Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict: Social Revolution in Post-Independence Indonesia (1945-1949) 9789811508660, 9789811508677, 9811508666

Table of contents :
Foreword
Preface
From the Publishers
Introduction
Contents
About the Author
Chapter 1: The General Setting
1.1 The “Antithesis” of the Uleebalang – Ulema
1.2 Amir Husin Al Mujahid Movement
1.3 The Abduction of Amir Husin Al Mujahid
1.4 The Movement of Sayid Ali Alsagaf
Chapter 2: Regarding the Government
2.1 The Period of Resident Teuku Nya’ Arif
2.2 The Period of President Teuku Daudsyah
2.3 The Period Mr. S.M. Amin
2.4 The Period of Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara
Chapter 3: Regarding the Judiciary
Chapter 4: Regarding the Civil Servants
Chapter 5: Regarding the Parties
Chapter 6: Miscellaneous
6.1 Misconception About Democracy and Its Excesses
6.2 Excessiveness of Some Leaders
6.3 “Extreme Conservative” Religious Outlook
Annexes
Annex 1
Annex 2
Annex 3
Annex 4
Annex 5
Glossary

Citation preview

SM Amin

Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict Social Revolution in Post-Independence Indonesia (1945-1949)

Buku OBOR

Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict

SM Amin

Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict Social Revolution in Post-Independence Indonesia (1945–1949)

Buku OBOR

SM Amin Obor Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia

OBOR BOOKS grants Springer the exclusive right to market and sell the electronic and print versions of the Work in English language, in all countries in the world excluding the sale of print version in Indonesia. ISBN 978-981-15-0866-0    ISBN 978-981-15-0867-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

My first opportunity to read the book Atjeh Sepintas Lalu1 by Insider was in 1973, 23 years after the book was published. At that time, I was writing my master thesis, under the title “The Course of the National Revolution in Aceh,”2 at the Department of Politics, Monash University, in Melbourne, Australia. The university’s library has an excellent collection of books published in Indonesia, second only to the National Library in Canberra. It is fair to say that Monash University library is one of the libraries with the best collection of books on Indonesia. Atjeh Sepintas Lalu was one of the first books I read about Aceh politics. Hence I would not object if anyone would say that the book had shaped my paradigm on Aceh. I think I also need to say that although I’m originally from Aceh, born and raised there, my knowledge about Aceh politics after Independence was meager at best. This lack of historical understanding was due to the fact that since I was in the SR (Sekolah Rakyat, now SD or Sekolah Dasar – Primary School) until the SMA (Sekolah Menengah Atas – Senior High School), there was hardly any content on Aceh history in the curriculum. I remember clearly that one of the history books I read during my SMP (Sekolah Menengah Pertama – Junior High School) years only contained one page on the subject of Aceh, which covered the sultanate period. In SMA, the short glance into the history of Aceh stopped completely at the end of the Dutch and Japanese occupations. And even then, when it was available, the presentation of the subject was limited to dates of events. Unsurprisingly, the more detailed history subjects focused more on those about the kingdoms and the experiences of the Indonesian Independence in the island of Java. Obviously I am familiar with the rebellion movements of DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia  – Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army) in Aceh that began when I was in the third grade of primary school. I also heard the sounds of gunshot when the DI troops were attacking Bireuen. I also witnessed how the  (Jakarta: Fa Archapada, 1950).  Which I later adapted and published into a book titled Revolusi di Serambi Mekah (Revolution in the Porch of Aceh (Jakarta: UI Press, 1999). 1 2

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next day the TNI (Indonesian National Army) came to search the houses in the town door to door. It was only when my family was fleeing the town to the village, a few days after the rebellion broke, that I saw the fully armed TII – the Islamic Army – troops, passing by on their bicycles. After 3 months of taking refuge in the village, the onslaught of the “band,” as the town dwellers refer to the TII troops at the time, would always send my family and I to the dugout, which is called kurok-kurok in Acehnese dialect. As is known, the Darul Islam movement that spread from West Java under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo broke out in Aceh from 1953 to 1962. The fact that in Aceh the movement was led by ulema, namely, Teungku Muhammad Daud, was only known to me when I was in junior high school. However, it was not very clear to me who he was and why he started the rebellion. There was no “explanation” about it at all. I was even more uninformed about the political history of Aceh when I was studying at the University of Indonesia, because at the time, my focus of study was on the issues of Indonesian political history. One of the reasons for the people of Aceh’s and my lack of knowledge about Aceh was the limited number of books about the region published in the early 1950s. There were only a few books published not long after the breakout of the DI/ TII rebellion. And, of course, the books mostly explained the reasons why Daud Beureueh, the ulemas, and their supporters decided to revolt against Indonesia, whereas it was just a few years before that they stood together in the front lines to defend Indonesia’s proclamation of independence. Among those books is one titled Atjeh 1000 Tahun and Events of Teungku Daud Beureueh c.s.,3 written by an Acehnese journalist who lived in Medan, Dada Meuraxa. Another Acehnese writer, who lived in Jakarta at the time and was a former editor at Semangat Merdeka newspaper that was published in Kutaraja (now Banda Aceh) during the revolution, Tk Alibasjah Talsya, wrote a book titled Sedjarah dan Dokumen-dokumen Pemberontakan di Atjeh4. So, the two writers lived outside Aceh. There were a number of other books that responded to the rebellion of Darul Islam movement in Aceh. One of them was Sekitar Peristiwa Berdarah di Atjeh5 written by Mr. S.M. Amin, former Governor of North Sumatra. At the time North Sumatra covered three Presidencies, namely, Aceh, East Sumatera, and Tapanuli. The other books are Rahasia Pemberontakan Atjeh and Kegagalan Politik Mr. S.M. Amin,6 by A.H. Gelanggang, the pseudonym of T.A. Hasan, the residents of East Aceh who absconded to the Darul Islam movement. Another figure of dissident, Hasan Saleh, was a TNI captain who supported the Darul Islam and later on became Commander of the TII in Aceh, who wrote Revolusi Islam di Indonesia7.

 (Medan: Pustaka Hasmar, t.t.).  (Jakarta: Penerbit Kesuma, t.t.). 5  (Jakarta: Soeroengan N.V., 1956). 6  (Kutaraja: Pustaka Murni Hati, 1956). 7  (Darussalam [Sigli?]: Pustaka Djihad, 1956). 3 4

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The last book reveals some of the “ideological” aspects of the Darul Islam movement in Aceh. All the above mentioned books discuss issues on the Darul Islam revolt in Aceh. However, for various reasons, the revolt itself was related to the situation in Aceh during the first few years of the independence; hence the books were related to Atjeh Sepintas Lalu (Aceh some time ago). It is useful to realize that there were not many book writers in Aceh in the early 1950s, on any topics, such as social, cultural, and economic developments, let alone on politics and law. In this case, even lesser known writers hardly existed. Such a situation differed sharply from those of the previous centuries. History has recorded major writers of Aceh in gold ink on the subjects of religion and literature, namely, Syamsuddin as-Sumatrani and Hamzah Fansuri, who are famous throughout the Malay world. Not to mention literary works in the form of saga in Acehnese dialect by men of letters, such as Teungku Lam Rukam Do Karim and other writers who preferred to write anonymously. Among those, we should also remember the great name of Teungku Tjhik Pantee Kulu who wrote the Hikayat Prang Sabi which was highly successful in inflaming the fighting spirit of the Acehnese warriors and instigating fear enough for the Dutch colonial troops to tremble. It should be noted, though, that the great wars against the Dutch had somewhat discouraged many Acehnese writers. A new generation of Aceh writers only started to appear in the 1920s when the wars had gradually subsided. During the era, there were several major names, such as Hasbi as-Shidiqi, Ali Hasjmy, El Muhammadi, and Ismail Jakub. It is really interesting to observe the ups and downs of the Acehnese writers in relation to the era. “People come and go,” wise men say. There are many ways to explain this. First, the golden era of the great writers of the Aceh Sultanate ended with the collapse of the Aceh Kingdom. At that time, all elements of the society in Aceh joined the war against the Dutch colonialists. Most of the ulemas, who until then had been the sources of knowledge, were involved in the decades of rebellion again Dutch’s efforts to conquer them. The ulemas not only had no time to write but they had also been compelled to abandon the dayah (or pesantren – Islamic boarding schools). Under such conditions, there seemed to be only one ulema who had time to produce a monumental literary work, namely, Teungku Tjhik Pantee Kulu, with his book Hikayat Prang Sabi. Even then it seemed that the great ulema was “compelled” to write the book to inflame the spirit of resistance among the Acehnese people to fight the Dutch. The second reason is that the war against the Dutch went on for decades and had obliterated the local education system. Without it, Aceh was as good as totally ruined. It would need at least one generation for the region to be able to produce good writers after the Dutch offensives. To that extent, the first generation of writers born in the period of independence struggle were not fully the product of education of the new Aceh. Instead, most of them had left Aceh to be educated elsewhere, namely, in other parts of Sumatra, or Java, or even Egypt. Writers, such as Hasbi as-Shidiqi, Ali Hasjmy, El Muhammadi, Nur El Ibrahimy, and Ismail Jakub were the ones from this generation.

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In fact, there had been many more budding writers than the ones previously mentioned; however, their works never made it to the publisher. The reason was probably because there was simply no chance for this to take place. In the 1970s, I met a former bureaucrat during the Dutch colonial times and during the Japanese occupation, whose daily activity was mainly filled with conducting research on Aceh. He has a myriad of knowledge. However, when I asked him why he didn’t publish his writings, his answer was very simple: “Later, maybe.” For some people, the opportunity really never came. Hence, their knowledge was never publicly available. For other writers, opportunity came in their later days. Their works that should have been published in the 1940s and 1950s only appeared in the 1960s. Some even only came to surface in the 1980s. Indeed “it’s better late than never” as the saying goes. One of the hidden talents was that of H.M Zainuddin, who, among others, wrote the book Tarich Atjeh and Nusantara. Another example is M. Junus Djamil, who wrote the book Gadjah Putih.8 There is another reason why books on Aceh were not published for a certain period of time. The reason is related to the likelihood that the book to be published was against the mainstream of the local politics. Some writers were wary of putting pen to paper for fear of intimidation by certain elements that might feel disadvantaged by the book’s publication. I myself have had such experience in the 1990s (!) when my books, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik9 and Revolusi Serambi Mekah, were published. I experienced some intimidation in the form of anonymous letters sent to me, threatening to sue me. Fortunately, none of the intimidation materialized. However, there have been times when one is faced with a situation when one has to write and publish one’s book. There is that momentum for a writer to publish a book, namely, when he feels that the people really need his ideas. In this case, perhaps the writer thinks that the level of intimidation that he is faced with is not as significant as compared to the needs of the people for the information that he wants to convey. In this context I think the publication of the books, such as Sedjarah dan Dokumen-dokumen Pemberontakan di Aceh by Alibasjah Talsya and the book Atjeh 1000 Tahun dan Pemberontakan Teungku Daud Beureueh c.s. by Dada Meuraxa fall under this category. From a rather different perspective, the possibility of intimidation might have been almost insignificant. However, there was a kind of “compulsion” for someone to provide people with some information so as to prevent them from getting it from other sources from a different camp. There were some books that fell under this category in Aceh during the first years of independence. The most outstanding were those written by Abdullah Arif, both in Indonesian and in Acehnese dialect. The one written in Indonesian was Disekitar Peristiwa Pengchianat Tjoembok,10 whereas the

 (Kutaraja: Lembaga Kebudajaan Atjeh, 1958).  (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1990). The book was a translated version of my book, The Republican Revolt (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985). 10  (Kutaraja: Semangat Merdeka, 1946). 8 9

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one in Acehnese dialect was the series of Acehnese saga Seumangat Atjeh11. The publication of the books was aimed at defending the policies of the Acehnese ulemas who were controlling the Acehnese political stage at the time. From a different camp, there was Tusny Sjah, the pseudonym of Teuku Husin Sjah, who wrote Suasana Atjeh12 that defended the nobilities and rebuked the ulemas of PUSA (the Association of Aceh Ulemas). Where should Atjeh Sepintas Lalu be positioned within the mapping of books on Aceh written by authors from the region in the 1950s and 1960s as I previously mentioned? To answer such a question, first we must look at the scope of discussion in this book. The book describes the legal and political situation in Aceh in 1945–1949. As mentioned by the author in his Introduction part, the book explains “specifically the events and incidents that show dissatisfying circumstances” (the spelling has been revised accordingly, author). What the writer intended to mean was, the events and incidents related to the general situation, government, judiciary, civil servants, and life of the parties. Examining further the events and incidents brought forth by Insider in Atjeh Sepintas Lalu, the main issue was the dispute between two major streams of thoughts that cut across the people of Aceh during the era. The two major streams were one based on religious teachings and the other which was secular and non-religious. Since both streams had their own ideas and followers, what followed was the unavoidable emergence of groupings of people. In turn, the chances for physical conflicts were wide open. It was everybody’s secret that the supporters of the religious ideas were not solid since inside the group, there were some people with conflicting interests who at certain points might turn against the group, or support it when their interests matched. Such reality had already lingered since the 1920s, when there were ulemas who had been considered “stodgy”13 and in contrast to the rising of young reformist ones. The orthodox ulemas were highly uneasy with the arrival of Muhammadiyah in 1923; hence they were compelled to cooperate with the reformists. Some of the cooperation was temporary in nature, but some others lasted. The continuity of the cooperation depended on the orientation of orthodox ulemas, whom I would divide into two and call – for practical reasons – the puritan and the moderate. The reformist ulemas welcomed the cooperation enthusiastically. This is by the reason that on the one hand, the orthodox ulemas, both the puritans and the moderates, were no less than their own teachers. On the other hand, it was also because of the fact that Muhammadiyah was driven by non-Acehnese ulemas who were cooperating with the Uleebalang or Acehnese nobilities that they disliked. One highly outstanding example of cooperation between the orthodox and reformist ulemas was the establishment of PUSA in 1939. Another example of the extending hands of  (Kutaraja: Abdullah Arif, 1950).  (Jakarta: Teesyala, 1950). 13  My apologies for having to use the term, because it was the term used in those days. What was really meant by “stodgy” was “orthodox.” There were some who likened the term “stodgy ulema” to “traditional ulema.” 11 12

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the orthodox moderate ulemas to the reformists was their support of Darul Islam, despite the fact that the puritan ulemas were highly against the revolt. However, the relationship between the orthodox ulemas and the reformist ones was basically founded on principles of rivalry. All things considered, the orthodox Ulemas were incessantly threatened by the religious reforms maintained by PUSA. They were fully aware that PUSA ulemas’ intention was primarily to erode the orthodox ulemas’ teachings. Therefore, they would cooperate also with the other elements of Aceh that were fighting against PUSA at every opportunity. In the meantime, the supporters of secular thought in Aceh at the time were really solid. However, they were a minority group. Despite their secular thinking, they were also Muslims, to the extent that they were as pious as the ulemas. In general the group consisted of the nobility, their families, and relatives. Although many of them were educated in the madrasah, most of them had gone to Dutch-run public schools. Generally they were the opposite of PUSA, although there were a number of noble individuals that supported the local reformist organization. The dignitaries and figures from outside, which included the leaders of Taman Siswa, Muhammadiyah, and a handful of PUSA Ulemas, identified or even sided with them. Naturally the support given by some Muhammadiyah leaders and a number of PUSA ulemas to PUSA’s policies was not because they were secular in the first place. They didn’t like the policies of some PUSA leaders that were dominating Aceh government at the time. In many respects their identifying and siding with the non-religious group was not shown openly. From the political point of view, it could be concluded that ideas were galvanized in two major political camps. Prior to independence, the Dutch and the Japanese were always trying to equalize the two powers. Nonetheless, when the foreign powers disappeared from the land of Aceh, the equilibrium lost its balance. As a result, the PUSA ulemas were fighting head on with the nobilities in physical conflicts that broke at the end of 1945 and lasted until early 1946. The upshot was the disappearance of the real power of the nobilities. Without foreign power and with the collapse of the Uleebalang system, PUSA became the only dominant social and political authority throughout 1945–1949. Both the civilian and military powers were in their hands. Additionally, it was also supported by the fact that the Central Government had let PUSA domination operate somewhat smoothly. The Government did nothing because it was highly dependent on PUSA which had managed to mobilize the people of Aceh to support Indonesia’s independence. However, such trends did not necessarily mean PUSA was free of challenges. Indeed there were disputes and confrontations which arose, although they were few compared to its dominant influence. What remained of the Uleebalang influence did attempt to shake PUSA’s power. However, despite getting some support from a number of PUSA ulemas and orthodox ulemas, the endeavors failed completely. The Central Government had no willingness to intervene in defense of Acehnese nobility, preferring to take the role as intermediary in the conflicts taking place in in the province. The Central Government was fully aware that intervention would humiliate PUSA. The outcome of taking such action was clear: the ulemas of Aceh

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would stop supporting Indonesia’s fight for independence. For the Central Government, it was obviously an advantage to keep its hands off rather than risk a predicament of national division. The Central Government’s attitude toward PUSA differed greatly from its policy toward what happened in East Sumatra. When the social revolution broke out in East Sumatra in 1947, the Government sent a team to resolve issues of the Malay nobilities’ troves that were confiscated by the people there. In Aceh, however, the Central Government did nothing despite the overflowing protests and demands by the Uleebalang. In the absence of the Central Government’s power in Aceh, it was fair to say that the PUSA government there could run smoothly without central control. Anything could happen in such a situation. It was such a situation that Insider meant by “dissatisfying circumstances.” One of the reasons behind it was the differing point of view between the followers of the Ulemas and religious ideals and those of secular opinion. In spite of the circumstances, Insider believed that the people of Aceh had to be aware of what the “dissatisfying circumstances” were and how they had occurred. Yet, it was easier said than done to disclose the “dissatisfying circumstances” for concerns of being considered a critic, protester, or attacker on authority. Such criticism, protest, or attack would certainly open up opportunities for risky social, political, and even security circumstances. The reason was no other than the dual allegiances or cross-cutting loyalties of the elements that supported the religious and non-religious thoughts that would distort the grouping boundaries. In that regard, a “criticism” towards the authorities would be considered as a “protest” or even an “attack” against them. Furthermore, because power was dominated by the reformed ulemas, they would be the ones to feel “attacked.” In certain situations, such attack on the reformist ulemas could evolve into an assault towards the entire ulema as the onslaught might be interpreted as a threat on Islam. Therefore, whoever wanted or dared to expose the “dissatisfying circumstances” would eventually have to deal with the ulemas and their supporters. In such a situation, the revealer would risk his own personal safety. In addition to personal safety, there was another thing that would tend to be put under consideration, namely, friendship. Often during research for this work, there were feelings of awkwardness with regard to discussing some things, for the reason that the subject matter being discussed also involved someone or a group of people that we knew or who were even our friends. In my opinion, those were the issues raging in the minds of the writer of Atjeh Sepintas Lalu that made him opt to use a nom de plume. By using an alias, the writer wanted to inform that he knew exactly about “dissatisfying circumstances” occurring in Aceh in the years of 1945–1949, because he was truly an “insider.” Of course, as an “insider” he was the insider in the Aceh government at the time. However, he did not want the readers to know “who he was,” due to one of or the two reasons that I previously mentioned. Nevertheless, he felt it was his duty to uncover the “inside story” as his responsibility to the people of Aceh, although he realized that it was not easy for the Acehnese at the time to understand or even believe it.

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Who was the Insider? Is it necessary now to ask the question? I think the current generation of Aceh in particular needs to know. The nom de plume was quite interesting, moreover when connected to the title of the book he wrote, Atjeh Sepintas Lalu. For the most part, people who wanted to know about Aceh at a glance as told by the writer under a pseudonym had to understand that the story was sensitive. If it wasn’t so, why on earth did the writer feel the need to “hide” his real name? Was he cheating by hiding his identity? Not really, because, shrewd readers would be able to guess who the real “Insider” was by reading the five annexes that originated from the Aceh authority at the time, which were no other than the officials of the ulema circle, particularly PUSA. The two documents were signed by Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureueh as the Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo. The other three annexes came from the office of some officials who were critical of the “PUSA government” at the time, namely, the Governor of North Sumatra (the first one, author) and the Commissioner of the Central Government for North Sumatra. Mr. S.M. Amin had assumed the last two positions. I myself only believed that the Insider was Mr. S.M. Amin’s nom de plume after I read his other book, namely, Sekitar Peristiwa Berdarah di Atjeh (Issues Surrounding the Bloody Incidents in Aceh). There is a word used in the book that is the same as the one used in Atjeh Sepintas Lalu (Aceh at a Glance), namely, menyerupai (to look like), which is used uniquely by Mr. Amin – his popular name. What he means by menyerupai in both books is “that is,” or “namely,” or “like.” As far as I remember, I have never found such use of the word in other books. Nevertheless, I only became absolutely sure that Insider was the pseudonym of Mr. S.M. Amin when I interviewed him in Jakarta in 1975. At the end of the interview, he complimented me with the book Atjeh Sepintas Lalu. On the first page of the book, he wrote “Mementos from the Author,” and underneath it, he put his signature and name. While handing the book over to me, he said, “Insider was my nom de plume.” At the time I didn’t ask why he used a pseudonym. As a student of a doctoral program, I didn’t feel the need to ask such question. There was nothing wrong for a writer to use an alias. And it didn’t necessarily mean that he was afraid to be known. Nor was there a need to interpret that the book contained slander or other negative things. Mr. Amin was indeed far from being like that. He was not afraid because he loved Aceh. Although his parents were not originally from Aceh, he was born and raised in Aceh, in the Krueng Raba village (Banda Aceh). While his parents celebrated Kureng Raba by naming him after it, only a handful of people in Aceh and North Sumatra knew that he actually had a surname of Nasution. His “Aceh-nese” was made stronger as he married an Acehnese girl, a daughter of the nobility. The other reality was that he never fled from Aceh. After finishing his education in law that made him a meester in de rechten (master of law), he returned to Aceh and worked there. During the revolution, he stayed in Kutaraja and became the Governor of North Sumatra and the Commissioner of the Central Government for North Sumatra. It was only after the recognition of the RI’s sovereignty by the Dutch that he was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta. It was due

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to his Aceh-nese that he was reappointed as the Governor of North Sumatra with the main duty to resolve the Darul Islam conflict in Aceh. The book Atjeh Sepintas Lalu discusses a fragment of the history of Aceh. Looking at the book from the current perspective, it actually has become one of the fragments of Aceh history itself. From that perspective, the book is invaluable. Its republication, which is more than six decades after it was first made available, is even more invaluable. By reading it in the current context, we will be able to understand and interpret the events that had happened to Aceh at the time and understand Aceh’s development today. Of course, today’s Aceh is greatly different from Aceh of many decades ago. Now the dispute between the religious and the secular have been resolved, and religious values have been accommodated in Aceh’s current syariah legal system. The current generation of Aceh who is familiar with the situation in the past will be inspired by the explanation by Mr. Amin, the “Insider” in the book. Some of them will probably be simply amazed and say: “Oooh.” Such responses are appropriate since Mr. Amin depicted the situation in Aceh as he had experienced it, albeit through the perspective of a legal expert. Professor at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Indonesia Depok, Indonesia

Nazarudding Sjamsuddin

Preface

The book Atjeh Sepintas Lalu, written by Insider and published for the first time in 1950 by Fa Archapada, initially felt “mysterious” for the obscurity of the writer’s “nom de plume” and the unknown publisher. However, ever since I found the manuscript for the first time in Leiden in 1998, I have been very impressed with the book and was convinced that it was written by someone important, or by someone who was right in the arena of Aceh’s upheaval between 1945 and1949. One of the clues is an admission in the mysterious book’s preface that “All events and episodes mentioned were directly experienced by the writer.” For years I have been trying to find out about the important person, the witness of the history of Aceh, who was hiding behind the nom de plume “Insider.” The nom de plume itself implies that the writer was surrounded by events, someone “inside” in the truest sense of the word. If I’m not mistaken, I found out about the book for the first time from one of the writings by the Australian historian, Anthony Reid, who cited that the “Insider” was likely to be Mr. S.M. Amin, the first governor of North Sumatra and Aceh. Reid’s dissertation was about the 1946 bloody events in North Sumatra and Aceh, which was drawn from many literary sources, including the book by “Insider.” In 2011 I was granted the opportunity by the family of the late Mr. S.M. Amin to look into and examine the important man’s archives and books in his family’s residence in Sumenep Street, Menteng, Central Jakarta. There I became increasingly convinced about who the Insider was. The book, with red and white cover, was placed together with dozens of other pieces of literature that he had written. The late Mr. S.M. Amin’s children also told me that they used to have a lot of those books in the house and that the Insider was no other than their late “Papi.” The family gave me permission to find a publisher in order to reproduce the book by “Insider” as it has become increasingly difficult to find. The content of the book is greatly important to expose and learn about one side of the history in continuously turbulent Aceh. To get a better understanding about the context of Mr. S.M. Amin’s (Insider) book and the history of Aceh’s conflict, I decided to contact Prof. Dr. Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, from the University of Indonesia, who wrote a dissertation on the Aceh revolt. My intention was to invite Nazaruddin Syamsuddin

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to write an introduction for the republished version of the book. In one of Mr. S.M. Amin’s family archives, I located some files in the form of interview correspondence between Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, who was at the time a postgraduate student in an Australian university, and the late Mr. S.M. Amin. In my communication with Prof. Nazaruddin, as he mentioned also in the introduction to this book, it transpired out that Mr. S.M.  Amin told Prof Nazaruddin that the former was the Insider, the author of the book Atjeh Sepintas Lalu (Aceh at a Glance). To maintain the currency of the book, I changed the title to Understanding the History of Aceh Conflict. I would like to thank the family of Mr. S.M. Amin, namely, Mrs. Ibu Siti Sofiani Iskandarsyah, Mrs. Aida Ismeth, Mrs. Dewi Andang, and Mr. Riawan Amin, for their enthusiasm in allowing me to republish this work. My utmost appreciation also goes to Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia for their support in republishing this very important but forgotten old manuscript. It is our hope that this publication will heighten critical studies not only in the history of Aceh but also in the history of Indonesia in the early years after the establishment of the republic. Medan, Indonesia 7 March 2014

Phil Ichwan Azhari

From the Publishers

This book is the result of a co-publishing agreement between OBOR and Springer which seeks to publish notable works from Indonesia translated from Bahasa Indonesia into English. The original work titled Atjeh Sepintas Lalu (Aceh at a Glance) was republished as Memahami Sejarah Konflik Aceh by OBOR in 2014. The author, SM Amin, passed away in 1993, and his daughter, Dr. Dewi Andang, has granted the publishers permission to publish the English edition posthumously. This was not without its challenges, as any updates to the original text could not be substantial, beyond what OBOR was able to carry out based on the manuscript reviews. Furthermore, while footnotes were presented to consolidate sources and provide further explanation in the original and 2014 version in Bahasa Indonesia, no comprehensive reference list ever existed. As such, the publishers have included the original footnotes as endnotes, having no full bibliography of sources available. While this is most unusual in an academic text, we felt that an English version of the book still warranted publication to be made available to the broader international scholarly community who is interested in Indonesian history and politics, and that of Aceh specifically. For reasons noted by the reviewers and as Preface by Dr. Phil. Ichwan Azhari and Foreword by Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin confirm, this book has value as “a very important historical document, not only for the history of Aceh, but for the history of modern Indonesia.” We thus present the English translation to be taken as a version of record of an influential historical book in Indonesia by a key political figure whose personal account of this underreported period of Indonesia’s postindependence history remains of interest and of value.

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Introduction

A friend is he, who is willing to advise me (Freely translated from Een vriend is hij, die mij mijn feilen toot)

This small book was published with the intention that it could be used as an intermediary in conveying to the public some important events and incidents in Aceh, covering a period of about 4 years, from the Proclamation of Independence to the transfer of sovereignty. The events and incidents conveyed in this work, while useful material, is far from being complete. Firstly, they can also be used by every person who wants to know the background of the difficulties arising as a result of the events and incidents that had to be dealt with in the period of history in Aceh. Secondly, this resource could also be used by the government as a store of information, raising the prospects for an appropriate conclusion to be made about the condition of the people and the desires of the members of Acehnese society. To fulfill this purpose, naturally the account is about events and incidents that had caused troubles and showed dissatisfying circumstances, whereas the events and incidents that did reflect a situation to be proud of are not going be conveyed because they were beyond the scope of the purpose of the account. The “objective” elements in preparing this are the main focus. However, there is a possibility that there are words that may “affect” some people. Should that be the case, please be so good as to forgive and consider that it is not what the writer intended. Actually, the possibility of offense caused lies in the initial presumption. However, after considering the advantages and disadvantages, the writer concludes that the possibility that this may “affect” some people should not become the reason to withdraw from the intention to publish this book. The consideration that this short account will bring benefit for the public is more important than the desire to be sensitive to some people’s feelings.

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Introduction

All of the events and incidents told in this book have been closely experienced by the writer. Unfortunately the writer does not have formal records, and this account is based solely on memory. Therefore, it is possible that there would be something not quite conforming with reality, but the author believes that if it was an oversight, then it must be something that was not very important. Initially it was the writer’s ambition to prepare a book that is rather broad and comprehensive. Unfortunately, time restriction did not allow this to happen, while the demands for “currency” require the book to be published immediately. The intention to publish a broader and more comprehensive book remains, and hopefully, it can be realized in the future. Hopefully the publication of this book is intended as an introduction to a more comprehensive publication, which together fulfills the desire of the writer’s heart. Aceh at the end of January 1950

Author

Contents

1 The General Setting ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 1.1 The “Antithesis” of the Uleebalang – Ulema ��������������������������������������   2 1.2 Amir Husin Al Mujahid Movement������������������������������������������������������  10 1.3 The Abduction of Amir Husin Al Mujahid ������������������������������������������  13 1.4 The Movement of Sayid Ali Alsagaf����������������������������������������������������  14 2 Regarding the Government������������������������������������������������������������������������  19 2.1 The Period of Resident Teuku Nya’ Arif����������������������������������������������  19 2.2 The Period of President Teuku Daudsyah��������������������������������������������  21 2.3 The Period Mr. S.M. Amin�������������������������������������������������������������������  27 2.4 The Period of Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  32 3 Regarding the Judiciary������������������������������������������������������������������������������  43 4 Regarding the Civil Servants����������������������������������������������������������������������  47 5 Regarding the Parties����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  51 6 Miscellaneous������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  55 6.1 Misconception About Democracy and Its Excesses ����������������������������  55 6.2 Excessiveness of Some Leaders������������������������������������������������������������  60 6.3 “Extreme Conservative” Religious Outlook ����������������������������������������  66 Annexes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  69 Glossary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  83

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About the Author

Sutan Muhammad Amin, whose nickname was Krueng Raba Nasution, was born in the town of Lhoknga, currently in Aceh Besar District. To be more precise, he was born by the bank of a small river called Raba River, or Krueng Raba in Acehnese dialect, on 22 February 1904 to the couple Mohammed Taif, a principal of a Malay Elementary School during the Dutch East Indies colonial rule, and Siti Medina, a loving stay-at-home mother with great concern and affection for her family, who came from Batang Natal, Mandailing. He had two older sisters and two older brothers and a younger brother, namely, Amir, Zubaidah, Munir, Nurjani, and Adham. He was the fifth child of six siblings. In 1912, his father, who registered his birth year as 2 years younger, enrolled him at Europeesche Lagere School (ELS – an elementary level school) in Sabang where he studied for 3 years before he moved to an ELS in Solok in 1915. His schooling opportunities were none other than the result of the Ethical Policy adopted by the Dutch Indies government since 1903, which gave indigenous and Chinese descendants an opportunity to study at the European Elementary School. He then moved to Sibolga in 1916, and in 1918, he resumed his ELS school in Tanjung Pinang and finished elementary school education level there. Then with the blessing and support of his parents, he went to STOVIA, a medical school in Batavia, in 1919, following in his brother Munir’s footsteps. But the idea of going to STOVIA was not fully his heartfelt wish but of his father who really hoped for him to become a doctor. At STOVIA, he began to be actively involved in the national movement, albeit at the time the movement was still confined to regional sentiments. He joined the Jong Sumatranen Bond movement, which became one of the starting points of the nationalism that his father had taught him since he was a child. He, however, could only manage to stay in STOVIA for 2 years, due to the emotional turmoil of someone who wanted something different, something new. Then in 1921, he moved to MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs), which was a junior high school level education, in Batavia, where he was a high-achieving teenager that made some of his teachers admiringly amazed. Finally in 1924, he obtained a MULO Diploma with flying colors. Hence, it was not difficult for him to  

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About the Author

be accepted as a student of AMS (Algemeene Middelbare School) in Yogyakarta. He had to continue his studies in Yogyakarta, because at that time, there was no AMS in Batavia. There was only one school of that kind at that time, which was in Yogyakarta. In the AMS, his sense of nationalism flourished even more, influenced by his friends who came from various regions of the archipelago. It was also in the AMS that he became acquainted with M.  Yamin, a friend whom he considered smart and was always throwing ideas about union, unity, and independence of a nation. He continued to grow into a bright young man, not only intellectually but also with regard to maturity in his emotional and social intelligence. By mid-1927, he finished his school well and obtained the Diploma from AMS Afd B Yogyakarta. With all the capabilities that he had, in 1927, he was finally accepted at Rechtschoogeschool, a law school in Batavia which later became the current Faculty of Law at the University of Indonesia. Being a lawyer had always been his dream since childhood. And at the time, holding the status of a higher education student was prestigious in the eyes of society. People treated the well-educated youth with deference. Even the Dutch teachers treated them with respect. In short, educated youth were considered exceptional. The Dutch East Indies government, however, was always highly suspicious and vigilant against the higher education students. In their opinion, they were already matured in their thoughts and enjoyed reputable social status, so they were more capable of critical thinking and would often criticize the Dutch East Indies government. They were wary that youth movement might erode the strength of their colonial power. During his education at the Law School, it was indeed true that he had reached the highest point of his nationalist movements as a youth. By that time, the movement had become a national rather than provincial in nature. The previously regional organizations had merged into national organizations. One of them was the Great Commission of Indonesian Youth (Komisi Besar Indonesia Muda (KBIM)), of which Amin was one of the creators. The youth movement reached its peak with the Youth Congress on 28 October 1928, with a resolution which pledged to uplift the spirit of youth nationalism even more. He was one of the initiators of the youth congress. In 1933, he successfully finished his law school and earned the title of Meester in de Rechten (Master in Law or Mr.) with an excellent grade to become a lawyer (advocate). After he finished his law school at the Batavia Law School, he later returned to serve in his homeland. On 16 July 1934, he was accepted to work as Advocaat Procureur (lawyer and attorney) based in Kutaradja with the position of lawyer and attorney of the Court of Justice of Medan. Nonetheless, his father preferred for him to work as an employee of the Dutch East Indies government where college graduates were in great demand by the offices of the colonial government. His father’s preference was based on the fact that he himself was working for the Dutch East Indies government and such a position was highly respected by the people at that time and would lead to economic prosperity due to the considerable salary. But he was a young man with unshakable assertiveness, and the nationalism that he believed in had taught him to be faithful to his nation and people. His conviction made him adamant to work as an advocate despite the not always promising financial returns.

About the Author

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During his work as an advocate, he handled many problems of the people of Aceh, especially in Kutaradja, where he had to deal with various cases of individuals who were faced with the law. He was known as responsible, honest, and courageous in defending the truth, judicious, and wise. Such was the impression embedded in the minds of the people of Aceh and the Uleebalang about him. He maintained a good relationship with the Uleebalang of Aceh, and that association had led him to find his soul mate. In Kutaraja, he found his true love. A fair and charming Acehnese girl, named Cut Maryam who was born on 20 August 1920, from Lhoknga stole his heart, and they were together until the end of his life. Both of them got acquainted with the help of his relatives. The Acehnese girl was 17 years old, which at the time was considered a mature age for women to marry. They got married on 17 October 1937. From their marriage, they had five children, four daughters and a son, namely, Siti Ainomi, Siti Sofiani, Siti Aida Zulaika, Siti Ratna Dewi, and Ahmad Riawan. Amin worked as an advocate in Aceh for 7 years until finally the Dutch were temporarily expelled and the Japanese came to occupy Indonesia in 1942. Since then, he was appointed as a judge (simpankan) in Sigli. There, he served wholeheartedly by delivering the fairest verdict in all the cases he presided. In 1943, he, who had become renowned as a nationalist figure, was appointed as the director of Kutaradja Secondary School and served as a teacher in the school, where he delivered moral education to all his students, instilling a great love of the homeland. He also became an educator who was much loved, obeyed, and respected by all his students. As a result of his teachings, a few years later, many of his students joined the Student Army of Aceh that took part in the struggle to free Indonesia from Japan. In the same year, he became a member of the Homeland Protection Agency and later served as a member of the Aceh DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah  – Regional People’s Representative Council) during the Japanese occupation. Finally, after relentless struggles for independence, on 17 August 1945, President Ir. Soekarno and Vice President Drs. Mohammad Hatta triumphantly proclaimed the Indonesian nation’s independence. After its proclamation, all issues concerning the administration of Indonesia as a new nation-state began to be established. One of the government’s policies at the time was to divide Indonesia into eight provinces, of which one of them was the Province of Sumatra with Mr. Teuku Muhammad Hasan as the governor. As it turned out, the new nation-state of Indonesia, in general, and the Province of Sumatra, in particular, were going through highly complex problems, and the most threatening was the Dutch attempts to seize Indonesia again with the help of allied troops. So, after some consideration, the Province of Sumatra was divided again into three provinces in compliance with the resolution of the session of the House of Representatives of Sumatra on 16–20 April 1946. He was then appointed as the junior governor of North Sumatra, set by Vice President Drs. Mohammad Hatta. On 14 April 1947, he was subsequently sworn in as the governor of North Sumatra, and since then, he began his service as a governor to establish the existence of Indonesian independence through the Province of North Sumatra by running the civil administration with its various policies and sacrifices.

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About the Author

Later on, based on the mandate of Law No. 10 of 1948 on the Province of North Sumatra that officially governed the division of Sumatra into three provinces, with the enforcement of a presidential decree by President Ir. Soekarno dated 30 May 1948, Amin was officially dismissed as junior governor and later appointed as governor of the North Sumatra Province. Then on 6 June 1948, he was sworn in by President Ir. Soekarno himself who was at that time in Aceh. He was among the only three Indonesian governors in the course of the nation’s history who was directly sworn in by the president. During his time as the governor of North Sumatra Province, he issued various sensible policies so that in the critical times when the Dutch almost managed to control the entire territory of Indonesia, the North Sumatra Province remained secure to demonstrate Indonesia’s fervent existence. Also in the same year, he was appointed as a judge at the Appellant Court of Bukittinggi. However, when the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) was established at the end of 1949, he was later dismissed as governor since all authorities were taken over by the military governor. He was subsequently transferred to assume the task of government commissioner for the Region of North Sumatra in 1950. In accordance with his assignment, he and his family then moved to Jakarta and worked as a lawyer there. On 6 October 1953, he was again appointed as governor of North Sumatra Province, making it his second period serving as governor in North Sumatra. He was called in again to serve North Sumatra due to the considerable distress happening in the region. Therefore, he, who was a strong and charismatic figure in the eyes of all people of North Sumatra, returned to resolve the various conflicts. In 1956, his time of service in North Sumatra was terminated, and he was later transferred to join the Cabinet of the Minister of Home Affairs in Jakarta. He was one of the initiators of Regional Autonomy at that time, until 31 August 1956 when he assumed the position as the chairman of the Committee of Regional Division of Indonesia (Implementing Regional Government). To honor all his achievements in the political arena, he was appointed governor of Riau Province and was sworn in on 27 February 1958. Later, he was discharged in 1960 and assigned to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta. On 20 May 1961, he received the Satyalencana medal of honor during the commemoration of independence from President Ir. Sukarno. From then on until the 1980s, he actively worked to write books about the law and his critical views of the state of Indonesia at the time. He has written 20 books in his lifetime, 12 of them were published in Medan, Jakarta, and Penang while the other eight have not yet been published, despite the fact that the books that he had written are highly qualified and carried with them the great value of his mind that was always busy pondering government issues and caring about the course of the Indonesian nation. On 8 August 1991, he again received another medal of honor, namely, the Bintang Jasa Utama, which was signed by President Soeharto. Then on 13 November 1991, he received the Bintang Legiun Veteran honorary medal, signed by the head of the Legion of Veterans of the Republic of Indonesia.

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16 April 1993 was a day of mourning both for Amin’s family and for all the people of Indonesia – the day he breathed his last. The song Gugur Bunga (“The Falling Petals” – a song of mourning usually sung/played to commemorate fallen heroes in Indonesia) was hummed with grief. He died at the age of 89. He remains in the people’s memory as a wise teacher for the future of the Indonesian nation through the historical accounts that he had written and has been quoted by the pens of the young generation and through his books. On 10 November 1998, he received the medal of honor of the Bintang Mahaputra Utama, signed by the president of the Republic of Indonesia, B.J. Habibie. Eleven years later, on 10 November 2009, he yet again received the medal of honor of Bintang Mahaputera Adipradana, signed by President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Chapter 1

The General Setting

The August 17 1945 Proclamation of Independence that was broadcast throughout all corners of the world had led to anxiety. Although it was declared in August, the proclamation was only known to the Acehnese in mid September 1945. It brought in some fresh air because before the declaration was broadcast, the people seemed to be in waiting for something. For the general public in the region the capitulation of the Japanese inevitably indicated the return of the Dutch to the region. It never crossed their mind that it might bring with it changes in the country’s state administration. During the era of waiting the people were divided into three ways. The first grouping, which was the largest, was the group of people who were waiting quietly without paying too much attention to what might happen. They were not “politically minded” and would accept whatever might come with an open heart. The second was the group of people who were very happy and excited with the capitulation of the Japanese. This group aspired for the return of Dutch power in the country. Most of the people in the second group still kept with them the sweet memory of the good life that they enjoyed during the times when the Dutch were still in power and before the Japanese took control of the area. Those people who, during the Dutch regime, assumed high positions that provided them with opportunities and lives with luxury and wealth. For these people the capitulation of the Japanese meant the return of Dutch power, which in turn implied the return of a life of pleasure, grandeur, and luxury. The third group consisted of people who appeared calm on the outside, but were actually very restless in the inside. They were anxious about the consequences that might happen if the Japanese left and the Dutch returned to occupy the region. The return of the Dutch was their utmost fear. Some people in this group took an “active” and respected role, both during the landing and occupation of the Japanese. A small part of these people actually had reasons to fear the arrival of the Dutch. Many of them, principally for the sake of their own selves or their group, but disguising it as the public’s, had done profound disservice to the people during the times of the Japanese occupation. They had gained high positions and ranks; and © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7_1

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1  The General Setting

they had manipulated the opportunities resulting from such positions and ranks for their own and their group’s benefit. They were former loyal followers of the kingdom of Japan. And they expressed their Japanese loyalty to the extent that in their daily life they did their best to act like the Japanese in attitudes and behavior. It is manifested in the way they walked, talked, expressed things, and even in their character and temperament; in short in everything – both good and bad. They had forgotten that nothing stays forever in this world and mistakenly thought that the Japanese power in the region would last forever. Consequently, they duly followed all commands from their superior without any sympathy towards the people. If necessary, the commands would be implemented with intimidation, and quite often with violence. It was obvious that for them a permanent power of the Japanese in the region was a matter of life and death. Initially there seemed to be nothing apparent that would become a point of conflict between the three groups mentioned earlier. They seemed to live separately in each of their own minds with no connection between one another. Gradually, however, things that had caused contention between them began to surface. The group that wanted the return of Dutch power began to accumulate the unbecoming attitudes and behavior of the latest mentioned group during the Japanese occupation period. They started to employ tactics in order to find out about and record the names of each person that had cooperated with the Japanese and everything that might put pressures on the “collaborators”. Nonetheless, the party that had been under scrutiny immediately reacted against it, which then led to a tense situation. Just when the tension hit the highest point, the news that the Indonesian leaders had proclaimed independence of the people of Indonesia was announced. The Proclamation of Independence brought about very good effects on the current circumstances. The tension instantly subsided. Unity among all people, groups and layers of society was restored. People reunited and took a unanimous stand in an attempt to fulfill the substance and objectives of the proclamation. All in all it proves that the people of Aceh still longed for independence and were more than willing to sacrifice anything to keep it.

1.1  The “Antithesis” of the Uleebalang – Ulema It is highly regrettable that the unity and unanimity of purpose did not last. Suspicion arose and obliterated the highly honored unity and unanimity of purpose. The people were then divided into two groupings, which eventually became impossible to be reconcile, namely between the Uleebalang (feudal landlords) and the Ulema. In point of fact conflicts between the two groups were by no means newly arising. Such antagonism, albeit inwardly kept, had epitomized the relationship between the warlords and the Ulemas for decades. The conflict constituted rivalry between adat (custom or tradition) and (Islamic) law. The king as the custom or traditional leader (“adathoofd”) preserved the continuity of the tradition, while the ulemas, at least a small number of them, held positions within the state government as judges

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overseeing affairs of marriage and reconciliation, with the aspiration and attempts to eradicate anything related to custom with the purpose of replacing it with Islamic rules and regulation. Such rivalry had remained latent due to the lack of chances for it to flare up. Circumstances – in relation to the organization of governance in each Zelfbestuur (self-government), where the uleebalang still ruled as kings with full legislative, executive, and judiciary power over all affairs in their areas – did not leave any room for maneuver for the people under such rules to realize their aspiration in case it was not in accordance with applicable rules and norms. However, for those who lived under the Zelfbestuur community and who paid reasonable attention to current issues within the society it was clear and obvious that the realization of the ideals perceived and conceived in the hearts and minds of most of the people was only waiting for its good time. When the time came, the enactment of the ideals would surely begin, albeit with force. The good chance came with the arrival of the capitulation of the Japanese. The capitulation led to a period where there was practically no government and the emergence of a “gezagsvacum” (power vacuum) where every person could do as he wished, in an arbitrary manner. The laws and regulations of state, or the traditional custom and manner that previously ensured the perfection of lifes journey in a community disappeared. A power vacuum lead to a circumstance where weapons were the only rulers. The two disputing parties, the Uleebalang and the Ulema parties, were actively rallying each of their troops. The former party mainly consisted of the nobilities and their relatives, as well as the group of people, mostly of advanced age, who had been loyal to their kings and felt indebted. This was in part due to the help and support they had received for generations. The second party consisted of the clergy, the youth, and those who had been dissatisfied with their kings. For reason of principle and the ideals of eradicating the Zelfbestuur system, they sided with the clergy. Some sought to take revenge due to some of the kings’ conduct which was perceived as unfair or cruel. The number of supporters of the latter party gradually grew so large that it surpassed the number of the former. This was not unexpected. In general the kings’ conduct towards their people had been such that the people’s general attitude towards their kings, despite their appearing as respectful and loyal, was essentially influenced by fear and hate. The organization of the Ulema’s struggle was based in some parts of Pidie, in one of the villages, namely Are, near Sigli. The Headquarters in this village led the attempts of preparation to end the centuries of rules of the Uleebalang in the area. Likewise, the Uleebalang party didn’t want to miss the chance on confrontation with the Ulema. The latter party’s Headquarter was located in some part of Lam Menlo, namely at Cumbok village. The preparation by the two parties to launch their “war strategy” was finalized in November, and it was just a matter of waiting for an incident to happen, one that could be used as a reason to start an attack. The long awaited event finally arrived. Due to the pressures by the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Army, or TKR) the Japanese troops that were

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1  The General Setting

still situated in Sigli and assigned by the allied troops to maintain security and order were prepared to surrender their arms. The Japanese army then announced that they would surrender their arms, but instead of surrendering them to the People’s Security Army they would only surrender them to the “people”. Unsurprisingly the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat rebuffed the Japanese army’s proposal. The TKR’s consideration that as the state apparatus responsible for the whole people’s safety and security they were the ones that had the authority to receive the handover of the Japanese firearms instead of the “people” was correct. On the contrary, the Ulema and Uleebalang parties were also vigorously trying to get the arms for their own benefit, hence leading to a quite interesting circumstance that attracted attention. Three groups of people, namely the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, the Uleebalang party, and the Ulema party, were struggling as adversaries to get hold of the weapons that would be an absolute requirement in defending the interest of each party. Whereas behind the scenes, provocateurs magnified the dispute. Disagreements became increasingly tense. The impression was that they could not be peacefully resolved. The government envoys from Kutaraja who tried to help find a peaceful resolution to the dispute ended with no result. Likewise, the envoys from Medan sent by the Governor of Sumatra ended in failure. The failed attempts by the government envoys could not be laid at the feet of the government. All things considered it was easy to conclude that the disagreements could not be peacefully resolved, regardless of the person assigned to lead them to that end. Indeed, neither the Uleebalang nor the Ulema party wanted a peaceful resolution. Both parties wanted to settle the conflict with weapons, which was a solution that would have a certain (positive) conclusion on who would hold the power in the region in the future. For the disputing parties it was a matter of “to be or not to be”. The second important factor, as earlier alluded to, was the role of the Japanese army in the dispute. The Japanese army was taking advantage of the favorable circumstance to map out their “strategy”. The situation as a result of the dispute provided them with a possibility of an “afleidings maneuver” (diversionary maneuver). To divert the unwanted attention to the Japanese army units that were still scattered throughout the region, they waged a “fluister campagne” (whisper campaign) that aimed at circulating news that could widen the gap between the disputing parties, to preserve the dispute. If public attention stayed focused on the disputes, the Japanese could avoid unwanted attention. The Japanese were successful in their attempts. Their own security, which was initially threatened by several offensives against some of their military posts in the area, was restored. The situation became increasingly precarious. One night in November, around midnight, a large number of villagers from around the town of Sigli, armed with daggers, (rencong), and some rifles, entered Sigli and gathered at the house of Gunco Sigli and at that of the Uleebalang of Pidi. They were the followers of the Uleebalang party. They soon prepared themselves to take control of the town by deploying guards in “strategic” locations and scrutinized the traffic. They conducted quite a few examinations and arrests. Anyone suspected of taking the Ulema’s side was scrutinized and arrested.

1.1  The “Antithesis” of the Uleebalang – Ulema

5

Their adversaries soon reacted. Not long after the occupation of Sigli by the Uleebalang party, the Ulema party mobilized a huge rally, which consisted of thousands of people young and old, who came from the villages around Sigli also. Fully armed, and in orderly rows, they marched into Sigli while shouting the name of Allah and the Prophet. The rally circled around the town through the main roads. It was clearly obvious that the rally would end in bloodshed. The Uleebalang party that was occupying the town had been ready to take the necessary measures. Suddenly the sound of a gunshot was heard, followed by several more. In an instant the protesters retreated from the town and organized their defense in the outskirts. The gunfire from the town was responded to fiercely. The battle became increasingly violent and went on for 3  days and three nights. The number of casualties was by no means small. The Tentara Keamanan Rakyat under the command of Colonel Syamaun Gaharu, Major T.A.  Hamid, and Lieutenant Bachtiar and the troops that had been obliged to maintain security were powerless. The government in Kutaraja deployed a number of troops to help the TKR. The battle in the town stopped as a result of the army’s efforts. The army then made a provision that all followers of the Uleebalang party that were occupying the town had to leave in the shortest time possible; and likewise, commanded the Ulema Party that was still holding on in the outskirts to also leave their defenses. Both the followers of the Uleebalang and the Ulema parties were forced to return to their respective villages. Both parties complied with the rule. However, anyone who would think that the compliance by the two parties meant everything was resolved was mistaken. Peace between the two warring parties was certainly not established, prospects of the situation returning to normal in a short time were short-sighted rosy interpretations of the circumstances. A battle later on took place outside the town. Both opponents exerted every effort, morally and materially, in terms of human resources and weaponry, in pursuing their goals. One of the parties spent their whole energy and thoughts to crush their opponents in order to seize power. Whilst the other side was attempting to defend the power that they’d held heritably for hundreds of years. In the battle that didn’t recognize peace, the fight would decide the life and death of the warring groups. Actions that really offended the sentiments of humanity, those that should not have been done by a nation that had achieved a high level of intelligence, really happened. The sentiments had lingered in the hearts of the followers of both parties, impelled by hate and resentment that had flourished in decades and handed down from one generation to another. Such factors caused the battles to rage maliciously without taking into account of God’s prohibition and command. The battles between the two parties continued for more than 2 months. Everything concerning people’s livelihood was halted in the war zones. Farmers, fishermen, tradesmen, all left their work behind and joined the conflict, resulting in an incalculable amount of material loss. At first there were signs predicting a victory on the Uleebalang’s side. Faced with such a situation, the government in Kutaraja, under the pressure of the Regional National Committee whose members consisted mainly of those who tended to lean

6

1  The General Setting

towards the Ulema’s side, sent an ultimatum to the Uleebalang party to stop the fight, with a warning that if they were not compliant, they would be regarded as rebels against the government of the Republic of Indonesia, and, as a consequence, an action, including a violent one, would be taken to deal with the troubles. The ultimatum did not yield the intended result. The Uleebalang party that was presented with the ultimatum, that was in a strong strategic position, and was aware that the official army’s weaponry was inadequate, ignored the ultimate and went on with their offensives. Massive battles continued to rage with countless numbers of casualties, both in terms of human and material losses. The government of Kutaraja was forced to take military action. From Kutaraja strong troops consisting of those who had had experience in battle were deployed. The big canons that had not been used, together with the experts, were also deployed to the war zones. In a short time the Uleebalang party’s “fortress” in Lami Meulo could be put under control, and the collapse of its defense ended the 2-month war that had inflicted heavy casualties and caused significant numbers of human and material losses. The end of the battles meant the end of the power of the Uleebalang in Aceh. The end of the centuries of power of the Uleebalang also meant “radical” changes in the “structure” of the regional government, which also heralded the arrival of a new era. The new aim was to establish order in order to establish a more stable government. The “antithesis” of Uleebalang-Ulema that had caused massive battles in Pidi, ended the power of the Uleebalang. A centuries old Acehnese power was now gone, which did not only mean a structural change in the society in Pidi, but it also affected the structure of society of the whole populace of Aceh. In every part of Aceh, namely in the residencies in the East and West, in the North and South, and also in the Central, the Uleebalang’s defeat brought with it the end of their authority as the “adathoofd” or traditional leader. In every corner of the residencies of Aceh the Ulemas took action and forced the active Uleebalang to surrender their authority to them. Most of the Uleebalang had already felt despondent by their counterparts’ defeat in Pidi. Immediately after receiving the news of the defeat they succumbed to the Ulemas’ demands. Some of them didn’t even wait for the demands of transfer of authority, such as some of the Uleebalang from Aceh Besar who, upon receiving the news that the battles had ended, immediately surrendered their power to the government in Kutaraja to be handed over to the designated official. In consequence, the regional and the Zelfbestuur governments were concurrently eliminated, and replacement regional units under the term “negeri” (state) with area sizes similar to the size of the vanished Zelfbestuur were established. The government of Kutaraja then passed stipulations concerning the appointment of leaders who would govern the states. By reason that the stipulations were passed under the instructions of the faction that had succeeded in seizing power it was not surprising that all positions of the head of state fell into their hands, and the result was easily predicted. Ever since then, all issues related to the matters concerning the village

1.1  The “Antithesis” of the Uleebalang – Ulema

7

people in Aceh, which were previously administered based on customs and tradition, would be managed based on Islamic laws. The reorganization of the central governance of the residencies was also scrutinized. The current resident, Teuku Nja’ Arif, who until then had been responsible for everything that happened in Aceh, was replaced by Teuku Daudsyah, former assistant to East Aceh resident. The National Committee’s structure was also renewed. Tuanku Mahmud, the former deputy chief, was replaced by Mr. S.M.  Amin, head of the residency’s judiciary. The running of the government administration in that period, as previously mentioned, was more satisfactory than the prior ones. Apart from some resistance by the Ulema Uleebalang, the sources of troubles in running the government had disappeared. The Japanese army that also often created disorder had left the region. In short the circumstances were more conducive for the perfect running of government as compared to the previous conditions. Attributable to the sound cooperation between the public, the party, and the National Committee under the leadership of resident Teuku Daudsyah, all matters, both those concerning governance to a limited extent, and those with regards of issues related to the economy, health, agriculture, the Police, finance, and so on, were running satisfactorily. No one at the time could predict that in a short period of time the government would again be forced to deal with troubles, a repetition, or perhaps a continuation of the events that had taken place in Pidi not so long ago, the incidents that had claimed quite a large number of casualties and brought sorrow and sufferings to many widows and orphans. The troubles here referred to those caused by a movement led by Amir Husin Al Mujahid. However, before we discuss it, let us follow the subsequent review. As has been previously mentioned, the clash of ideas between the Ulema and the Uleebalang was initially limited to the prominent Ulemas and Uleebalang, and also limited only to the area of Pidi. However, the Ulema managed to increase the number of their followers, to the extent that at some point the group included most of the common people all over Aceh region. It was owing to the fact that the Ulema had used very good “leuzen” or slogans. Namely their struggles were aimed at heading to “the annihilation of the traitors of religion and nation”. They circulated news that the Cumbo’ (the Uleebalang group) were the Dutch collaborators who were attempting to bring down the Republic, and that the Cumbo’ continuously maintained communication with the Dutch in Sabang, or with the submarines crisscrossing the coasts of Aceh. Furthermore, they also spread information that the Cumbo’ didn’t believe in God, and that they had trampled on the Koran and ripped the pages of the holy book, and prevented people from praying. Followers of the Ulema disseminated all the information to the ignorant people in the villages. For someone that has lived in Aceh for quite some time and knows a little bit about the psyche of the people there in general, it was not surprising that all of the propaganda and incitement touched on sentiments of religion and nationhood and had enormous impact.

8

1  The General Setting

The Acehnese are renowned as people that love independence and will not hesitate to sacrifice their lives in attempting to achieve freedom. The history of Aceh recorded decades of armed resistance against the Dutch, a showcase of their heroism in maintaining their freedom from the attacks by the Dutch, the heroism of both the sons and daughters of Aceh. Thousands of people, men and women, old and young, had fallen victims in the struggle. It had not been long since the end of the formidable independence struggle and many of the older people still had vivid memories and had even been involved in the incidents. Similarly, the Acehnese are also renowned as people who love their religion and are highly devoted to it. In the struggle against the Dutch in the past, the Ulemas had a significant role, and the speeches made by the Ulema commanders in the famous war were always based on religion, the religion that, they said, obligated every Muslim to take part in the resistance war against the Dutch, the war of which was the “holy war”, because those that they were fighting against were the “infidels”. It is then clear to us why the slogan “the annihilation of the traitors of religion and nation” was warmly hailed by the general public, especially those of the lower class. Those who were at the outset neutral towards the conflict that had nothing to do with them eventually took sides with the Ulema. As for whether or not the charges that the Ulemas addressed to the Uleebalang are true, was no problem for them. As usual the common people didn’t try to find out whether or not the charges were based on the truth, instead they would follow and abide by the inciters’ instigation that managed to draw their attention to a purpose that they believed was pure and holy. In an instant, flocks of people from every village and corner of residence of Aceh turned up with a common purpose of devoting their life to their religion and nation. Forming a huge mass consisting of people coming from all walks of life, angry and full of hatred, malicious, and bound to each other by a common purpose, namely “to annihilate the traitors of religion and nation, the Uleebalang party, the feudal”. The charges against the Uleebalang party were really serious. It was such charge that seemed to be the main reason for the regional government in Kutaraja to send an ultimatum to the party. Despite the fact that the government, which at the time was perceived de facto as identical with the Regional National Committee, it was doubtful that it would try to verify the truth behind the charge. What was more likely to happen was that immediately after the charges were made some superficial (oppervlakkig) investigation was conducted, and they were taken as true and as a response an ultimatum was issued, after which, since the party to whom the ultimatum was sent ignored it, then a statement was made that the Uleebalang party was the party of rebels, the party of traitors. Indeed, the government’s attitude was not unexpected. The list of names under its structure was so obvious that an objective attitude was not anticipated.

1.1  The “Antithesis” of the Uleebalang – Ulema

9

An opinion of an individual member that was different from public opinion, in spite of the fact that the member had the courage to express it, would not change the common perspective. The Ulema Party explained, after their victory, the truth about the charges they made against their opponents had been proven by the findings of some Dutch currency and a Dutch flag in a Cumbo’ party’s storeroom. They further explained that they found the money and flag while they were searching the Uleebalang’s Headquarters and the house of Teuku Daud Cumbo’. The fact that they had never surrendered items they had found to the government only gave reasons to doubt their statement. Furthermore, even if it had been true that the items had been found in the storeroom of Teuku Daud Cumbo’, it was not ample reason to justify such serious charges. Therefore it could be concluded that the charges against the Uleebalang party that they were the “traitors of religion and nation” had not been based on facts. It was most likely that the leader of the Ulema party had been using the charges, despite the fact that they were not sure about their truth, as an instrument to attract more followers. They had known exactly how great the spirit of freedom and religion of the general people in their region was, and they had been totally aware of the great influence the spirit had in influencing the people to sacrifice as many lives as possible. With such knowledge, the Ulema party devised their smart and “effective” strategy. In fact, the saying “het Joel heiligt de middelen” – (the purpose purifies all efforts) is quite usual to be used as a guideline for a struggle, is it not? By way of contrast, it has to be mentioned that it was not beyond possibility that the leaders of the Ulema Party were indeed certain of the truth behind the charges they had made against their enemies. It was most likely that the leaders were convinced that their adversaries really desired the return of the Dutch to the region, that they could maintain their position as they were, and that they aspired for a life of luxury and pleasure, and that they wanted a chance to avenge some of the groups of the Ulema who, during the Japanese occupation times, played a significant part in their attempts to reduce the Uleebalang’s power. And based on all the above mentioned, they were convinced that their enemies were traitors. All things considered, it has to be admitted that the attitude of some members of the Uleebalang had been very onsympathiek (unlikeable) immediately after they heard the news about the capitulation of the Japanese. They found delight in instigating hatred towards the Japanese; in spite of the fact that during the Japanese occupation times they were highly pro Japanese and did their best to maintain friendship with the Japanese. After the Japanese surrender, the Uleebalang would not hesitate to launch intimidation and insult anyone who had good relationship with the Japanese, an attitude that was aimed at the group of Ulema since it so happened that the members of the latter party had enjoyed prominent positions and maintained good relationship with the Japanese during the occupation period.

10

1  The General Setting

Anyone who would look at all things “objectively” would certainly conclude that still none of those reasons was enough reason to impose such serious charges on fellow humans. After the surrender of power by the Japanese government and before the arrival of the news of the proclamation of Indonesia’s Independence in Aceh there was an attitude of “passiviteit” (passivity) and “fatalistisch” (desperation). No one at the time would think of the possibility of the return of Dutch colonialism, let alone to contemplate efforts to prevent the return of Dutch colonialism to Indonesia. Everyone at the time lived with the thoughts that the return of the Dutch and a recurrence of the situation that they left behind in 1941 were bound to happen, and it was just a matter of time for the events to come about. With such thoughts lingering in the back of mind, everyone tried hard to find in the deepest heart anything that could be said positively with regard to the Dutch, in anticipation of the latter’s arrival. Appreciation of a reality is not something constant, but instead it changes. The appreciation depends on the situation. A certain attitude might be highly valued at one period of time, but might not be in another era. This is something that should be a concern for anyone responsible decision makers. Not paying attention to such change means being ineffective and conclusions made from such lack of insight are inappropriate, perhaps even unjust. The ramification of the nature of not paying attention to circumstances was severe. At the time everyone who was doubtful about the success of independence would be considered a traitor. It was considered an irresponsible conclusion if we knew that, according to the books, a young man who could be considered as informed, our own leader, who is currently the President of R.I.S (Republik Indonesia Serikat – the Republic of Indonesian States) and Drs. Hatta, the Prime Minister of R.I.S., had once expressed their reservations. Only until after several young men in Jakarta took forceful action were some leaders willing to sign the proclamation of independence and lead the independence movement that ended with the surrender of sovereignty by the Dutch.

1.2  Amir Husin Al Mujahid Movement Amir Husin al Mujahid argued that the government was flawed still, with many “remains of feudalism” that had to be eliminated in order to have a stable government that ran well with the people’s cooperation. He also argued that it was his duty to improve the government by eliminating the elements that, in his opinion, were “blocking the passages of the National Revolution.” Under such considerations, a large number of “hot blooded” people were gathered under an organization that he named “T.P.R.”, short for “Tentara Perjuangan Rakyat” (People’s Struggle Army). He started his movement from where he lived in Idi. From there he headed to the north, passing through towns in the coasts of East

1.2  Amir Husin Al Mujahid Movement

11

Aceh, from Lhok Sukon, Lhok Seumawe, Bireuen, Samalanga, Aleuredu, Sigli, to the capital of Aceh residency, Kutaraja. Starting with the possession of a limited number of weapons, the further northward it moved the larger the number of the members gradually became. By the time it reached Kutaraja it had become a well-organized unit with strong weaponry that was not easy to defeat. The headsmen that joined the crowd had a particular role. Many people, always the innocent ones, those who they happened to pick out as “feudal”, were victimized. Many were captured and exiled in a strange place, a place that they would only leave after the surrender of power to the Republic of Indonesian States. Upon their arrival in Kutaraja, the band started to arrest people; some of whom were civilian and military leaders, such as Major General T. Nya’ Arif, who at the time was the commander of the army, and T. Husin Trumon, the assistant to Aceh Besar resident. Positions that were made empty by the seizure of the civil servants were then filled with members of their own group as replacements. To replace T. Nya’ Arif, Amir Husin Al Mujahid appointed himself as a Major General. Those who had been caught were then exiled to a secluded place. Next, after getting reinforcement from Pesindo (a political party) under the leader of someone named Nya’ Neh, the band continued its push to West Aceh, where, like what they had done in the East and North, everyone that they picked out as part of the “feudal” system and therefore “dangerous”, was arrested and eliminated. What on earth were their reasons for detaining the state leaders who were holding responsible positions in Aceh region? One thing for sure, the movement went on without any approval or prior knowledge of the Regional Government. In that respect Husin Al Mujahid’s movement was an illicit movement that the Regional Government had failed to stop due to the weakness of the state apparatus. T. Nya’ Arif realized that. He didn’t resist the illegal push towards the respectable institution, but instead ordered his troops to appease the demands of Husin Al Mujahid c.s. So, in March 1946 we witnessed an event in a country that was under a normal condition, an event that was very strange and embarrassing for the government. However, considering the circumstances and era, the events were actually devastatingly sad, namely, the leaders of the state were appallingly humiliated by a mob. The deplorable treatment which, on behalf of maintaining security and peace, to avoid bloodshed, and upon full awareness that it could not be surmounted, had to be endured. T. Nya’ Arif had been known as a true nationalist ever since his youth during the Dutch colonial times, was detained and exiled in a place by reason that he was “dangerous to the country’s safety because of his relationship with the Dutch”. Although, Teuku Nya’ Arif, a person who had been involved in movements that relentlessly resisted the Dutch occupation, someone renowned as the defender of the common people in the region of Aceh, did not endure the humiliation for long. He died at the end of 1946. May God grant his soul the most glorious place next to Him, the reward that he deserved but did not achieve in this transient world.

12

1  The General Setting

As was previously explained, the Cumbo incident, which on the surface seemed like an annihilation of Dutch collaborators, was in essence a power struggle between the Ulema who attempted to grab power, and the Uleebalang who were trying to hold on to the authority they had maintained hereditarily for centuries. The seeds of resentment between them had actually been germinating for decades. The power void (gezagsvacuum) after the surrender of the Japanese to the Allied forces, augmented by sentiments provoked by the Japanese army, became a casus belli for the two parties to wage war. The final result of the war was the disappearance of the Uleebalang group as the custom or traditional leader (adathoofden) and the emergence of the Ulema that held the power. One superseded another. Husin Al Mujahid’s movement could be considered as the continuation of the “Cumbo” incident. In addition to the Uleebalang position, there were still many other important positions in government assumed by the Uleebalang families. The Ulemas believed that those positions also needed to be put under their control. So long as the important positions were still in the hands of the family members or followers of the Uleebalang, there would always be the possibility of trouble in the running of government by the new members of government officials. To prevent such possibility from materializing was the purpose of Husni Al Mudjahid’s campaign, or, in their own words, their duty was “to obliterate the leftovers of feudalism that are still remaining”. With Husin Al Mudjahid’s settlement, it could be said that the whole government of Aceh was now in the hands of the Ulema. The group was identical with the campaign that was the “opposition” group during the Dutch colonial times, a group that was united under the organization of PUSA (the Association of Ulema Throughout Aceh). They could then govern freely, without having to deal with difficulties created by some parties with viewpoints different from theirs. They took advantage of the opportunity and based everything on the philosophies that guided their group’s life. At first everything went satisfactorily. The government could continue peacefully. Everything that might become a thorn in the eyes of the people during the rule of the Ulebalang was terminated. Agriculture, plantation, livestock, and so on, were industriously cultivated by the people. Commerce, including that with Malaya, was progressing well and it was fair to conclude that Aceh was a well-run region – both politically and economically. Good relationships between members of the government and the people were maintained. However, such conditions gradually changed. The people’s respect and love towards their leaders were changing. Accusations against the leaders began to appear. Charges of corruption, illegal trade, favoritism towards family and friends, entrusting important positions to friends with no regard of their competence, and accusation of self-seeking, came up repeatedly. It reflected a process of the general people’s changing attitude towards the leaders that they had so far loved and respected. If questions were asked about the reasons behind the changing views the answer would be both because of the very attitude of some of the leaders and the attitude of some of the people themselves as well.

1.3  The Abduction of Amir Husin Al Mujahid

13

The reality is, there was nothing in the world, not even the smallest thing, could be carried out in a way that would satisfy everybody. Every effort in any kind of work would go through some difficulties in one way or another, especially work involving running a government. Likewise, the reality was humans do tend to look at other people’s mistakes with more critical eyes and think that they are smarter in managing things. It was most likely that the changing of the people’s perception of their leaders, or at least some of it, could be blamed on such a human trait. The other reason was perhaps due to some of the followers’ disappointment. As usually happened in any political struggle, leaders of the opposing side would in their speeches deliver the shortcomings and vices within the society and suggest solutions on how to eradicate them once they took over the control of the government. Actually, being on the opposite side was easy. Expressing other parties’ shortcomings and criticizing those who were running the government was not a difficult task. Perfectly running a government that required resilience, wisdom, and great capacity, however, was a totally different thing. Changing from being the opposition, to become the leaders of a political government would bring huge responsibilities toward the fate of the homeland had indeed bring changes to ways of thinking. The “revolutionary” nature of change demanded immediate change in everything considered imperfect. That “revolutionary” notion gradually changed to the “evolutionary” one which also saw some good things in gradual changes. The “real” nature of change, had previously been unable to look at the difficulties of context. Circumstances due to conditions, timing, and era, were all aspects of reality which a “revolutionary” approach failed to acknowledge., However, both processes were beneficial and detrimental for Aceh’s new political leadership, so that decisions were made based on profit and loss calculation. The former leaders of political movements in Aceh who had become members of government were not insusceptible from such processes. They were also caught in the predicament that had made things difficult for them. On the one hand stood their colleagues demanding that they keep promises as party leaders, however, on the other hand they were restricted by the state’s interests, rules, and regulation. As a result, hostility emerged against government members. Former comrades during the political struggle were forgotten power was gained.

1.3  The Abduction of Amir Husin Al Mujahid The first reaction came from the army. The army reacted with the abduction of Amir Husin Al Mujahid, who proclaimed himself as a General Major. Such action could be taken as the army’s retaliation for what Husin Al Mujahid’s band had done to the army on March 1946. On the whole, however, it could also be taken as the Uleebalang’s reaction against the Ulema. It was an action which the members of the army seemed to be able and dared to do. Abduction was made easier

14

1  The General Setting

under the dissatisfaction of part of the general public with the Ulema, unity among the Ulema themselves and the members of the government there was no longer as much unity as there had been previously. In the beginning, the abduction appeared to be an internal incident within the army organization. The abduction of Amir Husin Al Mujahid took place in Hotel Aceh, in Kutaraja. Initially successful it would probably end the General Major’s life if his comrades who were in Sigli did not come to his rescue at the last minute. The group of men that were abducting him were intercepted at a particular place about 10 km on the way to Sigli and they were forced to surrender their catch to the interceptors. The hatred towards Husin Al Mujahid had been so deep, which was reflected in the humiliation, insult, and torture that his abductors subjected upon him when he tried to escape. Hatred increased the likelihood that the purpose of the abduction was to bring him to a village near Sigli and turn him in to Husin Sab, one of the leaders of the Ulema during the Cumbok incident, who was a figure of authority that was greatly feared by the villagers. It should also be noted that Husin Sab was the brother of Sab Cut, who was an even more prominent leader, notorious for his ruthlessness. However, Sab Cut had been shot dead in Lhok Seumawe several days prior by some people who – based on the public’s accusation – were Husin Al Mujahid’s accomplices. Consequently after the assassination of Sab Cut some allegation was made that a small group had emerged within the Ulema front, namely Husin Sab and his followers in Giging that hated Husin Al Mujahid and his followers. It was most likely that some of these people had closely collaborated with the group of Amir Husin Al Mujahid’s abductors to slaughter Amir Husin Al Mujahid. The quick action taken right at the critical time had prevented the execution from taking place.

1.4  The Movement of Sayid Ali Alsagaf Sayid Ali’s campaign was the first movement that was carried out in a “massive” and “organized” campaign against those who were in control of the government in Aceh region. The movement was preceded by several “individual” and “unorganized” actions in some places by elements, regardless of whether or not they had had any relation to Sayid Ali Alsagaff. More than a few similar actions had been carried out, not only in the form of mere statements through distribution of pamphlets, but also predacious actions like robbing people’s properties. The campaign launched by Sayid Ali and his comrades Waki Harun, Haji Muchsin, Teuku Siamaun Latif, Tgk. Mohd. Asyik, Muhamad Meraksa, and Nya’ Sabi called for demands that they put in some kind of “program of action”. The fact that the campaign had managed to spread throughout the corners and among the people in the whole Aceh region, and that some of those people came from the “feudal” front, showed that it could also be taken as a manifestation of the society’s dissatisfaction towards those running the government. Similarly, the Aceh

1.4  The Movement of Sayid Ali Alsagaf

15

revolution could be considered as an act of retaliation by people who had fallen victim to and had escaped from the Cumbok incident seeking revenge on their adversaries who were now occupying the most important positions of control in the country’s government. The charges against their targets, that Sayid Ali and his friends had maintained relationships with the Dutch, and that they were accomplices of NICA that were trying to bring Aceh back to the colonial era, were noted based on realities. Accusations such as these were purportedly part of the strategy used during the Cumbo incident with a purpose of dividing Sayid Ali’s front and luring the latter’s followers to defect to their side. Even the truth about the allegation that Sayid Ali had a relationship with Muso’s P.I.I (Pelajar Islam Indonesia – Indonesian Islamic Student) in Madiun that opposed the government of the time was questionable and had to be put into the perspective of the previously mentioned interest of strategies. “The program of action” of the campaign was related to the following charges: 1. That they had succeeded in taking control of government position and had established an association called “Banteng Hitam” (Black Bull). 2. “That they were against everyone outside their united front and, as a result the whole government was in their hands and all their wrongdoings remained covered up”. 3. “That they were perpetrating various frauds and crimes, among which were: (a) Committing massive corruption. (b) Committing massive illegal trading. (c) Murdering people they disliked and considered dangerous. (d) Not taking care of the baital mal and zakat as they should be. (e) Not heeding the regulations and instructions by the Central Government. (f) Using revenues from oil mining and plantation for their own purposes”. Furthermore they were accused of “being provincial and monopolizing all positions.” Therefore, on behalf of Sayid Ali and friends, they said, they decided to improve the situation, and as the first attempt, demanded the surrender of almost all of those holding the high-level important positions and responsibilities, excluding the Governor of North Sumatra and Resident Teuku Daudsyah. The attempt ended in tragedy. The Military Governor, Tgk. Mohamad Daud Beureuih, who was responsible for the security of the region, took the necessary action of arresting Sayid Ali and hundreds of his followers. They were later exiled to an isolated place, an exile that lasted until the handover of power by the Dutch, a period of more than 1 year. The chronology of the movement’s development was as follows: Real action began in the middle of August 1948, preceded by some problems due to disagreement between Sayid Ali and his aides. Resentment simmered among those who were insulted by an appeal made by Sayid Ali and his friends to the Governor of Sumatra in Bukit Tinggi. It was stated during the appeal, that the situ-

16

1  The General Setting

ation in Aceh was awful due to citizens feeling life was under threats as a result of the attitude of several influential people in government. Somehow, the appeal letter that was probably taken as a specific letter of complaint fell to the hands of the accused. These people, who felt that their good names had been tainted, brought the sender of the appeal letter to the court. The accusation was concerning a crime of insult, and the public was aghast to see how the persons concerned were immediately arrested and imprisoned despite the fact that insult was not a crime. In that case, since the result of investigation was not handed over to the judge, the judge was powerless to interfere. After a few months there was no sign of a court proceeding to begin and the suspects remained in detention. It was only when the dossier was sent to the judge, that suspects were released from prison under the pressure of some influential people. The court proceedings showed the general public’s interest in “Sayid Ali and friends”. People came in flocks to stand in front of the court building. They had left their daily work and waited for a long time before the court session started. At the least all these were signs that the general public had sympathized with Sayid Ali and his friends, and perceived them as defenders of the oppressed. Examination could not be concluded in one court session. The court proceeding itself was adjourned several times, at one point, at the time when decision had not been made, Sayid Ali and his friends launched their campaign. It was most likely that Sayid Ali had used the opportunity to broaden the reaches of his campaign throughout every corner of Aceh. After some preparation that seemed to have been planned beforehand, a large number of people from the various villages around the vicinity of Kutaraja gathered under the leadership of Sayid Ali and his friends on 18 August 1948 with the purpose of conducting a massive rally to reinforce their demand of the surrender of a large number of state dignitaries in order to bring improvement to the government. The party in charge in Kutaraja was aware of the situation. The envoy that was dispatched to Lam Baro, where the demonstrators were gathering, consisting of Tgk. Hasbullah Indrapuri, an influential Ulema, and Tie’ Mat Rahmani, a Lieutenant Colonel, managed to appease the crowd and advised them to disband and instead send their leaders to Kutaraja to deliver their disagreements to the persons in charge. The crowd accepted the advice. Representatives that they sent to Kutaraja had a talk with the dignitaries at the Governor of North Sumatra’s residence. As a result of the discussion, the crowd of people that was ready to enter Kutaraja disbanded, and order was restored. The subject of the talk between the envoys and state dignitaries was open to speculation. Some news reported that during deliberations the government promised to remove some detested officials from their positions. Other news, however, reported that the government only promised all of the complaints and objections voiced by

1.4  The Movement of Sayid Ali Alsagaf

17

the campaign would be extended to the central government through the state commissioner in Bukit Tinggi. It was never clear which of the two versions of news was correct, but one thing was certain which was that changes demanded by Sajid Ali and his people were not made. Things remained as they were. The Governor of North Sumatra’s announcement on 20 August 1948 (Annex 1) consisted of a statement of acknowledgement. It aimed to appreciate the desire of most people to renew the government structure. There was promise to carry out gradual rationalization, which showed the government was not willing to instantly fulfill the demands of Sajid Ali and his friends. In the meantime, the situation became increasingly tense. Sajid Ali and his friends continued to spread their propaganda in the villages to broaden their influence. Conversely, their opponents did not stand idly by. The opposing front was also recruiting followers in the villages, forming a united front against their adversaries and launching anti-propaganda campaigns. Both fronts were snooping into each other’s moves, increasing the likelihood of bloodshed. In such situation the judge kept adjourning the court examination of Sajid Ali and his friends in relation to the charges of defamation that had been brought by their opponents. It was most unfortunate that decision concerning the claim could not be speeded up. If the decision had been promptly made on whether or not Sajid Ali and his friends were guilty of the charges it would have been easier for the government to take a final and resolute action based on the judge’s decision. In early November 1948 the regional government held a Municipal congress in the provincial capital. Every resident, assistant resident (wedana), and head of government agencies around the Aceh region was requested to attend, so at the time Kutaraja was flooded with government officials. Suddenly news of the arrest of Sajid Ali and tens of his followers broke, and it was confirmed by a declaration made by the Military Governor dated 4 November 1948 (Annex 2). They were charged with a conspiracy to capture a large number of state dignitaries on their black list. The large-scale arrest and the further investigation conducted on them was based on a report that Sajid Ali and his men had planned for a “Coup d’etat”. It was said that Sajid Ali and his friends’ plan involved a sudden attack of the city while the Municipal congress was in session at the North Sumatra Representatives’ Council’s Building. Some of them would occupy the strategic places around the city while the other part would besiege the parliament building, and capture every person participating in the congress, while yet another part would surround the residences of the dignitaries to capture and arrest them. After they were done with the plan they would hold a general election so that the people could appoint leaders that they really liked. The whole plan failed completely due to the authorities’ vigilance. Hence Sajid Ali and his men were immediately arrested and further detained.

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1  The General Setting

The truth of the report received by the Military Governor office could not be fully established. Putting it into consideration, justice required an objective conclusion based on facts. It could be claimed that the requirements for objectivity in considering and drawing the conclusion in this case could not be 100% guaranteed. In general the people who were providing the considerations were dignitaries and Sayid Ali’s adversaries. The number of those that might be able to place themselves above any conflict was small. It was also possible that the reports concerning Sayid Ali’s intention to march into the city by force was merely provocative, allegations that were not based on facts, but instead made as a justification to conduct large-scale arrests as has been earlier mentioned. Such presumption was supported by news about Sayid Ali before his arrest. The news stated that he was trying to galvanize the people villages to take action to topple the government, an allegation that was not true. As we all knew, those that had been arrested, after the release of a small number of them, were exiled to a faraway place. Sayid Ali and his men had now been released. However, the release also meant that the resolution concerning the issues surrounding Sayid Ali was highly unconvincing. It was foreseeable that the group of people who carried out their action based on unwavering conviction and strong desire for improvement of the situation would continue their struggle. The condition that they were obligated to leave Aceh region only added more reasons for them to accuse those occupying the government positions of being “colonial” and “imperialist” by nature. In addition to the fact that the exiles would be faced with difficulties in earning a living outside their region and village, a place that they were totally unfamiliar with, seemed that the punishment inflicted upon them was even harsher. Therefore, it appeared to be wise if their exile to a place outside the region was cancelled and that they were allowed to return to live wherever they wished. Removing them from the region without sufficient means would only cause increased hatred towards the government, turning it into harmful propaganda. Whereas if the exiles were granted freedom the possible sources of anti-government propaganda would be reduced.

Chapter 2

Regarding the Government

The period of government that lasted from the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945 to the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1945 could be divided into four parts based on the government leadership. First: the period of government under the leadership of Resident T. Nya’ Arif, from the Proclamation of Independence to January 1946. Second: the period of government under the leadership of Resident Teuku Daudsyah, from mid January 1946 to late May 1948. Third: the period of government under the leadership of Governor Mr. S. M. Amin, from late May 1948 to late August 1949. Fourth: the period of government under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara, from late August 1949 to the time of transfer of sovereignty (Picture 2.1).

2.1  The Period of Resident Teuku Nya’ Arif Since the government was based on democracy in addition to the leaders of the regions a regional representative body called the Komite Nasional Daerah (Regional National Committee) was establishment comprising several members that were decided by the result of the people’s votes. However, since an election was impossible due to the circumstances, it was replaced by appointment based on political party’s nomination. As the deputy head Tuanku Mahmud, who was formerly a high-ranking official during the Dutch era and the Head of the Judiciary of the Aceh Region during the Japanese times, was appointed. In addition to the Committee, another body was established, namely the Executive Body, which consisted of several members selected from the members of the Regional National Committee itself. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7_2

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2  Regarding the Government

Picture 2.1 Resident Teuku Nya’ Arif

The executive body chaired by the Resident helped the Resident’s in the daily administration of the government. The governments in the non-district resorts remained as they were. The resorts continued to be called afdeeling, headed by the Assistant Resident, and onderafdeeling headed by a Controleur (Checker or Supervisor). In the beginning, after the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence was made known in Sumatra, the Governor of Sumatra, Mr. T. M. Hasan, issued several stipulations concerning the appointment of Assistant Resident, Controleur, and other high-ranking officials. In general the stipulations appointed the Uleebalang and their family for the above positions. As a consequence of the struggle of power between the Uleebalang and the Ulema, as previously discussed, none of the stipulations could be implemented. The designated person had died during the conflict, or the influential group refused their appointment as government officials. The pressures exerted by the influential group to appoint the dignitaries they preferred, which was not debatable at the time, resulted in the annulment of the previous stipulations and the passing of new ones containing the appointment of other persons to occupy the vacant positions. The regional government headed by T. Aja’ Arif, as the first government, had to undergo extremely difficult ordeals where everything was at the preparatory stage and in chaos. Conflicts between different groups of the community were still intensifying and there was no sign of whether those conflicts would lead to a resolution. To make things worse, the Japanese army remained vicious in some parts of the region, turning the Resident into practically a leader of the People’s Security Army that had to continuously deal with the Japanese army to settle any dispute with the Japanese army. Given that there were so many issues to deal with and that those issues could not be handled by just one person, a Deputy President, namely T.R.P. Mohd. Ali was appointed. The deputy resident was required to stay in the capital town, Kutaraja, and administer the Resident’s work. Whereas President T. Nya’ Arif himself went

2.2 The Period of President Teuku Daudsyah

21

on trips to visit various places outside Kutaraja, visiting every corner of the region where a problem that required immediate settlement came up, either as a result of conflict between the people and the Japanese army, or among the people themselves. The first government did not last very long, in fact it only lasted about 4 months. The short period was full of difficulties, conflicts, battles, and chaos. It was within the most difficult 4-year period of the developing situation in Aceh in relation to managing the government of Aceh from the Proclamation of Independence to the transfer of sovereignty. It was during this period that the rule of the Uleebalang finally ended and was replaced by the rule of the Ulema, as has been mentioned in the previous pages. Now the government had to manage the government based on what the Ulema group desired. The Regional National Committee structure consisted of members of the Ulema; there was practically no opposition faction in the representative council. Accordingly everything with regard to the running of the government administration followed whatever was wanted by the Ulema, or, to be more explicit, PUSA. Government administration was conducted based on the aspiration of one party, namely PUSA. In such a situation it was to no one’s surprise that it had been so easy for the government to issue an announcement of the regional government that sealed the Uleebalang as the traitor of the nation and religion. It was an accusation that was essentially made by an adversary instead of by a government that should have positioned itself above those involved in a conflict. On top of that the Japanese army that was still occupying some areas was also posing difficulties for the government. Their increasing viciousness in some places like Meulaboh, Kutaraja, dan Langsa, was tackled with courage and agility. All things considered, appreciation was due to the chairman of the Regional National Committee, Tuanku Mahmud, who had played a huge role with his continuous and tireless hard work to demonstrate wisdom in countless negotiations with the Japanese. Battles could be restricted within the town areas and did not spread to the whole Aceh region. The role of the youth that were united under the Republic of Indonesia Youth organization in fighting the Japanese army in the battlefields without regard to the threats against their lives also deserved appreciation.

2.2  The Period of President Teuku Daudsyah After mid January 1946 the Regional Government was led by Teuku Daudsyah as the President. During the Dutch colonial era, T. Daudsyah held the position of the Zelfbestuurder or Director of the Self-Administration area of Idi, an area in East Aceh; during the Japanese occupation times he was initially appointed as Guntyo Idi, then as assistant Bunsyutyo in Langsa; as Assistant President of East Aceh in Langsa during the early government of the Republic, and then as the President of Aceh. He was one of the Uleebalang, whose number was very small, who, despite

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2  Regarding the Government

the aftermath of the Ulema – Uleebalang conflict, could maintain a functional position of a President from the time his appointment was stipulated until recently. The critical incident that he had to deal with was the Amir Husin al Mujalid’s campaign. As has been previously mentioned, the campaign was a “continuation” of the Cumbok incident; a cleansing of all of the “remnants of the feudal party” that were still occupying official positions. And history continued. New government leaders, with the assistance of a new executive body, were appointed by the also new Regional National Committee. The structure of the representative body, albeit undergoing some changes, still had the “one-party system” or at least “one-group system” in mind; namely a structure that consisted of people who, despite their appointment as representatives of several parties, basically came from one front, which was the PUSA front. As the deputy to the Chairman of the Regional National Committee and its Executive Body, Tuanku Mahmud’s replacement, a Hoofdamtenaar (high-ranking official) during the Dutch times, and head of the judiciary of the Aceh region, Mr. S.M Amin was appointed. Amin was a dignitary who had been a Lawyer and Attorney in Kutaraja during the Dutch times, and during the Japanese times was at first the director of a middle school in Kutaraja, then a justice at the District Court (Tihoo Hoin) in Sigli; and then occupied the position of head of justice in Aceh region during the Republic times, a position that he held in addition to the occupation as Deputy Chairman of Regional National Committee. The structure of the first Executive Body was as follows: Chairman: Residen Teuku Daudsyah Secretary: Kamarusid Deputy Chairman: Mr. S.M. Amin Members: –– –– –– –– ––

Sutikno Hasyim H. M. Zainuddin Mohd. Hanafiah R. Insun

The government then issued a number of regulations, one of which concerned the properties of the Uleebalang group that had died during the Cumbok incident. Matters regarding the inheritance had long been the concern of the government. The properties owned by the deceased members of the defeated front in the Cumbok battle had mostly been taken away from the lawful heirs by the winning party. It was not clear into whose hands the inheritance had fallen, and since most of it was most likely moveable assets, they had obviously “changed hands”. The lawful heirs who had been living in deprivation had long demanded that their properties were returned. On the contrary, the followers of the Ulema Party that had taken part in the bloodshed were also beginning to demand that part of the properties were divided and distributed to the “commendable” followers.

2.2 The Period of President Teuku Daudsyah

23

Judging from the intensity of the demands, together with the reasons for them, there seemed to be an impression that the success of the Ulema leaders in recruiting a huge number of followers in a short time could also due to the promises they made to those people. Citizens imagined the sizeable rewards that they could obtain from the properties of those they would exterminate. That was highly probable considering that after the Cumbok incident a stance emerged within the group. The stance concerned moves to declare the properties as confiscated goods (verbeurd verklaard) based on arguments that, in their opinion, were based on Islamic law. Such a posture however, was not well received by most people within the group. Some of the regulations concerned the following: 1. The establishment of a body that had the rights and duties to manage the properties of the people from the Uleebalang group that had died in the Cumbok incident. 2. To examine and make decisions in relation to the demands concerning the properties. 3. Decide on the selling of some of the properties in order to compensate the losses suffered by the Ulema party as a consequence of the battles during the Cumbok incident. 4. The decision by the Body was a final verdict and could not be appealed. From a judicial perspective the regulation took a very broad perspective, which raised a question whether a Regional Government decree could contain actions related to ownership. Could the decree lead to the establishment of a body that was similar to a judiciary one? Hadn’t the decree breached the rule that such right fell within the competence of the Central Government? The decree was signed by Resident T. Daudsyah and the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Body, Mr. S.M. Amin. As a jurist it was hard for Mr. S.M. Amin to accept it since he was not aware of the judicial objections. Therefore it could be concluded that, likewise with the situation regarding some other decrees, due to the compelling circumstances there was no choice but to approve and sign the ruling. It had to be admitted that everyone would eventually approve of the ruling, given the fact that it was not merely a judicial matter, but instead other factors concerning the circumstances had to be taken into consideration also. Also, it should not be forgotten that the decree was passed as an attempt to conduct an oversight of the remaining properties and salvage them for those who were entitled to them. Time went on. The government under Resident T. Daudsyah’s governance ran very well and to satisfaction considering the highly deprived situation. Difficulties were everywhere and those in relation to the lack of finance had led to the incapacity to adequately carry out works that should increase the people’s welfare. Building irrigation, roads, bridges, providing medicines and schools were all neglected. Most government revenues came from import duties imposed on the military’s needs and weaponry. The offensives by the Dutch at the time still required huge attention towards the high quality of the military.

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2  Regarding the Government

In such condition it was most appropriate to give the highest appreciation to the traders, who were mostly Chinese, who, despite the increasingly tight blockade imposed by the Dutch, had willingly risked their life’s to continue commerce between Aceh and Malaya. The commerce played a substantial role in the Republic’s struggle in Aceh. Among the many names that had played a significant role in breaking through the Dutch blockade, there was one that deserved a special attention, namely Major John Li, a member of the “Navy of the Republic of Indonesia”. Without the trade activities the government’s revenues wouldn’t have been sufficient and the government’s problems would have been heightened. Changes then were made in the structure of T. Daudsyah’s government. After passing through the selection process during the plenary meeting, the structure was as follows: Resident Chairman: T. Daudsyah; deputy chairman, Mr. S.M. Amin; members: Sutikno Padmosumarto, Ali Hasjmi, Ameltz, Suratno, T.  M. Amin; secretary: Kamarusid (Picture 2.2). It was also during this government that Aceh received visitors from the central government which was undergoing a tour of duty to conduct observation and to strengthen the relationship between the central government and the region. One of the groups that paid a visit to Aceh was the group led by Mr. Hermani, followed by that of Mr. Abdul Majid Joyoadiningrat. These people brought with them to Aceh highly valuable information through their speeches, providing broader understanding about the significance of independence and democracy. At the time, another group led by Dr. A. K. Gani, as the security coordinator, also visited the region and provided useful information. In early 1947 members of the Central National Committee selected by the political parties left for Java to attend a plenary meeting of the Central National Committee that would make a decision regarding the Linggarjati Agreement, which consisted of Mr. S.M. Amin, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Body of the Regional National Committee, Sutikno Padmosumarto, Deputy Chairman of the Judiciary of Aceh Region, and Amelz, Chairman of the Semangat Merdeka Daily. Important reassignment in the government took place with the transfer of Mr. S. M. Amin to Pematang Siantar as Assistant Governor of North Sumatra in April 1947 upon his return from the KNIP Assembly in Malang. On 21 July 1947 the Dutch campaign aimed at destroying the state of the Republic of Indonesia began. The Dutch army, using all of the most sophisticated weaponry, both in Java and Sumatra, began its first aggression as they launched under the name of “polisioneele actie” (police action) by reason of “maintaining security and peace and set the people of Indonesia free from terror and rape by the armed bands.” In a short time they had managed to take control of most of Java, Palembang, and East Sumatra. The people in Aceh responded to the aggression with determination to maintain unity and common purpose, namely to defend the country until the last drop of blood. All disagreements between different groups and segments in the society

2.2 The Period of President Teuku Daudsyah

25

Picture 2.2  The Aceh Representative Council Executive Body in 1946. Sitting from right to left: T. M. Amin, T. Daudsyah (the Resident) and Mr. S.M. Amin. Standing from left to right: Hasyimi, Sutikno Padmo Sumarto, Suratno dan Amelz

disappeared instantly. Every attention and eye was directed to the country’s defense. The whole area of Aceh was shrouded by an atmosphere of war. The determination that they would obey the instruction to launch a scorched-­ earth policy in Aceh was reflected in the actions that would be taken. Explosive material and bombs were scattered around the corners of towns, villages, and roads as the evidence of people’s decisiveness and readiness to sacrifice everything if required by the circumstance. Reorganization was also carried out to form a government that was in tune with the atmosphere of war. With the stipulation issued by Vice President Drs. Moh. Hatta, Aceh region was declared a special military region with a military governor who was responsible for defense issues.

26

2  Regarding the Government

As the Military Governor, Tgk. Mohd Daud Beureuih, a prominent leader and former head of religious officials in Aceh, was appointed. All affairs, both civilian and military, were handed over to the military governor, insofar as they fell within the interests of defense. The unclear division of rights and responsibilities between the civilian government that had not been separated from the office of the military governor gave the opportunity for subjective interpretation of the phrase “within the interest of defense”, an issue that shall be further explained in subsequent pages (Picture 2.3). The tense situation reduced with the order of ceasefire. In late October 1947, Assistant Governor Mr. S.M. Amin, who had been detained by the Dutch when they entered the town of Pematang Siantar was brought to Medan and arrived in Kutaraja by sea via Penang. After several negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic, a conclusion was made on 17th January 1948 with the Renville Agreement, which was accepted by the people of Aceh. Albeit with misgivings, it was not rejected. An important event that would bring bloodshed in West Aceh, therefore brought difficulties to the government and it was T. Radja Tampok’s campaign, which shall be discussed in other pages in relation to other issues. The President’s visit in June 1948 was a historic event for the people of the region. The people’s love for him, their willingness to sacrifice everything for the country, their spirit to fight, their strong desire for freedom, all of it was manifest in the perfect welcome that he received and in the parades that the people staged in every place he visited (Picture 2.4).

Picture 2.3  Welcoming the arrival of President Soekarno at Lhok ‘Nga Airport in mid 1948

2.3 The Period Mr. S.M. Amin

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Picture 2.4  President Soekarno Observing the Artillery Troops

2.3  The Period Mr. S.M. Amin His Honor the President took the opportunity afforded by his visit to inaugurate S.M.  Amin, the junior governor of North Sumatra, as the Governor of North Sumatra. Such inauguration was the consequence of changes implemented in the government structure in Sumatra. As has been known, the changes had led to division of the island of Sumatra that had for so long constituted one province under the leadership of the Governor of Sumatra, Mr. T. M. Hasan. The capital was Bukit Tinggi, was now split into three provinces, namely: South Sumatra, Central Sumatra and North Sumatra. The inauguration of Mr. S.M. Amin the Governor of North Sumatra, brought us to the third phase of the government. Under the system of North Sumatra as one province Aceh, together with Tapanuli and East Sumatra, incorporated into one unit, which was an autonomous province. The residencies of Tapanuli and Aceh, which were autonomous residencies, were abolished, whereas the Resident was assigned to the Governor, and each residency then turned into regency with autonomy under the leadership of a Regent, together with the regency council that consisted of selected members. In its day-to-day administration the Regent was assisted by the executive body of the Regency’s representative council that consisted of members selected by and from the members of the Regency’s representative council.

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2  Regarding the Government

With the stipulation issued by the state commissioner of Sumatra, Sibolga was established as the temporary capital of the province of North Sumatra (Picture 2.5). Likewise the changes in government structure provoked two different kinds of reaction. Some of the people were for the changes, while others, albeit small in number, were against them. The largest part of the people didn’t react at all. As for the designation of Sibolga as the provincial capital people’s opinion was unanimous. It could be said that all the people from all walks of life believed that such arrangement was inappropriate and they tried to have it annulled and instead make Kutaraja the capital while waiting for Medan to be “won back”. A great deal of letters and parties’ resolutions of various arguments were sent, all of which basically suggested that Kutaraja was more appropriate to be chosen as the temporary capital for a variety of reasons. And the newspapers were by no means quiet on the subject either. In mid August 1948, while celebrating the Proclamation of Independence, the government yet again had to deal with another problem, which concerned a campaign that seemed to be well-organized and spread through every corner of the Aceh region. The campaign was led Sajid Ali and his men. The reasons behind and the demands made by the campaign could be read in other pages in discussion over other issues (Picture 2.6). The implementation of legislation that divided Sumatra into three provinces commenced with the establishment of a representative council of North Sumatra government that consisted of members of the abolished representative council of Sumatra, and they were representing Aceh, Tapanuli, and East Sumatra. The ­meeting to establish the council was held in Tapa’ Tuan, and during the meeting Governor Mr. S.M. Amin, gave an opening remark (annex 3).

Picture 2.5  Governor Mr. S.M. Amin

Picture 2.6  The Chairman and Members of the Regional Council of the Government of North Sumatra in late 1949. From left to right: Yahya Siregar, Yunan Nasution, Mr. S.M. Amin, Amelz and Tgk Mohammad Nur el Ibrahim

2.3 The Period Mr. S.M. Amin 29

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2  Regarding the Government

Assistance and support donated by the people of West Aceh for the meeting sessions to establish the Council held from 13 December to 16 December 1948 were clear evidence of the people’s commitment to take steps to unite as one country. The meetings went satisfactory and attracted the attention of all segments of society. However, it was highly regretted that during the second day of the meeting some members tried to obstruct it by leaving the room with the intention that it would discontinue the meeting. The obstructers were united under an association; the people’s democracy front, under the leadership of Resident Abdul Karim M.S. from P.K.I. – the Indonesian Communist Party. Contrary to their expectation, the chairman of the meeting believed that the session could proceed and the meeting continued. The reason provided by the obstructing group for leaving was because they and some other parties would not compromise with the distribution of seats in the Executive Body. A compromise between the religious-based parties had led to the appointment of the following members: Tgk. Mohd. Nur al Ibrahmy (Masyumi), Yahya Siregar (Masyumi), M.  Yunan Nasution (Masyumi), Amelz (P.S.S.I.) and Melanton Siregar (Parkindo), a structure that clearly reflected a religious front against the leftist parties. Then again the compromise was not surprising given the recent events, such as Muso’s campaign that at the time was taking place in Java. One of the important decisions, among others, was the establishment of Kutaraja as the temporary capital. This was quite a difficult issue for the people of Aceh since it seemed to have become a “matter of pride” (prestige kwestie), needing final resolution. The attitude taken by members from Tapanuli in regards to the capital issue, where they were willing to disregard their own feelings of pride and made a conclusion solely based on “objectivity”, was highly appreciated. The North Sumatra Province’s representative council’s assembly concluded and disbanded on 16 December 1948. The members then went their separate ways to return to their respective places with the determination to fully commit their physical and mental energies to implement the decisions in order to take the steps towards creating a government based on the principles of democracy. Unfortunately such burning desire could not be fulfilled as they wished. Not long after they closed the council meeting all of a sudden the Dutch launched their second aggression on 19 December 1948. The Dutch launched their strikes to all cities and defenses, including the capital of North Sumatra Province, Kutaraja, and other towns along the North, East, and West coasts; the strikes from the air and sea were fought back fiercely by the Republic. In a blink of an eye the peaceful situation turned into a violent state of war. For the second time since the proclamation of independence the people kept their promise to sacrifice their energy, riches, and even their life to defend independence. For the second time in a short period all hatred towards the Dutch burst out (Picture 2.7). The army and the people were supporting each other and obeyed all orders and instructions in the interests of defense, which included those concerning guardianship and the scorched-earth tactics.

2.3 The Period Mr. S.M. Amin

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Picture 2.7  The TNI (the Sumatra Commandment), Colonel Hidayat, During His Visit to Kutaraja; From Left to Right (sitting down) 1. Colonel Subiyakto from the Navy, 2. Mr. S.M. Amin, the Governor of North Sumatra, 3. Colonel Hidayat, 4. Tgk Daud Beureuih, the Military Governor, and, 5. Resident Tuanku Mahmud (Standing at the back), Resident T. Daudsyah and Lieutenant Colonel Askari and Lieutenant Colonel Dr Mahyudin

Also this time, as well as during the first aggression, along the coast, from the North to the West and East, defense canons remained alert, as were anti-aircraft canons, which were always ready to be fired if necessary. The defense organization underwent changes through moving its headquarters to Aceh. The Army was under the command of Colonel Hidayat, the Navy was under Colonel Subianto, and the Airforce was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Suyoso Karsono. Other than the disturbances suffered by the coastal defense due to the attacks mounted by the enemies’ war ships and the disturbance faced by the air defense with the raids by their bomber aircraft, the Aceh region, also in this second aggression, was spared the enemy’s invasion. The Roem-Royen Agreement, preceded by a ceasefire, was entered into at the time when the enemies had not been able to occupy Aceh, so as a consequence Aceh was the only region that had not been occupied by the enemies.

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As was known, therefore, the former head of the emergency government of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara, towards the end of his term, served as Deputy Prime Minister in Kutaraja. When Vice President Drs. Mohd. Hatta came to Kutaraja from Bangka to meet with the emergency government before it was dissolved he could not do it since the emergency government was still located somewhere in West Sumatra. However, he made use of the visit to share information about the country’s situation. Before the visit, a change had taken place in the regional government structure. With the stipulation issued by the head of the emergency government of Republic of Indonesia Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara, the province of North Sumatra was dissolved and the province was divided into two special military regions, namely Aceh and Tapanuli, subsequently led by Tgk. M. Daud Beureuih and Dr. F. L. Tobing as military governors. The position of Provincial Governor was abolished and the former governor was made the central government commissioner for North Sumatra. The provincial representative council was also dissolved. The purpose of the changes was to make the most of military forces. The following was how the authorities of the high level institutions were defined: Both civilian and military authorities were assumed by the military governor (article I). Civilian administration was carried out by the regional defense council and military affairs were carried out by the commander of the sub territory on behalf and under the responsibility of the military governor (article II). All of the above was stated in the Emergency Government Decree, dated 16th May 1949 No. 25/Pem/P.D.R.I. In regard to the responsibility of the Responsibilities of the Government Commissioner, the decree of the Emergency Government of Republic of Indonesia dated 17 Mei 1949 No. 22/Pem./ P.D.R.I. Articles 2 and 3 provided that the duties involved supervision. The fact that in practice the rules and regulations did not seem to be satisfying and generally considered inappropriate given the reality that tension was gradually subsiding instead of rising was evident in the comments made by those that were occupying important positions in the government.

2.4  T  he Period of Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara With the disbandment of the emergency government and the assignment of Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara in Aceh as Deputy Prime Minister, yet another change was taking place in the government structure. The Deputy Prime Minister was granted an extraordinary power in order to restore the island of Sumatra. He was assisted by an advisory body that consisted of

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the government commissioners, the territorial commanders of Sumatra, and other designated persons. The extraordinary power was used by the dignitary in a highly broad manner. In this case he showed exceptional diligence. He paid huge attention to every issue, from job opportunities down to the smallest issues. Practically there was no issue that escaped his notice. Such exercise of power, however, should not be taken as a correct practice. Wasn’t it true that the responsibility of a Prime Minister should be limited to cover the broad outline only while detail practical matters should have been left to the regional agencies? By such way of governing eventually the lower level offices no longer had any guideline concerning their respective duties, hence were becoming uncertain about their responsibilities. Most regulations concerned the economy. Some regulations were made to establish committees to “manage purchases of goods for the government”, in order to “stabilize the market prices”, to “restore the economy in North Sumatra”, and to “assist and supervise the State Bank”. Regulations were also issued on “opportunities to send merchandise out of North Sumatra”, “registration of plantation crops in Aceh region”, “sale of imported goods under the supervision of North Sumatra”, “requirements for buyout agent for forest products, crops, and exporter”, “sales of goods with coupons in North Sumatra”, and so on. In short, not a few regulations had been made. It would have been really good had the benefit that the people received been commensurate with the amount of energy that had been spent in the attempts to bring improvement to the people. The reality, however, showed that the economy became even more disappointing. The committees that had been established were useless. Goods were either increased in price or disappeared completely from the shops. The distribution of goods using coupons did not work. Objective investigation could lead to a conclusion that the causes of failure could not be fully pinpointed at the regional institutions’ incapacity as the regulators blamed, but they were mostly due to existing circumstances. An objective investigator would conclude that all the regulations which had been made would basically be useless since several requirements had not been created beforehand to make the situation conducive to make those regulations work perfectly. Regulations would not bring benefit if there was inadequate supply in the first place. Sales of goods with coupons had led to problems in some places, such as in Kutaraja and Lhokseumawe. While the sales had been notified to the public and the coupons had been distributed, on the sale day, however, goods were not available. As a result, the people that had traveled tens of kilometers on foot all the way from their villages to the city to claim their rights were extremely upset and disappointed. Those who wished for chaos took advantage by provoking those who were undergoing extraordinary turmoil, resulting in bitter fights between the merchants who were defending their rights, and the people who had violated the merchants’ right in their attempts to get what they thought was theirs.

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The latest deputy Prime Minister’s regulation, concerning the government of Sumatra, brought again some changes in the government structure. The regulation divided the North Sumatra region; previously constituted one autonomous province under the establishment of the emergency government of Republic Indonesia, it was now divided into two provinces, namely the province of Aceh and the province of Tapanuli East Sumatra, of which further arrangements would be placed under the leadership of Tgk. Mohd. Daud Beureuih and Dr. F. L. Tobing as governors. Regarding the division of the province unsubstantiated news began to circulate. Some said that the division was conducted in blind haste, with no consideration of the circumstances and without listening to the opinions of the institutions that had to be heard beforehand. The North Sumatra government commissioner and representative council had not been informed about the purposes of the division. Further rumors said that the changes were made due to the pressures of some indigenous people from Aceh and Tapanuli who were occupying important positions in the government. Even furthermore it was said that the deputy Prime Minister had agreed to divide the former North Sumatra province into two provinces, Aceh and Tapanuli East Sumatra because he believed the men that had pressured him were prominent leaders of the community and hence could be considered as its representatives. Therefore, based on such considerations, he felt that it was his responsibility to make the principle changes. According to the stipulation, the division was made based on the people’s wishes. With regard to the term “the people’s wish” several questions might be raised. Must all the wishes of the people be granted immediately without conducting any thorough review over the situation before making a conclusion? Could the population’s wishes be known, though casual discussion with some leaders who were considered as influential among the society? Shouldn’t the people’s wish be known through certain mechanisms, namely through deliberations by formal bodies and representative council, in this case, the representative council of North Sumatra, or at least the Executive Body? Not to mention the central government commissioner for North Sumatra? Was it unnecessary to hear all of those institutions’ points of view? Was it adequate to make a conclusion simply based on the point of view of some influential people in the society? Submitting to pressure or demand by some people by using a “fiction”, that the pressure was the people’s wish, provided an opportunity for the manifestation of unhealthy desires of some bands to demand many things on behalf of the people’s wishes. Whereas some in position of influence were out for their own or their group’s advantage. Those kinds of incidents, especially during the early times of the struggle for the nation’s freedom, and after the proclamation of independence, were plentiful. Opportunities for a repetition of unwanted and highly embarrassing incidents should have never been provided. It ought to have been clear that people did not want the new division, at least it seemed rather extraordinary and awkward that they would have wished for another

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division. Wasn’t it true that normally, in deliberating considerations of a regulation, the matters stated as reasons and causes to pass a decree were objective facts,? The fact that the people’s representative council’s opinion had not been heard regarding this matter, was stated in the council’s announcement in the “Semangat Merdeka” newspaper in late January 1950, in which it refused to be accountable for any consequence of the decree. The central government’s commissioner’s opinion had not been heard beforehand either, which was stated in an account that he gave in a private conversation. Now, let us, with his consent, put below some of his views concerning the establishment of Aceh province and the province of Tapanuli East Sumatra: “The division of the province of North Sumatra into two provinces, namely Aceh province and the province of Tapanuli East Sumatra, as an implementation of the deputy Prime Minister decree No. 8 Des/WPM/1949, will commence on 1 January 1950. The change came like a bolt out of the blue. Also, to the person who gave the account, who heard this from the deputy Minister “in passing” in an ordinary conversation. That the regulators that passed rules bringing principle changes in constitutional structure, before making consultation, did not feel the need, to first listen to views and opinions of institutions responsible in the governance of North Sumatra, namely the provincial representative council, its executive body, and the government commissioners. This was something that needed attention. Where on earth were the facts that showed the need to prevent the province from being divided into two parts “to improve and expedite the running of the North Sumatra province” as stated in consideration (a) of the decree? In consideration (b) it was admitted that the deputy Prime Minister had not had the authority to exercise the power to pass a regulation in lieu of law. However, word (c) furthermore, nevertheless, the power (that in fact had not been exercised) had been exercised anyway, by reason that the division of the province was desired by. 1 . The need to improve and expedite the running of the government, 2. The general public’s wishes to establish a system of government based on Law No. 22/1948. It was highly unfortunate that the above reason (1) was a reason that was “meaningless” or “vague”, hence it was impossible to have an exchange of ideas on the matter. As for reason (2) it could be said that indeed not only a few people shared the opinion that an implementation of a system of government as defined by Law No. 22/1948 needed to be implemented as soon as possible, however, the cause-effect relationship between the desire to have a democratic government and the need to divide the province of North Sumatra into two provinces was incomprehensible. The province of North Sumatra was a region established based on democracy, hence the regulations were democratic by nature, and made by the government commissioner of Sumatra and the President of the State of the Republic of Indonesia. Additionally, every matter concerning the administration of the province, based on

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the decision made during the plenary assembly of the North Sumatra representative council in Tapak Tuan in December 1948, should be conducted based on the guideline of the aforesaid Law. It was not wrong, then, to say that actually what the public desired was to have a more democratic system of government. The Law was the applicable law for the province of North Sumatra. What was the need for dividing the province into two provinces of Aceh and Tapanuli East Sumatra? Was the intention of the law to express the public’s desire for “an immediate establishment of the two provinces”? A thorough and objective exploration, not one that was based simply on “data” provided by a certain party, based on report from a party that had long desired for an Aceh unity, regardless of any relation with or influence from outside and that indeed during the establishment of the province of North Sumatra less than a year prior, had organized an opposition, came to a conclusion that there was no base whatsoever to the statement stated in consideration c), that there was a “public desire to divide the province of North Sumatra into two provinces”. The public in regard to this issue was divided into three groups. 1. Most of them were not interested in the issue of one or two provinces, did not know about or did not have any understanding on the matter. 2. A small part of them did not want the division. 3. An even smaller part that wanted the division and worked diligently to make their wishes come true. “From the formal point of view, the regulation cannot be deemed unlawful. The stipulation was made on 17 December 1949, at the time when stipulation No. 2/1949 and the institution of deputy prime minister in Sumatra had not been abolished and was still considered applicable. However, from the legal material viewpoint, from the point of view of its spirit (nature and scope), stipulation No. 2/1949 in relation with the political situation in 17 December 1949 some doubts came up. Could making some principle changes in the constitutional organization at that time be considered a responsible action? The changes meant injuring the very foundation of unity that strived to eliminate any unwanted differences. Up until this point diversity still enveloped the unity of ethnicities throughout Indonesia. Attempts to achieve unity would be more successful if the indigenous people who lived in the areas of Aceh and Tapanuli were united under the province of North Sumatra. By contrast, dividing the Province of North Sumatra into the provinces of Aceh and Tapanuli East Sumatra seemed to lessen the success of eliminating differences between the two ethnicities. Regional sentiments were likely to return more powerfully than ever. The extraordinary power of the deputy prime minister mandated by Law No. 2/1949 caused by the breakdown of communication between Sumatra and the government in Yogyakarta raised the need to establish a temporary and emergency institution to handle difficulties that might arise during the running of the government in times of emergency. The moment of 17 December 1949, the day the decree regarding the division of the Province of North Sumatra into two provinces, namely Aceh and Tapanuli East

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Sumatra, was enforced, was a totally different event compared to that of 30 September 1949, when the decree in regard to the transfer of the broad authority of the deputy prime minister was passed. On 30 September 1949 our country was still engaged in armed conflict with the Dutch. At anytime a new offensive could recur. At anytime the country might fall again into a battle zone and communication with Java would be cut off. In such situation the transfer of authority to the deputy and for him to use the power, was “logical”. However, to exercise the power on 17 December 1949, at a time when the Roundtable Conference negotiation had been concluded and ended with good results, was, not only improper, but was also contradictory to the intent (aard en strekking) of Law No 2. Indeed, the Roundtable Conference basically implied that the situation had changed from war to peace, from darkness to light, from emergency to normal, thus the split of North Sumatra, was not based on reality and reflected a lack of wisdom regarding the condition of the region, and lack of responsibility. It was therefore not surprising that some people in the intellectual circles raised doubts over the legitimacy of the decree. That was quoted from the opinion of the central government commissioner, which was just enough to show that even among the regional government circles the division of the province of North Sumatra into two parts was not unanimously approved. Hence the scorn coming from outside the government that such action was the last gift from Mr. Syafrudin to his like-minded friends, was a comment that would not boost the central government’s “prestige”, and one that had to be regretted. Close relationships that were expected to develop between the regional and central government as a result of the assignment of the deputy prime minister in the capital of North Sumatra Province, raised expectations of the people in the region. They hoped and believed that the situation of suffering would change into a condition where every citizen could live in happiness and prosperity. Citizens hoped that national freedom would bring improvement to their destiny. However, unfortunately for the people, hope and belief turned out to be in vain. Situations remained the same or deteriorated. It should not have been surprising, though. Expert leaders sent from central government to the region, including economic experts, engineers, and so on, were basically not necessary at the time and even if they had been sent to the region nothing would have changed. What was really needed at the time were not technical experts but instead experts in organization, namely people who had the capacity to encourage unity between workers in a company. This concerned an understanding of the region and the local people, someone who could place himself fittingly in the minds of the workers in the region and could understand its realities. What the companies needed at that time were not new buildings, but instead to maintenance of existing ones; the task they had to deal with were those that were maintained (onderhouden) instead of creating (scheppend). Work related to creation (scheppend) could not be implemented due to war circumstances. Additionally, despite the deployment of experts, changes could not be made. The requirements to make the situation conducive for them did not exist,

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whereas the necessary condition could only be provided by changes in the political situation, which meant a change from war to peace. The deployment of workers by the central government had brought with it an important reality, which had to be taken as a lesson learned for us in the future. This lesson was that in deploying people to a region, psychological factors had to be put into consideration, and in fact it had to be given serious attention. The people of Aceh had had a particular worldview, a mind that was significantly different from that of the people from other regions. This might be an effect of the fact the community had been isolated (geisoleerd). Unlike, for instance, the people from Minangkabau or Tapanuli, who constantly sent members of their community away to various places around the archipelago. People from Aceh did not like to migrate or leave their region. Hence, they were rarely found outside their own hometown. As a result, it could be said that people from this region were “static” (unchanging); since new ideas could not enter the regional outlook, which remained similar to what it was tens of years ago. Among other things, the Acehnese had certain views about religion. For the Acehnese it was an obligation to alienate and shun a Muslim who did not pray five times a day, or did not fast during the month of Ramadhan. For an Acehnese it would be easier to befriend a Christian than a Muslim of the previously described kind. Such conditions were a reality that had to be taken into consideration when deciding to deploy workers to the region. An attitude that ignored such reality would eventually be foolish. The harm resulting from such attitudes was enormous. And the harm was real. It manifested in the conflict of opinion between the old workers and the new ones deployed from the central government, a conflict of opinion that damaged the highly needed collaboration. Division seeped more deeply into small petty conflicts that eventually led to the separation of two different groups of people. A deep chasm between them made it, albeit inwardly, difficult to reconcile. Such situations were made worse by the attitude of the new workers who did not show any intention to approach “friends” that they had paid visit to, or made attempts to try to understand their world view. Instead they showed a derisive attitude. The other factor that had to be regretted was boastful attitude shown by some of the leaders deployed by the central government, a “bluff” attitude, an attitude that showed as if they were capable of coping with any kind of difficulty. It gave the impression that none of the things that had been done by the regional government was right and therefore had to be fixed. It was an attitude that seemingly downgraded the local government in front of the people, painting every local leader as corrupt. Even more dangerous were statements they made, not only in limited meetings, but also in front of the crowd in general meetings that were carried out purposefully for the leaders. Terms like “bogus leaders” in reference to Acehnese leaders had once been used by Mr. Syafrudin Prawiranegara at a public meeting in Kotaraja, making those insulted uneasy.

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In point of fact, to get people applauding and cheering in public meetings was not difficult, as long as the speaker unhesitatingly ridiculed those who were disliked by the public. Those responsible in maintaining public order, due to the circumstances, were not able to effectively perform their responsibility. Even more so if the mockery was done in a style commonly used by a comedian in a play. As a result, the remark became no different from a provocation. Hatred and suspicion between different groups in the community only intensified. Increasingly people were accusing their leaders of corruption and incapable of running the government. Quite the opposite, in the hearts of the government leaders who felt insulted by the term “bogus leaders” emerged hatred towards not only the very person who called them so, but also towards all the government staff deployed to Aceh by the central authorities. This was something, as previously mentioned, very bad for a close collaboration. Similarly, the government workers deployed by the central authorities disliked the local staff. They felt like they had been rejected. Most of the highest positions in the local government structure were assumed by indigenous Acehnese people, creating a very tight bloc that was not willing or hardly willing to maintain a good relationship with the former. For the central government employee it was a reason to accuse the locals of being “provincialistic”. Was the accusation correct? As often mentioned earlier a reality that any objective observer found and could not refute was that the people of Aceh were rather exclusive. They didn’t easily accept people from other regions, except if those people were willing to disconnect with their old life and hence live with locals as the Acehnese did. Explanations by experts in Acehnese custom that it was very easy for the Acehnese society to accept external elements would only be true if the external elements fulfilled the previously mentioned prerequisites. Such exclusive worldview was understandable given the history of the region. The region had once been reasonably “open”, where communication with the outside world was conducted freely, until 40 years ago, when the war with the Dutch ended. The decades of war with the Dutch had made the Acehnese sultans, who in their independent past maintained very good relationship with some major kingdoms of the world, insular and closed to new worldviews. As a result, its people became “exclusive” and suspicious of anything from outside the region. The political climate in Aceh at the end of 1949 was overwhelmed with doubt triggered by the situation concerning the attitude of and statements from some of the leaders from Java. The “patriotism” that, until the Japanese occupation period, had not fully developed into an “Indonesian” Nationalistic Patriotism but instead was still in the phase of local Acehnese patriotism. This was reflected after the arrival of the Japanese when every government staff coming from outside Aceh were laid off, or at least demoted. Quite a number of employees who originally came from outside Aceh expressed their intention to leave the region because the situation made them feel u­ ncomfortable.

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Their exodus in a large number would be a huge disadvantage for the government institutions in Aceh. Some of those who wanted to leave the region included people who had lived in Aceh for quite a long time and were occupying important government positions in various fields. Such “panic” should have been put at ease and wise efforts should have been attempted to change their mind so that they were willing to stay. Most unfortunately no effort to that purpose was attempted, yet, on the contrary, the indigenous people of Aceh with important government positions instead expressed views that seemingly welcomed them to do so. Although it was understandable that Acehnese rulers had felt hurt by the insulting comments made on them. Such negative attitudes were unacceptable and undesirable coming from people of high stature. One noted example of the indigenous Aceh workers’ dislike the towards those coming from outside was the statement made at a meeting attended by every representative from each Regency of Aceh, held in Taman Persahabatan (Friendship Garden) by the association of merchant, Gasida. The institution responsible for security and order in the region, the Military Governor, made a comparison. “In Aceh,” he said, “all ranks (from the lowest) to the rank of Governor, were assumed by a person who came from outside Aceh. But outside Aceh there was no Acehnese that assumed a high position, not even a street sweeper.” “However,” he continued his sentence passionately, “people keep on saying that the Acehnese are provincialistic. Those who no longer wanted to work in this region are free to leave. The exit door is wide open.” Such a statement was highly disappointing, given that it was made by a responsible dignitary. Catastrophe would hit the region if the suggestion implied was acted upon by the non-indigenous civil servants. The confidence that the Acehnese would be able to solve their domestic problems by themselves was an exaggeration. Current realities showed that almost all of the leaders with various skills, such as health, animal husbandry, traffic, finance, and agriculture, were assumed by non-Acehnese experts. Such reality was due to the fact that there was no expert who came from the region. The past Dutch administration treated Aceh as a special region (uitzonderlijk gewest). In Aceh the Dutch applied a policy that was different from that of other regions. Under Dutch politics Aceh had been a government with a crown. Such difference was due to the unique facts about the Acehnese society as a result of its isolation from other regions that in turn caused the people to remain unchanging. It could not be overlooked and taken lightly. One of the things that had to be maintained if we intended to change the people’s situation and mindset to be more similar to those of the people from other regions was to end the isolation. The establishment of the North Sumatra Province, which united the people of Aceh, Tapanuli, and East Sumatra, was quite appropriate in the perspective of attempting to remove existing differences between those people.

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The division of the North Sumatra Province into two, therefore, was to be regretted at best. The people from the region, however, were very “critical” and full of “humor”. It was reflected in the remarks and innuendos they made regarding the unfortunate situation. Often they were directed at the central government and its regulations. Thus, it was very important that regulations for the region were not hastily passed, but instead they first had to go through thorough consideration. Indeed there were a few regulations that gave an objective observer the impression that they were made based on inappropriate foundation and did not reflect the real condition on the ground. In addition, those regulations were often not easy to understand. Yet when the regulation concerned the division of power between government institutions, what followed was conflicting interpretation of the words within them, which, as a result, triggered conflicts that ruined the spirit of collaboration. It was generally known that such conflict of ideas truly happened between the office of the military governor and that of the provincial one, and also between the military governor and the government commissioner. Despite the fact that the dispute never really developed aggressively, it did nevertheless, affect the personal relationship between the two dignitaries. The general public knew about conflicts of opinion and was aware of the fact that they had caused an obstruction for the most perfect cooperation to take place. It would have been great, for instance, if the two leaders could maintain a close cooperation. On one side was a knowledgeable jury who did not join any particular party to avoid being considered taking the side of a “conflicted party”, and on the other side was a former leader of the largest party with great influence over the people. Close cooperation between the two would certainly bring invaluable benefit for the people in the region. Unfortunately, however, that did not happen, which was due to the fact that not only were regulations passed by the central government weak, they were also unsuitable for the current situation of the society. For an insider within the government affairs it was no secret that a conflict in regard to export and import matters arose. This was especially as a result of the unclear nature of the central government’s regulations concerning the division of responsibilities between the two functionaries. At one time the Military Governor issued a regulation regarding a ban on export of agricultural produces. Not long after that the government commissioner issued a circular stating that the regulation was unlawful, consequently creating uncertainties for the subordinate agencies, which, according to the regulation, were assigned to carry several responsibilities. Disagreement also arose in the organization of oil mining and the exploitation of the Kualu Tutut gold mine. The operation of which by the military governor had been handed over to a private company; whereas, such a decision was not approved by the government commissioner. The other disagreement was over the appointment of Resident Abdul Karim M.S. in Langsa. It had to be admitted that all those incidents were, in addition to the previously discussed matters. Not to mention the difference of “mindset” based on differences of educational background and life environment of the two dignitaries. On the one

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Picture 2.8  Major Jhon Lie, the Blockade-Runner who had caused headaches for the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Malacca Strait waters

side was a leader who had put too much emphasis on judicial considerations, whereas on the other was one who only paid attention to the circumstances and less to legal considerations (Picture 2.8). In such a situation it was obvious that a conflict was inevitable, except if the Laws and Regulations of the Central Government were distinctly consistent in governing the rights and responsibilities of each party. News then spread that the designated central government commissioner had resigned from his position on his own request. Although it was known that he had long aspired to broaden his knowledge abroad, the impression that came up was that such aspiration had more or less something to do with the hardship that he had experienced in trying to implement cooperation between regional institutions. The commemoration of the Independence Proclamation was celebrated happily by people from all walks of life where state leaders gave speeches in the ceremonies. The transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 was celebrated as well, of which during the ceremony the government commissioner for North Sumatra gave a speech (Annex 4).

Chapter 3

Regarding the Judiciary

The Dutch system in regard to rules and regulations applicable to the people of Indonesia in their daily life, such as marriage, family law, recognized everything that had been customary in our nation for centuries. The compilation of those rules was called adat or customary law. Customary law, however, was nowhere near, as many might think, religious law, or Shariah Law. It was only in the Aceh region that they were similar. Generally in Aceh every rule that fell into family law applicable to members of the indigenous community was based on Islamic law, except for some marriage customs that were not by nature very significant. The spirit of Islam lived deeply in the hearts of the people in the region, by means of hundreds of years of influence. The people of Aceh were “Islam minded”, and in general there was no decision they made or rules they obeyed that was not based on or originated from Islamic law. The Ulema who were aware of the fact that in reality not all laws applicable to the people were based on Islamic law, considered other law assume that the enactment of regulations that are not based on Islam, is an imperfect and had to be amended immediately. Such a situation, in their opinion, was caused by misconduct of the Uleebalang who would continuously try to make people turn away from Islam and embrace local customs to enable them to have full control over the people. The history of Aceh had shown us endless disagreements between customary and religious leaders. The Ulema, who only had limited judiciary power, for instance on marriage, would constantly try to broaden, or at least maintain their authority granted by the constitutional organization. Whereas customary leaders would attempt the opposite, namely to reduce the authority of religious judges. The exercise was not exclusive to Aceh, in fact, many other regions in Indonesia applied a basic principle that maintained a division of power between the religious and customary judges. The ideology that wanted Islam to command every aspect of life was something not to be ignored, although there were also other groups that did not agree with such belief. Opponents viewed Islamic domination as fanaticism, outdated, and incompatible with the current situation. The latter group of people included those of the © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7_3

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same religion, namely Muslims who had acquired religious education from abroad (Cairo), and those who had received Western education, not to mention those who had lived overseas and had broader perspective through their experiences during their overseas travel. The police corps and the state prosecutors were of the above belief, and so were the subordinates within the organization, which formed a power that could not easily be disregarded. There were times when the application of justice took a decision that was contradictory to the applicable law. Let us look at several incidents: 1. A man was found by villagers inside a house of a woman who was not his muhrim1 (relative). Both the man and woman were taken by the band of villagers and brought to the police to be put in jail for adultery. The case later went to the prosecutor. The prosecutor and police had the opinion that there was no reason to detain them. The crowd forcefully insisted, and, in consequence, the couple had to be moved out from the village community for their own safety. 2. People of one particular city staged a rally and protested, concerning the release by the court of a couple accused of adultery, but the judge had to release the couple on grounds that that they were adults, single, and were not of Acehnese origin. 3. During a court proceeding, a plaintiff strongly refuted a testimony by his opponent’s witness by reason that the witness was a Christian. These kinds of incidents had become an endless source of problems, especially for the judges, prosecutors, and the police, who had to handle them courageously. The conflict was based on the outlook that lived within the hearts of a particular group of people in the society. As a result of the belief, the intention was to carry out Islamization for the whole people in every aspect of life. They believed in what was implied in the commands that said: “our religion is Islam, so all rules and regulations are Islamic rules and regulation”. The direction towards Islamization had previously continued during the Japanese occupation time. Rumors said that one of the reasons PUSA had provided invaluable support when the Japanese landed in Aceh was the promise made by the Japanese to agree to the transfer of government power to PUSA and that the governance and rules and ­regulation would be based on Islamic Laws. However, whether or not the rumor was true, this was never established. In reality the Japanese in Aceh had truly given special attention to Islam, and one of the amendments in the state administration, after they took over the governance of the region, was the change in the judiciary system. The change involved the

1  Persons who one are forbidden to marry because they are too closely related but are allowed to associate with each other, or close relatives.

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establishment of a Court (Syu Kyo Hooin) that was granted the competence to take care of cases based on Islamic law. However, in reality the decision to grant the competence was not very significant. Moreover, since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, the central government had not shown any sign that it would realize Islamic law. However, the central government was by no means unaware of the desire in some regions. Central authorities held the opinion of understanding Acehnese aspiration due to the reality that a special situation in Aceh did exist. Such realization was reflected in the announcement by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that promised to establish a Syariah Court with executing judges granted the competence to handle certain cases in relation to nikah, talaq, fasah, ruju’, nafkah and frail (marriage law). However, the promise remained a promise. The law concerning its establishment remained to be awaited. Nonetheless it did not discourage the people who believed in Islamization, some of whom held significant positions in the government. The officials of the regional religious affairs office proposed a Bill to establish the Syariah Court equipped with the necessary rules and regulation. The bill would later be passed into Law by the regional government, the regent, and the working agency of the regional national committee. As a consequence, we could witness a situation where, in addition to the judiciary body established by the central government, existed also several judicial bodies established by the regional government, to handle certain cases based on unlawful grounds. This contradiction between Sharia and state law had made it very difficult for government judges to do their work, resulting in confusion in the society. In reality the designated institution refused to execute the verdict with force, and usually the losing party would discover the unlawfulness of the decision and would refuse to comply. In spite of everything, the people of Aceh were still waiting for a broad review by the central government about the situation in the region regarding judicial matters. There was a real desire to maintain legal certainty within society. The central government had to be able to understand the reality and where necessary establish rules and regulations that were in line with circumstances, despite the fact that the regulation was local by nature and was a deviation from the commonly applicable laws of the Republic. With such attitude and action, not only the unlawful situation could be made lawful, but the smooth running of the government could also be guaranteed. The regional government institutions were also far from quiet in expressing their desire for Islamization. It remained a “coercive position” where the passion of their heart was burning for an action. Yet, Islamists were not able to implement their legal agenda because the law would not allow it, which was evident in the unlawful establishment of the Sharia Court as earlier mentioned. There were several cases of competing interests in the sphere of justice and the law. The religious affairs officials had also taken the initiative to deliver a “joint declaration”, issued by “Ulema throughout Aceh” together with the religious affairs officials. The “joint declaration” stated a ban on several common traditions practiced by the people at large, such as “kenduri mati” (holding a party after someone died), “kenduri maulud” (holding a party to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday),

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“menziarahi kuburan” (visiting graveyards), and so on. The ban was rejected with such great opposition that in essence it became a ban on paper only. The military governor also failed to take a neutral position by putting himself above Islamization sentiments. The dignitary felt that evil wrongdoings such as adultery and gambling needed to be punished. In his opinion Islam hated adultery and considered it a great sin, thus it was compulsory duty for him to take action against adultery and gambling. By using the reason “on behalf of the country’s defense”, he passed a decree that did not only pose a threat on any guilty person, but also on a person who allegedly committed adultery and gambling, with the punishment of banishment to a vast jungle near Tangse, namely Blang Pandak (Annex 5). A ban was also imposed on the “seudati”, an indigenous game from Aceh, by the military government institution, which was a consequence of the influence of an ideal burning so passionately in the heart that it led to failure to perform solely as a state apparatus. The above explanation had to be sufficient to help the general public understand difficulties that state judges had to deal with in maintaining their duties. What kind of attitude that could be adopted towards such unlawful “regulations”? Should they be ignored as if they did not exist? It was easy to say but difficult to do. Judges who maintained a standpoint that complied to guidelines stipulated by the laws of the state, without regard to the surrounding environment, were hard to find. Therefore, it was most appropriate here that a special appreciation was extended to those judges.

Chapter 4

Regarding the Civil Servants

If a list of people who had suffered enough in recent times were to be made, since the Japanese occupation time until now, no one would deny the inclusion of civil servants. Civil servants, since the beginning of the Japanese occupation time until the turbulent era of independence, followed by the transfer of sovereignty, had continued to suffer. Their fate had not changed. Pay was so poor, and during the Japanese time people would say that civil servants, could end up “eating their pants”. That was to say that they could sell their pants to get more money to buy their basic daily needs. In those days the amount of money that could be raised by selling pants was rather large compared to the prices of daily needs. After the independence, however, they no longer had any source of income left. Firstly: because the source had dried up; there was hardly any employee that had so many spare pants. Pants that had been worn for years, could have still manage to get the expected amount. Secondly: although they still had enough spare pants to sell they could no longer be helpful. Given that export and import activities had resumed the price of pants had fallen. So, when it was compared with the price of daily needs it was far from significant. As a result, they did not have any choice but to wait patiently for the government to take action that would change their fate, except for those who were about to retire and hence entitled to get their retirement fund. Most civil servants would opt for retirement and would try to find another way to work in another company or engage in commerce to earn a living. Civil servants of the Republic of Indonesia in Aceh region were divided into two groups: First: The old civil servant group, both those who had worked since the Dutch/ Japanese occupation time and those who started since the Japanese occupation time. Second: The group of new civil servants who started to work in the era of the Republic. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7_4

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The first group generally comprised experienced employees with skill in each of their respective fields, and they consisted of people who were not originally from the region. The second group generally consisted of those who were not experienced, with less skill, and were of Acehnese origin. These differences between the two groups had created various difficulties that were disadvantageous for the relationship between them as would be further explained below. For the old civil servants, as well as with the people in general, the Japanese capitulation had brought a relief. The capitulation would bring, according to most of the people’s point of view at the time, improvement to their lives and an end to the suffering that they had experienced during the Japanese occupation. Some of them hoped for the payment of salary, in lieu of the shortage they believed they should have received during the Japanese era. Others calculated a retirement fund that they would get had they been asked to retire. Whilst some envisaged a return to previous high positions. The proclamation of independence, however, had instead brought doubts to the people. The obligation to swear allegiance to the State of the Republic of Indonesia was accepted happily. The number of those who refused to do it for a variety of reasons was small. In general the old employees continued to perform their duties, so, changes in the government structure had not been very significant. Changes were seemingly limited to begin with those of the positions such as residents, heads of the Afdeeling and Onderafdeeling. Decisions by the governor of North Sumatra, Mr. T.  M. Hasan concerning the vacancies were made by positioning indigenous employees who were not related to Uleebalang families. Appointments for those positions were political by nature. Those appointed came from the movement and from political parties. Skill or experience was not under consideration. It was to be expected. Skill and experience factors were not very important in that situation. On the contrary, it was influence, a capacity for decision making in difficult situations, and the ability to socialize with people at large were important factors. These were required skills for someone who had to deal directly with the public, namely as heads of the Afdeeling and Onderafdeeling. At the time no one was more appropriate to carry out these tasks than the indigenous people from the region and those originating from the movement. Overall they did not experience suffering in relation to the increasingly difficult day-to-day life as much as the old employees did. The new employees who came from the villages where they were located had rice fields or a productive plot of land that produced yield, or they could at least get some assistance from their close relationship with the local community, hence the hardship had not been that great. As for the old employees, in addition to the suffering caused by the shortage of income, they often also had to go through difficult situations that were really hard for them to handle, difficulties that were also disturbing their soul.

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As mentioned earlier, the differences between the old and new employees included experience, skill, and place of origin. It was these differences that had mainly led to difficulties that were “mentally tormenting” for them. Their experiences during the Dutch time were often used by some of the new employees as reasons to make accusations that might create suspicion against them. It was said, for instance, that they were Dutch accomplices or traitors. And when, for instance, the employee had a good reputation during the Dutch occupation time, or had a rather close relationship with occupiers, accusations against him would be really burdensome. In fact some old employees had been fired merely because of such accusations. When it was necessary for the old employees to show his skills through explaining something in relation to official work that was not in accordance with customs or regulations the new employees often took it as a warning. New thinking assumed that old ideas were no longer suitable in the era of independence and could only come from someone who had not adapted accordingly to the change of time, but instead was still trapped in the colonial mindset. Moreover when it concerned the difference in place of origin, although it was never expressed explicitly, it became the most important factor in social intercourse as well. It could be said that every important position in the civil service was assumed by an indigenous employee and this was important. In regard to matters of promotion, the “indigenous” factor was also significant. A lot of the indigenous employees got promotion that was actually undeserving and was carried out against the rules. However it had to be maintained on grounds of political consideration. That it caused feelings of dissatisfaction among the “non indigenous” employees was not surprising. Who would not feel frustrated, for instance, if after tens of years working as a “clerk”, one suddenly had to witness the promotion of someone who had just entered the office for a few months, as a manager or Regent? However, once again, it was not astonishing. The astonishment was a result of the constantly turbulent condition. Not implementing the policy would lead to hindrances in the running of the government. And time went on. The condition of the country was heading to improvement. Should the conditions that were, according to the measurement at the time, considered usual in the early period of struggle be taken as extraordinary according to the current measures? Changes had to be implemented if we wanted to put the country in order. The civil service had to undergo changes to improve the structure based on normal considerations. The central government had issued regulations concerning the rationalization of civil servants on the grounds that it was primarily aimed at putting the right person in the right place. The main focus was not the discharge of unnecessary civil servants. However, after regulation had been issued for some time, there had been no effect yet in the region. The structure of the civil service remained as it was.

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Appointment and promotion of employees were still carried out based on the previous practices. Rumor had it that the implementation was hampered by strong reaction against it, coming from the employees who had felt that their positions were under threat. Actually difficulties in implementing changes were not unexpected. Humans were selfish by nature and would quickly react when they felt their interests had been threatened. Not many people in the world would take a stand where he would put aside his personal interests for the benefit of his country. Humans would always have cravings for high rank and position deep inside their heart. That was human nature. That implementing the rationalization would take casualties did not need to be further reviewed. The time had come for the government to accelerate the implementation of the rationalization that it wanted. There seemed to be no opposition from the general public against it. On the contrary, one of the “program points” demanded by the Sajid Ali campaign was implemented. Strong reaction that might pose a threat would only come from the party that felt that they were the ones that would be “rationalized”. However, that should not be used as a reason for postponing the implementation. The voices against it would disappear and stop by themselves as long as it was done in a strong and fair manner. The rationalization would succeed in bringing in benefits, not only to the country, but also for the remaining employees. Civil servants of the region, especially those who were not indigenous Acehnese, were still waiting for their fate to change. Improvement in terms of ration and tulage was carried out in early December 1949, but it was still not sufficient to make ends meet. Prices of basic daily needs continued to increase. If changes were not made soon, in the sense that no improvement was carried out, it would most likely bring difficulties and chaos, and the running of the government would be hindered.

Chapter 5

Regarding the Parties

As earlier explained, as a consequence of the region’s isolation from other areas, Aceh had a distinct character, hence, the people of Aceh had an insulated outlook. A “different” world view had created a lot of difficulties in social intercourse in Aceh and had led people from outside to see them as exclusive, which the public in general regarded as “provincialistic”. In essence the “provincialistic” label took on a heavier stereotype of “incapability” or “powerlessness” to socialize, therefore in the eyes of others, Acehnese lacked “mental harmony”. However, East Aceh was different from the other parts of Aceh and was more similar to East Sumatra. Most of the people of this area came from other regions, therefore, both materially and spiritually they were more similar to the people from East Sumatra. The opening of companies by the Dutch in the past had led to human migration, consisting of the Javanese, which meant the introduction of new outlooks to the region. Hence, it ended the isolation of the region, making it appear to be separate from the remaining Aceh region. The particular situation had greatly affected the ups and downs of the political parties. Nonetheless, all of the parties based in Java also had a branch in Aceh. Party existence had yet to reach its sophisticated level in the region. The PNI, PKI, Masyumi, PSII, PSI, Pesindo, Sobsi, and so on, were also present in Aceh, however, the “party line” was often influenced by “regionalism” and was “specifically related to being Acehnese”. It was clearly evident when a particular party was faced with a rather difficult matter to be resolved. In such situation, where the members would have different opinions over the issue, more often emerged “a line that separated the pros and cons that was parallel to the line separating the Acehnese and non-Acehnese members”. That in regard to some essential issues it could cause rifts within the party followed by the emergence of a new influence. This was evident in the current situation where we witnessed the presence of the “Sarikat Buruh Minyak Sumatra Utara” (North Sumatra Oil Workers Union) in Perlak under the leadership of Hasan Abas, side by side with the “Sarikat Buruh Minyak Sumatera Utara” in Langsa, under © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7_5

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R.  Senikentara. There was also the North Sumatra Pesindo in Langsa under the leadership of Sarweno Sastrosutardjo, next to the Aceh region’s Pesindo in Kotaraja under the leadership of Ali Hasymi; the SOBSI of North Sumatra in Langsa under the leadership of B.  Hutajulu/Riphat, and SOBSI of Aceh in Kotaraja under the leadership of B. Bujang O. Effendi. The organizations were using the same name, based on the same Constitution, and also succumbed to the same central leadership, but acted separately from one another and were involved in disagreements. It became more evident when, on Langsa’s initiative, a “National Congress” was held, the congress was only attended by the “Langsa people”, because the “Kotaraja people”, despite being invited, refused to attend. All things considered, it was not surprising that the general public gradually believed that there was a “Langsa-Kotaraja” antithesis, of which the Langsa camp by the Kotaraja followers was believed to be the “red” line whose objective was to harm religion and the nation. Whereas the opposite opinion, the Kotaraja camp was the line of party that defended religion and the country. There was discord between the Langsa camp who believed themselves to be “progressive” people seeking to improve the life condition of the society that had been damaged by the “reactionary” line and the “corrupt” people of Kotaraja. The sad tragedy in Langsa, known as the Langsa Hotel affair, where several new leaders had fallen victim in the demand for a better life, could be considered as a result of this antithesis. Before the incident that had triggered highly strong reaction among the workers was discussed, it would be good to first get a brief explanation about plantations and oil mining in Aceh. The plantations and oil mines that should have been important sources for the region, turned out to be incapable of fulfilling their obligation, instead they had become “liability posts” (loss) in the “budgeting” (treasury) of the region. The government had drawn on a lot of funds with the hope that it would be used to bring improvement to the companies so that it could yield profit for the government. However, the money spent did not produce the profit that was expected based on sound calculation. The reasons might lie in the companies’ organization. The people in the organizations comprised those who lacked the capability and skill in the businesses. Nonetheless they were appointed due to the fact that the considerations did not solely rely on their skill, but was based on their influence in the local environment. Let us now return to the incident of Langsa Hotel affair, where there was a shooting of protesters that resulted in two people killed on the spot and six wounded. The following was the series of events that preceded the incident: The “Sarikat Buruh Minyak Sumatra Utara” of Langsa, under the leadership of R. Senikentara, organized a strike in the form of a “sit down strike” because they felt that the government had not paid serious attention to their demands. Their demands concerned the following:

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1. “Improvement of the workers’ life in relation to their salary and rations that were always belatedly received”. 2. “Reorganization and rationalization of the North Sumatra oil companies, so as to improve it, by replacing the old leaders with new ones consisting of capable, skilled, and honest leaders because in their opinion the old leaders were – these are the terms they used  – “adventurers” and “corruptors” that had caused the government billions of rupiah in losses and had brought suffering and poverty to the thousands of families of oil mining workers”. It was necessary to be aware that item 2 of the demands was aimed at the general manager who had been suspended by the governor of North Sumatra for his involvement in a misappropriation of his power, however, before the investigation had concluded he was reappointed as the general manager by the military governor who believed that as the military governor he had the authority to make decisions concerning the oil mining organizations, which at the time due to their being vital objects had been put under the military. The appointment, followed by a discharge of several employees and the establishment of a new workers’ union in Perlak by the new leaders, which refused to recognize Langsa’s workers’ union, had triggered such a strong reaction that it eventually had to be annulled. The Regent of Kotaraja, T.  A. Hasan, was then appointed as the new General Manager. However, he was also disliked by the general public in Langsa, because he was known, as former Regent in East Aceh, to have shown an attitude that “exclusively” rejected the refugees from East Sumatra in addition to making a statement in a general meeting that the refugees from East Sumatra that had been displaced by the Dutch offensive, were the accomplices of NICA. The appointment (of T. A. Hasan) also triggered some reaction. For the second time then the appointment was annulled, and Resident T. B. Daudsyah headed to Langsa to resolve the complicated problem. He held a meeting with all of the workers’ unions and provided the workers an opportunity to select a general manager that they liked and considered capable. As a result, mister Johan was appointed, a person that, based on his experience during the Dutch occupation era, was rightly positioned to lead the oil company. However, the former leader of the oil mine that had not been selected, with the support of the new “oil workers’ union” that he established and was based in Perlak, took actions that were hampering the company’s operation. The oil wells that were located in some parts of Perlak were put under his control, creating a situation where the oil workers’ union of Langsa under the leadership of R. Senikentara, had to deal with the oil workers’ union of Perlak under H. Abbas’s leadership. It was during a chaotic situation that the oil workers’ union of Langsa, who no longer had patience with circumstances and, as a protest against the government that they believed had been negligent in taking a decisive attitude, went on a “sit-down strike”.

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With the intervention of several military institutions and Osman Adams, a prominent person in Langsa, the “sit-down strike” ended after several days. Both parties, the workers and the military, showed good will to end the highly detrimental dispute. The atmosphere that had begun to improve suddenly turned bad as a result of the arrival of the regional police chief, Moh. Insya, accompanied by about six policemen from Kotaraja. The police purpose was to carry out a special task on the military governor’s order, namely to arrest the leaders who had organized the “sit down strike”. Attempts by some people to persuade the chief of police to postpone his plan had not been successful. The chief police insisted that he would carry on with the plan whatever happened. True to his word, he arrested and detained the designated leaders. The workers tried to have their leaders released. Initially they tried to do it through sending a request letter to the head of the regency police office, then by sending some delegates, followed by fasting as a protest, but all was to no avail. Therefore, they then decided to hold a protest in front of the place where the regional chief police that had arrested their leaders were keeping them, and would demand for the latter to be freed. The protest ended in tragedy. At Langsa Hotel, where the workers’ leaders had been detained, while an argument was taking place between the protesters and the guards a first shot was fired, followed by several more. In the blink of an eye the protesters dispersed, leaving two dead and several others wounded, while the captives disappeared without any trace. Basically the “background” of the sorrowful incident was the antithesis of Langsa, the antithesis between the people who came from outside the region, especially the refugees from East Sumatra that had come to Aceh to escape from the first Dutch offensive, and the indigenous Acehnese, and the conflicts between the new lines and the old ones that was still widely found in the region. In any event or incident that had to be dealt with and caused troubles, especially for the government, the antithesis was known to be the main cause. Incidents included the economic matters, military, or social environment as well as those concerning day-to-day life. As long as the antitheses were not eradicated, the political existence in the region would never be able to rise to a more sophisticated level. Success could only be achieved by bringing separate outlooks closer to each other, provided that the two parties were willing and would sincerely try to understand the other party’s mindset. And our government, the democratic government, would always have to undergo obstacles in its implementation.

Chapter 6

Miscellaneous

6.1  Misconception About Democracy and Its Excesses As mentioned in the earlier pages, democracy and its implementation, both consciously and unconsciously, had often been misunderstood. In the 4 years after the people of Indonesia proclaimed their independence, there had been many occasions where an individual or a band of men took actions on behalf of democracy, whereas, after some examination, those actions were more like illicit actions that were often done for personal gain. Every citizen should know that the right granted by democracy was by no means a right that he could exercise at any time and place. Indeed, “democratic rights refer to managing something for the interest of the public,” not in the sense that the right to voice one’s opinion, to think, to gather, were mainly reserved for one official body, which was the People’s Representative Council. During the time it was in session, the People’s Representative Council assumed that democracy only concerned matters that fell into matters within the competence of the representative council. There was an assumption that competence was limited to matters within and not included the executive right of other official agencies, which were separated from the representative council, and that the stipulations passed by the People’s Representative Body would only be applicable if they had been approved by the executive body (the President). In practice, it was not that People understood the substance of democracy, but it was more about the will of the People’s Representative Council as representative of the People. It was obvious then that democratic rights were the rights that had to be exercised in an orderly manner, a right that had certain limitation regarding its “subject” and “object”. There was once an incident of usurpation of properties by a group of people from the lawful owners. The objections raised by the owners were easily put aside by the usurpers by reason that “the taking of the properties was based on the people’s request. Therefore it had to be granted because our government is a democratic one”. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7_6

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Picture 6.1  The Vice President Drs Mohammad Hatta and his entourage during a visit to Aceh in mid 1949, posing in front of the North Sumatra People’s Representative Council Building in Kutaraja. From left to right (sitting): 1. The Sultan of Siak, Syarif Kasim; 2. Secretary of the State, Mr. A. G. Pringgodigodo; 3. Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo; 4. Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Sukiman; 5. Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat and Karo, Tgk M. Daud Beureuih; 6. Vice President, Drs. Muhammad Hatta; 7. Governor of North Sumatra, Mr. S.M. Amin; 8. Minister of Information, Mohammad Natsir; 9. Dignitary, Baswedan; 10. Resident Tuanku Mahmud; 11. Resident Teuku Daudsyah; 12. Member of the Governing Body of the Central National Committee, Z. Baharuddin

Demands made by a band of men on behalf of a dignitary or on behalf of democracy for a provision, which the dignitary was against in his deepest conscience, were often fulfilled albeit merely because the dignitary didn’t dare to face the “consequence” of a refusal. Many people wanted the process of selecting members of the representative council by the people through an election to be applied in selecting all government positions. Hence there were many requests regarding the appointment of professionals such as judges, doctors, and teachers. According to the demands, those appointments had to also be based on democracy, namely the people’s will. Without trying to undermine the meaning of “acceptabiliteit” (acceptability  – liked by the community) it did not seem to be necessary to explain to people who could look into the matters objectively. What would happen if the appointment of an expert in one field of work had to be decided based on the people’s will? Wouldn’t it be chaotic if jobs that needed particular skills were given to the unskilled? It had to be understood that the selection system through representation, based on the constitution, only applied to people’s representative bodies. A selection of a

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Picture 6.2  Vice President Drs. Mohammad Hatta and Minister of Home Affairs Dr. Sukiman, and Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, observing the people’s parade

Picture 6.3  A parade was held in honor of the Vice President’s visit

very few other positions were also included in this provision. A belief that every official body or every position must be established through a general selection by the people implied that in a democracy every difference, both concerning skills and

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Picture 6.4  Vice President Drs. Mohammad Hatta during a picnic in Lho’Nga

experience, had disappeared. It was a belief with consequences that could not be accounted for. Another interesting reality was the quick and easy manner by which people could accuse the government’s action as “an abuse of democratic rights”, “fascistic”, “a colonial act” and so on. Whereas in many cases, objective investigators could quickly conclude that the government’s action was correct and it had to be executed. In many instances the charge was made with conviction, yet the complaint often concerned a misunderstanding. Not many people seemed to be aware that freedom of speech, of association, to stage a demonstration, to express opinion verbally or in writing, was by no means the same as freedom to incite, to jeopardize security, and to slander. In point of fact the freedom guaranteed by the constitution was restricted. The very freedom could be revoked, in the event there were reasons to conclude that chaos was most likely to occur if above said freedom was not revoked. The strike that was staged in East Aceh was followed by the arrest of some of the leaders, who exaggerated and heralded the action. A few leaders made accusations as if the government did not recognize the right to strike, whereas state laws recognized strikes as the workers’ weapon in their struggle to obtain a better life. There was nothing to substantiate the accusation. However, it seemed that the best guess was to assume that the arrest was made due to the excesses consequences of the events surrounding the strike. The “excessen” (excesses) had turned into crime. According to circulating news, the arrested leaders often expressed provocative slanders against the state leaders in general meetings.

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For years our people had been taught to leave behind the slave mentality, and to replace it with the spirit of an independent, sovereign, and democratic nation. As a result of the leaders’ teaching, indeed, the spirit and soul of the people had undergone changes towards a mindset more suitable with the realm of independence. However, quite the reverse was materializing. It was undeniable that besides bringing in advantages, the changes brought against the accused, had disadvantages as well. Among the people a band of men often emerged, led by unhealthy elements, who were “indissplinair” (undisciplined) and “ongebonden” (unbound). Any action taken or regulation issued by the government would most easily become a target of derisive, mocking, and “afbrekend” (destructive) criticism. The freedom to express an opinion guaranteed by democracy, which was one of the state’s five principles of Pancasila, could be most easily interpreted as such that the freedom had gone beyond the limits of politeness and turned into a freedom to condemn and insult. Not to mention the greater “excesses”, such as forcefully urging an authorized government to revoke a regulation or action that they disliked. And those were all carried out on behalf of “the people’s will”. Often “the people’s will” was just lip service. There were countless exploits that had been carried out on behalf of “the people’s will”. Many people had suffered as a result of some actions that were claimed to have been carried out on behalf of the people. Many innocent citizens had fallen victim to actions perpetrated on behalf of “the people’s will”. Many properties disappeared and unlawfully changed hands to unauthorized parties on behalf of “the people’s will”. And, thousands of men, widows, and orphans would be able to confirm those occurrences. The sacred phrase, “the people’s will”, had been used to adorn the lips of heartless and irresponsible people to justify exploits that had been perpetrated in order to fulfill their greed. Aceh itself had not been spared from the troubles resulting from the “excesses”. A person who was expected to give alms should fulfill the expectation because it was “the people’s will”. A citizen who was expected to lend his vehicle had to immediately meet the expectation because it was “the people’s will”. A government agency that would relocate some staff would have to be meticulous in its reasoning to avoid the possibility that “the people’s will” would force an annulment of the relocation plan. To sum up, people from all walks of life and from the government detested and even feared the phrase “the people’s will”. As a matter of fact, such situations did not exclusively occur in Aceh, or even in Indonesia. Every democratic country had once gone through such phases in its history. Aristotle had once said of similar situations, that it was not the genuine will of people that had been used by the government as a guideline, but instead it was the will of an eloquent speaker (a demagogue). It would be most easy for an articulate person with no sense of responsibility to take advantage of the people in general. So long as the demagogue knew exactly the temperament of the general public. He would pay attention to what the people wanted and within it he would continue his strategy of public speaking in order to be able to exercise his own personal will. So, the real situation would seem that he was led by the people instead of the other way

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around. Then casually he would device a strategy so that his own will would be exercised. Furthermore Aristotle stated that such kind of government was actually a “mass” of people who forced their will despotically. The “mass” was mob rule, similar to a king who had an unlimited power and ruled as a “tyrant”. Tyrants would always live among his worshippers. Immoral people would incessantly worship the king simply to get everything they wanted. In ancient times, Aristotle likened the tyrant to a demagogue, a leader who was an eloquent speaker, who took advantage of his people to get what he wanted. Aceh was not short of leaders like that. Such leaders are not able to have a broad vision. His vision would be limited to the situation in the region without being able to look beyond the region’s boundaries. He wouldn’t be able to see the ups and downs of the national struggle, neither could he look into the kind of changes that he had to make, or look into changes in the political development in carrying out his duties. He would continuously hang on to the one phase. He would refuse to understand and accept the fact that the sarcastic remarks made against B.F.O. leaders had been deserving during the time before they were united in one front with the leaders of the N.R.I against the Netherlands at the Round Table Conference, but were damaging when made after the event. Speeches given to keep up the spirit of the troops and militia to fight were appropriate before the ceasefire, but was not fitting after that. Attitude towards the Dutch had to be changed from animosity to goodwill after an accord was signed. People and their speeches had to also adapt themselves with the changes. However, their attitudes and statements remained unchanged, and they continued to ridicule leaders, mocking non-Republican leaders, bearing animosity towards the Dutch, and even continued to make remarks in their speeches that were characteristically divisive. What made things more difficult was the repetition of history of the region concerning the position of such leaders in the society. The recurrence of history referred to the fact that those leaders seemed to have been monopolizing (monopolisirin) political development. Those who still had the character of a true leader seemed to have been eliminated from the political scene because they were no longer popular, and also because they refused to be controlled. They had to give up their leadership to leaders who were renowned as popular speakers in the society, who were willing to be led and adapt themselves to the people’s will, although it was against the state law and their own principles. In such situations Aristotle stated that true leaders would be eliminated, and the eloquent speakers, who were not leaders, would sprout everywhere like mushrooms in the rainy season.

6.2  Excessiveness of Some Leaders And so it went with the misconception concerning democracy and its excesses insociety.

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We could not close our eyes to excesses manifesting as if he was holding on to colonial rules and unable to free himself from the old way of thinking. This condition was an undeniable reality. The proof of accusations that the leaders running the government in Aceh were “fascistic” could be shown in the arrests that were often made in a great number. Indeed, various arrests had been, according to accusations, were made based on unjustified charges. Objective investigation had led to the fact that in more or less 4 years since the proclamation of independence until the time of the transfer of sovereignty, hundreds of citizens had been arrested. Actually, the situation should not be surprising. In a country that was undergoing an extraordinary circumstance, everything had to be carried out within the atmosphere of war and every attention had to be directed to actions related to the country’s defense and security. Enemies were constantly waiting for the right time to leap in to disturb the security and peace, and even to obliterate the country, such actions, which in normal times would be considered undemocratic proceedings, were unavoidable. Perhaps the circumstances required that quick decision had to be made because doubts on judicial considerations might have put the country in danger. On the contrary it was also indisputable that objective investigation gave the impression that many of the actions taken by the government in Aceh were inappropriate, regardless that they were based on the perspective of “the country’s defense and security” or “extraordinary circumstances”. Among the great number of arrests some were made against every person who was against the existing condition and not satisfied with it. Many arrests had been made merely based on negative sentiments, or on unfounded reports, or on personal considerations. It could be said that those incidents were the effects of “the way some government leaders think”. Such frame of mind in its turn was the effect of the “lack of understanding” in regard to the characters and procedures of a democratic country. The leaders as such considered that one could limit the freedom of movement of people in the event that they had done or allegedly done something. Limitations were imposed according to Acehnese leaders’ own judgement with regard to what endangered the country. The fact that the structure and nature of a democratic state fully guarantee a person’s right to have an opinion and ideology, and to move around freely, and that restraining a person from exercising those rights could only be done under some circumstances and conditions had been ignored. Such ways of thinking had indeed led to an attitude that made taking actions that restrained freedom of movement an easy thing to do. Hence those decisions were irresponsible. Some of them were carried out as an act of revenge, based on self-­ interestor the interest of a small group. For instance, there was an occasion where a government leader issued a recommendation in a people’s meeting that arrests were made of certain people on the grounds that they had often come up with thoughts and beliefs which might create difficulties to the government. The elimination of such thoughts would make it easier for the government to run the administration.

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In their way of thinking, the issue of whether or not an arrest would depend on whether there was a likelihood of difficulties as a result of a person’s action. For them, the fact that an arrest of a person in relation to an action had to be based on applicable rules and law was too “judicial” and highly “bureaucratic”. “Someone who is bound to rules and regulation is not revolutionary and lacks dynamics.” And so went their opinion. The consequence of such thinking was the likelihood of arbitrary arrests, which practically meant the death of “rechtszekerheid” (legal certainty). In such situations the statement that our country was a state of law became empty words that did not reflect reality. Yet, that way of thinking was reflected in a statement made by someone responsible for running the administration of a district. It was fair to say that this dignitary had never had any experience in matters regarding the government or administration before he was appointed to his position. He expressed his astonishment concerning why people made “exaggerated” comments that matters related to policies and governance were difficult and required extraordinary wisdom. For him, he stated, none of them were difficult. “Anyone who creates difficulties,” he said, “is easy to deal with. Just send the police to that person, or perhaps it was better to send some young men from the political party. I guarantee the problem will be resolved in the blink of an eye”. For someone with a different way of thinking, who would still put emphasis on the rule of law in relation to providing guarantee for freedom of movement and freedom of expression? It was extremely difficult to maintain cooperation from leaders of that type. Disagreements would incessantly arise, and difference of opinion could not be taken lightly in day-to-day running of government administration. They would lead to mental stress, suffered not only because of having realized that unlawful actions had been taken, but also because of being accused of being too bureaucratic, reactionary, and so on. Other accusations were that many government leaders had still been influenced by the “outdated” teachings in Islam. They too strongly adhered to issues that in recent times even the Islamic countries and other regions in Indonesia had been considered “outdated”. Undeniably, when it came to issues concerning religion, the opinion of most of the clerics meant that it was the opinion of most of the government leaders in the region, a situation that was different from the other regions. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the movement within the government to Islamicize it, despite contradictory law, was very strong. The Military Governor’s ban on the practice of the seudati, a traditional Acehnese dance, could be considered as one impact. According to the institution that issued the ban, seudati could cause people to forget God, considering that it was merely worldly. “The game”, he further stated, “was a source of evil. It would give a lot of opportunity for men and women to freely mingle and thus would lead to adultery and fighting. It would make people lazy, both the dancers and the spectators as it would be pointless to watch, and it encouraged rampant gambling”. The ban was greatly reacted against, causing clashes between the game organizers and local

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g­ overnment officials. In the end the reactions could not be stopped, because the ban could not be applied. The ban was essentially a meaningless one, a bitter reality that did not contribute anything to the government’s stability. It is hoped that this would be a lesson learned for those, who, issued bans which afterwards could not be enforced because they weren’t suitable with the condition of the society. They carried out these bans without serious consideration of the situation. Without first examining the possibility of applying the rules solely based on considerations that had nothing to do with public interest. The above accounts left the impression that many government institutions, both the local and national ones, had been very quick in issuing regulations. Although they were inappropriate given the situation of the society, and would only create difficulties. There are many reasons that could be offered to justify that impression. The influence of “Islamization” ideology had also inspired some government leaders that support it to “improve” the existing rules and regulations governing gambling and adultery offenses. These leaders considered the two offenses very serious and much more serious than the others. As a result the authorized institution issued several regulations with a purpose of increasing the efforts to eliminate those offenses. The military governor’s office, for instance, issued a particular regulation (Annex 5). From a judicial perspective, the regulation was not appropriate. It was stipulated in the regulation that the parties who were suspected of perpetrating such offenses should be arrested and remained in detention, whereas the applicable law (R.B.G) only allowed custody (as a preventive measure) for certain offenses, which did not include gambling. Furthermore, the regulation stipulated that the suspects, despite their unproven guilt, could be arrested and banished to a certain location (Blang Pandak). In practice, the judges were not the only party that had to face difficulties as a result of the state dignitaries’ attitudes, because basically such difficulties were also faced by all public officers, especially those assuming responsible positions. In their day-to-day activity and socialization some of those leaders also showed a rather strange attitude that was inappropriate for government dignitaries. Officials were expected to be neutral in matters concerning religion. For them the measurement for whether or not a person could do his duties was based on whether he was obedient in prayer and fasting. A person who rarely missed prayer or fasting had to be able to maintain his duties, regardless of the fact that he had superficial knowledge and no experience whatsoever. On the other hand, someone with great knowledge and experience would not be considered competent if he did not pray and fast. The fact that in addition to “obey God’s command” one had also had to “refrain from God’s prohibitions”, for instance the prohibition to steal, kill, persecute, and so on, was not a concern. It never crossed their mind that not all people who continuously obeyed God’s command, would automatically refrain from doing things that God forbade. In reverse, not all people disobeying God’s command were of low morality. However, for them, a person who did not pray and fast was an infidel. Infidels should not be made friends with and should be estranged.

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The arrival of the experts from Java, who mostly did not think that religion was important, was not warmly greeted in Aceh. Nor was this surprising. Therefore, it was similarly not surprising that the local government kept advising their national counterparts to send officials who were devoted to their religion. Such advice should not be taken as “outdated” or small-minded, it was instead given based on the “reality”. One particular incident that caused great reaction among the group of people who called themselves the “Langsa front” was the treatment against a Resident and member of the North Sumatra People’s Representative Council, Abdul Karim M.S., and his associates. The incident not only attracted special attention of the public at large in the region, but also became one of the causes of actions by the Langsa front against Kutaraja. It also engulfed the tenuous relationship between the governor of North Sumatra and the military governor of Aceh as well. The following was an account of the incident. In early 1948, a group of people came to Tapa Tuan to attend the assembly to establish the North Sumatra Province’s Representative Council. Some of them were from Bukit Tinggi and among the members of the team was Abdul Karim M.S., the Resident and the State Commissioner of Sumatera. During the second assembly, after the inaugural ceremony had concluded, a disagreement occurred between the representatives of the political parties, namely the Parkindo, PSII, and Masyumi under one faction, and the group of Abd. Karim M.S. and his associates under the people’s democracy faction (F.D.R) on the other side, concerning issues related to the structure of the North Sumatra People’s Representative Council Executive Body. A heated debate took place and ended with the F.D.R faction making a statement that from then onwards it would no longer be willing to attend the meetings and that it would not participate in the government. And, after making the statement, all members of the faction left the meeting. That event, which could still be taken as a legal approach to strive for a cause within the parliamentary setting and was not an “illegal obstruction”, was considered something very serious and an opposition to the government. The matter had probably been exaggerated when it was informed to the dignitary responsible in overseeing regional security in Kotaraja. The dignitary, who didn’t seem to first carry out further investigation over the matter, then ordered the arrest of Abdul Karim M.S. and his team in Tapa Tuan and forbade them to leave town. The arrest prompted huge reaction, especially from Abdul Karim M.S.’s followers, which was known as the Langsa front. Reaction also came from neutral parties that were not part of either the Langsa or Kotaraja front. The event only increased the scale of the antithesis between Langsa and Kotaraja. Criticism against the government policies became fiercer ever since, “accusations” of being fascistic, colonialist and reactionary, were leveled incessantly at them. The ban for Abdul Karim M.S. and his associates from leaving Tapa Tuan was in place for a few months until, one time, with intervention of the P.T.T.S. (Commander of the Army and Territory), Kolonel Hidayat, who on his way to Kotaraja stayed the night in Tapa Tuan and met with Abdul Karim M.S. and his associates. The military government issued a new stipulation that allowed Abdul Karim M.S. and his

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a­ ssociates to leave Aceh on condition that they did so through the Tapanuli region. It was a condition that was actually difficult to fulfill given that at the time the Dutch that had already managed to occupy Barus and was closely keeping the seas and the Aceh-Tapanuli borders under constant surveillance. Apparently Abdul Karim M.S. and his associates agreed on the condition, and at some point they left Tapa Tuan, escorted by the police, and went southward. There had been no news about when exactly the group had passed the border and entered Tapanuli, but not long afterwards there was some news circulated that the men had safely returned to Langsa and were again busy leading the people in East Aceh. The information turned out to be accurate. Based on later information, it turned out that in the middle of their journey, at a crossroads in a village, they managed to sneak out from the police’s escort, and after crossing mountains, valleys, and jungles for several weeks, and going through various adversities, they finally arrived back in Langsa. In Langsa they were warmly welcomed by the people, who mostly consisted of followers and evacuees from East Sumatra and sympathetic locals. The account of the event was rather extensive because in the opinion of the public at large it was one of the clear evidences many people within the government, namely the reactionary elements, ignoring the rights of the people. The rebuttal made by Abdul Karim M.S. and his friends was that their arrest was none other than an abuse of the country’s law. There were no rules or regulations that justified such action, apart from the fact that it was “exorbitante rechten and passenstelsel” (the highest right and a rather loose system), a legal legacy of Dutch occupation. Such rules and regulations had become automatically null and void since they were inapplicable in a democracy. According to public opinion, the rebuttal against the central government had a solid foundation and contained some truth. Actually, anyone who took a neutral stand would agree with the rebuttal by default. The impression that was made was that wide-ranging rights granted to the Military Governor had been unlawfully exercised. It could be that they had been implemented in order to avoid difficulties that might arise in Aceh as a result of the arrival of Abdul Karim M.S. and his associates in the region. Had the stipulations in regard to the removal Abdul Karim M.S. and his associates been consistently applied, they should have been instructed to leave Langsa, where they came back after disappearing from South Aceh on their way to Tapanuli region. However, there was no sign that it would be implemented. The men remained in Langsa and continued to be active. The government’s attitude towards someone who was highly popular and familiar with his location was not surprising. Langsa was a place where Abdul Karim M.S.’s followers were based, and, Abdul Karim M.S. would most likely in East Aceh create chaos that the state apparatus could not control. The decree issued later by the governor of North Sumatra, concerning the appointment of Abdul Karim M.S. as Resident to assist the governor of North Sumatra, only augmented the existing friction between the dignitary and the m ­ ilitary

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governor who would inevitably consider the appointment as a “de ja vu” of his own action, and as a “rehabilitation” for Abdul Karim M.S. There was indeed a reason for the military governor to make such conclusion from the appointment of Abdul Karim M.S. Indeed it could be considered an unwise decision, except if the intellectuals at the time had been right in their assumption that the purpose of the appointment was to keep him close to the government to make him responsible for maintaining in East Aceh. If the above consideration was the reason for Abdul Karim M.S.’s appointment in Langsa as Resident, one had to admit that it turned out to be a wise decision. Since then those in the know had been reporting that Abdul Karim M.S.’s attitudes and actions were always in line with the country’s policies, that he had been good in the courses he provided as a man of his party, and in his day-to-day activity, where he would stand behind the government and tried his best to maintain order in the restless circumstances. Based on the above accounts one could conclude that the “point of view” of a certain party concerning the development in day-to-day life, was rather different from the point of view that should have been maintained by a democratic country. The “progressive” opinion would gradually prevail in the region despite the fact that a “barrier” could be placed to prevent new ideologies and thoughts entering the North. The currents coming from the South were inevitable. It would have been much better if attempts were made to provide conditions favorable for the currents to enter the region gradually so as not to have it coming like a deluge that would wash away everything blocking its way. The main conditions were to maintain tolerant attitude and efforts by the dignitaries to get closer to the people. The elimination of everything that might make it conducive for the region to remain “isolated” was a priority. Therefore, special attention, namely a review by the national government of the realities and actions in relation to the above accounts, was absolutely necessary (conditio sine qua non). Attempts towards creating favorable conditions to allow such improvement were required immediately. The faster changes took place in the region the better. The unity of the republic required it to immediately change.

6.3  “Extreme Conservative” Religious Outlook The “extreme conservative” outlook displayed by some ulemas and their followers in North Aceh, were a band of troublemakers in West Aceh known as the T.R. Tampok party, and several people in Kotaraja. Some villagers under the leadership of an ulema had once had a meeting in Samalanga. They discussed a situation where, in their opinion, several incidents and events had violated Islamic laws. And, they intended to amend the situation. As a

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first step, a resolution was made to force the government to issue several bans. One such decree outlawed the wearing of a hat and tie. That the T.R. Tampok party in West Aceh also began to play its role in the development of events had been recorded in history. Several decades prior, during the Dutch occupation, the party was a threat to Dutch authority in the region. It refused to succumb to the Dutch administration, that they considered infidel. It was highly unfortunate that T.R.  Tampok had the same opinion and attitude towards the Republic, which had caused them to be raided and chased down to Meulaboh. The invasion was followed by several incidents that caused massive bloodshed. A perfect resolve would never be reached as long as the gang maintained their extreme conservative ideology. T.R. Tampok considered any government that did not meet their demands was infidel and a dajjal government. During the party held in honor of the vice president’s visit, some dances were formed by girls. Apparently several extreme conservative ulemas in Kotaraja found them to be a breach of Islamic laws. As a result, the event organizer was compelled to insistently fend off the attacks against them. A resolution was issued, containing demands that in the future they would pay more attention to “Islamic laws”. In principle the number of people who had such extreme conservative ideology was very small. Similarly, only a minute number had a moderately conservative outlook, coverning a small part of the ulemas within the government. The people at large, meanwhile, did not have any standpoint and had no concern about any issues that did not directly affect their livelihood. It was most unfortunate, that in general the population were very easily influenced by the leaders. Hence the citizens would quickly conduct unlawful actions if they were aroused under the guise of religious offense or provokation by dubious leaders. There were many incidents where gangs of men raided theatrical performances because they had been instigated to do so by their leaders on grounds that women had been involved in the performance. Some attacks had also been carried out on seudati performers. Another incident included pressure that was put on a school principal that was so great that it was deemed necessary to temporarily evacuate him from the place. It was simply because he allowed his students – boys and girls – to play baseball. There were many incidents that had taken place as effects of religious ideology staunchly held by the government officials and the ulema, namely the “moderately conservative” and “extreme conservative” branches. Information that did not insult the principles of Islamic religion was required in order to improve the government. People’s Islamic education in the region was another key to strengthen their citizenship. Changes did not seem to be too difficult since in principle harmful aspects were merely a result of exclusive interpretation of religion, and not about the basic principles. Modern education that was guided by principles exercised by modern Islamic countries, especially for children, would quickly bring the intended changes. It may not take a long time for this generation to change.

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Predictions made by some leaders that our country would continue to face various challenges before it reached its dreams, seemed to be true. Every citizen has a great responsibility to contribute his energy and mind to help eradicate every factor that posed a threat to the country’s development. Hopefully all efforts that were carried out in the attempts to get rid of all shortcomings and failings that had loomed over our society and that the society was still suffering from could succeed in a short time. It was vital that our country could provide security and order, happiness and prosperity without any serious obstacles.

Annexes

Annex 1 (Quoted from the “Semangat Merdeka” Daily) NOTICE The desire of most people in the region to amend the regional government by modifying the structure of government had long been shared by the authorities. In this case the government has decided to carry out an “adjustment” of all positions as soon possible. However, the government will never agree to make immediate changes based on accusations that are baseless, unclear, or in which truth remains to be proven. The government intends to carry out “adjustment” in an orderly approach based on laws, and any other approaches are deemed harmful for the country. Therefore, it is advised that any party desiring improvement in the government takes note of the effect and intent and never take actions against the will of the government. The government will not hesitate, if necessary, to use all its means of power to overcome any crisis that may arise as a result of one's actions, even if it is conducted with virtuous intention and purpose. Kutaraja, 20 August 1948 Governor of North Sumatera Mr. S. M. AMIN

Annex 2 (Quoted from the “Semangat Merdeka” Daily) NOTICE No. GM-14-M To all citizen of this region, © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7

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On 3 November 1948 the government took action against the campaign by SAID ALI and his associates that has continuously incited some of the people to call for a general revolution in continuation of their campaign on 18 August 1948. The person who led this campaign and is involved in it has been arrested to be tried. Since the governor of North Sumatra issued a notice on 20 August 1948 concerning the matter they have been repeatedly warned against doing anything that will create confusion and chaos that will harm the country and the general public, however, they did not heed, and instead clandestinely and cunningly made various attempts to rally some of the people in order to attain their objectives that will be highly detrimental for the nation’s and the general public’s safety. Therefore, on behalf of the country’s safety and public order, the government feels the need to responsibly use its means and power to take the above measures. Therefore, all residents and people who do not have any involvement in the matter should keep calm in all circumstances. The Government acts with all the wisdom that is in it. The above has herewith been brought to inform all people and residents. Kutaraja, 4 November 1948. The Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo, Tgk. Muhd. Daud Beureueh.

Annex 3 Address by the Governor of North Sumatra at the session of the establishment of the North Sumatra People’s Representative Council in Tapa Tuan on 13-12-1948. (Quoted from “Semangat Merdeka” Daily).

Honorable Gentlemen It is most appropriate that I firstly express my gratitude to all of you who have kindly come to this event today. I realize this is a difficult time, especially in relation to transportation, thus your presence here is a proof of your commitment to the betterment of our country. Next, I would like to express our gratitude to GOD THE ALMIGHTY that has allowed us to gather in this room in the town of Tapa Tuan at this lovely and beautiful coast of West Aceh, to fulfill the obligation imposed on us to establish the Representative Council of the North Sumatra Province. The obligation concerns upholding the mandate of Law No. 10/1948 that was passed as a consequence of the aspiration of our Constitution that requires the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia to adopt a democratic system. Once the North Sumatra Province’s People’s Representative Council has been established, it could be stated that we have progressed one step further in our attempts to establish a country based on the sovereignty of the people; a nation state where everything is done based on the will of the people in general, where every

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action is carried out on behalf of collective interest, free from any threat of fear and anxiety. Honorable Gentlemen, The abovementioned nation state remains an ideal; the journey that we have to take together before we turn the ideal into reality is long and full of difficulties, troubles, and obstacles that we will have to overcome. Let’s contribute our energy, thought, wealth, and if necessary, even our life, to help the efforts to uphold the country we aspire to. Honorable Gentlemen, The establishment of the North Sumatra Council (D.P.S.O.) that we are about to institute is one of the attempts to bring us closer to the time where we can witness the fulfillment of our ideals, to turn our dreams into reality. Establishing the council is not a difficult task, a work that doesn’t require sacrificing our thought and energy. What requires our thought and energy, obedience, determination, patience and composure, will give us the greatest test, is the implementation of every obligation and right that comes with it and that rests with us as the representatives of the people. The ideal implementation requires the following: We must have a confidence that changes that take place as the consequences of Law No. 10/1948 are certainly changes that will bring us to improvement. Considerations that are subjective and self-serving that could be used as reasons to turn against the intent of the amendment of the law should be erased from our hearts. Changes in the government that we will apply will bring significant and radical changes. Until now the regional government has been based on the unity of residencies; this unity of regencies is mainly based on ethnological considerations. The Aceh residency is based on Aceh unity, the Tapanuli residency on the Batak unity, and the East Sumatra residency is based on the unity of the Malay people. It is clear to us the establishment of the unity is based on a shallow nationhood and is not suitable for our Republic. Therefore, the Province that we are about to establish will no longer be based on the old foundation, but instead on a new one, namely economic and political unities and so on. Honorable Gentlemen, The type of government that will be realized is a democracy. For Tapanuli a democratic government is nothing new. Such kind of government is suitable for the custom in that region. Thus it can be considered that the changes effected by Law No. 10 /1948 won’t cause anxiety among the people there. It is, however, rather different for Aceh and East Sumatra. For centuries these regions have not experienced any government that was collegial by nature; the history of these places has shown that for hundreds of years the people in the regions had been ruled under the reigns of Sultans and Ueleubalang, who exercised their powers dictatorially. Therefore, it is possible that at first the people of the regions will feel awkward in adapting to the changes.

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However, we are confident that, when they remember the experiences that they had been through in the past three years, from the time of the proclamation of the nation’s independence until recently, the people in Aceh and East Sumatra will eventually adapt themselves to the effects of the changes. Honorable Gentlemen, I trust and believe all of us believe that the changes in the government that we are going to bring about will bring us to improvement. I am confident all of us, as citizens and representatives of the people, are broad-minded. We are capable of putting the interests of residencies under our care for the benefit of a broader unity. The changes in the government will more or less bring some disadvantages, but the advantages will be greater. The disadvantages resulting from the changes will only be experienced by individuals, or perhaps ranks that have so far come with great authority, and will thus be removed or given other characters. Let us clear our hearts from any feeling of displeasure owing to judgments made based on self-­ interest. Let us banish any feeling that is rooted in considerations relating to narrow-­ minded nationhood or religious differences. Our country is based on, among others, one nationhood, thus there is no place for the nation of Aceh, nation of Batak, or that of Malay; for the country there is only one united nation, namely the nation of Indonesia that consists of several groups of people who come from the region of Tapanuli, region of Aceh, region of East Sumatera, and so on. Religious difference is not a problem for us. We are free to follow any religion that we believe according to our faith; religious difference will never break the unity of our nation. Honorable Gentlemen, The enforcement of the law that concerns government changes will have to be carried out in times of trouble and crisis, both coming from outside and inside the country. In regard to matters vis-à-vis the government we are not quite perfect. This is something that we are all aware of. It is mostly due to the rather unhealthy economic condition. Every matter concerning areas under the care of the government seemed to be stalled. Matters related to transportation, healthcare, education, welfare and finance, practically everything under the government’s care (overheidszorg) are in a critical state, a state that requires immediate change. The circumstances seem to reflect our lack of capacity in taking care of our own household. This has become a reason for enemies that never want our national independence, to announce to the world that everything in our Republic seems to be in “chaos” and requires improvement. Honorable Gentlemen, Certainly the unsatisfactory situation to a degree will rather negatively affect the mind of the general public. The symptoms have been reflected in the voices expressed within our community showing their disappointment over the current situation. They are hoping for improvement and they believe that improvement will come as a result of the changes that the government is about to make. Resolutions and calls for the immediate enforcement of Law No. 10/1948 have been received from South Tapanuli.

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As the people who bear the responsibility to oversee that law is properly upheld, we are shouldering an enormous burden, namely putting into effect everything relating to the law to be in line with the general public’s will. I am calling for all of you gentlemen to fulfill the will of all the citizens who desire happiness and prosperity for our country. Realities have revealed various consequences of the flawed maintenance of public interest. Some people who have been renowned nationalists and have aspired to strengthen the government’s position are beginning to change their attitude since their trust in the government is gradually disappearing. This saddening fact is by no means generally caused by negligence or omission, but more due to circumstances. We should not forget that running a government administration in the current situation where resources are enormously lacking is extremely different from governing in a normal situation, where sources are easily available to ensure a perfect running of government. To compare the recent situation with that of during the Dutch time in order to say that the situation regarding government administration under the Dutch rule was better than it is now under the Republic and make a conclusion that therefore we are not capable of running our own household is totally biased. Standards used to measure successes in a normal time should not be applied to judge those in an abnormal one. Additionally, we should not forget that there are still many people in the civil service that do not have adequate sense of responsibility. It is hoped that a greater awareness of the real situation may increase in the heart of the civil servants who have not been fully aware, and that the same awareness may also grow in the hearts of those who have been negligent in performing their duties as responsible members of the government. Once such awareness is built in the hearts of the two abovementioned groups everything will undoubtedly run more smoothly than ever before. Honorable Gentlemen, We are meeting here to establish the representative council of the North Sumatra province. Since the council is yet to be established no words can be said about its past experiences. Similarly, there are no experiences that can be used as a reference in designing a future work plan. Nonetheless, please allow me to give a brief overview about the recent situation of our country. We know that our vice president is currently engaging in a dialogue with the Netherlands to prepare for the negotiation that will be resumed. It seems that several problems and obstacles in reaching an accord between the Republic and the Netherlands have yet to be resolved. Given such a situation it is most appropriate that all the people of Indonesia give their utmost support for the national government, both physically and spiritually. One of the most valuable contributions will be national discipline, which we must demonstrate. Next is a full awareness among the people of their responsibilities toward the government. It is undeniable that our recent domestic situation has caused anxiety among anyone who desired happiness and prosperity for every citizen. The main source of

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all the problems, in our opinion, is our economic condition, which is very far from perfect. Prices of food and necessity goods are soaring so high that most people, especially those who don’t earn their income by working as laborers or as civil servants, cannot afford to buy things to fulfill their daily needs. The current soaring of prices, in our opinion, is a result of an unhealthy balance between the amount of merchandise being traded and the amount of currency in circulation. Based on the abovementioned, therefore, it is the main duty of the government to bring the balance to a healthy equilibrium. One of the ways to achieve this is to increase production and limit the printing of currency. To increase production we must channel all our energy into agriculture, livestock, and so on. Assessment of every position in the government needs to be made as soon as possible and any unnecessary employee should be made productive. Expenditures need to be rationalized, and effective control (monitoring) of money spending is highly appreciated. Once we maintain such practices and have a healthier financial condition we will be able to fully direct our attention to other areas. People’s capacity can be increased by building more schools and improving the equipment for learning. People’s health can be taken care of by building hospitals and providing proper medicines. Transportation and communication can be improved by building proper roads, bridges, and establishing telephone and telegraph lines. Livestock, agriculture, in short, everything that will bring us to improvement need to be taken care of. Honorable Gentlemen, We all realize that things can only work well if people’s power is used to its maximum capacity. People can only reach their maximum power if they are able to live sufficiently. If they live in deprivation, it will certainly be difficult for them to carry the burden of duties and responsibilities effectively. Therefore, one of our main duties and responsibilities in the future is to take care of the livelihood of the government employees. Honorable Gentlemen, As members of the representative council, you all bear the duties and responsibilities to discuss issues concerning your constituents’ welfare, and accordingly make attempts so that rules and regulations needed for them could be made into laws. This is in order to restore order in community life, based on the constitution. To find out about everything concerning the needs of the public it is highly required that members of the council at all times maintain a close relationship with their constituents. In addition to maintaining a good relationship in order to get and share information, an “opvoedend” (educational) relationship needs also be established. Therefore, it is also the duties and responsibilities of a people’s representative to educate their constituents so that their level of intelligence is on par with that of other nations in the world. They should particularly be made aware of the need to raise their level of intelligence in order to be able to accept new ideas embraced by every civilized nation in the world.

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Let us try to educate our people to the best of our ability, so that they can accept and understand the meaning and significance of the foundation of our nationhood as specified in our national principles: Humanity, A belief in One God, Social Justice for all Indonesian People, People’s Sovereignty, and National Unity. Let us do our best to assist them to adapt to situations arising as a result of the implementation of the principles of our nation state. They should be made aware that every citizen of Indonesia, regardless of religion, race or ethnicity, is equal before the law, and therefore has the same rights and responsibilities; that every citizen is free to follow any religion that they believe, that our attitude towards any nation, regardless of the color of their skin, yellow, black, or white, is based on humanity. These ideas are embraced by every advanced nation that has advanced to a high level of intelligence, and every action they take is based on these ideas. Honorable Gentlemen, Realities have proven to us that some of our people have not fully understood the elementary principles (elementaire beginselen) of our government, which is the sovereignty of the people. The following needs to be strongly emphasized to the people: That people’s sovereignty, which means that at any time and opportunity a citizen has the right to demand for a change or improvement of a situation that he thinks is imperfect. People’s sovereign right, however, means that it is a right granted to and will be implemented by a representative of the people who exercises the right as a member of the representative council in the council’s sessions; That it doesn’t mean that within the government organization all government institutions have the same rank, but they are structured according to different ranks with different rights and responsibilities; That the connection between the institutions is organized hierarchically; That it is a surprise and an event which is inconsistent with the principles of constitutional law that an institution of a lower level issued a demand for an accountability on an incident taking place in the lower level institution’s own region, because the real party that has the right to demand for such accountability is actually the higher level institution to the institution of lower level, which has the duty to give the accountability to the higher institution within the shortest possible time; That the establishment of autonomous regions will be sought shortly means that the autonomous regions will be separated from the national government and will have the broadest right to introduce regulations regarding the region, instead that the granting of the autonomy means only that certain matters in regard to the state and so far has been under the competence of the national government that have been handed over to the regions, but the structural connection to the national government remains.

Honorable Gentlemen, Misunderstanding over the previous issues is one of the most important factors that have caused the government administration to run less smoothly in the past. As responsible representatives of the people, honorable gentlemen, your main responsibility is to provide sufficient information and explanation. Hopefully your efforts toward that direction will bring concrete results to bring the journey of the government to the future to paths that are better than those in the past.

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Honorable Gentlemen The time to inaugurate you as members of the North Sumatra Representative Council has come. Before I inaugurate you as members of the D.P.S.O., I think it would good if I first mention several things that should always be a concern for all of us. Membership of a representative council puts someone in the most privileged position with extraordinary rights. It should be most appropriate that you use the rights properly for the benefit of the people at large, and not for that of a group or a person. We should be conscious that we do not sit in the representative council to represent someone or a group of people, but instead we are representing the whole citizen of the country and it is their interest that we will stand for, even though our membership is a consequence of attempts made by someone or a group. Honorable Gentlemen, Furthermore, membership of the representative council also grants someone the right to express an opinion concerning an issue and to discuss it in the council’s sessions freely. The law of the state guarantees that no member can be charged for things that he says in a representative council’s meeting. This extraordinary right should be maintained properly, and we should be fully aware that in no way the rights means that any member can express his opinion in the session without any concern of things that he has to be respectful of in regard to religion, custom, manner, humanity, order, regulation, and so on. Unlimited freedom means unruly freedom, which resembles anarchy. Thus, in this session, we should be able to express our thoughts in an orderly manner, without committing an abuse of things that are subject to the requirements of religion, custom, manner, humanity, order, and the state, free from fear, free from considerations that serve self-interest, someone’s interest, or a group’s. Honorable Gentlemen, In this historical moment, in this room where we gather today in the town of Tapa Tuan, which is located on the West Coast of South Aceh, I declare the establishment of the D.P.S.O. that consists of 45 members, namely: 1. Tgk. Ismail Jaccob, 2. Soetikno P. S., 3. Amelz, 4. H. Moestafa Salim, 5. Karim M. Doeryat, 6. M. I. Daoed, 7. Abd. Moekti, 8. Apan Daulay, 9. Tg. A. Wahab, 10. M. Abdoeh Syam, 11. M. Saridin, 12. Bagindo Bujang,

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1 3. TA. Mohd. Noer Ibrahim, 14. Hadely- Hasibuan, 15. A. Sutarjo, 16. A. Xarim M.S., 17. Agus Salim, 18. Herman Siahaan, 19. H. Abd. Rahman Syihah, 20. M. Joesoef Abdoellah, 21. Dr. Gindo Siregar, 22. Dr. R. Sunario, 23. Bachtiar Joenoes, 24. Dr. Cashmir Harahap, 25. D. Dyar Karim, 26. M. Siregar, 27. Kario Siregar, 28. Nulung Sirait, 29. M. Hutasoit, 30. M. Yunan Nasution, 31. S. M. Tarigan, 32. Lokot Batoebara, 33. A. St. Soaloan, 34. S. M. Simanjuntak, 35. Mr. H. Silitonga, 36. Mr. R. L. Tobing, 37. Dr. H. L. Tobing, 38. Dr. Warsito, 39. Fachroedin Nasution, 40. Abd. Hakim, 41. Rustelumbanua, 42. Patuan R. Natigor, 43. St. Mangaraja Muda, 44. Haji A. Azis, 45. Yahya Siregar. With heartfelt congratulations extended to the members I now declare the opening of the first meeting of the first session of the North Sumatra Representative Council. We hope that this first session will bring concrete results for our nation and state. M e r d e k a!

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Annex 4 Address by the Commissioner of the national government for North Sumatra in Kotaraja on 27-12-1949 to celebrate the day of the “Transfer of Sovereignty” (Quoted from “Semangat Merdeka” daily).

Gentlemen, In this historical moment, the time that opened the gate of sovereignty will give greater guarantee to the people of Indonesia. To achieve our common purpose, happiness, welfare, prosperity, affluence, peace, and security, by expressing our gratitude to God the Holiest and the Highest, I am hereby standing here in front of all of you to say a few words before assuming my duty. I will take on my duty with the deepest emotion because I personally feel tremendously honored to be assigned with the duty. At this very moment, in a place thousands of miles from where we are now, a ceremony of the transfer of sovereignty from the kingdom of Netherlands to the government of the United Republic of Indonesia is being held. The ceremony will mark the end of a situation that has long become a subject of disagreement between the two ideologies of the world, namely the reactionary and the progressive. An ideology which is a power with quite a large number of followers that extends to all cities and villages, throughout every corner of every country in this wide world on the one hand, against the progressive ideology that is also an enormously great power with a large number of followers as well, and also extends to all cities and villages, throughout all countries in the world on the other hand. Followers of the two ideologies are beyond nationhood, where the reactionary has followers from every nation, and the progressive as well. For four years the two have had opposing ideas in regard to matters concerning the Indonesian people’s struggle in realizing their aspiration of their nationality. For four years the followers of the two ideas have been confronting each other, each of them devoting all efforts and energy to press their demands. The struggle, as we have experienced, have been waged mostly within the areas of diplomacy, albeit there have been times where they were carried out using military powers. As a result, many of those who loved independence have sacrificed their lives, and death has moved them from the mortal realm to the immortal one, leaving behind their wife, mother, father, children, or relatives in sadness. With the blessing of God the Almighty, finally, comes the time when all of the sacrifices that the Indonesian people have made are not in vain. As a result of all our sacrifices of lives, energy, and properties, an accord has been reached between the kingdom of Netherlands and Indonesia, a unitary state of the United Republic of Indonesia, which will cover most of the Indonesian archipelago, unconditionally and fully.

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Gentlemen, At this moment we are gathering here in order to attend the ceremony regarding the statement of agreement by the kingdom of Netherlands to hand over its sovereignty over our Homeland to our people. Please do think with a calm heart and healthy mind of the meaning and significance of this historical moment, and after you do that and are aware of the consequences of the event, I am sure that the feeling that will sweep over your soul and heart will be that of utmost gratitude to God the Almighty. The aspiration of the Indonesian people, namely to assume a position next to all of the independent states in the world, has been fulfilled. The people of Indonesia have become an independent nation, a nation that is capable of taking care of its own household, a nation that can manage issues relating to nationhood in its own way, free from pressures from authorities that do not come from within their own nation. Really, gentlemen, the vision of the time that lies before us, is full of hope, filled with happiness, full of prosperity and affluence. Nonetheless, we should never forget that in addition to the pleasures that we will feel, there will also be bitter experiences, great sufferings, times of difficulties, which we will have to go through. Gentlemen, Therefore, it is a reality that in general people have traits that have to be shunned, as well as commendable virtues. When a person, after making all efforts, gains pleasant result he should be grateful to God that has granted him his wishes. Moreover, he should be more careful and thorough with his actions and attitudes to earn people’s approval and respect. However, the reverse often happens. And so it is with a nation as well. Once a nation gained victories after their struggles and achieved wonderful results, they often forget that all of the results of their struggles are no less than gifts from God the Almighty. The nation thinks that it rules the world and that no other power in the world can beat it. Arrogance has started to sprout in the nation’s soul. And, eventually, it will lead to a downfall. History of the world has provided us with enough evidence of that. Thus, it is appropriate that hopes are shared that the people of Indonesia who have been granted by God an independence after their struggles, realize that the overwhelming feeling, the views that insult and ridicule other nations, any action and attitude that shows hatred and hostility towards other nations, especially towards the nation that in the past had been its opponent in terrible struggles that had caused losses of people’s lives and properties, must be shunned. All feelings of vengeance and enmity should be eradicated from our hearts. A noble attitude, which can forgive and respect a foe that has become a friend, should become a guideline for our actions in the future. All this requires a radical change in our nation’s soul, a change in the way of thinking, in the way of putting things into perspective, which is a way that should apply according to current circumstances.

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Gentlemen, The Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia is democratic. It means that everything that takes place in this country will take place within the law and recognized by democracy as the basic principles. The basic principles include freedom to express one’s opinion, both verbally and in writing, freedom to gather and hold a meeting, freedom to follow and develop an ideology, freedom of religion, freedom to change religion, and so on. In short, freedom in any aspect of life. Upon us, all citizens of the state sit with a huge responsibility to uphold and respect all the laws. Sharp criticism, statements that we disagree with, followers of a religion that is not ours, should not create any friction between us. On the contrary, we should also be aware that every right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United Republic of Indonesia does not in any way allow us to launch a criticism beyond the limits of humanity; to make a statement of ideology that is different from others’, and when exercising the obligations of a religion it should not be carried out in such a way that it hurts the feelings of another group in the society. Our independence is not an unruly independence, instead an orderly independence that can only be implemented in ways that follow the rules governed by laws, by humanity, by code of conduct, and by polite manner. It is therefore undeniable that until now within our communities there have been events that refer to a wrong interpretation of the meaning and significance of the democratic rights. Changes in the shortest possible time are highly required. Gentlemen, A conclusion that can be drawn is as follows: At the moment the people of Indonesia are standing in front of a gate to enter a new era, an era of greatness and triumph. Nonetheless, in order to reach lasting greatness and triumph the people of Indonesia will still have to make changes in several aspects of their soul in order to overcome difficulties and obstacles that they will face. Gentlemen, A question came up in my heart: What will the future of our nation be? Will we be able to overcome problems that will come up in the development of our country? Can solutions maintain the greatness of our Homeland? I can, with full confidence and awareness, provide a satisfactory answer. In the past we experienced several periods that clearly showed that independence was not new to our nation, this has been evident in the course of history of our homeland. Our nation had once experienced a golden age, an era when we had the triumphant kingdoms such as Sriwijaya, Majapahit, Mataram, Aceh, and others. And during the times when these kingdoms ruled the whole archipelago and extended as far as the Madagascar islands in the West, and the Philippines in the East, all aspects of life in society had reached advances beyond compare.

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History has also told us that during that golden age ships from Indonesia had sailed through vast oceans, carrying with them our merchants, that could be found all over the world, bringing with them our culture and teachings, and practically everything worked well and orderly, and every citizen lived in happiness with prosperity. Gentlemen, A brief review of the past has provided us with hope and confidence that with the blessings from God the Almighty our nation now is facing another glorious age. Let us spiritually and physically prepare ourselves to move forward to a time when every member of our nation can live as a citizen of an independent and sovereign state securely and safely, in harmony and peace, with happiness, prosperity, and justice. That’s all for now!

Annex 5 Announcement by the Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo (Quoted from “Semangat Merdeka” daily)

NOTICE GM 12 M To all residents of the military areas of Aceh, Langkat and Karo, it is announced that: (a) Acts of gambling, adultery, and stealing are against the Laws of the State, and based on the recent situation in the region, they can also be considered as acts that may disturb, agitate, and disrupt public safety and order, which as a consequence, will weaken the spirit of our struggle in defending our homeland, and is highly damaging for the livelihood of a society in an independent state. The government, with a full sense of responsibility for peace, defense, and happiness of the whole nation, intends to eradicate those acts by taking actions that are in line with the objectives. Therefore, based on the power specified in article X of the State Defense Decree No. 30, hereby governs that: Anyone who commits or takes part in gambling of any kind and in any way, who commits adultery or stealing, with or without a ruling by a judge, is subject to a decision to remove them from where they live to another place that will be decided at an unspecified time, where they are required to do something under the government’s instruction.

The above has herewith been brought to the attention of every resident. Kutaraja, 18 September 1948 We, the Military Governor of the Military Areas of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo. Major General TGK. DAOED BEREUEH

Glossary

Aard en streking  Nature and scope, intent Adat hoofd  Traditional leader Afbrekend  Destructive criticism Afdeeling  Department, division, section Afleidings maneuver  Fleet movement training (army training) Antitese  Antithesis Avonturiers  Adventurers. cheats Bandelos  Without restrain, free attitude, ignorant Bariere  Barrier Beleid Policy Bluf Boast Capitulatie  Capitulation; surrender after a defeat Circulair Circular Corrupteurs Corruptors Coup d’ etat  Seizuree of power from government Douane  Import duties Dwangpositie  Coercive position, abuse of position, abuse of office Een groep stelsel  A group system Een partai stelsel  One-party system Elementaire beginselen  Basic principle, principal Excessen Excessive Exorbitante rechten  The highest right Exporteur Exporter Fatalistisch Desperation Fluister-campagne  Covert campaign relating to political struggle Gegevens  Data, information Geisoleerd  Closed, isolated Gematigd  Moderate, average, medium Georganiseerd Organized Gezagsvacum  Power vacuum (government) © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 SM Amin, Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0867-7

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Het Joel heiligt de middelen  The purpose purifies all efforts Hoofdambtenaar  High-ranking official Ilegale obstruksi  Illegal obstruction Insider Insider Inzicht Insight Islamiseering Islamization Isolemen  Isolated, an isolated part Jurist Lawyer Klerk  clerk, salesclerk Kotaraja, Kutaraja (Kuta Radja)  Banda Aceh Leuzen Slogan Niets zeggend, vaag  Meaningless, vague Onderafdeeling  Sub section Onderhouden Maintain Onderneming Company Ongebonden Unbound Ongeorganiseerd  Unorganized (messy) Onsympathiek Unlikeable Opkoopagent  Purchasing agent Oppervlakkig Shallow Opvoedend Educative Overcompleet  Exceed the necessary amount/number Overheidszorg  Government field Partijleven  Party line Partywezen  Party business Passenstelsel  A rather loose system Passiviteit  Passivity (suffering) Polisioneele actie  Police action Prestige kwestie  Matter of pride Programma punten  Main program, principal program, program point Programma van actie  Program of action (programmed action) Provincialistisch  Of provincial nature Psyche  Human soul, character Rechtszekerheid  Formal law, legal certainty, just Reel Real Scheppend  Create something new, creative Specifik Acehsche verhoudingen  Specifically related to being Acehnese Stelsel System Terloops  In passing Toch Anyway Uitzonderlijk gewest  Special Region Uleebalang  The nobility or aristocracy in the Acehnese society Verbeurd verklaard  Confiscated goods Wezen People Zelfbestuur Self-government

Glossary