The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia: The Practice of Governance in Conflict (SpringerBriefs in Political Science) 981996251X, 9789819962518

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
About the Author
Acronyms
List of Diagrams
1 The Polarization in Post-conflict Society
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Conflict and Governance
1.3 The Social Construction Approach of Research
2 Democratic Governance in Conflict
2.1 The Foundation of Conflict Analysis
2.2 Conflict in Nature
2.3 The Discourse of Conflict Management
2.4 Democratic Governance in Conflict
3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict
3.1 Peace Issues
3.2 The History of War in Aceh
3.3 Coercive Governance in Conflict
3.4 Developmentalism, Bureaucracism, and Militarism
3.5 The Grievance of Aceh
3.6 Road to Peace
3.6.1 Transitional Democratic Governance in Conflict
3.6.2 The Consolidation
3.6.3 New Dynamics of Aceh Post-conflict
3.7 Local Governance in Conflict
3.8 Conclusion
4 The Social Construction of Reintegration Process in Aceh Post-conflict
4.1 The Discourse of Basic Human Needs After Mou Helsinki
4.2 The Discourse of Reintegration Implementation
4.3 The Discourse of Governance in Conflict in Aceh
4.3.1 During Economic Reintegration
4.3.2 Political Reintegration Process
4.4 Review
4.4.1 Conclusion
5 The Contribution of Democracy to Governance in Conflict
5.1 The Stages of Governance in Conflict
5.2 The Model of Governance in Conflict
References

Citation preview

SpringerBriefs in Political Science Novri Susan

The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia The Practice of Governance in Conflict Second Edition

SpringerBriefs in Political Science

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Novri Susan

The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia The Practice of Governance in Conflict Second Edition

Novri Susan Department of Sociology Faculty of Social and Political Science Airlangga University Surabaya, Indonesia

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Political Science ISBN 978-981-99-6251-8 ISBN 978-981-99-6252-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6252-5 Jointly published with Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) The print edition is not for sale in Indonesia. Customers from Indonesia, please order the print book from: Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) ISBN of the Co-Publisher’s edition: 978-602-473-065-9 1st edition: © Airlangga University Press 2019 2nd edition: © Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

This monograph is the result of my field research, as the part of my master program research, about the separatism conflict between Aceh Independent Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia. I have conducted a field research during 2008 to understand the practice of conflict management in Indonesian governance during 2003–2007. The separatism conflict in Aceh was a very long process of peace effort. Aceh is a region with its strong relation with the state of Indonesia since the region and its society had contributed very big to the state. In this research, I found the strong relation of democracy and the method of conflict management by Indonesian governance. I use the term of conflict governance to refer the concept of conflict management in governance. The approach of non-democratic politics as the New Order regime used never solves the problem of separatism conflicts such in Aceh. This monograph will show how democracy creates more opportunity of conflict management practice to reach a constructive result. I would like to send my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Tatiana Benavade, and all of colleagues in United Nations mandated University of Peace who supported my work. Also my grateful to my family, Ulyati (my wife), Asiya Sabili (my daughter), my parent, brothers, and sister who supported by all heart. Last but not least, I have to say thank you to all of my colleagues at Sociology Department FISIP UNAIR for everything. I hope this monograph will contribute academically in social and political sciences. Surabaya, Indonesia February 2018

Novri Susan

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Contents

1 The Polarization in Post-conflict Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Conflict and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Social Construction Approach of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 2 4

2 Democratic Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1 The Foundation of Conflict Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2 Conflict in Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3 The Discourse of Conflict Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4 Democratic Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Peace Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The History of War in Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Coercive Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Developmentalism, Bureaucracism, and Militarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 The Grievance of Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Road to Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1 Transitional Democratic Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2 The Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.3 New Dynamics of Aceh Post-conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Local Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15 15 16 17 18 20 21 22 24 26 32 33

4 The Social Construction of Reintegration Process in Aceh Post-conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Discourse of Basic Human Needs After Mou Helsinki . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Discourse of Reintegration Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Discourse of Governance in Conflict in Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 During Economic Reintegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Political Reintegration Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37 38 40 43 43 45

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Contents

4.4 Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.4.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5 The Contribution of Democracy to Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.1 The Stages of Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.2 The Model of Governance in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

About the Author

Novri Susan Ph.D., is a Sociologist at Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia. He was born in Klaten, Indonesia. Novri received his bachelor degree in sociology from Gadjah Mada University which religious conflict in Ambon Maluku as the topic of his undergraduate thesis. He finished his Master of Art (M.A.) in International Peace Studies, United Nations-University for Peace in Costa Rica with a master thesis about conflict governance and democracy. He received his doctoral degree on Global Studies from Doshisha University, Japan, with a doctoral thesis about conflict management and governance in Indonesian democracy. He published books, journals, and article such as Sosiologi Konflik, Negara Gagal Mengelola Konflik, paper in some international journals, and articles in Indonesian national newspapers. He is a lecturer at the Sociology Department of Airlangga University since 2003, mainly about social theory, peace analysis, and conflict management. Recently, he becomes a Director of Centre for Development and Conflict Management FISIP UNAIR. Dr. Novri also becomes the member of editorial board of International Journal J-Sustain (www.j-sustain.com) since 2015 and Managing Editor of APSSI Journal (Asosiasi Program Studi Sosiologi Indonesia) since 2018.

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Acronyms

ABRI AMM ASEAN CMI CoHA DI/TII DOM EU FORKAB GAM GoI Golkar HDC KPA KPU MoU TNI UUPA USA

Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Army Forces of Republic Indonesia) Aceh Monitoring Mission Association of Southeast Asia Nations Crisis Management Initiative Cessation Hostilities Agreement Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islam State/Islamic Army of Indonesia) Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation Zone) European Union Forum Anak Bangsa (Nation’s Children Forum) Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) Government of Indonesia Golongan Karya (functional group), since 1998 becomes Golkar Party Hendry Dunant Centre Komite Peralihan Aceh (Committee for Aceh Transition) Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Committee) Memorandum of Understanding Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army) Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh (Law of Aceh United States of America

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List of Diagrams

Diagram 3.1

Diagram 3.2 Diagram 5.1

Violent LL incidents and total # of LL conflicts, by month (World Bank on aceh conflict monitoring update, 1st March-30th April 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The dynamics of conflict in Aceh (Susan 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . Democratic governance in conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27 34 52

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Chapter 1

The Polarization in Post-conflict Society

1.1 Introduction In many cases, a peace process of post-conflict society is influenced by a reintegration process of all parties. As the fact of war impacts, a post-conflict society usually is followed by a social and political polarization. The polarization can be seen in the emergence of new groups such as former combatant both from separatist and prointegration groups and conflict survivors. At the same time, the other social groups that have been defined by the previous social structure also shape the polarization such religious groups. Ipso facto a reintegration process of post-conflict society factually faces the contestation of social groups to define and fulfill their basic human needs (BHN). At this point, this research wants to trace the question of how do postconflict society groups construct their basic human needs socially? The next social construction attempted by this research is how the conflict interest is governed by social groups? In order to understand the social construction of basic human needs and the governance conflict, the proposition of sociology of knowledge—social construction approach—about the character social reality, namely plural, relative and dynamics (Berger and Luckman 1966) can initiate this process. This proposition explains how a social reality such basic human needs is constructed by different groups with their various interpretations. Then how does the conflict of interest can create a dynamic during the process of governance in conflict. This proposition directs this study by looking at social and political issues related to basic human needs in a public sphere. Social and political issues related to basic human needs fulfillment by different groups in a post-conflict society can be found in the issues of settlement, former militias’ reposition in a political system, women participation, and livelihood. Those issues theoretically can be put in the basic needs theory (Maslow 1954; Neef 1987; Burton 1990; Rosenberg 2003) which consider that basic needs as the root causes of conflict. Basically, this research sees the contestation of interest groups in fulfilling

© Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) 2023 N. Susan, The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6252-5_1

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basic needs and how they govern the contestation by using democratic governance in conflict analysis. Through the case of Aceh post-violent conflict, this research mainly aims to answer the discourse of governance in conflict and peace development. Basically, this research aims at analyzing how conflict is governed through a democratic way that can create a productive conflict through the case of Aceh Indonesia.

1.2 Conflict and Governance The term of democratic governance in conflict in this study basically is rooted in democracy theory. In general, democracy theory sees the power of state comes from the people. However, the development democracy theory and its practices in the world have been developed so vary. David Held in his Models of Democracy divided 13 models of democracy in our recent world (Held 2006). One of the models is deliberative democracy which governance in conflict gets its concept. However, there is no a specific theory of democratic governance in conflict in peace and conflict studies. Some analyses may have started by using the term of governance in conflict, such Bell and O’Rourke in The People’s Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy have used the term of ‘post-governance in conflict.’ However, Bell and O’Rourke did not use governance in conflict as their main analysis rather to use the term in introducing a condition of post-conflict society and government’s performance (Bell and O’Rourke 2007:294). Peter Finel (2002) used the term of post-governance in conflict in Contemporary Challenges for Post-governance in conflict and Civilian Crisis Management. Finel asserted that “…the concept of ‘post-governance in conflict’ will be preferred, in order to underline that the governance takes place in the aftermath of a conflict, and perhaps more importantly, that the final status of the government territory is not necessary a state of its own.” In this case, Finel emphasized that this governance in conflict aims to strengthen and develop government’s institutions by considering and assuming some or all governmental functions are in a transitional time. At the same time, he focused more on international aids to governmental functions (Finel 2002:10). Democratic governance is the closest term with democratic governance in conflict. Gilbert M. Khadiagala in Governance in Post Conflict Situation: the Case of Rwanda (2004) used the concept of democratic governance to analyze Rwanda conflict. Khadiagala stated that post-conflict society needs democratic governance in order to handle social and political polarizations in that country. He argued that democratic governance is applied in “accountable and transparent public institutions, rule of law that protects the rights of all, and genuine popular participation in political decision” (Khadiagala 2004:12). Many cases show undemocratic governances can create a protracted violent conflict. Undemocratic governance can be seen from a state that uses a coercive

1.2 Conflict and Governance

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means such military operation without opening an inclusive political arena for deliberating and negotiating different notions. This case occurs in states with an authoritarian system such military regime in Indonesia during New Order era (1969–1998) and Myanmar recently under military junta. Ananda Rajah in her article Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues also proved the relation between protracted conflict and undemocratic governance of authoritarian regime in Myanmar. Myanmar regime always uses their coercive means to create a social and political stability. State’s policy in handling a public dispute is based on a top-down approach through a central political institution (Rajah 2004). Democratic governance in conflict is a young terminology in conflict and peace studies since there is still lack of theory and empirical study. Regarding with the case of Aceh Indonesia, this study has not found any direct terms of governance in conflict as an analytical framework. However as one of prominent secessionist conflict cases recently, there is a lot of Aceh conflict analysis. Edward Aspinall is one prominent scholar who pays attention on it; in his paper Aceh/Indonesia Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation (2005), he showed that Aceh conflict in Indonesia was mainly reproduced during the regimes of Soekarno and Soeharto. Aspinall showed that during the two regimes brought some issues in Aceh conflict, such as identity issues and grievances and structural causes. Identity issues relate to the spirit of nationhood of Aceh, Islam, and the historical glorious of Aceh sultanate. Islamic ideology particularly occurred at the first resistance of Aceh under Daud Beureueh in 1955–1959. Meanwhile during the regime of Soeharto GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: Independence Aceh Movement) used the historical glorious of Aceh Kingdom to resist the ‘structural violence’ and nationalism of Indonesia (Aspinall 2005:3–6). One research paper of conflict management in Aceh by Edy Suharto (2007) Democratization and Conflict Management: A Study on the Strategy of Negotiation in the Case of Aceh, Indonesia showed how democratic approach such negotiation is able to reach the Aceh peace agreement. This research found that peace democracy will transform the approach of regime from coercion and cooptation to negotiation and recognition (Suharto 2007:33). However, this research put the regimes as the manager since this research is a conflict management-based analysis. The study does not explain how both conflicting parties, GAM and the Government of Indonesia, govern their conflict. Related to post-conflict society, Rizal Sukma in Managing Peace in Aceh: The Challenge of Post-conflict Peace Building (2007) emphasized the importance of building ‘conflict resolution mechanism.’ He stated that “within the Acehnese context, the deep-rooted conflict in the province was among others caused by the absence of democratic mechanism of conflict resolution. This institutional need is crucial since a violent culture has been developed strongly by the war era” (Sukma 2007:7). Furthermore, Sukma mentioned that ‘conflict resolution mechanism’ should be based on a democratic system by ‘enforcing justice system, an effective dispute settlement mechanism, trust building, and peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts.’ Here what Sukma mentioned as a ‘conflict resolution mechanism’ actually aims to

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prevent violence and to find a conflict resolution (Sukma 2007:8). Basically, what Sukma mentioned as ‘conflict resolution mechanism’ based on democracy has a same direction with democratic governance in conflict. However, Sukma has not explored it deeply through a research. Moreover, the term of ‘conflict resolution’ is not compatible with the goal of violent conflict prevention as he also defined for the term of conflict resolution. Meanwhile the term of governance in conflict covers the goal of finding conflict resolution and preventing violence concurrently.

1.3 The Social Construction Approach of Research ‘Men on the street’ is the first proposition of social construction theory that this research has used. This proposition sees each group plays role in constructing and maintaining a social institution. In the social construction approach, then, governance in conflict is a social process of creating an intersubjective reality through discourses contestation. In this approach, there is no neutral position of each actor or group such as government, civil society, or third party. This proposition then looks at what knowledge that contains values and norms are used by each party in order to govern their contestation in fulfilling basic human needs. Furthermore, each group will undertake their strategy in winning their interest through a social and political movement. Even though this research has the assumption for guiding the research objectives, this research will not reduce a reality construction in Acehnese society. In the field of post-conflict society in Aceh, a social process occurred contextually that is different from the research assumption since the causal relation between groups’ contestation and governance in conflict cannot be put in a linear way. The two variables will influence to each other in a dialectic way. However, in order to limit this study, the researcher will focus on how democratic governance in conflict models influence the conflict dynamics such in Aceh post-violent conflict. This study uses the perspective of social construction which considers as a context of social, history, and language. This perspective as Schwandt testified will draw “an everyday, uncontroversial, garden- variety constructivism that might be described in the following way: in a fairly unremarkable sense, we are all constructivists if we believe that the mind is active in the construction of knowledge” (Schwandt 2003:305). This proposition brings us to a theoretical comprehension that the mind which influences people’s social actions is shaped by knowledge. In this perspective, knowledge will be represented in a language. As Berger and Luckman mentioned that language is an objectivated experience of everyday life (1966). In this research, the researcher looked at a language in order to reveal knowledge. Language is not only a tool of communication but also knowledge of the communities that we can find both a subjective and objective reality. As Schwandt argued that a “language is understood as a range of activities in which we express and realize a certain way of being in the world” (2003:307). Furthermore, Taylor (as cited in Schwandt 2003:307) argued that “language is seen neither as primarily a tool for

1.3 The Social Construction Approach of Research

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bargaining knowledge of the world as an objective process nor as an instrument whereby we order the things in our world, but as what allows us to have the world we have. Language makes possible the disclosure of the human world.” This approach also used the narrative features to guide the field work and analysis. Narrative features can be seen as follows: (1) addresses nuances and innuendos, (2) focuses on what is said, as well as why, and in what effect it is said, (3) assembles a dataset that can become larger at any time, (4) tellers of the narrative, are the experts of their own stories, 5) an analysis can be as fine-tuned as needed for the research agenda at hand, (6) emotion and non-verbal behavior can be included as the part of analysis, and (7) allows for broad or thematic understandings of the conflict process that capture not only what is said, but the meaning behind it (Johnston 2005:277). Social construction approach is expected to give a description on how a reality about the social configuration of basic human needs and the governance in conflict institutionalization in Aceh Indonesia.

Chapter 2

Democratic Governance in Conflict

Theoretically, this study may start questioning three things: first, what is the position of basic human needs in a conflict dynamic? Second, what is democratic governance in conflict? Third, why do democratic governance in conflict become a discourse of conflict management? Before coming to the discourse, it is important to understand the elements of conflict that usually showed up. Wallace and Wolf proposed that there are at least three elements of conflict, namely interest, power in social relation, and ideas or values such an ideology to reach a goal (Wallace and Wolf 1986:62–63). In many cases, the elements of conflict as Wallace and Wolf mentioned can create a conflict dynamic in which social groups always attempt to employ those elements to win or to reach their goal. Hence, instantly governance in conflict is the matter of how each group governs the conflict elements. Therefore, democratic governance in conflict is how the conflict elements are governed democratically by conflicting parties.

2.1 The Foundation of Conflict Analysis In the late of 19 centuries, Marx asserted his materialism history in which world societies’ history is about a class struggle (Marx and Engels 2000). Marx asserted that the class struggle aims to reclaim the means of production from few groups of bourgeois and to change the mode of production from capitalism to communism. Marx’s philosophy which is also rooted in Darwinism,1 it is claimed that human being always struggle with their basic needs. However, Marx believed that the basic needs, as he mentioned as the basic structure, is rooted in material needs. In order to fulfill 1

Charles Darwin pointed out that all creatures in this world are in the law of the survival of the fittest.

© Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) 2023 N. Susan, The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6252-5_2

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material needs in their history, the society creates means and mode of production in which the needs can be achieved. However, there is a power differential of the social groups which is influenced by how much capital that people have it in order to create or dominate the means and mode of production. This capital is the foundation of capitalism society which capital, in the term of materialism, determines the position of person in such social structure. In turn, the difference distribution of power—capital in a capitalistic society according to Marx extremely has created two different classes namely ‘bourgeois and proletariat’ (Marx and Engels 2000). The bourgeois class has a huge capital, such money and values,2 to create the means and mode of production by which actually they reach more than basic human needs. They take what Marx called it as an over value of production which the profit of production process is taken by themselves. This process creates a capital accumulation in bourgeois’ hand. Meanwhile, proletariat class is impoverished by the capitalism system since they do not get a fair share of the over value of production. Proletariat class, then, is not able to fulfill their basic needs such as food, education, and health. This condition will be changed when the proletariat class gets their critical consciousness about the crime of bourgeois class in the capitalism system. For Marx, this consciousness will create a proletariat revolution against bourgeoism and capitalism which a classless system or communism can be established. Marx actually has enacted the root causes of conflict and its dynamics in capitalism society. Many critics have been developed on his thought such his philosophy on basic needs. In Marx’s thought, basic needs are only interpreted as a material need. This critical thought particularly is rooted in the tradition of humanism social science from Max Weber to Wilhelm Dilthey. It also stated in Weber’s thought that the conflict within any society is sourced by the existence of social stratification. According to Weber, social stratification will be divided by economic class, social status, and political power (Weber 1947). Each of stratification tends to be reached by people for their good position in their society. This means the social stratification of Weberian can be mentioned as the institution of basic human needs. Those three of social stratification’s element are causing the type of social relation which conflict often occurs. In many cases, the combination of social stratification elements often shapes the dynamics of conflict. Hence, a conflict can occur in vary forms which follows the context of social stratification elements combination. This study relies on Marx and Weber’s thought in analyzing the conflict dynamics. Marx’s thought will open this study in a critical perspective in analyzing the power relation of social groups during their basic needs fulfillment. Meanwhile Weber’s thought will help to understand the dynamics of conflict through his proposition on social stratification as the institution of basic human needs.

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A value in Marx’s philosophy is an instrument in dominating the society. Particularly his view on religious teaching which is used to create a false consciousness to proletariat class. The proletariat class never understands their subordinated position in the mode of production of capitalism since a religious value is planted by the bourgeois class.

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2.2 Conflict in Nature Many scholars from social sciences have been in endeavor in looking the root of conflict. In the classical thought of Hobbessian, aggressiveness is the main instinct of human being since they should survive their existence in a wild environment. People know that they have this instinct hence they feel restlessness. This condition has created as Hobbes called it as homo homini lupus or Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe. Moreover, Hobbes believed that homo homini lupus is the nature of human being which means war is always the part of society. What Hobbes pointed out fundamentally show that conflict is caused by an aggressiveness of wolf. This philosophy, then, addresses a security approach to handle a human aggressiveness such by providing a coercive means, a strong police and army which there is no resolution for the conflict instead of a deterrent strategy. Burton called it as a dispute for a condition of fighting based on an aggressiveness of men (1998). Furthermore, as Burton mentioned that dispute is different from conflict which a resolution can be constructed by the parties. Meanwhile dispute only can be contained by force or coercive means. Bartos and Wehr defined conflict as a “situation in which actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals/or to express their hostility” (2003:13). What Bartos and Wehr pointed out also has two dimensions of conflict namely ‘goal’ which it is negotiated socially and ‘to express hostility’ which it is un-negotiable. This definition contains what Burton differentiated between conflict and dispute (1998). A hostility expression needs to be contained by a force, strength, or power since it has the character of wolf aggressiveness. Meanwhile, a goal can be negotiated socially by the conflicting parties through the institutions of society. By considering the elaboration above, the researcher understand conflict as a dynamic of social configuration in fulfilling basic needs. This definition looks firstly at the existence of different groups with different interpretation on basic needs and different power resources. This social configuration, in turn, creates a dynamic in which groups pursue their basic needs. In our society, the conflict dynamics occur in different or combination of social stratification.

2.3 The Discourse of Conflict Management In our contemporary conflict studies, conflict management aims to prevent a conflict from a violent form. Rubenstein also stated that “conflict management aims at moderating or ‘civilizing’ the effects of conflict without necessarily uprooting its causes” (Rubenstein 1996:1). Conflict management theory explains that all conflicts do not need necessarily to be resolved, but learning how to manage conflicts can reduce a violent escalation. As Carpenter and Kennedy pointed out that the challenge to a manager is not to erase conflict but to handle discrepancies as a productively as possible (1988:4). Principally what Rubenstein (1996) and Carpenter and Kennedy

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(1988) have pointed out explicitly explain that conflict management is about a skill in preventing a violent conflict. Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr in Using Conflict Theory (2003) in the chapter of Understanding and Managing Conflict argued that conflict management is the matter of how to become ‘a skilled-conflict actor.’ Then, they look at ‘conflict behavior’ to enhance a skill in managing conflict. They categorized conflict behavior by two opposite positions namely a non-coercive and coercive conflict behavior. Non-coercive conflict behavior includes a ‘pure cooperation, promising reward, and persuasion’ while coercive conflict behavior includes a ‘threat of coercion, nonviolent, and violent coercion’ (2003:175). The researcher wants to emphasize that a conflict management is a practice of conflict strategy which every agency should be skilled in a conflict. Conflict management is a process of each agency; it includes third party, to use their skill and knowledge to create an appropriate practice of conflict strategy (Bartos and Wehr 2003, Carpenter and Kennedy 1988). Another dimension of conflict management in this approach relates to how an authority is enforced by a conflicting party or a third party. This approach sees that conflict management is about how to contain a violent conflict by using a set of authority and forces. As Hugh Miall also asserted that conflict management is the art of appropriate intervention to achieve political settlements, particularly by those powerful actors having the power and resources to bring pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce them to settle (Miall 2004:3). Therefore, it is obvious that conflict management creates a negotiation based on power relation. According to Hopmann, power relation’s negotiation is characterized by a bargaining approach. It is opposite with problem solving approach of negotiation. Hopmann urged that negotiation based on bargaining is characterized by power determination such as threats and pressures (Hopmann 1995:26). In this case, a bargaining approach is one character of conflict management which is likely to open a window of opportunity for dominant group to determine a resolution. However, some of scholars put conflict management as an umbrella concept which it does not only prevent a violent conflict through the practices of management but also to transform a conflict. It means conflict management is not only the matter of conflict containment but about how to construct a problem solving too. Hamad (2005) in Reconceptualization of Conflict Management argued that the term of management is not only about ‘to manage’ or ‘to cope with’ but it is also ‘to administer’. Hence he pointed out that conflict management is a discipline and an ‘umbrella name’ which can be used to transform a conflict (Hamad 2007:10–11). The researcher is not at the same position with Hamad’s interpretation on conflict management which is interpreted more than as violent conflict containment. The term of conflict management is not adequate to cover to the meaning of what Hamad argued. Hamad mentioned that conflict management is also a process of transforming conflict. It means conflict management is not only to contain violence of a conflict but to create a conflict resolution and to answer the roots causes of a conflict. Hamad has put conflict management definition as conflict transformation of Lederach (Hamad

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2005:16). He believed that conflict management is as a discipline. In this position, the researcher’s statement is opposite with Hamad’s discourse in using conflict management term to cover the meaning of conflict transformation. Conflict management still needs to be addressed to the meaning of violent conflict prevention strategy which means each party should handle a conflict by reducing violent action. The using of authority, then, in conflict management is the part of conflict strategy of dominant party. However, the next discourse is that terminology of conflict management is not appropriate anymore when this approach should be addressed to a democratic ideal. Moreover, there should be a change of conflict management terminology if its definition should cover what Hamad asserted above. Management is the term of economy positivism which gives a huge authority to top leaders for controlling their organizational process. The main goal of management in positivism economy is to control and stabilize all processes of organization in order to implement a blue print of organization. In this understanding, top-down approach and decision based on position are the core of conflict management’s values (Weymes 2004). Then, it can be said that conflict management is not an appropriate in changing unproductive conflict into productive conflict since it does not compatible with democratic ideal. If we are talking about a policy, it will be based on an authority’s decision rather than all agencies deliberation. Here what happens is a power determination by a manager. Conflict management is the term of positivism in conflict and peace studies. Hence in order to look for the way out from its own dead road, conflict management should be changed, from its terminology, methodology, and theory.

2.4 Democratic Governance in Conflict In this study, democratic governance in conflict is defined as a relation dynamic among actors in governing the elements of conflict in an inclusive political arena which is signed by the activity of social groups in pursuing, deliberating, and implementing a reached peace policy.3 A peace policy is considered as a result of conflicting parties’ deliberation which it should be implemented by all agencies involved. Agencies in the democratic governance in conflict concept are mainly state and civil society. Before coming up to democratic governance in conflict theory, it is needed to understand briefly the use of governance term. Regarding on governance in post-conflict society, Rondinelli proposed three stages in rebuilding governing in a post-conflict society by considering administrative capacity and government human resources. He mentioned three stages as follows: 3

I want to differentiate the terms of ‘peace agreement’ and ‘peace policy’ in the discourse of governance in conflict. Peace agreement usually refers to the result of conflicting agencies’ negotiation during a long war which is aimed to start a new step of peace development. Meanwhile, peace policy can be referred to the result of conflicting agencies in a democratic system after all conflicting agencies have reached a peace agreement.

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First, in the immediate post-conflict reconstruction period, the government must address fundamental and urgent issues of maintaining peace and security, reestablishing governance, redeveloping the economy, and reintegrating society. Second, in the transition period which the government needs to stabilize the country’s economy and governance structure and the civil service must move toward performing the types of functions that is usually carried out in more stable political systems and societies. Third, in a period of stabilized governance beyond transition, government approximates in its functions and the civil service’s performance should be able to perform, those roles normally identified with growing economies and institutionalized governance in more mature political systems (Rondinelli 2007:15–16). In general, Rondinelli argued that governance in this meaning is related to public service by government. Similar to Rondinelli, Debiel and Terlinden categorized governance in a post-conflict society into three dimensions, namely ‘security governance, political-administrative governance, and socioeconomic governance’ (Debiel and Terlinden 2005:3). In its general concept, governance is a set of political practice based on rules and processes in creating political policies, providing public services, and undertaking a public administration. However, there should be a clear distinction in understanding governance (good governance) and conflict governance. Actually conflict governance is looking at the political process of conflict dynamics without putting the issue of public service such good governance program. Conflict governance focuses more on a deliberative process. In this study, democratic governance in conflict can be explored through the concept of deliberative democracy. ‘Deliberative democracy’ or ‘deliberative politics’ (Held 2006, Salian 2002; Turan 2004; Vitale 2006) actually can be traced from Habermas’ thought (1996) in which deliberative democracy looks at a rational argumentation and discursive practice in a political communication between state and civil society or among the social groups.4 Vitale explained that Habermas sees legitimacy of democracy necessitates the political decision-making process emerge in an outline of ‘broad public discussion,’ in which all participants can discuss the multi-issues in a wary and reasonable way. Then decisions only can be created after this process of debate has taken place (Vitale 2006:745). The substance of deliberative democracy is an inclusive political arena in which all agencies stand in an equal relation, free from power domination, and transparency in order to reach a common perception or consensus. Furthermore, state and civil society should create an inclusive political arena in which they can negotiate their needs and create a policy based on common goal. This substance is different from the substance of liberal democracy.5 Deliberative democracy, then, is the initial concept of governance in conflict. However as an ideal concept, deliberative democracy faces vary social realities which can create a conflict dynamic (Held 2006). Such a different reality of basic needs 4

I will explore more deeply how the deliberative democracy is related to the concept of governance in conflict in this chapter. 5 See Dryzek (2000) and Held (2006).

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will create a different policy priority. A different reality of basic human needs is pursued by each group by using their power such as identity, political network, and money. In this stage, a different reality and agency’s power are the foundation of conflict dynamic. Anthony Giddens called the dynamic based on power conflict as ‘dialectic of control in social system.’ Conflicting agencies with their power has a ‘transformative capacity’ which they are able to negotiate and create a movement for fulfilling their needs (Giddens 1985, p. 11). In describing a conflict dynamic, Galtung’s triangle (Ramsbotham et al. 2003:10– 12) can explain that matters. In Galtung’s triangle, different power and reality can fashion a different attitude and behavior of social groups. One of social groups with more power than the others may be more intractable in holding their interest. Meanwhile, another party with less power perhaps is more distrustful. Following Galtung’s triangle, the political attitudes will create political actions. Technically, political actions can be observed through any social practices of conflicting parties such as hampering a negotiation process or undertaking a violent action. This study, then, look at what kind of political attitude and social practices in conflict relations in order to reveal the conflict dynamic. Conflict dynamic, then, is the result of dialectic of reality and power. The different reality and power that manifested in a political attitude and social practice should be governed by a political institution which provides an arena, norm, and values in resolving the conflict. As Burton also argued that the grievance of groups should be brought to an institution which it provides such negotiation space (Burton 1998). At this point, then, the success of each party to come out from an unproductive conflict6 depends on what kind of institution that is used for transforming an unproductive conflict into a productive conflict. A productive conflict is possible to bear a positive implication to each party by preventing violent forms and proliferating problem solving. By considering this theory, this thesis is going to understand what values, norms, and political arena are embraced by all agencies to govern their conflict. As it has been mentioned before, deliberative democracy is an ideal concept of political system which it can be said as the ideal values and norms of all conflicting agencies in governing conflict. Political arena is a specific space of conflicting parties in which social interaction can be established and structured. In governance in conflict, a political arena is a very vital part in order for all agencies to communicate their reality.

6

Unproductive conflict can be seen in a protracted violent conflict. In our conflict studies, it can be reproduced when power domination and contentious strategy are used by conflicting agencies. Meanwhile, a productive conflict will result a positive implication to conflicting parties such an ability to prevent violent action and to upgrade a negotiation skill. This analysis can be seen in Rubenstein (1996).

Chapter 3

Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

3.1 Peace Issues Aceh had been in war for a long time. It was started from Dutch invasion in 1873– 1911, and against central government of Indonesia during in dependence era. In independence era, Aceh conflict’s causes emerged from two authoritarian regimes. First period was in 1955–1959 during Soekarno regime (Old Order) and second period in Soeharto regime (New Order). Nessen stated that both Old and New Order did the same atrocity in Aceh. Old Order prefigured the New Order in vital ways: “the dictatorial strength of the executive; the pervasive power of the military; the lack of elections; the dissolution or gutting of parliament and periods of martial law; the banning and emasculation of political parties; and the key role of functional groups” (Nessen 2007:187). According to Aspinall, the period of Old Order was more rooted in a political ideology difference between central government and Aceh. Aceh expected to create the state of Indonesia is based on Islam meanwhile the central government prefer to accommodate religious values as state’s ideology, namely Pancasila. Daud Bereueh, the leader of resistance movement, resisted central government’s stance by affiliating their resistance movement to Darul Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia). The movement was coordinated by ulama (Islamic scholar) which defeated uleebalang (Acehnese aristocratic caste). In responding to the movement, central government sent a military operation without distinguishing a civilian or rebel which was same as in the Dutch war or ‘company war’ (perang kumpeni) (Aspinall 2007:156–160). By the time, Soekarno got success to resolve the conflict between central government and political resistances under Beureueh leadership by using a mutual negotiation approach. This approach was responded openly through some negotiation stages. Finally, a peace resolution could be reached by giving Aceh a special region in May 26, 1959, by enforcing Islamic law, education based on local values, and customary

© Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) 2023 N. Susan, The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6252-5_3

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law. This agreement is known as Ikrar Lamteh (Lamteh Declaration) (Sjamsuddin 1990). Second period of political resistance in Aceh is during New Order era under Soeharto regime. Unfortunately, special region status of Aceh was only a name, but it was not consistently implemented by the New Order regime. New Order regime’s policy in economy never gives any advantages to the grass root and local people. Particularly, natural resources exploitation such in the case of Aceh is not redistributed to Aceh people. That’s why, Acehnese people still live under poverty, young people did not have any chance to access a good employment, and women and children could not access good health and education services. Mainly, this chapter has six parts of issues. First part will be describing briefly Aceh society and its war history. The first part is aimed to give a basic understanding of Acehnese’s social character in responding a social and political injustice. Second part will be reviewing the governance in conflict before democracy exists in Indonesia. This study uses the term of coercive governance in conflict to mention the patterns of political approach before democracy in Indonesia which a traditional security paradigm was deployed. Jeong stated that traditional security is an approach based on military power which negotiation does not get a political attention. Traditional approach neglects ‘social and economic inequities arising from an asymmetric, hierarchical relationship in the existing system’ (Jeong 2003:367). Third part will be assessing particularly how the coercive governance in conflict has worsened and protracted conflict. This part will be started by looking at the typed of political resistances of Acehnese society. Fifth part will be reviewing how democratic governance in conflict is able to create a peace accord genuinely through a mutual negotiation of conflicting parties. Finally, this chapter will be describing post-conflict society of Aceh which is signed by a new conflict dynamic. In the last part, social configuration of basic human needs creates a conflict dynamic during the reintegration process.

3.2 The History of War in Aceh Aceh is located in the north of Sumatra which Islam determines as the culture, social structure, and political values. This province is known well as the Serambi Mekah (verandah of Mekah). Islam was introduced to the other islands in Nusantara1 through this place. Aceh has different ethnic groups such as Aceh, Gayo, Batak Karo, Java, and Chinese. Aceh ethnic is the majority which Aceh Islamic kingdoms (sultanate) during 17–19 centuries were under Aceh ethnic. Actually Aceh people consider themselves as a nation since they have a different language among Sumatranese ethnics and their history of sultanate. Gayo is the second biggest ethnic group. Choy mentioned Gayo has less a will to fight (Choy 2003:285). Gayo ethnic is never notice Acehnese domination by using their original language in everyday life. Later 1

Nusantara is a name for Islands of Indonesia.

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on, Gayo ethnic affiliates politically to the biggest political party during New Order era, namely Golkar. Samudra Pasai was the Islamic Kingdom of Aceh which reached its glorious in the reign of sultan Iskandar Muda. This kingdom was the producer of pepper. In the history, Acehnese sultanate was able to compete with Portuguese in trading pepper. The aggressiveness of Portuguese in expanding their trade which threatened Muslim trading in Melaka, then, was resisted by the Islamic kingdom of Aceh by Turkey’s support in weaponry. During the Dutch expansion 1840–1873, under Tuanku Ibrahim, Aceh made diplomacy movement to European countries such as British and France in order to create an alliance of pepper trader. The diplomacy was aimed strategically to hinder Dutch expansion in Aceh and Melaka (Reid 2006:55–57). According to Reid, Dutch attacked Acehnese Sultanate in April 1873 by sending 3000 men and an ultimatum for Aceh in recognizing Dutch reign or war. Acehnese sultanate, under Sultan Mahmud, rejected the ultimatum. At the first invasion, Dutch was failed to occupy Aceh which killed General Kohler and 80 men and 400 was wounded. In the second expansion, the Dutch sent 13.000 men to attack Aceh kingdom. The representative for mediation from Britain, Turkey, and the former Aceh Prime Minister Habib Abd-ar-Rahman was rejected by Dutch (Reid 2006a:97–98). The Aceh resistance actually was always followed by the disintegration in Acehnese sultanate government. Sultan, ulama (Islamic scholars) and uleebalang (Acehnese royal family) contested different interest and strategy (Alfian 1999:73– 115). This sociological politics of Acehnese, then, occurred as a factor that weakened the Sultanate’s resistance against the Dutch. In 1903, Sultan Muhammad Daud, is young sultan that was able to be saved during the Dutch expansion, was surrendered. However, the Dutch government never occupies Aceh since Acehnese leaders join Indonesian independence movement to resist Dutch colonialism (Sjamsuddin 1990). Ipso facto war is the part of Aceh history. The history of war in Aceh and the glorious as a nation has shaped the character of Acehnese people, that are brave and pride (Alfian 1987). Hence, the character is likely to influence the character of every political resistance against colonialism and oppression. This character is still maintained strongly through Acehnese resistance against injustice after joining Indonesia.

3.3 Coercive Governance in Conflict The protracted violent conflict in some areas of Indonesia such in Aceh particularly are under the coercive governance in conflict of New Order era (19,696–1998). New Order era under General Soeharto’s ruling had thrown away Soekarno regime in 1965. Soeharto ruled this country by using military force to create a political stability, then, after Soekarno’s era, political stability was vulnerable. The doctrine

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of “Dwi-Fungsi ABRI” (dual functions of ABRI),2 then, was functioned politically as a legitimacy in spreading over military elites in Indonesian national administrative. Military elites during this era ruled economic and political structure utterly under the commando of Soeharto. At the same time, Soeharto created a national bureaucracy that was dominated by elites from his political party namely Golkar (Golongan Karya: Functional Group). This political order sustained New Order regime more than 32 years. This subchapter is going to review the political background in Indonesia, historically, by using the analysis of governance in conflict. As it has been elaborated in Chapter II, governance in conflict basically can be analyzed through the presence of political arena model, values, and norms. If we try to review, a political arena in which conflicting agencies can communicate and negotiate their needs will be determined by power dynamics. The one who will be involved, when and how a political arena will be opened are the result of power dynamics. All agencies that involved in a political arena, then, use their ideology to form what norms will guide their practice during a communication and negotiation. In an autocratic and militaristic regime, power dynamics will be influenced by a political control and determination of the regime. Then, a placement of agency in a political arena is under regime’s control by considering their interest such a political stability of the regime itself. In Myanmar, military junta control agency that can be the member of SPDC (the State Peace and Development Council) as a political arena.3 Since SPDC only accommodates agencies of the military junta, this political arena does not have a deliberative process. The fact is the political arena always creates a coercive policy to their people.

3.4 Developmentalism, Bureaucracism, and Militarism The regime of New Order got a bilateral support from USA (United State of America) in economic development program and deterrence. The support was the part of USA’s cold war with USSR, a war between capitalism and communism block. By the USA’s supports in 1969 New Order embraced capitalism and economic developmentalism as the national development strategy. Actually, economic developmentalism was adopted firstly in Latin American countries such in Brazil which is judged as the success story of economic development. The core of developmentalism is an economic and national income growth by creating industrializations and modernization. This ideology emphasizes the concept

2

ABRI (The Republic Indonesia Army Force) is the military force of Indonesia during New Order era. Now ABRI has been renamed as TNI (National Army of Indonesia). 3 SPDC (the State Peace and Development Council) replaced SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) in 1997 as a respond to international community demand on a national reconciliation in Myanmar. For further information also see Hlaing and Koh (2003).

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of ‘trickle down effects’ for creating economic prosperity. The root of developmentalism basically is rooted in the European colonialism. Such Wallerstein testified that in 1900, the idea of development has been proposed by the French Ministry of Colonies through a book entitled Les colonies françaises:la mise en valeur de notre domaine coloniale. Mise en valeur in the dictionary is translated as ‘development’ or ‘développement’ in French language. Furthermore, Wallerstein uses the Les Usuels de Robert: Dictionnaire des Expressions et Locutions figurées (1979) viewed that ‘mettre en valeur’ meaning is ‘to exploit, draw profit from’ (Wallerstein 2004:1). Indonesian government under the reign of New Order needed a political stability in order for them to guard the national economic development. However, economic development should be implemented through a consistent process to achieve a blue print of development by following the formulation and procedures. In order to succeed the state’s implementation of procedure and formulation, there must be a political control during the implementation. The political control needs to be planted since there should not be interruptions that may disturb and destabilize the process of development. Hence, the regime built a political structure that controls the territories and society. In order to realize this interest a modern political structure based of centralization of power had been created by the regime. Political institutions in all levels—from central to local—were set up to control social and political activities of the society. The regime replaced a local political institution with a modern political institution that can be controlled by the central government. This political strategy was legitimated by Act No. 5/1974 on ‘The Principles of Regional Government Administration’. Afterward, the Act had eliminated the meaning of special region of Aceh. In order to empower the modern political structure, the regime filled it with the main supporters of the regime explicitly, that are TNI and Golkar. TNI and Golkar elites filled the position in national bureaucracy and local political leaders such as governor and mayor. At the same time, the regime built a territorial commando from the province to village level which is mainly to stabilize social and political dynamics. Modernism, bureaucracism, and militarism in the governance of Indonesia during New Order era factually did not give any spaces for a political negotiation. It was controlled by state not even the public sphere. Civil society elements such as NGOs, student movement, mass media, and mass organization got a very limited political arena to pursue their aspiration. The exclusive political arena that was rooted by the interest of national economic development and sustained by militarism politics is only involved the regime’s political agencies. The regime’s political agencies such as technocrat, academician prodevelopmentalism, military elites, and Golkar elites designed state’s policies in the frame of national economic development. State’s policies in the context of national economic development were set up to reach a high economic growth and national income. One main policy of the regime policies was natural resources exploitation that became the main resource of economic growth. In addition, Aceh is one rich area of natural resources such as gas and oil in which the regime undertook the exploitation.

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3.5 The Grievance of Aceh In 1971, the central government established ZILS (Zona Industri Lhokseumawe/ Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone). The implementation of ZILS forced local villagers to move out from their home land. Most of the villagers are not well-educated which became the reason of government to hire foreigner and non-Acehnese people particularly from Java. At the same time, 80% of the revenue from natural resources exploitation was brought to Jakarta. Metareum mentioned that natural resources exploitation in Aceh contributed until 11% of PDB (Product Domestic Bruto), but the central government only returns 0.5% every year (Metareum 2002:20–21). The fact, ZILS did not give any advantages to local people around the industrial zone nor for Acehnese prosperity. In order to secure ZILS from people protest, the central government used military forces as the guards. ZILS is seen as a sweet security business for military force. At the same time, few local Acehnese elites were placed in the bureaucracy as a technocrat. As Ann Miller (2006) mentioned, there are two political strategies of New Order in weakening Aceh. First is to use military force in controlling and monitoring opposition forces such in Aceh. Second, Soeharto used the local indigenous class of technocrats to implement national development in order to counteract the power of the ulama. The injustice in Aceh has formed an identity resistance which considers the Indonesian government as a new colonial in Aceh. Dr. Hasan di Tiro declared a new political armed resistance to the Government of Indonesia with forming AchehSumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) or also called as GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: Independent Aceh Movement) in 1976. The movement is reflecting a deep disappointed to the state’s policies in which Acehnese people was oppressed both economically and politically. However, GAM was declared as a political resistance by taking the nationhood of Aceh which was under the ruling of Tiro’s family. As Hasan di Tiro stated as follows: “For I have been born to the di Tiro family of Acheh, Sumatra, the family that had ruled my country and had provided leadership to it through war and peace for so many generations and for centuries in the long history of our country” (Tiro 1984:1). Hence, the grievance of GAM is actually the combination between the identity and political economy injustice. New Order regime considered GAM as the threat of national stability. Hence, the New Order regime sent military forces to wipe out GAM from Aceh through “Sadar dan Siwah” Operation (1977–1982). This policy was the first military operation against the insurgency of GAM. Aceh under Soeharto’s reign was oppressed by both military atrocity and cooptation. As Nessen stated that New Order regime had had a two track approach of brutal violence and non-violent persuasion (including ‘mental upgrading’) (Nessen 2007:187). Hasan di Tiro and the other leaders of GAM ran out from Aceh to get a political asylum. By the helped of IRCR, Hasan di Tiro got a way out from Indonesia, then, he live in Sweden until now. When GAM’s leaders were absent from Aceh, the New Order regime did not create a good policy in responding the political resistance of GAM. The regime still reproduced social and political injustices across of Indonesia’s

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land including Aceh. Meanwhile, New Order believed that they had already wiped out GAM from Aceh. Therefore, the regime did not do a military. operation. This condition was used by GAM to consolidate their organization with recruiting unemployed young people. GAM sent their young combatant leaders to Libya to get guerilla tactic training in the asymmetric war with Indonesia. In 1989, the New Order declared DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer; military operation zone) in Aceh to response GAM’s consolidation and movement during that year; the period of DOM was from 1989 to 1998. During this military operation, thousands civilians were killed, kidnapped, and mutilated. Women were raped by the soldiers. Komnas HAM (Indonesian National Human Rights Commission) reported that the atrocities committed by TNI/POLRI during DOM have killed 944 Acehnese, around 3000 women became widows, and 15,000–20,000 Acehnese people became IDPs (Internal Displaced People) (Nessen 2006). The atrocious contra-insurgency of TNI/POLRI awakened young people, who their family members were killed or raped. They joint GAM’s revolt against Indonesian’s army. They revenged the atrocities of military operations by killing and kidnapping local government’s officials, army’s wife, civilians, and journalists. Indonesian’s army and some civilian groups who became the GAM’s victim, then, revenged back to that group and killed whoever was suspected as GAM’s member without an investigation and a court process. Then, PETA (Nation’s Defender), a militia organization pro Indonesia, is established by the support of TNI. Those behaviors created what Johan Galtung (as cited in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2003:9) as a contradiction and pushed the attitudes such as hatred, fear, and desperation among civilians. Conflicting parties in this phase got trap in what Pruit and Hee Kim called as ‘conflict spiral’ where each party do vengeance by using contentious tactic to revenge previous contentious actions of another party (Pruit and Hee Kim 2004:96).

3.6 Road to Peace During New Order, there was no road to peace at all for Aceh and the other areas such Papua but actually road to violence. The coercive governance in conflict of New Order regime did not give an inclusive political arena in which interest groups and citizen ideally are able to engage a negotiation. The political trust of many interest groups during New Order had been devastated perfectly. Hence, local people created a political resistance since there was no political acknowledgement to their existence. Moreover, the atrocities of military operation had created new grievance by taking the issue of human rights violations. So the conflict in Aceh was widened as the identity, economic and political injustice, and human rights violation-based conflict. The democratic government should face and solve those perpetuated conflict. In this subchapter, the researcher will explore how a fundamental political change in Indonesia generally has pushed the forming of democratic governance in conflict in erasing violence and solving conflict in Aceh.

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3.6.1 Transitional Democratic Governance in Conflict The collapse of New Order authoritarian regime in 1998 has brought democracy into Indonesian political system. This political change has developed new political hopes of people across of Indonesian territory. During the democracy transition in Indonesia, there are three periods of regime in governing Aceh conflict. First is in the period of B.J. Habibie who replaced Soeharto in 1998. In Habibies’ era, East Timor got a political chance by the transition regime to conduct referendum which East Timor chose to be an independent state in 1999. However Habibie did not give this political chance to Aceh since there is a claim that Aceh is different from East Timor. Aceh is the founder of Indonesian state by their support during independence movement against the Dutch.4 Meanwhile East Timor does not have a historical connection with Indonesia which this area was integrated by political interest of New Order regime. Moreover, Habibies’ decision on East Timor got huge critics from Indonesian society and political leader since the decision is considered as a big mistake in holding the Unitary State of Republic Indonesia. However what happened in East Timor, then, has encouraged Acehnese civil movement such initiated by SIRA (Sentra Informasi untuk Referendum Aceh: Information Center for Aceh Referendum). In 1999, student movement affiliated in SIRA mobilized civil society to protest central government and to demand a democratic referendum. SIRA’s leaders were arrested by police and some of them ran out from Indonesia to get political asylum. Muhamad Nazarudin the head of SIRA was arrested in 2005. Later, Nazar would be elected as the vice governor of Aceh with Irwandi Yusuf from GAM. Habibie regime attempted to recover Acehnese political trust by erasing DOM. General Wiranto as the Indonesian Military Commando asked apologize of Acehnese people for the past ‘military personnel’ atrocities. However, TNI declared a military emergency (darurat militer) as another name for military operation. This policy was decided after looking the GAM movement was getting stronger by the erasing of DOM. Actually, during the transition of democratic governance in conflict, there were some military operations as the counter insurgency such as Jaring Merah Operation (May 1989–August 7, 1998), Wibawa Operation (January–April 1999), Sadar Rencong I Operation (May 1999–January 2000), Sadar Rencong II Operation (February–May 2000), Cinta Meunasah I Operation (June–September 2000), Cinta Meunasah II Operation (September 2000–February 2001), Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Hukum I Operation (Recovering Law Order Operation) (February–August 2001), Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Hukum II Operation (September 2001–February 2002), Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Hukum III Operation (February–November 2002), Darurat Militer I Operation (19 May–19 November 2003) (Murizal 2003). In the second period of transitional democratic governance in conflict, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) tried to reduce the political tension in Aceh by promising a referendum for Aceh. Many critics from political leaders hampered the referendum 4

The President Soekarno said that Aceh is a capital area for Indonesia. Aceh donated their blood and money to support Indonesian Independence movement.

3.6 Road to Peace

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realization in Aceh. Therefore the promised is never realized. Gus Dur still wanted to resolve Aceh conflict through a negotiation process. Hence, he invited Hendry Dunant Centre (HDC) as the third party. HDC is an organization from Switzerland with focusing on conflict resolution. After Indonesian government invited them as the third party, HDC proposed peace proposal to both Indonesian government and GAM. In the middle of 2000, both two parties agreed to sign ‘Humanitarian Pause’ as conflict containment. This agreement was ineffective because both two parties were still distrustful to each other. In 2001, the Humanitarian Pause was broken up by the attacking Exxon Mobil’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) which GAM was suspected as the perpetrator. The attacking incident became TNI’s claim that the Humanitarian Pause is only used by GAM to reorganize their militias. After the failure of Humanitarian Pause, Gus Dur could not stop TNI’s ambition in implementing more military operations in Aceh. The vice president Megawati became Gus Dur’s successor after the impeachment of DPR (Indonesian House Representative) in the middle of 2001. Megawati regime continued in making road to peace by giving a special autonomy for Aceh with renaming Aceh as Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). NAD will get 70% revenue of LNG and eight years later will be 50% each. In the special autonomy, NAD also can implement Syariah Islam (Islamic law). However, special autonomy was not implemented fully and consistently. At the same time, HDC played role in mediating the perpetuated conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY), the coordinating minister for political and security affair, was appointed as the government representative in handling the negotiation with GAM. HDC facilitated GAM and Indonesian government in February and May in Geneva Sweden 2001. The GoI proposed a special autonomy act as the starting point in the dialogue. GAM rejected this point which it forces them to acknowledge Indonesia as their country. After passing a hard process of negotiation and by the pressures of donor countries such as USA, EU, Japan and World Bank in December 2002, two conflicting parties were persuaded to sign Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in Tokyo Japan. The CoHA agreement obligated them to stop all violent actions in order to give humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civilian formation (HRW 2003). This agreement actually was an endeavor to settle down the protracted violent conflict in Aceh. Joint Security Committee (JSC) was established to settle violent conflict which GAM, GoI, and ASEAN as its members. JSC was able to decline violence actions significantly by creating peace zones. However, there was a lack of mutual trust between two parties which broke the agreement since some violent actions occurred at the beginning 2003 between GAM and TNI/POLRI. TNI perceived that GAM was doing an organization consolidation and recruiting new members. As TNI mentioned that GAM’s power since January–March 2003 is 5225 members with 2083 guns. They were spread over in Kabupaten Pidie with 2385 members and 427 guns, 1316 in North Aceh members and 889 guns, 275 members and 170 guns in Aceh Besar and South Aceh with 89 members and 57 guns, while in West Aceh there are 222 members and 113 guns, 86 members and 79 guns in

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3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

Central Aceh, 827 members and 344 guns in East Aceh, and 25 members and 4 guns in Southeast Aceh (Murizal 2003). The GAM’s consolidation during CoHA has legitimated TNI for creating martial law in Aceh in May 2003 by mobilizing 35.000 troops for erasing GAM members within several months. Megawati got a huge political support in making the martial law from her cabinets, parliament members, and political leaders. During the martial law, TNI closed the ‘information market’ by establishing Media Center. This institution aimed to control and to gather all information related to the military operation. As what Acehnese senior journalist testified that military commander commanded them to support the interest of national integrity by providing information. The information controlling was aimed to weaken GAM’s position in Acehnese and international community.5 At this moment, GAM’s campaign through media was really bounded. Practically, the mass media both national and international only could access information from the Media Center.

3.6.2 The Consolidation In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was elected as the new Indonesian President through a popular vote. As a democratic regime, there is a new approach in governing the nation-state of Indonesia. It is including the method of governing separatism movements which the government of Indonesia (GoI) provides more inclusive political arena in order to engage a dialogue and negotiation process. It is showed by their commitment in prioritizing a peace dialogue and reducing a military treat. The new democratic regime appointed the former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari and Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) as the new mediator. In December 26, 2004, tsunami disaster hit 40% of Aceh, killed more than 200 hundred thousand people, destroyed infrastructure and all logistic networks. Indonesian government and GAM lost their logistic, institution’s network and personals in Aceh. Waizenegger argued that tsunami disaster in Aceh gives the big impacts on the conflicting parties in weakening of their ability military politically, socially, and economically (Waizenegger 2007:3). Tsunami disaster somehow has made conflict in the stalemate stage. This disaster can be mentioned as the power of creating a ‘ripeness time’ to open a new intervention or mediation. Tsunami disaster also gave a strong reason for international community to convince both GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to sit in a negotiation table. Meanwhile, the negotiation in Helsinki was on process, war in Aceh kept going between TNI/POLRI and GAM in a lower scale than previous war before tsunami disaster. At the beginning of 2005, 178 people were dead and 170 injured caused by 108 violent conflicts (Barron et al. 2005). Even post-tsunami TNI/POLRI and GAM still in war, but there was a constructive process in terminating the perpetuated violent conflict. As what Farid Husein (2007) asserted in his testimony on the negotiation 5

Interviewed with Yarmen Dinamika, one of senior peace journalists in Aceh in August 8, 2008.

3.6 Road to Peace

25

process that before the tsunami disaster hit Aceh, actually the GoI and GAM had reached a constructive process in creating peace accord. The negotiation which called as ‘marathon of Helsinki’ was sustained by the field political process. Farid Husain as the GoI’s negotiation team which was more responsible in sustaining the process of negotiation also came to the deep jungle of Aceh in order to meet GAM combatant. He met Muzakir Manaf as the GAM combatant’s commander secretly from TNI. He wanted to ensure whether GAM combatant in the jungle will agree and support the peace accord or not. He also convinced GAM combatant that Indonesia now is different from the previous time. Democratic regime will not lie anymore to Aceh people. Husain also met the other GAM’s senior leaders in Aceh, Singapore, and Malaysia. What Husain did was mainly to build a political trust from GAM leaders. Therefore, the negotiation could reach MoU Helsinki as the problem solving for Aceh conflict (Husain 2006). In the negotiation process, Martti Ahtisaari and CMI played roles as mediator and good offices by increasing parties’ communication when negotiation got stuck. Atiihsari also used his political aid in order to give a pressure to both parties. During the negotiation process, he stated that “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” The phrases give a strong psychological effect to the both conflicting parties that the negotiation process will not pass a single point without solving it firstly. The first meeting both GAM and Indonesian government kept their stance. Indonesian government insisted to use ‘local autonomy’ as the first starting point. The negotiation practically found dead roads since GAM was so allergic with the term of ‘autonomy’ meanwhile the GoI was so anti-‘referendum’ and ‘independence’ term. Ahtisaari proposed ‘self-government’ term to slice the stuck negotiation. However, as Djuli and Rahman stated that the term of self-government actually had been designed as ‘plan B’ of GAM negotiators (Djuli and Rahman 2007). The term was so hard for the GoI negotiator team. Even basically for GAM negotiators, the term of self-government is not really far from autonomy. As Djuli and Rahman (2007) mentioned that: “In many ways, self-government was another word for autonomy, but without the same abhorrent connotations.” A lot of strong critics came from military elites and parliamentary leaders to the term. Even there was a lot of critic, SBY regime still held a commitment in persisting the inclusive political arena. The fact is that SBY has a huge commitment in sustaining the inclusive political arena. After marathon process of negotiation which it took five formal rounds of table negotiation with EU commission and ASEAN’s support and civil society’s pressure, in August 25, 2005, two parties agreed to sign Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki Finland. This MoU is not only an endeavor to settle down violence but also answers the root causes of the conflict. The MoU obligated GAM has to acknowledge RI’s unity and sovereignty, selfdisarmament and demobilize its militias. GAM has a right to participate in all level of social and political activities such to have local political party. They get amnesty and rehabilitation, and economic compensation for former GAM’s member. Aceh with the special autonomy has a right to retain 70% of the revenues from all current natural resources, implement their own education and local values. At the same time, GoI

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3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

has to withdraw all non-organic military forces of TNI/POLRI except the organic structure. The organic structure is still needed to undertake its duty in maintaining the security in Aceh. The MoU Helsinki is also proposes a ‘Law on the Governing of Aceh’ (LoGA) in order to accommodate local politics (self-government) in Aceh (see MoU Helsinki 2006). Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was made by CMI, ASEAN and EU commission to control MoU’s implementation. Some triggers of escalation emerged such clash between TNI/POLRI with GAM. This clash got highest scale in June to July 2006 and drastically declined in August (World Bank 2006). The declination of violent incident was caused by the strong intervention of AMM that has political support from EU commission and ASEAN. The implementation of MoU signed the termination of thirty years violent conflict after sacrificing approximately 15.000 people death (Barron et al. 2005). AMM terminated the mission in undertaking some MoU’s points particularly demobilization and disarmament program. AMM has disarmed GAM by destroying 840 guns. At the same time, TNI demobilized 31,681 of non-organic troops from Aceh. During the demobilization and disarmament, both GAM and the GoI always had a different interpretation on MoU’s points. This fact occurred since political trust had not been built strongly by both parties. This condition pushed GAM and the GoI to reject politically the method of implementation. Reaching MoU Helsinki as the peace accord of Aceh does not mean Acehnese people would have a better life automatically. MoU Helsinki’s implementation mainly is the first key in building a better life in Aceh. From the 71 points of MoU Helsinki, reintegration process is the fundamental one since reintegration creates a new social and political dynamic in Aceh post-conflict society. A success of reintegration will influence a social and political stability in which peace building can be undertaken confidently.

3.6.3 New Dynamics of Aceh Post-conflict After three years of MoU Helsinki, there is a wonderful progress relates to a peace life. Aceh is a peace place now. Guns are no longer circulated and used. Children can go to their school with a big smile. Women do not feel afraid any more to go to their farm. People can travel to every place freely. The infrastructure development is rapidly undertaken in Aceh. Poverty can be reduced significantly. Nur Djuli, GAM negotiator in Helsinki, said “that is a peace.”6 However, it can be called as a general peace condition which security is appears in place. There are still some crucial issues that should be governed properly during the reintegration process. According to World Bank in Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update from January 2005 to March 2008, there is a tendency the rising of conflict in any dimension such as local political conflict, aids-based conflict, and administrative 6

From the interview with Nur Djuli at BRA office.

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Diagram 3.1 Violent LL incidents and total # of LL conflicts, by month (World Bank on aceh conflict monitoring update, 1st March-30th April 2008)

disputes. Even violence is still high it is lower than the conflict incidents. Conflict incidents during April 2008 are 144 incidents; meanwhile violence is 21 incidents (World Bank 2008:1) (Diagram 3.1). The report shows how conflict dynamic during the reintegration process is increasing which violent incidents also still occur. By looking at this report, the reintegration process is still complicated. 1. Economy Reintegration Reintegration is one of MoU’s imperative points in undertaking peace process in Aceh. It is one package of DDR program (Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration) in a post-conflict peace building. Ideally, the Reintegration Process in NAD can be seen in two main dimensions, namely a social economy reintegration and political reintegration. A social economy reintegration aims mainly to return back the GAM’s members both combatant and non-combatant to normal social economy activities such as to have a good job, to access a good education system, and to get a good health service. At the same time, the social economy reintegration is also addressed to the conflict survivors since they have lost their social economy life after the thirty years protracted violent conflict. In order to realize the goal of social economy reintegration, Local Government of NAD has established Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh/BRA (Peace-Aceh Reintegration Board). Nowadays, BRA has been undertaking particularly an economic compensation to conflict perpetrators and survivors. According to BRA, in 2007, BRA has undertaken economic programs such as Diyat (economic compensation for widows), to build or to fix conflict survivors’ house, aids for the disabled, and health aids.7 However according to some reports, the Acehnese society particularly the grass root people perceive that BRA’s social economy programs are not directed to the right people. Hence, there is a lot of protest during the program implementation. 7

See at www.bra-aceh.org.

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3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

The wave of protest by conflict victims from some districts came to the central office of BRA in Meuligoe pendopo governor (official governor’s house). Moreover, some of them stayed there as 12 representative of conflict victims from East Aceh and 700 conflict victims from Kabupaten Bener Meriah who stayed there for one month in Banda Aceh. They asked the unfair treatment in the distribution of economic empowerment fund (PE). For example, there is a village (Gampong) which only has 66 people but they got Rp120 million for PE (economic empowerment) fund. Meanwhile the village that consists of 1.808 people was only got Rp170 millions (Modus Aceh, February 2008). The protest of conflict survivors to BRA often occurs in the level of province, regency (kabupaten/kota), and village. The protest dynamic can be seen in Table 3.1. One research report from La Kaspia Institute (2007) showed that during the three years of reintegration process, there are some common problems: a. the aid program is not delivered directly to the target groups; b. status classification (discrimination) between former TNA (GAM former combatant) and non-TNA; c. status classification between former TNA before MoU and after MoU; d. inexpediency of the beneficiary number and the amount of the delivered fund; e. conflict of interest among KPA members (former TNA organization); f. an obligation to conceive a proposal for business development; g. there is no business assistance from BRA. Our last observation found some reasons why BRA is not able to implement the reintegration process: (1) there is a lack of good delivering system of the program to the targeted groups, (2) there is still lack of organization capacity to administer the programs such making a financial report, and (3) BRA’s staff still has a low capacity in designing and making a peace building program. Those factors actually are showing that the reintegration process by BRA does not have good governance institution. 2. Political Reintegration A political reintegration is to accommodate the former GAM’s members and the other Acehnese political groups into a democratic political system. The political reintegration is undertaken in the special autonomy of NAD by using LoGA. Two general successes have been harvested in the political reintegration, namely the direct election of Governor and the forming of local political parties. Aceh has six local political parties which are distinguished by different ideology, vision, and character. Six local political parties as KPU (General Election Committee) nominated are Partai Aceh (PA: Aceh Party) which is established by GAM, Partai SIRA (Suara Independen: Independent Voice Party) as the party of SIRA, Partai Rakyat Aceh (Aceh People Party) is established by SMUR, Partai Daulat Aceh (Aceh Sovereignty Party) which is established by ulama, Partai Aceh Bersatu (United Aceh Party), and Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (Aceh Prosperity and Peaceful Party). The existence of local political parties can be seen as one of good news of the political reintegration based on democracy. At the same time, those local parties prove

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Table 3.1 Dynamics of conflict survivors No. date (dd/ mm/ yy)

Area

Description

10/ 02/ 2006

Sigli

Hundreds conflict survivors in Pidie complained that they do not receive yet the reintegration fund

16/ 11/ 2006

Takengon

House aid from BRA in Bener Meriah is not delivered as in Budgeting Plan (RAB). The budget from NAD Government is Rp34,500,000/unit. Meanwhile in the realization is only Rp17,000,000–Rp20,000,000

01/ 09/ 2007

Lhokseumawe

Every political prisoner will get an education fund up to Rp10 million by BRA but they have not received yet

03/ 03/ 2007

Lhokseumawe

Aids for conflict victims’ house got failure Bantuan (Fund) because the data information of the victims was applied lately to BRA province

07/ 03/ 2007

Banda Aceh

The citizens of Aceh Tengah dan Bener Meriah regency, had a mass rally in the office of DPRA in Banda Aceh. They demanded DPRA to investigate the corruption in house development fund for conflict survivors in those areas. Since there is no single house can be used properly

08/ 01/ 2007

Aceh Jaya

The citizens asked an additional fund because Rp35 million is not enough to build a proper living house

11/ 17/ 2007

Desa Buket Panyang Kecamatan Julok, East Aceh

Some parts of burned house of the conflict survivors do not get the fund meanwhile the other house that were not burned during the conflict got fund from BRA

12/ 03/ 2007

Reudelong, Bener Meriah

The citizen of Bener Meriah protested the diyat distribution by BRA for widows of conflict victims, and whom got physical damage caused by the conflict. They also claimed that the implementation of house fund aid is not following the procedure (Budget Plan)

12/ 08/ 2007

Langsa

Ex political prisoners of GAM who got amnesty in Kabupaten Aceh Timur asked their rights on the delayed fund. They should get two acres of land and a house unit

12/ 28/ 2007

Lhoksukon

The citizen rejected Rp120 million of the house fund because they cannot distribute it to all citizen there with that amount

Source Modus Aceh (2008)

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3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

that Aceh society is polarized politically. Every people are positioning themselves by looking at ‘what is your party and what is my party.’ As Nur Djuli stated8 : …six local political parties and 34 national parties. So everybody is positioning themselves if you are not with us you are all is enemy…even you know…my colleagues…in GAM some of them regarding me as enemy because I am not in his party (Aceh Party, author). So this is of course also worrying.

According to Teuku Kemal Fasya, the current political situation is becoming messier by political violence and intimidation, both indirectly sponsored by the political rivalry and directly by the element of conflict creator. The story of violence is more bothering a harmony (Teuku Kemal Fasya 2008). Some cases of violent actions that still occur someway are caused by the polarization. At the same time, the polarization is characterized by ‘war culture’ that still exists. Many cases of violent actions, intimidation, and political campaign have segregated Aceh society politically and ideologically. The political rivalry in Aceh has emerged a non-cooperative attitude and a violent behavior. Such the rivalry between Aceh Party and SIRA Party has escalated the political tension in post-conflict Aceh. Moreover, Aceh Party is really ambitious to win every election in Aceh. Aceh Party now is targeting more than 50% of the NAD legislative in the 2009 general election. This political target has pushed them to do any possible actions. Some people in Aceh perceive that Aceh Party’s political target has encouraged them to do an anarchic action such an intimidation to the other political parties.9 According to some information from journalists in Aceh, one of local political parties could not fulfill the requirements of local political party establishment. Since this party and the members got intimidation in some areas that dominated by Aceh Party. As Yarmen Dinamika testified10 : …the victim of political rivalry during the verification of local political parties is…a party for women…its name is….PARA. It is not because they are not be able to establish their party. They have enough money…network for building party branches in regency and district levels. But what happens is….because there is a claim from one local political party that certain regions are a forbidden region for the other party.. They always terrorize.

The violent behavior also occurred during pilkada bupati (local election for bupati/ mayor). As ICG mentioned that in June 2007, GAM won the district of Bireuen with 60.2 per cent of the ballot. The election succeed were a product of popular back up, mass mobilization in rural area through military structure of GAM, and some intimidation and coercion (ICG 2007:2). However intimidation and violent action are also addressed to ex-GAM combatant organization KPA (Transitional Change of Aceh). 8

Interview with Nur Djuli at BRA office, August 14 2008. KBS, the spokesman of KPA stated to me that violence is still needed to achieve political goal. They still cannot trust fully the political commitment of the other groups in using democracy. 10 This information is justified by Yarmen Dinamika at Serambis’s office August 8 2008, senior journalist of Serambi Indonesia. Some journalists also have the same information. However, this information is not proved by a data since there is no investigation on it. This information is more an opinion constructed by PARA. 9

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Such as the case in Atu Lintang tragedy in which KPA’s office building was burned and destroyed. The violent action killed five member of KPA. This violent is indicated as ALA-Abas (Aceh Leuser Antara-Aceh Barat Selatan) group’s action. Irwandi Yusuf accused that the violence was done by the ALA-Abas group. Before the violent incident, there was a fight between IPT (Terminal Young People Association) that is backed up by PETA (Nation Defender Association) and KPA’s members in Bener Meriah (Modus Aceh 2008:9–10). Atu Lintang is located in Bener Meriah where the ALA-Abas movement is initiated mostly by Gayo ethnic. Bener Meriah is the land of Gayo. As it has been initially mentioned that Gayo ethnic cannot accept the domination of Aceh ethnic. Gayo people generally are affiliated politically with Golkar. The province partition movement by ALA-Abas group especially is initiated by Gayo ethnic group. This movement also has increased the political temperature of Aceh post-conflict society. This movement actually had been started during the secessionist conflict of GAM which is TNI backup movement. The discourse of civil society around this movement states that ALA-Abas movement aims to weaken the political position of GAM. However, the movement is getting stronger after MoU Helsinki. The issue of power distribution also becomes the foundation of this movement. Irwandi Yusuf responded this movement by accommodating some elites of the movement in his power circle.11 Most of civil society elements see Irwandi’s policy in accommodating few elites is not a constructive method for finding the problem solving. On the contrary, Irwandi often use a ‘violent communication’ to response the discourse of ALA-ABAS by blaming and stigmatizing.12 Irwandi stated that there is no space for ALA-ABAS movement in Aceh as long as he is still officiating as the governor in Aceh. Meanwhile there is no political arena in order for ALA-Abas group to deliberate and negotiate their grievance. Hence, ALA-ABAS groups run their demand to Jakarta, to find political support from the central government. The social polarization also has generated a movement in Aceh social structure. In the public discourse, this movement can be seen from the phenomenon of the exGAM members’ status reposition within the society. There is a superiority feeling of some former GAM members in their society. They claim the peace in Aceh is born by their struggle and blood. They put themselves on the top of Aceh social structure as a hero with some privileges should be given to them.13 As one of inong bale (women combatant of GAM) leader said: This is….my analysis that the social stratification of Aceh will change. He/She (ex-GAM, author) perceives that they have deserving …struggled. There is a group non hero…an ordinary people. Cuak group (government spy)….. Until now if we discuss with ex-GAM combatant—the term is still occur. There will be a new stratification…based on perception.

11

Irwandi appointed M. Iwan Gayo, one of ALA-Abas leaders, as the head of KP2DT NAD. Violent communication theory as Marshal Roserberg theory will be characterized by stigmatizing and blaming another party without any rational observation to what exactly another party needs. See in his academic speech Active Nonviolent Communication (2007). 13 This information was told by some NGOs activist, academician, and GAM members in a different interview. 12

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3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

At glance, during the reintegration process there is new social configuration of basic human needs. The fact is that the social configuration of basic needs reproduces conflict dynamics which is needs to be governed properly by all groups. In this fact, peace building of Aceh post-conflict society needs democratic governance in conflict to create a productive conflict.

3.7 Local Governance in Conflict In a ceremonial speech of three years MoU Helsinki commemoration by APRC and Inter Peace, Irwandi Yusuf claimed that Aceh is the most democratic place in the world.14 This statement can be true or vice versa. Based on our research, democracy in Aceh is still in the level of procedural democracy. The procedural democracy in Aceh is indicated by the existence of local political parties, direct election for local political leaders such as governor and bupati/mayor and the existence of UUPA (LoGA).15 Actually, this level is the character of transitional democracy which procedures and institutions are established visibly. However, the quality of democracy is not in place yet. The transitional democracy is influencing on how local political conflict will be governed. Following the fact that the interest groups struggle to fulfill their needs in Aceh, democracy in Aceh is still difficult to bear a legitimate policy. There is no real involvement of competent groups in deliberating and negotiating their interest. The involvement of social groups is only a procedural fulfillment. It means that the inclusive political arena is not built substantively. There is a case related to the fact above. In responding the issue of bad delivering system of the aid programs, the Executive Board of BRA has made a policy such requiring a kind of detention endorsement letter from the office of KPA (the former GAM’s organization), TNI, or POLRI for the people who wants to get the reintegration fund. Unfortunately, this policy is considered as a bad short cut of BRA to run away from their mistakes in undertaking their previous reintegration policies. KPA mentioned that the policy can disturb the trust building process between the former GAM organization and TNI/POLRI. Moreover, it will create a criminal action such a falsification of document.16 In some opinions, such as KPA and civil society elements state that one reason why the bad policy is always reproduced because there is no arena for all competent 14

I was invited in the three years MoU Helsinki commemoration by APRC and Inter Peace in August 12–14, 2008. I met most of new interest groups in the post conflict society of Aceh. In this opportunity I was involved in the atmosphere of Acehnese post conflict society which a hope and afraid is united. 15 Law on Government of Aceh (LoGA) has been formed by some critical points from civil society and KPA. However as Sydney Jones stated that LoGA is the best law that ever made for Aceh. Now the problem is how to enforce LoGA to assist political dynamics and development in Aceh. Qanun as the implementation procedure of LoGA until now is still being conceived. 16 KPA spokesman stated to me during the interview at KPA’s office.

3.8 Conclusion

33

interest groups to deliberate a policy. Actually BRA has a kind of deliberative institution, namely Commission on Sustaining Peace Aceh (CoSPA) which it provides a monthly forum for discussing any different ideas and conceptions in undertaking peace process in Aceh. This forum can be said as a political arena. The problem is that the forum does not have any authority in bearing a policy. In KPA’s perception, the CoSPA forum is kind of a safety valve of BRA’s mistakes. This fact has encouraged KPA to avoid in attending the forum. Moreover, there is a perception that CoSPA is not independence from the intervention of foreign country.17 By the fact above, Aceh has not institutionalized democratic governance in conflict. A major institution of democratic governance is an inclusive political arena in which all competent agencies in any level of leadership are involved in a transparent and equal negotiation. The democratic governance in conflict can bear a policy based on a common good, such MoU Helsinki as the result of a transparent and equal negotiation. It is an important ‘conflict resolution mechanism’ design after three years of MoU Helsinki by institutionalizing the democratic governance in conflict. Because democratic governance in conflict will be able to sustain the peace consolidation works such as the reintegration process, the establishment of truth and reconciliation commission (TRC/KKR), and the position of Wali Nangroe Aceh Darussalam.18

3.8 Conclusion Road to peace is the matter of what kind of governance in conflict is in place, coercive or democratic one. This chapter has shown historically how governance in conflict is brought by different approach, from coercive to democratic governance in conflict. During the regime of Old Order, governance in conflict is between democratic and coercion which a negotiation was used after military operation failed. In New Order regime, there was no inclusive political arena and no trust building but power determination. Military approach was dominant. In New Order, the dynamics of basic human needs movement were governed through coercive governance in conflict. During the transition of democracy, conflict was not put into a full inclusive political arena by several factors. First, the new democratic government was still not be able to open an inclusive political arena for separatist groups. It is indicated by the GoI’s pressure to GAM by giving a military treat if GAM does not accept the GoI wants and requirements. This fact was influenced by TNI intervention in determining how the government should respond to GAM politically. Second, there was a very low political trust from both conflicting parties. Each party perceived 17

In KPA’s opinion CoSPA was established by an international agency meanwhile the agency was not involved in realizing peace in Aceh. This fact has reduced KPA’s political trust to the forum. 18 Wali NAD is a leadership position which its meaning and position in democratic structure are being debated by political groups in Aceh. For GAM, wali should be placed as the highest political leader in NAD by having set of political authorities to decide and to create any policies in Aceh. Some other groups want to place Wali NAD as a cultural position within democratic system in Aceh.

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3 Road to Peace: From Coercive to Democratic Governance in Conflict

Diagram 3.2 The dynamics of conflict in Aceh (Susan 2007)

that their commitment would be betrayed. For GAM, they experienced how the GoI always betrayed Aceh. On the other hand, the GoI perceived GAM will never leave their mission in establishing independence of Aceh. The low political trust made the peace agreement from the negotiation could not be implemented jointly. Third is the political capacity of HDC in forcing the conflicting parties to commit their organization in enforcing the policy of conflict resolution. Fourth, the internal commitment of both conflicting parties to achieve peace was not fully engaged. Different from governance in conflict during the transitional democracy, basically the success of MoU Helsinki is rooted by how the regime has employed the deliberative democracy in governing conflicts such in Aceh. The inclusive political arena is indicated by the decreasing of military’s role by releasing more dialogue opportunities. However, the table negotiation did not involve the other groups such as ulama and civil society which means the inclusive political arena was still bound.19 Following the inclusive political arena is a political trust which was built through a special approach, such what Farid Husain did and the psychological effect of more dialogue opportunities. The political trust also got stronger when the state was able to place themselves in an equal relation with GAM negotiators. The inclusive political arena and well-built political trust have brought democratic norms such rule of the game into the conflict relation. Hence, the inclusive political arena, well-built trust, and democratic norms have created a possibility of sustainable peace negotiation. A sustainable peace negotiation which each party is always able to create a problem solving negotiation based. The conflict dynamics in Aceh can be seen in Diagram 3.2. Nowadays, the challenge is how new movement of basic human needs in the post-conflict society of Aceh will be governed by all conflicting agencies. As the researchers have mentioned that governance in conflict in Aceh post-conflict society after three years of MoU Helsinki is still signed by a low political trust among the groups and the existence of governance in conflict organization such CoSPA. Civil 19

Civil society elements and social groups see this political fact will influence the new political dynamics in Aceh since many former GAM members won the local election.

3.8 Conclusion

35

society elements are also perceiving that there is very low involvement in creating some crucial policies. Hence what happens in Aceh now is that conflict in the issue basic human needs is not governed democratically. Next chapter will discuss this issue by exploring the discourse of reintegration process in Aceh.

Chapter 4

The Social Construction of Reintegration Process in Aceh Post-conflict

This chapter mainly aims to understand the discourses of reintegration process in Aceh and governance in conflict during peace process after MoU Helsinki. As it has been mentioned, this study is using social construction theory which it interprets discourses in a public sphere. A discourse analysis is concern on language in daily life both spoken and written statement. Particularly spoken languages from subjects of this research will be presented without intervening, adding, and reducing the original form. Language is a subjective reality which contents a knowledge and interest of the subjects. Knowledge is a structured experience stream of each subject (individual) which justifies a reality around their environment (Berger and Luckman 1966). Meanwhile interest is a will to achieve some ends such as to dominate another group, to empower a community, or to create a mutual understanding. Hence, language of the individuals has a tendency to justify and to achieve some ends. Technically, there is a problem in translating the original language (Bahasa) into English. Particularly the problem is about to translate an intentional meaning of the subjects. This problem occurs since there is a different expression and meaning between Bahasa and English languages. In order to overcome the problem, the researcher will enclose the original language of the interview (Bahasa).1 This chapter has three main parts. The first part is going to reveal the discourse of the subjects relates to basic human need in Aceh post-conflict. Second part is about the discourse of reintegration process implementation. Third part will be exploring the discourse of governance in conflict in Aceh. The last part of this chapter will be reviewing the discourse. In the discourse presentation, the identity of subjects will not be showed to keep their safety except there is no objection statement from them. 1

All subjects will not be mentioned their identity. In general, this research has interviewed civil society elements, political leaders, and conflict survivors. The field research was done from early of July to end of August 2008.

© Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) 2023 N. Susan, The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6252-5_4

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Before presenting the discourse of reintegration process in Aceh post-conflict, the researcher will briefly explain on how to read this chapter. The subject’s discourse is a subjective reality in a public sphere which presents personal opinion. However, a subjective reality will be an objective reality when the content of discourse of different subjects has a same meaning. When a subjective reality has a different meaning, it means there is a conflict of subjective reality.

4.1 The Discourse of Basic Human Needs After Mou Helsinki This part is going to see what the subjective reality relates to basic human needs in post-conflict Aceh. After reaching the MoU Helsinki 2005 as the peace accord, Aceh society is aware that life without war is beautiful. They feel secure and happy in which many hopes for their young generations are rebuilt. Every people now is more free to go everywhere in Aceh. They can go to their farms without being scared by GAM or TNI/POLRI. ND2 was surprised when he went out to see people life in the night after the GAM’s weapon destruction “I tried to go by bus one night and in the beach there was a mother and twelve years daughter…. in the dark were sitting for the bus at 2 am. Because…she knows the bus will pass there.…That’s peace for me. I mean the absence of fear. Also then…the ability to make a living without being threatened by both sides…asking for money…and intimidation… You see…if you come here in Banda Aceh you don’t believe that we had the thirty years of conflict and the worst….you know….part of tsunami disaster… After sunami. It’s like nothing.” Most of the people in coffee shops, markets and mosque always hope the security that is now in place can be an eternal condition. They do not want to have a violent conflict and war anymore. They feel tired with fear and hopeless. At a coffee shop in the late of noon, I was with ZK ex-GAM combatant. ZK is typical of combatant with a low communication skill. He said stutter “We…Acehnese people…we do not want to lose it…the security. I only want to have a normal life. I want to take care of my mother.” AZ agrees that security is the first thing after protracted violent conflict in Aceh. As a government official, he also feels wonderful with the current security. He said “…How we feel the invaluable thing… feeling secure is wonderful. I am a government official with body guards around me…now that is not enjoyable at all. Now we can sit everywhere…to have a coffee…go at night. And I am sure that feeling secure is felt too by the rest of Acehnese people. So, with feeling secure now…free from intimidation…violence…we have agreed that nobody is allowed to turn back…(to have war).” At the first discussion with KS, a secure condition is also invaluable thing in Aceh. KS said… “Please…don’t let this secure condition…a… burned again. We 2

Only ND was interviewed by using English language.

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are building mutual trust now.” The secure condition in Aceh is really expected to be in place forever. The Acehnese people want to erase some elements that can disturb the security. They undertake kenduri pesiujeuk as a local wisdom in keeping peace by encouraging social forgiveness and proposing reconciliation (Modus Aceh 2008:9). The appearance of fear and feeling secure are the fact of MoU Helsinki. Aceh society always appeals to all parties to hold this condition. Informal leaders such Ulamas argue that the people keep the security atmosphere in Aceh through a religious moment such Friday pray. However the security cannot stand alone, it needs another fulfillment. Acehnese people call it Bulukat Kuneng (sticky rice) which means prosperity (Modus Aceh 2008). ZK mentioned that a security without prosperity is nothing. Then somehow war is better than it. He needs to eat and finance his family. “Now…we have the security condition…no war here…but we (ex-GAM combatant, author) have no job. How can we buy food without having a job? If this condition is always like this…war will be better.” ZK’s statement actually is also stated by the other combatant. AW testified about it, “Finally BRA now handles conflict survivors rather than GAM (conflict perpetrator). I think…that’s caused…. Because GAM has been paid…3000 members, one person is 25 million Rupiah. In MoU is mentioned only 3000 members of GAM…but if we look at the reality…many of GAM members do not know how to earn money. They came here (BRA) and said ‘it is much better for us to rob again… to make war again.” AZ said…”with feeling secure today…from any violence we agree for not to go back again….but as a human…that is not enough. We need to realize prosperity now… Physical development is almost finished… close to finish. But a treat to security can happen when there is no prosperity.” Prosperity is really important issue in post-conflict Aceh after the feeling of secure. YD has ever undertaken a traditional ceremony, kenduri (ritual meal), in Beuner Meriah in order to encourage both conflict survivors and perpetrators to keep the secure condition now by undertaking reconciliation among them. TNI/POLRI, local government official, ulama, PETA, GAM, and conflict survivors were invited. In the ceremony, ulama gave their appeal relates to forgiveness. Logically, the ceremony was successful as YD stated. In his newspaper it became the headline. However he testified, “I went… back home to Banda Aceh. In the next day, many people call to Serambi, commented in reader letter…sent SMS…commented to governor…to BRA. They said ‘How can we do a reconciliation meanwhile our house was burned…no clear who fix it… Our children now got injured… physical disability from war…not clear who will take care of them. We are still unemployed. TNI is fine. They have been apologized but where is the compensation?’…Then we (BRA, author) close the reconciliation program for now.” YD stresses that prosperity becomes a needs after the security. Ulama may agree that security and prosperity is really important for Acehnese people. However, security and prosperity only can be realized by Acehnese people when the implementation of Syariah Islam (Islamic Law) is implemented consistently. Islamic law will save the Acehnese people with God’s help. WNU says,

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“Islamic law is not implemented perfectly here. The implementation is still on the surface… Ya…how can Allah help us? If you ask me…what is our need now…just to implement Islamic law consistently. Democracy… I don’t know…I still cannot believe it.”

4.2 The Discourse of Reintegration Implementation BRA is the responsible institution of government in implementing the reintegration process in Aceh. According to ND, BRA has two mains reintegration program, namely physical and mental reintegration. He says “BRA divides the reintegration in two…one is physical reintegration. Where you get house…where…you know…have…you know scholarship, then the other one is mental reintegration that takes a very long time. Because mental reintegration is to erase hatred…to erase…revenge in your heart and to be normal again.” ND stated that even BRA has finished the physical reintegration there is no guarantee that BRA can jump to mental reintegration. Hence in order for BRA to solve this problem, there are three stages of reintegration. ND explains, “The reintegration also ummm… programming three stages. First is the compensation that means we give cash a…to people that just got out from the jungle, out of prison… So we give immediately…reimbursement…oh not reimbursement… disbursement… but then, I thought that it would be finished in one year and then 2nd year we do a…economic…a…livelihood program, retrain them because sometimes people 30–35 years old. They went to the jungle at 20 age years no skills…nothing. Then came out at 30–35 year old…and then no skill… We need to retrain them. What they like to do. Then they can get job. That’s the second stage. Third stage, the try to establish TRC…but until today that is almost three years…we haven’t finished the first stage…cash compensation. We haven’t finished yet. We do bit by bit livelihood in paralel. And the very very late is TRC and humanitarian court.” The fact is that BRA’s program on reintegration in Aceh does not run smoothly which is only the part of targeted groups can be touched by the program. There are many groups who perceive their rights are not delivered properly. As in this chapter, BRA got many protests from the society. Moreover, the most terrible condition is addressing to women in Aceh. AW testifies, “From women side…there is a lot of problem…women were terribly suffering during the conflict, now they perceive that there is a less attention to them…including from KPA. Women combatant is called inong balee… In MoU there is compensation for 3000 combatants but there is no single clause about women. From 6200 women combatant only several of them got…compensation.” KPA’s office got many calls every day since many people have not received their rights. KS states, “I got hundred calls by phone every day. About…their house that was burned…where do we complain…. That means BRA’s program is not widespread in taking care of victims. If it is widespread, all victims must get the program. However…KPA does not have an authority in BRA.”

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The failure of reintegration process by BRA has encouraged people, both victims and perpetrators, to leave their hope to BRA’s program. Hence, most of ex-GAM combatants do not expect much to the compensation of the Government of Indonesia. Many of them came back to their original job such as farmer, fisherman, trader, a teacher in Islamic traditional school (dayah) and the Islamic scientific houses in Aceh (Modus Aceh 2008). That is not only happen in men combatant group but women combatant group too. This fact is justified by AW. She says, “Inong Balee members never come to BRA. The people who come here is conflict victims…their husband were killed, their houses were burned. The combatant whose house was burned…until today…hasn’t been built yet. Every day I meet her but she never asks it… That makes me feel curious. For example, when there is a scholarship (from BRA) she does not really want it…. Sometimes we feel curious about it.” According to some perceptions, the low participation and attention on BRA’s reintegration program is caused by the bad policy of BRA. As in this chapter, rather to participate in BRA’s program, the people protest to their policy. Moreover, the distribution of economic compensation is not fair. Not all of the conflict victims get the economic compensation. This is the failure of reintegration process. Furthermore, the people have lost their trust to BRA. YM is working with both combatant and conflict victims in the grass root level. He is so energic. In the coffee shop of ‘Ayah Ule Karing’ he says, “Economically… the economy reconstruction…or economic reintegration is failed. The society undertakes a reintegration by themselves…finally the process is natural. What happens then is….an uncontrolled reintegration… new spoilers potential…new disturber of peace….no control for armed GAM members. There is a disappointment… losing a trust and belief to their future has caused them does that. Hence it is so small…their potential for keeping the peace. Nevertheless they got trap in a deviant activity…. criminal…revenge…or anything. I see that BRA does not function as its ideal….Reintegration has no a clear system.” What YM says about the failure of BRA’ reintegrating program basically is not refused by ND. ND comments on that fact, “I agree with that…in fact in the very reason I was appointed by the government is to reconstruct BRA, so when he called me from Kuala Lumpur, I have to come back. I spend here 4 weeks. The governor said ‘you have to take this job because you need to reform. And…It did not well you know… The money flows to the wrong person…..the data was not accurate and a lot of problem during the two years. In May 2007 the first I did that is to reconstruct. Redisposing the data…until today we haven’t finished because the delayed in getting fund of course from the central government.” ND argued that BRA’s failure is not only caused by BRA but the macro system in Indonesia. There is a complicated procedure and bureaucracy particularly in budgeting. Today…now…my staff in either districts or here they haven’t been paid salary from January. So how can we carry out the program? …This is thing that blocks our programs. The problem is in the system of finance in central government. Not just for Aceh but in all places. It’s strange for me…if in two weeks government without legal budget being approved that is a crisis. You know…the government

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cannot function if the approval of the budget by parlemen is delayed just by two weeks. It’s panic…but here…7–8 months.” Furthermore, he says again, “…but we do carry out our program. We…we corporate with IOM, we got 9 million from Japan, from USAID we got fund. I try carry out the program for the people. When we do data verification I borrowed to cash to USAID, to cash to UNDP, to cash from IOM because we cannot do ourselves.” YM agrees with ND just pointed out. The bad governance in central government is really substantial in influencing the reintegration implementation. However, BRA should not run from their responsibility in implementing the program. When BRA has the money from any international donatur, BRA is not able to create a good policy. BRA only distributes money and money. This pattern has built a negative perception. At the same time, the reintegration is only understood as a money distribution. YM says, “The fact is that reintegration does not belong to elites not the people. The socialization of MoU has not finished yet. The society has not known. They do not know either the existence of BRA. Hence they are resistance to BRA. They feel disappointed. Three years of MoU should be success but the get nothing. They are disappointed which their apathetic is appeared, there is no positive response from them. They see BRA is a petty cash…only distributing money. Yah…they are not able to create a good policy. I agree that now BRA cannot work properly.” The economic compensation to ex-GAM cannot be implemented ideally as in the MoU. The MoU Helsinki only mentions 3000 GAM combatants. The fact is that GAM has more than 3000 thousands members. AZ says, “We acknowledge…legally by using MoU… reintegration for 3000 ex GAM is done. However we are now looking at the fact that GAM and its supporters approximately 8000 or 14,000 people. This means…as political solution…ok…the promise is fulfilled… I say…as government…reintegration is not finished yet. Creating job for the people… Once they get prosperity…there will be a cohesiveness… I am telling you that…compensation…as a political solution has been finished. But the prosperity has been realized…so it is a debt…debt to society.” In ex-GAM side which is organized in KPA, they have to manage the money so carefully. Hence, KPA has made a policy on the economic compensation. KBS says, “From 25 million Rupiah that we allocated… not all of ex GAM combatant got 25 million… We did not allocate it fully to ex GAM combatant that is mentioned by MoU. The agreement of KPA in the rest of Aceh…the 75 billion Rupiah was divided in to 17 divisions. The money is managed intuitionally such by establishing a koperasi. We gave 2 or 3 million to ex GAM in the MoU, and then the rest is to establish koperasi. Many of the cooperation is success such in Pidie. Ya…such as motorcycle garage koperasi, agriculture cooperation, transportation of koperasi with buying several trucks to transport soil or something else. This is a collectiveness rights. The establishment of cooperation also is agreed by KPA. Therefore, the money is not finished all.”

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4.3 The Discourse of Governance in Conflict in Aceh A lot of interest during the reintegration and peace process in Aceh. Two main reintegration programs were namely social economic dan political reintegration got many critics and protests. More than that, the effect of reintegration failure is the increasing of violent conflict, crimes, and social unrest in Aceh (see this chapter). Why is the reintegration judged by many people in Aceh has failed? If it is looked from the discourse of reintegration process, the failure is caused by the unpopular policy and lack of good governance. How can unpopular policy be born in Aceh?

4.3.1 During Economic Reintegration There is an honest acknowledgement from BRA’ staff. SW says, “Our program is very instant program. We are only demanded to finish the budget…there is no sustainability of the program. In recovery stage as we are inside, we must see the effect of programs, its sustainability, what its impact. Now the program seems unconnected to each other… always unfinished. This always happens in the field. As well as reintegration process. We always define what the reintegration look like. We use this kind of process….but we never ask the people about their needs in reintegration. Therefore until now they are still in their own group, they still do not want to greet another people. That means… they do not want the reintegration that we designed for them.” If BRA wants to reintegrate the Acehnese people, they must implement any policies such training for conflict survivors. SW says again, “The trainings should be based on their own concept…such what is their concept about poverty. When we come and overwhelm them with our concept…we will get success… poverty should be defined by themselves. During peace process, NGOs.. I am from NGos too… not always employs the people concept… We should use the people’s reflection not based on our concept. We have to adopt their concept. I am not sure…why it is so difficult to realize this approach.” As YM from civil society element sees that BRA has already involved multistakeholders in making their policy and composing their program. The problem is that the involvement is only on a surface. He says, “What I see is like this…in a decision making process, they have their own approach. They use kind of multistakholders…but it is the elite multi-stakeholders which their vested interest is bigger than the program implementation. Because of each of elites has a different vested interest. And unfortunately BRA under Nur Djuli is not able to be a leading sector. So pity… If they involve the people…it is true that there an involvement. But…how is the quality of involvement? Finally it is so subjective… the anxious is that the involvement only become a fait-a comply…the people is involved but the fact is not.”

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Similar with YM, HW also perceives that the involvement especially the civil society in decision-making process is just a formality. HW states, “The involvement of civil society in decision making process… is made but just a formality. Just to impress that there is an involvement or participation. For example…in BRA program… there is Forbes (Joint Forum) which has a program for civil society. However the function… is not important. They also invite civil society to criticize their concept but our roles are not significant. Therefore it is just to impress…that… the involvement has been fulfilled. The fact there is no serious effort to catch the people aspiration.” The perceptions above consider BRA are not implementing democracy fully. Moreover, KS from ex-GAM combatant agrees that BRA now is not really democratic. In his perception, the previous BRA was still more communications between KPA and BRA. However, the communication now is rarely happened. He testifies, “If I am not wrong…there has been three heads of BRA. Two previous BRA heads always communicated with us…with us in the field… But when they were replaced….Pak Nur Djuli has taken over…the communication is rarely happened. In that time the communication was so solid, fair… but Bang Nur Djuli never ask us…that the program will be realized… How it will be faultless when BRA wants to allocate reintegration fund (program) keep in touch with the competent party…with us.” The absence victims’ representation is also of reasons why BRA is judged as an undemocratic institution. Hence for the conflict victim groups the policy of BRA does not advantage them. As KK, the conflict victim, states, “There is no victim representation now… As Pak Nur Djuli just stated that fund compensation is not delivered to the right target by BRA. It can happen…because there is no victim representation. Who knows the victims are us…the victims. I know which can be called as a victim. Another people just guess. We are disregarded.” Answering the common perception from the society ND states, “BRA is an ad hoc…a committee. The main duty is to implement the program…of course we have now a discussion evening here in APRC. Aaa…we asked people aspiration what the people want…such what TRC should look like. Then we relate it to the central government. We have a seminar… discussion.” The Head of Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Pieter Feith had emphasized the importance of a dialogue that involves civil society in holding peace process in Aceh, especially after AMM leaves in December 2006. “Direct consultation and dialogue should be continued even AMM has left. Civil community has an important role in supporting the sustainable of peace process” (Hinamagazine 2006). However, HW says about Feith’s appeal, “from the beginning of peace process…we have GAM and the Government of Indonesia… In the implementation of decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration, AMM only considered the demand of GAM and the GoI… For AMM they are only the actors of peace process. Yes…they invited civil society elements and asked their inputs but again…civil society was only mandated in monitoring the peace process.”

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4.3.2 Political Reintegration Process In the political reintegration process, there is a lot of issue that fuel the political tension in Aceh. Some issues such as ALA-Abas movement, Wali Nangroe Aceh placement in the political structure in Aceh and political rivalry of both local and national political parties in Aceh. Those political issues have created some violent incidents. ALA-Abas issue has pushed a violent action in Atu Lintang, Kabupaten Bener Meriah. Political rivalry between local political parties has born intimidations and mental terrors. In the case of ALA-Abas movement Irwandi Yusuf asserted that during his position as the Governor of Aceh, there will not be a provincial partition in Aceh. Because of Aceh now is already save and undertaking development, it needs unitary and coalescence. “If there is a notion of Aceh Leuser Antara Province (ALA) and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS), I am insisting that it must be rejected” (Koalisi Ham 2008). As the part of NAD government advisor YD at the same position with Irwandi, “Irwand said ‘Aceh has been established since 700 years ago. It is impossible to divide Aceh when I am the governor’. Ya…the fundamental problem…if we relate it to 2009…our general election will be mess… Just a village partition is prevented tightly by us…moreover that is a provincial partition. They do with many ways…the press the central government…until they said that they will boycott the general election (in 2009), we will establish different party (form Golkar)… You know…those are frustrated ways.” Furthermore he states, “The partition idea is also impossible. In LoGA the rule is so clear. All political decisions relate to Aceh must get Governor’s agreement and DPR Aceh.” Meanwhile the Head of KP3 ALA (Provincial Formation Committee), Dr. Rahmat Salam mentioned that the progress of ALA formation ALA and Abas as a fruitful effort of Acehnese people in the deep area for accelerating development and pushing prosperity. To the rest of Acehnese people, Rahmat Salam, call their understanding for supporting and succeed the partition. He refused that ALA Abas formation is aimed to weaken Aceh. “The assumption is not true, because the fact is two provinces candidate still use Aceh as a name. There is only an administrative separation. Moreover the partition aims to cut the distance of control” (Serambinews 2008). The rejection of Irwandi Yusuf to the ALA-Abas group actually is not a democratic way. It seems to be a violent communication of the regime which it hinders for dialoging any political notions. In the civil society’s perception Irwandi’s political attitude has devastated democratic values such inclusiveness and accommodation. HW states, “There is discrimination. Irwandi is from GAM, hence emotionally he is closer to GAM interests. Nah….the involvement of the oppositional groups…is not…opened seriously. To open a serious involvement is really important. Do not see they are enemy or not. Instead of that… they should be accommodated but it has been ignored initially.” In handling the ALA-Abas, Irwandi seems to use a pragmatic

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politics such by establishing KP2DT3 and recruiting one of ALA-Abas elites in the institution. Furthermore, HW says, “There is only the formation of Komite Percepatan Pembangunan Barat dan Selatan (KP2DT)…. But how far the committee is able to communicate with the people also becomes Irwandi’s assignment…because Iwan Gayo…is not accepted anymore there (in his ALA-Abas group).” Moreover, the exclusive political arena has strengthened the political polarization. HW comments on it, “Nah… now it is too late. Positioning the political resistance is obvious…this is ALA-Abas or not. In the future…their stance will be stronger politically in struggling ALA. It cannot be compromised anymore.” Civil society as the middle class tends to prevent their position to be a political partisan. In dealing with this political constellation, civil society demand an inclusive political arena in which a dialogue or negotiation can be engaged. HW states, “Civil society avoids pro and contra of ALA-ABAS issue…but we engage the institutionalization of dialogue for handling the issue. Actually a dialogue has been offered to Irwandi long time ago in order to be more well behaved…not always angry (Irwandi, author). He is not a troop…not combatant but… somehow more ferocious guy than GAM combatant.” What about BRA in undertaking the political reintegration? Is there an inclusive political arena for accommodating a negotiation process? BRA actually has provided it by creating CoSPA. CoSPA is a forum for any stakeholders of reintegration process to engage their interest in the implementation of reintegration program. However, this forum only exists formally. KS states about this fact,”…specifically I am telling you…the program of five organizations in BRA…we do not like it. If we were involved…it is only to be a good listener. It’s just… wasting the time. The program of APRC and CoSPA are not clear… BRA is becoming a commodity. That is what we are afraid of. Hence… next time we will reject (to be involved in CoSPA). Whatever a program undertaken by BRA…or under BRA will be rejected… CoSPA just aims to legitimate (BRA’s program, author). We will not take a part (of the program, author).” KS testimony is the fact of governance in conflict relates to reintegration process. Hence, most of the BRA’s policies are not accepted by some part of Acehnese people. Since the policy is not reflecting their aspiration. However, the disappointment particularly from ex-GAM community is not appeared in a radical way. Even BRA is not inclusive, and BRA does not have a good policy, ex-GAM members will not protest. As YM urges, “Now…whatever the behavior of BRA under Nur Djuli…antipathy of GAM is decreased. Because GAM members know that the head and staff of BRA are ex- GAM members. But if BRA is held by Jakarta…there will be a lot of critics. What I see now… with the presence of ex-GAM at BRA…they have sense of belonging to BRA. That means…they deliver their aspiration directly… no need to mobilize people… Yah it is the positive side.” Furthermore, YM explains, “…but that fact is same with covering the mistakes, rights? …It will be a time bomb. Like this….now who holds BRA is Nur Djuli. He 3

KP2DT is a government committee for catching the people’s aspiration in underdeveloped areas in Aceh and for implementing some strategic programs to overcome the poverty in that area.

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is the former GAM member. If one day BRA is held by non-GAM, the accumulation of disappointment will appear again. Under Nur Duli they (GAM members) feel reluctant… afraid…to protest…when non GAM people hold BRA) they will protest more actively. The mistakes by BRA now will be held by the successor of BRA in the future.” In civil society’s perception, many policies in Aceh are not made by a deliberative process. The discourse here is showing that the involvement in any agendas is not real. Moreover, the policies are decided in the elites’ level without involving the grassroots people. In this position, civil society found a difficulty. As HW sees, “That is only dominated by elites’ debate. It should be discussed with the people of Aceh…. Therefore the process will be more legitimate. Civil society’s position is obvious…undemocratic things…must be left. However…there is a doubtful of civil society in showing their position upon violence in Aceh. Moreover if it is related to TNI…GAM. …Must compromise with GAM and TNI.” The political rivalry of local political and national parties, conflict survivors’ and ex-combatant’s disappointment has increased the psychological tension of Acehnese people. The high psychological tension is able to provoke every group in Aceh to do a violent action and communication in Aceh public sphere. Mass media is the mediator of public sphere with their capacity in delivering social and political messages. At this function, YD argued that mass media should be able to mediate and to prevent the potential of violence. YD states, “One of our policies in our office is preventing violence….by considering the effects of the news. Ya…in Aceh actually there is 42 mass graves of conflict era… Previously there was a desire of Acehnese people…when DOM was erased in August 7 1989…they collectively dig the graves…The problem is…once it is published…TNI’s bad image will be showed up again…that their work is to kill…burry… But we cannot publish the mass graves digging…. The blood of Acehnese people will be burned. We never publish it. This is an effort to prevent new violent conflict or revenge because of bones pictures.” Furthermore, YD says, “I emphasized to journalists….our principle is not to publish a news which informs GAM is so great, GAM is well trained…has weaponry…no…never ever. Erase that! Second we started spreading the spirit of friendship…GAM was no longer as an enemy but now is our brother. Hence look at moments where the government official sit in the same table and drink a coffee and talk…take the picture… we said to our journalists!” At this dimension, YD’s newspaper has been a mediation institution in order to maintain peace process in Aceh.

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4.4 Review 4.4.1 Conclusion Now, we need to review and map the discourse of reintegration process in Aceh post-conflict. This review is following three dimensions of the discourse above. a. Basic Needs in Aceh Post-conflict Based on the discussion above, security is the first layer of basic needs in postconflict Aceh. With the current condition, there is no fear such in the war time. Every people can travel in all areas to earn money or to cultivate their lands. Prosperity is another level of needs after the existence of security in Aceh post-conflict. Most of social groups agree that prosperity should follow the security need. In order to get prosperity a job must be provided. Ex-GAM combatant somehow perceive that during war they felt better with a lot of food. The increasing of criminality in Aceh someway can be influenced by this perception. The character of combatant still remains in ex-GAM personnel which violence becomes a means of production. One of ex-GAM combatants that the author interviewed stated. “Sometimes…we still can use violence in order to achieve our goal.” Meanwhile, identity needs is mostly proposed by ulama. In the field, ulama group always remind that Islamic law cannot be left. The law will save Aceh. However, another group such ex-GAM combatant also pursues their identity needs by issuing ‘hero and non-hero’ and ‘extraordinary group and ordinary group.’ However the identity needs does not so often appear in the public discourse but security and prosperity. That means identity needs is following behind security and prosperity needs. b. Reintegration Implementation Conflict survivors, ex-combatant groups both from GAM and PETA, and civil society perceived that BRA has failed to implement the reintegration policy. The failure of BRA can be seen in delivering economic compensation for ex-combatants and conflict victims. Some group discussions of conflict victims that the writer joined, they stated that none of them has got the economic compensation from BRA. A negative stigma is also addressed to BRA that BRA is a petty cash since BRA does not have a proper policy for achieving the reintegration goals. In BRA’s argument, the failure of reintegration process in Aceh is caused by the complicated financial system of the central government. Therefore, BRA cannot operate any program plans to the people. Another problem is related to the data of conflict victims and combatants. MoU Helsinki only mentions 3000 ex-GAM combatant that should be given the reintegration fund. The fact is that GAM has more than 3000 combatants but approximately 8000–12,000 combatants. This number is not including conflict victims and ex-combatant from PETA and FORKAB. BRA needs to make a new categorization of reintegration fund beneficiaries. However, the data collection is not an easy process. The absence of exact data regarding conflict

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victims pushes BRA to find an alternative way such by asking an endorsement letter. The letter will prove that the victims have ever been arrested by both TNI and GAM. This policy aims to handle some people who claim that they are conflict victims. c. Governance in Conflict in Reintegration Process The social and political polarization in aceh post-conflict should be governed by the democratic governance in conflict which an inclusive political arena, values, and norms or law are in place. In Aceh post-conflict public sphere is free and democratic. Every people can state their opinion and criticize any policies of the government. However, the free public sphere is not followed by the presence of inclusive political arena in which social groups can deliberate and negotiate their interest. Civil society, ex-combatant from GAM, PETA, and FORKAB perceive there is an inclusive political arena for them to deliberate their interest. Civil society elements testified in the discourse above that the involvement of civil society in decisionmaking process is only a formality. The involvement just aims to fulfill the procedure of democracy. That is indicated by the policy which is not a common good policy. The policy does not reflect the negotiation process. Moreover, the number of involvements is very low. Many policies are only born by the ‘elite multi-stakeholders.’ However, civil society elements always persuade all parties in Aceh to open an inclusive political arena such what happen between GAM and the Government of Indonesia in Helsinki. Nevertheless, civil society is not able to open an inclusive political arena. This fact is caused by their reluctance in facing GAM and TNI. The absence of inclusive political arena does not only affect to civil society but to KPA too as ex-GAM combatant organization. The absence of inclusive political arena has created a violent communication in the public sphere such as blaming and stigmatizing such the response. KPA is blaming BRA through mass media or blaming another political party. Irwandi Yusuf accused Atu Lintang tragedy was caused by ALA-Abas group even there is no tangible data yet. More than violent communication, violent actions are done by local political party to another party. The violence is reflecting the absence of democratic values and norms. Meanwhile, LoGA is still not able to mediate the conflicts since it still needs to be derived in to qanun.

Chapter 5

The Contribution of Democracy to Governance in Conflict

5.1 The Stages of Governance in Conflict Governance in conflict has three level of analysis. First is the existence of political arena in which social groups are involved to engage their interest. This level determines a political involvement. Second is the presence of values, norms, and law by which social groups produce their political attitude and behavior. The model of political arena, inclusive or exclusive, will influence what political attitude and behavior during the struggle of social groups do. Third is political deliberation in which social groups negotiate their interest. In an authoritarian regime such during New Order in Indonesia, the political arena is very exclusive. This model of political arena only allows the regime’s supporter groups in making any policies. If the political arena also invited and involved ‘out groups’ of the regime, there is no a real deliberation. The regime employed their power both hard and soft powers such as military institution to control the interest groups and bureaucracy to hegemony the groups. When a political arena is very exclusive, the values tend to be anti-democracy. The dominant group such the state is only possible to be able to maintain the exclusive political arena by non-democratic values. The exclusive arena tends to build non-democratic values such as anti-critical notions and anti-pluralism. This condition can increase a political distrust of interest groups like the case of GAM to the Unitary State of Republic Indonesia. In many cases, the establishment of exclusive political arena and non-democratic values can create an unproductive conflict such violent political resistance. When there is no way to pursue a grievance, interest group needs to change the political arena and its values or to build their own arena such the case of Aceh secessionist conflict. That means they need to separate themselves from the state. In this case, the behavior appears in the form of violent action and communication. As what happen in the

© Airlangga University Press (AUP), part of Institute of Innovation, Journal Development, Publishing, and Intellectual Property Right (LIPJPHKI) 2023 N. Susan, The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6252-5_5

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5 The Contribution of Democracy to Governance in Conflict

Aceh conflict case, both GAM and the government of Indonesia did not undertake a deliberation but war.

5.2 The Model of Governance in Conflict The democratic system has influenced the model of governance in conflict, from coercive to democratic governance in conflict particularly in this research context. By the time, separatism conflict in Aceh has been solved. MoU Helsinki is the result of democratic governance in conflict in which all interest groups win the conflict. Why is democratic governance in conflict able to bear MoU Helsinki? Because democratic governance in conflict creates a productive conflict as it has been mentioned previously. A productive conflict is the result of inclusive political arena, democratic values and norms, and deliberative process. A conflict produces a problem solving, common good for all conflicting parties. It also prevents conflict from a violent form. The diagram of democratic governance in conflict can explain how a productive conflict can be produced. The democratic governance in conflict Diagram 5.1 affirms that a productive conflict will be created by the presence of an inclusive political arena, values and norms of democracy, and deliberative process. Aceh conflict has been ended by the democratic governance in conflict. Nowadays, Aceh post-conflict society has not employed the democratic governance in conflict. There is no inclusive political arena. The formal political arena such CoSPA and the other arena for making some policies during the reintegration process is only a procedural democracy. ALA-Abas group does not have any chances to be

Diagram. 5.1 Democratic governance in conflict

5.2 The Model of Governance in Conflict

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involved in a deliberative process since there is no inclusive political arena for them. Atu Lintang tragedy is indicated by the Aceh Governor as ALA—Abas movement. However why does not Irwandi Yusuf get aware? If his guess is true, violent actions of ALA-Abas group is affected by the absence of democratic governance in conflict in Aceh. Ex-combatant and conflict victims have the same problem with ALA-Abas group. In the case of ex-combatant and conflict survivors, the exclusive political arena is possible to push them in a violent activity such criminal action. The increasing of armed crimes and violent conflict between different groups cannot be separated from the fact of coercive governance in conflict in Aceh now. Irwandi may claim Aceh is the most democratic place in the world. However, the fact talks differently.

References

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