Uneasy Encounters: Christian Churches in Greater China (Christianity in Modern China) 9811918899, 9789811918896

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Praise for Uneasy Encounters
Note on Romanization and Chinese Characters
Contents
List of Figures
1 The Introduction
State Dominance in Totalitarian Regimes
Theoretical Issues
Economic Approach to Religion
Previous Research on Christianity in Greater China
Localization, Sinicization, Chinafication, China-ization?
Methodological Approach
Organization of Chapters
References
Part I The Case of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan
2 Struggle for Localization and Gradual Shift to Activism
The Roots of the Presbyterian Mission
The Situation During and Immediately after the Japanese Colonial Rule
Presbyterian Church in Taiwan under the Guomindang Rule
Localization and Legitimization of Political Activity
References
3 Re-Chinafication Versus Taiwanese National Identity
PCT’s Response to the GMD’s Language Policy
The First Stage: 1865–1971
The Second Stage: 1971–1985
The Third Stage: From 1985
Church’s Struggle for Taiwanese National Identity
References
4 Church and the Human Rights
The PCT’s Perspective on Human Rights
Language as a Basic Human Right
Free Elections and Self-Determination as Human Rights
References
Part II The Case of the Chinese Catholics in the People’s Republic of China
5 Catholic Mission in China and the Sino-Vatican Relations
Catholic Church under the Communist Rule
A Time of Silence: From the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution
The Renewal of Sino-Vatican Negotiations
Fruits of the Negotiations? Pope Francis and the Provisional Agreement
References
6 Catholic Church in the Light of Policy and Legislation Documents on Religion
Discussions on the Regulation of Religion in China: An Overview
Policy on Religion before 2018
New Regulation on Religious Affairs
The CCP’s Basic Position on Religion
Local Control
Religious Education and Appointing Clergy
Distribution of Religious Information
Finances and Donations
References
7 Chinafication of Catholic Faith in the Contemporary People’s Republic of China
Restrictions and Cooperation under the Authoritarian Rule of the CCP
References
8 Conclusion: Christian Churches in the Authoritarian Regimes
References
Index

Citation preview

CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN CHINA

Uneasy Encounters Christian Churches in Greater China Magdaléna Rychetská

Christianity in Modern China

Series Editor Cindy Yik-yi Chu, Department of History, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

This series addresses Christianity in China from the time of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties to the present. It includes a number of disciplines—history, political science, theology, religious studies, gender studies and sociology. Not only is the series inter-disciplinary, it also encourages inter-religious dialogue. It covers the presence of the Catholic Church, the Protestant Churches and the Orthodox Church in China. While Chinese Protestant Churches have attracted much scholarly and journalistic attention, there is much unknown about the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in China. There is an enormous demand for monographs on the Chinese Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. This series captures the breathtaking phenomenon of the rapid expansion of Chinese Christianity on the one hand, and the long awaited need to reveal the reality and the development of Chinese Catholicism and the Orthodox religion on the other. Christianity in China reflects on the tremendous importance of Chinese-foreign relations. The series touches on many levels of research— the life of a single Christian in a village, a city parish, the conflicts between converts in a province, the policy of the provincial authority and state-tostate relations. It concerns the influence of different cultures on Chinese soil—the American, the French, the Italian, the Portuguese and so on. Contributors of the series include not only people from the academia but journalists and professional writers as well. The series would stand out as a collective effort of authors from different countries and backgrounds. Under the influence of globalization, it is entirely necessary to emphasize the intercultural dimension of the monographs of the series. With Christianity being questioned in the Western world, as witnessed in the popularity of Dan Brown’s books since some time ago, the Chinese have surprised the world by their embracement of this foreign religion. NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!

Magdaléna Rychetská

Uneasy Encounters Christian Churches in Greater China

Magdaléna Rychetská Department of Chinese Studies Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic

ISSN 2730-7875 ISSN 2730-7883 (electronic) Christianity in Modern China ISBN 978-981-19-1889-6 ISBN 978-981-19-1890-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: fengyiyuan/Getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgments

Writing a book is a protracted and time-consuming endeavor and I owe much gratitude to many people. Many academics and colleagues have supported and inspired me during the course of this study. Special thanks go to Shih Fang-long, whose commentaries have been an important source of inspiration for this book. I am also grateful to Cindy Y. Y. Chu, Francis Lim Khek Gee, Yang Fenggang, and Chris White. It was a pleasure to work with dedicated scholars who offered valuable feedback and insights. The most thanks are undoubtedly due to my supervisor and colleague Dušan Vávra from Masaryk University, Brno. I have benefited enormously from his wisdom, constructive criticism, guidance, and friendship. The study presented in this book is a result of six years of research that would not be possible without financial support by several grants. The first research grant application resulted in funds from the Postgraduate Research Grant for the Study of the Tainan Region which financed my first major research trip to Taiwan’s archives. Subsequent trips to mainland China were funded by my alma mater—I have been awarded three subsequent grants by Masaryk University: in 2014 ‘ITMEPRE—Innovative Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives in the Study of Religions’ (MUNI/A/1148/2014), in 2018 ‘Research of the Chinese Catholic Church in Zhejiang Province’ (MUNI/A/1311/2018), and in 2021 ‘Christianity and authoritarian regime in Chinese societies’ (MUNI/FFDEAN/0080/202). They financed my several-month research stay in v

vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

People’s Republic of China, where I conducted field research and interviews in 2017–2018, and again in 2019. They enabled me to concentrate fully on research. Some data presented in the book were collected during my exchange visit to Zhejiang University in People’s Republic of China. My previous research resulted in the publication of research articles. I decided to take the issues I have already addressed in separate papers and connect them in this book. This monograph is, therefore, partly composed of papers previously published in academic journals over the past six years. I am grateful to the following publishers for their permission to reproduce text that originally appeared on their pages. A section in Chapter 1 appeared in Rychetská, Magdaléna. 2020. Negotiations between Christian Communities and Authoritarian China: Some Comments on the Current State of Scholarship on Christianity in China. ˇ Religio: revue pro religionistiku 28(2): 165–183. Ceská spoleˇcnost pro religionistiku o.s. https://doi.org/10.5817/REL2020-2-3. Reproduced by Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License. A section in Chapter 3 is based on the article published in Studia Orientalia Slovaca, an international journal focusing on China studies (Masláková, Magdaléna. 2016. Presbyterian Church in Taiwan as a Voice of Powerless Taiwanese Nation: Building Taiwanese National Identity. Studia Orientalia Slovaca. 15(1): 1–20. Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského, ISSN 1336-3786). Used by permission of Comenius University. The chapter has been revised and complemented with new data. Chapter 4 of the book was published in Review of Religion in Chinese Society with the title ‘The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and Its Changing Narrative on Human Rights’. Used under Creative Common CC BY license. In the second part of this book, Chapter 5 is based on research published in the International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church in a special issue on Catholic Christianity in China (Masláková, Magdaléna. 2019. The Role of Successive Popes in the Process of Unification of the Church in China. International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 19(2–3): 133–148. England: Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2019. 1655628). Reproduced by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandfonline.com). However, the article has been significantly updated and changed. A section of Chapter 6 reproduces parts of Masláková, Magdaléna a Anežka Satorová. 2019. The Catholic Church in Contemporary China: How Does the New Regulation on Religious

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

vii

Affairs Influence the Catholic Church? Religions. Switzerland. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel10070446. Reused under Creative Common CC BY license. The article is the result of a collaboration with Anežka Satorová, a lawyer and graduate of China Studies at Masaryk University. For the chapter, I have used only the parts of the article written by me which I have retained. Finally, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my parents, who have been my greatest supporters, and my sister, who has challenged and inspired me throughout my life. Last but not least, I would like to thank my husband, who has been there for me during the whole process of writing the book. I would not be able to finish without his support, especially after our son, Adam, was born just a couple of months before the book’s submission.

Praise for Uneasy Encounters

“This fascinating study illuminates the survival, development and negotiation strategies of Christian churches operating under authoritarian conditions in China and Taiwan across time. Extensive fieldwork and a raft of empirical data is effectively marshalled in the service of a sophisticated conceptual argument that goes beyond simplistic ‘domination-resistance’ models to establish how Christian groups respond to constraints imposed by authoritarian regimes and distinct local cultures. The book complicates traditional depictions of the role and behaviours of both the Presbyterian church in Taiwan and Catholic groups in the PRC, making a substantial contribution to our understanding of organized Christianity in Greater China.” —Dr. Jonathan Sullivan, Associate Professor, School of Politics and IR, University of Nottingham, UK “This book successfully fulfils its mission in dealing with relations between the powerful totalitarian regimes, the Nationalist government in Taiwan under Chiang Kai Shek administration, and in the People’s Republic of China since 1949. For Taiwan, the author was able to have a very exhaustive archival and library research on the historical development of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. However, the distinguished scholarship of the author was manifested on her capacity in grasping the difficult Catholic issues in the PRC whose political system with its policy making are operating in a black box, with complicated “guanxi” 關係. Researchers ix

x

PRAISE FOR UNEASY ENCOUNTERS

both Chinese and foreigner regard it as the “heavenly book with no words” 無字天書. However, the author was able to read the official documents between lines and listen to the voiceless by personal contacts. Among all kinds of restriction, although she was unable to contact the clandestine section of the Chinese Catholics, yet she was able to infiltrate into the depth of Catholic life in the government sanctioned section of the Catholic Church and to paint a very comprehensive picture on the problem of the Church-State conflict in the PRC.” —Sr. Beatrice Leung, Ph.D., Honorary Research Fellow, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Note on Romanization and Chinese Characters

The book presents two parts, which represent two separate case studies from both mainland China and Taiwan. For this reason, the use of Chinese characters is made somewhat more complex than it might have been. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) tends to use simplified characters, the Republic of China in Taiwan uses traditional characters. Therefore, scholars researching Taiwan usually use traditional characters, and scholars focusing on the PRC generally use simplified characters. I have decided not to break this tradition. Traditional characters are adopted in the first part of the book, which presents research on Taiwan, and simplified characters are used in the second part, which consists of a chapter about Christianity in the PRC. Regarding Romanization, for all Chinese-language publications, Chinese place names, and personal names I have used pinyin. For personal names in Taiwan, I have used the name commonly used by the individual.

xi

Contents

1

The Introduction State Dominance in Totalitarian Regimes Theoretical Issues Economic Approach to Religion Previous Research on Christianity in Greater China Localization, Sinicization, Chinafication, China-ization? Methodological Approach Organization of Chapters References

1 4 9 9 12 16 20 22 26

Part I The Case of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 2

3

Struggle for Localization and Gradual Shift to Activism The Roots of the Presbyterian Mission The Situation During and Immediately after the Japanese Colonial Rule Presbyterian Church in Taiwan under the Guomindang Rule Localization and Legitimization of Political Activity References

33 34

Re-Chinafication Versus Taiwanese National Identity PCT’s Response to the GMD’s Language Policy The First Stage: 1865–1971 The Second Stage: 1971–1985

59 60 61 65

38 40 49 53

xiii

xiv

4

CONTENTS

The Third Stage: From 1985 Church’s Struggle for Taiwanese National Identity References

67 69 77

Church and the Human Rights The PCT’s Perspective on Human Rights Language as a Basic Human Right Free Elections and Self-Determination as Human Rights References

81 84 87 89 98

Part II The Case of the Chinese Catholics in the People’s Republic of China 5

6

7

Catholic Mission in China and the Sino-Vatican Relations Catholic Church under the Communist Rule A Time of Silence: From the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution The Renewal of Sino-Vatican Negotiations Fruits of the Negotiations? Pope Francis and the Provisional Agreement References Catholic Church in the Light of Policy and Legislation Documents on Religion Discussions on the Regulation of Religion in China: An Overview Policy on Religion before 2018 New Regulation on Religious Affairs The CCP’s Basic Position on Religion Local Control Religious Education and Appointing Clergy Distribution of Religious Information Finances and Donations References Chinafication of Catholic Faith in the Contemporary People’s Republic of China Restrictions and Cooperation under the Authoritarian Rule of the CCP References

105 108 117 120 123 131 137 138 143 151 152 154 155 158 159 162 167 177 183

CONTENTS

8

Conclusion: Christian Churches in the Authoritarian Regimes References

Index

xv

187 194 195

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1

Fig. 1.2 Fig. 4.1

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4

Example of religious localization—the Church’s interior integrates architectural elements of Chinese culture. Catholic Church, Tainan Example of religious localization in the Chinese context—the Holy Family with Chinese characteristics Logo of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan displaying the burning bush from the Book of Exodus. (Source https://en.wikipedia.org) Paolo Calleri, Revolutionar (2013) The core values of socialism displayed at a bus stop Statue reminding socialist values in front of the Catholic Church, Zhejiang province Market with religious objects and Bibles for sales, Pilgrimage to Sheshan Basilica, Shanghai, 2019 Propaganda cartoon: Minors cannot enter religious sites. (Source http://www.bitterwinter.com)

18 19

93 127 170 172 179 182

xvii

CHAPTER 1

The Introduction

In the autumn of 2015, I began my doctoral studies with the aim of researching the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and its missionary and political struggles during the period of martial law and nationalist rule. By then I had already visited Taiwan twice, was familiar with Taiwanese archives in Europe, had developed my basic argument, and started writing some research papers. However, in 2016 and 2017–2018, I was given the opportunity to travel to the People’s Republic of China for exchange studies and stayed there for eighteen months. While in China, I decided to use my time to the full and conduct field research there. Initially, I aimed to continue my research on the Presbyterian mission in the PRC and on the Three-Self Protestant Patriotic Association. However, as a result of numerous external factors, I eventually decided to focus on smaller Catholic communities and their negotiations with the government. Back then, I was not familiar with the situation of the open Catholic Church in China, and based on the academic literature I had previously read, I supposed the church supported the Party and faced no issues in the regime. I was surprised to see how much troublesome was the at the first glance ‘unproblematic’ relationship between the open church and the government. While officially promoting the official state’s narrative, the local church’s representatives faced the everyday struggle to meet the needs of the regime. I returned to China in May 2019 to continue the research. These study and research trips showed me that two © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_1

1

2

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Christian groups in two historical periods and two different geographical locations (both within the Greater China) faced similar challenges. However, just as their theological background was different, so was their response to authoritarian rule and their missionary strategies. While the Presbyterian Church was one of the first religious bodies to oppose the Nationalist government, Catholics in China sought to follow the rules and find opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. I started to be interested in the issue and decided to research it further. Stark and Finke (2000: 35) correctly point out that ‘religious organizations do not exist in a vacuum, and they cannot therefore be studied in isolation from their sociocultural environments’. For this reason, all religious groups, including my two separate cases, should be analyzed within the context of the society of which they are a part. Academics researching Christianity in the Chinese context have increasingly emphasized the need to view religion from the perspective of its interaction with the state. All religious groups are greatly influenced by their social, economic, and political context. This is even more apparent in the Chinese context, where until the twentieth century, religion was closely connected with the political and social sphere as the Chinese emperor held the power to allow or prohibit any religious group (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). This book therefore examines the dynamic processes of the various social, political, and cultural negotiations that the representatives of Christian groups encounter within authoritarian societies in Greater China, where Christianity is a ‘foreign’ religious system brought to China by ‘colonial powers’. Even today, some Chinese refer to Christianity as yangjiao 洋教, a term meaning ‘foreign religion’.1 Due to the imperial history of Christian entrance to China, there has even been a pejorative saying, ‘one more Christian, one less Chinese’ (Kwan 2021).2 Conversion to Christianity is highly problematic for many people in mainland China and Taiwan. Acceptance of a foreign system can mean violation of the norms of family

1 The character yang 洋 means ‘foreign’ or ‘Western’; jiao 教 means ‘teaching’ or ‘religion’. While the term yang stands for Western things, it was often used as a pejorative label for Christian groups during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). For instance, Christians (Catholics as well as Protestants) were called yang guizi 洋鬼子—‘foreign/Western devils’, where the term guizi evokes strangeness rather than evil entity. The demonizing discourse on Christians is further analyzed in Klain (2014). 2 Duo yi ge Jidutu jiu shao yi ge Zhongguoren 多一个基督徒就少一个中国人.

1

THE INTRODUCTION

3

life and can harm relationships with other family members (Swanson 1986).3 Christian identity is often viewed as incompatible with Chinese identity. Christian priests and missionaries living in Greater China are well aware of this. It is an important topic for academic research to find out how and why religious groups choose strategies of cooperation or conflict under totalitarian regime. For this reason, the book seeks to answer the following question: How do two specific Christian churches attempt to protect and promote their interests in authoritarian societies? Secondary questions include: How do the churches respond to authoritarian rule? Do they prefer to function as a partner to or opponent of the regime? How do they adapt to the local culture in order to make their mission more effective? What strategies do they employ to create a link between Christian values and local cultural particularities? The book develops its analysis on Gill’s (1998: 66) suggestion that ‘[o]ne of the primary goals of most religious organizations is maximization (or retention) of parishioners’. The first missionaries came to Asia with the desire to introduce their faith to the local population.4 We can therefore assume that ‘successful mission’ is an essential part of Christianity. To fulfill this ambition (the maximization of believerss), the church has had to adapt to the local environment, that is, to create a local church (to some degree, small or large). I further assume that to achieve its aim of establishing itself on a lasting basis, the church would need to negotiate with the government.

3 However, since the 1990s, China has experienced rapid growth among Christians. Several Chinese scholars published articles about Christianity, and while not converting to Christianity, they proclaimed themselves to be cultural Christians (wenhua jidutu 文化 基督徒). Also recently, Christianity has been on a rise. According to Ma and Li (2018), words connected to the Christian faith are more searched online than phrases like ‘The Communist Party’ (gongchandang 共产党). Nevertheless, Christianity is still considered a foreign religion (Tamney 2005). 4 ‘Mission, the extension of the church beyond its existing frontiers, has been characteristic of the Christian fellowship from its earliest beginnings. In its claim to universal relevance, the Christian church resembles the other great missionary religions, Buddhism and Islam, which are also alike in looking back to a single historic founder. “Go forth, therefore, and make all nations my disciples” (Mt. 28:19).’ (Neill 2015: 6082). For more information about Christian mission, see Barrett (1982), Beyerhaus (1964), Neill, Anderson, and Goodwin (1971) or Latourette (1929).

4

M. RYCHETSKÁ

State Dominance in Totalitarian Regimes We can compare the way of rule over religion in contemporary mainland China and Taiwan during martial law for several reasons. Both regimes are totalitarian, and they are part of a long Chinese history, during which we see a pattern of state dominance over religion (Bays 2012; Tao 2017). During the thousand years of Chinese history, religious groups proved vexatious to authorities. The imperial court was suspicious of any religious movement which had a potential to create a dangerous political force. As early as the Tang dynasty (618–907 AD), a Chinese ruler had the sovereign right to control and regulate the religious life of its subjects. Despite this, various secret religious societies continued to operate as sources of resistance to imperial rule, which prompted the Chinese state to attempt to keep them under direct control. The state and the ‘Son of Heaven’ (tianzi 天子) legalized certain cults and religious groups by incorporating them into a ‘register of sacrifices’ (sidian 祀典) whereby ‘the canonization process constituted an important channel for establishing symbolic relationships between the imperial state and local communities’ (Goossaert and Palmer 2011: 30); the ruler also had the right to ban any religious activity as heretical and add it to the official list of ‘evil cults’ (xiejiao 邪教). It is not surprising, therefore, that with the transition of the Chinese empire to a republic and later to a people’s republic, the Chinese Communist Party in the PRC and the Nationalist government in the Republic of China in Taiwan considered it essential to make sure that religion neither interferes with state power nor harms its citizens. Early in the twentieth century, the emperor of Guangxu 光緒 (1871– 1908) and the reformist Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) proposed a radical reform of Chinese society and culture that included sweeping changes to the education system, including converting many old temples into modern schools and establishing a new national Chinese state. One essential part of the reform which survived the formation of the Republic of China in January 1912 was the reform of traditional Chinese religion. The inspiration for these changes came from Western Christianity.5 5 Christianity was perceived as a means of modernizing society, and missionaries became intermediaries between Western ideas and the new Chinese national state. The fact is that many of the representatives of the modern Chinese intellectual and educated elite graduated from missionary-run schools, and a significant number of them were Christians. For example, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan 孫中山; 1866–1925), the first president of the

1

THE INTRODUCTION

5

The changes are known as the Hundred Days’ reform (wuxu 戊戌) of 1898 (see Goossaert 2006). Although many of the reforms were ultimately unsuccessful, they were the beginning of a new wave of revolutions which sought to reinvent and modernize traditional Chinese culture— religion included—which was seen as a weakness but also one of the reasons foreign powers felt able to promise China territorial sovereignty. The whole process prompted a new discourse on religion which led to the creation of three distinct categories: religion (zongjiao 宗教), superstitions (mixin 迷信), and evil cults (xiejiao 邪教) (Palmer 2009). The groups labeled as religions were required to unite under hierarchical religious organizations and to be organized according to the patterns of the Christian church, which included an organizational (hierarchical) structure, an educational structure, and the creation of a body of ‘educated professionals’. The establishment of a religious group in China required all these systems to be in place. The new state recognized five groups: Buddhism, Daoism, the Catholic Church, the Protestant church, and Islam. Religious practices labeled as superstitions or evil cults—such as ancestor worship or the burning of spiritual money—were strictly forbidden. Thus, the Chinese government defined what, in political discourse, is accepted as an institutional religion and in this manner shaped religious orthodoxy. Nevertheless, various practices within the religious landscape have been excluded from this narrative and labeled as not being a part of officially sanctioned religions.6 Republic of China, was himself a Protestant (Methodist) and went to a Christian school in Hawaii and later in Hong Kong (Bays 2012). After receiving a Christian education, representatives of such an educated elite saw Christian teaching as prospering the whole society. In 1913, when the first elections were held, among the 274 elected to the Parliament, 60 were Christians. Furthermore, one of the first regulations of the newly established republic was the abolishment of the previous lunar calendar and the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in early 1912. In the same year, parliament guaranteed the freedom of religions (xinjiao ziyou 信教自由) in the provisional Constitution (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). Christianity was so influential that some voices were promoting the idea of Christianity as a state religion for the new republic as it would establish a closer relationship with other Western countries. This idea, however, was accepted only by a small circle of the society and was ultimately rejected. 6 Any quest to define religion in the Chinese context is fraught with difficulty. In this

book, when I speak of’religion’, I am therefore referring only to those institutionalized religious groups recognized by the state. I would like to state that I give up on the task of finding a definition of religion. I agree with Johnatan Smith (1982) that the term ‘religion’ is a scholar’s analytical tool, which helps to imagine the observed phenomenon. However, as Christian churches have been chosen for the research, the quest for finding

6

M. RYCHETSKÁ

The state control of religions in the two totalitarian regimes was not due solely to ideology but also to fear of prospective religious leaders mobilizing opposition to the government (Tao 2017). As concluded by Lap-Yan Kung (2006), in Chinese setting, religion is always a political issue. Policies and legal documents have therefore been created and issued to control and regulate religious life in mainland China and Taiwan. Two settings for the research are under the influence of such relations between state and religion. As concluded by Daniel Bays (2004: 35): Religious monitoring and regulation by the state in the recent past and present is not only a “Chinese communist” phenomenon but also a “Chinese state” one. Attitudes of suspicion and systematic policies of regulation or suppression (or both) towards grassroots religion have characterized the mind-set of all Chinese political regimes.

It is, therefore, not surprising, that both studied regimes tried to control religious organizations. Furthermore, they are both totalitarian regimes: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) ruled by the communist government and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan during the period of martial law (1949–1987). These two regimes are different; however, they are still similar in their way of totalitarian rule. According to Carl Friedrich and Zbigiew Brzezinski (1965: 22), there are six basic traits common to totalitarian dictatorships: 1. An elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man’s existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere, at least passively … 2. A single mass party typically led by one man, the ‘dictator,’ and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to 10 percent) of men and women … 3. A system of terror, whether physical or psychic, effected through party and secret-police control … 4. A technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and of the government, of all means of effective mass communication …

a definition of religion seems to be unnecessary. Christian churches are institutionalized groups with defined doctrine and rituals; believers openly declare their affiliation within the church.

1

THE INTRODUCTION

7

5. A technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat … 6. Central control and direction of the entire economy … We can find all these six features in both studied contexts. And while there are significant variations in the political structures and ideologies of Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist government, their way of rule can be defined as authoritarian—and the selected Christian churches faced similar pressure in the church–state relations. In totalitarian regimes, government edicts are unilaterally imposed by the decision makers, the political elites, without consideration of those affected by them. The relationship between the authoritarian government as the holder of power and the actions and reactions of a Christian group affected by the government’s pronouncements is a complex one. Even under an authoritarian regime, a Christian group may see itself as needing to develop a mutually supportive relationship with the state. I argue that a Christian group can take one of two main paths. It can struggle against the government and even mobilize direct opposition to it: as a hierarchical social group, it may have sufficient resources to organize its members ‘to oppose this form of domination, [and] actively demonstrate their physical presence in order to gain visibility and recognition of their needs and wills, demanding to be taken into consideration’ (Grinberg 2014: 39). Alternatively, it can seek to cooperate with the government to secure economic, cultural, and symbolic resources. Karrie J. Koesel explains (2014: 5): Although the interests of religious and political authority differ, each side has a set of resources at its disposal that can be offered to the other to minimize uncertainty and meet strategic needs. For instance, government officials may attempt to establish cooperative relations with religious communities as a means of preserving political power, governing more efficiently, and diffusing local conflicts. At the same time, religious leaders may seek vertical alliances with the regime to safeguard their survival, gain access to resources, and promote their spiritual agenda.

A group may choose partnership over conflict even with a state that restricts religious practice. Cooperation will be considered more advantageous if there is still space for negotiation and mutual benefit (Koesel 2014), but if only the authoritarian state is set to profit, the Christian

8

M. RYCHETSKÁ

group will have less motivation to participate in the exchange or may even oppose the state (Gill 1998). Indeed, local religious leaders are often most concerned about survival and tend to cooperate with the regime. In a totalitarian setting, we often see the dissembling of the citizens in the face of power. It seems to be more advantageous for many to silently follow the authoritarian regime and keep their official state recognition instead of revolting and being banned. It is, after all, the government that can provide the resources needed for the normal functioning of the parish. Also, we should not forget that churches that do not cooperate with an authoritarian regime must face ‘the police detention and house arrests of Christian worshipers and pastors’ (Vala 2018: 198). Such churches are not recognized by the state, have no legal status, and might face severe persecution. However, to choose cooperation instead of conflict does not necessarily mean to support the regime. While Christian churches played both breakthrough and helming roles in various democratization movements, often they just abstain for any conflict. The aim of this book is not to provide a general theory of church–state relations in a totalitarian regime. Power relations are not straightforward, and what is said and done in power-laden context might not be the same as what is said offstage. As noted by James Scott (1990: 136): ‘Most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites’. Often, instead of direct revolt, we can witness myriad invisible acts of resilience (Selden and Perry 2010). Therefore, the presented book should not focus only on the formal relations between the powerful totalitarian apparatus and weak subordinates. Rather, it wants to provide an inside into the practice of everyday life in two selected totalitarian contexts. In the totalitarian state, the subordination of the population does not always reach the dimensions indicated by the narratives of political history. This is especially true for the part of society that quietly accepted the situation and often found pluralistic strategies for self-realization despite the dictates of the authoritarian regime. The chapters of this book present examples of diverse forms of everyday experience in totalitarian regimes in Greater China. The two main parts of the book are separate case studies. Part one focuses on the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT). Initially, seeking to localize Christian faith in Taiwan, the church supported the various

1

THE INTRODUCTION

9

ruling regimes, but in the 1960s, it moved towards a position of political activism. Members of the PCT played active roles in the grassroots of democracy movement in Taiwan in latter half of the twentieth century. The church’s political activities and the theology that underpinned them are explored in part one. Part two focuses on the Catholics of the open church sector in the PRC—who (voluntarily or not) joined the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA). CCPA in contrast to the PCT officially supported and continues to support the totalitarian communist regime. The Catholics of the open church sector therefore provide a useful case for analyzing the various negotiations between a Christian church and an authoritarian regime.

Theoretical Issues Economic Approach to Religion Economic approach to religion played an important role in analysis of the selected cases. I elaborate the argument in the framework of the economic approach to religion (Iannaccone 1995, Stark and Finke 1992, 2000, Obadia and Wood 2011, F. Yang 2006).7 The economic approach to religion emerged in the 1990s in the USA context as a reaction to secularization theories. Instead of seeing religious belief as declining as a result of advanced modernity or modernization, the economic approach attempts to explain such changes by proposing a new paradigm using a market metaphor (F. Yang 2012). The approach proposes the idea that ‘religion comprises an economy much like commercial and other economies’ (F. Yang 2012: 94). Lionel Obadia and Donald C. Wood explained the main innovation of the approach (Obadia and Wood 2011: xviii–xix):

7 ‘The economic approach to religion or the economy of religion trace its origins to the Theory of Moral Sentiments of Adam Smith (1723–1790) and later to works of Max Weber (1864–1920)—especially to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. However, the new paradigm shift of economy of religion is connected to an academic movement the economics of religion coalesced as something new beginning with the early works of American sociologists Peter Berger (1970s/1980s), Rodney Stark, Robert Finke, and many others (1980s/1990s) and economist Laurence Iannaccone (late 1980s)’ (Obadia and Wood 2011: xv).

10

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Modernity and globalization are supposed to have dramatically changed the religious landscape of society. … The shift from (Bourdieu’s) “religious field” to (contemporary, and especially, American sociology) “spiritual supermarket” is a major conceptual shift. [I]n Bourdieu’s terms, people are passive agents, determined by processes of religious “capitalization”, while these new actor-figures rest upon another conception of social agency, in which the individual is a much more “free” and “active” actor in his/her relationship with religion.

In this way, a religious economy or spiritual market is created, where all religious activities and religious ideas are ‘goods’ offered by religious organizations to potential adherents to attract their interest and to current ones to maintain their support (Stark and Finke 2000). The economic approach to religion is attempting to provide an explanation for religious change (Froese and Pfaff 2001). Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000: 279) propose the following hypothesis: To the extent that (religious) pluralism or (religious) regulation are adequate inferential measures of (religious) competition, the overall level of religiousness will be higher where pluralism is greater or where regulation is lower.

Religious pluralism increases religious competition and creates a market with increased fluidity in which believers can more easily move between different religious denominations. One of the consequences of this is the new demand on Christian clergy to be more sensitive to the actual needs of church members—these include the need for indigenization. In an authoritarian regime (such as communist China and Taiwan under the martial law), this should, in theory, lead to resistance to the totalitarian state—as priests would be motivated to defend the interests of the church members injured by the oppressive regime. However, without any competition, the pressure for change might not be powerful enough for religious leaders to alienate themselves from governmental support (Gill 1998). Therefore, based on the economic approach to religion, we can hypothesize that the churches in totalitarian regime could also choose to cooperate with the government instead of direct opposition. The cooperation might help the church to keep at least some (hugely constrained) privileges that come from the status of a government-recognized religious group. Especially, if the religious market is restricted, the church might benefit from complicated cooperation and do not need to be afraid of

1

THE INTRODUCTION

11

many believers leaving the church as there are not many other groups a believer could choose from. For this reason, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association in contemporary China is an excellent example of a church selecting cooperation instead of conflict under the authoritarian rule as there is not much competition in Chinese religious market—as many competing religious groups are outlawed and often crushed by the local police. As concluded by Anthony Gill (1998: 66): [O]ne of the primary goals of most religious organizations is maximization (or retention) of parishioners. Church officials keep this fundamental objective in mind when deciding whether to seek state assistance. If access to government patronage and other state support enables the church to retain or expand its membership, close cooperation with government officials will be desired, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if the terms of establishment create a situation that promotes parishioner defections, cooperation is a poor strategic choice for church officials. Church-initiated conflict therefore results when government policies interfere with the church’ s ability to maximize its parishioner base. […] This situation presents itself only under conditions of religious competition since without other religious alternatives parishioners cannot adequately express dissatisfaction with church policy by expressing their exit option.8

The economic approach to religion provides an explanation why the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has shifted its theology to political activism under the martial law while the church had cooperated with the Japanese colonial government before. The Japanese colonial government considered the PCT a collaborator in a modernizing project. Furthermore, even during strong militarization and regulation of religious life in Taiwan, the PCT was the only non-Japanese Christian group allowed to proselytize in the island. From the proposed perspective, it would not be a good strategy for the PCT to oppose the Japanese rule. At the same time, this hypothesis clarifies why the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association seek cooperation with the Communist government instead of rivalry—the religious market in the contemporary People’s Republic of China is not open and is strictly regulated by the state. While the two regimes differ in their ideology, the studied religious groups faced similar difficulties.

8 Italicization is kept from the original text.

12

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Previous Research on Christianity in Greater China Much has been written about the relationship between authoritarian regimes and Christian groups in Chinese societies. These studies have largely focused on church–state relations from the perspective of social resistance to state domination.Cao Nanlai (2010) suggests that much of the research has narrated a simplified story of opposition between a totalitarian state and a resistant local society; in this context, between a party-state and Christianity. Research on Christianity in Chinese society, especially in the context of the People’s Republic of China, has therefore been dominated by three main scholarly approaches. Academics (largely) from theUSA have created a narrative that describes Christians in the PRC as a marginalized group facing extreme persecution—although their results and conclusions have been criticized.9 The other prominent discourse is created by scholars based at Chinese universities and other academic institutions, who provide an idealized picture of harmonious church–state relations. The last academic approach gives up on studying Christianity from the church–state perspective (Chambon 2020). After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), along with the opening up of the Chinese economy, the religious market was also re-opened.10 Since then, the Chinese government has guided scholars to promote an image of China as a traditional yet modern country and to ‘demonstrate its excellence’ (Froissart 2018: 6). For this reason, a significant number of Chinese research articles on religion repeat the same proclamations that we find in official state propaganda. They speak within the framework of the broader discourse created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): ‘… the Chinese social sciences are more applied in the sense that they are primarily intended to help the state solve social problems’ (Froissart 9 For the whole critique of the approach, see Cao 2018a, 2018b. 10 At the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

in 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Party changed its official policy and started to be more focused on economic reforms. These reforms led to a gradual shift from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. Hand in hand with the opening of the Chinese market, the Party implemented a relaxation of its policy on religion (Barbalet 2011). Over subsequent years, the Chinese government issued various documents and authorized more organizations for regulating religious groups. Thus, the formerly repressive policy towards religion was lifted by the government of Deng Xiaoping (1978), and the Chinese academic discourse moved away from its complete rejection of religion.

1

THE INTRODUCTION

13

2018: 4). Scholars who observe religious life in China from their positions in Chinese departments or institutions are controlled by the government. One of their roles is therefore to assist the state supervision of religion and promote what the government considers to be ‘normal religious activities’ (zhengchang de zongjiao huodong 正常的宗教活动). The state even requests that Chinese scholars take part in the training of officially certified religious personnel (Cao 2018b: 140): For the Chinese state, such professional training aims to produce ‘politically reliable’ (zhengzhishang kaodezhu) and ‘religiously literate’ (zongjiaoshang youzaoyi) clergy who are expected to play leadership roles not only in the five official religious associations but also in China’s political consultation system.

Researchers based at Chinese state institutions may be under closer scrutiny than Western scholars as, for the state, it is more important that their research is useful to the government; equally, they are unlikely to issue any severe criticism of the CCP. In the case of Christianity in China, their interpretations are very different from those of scholars based outside the PRC. Chinese scholars based at institutions in the PRC narrate a story of harmonious cooperation and coexistence between the Christian churches and the Chinese government (but generally ignore all the illegal underground and house churches). However, their position is influenced by the fact that it is not really possible to freely publish critical research within mainland China. The problem, however, is that in recent years, the research under the influence of Chinese soft power has also been published in major international academic journals. An example is an article published by Zhou Xiaowei (2021) in a prestigious Routledge magazine. Among other things, the author uncritically states that ‘the policy of “religious freedom” has been in place since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, and has evolved since then, due to changing political and social circumstances’ (Zhou 2021: 2). Promoting the official discourse of the Communist Party of China in foreign academic publications is problematic, and it is necessary to draw attention to this problem. Several studies have been also published about the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and its political involvement (Amae 2007; Ion 1999; C. Lin 1999; Rubinstein 1991), and they largely adopt a domination-resistance model in their narrative, in which the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan

14

M. RYCHETSKÁ

(PCT) is presented as an example of religious resistance to the dominant authoritarian regime. The studies tend to focus on historical research and political studies and describe the church’s impact on the development of democracy in Taiwan and its involvement and support of the dangwai (黨外)11 movement in the 1970s and 1980s. In doing so, they focus only on the political activities of the church, not the church itself. The research notes that the PCT, which issued an official statement concerning the democratization of Taiwan and linked its theology to social and political activism, was one of the driving forces behind the democratization of Taiwanese society, but overlook the religious aspects of the church’s efforts and see the church only as another political agent in the push for democracy in Taiwan. This book builds on the research carried out by these authors but also observes how the church responded to the pressure from the totalitarian government and to the demands of Taiwanese society. I analyze the church as a religious organization engaged in mission. My aim is not to criticize unreservedly current approaches to the study of Christianity in China and Taiwan. However, I wanted to point out some challenges connected to the current state of scholarship on the Protestant and Catholic Churches in the sinophone societies. An objective of the scientific study of religion should be to explain and/or interpret ‘social phenomena like religion—in terms of causes that are wholly in the natural world’ (Wiebe 2009: 135).12 Therefore, we should react to discourses on Christianity in China and Taiwan, and confront them with empirical results. We need to avoid challenges by continually reflecting on the way our own belief systems and ideas, as well as dominant discourses (whether within academia or discourses shared by believers in the field), influence the research and interpretation of data. It is necessary to question even the most basic assumptions about the issue, and carefully analyze our own process of analysis. This textual turn should allow us to constructively reflect on our own position during research (Konopásek 1996; Denzin and Lincoln 2018). Religious leaders often make decisions about the most effective strategy for the group and 11 The dangwai movement was an opposition to the GMD government. Eventually, it formed the Democratic Progressive Party. 12 Here, I have adopted a quotation from Wiebe’s critique of religious and theological agendas in the scientific research of religion. Even if his objection is aimed at one particular issue, I believe it can be applied to different areas of personal agenda within any research.

1

THE INTRODUCTION

15

its members. However, as interactions between religion and government are often obscure, it is always possible for the conflict to occur under totalitarian rule. I suggest, we should not forget, furthermore, that Christianity is a non-Western religion by origin, and, thanks to remarkable evangelization over the last century, it is also now non-Western in its contemporary context as there are more Christians in non-Western countries than there are in Europe and North America (Frykenberg 2003: 1). Instead of imagining Christianity as a monolithic (Western) religion with a single set of unchanging goals and challenges, we might do better to consider it a ‘glocal’ phenomenon (see Robert 2002; Beyer 2003). ‘Glocal’ is a neologism that has started to be used since 1990, especially in cross-cultural economic marketing. However, it is gaining popularity in other areas of contemporary scholarship. It fuses global and local—it refers to the adaptation of international concept to the local particularities (Roudometof 2016). I propose this methodological shift which sees Christianity as a global phenomenon based on countless unique local manifestations and particularities. Referring to Christianity as glocal implies that the various Christian groups in mainland China and Taiwan each have their specificities. Place of origin, the cultural setting of the mission, denominational differences, and authority structures—all these profoundly affected Christian missionaries exposed to mission in Asia (Robert 2002). There are many different ‘Christianities’ (in this example ignoring denominational differences): there is not only one Chinese Christianity, but also Zhejiang Christianity, Wenzhou Christianity, and so on.13 Christianity should not be researched as a single universal religion; local differences must be considered. The primary goal is not only to distinguish different denominations but also to observe different historical, political, and social influences. To refer to Christianity as a glocal phenomenon attempts to indicate that various Christian groups each have their specificities, that is, the Christian message is being spread among people with distinctively 13 In this example, Zhejiang is a province of China, while Wenzhou is one city in the province. However, not all Christian groups in Zhejiang share the exact same experience. They have a similar cultural and historical background, but the social and economic conditions are different. Furthermore, religious policies that apply to Zhejiang province in general do not necessarily apply to Wenzhou, as Wenzhou has a more prominent number of Protestant Christians than the rest of the cities in the province. Wenzhou is even called ‘Chinese Jerusalem’. For this reason, the local government is more strict towards the Christian groups in Wenzhou.

16

M. RYCHETSKÁ

different cultural, historical, and political heritages. Researchers should, therefore, focus less on identifying the specificities of Chinese Christianity as such, and spend more time observing the dilemmas various local churches have to face during the process of proselytization, and the strategies and means available to religious groups working within Chinese societies. I argue that the scholarship needs to go beyond the schematic dichotomy of church–state relations and to focus on the dynamic relationships between church, state, and society instead.

Localization, Sinicization, Chinafication, China-ization? I argue that religious specialists established in authoritative Chinese environments face two main pressures: the demands of authoritarian rule and social pressure requiring them to assimilate to the local culture. Localization (bendihua 本地化), sinicization (hanhua 汉化), and Chinafication (zhonggguohua 中国化)14 are still urgent issues for Christian groups if they are to move inwards from the margins and reach their intended audience. The book focuses on the political and social negotiations of two Christian groups in their respective environments. It analyzes the underlying norms that influence the regulation of religion by totalitarian regimes and how religion responds to such regulations: the relationship between the political ruler as the decision-maker and the reaction–action, resistance, and cooperation of Christian groups in their respective societies. It also analyzes the response of Christian groups to the requirement for the ‘localization’, ‘sinicization’, and ‘Chinafication’ of their religious message and the strategies they have adopted. To help the reader follow the main arguments of the book, it will be beneficial to briefly explain the use of three fundamental terms: ‘religious localization’, ‘sinicization’, and ‘Chinafication’. (1) Localization can equally be translated ‘adaptation’. It refers to the general process of ‘making something local’. The term bentuhua 本土化 can be also translated as ‘indigenization’ or ‘culturing’ (see Wesoky 2016). In the case of Christian mission, the meaning is

14 Zhongguohua can be also translated as China-ization, as proposed by Shih Fang-long (2021).

1

THE INTRODUCTION

17

a ‘religious localization’; it describes suitable ways of carrying out a mission in a particular culture. It is the broader social process of the intentional transmission of a system of ideas and values from one culture to another. It represents the process of long-term contact between different cultures, during which the cultures influence one another and are changed (Vodáková 2000). Every culture is a system that contains elements that are transformed during such contact. In most circumstances, one culture ‘borrows’ certain elements from the other and the relative contributions of one culture to the other are not equal (Boudon 2004). In the special kind of communication in which ideas and values are transmitted, these ideas and values need to be changed and adapted in order to influence the other society or culture (Gallo, Magliola and McLean 2003). Unlike the process of ‘acculturation’, which represents a spontaneous and unconscious process, localizations are intentional processes, that is, strategies. Religious localization is a process initiated by the church. For example, we can observe religious localization in theology, religious music, architecture (Fig. 1.1), or art (Fig. 1.2). Catholic inculturation and contextual theology of the Presbyterians are seen as the same strategy of religious localization. (2) Chinafication (zhonggguohua 中国化), or in Taiwanese context reChinafication (zai zhongguohua 再中国化) has a different meaning, in which political and cultural dimensions are intertwined. While, at the end of Qing dynasty and the beginning of the Republic era Christian missionaries started to use the term zhonggguohua 中国 化 in the same sense as religious localization to describe the process of making Christianity ‘more Chinese’, and therefore, more attractive to potential Chinese converts. In English literature, this has been usually translated as sinicization. The official translation of the contemporary use of zongjiao de zhongguohua 宗教的中国化 is that religions have to be ‘Chinese in orientation’, but several academic scholars still use the term sinicization (Vermander 2019). In this book, I propose using a different translation for zhongguohua to differentiate it to the cultural or ethnic context (hanhua 汉化). The terms sinicization and Chinafications are therefore not used interchangeably. Consequently, the term zhonggguohua 中国 化 should not be mistaken for sinicization in religious or cultural meaning. In the context of the book, zhongguohua refers to the political meaning of the term—follow the official state policy.

18

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Fig. 1.1 Example of religious localization—the Church’s interior integrates architectural elements of Chinese culture. Catholic Church, Tainan

To Chinaficate does not necessarily mean to make everyone Han Chinese, but rather for everyone to follow the leadership and the official narrative of the regime. Chinafication is a part of official state policy in the PRC, and was part of the official discourse of the Nationalist government during the martial law. Chinafication becomes a feature of church–state relations when the church musts react to the state’s official demand for localization of the faith and following the state’s directive. In the political context, to Chinaficate church does not mean to localize it—to make it more appealing for the local environment. On the contrary, the term has political overtones relating to following the dictates of the state. In the PRC, Chinafication invokes that the language of all religious materials and rituals is Chinese, doctrine and practice must be suitable for China—in a word, it means to be ‘more supportive of communist rule’. In the case of Taiwan, during the

1

THE INTRODUCTION

19

Fig. 1.2 Example of religious localization in the Chinese context—the Holy Family with Chinese characteristics

martial law period (1949–1987), the Guomindang government promoted an official policy of re-Chinafication (zai zhongguohua 再中国化)—to change Taiwanese people into Chinese people; to use the national language (guoyu 国语)—the Chinese language— instead of any local languages during religious rituals. It also had the connotation of following the regime. (3) Sinicization (hanhua 汉化) does not necessarily relate to a state or a region. Instead, it is connected to Chinese culture (zhonghua wenhua 中华文化). The term refers to instilling ‘Chineseness’ in a cultural sense. It implies a process of cultural assimilation, which includes Han Chinese language, traditions, and customs (F. Yang 2021; F. Shih 2021).

20

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Methodological Approach The research presented in this book in addition to detailed textual analysis of official church statements, state policies, and legal documents, combines textual analysis with sociological semi-standardized controlled interviews and participant observation. Textual analysis alone is incapable of describing lived experience, and to understand the present-day relationship between the church and the state, it is essential also to analyze society. The book seeks to integrate historical and sociological methods of data collection and analysis and interpretation in order to produce a more sophisticated understanding of the issues being researched, such methodology enables the researcher to use ‘whatever rigorous approach works to gain useful insights’ (Ring et al. 2002: 614). The research is based on an analysis of Chinese primary sources concerning the selected Christian groups in China and Taiwan. The main textual sources include the official reports of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), the public statements of the PCT, correspondence between Chinese church leaders and foreign missionaries, the Vatican’s encyclicals and reports concerning Catholics in China, national legislative and policy papers, and twentieth-century periodicals. These materials were supplemented by interviews conducted with representatives of the open church and informal discussions with Chinese Christians. The interview data served to qualify findings from other sources. The fieldworks were conducted in Zhejiang Province in 2017–2018 and 2019. Both pieces of fieldwork combined semi-structured interviews, narrative interviews, and participant observation. 20 representatives of the open Catholic Church were interviewed. For the field research, small cities near Hangzhou were chosen. Zhejiang Province has a significant number of Christian churches. Wenzhou is even labeled ‘the Chinese Jerusalem’ by some scholars (C. Nanlai 2017: 30). However, Christians in Wenzhou mostly represent the Protestant churches. In Zhejiang, there the Christian presence is more visible than in some other provinces. For these reasons, the interviews with the church’s representatives from Zhejiang province suggested essential answers for the questions about the church and state dynamics. Selected cities have a comparatively small group of Catholic believers. For example, we can find three churches in one of the cities, but all of these three churches have just one priest, who communes between

1

THE INTRODUCTION

21

them so as to be closer to a certain group of believers. There are slightly different attendants in different churches. This situation is similar to other selected cities, which also face a problem of not sufficient number of clergies. For this reason, all clergy within the cities were interviewed. They do not represent the leadership of the CCPA. They are rather leaders of the local Catholic communities of the open church sector. During the first field trip, 15 people were interviewed, 5 priests and 10 nuns; during the second field trip, 10 people were interviewed, 4 priests and 6 nuns. Some were the very same as interviewed during the previous fieldwork. In the interviews, priests and nuns, as local representatives of religious specialists and church officials, described the current situation of the church, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the PRC, and relationships with the foreign Catholic community. I focused on religious specialists as they are leaders in local communities and have a certain authority on religious matters. Lay Catholics are often less interested in state–church relations and may be more concerned with everyday issues. The clergy is more directly influenced by the regulation and any top-down changes as they are the people who organize the church and its activities; the laity can be considered more as passive agents than active agents.15 When in the field, I as a researcher acted as a visitor—someone who tries to develop closer relations with respondents with more frequent visits. Before the interviews, I visited the church several times during the masses and church meetings. During these visits, I observed the activities of the community and participated in them as well. Thanks to these visits, it was easier to approach the respondents, as they already knew me. Before the interviews, I informed all the participants about the aim of the research. However, the participants asked about my own religious beliefs—and I am also a Catholic. Thanks to this, participants tended to be more open and familiar. Nevertheless, the relationship between the respondents and the research was not intimate. The interviews were conducted repeatedly—during the first field trip, each respondent was visited at least twice within a few weeks. During the second field trip, each respondent was visited once for an individual interview and more than once during unofficial group meetings. Most of the interviews were recorded; however, some interviews were more unofficial during 15 Anyway, there are several cases when laity are engaged in church–state affairs. The assumption of their passivity is mostly focusing on the issues connected to their involvement with managing the church.

22

M. RYCHETSKÁ

communal breakfast, and data collected from such meetings were later retrospectively rewritten. I recorded fieldwork notes after each mass, church meeting, and interview—because of the specific character, it was not possible to write notes during such activities. Each interview took about 20–90 min. Most of the time, the respondents answered openly and were relaxed and spontaneous during interviews. Some provided answers were even quite controversial. For instance, when talking about church– state relations, some were openly critical towards the regime. Of course, they might have been still self-censoring their answers; however, the validity of their statements was not questioned. On the other hand, some interviews during the second field trip were rather short due to the reluctant approach of the respondents. Some of the previously interviewed participants were less open than in the previous years. The reason might be because I spent less time within the field, or because of changing, more severe situation within the PRC. The second explanation seems to be adequate as two respondents opened up in a different, more secure setting—outside of the church official venue, without any possible bystander.

Organization of Chapters The book is structured in two parts; The two main parts of the book are separate case studies. Part I (Chapters 2 to 4) focuses on the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Part II (Chapters 5 to 8) focuses on the Catholics of the open church sector in the contemporary People’s Republic of China. Chapter 2 shows how Presbyterianism transformed from its early days as a foreign mission spreading the Christian Gospel into being a localized church acting as an agent for political change in Taiwan. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan is the Protestant denomination with the longest tradition on the island. There has been a Presbyterian mission on the island for over 150 years, and it supported the initial modernization of Taiwanese society, especially regarding the introduction of modern medicine and the Western education system. Later on, the church became politically active, supporting the struggle for human rights, minority rights, democratization, and the creation of Taiwanese national identity. Through its commitment to political and social reform, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has built an excellent reputation among Taiwanese society and has become well-known outside Christian circles. It is crucial to notice the different approaches of the PCT towards two distinct totalitarian regimes

1

THE INTRODUCTION

23

in Taiwan. First, Presbyterians had to deal with Japanese imperial rule in Taiwan (1895–1945). Church leaders chose a strategy of cooperation with this government, as there were some benefits and no great risk of losing members. The situation changed after the Second World War when Taiwan became a part of China and came under the rule of the Nationalist government. When the nationalists lost the civil war on mainland China in 1949, they moved to Taiwan and established the rule of law. While the church continued to live under a similarly repressive regime, the situation changed as several Christian denominations moved from China to Taiwan along with the Nationalist government, so a greater number of competing Christian communities emerged. As a reaction to the policy of re-Chinafication of the Nationalist regime, the church has proclaimed to become a prophet for the Taiwanese nation and a critic of social and political iniquity. Chapter 3 focuses on one of the problems that the church faced after it changed its theological position and opposed the Guomindang government. In 1945, Taiwan became part of the Republic of China. The Guomindang government, however, considered native Taiwanese citizens disloyal, overly influenced by the Japanese colonial regime, and inferior to incomers from mainland China, at least until such time as they had been ‘re-Chinafied’, fully Chinese again. Although many of Taiwan’s inhabitants, particularly the Hoklo and Hakka peoples, belong to the wider Han Chinese ethnic group and are considered culturally ‘Chinese’, re-establishing ‘Chineseness’ in political structures and broader cultural matters became official policy. The Presbyterian Church promoted local languages as well as distinct Taiwanese identity. The chapter therefore analyzes the strategies used by the PCT to promote local languages and creating a new discourse on national identity. Within the context of contemporary Taiwan, the question of national identity is still a very current issue. The PCT narrated a new multicultural identity of Taiwanese people and declared the church to be a prophet to the nation. The chapter therefore analyzes the strategies used by the PCT to create such an identity and, based on historical sources published by the church, offers an interpretation of the church’s political activities. The Church did not only promote national Taiwanese identity but, more importantly, also introduced the new model of identity defined as multicultural and multi-ethnic, uniting four different ethnic groups living in Taiwan—the Hoklo, the Hakka, the Mainlanders, and the indigenous people. The new model rejected ethnic nationalism that considered only Hoklo people to

24

M. RYCHETSKÁ

belong to the ‘Taiwanese nation’. Instead, they promoted civic nationalism in effort to interconnect people with different cultural and ethnic background. The PCT saw its mission in establishing bonds and thus connected national Taiwanese identity closely with a specific identity of the PCT. Chapter 4 shows that religious bodies have the potential to be a positive force for change in society and that a Christian perspective on human rights can contribute to the secular discourse on the topic. The central theological position of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan began to change in the late 1960s, and over the following decade, the church became increasingly politically active and vocal in its support for human rights and democratization. This chapter addresses the issue of human rights as narrated within the church, which explained its involvement in human rights with reference to its Christian beliefs. Religious doctrine often contributes to the discourse on ethical issues in public life, although sometimes secular and religious concepts of justice collide. Across numerous societies, religions have established a prominent role within the public space. The Presbyterian Church has been a significant actor in Taiwanese politics, mobilizing its foreign contacts and organizing various events to support human rights in Taiwan and abroad. The PCT has been concerned with political issues in Taiwan for many decades, explaining its active involvement in human rights in terms of its Christian beliefs. One outcome of the church’s endeavors was that the people of Taiwan accepted the struggle initiated by the PCT and began to demand free elections. The church was one of the instigators of democratization and human rights in Taiwan and gained status and recognition for being so. Using the PCT as an example, the chapter shows that Christian perspective on human rights can contribute to the secular discourse on the topic. Chapter 5 is the first chapter of Part II. It shifts its focus on mainland China—on the Catholics of the open church sector joined in the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which in contrast to the PCT officially supports the regime. The chapter provides a brief introduction to the history of the Catholic mission in China. The focal point is the historical period since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and the Sino-Vatican relations. Regarding the Catholic Church, the Communist Party of China sought to break all ties between the Church in China and Western powers. The chapter explores how the

1

THE INTRODUCTION

25

entrenched position of Pius XII metamorphosed into the more conciliatory approach of Pope Francis. From the beginning, it was a significant problem for the PRC that Chinese Catholics were so tightly connected to the Vatican, which was seen as a foreign entity meddling in China’s internal affairs. The Vatican was also extremely distrusting of the PRC; Pope Pius XII openly condemned the authoritarian communist regime. Since 1957, there have been two Catholic fractions within the PRC: the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the underground church loyal to the Vatican. This may be about to change, however, as in September 2018, the Vatican and the PRC signed a new provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops, which could lead to efforts towards reunification of the Catholic Church in China after more than sixty years of division. The following two chapters focus more on the contemporary situation. Chapter 6 introduces policy and legislation documents on religion in the PRC and their influence on the contemporary Catholics in mainland China. The Chinese Communist Party considers one of its essential roles to be making sure that religion neither interferes with the state’s power nor harms its citizens. The Chinese government has regulated all public religious activity for many years. Policy and legal documents have therefore been issued to control and regulate religious life in the PRC. The chapter aims to analyze contemporary Chinese religious legislation in light of anthropological research in order to fully comprehend the lived experience of Catholics in China. The chapter provides a broader context by introducing other PRC policies and legal documents that concern religion. The most recent one is the revision of the Regulation on Religious Affairs which took effect on February 1, 2018. The principal changes of the regulations are (1) the shift in the basic position of the CCP back to the direct promotion of socialism; (2) the new role for local government institutions in controlling religious activity; (3) the control of religious schools; (4) new restrictions on the dissemination of information; and (5) greater supervision of the finances of religious institutions. The regulation promotes tighter control of religions and a new policy of Chinafication (zhongguohua 中国化). Chapter 7 shows how Catholics in China struggle with the policy of ‘Chinafication of religions’ which has been implemented by the communist government. Since 2015, the Chinese authorities have advocated the ‘Chinafication of religions’ (zongjiao zhongguohua 宗教中国化), which according to the government should eventually lead to the creation of

26

M. RYCHETSKÁ

a harmonious society in China. Catholics have to face allegations of supporting foreign interests instead of the People’s Republic of China. Catholic Christians are often considered to be less loyal to the CCP than other believers as they have strong connections outside the country. Several interviewed priests raised their concerns about this issue during interviews. They feel that one of the major problems for Catholics in China is how Catholicism is still by some perceived as a foreign religion. They are therefore struggling to localize their churches and to eliminate such a perception by promoting religious localization (bendihua 本地化) and Chinafication (zhongguohua 中国化) of the Catholic Church, such as by using Chinese music during mass but mostly by following the official direction of the CCP and promoting socialism. The book seeks to make contributions, empirical and theoretical, to the current state of research into Christianity in Greater China. On the empirical level, the chapters presented in the book detail the nature of relations between the selected churches and the state and society from the early years of the church in China to the present day. They describe situations of both cooperation and conflict with the totalitarian regimes in Greater China and outline the strategies adopted by the churches with respect to localization. I argue that any Christian group faces two main pressures: pressure from its own need to adapt to the local culture and pressure from the government and its legal requirements.

References Amae, Yoshihisa. 2007. Taiwan’s Exodus: The Presbyterian Church in Taiwanese Nationalism, 1945–1992. Dissertatiosn thesis, Honolulu: University of Hawaii. Barbalet, Jack. 2011. Chinese Religion, Market Society and the State. In Religion and the State: A Comparative Sociology, ed. Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai, and Bryan Turner, 185–206. London: Anthem Press. Barrett, David B. 1982. The World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, A. D. 1900–2000. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Bays, Daniel H. 2004. A Tradition of State Dominance. In God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions, ed. Kindopp, Jason and Carol Lee Hamrin, 25–39. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. ———. 2012. A New History of Christianity in China. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

1

THE INTRODUCTION

27

Beyer, Peter. 2003. De-Centring Religious Singularity: The Globalization of Christianity as a Case in Point. Numen 50: 357–386. Beyerhaus, Peter. 1964. The Responsible Church and the Foreign Mission. London: World Dominion Press. Boudon, Raymond, ed. 2004. Sociologický slovník [Dictionary of Sociology]. Olomouc: Palacky University. Cao, Nanlai. 2010. Constructing China’s Jerusalem: Christians, Power, and Place in Contemporary Wenzhou. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. ———. 2017. Spatial Modernity, Party Building, and Local Governance: Putting the Christian Cross-Removal Campaign in Context. The China Review 17: 29–52. ———. 2018a. Chinese Religions on the Edge: Shifting Religion-State Dynamics. The China Review 18 (2): 1–10. ———. 2018b. The Rise of Field Studies in Religious Research in the People’s Republic of China. The China Review 18 (1): 137–163. Chambon, Michel. 2020. Making Christ Present in China: Actor-Network Theory and the Anthropology of Christianity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) 2018. The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research [e-book]. Los Angeles: SAGE. Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1965. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Froese, Paul, and Steven Pfaff. 2001. Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the New Religious Paradigm. Social Forces 80 (2): 481–507. Froissart, Chloé. 2018. Issues in Social Science Debate in Xi Jinping⊃s China. China Perspectives 4: 3–9. Frykenberg, Robert Eric. 2003. Introduction. In Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-Cultural Communication since 1500, with Special Reference to Caste, Conversion, and Colonialism, ed. Robert Eric Frykenberg and Alain Low, 1–32. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Gallo, Antonio, Robert Magliola and George Mclean (eds.). 2003. Hermeneutics and Inculturation. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Gill, Anthony J. 1998. Rendering unto Caesar: The Roman Catholic Church and the State in Latin America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Goossaert, Vincent. 2006. 1898: The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion? The Journal of Asian Studies 65 (2): 307–336. Goossaert, Vincent, and David A. Palmer. 2011. The Religious Question in Modern China. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. Grinberg, Lev Luis. 2014. Mo(ve)ments of Resistance: Politics, Economy and Society in Israel/Palestine 1931–2013. Boston: Academic Studies Press. Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1995. Risk, Rationality, and Religious Portfolios. Economic Inquiry 33 (2): 285–295.

28

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Ion, Hamish A. 1999. The Cross in the Dark Valley: The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1931–1945. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Klain, Thoralf. 2014. The Missionary as Devil: Anti-Missionary Demonology in China, 1860–1930. In Europe as the Other: External Perspectives on European Christianity, ed. Judith Becker and Brian Stanley, 119–148. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Koesel, Karrie J. 2014. Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences. New York: Cambridge University Press. ˇ Konopásek, Zdenˇek. 1996. Text a textualita v sociálních vˇedách (Cást tˇretí: Reflexivní impuls) [Text and Textuality in Social Science]. Biograf 9: 7–15. Kung, Lap-Yan. 2006. National Identity and Ethno-Religious Identity: A Critical Inquiry into Chinese Religious Policy, with Reference to the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Religion, State and Society 34 (4): 375–391. Kwan, Simon Shui-Man. 2021. Decolonizing “Protestant” Death Rituals for the Chinese Bereaved: Negotiating a Resistance that is Contextually Relevant. International Journal of Practical Theology 25 (2): 243–262. Latourette, K.S. 1929. A History of Christian Missions in China. New York: The Macmillan Company. Lin, Christine L. 1999. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy. Sino-Platonic Papers 92: 1–153. Ma, Li and Jin Li. 2018. Surviving the State, Remaking the Church: A Sociological Portrait of Christians in Mainland China. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications. Neill, Stephen. 2015. Missions: Christian Missions. In Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones, 6082–6087. Detroit, New York, San Francisco: Thomson Gale. Neill, Stephen, Gerald H. Anderson, and John Goodwin, eds. 1971. The Concise Dictionary of the Christian World Mission. Nashville: Lutterworth Press. Obadia, Lionel and Donald C. Wood. 2011. Economics and Religion, Economics in Religion, Economics of Religion: Reopening the Grounds for Anthropology? The Economics of Religion: Anthropological Approaches, ed. Lionel Obadia and Donald C. Wood, xiii–xxxvii. Bingley: Emerald Publishing. Palmer, David A. 2009. China’s Religious Danwei: Institutionalising Religion in the People’s Republic. China Perspectives 4: 17–30. Ring, Lena, Cynthia R. Gross, and Elaine Mccoll. 2002. Putting the Text Back into Context: Toward Increased Use of Mixed Methods for Quality of Life Research. Quality of Life Research 19 (5): 613–615. Robert, Dana. 2002. The First Globalization: The Internationalization of the Protestant Missionary Movement Between the World Wars. International Bulletin of Missionary Research 26 (2): 50–66.

1

THE INTRODUCTION

29

Roudometof, Victor. 2016. Glocalization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Selden, Mark and Elizabeth J. Perry. 2010. Introduction Reform, Conflict and Resistance in Contemporary China. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, 1–30. 3rd Edition. London, New York: Routledge. Shih, Fang-long. 2021. Taiwan’s Culture Wars from “re-China-ization” to “Taiwan-ization” and beyond: President Tsai Ing-wen’s Cultural Policy in Long-term Perspective. In Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges, ed. June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques De Lisle, 284–311. London, New York: Routledge. Smith, Jonathan. 1982. Imagining Religion. From Babylon to Jonestown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stark, Rodney, and Roger Finke. 1992. The Churching of America, 1776–1990. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. ———. 2000. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Swanson, Allen. 1986. Mending the Nets: Taiwan Church Growth and Loss in the 1980s. Pasadena: William Carey Library. Tamney, Joseph B. 2005. Introduction. In State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies, ed. Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney, 1–17. Leiden: Brill. Tao, Yu. 2017. The Historical Foundations of Religious Restrictions in Contemporary China. Religions. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel8120263. Vala, Carsten T. 2018. The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party? London, New York: Routledge. Vermander, Benoît. 2019. Sinicizing Religions, Sinicizing Religious Studies. Religions. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10020137. Vodáková, Alena. 2000. Sociální a kulturní antropologie [Social and Cultural Antropology]. Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství. Wesoky, Sharon R. 2016. Politics at the Local-Global Intersection: Meanings of Bentuhua and Transnational Feminism in China. Asian Studies Review 40 (1): 53–69. Wiebe, Donald. 2009. Religious Biases in Funding Religious Studies Research? Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 17(2): 125–140. Yang, Fenggang. 2006. The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China. The Sociological Quarterly 47: 93–122.

30

M. RYCHETSKÁ

———. 2012. Religion in China: Survival and Revival under Communist Rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2021. Sinicization or Chinafication? Cultural Assimilation vs. Political Domestication of Christianity in China and Beyond. In The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and Below, ed. Richard Madsen, 16–43. Leiden: Brill. Zhou, Xiaowei. 2021. Localisation of Christiasnity in China: Difficulties in and Possibilities of Achieving Harmonious Cultural Integration. Journal of Beliefs & Values. https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2021.1969206.

PART I

The Case of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan

Leaders of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) sought to adopt effective strategies for their mission in Taiwan. Besides religious localization, they also reacted to the ruling totalitarian regimes. Initially, they preferred a strategy of cooperation with a repressive government. The Japanese government became an ally for the church’s civilization project, and thus the cooperation was advantageous. After the Second World War, Taiwan became part of China and came under the rule of the Nationalist government. In 1949, the nationalists transferred to Taiwan and established the rule of law and re-Chinafication (zai zhongguohua 再中國化). Although the church was now under a regime equally as repressive as that of the Japanese colonial era, the new government did not attempt to cooperate with the church, which therefore gradually established its opposition to the regime and called for democratization. In the first part, the gradual change of the church’s position is observed and explained. This part will seek to present how the church changed from its early days of carrying out a foundational Christian mission to becoming involved in political activities.

CHAPTER 2

Struggle for Localization and Gradual Shift to Activism

Presbyterian churches are a sub-group of the Protestant reformed church movement based on the teaching of John Calvin (1509–1564) and his followers. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan was formed by the amalgamation of two separate foreign missions: the British Presbyterian mission and the Canadian Presbyterian mission. The two missions shared a theological and historical background, being built on the common heritage of the Scottish church founded by John Knox (1513–1572), who wedded Calvin’s theology to a Presbyterian system which elected church leaders (elders) who regularly met at national synods (Tomkins 2009). The PCT functions as a presbyter-synodic establishment based on the principle of election and delegation. Local religious associations are united into regional presbyteries with elected superiors. These regional bodies are further grouped into higher units called synods (Filipi 2008). The synods are also controlled by an elected organ and further grouped into the National General Assembly (Zonghui changzhi weiyuanhui 總會常 置委 員會). The National General Assembly, whose representatives are elected from the synods, is the supreme body of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Its annual meetings deal with the church’s agenda, missionary and evangelistic goals, and the election of its leaders. It is this possibility to elect church leaders which makes the church a potential model for the establishment of democracy in Taiwan (Amae 2012).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_2

33

34

M. RYCHETSKÁ

As a Protestant church, the PCT has been involved in the modernization of sectors such as medical care and education, but some authors suggest the arrival of Presbyterians in Taiwan had an even more important effect. Amae Yoshihisa (2012) argues that the particular structure of the church enabled the Taiwanese to experience democracy for the first time in their history.

The Roots of the Presbyterian Mission In the nineteenth century, Taiwan was officially part of Fujian province in the Qing empire. The Qing administration’s overriding concern at the time was the Inner Asian frontier, so it had little interest in the island until the middle of the century when Western incursions prompted the Chinese court to reorient itself on the maritime world, which included Taiwan (Fairbank and Liu 2008). After the Opium Wars (1839–1860), several anti-Christian activities and uprisings broke out in mainland China and Taiwan. Wealthy traditional families saw Christianity as a heterodox faith (xiejiao 邪教) that endangered traditional systems and Confucianism (Fairbank and Liu 2008). Although the modernizing activities of the missionaries might have been welcomed, their religious message was often rejected as they were perceived as foreign invaders (Robert 2009). Shortly after Western weaponry had demonstrated its superiority in the Opium Wars, the First Presbyterian missionaries reached the coast of Taiwan. The Second Opium War (1856–1860) led to the signing of several treaties in Tianjin and Beijing and the re-opening to foreigners of the Taiwanese ports of Danshui 淡水 and Taiwanfu 臺灣府 (now Tainan) after almost two centuries of closure. The Qing dynasty also guaranteed protection for all Christian missionaries (Rubinstein 2003). The Presbyterian mission to Taiwan began in 1865 when Dr James L. Maxwell (1836–1921), a doctor and senior member of the Presbyterian Church in Birmingham, England, arrived with his medical mission. Maxwell settled in what is now Tainan 台南, so the southern region of Taiwan became the center of the British mission. A few years later, Rev. Dr. George L. Mackay (1844–1901), sent by the Canadian Presbyterian mission, arrived in Taiwan and in 1872 began his missionary work in Danshui 淡水 in northern Taiwan (Amae 2012). Almost immediately after their arrival, the missionaries aimed to establish independent regional presbyteries with local representation. The very

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

35

first presbytery was founded in 1896 in the south of the island and united 23 parishes. Foreign missionaries had the right to vote as they were the founders of the presbytery (Amae 2012), but they gradually sought to delegate more responsibility for running the presbytery to local ordained pastors. Western missionaries brought with them financial resources and the new technologies of Western medicine. They also set up schools that gave ordinary Taiwanese the opportunity to receive higher education, including Taiwan’s oldest existing school of the Western type of education in 1876, just eleven years after the arrival of the First Presbyterian missionaries. This was the Theological Seminar in Tainan, whose main aim was to raise a new generation of local pastors. Four years later, missionaries built a hospital providing Western-style medical care in northern Taiwan.1 Such hospitals often provided the space for an initial contract between missionaries and the people of Taiwan. For example, if a patient was hospitalized in a hospital established by the mission, a local pastor would often visit and introduce the patient to Christian teaching (Beng 2012). Students in Christian schools were likewise introduced to the Christian faith. In the first decade of Presbyterian missionary work (1865–1875), most of those who became acquainted with Christianity through a stay in or visit to a hospital were converted (Lin 1999). Christianity also spread because Western medicine was more successful than traditional folk healing practices, and as a result, the Christian God was often considered stronger than local deities and this provided a solid reason for some people to abandon local cults (Gernet 1985). The effectiveness of Western medicine for evangelization was also realized by the missionaries themselves, as can be seen in the testimony of James Maxwell (2015: 381): Medical missions should be recognized as of the highest value. […] Medical missions advance scientific knowledge and explode many of the base superstitions of the Chinese. […] In connection with the preaching of the gospel, [medical agency is] a most effective instrument in the aggressive work of mission.

Although today the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan is a unified church, it was originally two separate missions. Presbyterian missionaries from the UK and Canada built different ecclesiastical structures and worked in 1 This was the Mackay Memorial Hospital, which is still in operation today, as is the Theological Seminar in Tainan. See Lin 1999, Mackay (1895).

36

M. RYCHETSKÁ

different parts of Taiwan. They also had slightly different mission strategies, focused on different target audiences, and were divided in their opinions as to how much responsibility should be shared between foreign missionaries and local pastors. Missionaries from the UK focused mainly on the Hoklo community, one of the four Taiwanese ethnicities; Canadian missionaries focused on the island’s original inhabitants (yuanzhumin 原 住民).2 Some of the Presbyterian missionaries from the UK had already worked in the closest Chinese province of Fujian 福建. This was an advantage for them as many of the ethnic Hoklo in Taiwan spoke the same dialect of Hokkien (minnanhua /minnanyu 閩南話/閩南語). Missionaries were also able to use the existing Romanized transcript of the Bible in Hokkien. Knowledge of the language therefore became the first step in helping the spread of the Christian faith among the local population. Such pioneering work in Taiwan was nonetheless still perilous. Missionaries encountered resistance: many of their churches and hospitals were destroyed and on numerous occasions, local people tried to stone them (Mackay 1895). Under pressure from the British government, however, the Qing dynasty guaranteed religious tolerance and repressed riots and attacks on Christian missionaries. The most influential missionaries in the south of the island were Edward Band (1886–1971), Thomas Barclay (1849–1935), and William Campbell (1841–1921). Canadian missionaries attended more to the indigenous peoples as they considered their religious ideas less complex than the system of beliefs and practices of the majority population. This, they felt, made indigenous peoples more open to accepting the Christian Gospel (Rubinstein 1991). Converting the Hoklo and Hakka was seen as more challenging as they had brought with them from mainland China the Confucian system, a highly family-bound ancestral cult, many diverse local cults, and various forms of Daoism and Buddhism. These beliefs represented more complex and elaborate religious systems and thus presented a problem to the spread of Christianity among their followers. George Leslie Mackay (1895: 133–134) identified the ancestor cult as the greatest obstacle to Christianity in Taiwan:

2 The ethnic composition of Taiwan is diverse and distinctive. Four groups can be distinguished: The Hoklo—Heluoren 河洛人; the Hakka—Kejia 客家; mainland Chinese; and indigenous people yuanzhumin 原住民.

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

37

The worship of idols is first given up; but it may be months—perhaps a year—before the tablet can be forsaken. […] the worship of ancestors is indeed the most stubborn obstacle Christianity has to face.

The religious ideas of the original inhabitants, on the other hand, were seen as less complex by the missionaries,3 who felt they were able to provide a sense of inclusion to many indigenous peoples, and helped them shape their own identity as an alternative to the majority Han population (S.-Y. Yang 2008). The indigenous population was also more open to conversion because missionaries provided them with gifts and economic support, offered people jobs in Christian institutions, and even supplied new converts with food, giving rise to the term ‘rice/wheat Christians’4 — people who converted because the mission supported them with food.5 However, when the social and economic conditions of such converts improved, it was not unusual for them to return to their previous religions and eventually leave the Christian church (Rubinstein 1991; Heylen 2010). The Canadian mission differed from the British mission in the south in one particularly crucial aspect. George Leslie Mackay, its main leader, very early started to support the idea of localization of the mission. He pioneered the establishment of local, indigenous congregations. He learned the local Taiwanese dialect, and along with the Gospel, he brought social service and modern Western medicine to the natives (Rubinstein 1991; Gardella 2007). He wanted to create a localized independent church headed by native ministers. He delegated numerous responsibilities to the local Taiwanese pastors and rejected oversight

3 The term indigenous peoples refers here to those indigenous tribes which did not reside in mountainous areas but lived close to the Han population. Those tribes that lived deep in the mountains were relatively difficult to reach, and although missionaries tried repeatedly to reach them, it was a long time before evangelization among them achieved its first successes. George Leslie Mackay began these expeditions and explained the difficulty of such a mission (Mackay 1895: 265). 4 The term appeared for the first time in literature written by missionaries and European travelers who were critical of conversions that took place only for materialistic reasons. Later, the term ‘rice Christians’ would be used, for example, by Tiedemann (2000), in the classification of Christians based on commitment to the Christian faith. 5 Such a missionary strategy was also widespread elsewhere. Missionaries were often financially gifted converts. In the context of mainland China, this topic is addressed by, for example, Lutz (2001).

38

M. RYCHETSKÁ

by foreign personnel (except himself, of course), an approach that was initially criticized as too controversial. Although formed within his social, religious, and cultural framework, Mackay’s mission and general attitude were nonetheless unique for his time. His promotion of local leadership was controversial, however, and some of his peers were decidedly skeptical of such an approach. For instance, Thomas Barclay, from the southern mission, supported continued oversight of local preachers by foreign missionaries: ‘The chapel was provided with a preacher-in-charge, but all these preaching stations required to be supervised by the missionary […]’ (Band 1936: 49). Mackay also promoted a greater role for women in the church, publicly opposed ‘The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885’,6 and married a local Taiwanese woman (Forsberg 2012; Meynell 2012), all of which shows Mackay in something of a different light. Rohrer (2005) believes that Mackay promoted local ministry unhindered by foreign interference so that he alone would have control over the mission, and sees him as an ‘insecure dictator, jealous to maintain his absolute control over his converts’ (Rohrer 2005: 30). We can only guess at the inner motivations for Mackay’s missionary strategies. Nonetheless, the impact of Mackay’s attitude was creation of a localized church, which was rather unusual for nineteenth-century mission in Asia. The Canadian mission was initially very different and innovative. With the help of other Canadian missionaries, Mackay linked religious change to social change. Missionaries, in general, were recognized as those who introduced modernization to Taiwan. They had better financial resources and knowledge and could therefore build modern schools and hospitals (Rubinstein 1991). After Mackay’s death, however, Canadian missionaries largely took back control of the mission in Taiwan.

The Situation During and Immediately after the Japanese Colonial Rule After the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), Taiwan became part of Japan under a treaty signed in Shimonoseki in 1895.7 Chinese leaders in 6 Canadian government passed the Chinese Immigration Act to limit the entrance of Chinese immigrants. 7 During the conference in Shimonoseki, an independent republic of Taiwan—the very first republic in Asia—was declared on 23 March 1895. It existed for only four days in

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

39

Taiwan and Taiwanese inhabitants opposed Japanese control and during the peace treaties the independent republic of Taiwan—the very first republic in Asia—was created on 23 March 1895; Taiwan’s governor Shao Youlian 邵友濂 (1840–1901) was declared president. Barely a week elapsed before the Japanese army landed at Jilong 基隆, on 29 March. Japanese troops suppressed the revolt, and Taiwan became part of the Japanese empire in October of the same year (Bakešová 1992, Fairbank and Liu 2008). Through a propaganda campaign promoting Japanese culture and language, the Japanese colonial government began a program of gradual assimilation of the Taiwanese population (Japanese Dóka 同化), hoping that most people would completely renounce their Chinese heritage (Heylen 2010; Lamley 2007). After the outbreak of the Second SinoJapanese War (1937–1945),8 the Japanese government announced a new project, kóminka (Japanese kóminka undó 皇民化運動, Chinese huang min hua 皇民化). The project aimed to transform the Taiwanese into imperial entities fully committed to Japan (Japanese kómin皇民) (Marchand 2010). At the beginning of the Japanese rule, the church’s leaders promoted cooperation with the regime. They built on colonial apparatus to promote the church’s culture (Seitz 2021). At the same time, Presbyterian mission was the only non-Japanese protestant denomination allowed by the colonial regime. However, in 1940, the Japanese government evicted all foreign missionaries from Taiwan, and all missionary schools and hospitals came under Japanese control (Bakešová 1992; Bakešová et al. 2004). The expulsion of foreign missionaries had some unexpected and positive consequences. Local Presbyterians accepted the Japanese administration of schools and became influenced by the Japanese government (Seitz

a state of peace before the Japanese army landed in Jilong on 29 March. The definitive end of the republic’s brief existence came in 1902 (Bakešová 1992). 8 Despite any earlier military clashes, the Second Sino-Japanese War is generally considered to begin in July 1937 when Japanese troops invaded Beijing. Initially, the pressure on Taiwan was not great, as the fighting focused on northern China. However, when the Japanese army moved south, Taiwan became a strategic place. Japanization of both language and culture took place. The Taiwanese population was forced to use the Japanese language; women wore traditional Japanese clothing; everyone celebrated Japanese holidays. Taiwanese were never part of the Japanese army, however, as the government considered them disloyal. Taiwan was an essential source of raw materials and food (Bakešová et al. 2004).

40

M. RYCHETSKÁ

2021). And so, the Presbyterian mission survived and thrived under the leadership of native Taiwanese pastors. The expulsion meant local pastors and church leaders realized the need to create an independent church without support from foreign missions, and the resulting autonomy showed that they could lead the church without outside help (Amae 2012). A church in which most of the leadership had originally been foreign-born now became, as a matter of necessity, a domestic church with local leaders: in 1943, a synod was formed with no foreign leader; a separate Southern Synod, born out of the original British mission, was formed two years later. Church leaders initially demanded that the two synods develop independently, but in 1951 the two were united and a National General Assembly was formed, and the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (Taiwan jidu zhanglao jiaohui 台灣基督長老教會) was established. At the meetings of the General Assembly, the relationship between local parishes and synods was clearly defined, the election of synodical leaders took place, and schools and theological colleges which had been under the Japanese mission during Japanese rule were taken back under Presbyterian administration. This was now truly the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan—the PCT.

Presbyterian Church in Taiwan under the Guomindang Rule After World War II, Taiwan transitioned, and once again became part of China. Foreign missionaries were allowed to return to Taiwan, but they immediately sensed that the situation had changed for them and that the local pastors who had stayed on the island did not want things to return to how they had been, but wanted rather to maintain the domestic character of the church. The PCT had become at least partially independent of foreign support, and now foreign missionaries were no more than assistants to the local leadership (Rubinstein 2003). The Taiwanese population acquired Chinese citizenship, if only on paper; it soon became apparent that Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 (1887– 1975) perceived Taiwan as a new source of funding for the civil war

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

41

taking place on the mainland between the Communists and the Nationalists (Guomindang 國民黨, GMD).9 Having lost the war on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek withdrew to Taiwan. The GMD government then declared martial law (1949–1987),10 and so began a period of harsh suppression of any resistance or criticism (Rubinstein 2003). Nationalist troops imprisoned and tortured many Taiwanese—especially the educated elite (S. Tsai 2005). The totalitarian rule of the GMD was not anti-religious, and freedom of religion was guaranteed. The new government did not want to destroy religion as the communists on the mainland did. During the Cold War, religious freedom was ‘good politics against the atheist, totalitarian Communism’ (S. Tsai 2005: 91). However, the Nationalist government still constructed a comprehensive apparatus for monitoring and strictly controlling all religious groups on the island—including Christian churches (Bays 2012). The party-state established control over every social organization, and the government-controlled religious groups on the island via formal and informal means. Martial law restricted freedom of speech, information, and movement. There were also other forms of control over religious bodies, such as the local police, the military intelligence office, and the National Security Bureau (Kuo 2008). Thanks to this supervision machinery, most religious organizations submissively followed the government. The situation worsened for the PCT—even though Chiang Kai-shek was himself baptized a Methodist, there have been many new challenges for the church. While Chiang’s regime had friendly relations with many other Christian denominations, it was not the case for the PCT. Together with the Nationalist government, a vast number of Christians fled from the communist regime to Taiwan. GMD was not anti-religious, so many denominations submitted to the authoritarian regime and avoided political topics (Kuo 2008). Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek was suspicious of religious groups as they could potentially challenge the regime (Tao 9 Taiwan had rich resources of coal, sugar, rice, and tea (S. Tsai 2005). 10 Chiang Kai-shek was not the president of the Republic of China during this period.

He resigned on January 21, 1949, and came to Taiwan as a private individual. The official president of the Republic of China was Li Zongren 李宗仁 (1891–1969), who emigrated to the United States in the same year and eventually returned to the People’s Republic of China in 1964 and apologized to the PRC government for fighting communism in his youth. It was only through an agreement with Zhou Enlai 周恩來 that he was welcomed in Beijing, even though he was listed as a war criminal (Bakešová et al. 2004).

42

M. RYCHETSKÁ

2017). He was terrified of communist infiltration and disloyal Taiwanese. The leaders of the Presbyterian Church demanding democracy, independence and localization were incompatible with the nationalist governance. The Nationalists saw the PCT as problematic not for their religious faith, but for their prophetic appeal for political change. The period of martial law was devastating. Many Presbyterian members, who were prominent leaders in local communities, were also victims of the ‘2–28 Incident’ (ererba shijian 二二八事件) in 1947.11 Together with other representatives of the intellectual elite, they were considered a potential threat by the government, and many missionaries and preachers became victims of the so-called White Terror (baise kongbu 白色恐怖).12 Presbyterian pastors were often suspected, interrogated, or even eliminated; the Presbyterian publication Taiwan Church News 13 was banned. Many members of the Presbyterian Church later recall that the terror was directed particularly towards them and against the PCT (Amae 2007; Rubinstein 2003). As the situation worsened for the Taiwanese population, preachers and pastors were able to offer believers emotional and psychological support; Christianity, as it turned out, was better able to help people cope with sadness and suffering than were some other religions (Rubinstein 1991), and as a result, the PCT experienced significant growth in new converts during the decade from 1948. The growth was an outcome of several evangelistic programs the church started during this time. The projects aimed at gaining new believers; it’s Double the Church program (Bei jia yundong 倍加運動), for example, was highly successful. The program, initially run only by the Southern Synod, aimed to attract new converts and gather twice as many members. The program came to an end in 1965, 11 On February 28, 1947, an incident occurred, often referred to as one of the saddest moments in Taiwanese history. The whole incident began after police brutally beat a woman who was trying to sell cigarettes illegally. Those who watched the incident stood up for the woman, at which point the Nationalist police shot their way to the nearest police station. This led to a rebellion and attacks on the police, soldiers, and immigrants from the mainland. Thanks to the GMD army that landed in Jilong, the protests were violently suppressed. Many people were killed, and an even larger number were taken into custody (Kerr 1992). 12 During the White Terror period, around 3,000 people were executed and between 140,000 and 200,000 were arrested (Seitz 2021: 36). 13 Taiwan Church News (Taiwan jiaohui gongbao 台灣教會公報) was the mouthpiece of the PCT’s opposition to the GMD regime.

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

43

the centenary of the Presbyterian mission to Taiwan (Lin 1999), after which the Presbyterian Church funded several research programs to establish how the church had grown. We now have access to a precise mapping of the success of the Double the Church program. In fact, in the ten years from 1955 to 1965, church membership more than doubled, climbing from 86,064 to 176,255, and the number of churches grew from 410 to 839 (Swanson 1973). Another evangelistic effort was the New Century Movement (Xin shiji xuanjiao yundong 新世紀宣教運動), which aimed to bring improvements and innovations into preaching in the church over a five-year period (1967 to 1971 inclusive). The movement also focused on increasing evangelization among indigenous peoples and spreading the Christian Gospel to the wider mass of the population (Lin 1999). The program did not repeat the success of its predecessor, however, and after 1971, the PCT launched projects aimed more at addressing the social and political problems Taiwan was facing. From the late 1960s, the central theological position of the PCT began to change, especially with the emergence of contextual theology and a gradual move away from the Calvinist view of the separation of church and state. It nonetheless continued to build on those aspects of Calvin’s theology that concerned the image of God and common grace. The people largely responsible for introducing contextual theology into Taiwan were the influential theologians Shoki Coe Huang Zhanghui 黃 彰輝 (1914–1988) and Song Choan Seng 宋泉盛 (b. 1929).14 Shoki Coe was undoubtedly one of the most influential theologians. He was a minister of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, principal of Tainan Theological Seminary, and between 1971 and 1975, a director of the Theological Educational Fund of the World Council of Churches. Coe questioned whether it was appropriate for the Taiwanese church to promote theologies that had been developed in the West. He suggested, rather, that Christians should enter a dialogue with the local culture and society into which they were seeking to introduce the Gospel and offered the PCT a new and ‘contextual’ way of doing theology (England 2004). According to Coe, local churches in the Third World must ‘de-contextualize theology from the West and re-contextualize it in the postcolonial societies’ (C. Shih and Tseng 2020: 288). Contextual 14 I use Romanized spelling preferred by Coe and Song. The Chinese characters are added.

44

M. RYCHETSKÁ

theology enabled church representatives to include local legends and folk stories in their sermons. Furthermore, the new approach created a new public theology that dealt with the relationship between the Christian faith and public life. Contextual theology is ‘a methodology that enables a specific text to be interpreted within a particular context. While a text is fixed and unchanging, the context in which to interpret the text changes, based on time and place’ (Amae 2007: 23). It represents a radical attempt to connect Christian doctrine with living experience by allowing the text of the Bible to be interpreted within a contemporary cultural context. In fact, all theologies are ‘contextual’ as they do not exist in a vacuum, but the contextual theology introduced by Coe refers to theologies that are explicitly applied to the political context and the struggle against oppression (Kwan 2005).15 Coe argued that indigenization of the church was not enough in the new secular and technological society. Rather, Christians should reflect on the struggle for human justice and become political witnesses. Because the Christian God is a God of justice, ‘participating in the struggles to construct a just society is the only way to witness to faith in God’ (Joseph, Huang, and Hsu 2018: 6). The new theology combined social engagement and Christian teaching and called leaders within the PCT to engage in social and political action. By creating a space for the promotion of human rights, the new dogmatic paradigm helped church leaders to focus on spheres of believers’ lives other than a spiritual consolation. Contextual theology is closely connected to the Taiwanese people and to Taiwan as a piece of land, and is often, therefore, linked to Taiwanese nationalism and claims for a separate ethnic identity (Seitz 2021). The concept of contextual theology legitimized involvement in the political arena and drew the church into a political struggle. The PCT justified its political involvement by drawing links between political issues and Christian doctrine and by suggesting that human rights were a gift from God: the Christian God is the guardian of human rights, and the PCT has the duty to protect them in God’s name. After the concept of contextual theology had become established in the church, Song Chuan-seng, one of Shoki Coe’s successors at the seminary in Tainan, introduced the ‘theology of Incarnation’, which identified the Christian God with all human beings. What this meant in the

15 Although Coe and Song are often credited with introducing the concept of contextual theology, the term was not new (Seitz 2021).

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

45

context of Taiwan was that ‘through identification, Christian communities [were] participating in … sufferings and in the hope of liberation: and [were] thereby directly involved in the history and cultures of the Taiwanese people’ (England 2004: 677). Similarly, Chen Nan-Zhou (b. 1944) stressed that theology must be related to the cultural context and political problems of the local church. Christians in Taiwan had no choice, therefore, but to engage in political action that promoted democratization and the self-determination of Taiwan: If the Christian would like to respond to the God of the Exodus and to Jesus’s Incarnation and Cross and participate in the mission of God in Christ’s way in the midst of this identity crisis, he/she has no choice … but to identify with the suffering and oppressed Taiwanese, and to engage in the Taiwanese struggle for liberation and a new identity. (England 2004: 694)

Theologians collectively shifted the focus from personal salvation to social engagement and placed the whole of society at the center of their theology: Christian doctrine should not be Christian-centered but peoplecentered; Christians should care not only about their religious needs but also about the needs of society, the nation, and the world. Such an outlook represented a significant shift in the PCT’s theology and a departure from the Calvinist view of the separate on of church and state. As tensions between the church and the government rose, church leaders realized they could not sit quietly and wait for change and began to issue public proclamations calling for a progressive democracy in Taiwan and respect for human rights. In 1971, the PCT issued the first of its ‘Important Documents’ (zhongyao wenxian 重要文獻),16 by which it sought to draw attention to the problems the country was facing and to call for help. The documents were produced under the auspices of the General Assembly of the PCT in a cooperation between Taiwanese pastors and foreign missionaries. More credit is perhaps due to the Taiwanese leaders of the PCT as they, like the rest of the Taiwanese population, were those who had to face adverse conditions daily.

16 Today, all the statements are available on the church’s website and some correspondence is held in the archives of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London as part of the Presbyterian Church of English Foreign Missions Committee collection.

46

M. RYCHETSKÁ

The first public statement was the Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (Taiwan jidu yhanglao jiaohui dui guoshi de shengming yu jianyi 台灣基督長老教會對國是的聲明與建議).17 The document was originally to be an ecumenical work. It was drafted by the Baptist minister Rev. Chow Lien-hwa 周聯華 (1920–2016) in cooperation with other protestant ministers (F. Yang and White 2021) and was presented at a meeting of the Ecumenical Cooperative Committee consisting of the Presbyterian, Lutheran, Baptist, and Catholic Churches. However, the proposal was not supported by other protestant leaders as they were worried about possible persecution by the state. It was Reverend Kao Chun-ming 高俊明 (1929–2019) who introduced the document to the PCT assembly. Later, the PCT leaders signed a revised version and distributed it to the presbyteries (Amae 2008; Kao, Kao and Hu, 2001). The final version was signed by the PCT’s president Liu Hwa-Yi 劉華義 (1914–2005) and secretary-general Kao Chun-ming on December 29, 1971, and was published in response to the visit of President Richard Nixon to China and the announcement of the normalization of relations between the USA and the PRC.18 The USA, a traditional ally of the Republic of China, was now turning to the People’s Republic of China. As people in Taiwan began to fear a forceful reunification with communist China, the PCT’s first public statement declared the right of Taiwan to exist as a national entity without external interference and called for free elections as a basic human right. The PCT’s Important

17 The official English translation of this document is On Our National Fate. The original Chinese name is more complex and descriptive; the English translation is more straightforward and accessible. It is also worth noting that in several documents, 國 事(guoshi) is replaced by 國是. The two characters 是 and 事 are homophonic. However, 國是 means ‘the state is’, which makes no sense in the context of documents and their names. On the other hand, 國事 means ‘state affairs’, which is much more convenient in terms of meaning. As there is a relatively large number of homophonic words in Chinese, same-sounding characters are often confused. This was especially so in the past (Tˇrísková 2004, including this case. 18 The year 1971 was a turning point as Taiwan faced a series of diplomatic setbacks, one of which was the withdrawal from the United Nations of the Republic of China and its replacement by the People’s Republic of China. This was followed by Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing (July 9–11, 1971) to arrange a possible visit to the PRC by President Nixon. Nixon’s visit and the issuing of the Shanghai Communiqué took place soon afterward, in 1972 (Rubinstein 2006). This official visit was the first step toward the normalization of relations between the USA and the PRC and signaled the end of official relations with the Republic of China (Neary 2002).

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

47

Documents, like the Theological Declaration of Barmen (1934) and the Belhar Confession (1982), were said to be purely theological. The documents are all addressed to the church rather than to the regime (Seitz 2021), but their political connotations are undeniable. The PCT insisted that On Our National Fate was a religious statement, but its political context is clear. Proclaiming the independence of Taiwan and stating the case for democratic elections, the document became a symbol of the church’s controversial abandonment of its previous insistence on the separation of church and state: Recently the government has stressed the use of new people in official positions. Therefore, we earnestly request that, within the Taiwan area, it hold elections of all representatives to the highest government bodies to succeed the present representatives who were elected 25 years ago on the mainland. (Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1971)

The document is clearly not only theological and doctrinal but it also expresses the church’s concern regarding the prevailing political situation and its hope for change. The church initially attempted to publish the statement in a local newspaper as a paid advertisement, but the plan was aborted after it was uncovered by government security agencies (Amae 2008). During martial law (1949–1987), freedom of expression was impossible, even though the Constitution ‘guaranteed’ it. The media was strictly controlled by the government and was little more than a tool for government propaganda (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2011); any criticism of the GMD government was pounced upon. Nevertheless, the PCT made its statement, and some scholars consider it the first public declaration on self-determination to be published in Taiwan (Rubinstein 1991; Amae 2008). The statement was eventually issued in March 1972 in Taiwan Church News , although many copies of the paper were never delivered. This and several other statements were translated and published in the Englishlanguage magazine Self-Determination (Chutou tian 出頭天),19 which 19 The magazine was published by exiled church leaders in New York; the first issue was released in 1973. Other international movements which supported the self-determination of Taiwan included the Taiwanese Christian Self-Determination Movement in Germany (Chao 2008). Information regarding Taiwan’s situation under martial law was distributed by the PCT to other Christian churches around the world. For other accounts in the

48

M. RYCHETSKÁ

targeted an international audience. The statements were also secretly distributed to foreign missions, the World Council of Churches, the Vatican, and the US Department of State. No organization or individual in Taiwan could criticize the government without fear of reprisals. It is no surprise, therefore, that the publication of On Our National Fate was followed by a period of severe restrictions. Many of the foreign missionaries who helped to compile and disseminate the church’s statements were expelled, among them Donald Wilson, Daniel Beeby, and Milo Thornberry (Amae 2008). In March of the same year, the church published the statement On Our National Fate: Motivation Based on Faith and Theology (Guoshi de shengming yu jianyi´zai xinyangshang ji shenxueshang zhi dongyi「國是聲 明與建議」在信仰上及神學上之動議), which was a harsh critique of the previous church’s statement. It introduced the church’s new theological position on human rights and democratization and offered a religious interpretation of contemporary social issues. In the years that followed, the PCT continued to publish statements that drew links between Christian doctrine and political activism. In 1975, the church responded to a government order for Bibles to be confiscated by publishing another important document, Our Appeal (Women de huyu 我們的呼籲), which criticized the banning of non-Chinese Bibles, that is, most of the Bibles issued by the Presbyterian Church. The regulation led to protests in Taiwan and elsewhere, and the church argued that the confiscation was a denial of the human right to religious freedom. Further statements published by the PCT called for democratic elections, secession from mainland China, the creation of a distinct Taiwanese national identity, and the protection of human rights. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, the PCT switched its attention to other social problems and projects, which today include environmental protection and respect for human and minority rights. The church has also engaged with the support of the LGBT community and became well-known not only among Taiwanese Christians but also outside religious circles.

same vein, see essays by Donald Wilson, Virginia and Mark Thelin, Rowland and Judy Van Es, Wendell Karsen, and others in Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles (2008).

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

49

Localization and Legitimization of Political Activity Legitimization of political involvement of the church can be considered as the first step towards localization because it provides recognition to the church, and the church’s ideas can be transferred only if they are widespread. The importance of the legitimizing process has been described as: The key of marketing religion is creating the perception of credibility. […] The perception of legitimacy does not have to be broadly shared by [all] society but must be shared by a segment of the population large enough […] the credibility of founders’ religious commitments and the movement’s perceived legitimacy jointly determine the viability and growth of religious [groups]. (Miller 2002: 441)

One of the strategies, which can be found in the church’s statements, is religious argumentation based on Christianity. This is an obvious argumentation because religious arguments maintain socially defined reality by legitimating any situations in terms of their all-encompassing sacred reality (Berger 1990). It means that for some people, religious beliefs can justify even such argumentations, which are not about religious problems. It is not surprising that the church’s leaders used the Bible and Christian God as the ultimate argument. However, they were not satisfied only with the arguments based on their religious beliefs. They employed ‘double argumentation’. In On Our National Fate, the double argumentation is employed to support human rights. First, the statement uses Christian argumentation, and then it supports it with the authority of the United Nations. However, we can observe a semantic difference between the Chinese original document and its English version: We oppose any nation without concerning human rights and the will of fifteen million people in Taiwan to be interested only in its own (selfish) interests and to make any decision against human rights. Human rights are both—given by God and (also) the people’s own right to decide their own destiny. (Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, Chinese version 1971)

The English version is different:

50

M. RYCHETSKÁ

We oppose any powerful nation […] making unilateral decisions to their own advantage, because God ordained, and the United Nations Charter has affirmed, that every people has the right to determine its own destiny. (Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, English version 1971)

The difference is significant as the United Nations Charter is mentioned only in the English version. It seems, that the authors of the text thought that it would be an important reference only when the statement was addressed to the whole world and to all nations. In both versions, it is obvious that religious argumentation is not enough. Because of the importance of the UN in the international sphere, it is combined with the reference on the United Nations Charter affirmation. I assume that the authors of the statements have realized that an argument satisfactory for Christians, could be insufficient for other people to whom the statement was also addressed. Double argumentation can be considered as a conscious strategy—strategy connected to localization because it is a kind of communication when some ideas and values are transmitted. Another example is from a statement written more than 10 years later, which shows the continuation of the strategy: Language is an inherent human gift, it is a God-given gift, is the basic condition for human existence, self-affirmation, also it is the essence of human history, culture. (Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 1985)

This also is the double argumentation. At first, we see the argument that language is a gift from God (argument based on religious belief) and the second argument stresses language as an important part of human culture, history, and very existence (not a religious argument). The religious argument refers to the special status that is attributed to particular matters within the interpretation of the Christian faith. Subsequently follows the argument, which highlights the secular importance of culture and civilization. This style of argumentation can persuade one even more. It is used in the official statements of the PCT almost systematically—it shows, how important this strategy is. We cannot forget that these statements were written by several people, often in cooperation with foreign missionaries. It is a reflected and sophisticated text representing the opinion of the whole PCT.

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

51

Another strategy in the localization process of the PCT, is a new and important role of prophet, that the church created within the narrative. The role of the prophet has emerged after the first public statement published by the PCT. It can be considered as an emphasis on the status and legitimacy of the church. The church’s status has changed—they are not just some people, who share the concerns of Taiwanese people. The church constituted itself a prophet (xianzhi先知) of the nation, which it exercised on behalf of otherwise overlooked sections of Taiwanese society, and so doing ascribed itself the position of an essential authority in society with a high level of prestige and legitimacy. Peter Tze Ming Ng has noted that this was not the case only for the Presbyterians as more Christian groups in Asia have constituted themselves prophets. In his words, Christian missionaries have become the prophet because of the specific situations they encountered [. . .] and their unfailing commitment to Christianity. Their commitment to the Church required them to be open and be responsive to their situations, in such a way that they could discover deeper meanings and the bigger truth of Christianity which could accommodate their experiences in China. Hence, they became prophets of their time, calling for a new understanding of Christian mission in China. (Ng 2012: 113–114)

The term prophet, a person of foresight (xianzhi 先知), was used for the first time in 1975: We beseech the help of the Holy Spirit to lead us and to enable the church to give expression to its true role of prophet and priest.20 […] The church should become the servant of justice and truth; the aim of the church’s existence is to communicate the message of God’s love, and because of this the church must, in the spirit of real love, get involved in the actualities of modern society and through service seek to change the conditions of society. (Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1975)

So according to this expression, the PCT as a prophet must be involved in society and thus even in politics. This is a very clear statement, where the church has justified its political and social involvement by applying religious legitimizing. In a statement written in 1989, this kind of proclamation was repeated: 20 我們祈求聖靈幫助我們, 引領我們, 使教會真實發揮先知與祭司的角色。

52

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Christians in every generation are united in principle of righteousness and compassion, [they] play role of prophet, become a social conscience, announce the truth, help [support] weak, [and] promote righteousness. (Let People of Taiwan out of Shadow 1989)

According to this, the church should be the prophet, the leader of Taiwanese people, who specifies what is right for the whole society based on his own religious belief. According to Yoshihisa Amae, it is exactly the role of prophet, which explains (and is also the result of) the political activity of the PCT: Prophet here is understood as someone who boldly speaks the truth of God. The foreign missionaries expected the PCT to speak out against the social injustice which they witnessed in Taiwanese society under martial law. The PCT actually created the role of an important authority within society. The church, indeed, started to be a representative of the society. For example, in 1986 the Presbyterians won 11 out of 225 seats in the Legislature and the National Assembly. In 2003 they even occupied 7% in the Legislature, despite the fact that they represent less than 1% of the population.21 (Amae 2007: 60).

Interestingly, while still being critical towards the Nationalist regime, the PCT still tried to establish good relations with the government. The church as the prophet should help (and guide) the government: The church must not carelessly take its ease and abandon the role of prophet. We know that if we only praise what is commendable, this is not adequate expression of the church’s responsibility to the nation is no way to help the government to overcome present difficulties. (Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1975)

In this statement, they just wanted to kindly admonish the government and hence improve the situation. Despite the PCT being considered an example of opposition to the totalitarian regime, the church used different 21 Kuo (2008: 44): ‘Among the 225 legislators elected in 2003, there were 42 Daoists

(including believers in folk religions), 25 Buddhists, 6 Catholics, 21 Christians, and 45 friends to all religions; the rest refused to answer or could not identify their religion in our telephone interviews with their staff. Among these 21 Christian legislators, 15 were Presbyterians, and all of these Presbyterian legislators were members of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).’

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

53

strategies. Open revolt is only one way of resistance and protest technique available to the subordinates in a totalitarian context (Selden and Perry 2010). However, in the year 1987, the PCT’s attitude changed and became more open and radical: Inappropriate policy of government caused that our church also has neglected responsibility to be a prophet. (Public Notice of Respect for Human Rights of Aboriginal People 1987)

The role of a prophet is not to assist the government anymore. The government has been evidently accused of doing inappropriate policy. The church was able to publish such a statement thanks to the changed situation as the martial law was lifted that year. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has undergone a long and complex development during which the church gradually sought to adapt to the changing social, religious, and political conditions. During Japanese colonial rule and the period of Guomindang rule, the Presbyterian Church focused on the local population and all its needs not only religious. Early missionaries brought with them modern Western medicine and extended education to the wider mass of the people. After the modernization of Taiwan, these means of mission were no longer felt to be adequate, and in the difficult times that followed the church began to offer its members economic, emotional, and psychological support. When martial law was imposed, the Presbyterian Church was the first to appeal for democratic elections in Taiwan. The later social engagement of the PCT shows that it was seeking to win believers not only through spiritual teaching but also through the help of other kinds. Whether or not these more recent endeavors have been successful is difficult to assess, especially considering that less than 1% of the population is currently part of the church.

References Amae, Yoshihisa. 2007. Taiwan’s Exodus: The Presbyterian Church in Taiwanese Nationalism, 1945–1992. Dissertation thesis, Honolulu: University of Hawaii. ———. 2008. Pioneers in Taiwan’s Human Rights and Democracy: The Role of the Foreign Missionaries of Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. In A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980,

54

M. RYCHETSKÁ

ed. Linda Arrigo and Lynn Miles, 172–210. Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance. ———. 2012. Europeans and the Formation of a Presbyterian Enterprise: A Prototype of a Civic Taiwanese Nation? In European Perspectives on Taiwan, ed. Damm Jens and Paul Lim, 46–65. New York: Springer. Arrigo, Linda Gail and Lynn Miles (eds.). 2008. A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980. Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance. ˇ Bakešová, Ivana. 1992. Taiwan. Jiná Cína [Taiwan the Other China]. Havíˇrov, Prague: Nakladatelství Petr Pavlík. Bakešová, Ivana, Rudolf Frust and Zdˇenka Heˇrmanová. 2004. Dˇejiny Taiwanu [The History of Taiwan]. Prague: Lidové noviny. Band, Edward. 1936. Barclay of Formosa. Tokyo: Christian Literature Society. Bays, Daniel H. 2012. A New History of Christianity in China. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Beng, Huan-Sheng. 2012. When the East Meets the West. The Educational Career of George L. Mackay in Formosa 1872–1901. In The Asian Conference on Arts and Humanities 2012: Official Conference Proceedings, 306–316. Xinzhu: National Xinzhu University of Education. Berger, Peter. 1990. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Doubleday. Chao, You-yuan. 2008. The Taiwanese Christian Self-Determination Movement in Germany. In A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980, ed. Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles, 163–167. Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance. England, John. 2004. Asian Christian Theologies: A Research Guide to Authors, Movements, Sources. Vol. 3: Northeast Asia. New York: Orbis. Fairbank, John K. and Kwang-Ching Liu. 2008. The Cambridge History of China. Volume II. Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 2. Cambridge Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Filipi, Pavel. 2008. Malá encyklopedie evangelických církví [Little Encyclopedia of Churches]. Prague: Libri. Forsberg, Clyde R., Jr. 2012. Pan Celtic Anglo-Saxonism, the Polar Eden, and Crossing Racial Divides: The Interesting Case of George Leslie Mackay. In The Life and Legacy of George Leslie Mackay: An Interdisciplinary Study of Canada’s First Presbyterian Missionary to Northern Taiwan (1872–1901), ed. Forsberg, Clyde R., Jr., 111–137. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Gardella, Robert. 2007. From Treaty Ports to Provincial Status, 1860–1894. In Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein, 163–200. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

55

Gernet, Jacques. 1985. China and the Christian Impact. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heylen, Ann. 2010. Reflections on Becoming Educated in Colonial Taiwan. In Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy, ed. Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers, 149–164. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Joseph, M.P., Po Ho Huang, and Victor Hsu. 2018. Wrestling with God in Context: Revisiting the Theology and Social Vision of Shoki Coe. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Kao, Chun-ming, Kao Lee Li-chen, and Hu Hui-ling. 2001. Shizijia zhi lu: Kao Chun-ming mushi huiyilu [The Road of the Cross: Memoir of Rev. Kao Chun-ming]. Taipei: Wang chun feng. Kerr, George. 1992. Formosa Betrayed. Taipei: Taiwan Publishing Co. Kuo, Cheng-tian. 2008. Religion and Democracy in Taiwan. New York: State University of New York Press. Kwan, Simon Shui-Man. 2005. From Indigenization to Contextualization: A Change in Discursive Practice Rather Than a Shift in Paradigm. Studies in World Christianity 11 (2): 236–250. Lamley, Harry J. 2007. Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism. In Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein, 201–260. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Let People of Taiwan out of Shadow 讓台灣人民走出政治銅像的陰影聲明. 1989. Chinese Version. [online]. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?Doc ID=039. Accessed 16 December 2019. Lin, Christine L. 1999. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy. Sino-Platonic Papers 92: 1–153. Lin, John Baptist. 2018. The Vatican Asks Legitimate Bishops To Step Aside in Favour of Illegitimate Ones. Asianews. http://Www.Asianews.It/News-En/ The-Vatican-Asks-Legitimate-Bishops-To-Step-Aside-in-favour-of-illegitimateones-42896.html. Accessed 06 April 2019. Lutz, G. Jessie. 2001. A Profile of Chinese Protestant Evangelists in the Midnineteenth Century. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Mackay, George Leslie. 1895. From far Formosa. The Islands, Its People and Missions. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. Marchand. Sandrine. 2010. Silence in Postwar Taiwan. In Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy, ed. Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers, 165– 180. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Maxwell, James Laidlaw. 2015. Medical Mission Work in Formosa. In Chronicling Formosa: Setting the Foundations for the Presbyterian Mission, 1865–1876, ed. Niki Alsford, 381–383. Taipei: Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines. Meynell, Hugo A. 2012. Prolegomena to Missiology: Reflection on Religious and Political Differences. In The Life and Legacy of George Leslie Mackay: An

56

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Interdisciplinary Study of Canada’s First Presbyterian Missionary to Northern Taiwan (1872–1901), ed. Clyde R. Forsberg, Jr., 139–150. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Miller, Kent D. 2002. Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations. Strategic Management Journal 23 (5): 435–456. Neary, Ian. 2002. Human Rights in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. London: Routledge. Ng, Peter Tze Ming. 2012. Chinese Christianity: An Interplay between Global and Local Perspectives. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. 1975. http://english.pct.org. tw/Article/enArticle_public_19751118.html. Accessed 16 December 2019. Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 我們對 《語文法草案》 的立場. 1985. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=020. Accessed 16 December 2019. Public Notice of Respect for Human Rights of Aboriginal People 尊重原住民人 權的告白與呼籲文. 1987. Chinese Version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc. aspx?DocID=027. Accessed 16 December 2019. Rawnsley, Gary and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley. The Media in Democratic Taiwan. In Taiwan Experience Since Martial Law, ed. David Blundell, 395–417. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. Robert, Dana. 2009. Christian Mission: How Christianity Became a World Religion. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Rohrer, James. 2005. George Leslie Mackay in Formosa, 1871–1901: An Interpretation of His Career. Journal of the Canadian Church Historical Society 57: 3–58. Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe. ———. 2003. Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan: The Presbyterian Church and the Struggle for Minnan/Hakka Selfhood in the Republic of China. In Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society, ed. Philip Clart and Brewer Jones, 204–256. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ———. 2006. The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan’s Democratic Society, 1945–2004. In Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia, ed. Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah Brown, 109–135. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe. Seitz, Jonathan. 2021. Taiwan under Martial Law and Presbyterian Responses. In Christian Social Activism and Rule of Law in Chinese Societies, Studies in Christianity in China, ed. Fenggang Yang and Chris White, 35–51. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press. Selden, Mark, and Elizabeth J. Perry. 2010. Introduction: Reform, Conflict and Resistance in Contemporary China. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and

2

STRUGGLE FOR LOCALIZATION AND GRADUAL …

57

Resistance, 3rd ed., ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, 1–30. London, New York: Routledge. Shih, Chih-yu, Samantha Wan-, and Tseng. 2020. Beyond China’s Threat: The Contextual Theology of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. International Journal of China Studies 11 (2): 279–297. Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, Chinese version 台灣基督長老 教會對國是的聲明與建議. 1971. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=001. Accessed 04 December 2019. Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, English version. 1971. English version. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_ public_19711229.html. Accessed 16 December 2019. Swanson, Allen. 1973. Taiwan: Mainline Versus Independent Church Growth. A Study in Contrasts. Pasadena: William Carey Library. Tao, Yu. 2017. The Historical Foundations of Religious Restrictions in Contemporary China. Religions. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel8120263. Tiedemann, Rolf Gerhard. 2000. Baptism of Fire. China’s Christians and the Boxer Uprising of 1900. The International Bulletin of Missionary Research 24 (1): 7–12. Tomkins, Stephen. 2009. Struˇcné dˇejiny kˇrestˇanství [A Brief History of Christianity]. Prague: Volvox Globator. Tˇrísková, Hana. 2004. Tónová cˇ ínština – jazyk zpˇevný? [The Sounds of Chinese]. Nový Orient 59 (1): 51–55. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. 2005. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s quest for identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Yang, Fenggang, and Chris White. 2021. A Historical Overview of Chinese Christian Activism: Institutional Change toward Democracy. In Christian Social Activism and Rule of Law in Chinese Societies, Studies in Christianity in China, ed. Fenggang Yang and Chris White, 1–30. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press. Yang, Shu-Yuan. 2008. Christianity, Identity, and the Construction of Moral Community Among the Bunun of Taiwan. Social Analysis 52 (3): 51–74.

CHAPTER 3

Re-Chinafication Versus Taiwanese National Identity

When Taiwan went under the administration of China in 1945, people in Taiwan considered this transition to be a happy event—they hoped to finally become equal citizens. However, very soon Taiwanese’s dissatisfaction increased. After the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, and the Nationalist government lost the civil war in mainland China, the Republic of China became a government in exile. Taiwan’s people once again faced a change in terms of their belonging. Under the leadership of the Guomindang (GMD) government, Taiwan was recognized as a province of the Republic of China and its people officially became Chinese citizens (Heylen 2013). The GMD government was concerned about the previous fifty years of Japanese rule and its influence on Taiwan. Taiwanese people (who had lived in Taiwan before 1945) were considered to be disaffected in China, and the government made it impossible for them to fully participate in country politics (Wachman 1994). The Guomindang government considered native Taiwanese citizens disloyal, overly influenced by the Japanese colonial regime, and inferior to incomers from mainland China, at least until such time as they had been ‘re-Chinafied’, fully Chinese again. During the first years of martial law, the Taiwanese were largely excluded from political power in Taiwan, but in contrast, the newly arrived ‘Mainlanders’ were excluded from small and medium-sized businesses (M. Brown 2004). The

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_3

59

60

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Taiwanese were underprivileged citizens, and they did not share the same identity as the Mainlanders. While the GMD government claimed Taiwan to be nationally Chinese, the government still initiated the re-Chinafication (zai zhongguohua 再中國化) policy. One strand of the policy made the Chinese national language (guoyu 國語) the only permitted language. The suppression of any cultural, ethnical, or linguistic differences started. Only Chinese history was taught at school—Taiwan was included in curricula only as one of the ROC’s provinces. History textbooks virtually mentioned only life on the mainland (Gold 1994). These policies of re-Chinafication implied that it should have been easy for everyone to become an equal Han Chinese, but the reality was different. It was very difficult for Taiwanese to be treated as equals by Mainlanders (M. Brown 2004). The situation was comparable to the conditions during the Japanese occupation. Taiwanese people were frustrated to be once again ruled by outsiders with whom they were unable to identify. It was the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan that promoted local languages as well as distinct Taiwanese identity despite the possibility of persecution by the Nationalist regime. The chapter analyzes the strategies used by the PCT to promote local languages and create a new discourse on national identity.

PCT’s Response to the GMD’s Language Policy From its very early days, the Presbyterian mission in Taiwan set a goal of establishing a localized church and insisted that its missionaries learn and teach in local languages and dialects. To attract people to the Christian message and help them better understand it, the missionaries translated portions of the Bible into the vernacular and in 1885 began publishing newspapers in a Romanized Taiwanese script. The government’s attempted suppression of local languages therefore presented a serious operational challenge to the PCT. To fully understand the importance of local languages to the PCT’s mission strategy, it will be helpful to compare the church’s approach during the period of martial law with previous approaches. The Japanese colonial government (1895–1945) and the GMD government were similar in being two totalitarian regimes that operated a strict language policy: Japanese-only under the former and Chinese-only under the latter. During the first stage of the PCT’s argument for the importance of local languages—that is, before it published Our National Fate by the

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

61

PCT in 1971—the church did not publicly criticize the ruling government, choosing rather to take the course of cooperation. During the second stage, between 1971 and 1985 and the publishing of Resolution about the ‘Letter from the Ministry of the Interior Prohibiting the Use of Dialects for the Sermon’, the church became more vocal in its criticism of the ruling regime. In these two stages, the argument regarding language was similar: the use of local languages was an essential component of missionary strategy. Like all foreign missionaries, Presbyterians faced the challenge of spreading the Christian Gospel and establishing a mission in a different cultural context, and language was clearly one of the most fundamental means of creating bridges between the missionaries and local communities. The church’s political stance regarding local language was initially driven, therefore, by its missionary aspirations and its goal of localization. In the final stage, after 1985, the argumentation changed in line with a new emphasis on contextual theology: language was now narrated as a gift from God and as the basis of culture. The First Stage: 1865–1971 From the beginning of the Presbyterian mission in Taiwan in 1865, operating in local languages was a key part of the strategy of religious localization. As early as 1889, the Scottish Presbyterian missionary William Campbell (1841–1921) was urging his fellows to become proficient in local dialects: ‘The more immediate hindrance to bringing them under the influence of the Gospel is our ignorance of their language. Some of them do understand a little Chinese, but the great mass of them not a sentence’ (Campbell 1889: 400). Other missionaries were equally aware of the importance of language as a medium for establishing the local church. From the time he arrived in Taiwan, the Reverend George Leslie Mackay (1844–1901) spent many hours learning languages (Mackay 1895). The onus on missionaries to operate in the vernacular continued into the twentieth century. In the early years of martial law, Reverend John Whitehorn suggested that: ‘All over the world and throughout the Church’s history it has been found that one of the most important factors in the attainment of Christian maturity is the possession of the Scriptures in the mother tongue of the people’ (Whitehorn 1955: 31–32). Addressing believers and potential converts in their mother tongue, a

62

M. RYCHETSKÁ

language they could understand and be at home in, helped the missionaries establish truly localized churches. The members of some aboriginal tribes even considered the missionaries’ ability to speak their language evidence of the omnipotence of the Christian God (Covell 1998). The Presbyterian mission faced a stern challenge, therefore, when the colonial Japanese government implemented its Japanese-only language policy. Japan annexed Taiwan in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War and made all its inhabitants Japanese imperial subjects. The government then began a program of gradual assimilation (Japanese Dóka 同化) of the Taiwanese population and hoped that most people would completely renounce their Chinese heritage (Lamley 2007). Non-Japanese religions were suppressed by the regime, but Christianity continued to be tolerated. The colonizers discriminated against the local peoples and considered them second-class citizens. Only if Taiwanese fully assimilated could they become citizens with full Constitutional rights, and only if they became fluent in Japanese were they able to gain access to the employment market. An essential strand of the assimilation program was an education system that provided new public schools (Japanese Kógakkó 公學 校) for Taiwanese students. The government did not want the Taiwanese to be well-educated, however, so the better-equipped schools (Japanese šógakkó 小學校) were reserved for Japanese students (Lamley 2007). Many educational institutions operated only in the Japanese language, thereby denying most Taiwanese access to higher education. It was not until the late 1910s that ‘racial coeducation’ at the post-primary level became legal and the first middle school for Taiwanese students was funded in Taizhong (Takeshi and Mangan 1997). The Presbyterians saw an opportunity for mission in this unsatisfactory situation and turned it to their advantage. Establishing schools and colleges that operated in local languages, created a space for the Taiwanese population to receive higher education. During the early years of the Japanese colonial era, Presbyterians, who represented more than 80% of Christians on the island of Taiwan (Rubinstein 1991), were able to build good relations with the Japanese government and many PCT missionaries enjoyed cordial relationships with high officials in the administration (Ion 1993). Rubinstein further points out: The Presbyterian missionaries often served as negotiators between the local residents and the Japanese and earned the respect and praise of the Japanese military leaders. They also discovered that they had the support

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

63

of the Japanese civilian authorities, who looked on them as the forerunners of their own efforts at modernization. (Rubenstein 2003: 208)

Because of the church’s strategy of cooperation, the government saw it as a valuable assistant in civilizing the population and modernizing society. In using education and medical care to build bridges with the unchurched population (C. Lin 1999), the missionaries were seen to be bringing modern education and Westernization to Taiwan. In turn, Presbyterians considered the Japanese government a partner in their own efforts towards modernization. They were even prepared to overlook some of the problems if it meant avoiding sanctions: In regard to mission work, the coming of the Japanese has on the whole been distinctly favorable. It has however interfered with our schools, all private schools being closed within a certain distance of a government one. (Broomhall 1907: 70)

This period of largely peaceful coexistence did not last, however. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Japanese government became increasingly militant and totalitarian and set out to further industrialize Taiwan and ‘imperialize’ its inhabitants. Its new ‘kóminka’ project (Japanese kóminka undó 皇民化運動; Chinese huang min hua 皇民化) aimed to transform the Taiwanese into imperial citizens (Japanese kómin皇民) fully committed to Japan. It also outlawed ‘foreign’ languages (Chinese, Taiwanese, and aboriginal languages) (Marchand 2010) and made Japanese the ‘national language’ (J. kokugo國語). In addition to banning the use of local languages in education and worship, which obviously had a huge impact on the Presbyterian mission, the government also banned the commonly used Romanized translations of the Bible as it suspected foreign Christian missionaries of spying and using the Bible as a means of spreading subversive messages. All Bibles published by the Presbyterians and written in a language other than Japanese were prohibited. The police carried out searches for illegal Bibles, which if found were confiscated and burned (J. Dickson 1974). Presbyterian schools were strictly controlled. Any that taught in a language other than Japanese were closed, and students at schools that remained open were forced to attend ceremonies of the imperial Shinto cult. During this whole turbulent time, however, the Presbyterian missionaries remained silent and withheld any criticism of the colonial

64

M. RYCHETSKÁ

government. If they did write about clashes with the government or the police, they were also careful to mention the benefits of Japanese rule (Band 1936). Nevertheless, because Presbyterians were popular with the local inhabitants and had better relationships with them than did the colonial administration, the government became nervous of the missionaries’ impact on the Taiwanese population (Ion 1999). As the war progressed, the regime began to regard all foreign missionaries in Taiwan as spies, and in 1940 evicted them (Bakešová 1992; Bakešová et al. 2004). Despite their numerous run-ins with the Japanese colonial government, Presbyterian missionaries continued to paint a mostly positive picture of the Japanese rule. Although they were questioned regularly by the police for flouting the language law, the missionaries wrote reports which suggested that the language issue was more an internal problem for the mission than it was a source of oppression by the government. On the predicament facing Christian mission in Taiwan, one missionary wrote to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs as follows: With the difficulties presented by the dual language and the ever more delicate political background, one is compelled to wonder how long the foreign missions can survive. One may indeed hope that conditions will perceptibly improve when all the organizations are headed by men who can converse freely with the higher officials in their own [Japanese] language. (Cited in Ion 1999: 103–104)

Here, the language problem is clearly being reported as a product of the missionaries’ lack of facility in the Japanese language, and cooperation with the regime continues to be perceived as desirable and advantageous. Until 1925, the Presbyterians were the only permitted non-Japanese protestant denomination, so had no religious competition, at least from other Protestants, and were therefore the face of Christian mission in Taiwan. At the same time, well-educated local pastors who had become leaders within the national intellectual elite were becoming ever more prominent in the leadership of the Presbyterian mission, which was therefore becoming ever less ‘foreign’. During this first stage of the Presbyterian discourse on the language issue, the church saw local languages as a key to the success of its mission, and despite difficulties with the new language policy made no significant political criticism of the government. After the Japanese colonial era and into the early years of the GMD government, the church

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

65

largely continued its strategy of cooperation. That all changed with the publication in 1971 of On Our National Fate. The Second Stage: 1971–1985 The argument that working in local languages was key to the success of the mission continues into the second stage, but now we see a change in the PCT’s approach to political activity: from 1971 onward, the church openly voices its criticism of the government. Before the nationalists came to Taiwan from the mainland, the country was a veritable babel of languages: Chinese, Japanese, local languages such as Taiwanese (taiwanhua 台灣話), and the Austronesian languages of the indigenous people. Several ways of writing Chinese and Taiwanese were used, such as Romanized Chinese and Taiwanese written in Chinese characters. As part of its program of re-Chinafication, the GMD government followed the Japanese government in implementing a national language policy (guoyu 國語). Now all languages other than Chinese were banned. Taiwanese languages were restricted (movies and books could be made or published in Chinese-only). The Hoklo and Hakka languages were denounced as vulgar (F. Shih 2012), Romanized transcription of Mandarin Chinese was forbidden as the GMD argued that the Chinese language should be written only in characters, and as part of the de-Japanization of Taiwanese citizens, the Japanese language was also banned. The new language policy once again presented problems for the PCT. Presbyterian churches that had been conducting services in a variety of local languages were forced to use only the national language, even though many Taiwanese were unable to communicate in Chinese. Most Taiwanese regarded the national language as the language of the tyrant (Amae 2012). Whereas local languages had up to this point been seen mainly as a tool for localizing mission and communicating the Gospel to Taiwanese in their mother tongue, during the period of martial law, Taiwanese languages began to be considered a sign of protest, an expression of disagreement with the ruling party, and the Romanized vernacular became a symbol of Christianity (C. Lin 1999). In 1975, the government confiscated all Bibles not written in Chinese. Many of these were published by the PCT and used for missionary purposes. As a response, numerous protests were called in Taiwan and abroad. In the same year,

66

M. RYCHETSKÁ

the PCT published the document Our Appeal , which declared the right to use local languages for religious purposes: In a free world everyone enjoys full religious freedom. Thus, every person should be able to enjoy the freedom to use his own language to worship God, to express his own religious faith. Regrettably, Bibles published by the Bible Society in local languages have been unexpectedly confiscated and banned. The incident was a great shock to people here and abroad. The authorities regarded using dialects for Bibles as a contravention of the policy to promote the use of the National language, and this is the reason they were suppressed. Furthermore, we [urge the government] to guarantee the freedom to continue to publish Bibles in any language. (Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1975)

Clearly a response to specific events that jeopardized the PCT’s mission, the document emphasizes the need to authorize the publication of the Bible in different languages and to allow the use of local languages in worship, two practices evidently associated with the church’s missionary aspirations. Local languages are still, then, being seen as a tool for successful mission: the statement was published primarily because the language policy threatened the church’s mission, not because of any general disagreement with government policy. The argument has developed from the first stage but has not changed in essence. The church’s next significant statement on the language policy was Petition against ‘Regulation of Temples and Churches’ by the PCT , published in 1979 as a response to a new draft regulation dealing with religious institutions: To forbid local languages will not only cause problems to mission, but also harm the prestige of the government. Language is a missionary tool, if people enjoy religious freedom, it depends entirely on the possibility to be able or not freely use own language. Petition against (Petition against ‘Regulation of Temples and Churches’ by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1979)

In June of that year, the PCT found that the ‘draft’ regulation had in fact already been approved by the Executive Yuan (Xingzheng yuan 行政院). Petition raised numerous objections to the regulation, which was eventually withdrawn. The argument was similar to that used in Our

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

67

Appeal : language is closely connected with religion. Being allowed to use your mother tongue to worship God is a matter of religious freedom, and using local languages is an important missionary tool. Both documents clearly state that the suppression of local languages and dialects restricts religious freedom and poses a threat to missionary activity. From the 1970s onward, the PCT, unlike other Christian groups, began to openly criticize the GMD government. Although there were now more Protestant churches, most of the new missionaries who had come from mainland China after 1949 focused on mission to Mainlanders rather than to indigenous Taiwanese. The majority of PCT pastors, however, were Taiwanese and better able than foreign missionaries to identify with the oppression and problems experienced by Taiwanese society. Increasing dissatisfaction within the regime led the PCT to issue more public statements, which now concerned politics as well as religion. The church increasingly saw itself as the voice of the oppressed local community. The campaign to use local languages in church services and publications resonated powerfully with the wider population, and even those who were not Christians began to recognize the PCT as a defender of the Taiwanese people. As it became active in politics, the PCT began to see itself as a Taiwanese church—a church for all Taiwanese, including the Hoklo, the Hakka, and indigenous peoples—and to present itself as a protector and defender of the Taiwanese nation and a voice for human rights, democracy, and self-government. The Third Stage: From 1985 The third stage represents a further shift in the church’s argument for the importance of local languages. In 1985, the PCT published two public statements: the Resolution about ‘Letter from the Ministry of the Interior Prohibiting the Use of Dialects for the Sermon’, and Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’. The central theme of both documents was the promotion of local languages, but the argument for protecting such languages was now couched in the following terms: Dialect is a nation’s inherent culture, is an important part of people’s lives, and also is the expression of religious life, which can’t be separated from content. (Resolution about ‘Letter from the Ministry of the Interior Prohibiting the Use of Dialects for the Sermon’ 1985)

68

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Language is an inherent human talent, a God given gift, a basic condition for human existence and self-affirmation; it is the essence of human history and culture. (Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 1985)

There is no longer any reference to language as a missionary tool or to the use of local languages for religious purposes. Language is now associated with the civilization of society; it is the basis of human society, culture, and nationhood. A new theological argument is added in support of protecting local languages: language is a gift from the Christian God.1 The statements are also much more direct in their criticism of the government: The prohibition of dialects will bring to the church and national society many disturbances, conflicts, and numerous disorders. Moreover, it will destroy the government and the nation’s image in the international space. (Resolution about ‘Letter from the Ministry of the Interior Prohibiting the Use of Dialects for the Sermon’ 1985) Because of the implementation of the Language Law, basic human rights and religious freedoms will be seriously harmed. [The law] will cause the nation and the state to be brought to endless disaster. (Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 1985)

Here, the PCT is not only voicing the church’s concerns regarding the future of Taiwan but also seeking to exert pressure on the GMD government: the language policy presented a real danger to the machinery of the state and to the whole nation. To a localized Taiwanese church, this new emphasis seemed more appropriate than continuing to make an argument based on concerns regarding its missionary activity. The PCT’s response to the GMD government’s language policy was the development of the new church’s argument for the importance of local languages. From 1985 onward, a new theological justification for the promotion of local languages appears.

1 For more information about the argument, see the following chapter.

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

69

Church’s Struggle for Taiwanese National Identity2 Within the context of contemporary Taiwan, the question of national identity is still a very current issue. Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, there was, among others, one evident political problem—an absence of consensus regarding national Taiwanese identity. Therefore, the question of national identity has started to be a very popular topic of public discussion (Wachman 1994; Muyard 2014). During Taiwan’s quite complicated history, there were different and changing groups of residents living in Taiwan. Those different groups used to distinguish each other by defining themselves according to ethnicity, local diversity, shared cultural heritage, common ancestry, etc. But in recent decades, there has been a public rise of the new Taiwanese national identity, which is defined as multicultural and multi-ethnic, uniting four different ethnic groups living in Taiwan— the Hoklo, the Hakka, the Mainlanders, and the indigenous people.3 It does not mean, however, that there was literally no discussion about national identity before the 1980s. After the Guomindang government took control of Taiwan, many Taiwanese national movements emerged. Some of them were based on common ethnicity while others on common citizenship. According to the first mentioned, Taiwanese included only Hoklo people—ethnicnational identity was created upon common ancestry, common language, and common culture. But this national identity was excluding other people living in Taiwan who often shared the very same experience. On the contrary, civic nationalism was able to bring together all people in Taiwan, all Taiwan’s citizens. Therefore, in civic nationalism, Taiwanese is 2 This sub-chapter follows how the PCT established the new Taiwanese national identity during the martial law. For information about the contemporary church’s discourse on national identity, see Rychetská (2021a, b). 3 The ethnic composition of Taiwan is diverse and distinctive. Four groups can be distinguished: The Hoklo (Heluoren 河洛人), the Hakka (Kejia 客家), Mainlanders, and indigenous people (yuanzhumin 原住民). Of these, only three (the Hoklo [70%], the Hakka [18%], and Mainlanders [10%]) are found in mainland China, where they are perceived only as language groups, not ethnic groups, as they are part of the most prominent ethnic group of the Han. The Hoklo came to Taiwan from Fujian Province in China in ancient times; the Hakka emigrated from inland China; Mainlanders migrated to Taiwan after 1949 with the arrival of the Nationalist government. Indigenous Taiwanese have different ethnic roots from these three groups. They are of Austronesian origin and currently represent only around 2% of the population.

70

M. RYCHETSKÁ

a political term, connecting people with different cultural, linguistic, and ethnic backgrounds. This national identity has been also adopted by the PCT that has recognized itself as a Taiwanese church connecting Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous people. In fact, nowadays many scholars as well as people living in Taiwan believe Taiwanese national identity is civic in nature (Muyard 2014). According to Amae (2007: viii), the Presbyterian Church has been ‘a catalyst of discourse on civic Taiwanese nationalism’, and therefore the church can be seen as very influential in the society. In Taiwan’s context, conversion to Christianity could be problematic and the Protestant mission has often faced such issues. The church can grow only if it is able to adapt itself to Taiwanese society (Rubinstein 1991). The missionaries often care also about other problems, not just eternal salvation. During sermons pastors sometimes rather react to dayto-day matters of the believers than discuss the exegesis of Bible (S. Yang 2008). Support of the new Taiwanese national identity can be understood as PCT’s reaction to the contemporary needs of people. As explained in Froese and Pfaff (2001), in a totalitarian regime that nonetheless allows freedom of religion, some religious groups may feel free to oppose the government. However, the strategy can be successful only if the church is able to represent the oppressed nation and is a ‘national church’. In this case, creating a narrative of a national church means further connecting Christian ideas to the Taiwanese cultural context via religious localization. In the Chinese and Taiwanese context, such a scenario seems impossible as Christians (whether Catholics or Protestants) are a minority within the population; and conversion to Christianity is often seen as betraying Chinese identity. The PCT therefore faced the challenge of creating a national identity which would not only include the Presbyterian Church but also establish a certain status for the church, namely, the status of an alternative leader of the society. The PCT narrated a new multicultural identity of Taiwanese people and declared the church to be a prophet to the nation. Since 1970s, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has been the promoter of specific Taiwanese national identity—it is obvious from how terms ‘Taiwan’ (台灣) and ‘Republic of China’ (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國) were used in all public statements of the PCT. Before the year 1987, the term ‘Taiwan’ was used 24 times referring to a country, state, or territory. In

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

71

contrast, the term ‘Republic of China’ was used only 4 times.4 Similarly, ‘Taiwan’ (‘Taiwanese’) as a qualifier for persons was used 15 times, but people of the ‘Republic of China’ appears only once. Furthermore, ‘Taiwan’ is connected with the noun ‘people/inhabitants’ (renmin 人民) as well as with the noun ‘compatriots’ (tongbao 同胞). The term tongbao can also mean ‘siblings’ (people born from the same parents, having the same ancestors). Even in the English versions of statements, the term tongbao is translated as ‘brothers and sisters’ (Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1975). The term has an emotional connotation—it deepens the sense of belonging and creates a certain bond within the text of the public statements. After lifting of martial law in 1987, the trend favoring the term ‘Taiwan’ continued— ‘Taiwan’ was used 25 times more frequently. Usage of different names for the territory of Taiwan has a great significance. For example, President Lee Teng-Hui (李登輝, 1923–2020) has preferred the term ‘Republic of China’ in his official speeches. He has used this name for Taiwan in order to Chinaficate the population of Taiwan—promoting the Chinese identity of Taiwanese people (Lu 2015). If the PCT has implemented just the opposite strategy in the name used for Taiwan, we can assume this is because of the church’s attempt to create a distinct Taiwanese national identity separate from Chinese identity. In the public statements, the Presbyterian Church did not only promote national Taiwanese identity but, more importantly, also introduced a new model of identity. The new model rejected ethnic nationalism that considered only Hoklo people, the biggest ethnic group in Taiwan, to belong to the ‘Taiwanese nation’. Civic nationalism, introduced in the statements, did not build Taiwanese national identity on a common ethnicity, culture, or language. On the contrary, in the very first Public Statement On Our National Fate by the PCT , the PCT made a noticeable effort to interconnect people with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds: The current inhabitants of Taiwan—of which some ancestors settled here thousands of years ago, most moved here two-three centuries ago, and some came here after World War II. Despite the fact that our backgrounds and opinions may differ we have a common belief and ambitions—we love this island, it is our home [...] certainly we are not willing to live under

4 The most commonly used term for denoting country/state/territory was the neutral ‘country’ (guojia 國家)—55 times.

72

M. RYCHETSKÁ

the communist totalitarian system.5 (Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1971)

From this formulation, it is clear that Taiwan is regarded to be home for various different individuals and groups. At the same time, within the text, there is established unification among them, leading to united identification. According to the statement, all that is needed is to call Taiwan one’s own home and love the island. Thus, a very strong emotional bond between residents and the territory of Taiwan is created. It does not matter, according to the statement, whether Taiwan’s residents have different origins or even (political) opinions. Even if it is not made explicit, the only important thing is to team up against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its Communist regime.6 In general, if different groups in Taiwan (including the PCT) share mutual aims, it is a sufficient basis for a common identity. It does not matter whether there are differences in language, culture, ethnicity, or even religion. Christianity, therefore, should not be perceived as something distinctive—if Christians live in Taiwan, love it, identify with its people, and fight for a better future for Taiwan, they should be easily connected with other Taiwanese people. According to the PCT, all who share the same aims can share the same identity. The PCT represents itself as closely linked to the Taiwanese population. The church has been fighting for the Taiwanese nation—its members share the same identity with the rest of Taiwan’s population. We can find a very similar argumentation in other public statements of the PCT. Those statements contain an explicit or implicit reference to multi-ethnic national identity based on common citizens. In 1975 Our Appeal there were already some signs, but the idea of the new model of national identity wasn’t yet formulated:

5 The statement was also translated into English by the church. However, the characterization of the PRC regime as ‘communist totalitarian system’ (gongchan jiquan 共產極 權) is missing in the English version. 6 Such a requirement was a reaction to the already mentioned visit to Beijing by Kissinger in 1971. People in Taiwan were afraid that the normalization of relations between the USA and the PRC would lead to handover of Taiwan under the administration of the PRC. The PCT was just verbalizing concerns in Taiwan’s society.

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

73

Citizens should enjoy privileges, responsibilities, and the same opportunities. After all, we are all compatriots (brothers and sisters)7 living in the same territory. Therefore, we should treat each other with mutual understanding, help each other, and adopt the attitude of mutual belonging. (Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1975)

In the statement, there was already the idea of ‘mutual belonging’ according to shared citizenship and territory. Another, more concrete formulation of a multi-ethnic nation/society is included in the statement written in 1987: We believe that only the elimination of barriers between aboriginal people and compatriots (brothers and sisters) in the plains allows to enjoy an equal compatriot relationship. We call upon all plains compatriots (brothers and sisters) and churches in the plains to create a new approach to actively cooperate with indigenous people with compassion and mutual respect, enabling our society to establish a multi-ethnic coexistence and to enjoy the variety of cultural characteristics. (Public Notice of Respect for Human Rights of Aboriginal People 1987)

During the presidency (1988–2000) of Lee Teng-Hui (1923–2020), the localization movement/Taiwanization (bentuhua 本土化) took place. The movement was a reaction to the previous program of reChinafication. Not only the approach of Lee Teng-Hui but also the DPP campaign helped to increase national consciousness. The bentuhua movement was an integral part of democratic reforms which took place in the 1990s. The DPP started to describe the Taiwanese nation as consisting of ‘Four Great Ethnic Groups’: Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders, and the original inhabitants (F. Shih 2012). According to Shih Fang-Long, it was President Lee Teng-Hui who tried to develop the concept of a ‘new Taiwanese’. In 1994, Lee said about the Taiwanese nation: Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division. We are all Chinese. Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are Taiwanese. (F. Shih 2012: 20; from Zhongguo shibao 中國時報, 31 Dec 1994)

7 The English version of the statement runs ‘we are all brothers and sisters’.

74

M. RYCHETSKÁ

While Lee Teng-Hui was the first high official to promote the new national identity, it was the PCT that came up with the idea first. The argument for a united identity in the PCT’s public statements and the proclamation of Lee Teng-Hui is the same—any ethnical or cultural difference does not matter, and there should be no division according to the time when someone settled in Taiwan. Before the 1990s, people in Taiwan were not so much divided according to their province of origin, but the important factor was the time of arrival to Taiwan and the opinion about Taiwan’s belonging and political status (Wachman 1994). Lee Teng-Hui was a member of the Presbyterian Church.8 Therefore, we can assume that he was influenced by the narrative of the PCT. An important difference between both formulations is the highlighting of unification of Chinese and Taiwanese identity in President Lee Teng-Hui’s wording. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan did not try to connect Chinese and Taiwanese identity. The church felt no need to remind its followers of their Chinese cultural or linguistic heritage. President Lee was trying to Chinaficate Taiwan’s citizens; the PCT, on the other hand, tried to create a new identity distinct from the Chinese national identity. The Taiwanese nation as a multi-ethnic nation explicitly appeared for the first time in the statement written in 1995: The concept of a new country: Taiwan is a multi-ethnic society with diverse ethnic groups with different backgrounds. Taiwan as a state should be based on mutual respect, mutual trust and equality among all people. The citizens of the new country: Anyone who consider Taiwan to be one’s homeland (native soil). (Statement on ‘New and Independent Taiwan’ 1995)

This statement repeats the PCT church’s position about Taiwanese national identity. It highlights the common civic belonging and goals, instead of ethnic particularity. In 1990s, the term ‘Taiwanese’, for its ambiguity and vagueness, was used for political purposes—sometimes it was used to refer to all residents of Taiwan but ‘in areas where there was a struggle for power, the Democratic Progressive Party tended to stress the politics of ethnicity and identity, and ‘Taiwanese’ thus merely stood for 8 President Lee converted to Christianity and became a devoted believer, who read the Bible and regularly attended church meetings. His faith helped to overcome his trauma of the White Terror. For more information about Lee Teng-hui’s conversion to Christianity, see S. Tsai (2005).

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

75

the majority Hoklo people’ (F. Shih 2012: 20). In that time, Taiwanization was also associated with an ethnical identity of Hoklo people (F. Shih 2012). But the PCT proclaimed its position about the issue very clearly— it still promoted a united multi-ethnic Taiwanese national identity. It is clear that anyone who considers Taiwan to be his/her own home can identify as Taiwanese—as somebody united with the whole of Taiwan’s population. At the time of publishing analyzed statements, the PCT focused its mission on various ethnic groups within Taiwan, not just on Hoklo people. The church was supporting minorities—among them aboriginal tribes. Aboriginal people do not share the same language, culture, or ethnicity with the rest of Taiwan’s population. When thinking about national identity, the church could not forget about the fact many of its believers from aboriginal tribes. The mission was often received more positively within minority groups with some social stigma. The PCT tried to improve the situation of such underprivileged groups. The church played a crucial role in mobilizing and supporting aboriginal people. It provided financial resources, education, and health care. The church also often criticized the GMD government for harming native people (Enn 2012). Since Japanese colonial rule, tribal people in Taiwan experienced a long time of constant suppression of their unique identity (Rudolph 2014). But the Christian community provided them with a sense of belonging. The PCT promoted aboriginal languages and preserved their culture. A large amount of presbyteries were established among original inhabitants. But at the same time, the church used its influence to gain new members (Enn 2012). That is why the PCT could not defend the aims of only one group in Taiwan—in general, the main goal of any Christian group is to convert and bound up all people in the church. According to Melissa Brown (2004), aboriginal people have been only recently included in the concept of a new Taiwanese identity. I argue, however, that the PCT has been constructing this blended identity at least since the 1970s. The church has highlighted the way in which Taiwanese national identity unites the people of Taiwan—because a united group would be able to be heard by the government. Later, a rich cultural heritage from mainland China has been recognized, but it has been claimed to be changed through Taiwan’s peculiar history. The new cultural form and identity have been the result of this historical change (Wachman 1994). Thanks to this narrative, Taiwanese national identity

76

M. RYCHETSKÁ

(including also aborigines) has been constructed as a distinctive identity from Chinese identity (M. Brown 2004). I believe, the statement’s appeal for equality and recognition of multiethnic and multicultural identity was also an effort to connect Taiwanese national identity with a specific Presbyterian identity. Since the publishing of the first statement, the church indeed started to organize many protests and meetings promoting the Taiwanese national identity and the independence of Taiwan. It might be surprising that the church never mentioned its own religious belief during its reflections about national identity (but the statements are proclaimed to be ecumenical works). But even without any reference to Christianity, the church was still able to unite its own identity with Taiwanese national identity (as created within the statements). It is very clear that all statements agreed on who should be perceived as included within Taiwanese national identity—anyone who loves Taiwan and sees it as one’s own home. As noted by Yang Huilin (2014), a scholar researching religion in China, Christianity was a foreign religious system in China (and Taiwan) and therefore Christian groups needed to establish a link with Chinese identity (local identity). In accordance with my analysis, the PCT employed precisely this strategy. Christian missionaries have always emphasized the need to create a linkage with the culture they have operated in, and to remove a stigma of a foreign religion. Thus, only the PCT’s identity can be included in Taiwanese national identity, but the Taiwanese national identity cannot be covered by PCT’s identity. It would be counterproductive to bond Taiwanese national identity with Christianity—not everybody would be able to truly identify with such a concept. As it has been shown in the analysis, the PCT supported civic nationalism rather than nationalism based on ethnicity. I have tried to explain that the church implemented this strategy as part of religious localization. The church was focusing its mission on various groups in Taiwan—and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to support just one group. The proclamations of the PCT concerning the new Taiwanese identity were important for several reasons. At first, they made it possible to interconnect people with different ethnical backgrounds and various cultural heritage. They also doubted previous definitions according to which ‘Taiwanese’ were only those who had been living in Taiwan before the GMD’s arrival in 1945. The PCT recognized Taiwan as a separate unit with its own nation. The last very significant reason was the possibility to connect the Presbyterian Church with Taiwanese national identity—they do not

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

77

only share the same aims, but the PCT is a visible fighter for ‘Taiwan church’s issue’—it is the church that was the brave voice of the powerless and suppressed Taiwanese nation.

References Amae, Yoshihisa. 2007. Taiwan’s Exodus: The Presbyterian Church in Taiwanese Nationalism, 1945–1992. Dissertation thesis, Honolulu: University of Hawaii. ———. 2012. Europeans and the Formation of a Presbyterian Enterprise: A Prototype of a Civic Taiwanese Nation? In European Perspectives on Taiwan, ed. Damm Jens and Paul Lim, 46–65. New York: Springer. ˇ Bakešová, Ivana. 1992. Taiwan. Jiná Cína [Taiwan the Other China]. Havíˇrov, Prague: Nakladatelství Petr Pavlík. Bakešová, Ivana, Rudolf Frust and Zdˇenka Heˇrmanová. 2004. Dˇejiny Taiwanu [The History of Taiwan]. Prague: Lidové noviny. Band, Edward. 1936. Barclay of Formosa. Tokyo: Christian Literature Society. Broomhall, Marshall. 1907. The Chinese Empire: A General and Missionary Survey. London: Morgan & Scott. Brown, Melissa J. 2004. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Campbell, William. 1889. An Account of Missionary Success in the Island of Formosa. London: Truebner & Co. Covell, Ralph. 1998. Pentecost of the Hills in Taiwan. The Christian Faith among the Original Inhabitants. Pasadena: Hope Publishing House. Dickson, James. 1974. Stranger than Fiction. A Thrilling Story of Modern Christian Missions Among the Aborigines of Formosa. Toronto: Evangelical Publishers. Enn, Rosa. 2012. Indigenous Empowerment through Collective Learning. Multicultural Education & Technology Journal 6 (3): 149–161. Froese, Paul a Pfaff, Steven. 2001. Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the New Religious Paradigm. Social Forces 80 (2): 481–507. Gold, Thomas. 1994. Civil Society and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity. In Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan, ed. Stevan Harrell and Jun- Huang, 47–68. Boulder: Westview Press. Heylen, Ann. 2013. Reading History and Political Illustration in Taiwan Popular Culture. Oriental Archive 81: 2–25. Ion, A. Hamish. 1993. Cross and the Rising Sun: The British Protestant Movement in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 1865–1945. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

78

M. RYCHETSKÁ

———. 1999. The Cross in the Dark Valley: The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1931–1945. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Kuo, Cheng-tian. 2008. Religion and Democracy in Taiwan. New York: State University of New York Press. Lamley, Harry J. 2007. Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism. In Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein, 201–260. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Lin, Christine L. 1999. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy. Sino-Platonic Papers 92: 1–153. Lu, Wei-lun. 2015. What’s in a Name? The Interplay of Metaphor and Synonymy in Teng-hui’s Presidential Rhetoric. In The 12th Annual Conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies, Krakow, 8–10. April 2015. Krakow. Mackay, George Leslie. 1895. From far Formosa. The Islands, Its People and Missions. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. Marchand. Sandrine. 2010. Silence in Postwar Taiwan. In Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy, ed. Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers, 165– 180. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Muyard, Frank. 2014. The Formation of Taiwan’s New National Identity since the End of the 1980s. In Taiwan since Martial Law: Society, Culture, Politics, Economy, ed. David Blundell, 297–366. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press. Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. 1975. http://english.pct.org. tw/Article/enArticle_public_19751118.html. Accessed 16 December 2019. Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 我們對 《語文法草案》 的立場. 1985. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=020. Accessed 16 December 2019. Petition against ‘Regulation of Temples and Churches’ by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan [反對制定「寺廟教堂條例」台灣基督長老教會請願書]. 1979. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=008. Accessed 16 December 2019. Public Notice of Respect for Human Rights of Aboriginal People 尊重原住民人 權的告白與呼籲文. 1987. Chinese Version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc. aspx?DocID=027. Accessed 01 January 2022. Resolution about ‘Letter from the Ministry of the Interior Prohibiting the Use of Dialects for the Sermon’有關《內政部來函禁止使 用方言傳教》 本教會之決議 文. 1985. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=019. Accessed 16 December 2019. Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe. ———. 2003. Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan: The Presbyterian Church and the Struggle for Minnan/Hakka Selfhood in the Republic

3

RE-CHINAFICATION VERSUS TAIWANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY

79

of China. In Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society, ed. Philip Clart and Brewer Jones, 204–256. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Rudolph, Michael. 2014. Establishing a Tradition of Migrant Brides: The Aborigines. In Immigration Societies. Taiwan and Beyond, ed. Lipinski, Astrid, 23–48. Berlin: Lit Verlag. Rychetská, Magdaléna. 2021.To Unite as One Body: The Presbyterians and Changing Identities in Taiwan. In Christian Social Activism and Rule of Law in Chinese Societies, Studies in Christianity in China, ed. Fenggang Yang and Chris White, 53–71. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press. Shih, Fang-long. 2012. Taiwan’s Subjectivity and National Narrations: Towards a Comparative Perspective with Ireland. Taiwan in Comparative Perspectives 4: 6–33. ———. 2021. Taiwan’s Culture Wars from “re-China-ization” to “Taiwanization” and beyond: President Tsai Ing-wen’s Cultural Policy in Long-term Perspective. In Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges, ed. June Teufel Dreyer and Jacques De Lisle, 284–311. London, New York: Routledge. Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan台灣基督 長老 教會對國是的聲明與建議. 1971. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org. tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=001>. Accessed 12 February 2022. Statement on ‘New and Independent Taiwan’《新而獨立的台灣》 聲明. 1995. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=070. Accessed 02 April 2016. Takeshi, Komagone, and J.A. Mangan. 1997. Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan 1895–1922: Precepts and Practices of Control. History of Education 26 (3): 307–322. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. 2005. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wachman, Alan M. 1994. Competing Identities in Taiwan. In The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present, ed. Rubinstein, Murray A., 17–80. New York, London: M. E. Shape. Whitehorn, John. 1955. He Led Them on: The Story of the Christian Movement among the Paiwan Tribe of Formosa. London, Ayesbury: Hanzell Watson &Viney LTD. Yang, Huilin. 2014. China, Christianity, and the Question of Culture. Texas: Baylor University Press. Yang, Shu-Yuan. 2008. Christianity, Identity, and the Construction of Moral Community Among the Bunun of Taiwan. Social Analysis 52 (3): 51–74.

CHAPTER 4

Church and the Human Rights

Human rights are a moral concept; rights are attributed to a person regardless of nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, language, or religion1 . Fundamental human rights encompass four generations of rights that developed over time. The first-generation of rights are those ‘that refer to personal autonomy of the individual and the rights that enable citizen participation in power in a society’ (Cornescu 2009: 3). These rights are enshrined in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights (1976); first-generation rights include freedom of religion. The second generation of rights is socioeconomic and cultural. The thirdgeneration is solidarity rights such as the right to a healthy environment, peace, and the right of people to self-determination. The fourth generation is rights related to future generations and includes those pertaining to genetic engineering (Cornescu 2009; van der Ven 2010). In Western liberal democracies, human rights are considered universal and timeless and are ‘all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible’ (UN General Assembly 1948). Clemens Nathan (2009) nonetheless points out that the concept is not truly universal but rather a product of the European Enlightenment. Its origins are generally associated with the rise of 1 Religious groups, including Christian churches, have of course been involved in human rights violations, often appealing to their religious authority to justify their actions. See, for example, Robinson 2018.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_4

81

82

M. RYCHETSKÁ

modern rational philosophy and a more critical approach towards Christianity: declarations on human rights such as the Universal Declaration are based on the principle of personal autonomy, although this still resonates quite strongly with the Christian teaching of people as representatives of God on the earth. The supposed contradiction between human autonomy and Christian theology is not an insurmountable obstacle to a Christian definition of human rights, and the ideas underpinning human rights are becoming an increasing focus of Protestant theology and are drawing Protestant communities into greater political engagement. Human rights can be categorized as social, civil, personal, and religious, and include the rights to liberty, free movement, use of the mother tongue, and freedom of conscience and religion (Horyna 2003). They are usually regarded as pertaining to the individual but are often appropriate to—and appropriated by—whole communities (Black 2009). Attempts to connect human rights and Christianity have always been controversial. Some Christians argue that the concept derives at least partly from the New Testament (Taber 2002); others believe Christian doctrine is incompatible with liberal values (O’Donovan 1996)2 and that supporting modernity inevitably leads to the marginalization of Christian religious tradition.3 However, Grayling (2017) sees the roots of human and civil rights in the Protestant Reformation and the emergence of the idea of freedom of conscience. However, while bringing new ideas and supporting some rights, the leaders of the Protestant Reformation were not supporters of political liberty. Still, the influence of the Reformation, and especially of Calvin’s theology regarding modern civil and human rights, has been a cause of significant dispute. Interestingly, Calvin himself 2 One significant example of Christian institutions failing to promote human rights is the Holocaust (1939–1945). The Catholic Church did not counter German nationalism, and several Protestant churches took a pro-Nazi stance (Shepherd 2009). Some Christian leaders also gave their blessing to horrific human rights violations is Rwanda. Catholic and Protestant groups—including the head of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda—supported the genocidal killing (Waller 2009). In Taiwan during the period of martial law, several Protestant groups supported Chiang Kai-shek—himself a baptized Methodist—and failed to condemn his regime’s human rights violations. 3 The Vatican published several encyclicals condemning liberal human rights. In Quod

aliquantum from as early as 1791, Pius VI called all Christians to oppose the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’ as he believed it was antithetical to Catholic doctrine. In 1832, Gregory XVI published Mirari vos, which condemned ‘liberalism, individualism, and democracy as well as freedom of conscience, of speech, and of the press’ (Hogan 2015: 58).

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

83

was little interested in the subject: he wrote no commentary on politics except for one section of his Institutes (Vorster 1999). While his followers would use his theological view of creation, of human beings as the image of God, and of common grace to support the idea that human dignity was inherent, he himself never promoted subjective rights or individual liberties (O’Donovan 2015). Rather, he emphasized punishment for heresy (Vorster 1999). This point is further highlighted by Lecce, McArthur, and Schafer (2017: 5–6): ... the Protestant leaders were not themselves consistent believers in political or even religious liberty. Reacting to a peasant revolt that challenged the foundation of Germany’s social order, Luther wrote that princely authority is divinely ordained, and he explicitly denied that common people are qualified to judge what should be the bounds of their rulers’ power. And Calvin suppressed dissenters while in control of Geneva’s government, going so far as to allow one of them, Michael Servetus, to be executed. And, apart from the religious ideals of the Reformation, we might find other, concurrent sources for the emergence of the concept of human rights, such as the revival of classical ideas, the spread of literacy, and the economic changes that undermined feudal structures of authority and gave common people more control over their lives. But it is an open question whether any of these could have had a comparable impact under a society still dominated by the iron hand of the Catholic Church.

There are other voices that support Grayling’s claim. Linda Hogan (2015: 58) argues that ‘the formative role that Christianity played in the articulation of liberal values continues to have relevance for today’. During early modern times, it was Calvinist theologians who played a significant role in creating the discourse on human rights. Theodore Beza (1519–1605), Johannes Althusius (1563–1638), John Milton (1608– 1674), and John Adams (1735–1826) all promoted ‘Christian social witness’ and addressed social issues from a biblical perspective (Hogan 2015). Witte further explains that: Early modern Calvinists were particularly ardent champions of the rights of life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness, rights of democratic election and representation, rights to political dissent and civil resistance, freedoms of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly, freedoms of contract and association, rights to marriage, family, divorce and inheritance,

84

M. RYCHETSKÁ

rights to form and dissolve corporations, partnerships and other voluntary associations. (Witte 2007: 35)

Such thinking shaped the Protestant churches that built their theology on classical Christian texts and on Calvin’s theology and that of his followers and strongly influenced teaching in the Protestant world regarding church and state, duties and rights (Witte and Alexander 2010). While not all protestant churches have promoted civil and human rights, many have felt the pressure to draw a connection between their religious traditions and conformity to the newly emerging approaches to human rights. They often reinvented their own tradition as one that promotes human rights because ‘religious believers might certainly find it easier to believe in human rights … if they could be assured that God does indeed believe in human rights’ (Evans 2007: 9).

The PCT’s Perspective on Human Rights The PCT statements devote a significant amount of space to human rights, such as the rights to personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech. Although the Constitution of the Republic of China guarantees several of these rights, Article 26 adds that human rights may be restricted ‘in order to avert an imminent crisis, maintain social order, or promote the public interest’ (Neary 2002: 103). The Nationalist government was thus all but absolved from the necessity to respect human rights. Criticism of this approach and of the vague wording in the Constitution was one of the points made in the PCT’s first official statement: We oppose any powerful nation disregarding the rights and wishes of fifteen million people and making unilateral decisions to their own advantage, because God ordained, and the United Nations Charter has affirmed,4 that every people has the right to determine its own destiny. (Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1971)

The statement suggests that the concept of human rights is not simply a part of Christian doctrine. Rather, because it is the Christian God who 4 In the Chinese version of the text, there is no mention of the UN.

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

85

grants people their human rights, the Christian church has the right to demand them, and in this case request that the government fulfill them. In a later statement, we read that according to the PCT, the Christian church (represented by the PCT) is to be the guarantor and protector of human rights: The purpose of the Church of Christ, to which also we belong, is to spread the love of God. Its mission is to uphold human rights and human dignity. Its service is to seek a peaceful and civil society by promoting justice, freedom, peace, and reconciliation. (A Clarification about ‘Mr. An Kezhi’s Testimony in the Asia Pacific Affairs Group’ 1981)

The mission of the Presbyterian Church is therefore not only to spread the Christian Gospel but also to promote human rights and dignity, and thus to participate actively in civil society and engage directly in national politics. This hints at a significant shift in the church’s perspective on the role it should play in civil society. As part of the Protestant reformed church movement based on Calvin’s teaching, Presbyterian churches had previously advocated a separation between church and state: Based on his doctrine of the two kingdoms, Calvin argued that Church and state are to be kept distinct from each other. But against the Anabaptists, who rejected the participation of Christians in government as civil magistrates, Calvin argued that both Church and state are ordained by God. He was convinced that when Church and state are separate from each other, both can maintain their reciprocal cooperation and mutual responsibility. (Intan 2018: 56)

At the beginning of their mission in Taiwan, Presbyterian missionaries also advocated the separation of church and state. During Japanese colonial rule, less than 40 years before the first public call for human rights, the missionary Edward Band promoted cooperation with the government rather than support for the rights of local believers. His primary concern was to protect the mission: Many Formosans5 are disappointed that in this affair we missionaries have not stood out as the champions of Formosan independence against the authorities. We have no desire or right to do that. As missionaries, if we 5 Formosa is a name for Taiwan formerly used in the West.

86

M. RYCHETSKÁ

can secure an official guarantee that no infringement will be made against perfect freedom for Christian education, we must be prepared to carry out the colonial policy of the Japanese authorities. (Band 1936: 473)

Band believed that Christian missionaries had no right to criticize the government. As well as there being no theological basis for social engagement at this time, non-intervention was advocated in an effort to maintain good relations with the government and to protect Christian education. After 1928, if missionaries wanted their schools to stay open, they had not only to use the Japanese language but also to perform Shinto rituals, especially during the time of the K¯ominka movement (Amae 2012). The Presbyterians were not prepared to give up their schools and endanger their missionary activity, so chose to cooperate. The leading figures of the Presbyterian mission were, furthermore, foreigners, who did not perhaps identify strongly enough with the needs and issues of the local population, so allowed the practice of the national cult, considering it merely a harmless manifestation of nationalism. Their focus, rather, was on education and healthcare (Ion 1999). From the late 1960s, the fundamental theological position of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan began to change, especially with the emergence of contextual theology, which supplanted many of the tenets of Calvinism. Human rights were an important issue for the PCT, whose public statements were issued precisely because of perceived violations. Importantly, the PCT believed that basic human rights included those to self-determination and free elections. Although we might now categorize these third-generation rights, for the church leaders they were foundational. In the PCT’s second official statement, On Our National Fate: Motivated by Faith and Theology, a further reference to human rights emerged regarding their origin and the fact that the church must become the protector of those rights: But should the corporate Church, which acts in the name of Christ, keep absolute silence on social and political issues? Not necessarily, as in the following two situations, (i) When political power from without violates the nature of the Church and the carrying out of her mission on earth, and when, (ii) similarly, political power from without violates human rights, that is, the dignity of human existence. Therefore, looking at it from the point of view of Christian faith and ethics, if the two situations cited above should occur (or even have the possibility of occurring), that is, if the Church’s life and human rights are

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

87

violated, then (i) the Church cannot but contend vigorously for the truth of the Gospel and its own life, and (ii) also fight to protect God-given human rights, for the origin of human rights lies in man’s having been created in the image of God (Gen. 1:26-27). When the Church of Christ in either of these two cases produces a statement, this kind of statement is not basically political, but is a confession of faith. (On Our National Fate: Motivated by Faith and Theology 1972)

Human rights are described as a gift from God. Here, the argument goes further than the previous statement and is supported by a reference to the Bible—the First Book of Moses. The PCT took the story from the Bible and linked it directly to its own context: if people are created in the image of God, they have human rights, and human rights are universal because all human beings are God’s creation; the PCT is to become the protector of these rights since it is the bearer of the Christian faith.

Language as a Basic Human Right The Nationalist government, like most Chinese mainlanders, did not understand Taiwanese (especially its various dialects) and banned its use as a language of instruction and a language for written texts. In fact, to cement its hold on power in the country, the government banned all languages except the Chinese national language (guoyu 國語). The PCT flouted this rule, but most other denominations in Taiwan used Chinese, not only because they wanted to avoid conflict with the government but also because their mission was directed towards migrants from mainland China. The national Chinese language was incomprehensible to most Taiwanese, however, and quickly became known as the language of the oppressor (Amae 2012). The PCT took issue with the GMD’s language policy and continued to publish books, Bibles, and sermons in whichever local language was spoken by its target audience. Presbyterians had promoted local languages since the beginning of their missionary work in Taiwan, and therefore considered the government’s requirements impossible to apply. As well as their historical use for missionary purposes, under martial law, local languages became a means of expressing disagreement with the ruling GMD. The use of the Taiwanese language was considered a sign of protest, and the Romanized vernacular became identified with Christianity (C. Lin 1999). Because the church protested against the language

88

M. RYCHETSKÁ

policy, the rest of the society began to consider the PCT a defender of the nation. Using local languages during religious services and in church newspapers had a powerful impact on the Taiwanese population and emphasized the fact that PCT pastors identified with the oppression and problems experienced by the whole of Taiwanese society. The importance of local languages is stressed in the memoirs of Shoki Coe (1993: 244): ‘One’s mother tongue is part and parcel of one’s very existence. To try to forbid it, to take it away forcibly, this is nothing less than an attempt to obliterate one’s identity as a person’. Suppressing the use of a person’s mother tongue is seen as depriving them of a basic human right. In 1975, the government confiscated all Bibles not written in Chinese. Most of these were published by the PCT and used for missionary purposes. Christians responded with protests in Taiwan and abroad, and the PCT published Our Appeal : In view of the danger in which our country stands at this time, the Church must take responsibility with regard to the nation’s survival, and once again honestly express to the government our Church’s position on the national fate… The people in every nation in the free world enjoy full religious liberty. Thus, every person should be able to enjoy the freedom to use his own language to worship God and to express his own religious faith… On the basis of its mission to protect human rights and preserve human dignity, the Church appeals to the government to strengthen the development of society, to focus its attention on the atmosphere of corruption in society, of unequal distribution of wealth, of avarice, public peace and order and pollution, and to adopt effective measures to safeguard human rights and the welfare of the people. (Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1975)

Elsewhere, the statement emphasizes the need to authorize the publication of the Bible in different languages and argues that the implementation of the new language policy violates religious freedom (xinyang ziyou 信仰自由). The statement does not make an explicit link between religious freedom and human rights, but freedom of religion is a firstgeneration human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration. The language policy of the GMD government was threatening the mission of the church, which had appointed itself as the protector of human rights and of the whole of Taiwanese society.

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

89

Several other PCT statements supported the use of local languages. In 1985, the church openly declared that the new language policy deprived people of their fundamental human rights and could lead to the destruction of Taiwanese society: Because of the implementation of the Language Law, the basic human rights and religious freedom will be seriously harmed.... It will cause the nation and the state to be brought to endless disaster. (Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 1985) Prohibition of dialects will bring to the Church and national society many disturbances, conflicts, and numerous disorders; moreover, it will destroy the government, the country’s image in international space. (Resolution about ‘Letter from the Ministry of the Interior Prohibiting the Use of Dialects for the Sermon’ 1985)

The argumentation has changed. The church is worried about Taiwan’s future and is urging the government to withdraw the language policy. Its rhetoric is urgent: language concerns the whole society, culture, and nation.

Free Elections and Self-Determination as Human Rights The PCT narrative sees free elections and self-determination as basic human rights. A demand for free elections may be a surprising inclusion in what was purported to be an ‘ecumenical’ document, but the church had formulated its stance on self-determination as a human right at least as early as 1970, that is, before it had publicly declared it in the statements: Basic human rights demand that the welfare and wishes of the ten million people who live in Formosa should be the major factor in determining Formosa’s future. (Correspondence in Presbyterian Church of English Foreign Missions Committee collection)

A year later, the church called for self-determination in an official statement that it claims was a result of ecumenical cooperation. The motivation was political, however, and the religious argumentation was added later to support the claims, as we see by comparing the church’s first two statements. The statement from 1971 couches the request for elections in the following terms:

90

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Recently the government has stressed the use of new people in official positions. Therefore, we earnestly request that, within the Taiwan area, it hold elections of all representatives to the highest government bodies to succeed the present representatives who were elected 25 years ago on the mainland. (Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1971)

The elections are not linked to the issue of human rights and there is no link with Christian doctrine—the appeal is based solely on social and political concerns. By the following year, however, the argument had moved on: Even this proposal that the government “hold elections of all representatives to the highest government bodies” is motivated by the belief that human rights are given by God. For we believe that only in this way can there be any internal reforms. (On Our National Fate: Motivated by Faith and Theology 1972)

The statement was a response to Christians from other communities who had criticized the 1971 document for being too political. The document was controversial not only in Christian circles (Neary 2002), and some criticism even came from within the PCT itself. The Seven Sisters Presbytery published a critical response to On Our National Fate and even threatened to withdraw from the PCT (Correspondence in Presbyterian Church of English Foreign Missions Committee collection). Little wonder, then, that the church soon sought to consider its political demands more theologically. The argument was constructed as follows: fresh elections are necessary—elections are a human right—human rights are a gift from God— human beings were created in the image of God—the Genesis narrative. According to these connections, the PCT argued that the demand for fresh elections was based directly on their faith as they had created a link to the biblical text. Efforts towards social transformation along the lines of democratic Western countries nonetheless begin to come to the fore: here, the Christian doctrine works more as a legitimizing tool, and interestingly, the reference to Genesis appears in only one other statement: We believe that we are created in God’s image, that people should have dignity and a free will to determine their own destiny. We also believe

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

91

that God gave us land for each to live on in peace. But in human history, people have abused power to seize land and life from others by force, so that the world is filled with injustice and evil. We believe in Jesus Christ who became human and proclaimed the coming of the Kingdom of God, changing the old world order for a new creation. This is the basis for the hope of humankind. (Declaration of Sovereignty and Independence of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1991)

There is no explicit mention of human rights (renquan 人權) in the document, but we do find a reference to the right to dignity (zunyan 尊嚴). Since human rights and the right to dignity are often directly connected in the PCT’s statements, such wording can be considered an indirect reference to human rights. Furthermore, the church once again puts the Christian doctrine of creation at the foundation of its theology. Such a foundation is necessary if human rights are to be considered universally applicable. However, ‘[what] human rights advocates very rarely say is that the notion of human rights rests on a developed account of human nature’ (C. Brown 2013: 24). Indeed, many advocates of human rights are unable to define what makes human rights both truly human and truly universal. At this point, a Christian interpretation fills the gap: people were created by God. This is of course a religious interpretation, but it shows how religion can enter the secular discourse with its religious language and understanding. Nonetheless, rather than trying to find a fixed definition, we should look at the issue of human rights within a pluralist discourse, which ‘although embedded in the politics of power, has nonetheless been productive of enduring values’ (Hogan 2015: 3). In this way, the PCT’s interpretation based on its Christian doctrine also has a role to play. The same understanding of human rights as a gift from the Christian God is mentioned in other statements from the church: Our Church confesses that Jesus Christ is Lord of all mankind and believes that human rights and a land in which each one of us has a stake are gifts bestowed by God. Therefore, we make the declaration, set in the context of the present crisis threatening the 17 million people of Taiwan. (A Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1977) We firmly believe that land and human rights are given by God. Therefore, the aim of the Church is to love one’s own homeland and actively

92

M. RYCHETSKÁ

care for the future of Taiwan. (Recommendations from the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan Concerning the Present Situation 1990)

There has been little change in the PCT’s narrative of human rights since 1975. In addition to the argument that human rights are granted by God, we can see here how the church linked the concept of basic human rights to the right to a homeland and therefore to Taiwan’s right to selfdetermination. While promoting human rights, the church also called for the creation of an independent country, often using the term ‘homeland’ (xiangtu 鄉土) to support its appeal. Homeland is an emotive, pathosfilled term that readers easily relate to. The argument is clear: the right to a homeland is a fundamental human right granted by God and protected by the PCT as the self-appointed prophet of the Taiwanese nation. The PCT repeatedly appealed for recognition of the right to a homeland: the PCT theologian Wang Xianzhi (王憲治, 1941–1996) introduced the concept of a homeland theology (xiangtu shenxue 鄉土神學) during the Christian Conference in Asia (September 3–5, 1979, Taipei). Wang Xianzhi developed a theology of homeland based on the role of the promised land in Israelite history and on the six major covenants of the First and New Testaments. Taking the Exodus/nation-building/exiles of Israel as a paradigm,6 homeland theology affirms that the issues of ethnicity (people), land, power, and God are the main theological themes for the Israelites, the Israelis, and the Taiwanese (England 2004) (Fig. 4.1). Wang’s theology was based on the church’s position on human rights, including the right to a homeland, and aimed to consolidate a new national Taiwanese identity.7 Huang Po-ho 黃伯和, Chen Nan-Zhou 陳 南州, and Song Choan Seng 宋泉盛 were among the Presbyterian theologians who helped to develop homeland theology. Following on from contextual theology and the public statements of the PCT, Rev. Song, Rev. Coe, Rev. Ng Bu-tong, and Dr. Lim Chong-gi Quansheng founded the movement Formosan Christians for Self-Determination, which aimed to ‘assert [Taiwanese] human rights of self-determination … and to promote the cause of self-determination in the international community of nations’ (England 2004: 688). The first goal of the movement was ‘to 6 The church’s logo reflects this position. The logo displays the burning bush from the Third Book of Moses (Fig. 3). 7 See Chapter 2 of this book.

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

93

Fig. 4.1 Logo of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan displaying the burning bush from the Book of Exodus. (Source https://en.wikipedia. org)

attain a stronger manifestation of Christian conviction of human rights for Taiwan’ (Tiu and Siau 2012: 127). Together with Shoki Coe, this group of theologians sought to create a new Asian theology of liberation based on the view that Christian theology was too dependent on Western ideas and that theology should be local. In their case, theology was to fit the unique cultural and political context of the Taiwanese people. The combination of contextual theology and homeland theology led the PCT to promote Taiwan’s independence and self-determination as a basic human right. In 1977, the PCT issued a statement that dealt solely with the issue of human rights violations in Taiwan. The brief statement was addressed to all Christians and nations of the world, and in the name of President Jimmy Carter: Our Church confesses that Jesus Christ is Lord of all mankind and believes that human rights and a land in which each one of us has a stake are gifts bestowed by God. Therefore, we make the declaration, set in the context of the present crisis threatening the 17 million people of Taiwan. Ever since President Carter’s inauguration as President of the United States he has consistently adopted “Human Rights” as a principle of his diplomacy. This is an epoch-making event in the history of foreign policy... In order to achieve our goal of independence and freedom for the people of Taiwan in this critical international situation, we urge our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country. (A Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1977)

94

M. RYCHETSKÁ

The church again repeats its position that human rights are a gift from God and that land and self-determination form a part of these rights. In the statement, the church openly asked for help from President Carter, who had been a strong advocate for human rights in the early part of his presidency but also continued normal relations with the PRC, a course that the PCT saw as endangering Taiwan’s position on the international stage. In December 1978, President Carter announced that the USA would recognize Beijing rather than Taipei as the capital of China, and in 1979 the USA severed its official relationship with Taiwan. On December 10, 1979, a celebration of Human Rights Day was organized in Kaohsiung, during which the GMD’s opposition (dangwai 黨外) demonstrated against human rights violations in Taiwan.8 The GMD sent in the police to forcibly break up the demonstration and make arrests. Persecution of many of those involved in the ‘Kaoshiung incident’ followed. One of those arrested was Reverend Kao Chun-ming (高俊明, 1929–2019), the general secretary of the PCT. Kao had been one of the signatories of the PCT’s Declaration on Human Rights and was a supporter of Shih Ming-teh (施明德, b. 1941), one of the directors of Formosa Magazine, a platform that opposed the government. The government ‘determined that the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan was an organization which was more political than religious … So the authorities used the Formosa Incident of 10 December 1979 as an excuse to arrest many church people’ (Tiu and Siao 2012: 133). However, after the incident, local people started to collect and circulate information and materials on human rights (Arrigo and Miles 2008). The church made no further official calls for an independent Taiwan until fear of persecution all but ended with the lifting of martial law in 1987.9 The political situation then eased slightly, and a period of free speech began: the government was openly criticized, reforms were proposed (Rawnsley and Rawnsley 2011), and the PCT once again began to support the concept of a sovereign and independent Taiwan. The 8 A year earlier, the PCT organized a service to commemorate the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Originally, it was supposed to be a joined service with the Catholic Church. The latter, however, withdrew from the event as its representatives were afraid of persecution from the state (Amae 2008). 9 During the period of martial law, the GMD government considered Taiwan to be part of mainland China and not, therefore, an independent country. The Taiwanese population was not perceived as a ‘nation’; people were not considered Taiwanese but Chinese citizens.

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

95

term ‘sovereignty’ (zhuquan 主權) was first used in 1989, two years after the lifting of martial law, and in 1991 the PCT published its Declaration of Sovereignty and Independence (台灣主權獨立宣言), an important document in which the church officially and openly appealed for the sovereignty of Taiwan: We believe that we are created in God’s image, that people should have dignity and a free will to determine their own destiny. We also believe that God gave us land for each to live on in peace. But in human history, people have abused power to seize land and life from others by force, so that the world is filled with injustice and evil... The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan firmly proclaims that: Taiwan is a sovereign country. Taiwan’s sovereignty and land belong to the people in Taiwan. Taiwan and China are two different sovereign countries. Therefore, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan categorically affirms that: A new Taiwan Constitution be written... Officially use “Taiwan” to join the United Nations... Establish a new relationship between Taiwan and China. Before a new government is formed based on a new Constitution, and before authority is given by the people as a whole, no person or political party, or group should have the right to consult with the China government about any important policy which influences Taiwan’s security, and matters relating to citizens’ benefits. According to the principle of mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, Taiwan and China should mutually recognize and respect each other and promote harmony and development in Asia and in the Pacific. We sincerely seek God’s help to give us the strength of the Holy Spirit to renew all creation, so that we can establish a new and sovereign Taiwan. (Declaration of Sovereignty and Independence of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 1991)

Almost 20 years later, in January 2019, the PCT published a further statement in support of an independent Taiwanese national identity and the independence of Taiwan as a country: We firmly believe that human rights and homeland are given by God. Christians seek justice and safeguard human dignity in order to participate in the continuing creation of God, manifesting God’s image. We firmly believe that Taiwan is a beautiful homeland given by God to the Taiwanese people, comprised of Austronesian Indigenous Peoples,

96

M. RYCHETSKÁ

descendants of immigrants across the Taiwan Strait who married with Plain Indigenous Peoples, and the new immigrants after WWII. Taiwan is a multi-ethnic and multicultural oceanic nation. Taiwan has never been part of the People’s Republic of China. (On Safeguarding Taiwan’s Sovereignty and Dignity 2019)

The church’s basic position has therefore changed little since the 1990s: Taiwan as an independent country is an outcome of human rights given by God; Taiwan is a gift from God to the Taiwanese people. The PCT promotes Christian involvement in social issues and legitimizes the church’s role in society. Christian faith, the independence of Taiwan, and human rights are all connected. The Christian God is the guarantor of human rights and of self-determination for the Taiwanese people on the territory of Taiwan (Frettingham and Hwang 2017). The Presbyterian Church has been a significant actor in Taiwanese politics, mobilizing its foreign contacts and organizing various events to support human rights in Taiwan and abroad. It established the Worldwide United Association of Taiwanese, which united Taiwanese people in Taiwan and abroad with a view to defending the human rights of its Taiwanese compatriots. The church realized its potential as a member of a wider Christian fellowship and asked for help from abroad. The statements and letters explaining the PCT’s position were distributed among other foreign Christian churches and the church repeatedly appealed to the United Nations and foreign governments for assistance; leaders of Formosan Christians for Self-Determination used their connections to raise funds to help political prisoners (Tiu and Siau 2012). Combining political and theological criticism of the human rights violations committed by the Nationalist government became a powerful tool, and the church and other political opponents of the GMD finally helped Taiwanese society transform itself into a democratic system. Li Teng-hui (李登輝 1923–2020), the first democratically elected president of the Republic of China in Taiwan, was a member of the PCT. Frettingham and Hwang sum up the PCT’s involvement in political developments in Taiwan: It was during the 1970s that the PCT came into open confrontation with the GMD regime, publishing a series of outspoken statements criticizing restrictions on religious freedom and human rights and calling for democratization and self-determination for the people of Taiwan. These

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

97

statements were some of the earliest public attempts to reorient the GMD’s project of national consolidation towards Taiwanese autonomy… The PCT may not have regarded their challenge to the GMD as political, but the government took a different view. The PCT’s advocacy of selfdetermination and democracy, and support for the activist movement that later became the DPP,10 came at a considerable cost during the martial law period. Its challenge to the GMD’s project of state-building accepted its basically secular civic nationalism and its distinctiveness from religion, while making arguments on religious grounds for reorienting it towards a project of Taiwanese nationalism. (Frettingham and Hwang 2017: 365–366)

The early Calvinists saw no problem in using secular language to explain Christian doctrine. The PCT returned to this discourse and took Calvin’s theology of the image of God and common grace as a basis for its narrative on human rights. Calvin’s support for freedom and liberty was based on his interpretation of the Bible, mainly the letters of Saint Paul, but his language was strikingly ‘modern’. He spoke of: the subjective “rights” (iura, droits) of individuals, in addition to their “liberties” or “freedoms” (libertates, libertés). Sometimes, he used such general phrases as “the common rights of mankind” (iura commune hominum), the “natural rights” (iura naturali) of persons, the “rights of a common nature” (communis naturae iura), or the “equal rights and liberties” (pari iura et libertates) of all. (Witte and Alexander 2010: 138)

For Calvin, human beings were created by God and in God’s image. Because of the fall, humankind lost the grace of God, but not entirely, and God’s image is still present in every person: ‘we are not to reflect on the wickedness of men, but look to the image of God in [people], an image which, covering and obliterating their faults, should by its beauty and dignity allure us to love and embrace them’ (Calvin). Vorster provides a neat summary of Calvin’s position: The image of God and the gifts of God’s grace to humankind constitute the basis of Calvin’s view of the responsibilities of individuals to one another. It is our duty to see our fellow human beings as creatures of God with certain gifts bestowed on them by God. It is also the responsibility of

10 The Democratic Progressive Party.

98

M. RYCHETSKÁ

the believer to act on behalf of others in order to promote justice. (Vorster 1999: 212)

Similarly, the PCT, which has been concerned with political issues in Taiwan for many decades, explained its active involvement in human rights in terms of its Christian beliefs. One outcome of the church’s endeavors was that the people of Taiwan accepted the struggle initiated by the PCT and began to demand free elections. The PCT was one of the instigators of democratization and human rights in Taiwan and gained status and recognition for being so. äIt is important to understand how Christian thinking is evolving and adapting to current conditions. The chapter has therefore followed changes in the theological perspective and shown how a religious group can become involved in secular affairs. Recent scholarship has, after all, shown that despite theories of growing secularization, the role of religion in the political and social fields has increased rather than declined. Christian theologians are facing the challenge of how the Christian faith can contribute to the public debate surrounding issues such as human rights, and religious institutions have been strengthening transnational connections and their potential for influencing public life. It is essential, therefore, to further explore the channels of interaction between religions and secular society. We should not forget, however, that Christian doctrine is not static but constantly developing and adjusting to the evolving context. Churches develop a theological understanding of human rights that best fits their needs and supports their position, and this has certainly been true of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.

References A Clarification about ‘Mr. An Kezhi’s Testimony in the Asia Pacific Affairs Group’ 澄清關於「安克志先生在亞太事務小組之證言」. 1981. Chinese version. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19770816.html. Accessed 16 December 2019. A Declaration on Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. 1977. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=012. Accessed 12 December 2019. Amae, Yoshihisa. 2008. Pioneers in Taiwan’s Human Rights and Democracy: The Role of the Foreign Missionaries of Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. In A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights Through International Networks,

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

99

1960–1980, ed. Linda Arrigo and Lynn Miles, 172–210. Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance. ———. 2012. Europeans and the Formation of a Presbyterian Enterprise: A Prototype of a Civic Taiwanese Nation? In European Perspectives on Taiwan, ed. Damm Jens and Paul Lim, 46–65. New York: Springer. Arrigo, Linda Gail and Lynn Miles (eds.). 2008. A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980. Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance. Band, Edward. 1936. Barclay of Formosa. Tokyo: Christian Literature Society. Black, Jan Knippers. 2009. The Politics of Human Rights Protection. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Brown, Chris. 2013. Human Rights and Human Nature. In Human Rights: The Hard Questions, ed. Cindy Holder and David Reidy, 23–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coe, Shoki. 1993. Recollections and Reflections. New York: The Rec. Dr. Shoki Coe’s Memorial Fund. Cornescu, Adrian Vasile. 2009. The Generations of Human’s Rights. In Days of Law: The Conference Proceedings [online], ed. David Sehnálek, Jiˇrí Valdhans, Radovan Dávid and Ibor Kyncl. Brno: Masaryk University. https://www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/dny_prava_2009/files/prispe vky/tvorba_prava/Cornescu_Adrian_Vasile.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2019. Declaration of Sovereignty and Independence of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan 台灣基督長老教會 《台灣主權獨立宣言》 . 1991. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=051. Accessed 16 December 2019. England, John. 2004. Asian Christian Theologies: A Research Guide to Authors, Movements, Sources. Vol. 3: Northeast Asia. New York: Orbis. Evans, Malcolm D. 2007. Introduction: Does God Believe in Human Rights? A Reflection. In Does God Believe in Human Rights? Essays on Religion an Human Rights, ed. Nazila Ghanea-Hercock, Alan Stephens and Ralph Walden, 1–16. Leiden: Brill. Frettingham, Edmund, and Yih-Jye Hwang. 2017. Religion and National Identity in Taiwan: State Formation and Moral Sensibilities. In Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies, ed. Cheng- Kuo, 339–372. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Grayling, Anthony. 2017. Human Rights: Past and Future. In Fragile Freedoms: The Global Struggle for Human Rights, ed. Steven Lecce, Neil McArthur, and Arthur Schafer, 23–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hogan, Linda. 2015. Keeping Faith with Human Rights. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

100

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Horyna, Bˇretislav. 2003. Lidská práva [Human Rights]. In Judaizmus , kˇrestˇanství , islám [Judaism, Christianity, Islam], ed. Bˇretislav Horyna and Helena Pavlincová, 366. Olomouc: Nakladatelství Olomouc. Intan, Benyamin F. 2018. Calvin’s Ideas on the Church-State Relationship and Their Meaning for the Churches in Indonesia. European Journal of Theology 27 (1): 55–66. Ion, Hamish A. 1999. The Cross in the Dark Valley: The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1931–1945. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Lecce, Steven, Neil Mcarthur, and Arthur Schafer. 2017. Introduction. In Fragile Freedoms: The Global Struggle for Human Rights, ed. Steven Lecce, Neil McArthur, and Arthur Schafer, 1–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lin, Christine L. 1999. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy. Sino-Platonic Papers 92: 1–153. Nathan, Clemens N. 2009. The Changing Face of Religion and Human Rights: A Personal Reflection. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. Neary, Ian. 2002. Human Rights in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. London: Routledge. O’Donovan, Joan Lockwood. 1996. Historical Prolegomena to a Theological Review of ‘Human Rights.’ Studies in Christian Ethics 9 (2): 52–65. ———. 2015. Human Dignity and Human Justice: Thinking with Calvin about the Imago Dei. Tyndale Bulletin 66 (1): 121–136. On Our National Fate: Motivated by Faith and Theology「國是聲明與建議 」在信仰上及神學上之動議. 1972. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?Doc ID=002. Accessed 16 December 2019. On Safeguarding Taiwan’s Sovereignty and Dignity. 2019. http://www. pct.org.tw/news_pct.aspx?strBlockID=B00006&strContentid=C20190130 00006&strCTID=&strDesc=Y&strPub=&strASP=news_pct&v=1. Accessed 16 October 2021. Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. 1975. http://english.pct.org. tw/Article/enArticle_public_19751118.html. Accessed 16 December 2019. Our Position towards ‘Draft of Language Law’ 我們對 《語文法草案》 的立場. 1985. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=020. Accessed 16 December 2019. Presbyterian Church of English Foreign Missions Committee. Home Materials: Minutes, Reports, and Correspondence. London: School of Oriental and African Studies Archive. Recommendations from the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan Concerning the Present Situation. 1990. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_ 19900515.html. Accessed 16 December 2019.

4

CHURCH AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS

101

Rawnsley, Gary and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley. 2011. The Media in Democratic Taiwan. In Taiwan Experience Since Martial Law, ed. David Blundell, 395–417. Berkeley: University of California Press. Robinson, Geoffrey B. 2018. The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shepherd, Frederick M., ed. 2009. Christianity and Human Rights: Christians and the Struggle for Global Justice. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan台灣基督 長老 教會對國是的聲明與建議. 1971. Chinese version. http://www.pct.org. tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=001. Accessed 16 December 2019. Taber, Charles R. 2002. In the Image of God: The Gospel and Human Rights. International Bulletin of Missionary Research 26 (3): 98–102. Tiu, Sui-hiong, and Cheng- Siau. 2012. Shoki Coe: An Ecumenical Life in Context. Geneva: WCC Publications. UN General Assembly. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations (webpage). https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declarationof-human-rights. Accessed 19 October 2021. Van der Ven, Johannes A. 2010. Human Rights or Religious Rules? Leiden, Boston: Brill. Vorster, Jakobus. 1999. Calvin and Human Rights. The Ecumenical Review 51 (2): 209–220. Waller, James E. 2009. Deliver Us from Evil: Genocide and the Christian World. In Christianity and Human Rights: Christians and the Struggle for Global Justice, ed. Frederick M. Shepherd, 3–19. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Witte, John Jr. 2007. The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Witte, John Jr and Frank S. Alexander. 2010. Christianity and Human Rights: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ziebertz, Hans-Georg. 2021. Introduction to the Special Issue: Religion and Human Rights: Complementary or Contrary. Religions. https://doi.org/10. 3390/rel12020109.

PART II

The Case of the Chinese Catholics in the People’s Republic of China

Catholics in China are often depicted in binary opposition of the ‘official’ and ‘underground’ church. However, the situation is more complex, and Chinese Catholics cannot be classified through these two simplistic categories based on the state registration. Also, whether registered within state structures or not, Catholic communities belong to one Chinese Catholic Church. Part II studies the Catholics of the open church sector in the People’s Republic of China. Most of the clergy within this part of the church have (voluntarily or not) joined the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA). Ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government has perceived Catholics as being closely connected to the Vatican. Since the late 1950s, Chinese Catholics united under the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association have generally supported the totalitarian communist regime. However, despite seeking to practice religious localization, the Catholic Church has been repeatedly criticized for not being ‘Chinese enough’ and has been accused of being more loyal to foreigners than to the PRC. It seems, that if the Catholic Church is to be successful in its mission, it must adapt to the local environment, which has included following the directives of the Communist Party.

CHAPTER 5

Catholic Mission in China and the Sino-Vatican Relations

The Catholic missionaries entered China in the late 1290s, but the mission continued only for the next 50 years. The first permanent mission was not established until the end of the sixteenth century, when Michael Ruggieri (1543–1607), an Italian missionary, obtained permission to settle with other missionaries in China in 1583. The first significant expansion of the Catholic mission in China thus came in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Jesuit missionaries initially used a ‘top-down’ mission strategy—focusing first on the intellectual elite because they believed that after the conversion of elites, the Catholic faith would spread among the rest of the population. They even hope to convert the members of the imperial court. The Jesuits also introduced a new strategy—accommodation. The accommodation strategy was based on localizing the Christian Gospel and adapting Christian teaching to the local culture. This was the first attempt to localize the Catholic faith in China. Undoubtedly, the most successful Jesuit of that time was Matteo Ricci (Li Madou 利玛窦; 1552–1610), who became a symbol of a prosperous Catholic mission in China. In the following years, Catholics faced periods of persecution—for instance, in 1616, Shen Que (?–1624), a deputy of the Board of Rites of the Qing dynasty, wrote a critical report about Christianity comparing it to heterodox sects xiejiao 邪教, leading to the expulsion of all foreign Christian missionaries to Macao. The label heterodoxy was religious and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_5

105

106

M. RYCHETSKÁ

political—as any ‘heterodox’ group was seen as a political threat to the ruling class and dynasty’s ideology. Later, in 1647, the Qing court issued an edict against Christianity. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the anti-Christian movements mirrored the changing emperors and their relations with missionaries. While Emperor Kangxi 康 熙 (1662–1722) issued the Edict of Tolerance in 1692, his son, Emperor Yongzheng 雍正 (1723–1735), officially withdrew the edict and banned Christianity in 1724 after the Rites Controversy. However, the Jesuits were genuinely successful—they established important Catholic communities in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guizhou, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi (Wiest 2014). Although the Qing dynasty officially banned Christianity after the Rites Controversy, Christianity never completely disappeared from China. Some missionaries remained in China despite the ban, and new ones could enter China despite restrictions. A significant change that helped the Christian mission was that, unlike missions in the thirteenth century, Christianity was partially spread among the local population; from the seventeenth century, there were local groups of Chinese Christians. Following the imperial ban, there were approximately 210,000 Catholics in China; despite the persecution, the number rose to 264,000 by 1840, with the total number of priests and bishops almost doubling in 1815 (Camps 2010; Wiest 2014). Chinese Catholics could practice their faith openly, with government officials persecuting mostly foreign missionaries rather than local Chinese believers. Foreigners were not only more easily recognizable but also considered to be a threat to the empire. That was the reason why foreign priests could not stay in one place for a long time. During short visits to local parishes, they performed sacraments such as confession, the Eucharist, baptism… Without the possibility of foreign oversight, responsibility for the local Catholic community was gradually transferred to Chinese priests. Without intention, the Catholic Church started to be localized. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were only 6 Chinese priests ordained. However, the number of Chinese priests increased due to the need to maintain the mission even after the ban on the spread of Christianity. Before the reopening of China to foreign missionaries, local Chinese priests accounted for two-thirds of the 75 missionaries working in the area (Wiest 2014). After the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), the situation changed for the Catholic Mission in China. New treaties that the Chinese

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

107

regarded as humiliation with the opening of trading ports and heavy indemnity nearly destroyed the Qing dynasty’s economy. Unfortunately, Christian missionaries came to China by taking these trade ships and allied themselves with their own officials locating at the trading ports for protection from kidnapping and supply of provisions. The Chinese who were full of anti-foreignism could not express their ill feelings directly towards foreigners in China but channeled their anger indirectly to foreign missionaries. New treaties guaranteed freedom to practice Christianity and issued official passports for missionaries, allowing them to travel to China’s inner parts to spread their Gospel. In 1940, Christianity was again openly propagated in China. Paul A. Cohen (1963: 21) noted in his book on anti-Christian movements in 1860–1970 that ‘before, as well as during, the nineteenth century, … severe persecutions were frequently carried out against the religion at the local level and, in some instances, throughout the empire. Even when Christianity escaped the active hostility of the government, it was always subject to the disapprobation of the Chinese author—official and nonofficial alike’. At that time, anti-foreign sentiments increased, and several anti-Christian books and leaflets were circulated. Christians were accused of sexual deviance and witchcraft. In the anti-Christian pamphlets, Catholics were ridiculed as the character of ‘the lord of Heaven’ Tianzhu 天主 is pronounced similarly to ‘the heavenly pig’ tianzhu 天猪 (Klain 2014). Most Chinese people were suspicious of Christian missionaries, and educated classes often rejected and opposed Christianity. People were caught between foreign church and anti-foreign moods when local gentry and officials discredited missionaries and accused them of helping colonial powers and bringing misfortune. In the 1860s, the Qing empire was flooded with anti-Christian and anti-foreign propaganda. The hostility to Christianity was caused by its influence in the Taiping rebellion (1851– 1864) as well as its connections to foreign powers who guaranteed (often by force) protection of Christian missions in China (N. Chen 2003). Chinese reacted to foreign political pressure and linked it to the Christian missionaries and their increasing presence (Clark 2011). The anti-Christian sentiments escalated into the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901). According to Kenneth Scott Latourette (1929), approximately 47 missionaries and more than 30,000 Chinese converts died during the uprising. Christians were killed because the rebels saw them as the cause of the problems China was facing at the time. When the uprising ended in 1901 with the signing of the Beijing Protocol (Xinchou Tiaoyue

108

M. RYCHETSKÁ

辛丑 条约), the insurgents, along with those involved in violence against Catholics, were punished by the French government. As a result, the Catholic Church in China was again associated with cruelty and violence against the locals because foreign missionaries did not speak or protest in any way against the massive executions of the rebels (Bays 2012). After the Republic of China was established, Bishop Celso Costantini (1876–1958) became the first apostolic delegate to China. The Vatican supported religious localization and condemned the imperialist past of the Catholic Church in the past. Pope Pius XI (1857–1939, pp. 1922–1939) thus ordained six Chinese bishops in 1926. Following this, the Chinese Nationalist government dispatched an ambassador to the Vatican in 1943, and three years later, the Vatican appointed Thomas Tian Gengxin 田 耕 莘 (1890–1967) as the first Chinese cardinal. Unfortunately, this did not change that the Catholic Church in China was de facto run by foreigners until the 1950s (Wiest 2014). Furthermore, after the May fourth movement (1919), anti-foreignism was transformed into nationalism. The new narrative has stressed the conflict between Chinese people and foreign imperial powers—including the Catholics.

Catholic Church under the Communist Rule The anti-foreignism and anti-Christian sentiments continued after 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds strong views on religion. Based on Marxist ideology, party leaders believed that after the end of the class struggle, all religions would eventually disappear. Communists had supported the movement against religion from as early as the 1920s, and many saw Christian missionaries as equivalent to the European and American powers that attacked and humiliated the Chinese in the nineteenth century. The Party refuses to acknowledge Christians as religious figures— while some were having imperialist agenda, others acted according to their religious beliefs, and the PRC praises the Boxers as representatives of a national fight against foreign oppressions who justly killed foreigners and Christians (N. Chen 2003). The Chinese Communist Party, however, did not go as far as promoting the idea of religion as ‘the opium of the people’ as it was aware that religions were unlikely to disappear as quickly as many communists

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

109

would have wished.1 Religion was to be allowed in New China. In the words of Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–1976): ‘All religions are permitted. […] Everyone is free to believe or not to believe; neither compulsion nor discrimination is permitted’ (Mao 1965: 313). The government even officially protected freedom of religion. In 1949, just after the establishment of the PRC, the National Political Consultative Conference published the Common Program. Among other basic rights of Chinese citizens, the document, which resembled a provisional Constitution, in fact ‘guaranteed’ freedom of religion (Zhuo 2009). A few years later, in September 1954, the National People’s Congress signed the first Constitution. According to Article 88, all Chinese citizens had the right to believe freely.2 The Party’s official position on religion was unusual for a communist regime. It led scholars and foreign observers to hope that there would be true freedom of religion in New China, which leaders supposedly rejected the Soviet position towards religion. However, as it turned out, this was not the case. In reality, the policy on religion in the PRC was often restricting and repressing. The religious policy of the PRC was in many ways inspired by the policy previously introduced by the Guomindang government—allowing only selected religious groups under the direct control of the regime (S. Smith 2015). As JeanPierre Charbonnier (2007: 426) explains: ‘Religious freedom only existed insofar as believers did not promote counter-revolutionary activities;’ (or if the central or local government did not suspect them of being involved in such activities). Of course, whether freedom of religion ever actually existed (or exists) in the PRC is open to debate. What we rather see perhaps is the Beijing government creating a legal platform that legitimizes state control of religious life in China.3 At the time of the first Constitution, there were approximately 4 million Christians in China, three-quarters of whom belonged to the 1 In 1950, Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898–1976) gave a speech on the subject, explaining that Lenin’s position on religion followed by the Soviet Union was not suitable for New China (S. Smith 2015). 2 According to the Constitution of the PRC, all ‘normal religious activities’ are protected. This is a little problematic, however, as the term ‘normal’ (zhengchang 正 常) is not explained anywhere in the Constitution or in any other legal document, leaving the term somewhat vague and without any fixed interpretative framework. For more information, see the following chapter. 3 For more on the issue of religious freedom in China, please see (Potter 2003; Yang 2017).

110

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Roman Catholic Church, with its 137 dioceses and 4,788 priests; more than half of Catholic priests were Chinese citizens. Most Catholic congregations were nonetheless still under the control of foreign missionaries and mission societies; all of them were under the authority of the Vatican (Janz 1998). Party members who sought to revolt against foreign imperial power aimed much of their criticism at Christianity. The Cold War, fear of Western imperialism, and the hostile attitude of the CCP towards foreigners in general combined to precipitate a campaign against all foreign missionaries. Party members who had revolted against foreign imperial power now aimed their wrath at Christianity—Chinese national identity and Christian identity were incom- patible and conflicting. The government accused numerous Catholic priests and nuns of supporting imperialism and capitalism. Madsen (2017) suggests that the CCP regarded Catholics as especially problematic because of their allegiance to the Vatican. Some bizarre allegations appeared: Catholic sisters working in orphanages were put on trial and accused of killing children under their care (Bays 2012). From 1951 onwards, the government began to expel foreign missionaries. Around 5,000 Catholic priests and nuns left China (Charbonnier 2007); several other Catholic clergies were imprisoned.4 Chinese Catholics understood the situation is turning for the worse. For example, one testimony states: On October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was established. Since then, naturally, there have been more and more incidents and difficulties for the church. . . There was sad news from Xining, Qinghai: Father Xiao Lijia, a German priest from the Society of Divine Word, was killed. . . The fellow missionaries were also beheaded. (Su 2000: 49–51)

In the early 1950s, the government, led by premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898–1976), urged leaders of the five main religious groups (Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism) to create patriotic religious organizations loyal to the state and to the CCP as its representative. To supervise these organizations, the state established a single national organization to manage all religions in China, including all its institutions and believers. While Zhou Enlai ensured religious freedom for the

4 However, this led to an important change for Chinese Catholics, as before the establishment of the PRC, less than 19% of all senior clerical posts in China (26 out of 139) were assigned to Chinese clergy (Bays 2012).

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

111

Chinese Catholics, all Catholic universities were soon closed. In 1951, the government expelled Vatican’s internuncio to China Antonio Riberi (1897–1967).5 This year became a landmark in persecution of Chinese Catholics—priests, nuns, and lay believers as well (Chu 2016). All religious organizations were to be united at the national level. The patriotic associations (aiguohui 爱国会) have promoted the idea of state supervision and control and the removal of foreign influence and interference.6 This, however, raised the question of how to handle the relationship between Chinese Catholics and the Holy See. For the Beijing government, it was paramount that all citizens remained patriotic and fulfilled their duty to the central government; Catholics loyal to the Vatican were seen as disloyal and untrustworthy. There was even a popular saying, ‘one more Christian, one less Chinese’ (Kwan 2021). The CCP began to promote ‘localization’ and the independence of churches, a program that included cutting off financial ties to and administrative support from the Vatican (F. Yang 2017). Most local Catholic leaders remained loyal to the Vatican, although a significant minority of Catholics continued to support the regime and the CCP’s proposal to maintain independence from the Vatican and to place local churches exclusively under Chinese leadership. They stated that because ‘Jesus was himself a laborer’, so Chinese Catholics should make a stand as fellow laborers and willingly contribute to the good of the state (Bays 2012). In December 1950, around 500 Chinese Catholics signed the Guangyuan manifesto (Tianzhujiao zili gexin xuanyan 天主教自立革新宣言), which promoted the idea of an independent patriotic association for Chinese Catholics7 and declared the need for independence from the Vatican and any other foreign power: Because we love our motherland, we are determined to cut all relations with imperialism, to do all we can to reform ourselves, to establish a 5 From 1946, Archbishop Antonio Riberi, an ambassador representing the Vatican in China, openly supported the Guomindang government, promoted anti-Communist policy, and banned local Catholics from joining the Communist Party or any organization run by the CCP. He also supported the ‘Legion of Mary’, a group of Catholic activists who were fighting communism. 6 The Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Association was established in 1953, while CCPA was finally established in 1957. See Janz (1998). 7 The manifesto was published in Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao 解放日报), Shanghai, December 1950.

112

M. RYCHETSKÁ

new Church that shall be independent in its administration, finances, and its apostolate. We won’t let the Church be tainted by imperialism. (Guangyuan manifesto 1950)

The government supported the establishment of ‘Catholic reform communities’, which went on to become the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), which was to be independent of all foreign influence in terms of its funding, propagation, and administration (Madsen 1999). TheCCPA was supervised by the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB), and the RAB was under the control of the United Front Work (Tongzhanbu 统战 部) (Bays 2012).8 In 1957, Chinese Catholics loyal to the CCP established the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA, Zhongguo tianzhujiao aiguohui 中国天主教爱国会), claimed full administrative independence from the Vatican, and later elected its bishops. The Vatican refused to recognize the CCPA, and its bishops, who were elected without the mandate of the Apostolic See. Since, at this time, many Catholics had already refused to join a centralized ‘puppet’ church, two Catholic bodies emerged within the PRC: the CCPA under the control of the government and the underground Church (dixiajiaohui 地下教会) loyal to the Vatican.9 Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, in 1952, Pope Pius XII sent the apostolic letter Cupimus Imprimis to the Chinese Church. In the letter, he declared that Catholic Church is not a political threat to the new regime, and highlighted that Catholic doctrine is not incompatible with any doctrine (Chu 2016). However, the government demanded nothing less than the complete subordination of all religious bodies within its territory and to remove any foreign influence (Madsen 1999). Anyway, the Holy See did not favor the new developments in China as ‘the Vatican had little understanding of or sympathy for the New China’ (Janz 1998: 134) Pius XII was strongly against the idea of an independent Catholic Church in China under 8 Since 2018, the controlling authority of the Religious Affairs Bureau was delegated directly under the United Front Work Department, which means that religious activities are now directly controlled by the Party. In other words, the religious life of millions of Chinese citizens is ruled by an atheistic totalitarian regime. 9 The situation changed very recently (September 2018) when the Vatican and the PRC signed a new provisional agreement on the appointment of bishops. The agreement signals a possible reunification of the Catholic Church in China after more than sixty years of division.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

113

the direct leadership of communists and was struggling against Communism not only in the Chinese context but also, and perhaps especially, in Europe. The Pope was fearful of the new communist ideas that seemed to be spreading across the world, and the Vatican’s position was clear: totalitarianism was incompatible with the Catholic faith. The church’s ideological conflict with the Marxist regime and its rejection of religion in general and Christianity in particular then escalated.10 Pope Pius XII repeatedly stressed the need to fight communism. In 1949, the Holy See published the Decree Against Communism,11 which explained very clearly that Catholics would be excommunicated if they ‘[declared] openly the materialist and antichristian doctrine of the communists’, de facto if they supported the regime (Decree against Communism 1949). The Pope reaffirmed the church’s complete rejection of communism in the encyclical Ad Apostolorum Principis , addressed primarily to Catholics in the PRC: For under an appearance of patriotism, which in reality is just a fraud, this [patriotic] association aims primarily at making Catholics gradually embrace the tenets of atheistic materialism, by which God Himself is denied and religious principles are rejected. (Ad Apostolorum Principis 1958)

Pius XII saw atheistic materialism—Marxism, communism, and socialism—as being in direct opposition to the Catholic faith, and the patriotic associations as simply a vehicle for pushing atheism on its members. Some observers considered Pius XII overly obsessed with communism, and that his obsession had led to divisions in the church.12

10 At the time, the Holy See had already published an encyclical rejecting Marxist ideology. In 1937, Pope Pius XI expressed the negative position of the Vatican towards communism in Divini Redemptoris. Communism and socialism were rejected as they are atheistic and Bolshevistic (Luxmoore and Babiuchová 2003). 11 As a reaction to the communist rule in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Pope Pius XII and the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy See published a document titled the Decree Against Communism on July 1, 1949. The document expressed the Vatican´s strong opposition to communism (Luxmoore and Babiuchová 2003). 12 In the case of China, the situation was even more intense as Pope Pius XII officially supported the nationalist Guomindang government during the civil war; and even after the nationalists lost the war in 1949 to the communist regime, the Vatican still recognized the Nationalist government in Taiwan as the ruler over the mainland China. On the Vatican’s stance towards communism, see Luxmoore and Babiuchová 2003. The situation of the

114

M. RYCHETSKÁ

In Decree Against Communism,13 the Vatican ordered all Chinese Catholics, on the threat of losing their Catholicity and of excommunication, to boycott the new Communist government. In the encyclical Ad Sinarum Gentem 14 of 1954, Pope Pius XII even promoted the ideal of martyrdom as part of the fight against the regime: If it sometimes happens that he who wishes to remain faithful to the Divine Redeemer even unto death must suffer great harm, let him bear it with a strong and serene soul. […] May you be aided by the Holy Martyrs of China, who serenely faced death for love of their fatherland, and above all for their loyalty to the Divine Redeemer and His Church. (Ad Sinarum Gentem 1954)

The Vatican argued that it would be better to suffer physically than to defend the leadership of the CCP. Indeed, most Chinese Catholics and foreign missionaries in China rejected the Manifesto and maintained their loyalty to the Vatican. In Shanghai, especially, Catholics who resisted the government’s program of cutting ties with the Vatican united in active opposition. Young lay Catholics united in the ‘Legion of Mary’ were condemned by the CCP as enemies of the Chinese people (Mariani 2011). Catholics loyal to the Vatican were seen not merely as a religious group, but as a political force challenging the legitimacy of the CCP. Anyone loyal to Rome was an ‘enemy of the state’, and the underground Church persisting in Catholic Church during this period is explored in Madsen 1999. The relationship between the Vatican and Taiwan is further explained in Leung and Kuo 2014. 13 The document states (Decree against Communism 1949):

Question 1: By chance is it licit to give name or to make favors to communist parties? Response: Negative. Q2: By chance is it licit to publish, promulgate or read books, journals or leaflets which defend the action or the communist doctrine, or to write for them? R: Negative. Q3: Can Christians who perform the acts mentioned on n.1 and 2 be admitted to the sacraments? R: Negative. Q4: If Christians declare openly the materialist and antichristian doctrine of the communists, and, mainly, if they defend it or promulgate it, ‘ipso facto’, do they incur in excommunication (‘speciali modo’) reserved to the Apostolic See? Response: Affirmative. 14 In October 1954, the Pope Pius XII appeal in the encyclical to the Chinese Catholics to fight against separation of the Chinese Catholics from the Vatican.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

115

their faith to the Vatican was pushed towards revolting against the totalitarian system. Persecution of leaders and lay members of the underground Church soon followed. Some Catholics were determined to defend the Vatican, even if it meant putting their lives in danger, preferring a violent death to compliance with the demands of the communist authorities. The Jesuit father Beda Chang 张伯达 (1905–1951), one of the most celebrated leaders of the Shanghai community, was killed in prison after he refused to renounce his faith and join the ‘reform communities’. The Catholic community hailed him as a martyr (Mariani 2011).15 Regarding the Catholic Church, the goal of the CCP was clear: to isolate and control the local communities and cut them off from foreign support. The ‘ideal citizen’, if he was a Christian, was to comply with the political authorities and observe patriotic obedience ‘to laws and regulations as the ‘standard of all behavior’, rather than Biblical norms’ (Vala 2017: 63). For the CCPA, the most significant issue facing the Catholic Church in China was the shortage of Chinese bishops, or indeed of any bishops: in 1958, 121 of the 145 dioceses had no bishop at all. The Vatican was clearly not doing its job. To address the problem, the association decided to elect its own bishops, without papal approval: the nominating authority was the Religious Affairs Bureau under the direction of the CCP (Bays 2012). The Vatican refused to approve Chinese bishops ordained by the CCPA and expressed its position in the encyclical Ad Apostolorum Principis ,16 published on June 29, 1958: The Catholic Church in your nation, as in all the others, will not be able to be ruled with ‘autonomy of government’, as they say today. It will be totally necessary for your Christian community, […] to be completely subject of the Supreme Pontiff, Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth, and be strictly united with him in regard to religious faith and morals. (Ad Sinarum Gentem 1954)

15 For more information about the persecution and martyrdoms of the Chinese Catholics, see Rychetská 2021. 16 Even before this, the Vatican issued encyclicals concerning China: In 1952, Cupimus in Primis praised the loyalty of Chinese Christians; and in 1954, Ad Sinarum Gentem voiced support for foreign missionaries.

116

M. RYCHETSKÁ

No person or group, whether of priests or laymen, can claim the right of nominating bishops. […] Consequently, if consecration of this kind is being done contrary to all right and law, and by this crime the unity of the Church is being seriously attacked, an excommunication reserved specialissimo modo to the Apostolic See has been established. (Ad Apostolorum Principis 1958)

The appointment of bishops without Vatican approval was seen as ‘a very serious act of disobedience’; such bishops could not teach the Catholic gospel or lead the Catholic community, at least according to Pius XII. All these proclamations and actions made it very clear that the Vatican’s position regarding the PRC was an utter rejection of the actions taken by the Chinese government. According to Ad Apostolorum Principis , the Vatican was the only rightful authority capable of appointing bishops and there was no place for a dialogue with communist China. No bishop selected by the Chinese government was recognized by the Holy See; all were considered ‘unapostolic’. Many Chinese Catholics loyal to Rome refused to obey the government; some even refused to send their children to state schools or to read communist publications. Afraid of the threat of excommunication and of losing their credibility, some bishops elected by the RAB did not wish to disobey the Vatican and refused consecration (Charbonnier 2007). The issue of episcopal consecration was extremely important as ‘the “apostolic mandate” granted by the Vatican deeply [affected] the legitimacy and power of the open and underground bishops, including the loyalty they receive from fathers, sisters and laity’ (Chan 2017: 125). We should not forget that a bishop is not only a religious leader, but also a more general authority that might easily lose its support (Koesel 2014). After the CCPA started electing its own bishops, the Holy See secretly appointed bishops who had not received a nomination from the association. The Vatican appealed to all ‘good priests’ to follow their nominees rather than those of the CCPA (Charbonnier 2007). The Catholic Church thus became divided between the CCPA with its own bishops, authorized by the CCP, and the underground church with its bishops approved by the Vatican.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

117

A Time of Silence: From the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution Since the 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party has launched several political campaigns aimed at consolidating power. The Anti-Rightist Campaign (Fanyouyundong 反右运动) of 1957 was one of the first moves to place Chinese Catholics under state surveillance. A political purge of certain individuals was launched, and around 550,000 citizens were labeled ‘rightists’, including many intellectuals and religious leaders. As foreign Catholic missionaries had already been expelled from China, so the AntiRightist Campaign began a crackdown on local Chinese Catholic leaders. Catholics were among those who were labeled rightists and imperialists for their connections with Western powers; antipathy towards Catholics and Protestants was aroused across the country. Many priests and lay believers suffered harassment, some were publicly criticized, and others were sent to the countryside for ‘re-education’ and ‘reform through labor’ (laodonggaizao 劳动改造) (Liu and White 2019). Many others were put under house arrest, whereby pressure was exerted through total isolation. Believers were forced to renounce their Christian doctrine, which was considered a cloak for colonial interests. Hot on the heels of the Anti-Rightist Campaign came the Great Leap Forward (Da yuejin 大跃进), initiated in 1958. Alongside collectivization, forced labor, various social pressures, and widespread famine, the Great Leap continued with the regime’s political campaigns, which became a part of everyday life for both rural and urban populations. The campaigns included programs against religious leaders and especially against unregistered religious groups; the Party tried to replace religious meetings with propaganda sessions (Valentino 2004). Barely a year on from the end of the devastating Great Leap Forward, Mao introduced yet another political campaign—the Socialist Education Movement (Shehuizhuyijiooyuyundong 社会主义教育运动), otherwise known as the Four Cleanups (siqing 四清)—launched to eradicate reactionary elements from the political, economic, organizational, and ideological arenas. Early on, however, it became clear that other sectors of society would become victims of the campaign. Beginning in 1965, it was the Chinese Catholics who became the new target to be attacked in the movement. The CCP sent armed soldiers to predominantly Catholic villages to persuade villagers, by any means necessary, to renounce the Catholic Church (Harrison 2014).

118

M. RYCHETSKÁ

From 1951 to 1987, there was no official dialogue between the Holy See and the PRC. Once the CCPA had consolidated its control and influence, all ties to the Vatican were cut. Despite protests from the Vatican, by 1965 the association had ‘democratically’ elected and consecrated more than fifty bishops loyal to Beijing. On the other hand, the underground church was isolated from Western support and influence and such unofficial communities were rooted in the local context. They also had to face an acute shortage of trained religious specialists (Goossaert and Palmer 2011: 380–381). During the Great Leap Forward, the government exerted strict control on religious groups, and many religious activities came to a complete halt. Although Sino-Vatican relations had effectively been discontinued, changes took place in the Vatican which would affect relations further down the road. Pius XII’s successor, John XXIII (1881–1963, p. 1958– 1963), took a very different approach to countries under communist rule and even excused Eastern European Catholics who supported the communist regime as they had no freedom to reject Marxist ideology. John XXIII was within the church presented as a pope of peace and justice and a supporter of peaceful dialogue with communist regimes, especially those in Europe, and his more benevolent attitude led to an improvement in relations between the Vatican and some communist countries (Luxmoore and Babiuchová 2003). His more open stance became clear in the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), during which no document was published which explicitly condemned communism. Vatican II sought to open the Catholic Church up to the modern world and to countries beyond Europe and was influential in furthering dialogue with the PRC. Pope Paul VI (1897–1978, p. 1963–1978) also followed a more conciliatory path. In December 1965, he sent a delegation to Beijing, hoping for a resumption of the discussions concerning the situation for Chinese Catholics.17 Within a few months, however, the Cultural Revolution (Wuchanjiejiwenhuadageming 无产阶级 文化大革命) began and progress stalled (Charbonnier 2007). Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966. Even though this time was characterized by the near deification of Mao, the

17 Although Paul VI tried to continue with dialogues with the PRC, in 1966 the Holy See established apostolic nunciature in Taipei. The Vatican was the only European country to have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

119

Chinese government declared the PRC an atheist country and banned— and sought to abolish—all religious activity. Rather than belief in a religion, Chinese citizens were to put their faith in the Party and in Mao himself. The CCP aimed to create a form of political religion based on Mao’s interpretation of Marxism (Zuo 1991). According to the CCP, religion itself was deemed to be of no use for Chinese citizens, who therefore needed to suppress all religious manifestations. Between 1966 and 1976, all religious buildings were closed, churches included, all religious associations were closed down, religious affairs units disbanded, and many religious clergymen were arrested or persecuted (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). The stormtroopers of the Cultural Revolution were the Red Guards (Hong weibing 红卫兵), who were especially active in demolishing churches and religious buildings, monuments, and works of art (Phan 2020). For Chinese Catholics, it was a wave of oppression even more violent and vicious than the Great Leap Forward. Zuo Jiping (1991: 103) describes the horrible situation in the following manner: ‘Thousands of innocent people were beaten to death without knowing why. Thousands more committed suicide’. Indeed. The Cultural Revolution represents the peak of the darkest period in modern Chinese history. In 1967, Pope Paul VI tried further to appeal for reconciliation. He sent a letter to China titled ‘An Appeal to China for Liberty and Peace’ (1967). In the letter, he stressed that Catholic Church does not seek worldly temporal power and is thus no opposition or threat to the Communist regime. He has not received any answer. During this time, the Vatican and the rest of the world received little information about the situation of Catholics in China (Lam 2020). With China now increasingly isolated, the Holy See relaxed conditions for Chinese underground bishops and allowed them to appoint successors without the direct order of the Vatican (Madsen 1999). Nonetheless, the consequences of the Cultural Revolution were not as severe as the Party intended. Contrary to the aims of the CCP, the campaign did not cause Catholics to forswear their faith, religion has not disappeared from China, and believers did not denounce their beliefs. Local churches may have been shut down or even destroyed, but many Catholics still continued meeting in private, gathering in one another’s homes at night, keeping the Christian Gospel alive by reproducing the text of prayers orally or by hand (Ticozzi 2020).

120

M. RYCHETSKÁ

The Renewal of Sino-Vatican Negotiations In 1978, at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the CCP changed its official policy and began to be more focused on economic reforms that led to a gradual shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy. Hand in hand with the opening up of the Chinese market came to a relaxation of policies towards religion (Barbalet 2011). In 1980, after a period of temporary closure, the CCPA was re-established and a new organizational structure for the administration of Catholic clergy—the National Conference of Bishops—was created (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). Neither organization was recognized by the Vatican. Under the management of the CCPA and the Conference of Bishops, and in close cooperation with the CCP, several Church facilities were restored, and new ones were built (F. Yang 2017).18 The government in Beijing even responded to overtures from the Holy See for a resumption of negotiations and a rapprochement of sorts. As early as 1979, Pope John Paul II (1920–2005, p. 1978–2005) expressed his wish for reconciliation with China, and in 1987, the Vatican and Beijing recommenced negotiations (Chu 2014). John Paul II pursued his predecessors’ attitude towards dialogue and pushed for the development of the Catholic Church in China and of unity between Chinese Catholics. At the same time, the government of the PRC was seeking to improve China’s image around the globe and realized that the Vatican might help to achieve this goal (Leung and Wang 2016). Dialogue was far from straightforward, however, as John Paul II was at heart a conservative and well-known for his negative opinion of communism.19 He was a strong advocate of religious freedom, and according to one professor of contemporary church history, the pontificate of John Paul II represented a turn towards anti-communist doctrine. I suggest, however, that his personal stance did not influence the position he took as a Pope. He admitted that he followed two opposing strategies in his approach 18 The restoration of land or property once confiscated is a complicated matter. A religious group is allowed to petition for reparation but the process is arduous and can take several years. For more information, see F. Yang (2017), Koesel (2014). 19 John Paul II had experience of Communist rule and of democratic opposition in the European context. Before he became pope, he was a strong critic of Marxist ideology and the Vatican’s passivity in the face of the persecution and suppression of Catholics in communist countries.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

121

to communist countries—an official strategy of dialogue and a personal strategy of a resistance (Chenaux 2012). Another difficulty was that the Beijing government did not want the Vatican, as a sovereign state, to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs. For the CCP, the appointing of Chinese bishops was an example of foreign meddling in the internal political affairs of the PRC (Chu 2014). John Paul II’s attitude towards the PRC could hardly be described as benevolent, but he nonetheless actively sought the reunification of the Catholic Church in China. In 1983, he sent a letter to Deng Xiaoping explaining the hope for reconciliation: Chinese Catholics feel a deep loyalty and love for their own land… and at the same time feel united with the Pope and with the Catholic communities of all the other countries. This essential union with the Pope cannot harm the ideal and concrete unity of their own nation or be to the detriment of its independence and sovereignty. (John Paul [1983] 2006)

The main barrier continued to be the consecration of bishops without papal approval. Negotiations appeared ambiguous: although some representatives of the Holy See were invited to visit China, no official agreement between the PRC and the Vatican was forthcoming. One reason for this was that John Paul II strongly opposed the independent election of Chinese bishops and mentioned the issue of the apostolic mandate many times in his letters to China. He did not directly criticize the CCPA and its election of bishops in the way of his predecessor Pius XII, but did in 1980 express his position very clearly20 : ‘The bond which links the Bishops, individually and as a body, to the Bishop of Rome, who, by the will of Christ, is also the Pastor of the universal Church’ (Address of John Paul II to the Bishops of China on Their ‘Ad Limina’ Visit 1980). Five years later, the Pope restated his position: ‘The communion of the one, holy, Catholic and apostolic Church […] is a question of a bond which joins every local Church with the Pope and with the Catholic communities of all the other countries, and which is essential for the faith of Catholics’ (Address of Pope John Paul II to The Bishops of The Chinese Episcopal Conference On Their ‘Ad Limina’ Visit 1985). The Pope also provided

20 Pope John Paul II addressed his letters to ‘China’ and ‘the bishops of China’, but many were in fact meant for Taiwan, as the Vatican had diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than with the PRC.

122

M. RYCHETSKÁ

financial and moral support to the underground church, which caused a number of setbacks in the diplomatic negotiations. For example, in 1991, the Pope appointed Archbishop Ignatius Gong Pinmei as cardinal. This decision irritated the leaders of the CCPA and the Chinese government as until 1988 Gong had been in prison for his opposition to the regime. Pope John Paul II praised Gong for his refusal to obey the CCPA. In 2000, the Pope emphasized the role of martyrs in China, and this drew a strongly negative reaction from the Chinese government. Some martyrs killed during the Boxer Uprising were dismissed by the People’s Daily as criminals who deserved punishment for their crimes (Madsen 1999; Chu 2014). Pope Benedict XVI continued the gestures of goodwill towards the PRC. He saw reconciliation and unification of the church in China as one of his main aims and expressed his sentiments in a letter to Chinese Catholics in 2007 (Moody 2012). Some saw the letter as the ‘most important papal letter on China in fifty years’ (Mariani 2014: 48). In the letter, Benedict XVI stressed unity as one of the most important demands of the Vatican: Communion and unity—let me repeat—are essential and integral elements of the Catholic Church: therefore, the proposal for a Church that is ‘independent’ of the Holy See, in the religious sphere, is incompatible with Catholic doctrine. (Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benet XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’ s Republic of China 2007)

Here we see a clear development in the papal rhetoric. In the letter, the Pope confirms the authority of the Vatican in all matters of religion, whereas Pius XII had claimed that the power of the Church was ‘in no sense limited to so-called “strictly religious matters”’ (Ad Apostolorum Principis 1958). In forsaking the ideals of Pius XII, Benedict XVI created space for negotiation, although Vatican II had long signaled the determination of the Holy See to be more involved in the modern world and open to dialogue (Zängle 2014). For a while, it seemed that some kind of mutual understanding had been established between the Vatican and the CCPA on the appointing of bishops. In 2011, the CCPA canceled a planned ordination as the candidates were not approved by the Vatican, but other appointments went ahead and the negotiations faltered once more (Wiest 2014). After this,

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

123

Benedict XVI was unable to maintain good relations with the PRC, but the appointment of Pope Francis led some commentators to see a brighter future for Sino-Vatican relations.

Fruits of the Negotiations? Pope Francis and the Provisional Agreement The official position of the Vatican and successive popes has varied since the division of the Catholic Church in China. While Pius XII. was highly critical of the regime and gave his support to the underground church, most of his successors have sought to find a degree of compromise and to enter a dialogue with the Beijing government. In 1986, the Vatican initiated formal negotiations in the hope of improving the situation for the millions of Chinese Catholics, both ‘official’ and ‘underground’ (Leung and Wang 2016). The outcome of these negotiations was the signing, in September 2018, of the new provisional agreement between the Holy See and the PRC regarding the appointment of Chinese bishops. The agreement was prolonged for another two years in 2020. The agreement is undoubtedly a landmark in the history of the Catholic Church in the PRC. The exact content of the agreement still remains undisclosed, but we do know that the central issue is the consecration of bishops in China. The agreement grants authority to elect Catholic bishops in China to the CCP, while the Holy See retains the right to veto. The agreement signals the possible reunification of the Catholic Church in China after more than sixty years of division. Some have suggested that the agreement is solely the work of Pope Francis (Hong 2018; ‘United We Stand: China’s Underground Priests’ 2018). I, however, argue that it should be seen in the wider context of the historical and ideological development of the Catholic Church. Even though the Pope himself has claimed responsibility for creating the agreement, it is rather the result of many years of discussions between numerous of his predecessors and the government of the PRC; the Vatican’s position on China was also greatly influenced by the Second Vatican Council. The importance of the agreement is shown in Pope Francis’s statement that he ‘must go to China’ (Lo 2019). If he does, he would be the first pope to visit the PRC since its establishment. Not surprisingly, the agreement between the Vatican and the PRC has been the subject of much debate and dispute (‘Chinese Catholics Remain Split over Vatican Deal’ 2018). Some voices are openly critical (Hong 2018; ‘United We Stand: China’s Underground Priests’ 2018).

124

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Pope Francis has not only recognized all bishops appointed by the CCPA and granted them his additional approval but he has also revoked their previous de facto excommunication. The signing of the provisional agreement should certainly be seen as a part of the Vatican’s goal to promote and establish a universal and united Catholic Church in China. The two parties signed the agreement just a few months after the Beijing government revised its policy on religions, a revision which has been criticized by many scholars for representing the suppression of religious life in the PRC (Batke 2017; Leung 2005). The provisional agreement with the Catholic Church has, therefore, taken some commentators by surprise (Hong 2018; Chinese Catholics Remain Split over Vatican Deal’ 2018). And perhaps the Pope now hopes that the CCP will release some of its tight control over Catholics in China. Four days after the signing of the agreement, the Pope explained the agreement in the Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church. As well as clarifying his motives, he also conciliated seven bishops elected by the CCP without papal approval. He also appealed to the underground church to unite with the patriotic association and Catholic priests to seek an application for civil registration within the CCPA. On this matter, the Holy See has published an explanation for the recommendation: [T]he Holy See does not intend to force anyone’s conscience. On the other hand, it considers that the experience of clandestinely is not a normal feature of the Church’s life and that history has shown that Pastors and faithful have recourse to it only amid suffering, in the desire to maintain the integrity of their faith (cfr. Letter of Pope Benedict XVI to Chinese Catholics of 27 May 2007, n. 8). Thus, the Holy See continues to ask that the civil registration of the clergy take place in a manner that guarantees respect for the conscience and the profound Catholic convictions of the persons involved. (Pastoral Guidelines of the Holy See Concerning the Civil Registration of Clergy in China 2019)

Some unofficial underground bishops indeed stepped down from their posts in favor of candidates officially assigned by the CCPA.21 And Chinese Catholics joining the CCPA should not be seen as disloyal to 21 For example, the Uca News has reported that underground bishops Guo and Peter Zhuang Jianjian are stepping down from their post. For more info, see ‘Vatican Mission Oversees Chinese Underground Bishops Stepping Aside’ (2018).

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

125

the Vatican. The Pope appealed to Chinese Catholics to ‘be good citizens, loving their homeland and serving their country with diligence and honesty, to the best of their ability’ (Intervention by Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States of The Holy See 2018). The wording is in fact aligned with the way the Chinese government requests religious citizens to support and love the country, and only then to love their own religion (aiguo aijiao 爱国爱教). In this appeal for patriotism, some scholars also see a tacit appeal to support the Chinese Communist Party (aiding 爱党) (Vala 2017). As Leung and Wang sum up (2016: 447): ‘The CCP still emphasizes the “good citizen” role of religious believers which means that religious believers must first comply with the demands of the Party and state before they obey the religious rules and follow the teachings of religious leaders’. From the CCP’s position, all Catholics should therefore promote the leadership of the CCP and the socialist path (Cox 2007). Of course, as the representative of the Vatican, Pope Francis promotes dialogue and negotiation and may therefore partially support ideas that are considered as having significance for the PRC. He is, after all, a diplomat, and in all likelihood does not see the appeal itself as promoting communism. Some have questioned the Pope’s position on this issue, however, and see him as a reformer who promotes some outlandish ideas. He is well-known for his involvement in the controversial subjects of liberation theology,22 social justice, and ethical issues, for promoting support for the poor and condemning the free-market economy.23 This latter idea especially aligns Pope Francis with some of the official ideologies of the CCP. He states, for example: While the earnings of a minority are growing exponentially, so too is the gap separating the majority from the prosperity enjoyed by those happy

22 Liberation theology considers capitalism to be immoral and a means of oppressing the poor. Liberation theology calls on Catholics to promote social justice rather than capitalism. Before his papacy, Pope Francis wrote a chapter called ‘The limits of capitalism’, in which he equated capitalism with the promotion of selfish and unjust behavior. Pope John Paul II on the other hand opposed this theology. See also McQuillan and Park (2017). 23 Pope Francis is also seeking to free the Vatican from materialism and elitism. He canceled and withdrew many honorary degrees as he believes they simply promote a social hierarchy within the church and are a tool for making money. For more on this, see Zulehner (2016).

126

M. RYCHETSKÁ

few. This imbalance is the result of ideologies which defend the absolute autonomy of the marketplace and financial speculation. Consequently, they reject the right of states, charged with vigilance for the common good, to exercise any form of control. A new tyranny is thus born, invisible and often virtual, which unilaterally and relentlessly imposes its own laws and rules. (Evangelii Gaudium 2013)

Throughout his papacy, Francis has advocated the state as a controlling mechanism for creating more equal conditions for its citizens. In championing a government’s ability to ‘force’ citizens to contribute, he lambasts the free-market economy. McQuillan and Park conclude (2017: 420, 422): ‘Pope Francis calls for an expanded role for government redistribution in efforts to alleviate poverty [but in doing so, he] also makes an unrelenting attack on capitalism’. Some have even connected his ideas directly to Marx’s notion of a class struggle (Stourton). Paolo Calleri illustrated this point in a cartoon in which we see Pope Francis holding a banner which declares that Jesus Christ was himself a communist, thus clearly depicting how some of the Pope’s critics see him as promoting similar concepts to the communists (Fig. 5.1).24 Other voices criticize the new Sino-Vatican agreement not because of Pope Francis’s leftist ideas but because it does not appear to offer full religious freedom or to sufficiently promote human rights: as the Beijing government does not allow all citizens true freedom of religious belief and practice, the Pope should not be actively seeking any form of cooperation (Hong 2018, ‘United We Stand: China’s Underground Priests’ 2018). Many underground priests and bishops in the PRC are especially disappointed with the agreement, and confused by it, as they do not feel it will improve the situation for all Catholics in China (‘United We Stand: China’s Underground Priests’ 2018), and that the door is still open for the CCP to elect bishops who are not loyal to the Vatican. They suggest that Pope Francis is not familiar with the everyday reality of believers in China. He on the other hand stresses the need to unite the church even if the conditions are not yet perfect, and calls on the example of Abraham to illustrate his point:

24 There are, however, many others who support the Pope’s aspirations and suggest his mission is not Marxist but is dedicated to promoting the ideal of Jesus Christ as the bringer of relief to all people regardless of their social status. For more on similar apologetics, see Spadaro (2018), Zulehner (2016).

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

127

Fig. 5.1 Paolo Calleri, Revolutionar (2013)

Had Abraham demanded ideal social and political conditions before leaving his land, perhaps he would never have set out. […] It was not historical changes that made him put his trust in God; rather; it was his pure faith that brought about a change in history. (Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church 2018)

The Vatican has continued to show the PRC in a positive light, as we see in a message from Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher in 2018 in which he suggested that the CCP had been beneficial to China and to the wider world: At the international level, today more than ever, Mainland China is at the centre of political, economic and cultural interest. China sees itself as a crossroads of development, thanks to such important projects as the New Silk Road (‘One belt, one road’). In foreign policy, it is clearly adopting a new approach to the existing balances in international relations and is also consolidating its presence in developing countries. In domestic policy, China is promoting long-term programmes aimed at giving a considerable

128

M. RYCHETSKÁ

number of citizens the possibility of overcoming poverty. At the same time, the Chinese cultural system is committed to a strong drive in the areas of scientific and technological research. (Intervention by Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States of The Holy See 2018)

The document is published on the official webpage of the Holy See (http://w2.vatican.va/content/vatican/en.html), and Gallagher is the secretary for Relations with States of the Holy See; for these reasons, we can consider his message as representative of the Vatican’s position and perhaps even that of the Pope himself. Similar pronouncements had been made by previous popes. John Paul II and Benedict XVI are often depicted as more conservative than Pope Francis (Zulehner 2016), but the three used almost identical language. Here, for example, is John Paul II speaking about how Chinese Catholics should contribute to the development of the PRC: A genuine and faithful Christian is also a genuine and good citizen. A good Chinese Catholic works loyally for the progress of the nation, observes the obligations of filial piety towards parents, family and country. (Apostolic Journey to Pakistan, Philippines I, Guam, Japan, Anchorage 1981)

I suggest that the popes choose to depict Catholics as ‘good citizens’ for three reasons. First, according to the teaching of Vatican II, the church should not be linked to any political system, even democracy, and should not set out to change any country (Moody 2012). Secondly, the Holy See desperately wants to rid itself of its historical connection to imperialism, especially in the Chinese context, and to avoid any further criticism on the matter. Finally, the Vatican is seeking to cooperate with the PRC and to be seen to say all the right things about a country for which the notions of nationalism and patriotism are paramount. Another example of the Vatican’s aim to stabilize its relationship with the PRC is the fact that during the recent protests in Hong Kong (2019 and 2020), the Vatican and Pope Francis kept silent. More alarmingly, according to The New York Times online portal, on July 5, 2020, the Pope was to include the following statement addressing the situation in Hong Kong: [The current situation] requires courage, humility, nonviolence and respect for the dignity and rights of all. I hope that social and especially religious

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

129

life may be expressed in full and true liberty, as indeed several international documents foresee. (Sanger et al. 2020)

This part was, however, excluded from his speech, and it clearly signals the Vatican’s desire to maintain good relations with the PRC even if that means not speaking up against persecution and violence. It seems that those who warn about the communists’ influence on the Holy See may be correct. Despite all this, Pope Francis is not blind to the situation for Catholics in China, nor is he ignorant of the strict control exercised by the state. I suggest that he is hoping rather that his involvement will help to bring transformation and normalization of the situation and that ‘Chinese Catholics [will be able] to live their faith in full communion with the universal Church’ (Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church 2018). There are similarities here between Francis and the Cold War popes. Although Pius XII was extremely strict and rejected all collaboration with communists, his approach yielded no positive results for the Catholic Church. Quite the opposite. The Eastern European socialist block answered with yet more severe suppression of religious freedoms. Popes John XXIII and Paul VI changed the way diplomatic negotiations were carried out with communist regimes. Without ever justifying or legitimizing communist rule in Eastern Europe, they instituted a dialogue with the regimes. The outcome was that even Moscow attempted to continue cooperation with the Holy See and to some extent tolerated Catholic activities within the Soviet Union.25 We may suppose, therefore, that the current approach of the Vatican is influenced by this experience and by the belief that cooperation can help to promote the reality of religious freedom. We should also remember that Sino-Vatican negotiations were initiated by Francis’s immediate predecessors. Dialogue between the Vatican and Beijing recommenced during the pontificate of John Paul II after several decades of silence, and Benedict XVI continued with the same attitude towards diplomatic relations. We should therefore place the actions of

25 This does not, however, mean that it would lead to the enshrining of religious freedom in the Constitutions of communist countries. Many countries nonetheless allowed their bishops to visit the Vatican. President Khrushchev even sent a personal letter to Pope John XXIII on his birthday. For more on the Vatican’s dialogue with Eastern European communist regimes (Luxmoore and Babiuchová 2003).

130

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Pope Francis in the context of those who went before him, and he himself has repeated this very fact on numerous occasions in order to legitimize his decisions. The agreement can therefore be seen as the result of many changes within the Catholic Church over a number of years but also of Francis’s pursuit of this same direction. Something that resounds through all Pope Francis’s writing and preaching is the need for the Catholic Church to ‘build bridges, not walls’ (Message of the Holy Father to Participants in the 3rd International Conference of ‘Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church’ 2018). Historical developments within the Catholic Church have therefore combined with the personal standpoint of the current Pope to create the right conditions for the signing of the Sino-Vatican agreement. To this day (2022), the Vatican defends the agreement as an essential step towards the normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC and the reunification of the Catholic Church. One year after the signing of the agreement, the agreement bore fruit—the first official joint appointment of Chinese bishops consecrated by both the Chinese state and the Vatican took place. On August 26, 2019, the first bishop after the signing of the agreement was consecrated—Antonio Yao Shun 姚顺 (*1965) was appointed bishop of the Jining 集宁 region in Inner Mongolia at the age of 54. Two days later, another bishop was consecrated—Stefano Xu Hongwei 胥红伟 (*1975), who became bishop of Hanzhong 汉中 in Shaanxi Province. The consecration of the new bishops was accompanied by enthusiastic reports from the Vatican as well as much criticism and concern from several observers. However, the Vatican also emphasizes that this is the first time since the founding of the PRC that the Vatican has effectively entered into a de facto international agreement with China. Nonetheless, there are reports of harassment and the disappearance of Church representatives loyal to the Vatican. For instance, Bishop Shao Zhumin 邵祝敏 (1963–) of Wenzhou diocese disappeared for a week. Also, Guo Xijin 郭希錦 the former bishop of Mindong diocese, who was removed from his position by the Vatican, refused to register within the CCPA and was detained by police. Guo was one of the underground bishops the Vatican had asked to step down after the signing of the agreement (Wang 2020). To satisfy the PRC, the Vatican demanded two of its bishops—Peter Zhuang Jianjian 庄建坚 (*1931) and Vincent Guo Xijin 郭希錦 (*1958)—who are part of the underground church, to relinquish their positions to the bishops selected by the CCPA and approved by the CCP (J.-B. Lin 2018).

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

131

According to advocates of the deal, negotiations should lead to less persecution and improve the lives of Chinese Catholics while creating harmonious cooperation between Catholic believers and the state. The Vatican promotes the agreement in a positive light. From its perspective, the most important aspects of the agreement are that the Pope has the final word in appointing bishops in China, all Catholics in China are now united with the Holy See, and all of the 100 bishops in China are now recognized by the Vatican 31 of these are underground bishops who are not officially recognized by the CCP) (Ticozzi 2020). Nonetheless, several observers and critics ask Pope Francis to be a promoter of human rights. According to many, since Beijing’s government is not allowing all citizens to believe and practice their religious beliefs truly and freely, the pope should seek no cooperation with the regime. Especially, many underground priests and bishops in the PRC are disappointed as they do not consider the agreement to benefit the overall situation of Catholics in China (‘United We Stand: China’s Underground Priests’ 2018). They are afraid that if the CCP elects the bishops, they might not be truly devoted to the Vatican. This agreement might put even more power over the Catholic Church in China in the hands of the CCP. We should not forget that ‘a key concern of the Religious Affairs authorities and of the official associations was the ordination, registration, and management of the five religions’ clergy’ (Goossaert and Palmer 2011, 331). Therefore, the question of the Pope’s approval of these bishops was an important issue for the Chinese government as well. Solving the question of the ‘apostolic mandate’ promotes the legitimacy and power of the state-run Catholic organization, including the loyalty of lay believers.

References Ad Apostolorum Principis. 1958. http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/ encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_29061958_ad-apostolorum-principis. html. Accessed 10 April 2019. Address of John Paul II to the Bishops of China on Their ‘Ad Limina’ Visit. 1980. https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1980/nov ember/documents/hf_jp_ii_spe_19801111_vescovi-cina.html. Accessed 10 April 2019.

132

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Address of Pope John Paul II to The Bishops of The Chinese Episcopal Conference on Their ‘Ad Limina’ Visit. 1985. https://www.vatican.va/con tent/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1985/november/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_ 19851108_cina-ad-limina.pdf. Accessed 14 February 2022. Apostolic Journey to Pakistan, Philippines I, Guam, Japan, Anchorage. 1981. https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/travels/1981/travels/doc uments/trav_far-east.html. Accessed 10 April 2019. Ad Sinarum Gentem. 1954. http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/it/encycl icals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_07101954_ad-sinarum-gentem.html. Accessed 10 April 2019. Barbalet, Jack. 2011. Chinese Religion, Market Society and the State. In Religion and the State: A Comparative Sociology, ed. Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai, and Bryan Turner, 185–206. London: Anthem Press. Batke, Jessica. 2017. PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the China. Leadership Monitor 52: 1–9. Bays, Daniel H. 2012. A New History of Christianity in China. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Calleri, P. 2013. Karikaturenseiten 2013. Paolo Calleri. http://www.paolocalleri.de/paolo-calleri/karikaturen2013/revolutionaer_farbig_calleri.jpg. Accessed 14 May 2019. Camps, Arnulf. 2010. Actors. In Handbook of Christianity in China. Volume Two: 1800 to the Present, ed. R. G. Tiedemann, 115–132. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Chan, Shun-Hing. 2017. Civil Society and the Role of the Catholic Church in Contemporary China. In Christianity in Contemporary China. Socio-cultural Perspectives, ed. F. K. G. Lim, 123–138. New York: Routledge. Charbonnier, Jean. 2007. Christians in China. A.D. 600 to 2000. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. Chenaux, P. 2012. Katolícka Církev a Komunismus v Evropˇe (1917–1989). Od Lenina K Janu Pavli II. [Catholic Church and Communism in Europe]. Trans. ˇ Cadský. Prague: Rybka Publishers. Chen, Nan-Zhou. 2003. Contextualizing Catholicity: A Taiwanese Theology of Identification. Asia Journal of Theology 17: 341–363. Chinese Catholics Remain Split over Vatican Deal. 2018. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/chinese-catholics-remain-split-over-vat ican-deal/85007. Accessed 14 May 2019. Chu, Cindy Yik-yi. 2014. China and the Vatican, 1979–Present. In Catholicism in China, 1900–Present: The Development of the Chinese Church, ed. Cindy Chu, 147–168. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2016. The Chinese Sisters of the Precious Blood and the Evolution of the Catholic Church. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Clark, Anthony. 2011. China’s Saints: Catholic Martyrdom during the Qing (1644–1911). Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

133

Cohen, Paul. 1963. China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cox, Lawrence. 2007. Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers. The AsianPacific Law and Policy Journal 8: 371–430. Decree against Communism. 1949. http://www.montfort.org.br/eng/docume ntos/decretos/anticomunismo/#. Accessed 10 April 2019. Evangelii Gaudium. 2013. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_ exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evange lii-gaudium.html. Accessed 10 April 2019. Goossaert, Vincent, and David A. Palmer. 2011. The Religious Question in Modern China. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. Guangyuan Manifesto 天主教自立革新宣言. 1950. http://www.gylib.com/Art icle_Print.asp?ArticleID=672. Accessed 16 April 2019. Harrison, Henrietta. 2014. Chinese Catholic Visionaries and the Socialist Education Movement in Shanxi (1963–65). The Catholic Historical Review 100 (4): 748–770. Hong, J. 2018. China Cannot Be Trusted on Sino-Vatican Deal. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/china-cannot-be-trusted-on-sinovatican-deal/82773. Accessed 01 May 2019. Intervention by Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States of The Holy See. 2018. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secret ariat_state/2018/documents/rc-seg-st-20180322_gallagher-cristianesimoec ina_en.html. Accessed 10 May 2019. Janz, Denis R. 1998. World Christianity and Marxism. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. John Paul II. 1983 (2006). Letter to Chinese Leader Deng Xiaping. In Papal Documents Related to China 1937–2005, ed. Maheu, Betty Ann MM, Researched and compiled by Elmer Wurth, MM, 202–203. Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre. Klain, Thoralf. 2014. The Missionary as Devil: Anti-Missionary Demonology in China, 1860–1930. In Europe as the Other: External Perspectives on European Christianity, ed. Judith Becker and Brian Stanley, 119–148. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Koesel, Karrie J. 2014. Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kwan, Simon. 2021. Decolonizing “Protestant” Death Rituals for the Chinese Bereaved: Negotiating a Resistance that is Contextually Relevant. International Journal of Practical Theology 25 (2): 243–262.

134

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Lam, Wing Kwan Anselm. 2020. True Catholic and Authentic Chinese: The Theologico-Political Polemic in China. International Journal of China Studies 11 (2): 257–276. Latourette, Scott K. 1929. A History of Christian Missions in China. New York: The Macmillan Company. Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benet XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China. 2007. https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/letters/2007/ documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070527_china.html. Accessed 10 April 2019. Leung, Beatrice. 2005. China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity. The China Quarterly 184: 894–913. Leung, Beatrice, and Wen-ban Kuo. 2014. Taiwan’s Role in the Chinese Catholic Church: The Bridging Endeavor. In Catholicism in China, 1900 – Present: The Development of the Chinese Church, ed. Cindy Chu, 169–187. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Leung, Beatrice, Wen-ban Kuo, and M. Wang. 2016. Sino-Vatican Negotiations: Problems in Sovereign Right and National Security. Journal of Contemporary China 25: 467–482. Lin, John Baptist. 2018. The Vatican Asks Legitimate Bishops to Step Aside in Favour of Illegitimate Ones. AsiaNews. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/ The-Vatican-asks-legitimate-bishops-to-step-aside-in-favour-of-illegitimateones-42896.html. Accessed 06 April 2019. Liu, Jifeng, and Chris White. 2019. Old Pastor and Local Bureaucrats: Recasting Church-State Relations in Contemporary China. Modern China 45 (5): 564– 590. Lo, J. 2019. Why Must Pope Francis Come to China? UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/why-must-pope-francis-come-tochina/84508. Accessed 07 May 2019. Luxmoore, Jonathan and Jolanta Babiuchová. 2003. Vatikán a rudý prapor: ˇ zápas o duši východní Evropy: Studie o vztahu Rímskokatolické církve a komunistických státu˚ [Vatican and the Red Flag]. Trans. Línek. Prague: Volvox Globator. Madsen, Richard. 1999. China’s Catholics. Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society. Berkley: University of California Press. ———. 2017. Signs and Wonders: Christianity in Contemporary China. In Christianity in Contemporary China. Socio-Cultural Perspectives, ed. Lim Francis K. G., 17–30. New York: Routledge. Mao, Zedong. 1965. On Coalition Government, April 24, 1945. In Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, ed. Bruno Shaw. Volume III, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Mariani, Paul P. 2011. Church Militant. Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press.

5

CATHOLIC MISSION IN CHINA AND THE SINO-VATICAN RELATIONS

135

———. 2014. The Four Catholic Bishops of Shanghai: ‘Underground’ and ‘Patriotic’ Church Competition and Sino-Vatican Relations in Reform-Era China. Journal of Church and State 5 (1): 38–56. McQuillan, Lawrence J., and Hayeon Park. 2017. Pope Francis, Capitalism, and Private Charitable Giving. The Independent Review 21 (3): 419–441. Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church. 2018. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/mes sages/pont-messages/2018/documents/papa-francesco_20180926_messag gio-cattolici-cinesi.html. Accessed 10 May 2019. Message of the Holy Father to Participants in the 3rd International Conference of ‘Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church’. 2018. http://w2.vat ican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/pont-messages/2018/documents/ papa-francesco_20180711_messaggio-etica-teologica.html. Accessed 10 May 2019. Moody, Peter R. 2012. The Catholic Church in China Today: The Limitations of Autonomy and Enculturation. Journal of Church and State 55: 403–431. Pastoral Guidelines of the Holy See Concerning the Civil Registration of Clergy in China. 2019. http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/ pubblico/2019/06/28/0554/01160.html#en. Accessed 15 June 2019. Phan, Peter C. 2020. Christian Martyrdom in Asia: Bearing Testimony to the Love of God. In Wiley Blackwell Companion to Christian Martyrdom, ed. Paul Middleton, 382–406. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Potter, Pitman B. 2003. Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China. The China Quarterly 174: 317–337. Rychetská, Magdaléna. 2021. Persecution and Martyrdoms in China. In The Palgrave Handbook of the Catholic Church in East Asia, ed. Chu Cindy Yikyi and Beatrice Leung. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.https://doi.org/10. 1007/978-981-15-9365-9_14-1. Sanger, David E., Edward Wong and Janson Horowitz. 2020. The Vatican is Said to be Hacked from China before Talks with Beijing. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/politics/china-vat ican-hack.html. Accessed 10 January 2021. Smith, Stephen. 2015. On not learning from the Soviet Union: Religious Policy in China, 1949-65. Modern China Studies 22 (1): 71–98. Spadaro, Antonio. 2018. The Agreement between China and the Holy See. La Civiltà Cattolica. https://laciviltacattolica.com/the-agreement-betweenchina-and-the-holy-see/. Accessed 15 May 2019. Stourton, Ed. 2015. Is the Pope a Communist? BBC News. https://www.bbc. com/news/magazine-33024951. Accessed 10 April 2019. Su, Ruoyi 蘇若裔. 2000. Historical Document of Persecution Chinese Church in 1948–1957中國近代教難史料1948–1957 . Taipei: Fujen University Press.

136

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Ticozzi, Sergio. 2020. The Development of the Underground Church in PostMao China. In People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, ed. Chu, Cindy Yik-yi and Paul P. Mariani, 29–41. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. United We Stand: China’s Underground Priests. 2018. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/united-we-stand-chinas-underground-pri ests/ 83965. Accessed 14 May 2019. Vala, Carsten T. 2017. Protestant Reaction to the Nationalism Agenda in Contemporary China. In Christianity in Contemporary China. Socio-cultural Perspectives, ed. Lim, Francis K. G., 59–77. New York: Routledge. Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. Ithaca, London: Cornel University Press. Vatican Mission Oversees Chinese Underground Bishops Stepping Aside. 2018. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/vatican-mission-ove rsees-chinese-underground-bishops-stepping-aside/84147. Accessed 14 May 2019. Wiest, Jean-Paul. 2014. Sino-Vatican Relations under Pope Benedict XVI: From Promising Beginnings to Overt Confrontation. In Catholicism in China, 1900 – Present: The Development of the Chinese Church, ed. Cindy Chu, 147–168. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Yang, Fenggang. 2017. From Cooperation to Resistance: Christian Responses to Intensified Suppression in China Today. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 15: 79–90. Zängle, Michael. 2014. Trends in Papal Communication: A Content Analysis of Encyclicals, from Leo XIII to Pope Francis. Historical Social Review 39 (4): 329–364. Zhuo, Xinping. 2009. Religion and Rule of Law in China Today. BYU Law Review 519: 1–6. Zulehner, Paul Michael. 2016. Papež František a Jeho Reforma Církve. [Where Is PopeFrancis?]. Trans. H. Medková. Prague: Vyšehrad. Zuo, Jiping. 1991. Political Religion: The case of the Cultural Revolution in China. Sociological Analysis 52 (1): 99–110.

CHAPTER 6

Catholic Church in the Light of Policy and Legislation Documents on Religion

The Chinese government has regulated all public religious activity for many years.1 Policy and legal documents have therefore been issued to control and regulate religious life in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A revision of the Regulation on Religious Affairs (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli 宗教事务条例) took effect on February 1, 2018. The prime minister, Li Keqiang 李克强, and the State Council for Legislative Affairs (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan 中华人民共和国国务院) signed the new regulation in September 2017. The new version revised the regulation that was drafted in 2004 and brought into force in 2005. As the new revision has only recently taken effect, it is essential to introduce the regulation and particularly to focus on the changes it has brought about. In addition to comparing the new regulation with the 2004 version, this chapter will provide a broader context by introducing other PRC

1 As early as the Tang dynasty, the Chinese court had the sovereign right to control and regulate religion as part of the life of its subjects. In fact, even earlier, various secret religious societies might have been operating as sources of resistance to imperial rule, which led the Chinese state to attempt to keep them under direct control. Since 1949, the CCP government has also felt the need to control religious groups. See Britsch (1995), Potter (2003).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_6

137

138

M. RYCHETSKÁ

policies and legal documents that concern religion. The changes introduced by the new regulation affect all religious groups in China, but for some, the implications could be more serious than for others. This chapter will seek to offer a clearer understanding of the current Chinese legal system regarding religion and to address two questions in particular: 1) What are the changes in the new Regulation on Religious Affairs? 2) What are the effects of the new regulation on the Catholic Church in China?

Discussions on the Regulation of Religion in China: An Overview The Chinese government is currently promoting the idea of fazhi 法 治—the rule of law—and not solely in the realm of religion. One of the simplest definitions of ‘rule of law’ has been provided by Randall Peerenboom (2002: 2): At its most basic, rule of law refers to a system in which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual members of the ruling elite, as captured in the rhetorically powerful if overly simplistic notions of government of laws, the supremacy of the laws, and equality of all before the law.

From this concise definition, we can distinguish one of the main elements of the rule of law: no one is above the law, in any sense, whatever their standing in the political spectrum, their wealth, influence or other possible variables. In theory, it should apply equally to the state and to the Party. The Chinese government claims fazhi 法治 to be one of the pillars of contemporary Chinese society.2 Article 5 of the Constitution of the PRC (a translation is available on the government’s website) states that the PRC is a socialist country under the rule of law. Having the term enshrined in the Constitution does not necessarily mean the whole state is under the dominion of the rule of law: many would argue that the way fazhi is implemented in China means it can be interpreted as the rule by law (Sheehy 2006). Rule by law refers to the situation where the state holds the ‘reins’ and uses the law as a tool for achieving its own 2 Since the 18th CCP National Congress, the term ‘rule of law’ (fazhi 法治) has been associated with other terms said to represent the core values of socialism in China.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

139

goals (Peerenboom 2002). One characteristic of the rule by law is the creation of general and abstract rules which help to carry out the state’s agenda and make no provision for the exercise of restraint on state power (Castellucci 2007). Whether the PRC operates a system of rule by law or of law continues to be a subject of debate among scholars and sinologists. For instance, during the debate held on Chinese Law Net in June 2001, it was suggested that the Chinese legal system is compliant with the rule of law—not perfectly, but because the legal system has committed itself to obstruct the power of the state if necessary, it is still compliant. Peerenboom pursues the ‘middle ground’ and suggests the PRC is moving towards the rule of law (Peerenboom 2002). Palmer (2009) insists that if the rule of law is to be complied with, the policy on religion requires greater transparency and clearer administrative procedures. All the legislative changes were part of a broader socioeconomic and political program of reform whereby, from 2004 onwards, regulations became more directive to religious organizations, while some of the more ambiguous statements were removed from the statute books (Tong 2010). Although many scholars continue to insist that rule by law remains prevalent in the PRC and are more critical to the new regulations (G. Chen 2017; Homer 2010), others are more optimistic as they believe that the rule of law will eventually bring more openness, freedom, and harmony (Kuo 2011; Tong 2010). Lambert (2001), a former British diplomat to China, highlighted that the current ideology of the CCP, based on the thinking of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong, is key to the CCP’s position on religion and that atheistic materialism based on socialism should therefore be seen as the basic standpoint of the CCP in any of its dealings with religious groups in China. Potter (2003), on the other hand, believes that it was China’s historical experience that created the desire to exert control over religion. Various religions and religious groups have challenged the regime throughout its history, and for this reason, regulating religion in China is more an issue of legitimacy and authority than of ideology. As there was no legal document that managed religious life in China before 2005, Kuo Cheng-tian (2011) suggests that since that year we have seen an important change: a new political process of ‘… keeping a delicate balance between political correctness and liberal religious policies serve to explain the slow but significant improvement in religious freedom in China over the past decade’ (Kuo 2011: 1061). The author

140

M. RYCHETSKÁ

examines the dynamic between religious bodies and government representatives and suggests that the Chinese government is trying to adapt to the needs of domestic and international groups, including religious groups. Kuo sets out an optimistic but rather unrealistic vision of openness, freedom of religion, and harmony in Chinese society. Potter (2003) supported the idea that China should be pushed to follow certain international standards on human rights, including the various ‘freedoms’, as it is now a part of a globalized world and a leading world economy. These studies have been published before the inauguration of President Xi Jinping 习近平 (b. 1953). His regime brought more restrictions not only on religious life but also on other social spheres of Chinese citizens. The sinologist Wenzel-Teuber (2016) has published a detailed list of the changes in the new regulation on religion. As her article was published in 2016, it reflects the first draft of the regulation, which was published online so that specialists and members of the public could provide feedback. The article is brief and mostly descriptive. Batke (2017)3 also provides a necessary comparison between the previous and current drafts of the regulations. Her analysis is primarily based on a comparison between the frequency of selected vocabulary used in the two versions.4 Yang Fenggang (2017) provided further insight into the possible outcomes of the new regulations and described three different strategies towards the Chinese government employed by Christians in China: cooperation, accommodation, and resistance. Yang expressed his concern that the new legislation would bring greater suppression of Christianity in China as many religious activities (such as home Bible studies, religious conferences, and publishing religious content on the internet) now needed to be controlled and approved by the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA, Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 国家宗教事务局), which is now incorporated into the Department of United Front Work (N. Cao 2018: 2).5 This could be especially problematic for underground

3 Formerly a research analyst for the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence, Jessica Batke is an expert on political and social affairs in China. She is currently senior editor of ChinaFile. 4 For example, Batke (2017) noticed that national security (guojia anquan 国家安全) is cited three times in the new regulations versus one time in the old version, which led her to conclude that national security is an urgent issue in modern-day PRC. 5 The incorporation of SARA into the United Front Work is an important change as the office is now directly under the leadership of the CCP.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

141

Christian groups, who were now officially outlawed by the regulation. Yang also suggested that certain of the revised regulations could be considered a violation of the freedom of religion, a conclusion which clearly contradicts the government’s proclamations concerning the rule of law. Chinese scholars to have expressed their views on the regulation include Cao Shunli 曹顺利 in his article 《宗教事务条例》 解读 Zongjiao shiwu tiaoci jiedu (S. Cao 2005), which explored the processes involved in establishing the new law and suggested that the government created the new regulation to protect Chinese society and all citizens of the PRC. The main aims, according to Cao, are to safeguard national unity and establish a transparent legal system that can be made known to all religious citizens and so uphold the rule of law. He insisted that the new law was not created hurriedly but over a long period, as befitted such a significant new law. Hu Shaojie 胡绍皆 (2006) was particularly interested in the impact of the new regulation on religious groups. Hu highlighted the need for religious bodies to educate their members about the regulation—without knowledge of the requirements of the regulation, religious people cannot protect themselves—and sees the new regulation as further promoting harmony in Chinese society. Feng Baojun 冯宝军 (2016) suggested that the regulation, and its revision, were necessary for the preservation of social order and to create a harmonious society. Feng compared the PRC and its regulation on religion with various other countries and their laws and regulations and believes China is following the global trend in publishing more transparent regulations and in doing so is following the rule of law. Zhou Xiaowei (2021) also promotes the idea that the current policy on religion in the PRC is based on religious freedom. Such statements are, however, hugely influenced by communist propaganda and PRC’s soft power. Many official representatives of the CCPA describe the influence of the regulation on Chinese Catholics in the same way. Their writings, published with the approval of the patriotic association, create a conciliatory image of the Catholic Church in China and highlight the similarities between Catholic dogma and socialism.6 Some of these proclamations are remarkably similar to official state propaganda as ‘state-recognized religious leaders [are] expected to speak within the framework of broader 6 For instance, a priest Li Zhiyi (2019) published an article on how core socialist values are mirrored in basic Catholic teaching.

142

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Party policy’ (Goossaert and Palmer 2011: 321). We should not forget, therefore, that some Chinese scholars may just be blindly promoting official propaganda without critically analyzing the problems many religious groups are facing. Researchers at Chinese institutions may be under closer scrutiny than Western scholars as it is more important that their research is useful to the government; equally, they are unlikely to issue any severe criticism of the Party. In the case of Catholics in China, they often narrate a story of harmonious cooperation and coexistence of the Christian churches and the Chinese government (completely ignoring the underground church). The studies mentioned above indicate different approaches and mixed findings. Rather than focusing on state–church relations from the perspective of social resistance or state domination, this book considers lived experience and the difference between the official legal norms and what is actually happening on the ground of congregations of the open Catholic Church in China. In this, it follows the stance of Cao Nanlai concerning the need to ‘understand the meaning of everyday life […] to examine the symbolic presence of state power and state relations in the local church community’ (N. Cao 2010: 2), with a focus on a particular Christian denomination. The open Catholic Church is often seen as less involved in the church–state struggle as its theological orthodoxy promotes harmonious cooperation with the communist regime in China. In recent years especially, the Vatican has urged Chinese Catholics to be ‘good citizens’ and to support the ruling regime.7 This attitude is often overlooked as many researchers focus on the Protestant house churches which oppose the regime and support democracy and civil society (Lim 2019). Very few articles have analyzed the situation of the official churches as these are often perceived as ‘unproblematic’. I believe, however, that it is also important to consider their case. The open sector of the Catholic Church represents a significant number of Chinese Christians in China. And after the signing of the new provisional agreement between the Vatican and the PRC, the CCPA may one day represent all Catholics in China, especially as the signatory, Pope Francis, is in favor of uniting the underground and 7 This does not necessarily mean to support the CCPA, but to support the regime and its civil laws and regulations. See Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church 2018, Apostolic Journey to Pakistan, Philippines I, Guam, Japan, Anchorage 1981.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

143

open churches. He has even appealed to unofficial underground bishops to step down from their posts in favor of candidates officially assigned by the CCPA (‘Vatican Mission Oversees Chinese Underground Bishops Stepping Aside’ 2018).8

Policy on Religion before 2018 To understand the current regime for regulating religion, it is important to grasp the broader historical context of the PRC policy towards religion. As explained by Goossaert and Palmer (2011: 317): the state, from the late 1970s onward, attempted to shape religious orthodoxy and to draw clear demarcations between legitimate and illegitimate forms of religiosity, both through its structuring of public discourse on religion and through its attempts to institutionalize religious communities.

Furthermore, I would argue that the state attempted to shape religious orthodoxy through means of policies and legislative documents published by the Chinese government on the subject of religion. After Mao’s death, along with the opening up of the Chinese economy, the ‘religious market’ was also reopened. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee in 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Party changed its official policy and started to be more focused on economic reforms. These reforms led to a gradual shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy. With the opening up of the Chinese market came a relaxation of government policy on religion. Over the following years, the Chinese government issued various documents and authorized more organizations for the regulation of religious groups. The government of Deng Xiaoping lifted its repressive religious policy, and the Chinese academic discourse moved away from the complete rejection of religion. As soon as in 1953, Li Weihan 李維漢 (1896–1984), then the head of the United Front Department of the Party, suggested a new approach towards religion, which Mao adopted in his speech ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ in 1957 (Mao 1977). While forgotten in the years following the Great Leap Forward, the approach became the essential CCP’s position on religion. Li proposed 8 See the previous chapter.

144

M. RYCHETSKÁ

‘five characteristics’ of religion: ‘its longevity, its mass nature, its link with ethnic minorities, its international connections, and its complexity’ (S. Smith 2015: 79). Li advocated that banning religions would not cause their disappearance from society. OSn the contrary, according to Li, granting freedom of religion would eventually lead to impairing religious belief (Leung 1985). ‘Religious freedom policy’ resembles a mere slogan, as its primary aim is not tolerance of religious practices of Chinese citizens, but to ‘convert all the believers to non-believers’ (Lam 2020: 261). Freedom of religion is only temporary, and all faiths should disappear with time. This position was adopted by Deng and embodied in Document No. 19 (1984, transl. in Britsch 1995). We can observe the continuation of the strategies also implemented in the current religious policy of Xi Jinping. The primary legal document on religion in the PRC is the Chinese Constitution. The current version of the Constitution was adopted in December 1982, since then it has undergone several revisions.9 Article 36 regulates religious belief and affirms freedom of religion: Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.10 (People’s Republic of China 2018)

According to the Constitution, the Chinese government guarantees access to all ‘normal religious activities’ (zhengchang de zongjiao huodong 正常的宗教活动), although many scholars have raised questions as to what this actually means.11 The problem is that ‘normal’ (zhengchang 9 The Constitution was revised in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004, and 2018. 10 The bolded words are highlighted by the author. 11 The CCP officially guaranteed the freedom of religion as early as 1949 when the Party approved the Common Program (Gongtong gangling 共同纲领), which served as a provisional Constitution. The first Constitution signed in 1954 followed the same stance on religion (See Slobodník 2007). The article 36 is identical to the version from 1954.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

145

正常) is not defined and therefore remains rather vague. The intended meaning could be ‘legal religious activities’, but without definition the term could be used differently in different situations. In other words, in a certain situation, one religious group or activity could receive authorized status and become ‘normal’, while other groups, those not allowed by the government, could be seen as illegal, be outlawed, and deemed not ‘normal’. Furthermore, the status of any given group is neither permanent nor static but can change over time, even as far as being labeled an evil cult (xiejiao 邪教) (Zhu 2010). For example, several Christian groups have been included in the official list of evil cults. For instance, the Church of Almighty God (Quannengshen jiaohui 全能神教会)12 has been outlawed since 1995, and the members of the church have been persecuted (Irons 2018).13 However, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association should belong to the list of groups carrying out ‘normal’ religious activities. Two crucial points that are clear from the current formula are that only those religious activities that pose no threat to the leadership of the CCP receive legal protection and that no religious group in China should be influenced by a foreign entity. This includes any possible connection between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Vatican. If such a connection could be proven, the Catholic Church could face accusations of being aligned with foreign imperial forces. Since 1982, the Central Committee of the CCP has issued numerous documents on the regulation of religious life in China. The first official and detailed explanation of the PRC’s policy on religions was the document Basic Viewpoints and Policies on Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period (Zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben zhengce 宗教问题的基本观点和基本政策) —also known as Document No. 19 (trans. in Britsch 1995, 364–683). The following year, a revised draft, for public consumption, was published in the CCP journal Red Flag (Hongqi 红旗) (Morrison 2001). The document recognized 12 The leader of the church, Wang Yi 王怡 was sentenced nine years in prison in December 2019. 13 Other Christian churches listed as evil cults are, for example, Shouters (Huhanpai

呼喊派), Spirit Church (Linglingjiao灵灵教), Children of God, (Tianfude ern˝ u天父的儿 女), and New testament church (Xinyue jiaohui 新约教会). These churches belong to charismatic movements, and they are rather new in their origin. Among non-Christian religious groups outlawed and listed as evil cults, the most well-known is Falun gong (法 轮功). For the full list, see Irons (2018: 419–420).

146

M. RYCHETSKÁ

the continued existence of religion in China and rejected any suppression of religious groups and discrimination based on religious beliefs (Bays 2012). In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the document therefore reaffirmed the Constitutional freedom of religious belief in China. As Thomas David DuBois (2017: 95) concluded, this regulation was the ‘key moment of rehabilitation for religion in the post-Mao era’. Its principal tenet was respect and protection for religious groups in China and making such respect and protection a legal requirement. The Party’s actual position, however, changed little from its original Marxist perspective—the CCP repeatedly proclaimed that religion should not be an influential part of society, reaffirmed the belief that it would eventually disappear, and stressed the need for all religious organizations to adapt to socialism (shehuizhuyi 社会主义) and promote patriotism (aiguo 爱国) (Potter 2003; Morrison 2001). Furthermore, as the CCP propagated atheism, it required that all religious activities be confined within designated areas. For the Catholic Church, this meant that no Catholic meeting should be held outside official church facilities. Any form of pilgrimage or seminars outside of a property designed for religious purposes was thus outlawed (Leung 2005). Despite the proclamation that ‘every citizen has the freedom to believe in religion and also the freedom not to believe in religion’, the CCP reaffirmed its atheistic position by proclaiming that religion could not interfere with politics and that no party member could be religious (Document No. 19 trans. in Britsch 1995: 369). The document recognized that some citizens may be religious, but, according to the CCP, this should not be the case with party members and county leaders. The CCP required its members to believe only in communism and socialism. The Party’s position on this matter was strong: party members should not belong to any religious group because political and religious institutions should be separated from one another (Zhu 2010). For Roman Catholics, one section of the document was particularly noteworthy, namely that which related to ‘The International Relations of China’s Religions’, which dealt with how religious groups were to engage with foreign entities. It supported friendly visits and mutual contact but at the same time emphasized the need for Chinese religions to maintain independence and to shun foreign interference (Leung 2005). It opposed the idea of ‘designs of all reactionary religious forces from abroad who desire to once again gain control over religion’ in China (Document No. 19 trans. in Britsch 1995: 380). As argued by some scholars, this approach

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

147

was aimed principally at the complicated relationship between the Vatican and the Catholic Church in China. The Chinese government was still worried that normalizing diplomatic ties with the pope might lead to misunderstandings and renewed efforts from the Vatican to control the Chinese church (Palmer 2009). This would be unacceptable to the CCP. Lanier Britsch has summed up the basic position of Document No. 19: (1) Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought are the official theoretical and philosophical bases for attitudes, policies, and laws related to religion in the PRC. (2) According to Communist beliefs, religion and religious activities are expected in time to wither away. (3) Force and/or coercion are not to be used to hurry up the natural process of religion’s decline and ultimate demise. (4) Religious organizations and religious people are to be induced to participate in the United Front to create a strong Socialist state and economy. (5) Religion is a political matter and should be organized and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and the state. Members of the Party are not to believe in religion. According to policy, they must be atheists. (Britsch 1995: 361)

In 1991, almost ten years after issuing Document No. 19, the Chinese government introduced a new policy document, the so-called Document No. 6, called On Some Problems Concerning Further Improving Work on Religion (Document No. 6, trans. in Britsch 1995: 384–91). This was an internal paper not for consumption by the general public (Cox 2007). Some scholars nonetheless released it at a later date. The document reaffirmed the principles of Document No. 19, urging the supervision of religious activities on a provincial level and defining the jurisdictions of the various authorities (Palmer 2009). It stressed the need for additional control over religious groups in order to strengthen social stability, for a sense of national unity between believers and non-believers, and for the prohibition of ‘the lawless elements who use religion and religious activities to stir up trouble, violate the law and commit crimes’ (Document No. 6, trans. in Britsch 1995: 387). One adjustment was the demand to register all sites where religious activities took place. Only registered sites could be considered valid locations for ‘normal religious activities’ and thereby receive protection from the Chinese government. If any religious group wanted to open a new

148

M. RYCHETSKÁ

site, it was obligatory to seek government approval above the county level. Otherwise, it was outlawed. This was the case for many Protestant house churches (jiating jiaohui 家庭教会), which refused to come under the direct control of the CCP (Document No. 6, trans. in Britsch 1995). The document stated that local public security departments could directly intervene (‘take forceful measures’) against individuals or organizations who misused religious influence to encourage social disturbances and opposition to the leadership of the CCP. Building on previous legal documents, the State Council under the premiership of Li Peng 李鹏 introduced a further set of national regulations on religions in January 1994. These were Regulations on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners within China’s Borders, known as Document No. 144, and Order of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China No. 145 on Management of Places for Religious Activities (Document No. 144, trans. in Britsch 1995: 394–396, Document No. 145, trans. in Britsch 1995: 396–399). The first document issued more detailed regulations on foreign bodies and organizations involved with religious groups in China. While allowing them to participate or even lecture at religious sites in China, it strictly forbade them to establish or lead local religious organizations or to appoint religious clergy in China. It also prohibited foreigners from conducting missionary work among Chinese citizens in China and from circulating religious materials from abroad. Document No. 145, on the other hand, concerned local issues, such as the registration of places of worship. It directed all churches to undergo an official registration process and expressed the need for ‘appropriate management systems’ (Leung 2005: 909) The legislation also mentioned the kinds of punishments that would be meted out on those who violated the orders. According to the document, the penalties would range from an initial warning to the abolishment (physical destruction or closure) of the local religious places. Both directives complied with the previous two documents on religions but clarified some practical points concerning the CPP’s policy on beliefs. In 2004, the State Council of the PRC issued a new document entitled Regulations on Religious Affairs (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli 宗教事务条 例). This legal document, which regulates religious communities, took effect on March 1, 2005; soon afterward, a series of provincial regulations were established. According to some scholars, the new regulations signaled a ‘paradigm shift’ in the CCP’s policy on religion. The observation appears sound as the document stressed the need to regulate religious

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

149

groups in accordance with administrative transparency and straightforward legal regulations and laws (Tong 2010). The document was also much longer than any previously published policy documents on the issue and contained more detailed instructions. As James Tong noted, the Chinese government’s position towards managing religion shifted ‘from systemic policies towards the rule of law’ (Tong 2010: 883). All regulations were now more focused on following exact legal procedures, whereas previous documents had been much more ambiguous. For example, the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs contained fewer inconsistencies in the directions concerning the registration and legalization of religious activities (Homer 2010). For instance, Articles 12–15 contained detailed guidance for applicants seeking to obtain a license to organize collective religious activities; a long list of bureaucratic procedures was included. Alongside its socioeconomic and political reforms, the Chinese government was seeking to integrate religious policy into a new legal system. According to the new policy, religious organizations should gain more institutional autonomy and sovereignty over their internal affairs. Religious patriotic associations could run their religious training schools, recruit seminary teachers, certify religious personnel, and own and use property designed to religious groups. The regulations provided a more detailed administrative and judicial system for managing religious groups and activities, but this did not mean an end to all ambiguity. For example, the 2005 regulation still guaranteed government protection of ‘normal religious activities’ without any further explanation of what exactly these activities might be. A further change was that religious groups came under the same administration as social groups and organizations and were required to follow the same registration procedures and legal duties as civic groups and social corporations (Tong 2010). To gain legal status, all previously unregistered religious groups were required to ‘register with the government to become legal if they had a fixed place for religious gatherings, a regular number of attendants, and a designated set of leaders’ (F. Yang 2017: 86). Many of the Protestant ‘house’ churches hoped finally to become legalized under the new regulations (Homer 2010). While the government offered the possibility for unrecognized religious groups to apply for registration, any group failing the registration procedure would be abolished, and unauthorized facilities and publications would be destroyed or confiscated; only very few religious communities succeeded in passing the strict registration procedures (Tong 2010;

150

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Homer 2010). As most unrecognized religious groups failed to achieve registration, many decided not even to try (Zhuo 2014). After 2005, religious associations enjoyed greater legal protection as they were ‘empowered to lodge administrative appeals against bureaucratic decisions, challenge administrative actions in court, and sue for compensatory damage from illegal or negligent government actions’ (Tong 2010: 866). This meant that the new legislation introduced a more standardized administrative system for controlling religion in China, which even allowed officially registered religious groups to be protected against the misuse of government power. At the same time, however, the regulation granted greater legal power to restrict unwanted religious activities. One important change in the 2005 regulation was that it contained, for the first time, no explicit requirement for religious organizations to support socialism. Before 2005, the central government repeatedly highlighted the need for religions in China to adapt to socialism, but the new regulation carried no requirement to adjust religious doctrines to the state’s socialist paradigm. Furthermore, the document did not promote atheism or imply that politically the CCP viewed religion as a phenomenon that would ultimately disappear from Chinese society. The document continued the CCP’s previous stance of insisting on government control of international relations for the five approved religions: it authorized ‘friendly relations’ and cooperation between Chinese religious communities and religious organizations abroad. Local priests and religious specialists could go for training abroad, and foreign religious personnel could visit Chinese religious facilities to give lectures— providing they had received an official invitation. In practice, this meant that many students from Catholic colleges went to study at theological institutions outside China. Prior to these new permissions, that is, since 1994, many theological colleges had been sending their students abroad illegally. The government also now officially allowed domestic religious groups to receive donations from foreign individuals or organizations (Tong 2010). All these changes signaled a new phase in state–church relations and greater autonomy for religious bodies. Indeed, the situation appeared to improve in the early 2000s. Several Chinese scholars even published articles about Christianity and, while not converting to Christianity, claimed to be ‘cultural Christians’ (wenhuajidutu 文化基督徒). However, since the inauguration of the current President and Secretary-General of the CCP, Xi Jinping in 2012, the

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

151

persecution of Christians in China has intensified. The new ideological hardship of the central government and the overall consolidation of control over domestic affairs make the situation more difficult for the Catholic Church in China. There is no real freedom of religion in China. Many Christians—both Catholics and Protestants—are constantly facing many restrictions in China. As in the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese government closed and demolished churches, restricted religious education, meetings, and persecuted many religious leaders.

New Regulation on Religious Affairs More than ten years after issuing the Regulation on Religious Affairs, the State Council of the PRC implemented a new and revised draft of the regulations. The government had indicated its intention to update the regulations as early as 2016 when the Office for Legislative Affairs published a first draft of the changes on its website so that the general public could read and review the new regulations and raise their concerns. The review process was open for a month: Chinese religious organizations and netizens were able to offer recommendations from September 7 to October 7, 2016.14 The final draft was signed a year later, in September 2017. The final version of the regulations was signed by the premier Li Keqiang 李克强and the State Council for Legislative Affairs and took effect on February 1, 2018. The revised legal order added two chapters and several articles to the regulations, which increased in size from 7 chapters and 48 articles to 9 chapters and 77 articles.15 The numerous changes included closer monitoring of online preaching and of religious schools and training and fundraising for religious groups. It also brought changes to the

14 This process should come as no surprise. In its legitimization of the rule of law, the Chinese government often invites ordinary citizens to assert their right to comment on laws and regulations via the Internet (Huang 2012). According to Song and Miao (2014), such politics enhances citizens’ ability to communicate and participate in the political process, improves political socialization, and shapes political beliefs and consciousness. But it also balances the power structure between state and society, strengthening the power of Chinese civil society. However, we should not forget that the CCP also seeks to maintain authority and control through strict censorship. 15 Katharina Wenzel-Teuber (2016) mentions that the new version was to have 9 chapters and 74 articles. We can see, therefore, that the 2016 draft is not the same as the officially enforced version.

152

M. RYCHETSKÁ

legal status of religious bodies and places for religious activities and reaffirmed the CCP’s previous position on religion. I believe the most important changes to be: (1) the shift in the basic position of the CCP back to the days of Document No. 19 by reinserting the requirement of actively promoting and supporting socialism; (2) the new role for the local government institutions in controlling religious activity; (3) stricter control of religious schools and changes in the legal management of these bodies; (4) new restrictions on spreading information, both printed and digital; (5) greater supervision of religious finances and investments and restrictions on donations to religious groups. The CCP’s Basic Position on Religion The revision reaffirms the Chinese government’s position on religion—a position which is anchored in the Constitution: No organization or individual may force citizens to believe in or not to believe in religion … The state protects normal religious activities … No organization or individual may use religion to endanger national security, disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State, or in other activities that harm State or public interests, or citizens’ lawful rights and interests, or in other illegal activities. (Article 4, The Regulation on Religious Affairs 2018)

The new regulation follows almost the same formulae as Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution. However, the term ‘normal religious activities’ still lacks a proper description of what these religious activities might be. At the same time, it highlights the need for religions to duly observe the law. In this sense, only if the government officially recognizes the religious group is it considered authorized and labeled ‘normal’ (Zhu 2010). Still, a ‘normal’ religion must not threaten public order and stability or the unity of the PRC. One significant change is the new requirement that all religious groups adopt the tenets of socialism: The State … actively guides religions to adapt to socialistic society…. Religious bodies, religious schools, sites for religious activities and religious citizens shall practice the core values of socialism. (Article 4, The Regulation on Religious Affairs 2018)

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

153

This requirement was not included in the regulations of 2004, which in fact never used the term socialism. As already mentioned, after the publication of the 2004 regulation, many academics expressed optimism over the fact that there was no mention of a requirement to follow socialism and obey the leadership of the CCP. James W. Tong, for example, even called the earlier regulation a ‘series of enlightened religious policies’ (2010: 862). The new demand from the government is no surprise, however. The requirement for religious groups to ‘adapt to’ socialism was included in previous legal documents on religion, and the new regulation simply indicates a return to official state ideology. In recent years, the CCP has promoted its theory of religion ‘following socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi zongjiao lilun 中国特 色社会主义宗教理论) (Batke 2017). One manifestation of this is mandatory patriotic seminars in religious schools.16 Pursuant to this program, many religious associations have sought to reinterpret their teaching as one that serves socialism through promoting morality and a united and harmonious Chinese society (Palmer 2009). Since 2002, the authors of textbooks for this kind of education have interpreted numerous verses from the Bible in the light of socialism and patriotism (Kuo 2011). In 2016, President Xi Jinping 习近平 insisted that in the new era it was essential that religious groups in China adopt socialism and adhere to Chinafication (zhongguohua 中国化): Actively guide religion to adapt to socialistic society. An important task is to support religion in our country to adhere to the way of Chinafication [way of Chineseness]. (Q. Zhang 2016)

He also stressed the Party’s responsibility for managing religions in China. Religious citizens should support and love the country, and religious groups (aiguo aijiao, 爱国爱教) should promote the leadership of the CCP and the socialist path (Cox 2007). This trend towards promoting Chinese characteristics within religion is clear from articles published by the official WeChat group for religions in the PRC. For example, in May and June 2018, the WeChat group Weixin zongjiao微 信宗教posted 57 articles, 35 of which discussed religion and Chinese 16 The Catholic and Protestant associations added the term patriotic (aiguo爱国) to their official name to further express their devotion and loyalty to the regime. See Carsten Vala (2012).

154

M. RYCHETSKÁ

culture or Chinese ‘characteristics’, which means more than half of the articles were about the topic. The fact that the official group for religions on WeChat is promoting state policy should come as no surprise: from the sheer volume of articles published on the topic, we can conclude that this particular policy is central. In order to promote harmony between socialism and Catholicism, some believers even directly associate Pope Francis with socialist values by highlighting his support for underprivileged people. One interviewee even suggested that the pope is a communist17 (Interview, May 2019). Patriotism is explained as a Christian value. One priest described the need for one’s country (aiguo 爱国) as being connected to loving other citizens and other people in general, which he then compared to the basic command in Christianity to ‘love one another’ (Interview, May 2018). Promoting cooperation with the government is one common strategy of religious groups under the totalitarian regime. As explained by Karrie Koesel (2014: 16): Although the two sets of actors [religious group and a totalitarian regime] certainly have different interests and objectives, the nature of their relations can be cooperative because each side has the ability to provide resources needed by the other and can maximize its own interests through cooperative activities.

The open church is already utilizing this strategy, and Pope Francis is now promoting the same for the underground church. It is questionable, however, whether such subordination would truly lead to mutual cooperation as the government is rather strictly controlling the religious life in China. Local Control A second significant change is the new role for local government institutions. The previous regulation had partially shifted administration from government to religious associations, which were thus given more authority and sovereignty (Tong 2010). Now, local and regional government was to be responsible for implementing religious policy and supervising religious groups:

17 那个神父是共产党人!

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

155

The government at all levels should strengthen the guidance of religious work, establish and improve religious work mechanisms, and ensure the necessary conditions for religious work … The government at the county level should be responsible for leadership of religious affairs within its responsibilities. The villagers’ and residents’ committees should assist the government in managing religious affairs according to law. (Article 6, The Regulation on Religious Affairs 2018)

This represents a shift from the previous regulation that was directed at least towards the partial autonomy of religious groups. President Xi Jinping confirmed the responsibilities of local organs. During the Religious Affairs Work Conference in 2017, he explained that it is essential to include this notion into the training of cadres. The CCP promotes cooperation between the central government in Beijing and local-level organs while implementing national rules and policies (Batke 2017). This adjustment can therefore be seen as following the general policy of the CCP in seeking to strengthen local control (N. Cao 2017). Katharina WenzelTauber (2016) suggests that this is the most significant change to the regulation as it indicates stronger control over religion in China. Some other scholars (F. Yang 2017) are also critical of such a direction and also highlight the regulation’s stricter persecution of unauthorized religious leaders. It is the CCP that decides who will be the religious leader of any religious group existing in the PRC. Religious Education and Appointing Clergy The revision places fresh emphasis on institutions for religious education. The previous regulation mentioned facilities for religious education (zongjiao yuanxiao 宗教院校) just four times; the new regulation mentions them 55 times. Schools that provide religious training now come under the same regulation as all religious bodies. A whole new chapter, Chapter III, is dedicated to the management of religious schools: the authors of the revision were clearly keen to highlight the issue of religious training and the administration of religious schools (Article 16). The issue of state-led religious training has been important for a long time, as patriotic education should incorporate religious clergy loyal to the CCP (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). Only professionals with official religious seminary training approved by the government can conduct

156

M. RYCHETSKÁ

religious activity (Article 36). Without the official certificate, a religious preacher can be sanctioned in accordance with the law (F. Yang 2005). The most important change regarding religious education is arguably the fact that religious schools can now apply to register as legal persons (faren 法人) (Article 14).18 Numerous religious groups had already demanded this possibility as it allowed religious institutions to obtain legal status and protection (Wenzel-Teuber 2016). This step is therefore welcomed by many religious groups. The registration procedure for establishing religious schools has not changed in essence19 : religious schools can be established only if the national religious association applies to the Religious Affairs department of the State Council. But the new regulation provides more detail than the previous one. Because of the CCP’s efforts to move towards the rule of law (fazhi 法制), the Party supports more detailed regulations in order to create the sense that government regulations, legislation, and systemic policies are fair and legitimate (Batke 2017; Tong 2010). Some scholars, however, suggest that there may be a hidden agenda behind this process. In the words of Ping Xiong (2014: 610)20 : ‘The government tries to administer almost every aspect of religious activities in order to maintain control over religious bodies, persons, and activities’. The sole focus of Chapter III is the management of religious schools and the verification of the qualifications of those who teach there (Article 16). The new regulation states that religious schools can be established only by national religious associations or by religious groups at the provincial level under the direction of central government. Any other organization or individual is prevented from running institutions for religious schooling or performing any religious activity (Articles 11 and 41). Some authors have sought to prove that the new education-related regulations ‘are likely meant at least in part to further foreclose any possibility 18 Sites set aside for religious activities can also apply to register as a legal person. Unlike religious schools, sites for religious activities must first seek the approval of the local religious organizations. As a legal person, sites for religious activities or religious education can gain more civil rights and legal privileges. One of these is the ability to sue or challenge other legal bodies before a court as a united organization. At least in theory, therefore, the regulation increases the institutional autonomy of religious groups and creates space for judicial challenges. 19 Originally, Articles 8, 9, and 10 applied to religious schools and training. 20 Dr. Ping Xiong is a senior lecturer at the School of Law of the University of South

Australia.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

157

of external influence (such as the pope or the Dalai Lama) over the next generation of the faithful’ (Batke 2017: 2). This tighter control and management of religious schools provides the government with even more influence over religious education and believers. But in the light of the new provisional agreement between the Holy See and the PRC signed in September 2018, it seems that the pope, who had previously been seen by some commentators as providing ‘moral leadership’, may yet be able to wield at least some kind of influence. In a change from any previous document, religious schools are now officially allowed to employ foreign personnel. This is a totally new regulation not mentioned in any previous document on religion. The previous regulation had only allowed students of religious educational institutions to go abroad for religious training or foreigners to study at religious schools in China (Originally, Article 10). It did not mention foreign teachers at religious schools in China at all. Of course, it was not unheard of for foreigners to be invited to lecture at Chinese religious institutions and many priests met foreign missionaries during their theological studies (Interview, May 2018).21 Many Chinese seminars had gained permission to hire religious teachers from abroad, mostly from North America and Europe (Tong 2010). But it is important to get the theological training from the official theological seminary administered by the CCPA, as this organization is responsible for the curriculum, and for educating future priests to follow the official state indoctrination. The interviewed clergy did not mention this as a problem as they do not work closely with foreign priests or missionaries. They are based in small cities without collaboration with any foreign personnel.

21 To enroll in a seminary, an applicant must provide a letter signed by both parents approving of his desire to become a Catholic priest. Without this approval, the seminary would not take him (Interview, April 2018). When asked about this rule, one nun later explained: ‘You need to have approval, but it does not mean that if [the applicant’s] parents are not Catholics he would not get that approval. There are some who would agree, but some would not. Some mothers, if they are non-believers, cannot accept their sons becoming priests. There was one priest whose mother even committed suicide because of his decision. So, for this reason, you need the approval,’ (Interview, May 2018). Accepting any foreign religious system can violate the norms of family life, and have a negative impact on relations with family members (N.-Z. Chen 2003). Becoming a Catholic priest, who needs to accept celibacy, might be seen as unfilial as Chinese society is traditional patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilinear.

158

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Distribution of Religious Information Although religious organizations are allowed to publish and distribute printed religious material and to publish information on the Internet, they must closely follow government directives and are subject to strict central control. The basic rules for circulating publications involving religious content are still the same: they must not promote disturbances or create problems between different religious groups or between religious and non-religious citizens; they must not promote extremism, separatism, or discrimination, and the content must not ‘violate the principle of independence and self-government of religious groups’ (weibei zongjiao de dulizizhu ziban yuanze 违背宗教的独立自主自办原则) (Article 45). The new regulation does, however, prohibit the distribution of religious materials from abroad without informing the government: Importing religious publications and prints exceeding a reasonable amount for personal use, or using different means to import religious materials, shall comply with the relevant state’s regulations. (Article 46, The Regulation on Religious Affairs 2018)

The regulation prohibits the circulation of non-approved religious materials from abroad: all printed religious materials must observe government regulations, and no religious materials can be circulated without permission of the government. In effect, the regulation prohibits any form of evangelization through written material, although is not in fact a change from previous policy documents on religion. The new regulation places more emphasis on the use of the Internet. In fact, the very term Internet (hulianwang 互联网) appears for the first time. It did not appear at all in the 2004 regulation, but the new draft uses the term six times, thus reflecting the greater need to regulate religious content on the Internet in the modern era of global information and communication (DuBois 2017). Today, over 82 percent of all netizens use the Internet to search for information (Leibold 2011). When the government issued the 2004 regulation, the spread of information via the Internet was not so much of an issue, but from 2014, there has been a significant increase in the number of Internet users and all information within Chinese cyberspace is accessible 24 h a day. The Internet has become a space for sharing information about various events and even for airing criticism. Many have used the Internet for organizing

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

159

protests, offline gatherings, and religious seminars (S. Li 2010). Official churches often use create virtual communities of faith, when they use available online platforms, social networks, and microblogs to reach and contact their members. They share various religious content online— for example, information about the next mass, photos from religious trips to other churches, videos from religious events, or news from the Vatican (Interview, May 2018). This is nothing new for religious groups in the PCR (Thornton 2010). However, a new Provision on the Management of Online Information Content (Wangluo xinxi neirong shengtai zhili guiding 网络信息内容生态治理规定) has been in force since 2019, and Measures on Administration of Internet Religious Information Service (Hulianwang zongjiao xinxi fuwu guanli banfa 互联网宗教信息服务管 理办法) since 2021. Under the provision, even sites containing purely religious content that the government has not approved are deleted from the Chinese Internet. Finances and Donations The new Chapter VII on religious assets is longer than before, provides more detail regarding the management of religious finances, and directs authorized religious groups in China to implement the national unified finance, assets, and accounting system. All income, donations, and expenditures must be transparent and accessible to the public. Similar regulations had already been implemented for many years via an existing government document, so in this sense, the new regulation did not have a major effect on religious groups and schools, who already had to follow corresponding regulations. Articles 53 and 57 do, however, bring greater regulation of donations and investments and the commercial activities of religious organizations. For example, it is now illegal to invest in a site or building set aside for religious activities or in a religious or other large outdoor statue or to gain financial benefit from religion. It is also illegal to promote commercial advertising on behalf of a religious group (Article 53). Finally, although the Chinese government still allows national and foreign individuals to make donations to religious organizations, there is a new limit on the amount that religious bodies can accept without government approval. Donations exceeding 100,000 yuan (around 14,500 USD) must be reported to the Department for Religious Affairs at the county level or above (Article 57). This new restriction is unlikely to affect most

160

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Catholic Churches in China as these groups remain small and often with only marginal financial support. One Catholic priest explained that most contributions to church funds come from smaller donations from local believers.22 More funds may be forthcoming if the community is building a new church or repairing an existing building, but for the daily needs of the parish, small donations are sufficient. Some wealthy Christian businessmen from abroad (for example, Korea) do make larger contributions, but rarely are they in excess of 100,000 yuan (Interview, June 2018). The restriction may be more significant for some larger, well-known city churches with ties to foreign Christian organizations, including the Vatican. Some prominent local church leaders have obtained financial help from abroad, usually from the USA or Korea (Vala 2012), but the Vatican is also sponsoring the Catholic Church in China. Pope Benedict XVI, for example, donated 80,000 USD to a Christian charity organization in 2008 (McCarthy 2013). Today, government approval would be required for such a donation. Katharina Wenzel-Teuber’s (2016) suggestion that the main impact of this regulation is on Buddhism and Daoism appears inaccurate. Even if these two religious groups have great numbers of supporters and therefore more donations, the regulation could still trigger much trouble for other religious groups, including the Catholic Church. To sum up, the principal changes in the regulations are (1) the shift in the basic position of the CCP back to the direct promotion of socialism; (2) the new role for local government institutions in controlling religious activity; (3) the control of religious schools; (4) new restrictions on the dissemination of information; and (5) greater supervision of the finances of religious institutions. The Chinese government promoted the new regulation as a means of creating the state, following the rule of law (fazhi 法制), and further implementing bureaucratic measures with transparent administrative procedures. From a closer look at the changes, however, it seems that instead of the rule of law, the real aim of the regulation is to support a regime which follows the concept of rule by law (yifa zhiguo 依法治国). I fully agree with Martin Slobodník’s (2007) suggestion that while the rule of law should support the creation of a democratic society, the rule by law allows the state to utilize legal norms to enforce its own interests. In China, this means that the main aim of the regulation is not to 22 For example, in Haining (approximately 800,000 citizens), each member of the church (maximum 150 people) donates weekly around 30–100 RMB.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

161

create freedom of religion, nor to protect the rights of individual believers or religious groups. The ultimate goal is to create a legal platform that legitimizes the state’s control of all religious life in China. As for the Catholic Church in China, the changes may not be as critical as was feared. According to interviews carried out with representatives of the open Catholic Church in China, the church is aware that it needs to follow the CCP’s position on religion or else make trouble for itself. This was clear, however, even before the publication of the 2017 regulation. Interviewed Catholic priests and nuns were concerned about their everyday duties and responsibilities towards ordinary believers and would rather follow the law than create problems (Interview with a Catholic priest, March 2018). The main interest of the Catholic priests in the open church is to protect their parishes. For this reason, they tend to cooperate with the regime. After all, it is the government that can provide resources needed for the normal functioning of the religious group. The government decides whether any religious activity is legal, and the local religious leaders are often concerned with survival intrusions. The PRC enforced new regulations on religion that directly promotes socialism and an overall greater control over religious groups in China. The changes in regulations are not surprising as the state has tried to control the religious life of the PRC’s citizens for a long time. In many ways, the updating of the Regulation on Religious Affairs and the legislation on religion in China simply highlights the CCP’s longlasting fear of separatism, of the influence of foreign entities, and of possible challenges to the Party. The Party and officials within the leadership of the CCPA have continually sought to create a narrative that projects the creation of a legal system that protects religious beliefs. It seems more plausible, however, that the regulation is a tool that will allow the state to shape the religious life of Chinese citizens. For many years, the state has been determining the legal discourse on religion and creating strict boundaries between legal and illegal forms of religious activity. The newly enforced procedures are following this power play and demonstrating the uneven nature of church–state relations. The PRC still holds a dominant position of authority over religiosity within its borders and continues to tighten its control through institutionalization and Chinafication. The continuation of state authority continues to weaken the position of religion in China. In certain spheres, such as international influence or the recognition of specific religious groups, the state’s dominant position gives it a clear advantage over religious groups,

162

M. RYCHETSKÁ

such as regarding its ability to define what ‘normal religious activities’ are and use this term at its own discretion. Nonetheless, many articles within the regulation can become a tool in the hands of the government, and be used by the state to crack down on religious groups in the ‘gray’ area of the Chinese religious market, and this can have serious consequences for many local parishes.

References Apostolic Journey to Pakistan, Philippines I, Guam, Japan, Anchorag. 1981. https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/travels/1981/travels/doc uments/trav_far-east.html. Accessed 10 May 2019. Batke, Jessica. 2017. PRC Religious Policy: Serving the Gods of the China. Leadership Monitor 52: 1–9. Bays, Daniel H. 2012. A New History of Christianity in China. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Britsch, Lanier. 1995. The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China. BYU Law Review 347 (2): 347–399. Cao, Nanlai. 2010. Constructing China’s Jerusalem: Christians, Power, and Place in Contemporary Wenzhou. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. Cao, Nanlai. 2017. Spatial Modernity, Party Building, and Local Governance: Putting the Christian Cross-Removal Campaign in Context. The China Review 17: 29–52. Cao, Nanlai. 2018. Chinese Religions on the Edge: Shifting Religion-State Dynamics. The China Review 18 (2): 1–10. Cao, Shunli. 2005. The Regulation on Religion Explained 《宗教事务条例》 解读. Journal of Hunan Institute of Socialism 23: 32–33. Castellucci, Ignazio. 2007. Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics. Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 13: 35–92. Chen, Nan-Zhou. 2003. Contextualizing Catholicity: A Taiwanese Theology of Identification. Asia Journal of Theology 17: 341–363. Chen, G. George. 2017. Le Droit, C’est Mo: Xi Jinping’s New Rule-By-Law Approach. In Oxford Human Rights Hub. http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/le-droitcest-moi-xi-jinpings-new-rule-by-law-approach/. Accessed 04 April 2019. Cox, Lawrence. 2007. Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers. The AsianPacific Law and Policy Journal 8: 371–430. DuBois, Thomas David. 2017. China’s Religion Law and the Perils of Counting Consciousness. In Disturbances in Heaven, ed. Ivan Franceschini, Kevin Lin, and Nicholas Loubere, 92–97. Canberra: ANU Press.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

163

Feng, Baojun. 2016. The Implementation of the Regulation on Religion: Discussion on Legal Documents on Chinese Religion行动中的 《宗教事务条例》 : 中国宗教事务管理查及其法律评价. The Journal of the Northwest University of Nationalities 西北民族大学学报. http://www.cssn.cn/zjx/zjx_zjyj/ zjx_ddzj/201607/t20160725_3133231.shtml. Accessed 22 July 2019. Froissart, Chloé. 2018. Issues in Social Science Debate in Xi Jinping⊃s China. China Perspectives 4: 3–9. Goossaert, Vincent, and David A. Palmer. 2011. The Religious Question in Modern China. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. Homer, Lauren. 2010. Registration of Chinese Protestant House Churches Under China’s 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs: Resolving the Implementation Impasse. Journal of Church and State 52: 50–73. Hu, Shaojie. 2006. Survey about the Regulation of Religion after One and Half Year of Its Effect 《宗教事务条例》 实施一年半综述. Focus 关注 9: 38–44. Huang, Xuanyu. 2012. Re-Legalization or De-Legalization? Netizens’ Participation in Criminal Justice Practices in China. The British Journal of Criminology 52 (4): 724–743. Irons, Eduard. 2018. Chinese New Religious Movements: An Introduction. In Handbook of East Asian New Religious Movements, ed. Lukas Pokorny and Franz Winter, 403–428. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Koesel, Karrie J. 2014. Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuo, Cheng-tian. 2011. Chinese Religious Reform. Asian Survey 51: 1042– 1064. Lam, Wing Kwan Anselm. 2020. True Catholic and Authentic Chinese: The Theologico-Political Polemic in China. International Journal of China Studies 11 (2): 257–276. Lambert, Tony. 2001. The Present Religious Policy of the Chinese Communist Party. Religion, State & Society 29: 121–129. Leibold, James. 2011. Blogging Alone: China, the Internet, and the Democratic Illusion? The Journal of Asian Studies 70 (4): 1023–1041. Leung, Beatrice. 1985. The Impact of Modernization on the Catholic Church in China. Missiology: An International Review 13(3) 323–336. ———. 2005. China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity. The China Quarterly 184: 894–913. Li, Shubo. 2010. The Online Public Space and Popular Ethos in China. Media, Culture & Society 32 (1): 63–83. Li, Zhiyi. 2019. The Catholic Dogma and the Core Socialist Values 天主教信仰 与社会主义核心价值观的践行. Catholic Church in China 中国天主教 1: 18– 19. Lim, Francis K. G. 2019. ‘Serving the Lord’: Christianity, Work, and Social Engagement in China. Religions. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10030196.

164

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Mao Zedong 1977. On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, February, 1957. In Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, ed. Bruno Shaw. Volume V, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. McCarthy, Susan. 2013. Serving Society, Repurposing the State: Religious Charity and Resistance in China. The China Journal 70: 48–72. Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Catholics of China and to the Universal Church. 2018. The Holy See (webpage). http://w2.vatican.va/con tent/francesco/en/messages/pont-messages/2018/documents/papa-france sco_20180926_messaggio-cattolici-cinesi.html. Accessed 05 April 2019. Morrison, Peter. 2001. Religious Policy in China and its Implementation in the Light of Document No. 19. Religion, State and Society 29(2): 244–255. Palmer, David A. 2009. China’s Religious Danwei: Institutionalising Religion in the People’s Republic. China Perspectives 4: 17–30. Peerenboom, Randall. 2002. China’s Long March toward Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ping, Xiong. 2014. Freedom of Religion in China under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies. BYU Law Review 2013: 605–618. Potter, Pitman B. 2003. Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China. The China Quarterly 174: 317–337. Sheehy, Benedict. 2006. Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China and the West & (and) Implications for Commercial Dispute. Northwest Journal of International Law and Business 26: 225–266. Slobodník, Martin. 2007. Mao a Buddha: Náboženská politika voˇci tibetskému ˇ e [Mao and Buddha: Religious Policy on Tibetian Buddhism buddhizmu v Cínˇ in China]. Bratislava: Chronos. Smith, Stephen. 2015. On Not Learning from the Soviet Union: Religious Policy in China, 1949–65. Modern China Studies 22 (1): 71–98. Song, Yingfa and Hongna Miao. 2014. The Implications for E-Media, the Press, Government, and Politics in China. In E-Political Socialization, the Press and Politics: The Media and Government in the USA, Europe and China, ed. De Landtsheer, Christ’l, Russell F. Farnen, Daniel B. German, Henk Dekker, Heinz Sunker, Yingfa Song and Hongna Miao, 341–362. Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH Academic Research. Thornton, Patricia M. 2010. The New Cybersects: Popular Religion, Repression and Resistance. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, 3rd ed., ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, 215–238. London, New York: Routledge. Tong, James W. 2010. The New Religious Policy in China: Catching up with Systemic Reforms. Asian Survey 50: 859–887.

6

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF POLICY …

165

The Regulation on Religious Affairs 宗 教 事 务 条 例. 2018. The Policy of the Central Government of the PRC 中华人民共和国中央人民政府. http://www. gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-09/07/content_5223282.htm. Accessed 08 June 2019. Vala, Carsten T. 2012. Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian China: The Impact of Official Churches and Unregistered ‘Urban Churches’ on Civil Society Development in the 2000s. The China Perspectives 3: 43–52. Vatican Mission Oversees Chinese Underground Bishops Stepping Aside. 2018. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/vatican-mission-ove rsees-chinese-underground-bishops-stepping-aside/84147. Accessed 14 May 2019. Wenzel-Teuber, Katharina. 2016. The State Council Publishes a Draft Revision of the Regulations on Religious Affairs’. Religions & Christianity in Today’s China 6: 21–24. Yang, Fenggang. 2005. Lost in the Market, Saved at McDonald’s: Conversion to Christianity in Urban China. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44: 423–441. Yang, Fenggang. 2017. From Cooperation to Resistance: Christian Responses to Intensified Suppression in China Today. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 15: 79–90. Zhang, Qiaosu. 2016. Xi Jinping: The Need to Improve the Level of Religious Work under the New Circumstance 习近平: 全面提高新形势下宗 教工作水平. Xinhuanet. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/23/ c_1118716540. Accessed 01 May 2019. Zhou, Xiaowei. 2021. Localisation of Christianity in China: Difficulties in and Possibilities of Achieving Harmonious Cultural Integration. Journal of Beliefs & Values. https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2021.1969206. Zhuo, Xinping. 2014. Relationship between Religion and State in the People’s Republic of China. Religions & Christianity in Today’s China 4: 1–6. Zhu, Guobin. 2010. Prosecuting ‘Evil Cults’: A Critical Examination of Law Regarding Freedom of Religious Belief in Mainland China. Human Rights Quarterly 32: 471–501.

CHAPTER 7

Chinafication of Catholic Faith in the Contemporary People’s Republic of China

One aspect of religion that has exercised the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1949 to the present-day is the potentially harmful influence of foreign entities with respect to state security (Slobodník 2007). Catholics often have to face allegations of supporting foreign interests instead of the People’s Republic of China. The government, therefore, implemented policy of ‘Chinafication of religions’ (zongjiao zhongguohua 宗教中国化). The chapter shows how Catholics in China struggle with this policy, and what are the real implications for them. Catholic Christians are often considered to be less loyal to the CCP than are other believers as they have strong connections outside the country (McCarthy 2013), and the Catholic Church often has to face allegations of supporting foreign interests instead of the PRC.1 Because of a fear of infiltration, the official party historiography has consistently promoted this view by directly linking missionaries and Christian churches 1 In interviews, several atheist university students mentioned that in their view, certain religions promote separatism and endanger national unity. One such student stated: ‘[While] Buddhism in China teaches you to love your country, […] some religions, for example Christianity, maybe not. […] Especially in Tibet. Some religions in Tibet teach people to betray our country, […] to support America, not our country’ (Interview, February 2018). The student connected Tibetan Buddhism and Christianity with separatist ideas. According to another recent piece of research on students’ opinions concerning religion, Li Miao, Lu Yun, and Yang Fenggang (2018) discovered that among the major religions Catholic Christianity and Islam are held in lowest regard.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_7

167

168

M. RYCHETSKÁ

to imperial forces (Vala 2012, M. Li et al. 2018, Leung 2005). Several priests raised their concerns about this issue during interviews. They feel that one of the major problems for Catholics in China is how Catholicism is still by some perceived as a foreign religion, yangjiao 洋教.2 One priest stated that ‘The traditional thinking of the majority is still that the Catholic Church is a foreign religion, and for this reason they dislike it’ (Interview, May 2018). Another church representative had the same response: ‘Some people think that Catholicism is a foreign religion from abroad, so they reject it’ (Interview, May 2019). The priests further explained that the church is actively trying to rid itself of such labels by promoting religious localization (bendihua 本地化) and Chinafication (zhongguohua 中国化) of the Catholic Church, such as by using Chinese music during masses but mostly by ‘following the official direction of the CCP and cooperating with the government’, (Interview, April 2018). One priest even directly linked the whole idea of Chinafication 中国化 to its political aspect. When asked about the zhongguohua, he answered: ‘In China, it is how it is. We can do nothing about it. The church must follow the Party’s leadership’, (Interview, June 2019). In this context, Chinafication is not connected to the process of religious localization. It goes beyond this concept—it is not a mechanism to connect the Catholic faith to the local Chinese environment. In this case, it is a political program of nationalism implemented by the Communist government. To Chinaficate does not necessarily mean to make everyone Han Chinese (hanhua 汉化), but rather for everyone to follow the leadership and the official narrative of the CCP. Since 2015, the Chinese authorities have advocated the ‘Chinafication of religions’ (zongjiao zhongguohua 宗教中国化),3 which according to the government should eventually lead to the creation of a harmonious society in China (Zhuo 2014)—which might even mean a society absolutely obedient to the government. During the annual religious conference in 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping 习近平 (b. 1953) stressed the need for different religions to be compatible with socialism 2 There are, however, many believers and non-believers who do not perceive Catholicism this way anymore. But for the interviewed clergy, the problem of ‘foreignness’ of the Catholicity was mentioned several times as an issue they have to face. 3 The official translation is that Chinese religions have to be ‘Chinese in orientation’, authors such as Benoît Vermander insist on the term ‘sinicization’ (Vermander 2019), I would still prefer the translation Chinafication to distinguish the term from hanhua.

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

169

and therefore to undergo Chinafication. This direction has been stressed ever more urgently since the 19th Congress of the CCP in October 2017. Accordingly, Chinese Catholics and other Chinese citizens need to support socialism and to practice the core socialist values (shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan 社会主义核心价值观), which are displayed in public places for everyone to see (Fig. 7.1).4 Article 4 of the new Regulation on Religious Affairs mentions the following: The State, in accordance with the law, protects normal religious activities,5 actively guides religion to fit in with socialist society, and safeguards the lawful rights and interests of religious groups, religious schools, religious activity sites and religious citizens. Religious groups, religious schools, religious activity sites, and religious citizens shall abide by the Constitution, laws, regulations and rules; practice the core socialist values; and preserve the unification of the country, ethnic unity, religious harmony, and social stability. (The Regulation on Religious Affairs 2018)

These excerpts are suggestive of an ongoing process of the merging of religion and state ideology. It promotes the ‘state-leads, religion-follows’ model (zhengzhu jiaocong 政主教從) (N. Cao 2018: 3). In the words of Ping Xiong (2014: 610):

4 The core values of socialism in China are prosperity (fuqiang 富强), democracy (minzhu民主), civility (wenming 文明), harmony (hexie 和谐), freedom (ziyou 自由), equality (pingdeng 平等), justice (gongzheng 公正), patriotism (aiguo 爱国), dedication (jingye 敬业), integrity (chengxin 诚信), and friendship (youshan 友善). The terms are used in official state propaganda and are promoted in schools and displayed in numerous public places. 5 The PRC pledges to protect ‘normal religious activities’ (zhengchang de zongjiao huodong 正常的宗教活). The problematic aspect of this term is the lack of any clear explanation. Some suggests ‘normal’ should be seen as ‘legal’ and as far as the government officially recognizes a religious group, it is considered authorized and labelled as ‘normal’ (Zhu 2010), but the right to decide what defines ‘normal religious activities’ belongs to the state, not to the religious communities (Penny 2012). Consequently, this terminological ambiguity is beneficial for the regime. In general, the abstract nature of the rules which are later applied by the state leadership in pursuit of their own agenda is inherently linked to the rule by law (Castellucci 2007). If that is the case, the state has at its disposal a tool which effectively helps them to regulate all religious activity within its borders. For more information, see the previous chapter.

170

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Fig. 7.1 The core values of socialism displayed at a bus stop

The government tries to administer almost every aspect of religious activities in order to maintain control over religious bodies, persons, and activities.

To follow socialism and its values is to promote Chinafication (Vermander 2019), a connection that is made by President Xi himself: We must develop the socialist theory of religion with Chinese characteristics, […] we must continue to walk the path of socialism with Chinese characteristic; actively practice the core values of socialism, promote Chinese culture, strive to fuse together the religious teachings and Chinese culture. (Xi 2016)

President Xi gave his speech around a year before the Regulation was published. Comparing the first and latest versions of the Regulation, it is obvious that the speech greatly influenced the wording of Article 4, which incorporated phrases such as ‘practice core socialist values’. By adding such expressions to the legal document, Chinafication became enshrined

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

171

in the legislation and thus made mandatory, as Cao Nanlai concludes: ‘request of churches to promote the idea of sinicization6 undoubtedly serves the state nationalistic agenda […] state authorities have strengthened their efforts to resist the cultural impact and presumed infiltrating forces from the West’ (N. Cao 2017: 28). Since 2018, Chinafication of Catholic faith has become the official plan for the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA). In 2018, the association published a document titled Five-Year Plan on Carrying Forward the Catholic Church’s Adherence to the Direction of Chinafication in Our Country.7 According to the plan, Catholic theology, dogma, and practices should be shifted towards Chinafication. Core socialist values should be incorporated into Catholic teaching: Take guidance from the thoughts of socialism with Chinese Characteristics in Xi Jinping’s new era, particularly the spirit of his speech on the adherence to the direction on Sinicization of religions in our country, led by the core values of socialism, according to the direction and path of Sinicization clearly identified by the 9th National Congress of Chinese Catholic Representative. There is a need to increase the perception and recognition of Sinicization of Catholicism within the Church in order to push forward mutual adaptation between the Catholic Church and the socialist society. Clerics and Catholics must be led to implement the core values of socialism as well as to strengthen their own base to push forward with evangelization and pastoral work. To love the motherland and obey the state regime is a responsibility and obligation for each Christian. Core political requirements are acceptance of the leadership of the Communist Party of China, supporting the socialist system and safeguarding Constitutional and legal authorities. (Translation from ‘Sinicization of China Church: The Plan in Full’ 2018)

The plan promotes official support of the CCP, integrating loyalty to the state into the Catholic faith. In this way, the Party safeguards that there will be no opposition from the church’s members. All Catholics in China should be indoctrinated to love the country, love the CCP. Interestingly, the document asks to ‘push forward mutual adaptation between the Catholic Church and the socialist society’. One example of this is 6 To translate the term zhongguohua, I prefer the term Chinafication. 7 推进我国天主教坚持中国化方向五年工作规划.

172

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Fig. 7.2 Statue reminding socialist values in front of the Catholic Church, Zhejiang province

promoting the core socialist values at religious sites (Fig. 7.2). However, it is clear that the adaptation will be executed only one way. The trend towards effecting harmony between the Catholic faith and Chinese tradition is evident. While it can be part of religious localization in some ways, we often see the attempt for Chinafication in contemporary China. For example, connecting the Christian idea of respecting the elderly (zunlao 尊老) with the Chinese tradition of filial piety (xiao 孝) has been part of the localization of the Catholic faith for many years, and it is still visible in the PRC today. For instance, the Catholic diocese in Guizhou (天主教贵州教区) published on its WeChat group information about the activity, when a priest gave sacraments and gifts to older people and visited many of them in a local hospital. The article starts with a sentence: ‘Respecting the old and loving the young are traditional Chinese virtues’8 (Catholic Diocese in Guizhou 2021). It is a case of overlapping between Chinafication and religious localization, and it is indeed

8 尊老爱幼是中华传统美德.

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

173

relatively unproblematic for the church, as strategies of connecting local traditions with Christian values have been present in the Catholic mission. However, Chinafication is more about connecting political, not cultural, concepts with religious doctrine. To better illustrate the process of Chinafication of the CCPA, let us take articles published in the journal Catholic Church in China (Zhongguo tianzhujiao 中国天主教) as a case study. The journal is a Chinese periodical published by the CCPA, and the authors of articles and reports are mostly priests and bishops of the open Catholic Church. In 2019, many articles referred to the process of Chinafication (zhongguohua 中国化). Obviously, the content of these articles mirrors the official program of the CCPA, which in turn mirrors official state propaganda. In addition to the articles promoting the need to make Catholicism more in line with the CCP agenda, another manifestation of Chinafication is the mandatory patriotic seminars in religious schools.9 Pursuant to this program, Chinese Catholics sought to reinterpret their teaching as one that serves socialism through promoting morality and a united and harmonious Chinese society. Since 2002, the authors of textbooks for this kind of education, both Catholic and Protestant, have interpreted numerous verses from the Bible in light of socialist and patriotic ideals (Kuo 2011).10 Although the CCPA is a state institution and therefore follows Beijing’s directives, many church members support it in order to avoid being perceived as anti-Chinese or pro-foreign. The church is seeking to create an image of a patriotic Catholic community which is contributing to a harmonious Chinese society (McCarthy 2013). In order to promote this supposed harmony between socialism and Catholicism, some believers attribute socialist values to Pope Francis, highlighting his support for underprivileged people. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, one interviewee even suggested that the Pope is an example of a ‘good communist’ (Interview, May 2019). Patriotism (aiguo 爱国), one of the virtues associated with socialism and Chinafication, is described as a Christian value. The priest Li Zhiyi expressed his belief that the Ten Commandments are basically socialist values: 9 The Catholic and Protestant associations added the term ‘patriotic’ (aiguo 爱国) to their official name to further express their devotion and loyalty to the regime. 10 For examples, please refer to the following paragraphs on how the Ten Commandments are compared to the core socialist values by priest Li Zhiyi.

174

M. RYCHETSKÁ

In the everyday experience of a Catholic, the Ten Commandments and the core socialist values are the same. All Christians have the same values: to love the motherland, to love the people, to promote unity, to be unified with the masses, to promote a harmonious society, even to be unified with people with different worldviews and to be united to and protect people who oppose us [our belief]. (Z. Li 2019: 18)

Benoît Vermander concludes (2019: 8): ‘Leaders of both the Catholic Patriotic Association and the (Protestant) Three-Self Church were (and are still) striving to find biblical grounds for presenting the guidance of the Party as a form of obedience to God’s commandments’. In the same manner, in interviews, one priest often explained that following the official laws and regulations is not only a necessary part of being a good citizen but is closely connected to their faith and their understanding of Catholic dogma. Another interviewed priest explained that it is the duty of Catholics to follow the rules, because ‘as believers, we need to obey our religious laws, but in this society, we surely need to obey the laws of the society. If not, we might even hurt someone. We would need to face God’s judgment for this, [because] as Catholics we should be good towards others’ (Interview, April 2018).11 Another priest agreed: In fact, if you are a good Catholic, following the national rules is easy. The laws are just forbidding you to do such things as physically hurt or assault others or steal from them. But our Christian belief demands that we not only act rightly on the outside [to hurt, assault, steal], but at the same time are good on the inside, in our heart. If you are just being a good Catholic, it is enough. (Interview, June 2019)

Likewise, Chinese Protestants under the official Three-Self Patriotic Association highlight the moral values of Christianity and their compatibility with the socialistic state. Their position is almost identical to the official narrative of the Catholic Church, as Tsai Yan-zen suggests: The unregistered Protestant house churches repeatedly express that they are good citizens. In their apologetic writings, they never forget to mention that they love the country, care about the people, espouse national and ethnic unity, and are very willing to contribute their efforts to the advancement of society. Indeed, the Christian virtues they promote are compatible 11 In the interview, the priest referred mostly to regulations against violence and crime.

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

175

with the socialist morality which CCP would like to see practiced in Chinese society. (Y. Tsai 2017: 327)

In the same way, in interviews, Catholic priests often described patriotism—or a need to love one’s country—as loving each and every citizen according to the basic Christian commandment ‘love one another’ (Interview, May 2018). While acknowledging official regulations, some priests would still rather follow Christian doctrine than the CCP’s demands. As one priest put it: We are all patriotic, all people in China are patriotic [aiguode 爱国的]. But the situation in the church is specific. We need to respect the particularity of the church. After first obeying the church, we can be truly patriotic and obey the state. (Interview, May 2018)

Another one added: ‘[Socialism and Catholicism] have a different position on the question of beliefs. […] But, anyway, we need to follow the Party’s directive’ (Interview, June 2019). The need to follow the rules, but at the same time to be devoted to Christian doctrine, is not unique to the Catholic Church. In the Protestant churches, a similar narrative prevails. Vala (2017) analyzed the Protestant reaction to nationalism and patriotism in the PRC, and the stories Protestant priests told him to mirror those shared by Catholic priests. One unregistered Protestant preacher said: A good citizen will not go beyond the bounds of the laws and regulations […] [But] if you followed all these regulations, then the Christian gospel would not have spread so widely, because the regulations on public order restrict evangelism. Christians have the life of God, and so we do not have to obey. Because we live for God, so we can violate them. (Quoted in Vala 2017: 67)

This contradicts the assumption that Christians who are ‘good citizens’ and love their country must first cooperate with the CCP and only in second place obey Christian dogma (Leung and Wang 2016). It, nonetheless, depends on a particular church’s location. Some local governments might be more tolerant than others—leaving more space for local churches and their leaders. In areas with more severe pressure,

176

M. RYCHETSKÁ

church leaders might have no other choice but to submit to the state’s demands completely. Official religious policy in China also states that it is the task of the Chinese Patriotic Association to interpret religious doctrine and ideology. Religious groups united under the associations are compelled to follow the directives issued by the CCP and to ‘recognize the supremacy of the Chinese government on religious matters’ (Chan 2012: 990). Previously, non-registered religious groups who oppose governmental control were only de facto illegal (Cox 2007); now, they are officially outlawed. The Patriotic Association should be an instrument of the government, and all religious professionals and educational institutions must follow its directives. For the Catholic Church, the state repeats the need for the official church to follow bishops appointed by the CCPA and the authority of Vatican (Article 36). Before the publication of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, the CCPA had not officially recognized the authority of the pope to appoint bishops in China. In recent decades, the association has followed an unofficial agreement on the issue: bishops were generally elected from among those priests who had received approval both from the Chinese government and from the Vatican. Only in exceptional cases was a candidate without papal approval selected (Moody 2012). Even if it was only the CCPA who was to interpret Catholic doctrine, many Chinese Catholics have regularly followed news about the pope, who has continued to be considered a moral example and a spiritual leader (lingxiu 领袖). Many believers have followed and shared his teaching about the Christian life on the Internet (Interview, May 2018). As explained by one priest: ‘The pope is a successor to the apostles of Jesus Christ, a follower of Saint Peter, and therefore we as Catholics should obey him fully’ (Interview, April 2018). The official CCPA journal Catholic Church in China has rarely mentioned the pope as its aim is to weaken his influence on the Chinese Church. Despite their efforts, stories and items of news from the Vatican are often published in the church newsletter published by a diocese. The newsletter seems to focus more on the Vatican than on political issues connected with religion in China. On various official WeChat and Weibo accounts, Chinese Catholics are sharing quotations and prayers from Pope Francis or live-streaming masses from the Vatican. This was the case before the provisional agreement was signed, and even more so since. Such local newsletters and articles shared online represent the ‘everyday face’ of Catholicism in China. The content targets lay believers,

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

177

who tend to be less interested in the church’s political issues. It is normal for members of the open Catholic Church to hold a positive image of the pope and to see themselves as connected to the one united Catholic Church. This is evidenced that whether registered within state structures or not, Catholic communities belong to one Chinese Catholic Church.

Restrictions and Cooperation under the Authoritarian Rule of the CCP Church members come together through online groups on social networking sites and microblogs, which they use to organize meetings, masses, and trips; they often share pictures and prayers (Interview, May 2019). Some even use social networking for proselytizing (Lim 2019). Religious content on the Internet without approval from the government is nonetheless prohibited (Article 47, 48, see also F. Yang 2017). The state performs surveillance of the kind of religious information that is being spread. A Provision on the Management of Online Information Content 12 has been in force since 2019, and in December 2021, a new Measures on Administration of Internet Religious Information Service 13 was released by the Chinese government. It brought strict control over the sharing of content via the Internet. All groups and individuals need to apply for a license to share religious content, and foreigners and overseas organizations are now not allowed to engage in it. Such a license, which is valid for three years only, enables the holder to ‘interpret religious doctrine and rules with content conducive to social harmony, the progress of the times, and healthy civilization’ (Article 15). The new measures represent a sizeable obstacle for any church. One visited church has its own private WeChat group, the sole purpose of which is to share religious content; its members are active every day. The group operates to this day (2022), but its members face obstacles and even a possible shutdown. Online chat rooms, web-based message boards, and private online rooms create virtual communities of faith that might become a vital part of civil society as they are space for sharing and exchanging religious content but also personal testimonies (Thornton 2010). However, the censorship of religious material shared on the Internet is indeed thorough. For example, almost all 12 Wangluo xinxi neirong shengtai zhili guiding 网络信息内容生态治理规定. 13 Hulianwang zongjiao xinxi fuwu guanli banfa 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法.

178

M. RYCHETSKÁ

texts that explain Christian doctrine in any way are deleted on the Chinese app WeChat—even those groups that are allowed to distribute religious content (e.g., Tianzhujiao zhongwen wang 天主教中文网). In fact, only religious songs and passages from the Bible remain. Restrictions on religious activity discourage believers and further limit their already limited religious freedom. Similarly, although religious organizations are officially allowed to publish and distribute printed materials with religious content, the state prohibits the printing of religious materials which promote disturbance or separatist ideas (Article 45)14 : on the contrary, religion is to be an instrument of the government for promoting socialism and harmonious society (Z. Li 2019, Z. Zhang 2016, F. Yang 2005). Notably, there is no regulation forbidding the publishing of the current version of the Bible, although, within the patriotic associations, there are attempts to change its content so as to render it compatible with the CCP’s agenda (Vermander 2019: 5). For example, in 2020 UCA News ran a story about a new school textbook published by the government-run University of Electronic Science and Technology Press. According to the portal, the textbook supposedly retells the story from John 7:53–8:11 about Jesus and the woman taken in adultery. The story is, however, heavily changed. In the original story, the woman caught in the act of adultery is presented to Jesus by the Pharisees, who want to stone her to death, as this, they say, is the provision of the Law of Moses. Jesus, however, says, ‘He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her’ (John 8: 7AV). When they all start to walk away, Jesus dismisses her. But the new Chinese textbook, on the other hand, suggests that at the end of the story, Jesus stoned the woman himself, saying, ‘I too am a sinner. But if the law could only be executed by men without blemish, the law would be dead’. The modification should uphold the justice system in the PRC. While many voices within the officially sanctioned Church criticize the textbook, several CCPA representatives use the story in order to please the government. Furthermore, numerous restrictions on the circulation of the Bible have been reported in the past three years (‘Bible Rewrite Helps Stoke Censorship Fears in China’ 2018). Bibles cannot be sold on or downloaded from the Internet and foreign religious materials cannot be 14 Religious politics is closely connected to national politics and to the question of territorial autonomy.

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

179

Fig. 7.3 Market with religious objects and Bibles for sales, Pilgrimage to Sheshan Basilica, Shanghai, 2019

distributed without government approval; only ‘a reasonable amount for personal use’ is permitted (Article 46). Nonetheless, in June 2019 it was possible to order a Bible on Taobao, a Chinese online shopping platform, in both English and Chinese. Furthermore, despite the reports of a ban on the sales of Bibles, they were sold in specific markets (Fig. 7.3). Anyway, the trend towards stricter control of religious materials was already noticeable: some unofficial printed religious materials were available at the churches visited during the fieldwork in 2018; a year later, there are no such materials.15 Between 2013 and 2016, Zhejiang province was one of the main targets of an official state’s campaign focusing on destroying unauthorized churches and removing Christian crosses. The campaign was labeled ‘3 + 1 campaign’ (san gai yi chai 三改一拆)—suggesting that one in four buildings would be demolished and others will be changed (F. Yang 2017: 87). The visited churches had been unaffected by the program of demolitions even though they are in Zhejiang province, which has been

15 For example, during a pilgrimage to Sheshan Basilica in Shanghai in 2018 many leaflets were given to the visitors. In 2019, no materials were prepared, and the pilgrimage was restricted to a smaller area. In 2020 and 2021, the pilgrimage was canceled due to Covid-19 pandemic.

180

M. RYCHETSKÁ

one of the main targets16 ; churches in other provinces have also been facing destruction. The reason for this might be good relations (guanxi 关系) with the local government. During interviews, Catholic priests did not mention the issue of church’s demolition, but a Protestant pastor from the same area raised his concerns at an unofficial meeting: ‘In this city, we are blessed. But friends from Henan are having problems: [the government] is destroying their churches, they want to eliminate them’ (Interview, June 2019). Many priests and nuns repeatedly declared their aim to create and maintain good relationships with the local government. One priest expressed his greatest wish as follows: My wish is definitely to be able to develop and spread the Gospel. But in China today, the situation is that many, especially in this region, say our belief is a superstition. In many places, there are just a very few believers or friends of the church, just about one or two families. […] Another thing that I also wish is that relations with the government would develop, as our law declares that it should respect our beliefs. (Interview, April 2018)

Developing good relations with the government may also be a question of survival. When asked her opinion regarding patriotism, one nun mentioned that with respect to relationships with the government, ‘patriotism does not influence us. But the Party can decide to shut down a church. But in this area, our relations with the government are good, therefore we can manage our church freely, and they would not close us down’ (Interview, May 2019). While it is officially possible, filing an administrative lawsuit was not considered a possibility for a church if the government decided to demolish or otherwise remove it. The only chance is for a church to foster ‘unofficial’ relationships with people in local government if it wishes to continue its work without interference. Some of the more prominent members of Catholic Churches may benefit from ties to local officials, who might turn a blind eye to certain activities (Chambon 2019): cooperation between religious bodies and local governments is hardly uncommon in the context of authoritarian regimes (Koesel 2014). For clergy in the open church, it is easier to follow (most of) the CCP’s regulations and maintain good relations with the 16 Open churches were not so much affected by the campaign as the official targets were buildings belonging to unauthorized churches (N. Cao 2017: 30).

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

181

local government, and this can lead to a more benevolent approach from the government towards the parishes concerned (Goossaert and Palmer 2011). Such collaboration is often mutually beneficial—the church is free from strict government supervision, and the government need not fear any opposition or resistance from the church. This mutuality is noticeable from observing the everyday life of smaller Catholic Churches in Zhejiang province. On the one hand, there were often many children present during mass,17 even though the CCP does not support children to participate in the religious activity (Fig. 7.4).18 But at the same time, in mass, church leaders would rarely address sensitive topics or mention politics and instead focus solely on the daily issues and moral problems of the believers. They would rather self-censor their preaching than upset the status quo. We should not forget that the process of enforcing state’s policy and propaganda in the field of religion in China differs from province to province: some local government leaders and cadres may allow certain unofficial activities; in other places, the control is more sustained (Lambert 2001). What is permitted or overlooked in northern Zhejiang province may be extremely problematic in other parts of China. This is not to say, however, that every open church is blindly following all the rules set out by the CCP. Many Catholic priests and nuns are nonetheless concerned about the everyday needs of believers and fear drawing too much attention to the local church. They are only too aware that, ‘if you oppose the government, you will have trouble’ (Interview, April 2018).

17 In the churches visited in March–May 2018, it was an exception for children to

attend mass, but in May 2019, at the same churches, parents with small children were taking part in weekly meetings. Children were aged between one and ten years; older children had the content of the mass explained to them. These were not likely to have been newcomers to the church; the arrival of any new parents with children is possibly the outcome of the gradual connecting of the underground church and the open sector of the Catholic Church. This has, however, become less common. Since 2019, several provinces (Guizhou, Hubei, Shanxi, Qinghai, Yunnan) added formulation restricting minors taking part in religious activities. This formulation allows provincial governments to take action against children and young adults entering religious sites (Feith et al. 2022). 18 There is no legal norm restricting minors entering religious sites on the national

level.

182

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Fig. 7.4 Propaganda cartoon: Minors cannot enter religious sites. (Source http://www.bitterwinter.com)

The leaders of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association are becoming little more than collaborators who help to propagate the Party’s propaganda and attempt to connect core socialist values with the Christian dogma. They implement this high-level indoctrination through the mandatory patriotic training program in theological seminaries that is designed to produce priests who will finish their training as loyal subjects of the CCP; if not overtly loyal to the Party, they must at least acknowledge its leadership. On the other hand, local Catholic clergy of the open sector represents a form of Catholic orthopraxis that is more closely associated with the ‘everyday’ experience of lay believers. They are often not concerned with the same issues as the leaders of the CCPA, and the activities of many local churches do not fit clearly within legal parameters. The priests of the open Catholic Church are well aware of the situation and are mostly ‘playing according to the rules’ as it is essential for them to protect their activities and their small communities. Let me use the words of Michel Chambon (2017: 195), who concludes that the situation for the Catholic Church has changed little, as we can observe ‘a political status quo that allows

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

183

Christians to exist openly as long as they implicitly respect the leadership of the Party’.

References Bible Rewrite Helps Stoke Censorship Fears in China. 2018. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/bible-rewrite-helps-stoke-censor ship-fears-in-china/81983. Accessed 06 June 2019. Cao, Nanlai. 2017. Spatial Modernity, Party Building, and Local Governance: Putting the Christian Cross-Removal Campaign in Context. The China Review 17: 29–52. Cao, Nanlai. 2018. Chinese Religions on the Edge: Shifting Religion-State Dynamics. The China Review 18 (2): 1–10. Castellucci, Ignazio. 2007. Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics. Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 13: 35–92. Chambon, Michel. 2017. Are Chinese Christians Pentecostal? A Catholic Reading of Pentecostal Influence on Chinese Christians. In Global Chinese Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity, ed. Yang, Fenggang, Joy Tong and Allan Anderson 181–199. Leiden: Brill. Chambon, Michel. 2019. Urban Catholicism in China. Le Civiltá Cattolica 3 (1): 26–38. Chan, Shun-Hing. 2012. Changing Church and State Relations in Contemporary China: The Case of Mindong Diocese, Fujian Province. The China Quarterly 212: 982–999. Cox, Lawrence. 2007. Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisement for China’s Internal Migrant Workers. The AsianPacific Law and Policy Journal 8: 371–430. Feith, Katharina, Isabel Friemann, and Katharina Wenzel-Teuber. 2022. News Update on Religion and Church in China September 10 – December 4, 2021. Religions & Christianity in Today’s China 12 (1): 1–13. Goossaert, Vincent, and David A. Palmer. 2011. The Religious Question in Modern China. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. Koesel, Karrie, and J. 2014. Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuo, Cheng-tian. 2011. Chinese Religious Reform. Asian Survey 51: 1042– 1064. Lambert, Tony. 2001. The Present Religious Policy of the Chinese Communist Party. Religion, State & Society 29: 121–129. Leung, Beatrice. 2005. China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity. The China Quarterly 184: 894–913.

184

M. RYCHETSKÁ

Leung, Beatrice, and M. Wang. 2016. Sino-Vatican Negotiations: Problems in Sovereign Right and National Security. Journal of Contemporary China 25: 467–482. Li, Miao, Lu., Yun, and Fenggang Yang. 2018. Shaping the Religiosity of Chinese University Students: Science Education and Political Indoctrination. Religions. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9100309. Li, Zhi Yi. 2019. The Catholic Dogma and the Core Socialist Values 天主教 信仰与社会主义核心价值观的践行. Catholic Church in China 中国天主教 1: 18–19. Lim, Francis K. G. 2019. ‘Serving the Lord’: Christianity, Work, and Social Engagement in China. Religions 10 (3): 1–17. McCarthy, Susan. 2013. Serving Society, Repurposing the State: Religious Charity and Resistance in China. The China Journal 70: 48–72. Moody, Peter R. 2012. The Catholic Church in China Today: The Limitations of Autonomy and Enculturation. Journal of Church and State 55: 403–431. Penny, Benjamin. 2012. The Religion of Falun Gong. London: The University of Chicago Press. Ping, Xiong. 2014. Freedom of Religion in China under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies. BYU Law Review 2013: 605–618. Sinicization of China Church: The Plan in Full. 2018. UCA news [online]. https://www.ucanews.com/news/sinicization-of-china-church-theplan-in-full/82931. Accessed 15 October 2021. Slobodník, Martin. 2007. Mao a Buddha: Náboženská politika voˇci tibetskému ˇ e [Mao and Buddha: Religious Policy on Tibetian Buddhism buddhizmu v Cínˇ in China]. Bratislava: Chronos. The Regulation on Religious Affairs 宗 教 事 务 条 例. 2018. The Policy of the Central Government of the PRC 中华人民共和国中央人民政府. http://www. gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-09/07/content_5223282.htm. Accessed 08 June 2019. Thornton, Patricia M. 2010. The New Cybersects: Popular Religion, Repression and Resistance. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, ed. Perry, Elizabeth J. and Mark Selden, Mark, 215–238. London, New York: Routledge. Tsai, Yan-zen. 2017. ‘We Are Good Citizens’: Tension between Protestants and the State in Contemporary China. In Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies, ed. Cheng-tian Kuo, 309–336. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Vala, Carsten T. 2012. Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian China: The Impact of Official Churches and Unregistered ‘Urban Churches’ on Civil Society Development in the 2000s. The China Perspectives 3: 43–52.

7

CHINAFICATION OF CATHOLIC FAITH …

185

———. 2017. Protestant Reaction to the Nationalism Agenda in Contemporary China. In Christianity in Contemporary China. Socio-cultural Perspectives, ed. Lim, Francis K. G., 59–77. New York: Routledge. Vermander, Benoît. 2019. Sinicizing Religions, Sinicizing Religious Studies. Religions. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10020137 Xi, Jinping. 2016. Comprehensively Improving the Level of Religious Work According to the New Situation 全面提高新形势下宗教工作水 平. Xinhuanet . http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/23/c_1118 716540.htm. Accessed 17 April 2019. Yang, Fenggang. 2005. Lost in the Market, Saved at McDonald’s: Conversion to Christianity in Urban China. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44: 423–441. Yang, Fenggang. 2017. From Cooperation to Resistance: Christian Responses to Intensified Suppression in China Today. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 15: 79–90. Zhang, Zhigang. 2016. Sinicization of Religions: A Theoretical Contemplation. Study of World Religions 世界宗教研究 3: 21–29. Zhu, Guobin. 2010. Prosecuting ‘Evil Cults’: A Critical Examination of Law Regarding Freedom of Religious Belief in Mainland China. Human Rights Quarterly 32: 471–501. Zhuo, Xinping. 2014. Relationship between Religion and State in the People’s Republic of China. Religions & Christianity in Today’s China 4: 1–6.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: Christian Churches in the Authoritarian Regimes

The book presented two case studies of Christianity in Chinese authoritarian regimes: the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan during the period of martial law (1949–1987) and the open sector of the Catholic Church under the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association living under communist rule in the People’s Republic of China (1945 to the present-day). One of the main interests of both these churches is to create a well-established mission and stable parishes. The findings of the book clearly show that to accomplish their objectives, the churches have endeavored for many decades to localize the church: to create a link between Christian belief and the local culture. One component of adapting to the local environment is also to negotiate with the government and react to the official state policy on Chinafication (zhongguohua 中国化; or re-Chinafication zai zhongguohua 再中國化). Without state support, it would be extremely difficult to establish a church in the local community for any length of time. Under typical circumstances, the church tends to seek cooperation with the government, even if the government represents an authoritarian regime. As long as there are some advantages from such cooperation, churches that show support for the state will generally avoid conflict. However, as demonstrated in the case of the Presbyterians in Taiwan, a church might still prefer to reject totalitarian rule when it feels there is no space for negotiation and the government is causing it to lose members and is placing obstacles in the way of its mission. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2_8

187

188

M. RYCHETSKÁ

The book seeks to make contributions, empirical and theoretical, to the current state of research into Christianity in Greater China. On the empirical level, the chapters presented in the book detail the nature of relations between the selected churches and the state and society from the early years of the church in China and Taiwan to the present-day. They describe situations of both cooperation and conflict with the totalitarian regimes in Greater China and outline the strategies adopted by the churches with respect to localization. I argue that any Christian group faces two main pressures: pressure from its own need to adapt to the local culture, and pressure from the government and its legal requirements. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has undergone a complex series of developments during which it has attempted to adapt the Christian faith to the changing social, religious, and political conditions in Taiwan. From the arrival of the first missionaries in the nineteenth century, the Presbyterian mission aspired to create a local—and localized—church. The church gradually shifted from a position of cooperation with the ruling regimes to one of opposition to the totalitarian rule of the Guomindang government during the period of martial law in the Republic of Taiwan. The Presbyterian Church leaders sought to adopt effective strategies for their mission in Taiwan. Initially, they preferred a strategy of cooperation with the government. The Japanese government became an ally for the church’s civilization project, and thus the cooperation was advantageous. After the Second World War, Taiwan became part of China and came under the rule of the Nationalist government. In 1949, the Nationalists transferred to Taiwan and established the rule of law and the policy of re-Chinafication (zai zhongguohua 再中國化). Although the church was now under a regime equally as repressive as that of the Japanese colonial era, the new government did not attempt to cooperate with the church. Chiang Kaishek and his government considered the Presbyterian Church with its leaders demanding democracy and independence as a danger for national security. The church, therefore, gradually established its opposition to the regime and called for democratization. Also, the situation has dramatically changed for the church, as during the Japanese colonial era, the Presbyterians were the only non-Japanese Christian denomination on the island. The religious market at that time was hugely restricted and controlled by the government. The church has benefited from complicated cooperation, as there were no other concurrent Christian denominations. No opposition towards the oppressive government would not cause any believers lost, as there were not many other religious groups a believer could

8

CONCLUSION: CHRISTIAN CHURCHES …

189

choose from. However, with the new GMD government, many Christian movements and denominations came from the mainland China. The situation has changed, leading to possible decrease in parishioners, who could join other churches—some of them hugely supported by the GMD government. With many restrictions imposed by the government, cooperation would be a poor strategic choice for church officials. The results support the theory proposed by the economic approach to religion, that ‘Church-initiated conflict therefore results when government policies interfere with the church’s ability to maximize its parishioner base’ (Gill 1998: 66). During the rule of law (1949–1987), the PCT focused on local Taiwanese communities. Not only has the church elaborated several strategies for localization of faith but it has also aimed to create a new and direct connection to the Taiwanese nation by promoting the narrative of a ‘national church’ that would be a prophet to the Taiwanese nation and by linking Christian ideas to the Taiwanese cultural context. Over the past three decades, Taiwanese society has experienced liberalization and democratization. The church has not only been influenced by these processes but it has also, according to many authors, been one of the driving forces behind the formation of a democratic society in Taiwan (Amae 2008; Kuo 2008; C. Lin 1999; Rubinstein 1991). Under the martial law of the Guomindang government (1949–1987), freedom of speech and the expression of public opinion were restricted, and the media was controlled. It was difficult under such circumstances to formulate any opposition to or criticism of the GMD government. From the early 1970s, Presbyterians launched themselves as pro-democracy activists, calling for self-determination and elections. In order to transform Taiwanese society, the church has defined a new role for itself, not only as a religious organization but also as a social activist. The first public statement of the PCT is considered by some scholars to be the very first public declaration on self-determination published in Taiwan. Religious groups can sometimes create opposition to an authoritarian regime if the regime is not providing sufficient support and there is no effort towards a mutual partnership (Froese and Pfaff 2001). The church may choose to revolt against the government and promote human rights and democratization. Such behavior could attract new believers who identify with the church’s political standpoint (Gill 1998). Furthermore, a religious group can contribute to the discourse on many social issues in public life and even became a competitor to the government. The PCT was the first church to demand democratic elections in Taiwan. This was a

190

M. RYCHETSKÁ

controversial act; at the time it was publishing its statements, the PCT was the only Christian church proclaiming the need for democracy and human rights. The later social engagement of the PCT shows that it was seeking to win believers not only through spiritual teaching but also through adapting to local society both culturally and politically. The PCT’s statements that promoted democratization and protection of human rights integrated Christian doctrine with a political manifesto that demanded democracy and respect for human rights. The current situation in the People’s Republic of China is similar to the martial law period in the Republic of China in Taiwan. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Communist Party of China sought to break all ties between the Catholic Church in China and Western powers, including the Vatican. Despite economic liberalization in the PRC, the control and suppression of religious life in China continue. Cooperation between the government and local churches united is therefore a complex issue that should be the subject of research, but the problems facing the Catholic Church in China have been underrepresented. The church has been mentioned in only a very few books as the churches united under the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) are often perceived as unproblematic and not supportive of the domination-resistance model of church–state relations. However, even when a church is not opposing the government, church–state relationships continue to be complex. The Catholics in China united under the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association decided to go a different road than the PCT. Ever since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese government has perceived Catholics as being closely connected to the Vatican—a foreign entity involved in the internal affairs of the PRC. Since the late 1950s, Chinese Catholics united under the CCPA have generally supported the totalitarian communist regime. However, despite seeking to practice religious localization, the Catholic Church has been repeatedly criticized for not being ‘Chinese enough’, has been called ‘foreign’, and has been accused of being more loyal to foreigners than to the PRC. It seems that if the Catholic Church is to maintain successful mission in the PRC, it must adapt to the local environment, which has, in their case, included following the directives of the CCP. In recent decades, the Vatican, as the representative of all Catholics worldwide, has initiated negotiations with the Chinese government. One outcome of negotiations was the signing of a provisional agreement between the PRC and the Vatican on the election of bishops. However, at the same time, the Chinese government

8

CONCLUSION: CHRISTIAN CHURCHES …

191

promotes tighter control of religions and a new policy of Chinafication of religion (zhongguohua 中国化). In many ways, the updating of the legislation on religion in China highlights the CCP’s long-lasting fear of separatism, of the influence of foreign entities, and of possible challenges to the Party. The Party enforced a new Regulation of religion, and the main novelties of the Regulation are (1) the shift in the primary position of the CCP back to the direct promotion of socialism; (2) the new role for local government institutions in controlling religious activity; (3) the control of religious schools; (4) new restrictions on the dissemination of information; and (5) supervision of the finances of religious institutions. The regulation appears to bring in the rule by law (yifa zhiguo 依 法治国): while the rule of law should support the creation of a democratic society, rule by law allows the state to use legal norms to enforce its own interests (Slobodník 2007). In China, the new regulations aim to create a legal platform that legitimizes state control of all religious life in China, including that of Chinese Catholics. Rather than create any opposition, the Catholic Church has decided to continue following the state’s directives—promoting a harmonious story of cooperation between the Party and the Chinese Catholics. The leaders of the CCPA are becoming little more than collaborators who help to propagate Party propaganda and attempt to link core socialist values to Christian dogma. In this way, they connect their continuous aspiration for localization of the Christian faith with the government’s demands for Chinafication. Churches that do not cooperate with the regime must face ‘the police detention and house arrests of Christian worshipers and pastors’ (Vala 2018: 198). Such churches are not recognized by the state and have no legal status: they belong to the underground church and face severe persecution. The officially recognized Catholic Church implements high-level indoctrination through a mandatory patriotic training program in theological seminaries. This program is designed to produce priests who will finish their training as loyal subjects of the CCP; if they are not overtly loyal to the Party, they must at least acknowledge its leadership. The main interest of the Catholic priests in the open church is to protect the interest of their parishes. It is the government that decides whether any given religious activity gains legal status. Local religious leaders are often most concerned about survival and tend to cooperate with the regime. It seems to be more advantageous for them to follow the regulations and keep their official state recognition instead of revolting and being banned. It is after all

192

M. RYCHETSKÁ

the government that can provide the resources needed for the normal functioning of the parish. The CCPA therefore represents an example of an antipode to the attitude of the PCT. The leaders and churches that are part of this organization choose to cooperate with the government rather than oppose it. The CCPA was established by the government and promotes government policy and the official state narrative. Local parishes and smaller churches united under the CCPA have different reasons for cooperation. Such cooperation might help the church retain at least some of the benefits that arise from its status as a government-recognized religious group. This does not necessarily mean that the church leaders genuinely support the regime. They might decide not to openly rebel against the regime, as it might cause many troubles for their parishes. Instead, they adopt the safer course of personal opposition—which might be visible only within close circles of family and friends. Choosing cooperation instead of opposition is not unproblematic, however, and CCPA churches and priests must make decisions about the most effective strategy for the church and its believers. The findings of this book suggest that a religious group in a totalitarian regime can choose partnership over conflict if there is still space for bargaining and mutual empowerment. Also, the partnership is more possible if the religious market is hugely controlled by the government— and, therefore, the cooperation with the totalitarian regime is beneficial for the church. However, as the interaction between religion and government is complex, it is always possible for the conflict to occur under totalitarian rule. We can hypothesize that the CCPA and the churches under it would prefer to cooperate with rather than oppose the government and so keep some (heavily constrained) privileges and avoid being harassed by the local police. The ‘official’ Catholic Church in modern-day China is a prime example of a church that has indeed taken this route: [O]ne of the primary goals of most religious organizations is maximization (or retention) of parishioners. Church officials keep this fundamental objective in mind when deciding whether to seek state assistance. If access to government patronage and other state support enables the church to retain or expand its membership, close cooperation with government officials will be desired, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if the terms of establishment create a situation that promotes parishioner defections, cooperation is

8

CONCLUSION: CHRISTIAN CHURCHES …

193

a poor strategic choice for church officials. Church-initiated conflict therefore results when government policies interfere with the church’s ability to maximize its parishioner base. (Gill 1998: 66)

This may go some way to explaining why the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan shifted its theology and its general stance towards political activism under martial law after having chosen to cooperate with the Japanese colonial government, which saw the PCT as a collaborator in a modernizing project. Furthermore, even during the regulation of religious life in Taiwan at that time, and the militarization of society, the PCT was the only Christian group allowed to proselytize on the island. From the perspective suggested in this book, opposing Japanese rule would have been a poor strategy for the PCT. The different approaches of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association may also be explained by differing external factors. The GMD and the CCP are both authoritarian regimes, but they have different internal strategies and external partners. The pressure on the PCT and the CCPA might likewise have been different. However, it is clear that in both cases, strategies of religious localization have developed under the pressure of totalitarian regimes to political context. Both churches needed to react to the political pressure of Chinafication. Eventually, localization and the state’s request for Chinafication (re-Chinafication) led the Presbyterians to political activism and opposition to the government. At the same time, the Chinese Catholics on the mainland face similar challenges. They also need to localize their faith, and the Communist Party demands subordination under the policy of Chinafication of religion. Instead of political opposition to the regime, the Catholics decided to connect their faith with the state’s political propaganda—in this way, they also connect religious localization with political Chinafication. Furthermore, let us not forget that both groups are defined not only by their position towards the totalitarian state but also by their faith. For many people, these Christian groups (and other religions) represent a way to make meaning of their lives and provide psychological help in difficult times. Instead of a conclusion, let me borrow the words of Chan KimKwong (2004) on the role of religion in Chinese society: Yet religion will also most likely continue to be a receptacle for popular frustration and disenfranchisement, offering China’s have-nots ways to

194

M. RYCHETSKÁ

escape their desperate situation. Although the love, care, patience, and hope offered by religious groups can empower such people to confront daily hardship with grace and dignity, the groups may also channel popular dissatisfaction and anger into a powerful political force trying to transform the society, perhaps even by violent means... In short, religion can be a two-edged sword, capable of either stabilizing or destabilizing society in times of dramatic change. (Chan 2004: 71)

References Amae, Yoshihisa. 2008. Pioneers in Taiwan’s Human Rights and Democracy: The Role of the Foreign Missionaries of Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. In A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980, ed. Linda Arrigo and Lynn Miles, 172–210. Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance. Chan, Kim-Kwong. 2004. Accession to the World Trade Organization and State Adaptation. In God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions, ed. Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin, 58–74. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Froese, Paul, and Steven Pfaff. 2001. Replete and Desolate Markets: Poland, East Germany, and the New Religious Paradigm. Social Forces 80 (2): 481–507. Gill, Anthony J. 1998. Rendering unto Caesar: The Roman Catholic Church and the State in Latin America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Kuo, Cheng-tian. 2008. Religion and Democracy in Taiwan. New York: State University of New York Press. Lin, Christine L. 1999. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy. Sino-Platonic Papers 92: 1–153. Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church. Armonk, London: M.E. Sharpe. Slobodník, Martin. 2007. Mao a Buddha: Náboženská politika voˇci tibetskému ˇ e [Mao and Buddha: Religious Policy on Tibetian Buddhism buddhizmu v Cínˇ in China]. Bratislava: Chronos. Vala, Carsten T. 2018. The Politics of Protestant Churches and the Party-State in China: God Above Party? London, New York: Routledge.

Index

A Adams, John, 83 Ad Apostolorum Principis , 113, 115, 116, 122 Ad Sinarum Gentem, 114, 115 aiguo, 125, 146, 153, 169, 173 Althusius, Johannes, 83 Anti-Rightist Campaign, 117

B Band, Edward, 36, 38, 64, 85, 86 Barclay, Thomas, 36, 38 Beijing Protocol, 107 Belhar Confession, 47 bendihua, 16, 26, 168 Beza, Theodore, 83 Bible, 36, 44, 49, 60, 63, 66, 70, 87, 88, 97, 140, 153, 173, 178 bishops, 25, 106, 108, 112, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121–124, 126, 129–131, 143, 173, 176, 190 Boxer Rebellion, 107

C Calvin, John, 33, 43, 82–85, 97 Campbell, William, 36, 61 Carter, Jimmy, 93, 94 Chinafication, 16–18, 25, 153, 161, 167, 168, 170–173, 187, 191 Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), 9, 20, 21, 111, 112, 115, 116, 118, 120–122, 124, 130, 141–143, 157, 161, 171, 173, 176, 178, 182, 190–193 Chinese Catholics, 25, 106, 110–112, 114, 116–124, 128, 129, 131, 141, 142, 173, 176, 190 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 4, 12, 13, 25, 26, 108, 110–112, 114–117, 119–121, 123–127, 130, 131, 137–140, 143–148, 150–153, 155, 156, 160, 161, 167–169, 171, 173, 175, 176, 178, 180–182, 190, 191, 193 Chun-ming, Kao, 46, 94 Coe, Shoki, 43, 44, 88, 92, 93 Common Program, 109

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. Rychetská, Uneasy Encounters, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1890-2

195

196

INDEX

communist, 6, 9, 10, 18, 25, 46, 72, 109, 113–116, 118, 120, 126, 129, 141, 142, 154, 173, 187, 190 Constitution, 47, 84, 109, 138, 144, 152, 169 contextual theology, 43, 44, 61, 86, 92, 93 Costantini, Celso, 108 Cultural Revolution, 12, 117–119, 146 Cupimus Imprimis , 112

Guangyuan manifesto, 111, 112 Guomindang (GMD), 14, 41, 47, 59, 60, 64, 65, 67, 68, 75, 76, 87, 88, 94, 96, 97, 189, 193

D dangwai, 14, 94 Declarationon Human Rights , 94 Decree Against Communism, 113, 114 Democratic Progressive Party, 52, 74, 97 Document No. 19, 145–147, 152 Double the Church program, 42, 43

I International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, 81

E encyclical, 113–115 Enlai, Zhou, 41, 109, 110 evangelization, 15, 35, 37, 43, 158, 171 evil cults. See xiejiao

F fazhi. See rule of law Formosa Incident, 94 Formosa Magazine, 94

G Gallagher, Paul Richard, 125, 127, 128 Great Leap Forward, 117–119, 143 Guangxu, 4

H the Holy See, 111–113, 116, 118–124, 128, 129, 131. See also the Vatican homeland theology, 92, 93 Hundred Days’ reform, 5 Hwa-Yi, Liu, 46

J Japanese, 11, 23, 38–40, 53, 59, 60, 62–65, 75, 85, 86, 188, 193 Jinping, Xi, 144, 150, 153, 155, 168, 171 K Kai-shek, Chiang, 40, 41, 82 Kangxi, 106 Kaoshiung incident, 94 Knox, John, 33 L Legion of Mary, 111, 114 legislation, 25, 140, 148, 150, 156, 161, 171, 191 Lim Chong-gi Quansheng, 92 M Mackay, George L., 34–38, 61 martial law, 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 18, 41, 42, 47, 48, 52, 53, 59–61, 65,

INDEX

69, 71, 82, 87, 94, 97, 187–190, 193 Maxwel, James L., 34, 35 Milton, John, 83 Ming-teh, Shih, 94

N Nan-Zhou, Chen, 45, 92 National General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 33, 40 national identity, 22, 48, 69–72, 74–76, 95, 110 nationalist government, 4, 23, 84, 96, 108, 113, 188 national language, 19, 60, 63, 65, 87 New Century Movement, 43 Ng Bu-tong, 92 Nixon, Richard, 46 nun (Catholic), 157, 180

O On Our National Fate, 47–49, 86, 87, 90 open church, 1, 9, 20–22, 24, 154, 161, 180, 181 Our Appeal , 48, 51, 52, 66, 67, 71–73, 88

P pastor (Protestant), 35, 180 People’s Republic of China (PRC), vi, xi, 1, 4, 6, 9, 11–13, 18, 21, 22, 24–26, 41, 46, 59, 72, 94, 96, 108–110, 112, 113, 116, 118–131, 137–145, 147, 148, 151–153, 155, 157, 161, 167, 169, 172, 175, 178, 187, 190 Pius XI, 108, 113 Po-ho, Huang, 92

197

Pope, 25, 108, 112–114, 118, 120–129, 131, 142, 154, 160, 173, 176 Pope Benedict XVI, 122–124, 128, 129, 160 Pope Francis, v, vi, 25, 123–131, 142, 154, 173, 176 Pope Gregory XVI, 82 Pope John Paul II, 120, 121, 125, 128, 129 Pope John XXIII, 118, 129 Pope Paul VI, 118, 119, 129 Pope Pius VI, 82 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT), vi, 8, 9, 11, 14, 20, 22–24, 33, 34, 40, 42–53, 60–62, 65–68, 70–72, 74–77, 84–98, 189, 190, 192, 193 priest (Catholic), 154 prophet, 23, 51–53, 70, 92, 189

Q Quod aliquantum, 82

R re-Chinafication, 17, 19, 60, 65, 73, 187, 188 Regulation on Religious Affairs, vii, 25, 137, 138, 151, 161, 169 Religious Affairs Bureau, 112, 115 religious localization, 16–18, 26, 37, 49–51, 61, 70, 73, 108, 111, 168, 172, 188–191 Republic of China (ROC), vi, xi, 4–6, 23, 41, 46, 59, 70, 71, 84, 96, 108, 118, 122 Riberi, Antonio, 111 rule of law, 23, 138, 139, 141, 149, 151, 156, 160, 188, 191

198

INDEX

S Second Vatican Council, 118, 123 self-determination, 45, 47, 81, 86, 89, 92–94, 96, 189 shehuizhuyi. See socialism Shimonoseki, 38 Sino-Vatican agreement, 126, 130 Sino-Vatican relations, 118, 123 socialism, 25, 26, 113, 138, 139, 141, 146, 150, 152–154, 160, 161, 168–171, 173, 178, 191 Socialist Education Movement, 117 Song, Choan Seng, 43, 44, 92, 151 State Administration of Religious Affairs, 140 T Taiwan Church News , 42, 47 Teng-Hui, Lee, 71, 73, 74 Theological Declaration of Barmen, 47 theology of Incarnation, 44 Thomas Tian Gengxin, 108 Three-Self Protestant Patriotic Association, 1 totalitarian, 3, 4, 6–10, 12, 14–16, 22, 26, 52, 60, 63, 70, 72, 112, 115, 154, 187, 188, 190, 192 totalitarian dictatorships, 6 U underground church, 123, 124, 126, 131, 143 United Front, 112, 140, 143, 147 United Nations (UN), 46, 49, 50, 81, 84, 95, 96

United States of America (USA), 12, 41, 46, 72, 93, 94, 160 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 81, 94

V the Vatican, 20, 25, 48, 108, 110–116, 118, 120–123, 125, 126, 128–131, 142, 145, 147, 159, 160, 176, 190

W Weihan, Li, 143 White Terror, 42, 74 World Council of Churches, 43, 48

X Xianzhi, Wang, 92 Xiaoping, Deng, 12, 120, 121, 143 xiejiao, 4, 5, 34, 105, 145

Y Yat-sen, Sun, 4 Yongzheng, 106 Youlian, Shao, 39 Youwei, Kang, 4

Z Zedong, Mao, 109, 118, 139, 147 zhongguohua, 17, 25, 153, 167, 168, 171, 187, 188, 191 Zongren, Li, 41