executive Committees or memberships on either side, the other party would probably consider such repudiation a "double cross." Occasionally, when the scale committees have difficulty in reaching an agreement, the union committee will offer to take back the employer's latest proposal "without recommendation." However, under such circumstances, rejection by the union membership is almost assured. The International Unions exercise varying degrees of control over the local unions, as will be seen shortly. In at least one instance, a settlement which the local union committee had agreed to recommend to its membership gave rise to the intervention of the officers of the International Typographical Union.2 Generally speaking, members of the Allied Printing Employers' Association have not been specifically committed to the Association by means of any written document, such as a power of attorney, for the purpose of authorizing the conduct of negotiations. During the period of the War Labor Board, such authorization was secured by the then Union Employing Printer's Association in order to meet the requirements of that Board in connection with the filing of Form 10 applications for wage adjustments. This procedure was adopted for external reasons only and had no internal significance. These authorizations were secured, «See infra, p. 82ff.

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moreover, after negotiations had been concluded and were not pertinent to the negotiations process. In only one instance has an authorization been entered into by the various employers prior to the beginning of negotiations. In the fall of 1947 the employers who were party to the Association's Typographical contract executed the following document: "We, as a member, hereby authorize the Allied Printing Employers' Association, a Division of Printing Industries of Philadelphia, Inc., to represent and bargain for us in our relations with Philadelphia Typographical Union No. 2, and to take such action as may be necessary to consummate an agreement." Special reasons prompted the use of this procedure in this particular instance. It was expected that the approaching negotiations would be extremely critical, and that some defection in the membership of the Association might occur. Since the TaftHartley Act had recently been adopted, it had become an unfair labor practice for a union to coerce an employer in his choice of a bargaining representative. Consequently, each employer who had in this fashion specifically selected his Association to represent him could be protected in that the union could not legally bring pressure to bear upon him to enter into a separate understanding. Since the "divide and conquer" technique had frequently been applied by this union in other cities, this step seemed highly desirable to the employers who voted to adopt it. Finally, the employers and their counsel were of the opinion that negotiations in this particular instance might not be successfully consummated and that the intervention of the National Labor Relations Board might be necessary in order to resolve the legal issues which might prevent the reaching of an agreement. In this connection it was believed that the Board might require evidence of the Association's right to prefer charges on behalf of its various members. As it developed, this authorization, which was in the nature of a pledge, had some moral effect in keeping the employers together. Although the written authorization technique was useful in connection with the negotiations just referred to, such cohesion and cooperation as may exist between members of the group are not secured by any such simple device. The problem of unity has two phases. All firms which are party to an Association agreement with any union are bound to observe the terms of that agreement for its duration, whether or not the firm continues its [46]

membership in the Association. In the case of a firm's withdrawal from the Association, however, the Association has the right, in the event of a dispute, to refuse to entertain its grievances at the third level, which involves discussion and conciliation between the officers of the Union and the officers of the Association, with full power to render a binding decision. Nor would the Association be responsible for the conduct of any firm which had withdrawn from the group. It is possible, of course, that a member might elect to withdraw from the Association in order to attempt avoidance of an Association-Union decision on some grievance, but this situation has never arisen. Keeping the Association's members together during the life of a labor agreement has never been difficult. The second aspect of the unity problem is of greater significance. It concerns the ability of the group to stand together during a period of negotiations or during a strike which might follow the breakdown of negotiations. In various cities when negotiations between the printers' association and a union have become deadlocked, the union has typically made efforts to negotiate individually with some of the employers, or to induce them to withdraw from the association and to make a separate settlement. Under such circumstances, "mandating" is resorted to by the union. A mandate consists of a declaration that union members will continue to work only in those shops which abide by certain conditions then voted upon by the union membership. It must be remembered that the industry is highly competitive. A defection of one or two employers may be enough to "start the ball rolling" and to bring about the complete disintegration of the employers' united front. Various union leaders and even certain of the employers are convinced that, in a crisis, the employers in the printing industry would never stand together for any period of time. The events which occurred in the fall of 1947 and the spring of 1948 do prove conclusively, and to the contrary, that, at least on certain issues, a substantial degree of unanimity of action can be achieved during a strike. In Philadelphia the majority of employers affected remained united during a six months' strike by the Typographical Union, and in Chicago and certain other cities, at approximately the same period, a similar degree of cooperation was evidenced. Unity of action, which is so essential for successful employer [47]

bargaining, has been achieved in Philadelphia as a result of the operation of a number of factors. Before enumerating them, it is necessary to point out that effective unity is not always required. During what might be termed as "normal" or "non-crisis" negotiations, a semblance of unity is all that is needed. In any event, the degree of unity necessary even during a crisis period need be only as great, or slightly greater, than that achieved by the union among its own members. In this connection, both parties naturally put their best foot forward and may indicate to one another a strength substantially greater than they actually possess. Here are the factors which work in the direction of unity among the employer group: 1. First of all, a common desire to resist what may be regarded as an unsound union demand. The more unreasonable the union's position appears to be, the greater the unity among the employers. In recent years the I.T.U., in particular, has made demands and taken positions very distinctly unpopular with employers. This fact, more than any other single force, has served to bring about a higher degree of cooperation among employers in the various cities and throughout the United States than was ever before realized. 2. The existence of a common problem or "plight." This factor is related to the point enumerated immediately above. If there is a common "plight," there may be a common desire to resist it. To the extent that a position taken by a union, though it may be regarded as unsound by all, affects only a portion of the group, the required element of unity to resist may not be forthcoming. For example, if an exorbitant wage increase should be insisted upon by a union, and if a particular segment of the industry should be experiencing hard times while another segment is flourishing, it will be extremely difficult to secure crisis-coöperation among the employers. 3. A common awareness of the danger that a special situation, which does not in the first instance affect all employers, may nevertheless have an ultimate impact upon the entire group. To the extent that this awareness is present, a specialized situation may be converted into a "common" plight. For example, employer ''A" may be perfectly willing to grant the demands of union "A" which are opposed by employer "B." But if these demands are granted as a result of a strike threat by union "A," employer [48]

"A" may be fearful that union "B" may utilize the same tactics, and employer "A" may be highly vulnerable with respect to union "B." 4. Mutual respect and trust among the employers. To the extent that a high standard of business ethics prevails, even in an unusually competitive industry, employers are more inclined to rely upon the oral pledges of their fellow employers. At a crisis stage in negotiations it frequently becomes necessary for each employer to get up and "declare" himself. Other employers will evaluate such a declaration in the light of their knowledge of the individual in question—as to whether he has the authority to "deliver" on his commitment, and as to whether he is known to honor his word. 5. Fear of loss of business to others because of a particular course of action. Many of the firms in the printing industry, while they may be competitors, also do business with one another. A trade composition house may sell typesetting to a printer who also operates a composing room. If that trade composition house should break away from the group, or should use its influence within the group in a manner adverse to the interest of the printer, the printer may be tempted to look around for another source of supply. 6. A desire on the part of the individual member firm to preserve a reputation for "trade association-mindedness." In certain respects any trade association membership carries with it various social and prestige considerations. Business advantage may have to be exceptionally great in order to induce an employer to lose caste with his fellow employer. 7. The extent to which the leadership of the group is motivated by the welfare of all and is cognizant of the long-run implications of a given course of action to the future of collective bargaining. This is partly a problem of internal organization—to secure effective representation from all elements. But it is also a matter of education of the group and of the leaders of the group, as well as the innate idealism and social philosophy of those who happen to be in positions of responsibility at any critical point in the Association's affairs. The employment of professional fulltime assistance and outside counsel known not to be the tools of special interests within the group is helpful in this connection. [49]

T H E EXTENT OF THE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP

As indicated earlier, the Association's collectively-bargained contracts set the pattern in the industry for all unionized employers. They also tend to establish the conditions observed in non-union shops. Between fifteen and twenty-five firms are covered by each agreement, with the exception of the stereotypere, which includes four of the five Philadelphia plants engaged in this type of work. These fifteen to twenty-five establishments are, for the most part, the largest unionized plants in the city of Philadelphia in the commercial field. They employ approximately eighty per cent or more of that portion of each union's membership which is engaged in commercial shops. The remaining twenty per cent of the union's commercial membership will be found in non-Association union shops or in so-called "open shops." Precise statistics do not exist with respect to the number of non-union plants in Philadelphia or the volume of their employment. It is known, however, that there are normally approximately 1,000 union compositors employed in Association shops, and at least five hundred compositors, most of whom are nonunion, in "open shops," exclusive of publication houses and newspapers. The same set of facts obtains with respect to pressroom employees. In the bindery, around eight hundred men are employed under union contract in Association shops; one thousand women are covered by a similar contract. The best estimates available indicate that there are around two hundred bindery men and three hundred bindery girls employed in shops where no contract exists. It would appear from these figures that a fairly high proportion of non-union labor exists. As a practical matter, with few exceptions, the open shops in the commercial field employ but a relatively small number of workers and there is little mobility among this group of employees. Many of them are no doubt useful only for the specific tasks which they have been trained to perform. The terms of the union contracts thus exercise a profound influence upon the rates of pay and working conditions in the non-union segment of the industry, since these establishments are too small and too disorganized to set any kind of independent group pattern. In periods of depression, however, when the labor market is slack, substantially greater deviations from the union scale will occur among this group. [50]

SUBJECT MATTER FOR BARGAINING

a. Typographical Union Bargaining generally takes place with respect to all of the subjects which are customarily raised at the bargaining table in any union-employer relationship, except to the extent that the unions themselves have succeeded in removing from the negotiations' area certain conditions which are set forth in their "International Laws." Each of the unions with which the Association bargains has its own body of such laws. They are promulgated in the annual or bi-annual conventions of the national body, usually adopted after referendum vote of the entire membership, and then incorporated into printed form and circulated to each local union group as the revised "International Laws" of the union. The International Typographical Union pioneered in the development of this procedure, and the other unions followed suit, no doubt in part because they were offshoots of the I.T.U. The I.T.U. prides itself that its laws are subject neither to bargaining nor to arbitration. Whereas its International Constitution and Bylaws relate for the most part to matters of internal regulation, its General Laws have a far wider application. The local union is enjoined by the international union not to enter into an agreement which contains provisions at variance with these General Laws, or which subjects these laws to arbitration. In past years, local unions occasionally ignored this injunction and the contracts consummated constituted valid and binding documents. However, the Executive Council of the national body would have disclaimed any responsibility for their enforcement. In Philadelphia, for example, the 1946-47 labor agreement did not meet the approval of the I.T.U. But by a series of changes in the General Laws, beginning with those adopted at the I.T.U. convention in Miami, Florida, in the summer of 1946, the authority of the local union group has been successively curtailed. It is now contrary to the union's laws for a local even to present to the employer a contract proposal which has not been previously scrutinized by the international's contract department, or to sign a negotiated contract which has not previously been found acceptable to the international. Section 4 of Article III of the General Laws of the I.T.U. provides that: "Subordinate unions are required to submit to the International President for review and approval, as complying [51]

with requirements of International Union laws, all proposals for a new contract, alteration, amendment or extension of an existing contract before presentation to the employer. No contract shall provide for automatic renewal on failure to notify either party thereto of desire to change or terminate the contract." Section 2 of the same Article states that: "No local union shall sign a contract guaranteeing its members to work for any proprietor, firm or corporation unless such contract is in accordance with International law and policy and approved as such by the International President . . The penalty visited upon the local union for failure to abide by these instructions could amount to suspension of its membership or of the local itself, or removal of its officers.3 There has also been much stricter supervision of local union bargaining since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Nevertheless, in the period prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, even when contracts were not underwritten by the national body because of some deviation from national policy or of international law, such discrepancy would have been relatively minor in character. Generally speaking, intricate and detailed provisions relating to priority, overtime, bases for discharge, and many other items have either been accepted by employers as binding in their relationship, or have been specifically incorporated into labor agreements with only the most minor amendments. Such acceptance has not always indicated employer approval of the principles underlying these provisions, but rather is a token of employer acquiescence to a set of conditions which he is powerless to change. Philadelphia employers have chafed under the Typographical Union's international laws, even though such laws were generally observed and, for the most part, were specifically incorporated into the contract with elaborations for clarification and with as many qualifications as could be negotiated without altering their basic substance.4 Not until the expiration of the 1946-47 collective bargaining agreement was an outright attack made by the Asso8

W h i l e t h i s is c l e a r l y p o s s i b l e u n d e r t h e u n i o n ' s l a w s , I . T . U . P r e s i d e n t W o o d r u f f R a n d o l p h c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d , i n h i s t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t h e N a t i o n a l L a b o r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d in t h e s e v e r a l c a s e s b r o u g h t in 1947-48, t h a t t h e local u n i o n s h a v e f u l l a u t h o r i t y t o b a r g a i n on all m a t t e r s w h a t s o e v e r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in M a r c h , 1949, a f t e r t h e S a n F r a n c i s c o P r i n t i n g E m p l o y e r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n h a d e n t e r e d i n t o a " m e m o r a n d u m a g r e e m e n t " w i t h t h e local typographical u n i o n of t h a t c i t y , t h e I . T . U . E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l p u b l i s h e d a b u l l e t i n d i s a v o w i n g t h e S a n F r a n c i s c o c o n t r a c t , d e c l a r i n g it " n u l l a n d v o i d , " a n d s t a t i n g t h a t " o u r m e m b e r s w h o will o b e y o u r l a w s will b e p r o t e c t e d in t h e i r r i g h t to do s o . " T h e e m p l o y e r s w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y i n f o r m e d by t h e I . T . U . Council t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t was "canceled." 4 F o r a s u m m a r y of s o m e of t h e I . T . U . ' s G e n e r a l L a w s , s e e A p p e n d i x .

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ciation on the International Union's laws. The militant course was taken then only because the union policy was made more unpalatable than ever by the union's adoption of the now famous "collective bargaining policy" at its International's convention in Cleveland in August of 1947.® The laws of the International Union more effectively reduce the area of collective bargaining than any unilateral action which might be taken by an employer. The status of the I.T.U.'s laws under the National Labor Management Relations Act has been challenged by the employers, who have contended before the National Labor Relations Board that a local union should be obligated to bargain on all conventional issues irrespective of the prohibitions of its international's laws. These cases have not yet been decided and a repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act might render them "moot." It is nevertheless true that the employer has no secondary line of defense in a similar body of doctrines to exempt him from his obligation to bargain. In point of fact, the employer is confronted with a series of N.L.R.B. and court decisions which seem continuously to extend the area with respect to which he must bargain in good faith. Employers of Typographical Union labor have long regarded these international laws as offensive. Not only has it been felt that such laws removed many important matters from the arena of collective bargaining, but the fact that they are unilaterally imposed by the union is found objectionable, even where the laws themselves may be reasonable. Subsequent to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, employers' opposition to these laws was based not only on the fact that they were not subject to negotiation, but also that some were clearly illegal. In this category were the closed shop and "struck work" provisions. The "struck work" law conferred upon union members the right to refuse to execute such work, and also gave the union the right to determine what fell within this classification. 0 As " O n one occasion, however, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union sought to invoke the a r b i t r a t i o n provisions in the General L a w s in an effort to set aside t h e local union's c o n t r a c t u a l c o m m i t m e n t to a r b i t r a t e a wage-reopening. T h e Association did not agree t h a t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n had t h e right to set aside the a r b i t r a t i o n provision which was expressly set f o r t h in t h e c o n t r a c t , and brought an Bction in Common Pleas Court to f o r c e the local union to honor its obligation. At this s t a g e the local union agreed to a r b i t r a t e , and the action was withdrawn. " A r t i c l e I I I , Section 5, provides: " S u b o r d i n a t e unions a t all times have the right to define as etruck work composition executed wholly or in p a r t by non-members, and composition o r other work coming from or destined f o r p r i n t i n g concerns which ha\e been declared by t h e union to be unfair, a f t e r which union members m a y refuse to handle the work classified as struck w o r k . "

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another example, the Typographical Union has long been insistent upon its right to define its own jurisdiction, 7 despite the processes of the N.L.R.B. The policy of the I.T.U. with respect to its International Laws is adamant under the present union administration. Except in those few instances in which local officers, for internal political purposes, may pursue policies aimed at discrediting the international leadership, nothing short of a strike which succeeded in breaking the control of the International would permit a purely local determination of the various matters covered by union law. The Allied Printing Employers' experiences with this problem are not essentially different from the experiences of other employers and associations which deal with this union elsewhere in the United States. It is sufficient to observe that, in this particular instance, association-wide bargaining by employers in a given locality has not brought about an equality of bargaining power with respect to the rights of both parties to insist upon a local determination of the subjects over which bargaining shall be conducted. b. Pressmen's

Union

The Pressmen's Union also has its body of international law. One of its provisions is as follows: (Article XV, Section 3) "Upon completion of any contract or agreement intended to be entered into, a true and correct copy thereof shall be sent to each member of the Board of Directors, but such contract or agreement shall not become operative until a majority of the Board of Directors have approved the same. Each and every contract and agreement shall have a provision therein that the same shall be underwritten by the International President and that the same shall not become effective or operative for any purpose whatsoever until so underwritten." Agreements between the Philadelphia employers and the locals of this union have been underwritten by the International President. However, the employers have considered the contract to be operative on the stated date, after ratification by the local union membership, even though it has required some period thereafter before the actual document has been returned from Pressmen's Home, Tennessee, bearing the endorsement of the union's Intersection

12 of

Article

III

states:

"It

ie t h e

unalterable

policy

of

the

International

Typo-

g r a p h i c a l U n i o n t h a t all c o m p o s i n g r o o m w o r k o r a n y m a c h i n e r y o r p r o c e s s a p p e r t a i n i n g printing

and

the

preparations

therefor

International Typographical Union."

belongs

to

and

is

u n d ,-r

(See also VII. 1 and 5 ; VIII,

[54]

the 1.)

jurisdiction

of

to the

national President. Moreover, no question has been raised in the past on any matter of objection from the International body. The local union is evidently afforded considerable autonomy by its International. There is no doubt, also, that the local has asserted its independence of thought and action, particularly with respect to economic issues, while following the International closely on matters of broad policy and national arbitration. Throughout the country, "interference" by the International officers has been directed toward efforts at conciliation in instances in which deadlocks occur in local negotiations, and to aid in the enforcement of contractual obligations in instances in which local unions may refuse to honor their commitments. However, in Philadelphia, since the formation of the Union Employing Printers' Association in 1933, there has been no instance of either character. The contract has been observed by both parties, and the grievance machinery, ending in arbitration, has resolved all disputes arising under its terms. Negotiations as to the provisions of new agreements have been concluded by the parties themselves, except for one item which, by mutual agreement, was handled as a dispute by the War Labor Board and resolved by Board order. This union doubtless has policies which are considered vital to its welfare, but local officers and committees seem to have approached all negotiations with an open mind and have never contended that certain items must be included or excluded from negotiations simply because of international union policy. In this connection, Philadelphia employers have been inclined to "leave well enough alone." They have not asked for provisions which would run counter to any features of International Union policy known to be of vital concern to the national body. But the International Union has not, in the recent past, endeavored to superimpose its will on local bargaining, and it is significant that the terms of the new International arbitration agreement recently negotiated by the International Union and the Union Employers' Section of Printing Industry of America do not specifically exclude the laws of the union from arbitration. An examination of the laws of the Pressmen's Union does indicate that there are certain areas in which a unilateral determination of conditions is sought or proclaimed. To some extent, however, these laws are "after the fact," and incorporate the best practices which have already been won by purely local bargaining. [55]

A summary of some of those international laws which appear to impose limitations upon local bargaining is set forth in the Appendix. A review of these provisions will give evidence not only of their extent, but their similarity to those of the I.T.U. Provisions of the Pressmen's laws, however, are not so onerous in practice and they are not observed so scrupulously. In the case of both unions, the extent to which such regulations prove burdensome or present an inflexible barrier in bargaining will depend upon the degree to which local unions are inclined—and are permitted— to deviate from these provisions. The philosophy of the present leadership of the Pressmen's Union—and it is to be noted that until his death in the fall of 1948 International President George L. Berry had been in office since 1907—is one of cooperation with employers in the interest of greater productivity. The union publication, the American Pressman, devotes a major portion of its space to a discussion of technical problems of printing. The union maintains a school and research institute, the services of which are available to employers. That higher wages can only come with increased productivity and the fullest cooperation between labor and management has been preached and practiced by this union for many years.8 a

T h e following quotation f r o m t h e American Pressman ( A p r i l , 1948) is illustrative of the outlook of the p r e s e n t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union leadership. " I t is to be hoped t h a t t h e membership will b e a r w i t h m e in repetition of w h a t has been said m a n y times, namely, t h a t there is a n inescapable c o m m u n i t y of i n t e r e s t between o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d the o t h e r h u m a n elements of o u r i n d u s t r y . " S o o f t e n we hear the definition of the i n d u s t r y in this f a s h i o n — ' i n d u s t r y a n d labor 1 —and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n usually follows by r e f e r r i n g to m a n a g e m e n t as t h e i n d u s t r y a n d o u r o r g a n i z a tion as labor. This is a false i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a totally i n a d e q u a t e a n d inapplicable u s e of t h e E n g l i s h language. " T h e industry is an i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of those who a r e engaged in it, &nd in t h e field of f r e e a n d p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e u n d e r t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p l a n of f r e e d o m there a r e three d i s t i n c t h u m a n elements t h a t m a k e up industry, which a r e t h e investor, m a n a g e m e n t a n d labor. T h e y constitute i n d u s t r y a n d they a r e inseparable in t h e i r relationship and any e f f o r t to s e p a r a t e t h e m predisposes d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d the introduction into i n d u s t r y of a false conception of ita s t a t u s . . . . " T h e three human units—investor, m a n a g e m e n t a n d labor—have t h e i r respective r e s p o n sibilities and a r e entitled to their rights in the scheme of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . H e who invests his money to s t a r t or e x p a n d a business is entitled to a f a i r r e t u r n u p o n his i n v e s t m e n t . . . . M a n a g e m e n t is entitled to f a i r compensation in t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of its duties, a n d labor is entitled to f a i r and j u s t r e t u r n s as the element of m a n u f a c t u r e a n d production, and while it has a l w a y s been t r u e t h a t t h e closest cooperation between t h e t h r e e should e n s u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e conduct of their industry, it is now m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n ever b e f o r e since, of course, t h e r e a r e those who have failed in t h e recognition of f u n d a m e n t a l principles of f r e e e n t e r p r i s e . " In a n o t h e r article, aimed a p p a r e n t l y a t c e r t a i n other p r i n t i n g t r a d e s ' unions, P r e s i d e n t Berry stated: " M a n y of o u r members will recall the i m p r a c t i c a l drive of the I n d u s t r i a l W o r k e r s of t h e World commonly r e f e r r e d t o in the heyday of its existence as t h e I . W . W . T h e i r philosophy was n o t only representative of exploitation in t h e industry b u t exploitation a m o n g t h e workers themselves. " T h e I . W . W . stood f o r t h e proposition t h a t t h e r e should be a dead-leveling in compensation r a t e s f o r the working men a n d women, irrespective of the vocation o r the classification of their work. I n a word, talent, initiative and pioneership were n o t elements involving any s u p e r i o r

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In local negotiations, the Pressmen's Union has not opposed the introduction of new processes but has welcomed these techniques. At the same time, the union has insisted that more productive presses should carry higher rates of pay, and, in consequence, has established through collective bargaining not the single "journeyman" scale which is in effect in other unions, but varying rates of pay depending upon the equipment operated. From time to time employers have advanced the criticism, however, that in addition to seeking greater remuneration from more productive equipment the Pressmen have sought to require that more manpower be utilized on such equipment than is necessary. Consequently, one of the important elements of collective bargaining with this union is the so-called "complement of men" on presses. Although the Pressmen's Union has operated under closed shop contracts for many years, it has never denied the employer the right to go outside the union for help if the union is unable to supply the number of men required. Such employees have been granted "permits" by the union and are entitled to work until such time as union members become available. A relatively large number of such "permit holders" is now employed in the industry in Philadelphia. c. Bookbinders'

Union

Men and women who are employed in the binderies of members of the Allied Printing Employers' Association are, for the most position in the scheme of compensation as a g a i n s t those who produced least by circumstances, by lack of t a l e n t a n d initiative a n d by d o w n r i g h t laziness. . . . " T h e I.W.W.'s f a i l u r e was likewise in consequence of the policy of t h e organization to produce little a n d demand much, whereas most everyone realized t h a t if we a r e to have a n equitable a n d j u s t distribution of wealth we m u s t firet produce t h e wealth. " W e see in our everyday life, even in this good year of 1947, evidences of exploitation, and these evidences occur in o u r organized labor movement as well as out of it. W e observe the f a c t e which indicate t h a t o u r g r o u p of c r a f t s m e n is called upon to c a r r y the economic deficiencies of a n o t h e r c r a f t . . . . " T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r i n t i n g P r e s s m e n and Assistant's Union of N o r t h America adheres to t h e proposition t h a t finer p r i n t i n g a n d more p r i n t i n g is good f o r all who a r e engaged in t h e enterprise. . . . " T h e p r i n t i n g d e p a r t m e n t of t h e i n d u s t r y over the p a s t half c e n t u r y has increased in m o r e p r i n t i n g and in better p r i n t i n g m a n y times over. It has been, and will continue to be, t h e wealth-producing d e p a r t m e n t of t h e industry in all the industry's ramifications. We realize, of course, t h a t f r o m this m a n y who a r e engaged in certain elements a t t e n d a n t to p r i n t i n g have benefited. This is a n evident f a c t sustained by the same physical conditions t h a t existed fifty years ago. W e are interested in h u m a n i t y and are willing to share, as we have shared a n d will continue to share, b u t in this we shall not a g r e e to abandon our economic rights t o receive t h a t s h a r e j u s t l y due us—any o t h e r e l e m e n t to the c o n t r a r y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . " T h e r e a r e those who m a y r e g a r d t h e f u t u r e in our industry as dependent upon l a r g e r and f a s t e r p r i n t i n g presses. W e accept t h a t as a high compliment to us, b u t we w a r n t h a t t h e so-called philosophy of the Industrial V»*orkcrs of Ih«? World of three doeadrs ago shall not a p p l y . I.W.W.-ism failed then and I.W.W.-ism will fail npain, irrespective of the face-lifting device« us?d or t h e type of f r o n t a g e of respectability t h a t may be used."

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part, covered by contracts with the Bookbinders' Union. There are two contracts, one for men with the Bookbinders' and Bindery Women's Union, Local No. 2, of the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, A.F.L., and one for women with the same local union, formerly Women's Bindery Union, Local No. 86. This union, too, has a set of so-called international laws, but in practice they have not provided any obstacle to bargaining, nor have they tended substantially to restrict the area of collective bargaining. In many instances, where hard-and-fast regulations appear in the "book of laws," they are so worded to strengthen the hand of a local in its bargaining with employers. Failure of a local union to secure contract provisions in conformity with such laws will not necessarily prevent the underwriting of that contract by the International President. Moreover, should such a contract not be underwritten, it would still be a valid agreement between the parties. In Philadelphia, as in many other cities, practices at variance with certain of this union's "laws" are in effect. Nevertheless, the contracts have been "underwritten" in each instance up to the present date. It is true, of course, that perhaps no striking and fundamental deviations exist between the local contract and International Union policy or law, but Philadelphia employers have not sought to engage in a frontal attack against these laws because such an attack has never seemed necessary. As will be observed from an examination of the Appendix wherein certain of these laws are summarized, the union's laws do contain certain definite prohibitions which, if scrupulously observed by the locals in their negotiations, would undoubtedly affect the area of local bargaining. Many of the laws, however, although worded unequivocably, actually set forth union objectives rather than union mandates. d. Stereotypere'

Union

Only four Association firms are party to the Association agreement with the Philadelphia Stereotypers' Union. They employ less than 100 persons in their stereotype departments. The Stereotypere' contract has been negotiated through the Association only for the last several years. The union in question is a local under the jurisdiction of the International Stereotypers' and Electrotypers' Union. This International Union also has its own body of laws which are, in general, as detailed and emphatic as those [58]

of the I.T.U. However, tions with the local body izations as to the extent, the collective bargaining

the Association's experience in negotiais still too limited to permit any generalif any, to which such laws impinge upon relationship. SUMMARY

The Allied Printing Employers' Association is a loosely-knit group. It is an association which is bound together tightly and effectively, however, when common problems arise or crises occur. Its organization, although somewhat cumbersome, is intended to give expression both to the diverse elements in the industry and also to the interrelationships which exist as between firms and unions. The Association represents a sufficient cross-section of the industry so as to function as the sole contracting agency with certain printing unions in the commercial printing field. Where individual contracts exist with the same unions, they are replicas of the Association agreement. Thus, basic conditions of employment f o r the entire letterpress industry, with the exception of photo-engravers and electrotypers, are set by Association-Union bargaining. Under existing policies, both of the unions and the Association, each union negotiates separately, and this has led to a substantial amount of "jockeying f o r position" on both sides. Each of the unions is subject to some degree of control by its international body. Contracts are generally underwritten by the officers of the larger body, which assumes responsibility for their enforcement. In the event of a labor dispute all, or the major part of, strike benefits are paid by the international union which would first have to approve the purpose of the strike. The membership of the international unions, at conventions held either annually or bi-annually, frames and passes legislation which governs the conduct of the union. These regulations are not concerned solely with the internal affairs of the organizations, or with what locals "ought" to try to accomplish in bargaining. In many cases they also determine the area of collective bargaining with local employers or local employer associations. These socalled "laws" have interfered with free and equal bargaining, particularly in the case of the International Typographical Union. The other unions' laws, although similar in verbiage, usually permit [59]

more scope for local determination, either in their breach or in their observance. Basically, the major differences between the unions appear to lie in differences of the philosophies held by the union leadership. Each of the unions at the national level possesses the authority arid the means to pursue policies similar to those which have been followed in recent years by the I.T.U. However, the Pressmen's Union, in particular, has exercised its control in a fashion generally regarded by the employer as beneficent, with a stern hand so f a r as its obligations are concerned, and with a hand so light and dexterous in the employer's affairs that he is frequently not aware of its existence or of its strength. The philosophy of the Pressmen's Union has been one of conciliation and arbitration. That of the I.T.U. has been militant, uncompromising and antagonizing. The Bookbinders, a weaker union than the other two, has followed a course more in line with that charted by the Pressmen. Employers in Philadelphia, as elsewhere in the United States, have been continually aware in recent years of the inequality of their bargaining position with the Typographical Union, and the policies of this union have done much to foster and cement the ties of employers one to another. A similar inequality of bargaining power exists, although possibly to a lesser degree, with respect to the other unions, but its existence has not posed the same problems. Whether the differences in the philosophy of the union leadership, as between the several unions, can be explained solely on the basis of the personalities of the leaders themselves, it is not possible to state. Some observers have indicated their belief that the militancy of the Typographical Union is inherent in its form of political organizations. This Union, unlike the others, has a "two-party" system. Two slates of officers, Progressives and Independents, are nominated both at the national and local level. An active political campaign is carried on preceding the bi-annual elections. Some have even accused the party in power, whichever party it may be, of "playing favorites" in the administration of union affairs, but whether or not this form of "patronage" exists, it is probably true that the incumbents are more continually "on their mettle" to justify their administration of union affairs than would be the case if there were no organized rival claimants for the offices. [GO]

Whatever the explanation might be, whether as an outgrowth of a political system or as an accidental result of the impact of personalities upon the affairs of the unions, differences between these unions are very marked and they are not primarily the product of differences in the economic position which they occupy. In each case sufficient resources are available so that the International, if pitted against a local group of employers, enjoys the superior advantage. Employers are not unaware of the weaknesses of their group and of the strength of the unions opposing them. In appraising the position to be taken during negotiations, employers are certain to calculate the likelihood of ineffective resistance, and the consequence of a strike in terms of loss of business to the area. While cooperation may be secured from other cities in the event of a strike, such cooperation is likely to be limited by "struck work" clauses in the contracts of these centers and the ever-present fear on the part of the struck employers that work "farmed out" to competitors will not return after the dispute is terminated. Ths absence of a supply of competent labor to replace strikers is also a consideration that would inevitably have a bearing upon the employer's willingness to permit dispute issues to be resolved by economic action. But beyond the limitations which are imposed by the inherent weakness of the employers' economic position there lies the simple fact that the unions, unlike the employers, have developed consistent, nationally-integrated policies and objectives. Associations and employers in the printing industry, while reluctant to accept these goals and the accompanying detailed regulations, have no coordinated alternative program of their own to offer or to fall back upon. Thus, the Philadelphia Association, when confronted with internationally-inspired programs advanced by their local unions, can bring to bear on their side only such wisdom and policies as they are able to formulate on a local level, and they cannot claim the authority of wide acceptance by other employers in support of their position.

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CHAPTER IV The Typographical Union Strike NY appraisal of the effectiveness of the Allied Printing Employers' Association as an instrument for collective bargaining should include a discussion of the manner in which the Association conducted itself during the 1948 strike. The strength and weaknesses of the Association are best illustrated by its behavior during this period. This story takes on added significance because it has to do with the most recent surge of union unilateralism, illustrating that this deep-rooted tendency is far from extinct in the printing industry.

A

EVENTS PRECEDING THE STRIKE

In January of 1946 the Association entered into two-year contracts with both the Typographical Union and the Pressmen's Union. These contracts provided for a reopening in the matter of wages at the end of one year. In March, 1946, a two-year agreement was entered with the Bookbinders' Union, which also provided for a wage reopening at the first anniversary date of the contract. Wage negotiations were undertaken with both the Pressmen and the Typographical Union in the fall of 1947. A settlement was reached with the Pressmen well before the expiration of the first year. No agreement could be reached with the Typographical Union. Tha't union sought a number of contract changes other than an increase in the hourly wage rate. This dispute was ultimately resolved by arbitration, as provided for in the agreement. In March of 1947, the Bookbinders' contract was opened, and a wage agreement was reached. In June of 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act became law. The Association then appraised the provisions of its various agreements in relation to that legislation. It was ascertained that the closed shop features of the Typographical and Pressmen's contracts, and the closed and preferential shop provisions of the Bookbinders' contract could be legally preserved only until their expiration dates. It will be recalled that the law set August 22, 1948, as the [62]

last date on which such provisions might be honored if they were incorporated into agreements entered prior to August 22, 1947. Contract negotiations to be entered in the fall of 1947 in the case of the two unions, and the spring of 1948, in the case of the Bookbinders, would have to secure the elimination of such provisions. It also became apparent that various other contract clauses, in one fashion or another, were tied into the closed and preferential shop provisions or the "struck work" clauses and would have to be changed. Shortly after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, two unions, the Pressmen and Bookbinders, approached the Association and suggested that their contracts be extended in order to preserve the hiring provisions until the last permissible date under the Act. It was indicated that many problems would arise during the first few months of the operation of the new law which might not be resolved by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts prior to the expiration of the current agreements. Negotiations between the parties would likely be simplified if the contracts were extended so that, by the time these issues had to be faced, both parties would have had the benefit of the experience of other unions and employer groups as well as additional guidance through interpretation of the law. In both instances, the parties agreed to a one year's extension of the contract with the understanding that the closed and preferential shop features which would be invalidated in August of 1948 would then be supplanted by such other provisions as the parties might mutually agree to. In the case of the male Bookbinders, it was expressly provided that the Association would, in the summer of 1948, enter into a union shop agreement, provided the union took the necessary steps to qualify and provided further that existing non-union employees would not be required to become members of the union as a condition of future employment. A similar agreement was reached with the women in the bindery union. At the time these interim agreements were executed, an increase in wages was also granted, and a further increase was to be made effective on the date upon which the contracts would normally have expired. The Association then informally contacted one of the officers of the local Typographical Union and made it known to him that, should that union so desire, a similar arrangement might be worked out. The Typographical Union representative demurred. [63]

He indicated t h a t such a contract reopening was not feasible in view of the various laws and regulations of his union establishing negotiation procedures. Thus, the Typographical contract was the only Association contract scheduled to expire a t the end of the year. 1 During the period in which these discussions were taking place, Woodruff Randolph, President of the International Typographical Union, began to issue to his various local unions a series of postcard bulletins setting forth in considerable detail a negotiations' s t r a t e g y to be followed by that union in view of the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. These bulletins developed a p r o g r a m which was formally adopted by the International Union a t its annual convention in Cleveland, Ohio, in August of 1947. The collective bargaining policy which was adopted by the International Typographical Union was incorporated into t h a t Union's General Laws. (Article III, Section 1 . ) It contained, among other things, the following statements: It is our policy that we continue to maintain our historic rights and prerogatives, to which we are entitled and which we have enjoyed for nearly a century. We believe that the harmony of our relations which has prevailed, almost without interruption, for many decades between our members, our local unions and their employers, can continue in the future, as in the past, and it is our policy to try to continue i t While there should not be, and will not be, any attempt on the part of the international or subordinate unions to violate any valid provisions of this law, or of any law, federal or state, yet there should be, and will be, earnest endeavors on the part of these unions to avoid any condition that will result in their being penalized by these laws and to avoid the sacrifice of rights and prerogatives which may be lost by the signing of contracts as heretofore. The Labor Management Relations Act does not compel the signing of contracts, and refraining from doing so is not a violation or evasion of the law. It will be our policy to refrain from signing contracts in order that we avoid agreeing, or seeming to agree, or voluntarily accepting the conditions created by such a relationship under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Upon the expiration of existing contracts, and until the laws above referred to are amended and free collective bargaining is again recognized, our members may accept employment only from employers who are willing to employ them under the "Conditions of Employment" which the several unions adopt, after approval by the Executive Council of the I.T.U. 1( Πιβ

Association's contract with the Stereotypere' Union was not to expire until May 1, 1948, and thus, at best, the closed shop features of that agreement could only have been extended for three months.

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They [the local unions] will engage in collective bargaining to the extent required by law, bearing in mind that the legal obligation of a "labor organization" under the LMRA to "bargain collectively," meet and confer in good faith with reference to wages, hours, etc., expressly provides as follows: "But such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." A "Conditions of Employment"2 form, which must be used by all unions and which is uniform except for local scales and practices, has been printed for the convenience and use of all subordinate unions. The form sets out the conditions under which our members offer their services—so long as they are individually able and willing to work. It is our policy that local unions do not seek to qualify as representatives under the Labor Management Relations Act . . . and that they do not seek to execute so-called union shop contracts. The process provided by the Labor Management Relations Act is too lengthy and cumbersome and there are features of such a union shop that are unacceptable to our members. Neither may our unions enter into no strike agreements or contracts of any kind without approval of the Executive Council. Employers of Typographical Union members throughout the United States quickly became familiar with this union's new policy. It was widely discussed and reviewed in the newspapers at the time. Copies of the famous postcard bulletins also found their way 5

The Conditions of Employment form referred to contained, among other things, the following provisions: "This schedule of the Conditions of Employment, as hereinafter stated, is in nowise a contract nor is it an offer susceptible of acceptance by an employer in any manner to infer ihat there has been any meeting of the minds in collective bargaining to attain the result* hereinafter prescribed solely by the union. "This policy of prescribing conditions of employment by union action only is for the purpose of retaining all legal rights of the union and its individual members. . . . The union promulgating these conditions of employment accepts no obligations as a collective bargaining agent as defined by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Any act of members of the union to quit their employment is a matter of their individual rights and prerogatives. "Failure on the part of any employer of members of the union to provide employment a t the standards set forth in these conditions will be evidence such employer has locked out members of our union and with the consent of the International Typographical Union such members may be classified as locked out and other union members may be notified of such lockout. " [ S e c . 36] The Union prescribes no obligation or duty for, or on behalf of, its members to work on any particular product not wholly produced in the shop in which they work. The union hereby reserves to each member the right to exercise any legal prerogative he may have to act individually in the quitting of his employment or to work only when be considers himself able to do so. The union accepts no obligations as regards the number of men needed to do the volume of work required by the office. " [ S e c . 40] The union reserves to its members the right to seek employment elsewhere when any conditions in the office where they are working become unsatisfactory, and to refuse to work when they consider themselves unable or unwilling to perform the duties imposed by the office. "Where the words 'journeymen,' 'apprentices,' 'foremen,' 'learners,' 'machinists,' 'members,' 'extras,' or 'substitutes' are used herein they shall refer only to and be applicable only to members of the International Typographical Union and of. . . . Union No. . . . "Members will work only under direction and supervision of a foreman of the composing room who is a member and who, as foreman, shall have full and complete control over the hiring and discharge of members doing any work in said composing room. "The composing room shall be operated under the laws of the International Typographical Union and of. . . . Union No. . . .

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into employers' shops and they were frequently posted on bulletin boards.8 There was thus no doubt in the employers' minds as to the course of action the union planned to pursue. Reports from various cities where negotiations were in progress indicated that these local unions were following this policy to the letter. In late September 1947, the annual convention of Printing Industry of America was held in French Lick Springs, Indiana. The members of the Allied Printing Employers' Association are, by virtue of such membership, also members of the Union Employers' Section of the national association. At this meeting of • These postcard bulletins contained euch i n s t r u c t i o n s as the f o l l o w i n g : ( " P o s t c a r d Bulletin No. 86 f r o m I.T.U. H e a d q u a r t e r s " ) " A rock-bottom f o u n d a t i o n m u s t be built u p o n which our relations with employers m u s t rest. In o r d e r to do so, we m u s t have a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s which remain inviolate u n d e r T H L or a n y s t a t e law. T H I S IS IT — M E M O R I Z E I T ! " W e c a n n o t be compelled to m a k e c o n t r a c t s w i t h employers. " W e c a n n o t be compelled to work a g a i n s t o u r will o r under conditions u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to us. " W e C A N collectively p r o m u l g a t e the specific conditions u n d e r which o u r m e m b e r s will work a f t e r expiration of existing agreements. " W e CAN collectively r e f u s e to work f o r any employer r e f u s i n g t o meet union-promulgated conditions of employment. " W e C A N issue 'We Do N o t P a t r o n i z e L i s t s ' . " These s a m e i n j u n c t i o n s w e r e reiterated in P o s t c a r d Bulletin No. 95, along with t h e following: " T h e T - H - L will p r e v e n t your securing a closed shop c o n t r a c t . " T h e T - H - L will p r e v e n t you f r o m excluding non-union m e n . " T h e T - H - L will p r e v e n t your r e f u s i n g t o handle s t r u c k w o r k . " T h e T - H - L will i n t e r f e r e with your jurisdiction over w o r k . " P o s t c a r d Bulletin No. 96 told union m e m b e r s : "Follow I . T . U . policy no m a t t e r w h a t h a p p e n s : "If it becomes necessary to leave your job m a k e n o s t a t e m e n t to employer, conciliator or a n y o n e else a s to t h e reason. You will s t r i k e o r quit work because you do n o t w a n t t o w o r k f o r a p a r t i c u l a r employer or do n o t w a n t to work a t a l l ; you will be r e f r a i n i n g f r o m w o r k i n g because you w a n t to do so and f o r n o o t h e r r e a s o n . " P o s t c a r d Bulletin No. 98 g a v e " O u r Objectives in Conferences with E m p l o y e r s " : " F i r s t — S u b m i t our offer consisting of two p a r a g r a p h s as follows: 1. W e propose t h a t t h e r e be no signed, verbal or any o t h e r kind of a c o n t r a c t . 2. We propose t h a t t h e employer recognize t h a t t h e r e is n o obligation on the p a r t of the union o r its individual members to do o t h e r t h a n m a y be specified in t h e 'Conditions of E m p l o y m e n t ' set by t h e U n i o n . " S e c o n d — T r y to determine, through discussion, a f a i r price f o r our labor, giving due consideration to employers' a r g u m e n t s and ability to m e e t conditions which t h e U n i o n contemplates p r e s c r i b i n g . Bear in m i n d t h a t once t h e union, with a p p r o v a l of t h e E x e c u t i v e Council of I . T . U . , p r o m u l g a t e s 'Conditions of E m p l o y m e n t , ' f a i l u r e on t h e p a r t of t h e employer t o comply t h e r e w i t h will result in a declaration of a lockout. Such declaration m u s t also have t h e a p p r o v a l of the Executive Council." P o s t c a r d Bulletin No. 99 s t a t e d in p a r t : " T h a t policy [the collective b a r g a i n i n g policy adopted a t t h e convention] can be successful only so long as local u n i o n s and employers f a i l t o reach a n a g r e e m e n t by t h e processes of collective b a r g a i n i n g . "If t h e union and employers reach a n a g r e e m e n t they m a y be compelled to sign a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t to t h a t effect. . . . T h e T - H - L specifically compels it I F A G R E E M E N T I S R E A C H E D . " U n d e r t h e T - H - L collective b a r g a i n i n g is being m a d e t o o difficult a n d t h e m a k i n g of cont r a c t s is n o w undesirable t o organized l a b o r . " Bulletin No. 100 stated in p a r t : "If by any chance t h e N L R B or a c o u r t should say we have n o t b a r g a i n e d in good f a i t h , t h e board or c o u r t would h a v e to define it o r leave i t t o o u r o w n definition. " B u t suppose a c o u r t should order you t o m a k e specific proposals on wages, houra, a n d w o r k i n g conditions. We have never been accused of a lack of i m a g i n a t i o n . "

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the Union Employers' Section the union's policies were discussed at great length. A resolution was passed condemning the action taken by the union. The implications of various methods of counteracting this program were also discussed. During the course of this discussion it became apparent to the vast bulk of employers who were in attendance, and to the officers and industrial relations secretaries of the various local associations, that the union's strategy was to secure a wage increase which would either be voluntarily granted by the employer or mandated by the union. There appeared to be no method of forcing the local union to enter into a legal contract, and to repudiate a policy that would have required employer connivance at violating the new law, other than to hold out against any wage increase except as a part of a legal contract, and to refrain from discussing wages except on the basis of the assurance from the union that such discussion was a part of legitimate collective bargaining as to the terms of an entire agreement. If the local union refused to give assurances that it would enter into a legal contract, the employers' only alternative would be to prefer unfair labor practices charges before the National Labor Relations Board. At the time of the employers' convention, negotiations had already reached a stalemate in the city of Baltimore on precisely these issues. During the convention word reached those in attendance that unfair labor practice charges had been filed against the union by employers in that city. It was then agreed that the Union Employers' Section would retain the services of a legal staff to advise the various cities who could not afford their own legal talent, or who wished the benefit of advice sharpened by the experiences of other cities. Shortly after the end of the convention, negotiations started in the city of Philadelphia. The proposal received from the union was precisely as set forth in the I.T.U. postcard bulletins, namely, 1. No signed, verbal, or any other kind of contract. 2. The employers to recognize there is no obligation on the part of the Union or its individual members to do other than may be specified in the "conditions of employment" set by the union.

A meeting of the members of the Association was called, and the history of the union's new collective bargaining policy was discussed. Affidavits were secured from each employer giving the Association authority to "represent and bargain for us in our [67]

relations with Philadelphia Typographical Union No. 2, and to take such action as may be necessary to consummate an agreement." It was understood by the employers that, in all probability, negotiations would reach a stalemate because of the union's refusal to enter into a contract. The negotiating committee was instructed to make every effort to secure a contract, but, if no contract could be secured, charges before the N.L.R.B. were to be filed. There was an awareness on the part of all of the employers that the union might elect to strike to secure its objectives. Meanwhile a hearing had begun before an N.L.R.B. trial examiner in the Baltimore case. Representatives of the Philadelphia Association and of the Philadelphia union were in attendance. By this time the I.T.U. policy had taken another tack. On October 7 a communication was sent to the local unions by the Executive Council of the I.T.U. announcing a change in strategy. This was to be in the form of a contract which could be canceled on short notice by the union in the event non-union employees were hired or struck work was accepted.4 • T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e beaded " E x p l a n a t i o n of Change in S t r a t e g y Because of A t t a c k by N L R B Counsel A g a i n s t Our Collective B a r g a i n i n g P o l i c y / ' I n p a r t , this s t a t e m e n t contained the following: " T h e a t t a c k by t h e N L R B General Couneel immediately a f t e r o u r convention a n d the g r o u p i n g a r o u n d him of o a r employers w a s highly significant. W e r e g a r d it a s a n obvious conspiracy a g a i n s t us. "Counsel Den h a m ' s only leg t o s t a n d on w a s his claim t h a t we w e r e not b a r g a i n i n g 'in good f a i t h ' in spite of t h e new l a n g u a g e in t h e T - H - L . A quick decision by t h e N L R B and p e r h a p s a quick i n j u n c t i o n to be in effect u n t i l reversed by a h i g h e r c o u r t would have been extensively used as anti-I.T.U. publicity a n d would have given Mr. Den h a m e n o u g h p r e s t i g e to g e t his a p p o i n t m e n t confirmed when C o n g r e s s meets in J a n u a r y . " W e t h e r e f o r e c a n easily comply with even D e n h a m ' s idea of 'good f a i t h ' by p r e s e n t i n g a f o r m of c o n t r a c t we will o f f e r to sign " I n t h e new f o r m of c o n t r a c t ( P - 6 A ) w e p r o t e c t ourselves as well as w e c a n by t h e p a r a g r a p h s a t t h e beginning, set in 10 p t . boldface type. The first p a r a g r a p h , a n d t h e p a r a g r a p h s t h a t follow, lettered ( a ) t o (i) both inclusive a r e t h e O N L Y protection you can w r i t e into a c o n t r a c t on m a t t e r s of u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e t o us. " C O N T R A C T P R O P O S A L O N L Y F O R 60-DAY D U R A T I O N " T h e r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e on 60-day notice is absolutely essential b e c a u s e : " I t p u t s t h e employer i n poeition w h e r e he is likely n o t to have union employees w o r k i n g f o r h i m if he hires non-union men ; if he b r i n g s in n o n - u n i o n m a t t e r f o r you to w o r k on or if h e tries t o t a k e a w a y y o u r jurisdiction. " T h e reason we adopted a ' n o c o n t r a c t ' policy was t o p r o t e c t ourselves a g a i n s t t h e above acts which t h e employer could p e r f o r m to o u r destruction. " N o w — w i t h t h e 60-day notice r e q u i r e m e n t of T - H - L , a local union can t e r m i n a t e f o r m P - 6 A o n 60 days' notice a n d begin ' b a r g a i n i n g in good f a i t h ' a g a i n , even ' D e n h a m style' a n d be f r e e a t t h e end of t h e 60 days. "OUR UNION'S LIFE AT STAKE " E v e r y member M U S T keep in mind t h e basic reason f o r o u r course of action. "1. W e w a n t to p r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t of o u r members individually or, as f a r as we can collectively, t o refuse t o work with competing non-union men ; t h e r i g h t t o r e f u s e to work on a c o m p e t i n g non-union p r o d u c t a n d t h e r i g h t t o p r o t e c t o u r jurisdiction over composing room work. "2. D u r i n g t h e life of a c o n t r a c t you c a n n o t successfully do eo. T h e T - H - L will stop you in several ways. "3. T h e employer is in position d u r i n g the life of a c o n t r a c t to a c t either w a y as to those important matters.

if the employer vrUl sign it.

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A t the same time, President Randolph forwarded copies of this new contract to the various local unions throughout the United States together with a statement which included the following: The contract form P-6A prepared for submission when employers insist on a contract contains ample reason for rejection by employers in the first paragraph which provides for 60 days' termination. DO NOT CHANGE THAT LIMIT. The other sections on the first page (a) to (i) inclusive are absolutely necessary. DO NOT CHANGE THEM IN ANY WAY. This contract offer makes our "Conditions of Employment" form much more desirable by employers.5 "4. T h e 60-day termination of the form P-6A limits the time during which you a r e in danger on tho*e three above stated points. " 5 . T h e other p a r a g r a p h s in F o r m P - 6 A a r e carefully drawn t o t a k e c a r e of the other m a t t e r « vital to e s . YOU can 'bargain in good f a i t h ' (even 'Denham s t y l e ' ) but a r e not required to agr