CHINA and the Catholic Church: Through Mutual Eyes (Christianity in Modern China) 981993172X, 9789819931729

Table of contents :
Contents
1 The Chinese Empire, Seen Through Catholic Eyes
First Catholic View and Understanding of China
Jesuit Interpretation of China
Catholic Views of China in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
2 Attitude of the Chinese Empire Toward the Catholic Church: From “Welcomed Religion” to “Heterodox Sect”
Under Tang and Yuan Dynasty
The Ming Dynasty and the Jesuit Enterprise
Chinese Opposition
During Qing Dynasty
In the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century
Appendix
3 The Holy See and the Chinese Empire: Diplomatic Attempts
Attempts with the Mongol Empire
First Attempts with the Qing Dynasty
Other Diplomatic Attempts with the Qing Government
4 The Catholic Church and the National Republic of China (1912–1949)
Social Context
Lou Tseng-Tsiang’s Attempts at Establishing Diplomatic Relations
Establishment of Diplomatic Relationship Between China and Vatican
5 The Catholic Church and the Communist Government: First Period, 1949–1978
The Fate of Archbishop Antonio Riberi
Gradual Steps of the Religious Policy
The Three Autonomies Movement
The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Ordination of Bishops
The Official Policy Toward the Catholic Church
The Great Cultural Revolution
Communism as a Political Religion
First Signs of Liberalization
New Evaluation of China by Western Christians
6 China Catholic Church and the Liberalization Policy (1979–2013)
Official Religious Policy of Deng Xiaoping
The Official Catholic Community
The Unofficial Catholic Community
Attitude of Western Catholics to China
Vatican Attitudes to China
7 The Catholic Church Under Xi Jinping (2013–2022)
Official Attitudes Toward Religion
Xi Jinping’s Religious Policy of Sinicization
The Interpretation of Sinicization by the Catholic Leaders
Implementation of the Policy of Sinicization of Religions
Xi Jinping and Pope Francis
The Signing of the Sino-Vatican Agreement (2018–2022)
Different Evaluation and Understanding of the Agreement
Conclusion
8 Church and State Relationship in China
Multi-Religious Society and Separation Between State and Church
Present Challenges
Specific Challenges from the Catholic Church
Conclusion
Essential Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN CHINA

CHINA and the Catholic Church Through Mutual Eyes Sergio Ticozzi

Christianity in Modern China

Series Editor Cindy Yik-yi Chu, Department of History, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

This series addresses Christianity in China from the time of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties to the present. It includes a number of disciplines—history, political science, theology, religious studies, gender studies and sociology. Not only is the series inter-disciplinary, it also encourages inter-religious dialogue. It covers the presence of the Catholic Church, the Protestant Churches and the Orthodox Church in China. While Chinese Protestant Churches have attracted much scholarly and journalistic attention, there is much unknown about the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in China. There is an enormous demand for monographs on the Chinese Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. This series captures the breathtaking phenomenon of the rapid expansion of Chinese Christianity on the one hand, and the long awaited need to reveal the reality and the development of Chinese Catholicism and the Orthodox religion on the other. Christianity in China reflects on the tremendous importance of Chinese-foreign relations. The series touches on many levels of research— the life of a single Christian in a village, a city parish, the conflicts between converts in a province, the policy of the provincial authority and state-tostate relations. It concerns the influence of different cultures on Chinese soil—the American, the French, the Italian, the Portuguese and so on. Contributors of the series include not only people from the academia but journalists and professional writers as well. The series would stand out as a collective effort of authors from different countries and backgrounds. Under the influence of globalization, it is entirely necessary to emphasize the intercultural dimension of the monographs of the series. With Christianity being questioned in the Western world, as witnessed in the popularity of Dan Brown’s books since some time ago, the Chinese have surprised the world by their embracement of this foreign religion. NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!

Sergio Ticozzi

CHINA and the Catholic Church Through Mutual Eyes

Sergio Ticozzi P.I.M.E. House Hong Kong, Hong Kong

ISSN 2730-7875 ISSN 2730-7883 (electronic) Christianity in Modern China ISBN 978-981-99-3172-9 ISBN 978-981-99-3173-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Sean Pavone/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

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2

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4

1 2 5

The Chinese Empire, Seen Through Catholic Eyes First Catholic View and Understanding of China Jesuit Interpretation of China Catholic Views of China in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

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Attitude of the Chinese Empire Toward the Catholic Church: From “Welcomed Religion” to “Heterodox Sect” Under Tang and Yuan Dynasty The Ming Dynasty and the Jesuit Enterprise Chinese Opposition During Qing Dynasty In the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century Appendix

21 21 24 29 31 36 40

The Holy See and the Chinese Empire: Diplomatic Attempts Attempts with the Mongol Empire First Attempts with the Qing Dynasty Other Diplomatic Attempts with the Qing Government

47 47 49 55

The Catholic Church and the National Republic of China (1912–1949) Social Context

63 63

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CONTENTS

Lou Tseng-Tsiang’s Attempts at Establishing Diplomatic Relations Establishment of Diplomatic Relationship Between China and Vatican 5

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The Catholic Church and the Communist Government: First Period, 1949–1978 The Fate of Archbishop Antonio Riberi Gradual Steps of the Religious Policy The Three Autonomies Movement The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Ordination of Bishops The Official Policy Toward the Catholic Church The Great Cultural Revolution Communism as a Political Religion First Signs of Liberalization New Evaluation of China by Western Christians

68 76 79 81 83 86 87 89 91 94 95 97

China Catholic Church and the Liberalization Policy (1979–2013) Official Religious Policy of Deng Xiaoping The Official Catholic Community The Unofficial Catholic Community Attitude of Western Catholics to China Vatican Attitudes to China

101 101 104 109 113 114

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The Catholic Church Under Xi Jinping (2013–2022) Official Attitudes Toward Religion Xi Jinping’s Religious Policy of Sinicization The Interpretation of Sinicization by the Catholic Leaders Implementation of the Policy of Sinicization of Religions Xi Jinping and Pope Francis The Signing of the Sino-Vatican Agreement (2018–2022) Different Evaluation and Understanding of the Agreement Conclusion

119 119 121 123 128 131 132 136 139

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Church and State Relationship in China Multi-Religious Society and Separation Between State and Church Present Challenges

141 145 147

CONTENTS

Specific Challenges from the Catholic Church Conclusion

vii

149 154

Essential Bibliography

157

Index

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CHAPTER 1

The Chinese Empire, Seen Through Catholic Eyes

People could wander how Europeans, and in particular Catholic Church members, have looked at China all over the centuries and where their view has derived from. It seems that their understanding and perspective varied and, at times, raised doubts about their objective comprehension of the full reality of the Chinese world. The results depended upon individual psychologies and personal concerns, upon the various religious, social, and political approach adopted, as well as upon different sources of information. The issue turns to be rather complex and requires a deeper investigation. Moreover, in dealing with history, it is necessary to be aware of the pitfalls of judging the past with the parameters and concepts of today and to make generalizations and valuations, without considering the real circumstances of the time, thus idealizing historical events, institutions, and persons. This creates myths or popular sayings that have grown up around an event or a person. Myths are quite common in dealing with history and, in order to avoid creating them, we need to pay particular attention to facts and events related to the history of the Christian presence in China.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_1

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First Catholic View and Understanding of China In the first centuries of the Christian era, the knowledge in the European continent about northern and eastern Asia and of the Chinese region, in particular, has been quite vague, if not absent. Bible mentioned a ‘land of Sinim’ (Is. 49,12) but it has not been identified. People spoke about Seres and Sinae, or making use of other names, but without a clear knowledge of their location. Francis Hirth in the Introduction to Chau Ju-Kua: His work on Chinese and Arab Trade in the 12th and 13th Centuries, entitled Chufan-chi,1 wrote: Although China appears to have first become known to the Greeks through the expedition of Alexander, (Nearchus and Onesicritus mention the Seres, of whose longevity they had heard marvelous tales, but which they evidently supposed to have been an Indian tribe), the first accurate information concerning China was supplied by the author of the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, writing somewhere about 80 A. D. He refers (§ 64) to the country of Thina as lying beyond the Malay Peninsula (Chryse) “where the sea terminates outwards.” For more precise information concerning the geographical position of China, we have to come down to the first half of the sixth century, when Cosmas Indicopleustes stated that Tzinista “was bounded to the east by the ocean.”

Cosmas, a Christian believer of the Church of the East, has traveled through several countries in South East Asia during the years 520–525 and published his observations in his Christian Topography in 535. Asia Minor and Arab countries maintained contacts, both by land and by sea, with far-eastern Asia and, consequently, could get a more objective acquaintance. Europeans, on the contrary, had to wait for the thirteenth century and the meeting was frightful. The impact of the Mongol conquest (then called Tartars), advancing throughout Asia and threatening even Western Europe (Battle of Legnica in Poland on 9 April 1241 and the Battle of Mohi against Hungary on the following 11 April), caused a fearful reaction in everybody all over the continent, realizing their violence and atrocity. Pope Innocent IV (1195–1254) adopted a practical measure, by sending delegations to their leaders in order to get better acquainted with them and, hopefully, reduce their threats. 1 Hirth/Rockhill: Chau Ju-kua « Bibliotheca Sinica 2.0 (univie.ac.at).

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The reports of the journeys and letters of the Franciscan emissaries to the Mongols, namely of Fr. John of Pian Carpini (1185–1252, who wrote Istoria Mongolorum, History of Mongols ), Fr. William of Rubruk (1210–1270, who wrote Itinerarium… ad partes Orientales, Itinerary… to the Orient ), John of Montercovino (1247–1328, who wrote Letters), provided a more objective and realistic account also of China, since the Mongols have conquered the Chinese Empire and have established there the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) under Kublai Khan (1215–1292, r. since 1260). Few years later, a positive evaluation of the Chinese world in Europe was provided by the publication of Marco Polo (1254– 1324)’s Travels, Il Milione, but it was soon forgotten, since it was generally considered rather imaginary. Only a few people took it seriously, among whom Cristoforo Colombo (1451–1506) who started his west-ward voyage in view of finding Marco Polo’s Cathay and Cipango. In the fifteenth century, after the so-called discovery of the New World, Portuguese and Spanish ships toured around the world in every direction, reaching also the Far East. The “discovery” of China by Portuguese was revealed to Europe by the report of Rafael Perestrello (+1600) after his 1516 and 1517 trips to Canton. Consequently, information on the characteristics of the Chinese Empire increased. The first Portuguese historian João de Barros (1496– 1570) published the Décadas da Ásia (Decades of Asia) starting in 1552 (all together four Decades): they include not only the reports of the Portuguese military and political expeditions, but also a detailed description of the geography and history of the Orient, together with translation of documents. He was also the first to interchange the name of Cathay with China. Barros acquired several Chinese books and maps and hired a Chinese scholar to translate them. The first book in a European language, exclusively related to China was the Tractado das Cosas da China (Treaty on Things of China), of the Portuguese Dominican friar Gaspar da Cruz (1520–1570), published at Evora in 1569, who, although having stayed in Canton for just about a month in autumn 1555, has collected objective data more abundant than Marco Polo himself, especially from the narrative, published in 1561, of Galeote Pereira, who has been prisoner in South China from 1549 to 1552. This book, however, was preceded by the letters of the Portuguese Jesuit Fr. Melchior Nunez Barreto (1520–1571), sent to his confreres in India, in which he reported the observations he gathered in two months

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of his visits to Canton. His letters, as we will see, most probably influenced Fr. Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606) in proposing the evangelization method of China, based upon the knowledge of the language, the adaptation to the local Chinese customs, and an official delegation to the Chinese Emperor. In Rome, the Jesuit general house was the hub of the international center of the society: many letters of confreres in the Asiatic mission were printed for the first time in Italy or at least were reprinted in an Italian translation from a Spanish or Portuguese original. Then, followed the Report of the Spanish Augustinian Fr. Martin de Rada (Herrada, 1533–1578) of his journey from Manila to Fujian in 1575 with the description of the Kingdom of China and the clear statement that China was the same country called Cathay by Marco Polo. He collected several Chinese books and, back to the Philippines, had them to be translated. In 1585, there was the publication of the collection of several of these reports by the Spanish Augustinian Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza (1545–1618), a full geographic, economic, religious, and administrative description of China, together with the texts of Galeote, of Gaspar da Cruz, and of Fr. de Rada. Between 1585 and 1595, it was translated in five European language, the English text in 1588 with the title, The Historie of the great and mightie kingdom of China. The last of the eleven Spanish editions of Mendoza’s book had appeared in 1598. About the above quoted first books on China, C.R. Boxer wrote2 : The unbounded admiration, which (in common with his countryman Galeote Pereira) he [Gaspar da Cruz] expressed for many aspects of Chinese life and work, forms an interesting contrast to the more critical attitude of Fr. Martin de Rada… Rada’s critical attitude is not, however, readily apparent from first reading of Mendoza’s book. Most of the Rada’s asperities are there either omitted or watered down, and the more admiring tone of his Portuguese predecessors seems to have strongly influenced by Mendoza’s attitude as an editor when compiling his famous History. This is of great importance, as these pioneer Portuguese and Spanish eye-witness accounts, when skillfully dovetailed together by Gonzalez de Mendoza, can be said to have formed in Europe a new tradition of Marco Polo’s Cathay. China now became to the reading public of Europe an enviable country, where justice was well administered, where the people were all prosperous 2 C.R. Boxer, South China in the 16th Century (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint Ltd, 1967), pp. lxi, xc, xci.

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and hard-working, peaceable and self-controlled. Art and industry were developed to unsuspected heights; and even the invention of printing on which Europe so prided itself, was found to have been anticipated in China. Only in the all-important matter of revealed Religion did the Chinese fall short of the highest achievements of the West, but God would doubtless remedy this defect in due time. Meanwhile, what we may term the “China Legend,” so industriously fostered by the Jesuits in the next two centuries, and which influenced Leibniz and other European thinkers of the Enlightenment so profoundly, was off to a good start.

Jesuit Interpretation of China After the Italian Jesuit Fathers Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) could take up a stable residence in Zhaoqing on 10 September 1583, the Jesuit reports started to spread in Europe. In 1584, under the request of the Spanish official John Baptist Roman, Fr. Matteo Ricci handed him a first short report on China for the Spanish king.3 In the same year, Fr. Alessandro Valignano (1538–1606) wrote a long text in Spanish on the Chinese Empire.4 In 1599, Frs. Duarte de Sante (1531–1600) and Alessandro Valignano had their Collection of Information published again by Hakluyt’s Regional Navigation Society, which was considered “an excellent treaty of the Kingdom of China.” The year 1615 saw the publication of a Latin translation of Fr. Matteo Ricci’s diary, Della entrata della Compagnia di Giesù e Christianità nella Cina (On the Entry of the Company of Jesus and Christianity in China), not simply translated but deeply re-edited by his confrere Nicholas Trigault (1577–1628) under the title De Christiana Expeditione apud Sinas suscepta ab Societate Iesu (History of the Society of Jesus in China): it attracted great attention.5

3 Francesco D’Arelli (ed.), Matteo Ricci, Lettere (1580–1609) (Macerata, Quodlibet,

2001), p. 84. The letter is dated 13 September 1584. However, scholars doubt about the authorship (see below). 4 Relación del grande Reyno de la China, y de sus calidades, embiada por el Pe Alexandro Valiñano, Visitador de Japón y de la India, de la Compañía de Jesús, en el año de 1584. 5 The original Diary of Fr. Ricci, however, will be published by Pasquale D’Elia only in the 1940s, Fonti Ricciane (v.1 Rome 1942, vv. 2 and 3, Rome 1949).

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Further general studies of China followed, which were translated in several languages. The best known are those of the Jesuit Fr. Alvaro Semedo (1586–1658), the History of the Great Monarchy of China, published in Portuguese in 1641 and soon translated in several European languages: it contains also the history of the Catholic Church in China. The Italian Jesuit Martino Martini (1614–1661)’s De Bello Tartarico (On the Tartar War) was published at Antwerp in 1654 and enjoyed a great popularity. In 1663 at Rome, Daniello Bartoli published Dell’Historia della Compagnia di Giesu, Terza Parte dell’Asia: La Cina (On the History of the Company of Jesus: China). In 1667, Fr. Athanasius Kircher published a treatise, which is commonly known simply as China Illustrata (“China Illustrated”), a work of encyclopedic breadth.6 The Spanish Dominican Fr. Domingo Fernandez Navarrete (1610– 1689) wrote Tratados Historicos, Politicos, Ethicos y Religiosos de la Monarchia de China (Historical, Political, Ethical, and Religious Treaties of Chinese Monarchy) in 1676 at Madrid. In 1686, the French Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623–1693) published in Paris Tabula chronologica monarchiae sinicae, a “Chronological Table of the Chinese monarchy,” in an attempt to show that there was Agreement between the Septuagint Bible version and the Chinese chronological records. His work had a major impact on European science. In 1687, the Jesuit fathers Prospero Intorcetta (1626–1696), Christian Herdtrick (1625–1684), François de Rougemont (1624–1676) and Philip Couplet published Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (Confucius, Philosopher of China), as well as an annotated translation of first three of the Four Books of the Confucian Canon. Later in 1735, the French Jesuit, Fr. Jean Baptiste Du Halde (1674– 1743) published the Description geographique, historique, chronologique, politique et physique de l’Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise (Geographical, historical, chronological, political and physical Description of Chinese Empire and Chinese Tartary), the first encyclopedic work on China. It was in four volumes and became very popular.

6 Its full title is China monumentis, qua sacris qua profanis, nec non variis naturae & artis spectaculis, aliarumque rerum memorabilium argumentis illustrate.

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All these publications provided a full picture of the Chinese Empire with a positive understanding of the country. But it was the correspondence of the French Jesuits which provided and spread a very optimistic perception of China, through the collection known as Lettres édifiantes et curieuses écrites des missions étrengères par quelque missionaires de la Compagnie de Jésus (Edifying and Curious Letters…) started in 1702 (the English version in 1707). In Germany, the parallel publication of the Weltbott was edited since 1720s by Joseph Stocklein. Fr. Du Halde was in charge of the French publication of the Lettres. The French propagandist purged the text of passages which he thought were too “archaic, too Chinese, too shocking for French ears.” Du Halde realized that there were differences in motive between his printed propaganda and the writing of the missionaries who, as well as being Jesuit defenders and propagators of the faith, were, many of them, trained scientists with an eye for accuracy. By the 18th century, editors like Du Halde, had to be careful not to add to the ammunition of the enemies of the Jesuits. Material by the Jesuits on China and the missionary enterprise there, when printed in Europe, was edited to accord with the political and propagandistic line of the Jesuits. Du Halde also saw the need to accent the Jesuit portrait of China, lest, through the presentation of material which contradicted the Jesuit picture, the missionaries and their supporters lose face.7

The role of the Jesuits did not only consist in bringing Western ideas to China, but at the same time they revealed China and its intellectual world to Europe. However, it was an ideal China. The picture of China given by them was described as a great and powerful empire enjoying peace and prosperity, dedicated completely to agriculture and to higher education. At its head stood a wise and civilized emperor who ruled according to the precepts of reason and of a high political ethic, guiding people by laws of a lofty morality. Social life was governed by established forms and rites, with emphasis on arts and science. Wars and conflicts were outlawed, while peace and harmony prospered. Such an ideal portrait of China became a dominant topic in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in philosophical and political discussions of Europe. 7 Theodore Nicholas Foss, “Chinese Chronology in J.B. Du Halde, Description… de la Chine”, in Actes du IV° Colloque International du Sinologie (Chantilly 1983, Varieté Sinologiques, Nouvelle Serie, No. 73, p. 164).

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China played an exemplary role in the French Enlightenment. The idealization of Chinese morals and beliefs made by the Jesuits suited to the polemical purposes of the European philosophers, particular of François Voltaire (1694–1778) and Gottried W. von Leibnitz (1646–1716). Voltaire in his Lettres Philosophique (Philosophical Letters) described China as “la nation la plus sage de l’universe.” But he made use of this knowledge to attack the Catholic Church and the Jesuits themselves in order to advocate freedom of Religion, freedom of expression and separation between Church and State. Leibnitz was the progenitor of the profound admiration for Chinese culture among the European intelligentsia. He kept updated with the latest news from China, reading almost everything published by the Jesuits and keeping correspondence and contact with the most important figures in the China mission. In 1689, he made a trip to Rome to interview Fr. Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1638– 1712), on home leave. In a series of conversations, Grimaldi convinced Leibnitz that the Kangxi Emperor was the closest approximation any human monarch had ever come to Plato’s ideal philosopher-king. Thus, such a manipulated information allowed European intellectuals to use China as a means to criticize the structure of their own system of knowledge and of economy through comparison of the two social systems. On ideological level, it influenced the whole movement of the Enlightenment with its emphasis upon reason. On religious level, it was employed against the Christian Churches, advocating a Religion without a Church as the way Confucianism was then understood.8 Chinese influence also played a decisive role in art (the vogue of chinoiseries ), and, above all, in the elegant way of life represented by Rococo style. Ashley E. Millar describes the attitude of the Jesuits in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.9

8 Unfortunately, for many scholars (Communist authorities included), Confucianism is still considered juts a political philosophy and not a Religion. But after the publication of books by Wing-Tsit Chen, H. Fingarette, P. A. Rule, Tu Wei-Ming, J. Berthrong, and especially of C.K. Yang (Religion in Chinese Society) this position is untenable (For more details, see S. Ticozzi, Religioni Cinesi, La Tradizione Confuciana [Sette e Religioni. Monograph No. 28, 4/2001]). 9 Ashley E. Millar, “The Jesuits as Knowledge Brokers Between Europe and China (1582–1773): Shaping European Views of the Middle Kingdom”. http://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic-History/Assets/Documents/WorkingPapers/Eco nomic-History/2007/WP105.pdf.

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The Jesuits, considered “as Knowledge Brokers Between Europe and China (1582-1773),” introduced China to Europe in quite idealized terms. Almost all sinologists agree with this position. They did use European categories to explain aspects of Chinese civilization to their European audience, but, at the same time, they undoubtedly aimed at supporting their own understanding of China and their practical concerns. The information they portrayed to suit their own beliefs therefore created a China reduced so as to be vulnerable to manipulation. The Jesuit portrayal of China featured an increasing emphasis on the rational side of Confucianism as the basis for the Chinese socio-political and economic structure to appeal to the growth of belief in reason in Europe. They manipulated the image of Confucius so they could defend their policy of cultural accommodation and their position in the Rites Controversy. They did not paint an accurate picture of the actual education system, and their over-idealized presentation would have been more transparently false if related to the lower classes of Chinese. The reason was that they enjoyed the status as monopolists of European information on the Middle Kingdom. Their transmission of knowledge took advantage of their unique position as the group that could understand (linguistically and culturally) Europe as well as China. The French missionaries, in particular, as the predominant suppliers of information on China, increased public interest in Europe as their publications on China accounted for almost one third of the volume of literature published in France at the close of the seventeenth century. The result was the creation of the image of China by the Jesuits who shaped it according to their personal motivations and unique context, thus creating a one-dimensional view of a complex Empire.

The True Role of Fr. Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) Within the context of the “China legend,” Fr. Matteo Ricci, in particular, was considered in “mythical” terms: he is pictured as the main figure of the history of the Catholic Church in China. He, in view of fulfilling the dream of St. Francis Xavier, and following the adaptation method proposed to him by Fr. Alessandro Valignano, wanted at any cost to enter the Chinese Empire and start the evangelization process of the country. Out of this plan, he looked at China in a rather optimistic manner and was ready to try any possible way in order to succeed in the enterprise. Since he was one of the pioneers, the first superior of the Mission, and lived there a long time, he has been taken into high consideration. His adaptation method to the culture and behavior of the intellectual class won him respect and

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admiration by the Confucian scholars. He was turned into the model of the missionaries in China, attributing to him all the positive successes. His fame contributed to build up his “myth”: he is considered the founder, the first to introduce China and Chinese culture to the West. It seems necessary, however, to set his role and fame in a more objective dimension. Chen Hong of China Jiliang University10 wrote that several scholars “have pointed out that Ricci was the first person who introduced Chinese learning to the West… that had blazed a trail for spreading Chinese learning… the first person who disseminated Chinese culture in the West…”. The first public writing of Fr. Ricci about China is supposed to have been written on 13 September 1584. However, previously on 24 June, Juan Baptista Román, factor of the Philippines, then in Macau, wrote to the Spanish King Philip II, that he has received “a very short report” of Fr. Ricci on China.11 This is the reason why someone doubts about of the authenticity of Ricci’s writing. Before him, as we have seen, quite a good number of people introduced China to Europe in all its aspects, as well as its culture. João de Barros (1498–1570) also “acquired several Chinese books and maps (and a Chinese slave to translate them), some of which he subsequently sent to the Italian historian Paolo Giovio…” The point I wish to make here is that both Barros and Rada preceded Ricci and his Jesuit successors in the systematic acquisition and study of Chinese books.12 The Spanish Dominican in Manila, Fr. Juan Cobo, (1546/7–1593) translated into Chinese several works by Seneca and the Doctrina Christiana (Christian Doctrine, under the title of Pien Cheng Chiao Chen Ch’uan Shi-Lu, Account dealing with the real Propagation of the true Religion) in 1593, the second Catechism in Chinese after F. Ruggieri’s Tianzhu Shilu (The True Record of the Lord of Heaven) in 1584. The text is a synthesis of Chinese and European philosophical ideas with the use of several terms from the Neo-Confucian thought.

10 Chen Hong, “On Matteo Ricci’s Interpretation of Chinese Culture,” in Coolabah, No. 16, 2015, ISSN 1988–5946, Observatory: Centre d’Etudes Australians/Australian Studies Centre, Universitat de Barcelona. 11 El padre Mateo Rizzi, que es uno de los dichos dos religiosos me a enviado una relación muy breve y açertad de las cosas de la China y de sus antiguedades y descriptió, la qual envio con las cartas dirigidas assi mesmo al virrey de la Nueva España para que las encamine a Vuestra Magestad. 12 C.R. Boxer, o.c., p. lxxxvii.

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Fr. Cobo, also translated from Chinese into Spanish the work Mingxin Baojian compiled by Fan Liben in 1393, under the title Espejo rico del claro corázón (Precious Mirror of the Clear Heart) and published in 1590. To Cobo is attributed also the Vocabularium Sinense, a Chinese Dictionary. The Jesuit Matteo Ricci is generally considered to be the first missionary who mastered the language and the culture of China, and who was able to adapt the European philosophy, religion and science into the Chinese context. However, Cobo took the first place in such an adaptation. It results evident if one studies his works in Chinese.13

A second common assertion is that Ricci first introduced to Europe Chinese culture by translating the Confucian Four Books. Fr. Henri Bernard, in 1937, pointed out that, when Ricci finished his annotations of the Four Books, he had realized their significance for Europe: “The annotation I’ve done will help our work in China and Japan, and will be well received in Europe.”14 According to Chen Hong, “in 1594 Ricci interpreted and translated into Latin four Confucian Classics, namely, The Analects of Confucius, Mencius, Great Learning, and Zhongyong.”15 Ricci few times mentioned that from 1591 to 1593 he has “paraphrased and annotated” in Latin the Four Books in order to help the young missionaries in their study of Chinese language. Fr. Giulio Aleni (1582– 1649), in the first biography of Ricci, stated that Ricci has sent a copy to Rome. However, this text has never been found. Francesco D’Arelli, in Matteo Ricci e la traduzione Latina dei Quattro Libri (Matteo Ricci and the Latin Translation of the Four Books, 1998), has specifically dealt with this “complicated and unsolved question.”

13 José Antonio Cervera Jimenes, “El Shilu del dominico Juan Cobo (1593)”, in

Revista Estudios, 32, I-2016. https://noticias.nat.gov.tw/news.php?post=91596&unit= 99,108,115&unitname=Taiwan-Hoy&postname=JUAN-COBO-NUESTRO-PIONEROINTERCULTURAL. 14 Bernard, R.P. Henri, translated into Chinese by Guan Zhenhu, Critical Biography of Matteo Ricci (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1993), p. 162. 15 Chen Hong, “On Matteo Ricci’s Interpretation of Chinese Culture,” a.c.

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Fr. Pasquale D’Elia about the translation of Ricci states that it has “seemingly remained a manuscript” in the hands of the language students.16 Vladimír Lišˇcák in “François Noël (1651–1729) and Latin translations of Confucian Classical books published in Prague in 1711”17 clarifies the issue: At the beginning was the translation of the introduction to Daxue [Great Learning] into Latin, published in Rome (Italy) in 1593 by Michele Ruggieri, 1543–1607; (Chinese name: Luo Mingjian). In 1662, the first Latin translation of some parts of the Confucian canon was published in China by Inácio da Costa (1603–1666; Chinese name: Guo Najue) and Prospero Intorcetta (1626–1696; Chinese name: Yin Duoze). However, the first translation of the Confucian classic books, which attracted significant attention, was Confucius Sinarum philosophus [Confucius, the Chinese philosopher], published in Paris in 1687. This publication has contained the annotated translation of three of Four Books of the Confucian canon….

François Noël’s Sinensis Imperii classici sex [Six Classics of Chinese Empire] has contained a new translation of the first three of the Four Books and added the Mencius (Mengzi). He also included in this book the Xiaojing [Classic of Filial Piety], one of the Thirteen Classics (Shisanjing), as well as the Xiaoxue [Small Learning], a collection of texts put together for children by Zhu Xi (1130–1200). About the consideration of Fr. Ricci as the founder of the Catholic Mission in China, Yu Liu, in “The True Pioneer of the Jesuit China Mission: Michele Ruggieri”18 stated:

16 P. D’Elia, Fonti Ricciane, vol. II (Rome, 1949), p. 33. 17 https://www.academia.edu/15865728/Fran%C3%A7ois_No%C3%ABl_1651_1729_

and_Latin_translations_of_Confucian_Classical_books_published_in_Prague_in_1711_% E8%A1%9B%E6%96%B9%E6%BF%9F_Fran%C3%A7ois_No%C3%ABl_1651_1729_1711_% E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%A8%E5%B8%83%E6%8B%89%E6%A0%BC%E5%87%BA%E7%89%88% E7%9A%84%E5%84%92%E5%AE%B6%E7%B6%93%E5%85%B8%E6%8B%89%E4%B8%81% E8%AA%9E%E7%BF%BB%E8%AD%AF. 18 In Jesuits Missionaries in China and Tibet (Vol. 50, No. 4, May 2011).

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However, Ricci did not start the Jesuit mission in China. Before him, there was someone who was senior to him both at their historic entry into the country on September 10, 1583 and in their subsequent years together in Zhaoqing, Guangdong Province. That person was Michele Ruggieri (15431607). Though remembered today as someone who prepared the way for Ricci and disappeared “from the scene in silence,” Ruggieri deserves far more serious attention, because as much as Ricci, he believed in the adaptation of the Christian message to the Chinese cultural milieu, but he went about it in a very different way.

The main reason for Ruggieri’s “disappearance” seems to be the opposition of Alessandro Valignano and Matteo Ricci, who did not agree with his openness to cooperate with Spanish Jesuits and Spanish Government authorities. About the originality of the “adaptation method,” proposed by Fr. Valignano and implemented by Fr. Ricci, also some clarifications are required, as it has been already stated. Such a method, which included the mastery of the Chinese language, the openness to Chinese culture and customs in view of propagating Christian faith, was basically proposed by Fr. Melchior Nuñez Barreto, whose letters were mentioned above. In May 1554, Fr. Melchior, then the Portuguese Provincial of the Jesuits, left Goa on his way to visit Japan and spent the winter in Malacca. Then, in July 1555 he reached Shangchuan, the island where St. Francis Xavier died, and from there made two one-month visits to Canton. In the first visit brought also with him Bro. Estavão de Goes (1526–1588) with the intention to get for him the permit to stay and study the Chinese language and culture. On 20 November, Fr. Melchior from Canton went back to Macau where, on 23 November, in a long letter in Italian, informed the confreres in India about his travel and suggested the possible ways to spread the Gospel in China: The following is the major difficulty people find in China to become Christians: that is, humanly speaking they seem lacking of enough courage to take up a new doctrine and law without the permit of those in authority: nor the latter will dare to give it without the permit of the King. Consequently, according to what I experienced in this land, it seems that there are only two possible ways (both difficult) to be followed to achieve its conversion, not to speak of the grace and the intervention of the Spirit, who is always necessary. The first way seems more human: it consists in negotiating an embassy to come to this kingdom, to achieve a peaceful agreement between them [Chinese authorities] and the Portuguese; together with the ambassador, some of the members of the [Jesuit] Company should go to the place

13

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where the King resides, which is said to be a journey of a thousand and five hundred miles inland, the most of which is by the river. And since after the arrival of the ambassador in Canton, it is required to wait for almost one year for the sending and returning of the acceptance of the request from the King, there will be time and opportunity enough to practice the language and to get acquainted with the local conditions. Then, going with the ambassador to where the King lives, efforts should be done to get the license to celebrate the divine offices, to get engaged in charitable works and to teach people: and after receiving some news of their virtue through the same ambassador and even through the same members of the Company who have gone, a sealed approval could be requested from the King, that all his subjects who would like to accept the law of the Creator, could freely do it, without scandal nor prejudice for him, and that neither the Mandarins nor the other Governors could forbid it, but give favor to those who follow the Christian Religion… The second way is not so much founded on human means and needs for fasting: it consists in this: two Fathers of the Company knowing the languages, should go to Canton; and when the Portuguese ships had to leave, they should remain with the risk of being beaten with canes and start to preach our most Holy Faith, both in the squares and in the houses; and even if they are put into prison, they should never stop preaching the Word of God, both in favorable and adverse conditions, in consolations as well as in afflictions, proposing it with stand-fast faith and hope: if the grain will die, it will produce ears and fruits. It is true that I find an inconvenience in the lack of language interpreters, who are young Chinese, who, meeting with some trouble, lose their courage, have fear to declare the things of God, which are told them, and even misinterpret them… What I feel in this land with my weak judgment is that some of the Fathers of the Company should come here, learn well the language, keep high spirit, that our Lord God might work some miracles through them and His mercy would bestow on some Chinese the grace of the faith in Jesus Christ Our Lord: in this way, many fruits will be harvested, helping God those in authority so that they do not to put any obstacle.19

The above quoted proposals, sent to India by Fr. Barreto, concerning the ways of the evangelization of China are quite original and, certainly, were known by and have influenced the thinking of Fr. Valignano, in deciding the so-called adaptation strategy he would carry out through Frs. Michele Ruggieri and Matteo Ricci.

19 M. Barreto, Fathers in Goa, 23 November 1555, from Macau (http://www.upf. edu/asia/projectes/che/che16.htm).

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Catholic Views of China in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries The over positive evaluation of the Chinese Empire represents the first phase of European understanding of and approach to China. Such an admiration of the Chinese Empire in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was increasingly replaced after the end of the eighteenth century by a dramatic shift, based upon an outlook exclusively concentrated upon Europe and by the objective deterioration, impoverishment and disorder of the living conditions in China. The Society of Jesus was dissolved in 1773 and the Jesuits in China were substituted by Vincentian (or Lazarist) missionaries. People in Europe became proud and satisfied at their economic and technical progress due to the industrial revolution, which produced contempt for the apparent hopeless stalemate, backwardness and poverty into which China seemed to have sunk into. The Qing dynasty had to face serious difficulties, such as “administrative inefficiency, intellectual irresponsibility, widespread corruption, debasement of the military, pressure of a rising population, and a strained treasury.”20 Moreover, China suffered frequent natural disasters, such as floods, drought, earthquakes, cholera, and other pests, as well as several rebellions and rural unrest, in particular the Taiping Rebellion, inspired by Christian elements (from 1850 to 1864). The official attitude of the Chinese authorities, as we will see, changed: the missionary activities were further restricted; the evangelizers both local and foreign had to perform their services underground, moving around from one place to another to avoid arrest. Isolated groups of Christians were often mistaken as subversive elements of popular sects. Foreign missionaries, in particular, were chased after, since they were strictly connected with the foreign political powers (privileged in the “unequal treaties” with “treaty rights”). The widespread economic and political decline in China was increased by the competition of foreign imports, forced upon the country by gunboat colonial diplomacy, thus contributing to the ruin of many domestic trades and to the rising of local unemployment.

20 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 177.

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As time went on, the idealized accounts of China given by the Jesuits were followed by an increasing number of descriptions produced by merchants. As a rule, the merchants had little interest in Chinese civilization and Chinese intellectual life. Their accounts tended to the opposite extreme to those of the Jesuits, and are frequently characterized by spiteful, contemptuous and disdainful descriptions of the Chinese. Those who composed them were concerned exclusively with trade and profit; they came into contact in China only with the lower classes in the sea-ports and with subordinate officials who did not always belong to the best elements of the nations. In Europe the cosmopolitan and broad-minded approach of someone like Leibnitz gave way to an outlook exclusively concentrated upon Europe… In the line with the disdain with which the academic world treated China, popular literature and the press took China and its population even less seriously in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Chinese were either characterized as uncivilized, inferior and decadent, or else they were represented as comic figures, who could be used in all kinds of ways as on object of mockery and amusement. Everything Chinese was distorted into something absurd and bizarre.21

With the arrival in China of the new wave of European and American missionaries, in the second half of nineteenth century, endowed with a certain romantic heroism (heroic generosity and readiness to martyrdom) combined with a confidence in the values of Western civilization and in the superiority of the Christian Religion, missionary activity increased in number and services. The missionaries, especially those who worked inland, shocked by the extreme poverty of the population, wrote to the Western audience at home for fund-raising and publicity purposes: they sensationalized their experiences with cases of poverty and injustice, as well as they criticized Chinese traditional Religions and customs. The missionary literature obviously underlined the expressions of Chinese superstitions and practices, often portraying the Chinese as a people of pagans, waiting to be saved and be civilized by the Gospel. They condemned the customs of abandoning children, of foot-binding, of concubinage, of arranged marriages of children, of opium smoking, of superstitious fear of the spirits, of idolatry, of corruption, of banditry, of exploitation and of injustice and misery. They frequently complained 21 Wolfgang Franke, China and the West (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 64, 143.

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against the hostility they were subjected to by the local authorities and gentry. The missionaries’ belief that all pagans were destined to hell unless they converted to Christianity, created a sense of urgency and the efforts for saving souls became of primary importance. Interesting was the contradiction of public and private opinions in the missionary writings: their critical comments made in public, however, differed from their opinions expressed in private correspondence. In these personal letters, in fact, they frequently spoke about the ordinary Chinese people they were working with, expressing appreciation for their kindness, diligence, hardworking, patience, and zeal for the Christian faith. As an example, just few letters of foreign missionaries describing the situation and the difficulty of their work in inland areas: An Italian missionary working in North Henan wrote in April 1877, during the great famine of 1876–1879: Just after the crossing of the Yellow River, continually for the whole three days of traveling, a miserable scene kept under my eyes. Boys and girls of very young age, emaciated and hungry, were loitering around on the streets, abandoned by their parents, who, struck by a horrible famine caused by prolonged drought, had emigrated elsewhere in order to avoid dying of hunger in their own houses. Then, an abundant rain for other three days seemed to change and improve the situation, but after it, the conditions returned as before, if not worse… In fact, after the rain, other three months of drought followed, with the appearance of grasshoppers which destroyed the whole crop of millet. Famine became harder and children abandoned on the street increase day by day. In about two months I collected 97 orphans, 43 of them are already in paradise…22

Bishop Simeone Volonteri, Vicar Apostolic of Henan explained to the Holy See in 1882: Preaching the Gospel is free everywhere, and the authorities cannot set up any obstacle on official and legal basis. However, everywhere they try, in indirect ways and with all means even violent, to raise opposition to new conversions. This is carried out mainly by the class of the gentry, especially

22 Letter of Fr. Cicalese from Tianjiajing, dated August 20, 1877, published in Le Missioni Cattoliche (L.M.C.), 1877.

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if they enjoy the consent and the support of the local mandarins: they excite popular revolts, which are rather overspread.23

The French Jesuit Fr. Joseph de la Servière wrote: I shall always retain a delightful recollection of my excursions amid the villages in the neighborhood of Shanghai in 1909-1910. Sometimes the Christian peasants are grouped apart, and their communities, numbering 300, 800, or 1,500 souls, governed, as far as their temporal interests are concerned, by local notables styled ‘administrators,’ remind one of our most flourishing parishes in Brittany or Flanders. The Catholic population in Kiangnan is made up of two perfectly distinct elements. Two-thirds of the faithful are “old Christians” descendants of the seventeenth and eighteenth century converts. Their ancestors have braved a hundred years of violent and vexatious persecution, and survived an even more dangerous predicament—namely, the almost utter lack of priests from the time of the suppression of the Company of Jesus down to the middle of the nineteenth century. Supported only by catechists and celibate women-workers, who christened and taught the children, ministered to the dying and watched over the recital of prayers in common, they remained loyal to the Church, and when new missionaries appeared to carry on the work of their mighty predecessors, they were astonished and overjoyed to discover that the foundations still stood firm and were strong enough to support the new building which it was their task to undertake. These old Christians are characterized by deep faith, strict observance of traditional customs, and a lavish spirit of charity, which it often requires some exercise of authority to keep within bounds… The second category of Chinese Catholics consists of new converts from paganism. These include, in the first place, foundlings abandoned by their heathen parents, who are taken up and cared for in the mission orphanages. Whatever may be said by travelers, who know little of China beyond the Treaty Ports, infanticide and the exposure of new-born children, especially girls, are still the common practice in certain provinces of the Middle Kingdom, and this to an extent utterly unknown in Christian countries, even where depravity reaches its maximum.24

23 Volonteri > Propaganda Fide (letter without date), SCPF Archives, China 1882, vol. 25, sheet 234. 24 Chinese Recorder 1913, pp. 613–614.

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Raymond Dawson summarizes the entire process in the period under consideration25 : If the first half of the 18th century in Europe was characterized by sinophilia and sino-mania, then the first half of the 19th century was known for its sino-phobia. While European sinologists in the 17th and 18th centuries focused their attention on Confucian texts and the Confucian interpretation of history, and the process created an idealized self-portrait of Chinese civilization, in 19th century specialists denigrated China as poor, backward and heathen country, and even regarded Confucius as promoter of an absolute regime.

25 R. Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon—An Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese Civilization (London, 1967), pp. 132–134.

CHAPTER 2

Attitude of the Chinese Empire Toward the Catholic Church: From “Welcomed Religion” to “Heterodox Sect”

Taking into consideration statistics and data, numbers and percentage, many people get the impression that Christianity in China has failed in taking root in the country. It seems an objective fact. Why such a failure? The fact requires an objective evaluation of the view and the attitude of the Chinese imperial authorities toward the Catholic Church. Dealing with history, it is always necessary to pay particular attention to circumstances and events in order to avoid building up myths.

Under Tang and Yuan Dynasty Tang Dynasty, due to its attitude of religious toleration and intellectual openness, welcomed Christian Religion at its first official entry in China in 635, as Jingjiao, the Luminous Religion (Christian Syrian Church or Church of the East) from Persia. Later, however, it suffered the slanders of Buddhists in Luoyang (698–699) and of the Taoists in Chang’an (712– 713). Then, during Wuzong Emperor’s period (841–846), when the Taoists, in control the court, were intensely jealous of the rapid growth of Buddhist monasteries, Christians shared the persecution with them. Economic and political matters also contributed to Wuzong’s policy of persecution. In 843–845, 4,600 monasteries and more than 40,000 private monastic establishments were suppressed, while some 260,000 monks and nuns had to return to secular lives. Monasteries of Central © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_2

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and Western Asian origins were also involved: an imperial decree “compelled the Daqin (Christians) and Muhu, (Zoroastrianism) in the number of more than 3,000 persons to return to lay life and to cease to confound the customs of China.” However, when many Christians on their journey home reached Canton, they learnt that the imperial decree had been revoked by Wuzong’s successor. Consequently, some of them, most likely, stopped in the city. Again, under Tang Xizong emperor (874–889), during the rebellion of Huang Chao (834–884), who captured Khanfu (probably Canton) in 877–879, according to the Arab historian Abu Zayd Hasan of Siraf, many inhabitants were put to death. Persons well-informed about these affairs relate that, without counting the Chinese who were massacred, there perished six score thousand (120.000) of Mohammedans, Jews, Christians and Parsees who were living in the city and doing business there.1

Although the figure can be incorrect, yet the fact remains that the foreign population in Canton was large in the ninth century and among them there was a good number of Persian Christians. In the above two cases, which were not specifically against the Christian Religion, the motivations of the persecution seem rather clear. The first Christians in China thus shared the great trials that Buddhists underwent. They had been accepted in China under the same conditions as the Buddhists, and they were close to Buddhism by their religious language and by their monastic form of life. They were now cut off from the Churches they had come from, and, since they had made few converts among the Chinese population, they disappeared almost entirely for the next three hundred years. However, Christians, scattered among the tribes [and kingdoms] of the north, the northeast and the northwest were to find their way into China again at the time of the Mongol invasion.2

The Mongol Emperors during the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), due to their syncretistic attitude welcomed all Religions. Muslims, Jews and Christians, both Persian and Western, formed a foreign enclave in China.

1 https://en.wikipedia.org./wiki/Huang_Chao. 2 Jean Charbonnier, Christian in China (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), p. 67.

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Although the Mongol emperors showed no special regard for Christians, they dealt with them in a positive way, and even requested more missionaries to work in their empire. In 1267, Kublai Khan (Shizu, r. 1279–1312) sent Niccolò and Matteo Polo, father and uncle of Marco Polo (1254–1324), back to Europe with the request to the Pope to send “a hundred Catholic learned men to teach Christian faith to the Mongol people.” And in July 1336, a letter from the Christian Alan chiefs to the Holy Father asked him for new missionaries. However, when Mongol power collapsed, Persian Christians and the converts of the Franciscan missions gradually disappeared by the end of the fourteenth century. Fortunato Margiotti provides a good general context3 : In the 13th and 14th century China, all religions enjoyed the same freedom of action. The legislative authorities of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) positively protected the rights of each of them. Catholic Religion, according to the testimony of missionaries and travelers, also benefited of the similar treatment. To such regime of freedom, that lasted about a century, followed a long period of intolerance. The national Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), in the intent of destroying whatever reminded of the Mongol oppressors, also cancelled the great religious liberty and the 1373 Code condemned all other religions, recognizing only Confucianism. It decided punishments against religious leaders and teachers, against religious associations, sects and those who favored them. Moreover, it was forbidden to foreigners to enter the Empire and to the transgressors it threatened expulsion or life imprisonment. Such was the legislation at the arrival of the Jesuits. In 1583, they obtained from Canton Viceroy the permit to reside in the Empire and to practice the worship to the Lord of Heaven, but with the condition of not spreading it among the local people. Although Ricci has always been against the request of an imperial authorization, there were some missionaries, as Longobardi and Vagnoni, who were inclined to submit such a request. The issue, brought to Rome by Trigault at the seventh general congregation (1615), remained unsolved since it was too arduous. Consequently, neither then nor later, there was no juridical guarantee for the Missions. And since the legislation against the heretical sects decided by the 1373 Code remained effective, Christianity in Peking remained officially ignored and, in the provinces, subject to either sympathy or antipathy of the local authorities. 3 Fortunato Margiotti, OFM, Il Cattolicesimo nello Shansi dalle origini al 1738, vol. II (Roma: Edizioni Sinica Francescana, 1958), pp. 492–495.

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The Ming Dynasty and the Jesuit Enterprise When Fr. Matteo Ricci (Li Madou, 1552–1610) entered China in 1583 with Fr. Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607), he was confronted with the strong Sinocentric vision of the Chinese authorities, which has started since the Qin Dynasty: Chinese Empire was the center of the world and all the other states had to pay tribute to it. Chinese civilization was considered the origin of all other civilizations and superior of all: the “barbarians” should change their ways of life and adopt the Chinese way. The Chinese emperor who was the Son of Heaven should be respected as the suzerain of all other rules on earth and should receive tributes from all the others. Since Fr. Ricci wanted at any cost to assure his staying in China and to reach Peking in order to gain the benevolence of the emperor, due to the then very common conviction that cuius regio, eius religio (“whose realm, its religion,” meaning that the Religion of the ruler was to dictate the Religion of people), he had no choice but to adopt the tributary system and to pretend that he was a tributary envoy from the “State of the Great West.” For this purpose, he submitted his petition and gifts to the Ming imperial court in 1601 and drafted with the help of Chinese friends.4 Li Madou, a public servant from the Great West, respectfully submitting the following petition, for the presentation of native products. Your servant came from a faraway land which has never sent a tributary mission. From afar, I have heard about the renowned civilization of the Celestial Dynasty, and I desire to be assimilated into the society for the rest of my life, so that my life would not be wasted. For that purpose, I left my native land, took the sea route, traveled for three years, covered a distance of eighty thousand li, and finally arrived at the Province of Guangdong. Conscious of the fact that the great Celestial Dynasty calls for all foreigners to render homage from four corners of the world, I therefore took courage to present myself at the Imperial Court. Respectfully I am presenting to your Majesty the native products I have brought as follows: one portrait of the Lord of Heaven, two portraits of the Blessed Mother of the Lord of Heaven, one breviary, one pearlstudded cross, two self-striking clocks, one world atlas and one Western harpsichord. Although the products may not be considered as very rare,

4 Paul Hoang, Zhengjiao fengbao (Shanghai, 1894), freely translated in Seraphin COUREUR, Choix de Documents (Shanghai, 1895).

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but they do differ as being tributes from the extreme West, and they are presented as expressions of my deepest devotion. Your servant has dedicated himself to the study of Tao (Way) since childhood. I am now over middle age, I am a celibate, having no children and dependents, and I have no worldly desires. The precious portraits I have presented are for the praying of Your Majesty’s long life, for the prosperity and peace of the people. Such is my deep loyalty. I humbly beg Your Majesty to have compassion on me, accept my sincere devotion and the native products I have presented. Thus, I shall further be grateful to Your Majesty’s all-embracing kindness. Thus, I shall be able to express my admiration. Your servant was fortunate to have passed civil service examination in his own country and was appointed to offices. I had learned the secrets of astronomy and geography. I had studied the movements of the stars and the measures of the sun. In all these, I found them to be agreeable with the ancient Chinese method. May I beg Your Majesty not to take into account my lowliness but to allow me to serve you with my humble talents. Such is my greatest desire. Your approval would be deeply appreciated, even though I dare not covet such honor. (28 January 1601)

When Fr. Ricci finally received permission to remain in Beijing, he was treated as a tributary envoy and provided with a regular stipend from the Ming court. Ricci, followed by many other Jesuits, not only adapted to the Sinocentric myth with its tributary system, but also adopted a parallel way and subtly developed their own myth of the “Great West,” of Europe and of themselves. They made all efforts to convey to Europe the picture of the Chinese Empire as the model State to imitate. But at the same time, they presented an idealized picture of Europe and of the Catholic Religion to the Chinese authorities and intellectuals. The idealized version of Europe was contained in his Map of the World (1602)5 : The continent of Europe contains some [thirty] states, all of which enjoy a monarchical system of government. They follow no heterodox doctrines, but are reverent followers of the Supreme Deity… The workers are skillful and clever while the people are well versed in astronomy and philosophy. In their daily activities they are solid and honest, and have high regard for

5 Min-Sun Chen, Mythistory in Sino-Western Contacts (Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada: Lakehead University Printing Services, 2003).

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the five relationships. Mode of production are plentiful. Princes and Ministers are prosperous and healthy. Communications are kept with foreign countries at all times while the merchants roam over the entire earth.

The same idealized Europe was described in Giulio Aleni’s (1582– 1649) Account of the Countries in 1623 and, consequently, also in the writings of Xu Guangqi (1562–1633). It was a further step in the process of “simulation” as Jacques Gernet, in his Chine et Christianisme,6 has called the Jesuit way, while other scholars usually call it “accommodation” or adaptation method. The “simulation” process has started when Ricci abandoned the Buddhist robe, studied the Confucian classics and appeared with a long beard and in the literati’s dress for the first time in May 1595, twelve years after his arrival in Zhaoqing. He realized that, if he wished to be received in Chinese high society, he should present himself not as a man of Religion but as a “Western man of letters,” with special scientific abilities: he was called “the extraordinary man, jiren.” He became known for his astonishing memory of the Classics and Qu Rukui (Qu Taisu, 1549– 1612) was first attracted to him because he considered him an expert in alchemy, able to produce gold, since he was supporting himself and others without any job. Another step in this process, therefore, was not only to appear as a philosopher and moralist, but also to resort to rare objects (like clocks and glass prisms), and to scientific knowledge (making map of the world and teaching mathematics) as a means to attract Chinese scholars and, hopefully, to convert them. With the Sinocentric myth being so strong and pervasive among the Chinese official-scholars, the only pragmatic approach for Matteo Ricci and other Jesuit missionaries who were dealing with the Chinese upper class was to accommodate and to present themselves on the same level, honorable members of the Great West. That was the reason for Ricci to decide to change the habit from the Buddhist robe to the Confucian silk dress, with the excuse of the bad name of the Buddhist monks. This basic adaptation required not simply changing in the external appearance but also in adopting the same status of the “literati” or scholar-officials, the same “polite and rational” behavior, making friends with them,

6 Jacques Gernet, China and the Christian Impact (Cambridge University Press, 1985, original Chine et Christianisme, Editions Gallimard, 1982).

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agreeing with whatever they affirmed. Consequently, came the ideological accommodation method of buru yifo (supplementing Confucianism and opposing Buddhism). Ricci, however, was careful enough to choose what he considered the original Confucian doctrines most suitable to fit with the Catholic teaching and rejected as wrong all other teachings, Buddhism, Taoism, and even Neo-Confucianism. In this way, he considered the original Confucians as followers of a natural Religion, without idols and errors. The best way to win the interest and sympathy of the Chinese was to present Christianity as a doctrine close to Confucianism and to accompany it with scientific knowledge. Ricci presented Christianity to the Sinocentric Confucian scholars, who were not very interested in Religion, just as a natural Religion, by identifying the Lord of Heaven with the Heaven of the early Confucian Classics, as a first step to attract their interest toward Religion. Ricci just desired them to accept his interpretation of Heaven in the Confucian classics as the Lord of Heaven, God, which he considered the true early Confucian doctrine. He welcomed the literati as they were, people “who do not believe in idols” and who took part to ceremonies in honor of Confucius and of ancestors through offerings, bows, and prostrations, just as a formality, as “civil ceremonies” for the good government. In Ricci’s letter to John Baptist Roman, dated 13 September 1584 has written: “China does not have a proper religion… Chinese people are divided into three sects… The last sect is of the literati: they, generally, do not believe in the immortality of the soul and make joke of what the other sects say about spirit and demons, they only thank the heaven and the earth for all the benefits they receive, but do not ask for the paradise.”7 Consequently, Ricci is addressing to those Confucians, who do not believe in idols, who are “good atheists”—as he called them: they do not deny the existence of the Supreme Heaven, but do not ask questions about it; they have a certain Religious attitude, accepting rites, considered civil or political, just as a tool for the political, social, and ethical life of the state. This kind of people, according to Ricci, are quite receptive of the Christian message. Just considering the original doctrine of Confucianism and keeping friendship with the scholar-officials prevented Ricci to really understand 7 Francesco D’Arelli (ed.), Matteo Ricci, Lettere (Macerata Quodlibet, 2001), pp. 84–

85.

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their instrumentalization of Confucian doctrine as a tool for government and for personal ambitions. Moreover, another consequence for Ricci and his followers was to accept the judgment of the “literati” on the sacrifices to Confucius and to the ancestors as simply “civil” and not as religious performance, as well as their superiority upon common people, their despise for their ignorant behavior and “their superstitions.” Such a “superiority myth” they shared with the Chinese literati prevented them to see and understand the reality of the life of the ordinary Chinese people. However, all this was the root of the opposition to Ricci’s method. The method of Ricci met with the critique from some other Jesuits. According to Fr. Niccolò Longobardi (1559–1654), his accommodation method—as wrote Michela Catto—8 was to strengthen the atheist system of China, becoming another Religion just employed in view of a good government. In Longobardi’s view, the Jesuits’ true attitude should be lacking of any kind of tolerance and accommodation, since there was the danger to become part of the Chinese system without converting China to the Gospel. Other Jesuit missionaries who were working among common people, together with the Dominicans and Franciscans, who were not facing the strong Sinocentric myth of the literati, did not have to create the myth of Europe, although sharing the religious conviction of belonging to the highest and true Religion. This made them listen, see, and judged negatively the behavior of the common people: their ways of worshiping the deceased ancestors, their belief in the presence of the natural spirits, the utilitarian ways of dealing with them, the fear of the spirits and demons, the religious worshiping of Buddha, Confucius, Laozi, Guanyin and other Immortals, etc. They considered these actions as “superstitious,” and therefore, to be forbidden. Unfortunately, at that time, missionaries generally lacked a clear and proper understanding of the psychological dimension of “superstition.” Consequently, the Rites Controversy, unfortunately, dealt only with either forbidding or allowing some specific actions, causing a strong conflict among individuals and congregations, without paying much attention to the education of the mind and to the formation of the right attitude of people. 8 www.giornaledistoria.net—Michela Catto, L’ateismo dei cinesi in Matteo Ricci e Niccolò Longobardo.

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Chinese Opposition Jacques Gernet in his China and the Christian Impact entitled his first chapter “From sympathy to hostility.” In fact, opposition came also from the Chinese side, even at the time of Ricci. In 1607, three hundred literati in Nanchang signed a petition demanding the expulsion of the Jesuit missionaries and the proscription of Christianity, since it was heterodox by prohibiting ancestor worship and destroying statues of the divinities. In 1610, the Buddhist Zhuhong (1535–1615) and the scholar Yu Chunxi (1553–1621) rejected Ricci’s notion of Heaven. With the increase in the knowledge of the Christian doctrine by the Chinese scholars, in May 1616 a memorial of Shen Que (Shen Tsui), the Nanjing vice minister of rites, raised his attacks against the Catholic missionaries and determined the first public suppression. The charges were that the Jesuits entered China secretly, were persons pernicious to the public good and tradition of China: “They appear to be monsters which cause great damage to Confucianism.” The conflict continued for more than two years, with the intervention of the Board of Rites through detentions and trials. Frs. Alvaro Semedo (1586–1658) and Alfonso Vagnoni (1568–1640) were sent to prison and then expelled together with other Jesuits from Nanjing and Beijing; many Chinese converts were arrested and beaten. Fortunately, the persecution was limited. The tenor of the judgment of the Board of Rites leaves no doubt that the principal factor of the attack launched by Shen Que was the hostility of Confucian ‘orthodoxy’ against Christianity and against the introduction of Western science, since by their astronomical theories the Jesuits, in his judgment, were doing away with the relationship between emperor and ministers.9 Books were published to refuse the teachings of the Jesuits: the most important were the Collected Essays Rejecting Heterodoxy (Poxieji) by the Zhejiang scholar Xu Changzhi (1582–1672) that contains, among the about sixty essays, the response of the Buddhist monk Yunqi Zhuhong (1535–1615) in his Heaven Discussion (Tianshuo), written in 1610. The anthology’s preface specified the intention of the work as to

9 George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants (London: Burns & Oates, 1962), p. 142; N. Standaert (ed.), Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume One 635–1800 (LeidenBoston-Köln: Brill, 2001), p. 510.

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uphold orthodoxy by refuting heterodoxy. Then, there were the antiChristian writings of Ouyi Zhixu (1599–1655), forming his Collected Essays Refuting Heterodoxy (Pixieji),10 whose preface dates 1643. Chin Ken-Pa wrote11 : Chinese culture, which is of long-standing selfsufficient and exclusive, treats all foreign cultures with a superior air, assimilating and making them serve China. Compared with the Chinese “Divine Dynasty,” all other cultures are nothing but heresies or barbarian namely “Yi.” Coming from foreign countries, Christianity is certainly “Yi,” whose doctrines are without exception heresy. So, an anti-Christian compilation appeared during the last years of the Ming Dynasty was titles as Shengchao Poxieji (The Sacred Dynasty’s Collection of Writings Exposing Heterodoxy). Chinese intellectuals, soon knowing better the content of the Christian faith, realized the ‘simulation’ adopted by the Jesuits and the exploitation of early Confucian doctrine and of the scientific knowledge in order to attract them to conversion. Consequently, already since 1620, conversions among literati almost disappeared.12 During the first decades of the Jesuit presence in China, opposition by the scholar-officials was motivated by their reaction to the simulation of the Jesuits, and by their judgment of Christianity as heterodoxy which was contaminating and destroying the good traditions and customs of China. The traditionalist concern, indeed strong, together with the sense of superiority of the Chinese civilization was playing an important role for the opposition.

10 Beverley Foulks, “Duplicitous Thieves: Ouyi Zhixu’s Criticism of Jesuit Missionaries in Late Imperial China”, in Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal (2008, 21:55–75): Ouyi amplifies this difference between Confucianism and Christianity in his writings, and he also vehemently defends Buddhism against Jesuit criticism. Ouyi objects to what he perceives to be similarities between Christianity and Buddhism, particularly the practice of repentance. In Ouyi’s opinion, it is too similar to be a coincidence, and we see Ouyi delivering impassioned ad hominem attacks accusing Jesuits of duplicitous thievery. 11 Chin Ken-Pa, “The Paradigm Shift: From Chinese Theology to Sino-Christian Theology—A Case of Study on Liu Xiaofeng”, in Sino-Christian Theology, No. 152, p. 141 (researchgate.net) 12 Adriano Prosperi, in “Nota Introduttiva a Jaques Gernet,” in Cina e Cristianesimo (Marietti: Casale Monferrato, 1984), pp. XXIII–XXIV.

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During Qing Dynasty Around the middle of the seventeenth century, when the conquest of the empire by the Qing army had become an accomplished fact, the new Manchu dynasty got more leisure to attend to Confucian improvement and civilization of the people: the anti-heretical attitude showed itself in its true character, also against Christianity. In January 1648, the Dominican Francisco Fernandez de Capillas (1607–1648) who had labored for six years to establish a Christian community at Fu’an, in Fujian, was put to death, and the persecution of his converts followed. The first Qing Emperor Sunzhi (1638–1661, r. since 1644) retained the services of Fr. Adam Schall von Bell (1592–1666), whom he appointed court astronomer, and gave him special honors. This created envy and caused a second wave of persecution, led by Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) with his book “Budeyi” (I can’t help it, 1659). He found a great ally in Wu Mingxuan, a Muslim official of the Bureau of Astronomy, who was punished with months of imprisonment when his charges against Adam Shall for several faulty predictions proved wrong. Adam Shall and his associates (Frs. Ferdinand Verbiest, 1623–1688, Lodovico Buglio, 1606–1682, Gabriel de Magalhaes, 1610–1677, and others) were attacked and sent to prison (September 1664). While the three fathers were sentenced to exile, Schall was condemned to death (January 1665). When in prison, due to their right calculation of a solar eclipse and an earthquake, the four fathers were released in May 1665, although five of their local associates were executed. In the following August, Schall passed away. In September 1665, all the twenty Jesuits, except the four working in the Court, and four friars (other five Dominicans hid in Fujian) were banished to Macau, but stopped in Canton. They were kept under guard until October 1669, when they were let free to leave. In this case, another reason of the persecution to add to the Sinocentric superiority, blind traditionalism, and xenophobic suspicions, that judged the Catholic Religion as heterodoxy, was the personal hate of Yang Guangxian and Wu Mingxuan. However, Yang’s feud was not primarily a personal one: his writings make clear that the object of his hatred was Christianity. If he centered his attack on Schall, due to his prominence, it was because, in the mind of the accuser, the cause of European science was used for promoting Christianity.

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Concepts such as xenophobia or anti-foreignism have been used to explain Yang Guangxian’s reaction, but they are probably too broad. A wide-spread acceptance of his anti-Christian view or the fundamental non-compatibility between Confucian and Christian ideas are equally inadequate as a satisfactory explanation. In fact, the Calendar Case was a combination of several factors, some of which had been smoldering before Yang’s attack took place: personal rivalry among the Jesuits, tensions between pro- and antiChristian factions at the court, and Schall’s dismissal of Muslim astronomy. An important aspect was also the Confucian roots of Yang’s thinking…13

Emperor Kangxi (1654–1722, r. since 1661) in 1670 issued the Sacred Edict (Sheng Yu), consisting of sixteen maxims, each seven characters long, to instruct the average citizen in the basic principles of Confucian orthodoxy: the seventh maxim reads, Wipe out strange beliefs to elevate the correct doctrine. These maxims were to be publicly posted in every town and village and read aloud to people assembled twice each month. In 1692, Kangxi issued an edict of toleration of Christianity: The Europeans are very quiet; they do not excite any disturbances in the provinces, they do no harm to anyone, they commit no crimes, and their doctrine has nothing in common with that of the false sects in the empire, nor has it any tendency to excite sedition … We decide therefore that all temples dedicated to the Lord of heaven in whatever place they may be found, ought to be preserved, and that it may be permitted to all who wish to worship this God to enter these temples, offer him incense, and perform the ceremonies practiced according to ancient custom by the Christians. Therefore let no one henceforth offer them any opposition. During the development of the Rites Controversy, the Jesuits, in order to defend their position, appealed to Kangxi Emperor on their behalf. In 1700, in fact, he issued an imperial rescript about the civic meaning of the rites. But, with the approval of Pope Clement XI (1649–1721) in 1704, the Rome Holy Office reaffirmed the condemnation of the rites and appointed Charles Thomas Maillard de Tournon (1668–1707) as Papal Legate to China. After the publication of the Roman decree in 1707, Kangxi banished Tournon to Macau: as the head of the Chinese authorities and intellectuals in their Sinocentric position, he gave a clear indication that he would never accept the Pope’s interpretation of the

13 N. Standaert (ed.), Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume One, o.c., pp. 514–

515.

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Confucian and ancestral rites. Therefore, he decreed that all the missionaries, who did not accept Fr. Ricci’s Rules,14 and did not ask for an official certificate (piao), had to leave China. When in 1716, the 1704 decree of Rome was finally published in Beijing, Emperor Kangxi ordered to retrieve all copies and send them back to Rome and launched a new wave of restrictions for Christianity. Meanwhile, Rome and Beijing had gone to such extremes that even the more conciliatory policy of the new Papal Legate, Ambrogio Mezzabarba (1685–1741), could not solve the misunderstanding. In 1721, the Legate issued a pastoral letter to all missionaries, reaffirming the 1715 decree but giving permission for eight specific rites. In reading it, Kangxi added a rescript in his own handwriting: “… There is no more striking example of sheer ignorance. Henceforth, no Westerner shall preach in the Middle Kingdom. We shall prohibit them in order to avoid further trouble!”. Emperor Kangxi tolerated Christianity because it has no “tendency to excite sedition,” but he prohibited it when he realized that it was a source of trouble, due to the controversy about the Rites. It strengthened the tradition of anti-Christian feelings, since Christianity was considered heterodoxy. In May 1717, Chen Mao (ca.1651–1719), a brigade-general in Canton pushed the high officials in Peking to urgently demand the prosecution of Christians as rebels, the demolition of their churches, and the punishment of mandarins who did nor suppress the Religion rigorously. The energetic efforts of the missionaries at the Peking court to prevent the issuing of an edict for the total extermination of Christianity remained vain: the emperor prohibited all missionaries from residing in China, without a special license granted by himself, and he let the mandarins in the provinces carry on the work of persecution to their heart’s content. In 1724, the second year of his reign, Emperor Yongzheng (1678– 1735, r. since 1722) issued the hengyu Guangxun (Amplified instructions on the Sacred Edict) in 10,000 characters specifying: 14 Surprisingly, these Rules of Ricci as Superior of the Jesuit China Mission have not come down to us. There is just a good summary of them, written in 1680 by the then Vice-Provincial of China, Giandomenico Gabiani, who, in his “Apologetic Dissertation on the Rites Permitted in the Chinese Church,” produced just a list of documents on the subject supposed to go back to the time of Ricci. Even Ricci’s last will and all the letters received from and written to the Chinese literati, also got lost. For more details see Paul A. Rule, “What were ‘The Directives of Matteo Ricci’ Regarding the Chinese Rites?” in Pacific Rim Report, No. 54, May 2010 (http://www.ricci.usfca.edu/assets/prr54.pdf).

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13. The Catholic Church, who speaks of heaven and earth, of the visible and the invisible, is not an orthodox doctrine. It is simply because [its members] understood astronomy, and were able to calculate the rules for astronomical table, that the Government made use of them to compile the calendar. This is by no means to say their sect is good: you must on no account believe them.

The various reasons that motivated the emperor rather shortly after his accession to proscribe the Catholic Religion in January 1724 included the disappointing for Mezzabarba’s legation, the realization that Christianity was “without any harm or benefit” and the Christian presence among royal ranks (the Sunu family). Consequently, the public proscription of the Catholic Church was followed by the exile of the missionaries and persecution of local Christians with churches turned into temples, storehouses, or schools. From then on, the Religion of the Lord of Heaven was strictly forbidden and the natives were not allowed to profess and propagate it. However, foreign missionaries were touring around secretly to administer sacraments to the faithful in Shansi, Shantung, Hukwang, Fujian, and Zhili. Some of them were searched, arrested, and severely punished, even with death. Lewis S. Robinson wrote15 : As early as the Mingshi [History of the Ming Dynasty], compiled between 1679 and 1739, Christianity is typified as a deceptive heterodoxy, though Christian doctrines are not examined. In an edict issued in 1724, the Yongzheng Emperor briefly touched upon the Christian belief in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, citing it as the locus classicus of the ‘heterodoxy of the West’

J.J. De Groot, dealing with this issue wrote16 :

15 Lewis Stewart Robinson, Double-Edged Sword (Hong Kong: Tao Fong Shan Ecumenical Centre, 1986), p. 2. 16 https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/2/mode/2up (vol. I); Sectarianism and religious persecution in China: a page in the history of religions, vol. 2, 1904, p. 273 (archive.org).

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Since this crusade (1724), which gradually passed over the whole empire, Romanism in China had to share the fate of the sects and religious communities sprung from paganism and Buddhism: it was given over defenseless to the mercies of a fanatical Confucian mandarinate, equipped by the State with that terrible scourge which we know as the Law against Heresy, until at last, in 1858, the treaties with European powers brought relief… It is difficult to admit that Shi Tsung acted in this matter under the pressure of a special anti-Christian spirit. Indeed, in the memorable year 1724 a decree against native heresy proves that he simply wanted to take rank as the Great Exterminator of Heresy generally…

Emperor Qianlong [1711–1799, r. 1735–1796] took a further measure directed against Christianity. And cases of martyrdom increased. The capture in Hubei of four Italian Franciscan friars secretly going to Shaanxi prompted the 1784 nationwide persecution of Christians. The emperor was shocked by the news that Chinese priests, educated outside China, have been ministering in China for years. An imperial edict stated that “Westerners propagating their religion and misleading the masses are of greatest harm to the morality and conventions of people.” He forbade Chinese to become Catholic priests; eight friars were expelled and thousands of Christians were exiled to the desert of Ili. After some years of relaxation, persecution was restarted in 1805, during the reign of emperor Jiaqing (1760–1820, r. since 1796), when an Italian Augustinian missionary was caught up by the police in his underground trips. A decree was issued on 4 September 1811, prescribing a search for foreign priests. Some of them were killed, and few were left; the main work was carried out by local Chinese priests. The four churches in Beijing were either destroyed or sold out. In 1820, the Vincentian mission at the imperial court was put to an end with the exile to Macau of the French interpreter, Fr. Louis François Lamiaux. The hostile attitude against Christianity during the Qing Dynasty is described as coming from the hand of the local mandarins. But, in fact, the role of the Board of Rites (Libu) has been dominant, since was responsible for the maintenance of the orthodox rules for private and social life, rites, ceremonies, and official Religion, as well as the implementation of the Law against Heresy. And the local mandarins dreaded very much any correspondence between the Board and the provincial Viceroys. Opposition to the Jesuits and other Western missionaries was motivated partly by the xenophobic suspicion that foreigners were spies; partly by

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ethical scruples against Christian refusal of some Chinese ceremonies such as the veneration of Heaven, ancestors and Confucius; and partly by professional jealousy, on the assumption that if Catholicism were to become prevalent in China, it will entail the decline of Confucius, Buddha and Laozi’s protagonist image. Behind the condemnation of Western learning lay the basic political fact that the Manchu rulers of China could not tolerate the propagation of a foreign religion which asserted the spiritual supremacy of Rome over Peking.17

In the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century After the Opium Wars, through the “Unequal Treaties,” the Western colonial powers particularly France for the Catholic Church (mainly the Huangpu Treaty in 1844, articles 22–24, and the Tianjin Treaty in 1858, article 13) obtained special privileges for foreign missionaries in acquiring properties and carrying on inland evangelization. Consequently, China’s traditional hostility to Christianity was greatly increased and, from 1860, the empire was covered by a growing quantity of violently anti-Christian publications. The main pretext of the persecution of Christianity, besides the usual ones of being a heterodox sect, deceiving the masses, violating the dynastic laws and customs, and following the footsteps of secret societies, was that the Christian missionaries, then including both Catholic and Protestants, were considered “the vanguard of the Western colonial powers to invade and control China.” The Sinocentric myth was until then maintained as a living reality because no other nation or civilization was strong enough to challenge the Chinese claim of superiority. The first shock on this line happened when Britain defeated China in the Anglo-Chinese Opium War of 1839– 1842. This event started for Chinese people a long painful period: they clearly realized not only that China was not the center of the world but also strongly felt their military and economic inferiority compared with the Western countries. They felt the psychological dilemma and suffered under the weight of the unequal treaties. They tried to solve it with the formula, “keep Chinese culture as substance and the Western knowledge as function.” People’s worry was about the “national salvation” with the aim of recovering its previous central place. 17 S.Y. Teng and J.K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 14, 15.

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On 28 December 1844, through the efforts of the French envoy Mr. Theodore de Lagranè (1800–1862), the High Imperial Commissioner at Canton, Qiying (Ch’i-ying, 1787–1858), petitioned the court that “henceforth, all natives and foreigners without distinction, who learn and practice the Religion of the Lord of Heaven, and do not excite trouble by improper conduct, be exempted from criminality.” In compliance with this memorial Emperor Daoguang (1782–1850, r. since 1820) on 20 February 1846 issued a rescript granting religious toleration. Toleration was meant “immunity from punishment for those who doing well profess the Religion of the Heaven’s Lord.” It is to be remembered that prior to this edicts Christianity was classed in the penal code with the heterodox and illicit sects.18

With this initiative, the French Government appropriated to itself the right of the “patronage” upon the Catholic Missions, which until then was the prerogative of Portugal, since the beginning of the new geographical discoveries at the end of the fifteenth century.19 After the edict, at times Chinese Government, under the pressure of the Western powers, reminded its mandarins that the Law against Heresy was abolished with regard to the Christianity, and its followers should be protected like all other citizens. Yet, all these exhortations did not prevent attacks upon missionary stations frequently instigated by mandarins and literati. Although, now and then, some Viceroys and other officers have issued proclamations protecting Christians, yet much more frequently mandarins promoted posting up of calumnious placards, plundering chapels and dwellings of Christians, without moving a finger to punish the ringleaders. Literati and officials becoming Christians, or associating with them, were deprived of their rank and position. Christians have been persecuted upon all kinds of pretexts and false accusations. Missionaries were deterred from renting and building chapels or hospitals, 18 Wu Chao-kwang, The International Aspect of the Missionary Movement in China (e-book in in Bibliotheca Sinica), p. 22. 19 The “Patronage System” was started by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 by dividing the

newly discovered lands between Spain and Portugal and entrusting to them the authority to carry on, with special privileges, the mission enterprise and affairs in their respective territories. On this issue, see S. Ticozzi, “Ending Civil Patronage: The Beginning of a New Era for the Catholic Missions in China, 1926,” in Cindy Y.Y. Chu, Catholicism in China, 1900-Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 87–104.

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especially in the cities. All these facts, that expressed the official attitude against ‘heresy,’ created many so-called missionary cases ( jiao-an). In 1844, the Illustrated Gazetteer of Maritime Countries, Haiguo Tuji, contained one of the most comprehensive compendium of anti-Christian dirty lore. It launched a growing tide of violent attacks against Christianity through pamphlets and tracts. The most popular was A Record of facts to ward off heterodoxy, spread in Hunan in 1861, with a list of more than 200 anti-Christian texts. At the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) called Chinese people of all ideological trends to unite to preserve Chinese civilization against the rebels, who were considered moved by Christian inspiration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, anti-missionary riots, caused also by the Catholic demand for restoration of church properties, repeatedly occurred in all the provinces, with the support of the local gentry. The most serious one was the Tianjin tragedy in 1870, when more than 20 foreign lives were lost. The hostility reached its climax with the Boxers Uprising in 1900, whose slogan was “Support Qing and exterminate foreigners.” One of their placards reads: Attention, all people in all the markets and villages of all provinces in China. Now, owing to the fact that Catholics and Protestants have vilified our gods and sages, have deceived our emperors and ministers, and oppressed the Chinese people; both our gods and our people are angry at them… More than 30,000 Christians lost their life. The practical cause was the simple fact that foreign missionaries could go inland and make their presence strongly felt with a privileged position and with critiques of Chinese customs and values. Thus, they directly undermined the cultural hegemony of the Chinese literati and officialdom, who shared hostile feelings. Even the common people, led by local leaders, resented against the attack of the practices of ancestor worship, against traditional feasts’ celebrations, and against unscrupulous behavior of some converts. The revengeful initiatives of these literati and local leaders were not motivated by their religious convictions, since they were despising as ‘superstitious’ the religious attitude of the common people. Moreover, since the missionaries were foreigner, Christianity was viewed as an external force that aimed at upsetting the entire spiritual foundation of the Chinese culture, a force that enjoyed foreign political and military backing. Consequently, antiforeignism became an important element in the anti-Christian opposition.

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The hostile attitude toward Christianity during the Qing Dynasty is shown not only by official and non-official documents, but also described in details by the missionaries themselves in the European literature. However, they seem to consider the hostility not as the necessary result of the official policy toward all non-Confucian Religions, but simple as the results of wicked efforts of local officials and their personal hatred against their Religion. J.J. De Groot, writing in 1901, at the end of his above quoted research on Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China, judged the Chinese Empire as a State which, on account of certain ancient dogmatic principles in the system of political philosophy whereupon is based, could not consistently do otherwise than brandish fire and sword in the face of every religious community or sect which, since the days of Confucius, has ventured to make its appearance in China; a State, in fact, which always follows this political line of action with the most scrupulous exactitude and must a fortiori be hostile to Christianity and to the despised ‘foreign devils’ who introduced it.20

Fr. Joseph de la Servière, S.J. in 1913 paper “The Work of the Catholic Church in China”21 wrote: Many reasons could be put forward to explain this relative powerlessness to win any hold upon the great masses of the heathen. In the first place, the lettered classes, amongst which the earliest missionaries had found their most able auxiliaries, were now closed to Christianity. Again, the Chinese people were incensed against the Christian nations who had imposed bitter conditions upon them after the ‘opium war’ and its corollary, the expedition of 1860. As a consequence, much prejudice was felt against missionaries, who were almost all Europeans. Again, the American, English, German, Spanish, French, and Portuguese population in the Treaty Ports furnished a bad example, their morals and their attitude towards the natives not tending to promote respect for the Religion which they professed. Perhaps the greatest stumbling-block of all lay in the underhand malevolence of almost the entire mandarin body, sworn foes of the Religion of the ‘Western Devils’… All these causes combined furnish but

20 J.J. De Groot, o.c., vol. 1, p. 3. 21 In Chinese Recorder 1913, pp. 613–626.

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too clear an explanation of slowness with which the number of conversions increased in the Celestial Empire throughout the nineteenth century.

Appendix A Chinese Opinion on the Christian Religion (Chapter VI of The Catholic Church in China from 1860 to 1907, by Bertram WOLFERSTAN [London, Sands & Company], pp. 240–248 [digital copy, www.univie.ac.at]) The following is from an article in Die Katholischen Missionen of January 1907. Rev. Fr. Jansen, missionary in East Mongolia, has, after many exertions, succeeded in obtaining and translating sections of the Memorial. What do the leading circles in China really think of Christianity and the Christian missions in China? To this question we get an answer through a Memorial issued from high official quarters, which bears the title Minkiao Hsiang-ngan (Good relations between People and Church). It was composed in 1905 by two members of the Chinese Ministry of Public Instruction; and, by order of the famous Viceroy of Tche-li, Yuan Shi-k’ai, and was confidentially distributed to all the mandarins of the province of Tche-li, ostensibly for the purpose of better enlightening them on the essence and nature of the Christian Religion, and correspondingly regulating their attitude towards it. The paper contains 37 pages and treats, in eight chapters, of the relations between China and the Christian missions. I. The First Chapter opens with a panegyric on the doctrine of Confucius. This doctrine, it is said, is all the more admirable, as it—in contradistinction to other religions—does not enjoin any faith in extraordinary things, such as the existence of good and bad spirits. Confucius does not dogmatize; he allows even doubt of, and criticism on, his own views. Nowhere else is the like found. The Buddhist and Mohammedan religions, naturalized in China, are living side by side in peace and concord. The Religion introduced from Europe has quite a different character. There, religious wars have always been the order of the day and have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands. With the arrival of the Christian Religion in China, these wars have been transferred thither also.

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Here follows a short history of the missions. In the ninth year of the reign of Wan-Li, of the Ming dynasty [1582], Matthew Ricci [S.J.] is stated to have come to China [The authors manifestly know nothing of the Franciscan mission during the Middle Ages]. More than one of these Jesuits at the Court of Peking have been favored with high honors by the Emperors. The decrees of persecution, which followed later on, had not for their object to oppose [the Christian] Religion, as such, but merely to put a stop to the continual quarrels between Pagans and Christians. Under pressure from foreign Powers, notably France, the free propagation and practice of the Christian Religion is nowadays granted. II. The Second Chapter is concerned with the treaties concluded with foreign Powers. These treaties—including those that refer to Religion—are stated to have been always detrimental to China. The articles, however, which have reference to the spreading of the Christian Religion, have been signed separately and have nothing to do with the other stipulations. The Article of the Treaty concluded with France [1860] runs thus, they say:—“The Catholic religion aims at urging all men to do good. All, therefore, who join it, shall enjoy protection and safety for their persons and property. They may, without restraint, meet for their religious practices, prayers, etc. The missionaries who, with friendly intention, travel through the country, shall everywhere find effectual protection on the part of the local authorities. Chinese who wish to conform to this religion, and keep its precepts, must not be molested or persecuted on that account. In conformity with this, all that has formerly been written and prescribed to hinder the religion of the Lord of the Heavens shall be cancelled in all the provinces.” … The chapter closes with the assertion that the Christians have oppressed the Heathens, thereby rousing the hatred of the same, and thus they themselves [the Christians] caused the burning of their churches and the massacre of their missionaries. III. The Third Chapter suggests how Europeans, especially missionaries, ought to be treated:—“We must show ourselves polite to them, since the Treaties order this. We should, therefore, let them preach freely, since we cannot hinder it; they, on their part, however, must not interfere with other people’s affairs. Furthermore, we must not forget that they are our guests; and that, if

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treated as such, get a good opinion of us, and will, in their turn, treat us civilly too.” “We must not oppress, yet just as little, fear, and, least of all, fawn upon, them; we ought simply to abide by the conditions of the Treaties, and the rules of friendship. In former times we have repeatedly ill-treated Europeans. That was unjust, and we acted, in those cases, just like one who receives a distinguished guest into his house without offering him a cup of tea. This manner of proceeding must be changed.” IV. The Fourth Chapter enters into the relations between Heathens and Christians. Here, the Heathens are described as Ping-min (ordinary subjects) and the Christians as Kiao-min (members of the Church). Here, once more, the pamphlet reverts to the attitude of the authorities, especially towards the missionaries: It is true we have often ill-treated the missionaries. One of the principal causes of this lies in the fact that their exterior, language, manners and customs, differ widely from ours. Moreover, the chiefs of the Christians are foreigners, you understand. Hence it is that, when a Chinese wishes to become a Christian, his fellowcitizens try to dissuade him from doing so, because they do not like his becoming a foreigner. The Christian, on his part, considers himself as a foreigner too, and, as such, wishes to let his adversaries feel the power of which he is thus possessed. So, Christians and Heathens are opposed to one another like fire and water. At the root of this attitude lies a great error; for, the acceptance of a Religion is in exactly the same case as the acceptance of either a vegetable or a meat diet. It depends entirely on individual taste; why therefore find fault with it. Another cause of enmity are the duties and taxes, which both parties alike must pay, for the common good. A difficulty, however, arises with regard to the special expenses of Pagan ceremonies. But Christians cannot be forced to contribute to these; it would mean obliging them to transgress their religious precepts. Furthermore, there are Christians who make use of the influence of Europeans in order to oppress their Heathen fellowcitizens. The latter, naturally, repay them in their own coin. Such Christians, however, reflect little credit on their Religion, for Jesus says:—’Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’ They should be denounced, both to the mandarin and their priest. Still, one ought to guard against charging the Church, as such, with the misdeeds of individuals; for, so one excites hatred against the Church, and conjures up those complications in which China can only be the loser. For, just as the murderers, so also the murdered,

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are Chinese; while it is our own country which has to pay the indemnities after such massacres.

V. The Fifth Chapter enlarges upon the origin and propagation of the Christian Religion. Here, it is evident that the authors, in stating their case, depend exclusively on Protestant sources. First come facts about the life of Jesus. Then the Greek Schism and the Reformation are briefly touched upon, with all the stock accusations against the pre-Reformation Church. Finally, the loss of Temporal Power of the Pope is emphasized—all this in language elsewhere employed by fanatical Protestants. A digression follows on the Boxer Rising which, indeed, is condemned, but, in the end, placed to the account of bad Christians, although the authors, by all sorts of fine words, endeavor to keep up the appearance of fair-mindedness. VI. The Sixth Chapter endeavors to give a description of the Christian Religion. It is couched in such wise that the contradiction between precept and practice on the part of Christians stands out in the boldest possible relief. To this end, the writers select from the Gospel some of its most beautiful doctrines. The command to love one’s neighbor as oneself is spoken highly of; likewise, Christ’s injunction to forgive until seventy times seven; to rejoice if reviled and persecuted; to do good to one’s enemies; and to offer the left cheek if struck on the right:—“Yet,” so the Memorial continues, “do those Christians, then, act up to these instructions, who make loud complaint about trifles, or who make use of their title of Christians to oppress the Heathens? Is not this acting directly contrary to the teaching of Jesus?” Instead of forever carrying on lawsuits for the sake of temporal advantage, the Christians—we read in the pamphlet—should pay heed to the advice of Christ to the young man, viz., to sell everything, give to the poor and follow Him. The chapter winds up with the protestation:—“If we here expose the faults of the Christians, this does not arise from hatred or bad intention; we only establish the facts.” Still, it is certain that, whoever reads this chapter, will get a very bad impression of the Christians. VII. The Seventh Chapter is devoted to the litigation which is carried on relating to the missions and Christians:—“The greatest troubles,” it is stated, “which China has had for the last ten years

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are these law- suits. They have cost numerous people their lives, and ourselves heavy fines, and even portions of our territory. The other religions have never caused us such embarrassments. Neither did the Catholic religion do so, until the end of the Ming dynasty [i.e., in the first period of the Catholic religion, from 1583 to 1644]. But nowadays it is not a fingers breadth behind the others.” VIII. The Eighth Chapter glances at the State of Religion in other countries:—“In Europe and America religious toleration prevails. The European Governments withdrew from the tutelage of the Church in the eighteenth century. To-day, both have their own separate sphere of action, in such wise, however, that a Christian, by membership of the Church, does not cease to be a citizen of his own country. The number of Christians who are devoted to their native land is very great.” “Among Chinese Christians also, there are, doubtless, many who understand this; still, some evidently do not. And this is unfortunate since—our country being very weak compared to her opponents - we must, even if united like children of a family, be prepared for possible oppression. But, to what misery do we expose ourselves, if we live in discord?” ------“These are, in brief outline,” continues Die Katholischen Missionen, “the contents of this — in more than one respect — remarkable Memorial. With all its exaggerations, inaccuracies, and distorted views, which are, indeed, easily understood, a certain striving for objective judgment must, on the whole, be acknowledged. It would indeed mean progress, if the Chinese authorities, in their attitude towards the Christian religion, would but substitute a little political moderation, such as here recommended, for open hatred or treacherous malice.” At the same time, the Memorial shows clearly that the deepest cause of the aversion to Christianity is not the Religion, as such, but its close connection with the so-called political Protective Powers. That China distrusts them, and returns hatred and aversion for their violent encroachment upon her most intimate domestic affairs. When she sees that the Mission continually has recourse to the armed force of the Protective Power concerned; and supported thereby, triumphantly carries through its lawsuits

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and claims for indemnity, what wonder that the distrust and aversion of the Chinese is extended to the Church and Missions too; and that the latter appear to them as a thorn in the flesh…

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CHAPTER 3

The Holy See and the Chinese Empire: Diplomatic Attempts

Attempts with the Mongol Empire The history of the Catholic Church in China registers few official delegations sent by the Holy See in Rome to the Chinese Empire. The most famous delegations to the Mongol Khans are those of Fr. John of Plano Carpini, in 1245–1247, of Fr. William of Rubruk (1210–1270) in 1253– 1254, and of John of Marignolli in 1338–1345. These delegations were official diplomatic delegations to the Chinese emperors, not primarily concerned about evangelization. The Italian Fr. John of Plano Carpini (1185–1252), from 16 April 1245 to 1247, and Benedict the Pole, two Franciscan monks, were sent as envoys of Pope Innocent IV to the Mongol Khans. The monks traveled through the dominions of Khan Batu (c.1205–1255) the ruler of the “Golden Horde” to the vicinity of Karakorum (present Kharkhorin, in Mongolia), where they witnessed the proclamation of Güyüg (1206– 1248) as the new Great Khan in 1246. The purpose of the delegation was described by Fr. John himself: We answered them that we were the envoys of the Lord Pope, who was the lord and father of Christians; that he had sent us to the King as well as to the princes and to all the Tartars, because he desired that Christians should be friends of the Tartars and be at peace with them. Moreover, as he wished that they should be also at peace with God in heaven, he, the Lord Pope, advised them both through us and by his letters, that they © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_3

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should become Christians and receive the faith of Our Lord Jesus Christ, for otherwise they could not be saved. He told them furthermore that he was astonished at the slaying of human beings done by the Tartars, and especially of Christians and above all of Hungarians, Moravians and Poles, who were his subjects; and as the Lord God was gravely offended at this, he cautioned them to abstain henceforth from such acts, and to repent of what they had done. Furthermore, we said that the Lord Pope requested that they should write to him what they would do and what was their intentions; and that they would give answer to him on all the above points in their letters…1

Fr. William of Rubruk (1210–1270), a Flemish Franciscan friar, in 1248, accompanied King Louis IX (1214–1270) of France on the 7th Crusade. On Louis’ orders, William and his traveling companions set off on 16 September 1253 on the journey to the court of the Great Khan at Karakorum. Arriving in late December they were received courteously and were given an audience on 4 January 1254. William’s Party stayed at the khan’s camp until 10 July 1254, when they began their journey back home. In May 1254, during his stay among the Mongols, William entered into a famous competition at the court, as the khan encouraged a formal theological debate between Buddhists, Muslims, and Christians, in order to determine which faith was correct. On his return, William presented to King Louis IX a very clear and precise report of his Itinerary,2 an account of the events of his voyage. The Italian Franciscan John of Marignolli (John of Florence, c. 1290– 1359) with 32 companions left Avignon in December 1338 under the order of Pope Benedict XI (1240–1304). They went to Naples “waiting for a ship of Genoa, which was coming with the Tartar envoys whom the Khan had sent from his great city of Cambalec (present Beijing) to the Pope, to request the latter to dispatch an embassy to his court, whereby communication might be established, and a treaty of alliance struck between him and

1 The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World, 1235–55, as narrated by himself, with two accounts of the earlier journey of John of Pian de Carpine (London: Hakluyt Society, 1900), translated and annotated by W.W. Rockhill in https:// depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/carpini.html. 2 It was entitled Itinerarium fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis de ordine fratrum Minorum, Galli, Anno gratiae 1253 ad partes Orientales.

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the Christians; for he greatly loves and honors our faith.”3 Then, together, they departed and reached the destination in summer 1342. He met the Great Khan Shundi (Toghon Temur, 1320–1370) on 19 August 1342 and offered him, among the gifts, even some stout horses. He remained there until 1345. And when the Emperor saw that nothing would induce me to abide there, he gave me leave to return to the Pope, carrying presents from him, with an allowance for three years’ expenses, and with a request that either I or someone else should be sent speedily back with the rank of Cardinal, and with full powers, to be bishop there; for the office of Bishop is highly venerated by all the Orientals, whether they be Christians or not.4

He left the empire from Zaiton on 26 December 1345. He stopped in Sri Lanka, in India, and in the Middle East, returning to Avignon in 1353.

First Attempts with the Qing Dynasty During the Chinese Rites Controversy, Clement XI (1649–1721) sent to Emperor Kangxi (1654–1722), the Papal Legates Carlo Tommaso Maillard de Tournon (1668–1710) in 1705–1706 and Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba (1685–1741) in 1720–1721. Pope Clement XI, on 5 December 1701, appointed Tournon as his Legate a latere (personal Legate) to the East Indies and to the Qing Empire of China. The Legate left Europe on 9 February 1703, arriving in India on the following 6 November, where, on 23 June 1704, he issued a decree forbidding the further practice of the Malabar Rites. Then, on 11 July 1704, Tournon set sail for China, arriving at Macau on 8 April 1705 and at Peking on the following 4 December. The purpose of the legation was to thank the emperor for his benevolence to the European missionaries, to establish harmony among them during the Rites Controversy by enforcing the decision of the Holy Office

3 Henry Yule, Cathay and the Way Thither: Being a Collection of Medieval Notices of China, vol. II (London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1913–1916), pp. 209–269. 4 Ibid.

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against the Chinese Rites, and to eventually establish diplomatic relationship with the empire, as well as to report to the Holy See on the general State of the missions and the labors of the missionaries. At first, Tournon was a bit reluctant to disclose the diplomatic purposes to the intermediary ministers and interpreters, but then he turned to writing them down on 27 December: Since I have a duty of obedience to your imperial orders, I add that such is the solicitude of His Holiness [the Pope] for the health of Your Majesty, that he is desirous to have correspondence with this Court and have someone who will continuously report on the prosperous state of the Royal Person and let him know anything in which he can be of assistance or what does not meet with Your Majesty’s approval. To which end, it would help if there were here also established a person of prudence, integrity, and learning, who would also be Superior of all the Europeans, in order to satisfy the desires of His Beatitude, the service of Your Majesty, and the perfect regulation of this mission, to which the patronage, example and loving teachings of charity of Your Majesty give such encouragement. This is, in summary, what occurs to me to humbly represent to Your Majesty with that promptness that his supreme orders demand, and with that feebleness which my weak strength so reduced by my long indisposition allows. But confiding in the generous heart of Your Majesty which knows how to assess the true merits of the slightest acts of obedience and with his deep understanding penetrates through a few words the heart of one who appeals to his kindness, I hope that he will deign to have pity on me, and give a favorable response to my requests.5

The emperor seemed to be favorable at first, but on 28 December he sent the mandarins with some questions: Would the Lord Patriarch be able to appoint a Superior on his own authority or would he need to write to the Sovereign Pontiff? Was it not possible for the office to be entrusted to one of the Peking missionaries? Besides those personal qualities required in such a Superior, would it not be better that he should be a man well versed in the language and customs of the Empire and possessing a least a ten-year knowledge of the ways of the Court?

5 Reported in Kilian Stumpf, S.J., The Acta Pekinensia or Historical Records of the Maillard de Tournon Legation, vol. I (P. Rule—C. von Collani edts, Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, Rome—Macau, 2015), pp. 64–65.

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The Legate complained about this change of attitude and suspected that the emperor had listened to suggestions from some Jesuits: consequently, he threatened them and the society as responsible for the emperor’s change of mind. On 29 December, the emperor expressed annoyance about the insistence of the Patriarch to appoint someone as Superior and order the Jesuit fathers to declare that none of them would accept the post. Tournon reported to the emperor that he would be satisfied if he would agree to the appointment of an agent for corresponding with the Holy See. On 30 December, the emperor decided to give a private audience to the Legate. So, on the following day at 2:00 pm, he was brought in sedan chair to the royal place on Jin Shan. The emperor invited him to freely express the purpose of his visit. Tournon gave the answer. First, to show gratitude to the emperor for his care for the missionaries; second, that he might set up a line of communication between His Holiness and His Majesty. The emperor broke into his speech saying that he commended the reasons for the Patriarch’s coming, namely that he had been sent by the sovereign Pontiff to deal with religious matters. The emperor said that he himself would not be unwilling to have regular contact with the Pope. ‘To handle this, said the emperor, you may choose anyone you wish.’ At his request had been granted, the Lord Patriarch pointed out that such an agent managing future correspondence would have to be (the words are his own) in the confidence of the Sovereign Pontiff and one who had an exact knowledge of the courts of European Princes and especially of the Roman Curia. The emperor frowning and in the manner of one giving friendly advice and in a quieter tone of voice said: ‘China and Europe do not have business with each other. I tolerate you for your religion; your concern should be only with spiritual matters and your doctrine. From however distant and diverse kingdoms you have come here, you all have one religion, and so any European staying here is capable of writing and receiving the papal letters to which you refer.’6

6 Ibid., pp. 88–89.

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About the delegation of Legate Maillard de Tournon, Emperor Kangxi had his own interpretation, as collected and reported by Jonathan Spence7 : In a summary of his first memorial, he mentioned three goals of his mission: the Pope’s desire to see to his flock, to express his esteem for the Emperor, and to thank the Emperor for protecting those who taught the faith in China. This much he has said before, and I told my servant Henkama to tell the Legate that it seemed as small reason to undertake the perils of a journey round the world; so, de Tournon added that the Pope also wanted a prudent and learned person to reside in Peking, act as ‘Superior’ of all the missionaries, and keep in touch with Rome. These requests, too, I found trivial, and noted that the Legate’s business would be over in no time if that was all he wanted. I added, after strolling by and seeing the Chinese translation of the Legate’s message that was being prepared by the Peking Jesuits Gerbillon, Pereira and Grimaldi, that the ‘Superior’ should be someone whom I knew to be experienced in Chinese life, language, and customs, who had been resident for ten years or more. Otherwise, multiple mistakes and confusion would arise. I would not, after all, send Henkama to take up a similar office in Europe. To this de Tournon responded by telling Henkama that I must have yielded to the pressure of the Peking Jesuits – so I asked my courtiers which of them would like this pointless ‘Superior’s job, and told the Jesuits to report to de Tournon that they would never accept it. Gerbillon and Pereira, in turn, informed me that it was a mutual exchange of correspondence between Peking and Rome that was the Legate’s dearest goal. So, I summoned de Tournon to an audience and spoke to him… Exactly why have you come here?... De Tournon said that he had come to repay debts of gratitude and also to institute reciprocal contacts between the Emperor and the Pope such contacts were valued, he said, by the rulers in the West. To handle such matter – I said, - choose whom you like. And the legate replied: The responsible party for the proper handling of such interrelationship must be one who is in confidence with the Pope, and deeply versed in the ways of the courts of the Western rulers, and especially in the ways of the Roman Curia. 7 Jonathan Spence, Emperor of China, Self-Portrait of Kanghsi (New York: Vintage Book, 1988), pp. 75–79. The account of the interpretation of Kangxi, however, raises some doubts, since it is too similar to the one of Kilian Stumpf’s in the text above quoted.

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I raised my brows and told him: China has no matters of common concern with the West. For the sake of Religion, I put up with you – while you in turn should have no concern beyond your minds and your doctrine. Although your group came here from different countries, you all have the same Religion, and for that reason any one of the Westerners here is capable of writing and receiving papal correspondence of the kind you have been talking about. I don’t know what you mean about a man in the Pope’s confidence. We have no such distinctions in choosing persons in China… The Legate answered: The missionaries dwelling here are honest men, but they lack inside knowledge of the Papal Court. Many envoys from other countries converge in Rome – and they are experienced in negotiation, and so are to be preferred to those who are here. So, I told him: If the Pope would send a man of impeccable conduct and spiritual gift as good as those Westerners here now, a man who won’t interfere with others or dominate them, he’ll be received as warmly as the rest. But if we give such a man power over the others, as you requested, there will be many and serious difficulties. You have seen Westerners who have stayed forty years, and if they are still somewhat lacking in knowledge of imperial affairs, how could someone just transplanted from the West do better? I would not be able to get along with him as I do with these. We would need an interpreter. Which means distrust and awkwardness. Such a man would never be free from error, and if he were appointed the leader of all he would have to carry any blame earned by the others and pay the penalties according to our usage. The Legate suggested he had a candidate, nevertheless, but I said: Enough of this. From the days of Matteo Ricci to the present we have had Westerners in this court, and we have never had any reason to blame them. I wish this my testimony to be made known in the West. De Tournon said that only good missionaries had been seen; he begged my protection for them, and praised my person. Your business is over, I said. Give a full account to the Pope.

As a practical result, the Papal Legate in 1705 appointed a procurator of the Holy See in Guangzhou. He chose Fr. Ignatius Giampé, who purchased a residence in this city and kept the post until 1709. Twenty Procurators followed from 1705, the starting date until 1923 as the final date, when it was substituted by the Apostolic Delegation. The headquarters of the Procure frequently moved between Guangzhou and Macau before finally settling in Hong Kong in 1842.

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The Sacred Congregation for Propagation of Faith (Propaganda, SCPF)’s general Procurator, at first appointed with clear administrative duties, gradually started to receive commitments as a reliable informer, transmitter of orders and distributer of missionaries’ appointments. As economic administrator, he had to distribute the subsidies sent from Rome… At the end of each year, he had to submit an annual report of his administration.8

After the delegation of Tournon, in 1708 Emperor Kangxi sent to the Pope in Rome as his messenger the Italian Jesuit Fr. Giuseppe Provana (1662–1720), together with the Chinese cleric Louis Fan Shouyi (1682– 1753, who joined the Jesuits and became a priest in 1717 at Rome) to explain his position on the issue of the rites. Fr. Provana arrived in Rome in 1709 and from 1713 to 1719 he resided in Milan and Turin. In March 1719 together with Fr. Fan departed for China: unfortunately, during the sea journey, he was stricken with a serious illness and died, but his corpse was carried to Canton and buried there. Emperor Kangxi waited in vain for him. The second Legate, Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba, was in China 1720– 1721. On 18 September 1719, Pope Clement XI accredited him, as his personal Legate to Qing Empire, with the purpose to promote the acceptance of the Pope’s Constitution Ex illa die (From that day), issued on 19 March 1715, condemning the Chinese Rites, though with some concessions. Mezzabarba went to Lisbon for an audience with the Portuguese king and reached Macau in September 1720. In Macau and in Peking he was submitted to a series of inquiries by the mandarins in order to find out his true identity and the purposes of his visit. At last, from the end of December of that year until the whole month of February 1721, he was cordially received few times by Emperor Kangxi and treated with high honor. He convinced the emperor to read the Brief he brought from the Pope, which allowed eight permissions in the performance of the Chinese Rites. In the first audience on 31 December 1720, the emperor asked some queries:

8 Fortunato Margiotti, “Le Missioni Cinesi nella tormenta”, in Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum, vol. II (3 vols. Rom-Friburg-Wien, 1971–1976), pp. 1002–1005; also http://archives.catholic.org.hk/Statistic/PPFC.htm.

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How can the Pontiff make judgment on the rites of China, which he has never seen nor known, while I would not dare judge the things of Europe, that I do not know. The Legate answered that the Pontiff did not intend to make judgment on Chinese things, but only on Christian Religion, on what can be permitted in it and what is not. Then the Emperor asked whether he had anything else to add. The Legate answered that he should beg his pardon for all the Europeans and forget all past things, that could have been source of offense for him, promising that for the future all will live in peace, without giving occasion of disdain. The Emperor admitted that it was a good thing and they will meet in another audience.9

Kangxi was pleased about the kind attitude of the Prelate, but considered the granted permissions of very little value and, consequently, was displeased about Mezzabarba’s defense of the 1715 papal decree that condemned the rites. Mezzabarba left Peking early March and reached Macau in May 1721. There, on 4 November he issued a pastoral instruction to explain and to grant the eight permissions. Mezzabarba left China on 9 December. Even the request of Mezzabarba to remain in China as the Superior of all missionaries and as intermediary between the Pope and the Emperor was not accepted, since Kanxi hoped that the Legate would personally explain his position to the Pope and then eventually return to China. However, the Legate succeeded to appoint a vice-procurator to station in Beijing. This office was closed from 1730 to 1787, due to the persecution in progress, but reopened until 1811 when it was finally closed, leaving open only the main office in Canton.

Other Diplomatic Attempts with the Qing Government10 From the middle of the nineteenth century, France and England in particular, following their military victories, forced upon China unequal treaties. Among other things, the treaties granted to foreign powers the right to 9 Sostegno Viani, Giornale della Legazione (Cologne, 1740), p. 93. https://books.goo gle.com.hk/books. 10 For this section I rely upon but completing my previous articles “Lou Tseng-Tsiang and His Contribution to China,” in Tripod, Spring 2009 Vol. 29, No. 152, and in my book, The Never Ending March (Hong Kong: Chorabooks, 2018), pp. 129–145.

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protect the missionary work and the properties of the Christian Churches and of all their members, both foreign and local. The Catholic missions were under the “French protection,” which was generally most welcomed by the French Apostolic Vicars. However, it soon gave rise to several complaints, mainly from Catholic Vicars of other nationalities, as well as to a veiled dissatisfaction of the Chinese authorities. …From 1860 France and England, following their victories against China, signed a treaty… in view of protecting their missionaries, who were guaranteed freedom of preaching and embracing the Christian religion…. Just some time before, that is in 1859, the Holy Father had entrusted to Bishop Celestino Spelta to deal a convention with the Chinese Government, which could protect all the Catholics in China. Unfortunately, that Honorable Prelate was kept for long time in Shanghai and in his Hupeh [Hubei] Mission by urgent affairs and was taken away from among the alive before he could accomplish the commission entrusted to him.11

In fact, in such a context, the need for more direct contacts between the Holy See and the Qing Government was felt by both sides. The initiative was taken by the Holy See, with the view also of getting a general assessment of the Catholic Missions in China. The Pope planned to send an Apostolic Visitor of all China Missions and appointed Bishop Luigi Celestino Spelta (1818–1862) to carry out the visit within two years, 1860–1862. The Pope also gave to the Legate a letter for the Chinese Emperor Xianfeng (1831–1861), which stated: We frankly want to manifest our good will towards You, and, We desire strongly to make possible the establishment of an entente between You and Us… We wholeheartedly beg Your Imperial Majesty to give protection to all the Catholics who live in the immense areas of Your Empire, as well as to all the evangelical workers, i.e., European missionaries, so that the Catholic faith can be freely preached in those regions Our Religion brings to Your Empire the greatest fortune and harmony, since it teaches, among other things, to search for peace, to show kindness, to avoid offending people, to exercise mutual charity as a duty toward the public authority, to have special care for the supreme leaders and to their ministers respect, trust and obedience, as duties toward God. Your wisdom understands well, Very

11 Archives of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith (SCPF, now SC for Evangelization of Peoples), Acta 1886, vol. 255, pp. 318–324.

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Honorable and Mighty Emperor, up to which extent the missionaries rely upon Your Imperial favor, and they are worthy of consideration: among other works of charity, they must announce and inculcate in their faithful sound precepts, and other doctrines of the Catholic Religion, through their words and especially through their examples…12

The purpose of the letter was to establish a kind of convention with the Chinese authorities. But unfortunately, due to the death of the emperor Xianfeng (on 22 August 1861) and the sickness and early death of Bishop Spelta (in September 1862), the letter most likely did not reach the destination. Most probably, Spelta, because of the death of the emperor, did not look for other ways to convey the Letter to the new Emperor. In his final report, about question of the relationships with the Chinese Government, Bishop Spelta suggested that “it should be desirable that, at the renewal of the treaties, signed by the Chinese Government with European Governments, which happen every ten years, the Holy See should push the French Government to make the signature of the Apostolic Vicars valid for the passports of their priests both European and Chinese, issue that the Chinese Government would accept since it has already showed the desire.”13 The following years saw the situation worsening, with the Beijing Memorandum in 1860 and the tragedy of Tianjin in 1870. However, after a few years, some calm returned to the mission scene. In early 1882, the then Hong Kong Governor, Sir Pope Hennessy (1834–1891), informed Propaganda in Rome that in the autumn of 1881 the Chinese Grand Secretary Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), then Viceroy of Zhili and in charge of Foreign Affairs for the Empire, had asked him to report to the Holy See on the situation of the Catholics in China. Foreign Minister Li expressed the desire that direct diplomatic relations be established between the Holy See and the Chinese Empire through the exchange of representatives. Unfortunately, the negotiations were not carried forward. After the rise of a new wave of persecution especially in South China due to the war between France and China over Tonkin (1884–1885), Pope Leo XIII (1810–1903), moved by the pitiful situation of the

12 See the Latin text of the Letter in Noel Gubbels, OFM, Trois Siècles d’apostolat, Histoire du Catholicisme au Hu-kwang depuis les origins 1587 jusqu’a 1870, pp. 368–370 note. See the French translation in L. Wei Tsing-sing, La Politique Missionarie de la France en Chine: 1842–1856, Paris, p. 531. 13 Archives of SCPF, above quoted.

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Catholics, decided to send a message to the Chinese Emperor Guangxu (1875–1908). In 1885, he entrusted Fr. Francesco Giulianelli (1831– 1898) of the Pontifical Missionary Seminary of Saints Peter and Paul in Rome, with his personal message to the Qing Court, dated 1 February 1885. The Pope appealed the emperor, first, for benevolence and protection of all missionaries and Catholics, especially within the context of the war. Then, he continued, underlining the nature of the work of the foreign missionaries: All the clergy who lives in Your flourishing Empire, are there only to preach the Gospel. They are sent by the Roman Pontiff, from whom they get their assignment, mandate and authority. They do not come from one single nation: today there are many also from Italy, Belgium, Holland, Spain and Germany who live in 18 provinces within Your vast dominion. The members of the Company of Jesus, as those of the Congregation of the Mission, who work in other provinces, too, come from different countries. And that is completely in accord with the nature of the Christian Religion, which is not for a single people but for all, and unites everyone through fraternal bonds, without any distinction of nation and race. The work of those who labor in the name of the Gospel is very salutary even for the public cause. They must abstain from political matters, and devote themselves totally to the propagation and the safeguarding of the doctrine of Jesus Christ. The main precepts of the Christian Religion are: to fear God, to preserve justice inviolably in all things and obey the magistrates, to honor the king not only from fear of his anger, but especially as a request of conscience. There is nothing more proper than these virtues to keep the masses doing their duty to preserve public security. In truth, Catholic priests who have come from Europe and who have for centuries carried out their apostolic functions in the very powerful Empire of China, far from bringing shame to the public power and to the civil affairs, have, on the contrary and, this is recognized by everybody, rendered great service. They have done it, first of all, through the propagation of Christian moral discipline, and then by the spreading of literature and other arts, which constitute civilization. You cannot doubt that they still have the same will and fidelity, obedient to Your name and to Your Majesty.

The Pope concluded the message, by expressing his deepest gratitude because of the proofs of benevolence of the emperor and wishing him God’s most abundant blessings.14 14 See the full text in L’Osservatore Romano, 25 March 1885.

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The letter was handed to the Foreign Ministry Office (Zhongli Yamen) on 8 April 1885. The same office gave an answer to the Pope on behalf of the emperor, dated 10 April 1885, which Fr. Giulianelli personally brought back to Rome. He handed to Pope Leo XIII in the Chinese and Latin text, with his own report of the visit and some comments.15 The official Notification, dated on the twenty-fifth day of the second moon (10 April 1885), being the eleventh year of the Kingdom of Guangxu, reads: The Princes and Grand Ministers of the Council for Foreign Affairs, by the authority of the Great Tsing state: That on the twenty-third day of the second moon (8 April 1885) the very illustrious Legate came to our Palace and, in our presence, delivered the Royal Letters of the Roman Supreme Pontiff. The same Council, on the twenty-fifth day of the second moon (10 April 1885) in its turn has handed them to the Great Emperor, who declared that he read them with great pleasure and consolation. He therefore orders that we ourselves, the Grand Ministers, ask the very illustrious Legate, once back in his Kingdom, to greet the Supreme Pontiff.

Following this exchange, Li Hongzhang took further initiatives toward establishing diplomatic relations with the Holy See. On 8 June 1885, he summoned an Irish Catholic, Mr. George Dunn, who was working at the Tianjin Customs Office, and told him that the emperor had received with great pleasure the Letter of the Holy Father. Consequently, the imperial government was willing to provide better conditions for the Catholic Missions in China and proposed the establishment of regular diplomatic relations with the Holy See, through an exchange of representatives. Mr. Dunn reported the content of the meeting to the Apostolic Vicar of Beijing, the French Lazarist Bp. François Tagliabue (1822–1890). The English secretary of the Chinese Legation in London was also informed. He spoke about it to Card. Henry E. Manning (1808–1892) of London. In August 1885, Cardinal Manning, in turn, wrote to the Vatican Secretary of State, Card. Ludovico Jacobini (1832–1887) about the proposal of the Chinese authorities. He made reference to previous initiatives and underlined the positive effects of the present proposal. Meanwhile Mr. Dunn, in January 1886, reached Rome and handed the letter of Li

15 In Vatican Secret Archives, Section Leo XIII, Foreign States Miscellaneous, China,

IX.

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Hongzhang, dated 7 November 1885, to the Secretary of State. In the letter, Minister Li had officially accredited Mr. Dunn to deal with the matter of diplomatic relations. Pope Leo XIII received Mr. Dunn on 4 February 1886. Later, Mr. Dunn also discussed the subject of relations with the Prefect of the Congregation of Propaganda, Card. Giovanni Simeoni (1816–1892). Meanwhile, Card. Jacobini organized three meetings of all the people concerned to discuss the issue. The result was that, on 4 August 1886, Archbishop Antonio Agliardi (1832–1915, Cardinal in 1896), Apostolic Delegate in India, was accredited to the Qing Court in Beijing. On the following day, L’Osservatore Romano pointed out that the Chinese Government requested that the Pope’s representative enjoy all kinds of authority to work effectively, “since it is absurd that the action of France in China should be considered exclusive or limitative of the authority of the Holy See, which enjoys the basic right to represent and protect its religious interests.” As soon as the news about the negotiations was circulated, the French ambassador to the Holy See, Count Edouard A. Lefebvre de Béhaine (1821–1897), together with the head of the French Government, Charles de Freycinet (1828–1920), strongly protested to the Holy See, saying that such a decision was a usurpation of the French right of patronage over the Catholic Church in China. On 12 August 1886, France threatened to sever diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Due to the stubbornness of the French Government, Leo XIII decided to send Agliardi to China as his Extraordinary Delegate, simply to gather information on the situation of the Church and of the Catholics in China. However, France opposed even this mission of Agliardi, by again threatening to break diplomatic relations and to retaliate against the Catholics in France. French public opinion, and even prominent ecclesiastical figures, lobbied Pope Leo XIII against the initiative. Thus, in September 1886, the Holy See notified George Dunn that the plan had to be abandoned, as being untimely. The Chinese authorities also expressed regret to Rome through a 6 October 1886 letter of Mr. Dunn. Toward the end of 1888, the Holy See asked the Apostolic Vicar of Beijing, the French Lazarist Bishop Tagliabue, to write a precise and impartial report on the advantages and disadvantages of having a Papal Nuncio in Beijing. On 3 December 1888, the bishop submitted a long report, which, due to its lack of any positive view of China, of the Chinese authorities and of the project of the Holy See, seemed to have as its aim

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the prevention of the assignment of a representative of the Holy See to Beijing. At the end of the report, in fact, Tagliabue begged the Holy Father to continue to entrust to France the protection of the Catholic Missions in China. Li Hongzhang was unhappy about the failure of the project and in September 1890, through the German Bishop Johann B. Anzer (1851– 1903), who was returning to Europe, sent a letter to Card. Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro (1843–1913), the then Vatican Secretary of State., who gave a positive answer. Although he gave a positive answer, there were no direct results, except that the good will on both sides led to future exchanges through informal contacts in the following years. Meanwhile, on 7 October 1891, Card. Rampolla, on behalf of Pope Leo XIII, invited the Apostolic Nuncio in Paris, Domenico Ferrata (1847–1914), to sound out the French opinion since the Holy Father, being aware of some serious incidents that were threatening the Catholic Missions in China, has decided to send a special messenger to the Chinese Emperor, to solicit his protection for the Church. The answer of the Nuncio, dated 14 October 1891, was that the French Foreign Ministry considered the sending of a special Legate of the Holy See to Peking “inopportune and dangerous at the present time.” In the meantime, Cardinal Rampolla, through the French Lazarist Bp. Pierre M. Alphonse Favier (1837–1905), then vicar general of Beijing Diocese, inquired of the Chinese authorities their opinions on the issues of sending a confidential Legate of the Holy Father to Peking and of setting up the Catholic Hierarchy in China. The answer in January 1892 was that the Chinese authorities agreed on both counts. They even proposed carrying out negotiations leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations, without considering the French position. However, the Holy See thought it not convenient. In 1895, on the occasion of the 60th birthday of the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908), the Holy See asked the French Apostolic Vicar of Peking, John Baptist H. Sarthou (1840–1899), to pass on to her the Holy Father’s good wishes. On 2 March 1900, at Pope Leo XIII’s 90th birthday, the Empress Dowager and the Foreign Ministry sent him their greetings. All these initiatives gradually created a good climate between the Holy See and the Chinese Government, both of whom were convinced of the

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need to set up direct relations between them. The disorders and the revolutionary outbursts that gradually led to the downfall of the Qing Empire at the end of 1911, delayed the further development of the contacts.

CHAPTER 4

The Catholic Church and the National Republic of China (1912–1949)

Social Context The consequences of the Boxer Movement brought a change of attitude of the imperial court toward the Christian Churches and foreign missionaries. As a result, they could enjoy years of relative calm, which favored a greater freedom and the increase of number of converts. On political level, however, the climate in the country was rather confused and violent, with frequent revolutionary uprisings which brought to the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Even after the establishment of the National Republic, the country could not enjoy peace and order. Everyone hoped that, after the foundation of the Republic, the order gradually could be restored, but, on the contrary, the civil and military mandarins gradually lost their authority, and, consequently, lawless people and bandits became ever more daring. Every day the most horrible crimes of pillages and destructions are registered, but everything goes on unpunished. The operators of these crimes are distinguished in two categories: there are public and known as bandits, who in any place and any time show what they truly are; but there are unknown and secret criminals, who by day time and whenever there is the risk of being discovered, show themselves to be gentlemen, as everyone else, but, by night time, they gather in secret places where either by five and six, they plan the most horrible crimes. The latter are very numerous and spread almost everywhere, both on mountains and on plains, in large centers and in small villages. The © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_4

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former ones keep their quarters on the mountains, and only from time to time, in the dark, they come down to the plain to perform some unpleasant actions. They are always in large company, usually of tens and hundreds, and have a well experienced leader, well known and feared…1 In my Mission – wrote a Bishop - there is an overspread anarchy; brigands, by thousands, have become the terror of the population and of the missionaries, who cannot venture to make trips and to visit their villages, remaining almost imprisoned in their own residences… This state of affairs turns into a great damage for the missions, since catechumenates and schools cannot operate, nor catechists and teachers can reach their own posts to instruct the new Christians.2 A Sister wrote: Human life is not taught much of today. Last week Sister Clare and I were going to see one of the first girls here who was very sick. On the way about fifty yards outside the city gate, we saw dogs pulling to pieces a man who had been shot for stealing the day before. It was the most ghastly sight I have ever seen and I am not the better of it yet. A boy working nearby told us that five men and one woman had their head cut off for stealing earlier in the week. He showed us the holes where their bodies had been thrown… Perhaps the poor people were stealing only to keep themselves or little ones from starving.3

In rural areas traditional customs and superstitious practices continued. The last three days there was a regular orgy of idolatry, the people all seemingly to vie with one another for the honor paid to the idols, three popular goddesses. All the temples of the city, and there are over a hundred, were decorated and illuminate at night, and candles and incense lighted before all the idols without exception. If anybody thinks that idolatry is dead or dying in China, let him come here in the first moon of the year.4

Within the intellectual circles, however, quite widespread were the critique and the refusal of Religion and of Christian churches in the name of “Science and Democracy” especially during and after the period of the May Fourth (1919) Movement. Various were the motivations. 1 A. Ferro, “Le Barbarie dell’Orde brigantesche in Cina”, in Le Missioni Cattoliche (LMC), 1927, p. 12. 2 A. Crotti, Noè Tacconi, il Primo Vescovo di Kaifeng (Bologna: EMI, 1999), p. 177. 3 Letter dated February 6, 1907, in L.M.C. 1907, p. 757. 4 Grant Maxwell, Assignment in Chekiang (Scarborough: Scarboro Foreign Missionary

Society, 1982), p. 93.

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In Liang Qichao (1873–1929)’s analysis, there were two motivations for the Christian Mission work in China: one was to conduct genuine religious proselytizing and the other to use such work in view of expanding Western power at the expense of Chinese sovereignty. Hu Shih (1891–1962)’s obstacles to Christian evangelization in China were: first, the new nationalistic reaction against foreign colonialism as shown in the Chinese demands for the cancelation of Unequal Treaties; second, the rise of rationalism in China; and third, the corruption within the Christian Churches in China. According to him, unless Christianity could find ways to overcome these obstacles, its future in China would be doomed. For anarchists such as Wu Zhihui (1865–1953) and Liu Shifu (1884– 1915), Religion was simply a nonsense, a reflection of man’s ignorance. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) attributed Christian failure in China largely to the mistakes made by the Chinese people: the existence of ‘rice Christians,’ the Chinese cultural chauvinism, and the Chinese contempt for Christian believers for their low social status, and the Chinese fabrication of wild rumors regarding certain church practices due to their own ignorance. Disturbances developed because the Chinese were hateful of the cowardly behavior of their officials in dealing with foreigners and because of the intervention of missionaries in civil disputes, in conflicts between Christian doctrines and Chinese worship of ancestors and idols. He criticized those Christians who have not yet lived to the requirements of Christianity and accepted, even supported their militarist and capitalist compatriots. About Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925), the father of the Republic, Audrey Well wrote5 : Sun Yat-sen’s Christianity has been a subject of some controversy; it has been argued that Sun was not really a Christian but portrayed himself as such for political reasons. The evidence cited for this lies in the fact that Sun was not a churchgoer nor did he often celebrate Christian festivals. Nevertheless, Sun told an audience in San Francisco, shortly before the Revolution in 1911: Our greatest hope is to make the Bible and Christian education, as we have known it, the means of conveying to our countrymen what blessings may be in the way of just laws… Of course, Sun

5 Audrey Wells, The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), ch. Influence of Christianity on Sun Yat-sen, pp. 102–112.

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Yat-sen emphasized his Christian beliefs to an American audience; naturally after being kidnapped in London he emphasized his Christian faith to arouse support. However, there is evidence that Sun Yat-sen was a regular reader of the Bible and discussed Christianity at length…

On the general situation, Paul Cohen underlined6 : At the same time, however, a radical new departure was taken in the Chinese anti-Christian tradition – one which in all its variety has remained dominant up to the present day. The essentially new ingredient in this development was the realization by some Chinese that there were forces in the West itself which were hostile to Christianity or, if not to Christianity, at least to the Christian missionary enterprise. From here it was but a short step to the appropriation of these new forces and their assimilation into the domestic anti-Christian tradition.

The predominant belief in the 1920’s within the intellectual circles was that Christianity, along with other Religions, was superstitious and has no place in a modern world ruled by reason and science. In particular, the Anti-Christian Movement, which lasted mainly from 1922 to 1927, and whose origin goes back to the request for ‘freedom from religion’ of the May Fourth Movement (1919), favored the formation of anti-religious and anti-Christian students’ associations. Many intellectuals and students accused all Religions as anti-scientific and useless, as an obstacle to the true progress of the nation. The movement started against the Conference of World’s Students Christian Federation held in Beijing in April 1922 and reached the climax in the ‘National Campaign for the Restoration of the Education Rights’ in 1924: the government was petitioned to take up the responsibility of the administration of all schools through local staff, expelling from them all foreign personnel. By the time the Northern Expedition drew to a close in 1928, the majority of Chinese intellectuals still find Religion in general, and Christianity in particular, unacceptable. In March 1926 in the “Analysis of the classes in Chinese society”, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) among the three system of authority people have

6 Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870 (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press 3rd Printing, 1977), p. 265.

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been subjected to, pointed out the third, “the supernatural system (religious authority) ranging from the King of Hell down to the town and village gods belonging to the nether world, and from the Emperor of Heaven down to all the various gods and spirits belonging to the celestial world.” He stated “the political authority of the landlords is the backbone of all the other systems of authority. With that overturned, the clan authority, the religious authority and the authority of the husband all begin to totter… As for the clan system, superstition, and the inequality between men and women, their abolition will follow as a natural consequence of victory in the political and economic struggles.”7 Christian missionaries were considered as tools of imperialistic aggression, of capitalist injustice, and of unscientific obscurantism. There were even more radical judgments especially in the communist propaganda: foreigners, especially missionaries, were particularly sinister because their treachery was hidden behind high-minded ideals. What appeared to be an offer of assistance to China through education, agricultural modernization and medicine, was in fact a ploy—nothing more than a cover for cultural imperialism and economic exploitation. National salvation, according to the early communist propaganda, should start by recognizing the reality of foreign aggression hidden behind the mask of Religion. Popular was the notion that the Christian missionary enterprise was inseparable from Western imperialism. It was an unconscious expression of a resentment against the intrusion of the West and the consequent internal disorder, which sought an external scapegoat to blame. Lewis S. Robinson, in this research on the opinion on Christianity of the Chinese literary writers in the first half of the twentieth century, concluded: [The fiction writers included in this book] were willing to accept what they considered to be the essence of Christianity, but rejected the institutional form in which it had spread to China. Their position is almost the ti-yong [essence –function] formula in reverse, except the ‘essence’ in this case refers to the exemplary character of Jesus Christ, without any accompanying theological considerations. In other words, theirs is a humanist standpoint. And the widespread closure of Christian colleges and hospitals during the periods in intense Chinese nationalism (culminating of course

7 Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, vol. 1, pp. 44–46.

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after the Communist victory of 1949) indicates that even the seemingly beneficial yong aspects of Christianity were not to be tolerated under the new regime.8

The refusal from the authorities and upper intellectual class was, however, balanced by a more positive attitude not only of Sun Yat-sen but also of President Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi, 1887–1975), who both were Christians. President Chiang, baptized in 1930 in the Methodist Church, aimed not only at the pursuit of personal enrichment and cultivation, but also at saving the nation. He advocated a reform of China based on the Christian spirit of sacrifice, service, and solidarity. For this purpose, he launched the New Life Movement in 1934 for the purpose of rejuvenating China. In a radio broadcast on 16 April 1938, entitled “Why I believe in Jesus” he said: As I look at the future of our Revolution, I am convinced that we cannot truly regenerate our nation unless we have the spirit—the revolutionary spirit—of struggles and sacrifice such as we find in Jesus! 9 Although President Chiang was not a Catholic, he esteemed the work of the Catholic Church in China and took a keen interest in Catholic affairs. Moreover, the Catholic missionary personnel and doctrine received warm acceptance by the common people and by the rural masses.

Lou Tseng-Tsiang’s Attempts at Establishing Diplomatic Relations During the first period of the Republic, although the social and political situation continued to be quite serious, the Catholic Church registered positive initiatives toward a stronger localization and maturity. In 1913, there was a proposal submitted to the Holy See to send an Extraordinary Envoy of the Holy Father to China, but was not implemented.10 There 8 Lewis S. Robinson, Double-Edged Sword, Christianity and 20th Century Chinese

Fiction (Hong Kong: Tao Fung Shan Ecumenical Centre, 1986), p. 6. 9 F. Schrmann, O.Schell, China Readings 2 Republican China (Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 154–157. 10 It was proposed by Rev. Domenico Callerio, Director of the Pontifical Seminary of Sts. Peter and Paul for Foreign Missions, who suggested the appoint to this task, the then Apostolic Delegate to the USA, Bishop Giovanni Bonzano, who had worked in South

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were attempts by the Chinese Government to establish diplomatic relationship with the Holy See in 1917 and 1918, which, however, were once again frustrated by France, in name of its patronage upon the Catholic Missions.11 At the proclamation of the Chinese Republic, John J. Lou TsengTsiang (Lu Zhengxiang, 1871–1949) from the diplomatic career sided with the Republicans and served as Foreign Minister in the provisional government under President Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), from March 1912 to September 1912 and then again as Foreign Minister from November 1912 to September 1913. In this post, he played a meaningful role in the modern political history of China, especially concerning China’s contacts with the Vatican. In his memoirs Souvenirs et Pensées, he summarized his attempts, as China’s Foreign Minister, to establish diplomatic relations between China and the Holy See: Since joining the Government, convinced of the superior importance of the spiritual values and of the support that they represent for the countries which keep them in high esteem, I tried to obtain for the Chinese Republic the cooperation of the Catholic Church, whose life and work I had observed for a long time, and of which I had become a member. Given a proper occasion, with the agreement of the Cabinet of Ministers, I asked the Vicar Apostolic [of Beijing] to officially sing a Te Deum in order that Almighty God might bestow His blessings upon the country of China. Such a ceremony was an unprecedented innovation. It took place in the North Cathedral [Beitang] at the presence of the diplomatic body. The aim was to publicly give a spiritual boost to relations between the Chinese state and the Religion of Jesus Christ, that is, with the Catholic Church. In my mind, such an act was only a beginning. In 1917, the opportunity to proceed further was offered to me. I proposed to the Government to reach an agreement with the Holy See in order to establish diplomatic relations between the Republic and the Holy See. And since such a proposal was accepted, I started contacts with the Vatican, who at once gave its consent… The intervention and the

Shaanxi Mission from 1891 to 1896: see Carlo CATTANEO, “Un inviato del Papa in missione straordinaria nel Celeste Impero. Una proposta di padre Domenico Callerio,” in Rivista Teologica di Lugano, XV, No. 3, November 2010, pp. 413–425. 11 On this topic, see in particular Fortunato Margiotti, “La Cina cattolica al traguardo della maturità”, in Sacrae Congregations De Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum, vol. III/ 1, 12 (Rom-Friburg-Wien, 1971–1976), pp. 508–540.

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systematic opposition of a great European power, that declared that it was acting to ‘protect’ the Missions, forced us to give up the project...12

The first prayer ceremony was held on 21 April 2013, on the day when the new Chinese Parliament was convening. The ceremony at the North Cathedral was presided by the French Lazarist Apostolic Vicar Stanislaus Jarlin (1856–1933) with the attendance of a delegate of President Yuan Shikai, and of Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang with his family. On the occasion, all Christians were invited to pray in their churches and to ask for a heavenly blessing upon the country and their leaders. Many Catholics attended from different places, proud that the Catholic faith has been taken in due consideration by the civil authorities. Minister Lou described the first initiative as “an unprecedented innovation.” A French missionary commented the event in Les Missions Catholiques in 1913: The Government of the Republic until now has kept its words. The liberal declarations, made by Yuan Shi-kai to the Bishop of Peking when he was enthroned, have not been dead letters. In the new Constitution freedom of religion is guaranteed. The fact of being Catholic is no more a condition that excludes people from official civil posts; it is not considered superstition for he first Republican Ministry has a Catholic as president, who is at present the republican minister for foreign affairs.13

The event made headlines in Western newspapers and received a favorable attention even from the American president and his cabinet. “The Christian Herald compared Yuan Shikai’s action to Costantine’s and Charlemagne’s in subjecting pagan nations to the yoke of Christ.”14 However, skeptical comments also were published.15 The intention of Lou was not ambitious, but realistic, as we have seen: just publicly providing a new spirit to the relationship between the China and the Catholic Church.

12 Souvenirs et Pensées (Paris: Dèsclèes Brouwer, 1945), Ricordi e Pensieri (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1947), pp. 105–106. 13 Quoted in Il Missionario cattolico, XI, 6, June 1913, p. 88. 14 Quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York-London:

W.W. Norton & co., 1990), p. 283. 15 See an article in http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res.

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The atmosphere, indeed, became more friendly. In August 1914, Rome charged Bishop Jarlin to announce to President Yuan Shikai, the news of the death of Pope Pius X. A meaningful gesture followed on November 30, 1914. The President of the Republic, accepted in a solemn ceremony like that of the presentation of diplomatic credentials, the autographical letter of the new Pope, Benedict XV (1854–1922), who was informing the President of his recent election. Bishop Jarlin handed the letter personally to President Yuan, in the presidential palace. On 28 December, 1914, the President returned his answer to be forwarded to the Pope.16 At that time, dissatisfaction with the French protectorate over the Catholic Missions was spreading rapidly in China, through the initiatives of Fr. Vincent Lebbe (1877–1940) in Tianjin. It was combined with proposals for the reform of evangelization methods, which would provide a greater role to the local clergy, greater respect for Chinese culture and for the patriotic feelings of Chinese Catholics. Unfortunately, World War I broke out, ending hopes of reform for the time being. As a consequence, the second initiative of Lou as Foreign Minister could only be taken up in 1917, when he again approached the Holy See, with a proposal for mutual diplomatic recognition. The negotiations were delayed by China’s participation in the war. Lou continued his efforts again in the spring 1918, through the mediation of the representative of the Principality of Monaco at the Vatican. On 11 July 1918, the Holy See officially appointed Archbishop Giuseppe Petrelli (1873–1962), Apostolic Delegate in Manila, to be its representative in China. On 17 July the Chinese Government appointed its plenipotentiary minister to Spain and Portugal, Dai Chenlin (1872– 1960), to represent his government at the Vatican. The news of the establishment of diplomatic relations became public when L’Osservatore Romano published it on 11 July 1918. The announcement underlined the essentially religious nature of the office of the Catholic representative, without revealing his name. However, the French Government of Georges Clemenceau (1841– 1929), on 31 July 1918, showed its absolute opposition to the decision, denouncing it as a violation of the French protection over Catholic missions, and threatening to stop all negotiations with the Vatican 16 See the account of the ceremony, in Il Missionario Cattolico, XIII, 2, February 29, 1915, pp. 21–23.

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to re-establish diplomatic relations, since France had severed them on 9 December 1905. Archbishop Petrelli was accused of being a Germansupporter. The Holy See, although denying the accusation, decided to substitute him with Bishop Pietro Pisani (1871–1960). France, however, was not satisfied with the latter either. During the conflict, Clemenceau quoted article 13 of the SinoFrench Treaty of 1858, claiming all rights to oppose the above decision, which was considered ‘clearly inimical’ to France. The response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, dated 6 August 1918, was measured and precise: Among all the evidence, the 27 June 1858 Treaty does not recognize any special rights of France. Its article 13 is identical to article 15 of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865. Besides, the French Government is acting in flagrant opposition with the ‘religious patronage’ it claims for itself. Moreover, ‘after the start of the war’ China is not the only country which has established diplomatic relations with the Holy See: Great Britain has acted along the same line.

China maintained all its rights, and expressed the regret that “France will simply be despised”.17 France not only continued its blind opposition and accusations, but also undertook ambiguous maneuvering within the Beijing Government itself. This was so insistent that the latter was forced to postpone the matter of the exchange of representatives with the Vatican. The conflict, with the polemics involved, had a great effect on the majority of Chinese Catholics. The issue continued to be quite serious. The Holy See, therefore, decided in 1919 to send the Apostolic Vicar of Guangzhou, Bp. John Baptist de Guébriant (1860–1934) as Apostolic Visitor to all Missions in China, in order to collect as many as possible objective data on their situation.18 In the meantime, Pope Benedict XV (1854–1922) issued the 17 See Edmond Neut, Jean Jacques Lou - Dom Lou (Bruxelles: Edition ‘Syntheses,’ 1942), p. 27. 18 On this topic, see the Report of the Apostolic Visitation of Mgr. G.B. De Guébriant (September 1919–April 1920), summarized by Card. Camillo Laurenti, in SCPF Archives, Year 1922, Ponenza No. 27. “Relazione circa i provvedimenti da prendersi perché celebrazione Sinodo generale riesca bene” (Roma: Tip. Poliglotta Vaticana, 1922), pp. 261–388.

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Encyclical Letter Maximum Illud, to deal with the problem of the native clergy, keeping in particular consideration the situation of the Church in China. Then, Pope Pius XI (1837–1939) on 9 August 1922 established the Apostolic Delegation in China under the leadership of Archbishop Celso Costantini (1876–1958).19 Since the heavy burden of the French patronage still existed, the Apostolic Delegate, following the example of the Protestant Churches, tried its best to shake it off, to reduce the ‘westernizing tendency,’ the ‘European nationalism,’ as well as the ‘western forms of Christianity.’20 After the success of the First National Council of the Catholic Church held at Shanghai (May–June 1924), Costantini encouraged Pope Pius XI to end the civil patronage upon the Church in China: it was done on 15 June 1926 with the Apostolic Letter Ab Ipsis Pontificatus Primordiis (Since the Beginnings of my Pontificate). The delegate soon entrusted the care of some mission territories to the Chinese clergy and on 28 October 1926, succeeded in having the Pope ordain the first six Chinese Bishops in Rome. On the same line, Costantini made some attempts to establish direct contacts between the Holy See and the Chinese Government. Following are the details of his initiatives, provided by one of his biographers.21 The first attempt of the Apostolic Delegate is dated on 8 April 1923. In a written report to Rome from Hankou, Costantini proposed, among other things, two points of basic importance on the issue: Dealing directly with the Chinese Government about the religious interests without other intermediaries. However, avoiding creating conflicts with the Ministers of the Foreign Nations, by keeping with them proper courtesy relations.

19 Card. Costantini Celso (1876–1858) remained in China until 1933, then became

secretary of SCPF (in 1935), and cardinal in 1953. All the information about his attempts to establish closer contacts with the Chinese government are recorded in his book “Con i missionari in Cina” (with the missionaries in China, 1946). 20 C. Costantini, Con i missionari in Cina (Roma: 1946, I), pp. 45–46. 21 Christina Gabrieli, Un Protagonista tra gli Eredi del Celeste Impero (Bologna: EDB,

2015), pp. 175–192.

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In this initial proposal, Costantini did not go into details and probably did not intend to suggest a Western style convention between the two states. But his intention was to liberate the Catholic Church from prejudices and wrong ideas which put in danger the apostolic ministry of the missionaries. Costantini wrote a full proposal on 12 February 1926, which he called the ‘intermediate solution’: it was a detailed project of a Treaty or Convention between the Holy See and China, concerning the Chinese Catholic clergy and believers. He wrote: From the side of the Holy See, there will be the acknowledgement of the political sovereignty of China, while from the Chinese part, the juridical acknowledgement of the Catholic Hierarchy, with the Supreme Pontiff as its head, and the enjoyment of the right of property and liberty of evangelization ministry by the Church. We should try also to include a clause regarding the schools…

Cardinal Willem Van Rossum (1854–1932), Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith, contacted Costantini on 19 April 1926, requesting him to write a draft of the convention. The delegate put it down in Hong Kong on the following June 6: it guarantees a juridical and permanent position for the Holy See and for the Catholic Missions, the possibility to establish the Chinese Hierarchy and to entrust some Missions to Chinese clergy: Such a Convention… would liberate the indigenous Missions from the control of France and facilitate the appointment of Chinese bishops by the Holy Father; this will mean to provide a high acknowledgement to the Chinese patriotism…

However, on 19 August 1926, the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Gasparri (1852–1934) sent the coded message: “Anyway, it is premature even to speak about conventions or negotiations from Rome’s side.” The failure of Costantini’s project was probably determined by motivations of prudence of the Holy See, who warned against avoiding negative effects on the coming episcopal ordination of the first six Chinese bishops and waited for the new development of the situation. Costantini made further steps in 1929. On 10 January 1929, the French Ambassador at the Holy See wrote a harsh letter to the Vatican

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Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, against an “overspread rumor in China that the Apostolic Delegate in Beijing is going to start negotiations with the Chinese Government in order to establish with the agreement of both, outside the concern of France, a modus vivendi concerning the Catholic Missions …” In fact, on 14 January, Costantini met the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Zheng-Ting (1882–1961), who proposed to sign a Friendship Treaty between the Holy See and the Chinese Government, concerning only with the affairs of the Missions. On 22 January, Costantini could also meet Chiang Kai-Shek (1887–1975) at Nanjing, who manifested the hope for direct relations between the Holy See and China. On January 25, Gasparri wrote to Costantini: “Regarding the Friendship Treaty, His Excellency should try his best that the Chinese Government submit in writing its proposal…” At the Christian funeral of Sun Yat-Sen in 1925, the Chinese Foreign Minister informed Costantini that he will send the proposal for the Friendship Treaty. However, on 6 June 1929, the delegate pointed out to Rome that his contacts with the Foreign Minister have raised serious alarms by the French authorities and press, putting the Minister in a very delicate position. This seems to have marked the end of the attempts of Archbishop Costantini to establish direct relations with Chinese authorities, since in 1933 he had to return to Italy. Pope Pius XI continued to pay attention to the situation in China. As soon as he realized that the domestic conflicts have been resolved on behalf of a national unity, and a central government was established in Nanjing, on the 1st of August 1928, he sent a telegram to all Bishops, Clergy, and Catholics in China to show his sympathy and love to the “great and most noble Chinese people” for the peace achieved. The Holy Father, who has always followed and continued to follow with lively interest the course of events in China, who was the first to treat China not only on the basis of equality, but also with affection and a most genuine and special sympathy , by consecrating with His own hands at St. Peter’s in Rome the first Chinese Bishops, rejoices and gives thanks to the Most High because of the conclusion of the civil war, and He prays that a lasting and fruitful peace may be restored, a peace both within and without, a peace based upon the principles of charity and justice . In order that such a peace may be obtained His Holiness expresses His hope that

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full recognition will be given to the legitimate aspirations and rights of people who outnumbers every other country on earth… The Holy Father desires that the Catholic Missions can make their contribution to the peace, prosperity and progress of China; and He repeats what He has already said in the Letter Ab Ipsis Pontificatus Primordiis (Since the Beginning of My Pontificate) of June 15, 1926, namely that the Catholic Church professes, teaches and preaches respect and obedience to the legitimately established authorities and that she asks for her missionaries and faithful the liberty and security with the common right…22

The reaction was quite positive, especially from the six Chinese bishops ordained by the Pope, but also from other bishops and even from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Wang Zheng-Ting.23 The former Chinese Foreign Ministry Lou Tseng-Tsang, then a Benedictine abbot, Dom Pierre-Celestin, commented: At this epoch of the Chinese history, rare are the politicians of foreign countries, who have understood how the courage shown by many Chinese citizens and the immense resources of our country provided a sure guarantee to the national future. Still even rarer were people who thought convenient to publicly express their opinion. Then, beyond any expectations, on 1 August 1928, the Supreme Pontiff, Pius XI, before all the Heads of State, addressed a telegraphic solemn message to ‘all the great and noble people of China…24

Establishment of Diplomatic Relationship Between China and Vatican Pius XII (1876–1958) also showed concern with the Church in China and on 8 December 1939 ended the Rites Controversy with the Instruction Plane Compertum Est (It is plainly known).

22 See the text of the telegram in Digest of the Synodal Commission, 1928, No. 2, pp. 200–201. 23 See Nuncium Summi Pontificis Pii P.P. XI , Series Missionologica, cura Commissionis Synodalis in Sinis edita, Numerus II, Peking 6 January 1929. 24 In the Preface to La Voix de l’Eglise en Chine (Bruxelles: Editions de la Cité Chrétienne, 1938), p. 8.

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Then, following the negotiations with the Japanese authorities in view of establishing diplomatic relationships, the Apostolic Nuncio in Switzerland, Archbishop Filippo Bernardini (1884–1954), on 12 March 1942, started talks with Dr. Hsieh Shou-Kang (1893–1974), the Chargé d’affaires of the Chinese Delegation in Berne in order to achieve the same objective. On May 9, Pope Pius XII received the credential letters of the first Japanese representative at the Holy See and then contacted Chinese Government. The official approval of Dr. Hsieh Shou-Kang by the Chinese Cabinet is dated on 9 June 1942, followed by his appointment by the President of the Republic of China, Lin Sen (1868–1943) on 17 June. On 23 October 1942, the Holy See’s daily L’Osservatore Romano published: The Government of Chongqing, after having expressed several times in the past its intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See, has now formalized its request. The Holy See, who has already declared its willingness to give favorable consideration to this intention, has accepted the request and has shown its approval for the nomination of Dr. Hsieh Shou-Kang Chargé d’Affaires of China in Switzerland, as Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister. Dr. Hsieh Shou-Kang is known for his literary activities and has rendered distinguished service both in the public Administration and in the diplomatic engagements of his country. After Japan and Finland, China is the third country to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See this year.

On 25 February 1943, Dr. Hsieh presented the credential letters to the Pope as Minister Plenipotentiary. Archbishop Costantini wrote in his diary: Today, the Minister Dr. Shou-Kang Hsieh has presented the credential letters to the Holy Father, with expressions of grateful and respectful homage. It is natural that this event, which is related in certain way to my work as Apostolic Delegate in China from 1922 to 1933, raises in my heart a great joy.25

25 B.F. Pighin, Edizioni critica del Diario inedito del Card. Celso Costantini. Ai margini della guerra (1938–1947) (Venezia: Marcianum, 2010), pp. 254ff.

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In China, as Representative of the Holy See, continued to be Archbishop Mario Zanin (1890–1958), the second Apostolic Delegate. After the establishment of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy in China (11 April 1946), Archbishop Antonio Riberi (1897–1967) was appointed Internuncio on 6 July 1946, succeeding him. On the following November 3, at Nanjing he presented the credential letters to the Chinese President. On 21 January 1947, Dr. Hsieh was succeeded as Minister Plenipotentiary by Dr. John Wu Jingxiong (1889–1985) until June 1949, when after two months of permanence in China, afraid of the serious political changes and worried for his family, he suddenly left the Vatican and asked political asylum to the USA Government.26 After this event, the Chinese Government proposed to the Holy See to send back Dr. Hsieh. The Holy See, however, considering the possible development of the new situation in China, thought more prudent to delay the issue and the Chinese Legation was taken care of by Mr. Zhu Ying, as a temporary chargé d’affaires. He worked as such until October 1954 when Dr. Hsieh returned to the Vatican.

26 See details in his autobiography, Beyond East and West (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951), pp. 325–343.

CHAPTER 5

The Catholic Church and the Communist Government: First Period, 1949–1978

Chinese Communists consider Religion as ‘opium of people’ and judge its views as anti-scientific and superstitious: it is a slavery of the mind, a relic of the outmoded social system exploited by the upper class, and will vanish when exploitation ends. About Christian Churches, Chinese authorities added another perspective: they saw them as the vanguard of the imperialist invasion, a tool of the imperialist West, thus being the most powerful enemy on ideological and practical level. This judgment motivated restrictive initiatives and oppressive measures in view of setting Religions and Christian churches under their full control, first, and gradually eliminate them. The Catholic Church, in particular, became a special target of official repression, since, for the Chinese authorities, it was a universal institution connected with a “state,” the Vatican State, ruled by a “king, jiaowang,” who was accused to side with the American imperialism. Indeed, the notion that the Catholic Church provided safe haven for counterrevolutionary elements and represented one of the principal institutions fostering pro-imperialist, anti-government activity hence forth became the standard justification for virtually all attacks against the Church.1

1 James T. Meyers, Enemies Without Guns (New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. 83.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_5

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The Catholic Church, in fact, created more difficult problems for the Chinese Government than the other four officially recognized Religions (Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Protestant Churches), which, not having a world head, could be more easily controlled. The vision of the Catholic Church toward Communist China was based upon the ideological standpoint and the concern for the integrity of the Catholic doctrine. Atheism and separation from the Pope could not be accepted since they are integral elements of the Catholic faith. But the Catholic antagonism concerns just ideology and doctrine, not the officials nor the people. The Holy See and the vast majority of the bishops in China were hostile to Communist movement insofar as it was atheist and materialist. So, the difference between the two sides consists mainly in the fact that Communists oppose all people who do not stand on their part, or who want to be above politics, and have power to silence and even eliminate them. Catholics, on the contrary, just oppose the ideology but respect everybody and, having no political power, cannot do any harm to anybody. However, the non-political stance of many missionaries and local Catholics was itself regarded as a form of counter-revolutionary activity because they did not contribute to the advance of the revolutionary cause. Another reason for the Catholic refusal was the employment by the Chinese authorities of violent and often unjust methods in treating religious believers and operators. Because of this, the rejection of Chinese Communist Government (or Red China) spread not only within the ranks of the all the Christian Churches but also within Western societies. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the policy of the authorities toward Christianity was carried out step by step: a first period of laissez faire was followed by the nationalization of Church’s properties and appropriation of the educational institutions and social services, by accusation and expulsion of foreign personnel, by strict control of the local clergy and believers with the emphasis on patriotism, by fostering reform movement and patriotic associations, by punishing and even eliminating people who refused to cooperate, and finally, especially during the Cultural Revolution, by carrying on a systematic persecution and suppression of all public religious activities, in view of eliminating Religion once and for all. For the Catholic Church, another element had to be taken into consideration, was the presence of the diplomatic Catholic Representative of the Holy See.

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The Fate of Archbishop Antonio Riberi During the summer 1949, the success of the Communist army in China during the civil war against the Nationalist Government was paralleled in Europe by the communist propaganda, which, under the strong impulse of the Soviet Union (through its Communist International or Comintern) was quickly spreading in many countries. Since the propaganda also included spreading atheism, the Holy See, considering particularly the European and Italian situation and according to its traditional position against atheism and communism (Pius XI in 1937, dealing with the situation in the West, had already published the Encyclical Letter Divini Redemptoris, to condemn atheist communism), in view of protecting the faith of lay Catholics, issued the declaration of excommunication for Catholics who cooperate with communism and joined atheist associations (L’Osservatore Romano, 1 July 1949). It was the condemnation of the communist doctrine but not of any particular state. In China, on 29 September 1949, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference approved the Common Program, whose article no. 5 affirmed “the freedom of religious belief.” There was no Catholic delegate among the eight representatives of Religions. On the following first of October, after four years of civil war, Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC), proclaimed in Beijing the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. The Internuncio of the Vatican, Archbishop Antonio Riberi, was the only diplomat not to be informed and invited to the ceremony. Under the encouragement of the Holy See, he tried some ways to contact the communist leaders for negotiations, but to no avail. While other foreign ambassadors had left China, he remained in Nanjing. He has remained there, even when Chiang Kai-Shek (1887–1975), with the Nationalist Government, has taken refuge in Taiwan (21 April 1949). In Rome, as we have already mentioned, after the resignation of the ambassador to the Nationalist Government, Dr. John Wu ChingHsiung (1899–1986), the Vatican, in order to keep open to any possible relationship with the Communist Government, refused to accept as his successor the former ambassador Hsieh Shou-Kang, asking only for a chargé d’affaires. In China, on 3 March 1951 the vicar general of Nanjing, Fr. Li Weiguang (1898–1964) published a Patriotic Manifesto signed by 700 Catholics in favor of the reform and autonomy movement. Toward the

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end of the month, Riberi opposed their position with a letter to all the bishops. This determined the beginning of a vast mass campaign to expel him from China: it started in April with a People’s Daily article intitled “Irrevocable Proof of Vatican’s Support for Imperialists to Interfere in Internal Affairs of Various Countries.” Events then began to unfold rapidly. Around the country groups were organized to demand Archbishop Riberi’s expulsion from China. On May 30, Xinhua reported the demand of the Beijing “Catholic Committee for World Peace and Against American Aggression” for the government to deport Riberi. The same day, Xinhua reported that a meeting of Catholics at Aurora University in Shanghai had concluded that Archbishop Riberi, “must not be allowed to continue his criminal activities in China.” On June 3, Xinhua headlined, “Shanghai Public demands Deportation of Anthony Ribery.” The same day it was reported that “more than 500 Roman Catholics in Chongqing held a demonstration in the morning of June 3 to protest against Anthony Riberi’s action in interfering with the internal affairs of the Chinese people and in undermining the movement for the reform of the Church.” The following day, Xinhua published “Deportation of Riberi Demanded by Patriotic Catholics and Christians of Nanjing.” The attacks continued, and on June 26, 1951, Archbishop Riberi was confined to his residence in Nanjing, under house arrest.2

From March to September 1951, at least thirty articles were published on the official press on the “Riberi’s case.” On 8 June, his Catholic Central Bureau in Shanghai was ordered to close down and on 5 September, after two months of house arrest, the Internuncio, just as a citizen of Monaco accused of having conspired with Western imperialists, was expelled to Hong Kong. On 7 September, four others of the department heads of his Bureau were arrested. After Riberi’s arrival in Hong Kong, the Holy See prevented the transfer of the Nunciature to Taipei, out of fear that the Beijing Government would retaliate against the Chinese Church. But although Riberi remained in Hong Kong, the oppression and persecution on mainland China continued. At the end of May 1952, the Taiwan Government succeeded, thanks to the mediation of Archbishop Yu Pin (1901–1978), to establish diplomatic relationship with Spain of General Francisco

2 Reported in James T. Meyers, Enemies without Guns …, o.c., p. 93.

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Franco (1892–1975). Spain was a Catholic nation, though under a dictatorship. The event allowed the Holy See to change the attitude toward the issue of the “Two Chinas” and in August 1952 raised Taipei to archbishopric. Riberi could, on 24 October 1952, go to Taipei to ordain Rev. Guo Ruo-shi (1906–1995) as the new archbishop. Then, he discretely moved the residence and the office there. Consequently in 1954, the diplomatic relationship between the Vatican and the Government of the Republic of China in Taipei could be normalized.

Gradual Steps of the Religious Policy In the first months of People’s Republic (1949–1950), the CPC authorities did not care much about Religions and for the moment let things go almost as usual in the religious sector. But soon, they took up a stricter policy on the following different lines: nationalization of all Church’s property, ideological re-education and indoctrination by organizing propaganda courses of Marxism and atheism, control of Church’s personnel by forcing foreign missionaries to leave and local believers to accept the reform and the autonomy (Three-self Movement, TSM3 ), and by establishing the Patriotic Association. On 28 June 1950, China launched the Land Reform through mass campaigns for the repression of all counter-revolutionary activities: it aimed at the elimination of the land-lord class and the distribution of the land. Many churches were closed; their properties were nationalized. In autumn 1950, the three Catholic Universities and several high schools were taken over by the government. By December, all the properties in China of Western countries, included those of the Churches, were congealed by the Chinese authorities and registered under the Chinese personnel in charge. With the decree for the suppression of ‘counter-revolutionaries,’ the public press increased attacks also against the Catholic Church with arrests of people. The official intent was to “purify” the Church from elements hostile to the new political course. The mistrust toward foreign personnel and missionaries, considered “tool of imperialism,” pushed Chinese authorities to ask them to spontaneously leave the country or 3 The American Board of Protestant Churches had adopted such a principle in 1884: “The one controlling principle is the establishment at the earliest practical moment of self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating institutions of the Gospel.”

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to accuse them of crimes, to sentence under ‘popular trials,’ imprison and expel them. About religious activities, the communist authorities continued to limit the religious celebrations, close churches, and require Chinese clergy to submit to indoctrination and to start the anti-imperialism movement. The year 1951 was marked by a series of attacks against the Catholic Church by the newly established Religious Affairs Bureau (12 February 1951). Besides the expulsion of the Papal Internuncio, there were campaigns to defame Catholic-run orphanages, to eliminate the Catholic lay association of the Legion of Mary, and to increase accusations against clergy convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes. In the year 1952, the two most important drives were the ThreeAnti and the Five-Anti (San-Fan, Wu-Fan) campaigns. Although these campaigns were not aimed directly against the Church, all the classrooms of the schools were occupied as accusation and struggle centers, causing tension and fear day and night. Expulsions continued. By the end of November 1952, according to Missionary Bulletin, the foreign missionaries still remaining in China out of the 5,500 in 1949 were 787 (524 priests), while the number of Chinese priests held in prison ranged between 200 and 300. Four bishops have died in prison, while other 14 still detained and 43 expelled. All over China, Catholic schools, hospital, and orphanages had been taken over by the government. On 15 June 1953, the attack of the Church in Shanghai started.4 It aimed first at the Legion of Mary, whose name gave the impression to Communist leaders to be a military organization. Chinese authorities increased the number of arrests of its members and of the clergy who were leading them. On 16 July, the communist press opened a propaganda campaign against Shanghai Catholics and in August spread it to Canton and to other cities. Pressure on Catholics to cooperate with the “patriotic” movement continued throughout 1954: by December only 61 foreign priests remained in China, of whom 21 in prison. In 1955, the government felt strong enough to launch a mortal blow to the most loyal Catholic stronghold in China, the Shanghai community. On 3 July, the Renmin Daily editorial called for the liquidation of 4 See details in Paul Mariani, Church Militant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

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“hidden revolutionaries.” The largest number of people arrested together in Shanghai happened on the night of 8 September 1955: namely, Archbishop Ignatius Kung Pin-Mei (Gong Pinmei, 1901–2000), together with 27 priests and about 300 lay Catholics, mainly members of the Legion of Mary. Throughout the whole year, about 70 Chinese priests and 3,000 lay people had been detained, because they “did not cooperate” with the authorities. Many other arrests preceded and followed, in Baoding (Bishop Joseph Fan Xueyan 1907–1992), Guangzhou (Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming, 1908–1995), Hankou, and elsewhere. At the end of 1955, 16 foreign clergy (15 priests and 2 bishops, of whom 13 priests and one bishop in prison) remained in China, together with 11 nuns, in charge of the school for children of the foreign diplomatic personnel in Beijing. The Catholic Church in China was almost totally confined into prisons or in labor camps. The years 1956 and 1957 registered the campaign of the “A Hundred Flowers contending,” of political relaxation: during it, some Catholics asked the true implementation of the religious policy and obtained the release of some bishops and clergy from prison. But later, the unexpected strong critiques against the Party caused a harsh campaign against the “rightist elements,” affecting also Catholic figures. On 16–17 March 1960, Bishop Gong Pinmei was trialed and condemned to life imprisonment. His trial was followed by that of the American Bishop, James E. Walsh (1891–1981), a Maryknoll missionary, who was condemned to 20 years of prison. Other 14 priests also were condemned. The years 1958–1962 registered the launching and implementation of the Great Leap Forward and of the Commune System (August 1858), aiming at quickly achieving the standard of the Western powers and the ideal of communism. Unfortunately, bad consequences and natural disasters followed. The drastic reduction of the agricultural production caused widespread famine and the death of millions of people, while other millions took refuge in Hong Kong and elsewhere. Some sources speak about 80 million of people who lost their life in these years. In 1964, during the Campaign for Socialist Education, Religion and religious believers have been attacked, and quite a few were sent to prison. It was the preliminary stage of the Cultural Revolution.

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The Three Autonomies Movement Communist authorities soon launched the control policy of the local clergy and lay believers. On 24 September 1950, the ‘Manifesto for the Three Autonomies’ (or Three-Self Movement, TSM) was published under the sponsorship of the Protestant pastor, Wu Yaozhong (1893–1979): independence and autonomy from foreign personnel, self-administration or self-governing of the church led and administered by local people, and self-supporting without any economic help from abroad. For the Catholic Church, on 30 November, at Guangyuan, Sichuan, Fr. Wang Liangzuo (1920–1997) and other 500 Catholics signed a Manifesto advocating the reform and the autonomy of the Catholic Church. It was published by New China Agency on 13 December, requiring the other churches to support it. From January 1951, “reform committees” started to spring up in many places. Since among Catholics, the reform movement received a rather cold welcome, it was changed into the “anti-imperialist movement for love of the nation and religion.” On 17 January 1951, a meeting of Catholic representatives was summoned by the Chinese authorities to foster the ‘Patriotic Movement’ and the TSM. It was followed on 3 March 1951 by the abovementioned Nanjing Patriotic Manifesto, signed by Fr. Li Weiguang and 700 Catholics. Meanwhile the Chinese authorities tried even to create a “Pope of China”: they invited the Vincentian archbishop of Nanchang, Zhou Jishi (Chow Chi-Shih, 1892–1972), to play the role, but at his refusal they submitted him to indoctrination and when in 1957 he refused to join the Patriotic Association, they sent him to prison. On 18 January 1952, Pope Pius XII published the Apostolic Letter Cupimus imprimis (We desire first), to the Chinese Catholics, in order to express solidarity for their sufferings and to reaffirm the necessity of keeping united with the See of Peter. The Pope showed a great admiration and love for the Chinese people, as well as for Chinese culture and society. Church teaching fits all societies, respecting justice, freedom, and brotherly love. He also expressed his admiration for the courage of the Chinese Christians in such a difficult time. In summer 1954, the 1st Christian (Protestant) National Council officially established the Patriotic Christian Association of the TSM (5 August). And on the following 20 September, the new Constitution of

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the People’s Republic of China was promulgated, setting the legal foundation of the control of the CPC upon all organized public activities, especially in the ideological and educational fields. On 7 October 1954, Pope Pius XII wrote the Encyclical Letter Ad Sinarum Gentes (To Chinese People), in which he denounced the TSM since aiming at the Constitution of a National Church. The Pope began by pointing out that the situation “has in no way improved; on the contrary, accusations and calumnies have been increasingly directed against this Apostolic See and against those who remain faithful to it.” He also expressed sorrow because “some among you who, deceived in good faith, or overcome by fear or led astray by new teachings, have recently adhered to insidious and dangerous movements…” The Pope explicitly condemned the autonomy movement under whatever way was presented, since it would raise the danger of leading to a national church.

The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Ordination of Bishops After the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the repression of the rightist elements, the Chinese authorities, following the success with the Protestant Churches, tried their best also to force the Catholic Church to establish the Patriotic Association. On 19–25 July 1956, a preliminary Congress of Catholic Representatives was summoned in Beijing by Zhou Enlai (1898–1976): 4 bishops, 11 vicars general, 11 priests, and 10 laymen (the “36 promoters”). In his speech, Zhou Enlai underlined that Catholics could keep spiritual unity with the Pope but were requested to severe the political and economic links. It was followed by two other meetings, on 14–18 January and on 12– 16 February 1957 (55 participants). Prepared by another meeting from 17 June to 13 July of the same year, the National Congress of Chinese Catholic Representatives (241 delegates) was held in Beijing from 17 July to 2 August and established the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), as an instrument in the hands of the CPC to relate with and control the Church. The Assembly retains that for the good of the motherland and for the future of the Church, the Chinese Catholic Church… must keep contacts purely spiritual with the Vatican Holy See [Fandigang Jiaoting], that is for the religious doctrine and the ecclesiastical rules must obey the Pope.

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However, on the political and economic levels, it must completely sever the relationship with the Vatican Holy See.

Its chairman was the Archbishop of Shenyang, Ignatius Pi Shushi (1897–1978). It was followed by the establishment of branches of the CCPA in several dioceses, while the Catholics were pressured to join it and to severe relationship with Rome. Meanwhile, priests and bishops continued to be arrested. There still were 19 foreign personnel (1 bishop and 7 priests in jail, + 11 Sisters), more than 2,000 Chinese priests and nuns, of whom 600 in jail and the others under strict surveillance without freedom of action. At the same time, while all Catholic Seminaries were gradually closed, the Chinese authorities started the process of democratic election of episcopal candidates. On 17 December 1957, there was the first democratic election of Fr. Li Xiting (1910–1989) as bishop of Chengdu. It became the model for other democratic elections in several cities (among whom Fr. Li Weiguang was elected bishop of Nanjing, on 19 March 1958). Consequently, on 13 April 1958, at Wuhan, the first autonomous episcopal ordination of two Franciscan priests, Dong Guangqing (1917– 2007) and Yuan Wenhua (1905–1973), was carried out against the explicit denial of the Holy See. Other ordinations followed on June 1 and July 20. Pope Pius XII, worried about these events, published another Encyclical Letter, Ad Apostolorum Principis (To the Prince of the Apostles, 29 June), denouncing the persecution in China and declaring seriously ‘illicit’ the episcopal ordination of bishops without the appointment of the Holy See. He explained the nature of the “two-fold sacred authority of order and jurisdiction” of the bishops, which differs from human authority: it comes from God to the Supreme Pontiff and through him to all the bishops, in order to carry on the sacred duties of teaching, sanctifying, and leading the faithful. Differentiating between the authorities, the Pope affirmed the validity of the episcopal ordination and therefore of the sacramental ministry, but, since it is illicit, it is without the power of jurisdiction upon Catholics. However, no condemnation measure was taken, avoiding the official excommunication of the newly ordained bishops and clergy involved. Episcopal ordinations, however, continued.

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The Official Policy Toward the Catholic Church In 1959, the director of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, Li Weihan (1896–1984) wrote the “Program of Action” of the Communist Party in dealing with the Catholic Church, in order to instruct the Communist Party of Cuba on the experience of the CPC.5 Li began with the assertion that, if the people’s democracies are to continue their advance to socialism and communism, they must “do away with the influence of the Catholic Church and with the activities which it carries on.” In order to achieve this end, Li offered to his Cuban comrades a “program of tactics” which had been “applied with success” in China, the purpose of which was “to liberate the Chinese people from the influence of the imperialist Catholic Church of Rome.” The program called first for the creation of a religious affairs bureau within the government, followed by the creation of national, regional, and local patriotic reform associations of Catholics under its directions. The opponents must be made to appear as “unpatriotic criminals who follow the imperialist instructions issued by the headquarters of the Catholic Church, the Vatican.” “The party militants must direct the work of the reform committees,” and they must “eliminate” the reactionaries whom they encounter among the masses, assuring the believers that their Religion has become “purer” now that it has been “freed from criminal and unpatriotic elements.” Also: “With the exception of spiritual affairs, every indication or expression of liaison with the Vatican will have to be spurned as being motivated by imperialist interests and supporting counter-revolutionary activities.” The next stage is the destruction of the link existing between the Catholic Church in China and the Vatican: “It is the task of our militants 5 James T. Meyers, Enemies Without Guns, o.c., pp. 205–207: he provides a synthesis of the document, introducing it with these words: … Nor have the communist authorities in China been the slightest bit reticent when it comes to announcing the long-range goal of their policies. They have, in fact, been quite open in publishing their views about the ultimate disappearance of religion as they progress toward socialism and communism, and about the role of state policy in hastening this development. On more practical level, however, the Chinese authorities have been so bold – and so helpful to our understanding of these events – as to publish a blueprint for the development of government policy toward the Catholic Church. This is not a plan of action which has its ultimate objective mere control and regulation. It aims rather, as it clearly states, “to destroy it” [the Church]. This is asserts, “is the objective to be obtained and that is what we are fighting for.”

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to convince the masses that the individual may have his religion, without the Vatican directing the affairs of all churches of the world.” The task of the Party militants was to lead the Catholic associations in a movement requesting the government to authorize the establishment of an independent church. The People’s Government will give the authorization, and the Independent Church will be organized. The last stage: “We can proceed to consecrating the leaders of the Church chosen by us,” which would lead to the ultimate objective: Once the key posts of the clergy are in our hands and submitted to [the will of] the People’s Government, we will proceed progressively to eliminating from the liturgy those elements which are incompatible with the People’s Government. The first change will affect the sacraments and prayers. Then, the masses will be protected against all pressure and all obligations to put on an appearance in the church, to practice religion, or to organize [religious] associations… We know fully well that when the practice of religion becomes no more than an individual responsibility, it is slowly forgotten. New generations will follow the old, and religion will be no more than an episode of the past, worthy of being dealt with in the history of the world communist movement.

Consequently, in the early 1960s, a change of tone of the official press in regard to the relationship with the Catholic Church was registered: from the differentiation on the request of breaking from the Pope only on the economic and political levels but not on spiritual matter, the emphasis was to “get free from the complete control of the Holy See.” The official attitude became rigid with brutal attacks against the Holy See, and especially after Pope John XXIII, who, in one occasion speaking about the Church in China, made use of the term ‘schism.’ The 2nd National Congress of the Catholic Representatives (256 delegates) was held in Beijing on 16–18 January 1962: it reiterated the primacy of the CPC upon church matters and denounced the reactionary behavior of the Vatican, considered as co-operator of the American imperialism against the New China. Three days later, other seven new bishops were ordained without the consent of the Holy See. Thus, all together there have been 53 illicit episcopal ordinations from 1958 to 1962. In Rome, meanwhile, after the death of Pope Pius XII (9 October 1958), Pope John XXIII was elected (28 October), who showed great concern for the Church in China: on 15 December, he spoke about the newly ordained bishops without the Holy See’s consent as “having

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opened the door to schism.” However, during the 1st section the 2nd Vatican Council (11 October–8 December 1962), on 26 November, 59 members, bishops from China, handed over to the Pope a document on the situation of the Church in China: they expressed admiration for the heroic behavior of the Chinese Catholics and asked not to condemn those who joined the CCPA and accepted the episcopal ordination, but to show them a sense of understanding of their difficult situation. Pope John XXIII agreed. After his death on 3 June 1963, he was succeeded by Pope Paul VI (21 June), who continued the Vatican Council until its end on 8 December 1965. On 31 December, Paul VI sent a New Year greeting message to President Mao Zedong, which however remained unanswered.

The Great Cultural Revolution The period of the Cultural Revolution (CR) was marked by the systematic suppression and destruction of Religion, with the attempt to turn Communism itself into a Religion in substitution. The year 1966 turned to be tragic. On 16 August, Mao Zedong launched the Great Cultural Revolution. During the following “ten years of catastrophe,” as later it was officially judged, which advocated the elimination of the “Four Olds” (ideology, culture, costumes and traditions), the policy of the religious freedom was totally rejected, and all religious activities were considered illegal. Its objective was to destroy all marks of Religion. Virtually all churches were ransacked and looted, while clergy and monks, as well as numbers of religious believers were imprisoned, tortured, and killed. Toward the Catholic Church, in particular, the Cultural Revolution was a continuation of the 1964 campaign for Socialist Education. May 1966 registered a violent criticism of the literature, plays, and movies called ‘poisonous weeds’ and accused to reject the primacy of politics and the control of the CPC. On 16 May, a circular was issued, showing the political intent of the attacks against the literary works, and people who oppose the communist ideology, especially religious believers. After the publication of the editorial “Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons” in People’s Daily on 1 June 1966, the Red Guards started a huge purge which swept the country, arresting and prosecuting all those they consider belonging to that category.

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Then, August 1966 arrived. On 4 August, Mao Zedong exposed his dazibo ‘Bombard the General Headquarters.’ On 11 August, the Sixteen Points Document put forward the guidelines for the CR as a new stage of the socialist revolution, a cultural revolution in order to create a new culture and a new man. On 18 August, a mass rally of the Red Guards, coming from all over the country, took place in Tian’anmen Square with the blessing of Mao. Lin Biao (1907–1971), who spoke on his behalf, repeated and entrusted to the Red Guards the target to eliminate the Four Olds, without clarifying the concrete meaning: consequently, they made use of the slogan to attack any individuals and institutions they were suggested to or they decided themselves. The full swing of the disorders of the CR lasted until July 1968 when Mao reprimanded five student leaders for their ultra-leftism and with the restoring of Mao’s group’s supremacy in the Ninth Party Congress (April 1969). The CR targeted Christians who were always suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. All the churches were closed and destroyed or turned into warehouses, prisons, workshops or wood stores. All the bishops, the priests, and the members of religious orders, whether they were patriotic or not, were arrested, insulted, and sent to hard labor or to prison. Many suffered a miserable death as a result of ill treatment. Christian families were undermined by an odious system of mutual denunciation and lapsed into silence. Religious books were burnt, although some of the Sacred Texts survived by being buried or walled up.6 The most well-known tragedy concerning the Catholic Church happened on 24 August, when a mob of fanatical Red Guards rang the doorbell of the Sacred Heart Catholic School in Beijing, which was run by the Catholic nuns for children of the foreign diplomatic staff. A large group of youngsters rushed in, shouting and brandishing knives, sticks, and whips. They stormed into every room, destroying whatever stood in their way. The eight foreign and about seventy Chinese nuns were dragged to the lower floor and were struck repeatedly. An elderly nun was lashed across the face with a whip so fiercely that her eyes were almost knocked out. A few days later a mock trial was held in front of a large crowd of people. The eight foreign nuns were labeled ‘counterrevolutionary.’ The Chinese sisters were sentenced to 20 years in prison. Then, the eight foreign nuns were expelled from China, facing a daunting 6 Jean-Pierre Charbonnier, Christians in China (San Francisco: Ignatius Press 2007), p. 443.

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journey to Guangzhou, and then to the border at Lowu, accompanied by a team of Red Guards. The train arrived in Guangzhou on 30 August 1966, when Sr. Molly O’Sullivan was seriously ill with fever. When the sisters left the train at Lowu and started to walk carrying their suitcase, Sr. Molly collapsed on the ground. A few Chinese soldiers lifted and threw her face-down into a baggage trolley. The other nuns managed to push the cart across the bridge. British soldiers and clergy welcomed the weary travelers on Hong Kong side. An ambulance was soon called and Sr. Molly was rushed to the hospital, where early in the following day she passed away. Nothing is known about what happened to the Chinese nuns of the Sacred Heart School: they simply disappeared in prisons.7 In Baoding, Hebei, just after the start of the Cultural Revolution, a group of Red Guards from the secondary school, armed with sticks, rushed into the Catholic Cathedral, located in the center of the city. They gathered all the vestments, religious articles and books in the courtyard in front of the church and burnt them. They led all the priests and sisters there, cursing them and beating them. An old priest fainted, and the Red Guard threw him on the pyre which was burning the religious articles and books. Another victim who was killed was a sister, member of the local St. Joseph Congregation. The Red Guards ordered her to tramp an image of Our Lady, but she refused: therefore, they hit her to death. Bishop Matthias Duan Yinming of Wanxian Diocese, Chongqing, saw the Red Guards rushed into his cathedral and took down a statue of Our Lady. He was ordered to crush it with a hammer. Since he refused, reportedly exclaiming, “You can take my head, but not my faith,” he was taken, tortured, imprisoned, and placed in a labor-reform camp until 1979. In Beijing, at the Northern Cathedral, in the 1966 summer an elderly Chinese priest met a large crowd of teenage Red Guards near the church entrance. The priest was forced to kneel while his arms were tied above his head; he was subjected to ridicule and commanded to give up his religious belief. He refused. The Red Guards threatened him and, at the end, buried him alive right on the spot.

7 For further details of the episode, see Paul Hattaway, China’s Christin Martyrs

(Oxford: Monarch Books, 2007), pp. 443–449. These Sisters are considered to be the last foreigner missionaries to be expelled from China, but in fact, there was still a Korean priest. He was Fr. Paul Im Bok Man, who went to Manchuria, then under the control of Japan, in the 1940s and worked in an underground community there until December 1992, when he was be sent back to Korea because of bad health.

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In North Henan, on 16 August, the Red Guards from a middle school went to the Catholic Church and destroyed the altar and all the sacred statues and images. They could not violate the Eucharist, since, fortunately the priest had previously consumed it. They carried outside the church all the things and set them on fire. They forced priests and nuns to kneel very close to the pyre in order to harm them. An old priest, who could move with difficulty, had both legs burnt and, brought back home, after few days passed away. On 24 August 1966, the Red Guards have searched all the churches in Shanghai, destroying the crosses, sacred images, and burnt all the religious books. On August 29, another group of Red Guards damaged the cathedral in Guangzhou, detaining priests and sisters. The churches at Ningbo and Nanyang were divided into various floors as residence of the families of the local opera troupes. The effects of the Cultural Revolution were felt even more intensively in the labor camps. For religious believers already kept there, in particular, it set off a chain of struggle, violence, and killings that created total chaos and despair. In their fanaticism, the cadres every day picked out as targets for ‘criticism-struggle’ mainly religious believers, several of whom survived and related their painful experiences.

Communism as a Political Religion After the 1949 revolution—writes Jiping Zuo8 —the exercise of charismatic authority reached a peak during the Cultural revolution in the People’s Republic of China, characterized by the near deification of Chairman Mao Ze-dong. Although China declared itself an atheist country, this deification, combined with Mao’s interpretation of Marxism, created a form of “political religion” that affected millions of people and profoundly transformed Chinese society.

Rituals were propagated and performed which could replace religious rites: the cult of the ancestors was substituted by the cult to Mao Zedong, exposing and worshiping his picture, calling him with great titles (Great Leader, Great Teacher, the Reddest Sun in our hearts, the Savior of the 8 Jiping Zuo, “Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China”, in Sociological Analysis 1991, 52:1, pp. 99–110.

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Workers), singing songs, and making pilgrimages to ‘holy places’ of his revolutionary activities. The sacred scriptures were taken over by the Little Red Book, to which magical powers were attributed, such as healing sick people and saving from any kind of difficulties. Public rites were introduced, such as big parades, flag hosting, bowing to Mao’s portrait, and reading of Mao’s quotations. Slogans became very popular, like “serve the people,” “the four loves,” with proposing model heroes, civilized units, etc. People were demanded to have full faith in communism, to undergo a conversion with moral requirements with the ultimate aim at becoming a ‘new man’ as the aim of salvation. Consequently, the Chinese Communism could be considered a religious movement since it provides the characteristics of a Religion, “a political religion,”9 that is a universal vision and orientation of life, a set of moral behavior with doctrines and rituals which appeal to everybody and to all the human faculties in order to build up a new human society. The hardest period of the Cultural Revolution ended with 1970, which marked a more relaxed climate of greater tolerance, even in the religious sector.

First Signs of Liberalization As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, on 10 July 1970, the Chinese Government liberated the American bishop, James Walsh (1891–1981), in view of improving relationships with the USA and as a start of opening up to the world. On the following 4 December, Pope Paul VI, from Hong Kong, during his visit to the Far East for the establishment of the Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences (FABC) in Manila (23–29 November), sent a message to China. In October, he had written to the secretary general of the UN, pleading for the admission of P.R. China in the world assembly. His plead was successful and, on 25 October 1971, the PRC was admitted as a member of UN taking the place of Taiwan.

9 “Political religion,” parallel to the “Civil Religion” of Jean J. Rousseau and Robert N. Bellah, is usually understood as the instrumentalization of Religion by a ruling political power with the aim of setting the entire life of society and of the individuals within its political concern and control.

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On 20 November 1971, an Italian delegation obtained to have a Mass celebrated for its members and other diplomatic personnel in the Nantang Church in Beijing. From then on, the church remained the only one reopened but mainly for the diplomatic personnel, until the liberalization policy of Deng Xiaoping. With the beginning of January 1972, the diplomatic recognition between PRC and USA came into effect. The Holy See kept special attention to the opening up of China and in 1973, its Nunciature in Taiwan, which was raised to this level in 1966, was left only with a chargé d’affairs. From the spring of 1974, the door of China started to welcome Chinese overseas and few foreign tourists. Consequently, the first direct news about the situation and the Christian communities in China could be spread abroad. For the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the P. R. of China (1 October 1974), some religious personnel (including Catholic clergy and lay people) were released from prisons and labor camps. The year 1976 registered, first, the death of Mao Zedong (9 September) and then, on October 6, the fall of the Gang of Four, who were the dominant promoters of the Cultural Revolution, led by Jiang Qing (1914–1991), the fourth wife of Mao Zedong. It was the work of Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) and other military leaders, who started to take some steps toward liberalization, and to rehabilitate Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). With the latter, the efforts of the Four Modernizations, launched by Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) in early 1975, could be taken up again. The Catholic Church, as an institution, has almost disappeared during the Cultural Revolution. It survived only in the hidden life of faith of Catholics in prisons, of lay people and of the few priests and sisters who could escape the persecution of those years. They could pray in their heart, in hidden corners of their house, with the fear of being betrayed even by their own relatives. On 29 December 1977, Ye Jianying (1897–1986) was the first to stress the need for a new approach to minority nationalities and revise policies concerning overseas Chinese and religious affairs, in order to “mobilize all positive factors to serve the cause of socialism.” In February 1978, 16 representatives of the religious circles, among whom some Protestant leaders and two Catholic bishops, attended the 5th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). On 5 March, a new State Constitution was approved, reiterating the previous

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policy of freedom of religious belief. On the following 16 March, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the Religious Affairs Bureau (later State Administration for Religious Affairs, SARA) were rehabilitated and reopened, as well and a new Research Institute for the Study of World Religions. The official press started to report religious information, among which the death of Pope Paul VI, followed by the election of Pope John Paul I (26 August 1978, his death on September 28) and of John Paul II (elected on 16 October). On 27 June 1978, in order to help the revival of the Church and to guide the clergy in meeting with the new pastoral needs, the Congregation for the Evangelization of People (CEP, now Dicastery of Evangelization) issued a document entitled Faculties and Privileges given to the Catholic clergy and faithful who live in mainland China, while these conditions persist. Its practical purpose was to facilitate the administration of the seven sacraments, by simplifying the ceremonies and giving faculty to all priests, who, when without a bishop, could perform ceremonies traditionally done by the latter. On 18–22 December 1978, the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC launched the liberation and the opening policy and restored freedom of religious belief. Christmas restarted to be celebrated but only in few places.

New Evaluation of China by Western Christians The negative evaluation of China by Catholics outside the country during the 1950s and 1960s due to the persecution of religious believers, registered a change since the 1970s due to the first direct contacts. Within the Western Christian Churches and also within the Catholic Church, several thinkers showed a great interest in the experience of the Chinese Revolution, although their sources of information were quite limited. The Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Pro Mundi Vita Institute cooperated in the reflection on the challenges Chinese development was raising to the Christian Churches. They organized a 5-day meeting at Bastad, Sweden, on Theological Implications of the New China in February 1974 and a second one in the following September at Louvain, Belgium, on Christian Faith and Chinese Experience. The third conference at Notre Dame on 29 June–2 July 1977 represented the efforts of American Catholic scholars to join the ecumenical reflection on the several questions of the religious future of China. These conferences

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marked the initiation of a new approach.10 Western Christians showed a new interest in learning about China, both its partially hidden contemporary events and its religious history. Out of the desire to have the Good News heard in China, their ambition was to understand the workings of God and man in the New China. The general attitude of both European and American scholars was of a strong optimism about the reality of China, in view of drawing challenges for the renewal of their own local Churches. Due to the shortage of information, optimistic was even the evaluation of the period of the Great Cultural Revolution, which later was officially judged as ‘ten years of catastrophes’ by the same Chinese authorities. China was considered as a model for all the churches. The optimistic evaluation was summed up by Joseph Needham: The Chinese society of the present day… is, I think, further on the way to the true society of mankind, the Kingdom of God if you like, than our own. I think China is the only truly Christian country in the world in the present day, in spite of its absolute rejection of all religions…

Lawrence J. Burkholder pointed out: The New China impresses some of us from the West as the secular Marxist counterpart of the Corpus Christianum. The New China combines, as it were, the rigor of the sect with the totality of Christian civilization. The Church, having been stripped of its temporal power, has, in effect deferred to Chinese Communists who are taking up the task of bringing in the ‘Kingdom,’ by the application of every conceivable means.

Some thinkers considered that the Maoist society expressed the early Christian ideal of a community of sharing, the establishment of the truly ‘Sacred Community,’ a classless society which can shape the New Man. The Chinese Revolution was compared with the Exodus of the Israel people and was seen as a genuine movement of social and spiritual liberation, although not complete, based on a secular philosophy, critical of all Religions. Its primary concern for man was meaningful, as well as its fighting for a better society. Chinese Catholics, especially those in China, who were dealing with the real life, did not share such an easy optimism. 10 For more details and for the following quotations, see James D. Whitehead and others (ed), China and Christianity, Historical and Future Encounters (Notre Dame University Press, 1979).

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In Rome, Pope Paul VI, as we have seen, pushed by the concern for the life of Chinese Catholics and for respect to Chinese people, realized the need to restart a kind of open approach to China.

CHAPTER 6

China Catholic Church and the Liberalization Policy (1979–2013)

Official Religious Policy of Deng Xiaoping With the liberalization policy launched by Deng Xiaoping, all Religions, including the Catholic Church, could restart to openly practice their faith. Chinese officials of the departments responsible for religious affairs, soon after being re-established, strived to regain full control according to the traditional policy. In February 1979, a national meeting on Religious Work was held in Kunming to plan the revival of religious activities of the officially recognized five Religions, clearly distinguished them from the others considered as ‘superstition.’ The policy on Religion was strictly linked with the policy toward national minorities. The guidelines of the 5-year plan included liberation from prison and rehabilitation of religious personalities; restoration and reopening of temples and churches; re-establishment of the religious patriotic organisms and structure; reopening of seminaries, monasteries, and convents and starting formation courses for new religious operators; publication of religious scriptures, books and bulletins; and restarting contacts with coreligionists abroad. All these new initiatives were motivated not only by the open and liberalization policy, but also by the need for the national unity especially in areas of religious ethnic minorities. The traditional policy of control was made official by the Communist Party in the Document 19 in March 1982, entitled The Basic Viewpoint on the Religious Question during our Country’s Socialist Period. The © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_6

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document emphasized that the policy was no longer centered upon class struggle but on socialist reconstruction and modernization. It underscored that the essential point of this policy is to make each citizen’s personal decision to believe or not to believe a private matter for oneself alone: consequently, people under 18 years of age should not receive religious education and all the public activities should get the official permit and places of worship should be registered. “The later foreign colonialist and imperialist forces mainly controlled the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches… We did away with imperialist forces within the churches and promoted the correct policy of independent, self-governed, and autonomous churches, as well as the Three-Self Movement (self-propagation, self-administration and self-support). The Catholic and Protestant churches ceased to be tools of the imperialist aggressors and became independent and autonomous religious enterprises of Chinese believers.” “Freedom of religious belief” was restated by the State Constitution and promulgated on 4 December 1982. For the Catholic Church, another important official document was issued on 17 February 1989, Stepping up the work over the Catholic Church to meet the new Situation (Document 3): it stated that the Church must accept the guide of the Party, and it strongly attacked the supposed interference of the Vatican: But the Vatican is again trying to wrest control over the Chinese Catholic Church. During these past few years, the Vatican has vilified and attacked the Chinese patriotic clergy. It has made use of its international status and the faith that the clergy show towards the Pope to send agents into China. It has also used other clandestine means to appoint bishops secretly and has conspired to stir up underground groups. It wants to divide the Chinese Church, but its efforts will be in vain. According to the facts we have at hand, the Pope has already appointed 15 underground bishops. These bishops in turn have ordained more than 200 priests who are dispersed through 17 provinces and cities. Underground church groups have been organized in Hebei, Fujian, Shaanxi, Wenzhou in Zhejiang and Tianshui in Gansu provinces respectively. They are a political force defying the government and an element that can seriously affect public security.

In February 1992, on the same line another document was issued Destroy completely the Organization of the Underground Religious Forces (Document 6), dealing once again directly with the Catholic Church.

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In November 1993, during a meeting with the officers of the United Front, Jiang Zemin proposed the ‘Three Points’ on Religion: 1. Party’s religious policy is to be comprehensively and correctly implemented. 2. Management of religious matters is to be strengthened according to the law. 3. Religion is to be positively guided in the adaptation to the socialist society. On May 1994, the Decrees Nos. 144 and 145, Regulations of the Management and Venues for Religious Activities and Regulations on the Supervision of the Religious Activities of Foreigners in China were issued. They required compulsory registration of all places of worship and of all ordained clergy, as well as they restrained the behavior of foreigners. On 16 August 1999, the document, A Proposal to Reinforce the Work on the Roman Catholic Church under the New Current of Changes, declared the decision of the authorities to eliminate the presence of all the underground Catholics and to extend the government control upon the activities of the official religious communities and upon the election of the new bishops. Consequently, during summer and autumn, the Catholic communities suffered a stricter control, with arrests of some underground bishops and clergy. During the years 2000–2013, the official control of the religious sector was kept tight, especially upon the ‘pernicious cults’ (mainly Falun Gong). On 30 November 2004, the new Regulations of Religious Affairs were issued, replacing those of 1994 and became effective from March 2005. Norms for the Registration of Religious Professionals in China and Norms for the Registration of Clergy Responsible of a Site for Religious Activities both became effective from March 2007, while Norms for the Identification of the Catholic Clergy were issued on 28 December 2009. These documents emphasized that all religious operators had to be evaluated for their qualifications by the patriotic religious bodies and presented for registration to the corresponding government authorities of State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) on the national, provincial, or district levels. On 1st of October 2009, celebrations were held for the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, with the participation also of Catholic leaders, even from Hong Kong and Macao. Catholic communities in China celebrated the National Day with prayers and singing contests.

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The Official Catholic Community With the liberalization policy, the clergy, who in the 1950s had joined the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), were reinstated to the gradually opened churches. Generally, they were old: a few of them even got married. Some did not accept the invitation with the excuse of being sick. Many accepted to take up the care of the newly reopened churches, in order to provide sacraments to the faithful and to assure their own livelihood. Churches were restored and even newly built in many cities and areas. The leading organs of the Church were revived. With the support of the government, on 21 December 1979, Fr. Michael Fu Tieshan (1931– 2007) was ordained Bishop of Beijing, the first ‘patriotic and democratic’ episcopal ordination since 1963. It was followed by other episcopal ordinations in order to provide bishops to vacant dioceses. From 1979 to 2013, there were 145 officially ordained bishops. In 1980, the 3rd Plenary Session of the CCPA was held in Beijing (198 delegates, of whom 33 bishops), and the National Assembly of the Chinese Catholic Representatives (it was considered the first, 31 May– 3 June). They established the Catholic Church Affairs Commission and the Bishop Conference of the Chinese Catholic Church (BCCCC). Bp. Zong Huaide (1917–1997) of Zhaocun Diocese was elected president of the CCPA, while Bp. Zhang Jiashu (1893–1988) of Shanghai, became chairman of the other two institutions. In the summer 1983, the CCPA celebrated the 25th anniversary of foundation: it adopted the decision, Adherence to the principle of having an autonomous and independent Church. In 1986, from 18 November to 3 December, the 4th Plenary Session of the CCPA and the 2nd National Assembly of the Catholic Representatives (278 delegates) were held in Beijing. They approved the statutes of the two supreme organs. Bp. Zong Huaide was re-elected president of the CCPA while Bp. Zhang Jiashu remained leader of the Church Affairs Commission and of BCCCC. They decided to “support socialism” and to “make a contribution to the unification of the motherland.” When on 12 February 1988, Bp. Zhang Jiashu died, Bp. Zong Huaide took over his national two posts as acting (11 April), while in Shanghai, he was succeeded by Bp. Jin Luxian (1916–2013). On 15–20 September 1992, the 5th National Assembly of the Catholic Representatives [combining the 5th Session of CCPA and the 3rd

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National Catholic Representatives Assembly] with 272 delegates was held in Beijing. It reorganized the three Catholic organs; it revised the statute of the CCPA, approved the statute of the BCCCC, which stated to act according to the Three-self Principles. The Church Affairs Commission was put under the BCCCC, together with other five Commissions (Seminary Education, Liturgy, Theological Studies, Finance, and International Relations). Bp. Joseph Zong Huaide was re-elected head of the BCCCC and of the CCPA (briefly called “One Association, One Conference, yihui yituan”). The liturgical reform of the Vatican II was adopted by introducing the use of the Chinese language. On 18 May 1993, the standing committee of the BCCCC published the Regulations for the official election and ordination of bishops. After the death of Bp. Zong Huaide on 27 June 1997, the 6th National Assembly of the Catholic Representatives was held in Beijing (281 delegates), from 17 to 20 January 1998. Bp. Michael Fu Tieshan (1931–2007) of Beijing Diocese was elected as president of the CCPA, while Bp. Liu Yuanren (1923–2005) of Nanjing, as president of the BCCCC. During these years, the formation of future clergy received special care: the first major regional seminary was reopened at Sheshan, Shanghai, on 10 October 1981. It was followed in October 1983 by the National Major Seminary in Beijing and by others for a total of 12 major seminaries and a score of minor seminaries. The Seminary Formation Commission was headed by Bp. Jin Luxian. Convents of Sisters also were opened in several dioceses. The common standing of the official Catholic leading bodies kept the principles of the Three Autonomies, as well as the democratic administration of the Church with the election and ordination of its own bishops. Toward the unofficial section of the Church, at first, they denied its existence and later cooperated with the civil authorities to control it. Only on 14 August 1988, as we will see, Bp. Philip Ma Ji (1918–1999) of Pingliang, Gansu, resigning from the CCPA, openly denounced the official Catholic leaders for creating division and schism and for immoral behavior. Contacts with foreign Catholic institutions were also restarted. Foreign Catholic high personalities (Cardinals Roger Etchegaray and Karl Konig in early 1980, John B. Wu Cheng Chung in 1985, 1986 and 1994, James Sin in 1987, Mother Theresa in January 1985, etc.) were invited to visit China, and the first Catholic delegation, led by Bp. Fu Tieshan

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visited Louvain, Belgium, in November 1985. Contacts and visits to USA, Korea, and to Europe were promoted. In the publication and social service sectors, in Shanghai, the Guangqi Press was re-established in 1984, followed by Faith Press in April 1991 at Shijiazhuang, which published the Faith Weekly; in 1997 it also opened the Jinde Catholic Social Service Centre (officially registered as an NGO on 11 April 2006 as Jinde Charities). On 7 December 1997, there was the opening of the publishing house, Shangzhi (Wisdom) Press in Beijing. These institutions not only printed religious books but also organized various cultural and formation activities. Some dioceses opened up centers for orphans, handicapped, sick, and old people. The year 2000 started with a very controversial event. Contrary to previous cases of cooperation with the Holy See, in the Beijing Nantang cathedral five new bishops were ordained without the consent of the Pope, due to the decision of the CCPA and SARA (6 January). Of the 130 seminarians and staff of the National Theological Seminary, who refused to take part in the ceremony, some were expelled and other submitted to indoctrination sessions. CCPA and BCCCC continued to operate on the autonomy and democratic administration lines. In March 2003, their top leaders discussed three new documents concerning the procedure for the democratic administration of the Catholic Church: namely, A Management System for Catholic Dioceses in China, The System for the Joint Conference of the CCPA and BCCCC in China, and Work Regulations for the Catholic Patriotic Association. The concern was for the democratic management of the dioceses and the joint leadership of the two highest bodies. In 2004 (7–9 July), the 7th National Assembly of the Catholic Representatives was held in Beijing (262 delegates, of whom 40 bishops): the top leaders remained as before, namely Bp. Michel Fu Tieshan as president of the CCPA, and Bp. Liu Yuanren (1923–2005), as president of BCCCC. Bp. Liu, however, passed away on 20 April of the following year, and on 20 April 2007, Bp. Fu also died: he was given an official funeral as a ‘state leader and a loyal patriot.’ The top posts remained temporarily vacant. In 2007, even after the publication of Pope Benedict XVI’s Letter to Chinese Catholics (see below), the 50th anniversary of the foundation of CCPA was celebrated (24–25 July). Liu Bainian, the secretary general of CCPA, gave the speech Success and Experience of the 50 Years of CCPA,

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providing the following data: in the years, 170 bishops were elected and ordained, as well as 1800 priests; 3000 sisters were trained, 12 major and 18 minor seminaries opened, as well as 70 convents; 200 candidates were sent abroad for further studies; a large number of religious books and publications were produced and published. The event was followed, in 2008, by the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the first self-elected and self-ordained bishops in China (19 December). Following the above-mentioned ordination of the five bishops in January 2000, there were other illicit ordinations in 2006, namely of Fr. Joseph Ma Yinglin (30 April) as bishop of Kunming, of Fr. Joseph Liu Xinhong (4 May) as bishop of Anhui, of Fr. Wang Renlei (30 November) as coadjutor of Xuzhou. The last illicit ordination in this period was on 20 November 2010 of Fr. Joseph Guo Jincai as bishop of Chengde: the ceremony, to which other bishops were forced to attend, took place despite a strong protest from the Holy See. The year 2010 registered three cases of official installation of clandestine bishops: namely of Bp. Matthias Du Jiang of Bameng, Inner Mongolia, of Bp. Francis An Shuxin, of Baoding, Hebei, and Bp. Vincent Zhu Weifang of Wenzhou, Zhejiang. The case of Bp. An created some misunderstanding because the ordinary bishop of Baoding, Su Zhimin, was kept in prison since 1997. The twelve official major seminaries continued to operate but later were reduced to ten. In September 2005, the Holy Spirit Seminary of Shandong was closed and the seminarians sent to the national seminary. The same fate happened to the major seminary of Inner Mongolia in September 2006. The motivation was the decrease of priestly vocations. This issue was given special concern by dioceses and seminaries especially during the celebration of the Year of the Priest, June 2009–2010. On 11 November 2011, the officials of the Hebei Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, without any previous consultation, appointed one of their section chiefs as deputy rector of the Hebei Catholic Major Seminary: in protest, all teachers decided to suspend classes from November 15 and more than 100 seminarians supported them, starting public demonstrations. These lasted few weeks until the appointment was withdrawn. The life of the Catholic communities in these years was marked by the constant commitment to pastoral ministry and evangelization, as well as in social services. Evangelization work was spread to the Special

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Economic Zone of Shenzhen with the opening of St. Anthony’s Church (12 December 2001) under the care of Beijing Diocese. The urgency to increase effort for evangelization was stimulated by the fast success of Protestant Christians and was brought up in various occasions, especially during the Year of St. Paul, 2008–2009. Each diocese organized various initiatives. The concern for the improvement of the religious formation of Catholics received constant attention through Sunday schools for children, winter and summer study camps for students of all grades, and special courses for lay leaders and ordinary faithful (the ‘Disciple Group’ course). There were efforts to stimulate more academic knowledge and research. The Shijiazhuang Faith Institute for Cultural Studies and the Beijing Institute for Cultural Studies, started by Sapientia Press in 2002, were the main promoters in this sector: every one or two years, they organized symposia on doctrinal and moral issues, like the Forum on Catholic Studies for Young Chinese Scholars in December 2009 in Beijing and the forum on inculturation held in Shijiazhuang in November 2010. The social service centers, which were opened by few dioceses, continued their commitment on behalf of people meeting with difficulties and natural misfortunes. In April 2010, after the earthquake in Qinghai province with 2,200 dead, Shijiazhuang Jinde Charities, Xi’an Catholic Social Centre and ordinary Catholics in Xining provided relief services to the victims. The same was done after the earthquake in Sichuan with 70,000 victims. The Church properties continued to be a cause of conflicts and harassments, due to the greed of development companies which bribed the support of local civil authorities. The most serious accident happened on 23 November 2005, when 16 Franciscan Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart in Xi’an were wildly beaten and wounded by a group of gangsters, because they wanted to prevent the demolition of their school.

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The Unofficial Catholic Community1 Bishops and priests who never compromised with the Church reform and autonomy movement, once liberated and back to their places, were welcomed by the faithful who had survived the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, around them, small communities were formed especially in areas of long Catholic tradition, all held together by a solid loyalty to the Pope. Their psychological attitude was still of mistrust and fear, and, as a consequence, at the beginning, they kept their activities and contacts very secret. The difficulties were caused by the lack of space for worship, lack of religious books, and lack of experienced guides. However, the Holy Spirit was working in them, strengthening their faith and making numerous conversions. Catholic villages were full of religious zeal and extraordinary events. The unofficial communities gradually got better organized. Religious books, coming from abroad, provided means to improve the liturgical celebrations, and the formation of people. From Latin, they shifted to Chinese language in the liturgy, led by priests, sisters, and lay leaders better formed. Some communities started to print their own books, first, the liturgical texts, and the Sacred Scriptures, then other spiritual and formation books. Later on, Catholic websites provided all the basic Catholic documents, liturgical texts, and other spiritual material. Underground communities in Hebei, Fujian, Heilongjiang, and Shanxi were the most committed in the printing sector. A number of unofficial priests were doing a great deal of ministry in the villages. Others, including younger priests newly ordained, circulated secretly far and wide, invited by Catholics from different places, serving the spiritual needs of the communities, but at times, creating disorder and division. According to the various circumstances, different kinds of communities appeared among unofficial Catholics: the totally ‘underground,’ the ‘semi-official,’ and the ‘intermediate group’ with its members practicing the faith openly but recognizing the authority of the Holy Father. New priests and sisters were formed thanks to the opening of unofficial seminaries and convents. As soon as the bishops were liberated, they

1 For further details see S. Ticozzi “The Development of the Underground Church in Post-Mao China,” in CY Chu—P. Mariani (eds), People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China (Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan 2020), pp. 29–41.

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not only ordained several former seminarians who have also come out from labor camps, but also opened up seminaries and convents. The first who did it was Bp. Zhou Weidao (1908–1983) of Fengxiang, in Shaanxi, followed by other dioceses, like Yixian in Hebei, in Fujian, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Henan, etc. The local seminaries included both preparatory, minor and major courses. Operating without the approval of the civil and official religious authorities, they always ran the risk of being closed down at any time. They had neither a fixed location nor, at first, a fixed curriculum. The length of the training varied from two to six years. They soon started to send their students abroad, mainly to Italy, Spain, and France and later to the Philippines and the USA. The beginning of the ordination of underground bishops dates back to the permission of the Holy See in 1980 to Bp. Zhou Weidao to ordain Fr. Lukas Li Jingfeng (1922–2017) on 26 March 1980, as his successor. Bp. Fan Xueyan (1907–1992), in response to the basic needs of his diocese of Baoding, took the initiative of training clergy and even ordaining bishops. This he did, first, without any previous mandate from Rome, but later the Holy See approved his action. In 1981, Bp. Fan ordained three bishops, followed by others, after the approval of the Pope. Since all these activities were officially considered ‘illegal,’ detention, and arrest of people involved soon were restarted by the authorities. The official Catholic leaders approved and cooperated in it, though even denying the existence of the underground community. Harassments against the underground clergy became frequent. Unofficial bishops were kept under surveillance. The most famous cases in these years, which attracted international attention, were of Bp. Fan Xueyan of Baoding, of Bp. Dominic Tang Yee-Ming (Deng Yiming, 1908–1995) of Guangzhou, and Bp. Kung Pin-Mei (Gong Pinmei, 1901–2000) of Shanghai, who was released on parole in 1985 and in 1988 was allowed to go to USA for medical treatment (made cardinal publicly in 1991). The reaction of the underground Catholics to the oppression and to the arrests of their leaders was quite strong. Around Mach 1988, a document with a very hard line began to circulate: it supposedly recorded an interview with Bp. Fan Xueyan and was drafted by underground circles of Baoding. Known as the “13 Articles,” it stated that the self-governing and autonomous official Church is no longer a Catholic Church; and its sacraments are valid but Catholics cannot receive them under the pain of committing sin.

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Church leaders in China took different views of the 13 Articles. In order to clarify the proper position, on 3 September 1988, the Rome Congregation for the Evangelization of People sent to all Catholic bishops the document Guidelines of the Holy See on some Problems of the Church in mainland China (or the “Eight Points Guidelines”). The Roman document specified that the ordination of the China appointed bishops is valid, but they fall in the excommunication latae sententiae, which however remained publicly ineffective until it is declared; the Sacraments administered by official clergy are valid, but Catholics are directed to “look for priests who have remained faithful”; the conditions and the formation in the newly opened official seminaries should be evaluated according to local circumstances. The existence of the underground community was officially brought to public attention when in August 1988, Bp. Philip Ma Ji, as it was already mentioned, openly denounced the official Catholic leaders: The root of the problem of the division can be traced to the action of some high authorities at the top of the three Catholic organizations, that is, to their betrayal and emptying of the teaching and commandments of the Church. As a consequence, even people who first have denied the existence of the underground community had to admit it, but putting the blame on the Holy See. Even the government acknowledged its existence as we have seen in the already quoted Document 3 of February 1989. This set off a new wave of oppression and arrests of unofficial Catholics. The two main cases, that have also been known abroad, were the demolition of the tent-chapel in Youtong, Hebei, by 5,000 armed policemen on 5 April 1989 with 300 lay Catholics being beaten and wounded and the arrest of two old priests with underground seminarians and novices in the village of Qiaozhai, in Hebei. However, the underground bishops did not keep inactive. On 21 November 1989, at Zhangerce, Sanyuan, Shaanxi, they founded the Catholic Bishops’ Conference with the attendance of 11 bishops and a dozen of priests. The assembly named three leaders as honorary presidents, namely Bishops Fan Xueyan, Deng Yiming and Gong Pinmei, all absent, and Bp. Liu Guangdong (1919–2013) as president delegate with Bishops Liu Shuhe (1919–1993), Fan Zhongliang (1918–2014) and Yang Libo (1919–1998) as vice presidents. Bp. Liu Shuhe worked also as secretary general, helped by a few priests.

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Within few months, however, all the participants were detained by the police and jailed, ranging from three months to three years. Their misadventure gained worldwide sympathy, but, since arrests continued, Bp. Chen Jianzhang (1920–1994) of Baoding took over the post of president delegate of the conference. In the following years, the secretariat of the conference expressed its opposition and its doubts about the faithfulness of the official Church. In April 1992, its document The persecuted Church of China, accused the authorities to aim at destroying the unofficial Church and raised a strong concern for the underground bishops, mainly for Bp. Paul Shi Chunjie (1920–1991), whose corpse was brought back home with large violet patches, of Bp. Fan Xueyan (1907–1992), whose body was also brought home in a sack, with wounds on the face and legs fractured, and of the case of Bp. Liu Shuhe who got sick and died in prison. The underground conference succeeded to make its voice heard through various documents, such as A Proposal from the Chinese Bishops’ Conference to the Holy See of 30 July 1993, the Pastoral Letter of China Mainland Bishops’ Conference in commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Chinese Hierarchy, of 28 October 1996 and other anonymous letters. After the death of Bp. Fan Xueyan in 1992 and of Bp. Chen Jianzhang in 1994, the post of president of the underground conference was taken up by Bp. James Su Zhimin (b.1932) of Baoding. However, he was put in jail in 1997 and the post was taken up by Bp. Fan Zhongliang (1918– 2014) of Shanghai. Bp. Fan Zhongliang on 24 January 2003 asked Bp. Joseph Wei Jingyi (b.1958) of Qiqihar to take up the responsibility of the affairs of the conference as secretary general and later as president. In 2003, Bp. Han Zhihai (b. 1966), bishop of Lanzhou, Gansu, in an Open Letter to my Friends invited all Chinese Bishops to try their best to overcome all divisions in view of the reconciliation. Oppression of the unofficial clergy, both bishops and priests, by the civil authorities continued throughout the years. Among the main facts were the arrest of Bp. Paul Zhao Zhendong (1920–2007) of Xuanhua, Hebei, with other seven priests, who were forced to sign a declaration that they will abstain from priestly ministry (January 2005); on 17 March 2007, Bp. Martin Wu Qinjing of Zhouzhi, near Xi’an, was taken away by government officials for a ‘study session’ and then disappeared; on 9 September 2007, Bp. Han Dingxiang (1936–2007) of Yongnian

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(Handan, Hebei) died in police custody; in March 2009, few priests of Mindong Diocese, Fujian, were detained and penalized of 500 yuan; in July 2010, Bp. Julius Jia Zhiguo (b.1935) of Zhengding, Hebei, was released after 17 months of detention in an unknown location.

Attitude of Western Catholics to China In the 1970s, China started to open up, allowing foreign people to visit the country. This determined a great shift in the view of the country, based upon what they were allowed to see. Western tourists were treated with favor and kindness; they were given privileges and brought to see only the model institutions in order to raise their appreciation. Western investors and businessmen considered China, with its quite large population in need of modernization, very attractive as the ideal profitable country to invest their capital. From the 1980s on, their vision and approach to China were enthusiastic based upon the hope to open their market and increase their gain. Their substantial investments helped China to become in few decades the second world economic power. This determined a very optimistic vision of the situation in China. Strong was the expectation that China will be open up and assimilate the Western values. Later, however, the belief in the West that democracy is the sole source of a regime’s legitimacy and that China will adopt it proved to be mistaken. For two millennia in China, the government has been seen as the guardian and embodiment of Chinese civilization. The prosperity of the country became the key source of the legitimacy of its government. The CPC’s achievement in recent decades was seen as the restoration of the country in a modern context and, consequently, it enjoyed a great deal of popular support. Starting from the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, the approach to China of the Western nations changed and became more practical and prudent. Within the Catholic Church outside China, due to the opening and liberalization policy launched by Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978, determining the restart of the religious activities of the Churches, the optimistic view increased, but the possibility to visit and see the real situation by both foreign and overseas Chinese provided a more realistic and balanced view. From then on, within the Catholic Church, two positions toward China were registered, the pessimistic and the optimistic view.

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The pessimistic view continued on the line of the position of the 1950s during the period of the open persecution of the Church and, at present, takes into primary consideration the conditions of the unofficial section of the Catholic Church in China. Its supporters, due to their full mistrust in Communist official behavior, underlined the lacking of a proper degree of freedom for the Catholics and for all citizens to live the religious faith and to keep the Catholic doctrinal principles, mainly the communion with the Universal Church and with the Supreme Pontiff. The optimistic view, following the 1970s, was based upon the appreciation of the recent changes and reforms that China has undergone and of the liberalization policy launched by Deng Xiaoping: they looked at the future with the hope that Chinese authorities would increase the range of its opening up to the world and of the religious liberalization.

Vatican Attitudes to China The recent Popes approached China in view of starting dialogue with such a populous and important nation. Pope John Paul II, following the example of Paul VI, on 18 February 1981, from Manila sent a message to China, underlining that Catholics can play a positive contribution to the building of their nation. The following year the same Pope invited the bishops of the whole world to pray for the Church in China and expressed the hope for overturning the long estrangement between the Holy See and the Chinese Government. In March 1984, the Holy See summoned some experts on China in order to collect suggestions on how to deal with the new situation of the country. As a first step, on the following 4 June, the Vatican required all the 29 foreign bishops to officially resign from their former diocesan sees in China. During the following years, the Holy See repeatedly sent messages to the Chinese Government through various channels and visits of Catholic and even political personalities. The messages produced some results. According to Ye Xiaowen, the then Director of the SARA: “In 1983, the Catholic Church expressed the wish to have direct contacts with us. Three years later, we began to have a number of contacts.” Such contacts were carried out in Rome between members of the Vatican’s Secretariat and of the Chinese Embassy in Italy. However, a negative reaction from

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Chinese authorities was registered in 1988 after the Holy See’s publication of the above quoted Eight Points Guidelines, complaining for the Vatican’s continuous persistence in its hostile attitude. The tragic event of 4 June (1989) put a stop to all contacts. The fall of the Berlin Wall in the following November and the success of the Solidarity Movement in Poland were partially blamed by Chinese leaders upon Pope John Paul II, thus negatively influencing the mutual contacts. Late in 1989, the Holy See, in view of avoiding being identified with Taiwan, opened a Study Mission in Hong Kong, under the Nunciature of the Philippines, to directly deal with the issues concerning the Church in China. In May 1992, Bp. Zong Huaide, the president of the CCPA and BCCCC, expressed the desire that the Vatican should resumed the negotiations that existed before 1989. The same kind of desire was also shown by John Paul II at Macerata in June 1993, when commemorating the 400th anniversary of the arrival in China of Fr. Matteo Ricci. In the following August, the press office of the Holy See confirmed that talks were going on between the two parts. However, in June 1994, the member of the Chinese Embassy in charge of them suddenly disappeared. This event and other factors stopped the contacts. Archbishop Claudio Celli, a Vatican Representative, on his way to North Korea (16–22 January 1996) stopped for a couple of days in Beijing in order to promote the resumption of the talks. Indeed, they were soon restarted in Rome and carried on with satisfaction of both sides, giving way to a wild speculation of interpretation. In the following year, the Vatican Secretary, Card. Angelo Sodano, specified that direct dialogue with China was a major goal of the Holy See’s initiative. In the second half of 1997, rumors became so insistent and widespread that diplomatic relations between the two countries seemed to be imminent. Many rumors continued about an Agreement between China and the Vatican, especially in the occasion of the visit of President Jiang Zemin to Italy in March 1998. In July 1999, in interviews to Italian newspapers during his visit to Italy, Premier Zhu Rongji also admitted that talks were going on well and showed optimism about the results. Some Chinese Bishops were asked to check with government officials about their truthfulness: they confirmed it. But, at the end, it seems to turn out just into a political measure. After the episcopal ordination of five candidates without the pontifical appointment on 6 January 2000, John Paul II on the first of October,

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feast of St. Teresa of the Child Jesus, Patron Saint of Missions, declared saints 120 Blessed Martyrs in China. Prompt and strong was the reaction of Beijing, both for the choice of the date and for the canonization of some foreign missionaries, whom Beijing accused of having being tools of imperialism and having committed heinous crimes against Chinese people. This marked a climax of tension between the two sides and a quite sour worsening of the contacts. On 24 October 2001, as a gesture of reconciliation Pope John Paul II asked forgiveness for possible past mistakes of Church’s people in China: he showed the importance he attached to the early resumption of the contacts. However, on 5 June 2003, Card. Angelo Sodano to journalists conceded that relations between China and the Holy See were at a standstill. At the worsening of the health of Pope John Paul II and at his death on 2 April 2005, the Chinese authorities and Catholic leaders sent messages of condolence but sent no delegation to his funeral. After the election of Benedict XVI, the issue of the Sino-Vatican relations surfaced again and contacts restarted. In fact, soon some sources confirmed the existence of negotiations, as well as their willingness to improve and even to establish diplomatic ties. The Chinese ambassador to Italy confirmed that Chinese authorities “already have contacts with the Vatican,” but without specifying their nature. Although in early September 2005, four Chinese bishops were not allowed to participate to the Synod of Bishops in Rome, the Secretary of State, underlined that the Vatican was willing to move its Nunciature to Beijing ‘this very night,’ provided that the Chinese Government guarantees religious freedom to the Church (25 October). Pope Benedict expressed his strong desire to visit China, desire which, from then on, received special attention. However, on 30 April and 3 May 2006, there were two episcopal ordinations without the appointment of the Holy Father, as already mentioned. It created a climate of confrontation, a breach of trust, denounced by the Holy See. On a positive side, on 25 June, Archbishop Claudio Celli and Msgr. Gianfranco Rota Graziosi of the Vatican Secretariat were sent and welcomed in Beijing for informal contacts with Chinese officials. However, CCPA leaders considered the event just as “a government foreign ministry’s matter.” Another illicit episcopal ordination on 30 November kept the atmosphere tense and cold.

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On 19–20 January 2007, Pope Benedict XVI called a special meeting of about 20 experts to deepen his knowledge on the situation of the Catholic Church in China, in order to issue an official letter to Chinese Catholics with the aim of fostering the normalization of relations with China. This created great expectations, soliciting suggestions from different parties. The Chinese government’s response was of appreciation. Later in the year, a Commission for the Church in China was established at the Vatican. Meanwhile, on 30 June 2007, Pope Benedict XVI made public the Letter to all Chinese Catholics, stating clearly the standpoint of the Church. He started with a clear and public declaration that the Holy See is “open to a respectful and constructive dialogue with the Chinese authorities, underlining that the solution of existing problems cannot be sought through ongoing confrontation and conflict.” His clarity on Church’s principles and position aimed at eliminating any unrealistic expectation from the Chinese side. The Letter abolished all the special faculties, previously given to the unofficial Church. The reaction to the Letter by the Chinese authorities was negative and its official publication was forbidden. In March 2008, the Commission for the Church in China held its first meeting at the Vatican. One of its results was that, on 22 April, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, Vatican secretary of State, addressed a letter to the 90 bishops, who were in union with the Holy See. The 2008 World Olympics, held in Beijing, provided few occasions of warmer contacts. The negotiations continued during the whole year, whose content included the Chinese request for the recognition of the eight illicit bishops in a single move. In the following year, the Vatican issued the Compendium of Pope’s Letter and the Year of the Priest provided the occasion for the publication of two official letter to the Chinese clergy by Rome (July 2010). In the meantime, on 22–24 March 2010, the third Meeting of the Commission for the Church in China was held in Rome: its final press communiqué expressed a very strong standing, inviting all Chinese clergy to avoid all initiatives, which were against the 2007 Pope Benedict’s Letter, especially in occasion of the approaching 8th National Assembly of the Catholic Representatives. The official reaction from the Chinese authorities was that the communiqué marked a step backward and showed mistrust toward China, a reversion to a conservative and closed attitude. As a result, on 20 November, Fr. Joseph Guo Jincai was ordained bishop of Chengde (Hebei) without the mandate from the Holy See.

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The ceremony, to which the other bishops were forced to attend, took place despite the strong protest of the Holy See. Moreover, on 7–9 December, the 8th National Assembly of Catholic Representatives was held in Beijing, with many bishops forced to take part. It elected the new President of the CCPA, the legitimate Bp. Fang Xingyao (b. 1951), and the illegitimate Bp. Ma Yinglin (b. 1965) as the new President of the BCCCC. On 17 December, the Holy See issued a press communiqué condemning the holding of the Assembly and the way Bishops were forced to participate. The reactions from the SARA and the United Front were strong and offensive. This stopped all contacts between Rome and Beijing. The year 2013 saw the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI followed in March by the election of Pope Francis, as well as, almost simultaneously, the election of Xi Jinping as President of the People’s Republic of China: at the occasion, there was an exchange of congratulations.

CHAPTER 7

The Catholic Church Under Xi Jinping (2013–2022)

Official Attitudes Toward Religion The Chinese leaders continued to keep the traditional attitude of the governance of the country, namely the absolute control of all sectors of the social life, which, we have seen, was the totalitarian attitude proper of the Chinese Empire. They updated it with the emphasis on “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” to which Xi Jinping added “in the new era.” Therefore, their efforts to make a ‘modern Communist Nation’ are characterized by the Party/Government’s full centralized control, with the emphasis on the economic welfare of the population and on social order (called ‘harmony’). As for the concept of ‘Modern Religion,’ Chinese authorities adopted the concept which was spread in the late nineteenth century from Europe to other parts of the world by capitalist and positivistic philosophy: that is, Religion must be considered as an ‘individual and private belief’ to be kept in the heart and conscience of a person, together with the consequent understanding of the “lay state’ and its full control of all religious public manifestations (French Laicité). This explains the Chinese policy of “freedom of religious belief,” and the employment of the ‘democratic management’ of religious institutions, as the instrument to control and turn them into tools for the economic progress and national unity. Recently, even the phraseology of ‘separation between state and religion’ has been adopted and became popular, since it is considered as an element for a ‘modern state.’ However, practically, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_7

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as we will see in the next chapter, it does not mean respect for the mutual autonomy of the two parties, but it means that Religion should accept full control of the State without interfering in its plans and objectives. Xi Jinping and his present leadership group soon realized the danger of a possible CPC collapse, caused by the opening policy of Deng Xiaoping and loss of the communist ideal. In order to save it, they drafted a plan to reinforce the Party’s authority and prestige by all means, centered upon a strong leader at its core. They gradually put the Party above the government by identifying the Party with the State. Such an identification was borrowed from the New Left intellectuals, adopting their ‘Statism of the Party.’ They tried to eliminate all possible obstacles by going back to before-Deng methods under the pretext of national security. One of the main obstacles to their plan was the remarkable resurgence of religious belief and practice, in a quite diversified expression. The leaders, therefore, felt the urgent need for a firm direction, since relations between China’s religious believers and the Communist Party have always been rather strained. For such a purpose, they made use of legislation suitable to their objectives, in the attempt to co-opt Religion for their own political objectives. First, however, it was necessary to determine the legitimacy of the CPC. On 11 September 2015, in an international meeting in Beijing, Wang Qishan, then head of China’s Commission of Discipline Inspection, took the unusual step of proclaiming publicly that the CPC’s rule over China was legitimate: “The legitimacy of the ruling Party lies in history, in its popular base and in the mandate of the people.” It was the first time that the word “legitimacy” appears in the Party’s official statements. In order to set up a solid basis for the CPC’s legitimacy, the authorities kindled the flames of nationalism and patriotism. Within the supremacy of the CPC, Xi Jinping paid special attention to his own central role. On ideological level, he had his own personal ambitions: he wanted to establish himself as the official ideological heir of Mao Zedong by having his ‘Thought’ inserted in the National Constitution (March 2018) and publishing his books on several topics, centered upon the China Dream and his ‘new’ achievements. He also abolished the limits of the term of the presidency and drew the line for the ideological struggle for the coming years (2021 and 2049, the “two centenaries”), strengthening the anti-corruption campaign. During the 20th CPC Congress, in October 2022, its Charter was emended by introducing the “Two Establishing” (establishing the central role in Xi Jinping in the Party and of

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his Thought as guidance) and the “Two Safeguarding” (safeguarding the guide of the Party and the central role of Xi Jinping and of his Thought). As a practical instrument for the religious sector, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) under the CPC was given greater importance and on 21 March 2018 it absorbed the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA, now National Religious Affairs Administration) originally under the State Government. Then, the Chinese authorities issued laws and regulations and launched campaigns to deal with specific problems, aiming at strengthening the legal basis in view of the national order. The National Security Law (2015) set an extensive definition of national security which makes unlawful any threat to China’s Government, sovereignty and national unity as well as its economy, society, and cyberspace interests. Its approval marked a signpost in Beijing’s intensifying crackdown on activism, dissent, and repression of social groups. Other new legislation included laws on Counter-espionage (2014), Counter-terrorism (2015), Cybersecurity (2016), and National Intelligence (2017). Particular attention was given to religious legislation. In practice, Chinese authorities prefer to issue regulations, measures, and norms on specific issues, but to avoid drafting a Law on Religion. New legislation included the new Regulations on Religious Affairs that came into effect on 1 February 2018; in February 2020, the Measures for the Administration of Religious Communities, in May 2021, the Administrative Measures for Religious Personnel, and in September the Measures for the Administration of Religious Educational Institutions; from March 2022 and June 2022, came into effect respectively the Administrative Measure about online religious information and on the financial system of venues of religious activities.

Xi Jinping’s Religious Policy of Sinicization Regarding Religions, President Xi Jinping showed particular concern for the “Sinicization Policy” (zhongguohua), launched in order to include and justify all the initiatives related to this sector. At the closure of a national meeting on United Front Work, held on 18–20 May 2015 in Beijing, he stressed that, if Religions intend to develop in China, they should undergo the process of “Sinicization” and be independent from foreign influence. Active efforts should be made to incorporate Religions into the socialist society.

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Religious work in essence is a mass work. It must thoroughly implement the policy of religious freedom of the Party, administer religious affairs according to the law, uphold the principles of independence, autonomy, and self-administration, and positively guide the adaptation of religions to socialist society. In order to positively achieve this latter objective, it is necessary to maintain their Sinicizing orientation, to raise the standard of legal compliance of religious work, to consider dialectically the social function of religion, to value and promote the role of religious believers, to guide religious believers to work toward economic progress, social harmony, cultural development and service for union among ethnic communities and the unity of the country.

On 22–23 April 2016, Xi Jinping personally attended and addressed a national conference on Religious Work, held in Beijing: he underscored that religious affairs carry special importance in the work of the CPC and the central government. He promised to fully implement the Party’s official policy and manage religious affairs in line with laws, but underlined again that the official trend is for Sinicization of all Religions. Authorities should work to unite religious and non-religious people, direct them to love the nation, and protect the unity of their motherland. Religious groups must adhere to the leadership of the Party, support the socialist system, the values and the ideology of Chinese Socialism. In the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Beijing, on 18–24 October 2017, Xi Jinping stated on Religions: We will fully implement the Party’s basic policy on religious affairs, uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation (Sinicization) and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to socialist society.

Xi Jinping stressed once again the Sinicization policy and the active guidance for the adaptation of religions to socialist society, addressing the national conference on religious affairs, held from 3 to 4 December 2021. The official purpose of Sinicization appears to be reforming and remolding religions, Islam and Christianity in particular, into a Partycontrolled tool to be used for its political aims. Therefore, the main concern of Xi Jinping is political, with the view of supporting the position of the CPC and his own leading role. Religions are turned into social

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institutions which the government must keep under full control. Sinicization amounts to conforming to whatever ideology is promulgated by the CPC at any given time, without expressing doubts about its truth.1 Consequently, the official meaning of the “Sinicization of Religions” is the political process of integration of religions into the official structure, along the lines of nationalism or patriotism. It aims at strengthening the role of the Han Chinese majority among the multi-ethnic population. In order to attract the support of the general population, the emphasis was on their patriotic and nationalist feelings, as well as on loyalty and national unity. The cultural concern is not missing. On 6 November 2018, in a meeting, the Chinese authorities urged representatives of the main Religions in China to modify the translations of their reference texts, in order to bring them into line with the requirements of the official Marxist ideology of CPC and of the “new era.” For this purpose, need was stressed for forming a religious ideological system with Chinese characteristics in line with the modern requirements by reinterpreting religious doctrines and rewriting religious texts according to the socialist standpoint.

The Interpretation of Sinicization by the Catholic Leaders The official leaders of the CCPA and of the BCCCC organized several meetings, both on national and provincial levels, to deal with the Sinicization issue. In December 2016, the 9th National Assembly of Catholic Representatives (365 delegates, with Bps. Ma Yinglin and Fang Xingyao retaining their top posts) made a resolution on deepening in the following years the spirit of this orientation proposed by Xi Jinping and to guide clergy and faithful of the whole country to implement it. In the official interventions in these meetings, the Catholic leaders tried to explain Sinicization in the larger sense of contextualization and inculturation. They were subsequently published in the bimonthly magazine ‘China Catholic Church.’ Here the opinion of the two top leaders.

1 For further details see S. Ticozzi, The Never Ending March (Hong Kong: Chorabooks, 2018), pp. 106–128.

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Bishop Fang Xingyao2 emphasized that Sinicization process started since the beginning of the presence of the Church in China in order to penetrate into Chinese culture and answer to the requests of Chinese society. Therefore, it suits the rule of development of the Church, as it was done since its beginning in the transition from Judaism into Greek and Roman world. It fits also with the spirit of the Catholic doctrine, according to the incarnational way of Jesus Himself. It helps the Church in the efforts to respond to the needs of the present world, in the process of globalization, cultural pluralism, religious cooperation, and international exchanges. The way of the Sinicization of the Church includes, first, keeping its political content, which is the adaptation to the socialist society, making use of the socialist core values to educate the masses of the faithful, improving the identification with the motherland, with Chinese people, Chinese culture, Chinese Communist Party, and Socialism with Chinese characteristics. Practically, it must maintain the autonomous and independent administration of the Church and its democratic management, since they are the prerequisites for a true Sinicization. Moreover, it must positively develop the building up of a truly Sinicized theological thought, by investigating Church’s history, biblical teachings, the spirit of the important documents of the Church in order to form a system of thought consonant to the best cultural traditions of China and of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. Bp. Ma Yinglin3 underlined “keeping the orientation of Sinicization as the compass of our action in developing all works,” namely: strengthening the theological research so to provide the theoretical support for loving the country and loving the church, as well as for the autonomy, independence, democratic administration and adaptation of the Church to the socialist system; building up a good administration of the Church; improving the formation of the Catholic believers; actively getting involved in social commitments and charitable services; developing Church’s contacts inside and outside the country. According to him, “In China localization of the Church is identified with the Sinicization of the Church.”

2 In Zhongguo Tianzhujiao, China Catholic Church, 2017, 4, p. 8. 3 Id. 2017, 5, p. 9.

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The official efforts of the Catholic leaders to explain the content of Sinicization were summed up in the drawing of a work plan, discussed, and approved by the 4th joint meeting of the 9th Catholic leaders from 17 to 22 May 2018: the Five-Year Plan of Development for Keeping the Trend of the Sinicization of the Catholic Church in China (2018–2022). The assembly also required all the dioceses to prepare their own five-year plan according to their proper conditions and publish it by the end of August 2018. Sinicization has indeed become the main concern of the Church. The text of the Plan4 is divided into nine sections. After the explanation of its background, the second section deals with the guidelines, the major goal and the basic content of the Plan.

On the Guidelines, it points out: By getting a firm hold on the Bible, inheriting of traditions and following the views and documents of the Second Vatican Council, the theological discussion on the Sinicization of Catholic Church will be constantly promoted and the practice of Sinicization of Catholicism will be gradually enriched.

The Major Goal is to meet the need to increase the perception and recognition of Sinicization of Catholicism within the Church in order to push forward mutual adaptation between the Catholic Church and the socialist society. Clerics and Catholics must be led to implement the core values of Socialism as well as to strengthen their own base to push forward with evangelization and pastoral work. The Catholic Church is to play an active role in the enhancement of socio-economic development and contribute to realizing the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

4 See the translation of the entire text in https://www.chineselawtranslate.com.

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On the Basic content, the Plan specifies: For adhering to Sinicization of the Catholic Church, it is necessary to have political self-consciousness and self-awareness. To love the motherland and obey the state government is a responsibility and an obligation for each Christian. Main political requirements are acceptance of the leadership of the Communist Party of China, supporting the socialist system and safeguarding constitutional and legal authorities. For Sinicization of Catholicism, it is necessary to have selfconsciousness on cultural integration. To realize the core values of Socialism and accept the contribute of the distinguished Chinese traditional culture, the Church should promote Chinese styles and integrate with Chinese culture in the proposition of theological thoughts, expression of public rituals and in Church building, painting, music and art. There is also a need to have selfconsciousness on adaptation to society. To adapt and serve society, and to fulfill one’s social responsibility, the Catholic Church has to perform its works in accordance with the law, safeguard the Church’s legal rights, carry forward the Catholic spirit of being the ‘salt and light’ of the world, explore and expand new ways of serving society, promoting social harmony and together building a beautiful China.

The third section emphasizes the need for deepening the political, legal, and social identification of the Catholic Church in China: by promoting the education on Socialism with Chinese characteristics and on the core values of Socialism, by insisting on the principles of independence, autonomy, and self-management of the Church, by strengthening concepts and education on the rule of law, and by playing an active role in enhancing economic and social development of the country.

The fourth section concerns the promotion of the integration of the Catholic faith with the Chinese culture: by enriching the expression of Christian faith with the Chinese humanistic tradition in order to foster cultural consciousness and self-confidence, by improving the knowledge of

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the traditional culture and striving to foster a pool of researchers and seminary teachers with higher theological attainments and profound Chinese cultural knowledge, and by developing local perspectives on the history of the Catholic Church in China.

The fifth section deals with developing a theology with the Chinese characteristics: by summarizing the experiences and thoughts on Sinicization in the history of the Church in China (edit and publish a “Textbook on Adhering to the Direction of the Sinicization of the Catholic Church in Our Country”), by deepening the study of theology on the inculturation of the Universal Church, by establishing a platform and team on theological research through holding the bi-yearly Theological Forum on Sinicization, and founding an Institute of Chinese Catholic Culture.

The sixth section is about creating a Church organization and management system with the Chinese characteristics: by deepening the system of democratic management of the Church and adhering to the principles of “collective leadership, democratic management, mutual consultation, and joint decision-making” with the aim of optimizing the structure and management, by letting lay people play active roles in the pastoral work of evangelization and administration of the Church, by clarifying, in accordance with the principle of democratic management of the Church, the division of responsibilities among the Patriotic Association, Church Administration Commission and the Dioceses, and by strengthening the rule of law and standardization of Church organization and administration.

The seventh section deals with a Sinicized liturgy expressed through Chinese elements: by collecting past concrete historical experimentations, by exploring liturgical expressions in Chinese ritual culture according to official guidelines, by fostering liturgical education in institutions of formation, by gathering liturgy experts to organize advanced study courses, by highly regarding the cultural differences and sensitivity in the area of ethnic

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minorities, and by selecting some parishes or dioceses to prudently launch pilot projects.

The eight section deals with the promotion of Church architectural styles, painting, and sacred music with the Chinese aesthetical features: by changing the popular view that Church structures, painting, and sacred music must be westernized, by exploring and encouraging ways of Sinicizing Church structures, painting, and sacred music, through a consultation team of Catholic architects and artists with theological and ethical foundations, as well as artistic talent.

The ninth section is about the practical ways of the implementation of the plan: strengthening the leadership of CCPA and BCCCC on organization, supervision, inspection, as well as increasing publicity and exchanges.

Implementation of the Policy of Sinicization of Religions Following the launching of the Sinicization policy, as we have seen, religious organization and academics held meetings and published articles on the issue, trying to explain it in the larger context of cultural contextualization and inculturation in various religious sectors, namely liturgy, art, and architecture. The criteria ranged from political criteria in favor of the CPC and the Government, nationalist criteria under the sign of patriotism and nationalism, and ideological criteria on line with socialist core value and traditional Chinese moral virtues. On practical level, the Chinese leaders followed a gradual approach, according to their traditional method, by starting from practical issues, from more problematic groups of people, as well as from target areas. The first religious groups of people were the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Buddhist Tibetans in Tibet. The details on their treatment are already quite known and covered by the mass media. The

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Sinicization campaign, due to its political objective, involves also local religions, like Buddhism and Taoism, which were targeted under the pretext of their commercialization. The key targets of the campaign, however, are the “foreign religions” of Christianity and Islam. Toward the Protestant and Catholic Churches, the first official initiative was started in Zhejiang province with the removal of crosses and demolition of ‘illegal’ structures, and in Henan province with controlling religious communities and restricting religious education of children. Based on the experience of the two provinces, they spread the initiative to other provinces. Such a policy was accompanied, as we have seen, by issuing regulations and administrative norms, which can justify the official actions. The Government of Zhejiang Province launched in 2013 the official campaign of “Three Changes and One Demolition”: by July 2014 at least 229 Christian crosses and churches were believed to have been demolished or had crosses removed, with 25 churches in the Catholic open and underground communities affected, even against the official protest of the old Bishop Zhu Weifang (1926–2016) and the clergy of Wenzhou. Protest spread not only among local believers but also among people in other provinces and abroad. In order to justify the actions, on 7 May 2015, a draft of regulations was issued by the Zhejiang provincial authorities on religious structures: about the location of crosses and religious symbols, they should be affixed to the façade and not on the top of the church, be reduced in size and fit in with the surroundings. On 22 March 2017, Zhejiang Government ordered Catholic and Protestant churches to install surveillance cameras inside and outside their church compounds and allow the presence of a surveillance committee. The policy of the removal of crosses, of the demolition of churches together with the closure of the unofficial places of worship spread to other provinces and continued, even if a more limited size, throughout the following years. In summer 2020, the authorities of at least five provinces even urged Christian believers either to replace the images of Jesus in their homes with posters of Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping, or to lose welfare benefits. Another area of the official concern was improving the Marxist education in schools and universities against Christian propaganda. On 9 July 2013, Marxist scholars in the official press warned against the rapid growth of Christianity and proselytization in the universities, disguised

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as cultural studies. It became a source of special worry for Chinese leaders. On 23 December 2013, the CPC called for a Marxist education campaign: the socialist twelve core values were incorporated into the educational system, from primary schools to universities in order to fill up a perceived moral vacuum, caused by decades of economic emphasis. In summer 2018 the Party launched the campaign for the “promotion of a patriotic striving spirit” among young and middle-aged intellectuals. And the following autumn 2018 registered an increase of ideological control in universities, on line to the slogan: “Resolutely oppose all forms of mistaken thought that distorts, misrepresents or negates Marxism.” On 27 October 2019 China has released the Outline for the Implementation of the Moral Formation of Citizens in the New Era as guidelines focused heavily on promoting patriotism and providing new moral guidelines for all citizens. On 12 July 2021, the central authorities issued the Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Ideological and Political Work in the New Era, with the aim at strengthening the Marxist ideology. All universities since 2020, and all secondary and primary schools since September 2021 had to add a special course on “Xi Thought” in their curriculum. One element of this campaigns was the concern for the religious education of children and youth under 18 years of age: the practical guideline on this issue was taken from the 1982 Document 19: Nor should anyone under 18 years of age be compelled to believe in religion, to become a monk or nun, or to pray in temples. School circulars in some places issued the prohibition for parents from “guiding, supporting, allowing minors to believe in a religion or participate in religious activities.” Other prohibitions followed: it is not permitted to do any religious activities outside the registered places of worship, to sell religious books, magazines and publications, to spread on internet any propaganda, literature, and images with religious content, to expose on sidewalks posters with religious content, etc. In order to control religious activities, in summer 2018, a Special Emergency Notice was distributed containing further orders: the number and backgrounds of worshipers of all faiths must be documented and reported to the authorities; the names of clergy must be displayed at parishes so that officials can confirm their identity; the Chinese flag must be on permanent display at religious venues and the national anthem sung at each service; officials would make impromptu visits to churches in the province to ensure that they comply with the new rules.

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Consequently, on 31 July 2018 the “Joint Conference of the five National Religious Organizations” launched the following appeal: religious activity sites are required to raise the flag and may hold flag raising ceremonies on important holidays, together with playing the national anthem. In addition, the Constitution, the national flag law, the patriotic heroes and martyrs are to be studied. Catholic leaders followed suit. Chinese authorities officially enforced the registration of religious venues, which, starting from April 2019, could apply for the legal person status in order to be able to perform public acts. From 2020 to 2022, at the spreading of the COVID-19 epidemic, the churches were closed and all religious external activities stopped (the “Two Suspensions”). And even, when they were reopened, they had to keep restrictions. Regarding the unofficial sections of the Catholic and Protestant Churches, the government authorities paid special attention to the registration of their clergy and of the venues of their religious activities, the finances of their communities, the control of the church attendance of the believers and their indoctrination. The objective is their gradual elimination.

Xi Jinping and Pope Francis During the recent years, it was the Holy See which expressed a proactive attitude to keep good relationship with the Chinese authorities. On the contrary, the basic personal attitude of Xi Jinping toward the Catholic Church appears to be rather passive, trying his best to avoid direct dealing with it. He concentrated his efforts on the control of all religions with the launch of his Sinicization policy and letting the UFWD and SARA to deal specifically with each Religion. Although he exchanged with Pope Francis congratulations at the election, he avoided meeting him in three different occasions. On 25–27 September 2015, the plan of Pope Francis (September 19–22 in Cuba, 22–27 in the US and UN) to meet with Xi Jinping, since they were expected to cross paths at the United Nations headquarters, failed. Pope Francis was very keen on the meeting, but Xi Jinping decided to avoid it. In 2019, although a visit to the Vatican was not on Xi Jinping’s official schedule for his State visit to Italy (March 21–24), a senior Vatican source claimed that Pope Francis was willing and asked for meeting him on 22 March. But the meeting did not occur.

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On 14 September 2022, Pope Francis and President Xi Jinping were both in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan, the latter for an official visit while the pope for attending a congress of world religious leaders. The Vatican showed “an expression of availability” for their eventual meeting. The Chinese side said that they “appreciated the gesture” but that there was no free time in Xi’s schedule. It was the third time that the meeting between Pope Francis and Xi Jiping was refused. Dealing in particular with the Sino-Vatican Provisional Agreement, as we will see, Xi Jinping left the negotiations to the Foreign Ministry. The contacts during the period of the Covid-19 epidemy also were left to the Foreign Ministry. On 3 February 2020, following the outburst of the epidemy in China, the Vatican, in a joint initiative of the Office of Papal Charities and the Missionary Centre of the Chinese Church in Italy, sent 700 thousand masks to China in an attempt to help stalling the disease. With the spreading of the virus in Italy, several solidarity gestures from mainland China were registered, including an initiative of Chinese authorities toward the Vatican. The spontaneous initiatives of Chinese Catholic individuals and institutions were required to accept the control of the Foreign Ministry.

The Signing of the Sino-Vatican Agreement (2018–2022) On 22 September 2018, the Vatican and the People’s Republic of China, after a long series of negotiations,5 at last signed a Provisional Agreement on the Appointment of Bishops , entering in effect on October 22, valid for two years. It was signed by the Holy See’s Undersecretary for the Relations with the States, Msgr. Antoine Camilleri, and the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Chao. The very brief message of the Chinese Foreign Ministry explained that both sides would continue working to “promote the improvement of mutual relations.” The communiqué of the Holy See says that the Agreement “foresees the possibility of periodic review of its application” and speaks of “the shared hope” that the Agreement would “contribute positively to the life of the Catholic Church in China, to the common good of the Chinese people and to peace in the 5 For the details of the previous development of the negotiations between China and the Vatican, see S. Ticozzi, The Never Ending March (Hong Kong: Chorabooks, 2018), pp. 146–177.

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world.” On the same day, the Press Office of the Holy See announced that Pope Francis “has decided to readmit to full ecclesial communion” the eight illegitimate bishops, seven living bishops (namely Guo Jincai, Ma Yinglin, Huang Bingzhang, Zhan Silu, Yue Fusheng, Lei Shiyin, Liu Xinhong) and one, posthumously (Antony Tu Shihua, who died in 2017). On 23 September, a statement on the website of the CCPA and BCCCC declared that both bodies sincerely endorsed the Provisional Agreement between the “two States, China and the Vatican.” In the next paragraph, the statement reaffirmed that the Chinese Catholic Church “will abide by the principles of independence, autonomy and selfgovernment,” as well as abide by the commitment to Sinicization and adaptation to socialist society. Few days later, on 26 September, Pope Francis issued a message to Catholics of China and to the Universal Church to explain that the decision was taken in the light of faith and to address the perplexity concerning the “value of the sufferings endured out of fidelity to the Successor of Peter.” On the following 12 December, during the round of negotiations between China and the Vatican held in Beijing, the head of the Vatican delegation, Archbishop Claudio Celli dealt with the problem of the jurisdiction of two Dioceses: to Bp. Guo Xijin he gave the letter downgrading him from ordinary to auxiliary bishop of Mindong Diocese, Fujian, and to Bp. Zhuang Jianjian of the Diocese of Shantou, Guangdong, the request for resignation due to the old age, in order that the just legitimized Bishops Zhan Silu and Huang Bingzhang, respectively, could take over their posts.6 The first positive result of the Agreement was the fact that, on principle, there should be no more illicit bishops in the Church in China. As a sign of this new situation, Bishops Guo Jincai of Chengde and Yang Xiaoting of Yan’an could attend the 15th Ordinary General Assembly of Catholic Bishops in Rome, the Synod of Bishops on Young People, Faith and Vocational Discernment (3–28 October 2018). Other positive results of the Agreement were the Episcopal Ordinations after the Agreement. Some sources numbered them correctly as six 6 On 22 January 2019, an official ceremony was held in the Hepo Church, Jiexi, Shantou Diocese for the official retirement of Bishop Zhuang Jianjian. It was followed by a concelebration presided by Bp. Huang Bingzhang, now the ordinary bishop of Shantou, with other Guangdong bishops.

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between October 2018 and March 2023, but however, it should be clarified that two were not carried out according to the procedure of the Agreement. They were the episcopal ordinations of Bp. Yao Shun of Jining, on 26 August 2019 ( approved by the Holy See in 2010), and of Bp. Xu Hongwei of Hanzhong on 28 August (approved by Rome in 2016). The first two ordinations done according to the procedure of the Agreement took place in winter 2020, only after the renewal of the Agreement: Bp. Chen Tianhao of Qingdao, Shandong, was ordained on 23 November, and Bp. Liu Genzhu of Hongdong, Shanxi, on 22 December, followed half a year later by the third one, of Bp. Li Hui of Pingliang, Gansu, on 28 July 2021, and by the fourth one of Bp. Cui Qingqi of Wuhan-Hankou, Hubei, on 8 September 2021. The new climate created by the signing of the Agreement favored new episcopal installations, but they also need clarifications. During the same years, there were six installations: three of unofficial bishops who accepted to become official (Bp. Peter Jin Lugang of Nanyang,7 Bp. Peter Lin Jiashan of Fuzhou and Bp. Paul Ma Cunguo of Shuozhou); three of official bishops, already members of the CCPA and BCCCC, who for different reasons were not officially installed as ordinary bishop of their diocese (Bp. Xu Hongwei of Hanzhong, after the retirement of old Bp. Aloysius Yu Runshen), Li Huiyuan of Fenxiang8 and Jin Yangke of Ningbo9 ). Another positive result of the Agreement has been an increase of other mutual contacts, mainly the attendance of the Vatican to the International Horticultural Expo (28 April–7 October 2019), the Exhibition of Vatican Chinese cultural relics in Beijing (28 May–17 July 2019), etc. To

7 The negotiations for the installation of Bp. Peter Jin Lugang on January 30, 2019, however, were going on for a long time before the signing of the Agreement. 8 On May 11, the First Catholic Representative Conference of Fengxiang Diocese near Xi’an was held in Baoji City, according to an official report. At the meeting, the CCPA established its first branch in the city and passed its Constitution. Bishop Peter Li was elected its chairman, and some diocesan priests were named vice chairmen. This happened about a month after a church was suddenly demolished in Qianyang city of the same diocese. According to a widespread belief, the church had been targeted because local priests had refused to join the CCPA. 9 He was ordained not following the official procedure in 2012 by the old Bishop, Hu Xiande (1934–2017), who was sick and afraid of the approaching death.

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be added, the already mentioned exchange of medical subsidies during the COVID-19 pandemics. On the side of the Vatican, the most evident result has been its show of concern for Beijing and, consequently, its silence on China and Hong Kong problematic issues: it has always been very careful to avoid anything that could offend Beijing. However, this behavior created a rather negative impression in many people, all over the world. Within the debate about the possibility of the renewal of the SinoVatican Agreement, Pope Francis, early in September 2020, in an interview, reiterated his support to the Agreement, emphasizing realistically that it is better to have a channel for dialogue than not having it. Amid a lot of speculation, finally on 22 October, there was the official announcement of the first renewal for other two years of the SinoVatican Provisional Agreement, without any change. It was done through exchange of diplomatic letters, with the Chinese side showing a rather cool attitude. The year 2022 registered several declarations of the Vatican that the Provisional Agreement will need some modifications but it will be renewed. From 28 August to 2 September, a Vatican delegation visited Tianjin. Finally, on 22 October, the Vatican announced that the Agreement has been extended again for another two years, without modifications. China Foreign Ministry confirmed it on 24 October. The Provisional Agreement, however, created a rather ambiguous situation related to the official registration of the clergy, mainly of the unofficial priests. A number of them registered on voluntary basis, but very often the registration was done under compulsion. It caused further tension in several dioceses, since a good number of priests refused to register. Although the Holy See underlined that the registration should not be forced and joining the Catholic Patriotic Association was not mandatory,10 however, the opposite fact was quite frequent: since its signing of the Agreement, members of the United Front and the CCPA have indoctrinated and tried to force bishops, priests, and underground faithful to officially register by joining the CCPA, under the pretext, “because the Pope wants it.” Since forced registration continued, on 28 June 2020, the Holy See issued the the Pastoral Guidelines concerning the civil Registration of the 10 See the interview of L’Osservatore Romano to Cardinal Fernando Filoni, then Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, on 3 February 2019.

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Clergy in China. It again deplored the employment of force to compel the underground clergy to officially register by joining the CCPA, but the document created many problems of conscience due to its ambiguous wording. The local civil authorities continued their policy of coercion, with several cases of priests suspended from the ministry and sent back home. In some places, some unofficial priests disappeared.

Different Evaluation and Understanding of the Agreement Chan Kim-Kwong pointed out in 201511 : Among the five major religions, Catholicism seems to have more direct relation with China’s foreign policy as the Vatican is a de facto sovereign state and the normalization between China and the Vatican can be first and foremost a diplomatic issue. A closer reading of China’s foreign policy can perhaps shed some light on the current dynamics. First of all, the Vatican has no economic military, resource and geo-political factors that render the Vatican as equals with China. In China’s priority in diplomatic importance, the Vatican is definitely not a great power, but a peripheral nation, and surely not an emerging power; it is positioned almost at the very bottom, between a small nation and an international organization! It is a very asymmetrical relation as perceived from China’s side and it draws little attention in the eyes of the Chinese leadership in reference to foreign affairs. They know, however, that the Vatican strongly desire to establish contacts with such an important and powerful country, and consequently try their best to draw all possible political advantages. Secondly, one of the often-quoted symbols of national humiliation by China is the Catholic Church in China which has been tool of the imperialist powers and had predominant foreign ordinaries controlling the majority of the dioceses prior to the formation of the PRC. Therefore, China hailed the establishing of the CCPA (with its principles of Three Autonomies) and the independent election and ordination of Bishops since 1958 as a major political strike against the Western imperialistic powers, a significant symbol that could not be disregarded and given up. Such victory is associated with China’s assertion of its sovereignty, a political position that China cannot concede for historical and political, not religious, reasons…

11 Chan Kim-Kwong: Conference 17.11.2015, Hong Kong (private circulation).

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The author continued underscoring that unless there is a factor that upset the current situation which forces China to deal with it in an urgent manner, there is no incentive to China to give any concession to the Vatican. On the contrary, unless China feels that it can gain some political victories or scores, such a possible gain in the cross-strait relations favor in China to advance the goal of Unification of Taiwan, it must agree to whatever terms being suggested for such a political objective. The Provisional Agreement can be considered a historic breakthrough, but the two signatories seem to have different objectives. Taking into consideration the official declarations of the Chinese side, it appears rather clear that, for the Chinese authorities, it is an Agreement with the Vatican as a State and not as a Church, and, therefore, it is dealt mainly by the Foreign Affairs Ministry in view of a political objective. The Vatican, according to the official declarations, aims at solving some difficulties of the Catholic Church in China for the appointment of bishops and for the full communion with the Universal Church. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, the main partner in the negotiations, starts always from the political perspective and aims at increasing the prestige of China, especially when it is sailing in rough waters (thus exploiting the friendship with the Vatican), and at further isolating Taiwan through the eventual diplomatic recognition from the Vatican. Chinese authorities consider the Agreement an affair of a State with another State, and not directly concerned with Religion. Moreover, because the content of the Agreement has been kept secret, the policy has allowed the authorities, both on central and local levels, to continue as before, underlining independence, autonomy of the Church, democratic election of bishops, forced registration of the underground clergy, etc. The official Chinese Catholic leaders, on their side, seem to behave as if the Agreement does not concern them: they continued to keep the traditional principles and position, under the push and guidance of the government officials. Few weeks after the first signing of the Agreement, on 17–18 December 2018, since the year was the 60th anniversary of the first episcopal ordinations without the papal mandate (on 13 April 1958), they celebrated it with a meeting and a seminar in Nanjing. Fortyeight bishops, more than 100 priests and 200 sisters were told by the head of SARA, that the principles of independence and self-management will not be eliminated “at any time and under any circumstances.” Bp. Ma Yinglin, on his part, emphasized the urgent need to select candidates

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“politically reliable, with good ethics and religious knowledge” for the vacant dioceses. From November 30 to December 1, 2020, the same Catholic leaders held the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Guangyuan Reform Manifesto of the Catholic Church (30 November 1950, that launched of the Patriotic Movement against Imperialism). They did not mention the Sino-Vatican Agreement, and repeated the emphasis on the autonomy principles, the study of the instructions of Xi Jinping, and the commitment of implementing the Five-year Sinicization Plan of the Church. On 9 April 2021, as part of the program of celebration of the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the CPC (celebrated on the 1st of July), the two top Catholic organs, together with other patriotic organizations, issued the declaration of the “Three Loves”: “We promote for all the believers of Religions in China the education campaign on the theme ‘love the Party, love the Nation and love Socialism’.” At the same time, there was the launch of the campaign for “knowing the history of the Party, feeling the care of the Party, listening to the directives of the Party, and following the steps of the Party.” On the issue, several meetings followed, especially in July, organized by central and provincial Catholic leaders. From 18 to 20 August 2022, the 10th National Conference of Chinese Catholics was held in Wuhan, in Hubei (345 delegates from 28 areas). It elected Bp. Li Shan as head of the CCPA and Bp. Shen Bin as head of the BCCCC, but it also formed an ambiguous Supervisory Committee with five members, close supporters of the official position. In the work report, Bp. Shen Bin mentioned that the announcement of the official approval of the new bishop during the ordination ceremony has been modified, with the addition of the “agreement of the Holy Father” (agreement, but not “appointment”!). The optimistic and hopeful vision within the Church supporting the signing of the Agreement emphasized its positive function for a dialogue with one of the greatest nations in the world and foresee eventual good results in the long run. But this optimism is challenged by a persistent pessimistic evaluation of the event, based upon the judgment of the present behavior of CPC authorities toward Religion and the Catholic Church. The pessimism continued on the line of the quite known Catholic position of the 1950s and takes into consideration the recent restrictive measures, especially upon the unofficial section of the Catholic Church in China. Its supporters, due to their full mistrust in Communist ideology and behavior, underline the lack of a proper degree of freedom

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for both official and unofficial Catholics, as well as for all citizens, in order to live their religious faith and to keep the Catholic doctrinal principles, mainly the communion with the Universal Church and with the Supreme Pontiff. Cardinal Joseph Zen Zi-Kiun (b.1932), former Bishop of Hong Kong, followed by a good number of believers, is well-known for speaking out boldly on behalf of “clandestine” Chinese Catholics who have being suffering oppression since the 1950s and now are still humiliated and oppressed, even after the signing of the Agreement. Since the launch of the Sinicization policy, their situation has worsened, but the compromise and appeasement of the Holy See with Communist authorities seem even more painful for them. Not a few commentators, both Chinese and Western, describe the Agreement between the Vatican and China as “discreditable,” while others consider it strategically necessary for the future of the Church as a channel for dialogue and negotiations.

Conclusion Chinese Authorities, at present, look quite convinced to be able by themselves to properly deal with the Catholic Church. In order to control lay Catholics, who are in small number and divided, they make use of either the carrot or the stick, according to the different circumstances. The official authorities have paid special attention to the bishops for a long time, succeeding in obtaining loyalty and obedience, at least formal, from almost all of them. The Sino-Vatican Agreement, thanks to keeping the content secret, practically agrees with the procedure of the democratic election of the bishops. By proposing only one candidate, without a real possibility to check his qualifications by the Vatican, the Chinese part gets the guarantee that all the future bishops will be “politically reliable” and “obedient subjects.” They also are sure to be able to patiently solve the issue of the unofficial bishops and clergy, forcing them to accept the official principles, and keeping under strict surveillance those who are unwilling to cooperate, until they pass away. Consequently, they do not seem to be too worried about the Catholic Church, since they think they can turn it into a State institution, and keep it under full control. Under such circumstances, the Holy See has to face and approach China in a realistic way: first of all, evaluate the real situation of the Catholic Church in China in its urgent practical needs. Then, through

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the negotiations with the government on the Agreement, it can make good use of this channel, to raise the practical problematic issues and deal with them one by one: starting from clarifying the space of the autonomy of the Church, the issue of the supreme authority within the Church in China, which is now taken by a democratic organ of representatives controlled by the civil and political authorities, the fate of the unofficial bishops, the freedom of bishops to contact the outside Churches, the registration issue of unofficial clergy, etc. Such a procedure requires commitment, patience, perseverance, proper concern for the spiritual benefit of the Church, and not just a political worry. However, the chance of success is not high. The most urgent issue seems to be the promotion of the initiative of all the Chinese members of the Catholic Church, both in China and outside, in strengthening their faith, in order that both bishops and lay people could take up their responsibility and play their proper role to build up the local Church on the foundation of the true autonomy, in communion with the universal Church.

CHAPTER 8

Church and State Relationship in China

The problem of relations between the Catholic Church and the Chinese state is an unusually complex one because of the fact that the Church is not simply a religious institution. The Holy See also function as a state which maintains state-to-state diplomatic relations. Technically, that is the Holy See and not the Vatican City which maintains these diplomatic relations, though the headquarters of the Church for both religious and diplomatic purposes is commonly referred to simply as “the Vatican… It should be important to separate these two aspects of the problem, the religious and the politico-diplomatic, but it appears to be virtually impossible to do so as the head of the Vatican State, the Pope, is also the head of the Church. Moreover, the Pope is the head of a Church which is Catholic – that is, universal – and within which obedience to the Supreme Pontiff on certain matters is required, based on his position as successor to St. Peter.1

In every country, Church and State relationship is always a quite complex and variable issue, since it deals with the interaction of the two institutions, which make universal claims on people’s life. There are clear signs that China is approaching a critical juncture in Religion-State relations.2

1 James T. Meyers, Enemies Without Guns, o.c., p. 201. 2 For a very comprehensive picture, see in particular, Jason Kindopp – Carol Lee

Hamrin (ed.), God and Caesar in China (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2004).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6_8

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Human history presents different models of relationship, based upon the vision and reality of human society. Since early times, Religion and State were usually merged and made inseparable: it was the result of a ‘monarchical’ (Greek: monos and arche, one principle, monopolar society) vision of society, whose ideal was unity and order. This pattern prevailed for quite a long time in human history, both in the East and in the West, with clear examples of this system in the Roman Empire, with the cult of the emperor, followed by the Sacred Roman Empire, in the West, as well as in the East, in the Chinese and Japanese Empires. On the other side, history also gives examples of religious leaders incorporating both religious and civil authorities, what is usually called ‘hierocracy,’ the government by the clergy: the clearest model of this system is the traditional Tibet, which has been ruled by the Dalai Lama, as both civil and religious head. However, the course of history has registered this model, at times, also within the Christian and Muslim traditions. Both models could rise and prosper in the above-mentioned ‘monarchical or monopolar’ vision, or, in simpler terms, within a society with a unique absolute power. In the West, due to the fact that, in the religious sector, the Christian Church gradually grew into a strongly centralized institutional structure, and it gave rise to an open confrontation with the ‘absolute power of the emperor.’ The starting point was the belief that both religious and civil authorities were from God, and, consequently, the Church kept a primary authority, especially on the spiritual dimension of the human life of people, considered superior to the material one. In the Middle Ages, among the Church affairs and particularly for the appointment of the bishops, arose the “Investiture Controversy”3 between Popes and Emperors. These tensions gradually created a clear distinction between the civil and religious authorities, the “temporal and

3 According to Wikipedia: “The Investiture Controversy or Investiture Contest was the most significant conflict between Church and state in medieval Europe. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a series of Popes challenged the authority of European monarchies over control of appointments, or investitures, of church officials such as bishops and abbots. Although the principal conflict began in 1075 between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor, a brief but significant struggle over investiture also occurred between Henry I of England and the Pope Paschal II in the years 1103 to 1107, and the issue played a minor role in the struggles between church and state in France as well. The entire controversy was finally resolved by the Concordat of Worms in 1122.”

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spiritual spheres” of society, that is, a society with two highest authorities (two centers of authority, bipolar vision of society), under the supreme authority of God. In the West, this ‘bipolar vision’ turned into a very sensitive issue the relationship and cooperation between the civil and the religious authorities. Obviously, there were ups and downs: at times, there were conflicts on some particular issues, at times, mutual respect for the proper autonomy, at times, good cooperation for solving together social problems, at times, even a too close cooperation to save the interest of both parties. The latter situation gave rise to the phenomenon of the ‘State Religion,’ that is, the official Religion of a State, a strict cooperation between Church and State, with its good and bad consequences. In fact, the too intimate cooperation between Church and State in the West, in view of their common intent to guarantee their shared religious faith and to eliminate heresy, as well as for other political interests such as keeping the social order and unity, gave rise, for example, to the Inquisition’s methods against heretics and Jews, or the so-called witch hunting, not to mention the past and recent complicated conflicts among followers of different religions and churches. Unlike in the West, in the Eastern Empires, since no Religion developed into a strong centralized institution, the ‘monarchical or monopolar vision’ of one absolute authority, both civil and religious authority in the hand of the emperor was kept on. Practically, speaking in particular about China, the emperor and the civil authorities controlled and made used of the different religious traditions operating in the country, at times, for the common benefit of all people, at times, for the advantage of one group against the others, and always for assuring and keeping the full control of the civil authority upon society. Among the range of responses that can be reconstructed from Ming and Qing sources, three main postures can be observed: patronage, prohibition and regulation. Patronage is the state-religion relationship that Buddhists upheld as their ideal. The patron state is one that chooses to identify its moral pedigree or legitimacy by aligning itself with one or more religious institutions and personnel in exchange for religious ratification of its regime. Prohibition stands at the opposite extreme. The prohibitionist state strives to ban religious institutions and religious practice as inimical to good social, political, and moral order. It regards religion as a hotbed of refusal and dissent that threatens its right to rule. Between these two positions of patronage and prohibition lies the posture of regulation. The

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regulatory state neither promotes religion nor seeks to abolish it, but acts to supervise, control, or limit the scale and form of religious practices in relation to its own goals for maintenance of the public order and the supervision of associational life.4

Chinese history, therefore, contrary to the stereotyped belief, was not exempt from religious conflicts, as we have seen: it is enough just to mention the killing of all Confucian literati and the burning of all their books by the first Qin Emperor in 213 BC, the persecution of the followers of Buddhism and of other foreign religions in 842–845 by Tang Emperor Wu Zong, as well as the constant opposition of all religious groups and movements, considered as ‘heterodox sects,’5 and the abovementioned murder of more than 30 thousand Christians by the Boxers in 1900. Chinese history registers even the attempt to make Confucianism the State Religion, a movement led by Kang Youwei (1858–1927), at the end of the Qing Dynasty and in the early years of the Republic. In recent years, the Communist Government in China, who keeps this “monopolar system” (one supreme authority system) under the motivation of building “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” makes use of these same traditional attitudes and methods. …The [Chinese] state’s suspicion of and interference in Religion is not only a short-term policy driven by Marxist ideology and measured in terms of decades. It is also a long-established practice measured in centuries or even millennia, one rehearsed countless time by emperors and their bureaucrats long before the actions of today’s cadres.6

4 Timothy Brook, “The Politics of Religion: Late-Imperial Origins of Regulatory State,” in Yoshiro Ashiwa – David L. Wank, Making Religion Making the State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 23. 5 For more details, see J. J. M. de Groot, Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China: A Page in the History of Religions (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen). 2v Amsterdam 1903–1904; Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity, The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-foreignism (Cambridge – London: Harvard University Press, 1977). 6 Daniel H. Bays, “A Tradition of State Dominance,” in J. Kindopp – C. Lee Hamrin, God and Caesar in China, o.c., p. 36.

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Multi-Religious Society and Separation Between State and Church A second stage in human history for the relationship between Religion and State was started, in the West, by the development of religious pluralism, first, and later, by the spreading of secularist and liberal ideology. These social phenomena raised indeed new challenges to both State and Religion. The model of a preferential Religion, or State Religion, at first, continued to prosper. But later, other models developed and were adopted: namely, separation between State and Religion, with respect for all Religions but without any preference; with the spreading of the liberal and secularist ideologies, the ‘a-religious’ attitude (adopted in Western Europe under the influence of the Enlightenment and the secularist ideology, which consider Religion just as a matter of private conscience) and the ‘anti-religious’ model. The ‘a-religious model’ of separation between Church and State has been adopted mainly in Western Europe. Today, all Western states guarantee freedom of worship and maintain a distinction between civil and religious authority, in different degrees and ways. The ‘anti-religious model’ was taken up mainly by states, run by Socialist and Communist Parties, which adopted the revolutionary and atheist ideology: Religion was considered ‘opium of people,’ and religious believers as ‘anti-revolutionaries’ and ‘people’s enemies’; the objective of the local governments was to hasten their elimination and disappearance. Chinese authorities after the liberalization of Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978, accepted the existence of religions but under the official control. By limiting the protections to religious belief and to normal religious activities, Document 19 and the Constitution (1982) restricted the realm of religious freedom to individual conviction and government-sanctioned normality. In reality, all aspects of religious expression and practice were subject to regulation… Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution offers protection for normal religious activities, but it does not define the meaning of ‘normal,’ other than to declare that religion must not be used to disrupt public order, impair health, or interfere with education. In a circular fashion typical of Chinese Communist Party rule, this vagueness has come to mean that anything the authorities deem illegal is ipso facto abnormal and, therefore, illegal. Interpretation is subject to the political whims of

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political authorities because no independent judiciary exists to counter their judgments…”7

Xi Jinping and Chinese authorities, by keeping this understanding and persisting in this attitude of political control, show the feudal mentality of ‘cuius regio, eius religio,’ which means, ‘the religion of the ruler dictates the religion of the people ruled.’ Such a mentality has been overspread all over the world, with many people unconsciously absorbing it. Catholics, also, have been convinced that the conversion of the king would entail the conversion of the population. Fr. Matteo Ricci, as we have seen, shared the same mentality. Looking back over the thousand years of Chinese history, one finds little new about today’s pattern of relations between State and Religion in China. Behavior of suspicion and systematic policies of regulation or suppression (or both) toward grassroot religion have characterized the mind-set of all Chinese political regimes.8

Lai Pan-Chiu wrote on Religion and State relationship9 : … Religion played an important role in the legitimatization of the traditional Chinese Government. Perhaps one may even say that in pre-modern China, the state itself was also a religious institution with the Emperor as its Chief Diviner and Chief Priest. The divine mandate was supposed to be earned and maintained not by birth but by good deeds or merits, by performing relevant religious rituals properly, and governing the empire efficiently. When there was a natural disaster, the king might have to perform rituals and offer prayers for his people, including confessing to and petitioning Heaven to bear the guilt on behalf of his people. Therefore, the state is supposed to have the right to decide what is the true religion permitted and to crush all the heresies and obscene worship, which are more or less equivalent to what are labelled as “evil cults” in contemporary China. This model of “subordination of religion to the

7 Michey Spiegel, “Control and Containment in the Reform Era,” in J. Kindopp – C. Lee Hamrin, God and Caesar in China, o.c., p. 41. 8 Daniel H. Bays, “A Tradition of State Dominance,” in J. Kindopp – C. Lee Hamrin, God and Caesar in China, o.c., p. 25. 9 “Religion and State Relationship,” in Asia News, 06.12.2017.

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state” is expressed also in the state’s establishing a particular department to supervise and control the Religions allowed by the Government. The state’s control or intervention covers not only the institutional and personal aspects, e.g. the number of temples, monks, and nuns, but also the deities to be worshipped. In fact, other than suppression, the state can also absorb the worship of certain deities originated at local level into the pantheon of the state cult.

Chinese authorities, although atheist, pretend the right to determine the details of the exercise of faith of the religious believers, the qualifications of the clergy (see the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama and Dalai Lama, in particular), the ways of worship, etc. The true separation between State and Religion has not yet truly happened in China, though the saying is frequently used, and the traditional mentality still persists in the government officials and in many people, including Catholics. Materialistic atheism of the Communist Party, as we have seen, was kept on official preferential level and turned into a ‘religious ideology,’ a ‘quasi-religion,’ or, as modern scholars call as we have seen, a kind of ‘political religion.’

Present Challenges In recent years, the modernization and globalization processes, with the development of the awareness for individual human rights, are deeply putting into question the ‘mono-polar vision of society,” as well as the liberal concept of Religion as just a personal private belief. In fact, globalization, with the multinational economic powers, the emphasis on human rights, democracy and freedom, the phenomenon of migration, and the rise of new social institutions, such as political groups or parties, social associations, educational and charitable organizations, community volunteers’ associations, cultural clubs, new religious organisms, etc., challenge all civil governments to provide a guarantee for the protection of the human rights of their citizens, including the free exercise of Religion, and the respect of their international relationship, that is, their links and loyalties with communities and institutions outside the country. Globalization is indeed producing other centers of authorities in each country.

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New social groups and institutions are gaining influence in a pluralized urban China, at the same time as the Chinese state is enhancing its capacity for governance.10

Consequently, both the visions of a unique or of two authorities in the society are put into question in favor of a multipolar vision of the social order, which gives space not only to the political and religious authorities, but also to the authority of the above-mentioned institutions. Worry about the negative potential of radical religious movements must be balanced by recognition of the positive and essential role religion can play in modern (and postmodern) societies… Non-profit organizations, especially religious associations, proliferated in the 1990s and have become partners with the state in providing social services. Greater regulatory attention to non-profits in the wake of financial scandals and their misuse of funds to bankroll terrorists is both necessary and proper, but this underscores rather than denigrates their importance. There is now a building awareness, including among the Chinese élite, that a successful capitalist democracy is far more than a country with markets and elections, that a vibrant civil society is the necessary ‘third leg’ of the overall structure. In concert with this broader rethinking of religion, human rights experts are realizing that the freedom of religion and belief is essential, not peripheral, in human rights advocacy and diplomacy, given its function as the conceptual and historical source of many other individual and associational rights. Social scientists are finding that social virtues, usually based upon religion, functions as social capital and are the essential cultural glue of successful societies.11

Even the liberal concept of Religion as only a matter of private conscience is put into question. Yoshiro Ashiwa and David L. Wank acknowledge that “the issue of individual belief is becoming crucial for the state and society in China”: Modernity treats Religion as a matter of individual belief in the context of secularism. At least within the modern social sciences, since Max Weber, 10 Dong Wang, “Restructuring Governance in Contemporary Urban China: Perspectives on State and Society,” in Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 20, no. 72, November 2011, pp. 723–733. 11 Carol Lee Hamrin, “Advancing Religious Freedom,” in J. Kindopp – C. Lee Hamrin, God and Caesar in China, o.c., 176.

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individual belief and secularism have been key concept of the study of religion in modernity. However, social scientists have been challenging these concepts of individual belief and secularism through fieldwork and monographs on non-Western societies…12

Specific Challenges from the Catholic Church13 Besides the basic challenge placed by any religious faith in the absolute authority of God, as the Supreme Authority, to the present Chinese official world-view, the Catholic Church, in particular, provides further challenges, especially in the following four issues dealing with the present relationship between Chinese Government and the Catholic Church. 1. The vision of the State The position of the Chinese Government was clearly expressed in 1982 No.19 Document: “Every patriotic organization, including the religious institutions, must accept the leadership of the Communist Party and the Government.” It is the traditional way, “Government leads, Religion follows.” The Government/Party guides all aspects of the life of the citizens. In principle, it would not allow any social community or religious body to be independent from government control. Such a vision and position have been officially reiterated many times, and the policy is carried out in a very strong manner since President Xi Jinping took power in 2013. He was borrowing a line from Mao Zedong: “Government, military, society, education, north, south, east, west – the Party leads everything.” It is the present official campaign. Such a position shows the monopolar vision of the Chinese authorities regarding the Nation: there is only one supreme authority. It is the vision of the absolute or authoritarian system, traditional in China since the beginning of the Chinese Empire. Jacques Gernet wrote14 :

12 Yoshiro Ashiwa – David L. Wank, Making Religion Making the State, o.c., p. 17. 13 It is a revision of my article “Basic Questions: Church and Civil Government

in China,” on the Hong Kong Catholic weekly, Sunday Examiner, 29 September 2019. 14 Jacques Gernet, China and Christianity, o.c., pp. 105, 108 and 115.

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As the Chinese emperors held total power over the organization of society and the universe, and space and time, it was not possible for religion in China to be autonomous. The various religious cults were therefore a political matter. The Chinese sovereigns reigned by mandate from Heaven… The Chinese concept of universal order was a global one which tolerated no division… The Western idea of a distinction between political and religious authority, each being vested respectively in the person of kings and those of popes, was regarded in China as an aberration… Being unfamiliar with the idea of a clear-cut distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, the Chinese deemed it inadmissible that a religion should detach itself from the general order and dominate it instead of being integrated with it…

The position of the Catholic Church has been explained several times and recently clarified by the 2nd Vatican Council, the Universal Catechism of the Church, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church and the encyclical letters of recent Popes. The 2nd Vatican Council solemnly reaffirmed that, “in their proper spheres, the political community and the Church are mutually independent and self-governing” because of the different aims they pursue. According to the Church, State, or Government is concerned with measures and institutions which are at the service of the secular common good of the nation, while the Church aims at meeting the spiritual needs of people. The mutual autonomy of the State and of the Church does not entail a separation but includes cooperation, especially on issues of common concern. The Church has the right to the legal recognition of her proper identity. Therefore, the political authorities should guarantee the Church the space needed to carry out her mission by respecting people’s right of freedom of Religion, both personal and communitarian. From her part, the Church has no particular area of competence concerning the structures of the political community. The vision of the relations between States and Religious Institutions by the Catholic Church corresponds to the requirements of a State under the rule of law and to the norms of international laws. Pope Francis emphasizes in Evangelii Gaudium (The Joy of the Gospel) that the Church wants to work with and serve people, the people as a whole and their culture, and not a single class, a minority, group or élite. We do not need plans drawn up by a few for the few, or an enlightened or

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outspoken minority which claims to speak for everyone. It is about agreeing to live together, a social and cultural pact (no. 239). Consequently, the vision of the State and society by the Catholic Church is multipolar, since she acknowledges that within the people there are public and private, political and civil, and secular and religious institutions, with which she wants to cooperate to build a better place for all to live in. This is the vision and the mission not only of the Universal Catholic Church, but it should be of each Particular or Local Church that is each Diocese with its bishop. Unfortunately, in China, because of the monopolar vision of the society by Chinese authorities, the Local Churches do not or cannot implement this mission, since they accept willingly or not the guide and control of the government. 2. The understanding of Law In the monopolar vision of society, the political leaders consider themselves having the supreme authority and consequently the duty to care for all dimensions of the life of the citizens, including the spiritual and the religious ones. Supreme authority conveys also the feeling of having a high degree of wisdom, which make the leaders judge and decide what is best for people: so, they draft and issue laws and regulations. They want to make use of these laws to rule people and society, that is ruling according to the laws they, as supreme authorities, have decided and issued. These laws are what the jurists call positivistic laws, which bring about the positivistic conception of human rights. Human beings have only the rights that laws, decided by the legislators, give them. Since these laws are manmade, they can be interpreted and modified by the legislators, who are above the law. Therefore, they cannot give absolute guarantee. This way is called “rule by law.” However, there is another understanding of laws and human rights, what the jurists call the naturalistic conception. It is based upon the conviction that there are universal laws or values and human rights are given by human nature itself. All human leaders must decide human laws in line with these universal laws and human rights, in front of which everybody, including the human legislators, is equal and must observe. This is what is called “rule of law.”

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It seems clear that Chinese authorities follow the “rule by law” and not the “rule of law” since they deny the existence of universal laws and natural rights, while the Catholic Church advocates the “rule of law.” 3. The explanation of Religious Freedom The article 36 of the national Constitution states: Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities…

The limitation of freedom only of ‘religious belief’ and only to ‘citizens’ who enjoy it is a clear indicator of the positivistic conception of human rights, which includes religious freedom, adopted by the Chinese authorities. Consequently, the precariousness of the human rights and of religious freedom is clearly manifested in such an ordinance. The reason is: what is guaranteed is only those issues, the positivistic legislator in a given historical period and in reference to a given socio-political reality, has considered worthy to assure special protection, and not what should be naturally recognized and guaranteed to every human being always and in every place. Since “normal religious activities” are protected, China Constitution admits not only “freedom of religious belief,” but also “freedom of profession of faith,” that is of manifesting it in given activities. However, since the subject is not clearly specified, it seems that dealing with “citizens,” only they are the subjects of the “religious activities,” and not the religious body or religious institution. Anyway, any public expression of the “religious belief” is “protected”: in other words, it should be allowed and controlled by the civil authorities. “Freedom of religious association” does not seem to be legally taken into a proper consideration. More problematic is the “freedom of propagation of faith,” since the Constitution forbids “compelling citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion.” It seems that Religion and atheism are placed on the same level. However, it is not. Due to the unipolar vision of the State with the political supremacy upon all other social sectors, including even the juridical

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field, religious freedom, together with all the other human rights, enjoys space of recognition and protection only as much as it turns functional to the political objective or, at least, it does not oppose it. On political level, the supreme authority is the Chinese Communist Party, whose official ideology is Marxism. Since it includes atheism, atheism becomes the orthodox ideology, and consequently, we can speak of “civil religion” or “political religion.” This fact legitimizes the public authorities and the public institutions to propagate the atheistic education and practice, forbidding religious education to children under 18 years of age. Moreover, since Marxism aims at the elimination of Religion, the same fact legitimizes the public authorities to acknowledge and allow, for the time being, the existence of some religions with its activities and to proscribe others. This allows to draw two consequences: first, in front of the Chinese Party or State, religious belief and atheism are not on equal basis; second, the official religious policy does not seem to be “freedom of religious belief,” but just “tolerance of religion.” 4. The separation between State and Church The statements should not be understood simply as Religion should not interfere in the educational sector and in the economic life of people and should keep the laws and regulations of the State, accept the supervision of the civil authorities, adjust to the socialist society, etc. If understood only in this way, the slogan “separation between State and Religion” becomes a way to keep religious beliefs out of politics and public life. But, the State, on its part, should recognizes public dignity to the religious experience in the social sphere, respect the autonomy of the Religion and of the Church, and avoid any interference in proper religious matters. In issues of common concern, as funerals, marriages, civil registration of personnel and properties, State and Church should reach a common Agreement and cooperate together. Pope John Paul II, commenting the following sentence of Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes “The political community and the Church are autonomous and independent of each other in their own field. Nevertheless, both are devoted to the personal vocation of man, though under different titles,” wrote:

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The ways the Council understands the term ‘separation’ of Church and State is far removed from the way totalitarian systems interpret it. It came at a surprise and, in a certain sense, also as a challenge for several countries, particularly under Communist rule. Clearly, these regimes could not disagree with the Council’s position, but at the same time they realize that it was at odds with their notion of separation of Church and State. According to their vision, the world belongs exclusively to the State; the Church has its own sphere, which lies beyond the ‘boundaries,’ so to speak, of the world. The Council’s vision of the Church ‘in’ the world conflicts with that interpretation. For the Church, the world is both a task and a challenge. It is so for all Christians, but particularly for the lay faithful. The Council gave prominence to the question of the lay apostolate, that is, the active presence of Christians in the life of society. Yet, according to Marxist ideology, this was precisely the area where it was necessary to establish exclusive control by the State and the Party.15

The trend should be to consider Religions as forms of social ties, operating in the social space, which prevent the State monopoly of the public space, thus providing the guaranty to true democracy. The religious manifestations are seen not as a threat but as a positive contribution to build up a good public space. For China, the process toward a true separation between State and Religion will be quite long and difficult, due to the strong traditional and monopolar vision of the social order.

Conclusion As a conclusion, we can try to answer the question: how will Christianity fare in China? We have seen that the recent measures the Chinese authorities are employing to control Religions and Christianity in China are not simply motivated by their atheistic vision of the world and by their intention to guarantee the monopoly of the authority of the present government, but also derive from the Chinese traditional understanding and exercise of the authority, since the imperial times. The persistence of the Sinocentric vision and the monopolar attitude of the Chinese Government toward human society and the employment of the recent control measures suggest that China as a nation will not accept 15 Pope John Paul II, Memory & Identity (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2005), pp. 135–136.

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Christian faith in a foreseeable future, from a human point of view. As the past emperors, Communist authorities, feeling challenged by the religious faith in a God above their authority, will consider Christian Churches as unwelcomed ‘strangers,’ or even ‘enemies’: as in the past Chinese authorities have perceived the Catholic Church as a heterodox sect, they will seek to eliminate it, although, at times, they tolerate it because of domestic and international considerations. The challenge to their ideological monopoly is the main reason for the opposition and oppression of Religions in China, both during the imperial time and under Communist rule, since both are totalitarian systems, which cannot accept any authority above their own. The motivations for their opposition have been different, as we have seen: endangering the supremacy of Confucian ideology and system, deteriorating the social and cultural customs, creating controversies and conflicts, being vanguard of the colonial powers and tool of imperialism, being superstitious and antiscientific, etc. But the real reason why the past and present civil authorities in China cannot accept Christian faith remains the presence of a superior authority above theirs. For political and pragmatic reasons, however, Chinese authorities, at present, compromise and favor a Religion under their full control, as a civil institution, a “national church”: this is the way they are treating the five official religions. However, Christian faith is addressed primarily to individual persons and not to the state, to the government or institution. Among Chinese people, both in the past and at present, based upon their personal decision and freedom, not only in China but also in the diaspora all over the world, accept Christian faith. In the past, many of them had given up even their life for their Christian faith. Recently people spoke about the “Chinese fever for the Christian faith” and some experts number them in dozens of million members. According to some observers, such China’s Christian fever, which will turn into a “Chinese Christianity” itself and will be able of taming Chinese society: the work has already started by the house churches and the underground sections of the churches. For these optimistic speculators, such a Chinese Christianization and China’s progress of becoming a global power will go hand in hand: according to their prevision, there will be a time when the Chinese nation will be the leading political and economic power of the world and Chinese Christianity, with its Sino-theology, will dictate the agenda of world Christianity. Such a vision, however, seems too optimistic. There are obstacles which require long time to be overcome: namely, the deep opposition of the

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official ideology based upon the traditional concept of absolute authority of the State, the recent world trends toward secularism and materialism, the division of Christianity which makes difficult the judgment and the choice to Chinese people, the utilitarian and pragmatic attitude toward Religion, the moral degradation of humanity, etc. The number of Chinese converts, indeed, will increase all over the world, and they will also take up their Christian communitarian witness, but it seems difficult that China as a nation with a monopolar vision will adopt Christianity. Such a scenario, however, should be welcomed in view of fostering a more authentically Christian faith, since it will detach it from links with any political government: Christian faith is essentially based upon personal decisions, which build up a spiritual and social community, engaged in the local society but overtaking all national and ethnic boundaries, thus building up the universal kingdom of God in Christ.

Essential Bibliography

AA.VV., Roma e Pechino (Roma: Studium, 1999). Yoshiro ASHIWA – David L. WANK, Making Religion Making the State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). Richard BUSH, Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abigdon, 1970). Jean CHARBONNIER, Christians in China, AD 600 to 2000 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007). Paul A. COHEN, China and Christianity, The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870 (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press 3rd Printing, 1977). Celso COSTANTINI, Con i missionari in Cina (Roma: 1946). Richard DAWSON, The Chinese Chameleon—An Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese Civilization (London: 1967). Pasquale D’ELIA, Fonti Ricciane (vol. 1 Roma: 1942, vols. 2.3, Roma: 1949). Wolfgang FRANKE, China and the West (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967). Jacques GERNET, China and the Christian Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, original Chine et Christianisme, Editions Gallimard, 1982). J. J. M. de GROOT, Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China: A Page in the History of Religions, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1903–1904). R. Po-Chia HSIA, A Jesuit in the Forbidden City, Matteo Ricci 1552–1610 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Jason KINDOPP – Carol LEE HAMRIN (ed.), God and Caesar in China (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 2004).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6

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Stephen Bun-Sang LEE, Relaciones Inglesia-Estado en la Republica Popular China (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1990). Anthony S.K. LAM, The Catholic Church in Present-Day China (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre, 1997). ———, Conflict and Dialogue (Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre, 2020). René LAURENTIN, Cina e Cristianesimo, al di là delle occasioni mancate (Roma: Città Nuova, 1981). Beatrice LEUNG, Sino-Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority, 1976–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Paul MARIANI, Church Militant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). Fortunato MARGIOTTI, “Le Missioni Cinesi nella tormenta”, in Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum (3 vols. Rom-Friburg-Wien: 1971–1976). Joseph METZLER, La Santa Sede e le Missioni (Milano: Edizioni San Paolo, 2002). James T. MEYERS, Enemies Without Guns (New York: Paragon House, 1991). Samuel H. MOFFETT, A History of Christianity in Asia, vol. 1, rev. ed. (New York: Orbis Book, 1998), vol. 2 (ibid., 2005). Bruno Fabio PIGHIN, Chiesa e Stato in Cina (Venezia: Marcianum Press, 2010). Juan de Deus RAMOS, Historia da Relaçoes Diplomaticas entre Portugal e a China, v. I: 1721–1725 (Macau: Istituto Cultural de Macau, 1991). Yangli REN – WANG Meixiu, Zhong-Fan Guangxi Yanjou (Beijing: World Religions’ Office, 1998). Lewis S. ROBINSON, Double-Edged Sword, Christianity and 20th Century Chinese Fiction (Hong Kong: Tao Fung Shan Ecumenical Centre, 1986). Nicolas STANDAERT (ed.), Handbook of Christianity, Volume One 635–1800 (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2001). Kilian STUMPF, S.J., The Acta Pekinensia or Historical Records of the Maillard de Tournon Legation, vol I (P. Rule – C. von Collani edts) (Rome-Macau: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2015). S.Y. TENG – J.K. FAIRBANK, China’s Response to the West (CambridgeLondon: Harvard University Press, 1979). R.G. TIEDEMANN, Handbook of Christianity, Volume Two 1800-Present (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2010). Leon TRIVIERE, La Chine et la Saint-Siège de la Première Guerre de l’Opium (1839–42) à l’Effondrement social de 1949, and Les Relations entre la SaintSiège et la China (Esope, Nos. 427, 428). Louis WEI Tsing-Sing, La Saint-Siège et la Chine de Pie XI à nos jours (Allais, 1971).

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Betram WOLFERSTAN, The Catholic Church in China from 1860 to 1907 (London: Sands & Company), pp. 240–248 (digital copy, www.univie.ac.at). Anthony YU, State and Religion in China: Historical and Textual Perspective (Chicago & La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2005). Henry YULE, Cathay and the Way Thither: Being a Collection of Medieval Notices of China, vol. II (London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1913–1916).

Index

A Abu Zayd Hasan of Siraf, 22 Agliardi, Antonio, 60 Aleni, Giulio, 11 Aloysius Yu Runshen, 134 Alphonse Favier, Pierre M., 61 Anti-Christian Movement, 66 Antony Tu Shihua, 133 Anzer, Johann B., 61 Apostolic Delegation in China, 73 Ashiwa, Yoshiro, 148 B Bartoli, Daniello, 6 Batu, Khan, 47 Benedict the Pole, 47 Bernard, Henri, 11 Bernardini, Filippo, 77 Bertone, Tarcisio, 117 Bishop Conference of the Chinese Catholic Church (BCCCC), 104 Board of Rites, 35 Boxer, C.R., 4 Boxers Uprising, 38

Buglio, Lodovico, 31 Burkholder, Lawrence J., 98 C Camilleri, Antoine, 132 Catholic Central Bureau, 82 Catholic Church Affairs Commission, 104 Catholic Hierarchy, 61 Catholic Pro Mundi Vita Institute, 97 Catto, Michela, 28 Celli, Claudio, 115 Chan, Kim-Kwong, 136 Chau Ju-Kua, 2 Chen, Duxiu, 65 Chen, Hong, 10 Chen, Jianzhang, 112 Chen, Mao, 33 Chen, Tianhao, 134 Chiang, Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi), 68 Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), 87 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 96

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Ticozzi, CHINA and the Catholic Church, Christianity in Modern China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3173-6

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INDEX

Chin, Ken-Pa, 30 Christian fever, 155 Church and State, 141 Cixi, Empress Dowager, 61 Clemenceau, Georges, 71 Cobo, Juan, 10 Cohen, Paul, 66 Colombo, Cristoforo, 3 Confucianism, 8 Congregation for the Evangelization of People (CEP), 97 Cosmas Indicopleustes , 2 Costantini, Celso, 73 Couplet, Philippe, 6 Cui, Qingqi, 134 Cultural Revolution (CR), 91

D da Cruz, Gaspar, 3 Dai, Chenlin, 71 D’Arelli, Francesco, 5, 11 Daqin, 22 Dawson, Raymond, 19 de Barros, João, 3 de Capillas, Francisco Fernandez, 31 de Freycinet, Charles, 60 de Goes, Estavão, 13 De Groot, J.J., 34 de Guébriant, John Baptist, 72 de Lagranè, Theodore, 37 de la Servière, Joseph, 18 D’Elia, Pasquale, 12 del Tindaro, Mariano Rampolla, 61 de Magalhaes, Gabriel, 31 de Mendoza, Juan Gonzalez, 4 Deng, Xiaoping, 96 de Rada, Martin (Herrada), 4 de Rougemont, François, 6 de Sante, Duarte, 5 de Tournon, Charles Thomas Maillard, 32

Dominic Deng, Yiming, 85 Dong, Guangqing, 88 Du Halde, Jean Baptiste, 6 Dunn, George, 59

E Emperor Daoguang, 37 Emperor Guangxu, 58 Emperor Jiaqing, 35 Emperor Qianlong, 35 Emperor Sunzhi, 31 Emperor Wuzong, 21 Emperor Xianfeng, 56 Emperor Xizong, 22 Emperor Yongzheng, 33 Etchegaray, Roger, 105

F Fang, Xingyao, 118 Fan Xueyan, Joseph, 85, 110 Fan, Zhongliang, 111 Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences (FABC), 95 Fernandez Navarrete, Domingo, 6 Ferrata, Domenico, 61 Filippo Grimaldi, Claudio, 8 Foreign Ministry, 132 Francis An Shuxin, 107 Franco, Francisco, 83

G Gasparri, Pietro, 74 Gernet, Jacques, 26 Giampé, Ignatius, 53 Gianfranco Rota Graziosi, 116 Giovio, Paolo, 10 Giulianelli, Francesco, 58 Golden Horde, 47 Great Khan Shundi, 49 Great West, 24

INDEX

Guangqi Press, 106 Guangyuan Reform Manifesto, 138 Guo, Ruo-shi, 83 Guo, Xijin, 133

H Hamrin, Carol Lee, 141 Han, Dingxiang, 112 Herdtrick, Christian, 6 Hirth, Francis, 2 Holy See, 61 Hsieh, Shou-Kang, 77 Hua, Guofeng, 96 Huang, Bingzhang, 133 Huang, Chao, 22 Hu, Shih, 65

I Ignatius, Kung Pin-Mei (Gong Pinmei), 85 Intorcetta, Prospero, 6 Investiture Controversy, 142

J Jacobini, Ludovico, 59 Jarlin, Stanislaus, 70 Jiang, Qing, 96 Jiang, Zemin, 103 Jiao-an, 38 Jinde Catholic Social Service Centre, 106 Jingjiao, 21 Jin, Lugang, 134 Jin, Luxian, 104 Jin, Yangke, 134 Jiping, Zuo, 94 John Baptist Roman, 5 John B., Wu Cheng Chung, 105 John J., Lou Tseng-Tsiang, 69 John of Marignolli, 47

163

John of Montercovino, 3 John of Pian Carpini, 3 John Wu, Jingxiong, 78 Joseph Guo Jincai, 107 Joseph Han Zhihai, 112 Joseph Liu Xinhong, 107 Joseph Ma Yinglin, 107 Joseph Wei Jingyi, 112 Joseph Zen Zi-Kiun, 139 Julius Jia Zhiguo, 113 K Kangxi Emperor, 8 Kang, Youwei, 144 Khan, Kublai, 3 Kindopp, Jason, 141 King Louis IX, 48 Kircher, Athanasius, 6 Konig, Karl, 105 L Lai, Pan-Chiu, 146 Lamiaux, Louis François, 35 Lefebvre de Béhaine, Edouard A., 60 Legion of Mary, 84 Lei, Shiyin, 133 Les Missions Catholiques , 70 Liang, Qichao, 65 Li, Hongzhang, 57 Li, Hui, 134 Li, Huiyuan, 134 Lin, Sen, 77 Lišˇcák, Vladimír, 12 Li, Shan, 138 Liu, Bainian, 106 Liu, Genzhu, 134 Liu, Shifu, 65 Liu, Shuhe, 111 Liu, Xinhong, 133 Liu, Yuanren, 105 Li, Weiguang, 81

164

INDEX

Li, Weihan, 89 Li, Xiting, 88 Longobardi, Niccolò, 28 L’Osservatore Romano, 60 Louis Fan, Shouyi, 54 Lukas Li Jingfeng, 110 Lutheran World Federation, 97 Lu, Zhengxiang, 69

M Ma, Cunguo, 134 Ma Ji, Philip, 105 Manning, Henry E., 59 Mao, Zedong, 66 Margiotti, Fortunato, 23 Mariani, P., 109 Martini, Martino, 6 Martin Wu Qinjing, 112 Marxism, 130 Matthias Du Jiang, 107 May Fourth (1919) Movement, 64 Melchior Nunez Barreto, 3 Meyers, James T., 89 Mezzabarba, Ambrogio, 33 Michael Fu, Tieshan, 104 Millar, Ashley E., 8 Ming Dynasty, 23 Mingxuan, Wu, 31

N National church, 155 National Congress of Chinese Catholic Representatives, 87 Needham, Joseph, 98 Niccolò and Matteo Polo, 23 Noël, François, 12

O Opium Wars, 36 O’Sullivan, Molly, 93

Ouyi, Zhixu, 30

P Patronage, 37 Patronage System, 37 Paul Shi Chunjie, 112 Paul Zhao, Zhendong, 112 Pereira, Galeote, 3 Perestrello, Rafael, 3 Peter Lin Jiashan, 134 Petrelli, Giuseppe, 71 Pisani, Pietro, 72 Polo, Marco, 3 Pope Benedict XI, 48 Pope Benedict XV, 72 Pope Benedict XVI, 106 Pope Clement XI, 32, 49 Pope Francis, 118, 131 Pope Hennessy, 57 Pope Innocent IV, 2, 47 Pope John Paul I, 97 Pope John Paul II, 97 Pope John XXIII, 90 Pope Leo XIII, 57 Pope Paul VI, 91 Pope Pius X, 71 Pope Pius XI, 73 Pope Pius XII, 76 Propaganda, SCPF. See Sacred Congregation for Propagation of Faith Provana, Giuseppe, 54 Provisional Agreement on the Appointment of Bishops , 132

Q Qing Empire, 62 Qiying (Ch’i-ying), 37 Qu, Taisu, 26

INDEX

R Religious Affairs Bureau, 84 Riberi, Antonio, 78 Ricci, Matteo, 5 Rites Controversy, 28 Robinson, Lewis S., 34, 67 Rome Holy Office, 32 Ruggieri, Michele, 5 Rule by law, 151 Rule of law, 151

Theresa, Mother, 105 Three-self Movement, 83 Tianjin tragedy, 38 Trigault, Nicholas, 5

S Sacred Congregation for Propagation of Faith, 54 Sacred Edict , 32 Sacred Roman Empire, 142 Sarthou, John Baptist H., 61 Semedo, Alvaro, 6, 29 Seres, 2 Shangzhi (Wisdom) Press, 106 Shen, Bin, 138 Shengyu Guangxun, 33 Shen, Que, 29 Shushi, Ignatius Pi, 88 Simeoni, Giovanni, 60 Sinae, 2 Sinicization Policy, 121 Sin, James, 105 Sino-Vatican Agreement, 135 Socialism with Chinese characteristics, 124 Sodano, Angelo, 115 Spelta, Celestino, 56 State Religion, 143 Sun, Yat-Sen, 65 Su, Zhimin, 107

V Vagnoni, Alfonso, 29 Valignano, Alessandro, 4 Van Rossum, Willem, 74 Vatican, 71 Vatican’s Secretariat, 114 Verbiest, Ferdinand, 31 Vincent, Lebbe, 71 Vincent Zhu Weifang, 107 Volonteri, Simeone, 17 Voltaire, François, 8 von Bell, Adam Schall, 31 von Leibnitz, Gottried W., 8

T Tagliabue, François, 59 Taiping Rebellion, 38 Temur, Toghon, 49

U Unequal Treaties, 36 United Front Work Department (UFWD), 97

W Walsh, James E., 85 Wang, Chao, 132 Wang, Liangzuo, 86 Wang, Renlei, 107 Wang, Zheng-Ting, 75 Wank, David L., 148 Well, Audrey, 65 William of Rubruk, 3 Wolferstan, Bertram, 40 Wu, Yaozhong, 86 Wu, Zhihui, 65

X Xi, Jinping, 118

165

166

INDEX

Xu, Changzhi, 29 Xu, Guangqi, 26 Xu, Hongwei, 134

Yu, Liu, 12 Yunqi, Zhuhong, 29 Yu, Pin, 82

Y Yang, Guangxian, 31 Yang, Libo, 111 Yang, Xiaoting, 133 Yao, Shun, 134 Ye, Jianying, 96 Ye, Xiaowen, 114 Yinming, Matthias Duan, 93 Yuan Dynasty, 22 Yuan, Shikai, 69 Yuan, Wenhua, 88 Yu, Chunxi, 29 Yue, Fusheng, 133

Z Zanin, Mario, 78 Zeng, Guofan, 38 Zhang, Jiashu, 104 Zhan, Silu, 133 Zhou, Enlai, 87 Zhou, Jishi (Chow Chi-Shih), 86 Zhou, Weidao, 110 Zhuang, Jianjian, 133 Zhuhong. See Yunqi, Zhuhong Zhu, Rongji, 115 Zhu, Ying, 78 Zong, Huaide, 104