Turkey's 'Self' and 'Other' Definitions in the Course of the EU Accession Process 9789048530748

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
1. Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations
2. The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change
3. New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations
4. The Helsinki Summit
5. Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations
6. New Area, New Identity, New Roles
7. Results and Implications
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Turkey’s ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Definitions in the Course of the EU Accession Process

Turkey’s ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Definitions in the Course of the EU Accession Process

Melek Saral

Amsterdam University Press

Cover design: Gijs Mathijs Ontwerpers, Amsterdam Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by the University of Chicago Press. isbn 978 94 6298 117 1 e-isbn 978 90 4853 074 8 (pdf) doi 10.5117/9789462981171 nur 754 © Melek Saral / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2017 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.



Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 7 Abbreviations 9 1 Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 11 1.1 International Institutions and Identity Change 11 1.2 Understanding Turkey’s Socialization 14 1.3 Discourse and Discourse Analysis 21 1.4 Case Selection: Three Different Time Periods in Turkey-EU Relations 26 1.5 Data Selection 29 1.6 Outline of the Book 34 2 The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change 2.1 The Concept of Socialization 2.2 The Socialization Process and Social Identity 2.3 Social Identity and National Identity 2.4 The Content of National Identity 2.5 Turkey’s National Identity

37 37 42 43 46 48

3 New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

57

Opening the Door to Europeanness

3.1 The EU’s Reluctant Interactions with Turkey 59 3.2 The Customs Union: The Opening or Closing of the Door to Europe? 64 3.3 The Luxembourg Summit: A Great Shock for Turkey 76 3.4 Silent Years until Helsinki 88 3.5 Conclusion 98 4 The Helsinki Summit

The Recognition of (Muslim) Turkey’s Europeanness

4.1 The Helsinki Summit: A Breath of Fresh Air for Turkey-EU Relations, the Cyprus issue, and the Kurdish Issue 4.2 The Elections, the New Turkey, and the New EU Approach 4.3 The Atmosphere before the Copenhagen Summit

101 105 121 128

4.4 The Copenhagen Summit 2002: New Hope for Turkey 4.5 Debates on the Identity and Europeanness of Turkey 4.6 Conclusion

136 144 152

5 Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations 5.1 Interactions with the EU and the Identity Issue 5.2 Slowdown of Turkey-EU Relations 5.3 The EU as a Threat to Turkey’s Territorial Integrity 5.4 Is Turkey Finding a New Direction? 5.5 Conclusion

155 165 171 175 179 186

6 New Area, New Identity, New Roles

189

7 Results and Implications 7.1 Turkey-EU Relations and Turkey’s Socialization 7.2 Overview of the Case Studies

201 201 203

Turkey – European or Middle Eastern?

Bibliography 209 Index 233

Acknowledgements This book is based on my doctoral thesis, defended at the Ludwig-Maximilans University of Munich in June 2012. This book would not have been possible without the support, patience and guidance of the following people. My deepest gratitude is to my advisor, Prof. Dr. Christopher Daase for having confidence in me and providing me valuable guidance throughout this research work. His encouragement and support helped me to finish my dissertation. I am also full of gratitude to Prof. Kratochwil who supervised me during my stay at the European University Institute. I am thankful to him for reading my papers, commenting on my views and helping me understand and enrich my ideas. I am especially grateful to Saskia Gieling, commissioning editor of the AUP for accepting my proposal and for her support and guidance, I would also like to express my gratitude to Pragya Vohra, gatekeeper at the AUP, and Jaap Wagenaar, project manager at the AUP, and the copy editor for their help and assistance in the production of this book. I am also thankful for the useful comments provided by the anonymous reviewers. I am also indebted to my sister Meliha Saral and my cousins Hacer Mete and Huriye Mete who supported me in data collection during my research stay in Istanbul. I also would like to make a special reference to the workers of Beyazıt Library in Istanbul and to Emin Doğan who is responsible for the Archive of Yeni Şafak. Without their support I could not have obtained such relevant data. Most importantly, none of this would be possible without the support of my parents, Zeki and Nevin Saral, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. They have always believed in me and encouraged me to achieve my academic goals. Finally I am grateful for the financial support I received from the Forege during my doctoral thesis.

Abbreviations AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) ANAR Ankara Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi (Ankara Social Research Center) Critical Discourse Analysis CDA Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) CHP Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) DSP Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) DP Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) DTP Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) DYP European Community EC European Union EU Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) FP Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (South Eastern Anatolia Project) GAP International Relations IR MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Action Party) Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) MSP NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) PKK Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) RP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) SP TBMM Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyonları (Turkish Radio and Television TRT Association) United Kingdom UK United Nations UN United States of America USA USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

1.1

International Institutions and Identity Change

Social environment and social interactions have a decisive impact on the identity of individuals. Personality and identity are developed by dealing with the social environment. States, like individuals, are affected by interactions with their social environment. Once they enter a social environment, or they interact with other actors, they are never the same (Johnston 2008). Interactions of states with international institutions not only change the normative characteristics and identities of states but, more importantly, shape their interests and their behavior. In international relations (IR) literature this is called the international socialization process during which the norms, rules, values, and ideals of the socializer are adopted by the socializee (Schimmelfennig 2002; Schimmelfennig 2003; Johnston 2001; Risse 2000; Checkel 2005; Flockhart 2006). If the socialization process is successful, it is expected to involve changes in self-conception, in conceptions of ‘in-groupness’ and new definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ In successful socialization, the redefinition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is consistently upheld and would not change under different circumstances, for example, for strategic or rational considerations (Gheciu 2005: 982). The claim that the behavior of actors changes because of endogenous change in the normative characteristics and identities of the actors through socialization is a radical statement for IR theory (Johnston 2001; Wendt 1994: 384). If we accept that identity drives behavior, then a change of identity and tracing this change allows us to make assumptions about political actors’ behavior and predict eventual changes, based on their identity. For example, the theory of democratic peace, which assumes that democratic states are more peaceful than other states, also relies on the connection between identity and behavior. It claims that states with a democratic identity are expected to behave according to this identity and they do not demonstrate violent behavior. However, one cannot describe the connection between identity and behavior as linear and a direct causal relationship. Identity and behavior take a rather meandering course. As Wendt puts it, states learn their identities through interactions with others, and these identities shape states’ interests. Identities are significant because they provide the basis for interests (Wendt 1999). Therefore, identity does not directly cause the

12 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

action or behavior but indicates which behavior is expected or legitimate (Barnett 1999: 10). Identity is the source of interests and people pursue their interests. It opens or closes the individual to different political discourses, makes them more or less predisposed to opposition and exclusion, and makes them more or less likely to pursue their interests aggressively or to anticipate the possibility of compromise (Wendt 1992: 398; Risse et al. 1999a: 157). Thus, identity and the changes in identity involving the redefinition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are of immediate political significance. Accordingly, questions touching on the effects of socialization on the identity of states and actors become urgent policy questions and require the attention of international relations researchers. The EU as a Socializing Agent International organizations and institutions such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have a role in international socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999b; Wendt 1999; Alderson 2001; Johnston 2001; Flockhart 2006; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Checkel 2005). The EU is one of the most influential political actors, not only in continental Europe but also in the world arena. It is undoubtedly a leading and significant international actor in terms of socialization and one of the most essential forces for societal change. The IR literature and sociological literature on organization suggest that value and preference change is more likely in institutionally thick environments. Europe easily qualifies as the thickest institutional environment beyond the nation-state anywhere on the globe (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1065; Risse-Kappen 1995; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Therefore, Europe and European institutions present the most likely case for socialization theory (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1065). Checkel suggests that Europe is good laboratory for addressing some bigger issues concerning institutions and socialization (Checkel 2005: 802). The EU operates within a framework of rules of membership and allocates values. It is based on common values and objectives, which are codified extensively in both the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union, as modified by the Amsterdam Treaty, states: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states’ (European Union 2006). Shortly after its establishment, the EU went beyond its technical, functional character and became a norm maker and a strong

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

13

identity-building actor. The EU has not only developed an international identity as an important actor in the international system, but the existence of the EU and its membership rules has a powerful impact on state identity in Europe. Its value system and beliefs about civic statehood also shape the values of the participating member states (Laffan 2004: 78-79). The membership applicants are expected to precommit themselves to this set of deep political beliefs. Accession criteria make socialization through EU institutions a process during which the rules and norms based on conditionality are transferred (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig 2000; Checkel 2000). Without this commitment to principle and practices on matters as wide-ranging as human rights, the rule of law, pluralism, and tolerance, membership should not be contemplated (Dyson 2007: 53). Through a strict preaccession conditionality, the candidate states are required to associate their legislation and institution with the entirety of the acquis prior to accession (Sedelmeier 2005: 141-153). As a result of EU conditionality and rule transfers, candidate and member states familiarize with the European norms (Grabbe 2001; Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b; Goetz 2005). The EU socialization process goes beyond the mere transfer of predetermined norms based on conditionality. The values of the EU are not simply conditions to subordinate the states through membership. These conditions are regarded as appropriate and the right thing to do by the majority of applicant states. The states do not just subordinate themselves to the conditions, but do so because these values and norms are accepted as appropriate behavior (Checkel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2007). Thus, EU institutions and the interactions with them are expected to change the values, roles, and understandings of states by making them more democratic, more liberal, and more tolerant actors. Several empirical studies in the field of IR and Europeanization show that EU applicant states experience many of these transformations during the negotiation processes, as do the EU member states even after they become full members. Through interactions with the EU, candidate or member states over time increase social learning and adapt or internalize the EU’s norms (Checkel 2001; Flockhart 2005a; Johnston 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b) or change their identities (Gheciu 2005; Hooghe 2005). States develop a transnational identity with the EU and feel that they belong to a group and define ‘self’ and ‘other’ within the values and norms of this group. Checkel identifies the end point of the socialization process as internalization, which he subdivides into two different types of socialization. Type I socialization is learning a role and then behaving appropriately, independent of agreement with the norms.

14 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

The second goes beyond role-playing, where agents accept the norms as the right thing to do (Checkel 2007). This type of internalization leads to a new definition of ‘self’ which provides self-evident and normal notions of expected behavior (Johnston 2008).

1.2

Understanding Turkey’s Socialization

Turkey’s socialization through interaction with Western institutions goes beyond its relations with the EU and dates back to the Ottoman Empire’s admission to the Concert of Europe in 1856. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the modernization process of the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural life based on Western standards intensified and the country incorporated and adapted Western customs and practices, such as the Roman alphabet, dress, the calendar, the measurement system, and holidays (Müftüler-Baç 2005). Although Turkey is not a member of the EU, it interacts with its political, economic, legal, and security institutions as a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE (Rumelili 2011: 235-236). Associated with the European Communities since 1963, Turkey gained candidate status in 1999 and concluded a customs union agreement with the EU in 1995 and has participated since then in the Union’s customs, competition, and common trade policies (Scherpereel and Zierler 2011: 30). Turkey also plays a critical role in the EU’s evolving security and defense policy as a member of NATO and shapes the European human rights order as a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (Scherpereel and Zierler 2011: 30; Rumelili 2011: 235-236). Beyond the EU and other European institutions, NATO has played an important role in the socialization of Turkey and its building of a European identity. From it is establishment, NATO was more than a security alliance defending the territorial security of its allies. It has united a group of countries around common norms and identities against the ideological and identity-oriented challenges posed by the communist world. Turkey has also not regarded NATO membership as just a security alliance through which it balanced external threats, but rather as a mean to signal its Western/ European identity (Kubicek et al. 2015; Gheciu, 2005). Membership in NATO suited Turkey’s goal of Westernization and pursuing a Western/European identity. Through NATO membership Turkey legitimized its claim that it was a Western/European country and acted to represent the Western international community in the eastern Mediterranean (Oğuzlu 2012: 153). Turkey’s geopolitical position and military capabilities made its admission

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

15

to NATO relatively easy compared to admission to the EU, with its exhaustive membership process. Since joining NATO, Turkey has never been asked to fulfill some of the membership criteria because of its military capabilities and geopolitical position (Oğuzlu 2013: 780-781). Although all of the above-mentioned Western/European institutions have played a significant role (with varying degrees) in the socialization of Turkey and in Turkey’s creating a Western identity, the focus of this book is on the EU. First, Turkey’s relationship with the EU has a long history. Almost from the establishment of the EU, Turkey has interacted with the EU on several levels and to different degrees. Second, the EU is one of the most powerful socializing agent with its tick normative framework and it presents the most likely case for socialization theory (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1065). Turkey’s Relations with the EU Turkey’s relations with the EU have a long history. Turkey has sought to become a member of the European community with varying degrees of determination since 1959 (Rumelili 2011: 235-236). Particularly since the 1995 Customs Union Agreement, Turkey has intensified interactions with the EU in spite of some interruptions and slowdowns caused by crises between the EU and Turkey. All the governments since 1987, despite the ups and downs in the relationship, have been enthusiastic about full membership. Based on the socialization literature, one would expect successful socialization of Turkey since it fulfills almost all the required conditions such as length and intensity of interaction as well as willingness of the socializee to join the institution. Turkey has also been desperately willing to be part of the community and its history over the last two hundred years can be understood in the context of Turkey’s desire to be Westernized. EU membership is therefore seen as the final goal of this process, the final step in incorporating Turkey where it belongs, into Europe. The willingness to join the EU has not been limited to the political elite in Turkey. Public support for EU accession was also relatively high, compared to the other candidate states. At the start of negotiations, domestic support reached 75-80%. Indeed, Turkey experienced many positive changes in its economic, political, and cultural life in the course of the EU membership process, changes that would be unimaginable without relations with the EU. The declaration of Turkey’s EU candidacy in 1999 had an important positive impact on Turkey’s moving toward the EU standards on the issues of democratization and human and minority rights (Müftüler-Baç 2005). In this respect, many reforms have been made in regard to freedom of

16 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

expression and of association, prevention of torture, expansion of cultural rights, and the reduction of the role of the military in Turkish political life during the DSP-MHP-ANAP (Demokratik Sol Parti [Democratic Left Party]-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [National Action Party]-Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party]) coalition government in 1999-2002 and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]) government after the 2002 elections (Rumelili 2011: 243-244). Turkey started to discuss national problems, which had been ignored for a long time, such as the Kurdish and Armenian issues. However, Turkey’s interactions with the EU have also had negative, unintended, and counterproductive consequences and the shift in its definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ has been in the opposite direction than expected. Instead of defining itself as a Western and European country, Turkey has increasingly seen Europe as its ‘other.’ The estrangement of Turkey over the course of the development of its relationship with the EU is extremely striking since Turkey regarded and described its ‘self’ from the time of its establishment as Western and/or European. Based on its definition of its ‘self’ as European, its ‘other’ was consequently always the non-European, non-Western states. It would be an oversimplification to trace the change in Turkish national identity only to its interactions with EU institutions. Several internal and external developments, including changes in domestic conditions and international and regional developments, have contributed to the change in Turkey’s definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ However, the EU has been – until the deadlock of relations – one of the most powerful factors influencing political decision-making and shaping political and public discourse in Turkey. This is supported by the fact that relations with the EU have not only brought about a lively discussion of national identity and self-concept but also put sensitive national concerns – such as the Kurdish issue, relations with Greece and Cyprus, and minority rights – at the center of political and public discourse. The exhaustive EU accession process, which had no real future, gave rise to the debate over and questioning of Turkish identity by both sides – by both supporters and opponents of EU accession. It worked to shift in Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in an opposite direction than expected. Within the framework of EU-Turkey relations, not only the EU but also Turkey made an issue of Turkey’s Europeanness. In the course of the EU accession process, historical in- and out-group definitions were also resurrected. Historically, ‘Turk’ has been the dominant ‘other’ of the European states system because of the military might and physical proximity of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the strength of its religious tradition.

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

17

It was also the relevant ‘other’ in the evolution of European identity. The European self was defined from the beginning in terms of what it was not. The non-European Turk as the ‘other’ of Europe played a decisive role in the evolution of this European identity (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 329-330; Diez 2004: 11). Based on this historically constructed image – namely, the image of ‘the Muslim enemy in front of the gates of Europe,’ Turkey has continued to be the ideal ‘other’ of the EU (Diez 2005: 633). It is also worth recalling Europe’s role as Crusader and Christian enemy in the course of the long history of Turkish-European relations. In particular, the EU’s requirements regarding the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus conflict awakened Turkey’s historical fears of being invaded by the Western powers, which in turn caused Turkey to regard the EU as a danger to its territorial integrity rather than as a partner in negotiations. Over time, these fears, combined with the impression that Turkey will never be accepted as a part of the EU, meant that the required resolutions of the Kurdish and Cypriot issues were regarded as a threat coming from an ‘other,’ thereby influencing Turkey’s definition of its ‘self’ and accordingly, its behavior. Research Questions How did interaction with the EU influence Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’? What are the reasons for Turkey’s new understanding of ‘self’ and ‘other’? How could a process promising the adoption of new norms, roles, and definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ fail in the case of Turkey, which even before the interactions intensified, saw and described itself as a part of Europe? What are the implications of this estrangement process? These questions are at the center of this book and will be answered based on the comparative case studies of three crucial time periods in Turkey-EU relations. The theoretical approach taken to analyze these research questions is a constructivist one. The reason for making use of a constructivist approach in not only that identity is at the center of constructivist theory (Wendt 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996), but also because these identities are socially constructed and reconstructed rather than given. In constructivist understanding, identity is shaped through language and discourse, which are powerful forces constructing reality. Constructivism emphasizes the importance of normative as well as material structures, as well as the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action (Price and Reus-Smith 1998). The basic principles of constructivism in conjunction with socialization, identity, and identity change will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 2.

18 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Positions of Turkish Parties on Turkey’s EU Membership Since the 1960s, the objective of joining the EU has been one of the major pillars of Turkish foreign policy. The 1960s and 1970s were years of ideological radicalization and political polarization in Turkey. The radical left was represented in the political arena by TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi [Workers Party of Turkey]) and the radical right was represented by MHP and MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi [National Salvation Party]), which were opposed Turkey’s relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) because of economic, cultural, or religious reasons (Yılmaz 2011: 190). The radical left and radical right opposed the EEC, arguing its imperialist and colonialist intentions would ruin Turkey’s economy. This Euroscepticism grew as a result of economic factors in the 1970s, including developing economic crises and Turkey’s struggle to get the aid promised by the EEC. Inevitably, relations with the Community cooled down (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 213). The Turkish political discourse on the issue of EU membership is relatively straightforward and, at least since the late 1980s, there has been somewhat of a consensus among the major political parties that Turkey should seek EU membership (Avcı 2004: 195). The following short description of the positions of the main Turkish political parties on EU membership illustrates this perfectly. The National Action Party (MHP) is, as its name indicates, a nationalist party. It has serious reservations about Turkey’s accession, but throughout the history of EU relations, it has been a supporter of the EU. The party program states that the MHP supports Turkey’s full membership in the EU as this issue acquired the status of state policy over time. In the 1980s the MHP supported the government’s decision to resume the frozen relations with the EU and to continue fulfilling the conditions for full membership, mainly because of the threat of communism. In the 1990s, the elimination of the threat of communism and the independence of the Turkic republics after the fall of the Soviet Union changed the MHP’s interest toward establishing a union with these republics rather than with the EU. Moreover, the increasingly political focus of the EU, such as the Copenhagen criteria, which raised issues like the Kurdish problem and minority rights, increased the alienation of the MHP (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 208-211). Nevertheless, the MHP’s position on EU membership from 1999 until 2002, when it was part of three-party governing coalition, was softer than after 2002. After parliament set elections for 3 November 2002, the MHP hardened its position, which then gradually became more rigid after the MHP was no longer in parliament as a result of the elections (Bardakçı 2010: 29-30). However, the MHP

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 19

still did not totally reject EU membership. According to MHP’s chairman, Devlet Bahçeli, the party’s official position was that despite reservations, the MHP always worked for integration with the EU, while in power and in the opposition (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 211; Bahçeli 2002). The MHP’s party platform in 2009 also stated that the party supported EU membership, provided Turkey’s interests were not compromised: ‘Our fundamental policy is that as long as the EU’s approach to Turkey’s national unity and integrity, and to the issues of Cyprus, Greece, and Armenia, does not damage Turkey’s interests, we are for continuing negotiations and for not accepting anything other than full membership’ (MHP 2009). The two main leftist parties – the Democratic Left Party (DSP), which has a national left position, founded in 1985 and the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]), a center-left party established by Atatürk in 1923 – are the principal supporters of EU membership. Until the DSP came to power in 2002, it had reservations about policy issues involving agriculture and defense, which had been lifted by the time of the Ecevit government from 11 January until 28 May 1999. Bülent Ecevit’s government accepted and signed the conditions for candidacy in Helsinki and adopted major constitutional and legal reforms to start the accession negotiations (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 214). The CHP states in its party program that it always supported Turkey’s membership in the EU and regards it as a process of societal change, which is the extension of Atatürk’s modernization. However, it requires a relationship based on equality and respect. It rejects the connection between Cyprus and Turkey’s membership as well as conditions that are in conflict with the Lausanne Treaty (CHP n.d.). Until the 1980s, the CHP’s position on the EU can be described as Eurosceptic. Although it perceived relations with the EU as closely related to secularization, Westernization, and democracy, it claimed that the integration process might affect Turkey’s economy, agriculture, and industry negatively. In the 1970s, the CHP distanced itself from the EU because of the global economic crisis. The turning point in the position of the CHP was the military coup in 1980. After the military coup, the left-wing parties strengthened their support of EU membership despite their differences of opinion on the EU as guarantor of individual rights and freedoms. The new political content of the EU, supporting multiculturalism and human rights, turned the left-wing parties, especially the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti [SHP]) and the CHP, which later replaced it, into parties in favor of the EU (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 213-214). The CHP’s position changed again after the 2002 elections and it became more nationalistic and oppositional. The CHP, together with the

20 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

MHP, became the strongest opponents of EU reforms and skeptical of the EU’s demands for negotiations, responding to widespread fears regarding the EU’s position on the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. Particularly from 2005 on, the CHP’s opposition, based on a nationalist agenda, was strengthened. The CHP’s motive was not only resistance to the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party [AKP]) government. It was due more to the dramatic decline in support for EU membership caused by widespread fears regarding the EU’s position on the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. This decline in public support was decisive in determining the CHP’s position on the EU and on issues closely connected to EU relations. The CHP hoped to strengthen its political position by playing on the fears of the Turkish public and opposing reforms closely linked with the EU membership criteria (Bardakçı 2010: 30-31). Two main rightist parties have made important steps in regard to the question of EU membership. The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi [ANAP]) – a center-right party founded in 1983 – called membership in the EC the ultimate aim of the government program under the government of Özal. In April 1987, Özal submitted the formal application for full membership. Under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz, the ANAP assumed a leading role in achieving EU membership and realizing the required reforms. The True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi [DYP]), founded in 1983 as the reincarnation of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti [DP]), was one of the governing parties and, with the CHP, carried Turkey into the Customs Union. After defeat in the 2007 elections, the DYP changed back to its original name, DP, with which the ANAP merged in 2009. The DP’s party manifesto indicates its pro-EU agenda and states that the DP is the party that submitted the application for EU membership and is determined to continue the membership process it started (DP n.d.). The Islamist parties – the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi [National Order Party]), the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi [National Salvation Party]), the RP (Refah Partisi [Welfare Party]), the SP (Saadet Partisi [Felicity Party]), the FP (Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party]), and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]) – had serious reservations against Turkey’s EU membership. Erbakan rejected EU membership not only for economic reasons but also for political and cultural reasons. He defined the EU as a Christian club, established to demonstrate that the cross was superior to the crescent and regarded Turkey’s EU integration as the last stage of the assimilation of Turkey’s Islamic identity into the Christian West. He considered it a Kemalist plot to bring Turkey into Western civilization and weaken the growing political influence of Islam

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

21

there (Duran 2004; Erbakan 1991; Özen 2010: 87). The radical position of Islamist parties shifted after two crucial events: First, the end of the coalition between the RP and the DYP through the intervention of the National Security Council, and, second, the elimination of the RP by the constitutional court. Since 1999 all Islamist parties (FP, SP, and AKP) have taken a pro-EU position. AKP discourse represented a total departure from the Islamism of the National Outlook Movement and declared its commitments to unconditional EU membership (Duran 2004: 133-134). In the elections of 2002, both the AKP and SP openly advocated membership in the EU. After coming to power, the AKP repeated its intention to not only adopt EU rules but also to apply them effectively (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 216-217). EU membership is mostly regarded by the political elite in Turkey as the final goal of Turkey’s Westernization, the final step in bringing Turkey to where it belongs, to Europe. Although the Islamist and nationalist parties focus mainly on the strategic benefits of membership rather than on the cultural- and identity-related arguments, their position on Turkey’s membership basically does not differ from that of the rest of the parties.

1.3

Discourse and Discourse Analysis

Analyzing identity is not an easy task and even more challenging is detecting and measuring identity change. Scholars analyzing identity and identity change face several challenges, including selecting the level of analysis, conceptualizing identity, finding the right method for measuring identity change which fits the theoretical framework, and extending the research time span since identity change does not occur overnight. This research will analyze the discursive reconstruction of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in Turkish national identity, applying the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the media reports on the political actors. Discourse is a broad term, which integrates a whole palette of different meanings ranging from a reference to a small sequence of text, through a complete textual variety or very abstract phenomenon (Titscher et al. 2000: 25-26). According to Foucault, discourse does not refer simply to language or speech but to how language works to organize a field of knowledge and practice (Tonkiss 2004: 374). ‘Discourse’ is a wider term than ‘text,’ which refers to ‘the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part’ (Fairclough 1989: 24). The discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way and at the same time limits the other

22 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

ways in which the topic can be constructed (Hall 1995: 291). Discourses as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak […] are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so they conceal their own invention’ (Foucault 1974: 49). Drawing from this definition, discourses first construct reality as they shape thoughts and behavior. They also involve the exercise of power in their exclusion of certain possibilities and consequent structuring of the relations between different social agents (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4; Dyberg 1997). Discourse constructs the reality. However, it has a dialectical relationship with social reality, meaning that social reality also reconstructs the discourse. As a systematic ordering of language, discourse involves certain rules, terminology, and conventions, which allow us to analyze how social identities are shaped by looking at media reports. The role of discourses in reproducing social identities becomes more important over time (Fairclough 1992). The relationship between identity and discourse is very powerful. Identity as a two-way process is the result of joint production (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 41; Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002: 23). The way we speak and the way we speak to and about others is an affiliation. Who we are is shaped constantly by the taken-for-granted concepts and assumptions embedded in discourses, but we also contribute to existing discourse by the way we speak (Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002: 23). Discourse analysis is a broad and complex interdisciplinary field, including theoretical and methodological approaches from diverse disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology, sociology, education, history, politics, and social policy. Different interpretations of the meaning of discourse – such as understanding it solely in linguistic terms as the units of written and spoken communication, or as being derived from, and dependent on, social practices – shape also the methods applied by the researcher. Language as the object of analysis is central to discourse analysis. However, as already outlined, for many researchers, discourse is not equivalent to language and language is not simply a neutral medium for communicating information, but a domain which shapes people’s knowledge of the social world (Tonkiss 2004: 373). Language is seen as forming the social meaning and reproducing social identities. Accordingly, discourse analysis is not narrowly limited to the study of texts or language. Discourse analysis is a methodology for analyzing social phenomena that is qualitative, interpretive, and constructionist. It explores how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created and are held in place (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 3-4; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 7). It not only embodies a set of

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 23

techniques for conducting structured, qualitative investigations of texts, but is also a set of assumptions concerning the constructive effects of language (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 5). Doing discourse analysis, one also faces several challenges. Part of the difficulty in establishing methods for discourse analysis is that discourse analysis is not singular. Distinct forms of analysis are collected under this label, invoking different understandings of discourse, drawing on different disciplines, and specifying different methodologies (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). There is no common way to do discourse analysis. One reason is because in different disciplines researchers apply various frameworks. Second, it is research which is data driven (Tonkiss 2004: 376). While standard terminology and methods are relatively lacking in discourse analysis, this research draws among the wide range of approaches, on CDA in particular, based on the following definition of CDA: CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice.’ Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objective knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258)

Since CDA perceives language use as social practice and explores the links between textual structures and their function in interaction within society, such an analysis is complex and multilevel and can bridge the gap between the micro- and macrolevel (Horvath 2009), which form, according Van Dijk, one unified whole in everyday interaction and experience. For instance, a racist speech delivered in parliament is a discourse at microlevel, but its enactment as a part of legislation is a discourse at macrolevel (Van Dijk 2001: 354). Socialization and Europeanization research mostly focus on a particular level, the microlevel, and analyze the elite, which creates an aggregation problem. Showing the socialization of agents does not prove the change or shift in the beliefs and norms of a state or society, which is actually as relevant and as effective as the microlevel regarding policy issues. The CDA offers rather a multilevel analysis and helps to capture the interactivity between the levels.

24 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Van Dijk suggests four ways to bridge the micro- and macrolevel through consideration of: 1

Members-groups: Language users engage in discourse as members of social groups, organizations, institutions, and, conversely, social groups may act though their members. 2 Actions-processes: Social acts of individual actors are thus constituent parts of group actions and social processes, such as legislation and news making. 3 Context and social structure: Situations of discursive interaction are similarly part or constitutive of social structure. 4 Personal and social cognition: Language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition: personal memories, knowledge and opinions, as well as those shared with members of the group or culture as whole. Both types of cognition influence interaction and discourse of individual members, whereas shared ‘social representations’ govern the collective actions of a group. (Van Dijk 2001: 354)

In addition to its potential to conduct multilevel analysis, CDA has the significant strength of being able to deal with the higher level of abstraction in analyzing or measuring identity change. Researchers mostly regard the empirical study of identity change as problematic since it is not something that can be readily observed, like behavior (and as a result most try to draw conclusions about beliefs and identity through observing behavior). Since social identities are created and represented through discourses, CDA offers an ideal way to deal with high levels of abstraction, such as tracing changes in national identity as well as in the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ through the interpretation of discourses. This helps to link analysis to the social context. A common objection to the use of discourse analysis is that it does not actually show the real thoughts and motives of the elites – only what they represent for the masses (Payne 2007: 505-506). However, discourse analysis is not interested in the real motives and interests of the actors. As Waever states: An advantage of this approach (discourse analysis) compared with psychological approaches studying perceptions and belief systems is that it stays totally clear of any relationship to what people really think. It is not interested in inner motives, in interests or beliefs; it studies something public, that is how meaning is generated and structured in a national context. (Waever 1994: 254)

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 25

Moreover the interdisciplinary approach of CDA makes it the most fitting method for the analysis of national identity change. The multidisciplinary approach of CDA combines linguistic historical and social-political perspectives, which enables the researcher to explore the interconnectedness of the discourses and structures (Wodak 2009: 9). There are many types of CDA, which may be theoretically and analytically quite different (Van Dijk 2001: 353). Among the various CDA I apply in this book is the discourse-historical approach of the Vienna School, which goes beyond pure linguistic analysis and focuses more on the relationship between linguistic means, forms, and structures (Wodak et al. 2009: 9). The Vienna School is a proven method for the analysis of national and collective identity (De Cillia et al. 1999; Weiss 2002; Wodak and Weiss 2004) and has been applied in the analysis of the construction of European identities (Krzyzanowski 2010) in several studies (Aydın-Düzgit 2013: 529). The discourse-historical approach is interested in discursive strategies, which are involved in the presentation of a positive ‘self’ and a negative ‘other.’ It views the discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the basic fundaments of discourses of identity and difference (Wodak 2001: 73). The main concern of the discourse-historical approach is not to study the linguistic system and its functional and semantic potential in all its dimensions per se, but to include the historical, political, sociological, and psychological dimensions in the analysis, theory, and interpretation of a specific discursive event (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 9). To identify topics and arguments of the political elite discourse on Turkish identity and definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ the research will apply CDA to a large sample of textual data. The analysis particularly focuses on the arguments supporting the Europeanness of Turkey and the otherness of the EU from geographical, cultural, historical, and religious perspectives. The analysis will make use of three discursive strategies, as adopted from Wodak: 1

Referential or nomination strategies, by which social actors are constructed and represented, for example, through the construction of in-groups and out-groups. This is done through us/them categorization, including metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches. 2 Predication strategies, by which social actors as individuals, group members, or groups are labeled negatively or positively (positive representation of the self and negative representation of the other through the stereotypical, evaluative attributions). These strategies are closely related to nomination strategies.

26 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

3 Argumentation strategies, through which positive and negative attribution are justified. For instance, topoi and fallacies to legitimate the exclusion or inclusion. (2009: 38-44)

Through applying Wodak’s discursive strategies, the book will provide answers for the following significant questions related how the Turkish ‘self’ and ‘other’ is constructed in the course of the EU accession process: How does Turkey linguistically name and refer to ‘self’ and ‘other’ (us/them)? Which characteristics and traits are attributed to ‘self’ and ‘other’ (negative or positive labeling)? Which arguments and argumentation, such as topoi, are used to legitimize, justify, and naturalize the certain representations of self and other? (Wodak 2001: 72-73).

1.4

Case Selection: Three Different Time Periods in Turkey-EU Relations

Turkey is an important case to examine for analysis of identity change through interaction with international institutions. There is a considerable amount of academic literature on EU-Turkey relations, but little scholarly work has been done on the impact of the EU on Turkish national identity and/or on Turkey’s definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Bahar Rumelili (2004, 2008, 2011), Beyza Tekin (2010), Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues and Ann-Kristin Jonasson (2011), Luigi Narbone and Nathalie Tocci (2009), and Catherine MacMillan (2013) conduct a certain degree of research on EUTurkey relations from an identity-related perspective. Turkish identity as related to the EU accession process, however, is still an understudied topic, even though it is a critical aspect of EU relations since identity defines behavior. Turkey searched for a European identity, not only upon the establishment of the republic, but in the twentieth-century Ottoman Empire. To be Western and European was a panacea for all the problems of the country; a path from underdevelopment to the civilized, modern world. Turkey itself redefined its identity as a European and Western country and enforced Westernization of the country. It defined ‘self’ as European and ‘other’ as non-European and based its foreign policy on this ‘self’ and ‘other’ definition. It was always on the side of Western countries as an ally of NATO and as a member of many European institutions. The views of the Turkish public on the effects of EU membership were mostly positive. Public opinion was, for a long time, overwhelmingly in favor of European membership. For a

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 27

long time, Turkey ranked among the countries with the highest enthusiasm for Europe. A huge number of Turkish people wanted to join the EU, thinking that membership would bring more welfare, better health and living conditions, and more democracy. According to opinion polls, about 70% of the Turkish people supported full membership at one point. This readiness to join the EU makes a case study of Turkey of upmost importance, because it was expected that it would have a positive impact on the socialization/ identity change of the country. The great willingness of Turkey to be part of a group and to define itself as European and Western should have enhanced the efficiency and success of the socialization process in the course of EU relations. If we cannot find the positive impact of EU relations on Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ or if we find different outcomes than expected, then discovering the conditions which cause an othering process rather than socialization and its consequences is significant not only for researchers but also for policy makers. The analysis of Turkey’s interactions with EU institutions and their impact on identity change in Turkey will be drawn based on three crucial time periods: from 1995 until 1999, from 1999 until 2005, and from 2005 until 2010. Socialization means that actors need some experience and time before they adopt new roles, norms, values, and beliefs. It is exactly this notion of ‘time’ that troubles the construction of an ‘ideal’ data set for socialization and identity research (Beyers 2005: 917-918). To deal with this covered time problem, I applied the analysis of party discourses over a long time span, from the start of the Customs Union in 1995 until 2010. This was time consuming but promised a meaningful comparative analysis. These three different time periods were approached to take account of the ways in which they each demonstrated the following: – the intensity of Turkey’s interactions with the EU; – the degree of the impact of the EU on Turkey; – the readiness of Turkey to accept EU conditions; – the EU’s attitude toward Turkey in terms of inclusiveness and/or exclusiveness. Turkey has a long history of relations with the European Union, beginning in 1963. These relations had significant historical turning points, including engagement with the framework of association (1963), Customs Union (1995), candidacy (1999), accession negotiations (2005), and the partial freeze of Turkey’s membership negotiations (2006). I divided the case studies based on important incidents opening or closing new phases in Turkey-EU

28 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

relations. The first case study starts with the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU in 1995. This was surely not the most important step for Turkey’s full EU membership, however, it was the most important step in which the interactions between Turkey and the EU intensified. Turkey regarded the Customs Union Agreement as a crucial development for its EU membership and as the acknowledgement of its Europeanness by the EU. This caused the illusion in Turkish society that Turkey was one step closer to membership and made the issue of EU membership the number one subject of public and political discourse in Turkey. It also dominated media discourse. In contrast to this great enthusiasm for being part of Europe, readiness for the required conditions was very low. The mentioning of problems like the Kurdish or Cyprus issues by the EU caused discomfort among Turkish politicians and the public. At the same time, the EU lacked the weapon of real conditionality, since there was no real membership negotiation until the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The second case study starts with the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999, when Turkey was given ‘candidate status,’ and lasts until the start of the negotiations in 2005. Helsinki was a turning point in Turkey-EU relations because since then the political and economic criteria for membership have become much more stringent and EU candidacy and reforms have become contentious issues in Turkey. After the Helsinki Summit, the salience of EU membership increased remarkably in political and public discourse. During this second period, the European Commission, the part of the EU responsible for implementing decisions of the EU, also decided at the 2002 Copenhagen Summit to start accession negotiations with Turkey without delay in December 2004. In December 2004 at the Brussels Submit, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. This decision constituted an important and historical landmark in Turkey’s relationship with the EU and also marks the start of the third case study. Shortly after the start of the negotiations in 2006, the EU decided to partially suspend the negotiations with Turkey. Since then, relations with the EU have slowed dramatically. The period from 1999 to 2006 can be interpreted as the upturn of the cycle whereas the period since 2006 clearly corresponds to the downward phase (Öniş 2009: 46). In the period from 2006 to 2010 Turkey-EU relations experienced a real deadlock. The exclusivity of the EU had caused a dramatic loss of trust on the Turkish side. In this period Turkey’s willingness to join the EU and commit itself to the membership conditions was at the lowest level in parallel with the EU’s low willingness to integrate Turkey.

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 29

1.5

Data Selection

The selection of sources within a case is an important concern for discourse analysis. Discourse analysts incorporate a wide range of linguistic and nonlinguistic data such as speeches, reports, manifests, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions. This empirical data is seen as sets of signifying practices that constitute a ‘discourse’ and its reality (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). The primary source materials used for this research are newspaper reports of political elite discourse to trace the shift in discourses regarding Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Analyzing the discourses political elites is important since they, according to the work of several constructivists, illustrate how elites, create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies (Cerulo 1997: 390). Media is the major actor in the transmission of communication (which can affect the national identity dynamic), a forum for exchange, and a medium for the self-observation of society. It is a political actor in the public sphere, raising a voice and contributing to opinion formation by commenting on political issues and events (Koopmans and Pfetsch 2006: 118). It has great power since it can communicate symbols of national identity to the whole nation at the same time (Bloom 1990: 85). As media has a leading role in construction of the nation-state (Siapera 2004: 129), namely construction of the nation-state through unifying experiences of space, time, and language (Anderson 1991) and providing a political space for the citizens (Habermas 1989), media resources provide powerful data for the investigation of national identity discourses. Newspapers can reflect the discourses of political actors and, at the same time, public opinion, as well as illustrate the linkage between the political elite and the citizens by showing which messages are conveyed from the elite to the public. This enables the capture of two important dimensions of identity measurement at the same time: the views of the political elite and what is delivered to the masses as well as the actual interface between the elite and the reactions of the citizens. To achieve this, I examined the political discourses in the Turkish newspapers with the restrictive goal of revealing the changes in the definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in Turkish political discourse within the framework of EU relations. This is important because political actors’ discourses in public media are mostly discourses accessed by the citizens, not the debates in the parliament about specific political issues. This is demonstrated by the data collected in the Eurobarometer, a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly by the European Commission since

30 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

1973. As the Eurobarometer shows, the communication between the EU and the public is strongly dependent on media since more than two-thirds of EU citizens consistently identify the media as their most important source of political information (Peter and De Vreese 2004: 3-4). Particularly in the case of Turkey, mass media analysis is of great importance. Since the establishment of Turkey, media has been the second political power (in some cases even the first power) and intentionally used for the top-down construction of the Turkish national identity. In both Ottoman and republican Turkey, journalists have played an important role in introducing national identity. Journalists compete with political elites in their claim to be the true expression of popular aspiration, which, in a true Jacobinist manner, they actually define what those aspirations should be. They challenge governments when the governments do not hold the same views that they themselves support, or when the governments do not function the way journalists think they should. In short, journalists have become the second estate in Turkish politics, after the politicians. As Turkish politicians of the early 1990s tended to place as much emphasis on their images as on concrete policies as a means to gather votes, one may even say that journalists became the first estate (Heper and Demirel 1996: 110-112). Four newspapers associated with various citizens groups and linked to different political parties were chosen for discourse analysis in order to mirror the political diversity of the discourse. Hürriyet identifies itself as liberal-conservative, has a strong nationalist stance and is one of the three largest newspapers in Turkey. Milliyet can be viewed as left-liberal. In the first years after its establishment, it supported the DP, which was a right-wing party but, with time, it shifted more to the left. Although the same media mogul has owned Milliyet and Hürriyet for a long time and there is a certain overlap in their daily coverage, Hürriyet has a larger circulation and a more nationalist approach. Yeni Şafak is a conservative newspaper that supports the ruling Justice and Development Party. Cumhuriyet is a centerleft, Kemalist, and secular newspaper, founded on 7 May 1924. Politically, it mainly supports the CHP. Choosing four different newspapers will help avoid the selection bias of the press. For each of these four newspapers, political actors’ discourses related to the national identity dynamic were analyzed. Moreover, I looked at the articles of columnists and analyzed their discourses to enable a diversity of the textual choices since they also are influential political actors and have a very significant role in Turkish politics. Columnists write daily articles on important political issues, mainly supporting a particular party and delivering this party’s discourse

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

31

on the issues. Therefore, the writings of columnists are also used as relevant data in this research. The data selection is not limited to texts that directly discuss Turkish national identity in course of EU relations. Texts about the Kurdish issue and to a limited extent about the Cyprus issue in the framework of EU relations were also selected as relevant data for the investigation since these two issues were from the beginning at the center of the negotiations with the EU and widely affected Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ as highly sensitive national issues. The Kurdish Issue: The Kurdish issue is Turkey‘s most imminent and crucial problem. As Kirişci puts it: ‘The Kurdish question in Turkey can be seen as a function of the state’s failure to reconsider the definition of its national identity in a manner that allows Kurds to express and live their ethnic and cultural identity in public’ (Kirişci 2011: 336). Turkey has been tackling the Kurdish problem since the establishment of the new republic in the early 1920s. The new geopolitical conditions after World War I gave the Kurds hope that they could establish their own national state. The Treaty of Sèvres signed after the peace negotiations in 1920 divided the Ottoman territory between France, Britain, Italy, and Greece and foresaw an independent Kurdish and Armenian state in the territories today belonging to Turkey (Hurewitz 1956: 74). The Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified and replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, establishing an independent Turkish state and removing all promises of independence for Kurds and Armenians. As a result, within the period from 1920 to 1938, Turkey faced seventeen rebellions, three of which were major, namely the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, the Ararat Rebellion in 1930, and the Dersim Rebellion in 1937, which were harshly crushed. In the 1960s and 1970s Kurds resisted against the repressive policies of the Turkish state. Following the 1980 coup many of the key figures of the Kurdish movement were imprisoned and others escaped from Turkey, as the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan [Kurdistan Workers’ Party]), the head of the Kurdish separatist movement, gradually became more radicalized. The socioeconomic inequalities between the Kurdistan region and Western Turkey, the emergence of a Kurdish movement in Iraq, and the highly ethicized public political space in Turkey also gave rise to the radicalization of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Then between 1984 and 1999, Turkey was the scene of armed conflict between the PKK and government forces, leading to the loss of about 35,000 lives on both sides. The terrorist activities of the PKK and the discourse of separatism strongly linked the Kurdish issue with terrorism. This led in turn to favoring a military solution,

32 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

which made a peaceful resolution of the problem impossible (Heper 2007: 1-11). Turkey’s handling of the Kurdish issue was impacted by the intensification of Turkey-EU relations beginning in the late 1990s. In 1999, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya and brought back to Turkey, where he was detained. At this time Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for membership in the European Union. The interaction between the EU and Turkey at the time meant that there was official support for an open debate about the Kurdish issue in Turkey, which gave rise to a reform process (Dyson 2007: 53). Since the intensification of relations with the EU and the developments in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish issue has been perceived not only as a security and military issue but also as a problem with social, economic, and identity dimensions. After avoiding discussion of the issue for many years, reforms, such as granting the right to broadcast in Kurdish and the right to learn Kurdish in private language schools, were enacted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the lives of Kurds in Turkey improved (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007: 81-82). However, Turkey’s approach to the EU’s requests in regard of the Kurdish issue was ambivalent. On the one hand, it was ready to enact reforms to improve the rights of Kurdish citizens. At the same time, the reform process awakened Turkey’s fears that the EU had a hidden agenda and wanted to divide Turkey and damage its territorial integrity. The Cyprus Conflict: Since the division of Cyprus in 1974, the situation has been a constant source of international tension. The EC’s involvement in the Cyprus issue goes back to the 1960s when Turkey and Greece became associate members of the EC and when the UK applied for full membership. Over the next decades, the EC’s involvement increased after the main actors in the conflict joined the EC – the UK joined the EC in 1973 and Greece in 1981 – or was accepted as a candidate. Turkey was accepted as a candidate in Helsinki in 1999. Turkey’s joining the Customs Union and its ambition to become a full EU member created a significant linkage between the Cyprus issue and Turkey-EU relations (Müftüler-Baç and Güney 2005: 281-287). Accession to the EU demanded from Turkey a good relationship with its neighbors such as Greece and Armenia and peaceful external relationships with other states. Consequently, this historical problem became a great obstacle in negotiations for EU membership (Tsakonas 2009: 109). From the beginning of the current decade, the Cyprus issue was a key marker of national identity and political change for Turkey. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey’s stance was based on rejecting any linkage

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 33

between the Cyprus issue and relations with the EU. In late 2002 the Turkish attitude toward accepting such a linkage began to shift (Ulusoy and Verney 2009: 115-117) because EU membership was closely linked to resolution of the Cyprus dispute and the obvious benefits of full membership were overriding issues (Öniş and Yılmaz 2008: 135-136). However, generally speaking, Turkey has perceived the EU’s intervention in the issue negatively, considered it an application of the Treaty of Sèvres, and felt discriminated against by EU policies. The Greek Cypriots’ acceptance into the EU, in spite of their rejection of the reunification of the island as well as the partial suspension of negotiations in 2006 because Turkey did not open ports and airports to Greece as required in the Additional Protocol, caused significant feelings of discrimination and loss of trust. Now the EU took the position of Turkey’s ‘other,’ joining Greece, which had perpetually been the ‘other’ of Turkey. These two national issues are highly relevant in defining Turkish identity and for examining relations with the EU and addressing the self/other definitions within the framework of EU relations. Resolution of the Kurdish issue and Cyprus conflict are not official conditions for EU membership. However, the tolerance for internal minorities has emerged as one criterion of European identity. Demonstrated commitment to this principle is one test would-be members of the European Union must pass (Citrin and Sides 2004: 178). The Kurdish issue and conflict in Cyprus are unstated obstacles to Turkey’s membership (Hughes 2011; Öniş 2001: 40). They are at the center of the negotiation process and are additional membership requirements among the Copenhagen criteria (Yeşilada 2013: 45). Debates and discourses on these issues were almost always linked to the identity issue and led to questioning of Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ For instance, the debates on the Kurdish and Cyprus issues within the framework of EU relations, as well the EU’s requirements regarding these issues, reminded Turkey of Europe’s position as ‘other’ during and after World War I when efforts were made to divide the country based on the Treaty of Sèvres. The debates on this issue caused Europe to be seen in Turkey as ‘other.’ Since discourses on the ‘self’ and ‘other’ are to be found more intensively in debates on these sensitive national issues, the analyses of political actors’ discourses on the Kurdish and Cyprus issues within the framework of EU relations is a good way to analyze the ‘self’ and ‘other’ definition. In the preparation phase of the discourse analysis, I first selected all articles which seemed to be related to EU relations, the Kurdish issue, and Cyprus. In a second step, I filtered this initial body of documents and eliminated the duplicate and irrelevant articles, which were either multiple appearances in different newspapers or not directly related to the research

34 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

topic. The final dataset contained 342 articles. Since in the center of the discourse analysis in this study is the question of how Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ shifted over time, I analyzed and commented in more detail on those documents, which delivered directly relevant information on the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Analyses of identity change done through the discursive analysis of the definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ – as in this book – offer more promise for tracing socialization and identity change than studies utilizing quantitative analysis. This is potentially a more promising method because it allows for a fundamental look at the most difficult, though most central, component of the socialization process, namely, how one shows changes in how agents understand their identities and preferences in the course of the socialization process (Johnston 2005: 1041; Abdelal et al. 2009). Translation of all analyzed articles was done by me. I attempted to keep the meaning and style of the original articles.

1.6

Outline of the Book

This book consists of eight chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter provides a short introduction of key concepts such as socialization and social and national identity as they are related to the theoretical framework for the case studies. The chapter also presents the basic features of Turkish national identity. The three subsequent chapters then deal with empirical analyses of the changes in ‘self’ and ‘other’ of Turkey. The third chapter presents the first case study, which deals with the time period from 1995 to 1999 (from the Customs Union to the Helsinki Summit) and analyzes two important turning points, the Customs Union and the Luxembourg Summit. The analysis of the discourses during and after the Customs Union shows that Turkey’s readiness to join the EU was very high. Accordingly, the description of self was predominantly European. However, analysis of the period of the Luxembourg Summit which left Turkey outside of the group of candidate states gave rise to the negative labeling of the EU and the definition of Europe as Turkey’s ‘other,’ grounded in historical negative memories. This chapter illustrates how the discourses shifted parallel to the EU’s exclusivity and Turkey’s enthusiasm for joining Europe was dampened. The following chapter, Chapter 4, analyzes the period from 1999 to 2005. During this period Turkey experienced intensive interactions, demonstrated great enthusiasm for EU membership, and underlined its ‘Europeanness.’ The chapter’s analysis focuses on two main turning points regarding Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ which impacted its behavior: the

Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations 35

September 11th terrorist attacks and the elections which brought a landslide victory for the AKP and changed the Turkish political landscape dramatically. The discourse analysis illustrates that these two incidents resulted in Turkey’s increasing use of the topoi of usefulness, the clash of civilizations, and values by portraying of itself as a (European) Muslim country and a bridge between two civilizations, in a bid to be accepted by the EU. This period was also fruitful for Kurdish reforms. Nevertheless, the belief that the EU did not intend to accept Turkey, but only wanted it kept busy, contributed to Turkey’s distrust of the EU and strengthened the otherness of the EU for Turkey, giving rise to an increasing negative labeling of the EU in conjunction with the topos of history. The last case study, in the fifth chapter, illustrates the influence of the very short-lived negotiation process and the stagnation of the process on account of Turkey’s description of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ The analysis shows that during this period, the increasingly exclusive behavior of the EU gave rise to dramatic changes in Turkey’s self/other definition. As a result of the EU’s exclusive stance, Turkey’s enthusiasm for the EU was replaced in this period with indifference and public support for the EU declined dramatically. The slowdown of the EU negotiations also gave rise to Turkey’s search for new alternatives, created desire to develop relations with the Middle East, and caused the debate to shift on its axis. This was strengthened by the suspension of the negotiations only one year after they started, creating the fear of a hidden EU agenda, or Sèvres Syndrome (Sevr Sendromu), which, in turn, strengthened the use of the topoi of threat and history. The sixth chapter deals with the new role, identity, and direction for Turkey. This chapter focuses particularly on Turkey’s new regional role in the Middle East, resulting from its exclusion from the EU and several other individual, systemic, structural, economic, ideological, and pragmatic factors. It illustrates how Turkey was assuming a leading role in the region based on its multidimensional unique identity and how this role to a great extent was diminished in the course of developments in the region after the Arab Spring uprisings. The concluding chapter of the book summarizes the main argument and central findings of the research. It makes clear the implications and results of the change in Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and evaluates the comparative case studies. It argues that favorable international and domestic conditions together with the EU’s exclusive manner and its top- down approach, gave rise to a more self-confident Turkey. Driven by strategic, economic, ideological, and emotional motivations, Turkey increasingly stressed its unique multidimensional identity. The EU process, recognized

36 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

in the international arena as one of the most powerful socialization process, precipitated a change in Turkey’s almost solely European self-definition, which, in turn, had significant consequences in its domestic policies and international relations.

2

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

2.1

The Concept of Socialization

Socialization is a complex and ambiguous concept. The connection of socialization with a wide range of themes like national identity formation, change in interests, compliance with international norms, and the effects of international institutions put socialization and identity at the center of IR studies. There is a small but rapidly growing body of literature within the field of IR and in EU studies on socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999b; Wendt 1999; Alderson 2001; Johnston 2001; Flockhart 2006; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Checkel 2005). Socialization is generally referred to as a process by which the newcomer becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction (Johnston 2001: 494). It is ‘the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1046). The process starts with an introduction to the new rules/norms/identities and proceeds through learning or ‘internalization’ (Schimmelfennig 2003; Johnston 2001; Risse 2000; Checkel 2005; Flockhart 2006). Throughout this process, institutional conditions and informal/formal rules structure social life while mechanisms such as instrumental bargaining, role playing, or persuasion shape which behavioral practices, norms of appropriateness, and outcome preferences are internalized by the political actors. The internalization of these practices, norms, and preferences are mostly regarded and analyzed on the individual level, as it is argued that they are internalized only by individual actors. However, the impact of these practices, norms, and preferences are far-reaching. Socialization refers to both individuals and groups. The interactions among individuals also shape the group’s features. Above all, the shared practices, norms, and preferences also characterize and shape the identity of larger social aggregates such as bureaucratic agencies, political parties, and countries (Beyers 2005: 900). The early constructivists in the IR socialization literature focused on the theoretical possibility of socialization and ignored the empirical analysis of the socialization process. For instance, Wendt assumes that identities can change through interaction. However, these interactions are lacking in communication. He underlines social construction and interaction but does not emphasize the linguistic aspect enough (Zehfuss 2001; Checkel 2004). Several empirically oriented

38 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

constructivists then built on Wendt’s theoretical work, considering the weaknesses in his understanding of interaction and the missing linguistic elements (Checkel 2004: 235-236). They developed and applied empirical hypotheses on social interaction, which emphasized arguing (Lynch 1999; Risse 2000), persuasion (Checkel 2001; Checkel 2003), social influence (Johnston 2001), and rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig 2003). Socialization is a social mediation and exchange which includes communication and social networks and it occurs not only through bargaining and negotiations, but also through simple social interrelations and interactions in an unrealized form (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009: 3). The outcome of socialization is not only a behavior change, which is achieved through mechanisms such as rewards (social or material) and punishment, coercion and bargaining, but also an identity change. Shared ideas, values, and norms construct identity. Individuals come to identify with the institution through intensive, repeated interactions. Institutions, and their rules and regulations, provide shared experience and shared social norms that enhance group identity and sense of community (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14-15). The transmission of norms make it easier for states to identify with each other (Scherpereel and Zierler 2011: 20-22). Successful versus Failed Socialization In the constructivist understanding of socialization, two terms are vital: logic of appropriateness and internalization. The logic of appropriateness, meaning that the socialized states adopt the norms because they regard them as appropriate, is increased when the credibility of the socializer is high within the target states. The willingness of the socializee to socialize will also be higher if the socializee shares the norms and values of the socializer. Other important factors impacting the logic of appropriateness are domestic factors, which facilitate or inhibit persuasion of rule adaptation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 20). The constructivists emphasize the significance of norms and values and the internalization of these norms. Socialization is not merely behavioral change but the transmission of values and norms. Once norms are internalized, they are incorporated into the domestic institutional framework of the socialized state through new laws, bureaucratic procedures, and the actions of individuals with political power (Alderson 2001: 419-420). Norms are the link between identity and action. Identity is also an essential term for the constructivists since it shapes preferences and, in turn, behavior. The outcome of socialization is not limited to behavior change but also includes identity change. As the new norms take

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

39

hold in the socialized countries, their identities and their definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ will eventually change as well. In particular, when the socializee identifies positively with the social group to which the norm promoter belongs and has a desire for inclusion in that group (Flockhart 2006: 96), the change in identity and in the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ will be more rapid and positive. So behavioral change is not linked to concrete incentives but to the use of norms through which socializees are persuaded, shamed, or praised for changing their policies. The change in behavior results from the change in the actor’s beliefs or the state’s concern for its reputation. Schimmelfennig states that the socialization process can go beyond the model of intended, effective, and positive impacts to unintended and sometimes even counterproductive effects (Schimmelfennig 2002: 18-19). Thus, it is worth looking at the conditions for successful socialization. The asymmetrical relationship between the socializee and socializer is a condition for successful socialization. Socialization is most likely when the socializee sees him- or herself as the student in a teacher-student relationship (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1075). In addition, strong opposition to change is an influential condition which negatively affects the success of socialization (Schimmelfennig 2005). The effectiveness of the socialization process depends on the length and intensity of contact (Beyers 2005) and on the types of norms (Hooghe 2005). Another important factor is the organizational characteristics of the institutions, which socialize the actors (Johnston 2005). Primary organizations are more effective in socialization than secondary organizations. Moreover, the purpose of the institution and specialization of the organization is expected to impact the efficiency of socialization. For instance, institutions that specialize in issues of minority rights are expected to be less effective as a socializing environment (Kelley 2004). Most importantly, the organization has to have a coherent identity and a set of normative characteristics. Without its own identity and norms, the impact of the institution on socialization will be very weak (Johnston 2005; Hooghe 2005). Moreover, the willingness of the socializee to be socialized and the trust between the socializee and socializer are also important conditions for success. The agent being socialized must identify positively with the social group to which the norm promoter belongs and have a desire for inclusion in that group. It is not possible to socialize agents who manifestly do not wish to belong to the social group of the socializer. On the other hand, in the case of social groups that desire membership and are close to the ‘Significant We,’ the number of available strategies and issue areas where socialization can take place is greater, as are the channels for socialization (Flockhart 2006: 96).

40 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Does the socialization process always have the same outcome? Can some socialization processes fail and have unintended, counterproductive outcomes? What are the implications of failed socialization on the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’? These are all questions that should be asked in socialization research. If socialization is successful, the socializees are expected to internalize the new ideas about the nature and purpose of their polity. This internalization would be mirrored in the discourses of socializees. The socializees would be consistent in their redefinition of identity/interest in accordance with the new ideas, and they would uphold the new definitions, vis-à-vis different audiences and in different circumstances rather than invoke different definitions for different audiences in an attempt to enhance their international gains and minimize domestic costs. Thus, one of the best ways to trace socialization is to look at the shift in the definition of identity. It is expected that political actors would try to protect and promote the definitions they now take for granted, for example, by seeking to embed them in the institutions, legislation, and practices of their polity (Gheciu 2005: 982). Therefore, the changes in language during the socialization process also have an impact in practice and lead to institutionalization, which means changes in the legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, or legislative action or changes in bureaucracy and in official policy (Alderson 2001: 419-410). In a higher degree of socialization, state identity also shifts to include a new definition of self and other. Successful socialization involves identification with the other, which is a continuum from negative to positive – from conceiving the other as anathema to the self, to conceiving it as an extension of the self (Wendt 1994: 386). In the course of interaction, actors engage in discursive practices designed to express and/or to change ideas about who their self is. Through cooperative actions actors gradually change their own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that new identity for itself. In other words, through cooperation actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other – to see themselves as a ‘we’ bound by certain norms (Wendt 1994: 390-391). Consequently, the state also acts according to its new self-definition and social purposes. When state identity is changed or a new state social purpose emerges as a result of this identity shift, it is expected that the purpose is, to some extent, stable and not easily changed when the governing elite changes. Socialization does not always lead to the expected, positive outcome. It might have unintended outcomes or become an ‘othering’ process instead of developing a common group sense (Schimmelfennig 2002; Checkel and

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

41

Katzenstein 2009: 8). In this context, the trust between the socializee and socializer is a very important condition. Interdependencies (even positive interdependencies benefiting both sides) can generate anxieties. To join a group and become part of the group norms and rules causes a great interdependence for the newcomer. Being dependent on people you don’t trust is an uncomfortable situation (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 10). If the trust is low between the socializee and socializer, this dependence might cause anxieties and lead to considering the socializer as ‘other’ instead of associating with it. The conditions and behavioral change required by the socializer agent in the socialization process may also be perceived, in this context, as a threat from outside rather than conditions for joining the group. In some cases, the socialization process and its effects on identity can entail identity crisis. The concept of identity crises was developed by Erikson. He defines it as a critical period, a kind of second birth, a critical time or an inescapable turning point, for better or worse. Pye has applied Erikson’s identity crises concept to political science. According to Pye: ‘In the process of political development, an identity crisis occurs when a community finds that what it had once unquestionably accepted as the physical and psychological definitions of its collective self are no longer acceptable under new historic conditions’ (Pye 1971: 110-111; Waxman 2006: 13). Like Erikson, Pye views identity crisis as not necessarily negative, but possibly a sign of growth and change. It is instead a crucial turning point with positive and negative possibilities. A crisis of national identity occurs when the level of societal debate and conflict over the national identity becomes particularly extensive, intense, and divisive and powerful political actors or significant sections of the population challenge it (Waxman 2006: 13). During the socialization process and intensive interaction, the debate on the identity issue is always on the table. The identity of the institutions and the socialized actors are questioned by the socializee and socializer. This is also a great opportunity for the political actors who might have competing interpretations of identity and compete to fix a particular identity because of convictions or prior interests (Barnett 1999: 10). The different interpretations of the meanings associated with national identity by the political elite and the public during the socialization process surely have the potential to lead to identity conflict. Political actors and domestic groups actively competing for their particular definition or conception of national identity may cause an identity crisis and conflicting definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ However, as already pointed out, this crisis is not necessarily negative and does not mean a collapse of national identity. Rather, it might

42 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

be a growing awareness that the dominant conception of national identity or some aspects of national identity are no longer appropriate (Waxman 2006: 13, 194-197).

2.2

The Socialization Process and Social Identity

Identity and identity change are popular concepts in IR, however, there is no clear, agreed-on definition of identity. It is a catch-all term used to explain a wide variety of actions and can be found in almost all international research areas. For instance, when we speak of democratic peace, we mean that the identities of states are decisive in the behavior of states. Thus, states which identify themselves as democracies do not fight each other. Identity is also at the heart of ethnic conflict research, based on the assumed link between identity and behavior. However, the concept is not always directly identified, nor is it defined. There are also several identity concepts, mostly used randomly, such as personal identity, national identity, social identity, political identity, and cultural identity. This definitional anarchy creates ongoing difficulty in identity research in IR, allows only very particularistic explanations for state action, and provides little possibility for generalization about identity and its consequences for state behavior at the international or national level (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 9). The key questions with regard to identity are: Who am I? Who are we? and Who are they? Identity is a definition, an interpretation of self that establishes what and where the person is in both social and psychological terms. All identities emerge within a system of social relations and representations and require common recognition of others (Guibernau 2007: 10). Identity is a product of social interactions, cognitively necessary to make ones way in the world and embedded in the social structures as it is only relevant in relations with others and is reproduced in interactions with them. The development of identity and its eventual modification is always a product of communication and interaction (Mead 1973: 177, 222, 244). In addition to the inherited characteristics and primary socialization, the characteristics which form identity come from social practices (Hopf 2009: 281). Since identity is comprised of specific characteristics of a person, related to and differentiated from others, the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are essential for the concept of identity. For IR, identities are always constructed against the difference of an ‘other.’ Identity is unthinkable without such a difference: it would make no sense to say ‘I am European’ if this did not imply a difference from being ‘Asian,’ ‘African,’ or ‘American’ (Diez 2004:

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

43

321). In particular, ‘[c]ollective identity is a relation between two human collectives, that is, it always resides in the nexus between the collective self and its others.’ (Neumann 1998: 399; Rumelili 2004: 32). The image of the ‘other’ is mostly used to reinforce and strengthen the existing collective identity (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 336). The theme of ‘the other’ – and especially what constitutes the otherness of ‘the other’ – has always been a very significant subject and has been at the very heart of the work of every major twentieth-century Continental philosophers (Neumann 1996: 141). A thing is perceived as much in terms of what it is not, as in terms of what it is. In philosophy, Sartre and others have underlined how the perception of another person contributes to the constitution of the self. As Edward Said illustrates it, European Orientalists created an Oriental other through and European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against this Oriental other (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 331-332). The categories of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are not fixed and can change through interactions (Rumelili 2004: 32-33). The def initions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are products of social relations and interactions. They change within the framework of these interactions, where ‘other’ may be represented through various more or less favorable predicates, metaphors, and binaries, which may be idealized or completely denigrated, affirmed, or negated (Rumelili 2004: 36; Aydın-Düzgit 2013: 526). On the other side, the identity discourses and performance of the ‘other’ reproduce the self’s identity. The discourses and practices that the ‘other’ adopts in the course of performing its identity may have reproductive or undermining effects on the identity claimed by the ‘self’ and the difference attributed to the ‘other’ (Rumelili 2004: 37-38). How the descriptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are at the center of social identities will be explained in the next section before moving on to a special form of social identity, namely, national identity.

2.3

Social Identity and National Identity

Social identity is a social and relational concept, which means that it is fundamentally defined through interactions and relationships with others. Individual or group identities are created, negotiated, and actively recreated through interaction with others (Talbot 2008). As Wendt puts it, ‘social identities and interests are always in process during interaction’ (Wendt 1994: 386). Social identities are formed in relation to other actors such as states, nations, international organizations, or institutions and are developed because people perceive themselves as belonging to groups and pursuing

44 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

their goals through membership in these groups. To confess a particular identity is also to belong to difference. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty. Identity is relational and collective. My personal identity is defined through the collective constituencies with which I identify or am identified by others; it is further specified by comparison to a variety of things I am not (Chambers and Carver 2008: 132). The identity concept of this book is driven by social psychology and is based on social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Turner 1987; Abrams and Hogg 1990). Social identity as defined by Tajfel is ‘that part of an individual’s selfconcept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group […] together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel 1978: 63). Social identity theories have their roots in the concept of ‘social group,’ which suggests that individuals tend to favor their own group (in-group) over other groups (out-groups). The concept of ‘social group’ plays an important role in all human relationships where a ‘social group’ is defined as ‘one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values’ (Turner 1987: 1). Since the groups give their members self-esteem, individuals are motivated to improve the status of the in-group in relation to the out-group (Hogg 1992; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Therefore, social identity is motivated by two processes: self enhancement and uncertainty reduction. Social identity is not merely recognition of membership in a social group, but also that the group and its characteristics have become part of the personal self-concept, with its associated values, emotions, and extensions of individual self-esteem. Self-esteem and the belief that the ‘self’ is better than the ‘other’ is one of the most distinctive features of group life. This motive for positive social identity may reflect one of the most basic human motives for self-enhancement and self-esteem. The other social identity motive is uncertainty reduction. It reduces the subjective uncertainty about our social world and our place within it. We like to know who we are, how to behave, who others are, and how they might behave (Hogg 2006: 121). Therefore, social identities are ‘we’ identities rather than ‘I.’ They are used to answer the following questions: Who are we? (What defines the boundaries of the group and who does not belong?) What are we? (The content of group identity like symbols, values describing the prototypical member of the group and the more general defining content of the group.) What is the relationship between in-group and out-group? (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6).

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

45

This recognition of ‘we-ness’ is important given the origins of the term ‘identity.’ ‘Identity’ comes from the French word identité, which finds its linguistic roots in the Latin noun identitas (-tatis is itself a derivation of the Latin adjective idem, meaning ‘the same.’). The term is, thus, essentially comparative in nature, as it emphasizes the sharing of a degree of sameness or oneness with others in a particular area or on a given point (Rummens 2003). Individuals are more prone to membership in social groups when the group membership maximizes the similarities between oneself and other group members at the same time as it increases the dissimilarities with other groups (Kinnvall 2004: 750; Turner 1987). In summary, the social comparison and boundaries drawn between ‘other’ and ‘self’ are at the center of social identities. These boundaries may be marked by visible markers, but they might also be socially constructed. This is sometimes self-constructed and sometimes created by others (Citrin and Sears 2009: 147). National identity as a special form of social identity is both a complex and highly abstract concept (Smith 1992: 60). It describes how a group of people or a country interprets its history, beliefs, and perceptions and how a mass of people share the same identification with national symbols (Bloom 1990: 52). According to Smith, national identities provide a powerful means of defining and locating the individual self in the world, enabling us to know who we are and who others are. This process of self-definition is key to establishing national identity and is the most important function of national identity (Smith 1991: 15-16). National identities also provide meaningful bonds between members of a community. Through the transmission of the cultural components of national identity (values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, languages, and practices) to the members of a given community (Guibernau 2007), a process of identification among the members of community is created. This identification process fosters the solidarity bonds among the members of a given community who come to recognize one another as fellow nationals (Gellner 1983). This fellow national also feel that their community is separate and distinct from others (Anderson 1991). As Wodak et al. put it: National identity implies ‘a complex of similar conceptions and perceptual schemata, of similar emotional dispositions and attitudes, and of similar behavioural conventions, which bearers of this “national identity” share collectively and which they have internalised through socialisation’ (Wodak et al. 2009: 4). While national identity is a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations, like common language, religion, geographic location, collective memory, and cultural practices (Ilya 1998: 16; Guibernau

46 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

2007: 11), it is important to underline that the perception of these fixed symbols changes and are subject to reconstruction and revision through societal, political, and cultural practices. Although national identities in particular are relatively stable, their discursively constructed nature means that there are always alternative constructions against which the dominant notions of identity have to be defended, and which offer the potential for change (Diez 2004: 321; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 96) In contrast to the essentialist approaches, which assumes that certain group identities are given based on blood, race, language, and territory, the constructivist approach views the nation as an imagined political community focusing on its invention and creation (Anderson 1991: 6). Identity is continuously constructed, negotiated, and contested through interactions between groups and individuals (Cerulo 1997). That identities are constructed does not mean that they can be completely divorced from objectified traits, such as race, ethnicity, religion, history, culture, or political system. Constructivism does also not claim that identity can be changed, reimagined, and reconstructed overnight (Rumelili 2008: 99). It is not about the radical short-run fluidity of identities. Constructivism is about the long-run formation and consequent stickiness of identities (Varshney 2007: 288), which are ultimately a presentation of self that is recognized by others (Rumelili 2008: 99).

2.4

The Content of National Identity

As discussed in the previous section, identity is a complex and multidimensional concept. For a significant and unbiased analysis, this complexity and multidimensionality should be considered. At the individual level, Abdelal et al. distinguish two dimensions of identity. Whereas the intensity dimension captures the strength of the loyalty felt by an individual, the content dimension refers to the meaning of the group for an individual member (Abdelal et al. 2006). Since it is not expected that through socialization the old identity will suddenly disappear and an entirely new identity will emerge, one should consider the particular content of the identity and look closely at this content to trace identity change. Depending on the quality and quantity of the socialization process, the importance of a particular feature of the identity to the socializee would have an impact on the likelihood of a change, on the extent of the change, and on the content of the change (Johnston 2005: 1032-1033). Not all the dimensions of identity are expected to change, but particular aspects of identity will be shifted, strengthened,

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

47

or weakened, whereas others remain unchanged. Thus, searching for an identity change based on a blunt notion of identity would provide null or weak findings (Johnston 2005; Lewis 2005). A group’s constitutive norms, social purposes, and cognitions may remain static, while beliefs about who the out-group is could change. A change in constitutive norms without a change in social purpose or in perceived out-groups is also possible (Todd et al. 2008a, 2). How can the particular content of identity be conceptualized for the measurement of identity and which content is relevant for the measurement of identity in this research? Unpacking the content of identity, scholars mostly speak of the following overlapping components or dimensions: changing set of beliefs, ideas, norms (Flockhart 2005b: 13) as well as values, oppositions, assumptions, and aims (Todd et al. 2008b: 20). Abdelal et al. characterize the content of identity as the meaning of the collective identity and refer to four forms of content: constitutive norms, social purposes, relation comparison, and cognitive models. Constitutive norms are the formal or informal rules, which define group membership and help other actors to recognize the identity. These norms not only help identify the appropriate behavior for a particular identity but, most importantly, they lead actors to recognize an actor as having a particular identity. They differ from social purposes by not determining the preferences of a social group, but by defining the boundaries and distinctive practices of a group. Socialization literature is mostly focused on the normative content of identity and the internalization of these identities at the point that the identity of the group is taken for granted by new members. For instance, the Copenhagen criteria of the EU – democratic polity, respect for human rights, primarily a market economy – are used to measure and define the Europeanness of the current and applicant states. The internalization and taking these norms for granted are seen as signs of European identity (Abdelal et al. 2009: 20-21). Second in Abdelal et al.’s content of identity are social aims, which they define as interests, goals, and preferences shared by group members. There is a connection between the identity of the actors and what these actors want (Abdelal et al. 2009: 22-23). The significant third content of the identity, according to Abdelal et al., is the relational content, referring to the beliefs and views about the ‘self’ and ‘other.’ This relational content of identity refers to a definition of identity based on what the identity is not or what the other of myself is. This relational dimension of identity is at the very core of social identity theory, according to which social identities arise through a process of social comparison and through drawing boundaries between them and us. The cognitive model refers to the worldviews or political and material conditions

48 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

and interests that are shaped by a particular identity. Identity influences selfunderstanding, making sense of one’s problems, identifying one’s interests, and orienting one’s actions. It is also a way of recognizing, classifying, and identifying other people and coding and making sense out of their actions (Brubaker 2004: 41-43; Abdelal et al. 2009). The cognitive models are not only about broad worldviews, but also about understanding of self, the group, and others through language. Analysis based on the cognitive content of an identity shows how identity affects an actor’s understanding of the world and, as a result, how their material or social incentives for particular actions will be influenced by their identities (Abdelal et al. 2009: 19-26).

2.5

Turkey’s National Identity

Turkey, a country that has experienced the collapse of an empire and still struggles for answers regarding its identity, is definitely a challenging and tough case for identity research. Huntington points out in his famous article, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ (1993), the torn identities of Turkey; and, according to Waxman, in the circles of Turkish scholars, writers, and politicians, ‘the question of Turkish national identity has often been framed in terms of an identity crisis’ (Waxman 2000: 3). Turkey does not share in the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, but neither does it belong to the predominantly Arab Islamic culture (Müftüler-Baç 1997: 3). It is usually described as a bridge between Europe and Asia, the West and the (Middle) East, or Western and Islamic civilizations (Göl 2009: 796). The desire to gain acceptance as a European state in its own right has always been an implicit objective of Turkish foreign policy (Müftüler-Baç 1997: 3). Although it predominantly described itself as European, Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are problematic because of these identity crises. Such a national identity is a totally different base upon which the EU might have an impact than, say, that of the English (Breakwell 2004: 27). Thus, it is not surprising that one faces several conflicting definitions of Turkish national identity, which make it almost impossible to find common ground and signifiers for defining the Turkish identity in research terms. There is an overwhelming consensus among scholars of modern Turkey that Turkish modernization and nation building has largely been top-down, state led, and elitist. To create a unified national identity and to gain recognition as part of Europe, the country was modernized under the tutelage of political and military elite (Müftüler-Baç 1997: 17-18). The leading role in this project was played by the state elite. The political elite decided what comprised

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

49

the national identity and what it meant to be a Turk, and the people, to a great extent, were excluded from this process. The dominant role of the elite in the formulation of Turkish identity is not something special and is an exception since generally the elite play a leading and crucial role in identity matters. What is significant in the Turkish case is the weak position of the masses in the identity construction of the newly established country. The masses in Turkey generally remained passive recipients of the nationalist message imposed top-down by the elites (Keyder 1997: 43). In spite of these challenges, one can establish some basic features of Turkish national identity, which might be applied for tracking the shift in the descriptions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ For the purpose of this book, I decided to analyze the following features of Turkish national identity: modernism/ Westernization, secularism, and religion. The justification to concentrate on these features instead of alternative ones is based on the fact that secularism and religion are the main values or doctrine as guiding principles which are predominant themes in scholarly inquiry and Turkish political discourse (Alaranta 2015: 15; Wood 2013: 274). From its establishment on Turkey has been dominated by the secularist versus Islamist cleavage and its identity defined by competing and sometimes complementary narratives of Islamic and Western identities (Alaranta 2015: 9). The secularism-Islam division is recurrently used in the discourses of actors, which are also closely linked with country’s modernization and Westernization (Alaranta 2015: 16). These competing features of Turkish national identity overlap to some degree, but still need to be discussed separately because of their significance in Turkish national identity. In the following, I will fix these predominant characteristics of Turkish national identity, based on their historical and social development, and will analyze each element explicitly. Western and Modern To become identified as European and to be a significant element of the political, military, and economic institutions of the West has occupied Turkey’s political agenda throughout its history. Historically, Turkey’s pro-Western orientation dates back to the time of the Ottoman Empire. Modernization and, to this end, Westernization have been the major goals of the political elite of the modern Turkish Republic as they were for the leaders of the Ottoman Empire (Keyder 1997: 37; Göl 2009: 796). As a result of military defeats from the seventeenth century onward the Ottoman Empire was forced to initiate a process of Westernization (Tank 2006: 465). The modernization of the Ottoman state started when the

50 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

empire acknowledged the military superiority of European power. It then took steps to reorganize its own military, which occurred under Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839). It then economically modernized itself during the Tanzimat period starting with the Imperial Decree of the Rose Chamber of 1839 and continuing with the Revolution of 1908, which brought the Young Turks to power until 1918 (Göl 2013: 43). In the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire initiated modernizing reforms aimed at strengthening the central state in order to compensate for what they had begun to perceive as their civilizational shortcomings. This process of secular modernization during the Ottoman period, which included reforms in the military, in education, in civil administration, in dress, as well as in political and civil rights, was equated by some with Westernization (the Westernists), whereas others opted for accepting Western technology while preserving Islamic institutions and culture (the Islamists) (Rumelili 2011: 243; Sakallıoğlu 1998: 7). European civilization has also played a significant role in the formulation of Turkish identity (Müftüler-Baç 1997: 18). From 1923 onward – but building on earlier attempts at modernization – the Western identity of Turkey was emphasized by the Kemalist state (Alaranta 2015: 20). With the establishment of the new Turkish Republic, the country decided its direction was toward Europe and the construction of its national identity was characterized by Westernization. For the founder of the republic, modernization was equated with Westernization, taking a place in European civilization, and internalizing all its cultural dimensions (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 35; Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997: 3; Keyder 1997: 37). Western civilization was considered the highest form of culture and society to which Turkey should belong and the military was trusted to have the guardianship role of the modern republic (Tank 2006: 465). The secularization and modernization of Turkey was a top-down process that ended up repressing society, for the state was not entirely capable of implementing its modernization policies among the majority of its population because there was a wide gap between the worldviews and life experiences of the Kemalist elite, on the one hand, and most of the population, on the other (Alaranta 2015: 11-12). However, there were nationalist like Ziya Gökalp who developed a political-social theory of ‘Turkish-Islamist-Westernist Modernism’ and who represented the idea that Western ideas had to be carefully balanced against national culture (Tank 2006: 465). Turkey’s desire to be included in the West was also strengthened through the security needs of country, which serve to reinforce its bond with the West. Throughout the Cold War period the state elite strengthened its ties

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

51

to the USA and Europe in line with the security needs of the country (Tank 2006: 466). Turkey’s strategic significance during the Cold War encouraged its identity as European and opened the doors to several European entities, such as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (later the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and the Council of Europe, as well its associations with the EC. Considering itself as a natural part of the Western international community, Turkey viewed the regional developments from a Western point of view. The majority of Turkish elites believed that the less the Islamic and Eastern characteristics of Turkish identity were emphasized, the more the secular and Western aspects of Turkish identity would be realized, which could help increase Turkey’s prospects of joining the EU (Oğuzlu 2008: 13). The prospect of eventual membership was also offered to Turkey in the early 1960s. However, again historical developments influenced Europe’s approach to Turkey’s self-definition as European. In the 1970s, the EC’s definition of Europeanness changed and democracy became the primary defining characteristic of a European state. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey lost its strategic importance for Europe and, in turn, its Europeanness in the eyes of Western countries (Oğuzlu 2008: 6). Turkey has turned a blind eye for a long time to the questioning of Turkey’s Western identity, all the while insisting on its Western identity. The subsequent pronouncements of the Eastern aspects of Turkish national identity – namely, its Islamic character and its Ottoman legacy – were an attempt to secure Turkey’s place in the West through its links to the East (Oğuzlu 2008: 6-7). More recently, growing international concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has influenced the perception of Turkey. As a result, the EU’s emphasis on Turkey as its cultural ‘other’ became much stronger (Verney 2007). In spite of Turkey’s self-definition as European, its otherness was always emphasized by the political community it wanted to join, as the Turk has been historically the most important relevant other of Europe (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 333). Despite the decline of Turkey’s importance for Europe, Western values and the desire to become an EU member only increased for Turkey, particularly after the end of the Cold War and the defeat of communism. Accordingly, the political discourse based on being European was fed continually with ideas on individual rights, pluralism and minority rights (Sakallıoğlu 1998: 8). However, in the post-Cold War era, there have been radical shifts in Turkey’s national security situation and in the definition of its national identity, which, in turn, have affected Turkey’s view of NATO. As a result non-Western/European dimensions of Turkey’s national identity have become more pronounced (Kubicek et al. 2015: 165).

52 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

The modernization of the Turkish Republic included the isolation of the Turkish self from its Ottoman legacy, including the Arab countries. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the state constructed its new external and internal others which were mirrored in the interests of the state and, in turn, its foreign policy. Foreign policy decisions were mainly influenced by the government’s perception of ‘self’ as European. Turkey – with its Muslim majority – always stressed the differences between the nation’s ‘self’ and ‘other’ Muslim countries and was allied with Western countries. Turkey became a member of almost all Western military, political, and economic organizations, including the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (later the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952 (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 58; Yavuz 1998: 27). As a result of the new definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ interaction with the Middle East was kept to a minimum – something that was reinforced by the negative images of the Arabs current in Western culture, such as the untrustworthy Arab who cooperated with the British against the Turks during World War I and the uncivilized, backward Arab states governed by Sharia law (Aykan 1993: 92; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 53). Turkey’s identification with the West was so deep that even during and after World War II it did not abandon the Western alignment of its foreign policy, although many nations and governments revised their allegiances according to the new balance of power (Lewis 1961: 296; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 52). Although Turkey is eager to be Western and European civilization has been a very important factor in the formulation of Turkish identity (Müftüler-Baç 1997: 18), it has mixed and conflicting perceptions of the West, which go back to the war for the independence (1919-1923) of the Turkish Republic (Erozan 2009: 9). On the one hand, the West is associated with civilization and modernization and is the driving force behind Turkey’s self-identification as European or Western. On the other hand, for Turks the West stands for imperialism because of the Treaty of Sèvres (Göçek 2011: 183), which aimed to split Anatolia between British, French, Greek, and Italian regions in 1920. Although it was never ratified and was replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Treaty of Sèvres left a deep wound in Turkish collective memory (Tekin 2012: 32) and it took root as the Sèvres Syndrome in the minds of Turks (Göçek 2011: 98-99). The basic assumption underlying the Sèvres Syndrome is that Europeans perceive the Turks as illegitimate invaders and occupiers of European-Christian lands and intend to restore those lands to their rightful owners, i.e., the Armenians, Greeks, and the Kurds (Yılmaz 2011: 188). Today, for many Turks the Sèvres Syndrome

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

53

is a filter through which the world is perceived and a manipulation tool to influence public attitudes toward the external world (Kirişci 2006: 33). It is an important aspect of Turkish political culture (Kirişci 2006: 32) and influences decision-making and foreign policy in Turkey (Jung and Piccoli 2001). As a result of the Sèvres Syndrome Turkey created its ‘others’ with imagined attributes who challenged Turkish state interests (Göçek 2011: 146). Several historical and political developments also turned this syndrome into paranoia, such as the Cyprus issue in the 1970s, the terrorist activities of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Kurdish PKK, as well the establishment of the Kurdish federal state in North Iraq under US control (Oran 2010: 160). The EU membership process continues to be accused of being the modern version of the Treaty of Sèvres because of demands regarding the Armenian question or the status of the Kurdish minority in Turkey (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007: 80; Dismorr 2008: 26). These practices remind the Turkish people of the European powers that wanted to impose the Treaty of Sèvres on their land and they associate the EU with the former enemy. Consequently, the more the EU insists on its requirements, the more it (or the West) becomes an ‘other’ for Turkey rather than ‘self.’ Secular and Muslim Secularism is a significant principle of the legitimization of the Turkish state and a main element of the new Turkish national identity. The alternative meanings and future of secularism constitute one of the most important conflict issues in Turkey since its establishment (Kuru and Stepan 2012). The separation of state and religion is a broadly accepted fact of political life in Turkey and its roots run as deep as those of most EU member states. The secularization of Turkey goes back to the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire and did not begin, as is widely believed, in the 1920s with Atatürk. Atatürk’s reform was rather the conclusion of almost a century of secularization of state institutions (Jung 2008: 120-121; Berkes 1998). The Turkish constitution from the early 1980s outlines the secular character of the state. Article 174 of the constitution safeguards the secular character of the republic by stating that no provision of the constitution shall be construed in such a way as to render unconstitutional the enumerated reform laws that safeguard the secular character of the republic. Moreover, Article 24 prohibits the exploitation of religion or religious feelings for the purpose of political or personal benefit, and forbids even partial establishment of the fundamental social, economic, political, and legal order of the state upon

54 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

religious principles (Özbudun 2011: 27-28). In addition, secularism has been consistently supported by the military. For decades the military acted as the safeguard of secularism as a fundamental political principle of the state by using power via certain state institutions such as the National Security Council and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Warhola and Bezci 2010: 433). The modernization project of the Turkish Republic required the negation of the Islamic framework from social and political life and the replacement of its symbols with those of the newly defined Turkish nation (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 35-36; Eisenstadt 1984: 9). In the elite’s discourse the West was described as solely rational and capable of modernity and Islam represented everything that reform, progress, and civilization were not (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997: 29). Thus, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, there was a tremendous effort to create a European state from the Turkish Muslim core of the Ottoman Empire through a nationalist, secularist, and authoritarian revolution and to secure the adoption of Turkey into Europe. The state was engaged in a vigorous reform program that lasted for fifteen years, to weaken not only the Islamic character of the state, but also that of the nation. In this context, separation of religion and the world was achieved through a number of reform acts. For instance, in 1924, the caliphate was abolished and a legal separation of religious and state affairs was effected. In 1924 the Muslim Sabbath, Friday, was dropped in favor of Sunday. In 1925 and 1930 Sufist orders were outlawed and Swiss civil codes, Italian penal codes, and the Latin alphabet were adopted. Furthermore, the second article of the 1924 constitution, which declared Islam the state religion, was annulled in 1928 (Çağaptay 2006; Berkes 1998: 461-479; Sakallıoğlu 1998: 8; Müftüler-Baç 1997: 17). These efforts aimed at eliminating the practices that marked Turkey’s as different from Europe (Rumelili 2011: 243-244) and changing the self-definition of the Turkish state, which was mainly based on the Islamic notion of the nation, by providing a new identity (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 47). Turkish secularism is strongly anticlerical and had as its aim the elimination of religious influence from government affairs and from the education system, allowing for strict state control of Islam (Ignatow 2011: 163). To establish a Western-like self and promote European-like identity, the disestablishment of Islam as the state religion and making politics independent of religious considerations was seen as necessary. However, Western facets of Turkish identity and Islam should not be regarded as two polar opposites that have only two modalities of interaction, where the failure of the former politics leads to the rise of the latter force (Sakallıoğlu 1998: 7-8). Secularism in Turkey does not necessarily mean nonintervention in religion by the state. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in

The Concept of Socialization and Identity Change

55

1923, there has been a dialectical interplay between the state and Islam, causing each to trigger responses in the other so as to preclude the possibility of Islam becoming a simple reaction against Westernization, operating independently from political and social determiners (Sakallıoğlu 1998: 7). Turkish secularism includes a state construction of a modern identity, which reflects the stronger traditions, and older institutions of Islam. The state controls the institutional framework and determines the political role that Islam can or should play (Davison 1998). To achieve this, the Republican elite revived the Ottoman state tradition of including the highest functionaries of Islam, the ulema, within the structures of the state and created a similar agency called the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) in 1924 (Sakallıoğlu 1998: 7-8). The Directorate was established to carry out services regarding the Islamic faith and practices and is entrusted with protecting and propagating Islam as central to Turkish national identity (Gözaydın 2008). In this framework, the Directorate (or Presidency) of Religious Affairs administered and funded Muslim facilities intending to keep religion subordinate (Wood 2013: 273). Article 136 of the constitution of the Republic of Turkey states that the Directorate ‘shall exercise its duties prescribed in this particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at nationality solidarity and integrity’ (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey). This statement indicates the official position of the Republic regarding the compatibility between religion and the secular state (Wood 2013: 273-274). However, the efforts of the Turkish state were not really successful. Religion has remained a significant element of Turkish national identity. Şerif Mardin’s research on identity in 1968, which asked participants to define themselves based on the following identities: inhabitant of Izmir, worker, Turk and Muslim, found that being Muslim ranked after being Turk (50.3% of the participants defined themselves as Turk) as the important identity signifier. According to the research, being a Muslim was seen as the first and foremost element of Turkish national identity by only 37.5% of the participants (Mardin 1983: 118). World Values Survey project director Prof. Yılmaz Esmer of Bahçeşehir University states like other Islamic societies, Turkish people are among the most devout in the world (Esmer 2008: 286). The 2012 World Values Survey shows that Turkey is one of the most religious societies in Europe and in the world. According to the survey, religion is a key component of Turkish society; indeed, the proportion of people who describe themselves as religious increased by 10% over the last 22 years (Esmer 2012). Generally the top-down nature of the establishment of the new Turkish identity, which to a great extent ignored the masses, is

56 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

blamed for the failure of the state to weaken the religion. In reality, Turkish identity, even during the heyday of Kemalism (1923-1950), could not escape its religious foundation. Even during this period, Islam was instrumental in forming the Turkish national identity (Yavuz 1998: 26). Contrary to the original aim of the state, a kind of Turkified Islam, which was intended to strengthen Turkish national identity, was created even though Islam was eliminated from the official definition of the nation. The establishment of a multiparty democracy after World War II, the rise of a pro-Islamic bourgeoisie in the 1980s, and new regulations allowing private media and education have also led to the stronger presence of religion in national identity. As demonstrated, Islam and secularism are significant elements of Turkish national identity. They are also widely used for the description of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Turkey describes itself as the only secular Muslim country and points out what differentiates it from the other Arab countries. Islam and secularism are the main areas of conflict between the state/elite and the masses. However, Islamists and secularists agree that both are significant pillars of Turkish national identity. Although very religious, the Turkish public has very similar attitudes with respect to the separation of the state and religion as the Western public. A sizeable proportion of the Turkish population espouses secular values (Esmer 2008: 284-286). In the case of Islam, the debate is not about the importance of Islam in shaping Turkish national identity, but about the strength of its presence in policy issues and in social life and the resulting policy implications. A majority of citizens and the newly arisen Islamic elite link Islam within their conception of Turkish national identity and argue that the primarily Islamic nature of Turkish identity should be given concrete political and social expression. The secularist elite and citizens also see Islam as an important source of Turkish national identity, but just one element among others, and not the exclusive source of Turkish national identity and not at all the most important one (Waxman 2000: 22).

3

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations Opening the Door to Europeanness

From 1995 until 2000, Turkey was a highly state-centric, security-oriented, and crisis-ridden country, tackling a number of serious economic, political, and cultural problems, such as a lack of democracy, human rights violations, absence of the rule of law, economic instability, legitimacy crises, and a lack of foreign policy vision and orientation. The relatively high degree of instability in Turkish party politics was reflected in the Turkish political party system of the mid-1990s, which was fragmented and polarized. One of the main reasons for this fragmentation was the division within the center-right and center-left parties. The ANAP and DYP on the center-right and the DSP and CHP on the center-left had great similarities in their ideologies and programs, but no cooperation. The competition within the center-right and center-left caused splintering of the votes. Moreover, the centrist parties failed in dealing with the economic and social problems, resulting in a dramatic decline in their electoral support (Sayarı 2002: 1819). The inconclusive elections and weak coalitions drew the country into political instability. None of the parliamentary elections held in 1991, 1995, and 1999 resulted in a majority party government, despite the use of a 10% national threshold for representation in parliament. From October 1995 until November 2002, Turkey had seven different governments, mainly two- or three-party coalition governments, including DYP-CHP, ANAP-DYP, RP-DYP, the minority cabinet of ANAP-DSP-DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi [Democratic Society Party]) along with independent deputies, and SP-MHP-ANAP (TBMM 2014a). The 1995 parliamentary elections failed to produce a stable government and power oscillated between several unmanageable coalitions, including the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi [RP]), an Islamist party which was ultimately overthrown by a ‘postmodern coup’ in February 1997. After the Welfare Party coalition was overthrown, the parliament failed to produce stable governments, resulting in the alternation of unstable minority coalitions until the 1999 elections. The 1999 elections saw the rise of a three-party coalition, led by Ecevit in alliance with the ANAP and the MHP. This coalition was more conservative (MHP-DSP (a weak liberal party)-ANAP), which complicated relations with the EU (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 27). At the same time, despite the 10% threshold, five parties obtained seats in parliament in all three elections. In addition, new parties were usually formed in parliament through factional and party splits,

58 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

increasing the number of parties represented (there were up to eleven at some points). The political party system was also marked by polarization, based largely on the growing conflict between secularists and Islamists (Sayarı 2002: 18-21). Two identity-based conflicts, namely Islam and the Kurdish problem, occupied the state and society (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007: 69), posing a serious threat to the secular nature and territorial integrity of the country. The conflict over Islamic identity was caused by the Islamist party’s new position as a key player in party politics in the 1990s. Formerly, it represented only a small segment of the electorate. Between 1991 and 1995, the Welfare Party experienced a notable upsurge in votes. It also captured local elections in several major Turkish cities in 1994. In the 1995 general election, it emerged as the strongest party, receiving 21.4% of the votes and 158 parliamentary seats (Sayarı 2002: 19). The second identity-based conflict was caused by the rise of the armed Kurdish secessionist movement led by the PKK, which reached its peak in the second half of the 1990s and was the most important source of political crises. As a result of the destructive impact of the PKK, nationalist extremism among the Turkish masses increased (Yılmaz 2009: 56). In this period, Turkey witnessed a violent radicalization and polarization of political choices, cultural identities, and even economic policies. During this time, Turkey was trying to bring its relationship with the EU to a conclusion, as foreseen by the Ankara Agreement, and to join the Customs Union. In 1987, Turkey abruptly decided to apply for full membership in the EC, which was a great surprise to the EC. It took more than two and a half years for the Commission to prepare its report on Turkey, which turned down Turkey’s application in December 1989. The Commission decided not to give a positive or negative response to Turkey’s application at that time. In its reply to Turkey’s application, the Commission concluded ‘that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away’ (Commission of the European Communities 1989) because of economic and political reasons. However, the EC accepted Turkey’s eligibility for full membership but recommended waiting until the EC’s next enlargement and to finalize the Customs Union at that time. Following the EC’s reply to Turkey’s application, and based on the Ankara Agreement, which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union with the Community by 1995, Turkey started preparations for the completion of the Customs Union. With the signing of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU on 6 March 1995 at the Turkey-EU Association Council, the transitional period of Turkey’s Association, as foreseen by the Ankara Agreement and the 1970 Additional

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

59

Protocol, was finalized (Müftüler-Baç 2005: 19). On 1 January 1996, the Customs Union came into effect, creating the closest economic and political relationship between the EU and any nonmember country.

3.1

The EU’s Reluctant Interactions with Turkey

During the 1990s, the EC/EU regarded relations with Turkey to a great extent as a strategic relationship, which did not include full membership. It generally used the words ‘strategic partnership’ and ‘special relationship’ in defining Turkey-EU relations. The EU’s position on Turkey can be traced back to the lessening of Turkey’s importance to the West and Europe with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Thus, the European Community preferred intensive cooperation within the framework of the Association Agreement and favored the Customs Union in 1995 instead of full membership. This was regarded as a good alternative, keeping Turkey under the influence of Europe, but stopping short of membership. On the Turkish side, the Customs Union was a significant prelude to full membership and so, because of this, Turkey was the first country to enter a customs union agreement prior to membership. Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement on 6 March 1995, under the grand coalition of Tansu Çiller’s center-right True Path Party and Deniz Baykal‘s center-left CHP, which gave the Customs Union laws and constitutional regulations high priority (TBMM 2014b). With the start of the Customs Union the EU became increasingly alert to Turkey’s political shortcomings and the Customs Union Agreement opened the way to the EU’s growing impact on Turkey’s political structures and practices. For example, after the arrest of several Kurdish deputies, the European Parliament delayed ratification of the Customs Union Agreement. Turkey unblocked the European Parliament’s ratification by slightly modifying a controversial article into a terrorism law (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 22). Following the Customs Union decision in July 1995, the Turkish government launched a series of democratizing and liberalizing reforms prior to the European Parliament’s vote on the Custom’s Union in December 1995. This package of constitutional changes was launched to satisfy the European Parliament on the state of democracy and was the first-ever package of amendments to the 1980 military-era constitution. The purpose of initiating these reforms was to persuade the European Parliament to give its consent to the Association Council Customs Union decision (Yılmaz 2009; Müftüler-Baç 2005: 19).

60 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

When the Customs Union came into effect on 1 January 1996, it not only created the closest economic and political relationship between the EU and a nonmember country, but also created the illusion in the Turkish government and the public that Turkey was finally entering the last stage of its association and moving toward membership. That is why there was such public outrage in Turkey when the EU’s enlargement process in 1997 left Turkey out and led to accusations that the EU was using double standards and discriminating against Turkey (Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis 2008: 119). When the European Council excluded Turkey from its list of formal candidates at the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, Turkish relations with the EU entered a difficult phase. Eleven other applicant states were granted formal candidacy status, although none of them were part of the Customs Union. Turkey was the only applicant country in the Customs Union and also had the longest-standing application and association. The European Council based its decision on human rights violations and lack of respect for minorities, among other issues. It emphasized that Turkey did not meet the standards for candidacy and offered instead a ‘European strategy’ based on the exploitation of the integration prospects foreseen under existing contractual relationships (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 22). Turkey considered this decision discriminatory treatment and responded in December 1997 by declaring that it would not join the European Conference and was suspending its dialogue with the EU. Therefore, it would not discuss issues like human rights and the Cyprus issue. At the same summit, Cyprus was allowed to start accession negotiations, which made the issue even more untenable for Turkey. In response, Turkey declared that it would go ahead with plans to integrate Northern Cyprus with mainland Turkey (Çarkoğlu 2004: 22). Turkey decided to base its relations with the EU on the Association Agreement, the Additional Protocol, and the Customs Union. However, the goal of full membership was not abandoned; Turkey began displaying a dichotomous approach to the Union, which would consolidate in the years ahead. While the government stepped up its campaign to obtain candidacy, the domestic political debate was rife with criticism of the Union. The ensuing 1997-1999 vicious cycles in EU-Turkey relations were matched by slow progress on domestic political reforms (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 22-23). The European Council Meeting in Cardiff on 15-16 June 1998 was seen as a good opportunity to rectify the difficult period of Turkey-EU relations after the Luxembourg Summit. In the declaration, the word ‘candidate’ was not used, but all the formulations, which indicate candidate status, were included. Moreover, it stated that the development of Turkey would be observed and, after six months, there would be a decision. Turkey welcomed

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

61

the language and perceived it as a positive development. However, it was not sufficient for Turkey to modify the policy it had been following since the Luxembourg Summit. An important development from the Cardiff Council Meeting was the EU leaders’ endorsement of the Commission’s ‘European Strategy’ for Turkey. It also invited the EU president, the Commission, and Turkish authorities to work on harmonization of Turkey’s legislation and practice with acquis. The Turkish authorities perceived communication of the European Strategy very positively although it did not contain new elements and most of the proposals had been made in earlier agreements, which had not been fulfilled. A document with their reactions to the proposals in the ‘European Strategy’ was sent to the Commission, confirming the Turkish side’s willingness to cooperate on the proposal’s strategy (Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis 2008: 6-7). The European Council meetings in Vienna and Cologne did not bring about any changes in the EU-Turkey relations. The Vienna European Council of December 1998 underlined the importance of EU-Turkey relations and of the further implementation of the ‘European Strategy’ to prepare Turkey for membership. The Cologne European Council of June 1999 was also not able to agree to any conclusions on Turkey. The initiative taken by the German Presidency to ensure the recognition of Turkey’s candidate status was prevented by the objections of some EU members. The Customs Union and Turkey’s Sensitive National Issues During this phase the arrest, trial, and death sentence of the PKK leader Öcalan marked Turkey-EU relations and touched the identity issue impacting greatly Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ The EU had not only required a fair trial for Öcalan, but also requested that Turkey solve its domestic problems, meaning full respect for human rights and the rule of law (Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis 2008: 6-7). Although the Customs Union caused readiness to discuss and consider Kurdish reforms and gave rise to the underlying of Turkish Europeanness, Turkey had serious hesitation and trust issues regarding the EU’s actual requirements, which in turn influenced Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ In the course of the Customs Union approval, the EU began to require steps from Turkey for improving human rights. The issue of human rights was being increasingly emphasized by the European Parliament. A reporter for the European Parliament, Gonzales, pointed out that the path to EU membership is through human rights and that the EU is very sensitive to human rights issues. If there was no improvement in this area, Turkey would

62 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

not join the EU (Cumhuriyet 1995h). Moreover, the West European Union prepared a report on the Southeast issue (at this time the issue was not referred to as ‘the Kurdish issue’) on 24 May, which was then discussed on 20 June at a meeting in Paris. Çiller went to Paris to attend this meeting. The report consisted of 95 pages, with 40 pages stating that the Kurdish population in Turkey was under pressure and did not have ethnic and cultural rights (Cucó 1995). This was one of the harshest reports on Turkey and on the solution to the Kurdish issue. It recommended political autonomy for the Kurds within Turkey’s territory and warned that failure to find a solution could limit Turkey’s integration into European institutions. The report also claimed that, by not recognizing ethnic identities, the state could bring this issue to a point that threatened the security of the country. It also identified the presence of Turkey in Cyprus as an occupation of the country (ibid.). In December, the European Parliament affirmed Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union. However, this was linked to the oversight of human rights in Turkey and financial aid was subject to conditions. The European Parliament’s prerequisite was that the government allow the expression of Kurdish cultural identity within the framework of Turkey’s territorial integrity. The decision required Turkey, the PKK, and Kurdish organizations to find a nonviolent solution to the Kurdish problem. These conditions were criticized in Turkey for putting Turkey and the PKK ‘in the same pot’ (Cumhuriyet 1995g). Despite mistrusting the missing conditionality tool of the EU, Turkey regarded the Customs Union as a great opportunity to address its political weaknesses and problems and was expecting many positive changes in its political and democratic standards. The Customs Union was seen as the key for the democratization of Turkey. Çetin pointed this out: ‘Turkey is now entering a very important phase […] one should not see this only as an economic union. It goes beyond political principles […] Turkey cannot be an equal member without solving the human rights problems and eliminating the hindrances to democratization’ (Cumhuriyet 1995f). The vice president of the DYP, Halit Dağlı, shared the same position and said: ‘The Customs Union will bring a lot of beautiful things to our country. It will cause democratization. Laws and the constitution will be more democratic. Turkey will be an industrial center in Europe’ (Cumhuriyet 1995d). The Customs Union provided Turkey with surely a big impetus for the discussion of the Kurdish issue. The EU was able, during this period, to create debates or initiatives on previously taboo topics in Turkey and Turkey showed a readiness to allow improvements in this regard. In 1995, after Turkey was accepted into the Customs Union, Yılmaz said in a speech at the

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

63

Strategic Research Center in Washington, DC, that economic, social, and cultural reforms for the Kurdish minority were underway and they were going to allow television broadcasting in Kurdish and schools that educate in Kurdish (Hürriyet 1995b). In the government’s Application Protocol, which was signed by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and the leader of the CHP, Hikmet Çetin, the same points regarding the solution of the Kurdish issue were made as in Mesut Yılmaz’s speech in Washington, DC. The chapter on ‘Restoration of the Southeast’ included planning and developing concrete steps, while maintaining national unity, for overcoming the legal and actual shortcomings, limitations, and hindrances that citizens experienced when freely expressing and developing ethnic and cultural identities. Similar formulations can also be found in the protocol of the 50th government (TBMM 2014c). After the start of the Customs Union, solving the Kurdish and Cyprus issues was a high priority for all parties. Following the establishment of the DYP-ANAP coalition, Yılmaz tried to find solutions for two problems in the way of EU membership. After the new government was established, Yılmaz declared his first action would be to allow Kurdish-language education and broadcasting. He said there was no disagreement with Çiller regarding this issue and confirmed that the state would make a distinction between citizen and terrorist and open the evacuated villages, which were now secure, to residents again. Homes would be built for inhabitants if their area was still not secure. The GAP would be continued (Hürriyet 1996d). (The GAP [Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (South Eastern Anatolia Project)] was the largest regional project in Turkey and included the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers through the provinces Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, and Kilis.) Yılmaz made a call for peace and dialogue and asked that the solution process be started without prejudice. He added that to refuse this call was to refuse peace. He suggested considering the Cyprus issue from a new perspective, abstaining from behavior that could cause tensions, beginning the negotiations without preconditions, and determining the solutions together. If the problems could not be solved, a mediator should be engaged, or an appeal made to the tribunal in The Hague. (This last point was rejected by Ecevit. He said it was not in the text and even mentioning The Hague was objectionable.) Yılmaz suggested taking some measures to improve security. He also warned the EU that it should assume its responsibilities without attaching strings (Hürriyet 1996g). In April Ecevit started opening the Southeast, which mirrored the official state policy on this issue. Ecevit initiated the opening in Diyarbakır

64 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

and said: ‘As the sun rises from the East, democracy will also rise from the East. We will abolish terrorists but will not break anybody’s heart. There is no ethnicity problem in the Southeast. If the people are provided with food, jobs and homes, there will be no need for police. The citizens themselves can deal with the PKK’ (Hürriyet 1996a). During the same month, Yılmaz organized a commission to search for democratic solutions and deal with issues like Kurdish television, radio, and education. The CHP took also some steps toward addressing the problem and prepared the Tunceli Report in November 1996, requiring recognition of Kurdish identity. It was felt that the Kurdish issue should be solved and that it was mainly caused by the legal and practical hindrance of free expression of culture and identity. The recognition of Kurdish identity was seen as the only path to true peace and democratization in Turkey (Hürriyet 1996f). Also, the RP and DYP (Refahyol) coalition took some steps for improving the rights of Kurdish people. Erbakan started a peace initiative for the Southeast. The first concrete step was the initiative of Kurdish television. Coalition partner DYP supported this idea. The DYP state minister, Salim Ensarioğlu, stated that these are innocent wishes. Kurdish songs and education is a good thing. He said: ‘There are several women’s problems and it is good if the women are informed about these issues in Kurdish since 80% of the women do not speak Turkish’ (Hürriyet 1996c). The majority of the coalition partners regarded the initiative for Kurdish television as positive, in contrast to talks with the Kurdish nationalist party HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi [People’s Democracy Party]).

3.2

The Customs Union: The Opening or Closing of the Door to Europe?

The start of the Customs Union Agreement was welcomed by both the Turkish and European sides. When the Association Council acknowledged the Customs Union with Turkey on 6 March 1996, the president of the EU and French foreign minister Alain Juppé called it a very important and meaningful time for Turkey-EU relations. The start of the Customs Union in January 1996 was not only welcomed by Turkish politicians but was seen more widely as grounds for a celebration in Turkey, which was mirrored in the newspapers. Hürriyet reported the news with the headline ‘Hello Europe’ and described it as a very important step in Turkey’s 34-year-old European dream. Prime Minister Çiller conveyed Turkish enthusiasm in her speech after the signing of the Customs Union Agreement by describing

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

65

the process as unification with the EU, which was broadcast on all TV channels: ‘I want to share with you the happiness of a historical day. Today is 6 March. The process of uniting with the EU has begun’ (Hürriyet 1995a). She described the day as the turning point for the Turkish Republic and said: ‘Happy, historical day for all of us’ (ibid.). During this phase, discourses of the supporter of Customs Union focused mainly on the Europeanness of Turkey and described Turkey’s joining the Customs Union as recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness or as the opportunity to become a European. They described the Turkish self mainly as European. The reference to Turkey’s Muslim identity was generally done to support the argument that its place is inside the European community. However, the opponents of the Customs Union mainly underlined the Eastern and Muslim identity of Turkey, criticizing Turkey’s joining the Customs Union. All of these discourses used the topoi of culture, values, geography, danger, usefulness, and history with different aims. Customs Union: Recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness The majority regarded joining the Customs Union as recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness or as the engine for the Europeanization of Turkey, which was underlined by the politicians as the most important signifier of the Turkish ‘self.’ Topoi of danger and history were mostly employed to warn the European Community about the exclusion of Turkey by referring to historical examples (Wodak 2001: 75-76) and to justify their positive attribution for the Customs Union. Underlying Turkey’s European identity, they placed the Turkish ‘self’ within the European community and outside the non-Western/Middle Eastern community, which was mainly described as the ‘other’ of Turkey. Çiller, for instance, emphasized in her speech in Brussels that the Customs Union was proof of Turkey’s Europeanness. In his column in Hürriyet, Ertuğrul Özkök referred to Çiller’s speech, which was to be given in Brussels. He wrote: ‘There are some striking points in Çiller’s speech. For instance, she is going to say, “I am European” just like Kennedy once said, “I am a Berliner.” She will say the borders of Europe are through Turkey and add that our real aim is full membership, not to build new walls between us’ (Özkök 1995). Çiller goes back in her speech to the Berlin Crises of 1961 during Cold War and as Kennedy made clear U.S. policy in the wake of the construction of the Berlin Wall by saying ‘Ich bin ein Berliner,’ she aimed to underline Turkey’s self-description as part of Europe and European by stating ‘I am European.’ She also combines in her speech the topos of danger

66 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

and the topos of history. Çiller equates the nonacceptance of Turkey with a building of an imaginary wall between Turkey and the EU and points to the threatening consequences of the nonacceptance in reference to the conflicts during the Cold War. The use of the phrase ‘between us’ stresses the belonging of Turkey to the EU, like West and East Berlin belonged together. In the same text, Özkök expressed his own feelings about the Customs Union with great enthusiasm because it gives the country the fruits of its efforts since the establishment of the republic: ‘A nation which could not even produce a needle 70 years ago, is now challenging Europe, which once imposed capitulation on Turkey […] Now Turkey is going to be a European country’ (ibid.). Özkök’s expression includes a negative description of Europe as Turkey’s historical other. His reference to the capitulation mirrors Turkey’s mixed and conflicting perceptions of the West. On the one hand, he claims Turkey to be a European country, but on the other hand he brings up Turkey’s capitulation, pointing to the historical rivalry between Turkey and the West. He interprets today’s relations with the EU from the perspective of this historical rivalry, since he describes Turkey’s acceptance into the Customs Union as Turkey’s challenging of Europe. Further, he put on one side the norms and values of the West, which Turkey embraces, and on the other, those of the Middle East (as Turkey’s ‘other’). In contrast to Western values, he said, ‘[t]oday’s Middle East is anarchy, chaos, underdevelopment, dictatorship, third world […] Here you are. It is your choice’ (ibid.). That joining the EU was seen as being part of Europe meant ultimately that its opposite was to be part of the Islamist world, which Turkey had avoided with great effort by its definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Europeanness, European values, and joining the European community are referred to in these discourses as something constructive and showing the willingness of Turkey to join the union and be part of it. In order to push acceptance into the Customs Union, the politicians used arguments pointing to the danger of radical Islam taking over the control of Turkey and thereby diminishing its embrace of Western values. This was also mirrored in Çiller’s arguments for being accepted into the Customs Union. Çiller tried to get support for the Customs Union by applying the topos of danger and arguing that the Islamists were stronger every day in Turkey and if the Welfare Party took control of the government, relations with the EU would be frozen. Turkey would be separated from Europe (Yeni Şafak 1995a). Çiller spoke to The Guardian before the elections and pointed out to that the danger of strengthening fundamentalism will not be limited to Turkey but will spread to include the neighboring countries. She said that

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

67

if Europe vetoed Turkey’s Customs Union membership, this would only help fundamentalists win elections. She warned that she was not exaggerating. Moreover, this decision would not only strengthen the fundamentalists in Turkey but also those in neighboring countries (Yeni Şafak 1995h). The CHP, as the party who was the main actor in the self-definition of Turkey as European by the establishment of the Turkish Republic, also underlined the Europeanness of Turkey in the course of the Customs Union process. In his visit to Brussels, the leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, met the socialist groups in the European Parliament and said in a speech that Turkish citizens are, from historical, geographical, and cultural perspectives, Europeans, and they were not searching for validation of their Europeanness, but just wanted to take their place in the European Union (Cumhuriyet 1995b). The supporters of the Customs Union portrayed the Europeanness of Turkey as something positive. They applied many analogies and metaphors in relation to the topoi of history and danger, in reference to Turkey’s entering the Customs Union and the EU membership process, such as ‘turning point,’ ‘big step,’ ‘target,’ ‘a motor,’ ‘a key,’ ‘capture of Istanbul.’ Particularly among the columnists, the start of the Customs Union caused a very intense debate about the Europeanness of Turkey. The Customs Union was referred to as a big step toward EU membership, as a dream, a motor, or a key. Although these analogies and metaphors were used to show the enthusiasm about the entering Customs Union they constructed at the same time the in- and out-groups linguistically and indicated Turkey’s self-perception as an outsider trying to join the group. Doğan Heper, for instance, wrote in his column: ‘This is a turning point for Turkey […] Europe provided a purpose for Turkey. To be European is a 200-year-old dream […] Turkey found its direction. The target is EU membership’ (Heper 1995a). By describing being European as a 200-year-old dream, Heper indicates in this passage that Europeanness is not the real identity of Turkey, but rather a cherished aspiration and ideal. The Customs Union was also mostly equated to the most important historical events and referred to as a key that would open the door to the EU or to a motor, which would hasten Turkey’s journey to Europe. Heper wrote: ‘There are important days in the lives of men and countries alike. For Turkey, they are the capture of Istanbul, the establishment of the republic by Atatürk, accession to NATO, and now the Customs Union, which is the key to the EU’ (Heper 1995b). In the same line, Sami Kohen equated the Customs Union to an engine that would bring Turkey to the EU: ‘We are today closer to Europe. However

68 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

[…] it is premature to speak of a European Turkey […] to be European you should accept this mentality and pass on this discipline […] The Customs Union will be a motor for the fast development of some economic and political regulations. And this will open the way for Turkey’s Europeanness’ (Kohen 1995). So Kohen did not share the view that Turkey is European but rather felt that the Custom Union will contribute to its Europeanness through economic and political regulations. The Europeanness is not a historical cultural identity but rather a mentality that could be achieved through reforms. Abbas Güçlü, however, criticized those who regarded the Customs Union as the first step or as recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness since Turkey was always European. He wrote: ‘As if we were not part of Europe, people evaluate this as the first step after 150 years, after 32 years […] With many of our institutions, we were already part of Europe […] As it is absurd to consider ourselves non-European before joining the EU or Customs Union, it is, in the same way, absurd to consider ourselves suddenly European because we joined the Customs Union’ (Güçlü 1995). Although these columnists seems to have different views on the Europeanness of Turkey and on the role of the Customs Unions on the Europeanness of Turkey, they all have one thing in common – they demonstrate how the start of the Customs Union inflamed debate in Turkey on the nation’s Europeanness. The Muslim Identity of Turkey Although the Customs Union was regarded as recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness or an opportunity to become European, it also gave rise to discourses referring both to the Turkish ‘self’ as Muslim as well as to the place of Turkey being inside the Western group. These discourses did not intend to create an in-group/out-group division based on cultural and religious difference, but claimed that Turkey could join the EU with its Muslim identity intact. These discourses underlined the compatibility of two identities, namely, Muslim and European. This strand of discourses is well illustrated in the reactions of Çiller to the opposition of the RP to the Customs Union based on religious arguments. She defended the Customs Union with a religious discourse to get domestic support. Çiller, for instance, said in an election meeting in Adana: ‘We will go in through the opened door and we will bring everything. We are fighting to bring mosques to the West’ (Cumhuriyet 1995c). Çiller expresses in this passage an identity-based argument for the support of the Customs Union, but draws a line between Turkish identity and Western identity by claiming to bring the Islam (using the mosques as symbol) to the West.

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

69

In this context, Çiller used the topos of danger and argued that the European countries should support Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union because by not accepting it, they would make Turkey move closer to the Islamic world. At the same time, to garner public support in Turkey, she referred to Turkey’s Islamic identity and proposed to bring the country, with this identity, to Europe. It was not only Turkey, but also the EU and European countries that also used Turkey’s Islamic identity in their arguments for and against Turkey’s admission into the Customs Union or EU membership. Germany’s president Roman Herzog said in a speech during his visit to Turkey: ‘Turkey is part of Europe and its role in the Middle East and the Islamic world is very important to us. Through our political and economic cooperation with Turkey, we are going to support Turkey’s journey to Europe. Europe is not a Christian club’ (Hürriyet 1996b). The Customs Union: Turkey Is Historically, Culturally, and Geographically Non-European Not all the actors welcomed the Customs Union. There was strong criticism from some political parties, such as the RP and the MHP. In principal, however, none of the parties, even the RP and the MHP, really opposed the Customs Union. The opposition parties (the government was a coalition of the DYP and the CHP) mainly criticized the conditions accepted by the coalition as not being in the best interest of Turkey and promised to correct this mistake and establish a better relationship with the EU. The MHP described its position as ‘not against a Customs Union, which is in Turkey’s interest.’ Its main points of opposition were the concessions on national issues like the Kurdish problem. It stated the MHP ‘will not accept a draft decision of the European Parliament which requires Turkey to sit at a table with the PKK in preparation for a Customs Union’ (Cumhuriyet 1995i). The MHP’s position as not opposing the Customs Union, but emphasizing the importance of full membership, was made clear in Bahçeli’s speech after the MHP placed second in the elections. In his speech, Bahçeli said: ‘We were not included in the TurkeyEU negotiations and we will first deal with this issue in detail and do an evaluation based on it. After this evaluation, we will reconsider the conditions’ (Cumhuriyet 1995a). The Welfare Party was also not refusing to join the EU. Its main argument was that without being a full member of the EU, Turkey’s move to join a European customs union would be a dishonorable action. Joining the

70 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Customs Union without being a full member of the EU meant that Turkey would not be represented in the decision-making bodies of the EU. Turkey would have to accept the decisions of an institution in which it was not represented (Yeni Şafak 1995e). Erbakan said: ‘We are not against a customs union. We oppose how we join it, the form of the treaty, and the text of the treaty. What does “customs union” mean? It means that the country develops a healthy economy, liberalizes everything, and has an economic system which is competitive in spite of abolishing customs. Who does not want this?’(Yeni Şafak 1995c). The ANAP was also in the critical camp, basically supporting Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union and EU membership but opposing the concessions required for admission. The vice president of the ANAP, Ekrem Pakdemir, said that joining the Customs Union was the right decision. However, concessions made or received should be explained (Yeni Şafak 1995e). The leader of the ANAP, Mesut Yılmaz, was not, in principle, opposed to the Customs Union, but in criticizing the approach of the government, he said that the Customs Union applies an embargo on Northern Cyprus. If Turkey accesses the Customs Union, it will be forced to harmonize with this embargo. He went on to say that they were not against the Customs Union but want it approached logically and they felt the government was joining the Customs Union with closed eyes (Cumhuriyet 1995j). The opponents of the Customs Union mainly referred to the nonEuropean identity of Turkey – its Muslim identity – and refused to accept the European identity. They defined Europe as the ‘other’ of Turkey. To support their arguments, they applied the topoi of culture, geography, history, and danger, mostly to underlined Turkey’s otherness from geographical, historical, and cultural perspectives. They also pointed out the danger of joining the Customs Union, referring to Turkey’s rivalry with the Western countries, giving rise to the placing of the Turkish ‘self’ in the Eastern community, and referring to the West as Turkey’s ‘other.’ While the majority celebrated the Customs Union as a recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness, the Islamists refused to accept the European identity and stated that Turkey belongs to the Arab world. The Customs Union was described as the main hindrance for the union of Turkey with its real self, namely with the Islamic world. This argumentation labels the Turkish self as Muslim and underlines the otherness of Europe belonging to a different group. For instance, the Welfare Party mostly referred to the EU’s decision to accept Turkey into the Customs Union as a strategic decision of the EU to hinder Turkey’s union with the Islamic world. Abdullah Gül said: ‘Turkey did not join the Customs Union through its own efforts […] This decision

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

71

was made by the European intellectuals and statesmen to hinder Turkey’s cooperation with the Islamic world’ (Yeni Şafak 1995g).1 In his election speech in Manisa, Erbakan said that this is a mandate of Europe […] The aim is to close the doors to the Islamic world (Soytürk 1995). Erbakan equates Turkey to a milk cow, which is exploited by the West. Western countries want to tie up Turkey and make it wait in front of the door in order to milk it. He said that the Customs Union is a story of binding Turkey in order to hinder its going anywhere. The West will never let Turkey join the EU, but if they don’t hobble Turkey, it will go elsewhere. They are afraid that Turkey will go to the Islamic Union. He stated that the aim of this treaty is to ‘tie Turkey to the door like a milk cow, to bind its eyes, and take its milk.’ He promised that when his party came to power, it would change the treaty (Yeni Şafak 1995b). Erbakan expected support from the Islamic world and criticized the Islamic countries for not reacting to this decision (Cumhuriyet 1995i). Refusing the European identity and referring to Turkey’s Islamic identity, Ali Bulaç wrote: ‘The full membership of Turkey means the mental and social Europeanization of Turkey and Europe’s acceptance of Turkey as a part of itself is still a dream. The number of Turks living in this dream is not small. Actually, people who live in this dream are hallucinating or they are deceiving themselves. Turkey’s human potential, geographical 1 It should be noted that joining the EU was still a fundamental state policy in Turkey and whichever party was in control, its discourses became more pro-European. Along the same lines, after RP was in government its definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ changed remarkably. The Turkish ‘self’ was now referred to as European. For instance, when the RP was in government as a coalition partner, the minister of justice, Şevket Kazan, expressed himself positively for the first time on integration with the EU, showing that EU accession was a firmly seated state policy and none of the parties in the coalition could oppose this policy as they did when they were in opposition. During his visit to France, he met the secretary general of the European Council, Daniel Tarschys, and underlined both the injustice of the exclusive manner of the EU and the Europeanness of Turkey, which had indicated a willingness to join the EU. He stated that the European Parliament and the Human Rights Court acted like they wanted to exclude Turkey and that Turkey is a European country and has had relations with Europe for 60 years. He continued that Turkey cannot be isolated from Europe even though the EU countries have not been candid with Turkey (Hürriyet 1996e). After Erbakan and Çiller built a coalition, Erbakan also stated that he was not against the European Union. On the contrary, he would have a balanced policy toward the EU and the Islamic countries. He stated that the aim of the Welfare Party was not to destroy the secular state, but to bring it to Europe. However, he emphasized Turkey’s Muslim identity and underlined its cultural bonds with the Muslim world, whereas he illustrated the relationship with the EU only as one of mutual advantage. He said: ‘We will develop our economic, social, and cultural relations with Muslim countries as a Muslim country. At the same time, we will develop our relations with Europe based on the mutual advantages’ (Yeni Şafak 1996).

72 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

location, history, interests, and its ultimate aim… […] direct it inevitably to its natural origins in the Islamic world. Turkey totally belongs to the Islamic world’ (Bulaç 1996). Bulaç also discusses Turkey’s full membership in the context of the identity issue but he rejects the European identity and refers to Turkey’s Islamic identity, which negates its belonging to the West. He uses, like Heper, the word ‘dream’ to characterize the Europeanness of Turkey, but intends, rather, its negative meaning. It is not a long-awaited goal and ideal but an unrealistic or self-deluding fantasy, since Turkey belongs to a different world. He then wrote about European identity and criticized people who assumed that Turkey’s general and historical direction is toward Europe, applying the topoi of geography, culture, and religion to prove that Turkey is not European: The greater part of its territory [it is argued] was in Europe […] There is a great error in this argument. Its territory in Europe did not extend to Vienna. In the north, its territory extended to Kirim and in the south to Yemen and Central Africa. How can it be European? […] The Muslims in Andalusia never regarded themselves as European […] Europeanness and European identity has, from religious and cultural perspectives, a different meaning and geographically it is limited to Western Europe. (Bulaç 1995)

He wrote that the real problem was not the loss of identity since so many Muslims living in Europe for years have not lost their identity. The question to ask is whether Turkey is really a European country in the sense of its identity. He added: From political and geostrategic perspectives, Turkey is not a simple country. Turkey is bound to the Islamic world as a remnant of the Ottoman Empire […] Turkey cannot assume the role of the political, cultural, and military shield of Europe against the Islamic world. This would be refusing its sense of existence and its historical and social identity. (Ibid.)

He posited in his article the Islamic world and Europe as political, cultural, and military opponents, and he assumed that Turkey’s joining the union would burden it with the role of Europe’s protector against the world where it actually belongs. Ismet Özel also denied the Europeanness of Turkey and pointed out the differences between Europeans and Turks in his article ‘Turks, Artificial Europeans.’ In this article he referred to the historical otherness of Turkey by

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

73

describing Turkey as the country that makes Europe aware of its boundaries and claimed there are several differences between Turks and Europeans: ‘Turks do not know the industry and hardship that actually make Europe Europe. For Turks, beauty, composure and justice were the most important, not the effort to get them. Because of these differences, Turks cannot adapt themselves to Europeanness’ (Özel 1995). He explicitly made the distinction between Turks and Europeans by comparing them as two different groups with two different historical, economic, and cultural backgrounds and identities. He then also criticized the artificial Europeans who act like Europeans in spite of this impossible adaptation and said the real issue is not to adapt to Europe but to find these artificial Europeans (ibid.). In addition to the topoi of culture and geography, the topoi of danger and history were also widely used by the opponents of the Customs Union. Common to these discourses is that they focused on the identity issue, describing the Turkish ‘self’ as Muslim and Europe as the historical rival and ‘other’ of Turkey. By using the topoi of history and danger, these discourses point at the historical rivalry between Turkey and the EU and describe the EU as the ‘other’ of Turkey. They referred mostly to capitulation and the Treaty of Sèvres to remind people of the danger of Western countries to Turkey by bringing up the historical rivalry. Immediately after the signing of the Customs Union Agreement, the vice chairman of the RP, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, stated that his party would eliminate the Customs Union Agreement if it won the next election. He suggested that by joining the Customs Union Turkey would be, in effect, a colony of the EU. The EU would make all the decisions and Turkey would have to implement them – this meant capitulation and colonial status for Turkey. He stated that after winning the elections, they would cancel the current agreement and make a new agreement beneficial to both sides (Cumhuriyet 1995j). With this language, Asiltürk was referring to the historical rivalry between Turkey and the West and was underlining the West’s otherness, invoking the capitulation and eventual defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The vice president of the MHP, Riza Müftüoğlu, challenged the association of Turkey’s real ‘self’ with the EU and said that the MHP did not consider it to be in the national interest to join the Customs Union before building a customs union with the Turkic republics. The Welfare Party’s interpellation regarding the Customs Union held that trying to make Turkey join the Customs Union with one-sided concessions would be economically devastating and Turkey would lose its political independence (ibid.). The opponents referred either to the Treaty of Sèvres or to the historical Islamic identity of the country or to the danger of joining the Customs Union. As already mentioned, the critical discourses on the Customs Union

74 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

were dominated by the negative labeling of Europe. Commentators mainly applied the topoi of threat and history, referring to the Treaty of Sèvres to warn the nation of the awaiting dangers if Turkey joined the European group. In this context, the Turkish ‘self’ was referred to as Muslim and was mainly described as the slave or ‘black man’ of Europe, indicating its powerful and malicious position. Looking at the discourses of the Welfare Party closely reveals that it defined the EU, with regard to the Customs Union, as the ‘other’ of Turkey and as a Christian union. Turkey’s true identity was Islamic and the Welfare Party regarded its ‘self’ as belonging to the Islamic world. Equating the Customs Union Agreement with the Treaty of Sèvres, casting Turkey a slave, the Welfare Party underlined Europe’s otherness and enmity toward Turkey, as was the case during the War for Independence. Erbakan repeatedly pointed to the discriminatory conditions of the Customs Union by describing the status of Turkey as the slave or ‘black man’ of the Union, which inevitably put the EU in the position of a suppressor and exploiter. Erbakan said that the Customs Union was a ‘slavery treaty’ and the Welfare Party did not recognize this treaty and would never recognize the treaty. Such a Treaty of Sèvres cannot be recognized (Yeni Şafak 1995d). On another occasion, he said: ‘Joining the Customs Union will make us a slave of the West. It is unthinkable that a nation would surrender itself to others without having a place in the decision-making bodies’ (Yeni Şafak 1995f). After the start of the Customs Union, the Welfare Party prepared a draft resolution stating that the EU and the Customs Union would damage Turkey morally and materially and requested a parliamentary investigation. It claimed that the EU is a political union. The Turkish nation is Muslim and should not join such a sociopolitical union. If Turkey joined the union, it would be treated as the ‘black man’ of the Union (Milliyet 1996). The resolution indicated that Turkey would be Europe’s ‘other’ even after joining the Union and would continue to be discriminated against. The Kurdish Issue As a Trigger of Turkey’s Othering: The EU’s Requirements Are Equal to the Treaty of Sèvres The chance of joining the Customs Union allowed Turkey to discuss and consider Kurdish reforms and supported the underlying sense of Turkish Europeanness. However, the EU’s requirements regarding the Kurdish issue had a negative influence on Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and served to strengthen Turkey’s experience of the Sèvres Syndrome. This is seen in the rise in the use of the topoi of danger and history (referring to

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

75

the Treaty of Sèvres and the rivalry with the EU) in relation to discussions of the Kurdish issue in conjunction with EU relations. For instance, when the president of the EU required a political solution for the Kurdish issue, President Demirel responded that he interpreted this solution as targeting the unitary structure of Turkey. He said that the West wants Sèvres. When asked whether he had received any secret information regarding this, he said that there was no need for secret information: Look at the incidents occurring every day. Would the West tell you that they want to have Sèvres? They would not say it. Who would say this? […] Today’s arrangements are not [designed] to bring Turkey into the Customs Union. Turkey is facing a conspiracy. They don’t want to include us in the Customs Union and they are telling us, ‘Don’t even think about the EU’ […] I also want to address the criticism of democracy and human rights in Turkey. Those who criticize us should know we don’t regard any of the measures as measures which might harm the unity of Turkey as a country and nation. (Cumhuriyet 1995k)

Demirel’s implicit use of the lexicals ‘them’ and ‘us’ indicates the reckoning of the West as Turkey’s rival. Demirel’s claim that the West ‘wants to have Sèvres’ indicates that ‘they’ are the enemy, the same enemy that Turkey faced during the War of Independence. In this context, Demirel uses the topoi of danger and history to remind the people that the measures required regarding the Kurdish issue carry specific, dangerous, and threatening consequences – as history has taught. Thus, Turkey should not agree to them. The requirements regarding the Kurdish issue ensure that Turkey’s description of ‘self’ is that it belongs to a different group than the West. In particular, the reference to the PKK as a negotiations partner in a minority conflict caused great anger in Turkey since the Kurdish issue was a definite taboo in the country. After agreeing to the Customs Union, the government was blamed for making concessions, which could lead to yet more concessions. For instance, on the day of the decision, Yılmaz criticized the government for selling out Cyprus for the sake of the Customs Union. He said: ‘When they ask tomorrow for a concession regarding the Southeast issue, are you going to say we don’t have any other choice?’ (Cumhuriyet 1995e). Yılmaz said that if his party came to power it would renegotiate the Customs Union requirements. Turkish politicians particularly criticized the Customs Union acceptance of the PKK as the representative of the Kurds (ibid.).

76 

3.3

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

The Luxembourg Summit: A Great Shock for Turkey

The different approaches of Turkey and the EU in regard to the status of Turkey in the Community were further polarized by the decision of the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. The EU made it clear to Turkey that it considered relations with Turkey purely economic and did not intend to respond to Turkey’s political ambitions regarding the EU. At the Association Council on 29 April 1997, the EU reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership and asked the Commission to prepare recommendations to deepen relations with Turkey. However, the Commission’s report ‘Agenda 2000, for a Stronger and Wider Union’ on 15 July 1997 (European Commission 1997), made no reference to Turkey’s full membership objective. The report only mentioned that the Customs Union was functioning smoothly and tasked the Commission with preparing a Progress Report on Turkey’s eligibility for eventual EU membership (ibid.). The Turkish side viewed this report with frustration and disappointment. On 13 December 1997, the European Council of Luxembourg decided to exclude Turkey from candidate state status mainly due to its shortcomings in human rights and to its unsatisfactory relations with Greece (European Council 1997). Since Turkey was the only aspirant country excluded from the enlargement, it viewed this decision as discrimination. At this point, politicians and many other people started to question relations with the EU and to regard the real reason for Turkey’s exclusion as its Muslim identity. The situation was worsened by the EU decision to give the green light to Southern Cyprus as a candidate representing the whole island. In sum, the period before and after the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 induced severe pain in Turkey and constituted one of the lows in EU-Turkey relations. Interactions with the EU in the Course of the Luxembourg Summit Before the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey assessed what it would need to do in order to get the desired outcome. It changed and softened, first of all, its policy of ‘no to privileged status.’ The reason for this was to convince Germany to record Turkey’s EU applicant status in Luxembourg on 12 December, since Germany did not want to give Turkey the same status as the Central and Eastern European countries. Beginning in February 1997, Turkey began supporting the ‘minus full membership’ model. This model enabled EU membership in the shortest possible time, but Turkey had to make concessions on the freedom of movement for Turkish citizens living in Turkey and to forgo the financial aid available to full EU members.

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

77

However, the EU was also not ready to accept this compromise and suggested the model of ‘Customs Union plus,’ which meant the development of the Customs Union but no full membership for Turkey. There were visits, meetings, and communications between EU officials, leaders of the EU states, and Turkey. One of the important political events before the Luxembourg Summit was Yılmaz’s visit to German chancellor Helmut Kohl since Germany’s position on Turkey’s EU membership was of upmost importance. After the meeting, Kohl said that Turkey is part of Europe and he would give his full support for its EU membership (Gürcanlı 1997a). Yılmaz found this visit rewarding and declared that Germany had given the green light for Turkey’s membership if Turkey would forgo freedom of movement for Turkish citizens in the EU. Yılmaz’s answer to the question of whether Turkey would now be included in the eleven candidate states at the Luxembourg Summit, was that after this endorsement, it would now be impossible for Turkey not to be included (ibid.). Turkey, thus agreed to forgo freedom of movement, which had been granted by the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Another important event was the invitation received from the EU four days before the Luxembourg Summit. The EU decided to invite Mesut Yılmaz and İsmail Cem to a dinner to which only Turkey and the fifteen member states (but none of the eleven applicant states) were invited. This invitation seems to be an attempt to prevent Turkey from seeing itself as ‘other’ because of the rejected applicant status. This way, Turkey would also be in the ‘family picture.’ Turkey termed this ‘consolation dining’ and refused to participate to protest the EU’s decision to treat Turkey differently from the other eleven applicant states (Kütük 2006: 277). This decision to refuse the invitation was also taken because of the final draft of a report prepared by EU president Jean-Claude Juncker based on his interactions with other EU states. This draft was going to be discussed at the Luxembourg Summit, which indicated that Turkey’s status would be different from the other eleven applicant states. Instead of being a preparation for membership or a participation mechanism (as applied to other applicants), for Turkey it was thought of as a closing mechanism. The draft mentioned the European conference as a dialogue platform where the general issues would be discussed and cooperation would be strengthened. There was no linkage made between the EU enlargement process and the conference. Moreover, the draft predicated the improvement of EU-Turkey relations on conditions like improvement in the Cypriot, Kurdish, and Greek issues, and human rights. Mesut Yılmaz responded to this draft, saying: ‘We would accept a premembership special mechanism. However, we cannot accept discrimination. You are discriminating’ (Gürcanlı 1997b).

78 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

After the EU did not include Turkey in the applicant states, Turkey strengthened its inclination to withdraw its application. In mid-December, Yılmaz set forth his final opinion and said that if the EU did not change its behavior, Turkey would take back the membership application within six months. His declaration of Turkey’s EU policy after the Luxembourg Summit decision can be summarized as follows. Turkey would continue its relations with the EU, aiming to unite with the EU. However, it would refuse all the conditions required for the strengthening of the relationship. Thus, Turkey would not join the first meeting of the ‘European Conference’ after the Luxembourg Summit. Relations between Turkey and the EU will continue only within the framework of the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963. The agreement does not attach Turkey’s membership to any conditions and includes only that the membership process be followed. Turkey’s application made in 1987 was made independently from the Ankara Agreement process. The application was made in the belief that it would be considered using the same criteria as the other applicant states. Because of the requirements regarding Cyprus and Greece, Turkey was ending its political dialogue with the EU regarding these issues. Turkey would take no steps regarding the Customs Union as long as the EU failed to produce the promised financial aid. Turkey would speed up the integration process with Northern Cyprus in answer to the EU’s decision to start negotiations with Southern Cyprus. Turkey gave the EU six months to revise its Luxembourg Summit decision. Turkey would have no political communication with the EU during this process and expected that the decision would be revised at the England Summit. However during this time, Turkey’s democratization and improvement in human rights would continue (Hürriyet 1997a). Yılmaz’s decision to take back the application was not shared by other members of the government. Upon Yılmaz’s declaration that the EU had only six months, Ecevit said: ‘Nobody can separate Turkey from the EU’ (Cumhuriyet 1997b). The Luxembourg Summit and Turkey’s Sensitive National Issues The Kurdish and Cyprus issues were also at the center of Turkey-EU relations before the Luxembourg Summit and after the exclusion of Turkey from the candidate states at the Luxembourg Summit. The EU and politicians of EU member states referred to the Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the course of Turkey’s EU membership. During his visit to Turkey on 25-26 March 1997, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel said: ‘Turkey […] is on track for the full membership target […] but full membership will not be in the immediate future. Human rights, the Cyprus problem, and the Kurdish

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

79

issue should be solved’ (Cumhuriyet 1997e). Turkey did not accept the EU’s position on the Kurdish issue and Cyprus problem and refused to consider these as conditions for EU membership. Yılmaz, for instance, answered the question of whether he believed that Turkey would be an EU member without fully implementing human rights guarantees as follows: ‘Because of terrorism we cannot adopt the European human rights norms and in the process of EU-Turkey unification, human rights, and the Cyprus and Greek problems cannot be preconditions’ (Hürriyet 1997g). The discourse of political parties at this time was dominated by the official state position and regarded the Kurdish issue solely as a terrorist problem, termed the ‘Southeast problem.’ Thus, the connection between democracy, human rights, and EU membership was rejected. Undersecretary of Turkish Ministery of Foreign Affairs Onur Öymen said: ‘The human rights problem will be off Europe’s agenda until 31 December 1997, with the help of the parliament. Turkey is going to be a full member of the EU […] There is no Kurdish issue in Turkey. It is only a human rights problem’ (Milliyet 1997a). Before the Luxembourg Summit, Yılmaz also answered the question whether Turkey could be a real democracy without solving the Kurdish problem along the same lines and said: ‘Our Kurdish citizens live all over Turkey. However, terrorist activities are only in Southeast Turkey. Thus we don’t consider this a Kurdish problem, but a Southeast problem’ (Hürriyet 1997g). However, in the course of EU relations, a new approach to the Southeast was, at least somewhat developed and solutions other than military solutions were considered. As Fikret Bila reported in his column, Prime Minister Yılmaz stated on his way to Diyarbakır: The nation-state should be more tolerant and modern in regard to religion and the culture of its citizens. The nation-state is not a melting pot […] The Southeast issue will be resolved through tolerance. The solution will be political […] There is no military solution. In every way, the solution is political. The military has its role, but the solution will come from politicians. The Southeast issue is not only about the development and improvement of the welfare of the people in this region. This is an issue which will determine Turkey’s status in the world. (Bila 1997a)

In October Yılmaz said, regarding Turkey’s EU membership process: We know that we need time and we should adopt the Maastricht criteria. We should find a solution for the Southeast problem, which you call the Kurdish problem, and we should make our relations with our neighbors

80 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

like Greece better. However, in Luxembourg the future geography of Europe will be decided and if Turkey will not take its place in this phase, its accession to the EU will be difficult. (Elveren 1997)

Even Erbakan accepted the prior position of the EU and pointed to the acceptance of Turkey’s weaknesses and said: ‘There are some weaknesses in Turkey in regard to human rights, democracy, and freedom. Europeans tell us you cannot join us with these weaknesses. That is quite normal. We have to take a lesson from this’ (Yeni Şafak 1997). The decision of the Association Council of 29 April 1997 in Luxembourg effectively put the Kurdish issue and Cyprus issue at the center of the political debates since it made Turkey’s membership dependent on the following conditions. First, Turkey should refuse to use violence to address its problems with Greece. In addition, Turkey should implement an active program to bring human rights standards up to international standards. The decision of the Association Council also stated that Turkey is right to combat terrorism but should seek political solutions. It also affirmed that after the conference between governments, the negotiations on membership for Cyprus will start. Debates on Turkey’s Identity in the Shadow of the Luxembourg Summit The Luxembourg Summit was an important event in Turkey-EU relations and the political discourses before and after the Summit illustrate perfectly how EU relations impacted Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Before the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey expressed its eagerness and readiness for EU membership, accepted its weakness in regard to democracy and human rights, and pointed to its responsibilities. These discourses mostly focused on the usefulness of Turkey and employed the topoi of right, history, danger, and threat to underline the importance of Turkey’s acceptance by the Community. Discourses after the Luxembourg Summit decision illustrate the disappointment of Turkey, which gave rise to negative labeling of the EU. Common to these discourses is the strong use of the topoi of the clash of civilizations, usefulness, and threat to illustrate the EU’s poor decision and the decision’s severe consequences. Foreign policy approach of İsmail Cem, foreign minister during the Ecevit-led coalition government in the late 1990s, was strongly mirrored in the political discourses in this phase. Cem formulated Turkey’s role based on its multidimensional identity and strong historical responsibility, and he aimed to make Turkey a pivotal actor in Eurasia and in the context of EU-Turkey relations.

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

81

Approaching the Luxembourg Summit Before the approaching summit the supporters of EU membership used the topoi of usefulness, right, history, danger, and threat to underline the importance of Turkey’s acceptance by the Community. The topos of right was employed to stress that membership is a Turkish right, the topos of threat to give a warning that it was going to search for other possibilities if EU membership was not forthcoming, and the topos of usefulness in order to highlight the advantages of Turkey’s membership. For instance, in a press conference Ecevit evaluated the first hundred days of the 55th government and employed the topoi of right and threat to signal that the EU is at the top of Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda. He suggested that a place in Europe is the right of Turkey, but at the same time he underlined that the EU was not the only possibility for Turkey’s allegiance. He said: ‘It is the priority of our nation and government to take the place which is our right. We are doing everything for this and we will do it. However, if the EU continues its negative approach, Turkey has other possibilities’ (Cumhuriyet 1997g). The advantages of Turkey’s membership for the EU were increasingly underlined and the fact that Turkey did not need EU membership was stressed. For instance, shortly before the Luxembourg Summit in November, Yılmaz stated: ‘Turkey does not need the EU. EU membership is not a passion or obsession. Turkey’s membership will be an advantage for the EU in the mid- and long term, if not in the short term’ (Hürriyet 1997d). At this time İsmail Cem was implementing a foreign policy approach based on the multidimensional identity of Turkey in order to position Turkey as a pivotal actor in Eurasia. During this time, the Turkish side increasingly emphasized that Turkey was not going to claim EU membership regardless of the cost. Cem in this regard mostly used the topos of mutual benefit, arguing that the EU membership should be advantageous for both sides. He said in an interview given to Cumhuriyet: ‘The EU is a target not an idée fixe. If Turkey is not accepted, this will not be the end of the world […] However, Turkey will not have the same enthusiasm and from this, neither Turkey nor the EU will benefit […] It is not our minister’s and government’s approach to abase Turkey and become an EU member at any price […] Nobody should expect our minister to abase Turkey’ (Cumhuriyet 1997a). Cem regarded the EU from a strategic perspective rather than an emotional one that carried with it unconditional acquiescence to the wishes of Europe. He, more than any other politician, stressed Turkey’s strengths, the advantages it could offer, and the contributions it could

82 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

make to Europe. In a speech delivered during his visit to Belgium, he said: ‘Now Europe should think. Are they going to lock themselves into a German-centered model? Do they want this? Or will they open themselves to new horizons, to new economic, political, cultural, and historical dimensions which they can only achieve with Turkey?’ (Hürriyet 1997e). The last stage of the warnings by Turkey was to threaten Europe with taking the application back. Shortly before the Luxembourg Summit, Yılmaz, together with Foreign Minister Cem, met EU president Jean-Claude Juncker. During this visit, Turkey threatened the EU with taking back its application if the decision in Luxembourg did not include Turkey. After the meeting, Juncker pointed to the European identity of Turkey and said: ‘We try to bring visibility to the Europeanness of Turkey, which is already a European country’ (Özdemir 1997). As usual during the prephase of the Luxembourg Summit, there was already an intense debate on the issue of identity on the Turkish side and on the European side. On the European side, the supporters of Turkey’s EU membership emphasized that Turkey was European and part of Europe. In November, Yılmaz visited Austria and met the president, Thomas Klestil. Klestil said after the meeting that the importance of the meeting was to underline Turkey’s being a part of Europe (Hürriyet 1997b). The opposition to Turkey’s membership based their arguments on Turkey’s religious identity. The leaders of Christian democrat parties in EU states met in Brussels and said that they were in agreement that Turkey could not be a full member of the EU. The leader of the European People’s Party, Wilfried Martens, said that they supported intensive cooperation. However, the European project is a civilization project […] Turkey’s candidacy for full membership could not be accepted (Hürriyet 1997c). This declaration greatly agitated the Turkish side and caused a loss of hope. After the statement of the Christian Democrats in Brussels on 4 March stating that Turks could not enter the EU because of the EU’s Christian identity, Turkey-EU relations became tense. To ease the tension, the foreign ministers of the European countries stressed the European identity of Muslim Turkey in the EU Foreign Minister Summit in Apeldoorn. The president of the European Commission, Hans van Mierlo, stated that Turkey-EU relations had not changed and Turkey would be treated the same as the other candidates. He said: ‘It has been accepted that Turkey has a European future. It will be evaluated on the same basis as other candidates’ (Cumhuriyet 1997c). Following this, German foreign minister Kinkel came to Turkey on 25-26 March and said: ‘Turkey belongs to Europe […] Turkey is bound to Europe. It is on track to full membership’ (Cumhuriyet 1997e).

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

83

On the Turkish side, the Muslim identity was increasingly seen as the real reason for not accepting Turkey as a candidate, not, as stated by the EU, the Kurdish or Cyprus issue. This caused Turkey itself to increasingly underline its religious identity in the pre-Luxembourg Summit phase. Yılmaz employed the topoi of history and danger by applying the Berlin Wall metaphor to separate the Turkish ‘self’ and the Christian ‘other’ before the Luxembourg Summit: ‘We think a wall like the Berlin all is being built in Europe. We will see whether we are wrong or not after the Luxembourg Summit. If one must be Christian to access the EU, we don’t need to speak about other conditions’ (Hürriyet 1997g). At the same time, Turkey still claimed to be European and stressed its Europeanness on several occasions arguing through topos of culture, history and geography. However, under the influence of Cem’s vision of the multidimensional identity of Turkey, the Europeanness of Turkey was more frequently stressed in conjunction with its multidimensional identity. In June, Cem explained the foreign policy aims of Turkey and he said that Turkey was, from a geographical, cultural, and historical perspective, European. This did not need to be acknowledged by other countries and institutions in Europe and the last decision of the European Commission was unjust (Hürriyet 1997f). Cem also stressed the multidimensionality of Turkish identity and assumed that Turkey is European but also Asian at the same time. He said that Turkey does not need to decide between Europe and Asia. While Turkey’s aim is full EU membership, Turkey is a world country, which means it does not want to imitate others but others want to imitate Turkey. He continued that the right approach is not ‘either Europe or Asia.’ Turkey has been, from a geographical, cultural, and historical perspective, European for 700 years (Cumhuriyet 1997d). During this phase the historical Europeanness of Turkey was referred to justify Turkey’s right to enter the EU employing the topos of right and the topos of history. In this line, Hadi Uluengin referred in his column to the long history of Turkey’s Europeanness and wrote: Tanzimat, Meşrutiyet, and the republic are essentially all extensions of the Europeanness movement […] For three hundred years our country experienced the utopia of joining the mentality, politics, and economics of the continent to which it already geographically belongs. In terms of civil rights, political system, and economic welfare, Turkey is today more advanced than all other Middle East and Islamic countries because Turkey has traveled a longer road on the way to Europeanness. I use the word ‘Europeanness’ intentionally instead of ‘Westernization’

84 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

or ‘modernization’ because I regard Turkey’s Europeanness as an obligation from a domestic and foreign policy perspective […] Today, they might not record our belonging to Europe. However, if we consider ourselves modern and civilized, we should f ight until we get it. (Uluengin 1997)

Uluengin equates joining the EU with the most important modernization eras of the county from the times of the Ottoman Empire until the establishment of the republic. The period of Tanzimat (Reforms) lasted from 1839 to 1876 during which the Ottoman Empire undertook far-reaching reforms to modernize the empire. The second move toward the modernization of the country was realized through the establishment of constitutional monarchy. (The first constitutional monarchy [1. Meşrutiyet] lasted from 1876 to 1878 and the second [2. Meşrutiyet] lasted from 1908 to 1918.) Surely the establishment of the Turkish Republic then opened a third era for the fundamental modernization of the country through far-reaching economic, political, and social reforms. The equation of EU membership with these important modernization eras in Turkish history indicated the significance of EU membership for Turkey. Referring to these modernization eras, Uluengin describes Turkey’s 300-year journey to join the EU as s journey toward utopia. It is also remarkable that Uluengin makes the distinction between modernization and Europeanness, the latter being an obligation and something that is worth fighting for. After the Luxembourg Summit After the decision was made to exclude Turkey from the candidate list, the debate on Turkey’s Muslim identity intensified. The decision to exclude Turkey from the Luxembourg Summit not only strengthened Turkey’s belief that the decision was based on its Muslim identity but also caused Turkey to increasingly emphasize its Muslim identity. Turkey regarded its Muslim ‘self’ as discriminated against by a Christian union because of religion. This also gave rise to the increasing stress on the EU as ‘other’ since the discrimination by a Christian club recalled the historical self/other definitions based on Muslim and Crusader roles. The disappointed supporters of EU membership applied the topos of usefulness and the topos of threat to support their arguments. In this context, they reminded the EU of Turkey’s multidimensional identity, various alternatives in terms of economic and political alliances, and its bridge position. A common element in these discourses is that they did not refer to

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

85

the European identity of Turkey but rather to its multidimensional identity. Prime Minister Ecevit, for instance, referred to Turkey’s strength and diverse alternatives after the exclusion of Turkey at the Luxembourg Summit. He reminded the EU that the Turkish public wanted full EU membership, but Turkey definitely does not need to be an EU member in order to survive and to develop its economy. He particularly underlined the multidimensional identity of Turkey and pointed to the danger of refusing Turkey. He said: ‘Turkey can build a new economic model with the USA, the Pacific countries in Asia, or Russia and other countries in the region […] Even if Turkey wanted to be isolated, it would not be possible. Some Western countries may attempt to isolate Turkey. However, the world is round and does not consist only of Europe’ (Batur 1997). The consequences of the negative decision was also argued through the topos of the clash of civilizations, representing Europe and the Islamic world, or the EU and Turkey, as opposing rivals. A good example of this is Foreign Minister İsmail Cem’s speech at a NATO meeting where he stated: Once we really thought about the EU issue […] However, they cannot even tell us openly that we are an applicant. If the EU is really willing to grant Turkey membership, they should also think a little bit. A one-sided love will not work […] The EU missed the opportunity to turn the clash of civilizations into a compromise of civilizations. They could have done it with Turkey, but they missed the opportunity. The Turkish public should not worry. Without the EU, Turkey, with its 75-year-old republic, will not forgo modern values like secularism and equality of men and women. Politically, we were already in forgotten nooks and crannies. Nothing will change in a negative sense in Turkey if we are still in forgotten nooks and crannies. (Gürcanlı 1997c)

This passage refers to the fact that the refusal to accept Turkey into the EU would cause a clash of civilizations. This discourse constructs two different cultural blocs, namely, Europe/West (‘them’) and Turkey/East (‘us’). Cem describes the relation between the EU and Turkey as a one-sided love to refer to the indifference of the EU in regard to Turkey’s joining the EU. He stresses that Turkey’s connection with modern values is not due to the EU and points to the isolation of Turkey from the West at the end of this statement by stating that Turkey was always alone. Yılmaz also used the topoi of history and threat, using the metaphor of the Berlin Wall in an interview given to the Financial Times: ‘With its decision, the EU built a cultural Berlin Wall […] The real reason for this

86 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

decision is without doubt religious discrimination’ (Milliyet 1997b). On another occasion, he underlined the EU’s Christian identity and implied that the EU decided at the Luxembourg Summit whether there would be a multicultural, multinational, and multireligion Europe in the twenty-first century or a Christian civilization, as some people assumed. Yılmaz said: The people who want to see the EU as the club of Christians won at the Luxembourg Summit. And we say, ‘If you think so, we will withdraw our application. If you continue to behave like you did in Luxembourg, we are no longer a candidate for membership.’ There is no sense to being a candidate for membership. We are not able to access the EU because we cannot be Christian. (Ergin 1997)

The religious identity of the EU and Turkey being each other’s ‘self’ and ‘other’ is underlined by the use of the Berlin Wall metaphor in conjunction with the topoi of history and threat. In the same line, Çiller, the leader of the DYP, referred again to the rejection of Turkey by the EU as the creation of a Berlin Wall, pointing to Turkey’s belonging to Europe. She underlined Turkey’s important role and strategic position as a bridge between Western and Eastern culture, based on its multidimensional identity, and pointed to the danger of refusing Turkey. Çiller remarked that Turkey’s EU accession is important for regional peace. It is such a vital necessity that a cultural Berlin Wall should not be built (Cumhuriyet 1997f). In her statement, Çiller also raises the topoi of history and danger to remind Europe of the danger of refusing Turkey, which could result in a conflict like the Cold War. Through applying the bridge metaphor, Çiller also supports the clash of civilizations thesis. In the bridge metaphor, Turkey is equated to a bridge linking two distinct cultures, namely, Europe and Islamic Turkey, but not belonging to either of them. Several statements by political actors indicate that Turkey’s religious identity was regarded as the main reason for the Luxembourg Summit decision. The role of religious identity in the decision was underlined frequently and the association between the decision and a Crusaders’ mentality was highlighted. Enis Berberoğlu asked whether the only reasons for not accepting Turkey into the EU are the Kurdish issue and the economic conditions. He added: ‘If so, how can the Czech Republic and Bulgaria be among the applicant states? […] It appears that our European dream is being defeated by the Crusaders’ mentality. Muslim Turkey was left in front of the European club’s door’ (Berberoğlu 1997). Zeynep Atikkan also declared that the decision was based on religious considerations and stressed Turkey’s European identity. She wrote:

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

87

A very important new reality which concerns the international system directly is now obvious. At the Luxembourg Summit, which was to set the enlargement perspective of the EU, the Union declared to the world that it is a Christian club […] Europe made a fatal connection between political integration and religion […] This is the only message of this Summit […] Now there is a new European concept and new European reality […] What will Turkey do now? Will it find consolation like Ecevit said? A new world will be established and Turkey will take its place in this world? No, because a new world is not going to be established and there is no need for it because Turkey’s place in the world is certain. The world in which Turkey wants to live is actually the world to which it belongs, Europe. (Atikkan 1997)

In this passage Atikkan labels the EU as a Christian club but at the same time claims that the only place to which Turkey belongs is Europe. She equates the EU with Europe and constructs the in- and out-group through the membership categorization. As usual this negative decision also caused a weakening of Turkey’s trust in the EU, strengthening the negative labeling of the EU and a questioning of its definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ A good example of this is Oktay Ekşi’s statement: The Luxembourg Summit removed the mask of the European countries and especially Helmut Kohl’s mask. We learned what they really think about Turkey. Now we will not believe that they consider Turkey as ‘self’ based on their declarations such as ‘Turkey is part of Europe’ […] We should now consider our relations […] without addressing the EU […] but without forgoing our ideal of uniting with modern civilization. (Ekşi 1997)

Moreover, the historical ‘self’ and ‘other’ def initions were brought up again and the exclusion of Turkey was grounded in historical conflicts. In particular, the deepest negative memories of the Ottoman Empire were recalled, particularly the Crusades and the defeat at Vienna. Yavuz Donat equated the Luxembourg Summit with the Vienna defeat. He wrote: The Ottoman Empire wanted to enter Europe in 1863. However, Europe resisted. Europe united against us […] The Ottoman Empire has been defeated for 314 years. Vienna was a defeat. As grandchildren of the Ottoman Empire, we are following the same path. We want to enter Europe. Europe is again united. Europe is again resisting. We are again

88 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

defeated. This defeat has so many similarities with the Vienna defeat. (Donat 1997)

The equation of the Luxembourg Summit with the defeat at Vienna is striking, since the Vienna defeat was the greatest downfall of the Ottomans in their struggle against the West, an event that today’s Turks still feel keenly. Donat repeatedly uses the words ‘we’ and ‘them,’ drawing the boundaries between Turkey and Europe. This is strengthening by his reference to the historical conflicts equating them with today’s situation, namely ‘them against us.’ Along the same lines, the EU was equated to the Crusader, who does not want to have Muslim Turkey. Doğan Heper stated that there is an opprobrium argument against Turkey’s membership: ‘Turkey is a Muslim country. According to the Christian democrats, the EU will be the center of Christianity. Does this approach not suggest a fresh Crusade mentality?’ (Heper 1997). In the same line Hikmet Bila wrote: ‘Whatever Turkey does, it will be not acceptable to the EU because it is not Turkey that is problematic, but Europe and Europe’s Crusade mentality, which it has not given up in a thousand years’ (Bila 1997b). Ergun Balcı asked in his column whether Europe likes Turks and gave the answer that Europe, due to historical reasons, does not like Turks and other Muslims. He gave a historical overview of the battle between Christians and Muslims and at the end concluded: ‘Although Europe has the victory, it does not forget that it has fought against Islam for a 1000 years and has had nightmares about the Turks for 250 years. Thus, it does not love Turks and Muslims’ (Balcı 1997). All these passages perfectly illustrate that Europe/EU was referred to as the ‘other’ of Turkey, based on the historical/religion-defined clashes. In this way, Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ shifted into the historical and religious lines, referring to the ‘self’ as Muslim and ‘other’ as Christian Crusader.

3.4

Silent Years until Helsinki

After the shock of exclusion at the Luxembourg Summit in 1998, the EU tried to find a way to communicate with Turkey and underlined Turkey’s European identity and its connection to Europe. For instance, the EU foreign ministers’ first meeting after the Luxembourg Summit made an effort to engage in dialogue with Turkey. Several European politicians tried to communicate with Turkey in order to ease the tension. The term president, Robin Cook, said that they hoped to create an atmosphere of openness

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

89

with Turkey. This would be an advantage for Turkey and for all European nations. Cook said: It is an advantage for Europe to support the political authorities. This is necessary for setting the identity of the Turkish nation, which has directed itself toward Europe. Netherland’s foreign minister, Hans van Mierlo, also pointed out that Turks had the feeling of being sidelined. Europe should, with its words and behavior, show that this is not so. (Lüle 1998)

Kohl blamed the Turkish government for not interpreting the Luxembourg decisions correctly to the nation because of domestic policy concerns, but at the same time, he said that it is impossible to exclude a country that considers itself European (Tınç 1998). In May 1998, England’s foreign minister, Robin Cook, visited Turkey before the Association Council to meet Demirel, Yılmaz, and Cem and improve relations, which were deeply damaged after the Luxembourg Summit. However, all these interactions were not successful. Because Turkey felt excluded from the EU, it refused to engage in dialogue with the EU. Turkey referred to the decision of the EU as building a new Berlin Wall by using the topos of threat, pointing out that the decision will diminish the multicultural character of the Union turning it into a Christian club. Yılmaz said in an interview on Bavarian television that ‘Only Turkey was excluded from the enlargement and the EU had decided to be a Christian club instead of being multicultural and multireligious […] The Luxembourg decisions built a new Berlin Wall […] The Luxembourg decision would teach us to stand on our own feet’ (İncel 1998). Yılmaz’s statement includes the description of the EU based on a religious identity as a Christian club, which inevitably indicates the exclusion of Turkey because of its Muslim identity. Furthermore, the comparison of the Luxembourg decision to the building of Berlin Wall strengthens Turkey’s exclusion from the place where it naturally belongs. As a reaction to the Luxembourg decision, Yılmaz refused to join the European Conference in London and schedule a visit to Georgia in his calendar for the same time to show Turkey’s determination not to join the conference. In spite of the negative decision of the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey tried to find a glimmer of hope based on some positive signals given by the EU. The 4 March 1998 EU Commission report on the ‘European Strategy for Turkey,’ which aimed to ease the EU-Turkey tension following the Luxembourg Summit, was received very positively by Turkey. It stated that

90 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Turkey would be included in the EU enlargement process and underlined that a strategy to prepare Turkey for full EU membership would be offered (European Commission 1998a). Another positive incident after the Luxembourg Summit was the invitation to join the other twelve applicant states at the meeting: ‘Trade, Enlargement and Multilateral System.’ This was also received very positively by the Turkish side and interpreted as the first sign of Turkey’s applicant status given by the EU and as an attempt to abolish the psychological block between the EU and Turkey. In addition, the statement of the vice-president of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, in his speech at this meeting (Brittan 1998) encouraged the hopes of the Turkish side. He said that enlargement would mean that the EU would have more than 540 million citizens and included Turkey’s population, which Turkey found very meaningful. A further positive development was the EU Commission’s report in November, which included Turkey among the other applicants. The report referred to twelve candidate states (European Commission 1998b). This report was also received very positively because of its milder political criticism. It praised steps taken for the adoption of the EU regulations. However, the steps taken for the improvement of human rights were not found to be satisfactory. The report also required a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue. The requirements regarding the Kurdish issue were sharply criticized by the government. Şükrü Sina Gürel, minister of state for the EU and Cyprus, said that the Union overstepped the line by trying to internationalize the Southeast issue, which was a Turkish domestic issue (Cumhuriyet 1998a). Moreover, Turkey’s glimmer of hope faded away due to some negative developments. For instance, in the Vienna Summit declaration, Turkey was mentioned only in a short paragraph. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Necati Utkan, said: ‘The EU’s strategy for Turkey’s full membership has been acknowledged. However, there was no further development in Turkey’s membership between the Cardiff Summit on 15 June 1998 and the EU’s Commission Report on 5 November 1998. Thus relations with the EU will continue on the basis of the 14 December 1997 declaration of the foreign minister and the 4 November 1998 explanation’ (Milliyet 1998b). The approaching Helsinki Summit gave rise to a slight move on the Turkish side and higher readiness for interaction. On 26 May 1999, Ecevit wrote a letter to Gerhard Schröder regarding the Copenhagen criteria and Turkey’s applicant status: Turkey does not claim that it is going to fulfill these conditions immediately […] We are aware that we need a lot of reforms to fulfill these

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

91

conditions. However, if Turkey has a clear membership perspective with a road map, the reform process will be stronger […] Turkey is expecting no discrimination, an official recognition of its applicant status with equal conditions, and concrete steps in preparation for membership. (Tınç 1999)

However, Turkey was again disappointed by the Cologne Summit. Turkey did not participate but only followed it through the Turkish assembly in Bonn. However, the prime minister and president of Turkey made an effort to put Turkey’s membership on the agenda by calling and sending letters to Schröder indicating the sensitivity of the new Turkish government to EU relations (Demir 1999). These efforts were not fruitful and because of blockage by Greece and Sweden, Turkey was not mentioned in the outcome declaration. Two articles predicting the debate about Turkish membership at the Helsinki Summit were also eliminated from the draft because of pressure from these two countries. Before the Helsinki Summit, relations with the EU were again heavily impacted by the crisis of the Kurdish issue. In 1998 Turkey experienced a refugee crisis with the EU. Thousands of Kurds went to European countries as refugees and Italy gave a green light to the refugees, arguing that Kurds did not have a country and were being treated badly. Turkey refused to speak with the EU about human rights issues in Turkey after it did not receive candidate status at the Luxembourg Summit. Therefore, the EU directed its requests to nongovernmental organizations. Cem wrote a letter regarding the refugee issue to the Italian foreign minister, stating that the refugee problem was not a human rights issue in Turkey, but an organized crime issue (Cumhuriyet 1998c). The crisis involved several EU institutions and the European Parliament decided that if a political solution could be found for the conflicts in Southeast Turkey and Northern Iraq, this would solve the refugee problem. The European Parliament adopted a Resolution on Kurdish refugees and on the position of the European Union on 15 January 1998 and requested the EU use international initiatives in searching for a political solution to the problem (European Parliament 1998a). That the EU accused Turkey of creating refugee problems was a shock. Turkey did not welcome the EU’s position and intervention. In January, Cem gave an interview to the Turkish Daily News and blamed the EU for taking steps, which could destabilize the region by provoking and fueling separatism based on ethnic differences. He said: ‘Regarding the Kurdish issue, Turkey is innocent and unlucky. It is innocent because a great majority of the problems are caused by the power vacuum in Northern Iraq. The terrorists benefit from this power vacuum and attack Turkey.’

92 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

He added: ‘I am not saying that only external factors are in play and we don’t have any responsibilities, but this particular external factor is very important’ (Cumhuriyet 1998b). Another important domestic incident before Helsinki, which also impacted EU relations, was the general election. A standstill in relations with the EU was experienced during the 56th government, which was in power from 11 January 1999 to 28 May 1999. Consequently, in the program of the 56th government (TBMM 2014d), under the leadership of Ecevit, the EU was not mentioned at all. A Euroasianization concept was used and Turkey’s role as the leader of democracy, secularism, and modernization in the Islamic world was emphasized. In foreign policy, relations with Kosovo, Armenia, the Arab countries, and Iraq were defined, but the EU was not mentioned. It was stated that Turkey would take its place in the European integration process without any concessions. The Southeast issue was regarded only as a terrorist problem and the solution was economic development of the region. The relations gained a new dimension when two nationalist parties won the elections in 1999. The winners of the elections were the MHP and the DSP. The general elections produced a nationalist coalition of the right and left with a sharp decline in support for centrist parties and for Islamic political agents (Ifantis 2009: 11). The MHP becoming the second largest party in parliament was surprising, not only for Turkey, but also for the EU. Europe was concerned about EU-Turkey relations because of the outcome. The MHP’s election manifesto reflected the MHP’s position on TurkeyEU relations, namely that relations with the EU should be reconsidered: ‘The approaches and decisions which impose conditions on Turkey and ignore bilateral agreements – in short, which are not at all friendly – make reconsideration necessary’ (MHP 1999). However, the manifesto also stated that the MHP supported the aim of full membership: ‘The MHP embraces the full membership aim as a principle which has become a state policy’ (ibid.). Furthermore it argued: ‘This should also be clearly declared by the EU. The full membership process should be in cooperation with Turkey and the full membership timeline should be determined. The EU should give up its hostile policies regarding the Cyprus and PKK issues’ (ibid.). Debates on Turkey’s Identity before the Helsinki Summit Approaching the Helsinki Summit brought two main strands of discourses to the forefront of the political debate. On the one hand, the religious identity was at the center of the discourse either as the reason for exclusion from the EU or as a reminder of Turkey’s usefulness. These discourses used the

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

93

topos of usefulness to remind the EU of Turkey’s importance for the EU and the Western world. Under the influence of Cem’s foreign policy vision the topoi of history, geography, culture, and religion were mostly applied in conjunction with reference to Turkey’s Muslim and multicultural identity, and not focusing only on the European identity of Turkey. On the other hand, there was an increasingly negative labeling of the EU in conjunction with the topos of danger, because of the hesitations and suspicion caused by the requirements of the EU regarding the Kurdish issue. This strand of discourses referred to the EU as ‘other’ and enemy of Turkey, referring to Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish ‘Self’ Described as European and Asian: The Multidimensional Identity of Turkey Before the Helsinki Summit Turkey’s self-definition as Muslim in the main political discourses became more visible. In this context, Turkey’s religious identity was either emphasized as the reason for exclusion from the EU or as a reminder of Turkey’s usefulness in the EU based on its multidimensional identity. For instance, at a media conference in Austria, Mesut Yılmaz referred to religious identity as the main reason for Turkey’s exclusion by saying that Turkey had buried its hopes for EU membership and that the EU did not accept Turkey for cultural and religious reasons: ‘We have to learn to live without Europe and to stand on our own feet. The EU has hurt our feelings’ (Milliyet 1998a). The definition of ‘self’ as European was now shifted more strongly to a European and Asian identity, pointing to the great potential and dual identity of Turkey. İsmail Cem pointed several times to the multidimensional identity of Turkey, which involves both Asian and European dimensions and has a significant and undeniable religious element as well. In this context, he employed the topoi of history and geography to prove Turkey’s Europeanness and the topoi of culture and religion to support Turkey’s Asian identity. He evaluated the first year of his assignment in Hürriyet and said: I rescued Turkey from an obsession with the EU. Now, nobody has such an obsession […] Turkey is not searching for an alternative to the EU. The alternative is Turkey itself […] We are a great country […] Are we European or Asian? I say the reality is that we are European and Asian. Whether Europe accepts us or not, we are already European and our Europeanness does not need official recognition. We have been European for 700 years. (Demir and Ergan 1998)

94 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

On another occasion, Cem answered the question of whether Turkey is European or Asian by saying that Turkey is both. He declared: If the definition of European is based on history and geography, we are European. If it is based on culture, we have two issues there. If it is based on religion and race, we don’t have anything in common with them. We are not going to change our religion in order become European. However, if it is based on democracy, secularism, and human rights, indeed we are European. (Cumhuriyet 1998j)

In the new Atlantic Initiative meeting in Istanbul, İsmail Cem again stated: From geographical and historical perspectives, Turkey is European. Turkey does not need to prove its Europeanness because it is European anyway […] Turkey is experiencing some changes and has started to develop new policies and to think again about its mission and its contribution to regional balance […] Turkey was regarded as a transit region before by Europe. With Central Asia and the Caucasus gaining importance, Turkey has assumed a key position instead of being a bridge country. This new central role of Turkey includes both its Asian and European identities but does not necessitate distancing itself from Europe. (Cumhuriyet 1998i)

These passages show that Turkey had not given up its European identity but, at the same time, claimed its Asian identity. They mainly use the topos of usefulness by referring to Turkey’s multidimensional identity and its advantages to the EU. Moreover in these passages to be European is defined in broader terms. It is remarkable that to be European is not equated with the EU. The possibility of being European outside the EU is emphasized and several aspects of Europeanness is highlighted. A good example of these discourses is Ecevit’s statement: ‘The world is round and it does not start and end with Europe. There is a Europe outside of the EU. One day they will knock on our door and ask us for membership’ (Milliyet 1998c). The discourses focusing on the Europeanness of Turkey has also pointed to the possibility of being European outside the EU as underlying Turkey’s Europeanness. Turkish politicians warned European leaders of the consequences of excluding Turkey, emphasizing the historical roots of Turkey’s Europeanness and underlying the advantages of Turkey’s membership. In these discourses, on the one hand, the historical Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized and, on the other hand, the advantages of Turkey’s special and different identity are underlined. In a speech given at Bahçeşehir University, Ecevit said:

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

95

EU membership is our right. However, some Europeans don’t regard us as European. Thanks to this behavior, we now realize that the world does not consist only of Europe. There are some psychological barriers to Turkey’s EU membership. The first one is that Turkey is a Muslim country and the second is ethnic discrimination. Western Europe is racist […] Turkey is the key country in the Euroasianization of Europe and Asia. (Milliyet 1999c)

The Kurdish Issue and the Negative Labeling of the EU: The EU Is a Spokesman of Turkey’s Enemies The Kurdish issue continued to impact relations between the EU and Turkey and Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ as illustrated by the incidents caused by the European Parliament’s Report on Relations with Turkey, adopted on 3 December 1998 (European Parliament 1998b). The incidents caused by the report show that Turkey considered the EU as its ‘other’ because of the associations made with the Treaty of Sèvres. The Report on Turkey suggested an International Kurdish Conference and made some decisions regarding the Southeast issue. (When the European Parliament published this report, Turkey was still searching for government alternatives.) Ankara’s response to this report was very harsh. State Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel criticized the European countries that made the Southeast issue a part of the Sèvres plans and tried to add it to the agenda. He said: If they think they will make Turkey accept this, the Europeans are totally wrong. This should not be considered within the framework of the Customs Union. If the Turkish nation considers this as hostile behavior, there will be significant consequences. The government would not have room to maneuver in EU issues. (Cumhuriyet 1998d)

Hikmet Sami Türk criticized the suggestion of the European Parliament for an international Kurdish conference in his speech at a conference on human rights in Turkey and said that Turkey would not allow human rights to be misused for intervention in Turkey’s domestic affairs (Cumhuriyet 1998f). The EU was blamed for acting along the same lines as Turkey’s enemies and the Treaty of Sèvres was referred to repeatedly within the context of EU relations, which diminished Turkey’s readiness to accept the EU’s conditions. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Necati Utkan, labeled the EU as the spokesman of Turkey’s enemies, equating the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue with the Treaty of Sèvres and said: ‘The European Parliament became a spokesman for Turkey’s enemies by accepting the report, which

96 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

aimed to resurrect the Treaty of Sèvres. The majority of the points included in the report are vital issues for Turkey and surely they cannot be the price of EU membership’ (Cumhuriyet 1998g). The arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish terrorist organization leader, in Italy in November 1998 not only impacted EU-Turkey relations with regard to the Kurdish issue, but also influenced Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Turkey requested extradition of Öcalan, but Italy refused. On 27 November 1998, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Italian president Massimo D’Aelema met in Bonn. After this meeting, they demanded an international trial for Öcalan and said that a European initiative for the solution of the Southeast problem was needed. Schröder said that the Öcalan issue had become a European issue. He said that all European countries support Italy and Ankara’s approach would estrange Turkey (Külahçı 1998). Ankara reacted sharply. State Minister for EU Affairs Şükrü Sina Gürel’s statement on this issue is dominated with ‘them’ and ‘us’ lexicals, drawing boundaries between Europe and Turkey. Gürel said: For now, we are trying to consider this in good faith. If they know what they are doing, then they are planning to do grave things. They are opposing us openly. If they don’t know that, we will explain it to them. There is a detailed script. They have shared the roles and they put it on the stage […] If they think there is a problem regarding Turkey’s Southeast, they should always bear in mind that this is a domestic issue. It is not an international issue […] In Turkey there is no status higher than citizenship and it is not based on blood. If Europe does not see this, we will assume they don’t want to see it. Then we will look at their intention, for example, putting Lausanne on the table and compromising our territorial integrity. (Cumhuriyet 1998e)

The last sentence of the text referring to the Lausanne Treaty uses the topos of danger in order to remind the people of the threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and to mark another estrangement of Turkey from the West, since the Lausanne Treaty symbolize historically the liberation of Turkey from occupation by the West. Europe’s policy regarding Öcalan was mostly regarded as hostile behavior after Öcalan was protected in Italy and not returned to Turkey. As usual, this in turn strengthened the perception of Europe as the historical enemy of Turkey and increased the number of references to the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue as the Treaty of Sèvres. The vice president of the DYP, Mehmet Gölhan, said: ‘Europe wants to put the Treaty of Sèvres on

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

97

the agenda again, which is intended to divide Turkey. It is not a coincidence that they will not give Öcalan back to Turkey’ (Hürriyet 1998a). On 16 February 1999, Öcalan was captured by security forces in Kenya, where he had been staying in the Greek embassy. After Öcalan was captured, tried, and condemned to death in Turkey, relations between the EU and Turkey became tenser. In particular, the EU’s requirements for Öcalan’s trial were seen as an attempt to revitalize the Treaty of Sèvres and, as usual, caused the alienation of Turkey. Ecevit criticized the EU’s role and said that they would not allow Europe to put Abdullah Öcalan on the agenda and make Turkey a discussion topic. He said: Some people and some of our allies hope to renew the impositions of Sèvres. They will be not able to achieve this. Turkey tore up the Treaty of Sèvres during its weakest period and chucked it out into the rubbish bin of history. Now there is a very strong Turkey. None of the plots against this country will be successful. This will stick in their gizzards. (Cumhuriyet 1998h)

In this passage Ecevit refers to the EU indirectly using the words ‘some people’ and ‘some countries’ but at the same time alludes to the historical conflicts during the Independent War, invoking the EU as its enemy. Turkish insistence on gibbeting Öcalan was refused sharply by the EU, which threatened Turkey with ending relations if Öcalan received the death penalty. Turkey’s reaction to EU pressure was very harsh. Ecevit warned the EU, saying: ‘Attempts to pressure Turkey will have no impact. Jurisdiction is independent of EU authority. Moreover, Turkey is a democratic country and nobody has the right to intervene in our domestic affairs’ (Hürriyet 1999c). Regarding the EU’s use of this issue as a trump card for Turkey’s EU membership, he added: ‘The EU does not accept us as an applicant anyway. We cannot make a political decision according to EU dictates. Those who try to influence the legal process in Turkey will be sharply rebuked by the Turkish public’ (ibid.). On another occasion, Ecevit criticized the European Parliament for interfering with the independent Turkish judiciary and described EU institutions as foreign institutions: As the government, we do not intervene in the judicial process. However, some foreign institutions try to intervene. This behavior cannot be tolerated. This is as great a disrespect as opposing the rights of a nation for independence. There are institutions in Turkey, which will decide what is to be done in the Öcalan issue and what is not. First, there will be a judicial decision and nobody has the right to intervene. (Hürriyet 1999d)

98 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

In spite of this crisis, Turkey continued to stress its European identity but, at the same time, regarded the EU as its ‘other’ who wanted to divide Turkey. The metaphor of a trap was mainly used for the EU’s requirements regarding the Kurdish issue. Thus, the EU was cast as Turkey’s enemy and the requirements as a hidden threat to Turkey’s territorial and political integrity. Ecevit, for instance, blamed the EU for imposing a minority approach based on a separatist minority understanding. He said: ‘Turkey will not walk into this trap. It is our natural right to join the EU’ (Milliyet 1999g). The comments of Bahçeli on this issue, as a leader of a nationalist party, were significant. Surprisingly, he was not against the European identity of Turkey, since he, like other party leaders, made the connection between modernization and Europeanness. In the context of Italy’s policies regarding the PKK and Öcalan, he said that the western European countries had tried to eject Turkey from Europe since the Ottoman Empire, to divide Turkey, to separate it from Europe, and to withdraw it from history (Hürriyet 1998b). He claims that Turkey is part of Europe by mentioning the historical rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. This historical illustration, however, at the same time, underlines the otherness of Turkey and Europe.

3.5 Conclusion This chapter analyzed Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the course of Turkey-EU relations from the Customs Union until the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Turkey-EU relations were impeded during this time by the different approaches and expectations of the EU and Turkey in regard to the Customs Union. The EU regarded the Customs Union as the optimal alternative to full membership, whereas Turkey considered it an important step for full membership. It also brought the identity issue to the center of the arguments in favor and against EU membership. The discourse of the political elite shows that the Customs Union was on the one hand regarded as the recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness and on the other as the opportunity to become European by the supporters of the Customs Union. They employed the topoi of culture, geography, danger, usefulness, and history to prove Turkey’s Europeanness and to remind the EU of the consequences of excluding Turkey from the community. The question of how much the Muslim identity of Turkey influenced its definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ was at the center of party discourses and arguments for and against the Customs Union. Accordingly, advocates of the Muslim identity supported Turkey’s acceptance by the governmental politicians. At the same

New Phase in Turkey-EU Relations

99

time, the opponents of the Customs Union criticized the conditions placed on Turkey before it could join the Union and argued that the Turkish ‘self’ is Muslim, denying Turkey’s European identity by employing the topoi of history, culture, and religion to make their claim. The decision of the Luxembourg Summit, which left Turkey outside of the group of candidate states, and the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue damaged Turkey’s trust in Europe and gave rise to negative labeling of the EU and a definition of Europe as Turkey’s ‘other,’ grounded in the historical negative memories such as the Vienna defeat, the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Crusades. The discourses of this phase was greatly affected by İsmail Cem’s vision of a multidimensional foreign policy for Turkey. In addition to the commonly used topoi of history, geography, culture, usefulness, and threat to remind the EU of Turkey’s various alternatives in terms of economic and political alliances and its bridge position, Cem used the topoi of mutual benefit and the clash of civilizations to stress Turkey’s multidimensional, Muslim, and Asian identity together with its Europeanness.

4

The Helsinki Summit The Recognition of (Muslim) Turkey’s Europeanness

During the time period 1999 to 2005, Turkey underwent radical changes and transformations in its political, economic, and cultural life caused by a number of historical events such as the February 2001 financial crisis, the November 2002 national elections and developments in Northern Iraq in regard to the status of the Kurdish population. These historical events played an important role in domestic and international developments in Turkey (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007: 69). The February 2001 financial crisis, which was regarded as the most severe and devastating economic crisis Turkey had faced in its contemporary history, made it clear that macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic development require a democratic, effective, and efficient government. The second crucial development in this time period was the November 2002 national elections, which resulted in the complete reordering of the political landscape. After this election, all the existing parties were swept out of parliament and the single-party, majority government of the AKP was established. Finally, the 2003 US war with Iraq and its impact on Turkey was a turning point in Turkish foreign policy and secured Turkey a place in the international arena. The Turkish parliament declared its disapproval of the war by rejecting the deployment of American troops in southeastern Turkey. After this decision, traditional Turkish reliance on US support in security issues changed and Turkey was reinforced in its orientation toward the EU. Also the war in Iraq and the developments in Northern Iraq, with regard to the status of the Kurdish population, quickened the pace of reforms in Turkey. These events certainly influenced and strongly shaped Turkey’s political and social features. However, the impact of the deepening Turkey-EU relations in the course of Turkey’s recognition as a candidate for full membership was also a very influential factor. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for full EU membership during the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999 was the beginning of a new period and gave rise to significant democratic and social reforms, backed by strong societal support for the reform process and European integration (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007: 69-71). Several public opinion studies conducted during these years indicated that public support for EU membership was above 70%. A survey commissioned by ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz showed that 70% Turkish citizens supported EU membership; 69.9% of the respondents believed that EU membership

102 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

would speed the development of democracy and human rights in Turkey; 38.2% of the respondents worried that Turkey would abandon national and moral values because of the EU. The results of the survey indicated that a large percentage of the respondents thought that the EU was right about its criticism of human rights in Turkey but had no right to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs (Cumhuriyet 2000c). Other research done by the Polar Research Center showed that 74% of the participants thought EU accession was positive. The participants saw the following as hindrances to Turkey’s membership: human rights and democratization 30.2%, Islam 17.1%, the economy 15.3%, terrorism 13.5%, fundamentalism 11%, and Cyprus 9.5% (Yeni Şafak 2000c). Research by ANAR (Ankara Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi [Ankara Social Research Center]) showed the distribution of public support among supporters of the political parties as follows: DSP 89.6%, ANAP 83%, MHP 77.7%, DYP 65%, and FP 58.7% (Ilıcak 2000). The research indicated that even the support by voters in the most religious and nationalist parties was quiet high. However, in spite of this high support, the belief that Turkey would become an EU member was very low. ANAR’s research showed that the public did not think that Turkey would be an EU member within ten years. Only 39.7 % thought that was possible. In December 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership in the EU without any preconditions and placed on an equal footing with the other candidate states. Following the Helsinki decision, Turkey experienced very eventful years in EU relations. After recognition of Turkey’s candidacy, the European Council, however, refrained from opening accession negotiations with Turkey, arguing that the country had to first fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. In turn, the Commission was given a mandate to monitor progress and to draft a first Accession Partnership for Turkey, recommending areas for reform (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 23). As a result, the interaction between Turkey’s domestic evolution and EU-Turkey ties intensified. The Turkey-EU Association Council began to meet regularly. From 2000 to 2002, the Association Council met three times and set the framework for an analytical examination of the level of harmonization of Turkish legislation with the acquis communautaire. The European Commission prepared the first Accession Partnership Document on 8 March 2001 (Council of the European Union 2001a), which was the basis for the Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, prepared by Turkish authorities on 19 March 2001 (NPAA 2001). The National Programme was revised in 2003 (NPAA 2003) to enable the opening of accession negotiations. The Accession Partnership Program included the same criteria as for the other applicants and the National Programme had to overlap with the

The Helsinki Summit

103

Accession Partnership Document. However, the National Programme was prepared according to the sensibilities of the MHP. It tried to balance the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria with the unwillingness to implement reforms on the most sensitive issues in the short term (Öniş 2003: 13). Thus, there was a great dissonance between the Accession Partnership Document and the National Programme, causing confusion in the conduct of the negotiations and reforms. The positive atmosphere created by the Helsinki Summit lasted just a short time, because Turkey was not invited to Sweden in January 2001 and this was followed by omission from the invitation list to the Ghent Summit. The decision to hold the Ghent Summit was made at the Nice Summit. The Nice European Council of December 2000 established the institutional framework necessary for an enlarged EU and called for a deeper and wider debate about the future development of the EU. To this end, a declaration on the ‘Future of the Union’ was attached to the Nice Treaty and the debate was formally launched in 2001. In order to structuralize this debate, a ‘Convention’ was set up in Ghent consisting of government representatives, members of national parliaments, members of the European Parliament, commissioners, and NGOs. Candidate countries were also represented at the convention on an equal footing with member states (Ministry for EU Affairs n.d.). Turkey’s exclusion from the Ghent Summit was justified by the EU, based on the doubtful improvement in Turkey’s adoption of the Copenhagen criteria. This decision led to the EU being represented by negative lexicalizations such as ‘unreliable,’ ‘unjust,’ and ‘unfriendly.’ Foreign Minister İsmail Cem expressed Turkey’s disappointment and warned the EU about the worsening of relations again: ‘There should be no discrimination between the EU applicant states. We don’t want to go back to the bumpy times before the Helsinki Summit. This would not be good for us or for the EU’ (Cumhuriyet 2001a). At the Nice Summit on 7-9 December, the European Council welcomed the progress made in implementing the preaccession strategy for Turkey but requested that Turkey submit its program for adoption of the acquis. Based on this document, Turkish authorities prepared the Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis in March 2001. In October 2001, two years after the Helsinki Summit, the Turkish parliament amended 34 constitutional articles covering a wide range of issues such as improving human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and restructuring democratic institutions (Ministry for EU Affairs n.d.). At the 14-15 December 2001 Laeken Summit, the European Council stated that ‘Turkey had made progress toward complying with the political criteria

104 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

established for accession, in particular through the recent amendments to its constitution.’ One of the most positive incidents in 2001 was the Laeken Summit in December. There were three positive developments in Laeken, Turkey was complimented because of its reform efforts. First, even though the word ‘negotiation’ was not mentioned, Ankara’s steps were identified as positive movement toward accession into the EU: Turkey has made progress towards complying with the political criteria established for accession, in particular through the recent amendment of its constitution. This has brought forward the prospect of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkey is encouraged to continue its progress towards complying with both economic and political criteria, notably with regard to human rights. The pre-accession strategy for Turkey should mark a new stage in analyzing its preparedness for alignment with the acquis. (Council of the European Union 2001b)

Second, the Cyprus issue was formulated with respect for the sensitivities of Turkey. Lastly, Turkey’s participation in European Security and Defense Policy was allowed. Mesut Yılmaz commented on these positive developments with the following words: Considering our 40 years of bumpy relations with the EU, our full membership path has never been so clear. We have achieved really important outcomes at the Laeken Summit. The most important of these is the acceptance of the approaching negotiations for full membership. It is the first time that negotiations with Turkey have been mentioned in an official text […] Another important point is that Turkey has been invited with other applicants. (Hürriyet 2001b)

Ecevit also commented: ‘Through these positive developments, our relations with the EU will reach a new stage. It is the first time that the EU has concretely spoken about membership prospects’ (Hürriyet 2001a). The constitutional amendments followed the adoption of a new civil code. It entered into force on 1 January 2002 and involved improvements in the freedom of association, gender equality, and child protection. There were also several legislative packages improving the legal system in Turkey, according to the accession acquis. Of particular note is the third legislative package. In August 2002, the Turkish parliament passed the EU Adaptation Law consisting of fifteen articles to meet the remaining requirements, which included abolition of the death penalty, allowance

The Helsinki Summit

105

of broadcasting in different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives, and improved educational opportunities for minority languages. At the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, it was decided that if the European Council, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decided by December 2004 that Turkey had fulf illed the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union would open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 23).

4.1

The Helsinki Summit: A Breath of Fresh Air for Turkey-EU Relations, the Cyprus issue, and the Kurdish Issue

Helsinki was the important milestone for Turkey-EU relations, radically transforming the nature of the relations by addressing the incomplete nature of the contract between Turkey and the EU. It was regarded as a new chance for the modernization of the country. The first reactions of the political parties to the Helsinki Summit decision were actually almost identical. On the one hand, they were happy to be accepted in Europe. On the other, they issued warnings about the eventual concessions in the Kurdish and Cyprus issues. Thus, after the Helsinki Summit, the discourses of political parties regarding EU relations were dominated by the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s uniqueness as a candidate. DYP leader Çiller, in her first statement about the Helsinki decision, said: ‘We are all satisfied with the steps taken for Turkey’s integration with the EU […] Our warnings about two decisions taken in Helsinki will be repeated in coming days. It should be understood from these decisions that the coming days are going to be tougher’ (Milliyet 1999e). In a press conference, the FP’s vice president, Veysel Candan, emphasized that his party supported Turkey’s EU accession, provided that it was not with prerequisites and against national interests. He stated that Turkey had not been given candidate status, but a candidacy for a candidate status, which was bound with prerequisites like the Cyprus issue (Cumhuriyet 1999). The MHP’s reaction was perhaps the most important one. The party’s supporters were the most sensitive to external events. Generally speaking, the MHP was very moderate in its first reactions to EU membership after Helsinki. The MHP employed the same discourse as other parties in describing EU membership as a crucial part of Turkey’s democratization and modernization and bringing Turkey closer to the West. The two contentious issues for the MHP were Cyprus and the abolition of the death penalty. The MHP also criticized the cost of

106 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

the Customs Union for Turkey. Bahçeli said: ‘Helsinki is the turning point of our country’s membership process, it is a milestone. It means acceptance of our country’s increasing international respectability and power […] The candidate status is, for us, the lifting of the fog curtain in front of one of the biggest windows opening to the West […] Acceptance as a candidate state is not a favor. It is a privilege resulting from the signed agreements’ (Milliyet 1999b). In this statement Bahçeli use the topos of power and the topos of right. He refers to Turkey’s power and respectability as reason for the recognition of Turkey’s candidate status instead of the usual European identity argument. The EU candidate status is not a favor but the right of Turkey because of the agreements not because of the European identity of Turkey. He describes the candidate status as the end of the uncertainty by equating it to the lifting of the fog curtain. At the same time he equates the EU with an opening window to the West, underlining Turkey’s non-Western roots. The Cyprus and Kurdish Issues after the Helsinki Summit The decision to grant Turkey official candidate status provided an element which had been missing over the previous decades – a contractual agreement based on the effective monitoring of Turkish convergence toward EU norms, backed by EU compliance with its own obligations toward Turkey (Ulusoy and Verney 2009: 116). With the recognition of Turkey as a candidate the EU had the conditionality tool, which in turn also influenced the impact of the Kurdish issue on Turkey’s definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ After the Helsinki Summit, every official document regarding Turkey-EU relations and Turkey’s membership, as well as every interaction between Turkey and the EU, involved points regarding the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. The doubts and hesitations because of the possibility of Cyprus becoming an EU member before a political solution of the conflict was the central point of critics of the Helsinki Summit. These doubts and hesitations meant that mainly negative qualities and features were attributed to the EU – like ‘unjust’ and ‘untrustworthy.’ The coleader of the CHP, Inal Batu, said: ‘Mainly the EU’s but also the West’s views regarding Cyprus have always been unjust […] The EU has repeated the same behavior in Helsinki […] We have to try to convince our allies that there will not be a huge gap between the full membership of Turkey and the Cyprus Republic’ (Batu 1999). The FP’s deputy, Veysel Candan, emphasized that Cyprus was a national issue and assumed that the EU made the Helsinki Summit decision only to obtain concessions on the Cyprus issue: ‘The government is taking a swing at the

The Helsinki Summit

107

Cyprus issue. The candidacy for candidacy status has only been offered to force a Greek-backed solution to the Cyprus and Aegean issues’ (Milliyet 1999e) In July 2000, Verheugen visited Turkey and contacted political leaders and human rights representatives. In his meeting with human rights representatives, he said that there had been no improvement in human rights in Turkey. The meetings with political leaders were held in the shadow of the Cyprus conflict. Ecevit told Verheugen: ‘If the EU didn’t intervene, the Cyprus conflict, as well the relations with Greece, would be better’ (Milliyet 2000a). Bahçeli refused Verheugen’s demand for a meeting. Verheugen left two pages of text, which contained a section on cultural rights. It required that everyone have the right to speak their own language and broadcast in it (without mentioning the word Kurdish), abolishment of the death penalty and the use of torture, as well as acceleration of human rights reforms. It showed that the Kurdish issue would be the most important subject of Turkey-EU dialogue. Although the text did not mention the Kurds as a minority, it referred to cultural rights, defined as the right to broadcast and provide education in native languages. This two-page text was kept top secret in Ankara and was given to just four politicians: Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, and Deputy Secretary of Foreign Ministry Faruk Loğoğlu. The education section of the text suggesting that broadcasting and education in the Kurdish language be allowed had the effect of a bomb in Ankara since the Accession Partnership Document would be based on this text. Although all Verheugen’s requirements regarding human rights and minority rights had been mentioned in the 1998 and 1999 reports, Turkey behaved as if it was hearing these requirements for the first time. After Verheugen left Turkey, a heated discussion of Kurdish rights took place, which forced Verheugen to give an additional explanation through his spokesman, confirming that the demands were not official requirements of the EU. The Third Progress Report announced by the Commission on 13 October 2000 stated that Turkey had not shown sufficient progress in human rights and in relations between Turkey and Cyprus. It used the word ‘Kurd,’ pointing out that the regions in southeast Anatolia mainly habited by Kurdish citizens had not experienced an improvement in economic, social, and cultural rights (European Commission 2000a). The Turkish side did not welcome the requirements of the report. Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz expressed Turkey’s position as stating the issue has to be addressed in terms of individual rights and not minority rights.

108 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

He said: ‘These issues can only be addressed by broadening individual rights. It should be handled as an approach valid for all citizens. If you consider this as minority or group rights, it is impossible for us to accept’ (Bila 2000a). The Accession Partnership Document -prepared by the Commission in November 2000 and adopted by the European Council in March 2001- was also shaped by critical issues like Cyprus, minority rights and Kurdish education (Council of the European Union 2001a). Athens wanted to have the Cyprus conflict included in the document, whereas Turkey said that was in conflict with EU law and the Helsinki equilibrium. During the preparation of the Accession Partnership Document, Ecevit’s government declared its sensitivity on the Cyprus issue and warned the EU against inclusion of border conflict solutions in the Accession Partnership Document. Ecevit said: The paragraph regarding the Cyprus issue is not acceptable as a political criterion and will never be accepted as such and we stress the necessity of eliminating the paragraph from the Accession Partnership Document […] We were expecting consideration of our warnings regarding Cyprus. Now we find that a new paragraph on the border conflict as a political criterion has been included […] This negative development has caused justified reactions from the Turkish public. I hope the EU will consider the sensitivity of our government and public sufficiently. Otherwise, we will be forced to revise our decision regarding the EU. (Cumhuriyet 2000a)

In spite of these warnings, in the end, the EU included the paragraphs pertaining to Cyprus and the border conflicts in the Accession Partnership Document under the short-term solution suggestions section. Ecevit declared: ‘The Accession Partnership Document is a great disappointment for Turkey’ (Cumhuriyet 2000b). The inclusion of these paragraphs caused significant debate. Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel and Enis Öksüz suggested rejection of the paper whereas Yılmaz was for softening the language instead of total rejection. The MHP was concerned about the term ‘minority.’ The use of the word in the paper was taken to be a threat, meaning that its purpose was to define Kurds as minorities (Milliyet 2000e). However, he did not totally reject EU membership, but only confined it to the character of republic meaning the territorial unity and unitary nation-state character: ‘Turkey is determined to work toward achieving the EU target within the framework of indivisibility of the country and the republic’s fundamental character’ (Milliyet 2000b).

The Helsinki Summit

109

Debates on Turkish Identity after the Helsinki Summit Since the Helsinki Summit was the first important step in Turkey’s joining the EU, the supporters of EU membership applied many metaphors, such as family, marriage and love, creating a sense of ‘in-groupness’ and underlying Turkey desire to join the group. As during the Customs Union decision, the Helsinki Summit decision was regarded as both recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness as well as its opportunity to become European. The religious identity of Turkey continued to be at the center of its description of ‘self’ as a way to justify its acceptance by the EU, but this time even Islamic political actors applied a Muslim identity discourse in support of Turkey’s EU accession, not to oppose it. The September 11th terrorist attacks caused Turkey to begin to underline its religious and secularist identity more frequently in the framework of EU relations. It continued to employ the topos of usefulness and the topos of benefit in conjunction with its role as a bridge between civilizations and religions. The Kurdish issue continued to influence EU-Turkey relations and even in the positive atmosphere of the Helsinki Summit the use of the topos of threat and the topos of history, emphasizing the Sèvres Syndrome, was persistent. Discussion of Turkish Identity after the Helsinki Summit After Turkey’s candidate status was recognized by the EU, debates on identity intensified. Acceptance of Turkey in Helsinki as an EU candidate was perceived as the recognition and confirmation of Turkey’s Europeanness and confirmed it was no longer seen as the ‘other’ of Europe. After the Helsinki Summit the Europeanness of Turkey was discussed and underlined by Turkish politicians and columnists more frequently and passionately. The very first ‘Europe Day’ was celebrated in May 2000 with great enthusiasm at the highest official level and was almost proclaimed a Turkish national holiday. Ertuğrul Özkök characterized the day as a second important day in Turkish history. Although he didn’t explain what was the most important day in Turkish history, he was probably comparing the Helsinki decision with Republic Day, which commemorates the proclamation of the republic in 1923 (Özkök 2000). As after the Customs Union approval, some in Turkey saw the outcome of the Helsinki Summit as European recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness, whereas others saw the summit as the start of Turkey’s opportunity to become European. The former view regards Turkey’s Europeanness as an unquestionable part of its identity, and the latter sees it as something

110 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Turkey needs to learn in the course of the socialization process. Oktay Ekşi from Hürriyet, for instance, characterized the Helsinki decision as the millennium of Turkey and as the recognition of Turkey’s European identity, indicating high expectations in regard to Turkey’s future as an EU candidate. ‘Although the new year and millennium for others will start in three weeks, our millennium started on 10 December 1999, when the clock struck midnight. And yesterday we experienced the first day of the new millennium as an unquestionable holder of European identity’ (Ekşi 1999). The decision was also commented as putting an end to Turkey being regarded as Europe’s ‘other.’ This strand of discourses did not regarded the decision as the conf irmation of Turkey’s European identity. These discourses didn’t def ine the Turkish self as European, but Turkey was no longer def ined as the ‘other’ of Europe. In his column, Sami Kohen expressed his enthusiasm for not being Europe’s ‘other’ anymore: ‘It makes one def initely proud to say we are now Europeans. However, with the membership label, one cannot be European or, better to say, an EU member […] At this point we have the following advantages: Turkey is now one step closer to the EU and no longer one of the “others” outside the EU’ (Kohen 1999). Kohen also expected that this decision would give rise to Turkey’s socialization: ‘Candidate status will strengthen the willingness of Turkey (from the bureaucrats to citizens) to be European, to share the same values and to reach Europe’s level’ (ibid.). As the negative decisions regarding Turkey’s EU membership were associated with Turkey’s negative memories of the West and impacted on its definition of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ the Helsinki Summit recalled the historical positive achievements of Turkey, namely Atatürk’s reform creating a Western country and its process of modernization, giving rise to the use of the love-marriage-family metaphors indicating Turkey’s joining the European group. As Atatürk’s reform changed Turkey’s focus from the East to the West, the Helsinki Summit decision was also expected to reorient Turkey definitely toward Europe. Güneri Cıvaoğlu wrote in his column about his first flight to France after Helsinki: ‘It is a wonderful feeling to be among the first passengers to Europe after the recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness and its acceptance as an EU candidate […] We are going on a long journey in order to make the candidate a full member. Turkey will achieve the second great mental revolution, following Atatürk’s reforms after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 […] I will again take my place in the passport control queue with others. However, I will no longer be upset looking at the queue of EU citizens. I know eventually I will go through this checkpoint showing only my passport and no visa’ (Cıvaoğlu 1999).

The Helsinki Summit

111

The decision was evaluated in the same line as the confirmation of the European identity of Turkey, which goes back to Tanzimat and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. As Doğan Hızlan wrote in his column: We were already Europeans; the adoption of civilization starts with mimicking and your acceptance into the civilization depends on the extent of your assimilation […] Our flirtation with Europe started with Tanzimat, and became a marriage of civilizations with the establishment of the republic […] The European parenthesis which we opened with Tanzimat is closed today with an angle bracket. (Hızlan 1999)

In this passage Hızlan on the one hand claims that Turkey was already European and accepted the civilization of which it wants to be a part. He applies the metaphors of love-marriage-family to describe the historical journey of Turkey to Europe. The use of the marriage-family metaphor indicates that Turkey is an outsider and does not belong to the family. It can only become a part of the family through marriage (Hülsse 2006: 406). He equates the Tanzimat to a flirtation indicating the first stages of Turkey’s assimilation into European civilization and compares the establishment of the republic to a marriage of two different civilizations. The Helsinki Summit decision was the final indication of the highest assimilation of Turkey, since it meant acceptance by Europe. The family metaphor was also used to describe Turkey’s candidate status and the consequences of this. The metaphor illustrates Turkey’s perception of its ‘self’ as the part of the European group with some duties as a part of the family. The Helsinki Summit decision was in this context referred to as joining the European family, which also brought responsibilities: ‘Turkey is now a member of the family. It has some homework to do. Of course, Turkey will protect its interests when it is doing this homework […] but at the same time, it will not forget that it is a part of the community and will make the change in its discourse required for being part of the family’ (Cemal 1999b). The intensified interaction after the Helsinki Summit also prompted Turkey to speak about its Europeanness and similarity to other EU countries, but at the same time, to use of the topos of benefit by emphasizing its differences, which would be advantageous to the EU. İsmail Cem’s vision continued to have an impact on the discourses during this period and the use of the topos of benefit meant the strengthening of Turkey’s religious identities and Asian identities. In this context, Turkish politicians particularly noted Turkey’s multidimensional and Muslim identity and the resulting benefits to the EU. Cem and Ecevit continued to underline

112 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Turkey’s multidimensional identity to remind the EU of the importance of Turkey. When Foreign Affairs Minister Cem evaluated the Helsinki Summit in a press conference, he stressed that Turkey’s identity was different from any other EU member and stated: ‘We are not just any candidate. Turkey is contributing its unique identity and its historical experience. It is joining the EU with its East-West, Christian-Muslim synthesis’ (Milliyet 1999a). Ecevit also argued along the same line and underlined Turkey’s multidimensional identity in Davos, saying: ‘Turkey is not only a European country. It is, at the same time, part of Asia, Caucasia, the Middle East, and the East Mediterranean. Turkey displayed its importance as a model in which the East and West are not in conflict but neighborly, showing that a Muslim country is compatible with democracy and modernity’ (Cemal 2000). At that time, stressing the multidimensional character of Turkish identity was not viewed as conflicting, but as complementary. The Eastern identity of Turkey was regarded as strengthening and enriching the Europeanness of Turkey to underline the benefit of Turkey for the European community. Turkey was represented on the one hand as European from geographical, historical and cultural aspects but at the same time the Europeanness of Turkey was referred to as sui generis and different than European Europeanness. The discourses underlining the different aspects of Europeanness of Turkey also stressed at the same time the in-group and out-group differentiation. In May 2000, Ecevit criticized those who questioned the European identity of Turkey using the topos of the richness of Turkish Europeanness with its multidimensional characters including Middle Asian, Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Black Sea, and East Mediterranean identities. He argued: The ‘Europeanness’ of Turks cannot be questioned from geographical, historical, or cultural aspects […] It is an interesting example of the lack of awareness in Europe that causes the European identity of Turkey to be questioned. However, we are not only European but also Middle Asian, Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Black Sea, and East Mediterranean. This mixture of identity is not a defect in the Europeanness of Turkey but the richness of its European identity. (Hürriyet 2000a)

Ecevit gave two reasons for the questioning of the Europeanness of Turkey by the European states: ‘racism in Europe and the EU still being seen as a Christian club.’ Ecevit assumed that two-thirds of Eastern Europe was racist. He also pointed out how inseparable ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Europeanness’ were and how both were historically complementary: ‘After the takeover of Istanbul, most of the viziers and grand viziers were Christian Europeans.

The Helsinki Summit

113

For centuries Europeanness and Turkishness were interconnected. Thus the Europeanness of Turkey could not be discussed. More evidence of the integration of Europeanness and Turkishness is the adoption of secularism in the Turkish Republic’ (ibid.). It is remarkable that, on the one hand, Ecevit claimed that Turks are European and, at the same time, he blamed Europeans for being racist. He described the Turkish ‘self’ as the same as Europe, but then portrayed Europeans as different and racist. He answered the question, Are the Turks racist? with a definite no. He differentiated between Turkish Europeanness and European Europeanness. This actually reflects very well the general attitude and the complex feelings of Turkey toward Europe and Europeans, always between trusting and not trusting, between defining it as ‘self’ or as ‘other.’ Supporters of EU membership continued to employ the topos of usefulness and the topos of benefit in conjunction with Turkey’s bridge role between civilizations and religions, referring to the mutual benefit for Turkey and the EU. Ecevit, for instance, claimed: Europe cannot do without Turkey but Turkey also cannot do without Europe. Everybody has to accept this dichotomy […] Turkey connects the two continents, not only geographically but also politically and culturally. For almost six centuries, Turks have been European. However, not only European, but at the same time, Asian, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern. Turkey is not only a bridge between Europe and Asia but also between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. (Cemal 1999a)

Although Ecevit demonstrated that Turkey and the EU mutually belonging together, he also used the topos of uniqueness by referring to the great potential of Turkey and the topos of threat by underlining that Turkey has other alternatives. He said: ‘EU membership is an aim, not an obsession. Of course we want it. Whether it happens or not, our ministers and I have worked hard for it. If Turkey is not accepted by the EU, it will not be destroyed and it will still have a future […] Turkey is in a great geographic position and will continue to develop without the EU’ (Hürriyet 1999b). The Helsinki Summit decision also gave rise to the debates on the religious aspect of identity, putting on the one side the Muslim Turkey and on the other side Christian Europe. The decision was on the one hand regarded as the refusal of a Christian identity by the EU and confirmation of Turkey’s European identity. The decision was debated on the basis of the EU’s Christian identity and the acceptance of Turkey, as a Muslim country, was regarded as the EU’s choice to no longer remain a Christian club. Even

114 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

the prior opponents of the EU membership – e.g., Islamic parties – regarded the decision as the choice of the EU to no longer remain a Christian club. For instance, Erbakan underlined the ‘otherness’ of Europe for Turkey and assumed that Europe would forgo acting as the ‘other’ of Turkey and become its ‘self.’ He said after Helsinki: As an independent deputy, I even interpellated concerning the government’s EU policy in 1969. However, now I am for EU membership. But why do I now support membership? We didn’t change, they changed. They didn’t want us, saying: ‘Here is a Christian club, but now they respect our beliefs.’ (Milliyet 1999d)

In his statement, Erbakan refers to ‘them’ and ‘us’ as belonging to different religions. Religion, namely Islam and Christianity, are the main signifiers of the construction of in-groups and out-groups in Erbakan’s statement. The decision was represented in the discourses as the EU’s decision on its Christian identity, defining the self and others based on their religious identities. Mesut Yılmaz, in this context, emphasized that Turkey should also take a step toward the EU and adapt to Europe’s identity, as the EU sheds its Christian identity. He said: With the Helsinki Summit, Europe exceeded itself. Europe concluded a historical discussion […] on identity. Is Europe going to stay a Christian domain or will it go beyond that? The discussion ended and Europe exceeded itself. It came out of the Christian ghetto. Now it is our turn to exceed ourselves […] They came out of their Christian ghetto; we should also move out of our ghetto. (Özkök 1999)

It is striking that the opponents of the Customs Union applying the topos of religion to support their arguments for not joining the EU now applied the topos of religion to support the argument for joining the EU. Particularly the Islamist columnists used the topos of mutual benefit by representing the Muslim identity as something which could contribute significantly to the EU. Ali Bulaç said in an interview given to Yeni Şafak about the EU membership candidacy: ‘Turkey’s EU membership does not mean that Turkey will disappear into the EU’s melting pot. As a Muslim and Islamist, I think that Islam will benefit from being together with different religions in a global world. The EU will be able to express itself thanks to this participation.’ It is remarkable that Bulaç does not use the topos of usefulness only to prove that the EU will profit from Turkey’s accession but he underlines

The Helsinki Summit

115

that Islam will also benefit from being together. In the same interview, he suggests that Islam is at the center of his argumentation and the main signifier of Turkish identity: ‘In the new European concept, Islam will be a decisive factor. To measure Europeanization in Europe, whether Europe is really ready for multiculturalism, is only possible through Islam’ (Çetinkaya 1999). Turkey’s Muslim identity was represented in these discourses as a factor, which will increase the Westernization of the country and the Europeanization of Europe. In contrast to the historical developments, where Westernization and Islam was not compatible and Westernization influenced the limitation of Islam, now Islam was referred to as the inseparable part of this Westernization project and was used as the topos of mutual benefit. The stress on Turkey’s religious identity increased even more after the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, which shaped international relations and also had a deep impact on Turkey-EU relations. After these attacks, Turkey emphasized its secular Muslim identity in addition to its Europeanness more frequently and intensively. The stress on Turkey’s Muslim and secularist identity was found to be a good card to play. It was believed that the religious and secular characteristics of Turkey would help carry Turkey to the EU under the umbrella of multiculturalism. In this context the self was represented as European but at the same time somehow different from the other European countries through its certain specific characteristics. In this context the topos of threat and the topos of usefulness were employed more frequently by pointing to the consequences of Turkey’s nonacceptance to the Union for the world and to the benefits of its membership. Hasan Cemal compared Turkey’s relations with the EU to a bout of arm wrestling, which illustrates the EU and Turkey as two strong competitors trying to win over the other and saw the changes that emerged after the September 11th attacks as beneficial for Turkey. He wrote in his column: ‘Turkey is the only secular Muslim country. Obviously this has increased the importance of Turkey, particularly in the eyes of America. And this is also has an important advantage in arm wrestling’ (Cemal 2001). The underlining of Islamic identity in the course of EU relations was also mirrored in Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey increasingly emphasized the Islamic character of its identity and applied, for the first time, to be the secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. As a secular state, Turkey had avoided even membership in the organization until 1976. This application was criticized in Turkey and outside, questioning how Turkey, as secular state, could be its leader. Turkey had wanted to show

116 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

that, as a secular, Muslim-majority state, it had an important dual role to play for the Muslim world and for Europe. Turkey could represent the Muslim world’s interests in Europe and effectively convey the European message to the Muslim world. The position of secretary-general would give Turkey, on one hand, the opportunity to be an important regional and global political actor and, on the other hand, to improve relations with the Arab world from which it had distanced itself for a long time. To lead the organization uniting these countries would also be a sign of consolidation with the Arab-Islamic countries. Discourses under the Shadow of the Cyprus and Kurdish Issues The wording on the Cyprus and the Kurdish issues caused deep distrust and Turkey mostly equated relations with the EU with a football game or a hidden trap. These discourses used negative labels for the EU and represented the EU as the competitor adversary of Turkey. Cem, for instance, criticized the wording on the Cyprus and the Kurdish issue and said: ‘That was not a goal, but an offside, so it is invalid […] Such last minute maneuvers cause Turkey to lose trust’ (Milliyet 2000d). Cem equates in this text Turkey and EU relations to a football game, which makes them two different concurrent teams instead of cooperating partners or the members of the same group. Turkey felt trapped by the Europeans after the acceptance of the final version of the document by the European Parliament on 15 November. Bahçeli criticized the document for being a chaotic road map, a step backward from Helsinki and containing hidden traps. According to Bahçeli, the hidden requirements to legitimize ethnic discrimination and the way the Cyprus issue was presented were obvious evidence of subterfuge (Milliyet 2000c). The use of word ‘trap’ indicates that relations with the EU were perceived as an unpleasant situation from which it is hard to escape. The EU is represented in this statement as the adversary who tries to trick Turkey to mislead it in regard to its interests. However, Turkey’s Europeanness was still underlined by politicians and it was made clear that Turkey would not forgo its aim to be a full member. Turkish Europeanness was referred to as an identity that differed from European Europeanness and it was represented as better than the EU’s Europeanness. In this strand of discourses even the claim to have the same identity was dividing and differentiating by referring to the different qualities, characteristics, and features of the same identity. For instance, after the inclusion of the Cyprus issue and the border conflict in the Accession Partnership, Ecevit voiced the disappointment of the Turkish side in his party meeting in parliament with the following comment:

The Helsinki Summit

117

No one should expect Turkey to give up on its membership. Europe is not just the domain of EU member states and Europeanness is not the exclusive character of EU members. Turkey has been European for 600 years […] Turkey’s past, present, and future cannot be isolated from Europe and Europeanness and Europe cannot deter Turkey through deception, suppression, enforcement, ethnic lobbying, or support of separatists movements […] Since some European Parliament spokesmen don’t know that Turks and Kurds are inseparable parts of a whole, they compare Turkey with the Basque region and Corsica […] They try to depict our citizens, who are inseparable parts of a whole, as a minority […] Turkey has had enough of such drivel. There is no place in Turkey’s Europeanness for such absurdity. (Cumhuriyet 2000d)

Even Bahçeli underlined that Turkey was not going to forgo its membership aim. Although MHP leader Bahçeli expressed suspicion of the requirements and labeled Europe as nearsighted and prejudiced, he, at the same time, emphasized Turkey’s determination to be part of Europe, referring to EU relations as part of the historical journey of Turkey and pointed out Turkey’s importance for the EU. He used also the EU and Europe interchangeably, which indicates that he perceives the EU as a cultural and geographical entity rather than a political one (Tekin 2010: 155). He said: We don’t want the charity of special protection from the EU. Turkey wants, first of all, for the EU to decide what it wants and what kind of Europe and world it wants […] The Accession Partnership Document is not a document of good faith […] It is a product of Europe’s traditional nearsightedness and Turkish opposition and it is surely not going to stop our historical journey nor is it going to imprison us. As long as the confused EU cannot free itself from its prejudices, it will not be able to approach Turkey with good will and a long-term perspective. At the same time, it is impossible for the EU to claim its future and play an important role in human and global issues. (Yeni Şafak 2000a)

In addition to these critics of the Accession Partnership Document, there were also positive remarks on the requirements of the document, in the context of Turkey’s socialization. The FP leader Recai Kutan, said that the requirements of the Accession Partnership Document were issues that Turkey had discussed for years and Turkey should implement these requirements, not for the EU, but for itself. Regarding the inclusion of the Cyprus issue in the Accession Partnership Document, Bahçeli asserted that the

118 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Cyprus issue should not be postponed until 2002 and the negotiations should also include the genocide in 1960. According to Bahçeli, Turkey should take urgent measures and start the negotiations in the next year because South Cyprus might join the EU (Yeni Şafak 2000b). The EU’s requirements were also equated to a swim against the stream, pointing to the challenge posed to Turkey by these requirements. Mesut Yılmaz declared the readiness of Turkey to tackle all challenges but at the same time also separated Turkey’s Westernization from the EU accession process by referring to the historical roots of Turkey’s Westernization. He also used the topos of threat and warned the EU of Turkey’s choosing a different path: The EU is forcing Turkey to swim against the stream. If it is necessary, we can swim against the stream. However, the outcome has to be worth it. Our choice is not Westernization in spite of the West and EU membership in spite of Europe. Our choice is to continue our Westernization, which started 200 years ago and achieve our final goal with Europe. The EU has to cease requiring conditions we will never accept. If it continues, we will choose a different path. (Hürriyet 2000b)

In his statement Yılmaz differentiates between the Westernization of Turkey and joining the EU. Although he identifies Turkey’s Westernization as a long journey which has as its final goal Europe, he, at the same time, underlines that Turkey can continue to the journey of Westernization through a different path. The requirements of the EU awakened great suspicion among Turkish politicians and the public, particularly because it was thought the EU only named requirements but offered nothing in return. It was feared that Turkey’s eagerness to be part of Europe would be abused by the Europeans. Mümtaz Soysal claimed in an early column that Europeans were taking advantage of Turkey’s weakness for Europe, and so they would make improper demands, specifically in regard to the Kurdish issue (Soysal 2000). The suspicion and distrust caused the negative lexicalization in describing the EU. In this way the EU was described as supporter of PKK. The main distrust and conflict was based on the Treaty of Sèvres. The tension between the EU and Turkey regarding the Kurdish issue was mostly caused by the historical fact that Turkey does not recognize minorities other than those specified in the Lausanne Treaty or the Bulgarian Friendship Agreement. Articles 37 to 45 of the Lausanne Treaty recognize only non-Muslim Turkish citizens as minorities. Thus, the EU reference to Kurdish people in Turkey

The Helsinki Summit

119

as a minority aroused great suspicion and was perceived as an attempt to reinstate the Treaty of Sèvres. Moreover, Turkey deeply distrusted the EU on the Kurdish issue because of the belief that European countries supported the PKK financially and logistically. This distrust was also fed by the media with headlines like ‘EU’s Support for the PKK’ (Cumhuriyet 2000f). In particular, the visits of EU deputies or European politicians to Diyarbakır, the so-called ‘capital’ of Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast as well as the invitations issued by the mayor of Diyarbakır as well as deputies of the DTP to the European Parliament nurtured the distrust. Therefore, the requirements regarding the Cyprus and the Kurdish issues brought up discussions about Sèvres. There was concern that the EU had a hidden agenda and wanted to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. Hasan Pulur wrote in his column: ‘It should not to be forgotten that the hidden invoice of EU membership is Sèvres. And thank God there are people in this country who are still conscious of independence’ (Pulur 2000). Minister of State Şükrü Sina Gürel, responsible for the Cyprus issue, said that the EU was responsible for the problems in the Cyprus negotiations: ‘It is like somebody is threatening us from behind with a drawn knife. We don’t know his purpose. If we suddenly turn, he might not be able to stab us. We are not going to cave in. At the same time, it hurts’ (Cumhuriyet 2000b). The comparison of the EU with a person holding a knife and threatening Turkey illustrates how deeply Turkey’s distrust against the EU was. Quite a number of columnists thought national problems were fueled by European Union membership. Çölaşan wrote in his column: ‘If we look at the Kurdish issue, we see it is pumped up by Europe […] Calling our Kurdish people a minority is disrespectful’ (Çölaşan 1999). Soysal also recalled that the requirements of the EU had the potential to revitalize the Treaty of Sèvres. ‘Would the pressure for local and cultural autonomy, behind the curtain of protection for minorities, not shake the values and principles of the republic and lead to a new Sèvres?’ (Soysal 1999). In this context, the steps taken by the politicians for a solution to the Kurdish issue were received with suspicion and criticized sharply. One of the significant hindrances to a Kurdish solution, within the framework of EU relations, was also this distrust of the EU on national issues. The Turkish side was upset that the EU considered the Kurdish issue a minority rights problem. Particularly the requirements regarding the Kurdish and Cyprus issues in official EU reports and documents were not perceived positively by the Turkish side. For instance, the requirements for Kurdish education and broadcasting were mostly discussed in conjunction with the Treaty of Sèvres and the politicization of the PKK. Prime Minister Ecevit

120 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

indeed regarded these requirements as the politicization of the PKK under the mask of cultural rights requirements and as the creation of a political separatist movement based on ethnic nationalism (Cumhuriyet 2000f). The MHP used a milder tone in criticizing the EU before the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue appeared in the official documents. After the EU’s requirements regarding broadcasting and education in Kurdish, the MHP used harsher criticisms. MHP deputy Yahnici characterized the Accession Partnership Document priorities as EU impositions and stated in his letter to the president of the republic, assembly speaker, prime minister, general staff and chiefs of foreign missions that the EU was reimposing the Treaty of Sèvres and had decided to create a Kurdish nation. He added that requirements regarding cultural rights and Kurdish television should be rejected and that the EU was acting as a spokesman for the PKK and delivering their requirements to Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2001b). In spite of this mistrust, the intensified interactions with EU institutions and the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, such as a commitment to human rights, pluralism, and tolerance, at least brought about an intensified open debate on the Kurdish issue (Dyson 2007: 53). With the exception of Özal’s (prime minister of Turkey [1983-1989] and president [1989-1993]) unsuccessful search for alternative solutions, speaking about the issue had been taboo. The word ‘Kurd’ was first officially used in 1991 by Prime Minister Demirel in Diyarbakır when he declared that there was recognition of the Kurdish reality. Since the word was then forgotten until the recognition of Turkey as an EU candidate in Helsinki, it is clear how important the start of these debates were (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 17-46). After Helsinki, in December 1999, Mesut Yılmaz made one of the most controversial speeches on the Kurdish issue in Diyarbakır. He stated: ‘The road to the EU is through Diyarbakır […] Call it a Kurdish issue or Southeast problem, Turkey is not going to be a great country or an EU member without solving this problem’ (Hürriyet 1999a). The EU’s demands regarding Kurdish broadcasting led, at the same time, to some constructive developments and discussion on this issue among politicians and the public. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem brought up Kurdish broadcasting shortly after Helsinki and said: ‘Everybody living in Turkey should have the freedom to broadcast in his own mother tongue. This is our belief and the EU has attached importance to this issue […] The EU is not asking us to define a minority and then label it. That there is no minority should not mean that we will hinder broadcasting in their own language when our people desire it’ (Hürriyet 1999e). Although Ecevit regarded these requirements as politicization of the PKK under the mask of cultural

The Helsinki Summit

121

rights requirements he also pointed out that the necessity of accepting the realities of the situation should not be ignored: ‘Modern communication technologies don’t have any boundaries. Northern Iraq and Europe already broadcast in Kurdish. We have to make our decision based on this reality’ (Bila 2000b). This position on Kurdish broadcasting was generally supported by all political parties except the MHP. After Verheugen’s visit in 2000 and the accompanying requirements for Kurdish rights, the CHP leader Öymen said: ‘There is no harm in Kurdish broadcasting […] There should be human rights in Turkey. Turkish people deserve a democracy by world standards. Turkish people are not more backward than Germans or Portuguese’ (Cumhuriyet 2000e). However, the minister of transport, Enis Öksüz of the MHP, expressed his displeasure with the EU’s intervention in the Kurdish issue, considering the EU as an outsider and ‘other’ for getting involved. He referred to the Kurdish issue as a family issue which indicates that the EU do not belong to the family and is different from the self: ‘A nation has only one official language. There is no nation in the world with two official languages. All the unitary countries have one language. The people you called Kurds are our citizens […] In issues regarding our citizens, we will discuss and we will decide. If we have a problem, we will solve it. It is a family issue and it is a mistake to try to solve it under the guidance of outsiders’ (Milliyet 1999f).

4.2

The Elections, the New Turkey, and the New EU Approach

A very important event in 2002 was the national election in Turkey, which ushered a major realignment of the Turkish political landscape and brought a landslide victory for the AKP. As a result of these 2002 elections for the first time since the 1954 Turkey had a two-party parliament. AKP won 330 of 550 seats in the parliament and CHP was the only other party to win parliamentary representation among the eighteen parties running in the elections. At the same time the major parties that governed the country in the 1990s, such as the MHP, ANAP, and DSP, did not pass the 10% threshold. After a decade of coalition governments Turkey got a majority government, opening the door for political and economic stability (Çağaptay 2002: 42-43). At this time public support for EU membership was still very high in Turkey. Party leaders liked to refer to this public support on every occasion. Vice president Mesut Yılmaz, for instance, explained the reform package to EU ambassadors and requested that they not disappoint the Turkish public, arguing that 70% of Turkish citizens wanted EU integration (Milliyet 2002b).

122 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

The importance of the mass support was also clear in Ecevit‘s answer to the question, which equated the EU membership process to an awaited train: ‘It is said that we missed the train twice during the Ecevit and Demirel governments. When you now look back on your political career, would you say that you did not demonstrate responsibility?’ (Hürriyet 2002m). Ecevit answered: ‘It is open to question […] At that time we had deep economic crises […] and public support for the EU was not as high as it is today. People had a negative impression of the EU. Now it is different. It is obvious that more than 70% of the public, even if the motivations vary, support EU membership. Sooner or later, it will be achieved’ (ibid.). Also Yılmaz‘s requirement for a referendum on EU membership made it clear that public support had a strong influence on the EU issue in Turkey. Yılmaz said: I emphasize this again. The most important factor for EU membership is the broad political and social public support. If this did not exist, Turkey could forget about membership […] I believe a great majority of the population support EU membership. And the research supports this. Thus, I am for a referendum on the issue […] It will be an advantage to hold a referendum now to demonstrate the support to the political authorities and to eliminate hesitation. (Hürriyet 2002b)

Bahçeli refused Yılmaz‘s referendum and said: ‘Since 1959 and for more than 40 years, nobody wanted to hold a referendum. A referendum would now be a step back’ (Ekşi 2002a). As Özkök commented in his column, the reactions to Yılmaz’s requirement actually showed the outcome of the referendum: ‘All politicians in Ankara were alarmed’ (Özkök 2002). Because of the strong public support, the discourse of the political parties was dominated by the issue of EU membership during the campaign. They tried to get votes by convincing the voters that they were for EU membership and could bring it to Turkey. Several reform packages and EU laws were also enacted during the election. Although the parties had different positions on the laws, they all supported EU membership. Kutan said: ‘We support all thirteen legislative proposals regarding the EU. This does not mean that we accept them without reading them, but we support membership’ (Hürriyet 2002o). For the legislative proposal regarding the EU, political parties voted as fellows, total yes votes, 304 – from the ANAP 79, AKP 53, SP 46, YTP (Yeni Türkiye Partisi [New Turkey Party]) 6, and DSP 65. The DYP was principally a supporter of the EU, but it particularly opposed education in Kurdish, except its deputies from eastern Turkey. Thus, they were called the ‘no-yes’ group, which was composed of 85 deputies.

The Helsinki Summit

123

The MHP, which had 126 seats in parliament, was, from the beginning, against the laws and voted no (Hürriyet 2002q). The MHP’s opposition to the legislative proposal was mainly because of Kurdish education and broadcasting. MHP leader Bahçeli said that they would support the laws if the sections about broadcasting and education in Kurdish were excluded (Milliyet 2002d). During the meeting in parliament on the EU laws, the metaphors and irony were constantly employed in Turkish political discourses. For instance, DSP Istanbul deputy Ahmet Tan employed the usual path metaphor equating the EU to a road and putting Turkey in the driver’s seat, saying: ‘We are like a truck driver hitting the road to the EU.’ The path metaphor describes the EU integration process as a political process, which has nothing to do with original belonging. Since the natural and cultural bases for identity are not relevant, but the ability to politically integrate is, there were no clear-cut and difficult-to-cross borders that would keep ‘us’ and ‘them’ apart (Hülsse 2006: 412). Turkey’s comparison to a truck driver illustrates Turkey’s ability to endure the long journey to achieving EU membership. The love-marriage-family metaphor (Musolff 2006: 32) was also deployed by the political actors, which considered Turkey as the lover of the EU and constructed the distinct borders of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In this case Turkey tries to join the family through a marriage as an outsider (Hülsse 2006: 406). This strand of discourses mostly labels the love of Turkey as a platonic relationship, because of the EU’s exclusionary behavior. For instance, SP Hatay deputy Mustafa Geçer also expressed Turkey’s willingness for joining the EU by equating it to a platonic relationship and asked: ‘Is Europe responding to our love?’ (Yeni Şafak 2002a). As the negative decisions and developments in the course of the EU accession process were mainly equated to the building of a wall between Europe and Turkey, positive achievements and decisions were mainly equated to the fall of these walls. When the laws were accepted in parliament, for instance, Turkey felt that it had made headway and the fall of the wall analogy was used by the politicians. Ecevit’s statement is a good example of this: ‘Now for sure the walls between the EU and us are going to fall […] Except for some details, Turkey will have the same freedom and rights as existing EU members. Thus, nobody can tell Turkey that it does not deserve EU membership and is not ready for it’ (Milliyet 2002a). According to this analogy there is a clear difference between ‘us’ (Turkey) and ‘them’ (Europe). The wall marks the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and keeps Turkey apart from the EU (Hülsse 2006: 413). The acceptance of the laws is regarded in this text as the abolishment of the biggest obstacle for Turkey’s

124 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

EU membership which gave rise to the fall of the boundaries between Turkey and the EU and enable Turkey to be part of the group. The 2002 Elections: Electoral Campaign Dominated by the EU Issue The elections in 2002 were not only an important milestone for Turkey, but were also watched closely by the EU Commission, which stated that they would consider the results of the elections in making the decision about Turkey. The main topic of the elections was EU membership, as Mustafa Karaalioğlu states in his column: One of the most important political powers in the elections will be the EU. Of course, the parties who choose EU membership as an election strategy will not win because of this. Even the opposite could happen and the parties who oppose the EU could win […] What is certain is that a party that totally rejects the EU will not be able to join the government. (Karaalioğlu 2002)

The EU process was also apparent in the platforms of the parties. Almost all the parties supported Turkey’s EU membership. They mainly used the topos of usefulness, the topos of history, and the topos of threat to get the support of the voters, claiming that they were the best supporters of the EU accession process. The SP described the EU as important strategic orientation and even the party most skeptical of EU membership, the MHP, defended a membership with dignity. All of the parties equated EU membership with Atatürk’s civilization project and declared themselves ready for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria (Cumhuriyet 2002l). The positions of the parties were as follows: The DSP and CHP regarded the EU as the extension of Atatürk’s reforms. The DSP declared the Copenhagen criteria overlapped with the party program and rejected the relationship between the Cyprus issue and EU membership as did the MHP. The DSP stated that it accepted EU membership as the basic aim of foreign policy: ‘This approach’s roots are based on reaching Atatürk’s modern civilization. It will open new horizons for Turkey […] The Copenhagen criteria overlap the DSP’s perception. The DSP does not believe that the Cyprus and Aegean issues are directly connected to EU membership’ (DSP 2002). The CHP used the topos of advantages and referred in its platform to the Turkish model established by Atatürk, which included the seeds for the coexistence of the Islamic world and the West, and the party said: ‘Thus we believe the success of the Turkish model will bring world peace and stability

The Helsinki Summit

125

to the region. So Turkey, by adopting the Copenhagen criteria, will reach the level of a modern civilization and gain special prestige in both the East and West’ (CHP 2002). The MHP, like the DSP, refuted the connection between the Cyprus issue and EU membership and requested sensitivity from the EU: ‘Turkey will be an EU member after a fair and self-respecting process. In order for our country to become a member, the EU should also show the required sensitivity and care […] Turkey will take its place as an EU country in the common European house. Turkey’s EU membership will result from protecting our legitimate interests regarding the Cyprus and Aegean issues’ (MHP 2002). The SP considered the EU not as a modernization project, but just one of Turkey’s strategic orientations. It used the topos of advantages and underlined Turkey’s double identity and role in the Islamic world. It assumed that Turkey’s full EU membership would be significant if Turkey maintained its beliefs, cultural identity, and values, and if it protected and developed its relations with its neighbors and with the Islamic world. If Turkey could be this kind of member, EU membership would lead to the development of democracy and to the increase of human rights standards in Turkey (SP 2002). The AKP emphasized relations with the EU as having special importance and stated: ‘Our party regards the full membership of our country as the natural outcome of the modernization process. The realization of the Copenhagen criteria is the most important step for our civilization […] Turkey will realize all the commitments and fulfill all the conditions required for the other applicant states’ (AKP 2002). The DYP and the ANAP claimed to be the best parties for achieving full membership. The DYP listed EU membership under the ‘Great Development Project’ and promised EU membership in its election platform (DYP 2002). The ANAP referred to its experience in the negotiations with the EU and claimed the presidency based on its vast experience in negotiations with the EU and argued that the ANAP would be the biggest trump card for Turkey in the negotiations process (ANAP 2002). The political speeches during the electoral campaign were also dominated by the EU issue. In order to win votes, all parties claimed that they were the best party for EU membership. The MHP stated they were for EU membership but, unlike the other parties, they would defend Turkey’s self-respect. The MHP chose an election strategy that distanced them from the EU and pointed out Turkey’s sensitivities to the EU’s requirements. It did not, however, totally reject membership. Knowing that public support for EU membership was very high, the MHP could not risk losing votes by

126 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

questioning EU membership. Bahçeli claimed that the MHP contributed positively to EU relations, saying: ‘Turkey’s EU membership has been on the agenda for a long time and concrete steps have been taken in the 57th government where the MHP has played a role. It is not true that in return for three things (abolition of the death penalty as well as allowing broadcasting and education in a minority group’s mother tongue), Turkey will get a date for the start of negotiations. This has been conveyed to Turkey by EU authorities’ (Hürriyet 2002d). He put the EU and Turkey in the opposite polls but at the same time stressed in his campaign that the MHP was for EU membership: ‘People will elect either someone who is passionately in love with Turkey or who is passionately in love with Brussels […] The MHP is for the EU but against yielding to pressure’ (Hürriyet 2002e). He emphasized the importance of obtaining the membership with honor: Including the MHP, there are no parties which do not aim for EU membership. The important thing at this point is to be a full member of the EU with a just, honorable perception and attitude for our citizens […] Why are some people in Turkey willing to pay any price to be an EU member and accept the three conditions (elimination of the death penalty as well as allowing education and broadcasting in Kurdish) without questioning them? They are the same with the terrorist organization requirements […] If these rights are provided, what problems is Turkey going to face in the future? Nobody thinks about this. (Yeni Şafak 2002c)

Although Bahçeli states in this passage that he supports EU membership, he constructs a clear difference between ‘us’ (Turkey) and ‘them’ (EU) by equating EU membership requirements with the demands of a terrorist organization. This equation makes the EU the enemy of Turkey, meaning that the EU is not trustworthy and should be treated with caution. He declared his party’s aim for a one-party government, political and economic integration with the EU, and the required effort and responsibility from a national and realist perspective to achieve EU membership. It was also to achieve the highest level of relations with Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasians, Central Asia, the Turkic republics, and the Middle Eastern countries, and to enrich economic, social, political and cultural cooperation’ (Hürriyet 2002r). Ecevit warned voters of the importance of their vote for Turkey-EU relations and declared: ‘The EU said, before closing the doors to Turkey,

The Helsinki Summit

127

that they would not open the EU’s doors before knowing what kind of government resulted from the elections. This means that if a party rejecting secularism wins, the EU’s doors will not be opened for this government’ (Cumhuriyet 2002b). He used the house metaphor and constructed the clear difference between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Turkey is outside the house, waiting for the door to open. To facilitate the opening of the door, in order to enter the house and become part of the secularist group, Turkey needs to not reject secularism, one of the most important values of Europe. In the same line the election of a nonsecular party means the EU’s door will remain closed to Turkey. ANAP leader Yılmaz even claimed he regarded EU membership as more important than being prime minister and said in the meeting in Samsun: ‘Nobody can take my heart out of me. My name is dauntless. Turkey is supposed to join the EU. I would prefer Turkey’s EU accession ten times more than being prime minister’ (Hürriyet 2002g). Çiller pointed to the special characteristics of Turkish identity and promised that Turkey would join the EU with these specific characteristics: ‘Turkey will join the EU with its call to prayer, with its flag and with the spirit of Gallipoli. Nobody should lump us together with the others. Whatever it takes, we will join the EU, showing the power of Turks while preserving our traditions’ (Hürriyet 2002h). CHP leader Deniz Baykal also appealed to voters with the EU membership card and he warned the voters of the consequences of voting for the parties with closer ties with the Middle East countries and said: ‘Don’t vote for those who are willing to give up principles that go back to Atatürk. Vote for the people who support them and will strengthen them. Don’t vote for the people who will turn Turkey to the Middle East and to the Arab world, but for the people who will bring the country to the EU and Europe’ (Cumhuriyet 2002e). In addition, in the meeting in Eskisehir, Baykal declared: ‘In these elections, you should look to our future and to our democratic republic, our Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Don’t waste all the suffering. In this election, you are deciding whether to waste all this suffering or not, whether to join the EU or not’ (Cumhuriyet 2002f). All these party discourses during the political campaigns centered on EU membership, reflected public support in Turkey, and showed how the political parties oriented their discourses around public opinion. The parties, however, stressed the particular principles that were important to their ideology for entering the EU. For instance, Çiller, as a leader of a center-right party, focused on the traditions of Turkey and wanted to enter EU with a Turkish flag and a prayer. It is also remarkable that she refers to

128 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

the spirit of Gallipoli. The Battle of Gallipoli was one of the greatest victories of the Ottoman Empire during WWI and a defining victory in the history of Turkey, forming the basis for the Turkish War of Independence and in turn the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Thus, referring to Battle of Gallipoli in defense of EU membership, puts the EU, paradoxically, in the enemy position, which was fought in the past to achieve independence. Baykal, as the leader of the CHP, underlines instead the connection between the EU and the principles of Atatürk. He portrays EU membership as the only future for Turkey and holds that any other alternatives will turn Turkey into an Arabic country, which tends to be equated in Turkey with being underdeveloped and backward.

4.3

The Atmosphere before the Copenhagen Summit

When we look at Turkey’s direct interactions with the EU before the Copenhagen Summit, it is clear that Turkey had very high expectations about reaching a conclusion to the 200 years of its Westernization process. It was an emotional moment. The atmosphere before the Copenhagen Summit was best described by Sedat Ergin. He wrote in his column: Each night we go to sleep with the EU and then get up the next day with the EU. The reports, comments, reactions, discussions, and insults in newspapers and on television regarding Turkey’s full membership are increasing everyday. At the same time, EU membership is taking up more space in our daily lives […] The hopes, expectations, aspirations, and ideals directed toward the EU and reactions caused by the mistakes and immoderation of the EU are all intertwined. (Ergin 2002)

During this period the EU accession process was referred to as the Westernization and modernization process of Turkey, while Turkey’s Muslim identity was underlined in conjunction with the topoi of usefulness, civilization, values, good example, mutual benefit, and threat – as usual, prior to an approaching important summit. The newly elected Islamic government had increasingly used the Muslim identity of Turkey in conjunction with topoi of values, good example, and civilization to support the argument that Turkey’s acceptance into the EU as a secular Muslim country would benefit everybody.

The Helsinki Summit

129

High Expectations before the Copenhagen Summit Throughout this period, EU accession was increasingly identif ied as the important step of Turkey’s Westernization. In the same line the EU membership mostly represented the last stage of the country’s historical modernization process using the topos of history. The topos of history was employed to justify Turkey’s accession to the EU. This statement of Yılmaz is a good example of these representations: ‘EU membership is the unavoidable extension of Turkey’s 200-year struggle for Westernization. Turkey has taken important steps in this struggle and now we are at the final step of the integration with the West, which is EU membership. Actually, Turkey’s EU membership is the culmination of the 200-year struggle for Westernization’ (Hürriyet 2002s). In this text Yılmaz again compares Turkey’s Westernization to a struggle, referring to the toughness of the process, and describes EU membership as the final point of this struggle. The representation of the EU membership as the final stage of the Westernization process draws a distinction between the (Western) developed Europe and (Eastern) backward Turkey. The high expectations before the Copenhagen Summit also influenced Turkey’s positioning on EU membership and its perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ The newly elected government and its mainly Islamic members also pursued the line that Turkey’s Muslim identity should be stressed so that the EU would accept Turkey in conjunction with the topoi of usefulness, threat, values, and the clash of civilizations. In this context, it was underlined, on the one hand, that if Turkey received a date for the start of negotiations it would be a model for the joining of democracy and Islamic culture that underlay Turkey’s Muslim identity (Hürriyet 2002i). On the other hand, the EU was threatened that if a date was not set for Turkey, the Turkish public would forgo EU membership and this, in turn, could damage multiculturalism in the world. The topos of the clash of civilizations represented Turkey’s accession as an opportunity to prevent the clash of two distinct civilizations, namely, Islam and Christianity. These of discourses referred to religious in- and out-group boundaries and underlined Turkish Muslim identity and represented the EU as a Christian club. These topoi (the clash of civilizations, threat, and usefulness) used the Muslim identity to underline the arguments for joining the EU. Before the EU Summit, Erdoğan went to Copenhagen to meet the prime minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Erdoğan’s statements in the press conference after the meeting is a significant example of the use of the topos of threat. Erdoğan blamed the EU for being disingenuous with Turkey,

130 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

stating that some of the countries which were given a date in Helsinki and at the Luxembourg Summit were more backward than Turkey is today. He said: ‘If Turkey does not get a date at the Copenhagen Summit, the EU is going to bear the consequences. The peace of Europe and the EU will be compromised. There will be no economic cooperation’ (Hürriyet 2002a). He warned the EU: ‘Either give a date to Turkey and adopt multiculturalism, which will prevent the clash of civilizations, or remain a Christian club’ (ibid.). At the same time the EU and the West were spoken of increasingly as Turkey’s 200-year-long civilization project. The acceptance of Turkey for EU membership was supported by the topos of values arguing that the EU will be able to pursue its values. Prime Minister Gül expressed this by saying: ‘Turkey is a country that combines modernity, Islam, secularism, and constitutionalism within its identity and keeps them alive. The importance of this model can be understood better in the current international situation. The EU will continue to pursue the basic values of community, [as well as] ethnic, religious and cultural tolerance when it accepts Turkey’ (Hürriyet 2002l). In this context, the topoi of religion and values were employed to support the argument that Turkey should be accepted into the EU because it is a Muslim country with modern values. Once intentionally isolated from Islamic countries, Turkey was increasingly identified by politicians as the representative of the Muslim world with modern values. They warned the EU that denying Turkey full membership would probably cause cliques in the Islamic world and the Christian club. This is obvious in Erdoğan’s speech delivered to European leaders in Washington, DC, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies shortly before the Copenhagen Summit: Turkey wants to carry its political Magna Carta forward, which is a synthesis of its Muslim identity and modern values. In my visits, I have not only requested EU membership but I have also invited the whole world to a new Renaissance. The fault line of civilization goes through Turkey. When Turkey is fully integrated into economic, political, and military institutions, it will show the whole world that Islam and Christianity, West and East can embrace […] If Turkey is not accepted, the Islamic world, as well as the millions of Muslims living in Europe, will feel discriminated against. This will primarily be a domestic problem and a risk for EU members. The West will be, for the Islamic world, a Christian club. (Milliyet 2002c)

The Helsinki Summit

131

Erdoğan concentrates in his speech on the civilization project aspect of EU membership and refers to the most significant fundaments of Western civilization, such as the Magna Carta and the Renaissance, in the context of Turkish multidimensional identity. He describes Turkey’s political Magna Carta as the synthesis of its modern and religious identity and illustrates Turkey’s joining the Union as a rebirth like the Renaissance through the unification of Islam and Christianity. He represents the ‘self’ and ‘other’ definitions through religious lines, namely Christians and Muslims, constructing clear differences between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ It is remarkable that he does use passive formulation when he speaks about the exclusion of Turkey without blaming the EU directly. As already outlined, after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the religious character of Turkish identity was emphasized more intensively. This increased throughout 2002 and particularly before the Copenhagen Summit. Having an Islamic government also played an important role. Before the Copenhagen Summit, it was repeated endlessly that Turkey’s acceptance as a Muslim country would bring advantages to the EU and rescue it from being a Christian club. It is remarkable that Turkey emphasized the importance of its religious Muslim identity, but at the same time warned the EU to not stick to its religious Christian identity. This strand of discourses created ‘them’ (Christian) and ‘us’ (Muslim) group constructions. For instance, Kutan pointed to the increasing significance of Turkey after September 11th and said: ‘A great percentage of the population want EU membership. The European Economic Union was exclusive and based on Christianity, but in today’s situation, it has lost this characteristic […] As a Muslim country, Turkey will enrich the EU. This is particularly important after September 11th and will stop dangerous movements’ (Hürriyet 2002p). Prime Minister Gül also employed the topos of advantages and pointed to the importance of Turkey’s Muslim identity and to the advantages of this identity for the EU: ‘If they want a powerful EU, playing important roles in world politics, Turkey has to join the EU. Turkey’s accession will not only be an advantage for Turkey but will also offer big advantages to the EU. The accession of a Muslim country will truly enrich the EU. It will show that the EU is not a Christian club’ (Hürriyet 2002f). Gül also applied the topos of good example to expressed readiness to fulfill the conditions based on a Muslim identity and pointed to the importance of Turkey carrying out the conditions since it would be a good example for the other Muslim countries. The representation of Turkey as a role model for the other Muslim countries indicated at the same time the priority of Western civilization over Muslim civilization. Turkey was an example for

132 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

the other Muslim countries because it has adopted the Western values and gained the right to join the group. Gül illustrated these with following words: The previous governments told us we are a special candidate, be tolerant toward us. We want to access the EU. And we are for knocking on the EU door after we do our part […] This will prove that Turkey, with its Muslim citizens, is a cooperative country in a democratic, transparent, and modern world. Such a Turkey will be a good example for the Middle East and other Muslim countries and so serve world peace. (Hürriyet 2002k)

Turkey’s increasingly Muslim self-description was not made at the cost of describing Europe as its ‘other.’ It was more about being a role model for other Muslim countries and transmitting Western values to them. So this underlining of differences was mostly done, not to isolate Turkey from Europe, but to add value beyond its European identity. Differences and Europeanness were emphasized in tandem. The long history of Turkey’s Europeanness and its attachment to Europe was a constant theme of politicians. Many times the historical roots of Turkey were underlined to illustrate the inseparableness of Turkey and Europe. In these discourses Turkey’s bonds with the West are not rooted in relations with the EU, but they are much deeper because of the cultural and historical bonds. Thus, not only Turkey needs the EU, but the EU also needs Turkey. Even in some cases Europe`s existence was made dependent on Turkey employing the topos of mutual benefit, as Ecevit said: ‘Turkey has been European for 600 years and Europe cannot exist if it gives us up’ (Hürriyet 2002c). The description of the EU as the most signif icant part of Turkey’s civilization, Westernization, and modernization processes was repeated by several columnists. As already outlined in Chapter 2, modernization is equated to Westernization, taking a place in European civilization and internalizing all its cultural dimensions (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003: 35; Bozdoğan and Kasaba 1997: 3; Keyder 1997: 37). Thus, the EU integration process is mostly referred to as the last destination of the country’s historical journey toward modernization, Westernization, and civilization. This reference to the EU accession process represents the EU positively as superior and modern and the Turkish self as backward, constructing the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Mainly this strand of discourses regards Western civilization as the only civilization and holds that Turkey, if it does not join this civilization, would draw apart from the civilized community. The

The Helsinki Summit

133

following passages are good examples for this strand of discourse, applying the topos of civilization and modernization. Fehmi Koru, for instance, stated: ‘Turkey has not only spent its last 200 years attempting Westernization but has been in almost all European institutions since World War II and has been connected with the EU for 40 years […] The republic was not only a modernization project but also a Europeanization project’ (Koru 2002a). Hasan Cemal described the EU as ‘the civilization project of Turkey. It is the extension of the civilization struggle of this land for 200 years and of the movement for catching up with the epoch, which had a great start with the establishment of the Turkish Republic’ (Cemal 2002a). Sami Kohen also equated EU membership with Turkey’s modernization process. ‘The EU has, for Turkey more than for all other member and applicant states, a political meaning. It is directly connected with the vision of Turkey’s Westernization and joining the modern states’ (Kohen 2002). Even the Islamic parties, which previously had a different discourse, now equated the EU with civilization and modernity. Ahmet Taşgetiren quoted part of Erdoğan’s speech to a group session in his column: ‘We consider the EU membership process as a second launching of our modern civilization ideal within the republic project. We are definitely for EU membership. We defend EU membership so as to not remain in the suburbs of civilization and development and not to be a slum in the developed and globalized world’ (Taşgetiren 2002). The definition of the EU as a civilization project meant that Islam was defined as the ‘other’ of Europe and the othering of a defined Islam (Emre 2002). Hasan Cemal also pointed to the long history of Turkey’s bonds with Western values, which were older than the EU and goes back to Ottoman era: The roots of the European dream can be traced back to olden times […] In this land, the choice of the West was made during the Ottoman era. It continued with the revolution of Atatürk and his friends […] Turkey made the choice to live with Western values quite consciously […] When Turkey made this choice, the EU did not exist. Turkey is in the West, but is it separated from the East? No and it can’t be. Turkey is a land that brings the West to the East and the East to the West. (Cemal 2002b)

Cemal makes use of bridge metaphor in this passage without a direct reference to it. His claim that Turkey’s existence in the West does not separate it from the East is based on the argument that Turkey plays the role of a bridge between the Western and Eastern civilizations.

134 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Progress Report 2002 before the Copenhagen Summit The expectation and enthusiasm of the Turkish side before the Copenhagen Summit was dampened by Progress Report 2002 (European Commission 2002). The progress report was a great disappointment for Turkey because the considerable enacted reforms to satisfy the EU’s accession acquis went unnoticed by this report. Thus, it gave rise to the increasing use of the negative labels to describe the EU, such as ‘people without good intentions,’ ‘dishonest,’ ‘liar,’ ‘two-faced.’ Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel indicated the report was a bad omen for the Copenhagen Summit: As the Progress Report has been reported in the media, I think it was not prepared by people who have good intentions. We did not have any expectations from the report, but we also did not expect the report to be an obstacle for us. The decision to be made in Copenhagen will be a political one […] It is clear that the EU has not decided its future yet. (Cumhuriyet 2002j)

Although he didn’t directly blame the EU and used only the word some people, he negatively describes these as people with no good intentions. He at the same time also used the topos of threat and claimed that a negative decision will be not good for the future of the EU. The requirements of the Progress Report were sickening, which gave way to despair and negative descriptions of the EU and Europe. In his column, Oktay Ekşi described the EU’s behavior as dishonest and unreliable and wrote: The EU has a very disturbing approach, and actually it is dishonest. They first require something, for instance, a change in a law. You think you did it, then they tell you to shorten the detention period. It is as if they have a long list. When you fulfill something, they give you two new requirements. It is like a turtle [sic] having a carrot dangling above his head. When he moves to snatch it, the carrot moves and he can never quite reach it. (Ekşi 2002b)

Even the dauntless supporter of the EU, Hasan Cemal, expressed his negative attitude toward Europe’s behavior in his column after Progress Report 2002. He wrote that in 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership, an important European diplomat told the advisor of the prime minister: ‘Alas! Now you are going to learn our real opinion of you.’ Cemal gave a reason

The Helsinki Summit

135

for the exclusion of Turkey its religion and described the EU as Christian club keeping ‘us’ and ‘them’ apart based on religious identities. He declared: ‘This was right. We are still learning. If it continues this way, we will learn that Europe is not composed of values like democracy, human rights, rule of law, and a custom union, but is a Christian club […] If the EU excludes Turkey just because its culture is different and it is Muslim and raises the flag of cultural nationalism, this means that the EU has not understood yesterday’s and today’s world properly’ (Cemal 2002c). After the Progress Report, the negative atmosphere was also mirrored in the descriptions of the Europeans, who were defined negatively and as the ‘other’ of Turkey. In his statement, Hikmet Bila dominantly employed ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourse and described Europeans as different from the Turkish ‘self’ as people who tell lies, have double standards, are two-faced, and take without offering anything in return: To negotiate with Europeans is like getting into bed with a bear. They have double standards, they tell lies. They speak differently to your face than behind your back. The terrorism directed toward them is bad, terrorism directed toward others is acceptable […] They create discord and than watch it from the sidelines as if they don’t know anything about it. They take you with a ladle but don’t even give you a spoon. They are two-faced. (Bila 2002c)

It was also common that the negative decisions were perceived as the outcome of the historical rivalry by employing the topos of history. Tufan Türenç, for instance, alluded to the historical rivalry and characterized the decision as the revenge of Vienna. He also singled out the European mentality and described it as discriminatory: They say you are not European. You cannot access the Union. We can offer you only special status instead of membership […] This is exactly the European mentality. ‘I am first class and others are second class and will serve me.’ It is incontrovertible that in the subconscious of Europe remains a genetic [desire for] revenge against the Ottoman attempt to capture Vienna. (Türenç 2002)

By describing this revenge as genetic he put all the Western countries to the unconditional enemy position. In this context, the Muslim identity of Turkey was again regarded as the reason for the exclusion of Turkey and it was not only used as a trump card

136 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

for obtaining EU membership, but was paradoxically given as the reason for the discrimination against Turkey and for its not being accepted as European. In answer to the question ‘What are the reasons for this double standard, in your opinion?,’ Erdoğan answered: We hear voices from EU states saying it is Turkey’s size, the big population, and Turkey being Muslim. There are some marginal groups saying that a country with a Muslim population definitely cannot enter the EU. We don’t want to consider the EU as a religious club. The EU is supposed to be a place for the reconciliation of civilizations, not for the clash of civilizations. The date given to Turkey will be the beginning of civilizations meeting and reconciling. (Yeni Şafak 2002b)

This statement of Erdoğan illustrates perfectly how the Muslim identity of Turkey was on the one hand regarded as the reason for the nonacceptance of Turkey into the EU and on the other hand was used to convince the EU to accept Turkey as a member by using the topos of threat based on the clash of civilizations argument. In both cases the Muslim Turkey and Christian EU were constructed as different ‘them’ and ‘us’ groups. Even among the secularist elite, some regarded religion as the real reason why Turkey was not considered European and was not asked to join the EU. Hasan Pulur wrote in his column: ‘We surely have to be European, adopt their values, and put them into force. However, we have to accept some realities. To be European is a way of life, and religion is an important part of this way of life. We cannot forget this’ (Pulur 2002). Emin Çölaşan also wrote in his column that Turkey would never be accepted by the EU, whatever it does, because of its Muslim identity and because of the historical hatred against Muslims. He added: ‘I have written it several times. For Turkey, the EU is an insatiable monster. Whatever we do, they will not appreciate it. It is very unlikely they will take us into their group […] The reason for this is historical […] Hatred of Ottomans! Hatred of Turks and Muslims’ (Çölaşan 2002).

4.4

The Copenhagen Summit 2002: New Hope for Turkey

In the Copenhagen Summit on 12-14 December 2002 the EU decided to give Turkey a date to begin accession talks for eventual membership. The decision to provide as a date for an appointment without obligation for negotiations (Sazak 2002) created an atmosphere of hope in Turkey, making

The Helsinki Summit

137

people believe that Turkey had finally received a concrete decision and the desired membership was not so far away. After the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey experienced quite eventful years engaged in the EU socialization process and reforms. Turkey conducted substantial legislative reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria, which targeted the authoritarian aspects of the Turkish constitution and legal system. The legislative reforms under the Ecevit government 2001 and under the AKP government in 2004 amended the Turkish Penal Code and antiterror law, expanded freedom of expression and other civil and political rights, and abolished the death penalty (Yeşilada 2013: 16-17). There was a consensus and great enthusiasm for the EU. Political parties, citizens, and the media supported the EU. In his column, Hasan Cemal reported research on Turkey’s EU membership. Asked if they would vote for EU membership in a referendum, 74.4% of participants answered yes; 17.3% no, and 8.3% were undecided […] The distribution of yes votes by party was, 85.8% CHP, 84.3% DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi [People’s Party]), 79% DYP; 70.7% AKP, and 69.6% GP (Genç Parti [Young Party]) (Cemal 2003a). This distribution shows that support of Islamic parties for EU membership increased considerably. Politicians often referred to this high level of support. In his speeches, Erdoğan stated several times that support for EU membership by the government, the opposition and the public was at 75%: ‘Now, 75% of the Turkish people support EU accession. If one held a referendum in EU member states, you would not see support this high […] 75% is meaningful support’ (Yeni Şafak 2003c). However, in spite of the enthusiasm and strong public support, the feeling of being excluded by the EU was very much in evidence. A nationwide opinion survey, conducted in 2003 by Hakan Yılmaz, affirmed this. It found that the feeling that the EU was excluding Turkey was very strong and trust in the EU regarding national problems was very low. Some 60% of the respondents agreed that the EU used double standards in its dealings with Turkey. Also one-third of the respondents had the opinion that the EU’s demands regarding human rights and minority issues were similar to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. Another one-third disagreed and the rest said that they did not have the historical knowledge to judge. Some 45% of the respondents agreed that the ethnic separatist movements would def initely increase if Turkey joined the EU (Yılmaz 2009: 53-54). During the years before the negotiations, the EU watched Turkey’s socialization process carefully and commented through official documents and

138 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

summits. The Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 praised Turkey’s reform efforts but also stressed that significantly more effort was needed, The Thessaloniki European Council welcomes the commitment of the Turkish government to carry forward the reform process, in particular the remaining legislative work by the end of 2003, and supports its ongoing efforts made in order to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria for opening accession negotiations with the Union. Taking into account progress achieved, significant further efforts to this end are still required. With a view to helping Turkey achieve this objective, the Council recently adopted a revised Accession Partnership, which sets out the priorities that Turkey should pursue, supported by substantially increased pre-accession financial assistance. (Council of the European Union 2003b)

In November 2003, the EU Commission produced a strategy paper which revealed the growing divergence between the EU’s approach toward Turkey and Turkey’s desire to be integrated into the community. As already outlined in the Customs Union chapter, the EU’s approach to relations with Turkey was a simple foreign policy matter, whereas Turkey wanted to be a real part of the Union. Turkey worked hard to meet the conditions for acceptance to the EU. However, in this strategy paper, the EU Commission focused on the concessions and changes, which were required from Turkey, but did not address the promises made to Turkey. This created a feeling of being deceived by the EU (Türkeş and Gökgöz 2004). The strategy paper praised, on one hand, Turkey’s progress in political reforms but stated that Turkey had not yet fully met the Copenhagen political criteria. It required more improvements in fundamental freedoms and cultural rights in the Southeast. The paper required resolution of the problem and indicated that the ‘absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations’ (European Commission 2003). The reference to the cultural rights in Southeast Turkey created a crisis between Turkey and the EU. On 19 May 2003, the Council adopted a revised Accession Partnership Document (Council of the European Union 2003a), which was generally assessed positively by Turkey. The only problematic point was again the Cyprus section. The second Accession Partnership Document narrowed the division to between short- and midterm for the fulfillment of the political criteria. It considered the sensitivities of Turkey; there were no new criteria. Although Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations were in a separate section, this section was formulated very carefully. Based on the revised Accession Partnership Document, Turkey adopted a revised National Programme

The Helsinki Summit

139

for the Adoption of the Acquis on 24 July 2003, which set out how Turkey envisioned dealing with the Accession Partnership’s priorities. In December 2004, the European Council decided, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005, and set out the framework and the requirements for starting accession negotiations. First, Turkey was to bring into force six pieces of legislation enhancing human rights and the functioning of the judiciary, and second, Turkey was expected to sign the Adaptation Protocol, extending its existing Association Agreement with the EU to all new member states, including the Republic of Cyprus. Fulfillment of these requirements by Turkey resulted in the opening of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 as planned and EU-Turkey relations entered a new phase (Müftüler-Baç 2008: 9). The Cyprus and Kurdish Issues after the Copenhagen Decision Relations with Greece and the Cyprus and Kurdish issues continued to be at the center of Turkey-EU relations before and during the Copenhagen Summit, influencing greatly the self-other definitions of Turkey. Turkey kept its official position regarding the Kurdish issue and did not recognize the Cyprus issue as a condition for EU membership. Although the Turkish side was afraid that Cyprus would be a condition for membership, after the Copenhagen Summit Gül officially assured the country that Cyprus was not on the table and added: ‘We don’t consider the Cyprus issue a domestic problem. There was no condition set in Copenhagen. We are for a solution. We said this. However, we are for a just solution, which will also consider Turkish interests. This is our approach until 28 February’ (Bila 2002a). Turkey was actually aware that the Cyprus issue was the biggest obstacle to EU membership. Hasan Cemal explained this situation using the house metaphor: ‘Cyprus and the EU are intertwined. The official discourse might be different; however, the reality is the deadlock in Cyprus will not open the EU’s door. To kick the ball in the wrong way in Cyprus means to concede a goal to the EU. Cyprus is the magic key. It is, at the same time, a trump card in the hands of Turkey. If we play it well, the EU door is going to open’ (Cemal 2002f). In this passage, Cemal illustrates the Cyprus as the reason for Turkey’s being outside the EU. The solution of the issue will give Turkey the right to enter the house and establish clear-cut borders and the separation of the Turkish ‘self’ from the European ‘other’ will be diminished (Hülsse 2006: 413) EU conditions forced positive developments in relations with Greece and a remarkable amount of contact between Turkey and Greece occurred

140 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

during this time. Turkish foreign minister İsmail Cem and Greek foreign minister Yorgo Papandreou spoke on a panel organized by the EU Common Forum entitled ‘Who Is the “Other”? Does Such a Concept Really Exist?’ They exchanged views on the planned process to solve Aegean problems and drew attention to the importance of dialogue, understanding, and respect in dealing with the problems between the two countries. Cem said: ‘Five years ago the “other” for Turkey was Greece and for Greece, Turkey. Nowadays, there is a great change in the cognitive perception of the “other” and we hope in a short time it will be purely positive’ (Cumhuriyet 2002d). Although in principle Turkey did not recognize the Cyprus issue as a condition for EU membership, it gave signs that if full membership was offered, Turkey was ready to make some concessions. The real issue for the Turkish side was the lack of trust in the EU, which in turn, gave rise to emphasizing the clear difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the decline in the readiness for reforms. After a meeting in Warsaw with the European Socialist Party, Baykal made references to the constructed differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’ and declared: ‘The EU displayed behavior which Turkey did not deserve […] They tell us to find a solution immediately for the Cyprus conflict. Be brave. OK, Turkey will be brave, but will you encourage Turkey? Are you ready to promise Turkey EU membership?’ (Cumhuriyet 2002c). Turkey’s distrust of the EU regarding the Cyprus issue was strengthened by the EU’s announcement of candidacy for Cyprus at the Copenhagen Summit. This kicked up a row in Turkey. After the Copenhagen Summit decision, Turkey turned defensive and declared that it did not recognize the EU’s decision on Cyprus. The Foreign Ministry emphasized that the accession of South Cyprus was against the 1959-1960 Agreements. The Kurdish issue was also a topic of debate along with the Cyprus issue during the Copenhagen period. The debate on the Kurdish issue, as related to the EU, was dominated by education in Kurdish and Kurdish broadcasting. Although the Kurdish issue was a major cause of Turkey’s distrust of the EU and caused an increasing estrangement from the EU, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and ANAP party leader Mesut Yılmaz gave the green light to Kurdish television. The government took several steps to administer the Kurdish reforms. First, Article 26 of the Turkish constitution: ‘In spreading and explaining opinion, you cannot use a language which is forbidden by law’ was removed. However, RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu [Radio and Television Supreme Council]) also had regulations hindering Kurdish broadcasting and they needed to change to allow it. The MHP strongly opposed the changes to RTÜK regulations, which allowed broadcasting in Kurdish. Although the DSP was also a nationalist left party, Ecevit’s

The Helsinki Summit

141

position on education in Kurdish was more moderate than Bahçeli’s. Ecevit distinguished between learning Kurdish and educating in Kurdish and said they would only allow the former: ‘Broadcasting and learning in Kurdish is different than educating in Kurdish. This we cannot allow’ (Hürriyet 2002j). The CHP responded positively to the requirements regarding more freedom for Kurds. The CHP human rights board chairman pointed out that to speak and develop a mother tongue is a democratic right and all Turkish citizens have the right to speak and develop their mother tongue freely and protect and disperse their subcultural richness. However, he made a distinction between the public and private sphere: ‘In the public sphere, education will be in our official constitutional language, Turkish. The state does not have an obligation to educate in the several mother tongues existing in our country’ (Cumhuriyet 2002g). The MHP’s strong opposition to the requirements of the EU regarding Kurdish rights caused, at long last, the dissolution of the coalition. Bahçeli rejected the expectation of Yılmaz for more understanding and change and stated that these types of requirements regarding education and broadcasting in mother tongues would mean the end of the coalition (Cumhuriyet 2002a). In an interview, Bahçeli answered the question of what he thought about the requirements regarding education and broadcasting in mother tongues: ‘The EU is now Turkey’s political target. The MHP is not the one dragging its feet on the matter; it is the one contributing. However, we don’t say we have to join the EU, whatever it takes, and we also don’t say the EU does not interest us […] If they want to open the way for the politicization of the PKK in order to open the way to the EU, we are not for this’ (Cumhuriyet 2002h). Bahçeli also blamed the EU for supporting terrorism and criticized the requirements for Kurdish education ‘as part of a game plan.’ He said that it is impossible to understand that a separatist organization, which causes great harm to Turkish society and democracy, is not considered from the perspective of the prevention of terrorism. The EU should be more coherent, decisive, and open regarding combating terrorism (Cumhuriyet 2002i). In spite of these criticisms, Bahçeli did not forgo the aim of EU membership. One of the reasons for this was, as already outlined, the approaching elections and strong public support for EU membership. Therefore, Bahçeli stated: ‘Turkey has wanted to join the EU for 40 years and this is now a political aim and state policy. The MHP is not waffling on this issue. On the contrary, it has made invaluable contributions. However, we are not saying join the EU, whatever it costs’ (Bila 2002b). It is remarkable in Bahçeli’s statement that he refers to the EU as a 40-year incident. This is rather different than usual political discourse pointing at least to the 200 years of

142 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Westernization history of Turkey as evidence of its Europeanness. This indicates that Bahçeli does not consider the EU as the extension of Turkey’s modernization, but rather only a political strategic decision. The MHP was the most skeptical about the EU regarding national issues, particularly the Kurdish issue. Thus, Bahçeli pointed on several occasions to the connections between the EU accession process and the PKK’s politicization, emphasizing ‘them’ and ‘us’ discourses. In these discourses the EU is the other of Turkey, which should not be trusted. Mostly the opponents of broadcasting in Kurdish, like Bahçeli, pointed to EU support of terrorism and made the connection between Sèvres and the EU requirements regarding Kurdish rights (ibid.). A stronger position was taken by MHP deputy Somuncuoğlu, who criticized the EU’s demands: ‘Cultural and political rights are in parallel with the terrorist organization’s change in strategy. When broadcasting in Kurdish is allowed, this will be followed by a requirement for Kurdish education. The acceptance of our Kurdish citizens as a minority will mean renouncing the Lausanne Treaty. Everyone can imagine what it will cost to give up the Lausanne Treaty and replace it with the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish state should not be trapped’ (Hürriyet 2002n). In top government circles, Kurdish education was also associated with the PKK. A report prepared by the security unit of the state to submit to the head of state assessed that the action of some groups regarding Kurdish education was a dangerous step in the PKK’s political combat strategy. The report pointed out that, after being unsuccessful in armed conflict, the separatist organization c hanged its strategy for becoming a state and nation and now wanted to alienate all areas of society in the name of cultural rights. The report also stated that some European countries promised the PKK that they would help the Kurds gain independence as long as the PKK did not use armed force and that the terrorist organization thought to benef it from the increasing social, political, and economic problems of Turkey, in order to create a nation and separate from Turkey. According to the report, the Kurdish people are hoping for Kurdish history lessons in the schools, alongside Kurdish language lessons (Cumhuriyet 2002k). The EU continued to play a key role in the Kurdish issue within the framework of Turkey’s negotiations process and was regarded by some as a good opportunity to solve the problem. The conference ‘EU, Turkey and Kurds,’ organized by the European Parliament, stated in its declaration that the process of Turkey’s EU accession would deeply impact the status and rights of Kurds in Turkey. Without resolution of the Kurdish issue, even a democratic, peaceful, and stable Turkey could not access the EU. Thus, Kurds should be

The Helsinki Summit

143

given an active role in the democratization of Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2003). Şemsi Yücel described the Kurdish requirements for being accepted by the EU in his column: ‘These are the conditions waiting for you, When somebody says ‘I am Kurdish,’ you will not say, ‘You are a secessionist.’ You will not be angry when you see Kurdish broadcasting or propaganda […] You will not bitch about people who give their children non-Turkish names […] Are you still a supporter of the EU?’ (Yücel 2003). The Kurds also regarded EU relations as an opportunity. In December, Kurds in Turkey placed a declaration in the International Herald Tribune, in the name of Kurdish society, with the title ‘What Do the Kurds Want in Turkey?’ The Paris Cultural Institute signed the declaration requiring the same rights for Kurds in Turkey as those required by Turks for Cypriot Turks in Cyprus and which European minorities have. The declaration emphasized that, in the course of EU integration, a new foundation for a peaceful solution had been created for Turks as well as for Kurds and the value of this opportunity should be understood (Cumhuriyet 2004c). There had also been some improvements in the course of Turkey-EU relations. The Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Working Groups of the Human Rights Advisory Board of the Prime Ministry emphasized in their minority report that the preparation for EU accession had produced progress in minority and cultural rights in Turkey. These improvements, triggered by the laws enacted in the EU integration process, were summarized by Hasan Cemal in an article reporting on a meeting to discuss the Kurds in Diyarbakır that was organized by intellectuals from İstanbul and Diyarbakır. Cemal wrote that the local people in Diyarbakır answered a question about the application of the laws as follows: ‘Before the laws, it was impossible to have a meeting about Kurds or at least it would be not as easy as it is today.’ Cemal reported that on 1 September, World Peace Day, big posters appeared in Diyarbakır streets in Kurdish and added: [A]nd nothing happened. Underline the phrase, nothing happened. Because one year ago it would not have been even imaginable to see Atatürk’s words on Kurdish billboards in the streets of Diyarbakır […] Does this mean the application is going well? I can summarize what I heard from reliable sources: There are no restrictions on Kurdish newspapers, magazines and books […] Kurdish songs are played on local radio and television stations, when the songs are not ideological […] However, it is not yet possible to have Kurdish news and discussion programs on local radio and television […] There is another issue still waiting although the laws are in place – Kurdish language courses. (Cemal 2003b)

144 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

In spite of these positive improvements, the intervention of the EU in the Kurdish matter was also causing discomfort in Turkey. Particularly the visits to Diyarbakır, the declaration given on the matter in this city, and the requirements for Kurdish cultural rights were received with great suspicion and anger. There were several visits from EU officials in 2004. In September Verheugen visited Tuzla, a village in Lice, Diyarbakır, and said: ‘The EU has placed great emphasis on the development of Southeast Turkey and, in this context, there are two political measures. The first one is to give the Kurds cultural and social rights. Thus, we are for Kurdish broadcasting and education […] The other is to meet the social and economic needs of the region’ (Cumhuriyet 2004e). Another visit to Diyarbakır was made in December by the president of the European Parliament, Joseph Borrell. He also discussed the cultural identity issue and declared: ‘The European Parliament being here today is a sign that the EU is for more peace, more economic development, and for the protection of the cultural identities of the EU and Turkey’ (Cumhuriyet 2004d). The other two visits in December by EU officials even involved declarations on the Kurds’ right to have their own state. After his Diyarbakır visit, the president of the European Parliament declared that Kurds have a different cultural identity. He said it is a democratic right to have a separate state if the society does not feel that it belongs to particular state (Cumhuriyet 2004a). During his visit with Diyarbakır’s mayor, Osman Baydemir, Miloslav Ransdorf, a member of the European Parliament, promised support for the political awakening and named the region Kurdistan. He said: If Turkey is serious about joining the EU, it should make investments in your region and in Diyarbakır […] We will support your political standing and your struggle to the best of our ability. Although our support is not much, we, as a country, will continue to support your region, your struggle; we will try to contribute to Kurdistan. We will continue to contribute. The resolution of Kurdish issues is, for all of us, a great opportunity […] When we came here in 1999, it was a great problem to use the words ‘Kurds’ and ‘Kurdistan.’ However, now we can come and use these words. This shows the development in Turkey. (Cumhuriyet 2004b)

4.5

Debates on the Identity and Europeanness of Turkey

The Copenhagen decision in 2002, like other positive decisions regarding Turkey, was perceived with satisfaction and as the certification of Turkish

The Helsinki Summit

145

Europeanness by Turkey. The EU was regarded as the key to Turkey’s fate. The decision was received warmly in Turkey and spread happiness and relief among members of the government. At Esenboğa International Airport in Ankara, just back from Copenhagen, Erdoğan focused in his speech on the Copenhagen criteria and the reform process and declared the readiness of the country for adapting the European norms. He promised that the modernization of Turkey would be done while protecting its national values, but, at the same time, he stated that the EU’s values are/and would become Turkish values, too. He said: Now we are experiencing the happiness of ending a difficult journey with success and having nothing to be ashamed of. I want to thank my great nation, which has always supported us […] Turkey will continue to take determined steps for EU membership in order to be a powerful country in the upcoming ten years, because the ideal of the majority of Turkish citizens is to be world citizens by protecting our values. The Turkish model is modernization through conserving local values. This is the ideal in the minds and hearts of our nation […] After that, whatever happens, we will continue to take steps to make the Copenhagen criteria Ankara’s criteria. The political values expressed in the Copenhagen criteria are not unknown to our citizens. These values are not imported values. We believe that these values are supposed to be our native values. (Hürriyet 2002j)

In this statement Erdoğan uses the path metaphor and equates the Copenhagen Summit decision to the successful ending of these difficult journey. Turkey is united by the EU and Europe by reaching the end point of these journey. There is not much difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ since through the European accession process the Turkish ‘self’ is integrated into Europe. Also the acceptance of Copenhagen criteria illustrates the political unification of Turkey with Europe. He employed the topos of values arguing that EU values are Turkey’s native values, which justify the acceptance of Turkey to the community and makes Turkey part of the family. However at the same time Erdoğan’s reference to the local values defining Turkish modernization, underlines the gradual differences between the ‘self’ and Europe. So far modernization has always been equated to Westernization and adoption of Western values. The reference to local values in the course of the modernization process illustrates that the Eastern identity of the Turkish ‘self’ gained more significance and is even influential in the modernization of Turkey.

146 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

The decision was also perceived – like other positive decisions of the EU – as Europe’s giving up the idea of being a Christian club. The discourses were mainly indicating that the borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on religious identity were diminished. As Koru put it in his column: ‘The decision of the EU was seen as proof of the EU not being a Christian club […] The Copenhagen Summit, which assured the applicant status of Turkey, was a historical decision for Europe. With this decision the EU, at least for now, has shown that it will forgo being a Christian club’ (Koru 2002b). Prime Minister Abdullah Gül pointed also to the EU’s decision as proof that it is not a Christian club. ‘Some people say that the EU is a Christian club, but it turned out that it is not […] If Turkey joins the EU, it will be the success of a Muslim and democratic country’ (Milliyet 2002e). Despite some criticism of the Copenhagen decision as a date for an appointment without obligation for negotiations (Sazak 2002), the decision mainly created an atmosphere of hope in Turkey, making people believe that Turkey had f inally received a concrete decision and the desired membership was not so far away. Hasan Cemal reflected this positive and hopeful atmosphere in his column: ‘I have to first underline several things, 1) Finally Turkey got a date from the EU. 2) Therefore, Turkey’s application is no longer an artificial one. 3) Things are beginning to go smoothly and there is no turning back […] We are really on the European track. This is compatible with the historical realities of Turkey […] They tried to keep Turkey’s application a sham, but were not successful’ (Cemal 2002d). Cemal uses the path metaphor constructing a political European identity for Turkish self through the accession process. Although he claims to be on the European track and constructs a political European identity, he refers at the same time to the EU as ‘they’ who tried to keep Turkey outside the group. Turkey’s success is not achieved with the EU but in spite of the EU. These statements by him underline the estrangement discourse and builds decisive borders between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ He wrote: ‘Now the station is not far away. If Turkey reaches the desideratum, it will step through the door between 2009 and 2013. The door opened in Copenhagen and will put the Turkish flag in Brussels’ (Cemal 2002e). In this passage he uses the path metaphor and the house metaphor. He first compares the EU accession process to a journey and claims that Turkey is now really close to the end station. This metaphor constructs a political European identity of Turkey created through the EU accession process. The differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are reduced to the minimum level through this journey (Hülsse 2006: 411-412). He also makes use of the house metaphor. This metaphor constructs clear boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Turkey was outside

The Helsinki Summit

147

of the house. After the Copenhagen Summit Turkey can step through the door and become part of Europe (Hülsse 2006: 413). During 2003, the willingness and readiness to join the EU had the highest level of support from the public and politicians because of the approaching negotiations date. Consequently, Turkey’s Europeanness and the EU as the most important step of Turkey’s civilization and modernization were stressed even more. In this context, Turkey was represented as European throughout its history. Gül called the EU the last big step of Turkey’s modernization and development (Hürriyet 2003f). By the preparation of the seventh reform package, Erdoğan referred again to the EU accession process as civilization project constructing two different identity groups – ‘us’ (Muslim) and ‘them’ (Western) – and drawing the boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ He stated: ‘We hope that this is the last package. Otherwise, we will have to prepare the eighth package. Why are we so determined? Our government is handling this as a national project – a civilization project, a meeting of civilizations, a consolidation project’ (Hürriyet 2003d). Turkey’s belonging to Europe and the West was supported with the same diverse topoi as us ual, such as history, geography, the clash of civilizations, and shared values, stressing the advantages of Turkey’s accession. He also warned the EU that if Turkey is not accepted that would make the EU a Christian Club. Erdoğan speech in 2004 was printed in the Wall Street Journal’s European special edition. He answered the question of why Turkey wanted to be part of the EU: Turkey is part of the EU in regard to its geographical location and its pro-Western behavior over the last 40 years. I think the EU members realize the necessity of taking Turkey into the EU […] We don’t consider the EU a Christian club, an economic community, or a place for the clash of civilizations. On the contrary, we consider Europe a place where the civilizations can live together peacefully. We see it as a political community with shared values. (Hürriyet 2004g)

On an other occasion, Erdoğan employed the topos of principles, pointing at to the long-standing political and cultural bond of the country with the European community. According to Erdoğan: The Ottoman Empire was, for centuries, a part of European history and played an important role. Since Atatürk’s reforms, Turks have defined themselves as Europeans and Turkey is a member of all the political, economic, and defense organizations in Europe. What makes Turkey

148 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

European is that she adopted the principles represented by Europe, like democracy, pluralism, rule of law, human rights, secularism, freedom of speech, and conscience […] Turkey decided on the West at the establishment of the republic. (Hürriyet 2003c)

In the above passage Erdoğan represents Turkey’s adjustment to the principles represented by Europe as evidence of Turkey’s Europeanness. The European identity of the ‘self’ in this case derives not only from the bonds of historical roots but also from an adjustment to common political principles. Thus, there are no separating lines between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In the same line Erdoğan stressed several times Turkey’s Europeanness and its deep roots in Europe. Erdoğan asserted that Turkey was not a lateblooming European. Turkey’s European adventure was a 200-year-old story (Hürriyet 2004d). According to Erdoğan, Turkey’s past also involved traces of European culture similar to the Copenhagen criteria. Again in these arguments Turkey’s European identity derives not only from the bonds of historical roots but also from shared principles. The Copenhagen criteria was claimed to overlap with the native values of Turkey: Actually, Turkey is not foreign to the Copenhagen criteria; we come from a past and tradition which includes tolerance, lenience, and respect for people. We come from a tradition which has all kinds of religions and beliefs. We come from a tradition which builds churches and mosques at the same time and in which people can live according their beliefs. We have a past which does not have assimilation tendencies. (Yeni Şafak 2003b)

In an interview given to the German tabloid Bild, Erdoğan made it clear that Europe is the absolute ‘self’ of Turkey and underlined that Europe and Turkey belong historically and culturally to each other: ‘Of course, Turkey belongs culturally and geographically to Europe. Europe’s roots are historically in Turkey and Turkey’s roots are historically in Europe. This means both sides belong to each other’ (Hürriyet 2004a). Since acceptance by the EU was regarded as the recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness, the unwillingness to accept Turkey was perceived as the refutation of Turkey’s Westernization. It was regarded as the failure of Turkey’s modernization process, meaning that 200 years of hard work had come to nothing. Thus, Turkey’s readiness to accept the conditions of the EU were relatively high, which could be detected in the discourses before the meeting of the European Council in December 2003. Erdoğan made this readiness clear:

The Helsinki Summit

149

Our accession to the EU continues to be the basic political and strategic aim of our government. We are determined to continue to meet the Copenhagen criteria; nonstop and determined […] I believe they will evaluate our hard work properly. Turkey’s full membership in the EU is not only a civilization project for Turkey, but also strategic richness for the EU. (Hürriyet 2003b)

Accordingly, the emphasis on the Muslim identity of Turkey was used in conjunction with the topos of advantage and the topos of model to convince the EU to accept Turkey, arguing that Turkey could be a model for the other Islamic countries. In this context, ‘self’ was described mainly as European. Gül, for instance, presented Turkey as ‘being a model for other Muslim countries’ (Milliyet 2003) and pointed to Turkey’s ability to merge Islam and modernity: ‘We showed the whole world that a country with 99% Muslim inhabitants can be modern, can apply the same human rights standards as the most developed countries and offer its citizens democracy. In addition, we showed that leaders who are conservative and respect values and religion can do this’ (Hürriyet 2003e). The Al-Qaeda terrorist attack in Istanbul in 2003 further strengthened the hopes that the multidimensional identity and civilizations argument would help Turkey to support its acceptance to the community. Thus after the terrorist attacks the topoi of threat and usefulness and referred to in relation to Turkey’s dual identity and its unique secular position as a Muslim country. At a dinner given for the ambassadors of EU members and applicants Erdoğan said: This time Turkey was the target of terrorist attacks […] because Turkey is mirroring Islam’s real face, a modern and civil face. Turkey proves that a country with a Muslim majority can be secular and democratic. Turkey has the privilege to represent Islamic culture at the edge of Western geography and Western culture at the edge of Islamic geography. Please don’t allow the people who want terrorism to be successful in separating Turkey from the West and the Islamic world from modern civilization. (Yeni Şafak 2003a)

In this passage the use of the topoi of usefulness and threat does not have the effect of constructing an ‘us’ (Muslim) and ‘them’ (Westerners belonging to different civilizations) because the common enemy and the necessity to fight this common enemy unites Turkey and the Western world. Turkey is represented as Muslim, but Turkey’s Muslim identity has more in common

150 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

with Western principles. It is modern and civil, and is prior to the rest of the Muslim world. In this passage, the ‘other’ of Muslim Turkey is the rest of the Muslim world, for which is Turkey a role model. The emphasis on Muslim identity, coupled with an Islamic party government, raised questions about whether Turkey was changing its direction. A change of direction in Turkey had always concerned the Western countries, particularly when an Islamic party like the AKP or RP governed the country. However, at that time, Turkey was deliberately highlighting its Islamic identity to obtain a place in Europe. In 2003, before his visit to Syria, Gül answered the question of whether Turkey was changing direction: ‘Our direction is evident. It is to integrate with the EU, to start EU negotiations as soon as possible, and achieve full membership’ (Hürriyet 2004h). Of course, relations with the EU were expected to give Turkey a stronger position among the Eastern countries. As Erdoğan put it: ‘Through our relationship with the EU, Turkey will experience changes which will give us new internal as well as external perspectives’ (Hürriyet 2004e). The politicians, furthermore, continued to stress that these characteristics of Turkey would be a great advantage for Europe employing the topos of the meeting of civilizations and to assume that if Turkey joined the EU, the meeting between the civilizations would take place under the EU’s roof, which would bring the EU a different level of power and contribute to global peace (Hürriyet 2004f). However, the argument that Turkey’s accession was a meeting of civilizations underlined, paradoxically, Turkey’s being from a different civilization and negated Turkey’s self-definition as Western and European. In addition, the Turkish side warned the EU that the nonacceptance of Turkey would send the wrong message to the Muslim world, namely that the EU is a Christian club. This discourse constructed a ‘self’ and ‘other’ that belong to different civilizations and put on the one side the Muslim world (‘us’) and the Christian world (‘them’). Hasan Cemal wrote in his column: ‘Is the EU a Christian club or not? The answer to this question is anticipated by the 1.5 billion people in the Islamic world’ (Cemal 2004). The warnings regarding the Christian identity of the EU were strengthened during the discussion by references to Christian values in the EU constitution. Turkey was afraid that the definition of the EU based on Christian identity would cause Turkey to be described, as Europe’s ‘other.’ Erdoğan said: ‘To refer to the Christian values in the constitution will have a limiting effect on the interaction with the other cultures […] It will keep Europe a small Europe […] I don’t think it is possible to limit Europeanness to a particular geography, belief, or tradition, considering Europe’s maturity level today’ (Hürriyet 2003a). Turkey already felt discrimination based on its

The Helsinki Summit

151

religion and regarded the reason for its nonacceptance into the EU was its Muslim identity, although Turkey itself increasingly claimed this identity to secure a place. For instance, Erdoğan referred to religious identity as the real reason for the hesitation of Europe in accepting a Turkey employing the topos of the clash of civilizations. He said: If they don’t give us a date in December, we will think there is another reason. And this is the civilization to which we belong […] Turkey has been made to wait for 41 years in front of the EU’s door. Turkey cannot wait anymore […] We don’t want EU membership because of more money or because of free movement. The EU should not be a place for the clash of civilizations and should show that it is not a Christian club by giving Turkey a date […] 75% of the Turkish people support EU membership. When Turkey shows such a commitment, our friends in the EU should show the same commitment. (Milliyet 2004)

The Kurdish and Cyprus Issues after the Copenhagen Summit Debate on minority issues in Turkey and criticism of the EU were broadened further with the EU Progress Report in 2004 (European Commission 2004). It required Turkey to ‘open’ for minorities and found the Lausanne Treaty, which recognized only three non-Muslim groups as minorities, far behind modern international standards. These EU’s minority rights requirements caused distrust of the EU and a negative labeling of the EU as the enemy and as ‘other’ of Turkey. CHP leader Baykal called the EU’s demands a trap and described the discussions on the issues as artificial. He affirmed that: Today they have suddenly started a discussion about Turkish identity. Of course, we expect important things for our country from the EU. However, to go beyond this and start artificial minority discussions will not serve anyone well […] Kurds, Albanians, Arabs, Circassians, and Georgians are all fundamental elements of the Turkish nation. The discussion of artificial minorities is a trap, but Turkish citizens are experienced. They will not fall into this trap. (Hürriyet 2004b)

On another occasion he said: ‘Minority issues were used as a weapon against the Ottomans […] It seems that this minority issue will be used continuously’ (Hürriyet 2004c). In the above two passages Baykal labels the EU or West as the enemy of Turkey by using the words ‘trap’ or ‘weapon’ in conjunction with the EU’s requirements regarding the minority issue.

152 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

These discourses construct the ‘us’ and ‘them’ as enemies, with clear-cut differences in interest. He also points to the historical experiences with the West in regard to minority issues to raise the awareness and to underline the otherness of Europe applying topos of history. Bahçeli also represented the EU as the enemy of Turkey and accused it of breaking the nation into pieces. He said: ‘The people who all made sacrifices to establish this country, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurdish speakers, wanted to be a nation. Nobody has the authority to dash it to pieces by calling them minorities. All our people living in this country are bound with a citizenship bond’ (Hürriyet 2004i). In this context, Cüneyt Arcayürek described Westerners as unreliable because of the requirements regarding the Kurdish and Cyprus issues. He contrasted the EU’s requirements regarding Cyprus with the requirements for the Kurdish issue and said that the EU would slowly enforce its requirements: The situation with the Southeast is like Cyprus. It is mentioned in the report for the first time as cultural rights. With time, will they require minority status or autonomy or a confederation with the Northern Iraq Kurdish state? Even Satan can’t know what is in the heads of Westerners. Today they put the Cyprus issue on the table for membership negotiations. Who can assure us that, at a certain stage, they won’t enforce something regarding the Southeast issue? (Arcayürek 2003)

4.6 Conclusion In the starting phase of this period, Turkey underwent several radical economic, social, and political changes. One of the most important events for the country’s political life was Turkey’s recognition as a candidate for full membership at the Helsinki Summit. There was great enthusiasm for joining the EU and it was regarded by some as the recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness and by others as the opportunity to become European. Even the Islamic political actors which had in the past used the Muslim identity of Turkey as the reason why Turkey should not join the community underlined Turkey’s Muslim identity in support of its EU accession. In this context, the topos of benefit was particularly employed to argue that both the EU and Turkey would benefit from Turkey’s Muslim identity. The two important events – one internal and one external – also heavily impacted the discourses on Turkey’s identity and EU membership. During this period Turkey witnessed an election process which brought a

The Helsinki Summit

153

landslide victory for the AKP and changed the Turkish political landscape dramatically. The newly elected Islamic government has increasingly used the Muslim identity of Turkey in conjunction with the topoi of values, good example, usefulness, and civilization to support the argument that Turkey’s acceptance would greatly benefit the EU. The EU’s Copenhagen decision in 2002 – a positive decision regarding Turkey – was perceived as the certification of Turkish Europeanness. In this context, the AKP government strikingly used the topos of values to highlight the shared common values of the EU and Turkey in order to justify Turkey’s place in the EU. In addition, the September 11th terrorist attacks also gave rise to the use of the topoi of benefit and threat underlying Turkey’s Muslim identity and its role as a bridge between the West and the East. Turkey particularly emphasized its multidimensional identity in the hopes of easing the accession process under the umbrella of multiculturalism and international peace postSeptember 11th. However, this did not mean that Turkey regarded itself as non-European or as the ‘other’ of Europe. Different identities combined with Europeanness were not questioned. Although Turkey experienced quite eventful years in the EU socialization process and reforms and carried out substantial legislative changes to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the Kurdish and Cyprus issues continued to cause discomfort in Turkey, impacting its definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ negatively. In this context, the ‘self’ and ‘other’ descriptions were mostly influenced by the historical rivalry between Turkey and the West. Comparing the EU’s requirements regarding the Kurdish issue with the Treaty of Sèvres continued, despite the positive steps taken in regard to the Kurdish issue.

5

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

In December 2004, Turkey’s constant efforts to initiate political and legal reforms, especially in the areas of human rights, and to demonstrate a strong political will to upgrade and deepen its parliamentary democracy were considered successful enough by the European Council that they announced that Turkey had met its political criteria and consequently full accession negotiations would begin on 3 October 2005. This was a turning point for Turkey and EU relations. EU actors appreciated the need to sustain Turkey’s ongoing reform process over the course of the negotiations. The EU had a continuing role in determining Turkey’s reform priorities through updated Accession Partnerships, in monitoring compliance through the Commission’s progress reports, and in threatening to suspend negotiations in the event of any stalling or backsliding in the reform process. Everything seemed in place for a successful socialization process. The 2005 Progress Report on Turkey stated that, despite the slower pace of reform and remaining problems with implementation, Turkey was continuing to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria (European Commission 2005a). In October 2005, the Council approved a framework for EU accession negotiations. In January 2006, the third accession partnership (Council of the European Union 2006) was signed and the screening process was completed by 12 October 2006. However, during 2005, and more accurately in 2006 and 2007, signals from both Ankara and Brussels indicated that relations were slipping dangerously back into the former vicious cycle. In Turkey, reform momentum slowed only a year after the official launch of negotiations, which risked serious derailment. Parallel to the worsening relations with the EU, public support also started to decline. A majority of Turks believed that Turkey would enter the EU within three years. However, they soon found out that this would not be possible for fifteen years, and even then was not assured. The Cyprus, Armenian, and Kurdish problems could cause an extension beyond fifteen years. This influenced the attitudes of the Turkish people toward the EU. According to Pollmark Research, for the first time, the opponents of the EU reached 30% of the population (İnce 2005). The research carried out by A&G (between 23-24 September in 32 cities among 2408 participants through face-to-face interviews) in 2006 found the number of people willing to join the EU had declined dramatically. The percentage of people saying that Turkey should definitely join the EU was 56.5% in 2002, 67.5% in 2004,

156 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

and 57.4% in 2005. By 2006, only 32.2% said that Turkey should join the EU. The percentage who felt that Turkey should definitely not join the EU increased from 17.9% in 2002 to 25.6% in 2006. And 14.6% of participants in 2002 said it made no difference whether Turkey joined the EU or not. In 2005, it was 18.6% and in 2006 33.3%. Research also showed that 78.1% of the participants did not trust the EU. Furthermore, 76.5% of the participants believed that the EU would put harsher requirements on the table. The great majority of participants thought that Turkey had no friends in the West, and that Turks saw themselves closer to Iran than to the West (Milliyet 2006a). Also, according to Eurobarometer, the EU’s positive image had declined 17%. The Eurobarometer ‘Spring 2006 Turkey’ (Eurobarometer 65) research indicated that support for EU membership declined from 60% to 43% and that 43% of the participants had a very negative image of the EU. Turkey had the second lowest trust in the EU (35%), after England with 31%. This was the first time that public support for EU membership dropped below 50%. In spite of these developments, the government claimed that the EU process was continuing and warned the EU of the declining support. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül said: ‘The process is ongoing. The state of EU relations and what is happening in the negotiations process has been exaggerated by both sides. Responsibilities and what is supposed to be done is obvious. And it is happening’ (Yeni Şafak 2006b). He also added that the exaggerations during this period were having a negative impact on the nation and warned the EU that both sides must exercise caution (ibid.). This decline in public support also caused concern among EU officials. Kretshmer said that he was disappointed in the decline of public support for EU membership and stressed that the decline to 44% was serious and disappointing. He added that Turkey was being invited to play a powerful role in a strong Europe, which required the government to deal with the nationalists and to carry the county forward to a better future for the sake of the nation (Yeni Şafak 2006a). In November, the EU published two important documents. The Progress Report 2005 said that in spite of the prime minister’s declaration regarding Kurdish issues, the efforts were inadequate and the promises had not been kept. This indicated that the situation in the Southeast had worsened and there was no policy for solving these problems. The report also criticized the lack of freedom of expression and religion, civil-military relations, the independence of the judiciary, relations with Cyprus, and the use of torture. It positively evaluated the effort to implement the Copenhagen criteria and the measures taken to achieve economic stability (European Commission 2005a).

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

157

In addition, the Council adopted a decision on the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the accession partnership with Turkey, on the basis of the political agreement reached by the Council on December 2005 (this decision was later superseded by a new January 2006 Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey) (Council of the European Union 2006). A proposal for the Council Decision was published on 9 November 2005 (European Commission 2005b) and described Turkey’s short- and midterm obligations, including the implementation of the Additional Protocol, normalization of relations with Cyprus, a solution for the Cyprus situation, and improvement of human and minority rights. Turkey particularly objected to the normalization of relations with the Greek part of Cyprus and the opening of ports and airports. Moreover, the requirement for making Kurdish an official education language and allowing Kurdish television and radio were not accepted. Turkey also objected to the requirement for solving border conflicts, arguing that Turkey had not caused the problems. Thus, there were no problems to solve (Cumhuriyet 2005f). Before suspension of negotiations, the EU had become very tough on Turkey. On 12 June 2006, EU foreign ministers met in Luxembourg and made Cyprus an offer to start the actual negotiations. This was an important factor in Turkey’s loss of enthusiasm for EU socialization. Mehmet Ali Brand quoted a private comment by Abdullah Gül: ‘Europe always posits that we have lost our enthusiasm. How could we not lose our enthusiasm? They are killing our enthusiasm. They are indulging Cypriots and using the Cyprus issue against us’ (Birand 2006). The EU Commission Progress Report 2006 (European Commission 2006a) revealed the hard line the EU had taken with Turkey. It was sharply critical and more demanding than ever. It sharply criticized the military and demanded a European standard in freedom of expression. It stated that identities other than those defined in the Lausanne Treaty should be regarded as minorities, demanded religious freedom for non-Muslims, and normalization in the Southeast. Ankara sent an Objection Document to the Progress Report 2006, which included objections to the evaluation of religious freedom, educational rights, police custody in Diyarbakır, cultural rights, torture, election thresholds, incidents in Şemdinli, and Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Regarding religious freedom, the Objection Report said that the Progress Report indicated that minority rights in Turkey were weak. However, the minorities described in the Lausanne Treaty, such as Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, have religious freedom and all the other minority rights. It also pointed to the elimination

158 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

of Kurdish courses, arguing that these courses were not suspended by the state. They ended because there was not enough demand (Cumhuriyet 2006b). Turkey began EU accession negotiations in October 2005 and the EU continued to play a determining role in Turkey’s reform priorities through the updated Accession Partnerships, by monitoring compliance through the Commission’s progress reports and by threatening to suspend negotiations in the event of a stall or reversal of the reform process. However, only a year after the start of the negotiations, Turkey-EU relations had a serious setback. The Union decided in December 2006 to suspend negotiations with Turkey on eight chapters related to the Republic of Cyprus because Turkey had not fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to include the Republic of Cyprus. Although this suspension did not prevent Turkey from pursuing negotiations with the Union, it signaled mistrust between the parties and caused a slowdown in the negotiations (Narbone and Tocci 2009: 23-24). In addition to the suspension of the eight chapters, during this period Turkey experienced several domestic crises, a general election, a presidential election, and legal proceedings against the governing AKP related to its position on secularism. These also caused a slowdown in Turkey’s reform momentum. Accordingly, Turkish domestic support for EU membership dropped dramatically from 62% in 2004 to 42% in 2010 according to Eurobarometer 2004 (Eurobarometer 62) and 2010 (Eurobarometer 74). The level of support for EU membership was only this low in the autumn 2008 Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 70). In the spring 2009 Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 71), 49% of the participants said that they thought EU membership was a good thing. By the autumn 2009 Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 72), it had declined to 45%. Trust in EU institutions also declined dramatically, from 51% in 2004 (Eurobarometer 62) to 21% in autumn 2010 (Eurobarometer 74). This shows that the difficulties experienced during the negotiations adversely impacted public opinion in Turkey. The most important cause for the decline in trust and support for the EU and EU membership was that the EU had not kept its promise regarding North Cyprus. Transatlantic Affinities research done by the Marshall Fund in 2008 indicated that Turks did not think that Turkey was part of the West. While 60% of Europeans believed that Turkey would be an EU member one day, only 26% of Turks believed it (Hürriyet 2008f). Research done by A&G in 2008 showed that 36% of the participants saw the EU’s exclusive manner as responsible for the decline in support, while another 25.2% said it was because there was significant doubt that Turkey would be accepted as a full member by the EU (Milliyet 2008b).

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

159

The Progress Report of 2007 pointed out that Turkey had come to a standstill in its reform process (European Commission 2007). This standstill continued into 2008, which was a very quiet year in EU-Turkey relations and fell short of the expectations of both sides. Turkey responded very reluctantly to reform requirements and the EU used the negotiations process for political leverage. Turkey did not announce any reform packages and did not discuss the National Programme draft in parliament. Normally the National Programme is to be updated every two years. Turkey took no new steps in this direction. The National Programme from Ecevit’s government had been last updated in 2003. Although in 2005 Turkey restarted negotiations, it did not prepare a new program, which in turn, led to uncertainty about laws and the adaptation process. All three EU Progress Reports since 2005 have demanded a new National Programme. The tenth reform packet was also not prepared in spite of EU pressure to include democratization, abolition of regional inequalities, and free movement of goods and services. Article 301 of the Turkish penal code was also not changed. The closure case against the AKP also caused a slowdown. The EU waited in the first half of 2008 for the results of the closure case. Erdoğan and Gül were not invited to the EU Government and President Summit in December. At this summit the EU made important decisions regarding Turkey, but did not mention in the outcome declaration that Turkey’s aim is to be full member. On Turkey’s part, the closure trial against the AKP reminded the government again of the EU process and quickened the adoption of adjustment laws, which had been delayed, such as Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code. The National Programme, which had not been updated since 2003, was also rushed into preparation. After the court decided against disbanding the party, the EU Commission required ‘the amendment of the legal regulations regarding the political parties and democratic institutions, including the constitution, to prevent future accidents.’ EU commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn said in a speech in Istanbul on 10 October 2008: ‘The court‘s decision at the end of July averted a full-blown crisis, but such cases highlight the need for urgent revision of the rules governing political parties, and also for broader constitutional reform’ (Rehn 2008). During 2008, the EU reminded Turkey of the necessity of reforms and sharply criticized the reform process. However, because of the inconvenient timing of the political crisis, it kept the recommendations for 2009. However, the slow pace of Turkey’s reform process was caused not only by Turkey, but also by the EU’s suspension of negotiations. In 2006, as already mentioned, negotiations on eight of the 33 sections were halted. France blocked five

160 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

chapters (including one of the eight already suspended), directly related to membership, and Cyprus blocked two chapters. Thus, Turkey could not make any progress in fourteen chapters. The EU also had not prepared the report two years after the closing of the screening process, which caused Ali Babacan to comment that the EU could not do its own homework. Babacan also reminded the EU that it had now become almost a tradition that during each EU president’s term, only two chapters were opened and this seemed to be a secret agreement between the EU leaders (Milliyet 2008a). During the negotiations, which had started in 2005, Turkey was able to open ten chapters and close only one of them. Croatia, which started negotiations at the same time as Turkey, had opened 22 chapters and closed seven of them by 2008. The 2008 Enlargement Strategy Paper stated that Croatia was going to be an EU member in 2009, provided it fulfilled the membership conditions. However, in the same document, for Turkey only human rights requirements were counted without any reference to membership (European Commission 2008b). All these developments caused a dramatic loss of trust on the Turkish side. In a meeting organized by the Turkey-EU advisory committee, Erdoğan said that Turkey was extremely determined to access the EU and that, in spite of all the disappointments, it was working toward the goal with the same enthusiasm. He went on to say that the suggestion of privileged membership changed the rules of the game during the game, which deeply impacted the Turkish nation’s opinion of the EU and used the metaphor of usefulness by arguing that Turkey will be an advantage for the EU in terms of assuming the burden. Erdoğan said: ‘Support for EU membership was 75% in 2004 and now is 59%. The loss of trust was caused by the declarations of our friends in the EU. We are not coming to be a burden to the EU, but to assume some of the burden’ (Milliyet 2008e). In the above passage he labeled the EU as ‘our friends’ and illustrated that Turkey and the EU belong to the same group. He also defined the Turkish self geographically as Asian and European, but politically as European only based on their shared political principles. He pointed out: ‘Positive responses to the question of whether Turkey would become an EU member dropped from 55-60% to 40%, a direct result of the loss of trust […] The debates about whether Turkey is European or not depend on the perspective. From a geographical perspective, Turkey is European as well as Asian. From the perspective of integration with the modern world, Turkey is far better than at least ten European countries’ (Milliyet 2008d). Trust between Turkey and the EU was at the center of Turkey’s debate on EU relations and membership and the restoration of the trust was seen as the only

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

161

way to save the relationship. Thus, to regain trust in the EU, in a meeting with the EU state ambassadors, Baykal demanded, a definite date for full membership and indicated that this would restore the trust of the Turkish nation in the EU (Hürriyet 2008e). The Cyprus and Kurdish Issues Shape Turkey’s Identity and EU Relations One of the most critical conditions for full membership, both before and after the start of negotiations, was the Cyprus issue. At the end of July, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol, which designated the south of Cyprus as the Cyprus Republic. With this signature, Turkey fulfilled all the conditions required by the 17 December Summit for the start of negotiations. Turkey claimed that this was not recognition of the Cyprus Republic and the Cyprus issue molded the relation with the EU and the debates on identity. The EU pressured Turkey through its reports and strategic papers, which increasingly stressed that if the airports and ports were not opened, the negotiations would stop. Turkey criticized the EU and was indifferent to suspending negotiations because of this. Erdoğan made this clear in a speech: ‘We will never step back if the airports and ports are opened to international traffic. Everybody should know this. The negotiations will stop. I don’t care’ (Milliyet 2006c). As a reaction to this speech, the EU sent clear and sharp warnings to Turkey from the Brussels Summit. A pointed and definitive memorandum from the Summit stated that Turkey should perform its duties, described in the negotiation framework, which included the full implementation of the Partnership Agreement and Additional Protocol (Milliyet 2006d). On 12 June 2006, the 45th meeting of the Association Council, the highest institutional decision-making body between Turkey and the EU, was held. The EC-Turkey Association Council prepared a Position Paper, which was one of the most oppressive documents prepared by the EU. This document referred to the Cyprus Declaration of 21 September 2005 (European Community 2005), which required full implementation of the Additional Protocol for all EU member states. According to the Cyprus Declaration, Turkey should implement the Protocol including all member states, and if Turkey fails in the implementation of Additional Protocol this will impact the whole negotiation process since the recognition of all member states is an important part of the accession process. In addition to the reference to the Cyprus Declaration, the document opened the way for a return to an already closed chapter – notably, such a necessity had never arisen

162 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

with any other applicant state. In the Conclusion Declaration of the EU (European Council 2006), the paragraph relating to Turkey was formed according to Greek requirements and included issues like the recognition of Cyprus and the normalization of relations. In addition to the references to the Additional Protocol and Counter Declaration, the following passage was added to the Conclusion Declaration: The European Council recalls that the Council will ensure, in the course of 2006, a follow-up on the progress made on all the relevant issues included in the above-mentioned Declaration. The European Council calls on Turkey to intensify the reform process and to implement it fully and effectively, so as to ensure its irreversibility and sustainability as well as to progress towards the complete fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria, including the commitment to good neighborly relations. In this context, any action which could negatively affect the process of peaceful settlement of disputes should be avoided. (Ibid.)

Furthermore, in Progress Report 2006, the European Commission stressed the Cyprus issue more intensively and used more direct language in criticizing Turkey. The report emphasized that the obligations based on the Additional Protocol are legal obligations, which include opening the ports. It also stated that the EU representatives have reminded Turkey several times that the implementation of the Additional Protocol is a legal obligation. Moreover, the report pointed out that Turkey could only start the negotiations after signing the Additional Protocol in June 2005. In November, the EU continued to repeat its conditions regarding the Additional Protocol and included the following in its Strategy Document 2006 (which included the enlargement strategy of the EU and recommendations regarding applicant states): The EU expects Turkey to ensure full, nondiscriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress of the negotiations. The Commission will make relevant recommendations ahead of the December European Council, if Turkey has not fulfilled its obligations. It is also essential that, as stated in the Accession Partnership, Turkey takes concrete steps for the normalization of bilateral relations with all EU member states as soon as possible. (European Commission 2006b)

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

163

The interactions between Turkey and the EU brought no change in the position of the negotiating parties and, at the end of November, the EU Commission decided to suspend negotiations in eight chapters because Turkey had not opened the ports to South Cyprus. It was decided that the eight chapters related to Turkey’s restrictions on South Cyprus would not be opened and the rest would not be closed until Turkey implemented the Additional Protocol. Turkey was given until the EU foreign ministers’ meeting on 11 December. Turkey saw all this as an excuse for not accepting it into the EU. After this decision, the CHP deputy İnal Batu said: ‘The Cyprus issue is being used as an excuse by people who don’t want Turkey in the EU […] We should now discuss the EU’s behavior, not only regarding the eight chapters, but the whole process’ (Cumhuriyet 2006a). Onur Öymen also assumed that the process was already not working and that they just wanted more concessions (Cumhuriyet 2006c). To normalize relations, Ankara made a last minute offer on 7 December, which stated that if Ercan airport was opened to international transfers and the Magosa port was opened to direct commerce, Turkey would also open one port and one airport to Greeks. Opposition parties’ reactions to the government’s offer were very harsh. For instance, Baykal criticized the government by saying: Supposedly the membership negotiations started in 2005. It has been almost one year and not even one of the 35 chapters is now at the closing stage. Membership negotiations are jammed. We have not even started negotiations and now eight chapters are suspended. This is a real breaking point […] We were so close. Everything was going well. What has changed? […] Too much love brings an early separation. An unfounded love, undeserved, artificial, nominal love brings an early separation […] There is no difference between opening one port and opening all ports. Opening the ports and airports means recognizing the Greek government. (Hürriyet 2006e)

Baykal uses the love-marriage-family metaphor and compares Turkey’s relations with the EU to a one-sided love, which illustrates how Turkey felt excluded and unwanted by the EU. This metaphor constructed the distinct borders of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ as Turkey tries to join the family through a marriage as an outsider. Beyond the Cyprus issue and the suspension of eight chapters, the Kurdish issue continued to play a significant role in Turkey’s EU relations. The Progress Report 2006 referred to Kurdish problems and said that

164 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

normalization in the Southeast would be possible through dialogue with the local governors. It also required that concrete strategies be developed for providing Kurdish people with basic rights and freedoms (European Commission 2006a). In 2006, the European Parliament accepted the report ‘The Cultural Situation of the Kurds,’ which recommended measures for addressing the problems: Turkey should sign, ratify and implement the European Charter for Regional or Minority languages, with reference to the Kurdish languages spoken in Turkey, and consider the possibility of mother tongue education, in addition to education in the official language. University courses on Kurdish language and literature should be encouraged and Kurdish families should be informed of the different linguistic possibilities and given instructions on how to apply for what is available. Moreover, access to modern mass media facilities for Kurdish speakers should be promoted and additional local centres should be set up in Turkey for the promotion of Kurdish culture with a view to raising awareness of and respect for minorities. (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2006)

There were also some positive developments regarding the term ‘Kurdish issue’ in the course of EU relations. During this time, Erdoğan used ‘Kurdish problem’ for the first time, which caused both excitement and concern. Until that time, the government had denied that there was a Kurdish issue and it was referred to mostly as the Southeast issue. After the start of negotiations, Erdoğan said on 8 October in his speech in Siirt that the start of the negotiations with the EU was a historical success and added: ‘I want to speak here not only to Turkey, but also to Europe and to the world. There are several problems in my country. This includes eastern and southeastern problems and some specific problems of my Kurdish citizens. However, you should not forget that other ethnic groups also have their own problems […] We should not make these problems a taboo. We should not let them threaten our unity and peace’ (Milliyet 2005c). The mentioning of a Kurdish problem was sharply debated in Turkey and criticized by the politicians. Mumcu, the leader of ANAP, warned the government that these words would be one day be remembered in international platforms or in Brussels. Bahçeli reminded that the use of ‘Kurdish problem’ would support the secessionist agenda (Hürriyet 2005e). The Kurdish people welcomed Erdoğan’s statements. Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, and Selim Sadak responded in a written statement that Erdoğan’s

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

165

words ended the traditional state policy as it had been since the start of the republic (Hürriyet 2005d). The use of this term was also greeted with satisfaction by the EU. Hansjörg Kretschmer said the prime minister stating that there is a problem which needs a solution is viewed with satisfaction in the EU. In an EU conference, Kretschmer said: ‘That is the first time the Kurdish problem has been stated officially […] This is a big step for democratic progress. We are observing the government’s strategy for solution of the problem. There are problems in the Southeast. We are willing, as the EU, to help’ (Hürriyet 2006a).

5.1

Interactions with the EU and the Identity Issue

The European Council decision in December 2004, that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and the negotiations on 3 October 2005 will be opened, was viewed again not only as a big step toward the West and modernization, but also as the acceptance of Turkey as Europe’s ‘self,’ not as its ‘other.’ Güneri Cıvaoğlu said: ‘Since Turkey has been on its way to Europeanization for 200 years, 17 December should not be considered a revolution but a success. For the first time, Europe sees Turkey not as “other,” but as a member of the family’ (Cıvaoğlu 2004). Cıvaoğlu used the metaphor of the path and the decision of Commission is the successful ending of this journey and absolute acknowledgment of Turkey as the ‘self’ of Europe. Davut Dursun added that Turkey’s accession was not the same as Poland’s or Croatia’s or Austria’s. Sharing the same values was an important step since Turkey had historically been the ‘other,’ suspected, undermined, and considered the enemy (Dursun 2004). The start of negotiations was celebrated with great enthusiasm in Turkey, which was reflected in the newspaper headlines with usual metaphors and equations like the historical Vienna reference or the different religionbased civilizations. ‘Vienna Waltz’ (Hürriyet); ‘We Resist and Win’ (VatanBugün); ‘Crescent and Star of Europe – Civilizations Embrace’ (Sabah); ‘Happy Ending: The Journey Has Started’ (Radikal); ‘We Sit at the Table: New Europe, New Turkey’ (Milliyet) (Özkök 2005). It was considered an important achievement in the history of Turkey, as Erdoğan remarked after the start of negotiations: ‘Turkey has taken a huge step which is suitable to its historical path’ (Yeni Şafak 2005e). Gül described the start of negotiations as an important historical day for the world and for unification: ‘The world has experienced a great, unprecedented development […] The East, West, Asia, Europe, Islam, and Christianity saw today, for the first time, unity

166 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

instead of fighting and separation […] This is a big gift for the world’ (Yeni Şafak 2005a). He continued: With yesterday’s decision, the EU also decided its status, identity and future. This strategic decision made Europe a global actor […] Yesterday a historical corner was turned, a big step was taken […] For 1000 years, Turkey has been in Europe. For 200 years, it has been part of the political institutionalization of Europe and for the last 50 years, it has had a special relationship with the EU. This is, in a sense, the historical record. (Hürriyet 2005c)

With the start of the negotiations, Turkey’s Muslim identity continued to be stressed, but this time there was also the need to assure the people that this identity would be preserved in the course of the move toward EU membership. Erdoğan stressed Turkey’s Muslim identity and reiterated that membership would not weaken it. He underlined that Turkey showed that a country with a majority Muslim population could attain modern democratic standards by protecting its moral and cultural identity and even benefit from them (Hürriyet 2005b). At the same time several columnists pointed to the necessity of deciding who Turks are in the course of EU relations. Yusuf Kaplan suggested that the most important question regarding Turkey’s EU accession process was ‘Who are we?’ He referred to the West, on the one hand, as the ‘other’ of Turkey, and on the other hand as an entity that had a great impact on Turkey’s identity. He underlined the importance of the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the context of EU-Turkey relations: ‘To understand your identity, you should understand those who are different from you, and you should understand how you differ from others […] To understand who and what Turkey is, we should understand what Europe is, or more generally, the West, which played a key role in the establishment of modern, secular Turkey’ (Kaplan 2005). Semih İdiz and Fehmi Koru saw a problem in having a dual identity and demanded that Turkey decide on one or the other. İdiz emphasized that Turkey did not board the EU train at the behest of the Europeans, but because it was Turkey’s wish to do so, a decision that was connected to the identity issue. ‘When we signed the Ankara Treaty, nobody told us we couldn’t join the EU because we are Muslims. We are the ones who looked for a way to adopt the European principles that make Europe, Europe’ (İdiz 2005). Then he asked: Why can’t we continue with the great changes which started with Atatürk? Why must we turn into an introverted, Eastern society with

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

167

an extreme Muslim and radical nationalist, conservative identity? The hard facts are that our republic is still an unfinished project […] If we are Western, we should be Western. If we are Eastern, we should be Eastern. If we say we are neither, we are a sui generis country and should then understand the common characteristics of this and align our identity with these characteristics. (ibid.)

Koru stated that Turkey is located ‘between East and West and in looking back and forth between both sides, we get dizzy. Of course, how we are regarded from the outside is important. However, we also have not yet decided who we are’ (Koru 2005). The remarks regarding the start of negotiations show that Turkey was still stuck between its dual identities. The positive decision on 3 October was considered a clear statement of Turkey’s role between Islam and the West. Gül, for instance, regarded the start of negotiations, on one hand, as unification with the EU, and on the other hand, as the opportunity to represent Eastern and Asian countries in the West. ‘We [the EU and Turkey] became each other’s components’ (Milliyet 2005b). As the only Muslim applicant country, Turkey also played the card of being a model for the other Muslim countries and being able to be a transmitter of values between the EU and other Muslim countries. In this context, the topos of model was employed to indicate the advantages of Turkey’s acceptance as a Muslim country. Gül argued: ‘With a great population and its relations with the Turkic republics and Muslim countries, Turkey’s membership will give these countries the feeling that they are represented in the EU’ (ibid.). As a result, Turkey increasingly stressed its position as a bridge between civilizations, which, paradoxically, constructed two different groups and drew boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ ‘If we are self-confident, it will make no difference whether they take us into the EU or not […] We are Turkey’ (Yeni Şafak 2005f). Turkey was ready to assume new responsibilities and began presenting itself, not as part of European civilization, but something different and more special. At a roundtable organized by the Brussels think tank Friends of Europe, Babacan said that the Islamic world would perceive Turkey’s membership as a noteworthy event because of Turkey’s specific characteristics. It would show that Islam and democracy can exist together and that if particular standards are met, the EU’s door is not closed to different beliefs […] The world will become more secure (Hürriyet 2006c) The will to join the EU was now not only based on the natural right of Turkey as a Western country, but also on the necessity of uniting two very different civilizations namely ‘us’ (Muslim world) and

168 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

‘them’ (Christian world). Erdoğan said: ‘We don’t have an addiction to EU membership, but we believe in the necessity of our accession. We must separate these. Turkey wants to access the EU to make it the place for the alliance of civilizations. This is because we don’t want the Islamic world and the Christian world to be against each other. We want them to show solidarity under one roof’ (Hürriyet 2006d). As its discourse about being a bridge between East and West increased, Turkey engaged itself more as a mediator between the West and the Arab countries, particularly between Palestine and Israel. In 2005 before the start of the negotiations, Turkey was acting as a bridge between West and East, between Muslims and the West, and between Arab countries and Israel. Turkey’s increasing engagement with the Arab countries disturbed the West. Erdoğan’s statements that Turkey did not have an addiction to EU membership also increased questions about whether Turkey had a new foreign policy orientation. The behavior of the government also suggested Turkey was actively pursuing closer ties with the Arab and Islamic countries (Milliyet 2006b). Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül explained, pointing at Turkey’s identity: ‘Turkey’s engagement with the Islamic world is not a result of the AKP’s identity, but of Turkey’s identity. Turkey is not going to isolate itself from regional advantages because of a relationship with the EU. Turkey’s value in entering the EU is this identity’ (Yeni Şafak 2005b). The Kurdish Issue and Turkey’s Definition of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ The Kurdish issue continued to impact Turkey’s self/other and in-group/ out-group descriptions. The requirements of the EU regarding the Kurdish issue continued to influence the trust between Turkey and the EU and in turn Turkey’s ‘self’ and ‘other’ description after the start of negotiations. Turkey increasingly became suspicious of the EU’s policies and requirements. The EU’s requirements regarding the Kurdish issue in the Accession Partnership Document and Progress Report 2005 were presented in the media as more demanding than those in 2003. Turkey was requested to make Kurdish education more widely available and to give minorities more rights. Moreover, in the EU documents of 2003 only the Southeast was viewed as a problematic area. This was broadened to the East in the EU documents of 2005. Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed his concerns regarding the EU and the Kurdish issue, stating that promoting Kurdish nationalism strengthened Turkish nationalism (Milliyet 2005a) and supported the division of Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2005b). Turkey more and more expressed its distrust of the EU regarding the Kurdish issue. Generally, there

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

169

was a strong belief in Turkey that the EU and European countries support the terrorist activities of the PKK and several incidents strengthened this belief among politicians and the Turkish people. The previously mentioned special interests of the EU in Diyarbakır and its governor were received in Turkey with distrust. For instance, Baydemir was the first governor invited to Brussels by the EU as part of a visitors’ program. He prepared a fifteen-page report about the region and the Kurdish issues (Hürriyet 2005a). Babacan criticized the EU for supporting the PKK in his speech at the 55th meeting of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission and said: ‘Turkey is alone in its combat against terrorism. We expect more cooperation and more candid behavior. It is such a pity that a television channel known for supporting terrorism is broadcasting in Europe. We see open supporters of terrorist organizations walking the corridors of the European Parliament’ (Yeni Şafak 2005d) Turkey-EU relations were becoming more difficult because of the PKK’s terrorist activities. The PKK applied pressure on Ankara by increasing its terrorist activities before 3 October, believing that the path to the EU was through satisfying the PKK and hoping that Ankara would respond militarily and the EU would intervene. The public was angry about the terrorist actions and believed that all the Kurdish reforms had brought nothing. The terrorist activities of the PKK were regarded as the result of EU reforms and the Copenhagen criteria and, thus, many wanted to forgo EU membership (Birand 2005). The situation was worsened by expressions of support for the PKK by EU officials. In his December visit to Turkey, the president of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission, Joost Lagendijk, commented on the recent Turkish military operation and said: ‘The Turkish military provoked the PKK and they answer with weapons. The military likes to clash with the PKK. It keeps the military at the center and on the agenda’ (Cumhuriyet 2005a). These words were criticized sharply by the political parties. Öymen said: ‘These words make clear that Lagendijk is under the influence of destructive terrorists and that he has lost the objectivity required by his position and therefore the trust of our citizens’ (Cumhuriyet 2005c). Mehmet Şandır, vice president of the MHP, also said that the EU counsels Kurdish separatists. On the condition that they do not have terrorist aims, the EU promises to politicize their separatism (ibid.). In this atmosphere, the politicians expressed their concerns about the support of the EU for the PKK more frequently. In spite of the reforms resulting from the Copenhagen criteria, the state regarded the Kurdish problem and the PKK as intertwined and was generally distrustful of EU policies and requirements regarding the Kurdish issue. The EU was mostly referred to as

170 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

untrustworthy, an enemy, or the supporter of the enemy, constructing clear boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Parallel to the reactions of the public, Erdoğan strengthened his criticism of the EU, stating that the EU wanted to divide Turkey: ‘It is true that there are several impositions on us by the EU. There are even some hypotheses that they are trying to divide us […] I think it is useless to place this on the agenda, although we have already responded as required’ (Cumhuriyet 2005d). Baykal criticized Erdoğan for becoming aware of this reality too late. His criticism of Erdoğan’s sharper position against the EU also included strong opposition to the EU: ‘Good morning, Prime Minister. Prime Minister, it is too late for this reaction […] No one outside or inside, not the EU or anyone else, can destroy our national unity. We did not earn our national unity with the help of others […] No one should play or tamper with it’ (Yeni Şafak 2005c). The EU is interpreted by Baykal as an outside threat and compared to the insider threats – terrorist and separatist organizations – who try to destroy Turkey’s unity. Baykal’s final remarks on the national unity of Turkey, defining the EU as the ‘other,’ further demonstrates the estrangement of Turkey in the course of the EU negotiation process regarding the Kurdish issue. The behavior of the EU regarding the Kurdish issue caused a loss of trust and, fearful of a return of the demands outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres, an enticement to Turkey to describe the EU as ‘other.’ Oktay Ekşi, for one, indicated the similarity between the EU’s requirements and the requirements of the Treaty of Sèvres. He wrote: It sticks in one’s throat. The impositions of the EU remind us of the Mondros Truce and remind some nationalists of the Treaty of Sèvres […] We were willing to say yes to everything when the negotiations started […] ok […] However, should we also accept suggestions which they themselves cannot agree on […] as if we did not apply for equal EU membership, but for cleaning up their floor, […] as if we were defeated and dependent on them and are supposed to sign the Mondros Truce and Treaty of Sèvres […] Of course, the EU is a model of civilization, but she does not need to be an arrogant club […] We knew from the beginning that the negotiations would be difficult. They would require us to adopt their values. We knew we would change to a great degree. However, we did not think that they would misuse and blackmail Turkey. They should know we are close to saying, ‘Damn your EU! (Ekşi 2005)

Ekşi represents relations between Turkey and EU essentially in terms of ‘them’ versus ‘us,’ in which the EU is associated with the enemy who

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

171

defeated Turkey and forced it to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. The requirements of the EU regarding the Kurdish issue is equated to the impositions of the Treaty of Sèvres, which strengthens the reference to the EU as the other and an enemy of Turkey. Furthermore, he describes the EU as a civilization project but labels it as an arrogant club, which indicates the perception of EU as self-enclosed organization. In this atmosphere, every step for the improvement of the Kurdish issue was regarded in light of the Treaty of Sèvres. Baykal expressed this, criticizing the government’s policy on the Kurdish problem and blaming it for acquiescing to the Sèvres-like requirements of the EU, equating the EU to the enemy: ‘[The government] bows to the pressure from outside. If we had said yes to everything, Turkey would not have been able to sign the Lausanne Treaty. It would have been bound by the Treaty of Sèvres […] The most powerful countries in the world made us sign Sèvres. Today’s government says yes to everything because it cannot stand up to the EU. Some did not submit to the enemy […] Turkey cannot submit to the defender of Sèvres and is not going to do so’ (Cumhuriyet 2005e). Regarding EU adjustment laws, in an extraordinary session, the Turkish parliament discussed the regulation of trustees and private educational institutions for minorities, which caused a hot debate about minority issues. The AKP defended the new regulations, saying that they will enhance Turkey’s reputation rather than diminish it. However, CHP vice president Onur Öymen said: ‘You are going back to Sèvres. To make one sided-concessions to minorities is Sèvres’ (Hürriyet 2006b). Baykal’s reactions were even stronger. He said: ‘The regulations regarding private educational institutions and minority trustees are fixed in Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty. The new regulation is a regulation to negate the Lausanne Treaty’ (ibid.).

5.2

Slowdown of Turkey-EU Relations

After the opening of negotiations, leading EU countries insisted repeatedly on a privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership, which also influenced Turkey’s self-concept and its perception of ‘in-groupness.’ The delay in the membership process and the insistence on the privileged partnership gave Turkey the impression that, even if it fulfilled all the conditions for membership, the EU was not going to accept it as a full member. The EU intended to keep Turkey at the door in order to get more concessions on the Cyprus, Kurdish or Armenian issues. The identification of the EU’s requirements for the Kurdish issue with the Treaty of Sèvres

172 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

led to an increasing perception of the EU as ‘other’ rather than the once desperately claimed ‘self.’ Thus, the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue were not considered conditions to be fulfilled, but a struggle for the existence of the country as in the Turkish War of Independence. The EU became more the hostile West than part of the idealized modernization and civilization project. The slow and exhaustive negotiations process impeded Turkey’s socialization process throughout this period. In December 2007, Turkey opened two other chapters: protection of consumers and health and trans-European networks. However, to open these chapters, Sarkozy required the statements regarding Turkey’s joining the EU be deleted from the declarations of the EU foreign ministers. As a result, when the ministers (the EU General Affairs Council) met on 10 December to prepare for the EU Summit, they issued a declaration in which they used ‘accession conference’ instead of ‘intergovernmental conference’ in order to avoid saying the negotiations were for membership. In the decisions of the General Affairs Council (Council of the European Union 2007), there was a strong statement about the western Balkans. However, Turkey was not included. It did mention that the EU Council was expected to open new chapters with Turkey and Croatia within the month. This declaration required more judicial reform, a fight against corruption, rights for minorities, woman, children, and unions, and a strengthening of cultural rights. The slowed EU-Turkey relations caused the EU to lose its attractiveness for Turkish political life. This was mirrored in the 2007 election manifestos of the political parties. This time the leitmotiv of the election manifestos was not the EU, as in the 2002 elections, but Northern Iraq. All of the countries promised that they would not let the PKK use Northern Iraq as a base for terrorism. The AKP devoted two pages in its election manifesto to the Northern Iraq issue, while the MHP, the CHP, and the DP (Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party]) all had one page. In 2007, Turkey prepared, on its own initiative, an EU Adaptation Program which was intended to improve living standards, including chapters on guarantees of job security, transparency in the bidding process, laws for family domestic problems, and consumer rights. However, the Turkish side felt that whatever it did, the problems with the EU would remain because the EU’s decision was politically driven. As Babacan stated: ‘The difficulties between Turkey and the EU are not technical, but political. If they were at the technical level, we would compensate for our weaknesses very quickly. In spite of everything, we will continue with our reforms without compromising and we will wait until Europe gets used to us’ (Milliyet 2007).

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

173

Emre Kızılkaya thematized the isolation of Turkey from Europe and wrote in his column: There is no doubt that it is a political decision to present Anatolia as ‘other,’ which harbors, from Troy to Cappadocia, far more of the cultural heritage of Europe than Greece, which has been welcomed. Possibly this decision is caused by the desire to unify a nationally divided Europe, at least on the basis of religion, and the reality that Turkey is a Muslim country […] Whichever epoch or geography of Europe you look at, you will see the political connection with Turkey and this is not true for any other neighbors of the EU, such as Russia […] We should not forgot that the countries which were long isolated by the Western Europeans as ‘other’ are today the locomotives of the EU. (Kızılkaya 2008)

In this passage Kızılkaya focuses on the otherness of Turkey from four different perspectives: historical, cultural, political, and religious. Turkey has more in common with Europe in regards to culture, which makes it European and a part of the ‘self.’ However, Turkey is historically regarded as the ‘other’ of the West – particularly because of its religion – and now politically Turkey is also labeled as the ‘other’ of Europe. During the slowdown years, Turkey continued to underline the importance of its multidimensional identity, its dual identity, and the significance of its membership for the EU to become a global actor. In this context the topos of usefulness, the topos of threat, and the bridge metaphor were used. On the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaty, President of the Assembly Bülent Arınç gave a speech in the Italian parliament and said: ‘In accepting Turkey, the EU will not only enlarge geographically, but will broaden its vision. It will have the opportunity to be a global actor’ (Yeni Şafak 2007a). As already illustrated, Turkey had started to underline its multidimensional identity, at least from September 11th. However, at the beginning, the European identity of Turkey was emphasized in addition to its Eastern identity. With time, reference to its multidimensional identity increased, pointing to the uniqueness of Turkey as a reminder that it had a lot to offer the EU. In this passage Arınç highlighted the unique identity of Turkey, which will be enriched through its accession because of its multidimensional identity. In this argument Turkey represent itself as being one step ahead of the EU as a result of its unique and special identity. Turkey’s civilization argument was accepted and played up by the EU officer who supported Turkey’s membership during this period. The minister of enlargement, Olli Rehn, said in an interview with the Daily Telegraph:

174 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

If Turkey’s membership is hindered, there will be a clash of civilizations. The biggest problem of our time is the relationship between the West and Islam. Turkey is a stabilizing influence in the Middle East […] Questioning Turkey’s membership has eroded EU credibility and weakened the reform process in Turkey. That Turkey is a bridge between the civilizations is not just talk, it is a reality. (Yeni Şafak 2007c)

However, some opponents argued that Turkey could not play the role of bridge between the EU and the Islamic world since the Islamic countries were opposing Turkey. At an international conference in Florence on 17 November 2006, where the leaders of Europe came together to appeal to future generations, former German president Helmut Schmidt said: ‘Turkey is not a bridge between Europe and Muslims. No Arab imam would want to be invited by Turkey. One should just remember how Arabs suffered during the Ottoman rule’ (Hürriyet 2006f). However, the foreign ministers of the Arab countries reacted and refuted this argument, stating that they fully supported Turkey’s EU membership. At the eighth Euro-Mediterranean conference of foreign ministers in Tampere, the foreign ministers of Arab countries commented on Schmidt’s speech. Jordanian foreign minister Abdelelah Alkhatib said: ‘We are honored by Turkey. We will do everything possible for Turkey’s EU membership’ (Yeni Şafak 2007b). The former Palestinian Authority foreign minister, Nabil Shaath, said: ‘Those who want to learn about Turkey’s place in the Muslim world should study history’ (ibid.). Turkey’s bridge position was neither liked nor accepted by the people who wanted Turkey to have a clear European identity and was regarded as a hindrance to Turkey’s real European identity and EU membership. In this context Turkey was labeled as torn between Eastern and Western civilization and referred to as being more inclined toward Eastern civilization, which was equated with barbarity and backwardness. As Güngör Aras expressed this in his column: The EU is, as the name implies, the union of European states and countries. And the powers governing Turkey don’t want to be European […] Since the Ottoman Empire, for Turks the desire to be European has been equated with the desire to be civilized. It is the desire for modern life. EU accession was important because it would open the door for Europeanness and carry us to modern life […] There is now no hope for membership since the powers governing Turkey turned Turkey’s institutions and lifestyle into a moderate Muslim country, got caught between European and Arab civilizations, and lost its identity […] If you want to

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

175

sit at the European table, you have to be European. Europeanness is a lifestyle. If you say, I will sit at this table but I won’t eat with a knife and fork […] and don’t speak their languages, I speak Arabic, they won’t let you sit at the table. (Aras 2007)

Thus, the underlining of the Muslim character of Turkish national identity, particularly framed as cooperation between civilizations, was criticized by the secular political elite for constructing ‘us’ and ‘them’ with clear differences based on their religious identities and for undermining Turkey’s secular identity, which bonds it to the West. Baykal brought up this issue during his meeting with the EU ambassadors and asked them about Turkey’s place. He pointed out that Spain represents Christian culture and asked whether Turkey, as a secular country, represents Muslim countries. He accused Erdoğan, who was one of the founders of this project, of not regarding Turkey as a secular country, but as a representative of moderate Islam (Hürriyet 2008e). The secularist elite was worried that the EU supported a moderate Islamic project in which Turkey was supposed to be featured. In particular, the support of the EU for the AKP during the closure trial caused tension. Erol Manisalı wrote about the EU’s intervention in the AKP’s closure trial and criticized the EU for supporting the AKP and moderate Islam in Turkey. He described the EU’s identity as integrating, democratic, and social to the insider but to the outside countries like Turkey, its identity is separating, imperialist, imposing, Islamist, and illegal (Manisalı 2008). Manisalı clearly constructs the in- and out-groups based the EU’s double standard toward insiders and outsiders.

5.3

The EU as a Threat to Turkey’s Territorial Integrity

The 2008 Progress Report stated that Turkey should undertake concrete steps to strengthen the climate for finding a resolution to the conflicts and required that Turkey not hinder Cyprus’s membership in international organizations. Moreover, the normalization of relations with Cyprus as well as the application of the Additional Protocol was required (European Commission 2008a). The report was criticized in the Turkish media for not including an EU promise to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus (Tınç 2008). Bahçeli criticized the report sharply. He said: ‘This report shows the exclusive and imposing manner of Brussels. It requires a unilateral recognition of Cyprus, does not mention any of the promises given, but still

176 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

wants Turkey to unilaterally open the harbors and airports in Northern Cyprus’ (Hürriyet 2008c). During this period, the EU also issued requirements on the Kurdish problem through several official documents. The Commission evaluated the Kurdish issue in Progress Report 2006 and pointed to other communities in Turkey which, by European and international standards, could qualify as minorities outside the scope of the Lausanne Treaty. It stated that, overall, Turkey had made little progress in ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with international standards. Progress Report 2007 stated that the Turkish authorities saw the citizens not as minority or majority, but as individuals having equal rights. However, it required that this should not be a barrier to providing specific rights based on ethnicity, religion, and language. The report also evaluated the steps taken for the Kurdish language as inadequate, saying that there was a time limit and subtitle regulations for programs other than movies and musicals. Moreover, it pointed out that Turkey forbid the use of a language other than Turkish in political areas (European Commission 2007). Progress Report 2008 further criticized Turkey’s negative approach to minority rights and indicated that the limitation of Kurdish education, in spite of the allowance of Kurdish language courses, still continued. These requirements were claimed to shown the EU’s real intention, that is, to create new minority groups in Turkey. In these cases the EU was again referred to as an untrustworthy partner who is separate from Turkey’s ‘self.’ Bahçeli pointed out that the EU was trying to create national minorities by force, which could be seen in Barossa’s speech in Ankara requiring cultural and political rights for Turkish citizens with Kurdish origins (Hürriyet 2008d). He also criticized the Commission’s report for continuing the exclusive manner of Brussels and imposing additional conditions. He said: ‘It is now definitely clear that the EU is keeping Turkey busy with a sham negotiations process and imposing additional requirements in the Kurdish issue as proof of Turkey’s inadequacy’ (Hürriyet 2008c). Several incidents negatively impacted the Kurdish issue over the course of EU-Turkey relations and strengthened Turkey’s belief that the EU and the European countries supported the terrorist activities of the PKK. The conferences organized by the European Parliament to support Kurdish politicians, for example, caused great discomfort in Turkey. “The Fourth International Conference on the EU, Turkey and the Kurds”, which was held under the auspices of the European Union Turkey Civic Commission, was organized by the European Parliament and took place on 3-4 December in Brussels. The conference dealt with the democratization of Turkey and the

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

177

EU reform process, political participation, and the Kurds. Many politicians and academics from Turkey participated in the conference, including DTP deputy Ahmet Türk, Leyla Zana, Doğu Ergil and Baskın Oran (EU Turkey Civic Commission 2009). Furthermore, the use of the designation ‘South Kurdistan’ for the first time by the Commission in its autumn 2007-2009 Economic Predictions caused grave concern, because this expression had been used mostly by the supporters of the PKK and its use automatically indicated that the Commission regarded Southeast Turkey as North Kurdistan. The crisis was averted by the intervention of the foreign ministry, the EU’s apology, and the removal of the name from the text. These types of incidents strengthened suspicion that the EU was supporting the PKK and helped define the EU as an enemy. This suspicion and mistrust of the EU, regarding the Kurdish issue, can be traced to the discourses of several political actors. The former MIT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı [National Intelligence Service]) under State Secretary Sönmez Köksal pointed out in a report on Northern Iraq that effectively addressing the PKK problem would only be possible with the support of the EU countries, because the PKK’s power was coming more from the EU countries, particularly Germany, France, and England, than Northern Iraq (Cumhuriyet 2008). Kutan also stated: ‘Behind PKK terrorism are the USA, the EU, and Israel. This is not just an assumption […] If we don’t define our attitude to the EU and USA, we will be not able to stop the terrorism’ (Hürriyet 2007). Blaming European countries for cooperating with or protecting the PKK was becoming a daily occurrence among top government officials. Erdoğan criticized European countries for being of two minds and accused the EU of not being earnest. He pointed out: ‘A PKK terrorist was captured in a European country and, after a trial, he went back to the terrorist camps in the Kandil Mountains. If they were earnest, they would extradite this terrorist. Unfortunately, none of the European countries have done this so far’ (Cumhuriyet 2007). In 2008, he also sent a letter to express his concerns and warned that European leaders are believed to support the PKK financially and politically. He said in his letter that it is not enough to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, but it must be actively opposed. He wrote: ‘Europe’s policies in this regard are really important to Turkey and Turkey requires that Europe take steps that will bring about the collapse of the PKK. The whole Turkish nation expects this […] The leaders of the terrorist organization are moving freely in European countries, in spite of Turkey’s requests for their return. Turkey expects more action from Europe’ (Hürriyet 2008b). That the EU increasingly engaged in discourse supporting Kurdish political rights without offering Turkey membership prospects resulted in

178 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Turkey’s unwillingness to pursue Kurdish reforms. Only small steps were taken, which did not really address the roots of the problem. For instance, Erdoğan made public the government’s GAP Operation Plan, which aimed to increase the welfare of the citizens in the region by fostering economic and social development within the GAP between 2008-2012. This operation plan included also full-time Kurdish broadcasting, which was opposed by MHP. Bahçeli said in a speech at a party meeting that it was unacceptable to the MHP that TRT (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyonları [Turkish Radio and Television Association]) would broadcast in Kurdish full-time. He said: ‘With part-time broadcasting, terrorism could not be stopped. How can the secessionist movements be stopped with full-time broadcasting? This is actually a full capitulation to the PKK’s armed attacks and to the political requirements of its extension in the cities’ (Milliyet 2008c). Consequently, during the slow years of EU-Turkey relations, there was also a slowdown in addressing the Kurdish issue. The discourse used by the government reverted again to the official discourse. Cengiz Çandar summarized this in his column, writing that the standstill, or even backtracking, on the Kurdish issue was reflected in Erdoğan’ speech on 21 October 2008 in Diyarbakır, which was far different than his initial speech on the issue in 2005. He said that three years after his famous speech articulating the Kurdish problem, he was again in Diyarbakır, speaking at the University of Dicle: On my way from the airport, I saw the streets. They are not proper for a modern city. Do the governors of Diyarbakır not have dust carts and cleaners? My nation should give them a lesson […] Civilization is streets, cleanliness, respect and love. We have taken steps for a new age in the context of democratization and human rights in Turkey. Kurdish broadcasting in TRT will start in January. In the beginning, it will be twelve hours, then it will be double that. (Çandar 2008)

Although many of the problems were still not solved, the prime minister did not mention them. After three years, the AKP backtracked and their official position was that there was no Kurdish problem. The change in official discourse on the Kurdish issue was also reflected in the response of TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Grand National Assembly of Turkey]) foreign affairs commission vice president Mehmet Ceylan to the European Parliament committee: ‘There is no Kurdish problem. It is only a terrorist problem […] The problems in the Southeast are mainly caused by geographically induced economic backwardness. The region is hilly, transportation is difficult, and we have witnessed 30 years of terrorism’ (Hürriyet 2008a).

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

5.4

179

Is Turkey Finding a New Direction?

Turkey-EU relations showed signs of revival with Prime Minister Erdoğan’s first visit to Brussels to discuss Turkey’s EU accession process since 2004. This 2009 visit strengthened expectations that the government was determined to bring the EU issue back onto its agenda. In accordance with this expectation, the AKP named 2009 as the year of the EU. Abdullah Gül also visited Brussels in March 2009. This was the first official presidential visit. Ali Bayramoğlu reported Gül’s comments on his way to Brussels: This is the first time that a Turkish president has officially visited the EU. This is a preplanned visit and we place great importance on it. You know that the national program has recently been completed […] A new head of negotiations has been appointed. Both the president and the main opposition party are making official visits to Brussels. This all shows we have a national commitment to the EU issue. It is the most important issue on Turkey’s agenda. (Bayramoğlu 2009)

Gül also repeated this in his press conference after his visit and said that this was the first presidential visit and should draw attention to the importance Turkey continues to place on the EU. This was also important since it showed that Turkey fully embraced the process (Yeni Şafak 2009a). For the CHP, 2009 also saw a reawakening of EU relations. Baykal visited Brussels for the first time in five years and stated that it was the CHP’s duty to support the EU negotiations process. He added that the reforms required by the EU were undertaken in order to develop democratic life. However, he underlined that Turkey was not more independent, more secure, and more European than six to seven years ago (Milliyet 2009f). With the improved relations with the EU in 2009, Turkey continued its discourse underlining its own multidimensional identity and its importance for the EU. This increasingly replaced the argument that Turkey is European, its natural place is in Europe, and it deserves to be part of Europe. The civilization project argument for Turkey’s EU membership was frequently used in this period. However, Turkey did not demonstrate itself as the bridge between two civilizations but as the active actor of a distinct civilization. In this context the topos of usefulness was used and Turkey’s Muslim, secular, and democratic identity was underlined to illustrate the advantages of its accession for the EU. This discourse still constructed two different groups (‘us’ and ‘them’) with different identities. However, in this case, the Turkish self was represented as more distinct and powerful because of its special

180 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

identity. Even the CHP, which criticized stressing the Muslim identity of the country in the course of EU relations, argued that Turkey should be accepted into the EU because of its Muslim identity. In September 2009, Baykal said: ‘It is obvious that our relations with the EU are stalled […] We in the CHP want to change this situation. We hope it will change in the near future and EU-Turkey relations will be mutually renewed. The EU has to realize the importance of access to a Muslim country that is also secular and democratic. It has to see the potential positive impact and importance of this membership for its interests’ (Hürriyet 2009a). The statesmen of European countries used the same discourse. Spain’s EU minister Garrido came to Turkey for the alliance of civilizations and answered Cumhuriyet’s questions. To the question of whether Turkey is representing Muslim countries in this civilizations alliance, Garrido answered: ‘Turkey is the only Muslim country which is secular and democratic […] Thus, it is an important country which can contribute to the EU being a global power and to the solution of Middle East problems. This point of view will also help by convincing the people who do not want Turkey’s membership’ (Cumhuriyet 2009b). Turkey continued to stress the advantages it would bring to the EU, indicating its growing self-confidence. In this context the topos of values, the topos of uniqueness, and the topos of usefulness were used. The vice chairman of the Turkish parliament, Nevzat Pakdil, pointed to the common political principles and said in the Second Turkey European Social Forum in Mardin: The EU is based on freedom, democracy, human rights, respect for basic freedoms, and the rule of law. These values are being adopted by Turkey, which aims to bring this nation to the level of modern civilizations […] Turkey, having a great civilization which unites different beliefs and cultures and enables a common life for them, will bring a richness and power to the EU with its potential and dynamism. (Milliyet 2009g)

The following statement by the EU’s chief negotiator, Egemen Bağış, illustrates perfectly how the topos of usefulness was applied to support Turkey’s accession in conjunction with the arguments that Turkey has a unique and powerful position in the international political arena. Bağış pointed to Turkey’s growing influence in the region and claimed that the decision will not only affect Turkey but the entire Muslim world, since Turkey is a significant role model in the region:

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

181

The EU will give 1.5 billion Muslims a message with its decision on Turkey’s membership. Not only 20 million Muslims in Europe, but also 1.5 billion Muslims the world over are following Turkey’s membership process. The Islamic world is searching for a role model […] Turkey negotiated indirect conversations between Israel and Syria and had a role in the lessening of hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Russia and Georgia, and Iran and the West. In my opinion, Turkey is a very important model which really should be utilized for world peace. (Milliyet 2009e)

The hopeless case for Turkey’s full membership exhausted the Turkish people and enthusiasm for EU membership was replaced by indifference. In this context the EU was increasingly referred to and labeled in negative terms, such as ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘deceiving.’ This discourse also underlined the group constructions of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ For instance, Erdoğan expressed Turkey’s indifference on several occasions. In a 2009 speech in Poland, he said: ‘If 27 countries say we won’t accept Turkey, it is fine; that’s the end […] 1959-2009, 50 years […] For 50 years, the EU has been deceiving Turkey’ (Milliyet 2009b). However, the discussions during the negotiations process and the EU’s approach not only caused disappointment and loss of interest among the people, but also enhanced Turkish self-confidence. Moreover, as a result of the reforms under the EU integration process, Turkey became a strong, stabilizing element in its problematic region. Turkey’s presence as a powerful and self-confident actor with its active and multidimensional foreign policy in regional and international politics attracted attention. It would be misleading and an oversimplification to attribute the growing self-confidence only to relations with the EU. A set of complex structural, systemic, domestic, international, and economic factors played a significant role. One of the most important reasons for the growing self-confidence was Turkey’s booming economy. After struggling through several severe economic crises, Turkey became a member of the G20 and was counted among the fastest-growing economies of the G20 and Europe. Developments in the region also provided Turkey with the opportunity to engage more actively and to play the leading role in the region. Turkey became more aware of its strategic and regional power and acted, based on this awareness. The optimal circumstances were used masterfully by Turkey as a significant actor in important international institutions such as the G20, holder of a seat on the UN Security Council, and head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Turkey’s commercial interests in the Middle East were also emphasized as important aspects of Turkey’s activism in the region. Turkey signed several economic and trade treaties with Middle Eastern countries

182 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

and aimed to be an energy hub. Turkey used the favorable environment in the region for very clever engagement in regional problems and tried to be a mediator, for instance, in the Balkans, the Caucuses, and the Middle East. There was a bidirectional relationship between Turkey’s growing selfconfidence and its leading political role in regional as well as international politics. With growing confidence, Turkey was more engaged in politics and this engagement in turn fed Turkey’s self-esteem and self-confidence. These positive developments were also mirrored in the self-description of Turkey. Turkey described itself more with the positive labels such as rising star, regional leading actor, and global actor. For instance, Gül referred to the growing self-confidence of Turkey in an interview in which he said that Turkey, like Norway, might say in the future that it does not want to be an EU member. He answered questions related to the new orientation of Turkey by suggesting there are some who are jealous of Turkey as a rising star (Hürriyet 2009c). That a disappointed but newly self-confident Turkey searched for alternatives and developed its relations with the Middle East led internally and externally to the shift in axis discussion in 2009. Turkey’s more active participation in world politics, based on its dual identity, made it, in turn, a more significant actor for the EU. Already in 2008, Turkey’s balanced and constructive policy after the war in Georgia highlighted Turkey’s importance for world politics, which became increasingly obvious throughout 2009. Turkey impressed the EU with its active foreign policy in mediating the conflict between Syria and Israel, in stabilization efforts in Iraq, and in the Pakistani-Afghan conflict over Iran’s nuclear program. Turkey had a new Syrian policy and regarded Syria as a potential ally and friend in easing tensions in the region. This new approach increased trust between the two countries. Turkish policy makers utilized these positive developments and acted as mediator in the Syrian-Israeli conflict, enjoying some degree of success. Turkey’s new policy approach was also reflected in its intensive diplomatic engagement in the rebuilding of Iraq after the US invasion. Turkey played a mediator role between Americans and Iraqi Sunnis and brought them together on several occasions. Turkey also organized several training programs for Iraqi politicians to contribute to the democratization of country (Aras 2009: 36-39). Turkey’s role in contributing to the dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistani was also remarkable. At the invitation of Turkey’s president and prime minister, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and Afghan president Hamid Karzai met in Istanbul in May 2007 (Davutoğlu 2008: 83; Öniş and Yılmaz 2009: 19). These developments combined with the cooling of relations between Turkey and the EU and the decline in public support in Turkey, forced the EU to put more emphasis on

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

183

its positive approach to Turkey’s membership. In the Enlargement Strategy 2009, the EU articulated Turkey’s strategic importance in key areas such as energy security, the hindrance and resolution of conflicts, and the regional security of the Middle East and the Caucuses (European Commission 2009b). The stronger presence of Turkey in the Middle East and the increased relations with Muslim countries also sparked an intense debate on the shifting of the axis, which again forced the EU to pay more attention to relations with Turkey in 2010. The EU was regarded as responsible for Turkey’s shift and was blamed by several international politicians for causing it. The leader of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, answered criticism of the EU by US secretary of defense Robert Gates by saying that Turkey’s distancing itself from the West started with the intervention in Iraq and with the position of the Bush administration (Cumhuriyet 2010e). The EU began speaking of full membership instead of limited membership. In June 2010, the EU commissioner responsible for the enlargement, Stefan Füle, met with Egemen Bagis in Istanbul. In this meeting, Füle said: ‘Turkey and the EU are now having a reliability test. When I speak for the EU, there is no privileged partnership on the table. What is being discussed is full membership’ (Cumhuriyet 2010f). Following the debates on the shift of axis, Turkey assured the EU that membership was still very important to it and described the EU accession process as, not only the most important civilization project in the history of the Turkish Republic, but also the most important for its democracy. It underlined its determination for full membership and shifted the blame for the stalled process onto the EU. Derya Sazak reported Erdoğan’s interviews with the Radikal newspaper in his column. Erdoğan said: Turkey has not at all lost its enthusiasm for EU membership and there is no slowdown in this regard […] But it is not enough that we alone are determined and have great enthusiasm. The same enthusiasm should also be on the other side of the table. Any loss of enthusiasm detected is due to the behavior of some EU countries. The declarations, behavior, and propaganda echo inevitably in Turkey […] Did you know that during each EU presidential term, only two sections have been opened and these put preconditions on the table which are not compatible with the spirit of negotiation? (Sazak 2010)

Derya Sazak then added: ‘Okay, the reforms have not proceeded at the same pace as in the past. However, a clear, full membership date and elimination of visa requirements have not been given to Turkey, but have been provided

184 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

to Croatia and Serbia without any problems. Then when the axis shifts to the East, the reaction is that Turkey is walking away from the West’ (ibid.). During his meeting with EU ambassadors, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also blamed the EU for the stagnant relations because it required additional conditions for Turkey’s membership, which were not required from the other applicants, and this is not right. Regarding the shift of axis, he assured the EU that the CHP’s orientation is to Western civilization. He said: ‘It won’t turn its shoulder to the East […] The main aim of Turkey’s foreign policy is mentioned in the founding constitution of the republic’ (Cumhuriyet 2010a). A New Start for Turkey-EU Relations and the Kurdish Issue The year 2009 brought not only a boost in expectations for a new start of EU-Turkey relations, but was also a very active year for the Kurdish issue. The government announced its Kurdish Opening (Kürt açılımı) project, which was required by the EU in the 2004 Progress Report. This Kurdish initiative purposed to extend cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurdish people and to overcome one of the major problems in EU accession talks. The government prepared a three-stage solution plan. The first stage would simplify the opening of Kurdish courses, offer broadcasts in Kurdish on private television channels, and change city names through changes in rules and regulations. The middle stage would enact laws to make the changes that were not possible through changes in rules and regulations. The last stage would redefine citizenship to open the way for Kurdish education and to strengthen local governments. The EU watched the development of and discussions about the Kurdish Opening closely and supported it fully in its 2009 Progress Report. In the course of the Kurdish Opening, the opposition sharply criticized not only the government, but also the EU. In these criticisms, terrorists, the government, the EU, and the USA were put in the same pot. The EU was mainly referred to as the enemy of Turkey and as a supporter and advocate of the PKK, which wanted to destroy Turkey. This reference also constructed ‘us’ and ‘them’ boundaries and labeled the EU as ‘untrustworthy.’ For instance, Bahçeli said: The destruction project of the prime minister is a death project in which the butcher of Imrali, groups in Kandil, secessionist groups, and Barzani combined efforts. With this opening, Barzani is satisfied, Talabani is satisfied, the USA is satisfied, the EU is satisfied, […] [and] the AKP is most satisfied. It is not possible that the outcome will be constructive for the Turkish nation when all these groups are satisfied with it. (Milliyet 2010b)

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

185

At the Foreign Policy and Security Conference organized by the Turkish think tank USAK (Uluslararası Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu [International Strategic Research Organization]), MHP vice president Deniz Bölükbaşı blamed the EU for having the same aims as the PKK and stated that the EU wanted to create national minorities by force. The PKK’s requirements and issues in EU progress reports overlap by 80% every year and the EU has become an advocate for the PKK in Turkey (Hürriyet 2010). Baykal was also not pleased with the Kurdish Opening and blamed Erdoğan for the rise of separatism, declaring: ‘Everyone has started to ask who we are. Does a prime minister have the right to put people through this? The pupils in school have started to ask each other about their ethnicity […] there is no policy in the EU for accepting each ethnic identity as a nation. They are only imposing this on us’ (Milliyet 2009a). Bahçeli warned Erdoğan regarding the Kurdish Opening and described the EU, along with the USA and the PKK, as Turkey’s foes, which desired to mislead him in regards to its interests. He said: ‘Mr. Prime Minister, don’t walk into this trap! It is your enemy who is encouraging you.’ The use of the word ‘trap’ indicates that the relations were dangerous. He added that the opening packet was a requirements packet from the EU, the USA, the PKK, and supporting deputies, as well as Erdoğan, and demanded: Write down the EU’s impositions. Then write down the expectations of the USA for the realization of the Great Middle East Project. Then write down the goal of the PKK since its establishment. Then consider the speeches of the 74 deputies who are known as supporters of the PKK. Then look at the requests of the prime minister for the opening. You will see that all overlap completely. Thus we, as the MHP, cannot accept this opening. (Cumhuriyet 2009a)

In this context the common references to historical events were made in current debates to support the argument that the EU was the enemy and the ‘other’ of Turkey. Historical negative events (such as the Treaty of Sèvres) were referred to in order to revitalize the old rivalry between Turkey and Europe, and this also gave rise to increasing references to the EU as the ‘other’ of Turkey. For instance, Bahçeli made the connection between the Treaty of Sèvres, the EU, the PKK, and the Kurdish Opening at every opportunity and argued that the EU wanted to diminish Turkey’s territorial integrity. He said: ‘The synergy and harmony between secessionist movements, the EU’s impositions, and the AKP’s concessions are not surprising to us’ (Milliyet 2009c). He criticized Ahmet Türk (chairman of the DTP) for speaking Kurdish in the parliament and said:

186 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Groups unified to destroy the republic and demolish the unitary national state, lovers of Sèvres, admirers of the EU, proponents of federal states, and mouthpieces of transatlantic powers have formed a front with our government and are working very quickly […] Nobody can divide the Turkish Republic. We should revisit our decision about the EU adventure. (Milliyet 2009d)

The position of the opponents of the Kurdish Opening was strengthened through incidents which disturbed Turkey and damaged its trust in the EU, such as the repeated conferences organized by the European Parliament or Europol’s statements that the PKK does not pose a threat to Europe. Europol claimed that the PKK is fighting for the political and cultural rights of Kurdish people and these activities are, for Europe, nonviolent actions and propaganda (Milliyet 2009h). Consequently, the Kurdish Opening was not always fully supported by the government because of concern about the public reaction. In August, the government renamed the Kurdish Opening as the Democratic initiative process (Demokratik Açılım Süreci), and a year later as Fraternity Project (Milli Birlik ve Kardeşlik Projesi). Despite changing the name of the initiative, the project ended up exactly where it started. It began with PKK militants coming from Habur and ended with their capture. None of the steps outlined by the government, such as establishing a commission for combating discrimination, making the Prime Ministry’s Human Rights Office an autonomous board, establishing independent mechanisms for complaint panels, and giving the villages their old names back, were undertaken that year.

5.5 Conclusion The start of the negotiations was celebrated in Turkey with enthusiasm. After this important decision Turkey – as the only Muslim applicant country – was represented as a role model for other Muslim countries and as a mediator between the Western and Eastern civilizations. The positive atmosphere created by the start of the negotiations process in 2005 lasted only until the suspension of negotiations in 2006. The period from 2005 until 2010 has been a dormant period in EU-Turkey relations, far below the expectations of both sides. Turkey responded very reluctantly to reform requirements and the EU misused the negotiations process for political purposes. The delay in the membership process and the insistence on the privileged partnership influenced Turkey’s self-concept and its

Start of Negotiations, End of Negotiations

187

perception of ‘in-groupness.’ Turkey continued to underline the importance of its multidimensional identity, its dual identity, and the significance of its membership for the EU to become a global actor, but at the same time had the impression that, even if it fulfilled all the conditions for membership, the EU was not going to accept it as a full member. The year 2009 saw a short-lived reawakening of EU-Turkey relations, during which Turkey again stressed its unique and multidimensional identity employing the topos of values, the topos of uniqueness, and the topos of usefulness. As a result of the EU exhaustive negotiations process, Turkey’s enthusiasm for the EU was replaced in this period with indifference. Even the attempts made in 2009 to revitalize the relationship largely failed and could not reinvigorate relations between the EU and Turkey. The complex structural, systemic, domestic, international, and economic factors in conjunction with the exhaustive EU negotiations process, the discourse underlining Turkey’s multidimensional identity and its importance for the EU increasingly replaced the argument that Turkey is European, its natural place is in Europe, and it deserves to be part of Europe. Turkey did not demonstrate itself as the bridge between two civilizations but as the active actor of a distinct civilization. This discourses still constructed two different groups (‘us’ and ‘them’) with different identities. However, in this case the Turkish self was represented as more distinct and powerful because of its special identity. The slowdown of the EU negotiations also gave rise to the decline in the steps taken toward the solution to the Kurdish problem by the Turkish government. The more the EU’s requirements shifted from the cultural realm (allowing Kurdish broadcasting and education and the protection of Kurdish culture) to the political realm (recognition of Kurdish identity), the more the Kurdish issue was identified with the Treaty of Sèvres and the more the EU was perceived as ‘other’ rather than the once desperately claimed ‘self.’ Thus, the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue were not considered conditions to be fulfilled for membership but struggles for the existence of the country as in the Turkish War of Independence. The EU had become more the hostile West than part of the idealized modernization and civilization project. Turkey underlined its uniqueness and multidimensional identity and became more self-confident about what it was able to offer, as a different identity owner. Turkey no longer claimed the bridge position between East and West but became a lead actor with a significant role in the international arena.

6

New Area, New Identity, New Roles Turkey – European or Middle Eastern?

After 2005, many Turks saw Turkey’s membership as a dream going nowhere. The relatively pro-Turkey leaders in France and Germany were replaced by skeptics. The discussion in Europe prior to the December 2004 Brussels Summit about a privileged partnership was also widely reported in the Turkish media and injured Turkish pride. The pressure for the recognition of Cyprus was seen as unjust since the Turkish Cypriots had voted in favor of the Annan Plan for resolution of the deadlock. Also the return of PKK terrorism strengthened the belief that the EU and the USA were behind the Kurdish separatists. During this time, the opposition parties fueled nationalism and supported the conspiracy theories. In the middle of this atmosphere, the EU lost its attraction and the government searched for other potential relationships. Some saw the Eastward shift in foreign policy as a pragmatic avoidance of the excessive concessions required by the EU and the USA. The changing international and regional dynamics, Turkey’s economic interests in the region, and its ambitions for a role as an energy corridor were also regarded as significant reasons for the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy. Others considered this shift a result of the ideological and emotional motivations of the AKP. Many scholars pointed to the new foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, as the person behind the new foreign policy parameters. His book, Strategic Depth, proposed that in the near future, Turkey must develop alternative policies toward its neighboring regions so it would have enough room to maneuver (Göksel 2009: 33-37). In the course of pursuing internal stability, ongoing economic development, political development, and the decades-long modernization/ Westernization process in line with liberal, democratic, and secular values, Turkey has developed new roles which became an essential element in reflecting and defining its new identity within the boundaries of state and in relation to others outside these boundaries (Göl 2013: 36; Oğuzlu 2016: 59). Starting from the mid-2000s, Turkey engaged in a more active foreign policy based on its multidimensional identity and extensive historical and cultural links with the region (Davutoğlu 2001). This foreign policy no longer consisted simply of the pro-Western interventionism followed from the 1950s through the 1990s; Turkey now sought to act as a pivotal country in the Middle East and the surrounding region as a close ally of the West. This foreign policy position was initially used to strengthen Turkey’s bid for EU

190 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

membership, but with time it caused a degree of concern, which led to the emergence of debates on Turkey’s apparent shift of axis. It would be an oversimplification to argue that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East was a reaction to its exclusion from the EU. As Rumelili argues, Turkey would be exercising its institutional power in order to shape European foreign policy in the direction of closer engagement with the region, even if it were a member of the EU (Rumelili 2011: 241-243). Indeed, one of the reasons for this change was Davutoğlu’s new understanding of Turkish foreign policy aiming to make Turkey an active regional and global player because of its historical and geographical particularities. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s ‘geostrategic location, booming economy, ability to understand different social and cultural dynamics in a vast geography, and commitment to advance democracy domestically and internationally are all important assets’ for contributing actively to the new global order (Davutoğlu 2012). He rejects the frequently used bridge metaphor to describe Turkey’s regional and international role, since a ‘bridge is a passive entity between two sides. There are two sides and you are bridge. No, we are part of both of the sides. We are part of all the events. So this is the challenge for the EU as a continental and regional order’ (Davutoğlu 2013). However, one could not say that the proactivism of Turkey is confined to the period of AKP rule. Indeed, there was a shift in the mindset of the Turkish ruling elite during the period of AKP rule, but this shift is not the only mechanism behind the change in Turkish foreign policy. The AKP’s foreign policy is the continuation of a longer transformation trend in traditional Turkish foreign policy, which started to transform from the end of the Cold War (Başer 2015: 293). During the Cold War, Turkey acted on behalf of Western interests and tried to hinder Soviet influence in the region. For example, Turkey played the leading role in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, signed as a result of a US initiative, between Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain. The end of the Cold War was a turning point that changed many principles of traditional foreign policy, such as caution, protection of territorial integrity, neutrality, and Westernization. In the 1990s these principles were replaced by self-confident multilateral activism. Turkey’s decision to participate in the 1990 Gulf War, the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, and Turkey’s participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations in different countries throughout the 1990s are good examples of Turkey’s departure from its tradition policy and for its multilateral activism (Çakır and Akdağ 2017: 3). Among other previous Turkish governments, İsmail Cem – foreign minister between 1997 and 2002 – had especially projected a more proactive foreign policy in the

New Area, New Identity, New Roles

191

Middle East and tried to normalize relations with Armenia, Greece, and Syria (Meral and Paris 2010: 79). He aimed to make Turkey a pivotal actor in Eurasia as a response to the vacuum Turkey found itself in at the end of the Cold War (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu 2016: 386-387). He regarded Turkey as a key actor in its neighborhood because of its multidimensional identity and strong historical European characteristics in the form of the norms and values that the republic was based upon. Ahmet Davutoğlu has used the same discourse referring to the historical geography and historical realities, but he asserted that Turkey needed to assume a new identity and position in the world to achieve its full potential as a regional and global actor based on its historical experience and responsibilities. He argued that the changes and transformations in the world arena is opening greater opportunities to achieve a regional and global leader position (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu 2016: 386-387). In addition to Davutoğlu’s new approach to the foreign policy and Turkey’s position on the world order, crucial external elements such as stagnation in Turkey-EU relations, the changing political landscape of the Middle East, and growing tensions over energy supplies in Turkey’s neighborhood also gave rise to a more proactive foreign policy (Meral and Paris 2010: 79). The developments in the regions and the international arena demanded a radical shift in Turkish foreign policy, forcing it to diversify its economic and political ties to strengthen its own hand, especially in energy, and to seek stability in its region and emerge as a neutral economic and diplomatic bridge between parties in conflict (ibid.: 80). Indeed, several individual, systemic, structural, economic, ideological, and pragmatic factors contributed in combination to the change in Turkey’s foreign policy. However, the stagnation of the EU relations played a significant role in this shift as well. During negotiations, both parties stressed Turkey’s religious identity and its roots in the East. Initially, Turkey hoped to remind Europe of its importance in unifying the two civilizations while, at the same time, stressing its European identity, and acted accordingly. The continuing arguments and debates on Turkey’s multidimensional identity also made Turkey aware of its potential as an international actor. Driven by both disappointment and growing self-confidence, Turkey had a new focus in its foreign relations, paid more attention to the Middle East, and was willing to play a leading role in the region. Thus, Turkey implemented several measures to improve relations with the Muslim countries. In 2009, the visa requirements between Syria and Turkey were abolished which was followed by the abolition of visa requirements for Jordan, Libya, and Lebanon. In a meeting for strategic cooperation in Aleppo, Davutoğlu said in Turkish

192 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

and Arabic, ‘I am announcing our new motto: One fate, one history, one future’ (Yeni Şafak 2009d), indicating that the two countries were destined to stand together – as they had done in the past they would do in the future. Davutoğlu added that the purpose of the boundaries between countries was not to separate them but to bind them together. It was assumed that improved Turkish-Syrian relations would also improve Turkey’s relations with the Arab world. He emphasized, however, that these relations would not replace relationships with other countries (ibid.). Moreover, Turkey laid the foundation for regional cooperation and took important steps to improve relations with Iraq and Syria. These steps were mainly based on economic cooperation. The project was called ‘Middle East Economic Cooperation,’ which first aimed to achieve a full-cooperation mechanism with Iraq and then to apply this economic cooperation model to Syria. After having ignored Syria for a long time, Turkey created a new policy area using Syria as the main entrance to the region. Zeynep Gürcanlı described these steps as of utmost importance and wrote in her column that the EU had been established in much the same way (Gürcanlı 2009). Speeches and declarations by politicians indicated an intention to cement a union with the countries of the Middle East that was similar to the EU. Prime Minister Erdoğan said in a speech, ‘The Iran-Turkey Common Work Forum,’ that Turkey and Iran could have a common currency (Yeni Şafak 2009c). In June 2010, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan established the Higher Level Cooperation Council, which was viewed as the establishment of the Middle East Union. New relationships were not only directed at Arab countries, but also at other Islamic republics. A departure from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy during the period of AKP rule also took place in relations with Israel. Turkey had always maintained strong economic, military, and political relations with Israel and avoided taking sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey was also the first Muslim country to recognize Israel and exchange ambassadors after the country was established in 1949. Although Turkey’s Middle East policy in general, and its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, became more multifaceted after the Cyprus conflict in the 1960s, when Turkey was hoping to get support from the Arab countries in the UN for its position on Cyprus, Turkey was steadfast in its Western orientation. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Turkey voted for the USSR’s resolution in the UN and asked for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, but at the same time abstained from voting for the first paragraph of the resolution, which criticized Israel as the aggressor (Aydın 2000: 113-114, 125-126; Karpat 1975: 126-131). Turkey’s long-standing positive relations with Israel were damaged by several events, such as the Gaza massacre and Erdoğan’s accusation that

New Area, New Identity, New Roles

193

Israel was violating human rights in response to Israel’s president Shimon Perez’s comments in Davos. These crises damaged Turkey’s long-standing political relations with Israel and provoked other crises, which resulted in Turkey’s cancellation of joint military exercises in 2009. Relations with Israel were then deeply damaged by the Israeli raid on the Blue Marmara Ship on 31 May 2010, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed. These developments led to a turning point, not only in Israeli-Turkish relations but also in Turkey’s general policy in the Middle East. Previously, Turkey maintained a policy of equal distance from each country, which was an extension of its Western orientation. However, after the above-mentioned crises between Turkey and Israel, Turkey abandoned its neutral approach, began to officially take sides, and no longer mediated between the parties. These crises had grave consequences for Turkey-Israel relations and even the US-brokered Israeli apology in March 2013 and promised financial compensation for the families of the victims could not normalize Turkey-Israel relations, since Turkey’s third demand for the normalization of relations, namely the lifting of the Gaza blockade, was not met. Turkey-Israel relations became more complicated over the course of the so-called Arab Spring, since Israeli and Turkish interests were on opposite sides (Huber and Tocci 2013: 2, 6). Relations with Israel showed a first sign of normalization after six years in 2016 after Israel paid 20 million dollars in compensation to the victims of the Blue Marmara incident and the mutual appointment of ambassadors. Turkey’s new stance did not actually mean giving up its Western orientation since Turkey was aware that its strong position in the Middle East was created by its otherness and Western orientation. To activate its multidimensional foreign policy and play a dominant role in the region required a European vision as strong as its Muslim identity. Without the European vision, Turkey could not continue its role as a global power. Davutoğlu expressed this by saying: ‘Turkey is now present in every global area. The EU integration process is supporting this. The concern of Turkey-skeptics may be that Turkey’s sphere of influence will include the EU and has the potential to lessen their influence’ (Hürriyet 2009b). Thus, Turkey tried to win a meaningful place within the EU and achieve full membership through its new role in the region, while also acknowledging its responsibilities in the region. Davutoğlu said: ‘Turkey’s role in building regional order is not in conflict with EU membership,’ adding that Turkey would make reforms and democratize itself to deserve the EU membership. He continued: ‘We should do this homework, not just for the EU, but for our internal order’ (Cumhuriyet 2010c). Turkish politicians explained Turkey’s new approach as a reflection of its multidimensional identity and declared there was no reason for concern

194 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

since Turkey was still directed toward the West. Abdullah Gül stated: ‘What Turkey is doing is obvious. Of course Turkey will go west, east, north, and south. It is going everywhere. The important point is where its values are going. If Turkey embraces democratic values, rule of law, respect for human rights, transparency, equality between men and women, and a liberal economy, there is no problem’ (Hürriyet 2009d). Gül here points to common political principles and values to ensure that there are no clear-cut differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’ and that we belong to the same group – but at the same time he refers to the multidimensional identity of Turkey. Turkey wanted to be inside the EU with this multidimensional identity. Ahmet Davutoğlu referred to the multidimensional identity of Turkey in an interview given to Der Spiegel on the shift of axis debate and affirmed that EU membership is not only relevant to Turkey’s foreign policy but also to its history. He expressed the EU’s strategic relevance for Turkey, but reminded the EU, at the same time, of the significance of Turkey’s multidimensional identity for the EU, making use of the topos of advantage. He added, Turkey’s EU membership is our most important strategic aim and it will remain so. We have pointed toward Europe since the Ottoman Empire’s reform policies in the nineteenth century. Turkey is not only a European country. It is, at the same time, an Asian, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern country. It is a multidimensional country. This is not a problem for the EU; on the contrary, it will help the EU. (Yeni Şafak 2009e)

Turkish policy makers regarded good relations with the Middle East and a leadership role in the region as necessary for a strong position in the EU. Davutoğlu refers to this in his book Strategic Depth and suggests that Turkey should have a solid stance in Asia. Otherwise it would have very limited chances with the EU (Davutoğlu 2001: 551-563). Erdoğan also explained the new, active role of Turkey as the normalization of Turkey and as Turkey’s realization of its identity. He said: There is no shift in axis or anything else. This is Turkey’s normalization […] If there is a shift of axis, it is Europe’s shift. One must deal with it. We are a county that can speak with the East, West, and at the same time, with the North and South. If the EU accepts Turkey, it will have special power. If you don’t want to walk this way with Turkey and if you are honest and candid, come and explain it. Say, ‘We don’t want Turkey joining the EU.’ (Yeni Şafak 2009b)

New Area, New Identity, New Roles

195

The Turkish-Brazilian deal with Iran on uranium exchange and Turkey’s ‘no vote’ in the United Nations Security Council on the sanctions against Iran (because of its nuclear policy), the debate on the shift of axis in Turkey’s foreign policy heated up. However, the no vote in the Security Council was based on an agreement between Turkey and Iran regarding the exchange of uranium, not opposition to the interests of the West. In addition, Turkey opposed to the nomination of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO secretary general (due to his actions during the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005 when he was prime minister of Denmark), a position that was perceived as a deviation from European norms and values and questioned how well Turkey had internalized such European values as freedom of expression (Rumelili 2011: 241). After Turkey signed an agreement with Iran for the exchange of uranium, the Security Council decided on sanctions against Iran. Erdoğan criticized this decision and answered questions about the perceived shift of axis, saying: ‘People who claim that Turkey is drifting away from Europe are spreading evilly conceived propaganda’ (Cumhuriyet 2010b). He also criticized the EU and said that Turkey first applied to join the European Economic Community in 1959 but there had been no earnest steps taken in that direction for 50 years. He added: ‘Some countries within the EU have tried to slow down the negotiations and Turkey is aware of their hidden agendas. In spite of that, we are carrying out the reforms with determination. Actually, this is a test and the EU did not realize it. We will see whether the EU is earnest or not. For a hundred years Turkey and the Arab world have been rejected because of hateful propaganda’ (ibid.). In this passage Erdoğan construct ‘them’ and ‘us’ with clear-cut differences belonging two different groups. ‘Turkey’ and ‘Arab’ are represented as belonging to the same group and both are rejected as untrustworthy by the Western group. The opposition parties also criticized Turkey for its shift of axis and portrayed Turkey’s choice of foreign policy orientation in black-and-white terms, namely, as either directed toward the West or to the Arab world. In this discourse, the Middle East was labeled as ‘radical’ and the West as ‘civilized.’ CHP deputy Öymen, for instance, said: ‘We call this a shift of axis. Turkey is shifting toward the Middle East and, at the same, time moving away from the world’s view and closer to the views of the radical countries’ (Cumhuriyet 2010d). The MHP’s deputy Bölükbaşı claimed that there is a shift of axis and ‘in the new axis there is Erivan, Erbil, and Gaza. If you make this picture broader you will see Barzani and Talabani’ (ibid.). Although the new foreign policy of the government was regarded as a shift and new orientation, the government stated several times that this new

196 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

policy should not be regarded as an alternative or replacement. However, the government would not forgo strengthening relations with the Arab countries. Cabinet Minister Ali Babacan said: ‘There is great potential for Turkey and the Arab countries. The ground is ready, all ingredients are ready, everything is ready – only political will is needed […] Turkey is developing its democracy and continuing the EU negotiations process while, at the same time, making a great effort to strengthen its bonds with the countries in the region with whom it has cultural and historical ties’ (Milliyet 2010a). In his statement, Babacan illustrates Turkey’s bonds with the EU as being based solely on political grounds. Thus, the EU accession process is only a political process and has nothing to do with Turkey’s foundations. His reference to Turkey’s historical and cultural bonds with the countries in the region makes it clear that Turkey’s original ties are to the East, which are stronger than mere political ties. Pointing to the consequences of the EU’s exclusionary manner and recalling Turkey’s willingness to join the EU and its readiness to meet the membership conditions, Erdoğan criticized the EU in his speech at the Black Sea University. He framed again Turkey’s efforts in the Civilizations Alliance Initiative to reminded his listeners of the potential benefits of Turkey’s full membership and warned the EU that an opposite decision would make the EU a ‘Christian club.’ He said: The EU is wasting Turkey’s time while we are trying hard to become a member of the EU. If you are not a Christian club, you should accept Turkey into the EU […] If the people who blame Turkey for shifting its axis are not maliciously disposed, then they do not understand Turkey’s new role […] This government started negotiations with the EU. We made an application in 1959, and an official one in 1963. Since then, we have struggled and worn ourselves out, but they still waste Turkey’s time. I tell them openly, if you are not a Christian club, you should take us. Today Turkey is a more suitable EU candidate than any of the other ten countries that joined the EU last time […] Don’t you want to be a power center? We are the government who started the Civilizations Alliance Initiative […] We are not going to forgo EU membership. We will continue to do our homework. (Milliyet 2010c)

In this passage Erdoğan uses the usual topos of usefulness based on Turkey’s unique position and identity to remind the EU of the advantages of Turkey’s accession and warns the EU not to be caught up in its Christian identity. These arguments point to the differences between ‘them’ and ‘us,’ that is, the

New Area, New Identity, New Roles

197

two different religious identities involved. This construction of differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’ is also strengthened by his reference to Turkey’s new position in the region. On the one hand, the shift of axis was not acknowledged but, on the other hand, the EU was blamed for Turkey’s new behavior. Erdoğan, in a joint press conference with Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), addressed the issue of whether the changes in behavior toward the Middle East would influence EU membership. Erdoğan said: ‘We have an unchangeable principle […] Our behavior toward the Middle East is a humanist behavior rooted in our values. We demonstrated the same behavior in Georgia. The EU will never change this. We did not consider the EU a Christian club, but a political organization. No other country has been left waiting for 50 years. The EU’s behavior is not just’ (Yeni Şafak 2010). The shift of axis was mainly regarded as a result of the EU’s estrangement from Turkey. The EU was warned about causing Turkey to turn completely away from the West so that it would look to the East instead. In his column in Cumhuriyet, for instance, Erol Manisalı attributed the EU’s continued perception of Turkey as its ‘other’ as responsible for the shift of axis and wrote: The EU has regarded Turkey so far as ‘other’ and always kept it busy. It did not accept Turkey as a member but handled the issue by just keeping Turkey under its control. Turkey also always played this game. However, the issue took on a new dimension when a new government came to Ankara, one that is deeply connected to Islam and the Middle East. Erdoğan initiated extensive economic and cultural relations with Islamic countries in the Middle East […] If this process continues […] Turkey’s political and cultural bonds will shift from Europe to the East and Asia. Turkey will change its identity slowly and instead of European values, Islamic and Asian values will be more influential. (Manisalı 2010)

Turkey, indeed, had a growing presence in the Middle East based on its multidimensional identity and played the role of a leading, self-confident actor in the regional and international arena. The emphasis on its cultural and historical ties with the Middle Eastern countries enabled Turkey to increase its influence on the Middle East enormously. However, the popular uprisings known as the Arab Spring has widely reshaped the regional power balance affecting Turkey’s role in the region. The uprisings and their aftermath have had a significant effect on the foreign policy of Turkey (Özcan et al. 2015: 195). Turkey, which has been actively involved in the region, especially since the

198 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

early 2000s, was regarded as benefitting from the changes resulting from the Arab Spring, at the beginning. According to a public opinion poll among five Arab countries conducted in late 2011, the majority of the respondents identified Turkey as playing the most constructive role during the Arab uprisings, while Turkish prime minister Erdoğan was mentioned as the most admired global leader (Ayata 2015: 96). However, the popularity of Turkey declined dramatically because of its increased involvement in the region and Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problem with neighbors’ policy was destroyed, which aimed to promote close ties with the countries with which Turkey had tense or conflictual relations. This was also partially due to the inconsistent Turkish reactions to the uprisings in the regions based on its economic or political interests. Up until mid-2012, Turkey played a mediator role in the region, successfully employing a range of soft-power instruments (such as financial assistance, technical expertise, and civil society support) to Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Ayata 2015: 97). However, Turkey’s responses to the Arab Spring varied among the affected countries, depending on Turkey’s vital interests toward each country. Therefore, Erdoğan’s diplomatic actions were regarded as inconsistent and perceived as a double standard. Toward Tunisia and Egypt, it was relatively easy for Turkey to support the uprisings against dictatorial regimes and to ask the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders to step down, since the economic interests in these countries were relatively minor compared to Libya and Syria. However, economic relations with the Arab countries like Libya and Syria has caused a reluctance and contradiction in Turkey’s reaction to the developments, which in turn damaged its reliability and image in the region and world. For instance, Turkey did not favor military intervention in Libya at the beginning, but increases in attacks on civilians and growing negative international public opinion against the dictatorial regimes caused a modification of Turkey’s position on NATO’s intervention in Libya. Turkey, however, after its initial incoherent policies on the Arab Spring countries, established itself implicitly as the supporter of democratization in the region, which illustrated Turkey’s leading role in the region and its unique identity. Erdoğan’s visits to Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia in 2011 (the so-called Arab Spring Tour) was an attempt to demonstrate Turkey’s determination for the support of democracy in the region and to strengthen the political and economic ties with these countries. The visits illustrate Turkey’s new confidence and regional assertiveness and confirm the intention of Turkey to become the key player in the new regional political environment. Erdoğan gave several speeches during his visit in Egypt, which mirrored Turkey’s intention to hold a leadership role at the heart of

New Area, New Identity, New Roles

199

the Arab Spring and reflected its ties with the Arab world, but at the same time with Western values. In a speech at Cairo University, he explicitly expressed the position of Turkey as being against the authoritarian regimes and for the democratic regimes. He said: ‘Turkey is always ready to support every will for democratization in its region and on the world’ (Erdoğan 2011). Erdoğan’s speeches in Cairo are of upmost importance, as Erdoğan in these speeches did not only strengthen Turkey’s position on democratization in the Middle East but also shows Turkey’s sui generis identity in the region as the only Muslim country with strong bonds to secular values. During an interview with Egypt’s satellite channel Dream TV, Erdoğan referenced secularism and suggested that Egypt ensure the secular nature of the state in its constitution. He told the Egyptians to not to be afraid of secularism and a secular constitution. In Turkey, constitutional secularism is defined as the state remaining equidistant from all religions, he said. ‘In a secular regime people are free to be religious or not.’ He added: ‘I recommend a secular constitution for Egypt. Do not fear secularism because it does not mean being an enemy of religion. I hope the new regime in Egypt will be secular. I hope that after these remarks of mine the way the Egyptian people look at secularism will change’ (İdiz 2011). Erdoğan’s statements on secularism were criticized sharply in Egypt, particularly by the Muslim Brotherhood, forcing Erdoğan to offer an explanation. Erdoğan said in response to the critics that his words were misunderstood because of the wrong translation, as the translator used the word ‘irreligiousness’ to translate the word ‘secularism.’ In spite of the critics, he repeated his support for secularism in the region and said in Tunisia: ‘Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state of law. As for secularism, a secular state has an equal distance from all religious groups, including Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and atheist people.’ He suggested Turkey as a model for Tunisia and other transitional countries in the region (Hürriyet Daily News 2011). Erdoğan’s strong reference to secularism indicates Turkey’s ties with the West, but Erdoğan pointed out the unique nature of Turkish secularism, defining it as different from Anglo-Saxon or Western secularism: ‘This is not secularism in the Anglo-Saxon or Western sense; a person is not secular, the state is secular’ (ibid.). The Syrian uprisings and Turkey’s reaction to it deeply affected the Turkish position in the region. Syria’s uprising evolved into a civil war and Turkey’s reaction to it was overshadowed by security concerns related to the Kurdish issue. Thus, in Syria, Turkey eventually pushed for military intervention in contrast to its reaction to Libya and to the military ouster in Egypt. Turkey’s reaction to the removal of President Morsi in Egypt in July

200 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

2013 was perceived as supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and diminished Turkey’s claim to be a neutral mediator in the region (Ayata 2015: 98). In the long term, Turkey was neither able to push Syrian president Bashir al-Assad to set in motion a serious reform process nor ensure the Muslim Brotherhood remained in power in Egypt (Oğuzlu 2016: 60). As of today, Turkey has no ambassadors in Egypt and Syria. Relations with Russia also deteriorated following Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian military aircraft on the pretext that the aircraft violated Turkey’s airspace despite numerous warnings. (Relations were quickly reestablished, however.) Moreover, the rise of radical and jihadist groups in the course of the ongoing power struggles in the region (such as ISIS and Al-Nusra), the involvement of Syrian Kurds in the fight against ISIS, and the international support and sympathy for these Kurdish groups greatly impacted the scope of Turkey’s foreign policy (Oğuzlu 2016: 60-61). Turkey has become so involved in regional conflicts that its influence has been reduced significantly and its credibility undermined. It is dealing with a growing number of Syrian refugees, and jihadist terrorism – in addition to PKK terrorism – has become a serious security threat in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s relations with Western partners such as NATO, the USA, Russia, Israel, the EU, and the UN soured and its domestic politics has to some degree experienced an authoritarian turn, which has increasingly isolated Turkey in the international arena (Ayata 2015: 97). As a result, in recent years Turkey has begun to express its interest in seeking membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a Eurasian political, economic, and security organization, as a substitute for its institutional relations with Western countries (Kubicek et al. 2015). At the time of this writing, Turkey’s relations with the EU has stagnated and it is going through severe regional and international conflicts. This has damaged Turkey’s ability to assert the leadership role it has aspired to play in the region for other Muslim countries as well as the mediator role it sought to play between the two civilizations (Europe and the Middle East) based on its multidimensional identity. Turkey’s strong presence and pivotal role in the Middle East was greatly diminished because of the rise of instability and conflicts in the region as a result of the Arab Spring uprisings. Despite all this, Turkey is still an effective county in the region. In addition to hosting more than 3 million refugees, it is also an important ally of the nations waging the war against ISIS. Turkey continues to pursue a proactive foreign policy in the region and aims to have a say in its future.

7

Results and Implications

7.1

Turkey-EU Relations and Turkey’s Socialization

Western civilization has always been a very important factor in the formulation of Turkish identity. Thus, Turkey has always put the EU at the center of its political life, regarding it as the end stage of its Westernization, a reliable means for its modernization, and as a place where it really belongs – a place in which it desperately wants to be accepted. Since Turkey regarded the EU as the representative of civilization and modernization and the spokesman for the Western world, it considered the EU to be in a higher position than itself because of its advanced democracy, economy, and sociopolitical structure. However, in spite of these favorable conditions for the strengthening of Western identity and the feeling of in-groupness, evaluating several decades of Turkey’s EU-led change in its definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ does not yield examples of a positive picture. Indeed, the favorable conditions promising a successful shift in Turkey’s definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ were overridden by the exhaustive and relentless EU negotiation process. Turkey’s great desire to join the EU, to be part of the group, and the support of the Turkish politicians and public for EU membership declined dramatically throughout the duration of Turkey-EU relations and reached its low point in the last decade. This was reflected in Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Since successful socialization involves a change in identity and a redefinition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ driven by this identity shift, looking at Turkey’s identity and its definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ helps answer also the question whether the interactions with the EU resulted in a successful socialization process or an estrangement. What is really striking in Turkey’s socialization process is that, despite the prior existence of its definition of ‘self’ as European, over the course of relations with the EU, Turkey increasingly defined itself as a Muslim country, a country with a dual identity, belonging to a different, but, in some respects, more advanced civilization. This shift in definition was stronger when the EU was discriminatory and excluded Turkey from the integration process. Parallel to identifying itself as Muslim and belonging to a different civilization, Turkey increasingly viewed the EU as its other. This can be observed more clearly when the EU established requirements regarding the Kurdish and Cyprus issues that awakened memories of the Treaty of Sèvres and further diminished Turkey’s trust in the EU. The EU increasingly became Turkey’s other, to be fought and defeated to ensure

202 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

the survival of the country. It must be emphasized that highlighting the Muslim identity and the dual identity of Turkey did not initially stem from the EU accession process. Stressing the Muslim or dual identity was used in conjunction with the topoi of benefit and threat and was regarded by the Turkish side as a good card to play to ensure acceptance by the EU. Thus, the underlining of Turkey’s Muslim or dual identity was generally more intensive before critical EU Summits or EU decisions. In particular, after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and after the election of an Islamic government, Turkey’s Muslim identity was underlined in conjunction with the topoi of usefulness and threat to warn the EU of the consequences of not accepting Turkey as a member of the community and to remind the EU of the benefits and the importance of Turkey’s membership for international politics and world peace. The Muslim identity of Turkey dominated the discourses in the course of EU relations by the opponents and supporters of EU accession. It was seen as the reason for the acceptance of Turkey, but also as the real reason for the exclusion of Turkey. This repeated emphasis of Muslim identity became, over time, a dominant signifier of Turkey’s self-definition. Discourse analysis illustrates that the Muslim Turkish identity was not only employed by the more conservative and Islamic-oriented government; the left-leaning, secular governments also stressed Turkey’s unique identity and defined its ‘self’ as Muslim whenever an important date in EU relations was approaching, when the EU made an unfavorable decision regarding Turkey, or whenever there was a crisis with the EU. Turkey’s governments continued to remind the EU of the importance of Turkey, regardless of ideology. Especially after negative decisions, Turkish governments searched for alternatives based on their Muslim identity, historical ties to Europe, or geographical particularities. The alternatives that Turkey considered for possible alliances changed depending on the ruling party and its ideology. Alternatives considered at any one time included the Balkan states, the Turkic republics, and the countries of the Middle East. However, the connections with Turkey’s historical and Muslim identities remained constant. Indeed, supported by domestic, economic, structural, regional, and international conditions, Turkey increasingly tried to play a leading role in the region. Governed by an Islamic party, Turkey experienced political stability and an economic boom after long years of political chaos and instability. Moreover, the advantageous conditions in the region and in the international arena gave Turkey the opportunity to be an important regional and international actor, bringing its Muslim identity to the fore – at least until the Arab Spring uprisings. However, it would be misleading to describe

Results and Implications

203

what Turkey experienced in the course of EU relations was an estrangement from the Western world. As Turkey’s self-confidence was buoyed by external and internal conditions and positive discussions of its identity replaced the traumas of the collapse of the empire and disappointing EU relations, Turkey indeed shifted its definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Consequently, the EU or West was no longer the ultimate ‘self,’ the only possible place Turkey belonged after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, but only one of the many dimensions of Turkish identity. Turkey was Western but at the same time Eastern, and this made Turkey a great country in a position to offer the Western countries both strategic and political advantages. Turkey became more self-confident and claimed to be in a better position with its multidimensional identity, since it understood both sides. However, Turkey has not forgone its Western identity since it is an inseparable part of Turkish identity and the existence of the Turkish Republic is based on this identity. Moreover, Turkey is aware that the Western part of its identity gives it a priority position among the Middle East countries, which is illustrated in Turkey’s policies on Arab Spring countries based mainly on a discourse of Western values. Thank to its ties to the Western world and its values, Turkey has become the model for the Islamic countries. Thus, Turkey did not forgo its Western identity. Components of Turkish identity were reordered based on political developments and reality. Turkey experienced a redefinition of its identity, an underlining of the multidimensional character of its identity and, in the course of this redefinition, the Muslim identity took priority. Although Turkey has not entirely walked away from the West, it has positioned itself closer to the Islamic countries.

7.2

Overview of the Case Studies

The Customs Union: Opening the Door to the EU Turkey and the EU regarded their relations and the Customs Union from different perspectives and these different points of views influenced the EUTurkey relations as well Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ throughout this period. At the beginning of the Customs Union, there was great willingness to be part of Europe, not only on the part of Turkish politicians, but among the wider elite as well. The discourses show that the start of the Customs Union was regarded as recognition of Turkey’s Europeanness or as the opportunity to become European, which Turkey had claimed for 200 years and which

204 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

was underlined by the politicians as the most important signifier of Turkish ‘self.’ They employed the topoi of culture, geography, danger, usefulness, and history to prove Turkey’s Europeanness and to remind the EU of the consequences of excluding Turkey from the community. Counterstatements from the Islamic and nationalistic side underlined Turkey’s Muslim identity and its place in a different civilization. They did not, however, totally reject the Union, but criticized the conditions for joining. Religion and Europeanness were at the center of the discourses as signifiers of the definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ and as the main arguments for and against the Customs Union. Before the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey used the topos of threat and the topos of usefulness, stressing Turkey’s importance for the EU and giving signs that it would search for other possibilities if EU membership was not forthcoming. The decision at the Luxembourg Summit further polarized the approaches of Turkey and the EU to the status of Turkey in the community and impacted the ‘self’ and ‘other’ definition of Turkey. It has significantly given rise to the negative labeling of the EU and to the revival of historical definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ with references to the historical rivalry with the West. At the same time, the Turkish side increasingly regarded Muslim identity as the real reason for not accepting Turkey, not the Kurdish or Cyprus issue, as stated by the EU. This also raised the profile of the religious aspect of Turkish identity and religion became increasingly the main signifier of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ definition of Turkey. The discourses of this phase were also greatly impacted by İsmail Cem’s vision of multidimensional policy of Turkey, Cem used the topos of mutual benefit and the topos of the clash of civilizations, stressing Turkey’s multidimensional, Muslim, and Asian identity together with its Europeanness. Among the most powerful determiners of the shift in Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the course of EU relations were the Kurdish and Cyprus issues. For example, after joining the Customs Union, Turkey became more willing to consider enacting Kurdish reforms, but there was still a degree of hesitation and serious trust issues on the Turkish side regarding the EU’s requirements, and this greatly impacted Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Even at this time, the requirements of the EU were equated with Sèvres, which underlined the ‘otherness’ of Europe. In particular, the crises after Öcalan’s capture strengthened Turkey’s inclination to associate EU requirements with Sèvres and to consider the EU as its ‘other.’ While Turkey claimed a European identity, at the same time it regarded the EU as the ‘other’ and labeled it as the spokesman of the PKK, which wanted to divide Turkey.

Results and Implications

205

Intensive Interaction with the EU: Turkey as a Bridge between West and East The recognition of Turkey, during the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999, as a candidate for full membership in the EU filled Turkey with hope for a more democratic and developed country taking its inherent place in Europe. Like the Customs Union decision, Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate was regarded as a recognition of its Europeanness and as an opportunity for it to become European through interactions with the EU. The first serious crisis after the Helsinki Summit caused by the terms of Accession Partnership Document gave rise to a deep distrust and labeling of Europe as untrustworthy and ‘other.’ The EU’s requirements regarding sensitive national issues reawakened the historical rivalry regarding the nation’s definition of ‘self’ and ‘other’ among the members of Turkish public, and Turkey’s politicians responded with negative lexicalizations in relation to the European out-group. To justify their claim to join the EU the political actors mostly underlined the benefits stemming from Turkey’s Muslim identity and religion in addition to its Europeanness. This has particularly increased after the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, which reshaped international relations and Turkey-EU relations. After these attacks, Turkey continuously used the topos of threat and the topos of usefulness in conjunction with the clash of civilizations argument. In this context, Turkey underlined its secular Muslim and multidimensional identity more intensively, hoping it would make achieving EU membership easier. Once intentionally isolated from Islamic countries, politicians increasingly presented Turkey as the representative of the Muslim world with modern values. Accordingly, they warned the EU that denying Turkey full membership could cause the formation of cliques, which would separate the Islamic world from the Christian club. In this context the self was represented as European but at the same time somehow different from the other European countries through its certain specific characteristics. The definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ were represented along religious lines, namely Christians and Muslims, constructing clear differences between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Moreover, the newly elected Islamic government had increasingly used the Muslim identity of Turkey in conjunction with the topoi of values, good example, usefulness, and civilization to support the argument that Turkey’s acceptance would benefit greatly the EU. Before the Copenhagen Summit, Turkey had very high expectations for achieving its goal in the 200th year of its Westernization process and

206 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

described the EU as the most signif icant part of Turkey’s civilization, Westernization, and modernization processes. The EU integration process was mostly referred to as the last destination of the country’s historical journey through modernization, Westernization, and civilization, which represented the EU positively as the superior and modern and the Turkish ‘self’ as backward. At the same time, Turkey’s identity, difference, and the importance of Turkey’s bridge position between West and East were emphasized more before the Copenhagen Summit. This underlining of differences was not to isolate Turkey from Europe, but to demonstrate that Europe would benefit greatly from Turkey’s accession. The ‘self’ continued to be described mainly as European. Therefore, Turkey’s definition of ‘self’ as Muslim was not a definition of Europe as ‘other.’ It was claiming the model role for other Muslim countries and the possibility of transmitting Western values to them. Turkey received the Copenhagen decision with satisfaction and as the certification of Turkish Europeanness, as usual, by a positive EU decision regarding Turkey. The AKP government strikingly used the topos of values, underlying the shared common values of the EU and Turkey, which justifies Turkey’s place in the EU. The discourses mainly indicated that the borders between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ based on religious identity, were diminished. The Stagnation of EU Relations and Turkey’s New Orientation Based on Its Distinct Civilization The positive atmosphere created by the start of the negotiation process in 2005 lasted only until the suspension of negotiations in 2006, which was a very quiet year in EU-Turkey relations and did not satisfy either side. The exclusive and discriminatory attitude by the EU resulted in Turkey’s dramatic loss of trust in the EU. During the short-lived reawakening of EU-Turkey relations in 2009, Turkey again stressed its unique and multidimensional identity, employing the topoi of values, uniqueness, and usefulness. However, this positive atmosphere did not last long and Turkey-EU relations were further impacted by the insistence of some EU countries on a privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership, which influenced Turkey’s self-concept and its idea of ‘in-groupness.’ As a result of the exhaustive negotiations process, Turkey’s enthusiasm for the EU was replaced in this period with indifference. The complex structural, systemic, domestic, international, and economic factors involved in the negotiations process caused the discourse underlining Turkey’s multidimensional identity and its importance for the EU to intensify,

Results and Implications

207

pointing to the uniqueness of Turkey as a reminder that Turkey had a lot to offer the EU. Turkey no longer claimed the bridge position between the East and the West, but became a lead actor with a significant role in the international arena. The delay in the membership process and the insistence on a privileged partnership gave Turkey the impression that, even if it met all the conditions for membership, the EU was not going to accept Turkey as a full member. This resulted in a slow down in the steps taken by the Turkey government to address the Kurdish problem. Blaming European countries for cooperating with or protecting the PKK became a daily occurrence. The correlation of the EU’s Kurdish requirements with the Treaty of Sèvres became stronger in the third time period and led to an increasing perception of the EU as ‘other’ rather than the once desperately claimed ‘self.’ Thus, the requirements regarding the Kurdish issue were not considered conditions to be fulfilled for membership but struggles for the existence of the country as in the Turkish War of Independence. The insistence on privileged partnership and no prospects for full membership caused the EU to lose its attraction for Turkey and the Turkish government searched for other potential international relationships. Turkey also became more self-confident due to favorable international and domestic conditions and pursued a more proactive foreign policy. Based on its multidimensional identity, Turkey developed a foreign policy to consist not simply of pro-Western interventionism and it started to play a greater role in world politics. No longer claiming just a bridge position based on its dual identity, Turkey assumed the role of a leading actor in regional and world affairs, offering solutions to problems and crises in the region based on the distinct civilization to which it belongs. There were strategic, economic, ideological, and emotional motivations behind this new direction. However, the exclusion from the EU, the identity change in the course of EU relations, and increased self-confidence through the EU accession process played a significant role in this shift. With the start of negotiations, both parties intentionally stressed Turkey’s religious identity and its roots in the East. With time, this discourse made Turkey more self-confident and aware of its neglected identity. Driven by both disappointment and growing self-confidence, Turkey had a new focus in its foreign relations – it turned its attention to the Middle East and developed its relations with Middle Eastern countries in order to play a leading role in the region. However, the Arab Spring uprisings has strongly diminished Turkey’s proactive foreign policy in the region, in particular, the Syrian uprisings, which evolved into a civil war. Turkey’s reaction to Syria diminished Turkey’s claim to be a neutral mediator in the region. Moreover,

208 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Turkey is dealing with a growing number of Syrian refugees and jihadist terrorism and its relations with Western partners such as NATO, the USA, Russia, Israel, the EU, and the UN soured, which have increasingly isolated Turkey in the international arena (Ayata 2015: 97). As a result, in recent years Turkey more frequently expressed it is interest in becoming a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation instead of the EU. At the time of this writing, Turkey’s relations with the EU have stagnated. Turkey is going through severe regional and international conflicts, damaging its long-desired model role in the region for other Muslim countries and the mediator role between two civilizations based on its multidimensional identity. Turkey’s strong presence and pivotal role in the Middle East has been greatly diminished as a result of the instability and conflicts in the region caused by the uprisings, among other reasons. Turkey is, however, still an effective county in the region. It is not only hosting more than 3 million refugees; it is also an important ally in the war against ISIS and it pursues a proactive foreign policy in the area, trying to have a say in the future of the region. Europeanness is still regarded as an important dimension of Turkey’s multidimensional identity, since it is an inseparable part of Turkish ‘self’ and it gives Turkey its strong claim to hold an important role in the region and internationally.

Bibliography Books and Articles Abdelal, Rawi, Yohiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2006. ‘Identity as a Variable.’ Perspectives on Politics 4(4): 695-711. Abdelal, Rawi, Yohiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott. 2009. ‘Identity as a Variable.’ In Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, ed. Rawi Abdelal, Yohiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, 17-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Abrams, Dominic, and Michael A. Hogg. 1990. Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances. New York: Springer-Verlag. Alaranta Toni. 2015. National and State Identity in Turkey: The Transformation of the Republic’s Status in the International System. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Alderson, Kai. 2001. ‘Making Sense of State Socialization.’ Review of International Studies 27: 415-433. Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Aras, Bülent. 2009. ‘Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-building in the Periphery.’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11(1): 29-41. Arkan, Zeynep, and Müge Kınacıoğlu. 2016. ‘Enabling “Ambitious Activism”: Davutoğlu’s Vision of a New Foreign Policy Identity for Turkey.’ Turkish Studies 17(3): 381-405. Avcı, Gamze. 2004. ‘Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse in the Post-Helsinki Period.’ In Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, ed. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, 194-214. New York: Routledge. Ayata Bilgin. 2015. ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of a Regional Actor?’ Journal of European Integration 37(1): 95-112. Aydın, Mustafa. 2000. ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War.’ Middle Eastern Studies 36(1): 103-139. Aydın-Düzgit, Senem. 2013. ‘European Security and the accession of Turkey: Identity and Foreign Policy in the European Commission.’ Cooperation and Conflict 48(4): 522-541. Aykan, Mahmut Balı. 1993. ‘The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s.’ International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25(1): 91-110. Bahçeli, Devlet. 2002. ‘Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği ve Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi.’ MHP Genel Merkezi, Ankara. Bardakçı, Mehmet. 2010. ‘Turkish Parties’ Positions towards the EU: Between Europhilia and Europhobia.’ Romanian Journal of European Affairs 10(4): 26-41. Barkey, Henri J., and Graham E. Fuller. 1998. Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Barnett, Michael. 1999. ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change.’ European Journal of International Relations 5(1): 5-36. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Başer, Ekrem T. 2015. ‘Shift-of-Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule.’ Turkish Studies 16(3): 291-309. Berkes, Niyazi. 1998. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. New York: Routledge.

210 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Beyers, Jan. 2005. ‘Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials.’ International Organization 59(Fall): 899-936. Bloom, William. 1990. Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Reşat Kasaba, eds. 1997. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach. London: Routledge. Breakwell, Glynis M. 2004. ‘Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union Institutions.’ In Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, 25-40. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Brittan, Leon. 1998. ‘Trade, Enlargement & the Multilateral System.’ SPEECH/98/207. 19 October. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/98/207&format=HTML &aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2007. ‘Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of EU Politics.’ In Handbook of European Union Politics, ed. Knud Eric Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack, and Ben Rosamond, 483-504. London: Sage. Çağaptay, Soner. 2002. ‘The November 2002 Elections and Turkey’s New Political Era.’ Middle East Review of International Affairs 6(4): 42-48. Çağaptay, Soner. 2006. Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? New York: Routledge. Çakır, Aylin A., and Gül A. Akdağ. 2017. ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government.’ Turkish Studies 18(2): 334-357. Çarkoğlu, Ali. 2004. ‘Societal Perceptions of Turkey’s EU Membership: Causes and Consequences of Support for EU Membership.’ In Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, ed. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe. 19-47. New York: Routledge. Cerulo, Karen A. 1997. ‘Identity Construction, New Issues, New Directions.’ Annual Review of Sociology 23: 385-409. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.’ World Politics 50(2): 324-348. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1999. ‘Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.’ International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 83-114. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2000. ‘Compliance and Conditionality.’ Working Paper 00/18. ARENA/ University of Oslo. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001. ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.’ International Organization 55(3): 553-588. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2003. ‘Going Native’ in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions.’ Comparative Political Studies 36: 209-231. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2004. ‘Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay).’ Review of International Studies 30(2): 229-244. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2005. ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework.’ International Organization 59(4): 801-826. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2006. ‘Constructivist Approaches to European Integration.’ Arena Working Paper 6, February. Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. http://www.sv.uio.no/ arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/2001-2010/2006/wp06_06.pdf.

Bibliography

211

Checkel, Jeffrey T., ed. 2007. International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Checkel, Jeffery T., and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2009. ‘The Politicization of European Identities.’ In European Identity, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, 1-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chouliaraki, Lilie, and Norman Fairclough. 1999. Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Citrin, Jack, and David O. Sears. 2009. ‘Balancing National and Ethnic Identities: The Psychology of E Pluribus Unum.’ In Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, ed. Rawi Abdelal, Yohiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, 145-175. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Citrin, Jack, and John Sides. 2004. ‘More Than Nationals: How Identity Choice Matters in the New Europe.’ In Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, 161-186. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Chambers, Samuel A., and Terrell Carver, eds. 2008. William E. Connolly: Democracy, Pluralism and Political Theory. London: Routledge. Davison, Andrew. 1998. Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2001. Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiyenin Uluslararası Konumu. Istanbul: Küre Yayınları. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2008. ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.’ Insight Turkey 10(1): 77-96. De Cillia, Rudolf, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak. 1999. ‘The Discursive Construction of National Identities.’ Discourse and Society 10(2): 149-173. Diez, Thomas. 2004. ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics.’ Cambridge Review of International Relations 17(2): 319-335. Diez, Thomas. 2005. ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power.”’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33: 613-636. Dismorr, Ann. 2008. Turkey Decoded. London: SAOI. Duran, Burhanettin. 2004. ‘Islamist Redefinitions of Identities: Turkey and European Integration.’ In Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, ed. Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe, 125-146. New York: Routledge. Dyberg, Torben Bech. 1997. The Circular Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community. New York: Verso. Dyson, Kenneth. 2007. ‘Reinventing Europe? Turkey, European Union Accession and Europeanization.’ In Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, ed. Esra LaGro and Knud Jorgensen, 51-69. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 1984. ‘The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and Analytical Remarks.’ In Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. J. Landau, 3-16. Boulder: Westview Press. Erbakan, Necmeddin. 1991. Türkiye’nin Temel Meseleleri. Ankara: Rehber. Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2011. ‘Mısır Kahire Üniversitesi Konuşması.’ 15 September. http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=6JrDfgPRbnk. Erozan, Boğaç. 2009. ‘Turkey and the West: A History of Ambivalence.’ Orient 3: 4-16.

212 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Esmer, Yılmaz. 2008. ‘Islam, Gender, Democracy and Values: The Case of Turkey, 1990-2001.’ In Changing Values, Persisting Cultures: Case Studies in Value Change, ed. Thorleif Petterson and Yılmaz Esmer, 275-203. Brill: Leiden. Esmer, Yılmaz. 2012. Türkiye Değerler Araştırması. İstanbul: Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi. http:// www.bahcesehir.edu.tr/icerik/1725-turkiye-degerler-atlasi-2012-yayinlandi Fairclough, Norman. 1989. Language and Power. London: Longman. Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fairclough, Norman, and Ruth Wodak. 1997. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis.’ In Discourse as Social Interaction, ed. Teun A. van Dijk, 258-284. London: Sage. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.’ International Organization 52(4): 887-917. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.’ Annual Review of Political Science 4, 391-416. Flockhart, Trine. 2005a. ‘Complex Socialization and the Transfer of Democratic Norms.’ In Socializing Democratic Norms, ed. Trine Flockhart, 43-63. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Flockhart, Trine. 2005b. ‘Socialization and Democratization: A Tenuous but Intriguing Link.’ In Socializing Democratic Norms, ed. Trine Flockhart, 1-21. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Flockhart, Trine. 2006. ‘“Complex Socialization”: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization.’ European Journal of International Relations 12(1): 89-118. Foucault, Michel. 1974. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the “New Europe.”’ International Organization 59(4): 973-1012. Göçek, Fatma M. 2011. Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era. New York: I.B. Tauris. Goetz, Klaus H. 2005. ‘The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe.’ In The Member States of the European Union, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne, 254-284. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Göksel, Diba Nigar. 2009. ‘Turkey and Europe: The Importance of Predictability.’ In Turkey‘s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos, 31-45. Heidelberg: Springer. Göl, Ayla. 2009. ‘The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular.’ Third World Quarterly 30(4): 795-811. Göl, Ayla. 2013. Turkey Facing East: Islam, Modernity and Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Gözaydın, İştar B. 2008. ‘Diyanet and Politics.’ Muslim World 98(2-3): 216-227. Grabbe, Heather. 2001. ‘How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity.’ Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 1013-1031. Grabbe, Heather. 2003. ‘Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process.’ In The Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, 303-327. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guibernau, Montserrat. 2007. The Identity of Nations. Cambridge: Polity Press. Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe. 2003. ‘From Euro-skepticism to Turkey-skepticism: Changing Political Attitudes on the European Union in Turkey.’ Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 5(2): 205-222.

Bibliography

213

Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hall, Stuart. 1995. ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power.’ In Formations of Modernity, ed. Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, 276-330. Cambridge: Polity Press. Heper, Metin. 2007. The State and Kurds in Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Heper, Metin, and Tanel Demirel. 1996. ‘The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.’ In Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics, ed. Sylvia Kedourie, 109-123. London: Frank Cass. Herrmann, Richard K., and Marilynn B. Brewer. 2004. ‘Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in the EU.’ In Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, 1-25. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Hogg, Michael A. 1992. The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity. New York: Harvester. Hogg, Michael A. 2006. ‘Social Identity Theory.’ In Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, ed. Peter J. Burke, 111-136. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hogg, Michael A., and Dominic Abrams. 1988. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes. London: Routledge. Hooghe, Liesbet. 2005. ‘Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission.’ International Organization 59(Fall): 861-898. Hopf, Ted. 2009. ‘Identity Relations and the Sino-Soviet Split.’ In Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, ed. Rawi Abdelal, Yohiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, 279-316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horvath, J. 2009. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis of Obama’s Political Discourse.’ In Language, Literature and Culture in a Changing Transatlantic World, ed. M. Ferencik and J. Horvath, 45-56. International Conference Proceedings, Presovska University of Presov. Howarth, David. 2005. ‘Applying Discourse Theory: The Method of Articulation.’ In Discourse Theory in European Integration, ed. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing, 316-351. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Howarth, David, and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2000. ‘Introducing Discourse Theory.’ In Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, 1-24. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Huber, Daniela, and Nathalie Tocci. 2013. ‘Behind the Scenes of the Turkish-Israeli Breakthrough.’ Istituto Affari Internazionali. IAI Working Papers 13/15, April. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/ files/iaiwp1315.pdf. Hughes, Edel. 2011. Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Politics of Exclusion. London: Routledge. Hülsse, Rainer. 2006. ‘Imagine the EU: The Metaphorical Construction of a Supra-Nationalist Identity.’ Journal of International Relations and Development 9(4): 396-421. Huntington, Samuel. 1993. ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22-49. Hurewitz, J.C. 1956. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Volume 1, 1535-1914; Volume 2, 1914-1956. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Hürriyet Daily News. 2011. ‘Erdoğan offers ‘Arab Spring’ neo-laicism.’ Hürriyet Daily News, 15 September. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=Erdoğanoffers-8216arab​-spring8217-neo-laicism-2011-09-15. İdiz, S. 2011. ‘PM Erdoğan’s Surprising Message in Cairo.’ Hürriyet Daily News, 15 September. http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=pm-Erdoğan8217s-surprising​ -message-in-cairo-2011-09-15.

214 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Ifantis, Kostas. 2009. ‘Turkey in Transition: Opportunities amidst Peril?’ In Turkey’s Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change, ed. Susannah Verney and Kostas Ifantis, 11-21. New York: Routledge. Ignatow, Gabe. 2011. ‘National Identity and the Informational Welfare State: Turkey and Malaysia Compared.’ The Information Society 27(3): 158-171. Ilya, Prizel. 1998. National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johansson-Nogues, Elisabeth, and Ann-Kristin Jonasson. 2011. ‘Turkey, Its Changing National Identity and EU Accession: Explaining the Ups and Downs in the Turkish Democratization Reforms.’ Journal of Contemporary European Studies 19(1): 113-132. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. ‘Treating International Organizations as Social Environments.’ International Studies Quarterly 45(4): 487-515. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2005. ‘Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe.’ International Organization 59(4): 1013-1044. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2008. Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jung, Dietrich. 2008. ‘Secularism: A Key to Turkish Politics?’ In Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, ed. Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, 117-138. New York: Palgrave. Jung, Dietrich, and Wolfango Piccoli. 2001. Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East. London: Zed Books. Karpat, Kemal H. 1975. Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Katzenstein, Peter J. ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Kelley, Judith. 2004. ‘International Actors in the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions.’ International Organization 58(3): 425-457. Keyder, Çağlar. 1997. ‘Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s.’ In Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, 37-52. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Keyman, Fuat E., and Senem Aydın-Düzgit. 2007. ‘Europeanization, Democratization and Human Rights in Turkey.’ In Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, ed. Esra LaGro and Knud Jorgensen, 69-90. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kinnvall, Catarina. 2004. ‘Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security.’ Political Psychology 25(4): 741-767. Kirişci, Kemal. 2006. ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times.’ Chaillot Paper 92. Institute for Security Studies, September. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf. Kirişci, Kemal. 2011. ‘The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Limits of European Union Reform.’ South European Society and Politics 16(2): 335-349. Koopmans, Ruud, and Barbara Pfetsch. 2006. ‘Obstacles or Motors of Europeanization? German Media and the Transnationalization of Public Debate.’ Communications 31: 115-138. Krzyzanowski, Michal. 2010. The Discursive Construction of European Identities: A Multi-Level Approach to Discourse and Identity in the Transforming European Union. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Kubicek Paul, Emel Parlor Dal, and H. Tarık Oğuzlu, eds. 2015. Turkey’s Rise as an Emerging Power. New York: Routledge. Kuru, Ahmet T., and Alfred Stepan, eds. 2012. Democracy Islam and Secularism in Turkey. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bibliography

215

Kütük, Zeki. 2006. ‘Turkey and the European Union: The Simple Complexity.’ Turkish Studies 7(2): 275-292 Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. Laffan, Brigid. 2004. ‘The European Union and Its Institutions as “Identity Builders.”’ In Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, 75-97. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. 2004. ‘Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis.’ Qualitative Methods 2(1): 28-31. LaGro, Esra, and Knud Jorgensen, eds. 2007. Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lapid, Yosef, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds. 1996. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Lewis, Bernard. 1961. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press. Lewis, Jeffrey. 2005. ‘The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union.’ International Organisation 59(Fall): 937-971. Litosseliti, Lia, and Jane Sunderland. 2002. ‘Gender Identity and Discourse Analysis: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations.’ In Gender Identity and Discourse Analysis, ed. Lia Litosseliti and Jane Sunderland, 1-39. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lynch, Marc. 1999. State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity. New York: Columbia University Press. Macmillan, Catherine. 2013. Discourse, Identity and the Question of the EU: Through the Looking Glass. London: Ashgate. Mardin, Şerif. 1983. Din ve İdeoloji. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Mead, George Herbert. 1973. Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus. Frankfurt a.M: Shurkamp. Meral, Ziya, and Jonathan Paris. 2010. ‘Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity.’ Washington Quarterly 33(4): 75-86. Musolff, Andreas. 2006. ‘Metaphor Scenarios in Public Discourse.’ Metaphor and Symbol 21(1): 23-38. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 1997. Europe in Change: Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2005. ‘Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union.’ South European Society & Politics 10(1): 16-30. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2008. ‘Turkey’s Accession Negotiations with the European Union: The Long Path Ahead.’ In Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints, ed. Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Yannis A. Stivachtis, 115-133. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, and Aylin Güney. 2005. ‘The European Union and the Cyprus problem 1961-2003.’ Middle Eastern Studies 41(2): 281-293. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, and Yannis A. Stivachtis, eds. 2008. Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Narbone, Luigi, and Nathalie Tocci. 2009. ‘Running around in Circles?’ In Turkey’s Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change, ed. Susannah Verney and Kostas Ifantis, 21-35. New York: Routledge.

216 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. 2004. The European Union, Turkey and Islam. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Neumann, Iver B. 1996. ‘Self and Other in International Relations.’ European Journal of International Relations 2(2): 139-174. Neumann, Iver B. 1998. ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus.’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 23: 397-416. Neumann, Iver B. 2008. ‘Discourse Analysis.’ In Qualitative Methods in International Relations, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 61-78. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Neumann, Iver B., and Jennifer Welsh. 1991. ‘The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society.’ Review of International Studies 17(4): 327-348. Oğuzlu, Tarık. 2008. ‘Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?’ Turkish Studies 9(1): 3-20. Oğuzlu, Tarık. 2012. ‘Turkey’s Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests.’ Washington Quarterly 35(3): 153-164. Oğuzlu, Tarık. 2013. ‘Making Sense of Turkey’s Rising Power Status: What Does Turkey’s Approach within NATO Tell Us?’ Turkish Studies 14(4): 774-796. Oğuzlu, Tarık. 2016. ‘Turkish Foreign Policy at the Nexus of Changing International and Regional Dynamics.’ Turkish Studies 17(1): 58-67. Öniş, Ziya. 2001. ‘Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective.’ Mediterranean Politics 6(3): 31-45. Öniş, Ziya. 2003. ‘Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era.’ Turkish Studies 4(1): 9-34. Öniş, Ziya. 2009. ‘Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists.’ In Turkey’s Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change, ed. Susannah Verney and Kostas Ifantis, 35-48. New York: Routledge. Öniş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. 2008. ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?’ Political Science Quarterly 123(1): 123-149. Öniş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. 2009. ‘Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era.’ Turkish Studies 10(1): 7-24. Oran, Baskın. 2010. Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, iç Mevzuat, içtihat, Uygulama. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Özbudun, Ergun. 2011. The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Özcan, M., T. Köse, and E. Karakoç. 2015. ‘Assessments of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East during the Arab Uprisings.’ Turkish Studies 16(2): 195-218. Özen, İmdat. 2010. ‘Impact of EU’s Decisions on Euro-Skepticism of a Turkish Religious Peripheral Party, Felicity Party.’ Journal of International and Global Studies 2(1): 83-117. Payne, Rodger A. 2007. ‘Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy Debate.’ Perspectives on Politics 5(3): 503-511. Peter, Jochen, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2004. ‘In Search of Europe: A Cross-National Comparative Study of the European Union in National Television News.’ Harvard Journal of Press/Politics 9(4): 3-24. Phillips, Nelson, and Cynthia Hardy. 2002. Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction. London: Sage. Price, Richard, and Christian Reus-Smith. 1998. ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism.’ European Journal of International Relations 4(3): 259-294.

Bibliography

217

Pye, Lucian W. 1971. ‘Identity and the Political Culture.’ In Crises and Sequences in Political Development, ed. Leonard Binder, 101-134. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. 2001. Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-Semitism. London: Routledge. Risse, Thomas. 2000. ‘Let‘s Argue! Persuasion and Deliberation in International Relations.’ International Organization 54(1): 1-39. Risse, Thomas, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knopf, and Klaus Roscher. 1999a. ‘To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union.’ European Journal of International Relations 5(2): 147-187. Risse, Thomas, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso. 2001. ‘Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction.’ In Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, ed. James Caporaso, Maria Green Cowles, and Thomas Risse, 1-20. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999b. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ed. 1995. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rumelili, Bahar. 2004. ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation.’ Review of International Studies 30(1): 27-47. Rumelili, Bahar. 2008. ‘Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective.’ Insight Turkey 10(1): 97-110. Rumelili, Bahar. 2011. ‘Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post-Enlargement Europe.’ Journal of European Integration 33(2): 235-249. Rummens, Joanna Anneke. 2003. ‘Conceptualising Identity and Diversity: Overlaps, Intersections, and Processes.’ Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal 35(3): 10-25. Sayarı, Sabri. 2002. ‘The Changing Party System.’ In Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey, ed. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, 9-33. Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Sakallıoğlu, Ümit Cizre. 1998. ‘Rethinking the Connections between Turkey’s “Western” Identity versus Islam.’ Middle East Critique 7(12): 3-18. Scherpereel, John A., and Matthew C. Zierler. 2011. ‘Barriers to Socialization: Turkey and Regional International Organizations.’ Journal of European Integration 33(1): 19-36. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2000. ‘International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment.’ European Journal of International Relations 6(1): 109-139. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2002. ‘The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.’ In Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States, ed. Ronald H. Linden, 1-29. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2003. ‘Internationale Sozialisation: Von einem “erschöpften” zu einem produktiven Forschungsprogramm?’ In Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, ed. Gunther Hellmann, Klaus Dieter Wolf, and Michael Zürn, 401-427. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005. ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe.’ International Organization 59(4): 827-860. Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005a. ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.’ In The Europeanization of Central and

218 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Eastern Europe, ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 1-28. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. 2005b. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel. 2003. ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey.’ Journal of Common Market Studies 41(3): 495-518. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, eds. 2006. International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2005. Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement: The Uneven Policy Impact of EU Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Siapera, Eugenia. 2004. ‘EU Correspondents in Brussels: Between Europe and the Nation-State.’ In Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, 129-161. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin Books. Smith, Anthony D. 1992. ‘National Identity and the idea of European unity.’ International Affairs 68(1): 55-76. Tajfel, Henri. 1978. ‘Social Categorization, Social Identity, and Social Comparison.’ In Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel, 61-67. London: Academic Press. Tajfel, Henri. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tajfel, Henri, and John Charles Turner. 1979. ‘An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.’ In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33-47. Monterey: Brooks Cole. Talbot, Steven. 2008. ‘“Us” and “Them”: Terrorism, Conflict and (O)ther Discursive Formations.’ Sociological Research Online 13(1). http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html. Tank, Pınar. 2006. ‘Dressing for the Occasion: Reconstructing Turkey’s Identity?’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 6(4): 463-478. Tekin, Beyza C. 2010. Representation and Othering in Discourse: The Construction of Turkey in the EU Context. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Tekin, Beyza C. 2012. ‘Human Rights as a Security Challenge: An Examination of Turkish Nationalist Discourse on Minority Rights Reforms.’ In Nationalism and Human Rights: In Theory and Practice in the Middle East, Central Europe, and the Asia-Pacific, ed. Grace Cheng, 21-45. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Titscher, Stefan, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak, and Eva Vetter. 2000. Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis. London: Sage. Todd, Jennifer, Lorenzo Cañás Bottos, and Nathalie Rougier, eds. 2008a. Political Transformation and National Identity Change: Comparative Perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge. Todd, Jennifer, Theresa O’Keefe, Nathalie Rougier, and Lorenzo Cañás Bottos. 2008b. ‘Fluid or Frozen? Choice and Change in Ethno-National Identification in Contemporary Northern Ireland.’ In Political Transformation and National Identity Change, ed. Jennifer Todd, Lorenzo Cañás Bottos, and Nathalie Rougier, 9-33. New York: Routledge. Tonkiss, Frank. 2004. ‘Analysing Discourse.’ In Researching Society and Culture, ed. Clive Seale, 245-260. London: Sage.

Bibliography

219

Tsakonas, Panayotis J. 2009. ‘How Can the European Union Transform the Greek-Turkish Conflict?’ In Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos, 107-121. Heidelberg, Springer. Türkeş Mustafa and Gökgöz Göksu. 2004. ‘Reflections on the EU Strategy Paper 2003- Two Approaches, Moving Conditions and a New Juncture’ Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs 9 (1): 61-82. Turner, John Charles. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Ulusoy, Kıvanç, and Susannah Verney. 2009. ‘Europeanization and Transformation of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: A Case of Democratic Peace.’ In Turkey’s Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change, ed. Susannah Verney and Kostas Ifantis, 109-127. New York: Routledge. Van Dijk, Teun A. 2001. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis.’ In The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, ed. Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, 352-371. Malden: Blackwell. Varshney, Ashutosh. 2007. ‘Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,’ In Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Charles Boix and Susan Stokes, 274-294. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verney Susannah. 2007. ‘National Identity and Political Change on Turkey’s Road to EU Membership.’ Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9(3): 213-221. Waever, Ole. 1994. ‘Resisting the Temptation of Post Foreign Policy Analysis.’ In European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, 238-273. London: Sage. Warhola, James W., and Egemen B. Bezci. 2010. ‘Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent Developments in “Laiklik.”’ Journal of Church and State 52(3): 427-453. Waxman, Dov. 2000. ‘Islam and Turkish National Identity.’ The Turkish Yearbook 30: 1-22. Waxman, Dov. 2006. The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity: Defending/Defining the Nation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Weiss, Gilbert. 2002. ‘Die vielen Seelen Europas, Eine Analyse “neuer” Reden zu Europa.’ In Europas Identitäten. Mythen, Konflikte, Konstruktionen, ed. Monika Mokre, Gilbert Weiss and Rainer Bauböck, 183-207. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It.’ International Organization 46(2): 391-425. Wendt, Alexander. 1994. ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State.’ American Political Science Review 88(2): 384-396. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wodak, Ruth. 2001. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis.’ In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 63-94. London: Sage. Wodak, Ruth. 2004. ‘National and Transnational Identities: European and Other Identities Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials.’ In Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, ed. Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer, 97-129. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Wodak, Ruth. 2009. The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as Usual. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wodak, Ruth, and Gilbert Weiss. 2004. ‘Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Diskursanalyse. Konstruktionen europäischer Identitäten.’ In Text und Kontext. Theoriemodelle und methodische

220 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Verfahren in transdisziplinären Vergleich, ed. Oswald Panagl and Ruth Wodak, 67-85. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann GmbH. Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf De Cillia, Martin Reisigl, Ruth Rodger, and Karin Liebhart. 2009. The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Wood, Steve. 2013. ‘Turkey and Europe: Identity and Other Crises.’ Turkish Studies 14(2): 272-291. Yavuz, Hakan. 1998. ‘Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism.’ Middle East Critique 7(12): 19-41. Yeşilada, Birol. 2013. EU-Turkey Relations in the 21st Century. New York: Routledge. Yılmaz, Hakan. 2009. ‘Europeanization and its Discontents, Turkey, 1959-2007.’ In Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos, 53-65. Heidelberg: Springer. Yılmaz, Hakan. 2011. ‘Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites and Public Opinion.’ South European Society and Politics 16(1) 185-208. Zehfuss, Maria. 2001. ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil.’ In Constructing International Relations, ed. Karin Fierke and Knud Jorgensen, 54-76. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Zürn, M., and J.T. Checkel. 2005. ‘Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State.’ International Organization 59(4): 1045-1079.

Reports and Documents AKP. 2002. Election Bulletin. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/akp_prog.doc. AKP. N.d. Party Program. http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi#bolum6. ANAP. 2002. Election Bulletin. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/anap_prog.doc. CHP. 2002. Election Bulletin. http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/chp2002-4.html. CHP. N.d. Party Program. http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/chpprogram.pdf. Commission of the European Communities. 1989. ‘Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, Brussels, 20 December 1989.’ SEC(89) 2290 final/2. http:// aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf. Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf Council of the European Union. 2001a. ‘Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey.’ 2001/235/EC. http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/ publication/fb5f74d4-2750-4d17-8e15-6ee60a517e38/language-en. Council of the European Union. 2001b. ‘Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laekan 14 and 15 December 2001.’ SN 300/1/01 REV 1. http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf. Council of the European Union. 2003a. Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey. 2003/398/EC. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003D0398. Council of the European Union. 2003b. ‘Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003: Presidency Conclusions.’ 11638/03. 1 October. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf.

Bibliography

221

Council of the European Union. 2006. ‘Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership Turkey.’ 2006/35/EC. http:// www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Apd/Turkey_APD_2006.pdf. Council of the European Union. 2007. ‘Press Release: 2839th Council Meeting, General Affair and External Relations: General Affairs.’ 16326/07 (Presse 288). 10 December. http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97555.pdf. Cucó. P. 1995. ‘The Eastern Mediterranean.’ Assembly of Western European Union Fortieth Ordinary Session (Third Part). Document 1465, 24 May. http://aei.pitt.edu/53596/1/B0906.pdf. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2012, ‘Interview by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on 12 March 2012.’ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu​ -published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2013. ‘Speech Delivered by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, in the University of London School of Economics and Political Science, 7 March 2013, London.’ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-ministerof-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-in-the-university-of-london-school-of-economics.en.mfa. DP. N.d. Party Program. http://www.demokratparti.tv/gorsel/DP.Yeni.Program.pdf. DSP. 2002. Election Bulletin. ‘Sessiz Devrim’ https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin. eser_bilgi_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI&pdemirbas=200206050 DYP. 2002. Election Bulletin. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/dyp_prog.doc. Eurobarometer 62. 2004. Eurobarometer 62. Autumn. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb62/eb62_tr_exec.pdf. Eurobarometer 65. 2006. Eurobarometer 65. Spring. European Commission. http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_tr_nat.pdf. Eurobarometer 70. 2008. Eurobarometer 70. Autumn. European Commission. http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_tr_exec.pdf. Eurobarometer 71. 2009. Eurobarometer 71. Spring. European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/ public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_tr_en_exec.pdf. Eurobarometer 72. 2009. Eurobarometer 72. Autumn. European Commission. http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_tr_tr_nat.pdf. Eurobarometer 74. 2010. Eurobarometer 74. Autumn. European Commission. http://ec.europa. eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_tr_tr_nat.pdf. European Commission. 1997. ‘Agenda 2000, for a Stronger and Wider Union.’ Bulletin of the European Union Supplement 5/97. 15 July. https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/ files/cap-history/agenda-2000/com97-2000_en.pdf. European Commission. 1998a. ‘European Strategy for Turkey: The Commission’s Initial Operational Proposals.’ COM(1998) 124 final. 4 March. http://aei.pitt.edu/4356/1/4356.pdf. European Commission. 1998b. ‘Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.’ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/ turkey_en.pdf. European Commission. 2000a. ‘2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.’ 8  November. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf. European Commission. 2001. ‘2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.’ SEC(2001) 1756. 13  November. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf. European Commission. 2002. ‘2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress toward Accession.’ SEC(2002) 1412. 9  October. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2002/tu_en.pdf.

222 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

European Commission. 2003. ‘Strategy Paper and Report for the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.’ COM/2003/0676 final. 5 November. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0 676&from=EN. European Commission. 2004. ‘2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession.’ SEC(2004) 1201. 6  October. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf. European Commission. 2005a. ‘Turkey: 2005 Progress Report.’ SEC (2005) 1426. 9 November. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/ sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf. European Commission. 2005b. ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the Principals, Priorities, and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey.’ COM (2005) 559. 9 November 2005. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/AB/2005_access.PDF. European Commission. 2006a. ‘Turkey 2006 Progress Report.’ SEC(2006) 1390. 8 November. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2006/ nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf. European Commission. 2006b. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007.’ COM(2006) 649. 8 November. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/ nov/com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf. European Commission. 2007. ‘Turkey 2007 Progress Report.’ SEC(2007) 1436. 6 November. http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf. European Commission. 2008a. ‘Turkey 2008 Progress Report.’ SEC(2008) 2699. 5 November. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/ turkey_progress_report_en.pdf. European Commission. 2008b. ‘2008 Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009.’ COM(2008) 674 f inal. 5 November. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/ key-documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf. European Commission. 2009a. ‘Turkey 2009 Progress Report.’ SEC(2009)1334. 14 October. http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf. European Commission. 2009b. ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010.’ COM(2009) 533. 14 October. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ strategy_paper_2009_en.pdf. European Community. 2005. ‘Enlargement: Turkey: Declaration by the European Community and its Member States.’ C/05/243. 21 September. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-tr20051123_13/d-tr20051123_13en.pdf. European Council. 1997. Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December 1997: Presidency Conclusions. DOC/97/24, 14 December. europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-97-24_en.pdf European Council. 2006. ‘Presidency Conclusions.’ 10633/1/06 REV 1. 17  July. http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/90111.pdf. European Parliament. 1998a. ‘Resolution on Kurdish refugees and on the position of the European Union.’Official Journal of the European Communities C 34/154, 15 January 1998. http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1998:034:TOC European Parliament. 1998b. ‘EU/Turkey Relations.’ Official Journal of the European Communities C 398/57, 3  December 1998.http://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=OJ:C:1998:398:TOC

Bibliography

223

European Parliament. 2009. ‘Enlargement Strategy 2009 Concerning the Countries of the Western Balkans.’ P7_TA(2009)0097. 26 November. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2009-0097+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. European Union. 2006. ‘Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.’ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/ en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf. EU Turkey Civic Commission, ed. 2009. Fourth International Conference on the EU, Turkey and the Kurds: European Parliament, Brussels, 3-4 December 2007. London: Kurdish Human Rights Project. MHP. 1999. ‘Lider Türkiye’ye Doğru, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi’ 18 April. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.eser_bilgi_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20 YAYINLARI&pdemirbas=199906498 MHP. 2002. Election Bulletin. ‘Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi seçim beyannamesi, 3 Kasım 2002: Türkiye‘nin onurlu geleceği’ https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin. eser_bilgi_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI&pdemirbas=200300790 MHP. 2009. Party Program. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.eser_bilgi_q?ptip​ =SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI&pdemirbas=201000337 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1998. ‘The Report Adopted by the European Parliament on Relations With Turkey. 3 December 1998’ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-report-adopted-by-the-europeanparliament-on-relations-with-turkey_-_br_3-december-1998-_br_.en.mfa. Ministry of EU Affairs. N.d. History of Turkey-EU Relations. http://www.ab.gov.tr/111_en.html. NPAA. 2001. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. Decision of the Council of Ministers.’ 19 March. http://www.ab.gov.tr/_195_en.html. NPAA. 2003. ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. Decision of the Council of Ministers.’ 24 July. http://www.ab.gov.tr/_196_en.html. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 2006. ‘Resolution 1519 (2006): The Cultural Situation of the Kurds.’ http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en. asp?fileid=17477&lang=en. Rehn, Olli. 2008. ‘Turkey and the EU, a Win-Win Game.’ Delivered at the Bosphorus Conference, Istanbul. SPEECH/08/520. 10 October. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH​ -08-520_en.htm. SP. 2002. Election Bulletin. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/progs/sp_prog.doc. TBMM. 2014a. Governments of the Turkish Republic. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi website. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukumetler.html. TBMM. 2014b. Coalition Protocol of Ciller Government (DYP-CHP). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi website. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/KP52.htm. TBMM. 2014c. Protocol of Ciller Government. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Resmi website. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP50.htm. TBMM. 2014d. Ecevit Government (11.01/1999-28.05.1999). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi website. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP56.htm. TBMM. 1998. Minutes of General Meeting, 20. Period, 3. Legislation Session, 06  January 1998. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi website. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/ tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=11005&P5=B&page1=50&page2=50.

224 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Newspaper Articles Cumhuriyet Articles ‘AB, üyeliğe açıklık getirmeli.’ Cumhuriyet, 30 April 1995a. ‘Baykal sosyalistlerden destek istedi.’ Cumhuriyet, 20 October 1995b. ‘Camiyi Batı‘ya götürmenin mücadelesini yapıyoruz.’ Cumhuriyet, 16 December 1995c ‘Eleştiren ve övenler.’ Cumhuriyet, 6 March 1995d. ‘GB’ye en kötü şartlarda girdik; Kişilerin değil milletin zaferi; DYP’de gümrük birliği bayramı.’ Cumhuriyet, 14 December 1995e. ‘Gümrük birliğinin temelinde CHP var.’ Cumhuriyet, 8 March 1995f. ‘Gümrük birliği için ağır diyet.’ Cumhuriyet, 14 December 1995g ‘Gümrük birliği resti.’ Cumhuriyet, 15 December 1995 h. ‘Muhalefetten Avrupa‘ya tepki.’ Cumhuriyet, 12 December 1995i. ‘Muhalefetten sert tepki.’ Cumhuriyet, 7 March 1995j. ‘Türkiye komplo karşısında.’ Cumhuriyet, 10 May 1995k. ‘AB hedeftir saplantı değil.’ Cumhuriyet, 17 August 1997a. ‘Avrupa’dan koparamazlar.’ Cumhuriyet, 21 December 1997b. ‘Avrupa’dan Türkiye’ye güvence.’ Cumhuriyet, 17 March 1997c. ‘Hedefimiz AB’ye tam üyelik.’ Cumhuriyet, 19 July 1997d. ‘Kinkel’den Erbakan’a devlet adamlığı dersi.’ Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1997e. ‘Türkiye’nin AB engeli Kohl.’ Cumhuriyet, 7 March 1997f. ‘Yılmaz, herkes fedakarlık yapacak.’ Cumhuriyet, 21 October 1997g. ‘AB haddini aşıyor.’ Cumhuriyet, 7 November 1998a. ‘AB, ayrılıkçılığı teşvik ediyor.’ Cumhuriyet, 24 January 1998b. ‘AB ile sığınmacı krizi.’ Cumhuriyet, 4 January 1998c. ‘AB’nin hesabı yanlış.’ Cumhuriyet, 5 December 1998d. ‘AB sürecine PKK gölgesi.’ Cumhuriyet, 29 November 1998e. ‘Ankara, AB’ye taviz yok.’ Cumhuriyet, 8 December 1998f. ‘AP, Düşmanların sözcüsü.’ Cumhuriyet, 6 December 1998g. ‘Avrupa’nın Sevr dayatması.’ Cumhuriyet, 3 December 1998h. ‘Türkiye denge ülke.’ Cumhuriyet, 3 May 1998i. ‘Türkiye hami peşinde değil.’ Cumhuriyet, 12 January 1998j. ‘Muhalefetten AB için farklı sesler.’ Cumhuriyet, 12 December 1999. ‘AB’ye son uyarı.’ Cumhuriyet, 10 November 2000a. ‘AB süreci zorlaşacak.’ Cumhuriyet 26 November 2000b. ‘Anap’ın anketi, Seçmenin yüzde 70’i AB üyeliğini istiyor.’ Cumhuriyet, 18 August 2000c. ‘Avrupa Türkiye’yi aldattı.’ Cumhuriyet, 23 November 2000d. ‘Kürtçe yayının sakıncası yok.’ Cumhuriyet, 21 July 2000e. ‘PKK’ye AB‘den destek.’ Cumhuriyet, 12 December 2000f. ‘AB’den çifte standart.’ Cumhuriyet, 21 October 2001a. ‘AB, PKK’nın sözcüsü gibi.’ Cumhuriyet, 1 January 2001b. ‘AB rotasına MHP freni.’ Cumhuriyet, 3 July 2002a. ‘AKP gelirse, AB hayal.’ Cumhuriyet, 14 October 2002b. ‘Avrupa iyi niyetli değil.’ Cumhuriyet, 18 November 2002c. ‘Barış formulü, Diyalog.’ Cumhuriyet, 14 February 2002d. ‘Baykal’dan barış mesajı.’ Cumhuriyet, 21 October 2002e.

Bibliography

225

‘Baykal, Laikliğe sahip çıkın.’ Cumhuriyet, 20 October 2002f. ‘CHP Kürtçe‘ye özgürlük istedi.’ Cumhuriyet, 20 January 2002g. ‘Devlet Bahçeli’den rest.’ Cumhuriyet, 26 January 2002h. ‘Hükümette Kürtçe ayrılığı.’ Cumhuriyet, 23 January 2002i. ‘İlerleme Raporu iyi niyetli değil.’ Cumhuriyet, 10 October 2002j. ‘Kürtçe eğitim PKK’nın eğitimi.’ Cumhuriyet, 18 January 2002k. ‘Seçime AB damgası.’ Cumhuriyet, 6 October 2002l. ‘Müzakere yeni haklar getirir.’ Cumhuriyet, 24 November 2003. ‘AB‘den Kürt yoklaması!’ Cumhuriyet, 8 December 2004a. ‘AP niyetini açıkladı.’ Cumhuriyet, 27 November 2004b. ‘Bask modeli istiyorlar.’ Cumhuriyet, 10 December 2004c. ‘Diyarbakır‘a gelmem mesaj.’ Cumhuriyet, 6 December 2004d. ‘Kürtlere daha fazla hak istedi.’ Cumhuriyet, 8 September 2004e. ‘AB’nin garip bakışları.’ Cumhuriyet, 19 December 2005a. ‘Günaydın Başbakan.’ Cumhuriyet, 18 April 2005b. ‘Langendijk’e sert tepki.’ Cumhuriyet, 19 December 2005c. ‘Parçalamak istiyorlar.’ Cumhuriyet, 17 April 2005d. ‘Sevrcilere taviz yok.’ Cumhuriyet, 15 August 2005e. ‘Türkiye’den 5 itiraz.’ Cumhuriyet, 1 November 2005f. ‘Kıbrıs bahane niyet kötü.’ Cumhuriyet, 30 November 2006a. ‘Türkiye’den AB’ye itiraz.’ Cumhuriyet, 28 December 2006b. ‘Türkiye kendi kalesine gol atmasın.’ Cumhuriyet, 1 December 2006c. ‘Birtakım proje peşindeler.’ Cumhuriyet, 28 October 2007. ‘PKK’nın gücü AB’den.’ Cumhuriyet, 15 December 2008. ‘Başbakan tuzağa düşme.’ Cumhuriyet, 17 August 2009a. ‘İspanya Türkiye için fırsat olacak.’ Cumhuriyet, 9 April 2009b. ‘CHP’nin yönü Batı.’ Cumhuriyet, 25 June 2010a. ‘Erdoğan AB ve ABD‘ye çattı.’ Cumhuriyet, 11 June 2010b. ‘Kıbrıs’ta liman açılımı.’ Cumhuriyet, 22 May 2010cd. ‘Omurga kayması var.’ Cumhuriyet, 12 June 2010d. ‘Türkiye’yi Doğu‘ya biz değil siz ittiniz.’ Cumhuriyet, 23 June 2010e. ‘Türkiye’nin tam üyelik vakti gelmedi.’ Cumhuriyet, 23 June 2010f.

Cumhuriyet Columnists Arcayürek, C. 2003. ‘Güncel.’ Cumhuriyet, 14 December. Balcı, E. 1997. ‘Avrupa Türkleri Sever mi?’ Cumhuriyet, 20 March. Bila, H. 2002c. ‘Onun Avrupası Var’. Cumhuriyet, 29 November. Manisalı, E. 2008. ‘Avrupa’nın tek standardı var, İşbirlikçilik.’ Cumhuriyet, 21 April. Manisalı, E. 2010. ‘Eksen kaymasına karşı AB’nin yeni Türkiye Politikası.’ Cumhuriyet, 28 June.

Hürriyet Articles ‘Çiller’den ‘Hadi Türkiye.’ Hürriyet, 7 March 1995a. ‘Yılmaz’dan Kürt reformu.’ Hürriyet, 21 March 1995b. ‘Demokrasi doğudan doğacak.’ Hürriyet, 17 April 1996a. ‘Herzog, Türkiye Avrupanın bir parçasıdır.’ Hürriyet, 5 November 1996b.

226 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

‘İlk adım Kürtçe TV.’ Hürriyet, 5 August 1996c. ‘İlk icraat, Kürtçe eğitimde atılım.’ Hürriyet, 7 March 1996d. ‘Kazan, Türkiye Avrupa ülkesi.’ Hürriyet, 29 November 1996e. ‘Kürt kimliği tanınsın.’ Hürriyet, 28 November 1996f. ‘Tarihi çağrı.’ Hürriyet, 25 March 1996g. ‘AB’ye 7 aşamalı tepki.’ Hürriyet, 15 December 1997a. ‘AB için yine aynı şart.’ Hürriyet, 6 November 1997b. ‘AB üyeliği için şok açıklama.’ Hürriyet, 5 March 1997c. ‘AB’de ya olacak ya olacak devri bitti.’ Hürriyet, 21 October 1997d. ‘Cem AB’yi şaşırttı.’ Hürriyet, 27 November 1997e. ‘Hedef Türkiye’yi 21. Yüzyıla dünya devleti olarak taşımak.’ Hürriyet, 19 July 1997f. ‘Yılmaz, Kültür Duvarı kurulmasın.’ Hürriyet, 26 November 1997g. ‘Amaç yeni Sevr.’ Hürriyet, 23 November 1998a. ‘Roma’yı yakmasını biliriz.’ Hürriyet, 22 November 1998b. ‘AB’ye giden yol.’ Hürriyet, 17 December 1999a. ‘AB üyeliği bir amaçtır saplantı değil.’ Hürriyet, 3 December 1999b. ‘Baskı sökmez.’ Hürriyet, 2 July 1999c. ‘Ecevit AP’ye kızdı.’ Hürriyet, 24 July 1999d. ‘Kürtçe TV sürprizi.’ Hürriyet, 14 December 1999e. ‘AB, ırkçılık ve Hıristiyan kulübü eğilimi etkisinde.’ Hürriyet, 4 May 2000a. ‘Yolumuzu çizeriz.’ Hürriyet, 22 November 2000b. ‘Ecevit, AB ile yeni bir dönem başladı.’ Hürriyet, 16 December 2001a. ‘Yılmaz, AB üyeliği için gerekeni yapmalıyız.’ Hürriyet, 30 December 2001b. ‘AB’ye çifte rest.’ Hürriyet, 10 December 2002a. ‘AB için referandum.’ Hürriyet, 7 March 2002b. ‘Avrupa bizden vazgeçmez.’ Hürriyet, 14 October 2002c. ‘Bahçeli AB taraftarlarına yüklenecek.’ Hürriyet, 23 August 2002d. ‘Bahçeli, Seçim kaçkınlarının amacı MHP’siz hükümet.’ Hürriyet, 28 September 2002e. ‘Başbakan Gül, AB üstüne düşeni yapsın.’ Hürriyet, 6 December 2002f. ‘Beni yıldıramazlar benim adım Yılmaz.’ Hürriyet, 20 October 2002g. ‘Çiftçimizi bu hale düşürenler utansın.’ Hürriyet, 14 October 2002h. ‘Erdoğan AB’ye sert çıktı, Çifte standart uyguluyorlar.’ Hürriyet, 9 December 2002i. ‘Erdoğan, Kararlı adımlarla yola devam.’ Hürriyet, 14 December 2002j. ‘Gül, AB kurnazlık yaparsa onurumuzu koruruz.’ Hürriyet, 10 December 2002k. ‘Gül, Ara formül hayal kırıklığı yaratır.’ Hürriyet, 11 December 2002l. ‘İçerde uyum, dışarda tartışma.’ Hürriyet, 10 March 2002m. ‘Karşıyız ama Meclis‘e saygılıyız.’ Hürriyet, 18 February 2002n. ‘Kutan, AB paketini prensipte kabul ettik.’ Hürriyet, 25 July 2002o. ‘Kutan, Bahçeli dışında uzlaşma sağlandı.’ Hürriyet, 7 June 2002p. ‘Meclis tablosu AB’den yana.’ Hürriyet, 31 July 2002q. ‘MHP, 2023’te Türkiye lider.’ Hürriyet, 29 September 2002r. ‘Yılmaz, AB treni kaçmadı.’ Hürriyet, 28 July 2002s. ‘Erdoğan‘dan AB‘ye hıristiyanlık uyarısı.’ Hürriyet, 6 September 2003a. ‘Erdoğan, AB sonuç bildirisi olumlu.’ Hürriyet, 13 December 2003b. ‘Erdoğan, AB Kriterleri taviz değil.’ Hürriyet, 29 May 2003c. ‘Erdoğan, Temenni ederiz 7. Paket final olur.’ Hürriyet, 30 July 2003d. ‘Gül, Birinci önceliğimiz AB‘ye girmek.’ Hürriyet, 3 December 2003e. ‘Gül, Ulusal Program siyasi taahhüttür.’ Hürriyet, 1 July 2003f.

Bibliography

227

‘Avrupalı mısınız? Şüpheniz mi var?’ Hürriyet, 2 August 2004a. ‘Baykal, Azınlık tartışması Türkiye’ye tuzak.’ Hürriyet, 26 October 2004b. ‘Baykal’ dan AB ile özel ilişkiye ret.’ Hürriyet, 27 November 2004c. ‘Erdoğan, 17 Aralık AB için testtir.’ Hürriyet, 22 October 2004d. ‘Erdoğan, AB sürecinde Türkiye değişecek.’ Hürriyet, 19 October 2004e. ‘Erdoğan‘dan AB‘ye sert çıkış.’ Hürriyet, 17 September 2004f. ‘Erdoğan’dan AB‘ye tarih uyarısı.’ Hürriyet, 21 May 2004g. ‘Gül, İstikametimiz AB.’ Hürriyet, 29 April 2004h. ‘Ülkeyi parçalatmayız.’ Hürriyet, 17 November 2004i. ‘AB’den tanışma daveti.’ Hürriyet, 3 September 2005a. ‘Erdoğan, Etnik ve dini aşırılık sürüyor.’ Hürriyet, 16 May 2005b. ‘Gül, AB üyeligi icin gidilecek yol asfalt degil.’ Hürriyet, 4 October 2005c. ‘Kürt sorunu ne demek.’ Hürriyet, 14 August 2005d. ‘Mumcu ve Bahçeli’den Erdoğan’a eleştiri.’ Hürriyet, 13 August 2005e. ‘AB, Hükümeti yakından izliyoruz.’ Hürriyet, 31 March 2006a. ‘Azınlıklar kavgası CHP, Sevr’e dönüyoruz AKP, İtibar kazanırız.’ Hürriyet, 22 September 2006b. ‘Babacan, Türkiye’nin tavrı daha Avrupalı.’ Hürriyet, 12 October 2006c. ‘Erdoğan, Türkiye AB’ye girme derdinde değil.’ Hürriyet, 3 April 2006d. ‘İnönü’nün ismini ağzına alma.’ Hürriyet, 13 December 2006e. ‘Schmidt’ten “Avrupa Sözü.”’ Hürriyet, 17 November 2006f. ‘Kutan, PKK’nın arkasında ABD, AB ve İsrail var.’ Hürriyet, 1 July 2007. ‘AB’yle Kürt sorunu.’ Hürriyet, 24 November 2008a. ‘AB’ye PKK için uyarı mektubu.’ Hürriyet, 14 November 2008b. ‘Bahçeli‘den önemli açıklamalar.’ Hürriyet, 11 November 2008c. ‘Bahçeli, Türklük ve Türk Milleti ayrı şeyler.’ Hürriyet, 15 April 2008d. ‘Baykal AB’den kesin tarih istedi.’ Hürriyet, 21 November 2008e. ‘En çok Filistin’i, en az İsrail’i seviyoruz.’ Hürriyet, 13 September 2008f. ‘AB ile ilişkilere reset atalım.’ Hürriyet, 25 September 2009a. ‘Davutoğlu Türkiye’nin bölgedeki durumunu açıkladı.’ Hürriyet, 20 May 2009b. ‘Gül’den Batıya dokundurmalar.’ Hürriyet, 2 November 2009c. ‘Türkiye niçin her tarafa doğru gidiyor? Hürriyet, 6 November 2009d. ‘Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye’de PKK nın sözcüsü oldu.’ Hürriyet, 18 March 2010.

Hürriyet Columnists Atikkan, Z. 1997. ‘Ve son perde.’ Hürriyet, 14 December. Batur, N. 1997. ‘AB’ye mahkum değiliz.’ Hürriyet, 19 August. Berberoğlu, E. 1997. ‘Suç ve ceza yerel değil.’ Hürriyet, 11 December. Çandar, Ç. 2008. ‘Başbakan ve Diyarbakır 12 Ağustos 2005-21 Ekim 2008.’ Hürriyet, 22 October. Çölaşan, E. 1999. ‘Peki ne yapalım? Hürriyet, 5 December. Çölaşan, E. 2002. ‘Öp babanın elini! Hürriyet, 6 August. Demir, M. 1999. ‘Demirel ve Ecevit AB atağına kalktı.’ Hürriyet, 31 May. Demir, M., and U. Ergan. 1998. ‘Biz zaten Avrupalıyız.’ Hürriyet, 27 July. Ekşi, O. 1997. ‘Bizim hiç mi kusurumuz yok?’ Hürriyet, 16 December. Ekşi, O. 1999. ‘Bizim millenniumumuz….’ Hürriyet, 12 December. Ekşi, O. 2002a. ‘Bahçeli‘nin ağzındaki bakla.’ Hürriyet, 10 March. Ekşi, O. 2002b. ‘Raporun görünen ucu….’ Hürriyet, 10 October. Ekşi, O. 2005. ‘Pax Romana.’ Hürriyet, 1 October.

228 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Elveren, M. 1997. ‘Yılmaz, Avrupa çifte standart uygulamasın.’ Hürriyet, 19 October. Ergin, S. 1997. ‘AB’ye 6 ay süre.’ Hürriyet, 18 December. Ergin, S. 2002. ‘AB sancısı.’ Hürriyet, 10 March. Gürcanlı, Z. 1997a. ‘Yılmaz, İstediğimizi aldık.’ Hürriyet, 1 October. Gürcanlı, Z. 1997b. ‘Yılmaz’dan AB yemeğine boykot.’ Hürriyet, 12 December. Gürcanlı, Z. 1997c. ‘Cem, Juncker bizi aldattı.’ Hürriyet, 17 December. Gürcanlı, Z. 2009. ‘Ortadoğu Birliği kuruluyor.’ Hürriyet, 16 September. Hızlan, D. 1999. ‘Biz zaten Avrupalıydık.’ Hürriyet, 12 December. İnce, O. 2005. ‘Avrupa Birliği Aşkı Sönüyor mu? Hürriyet, 13 April. İncel, A. 1998. ‘Yılmaz Kohl’e çattı.’ Hürriyet, 9 February. Kızılkaya, E. 2008. ‘Ne kadar Avrupalıyız?’ Hürriyet, 15 May. Külahçı, A. 1998. ‘Avrupa’nın tezgahı.’ Hürriyet, 28 November. Lüle, Z. 1998. ‘AB’den diyalog çağrısı.’ Hürriyet, 27 January. Özdemir, M. 1997. ‘AB’ye rest çektik.’ Hürriyet, 28 November. Özkök, E. 1995. ‘Hürrriyet yürekten destekliyor.’ Hürriyet 6 March. Özkök, E. 1999. ‘Kürt kelimesi konuşmaya nasıl girdi.’ Hürriyet, 18 December. Özkök, E. 2000. ‘Artık ikinci bir milli günümüz var.’ Hürriyet, 11 May. Özkök, E. 2002. ‘Bu referandumun sonucu belli oldu.’ Hürriyet, 9 March. Özkök, E. 2005. ‘O manşetlerin üstündeki logolar.’ Hürriyet, 6 October. Soysal, M. 1999. ‘Adaylık kapanı.’ Hürriyet, 8 December. Soysal, M. 2000. ‘AB‘nin Kürt kartı.’ Hürriyet, 1 March. Tınç, F. 1998. ‘Kohl Yılmaz’ı suçladı.’ Hürriyet, 31 January. Tınç, F. 1999. ‘Ölümlü öneri.’ Hürriyet, 15 October. Tınç, F. 2008. ‘İlerleme Raporu neden memnun ediyor.’ Hürriyet, 10 November. Türenç, T. 2002. ‘Moralimizi bozmayalım.’ Hürriyet, 14 December. Uluengin, H. 1997. ‘Neden Avrupa.’ Hürriyet, 27 November.

Milliyet Articles ‘RP, Gümrük Birliğine karşı bayrak açtı.’ Milliyet, 10 Februar 1996. ‘Öymen’den insan hakları güvencesi.’ Milliyet, 22 March 1997a. ‘Yılmaz, AB Berlin duvarı.’ Milliyet, 16 December 1997b. ‘AB umudumuzu gömdük.’ Milliyet, 27 April 1998a. ‘Ankara tatmin olmadı.’ Milliyet, 13 December 1998b. ‘Ecevit, AB kapımızı çalacak.’ Milliyet, 29 April 1998c. ‘AB‘den dayatma yok. Dışişleri Bakanı Helsinki Zirvesi‘ni değerlendirdi.’ Milliyet, 14 December 1999a. ‘Bahçeli, AB duyarlı olsun.’ Milliyet, 15 December 1999b. ‘Erbakan yüzünü Avrupa‘ya çevirdi.’ Milliyet, 15 December 1999f. ‘Batı Avrupa ırkçı.’ Milliyet, 7 October 1999c. ‘Erbakan yüzünü Avrupa‘ya çevirdi.’ Milliyet, 15 December 1999d. ‘FP, Kabul etmeyelim.’ Milliyet, 12 December 1999e. ‘MHP Kürtçe TV’ye karşı çıktı.’ Milliyet, 15 December 1999f. ‘Ulusal birliğimiz AB’den değerli.’ Milliyet, 8 October 1999g ‘AB’den 2-3 ay süre.’ Milliyet, 16 July 2000a. ‘Ankara, Kıbrıs dayatmasına hayır.’ Milliyet, 10 November 2000b. ‘Bahçeli, Sadaka istemiyoruz.’ Milliyet, 19 November 2000c. ‘Cem, ‘Son dakika golü’ ofsayt!’ Milliyet, 10 November 2000d.

Bibliography

229

‘Hükümette AB fırtınası.’ Milliyet, 10 November 2000e. ‘AB‘den artık tam üyelik istiyoruz.’ Milliyet, 5 August 2002a. ‘Halkımızı hayal kırıklığına uğratmayın.’ Milliyet, 6 August 2002b. ‘Onurumuzla oynatmayız.’ Milliyet, 11 December 2002c. ‘Tek destek SP’den.’ Milliyet, 25 July 2002d. ‘Yolumuz değişmez.’ Miliyet, 14 December 2002e. ‘Otoritesini kaybeden elbette bağıracaktır.’ Milliyet, 7 July 2003. ‘Başka şey ararız.’ Milliyet, 22 June 2004. ‘AB, karşılıklı Milliyetçiliği tahrik ediyor.’ Milliyet, 29 April 2005a. ‘Birbirimizin parçasıyız.’ Milliyet, 4 October 2005b. ‘Kürt sorunu sanal.’ Milliyet, 13 April 2005c. ‘AB’ye destek dibe vuruyor.’ Milliyet, 24 October 2006a. ‘Dış politikada sapma mı var?’ Milliyet, 5 April 2006b. ‘Erdoğan’dan Kıbrıs resti.’ Milliyet, 17 June 2006c. ‘Türkiye’ye 6 ay süre.’ Milliyet, 17 June 2006d. ‘Babacan, Avrupa’nın bize alışmasını bekliyeceğiz.’ Milliyet, 22 March 2007. ‘2008’de Türkiye-AB ilişkileri.’ Milliyet, 19 December 2008a. ‘AKP oy kaybediyor, AB projesi kazanıyor.’ Milliyet, 10 April 2008b. ‘Bahçeli, Manevi değerler siyaset piyasasına sürülüyor.’ Milliyet, 3 June 2008c. ‘Erdoğan, hem AB’yi hem de muhalefeti eleştirdi.’ Milliyet, 11 April 2008d. ‘Güven kaybının nedeni AB’li dostlar.’ Milliyet, 12 April 2008e. ‘Açılım tartışması.’ Milliyet, 22 September 2009a. ‘Almıyoruz desinler ne güzel biter.’ Milliyet, 16 May 2009b. ‘Bahçeli‘den Başbakan Erdoğan’a İsrail suçlaması.’ Milliyet, 6 January 2009c. ‘Bahçeli’den Türk’ün TBMM’de Kürtçe konuşmasına sert tepki.’ Milliyet, 25 January 2009d. ‘Bağış, AB bir buçuk milyar Müslümana hangi mesajı vereceğini belirlesin.’ Milliyet, 25 June 2009e. ‘Baykal, AB reçetesi tutmadı.’ Milliyet, 11 February 2009f. ‘Pakdil, AB bize çifte standard uygulamamalı.’ Milliyet, 11 December 2009g. ‘PKK, Avrupa için tehdit sayılmadı.’ Milliyet, 20 April 2009h. ‘Babacan, Türkiye ile Arap ülkeleri arasında potansiyel çok büyük.’ Milliyet, 17 June 2010a. ‘Bahçeli, One minutein yerini Türk yumruğu alacak.’ Milliyet, 8 June 2010b. ‘Erdoğan, Arap deyince gizli eller devreye giriyor.’ Milliyet, 12 June 2010c.

Milliyet Columnists Aras, G. 2007. ‘Elveda Avrupa, Selamün Aleyküm karanlık dünya.’ Milliyet, 15 December. Batu, İ. 1999. ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Kıbrıs.’ Milliyet, 19 December. Bila, F. 1997a. ‘Yılmaz’ın yeni yaklaşımı.’ Milliyet, 25 October. Bila, F. 2000a. ‘Yılmaz‘ın önceliği.’ Milliyet, 28 October. Bila, F. 2000b. ‘Kürtçe yayın tartışması.’ Milliyet, 16 November. Bila, F. 2002a. ‘Gül‘ün Kıbrıs’a bakışı.’ Milliyet, 17 December. Bila, F. 2002b. ‘Bahçeliden sert çıkış.’ Milliyet, 26 January. Bila, H. 1997b. ‘Avrupa 120 yıl önceki noktada.’ Milliyet, 15 December. Birand, M.A. 2005. ‘PKK faturası asker ve AB’ye çıkarılamaz.’ Milliyet, 11 August. Birand, M.A. 2006. ‘Gül’ü hiç bu kadar kızgın görmedim.’ Milliyet, 14 June. Cemal, H. 1999a. ‘Dünyada birinci kümeye aday olmak! Milliyet, 12 December. Cemal, H. 1999b. ‘Beş Paralık.’ Milliyet, 14 December.

230 

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

Cemal, H. 2000. ‘İşte Türkiye‘nin önemi diyince.’ Milliyet, 30 January. Cemal, H. 2001. ‘Ecevit, Avrupa trenini ikinci kez kaçırmak!’ Milliyet, 15 November. Cemal, H. 2002a. ‘Türkiye için tarihi dönüm noktası!’ Milliyet, 14 November. Cemal, H. 2002b. ‘Avrupa Birliği konusunda gaflet içinde olanlar.’ Milliyet, 6 June. Cemal, H. 2002c. ‘AB eğer koşulsuz tarih vermezse!’ Milliyet, 11 October. Cemal, H. 2002d. ‘AB ile devam….’ Milliyet, 14 December. Cemal, H. 2002e. ‘AB için seferberlik, Kıbrıs için 28 Şubat.’ Milliyet, 15 December. Cemal, H. 2002f. ‘Türkiye için tarihi dönüm noktası!’ Milliyet, 14 November. Cemal, H. 2003a. ‘Ya canın cehenneme Avrupa denirse….’ Milliyet, 25 December. Cemal, H. 2003b. ‘Diyarbakır‘da uygulama….’ Milliyet, 25 October. Cemal, H. 2004. ‘Şimdi sıra AB‘de.’ Milliyet, 16 June. Cıvaoğlu, G. 1999. ‘Profesörün kulağı.’ Milliyet, 12 December. Cıvaoğlu, G. 2004. ‘Aslanın midesinden.’ Milliyet, 18 December. Donat, Y. 1997. ‘Viyana bozgunu gibi.’ Milliyet, 15 December. Güçlü, A. 1995. ‘GB hayırlı, uğurlu olsun.’ Milliyet, 14 December. Heper, D. 1995a. ‘Avrupa’ya dev adım.’ Milliyet, 14 December. Heper, D. 1995b. ‘Gelecek yüzyıl Avrupa’nın olacak.’ Milliyet, 8 March. Heper, D. 1997. ‘Avrupa Birliği için sil baştan.’ Milliyet, 12 March. İdiz, S. 2005. ‘Biraz da özeleştiri lütfen….’ Milliyet, 27 June 2005. Kohen, S. 1995. ‘Avrupalı olmak, ya da olmamak….’ Milliyet, 7 March. Kohen, S. 1999. ‘Avrupalı olmak.’ Milliyet, 13 December. Kohen, S. 2002. ‘AB sadece siyaset değil.’ Milliyet, 7 June. Pulur, H. 2000. ‘Avrupalı Olmak.’ Milliyet, 27 May. Pulur, H. 2002. ‘Avrupalı olmak hayat tarzıdır.’ Milliyet, 19 December. Sazak, D. 2002. ‘Birleşik Avrupa Satrancı.’ Milliyet, 14 December. Sazak, D. 2010. ‘AB heyecanı.’ Milliyet, 5 January. Soytürk, Y. 1995. ‘Gümrük birliği uşaklık.’ Milliyet, 15 December.

Yeni Şafak Articles ‘AB’den GB’ye tam destek.’ Yeni Şafak, 10 December 1995a. ‘Erbakan, Batı Türkiye’nin sütünü sağmak istiyor.’ Yeni Şafak, 20 March 1995b. ‘Erbakan’dan GB’ye sarı ışık.’ Yeni Şafak, 30 December 1995c. ‘Erbakan, Gümrük Birliği kölelik anlaşması.’ Yeni Şafak, 13 March 1995d. ‘GB’nin bedeli açıklansın.’ Yeni Şafak, 8 March 1995e. ‘Gümrük Birliği Batıya köleliktir.’ Yeni Şafak, 20 February 1995f. ‘Refah Partisi bastırıyor.’ Yeni Şafak, 10 March 1995g. ‘Türkiye’deki seçimlere AB gölgesi.’ Yeni Şafak, 4 November 1995h. ‘İmparatorluk peşinde değiliz.’ Yeni Şafak, 30 June 1996. ‘Avrupadaki çağdaş zihniyetlerin en samimi muhatabı RP’dir.’ Yeni Şafak, 15 December 1997. ‘Avrupa Parlamentosu miyop.’ Yeni Şafak, 19 November 2000a. ‘AB için değil, Türkiye için.’ Yeni Şafak, 10 November 2000b. ‘Düşünce suçu AB‘ye engel.’ Yeni Şafak, 2 August 2000c. ‘AB maratonu böyle geçti.’ Yeni Şafak, 4 August 2002a. ‘AB‘ye üç önemli mesaj.’ Yeni Şafak, 10 December 2002b. ‘Bahçeli, Yılmaz Brüksel sevdalısı.’ Yeni Şafak, 20 October 2002c. ‘Erdoğan AB‘yi uyardı.’ Yeni Şafak, 6 December 2003a. ‘Gül, 2004‘te AB ile müzakerelere başlarız.’ Yeni Şafak, 10 May 2003b.

Bibliography

‘Israrla AB‘ye girmek istiyoruz ama olmazsa olmaz da değil.’ Yeni Şafak, 19 October 2003c. ‘AB artık küresel aktör.’ Yeni Şafak, 5 Oktober 2005a. ‘Avrupa’ya Kıbrıs resti.’ Yeni Şafak, 14 July 2005b. ‘Baykal, AB bizi bölemez.’ Yeni Şafak, 20 April 2005c. ‘Brüksel’de Rehn Babacan düellosu.’ Yeni Şafak, 24 November 2005d. ‘Tarihi yürüyüşte dev bir adım attık.’ Yeni Şafak, 4 October 2005e. ‘Medeniyetler ittifakının yolu Türkiye’den geçer.’ Yeni Şafak, 7 November 2005f. ‘AB’ye destekteki düşüş Kretshmer’in canını sıktı.’ Yeni Şafak, 13 July 2006a. ‘Meclis AB için erken toplanacak.’ Yeni Şafak, 10 July 2006b. ‘Arınç, Türkiye AB vizyonun genişletir.’ Yeni Şafak, 24 March 2007a. ‘Müslüman liderlerden Türkiye’ye AB desteği.’ Yeni Şafak, 1 January 2007b. ‘Türkiye’yi dışlarsak medeniyetler çatışır.’ Yeni Şafak, 12 June 2007c. ‘Dünyada artık PKK’ya yer yok.’ Yeni Şafak, 28 March 2009a. ‘Gazzede trajedi sürdükçe one minute devam edecek.’ Yeni Şafak, 9 December 2009b. ‘İran’la ortak para birimine geçebiliriz.’ Yeni Şafak, 28 October 2009c. ‘Suriye sınırında vize bayramı.’ Yeni Şafak, 14 October 2009d. ‘Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği stratejik hedefimizdir.’ Yeni Şafak, 22 June 2009e. ‘Ermenistan’a protokol uyarısı.’ Yeni Şafak, 21 January 2010.

Yeni Şafak Columnists Bayramoğlu, A. 2009. ‘Gül’le AB’ye geri dönüş ve yeni siyasi süreç….’ Yeni Şafak, 27 March. Bulaç, A. 1995. ‘Türkiye Avrupa olabilir mi?’ Yeni Şafak, 11 March. Bulaç, A. 1996. ‘İslam Birliği.’ Yeni Şafak, 18 October. Çetinkaya, Y. 1999. ‘Yeni Avrupa Konseptini İslam Belirliyecek.’ Yeni Şafak, 19 December. Dursun, D. 2004. ‘17 Aralık: Yeni bir milat….’ Yeni Şafak, 21 December. Emre, A. 2002. ‘AB’nin ‘öteki’si ve Türkiye.’ Yeni Şafak, 26 September. Ilıcak, N. 2000. ‘Asker, AB, İslam.’ Yeni Şafak, 12 October. Karaalioğlu, M. 2002. ‘AK Parti, Saadet ve ötesi.’ Yeni Şafak, 4 September. Kaplan, Y. 2005. ‘Avrupa’yla yüzleşmeden kendimizi anlamak.’ Yeni Şafak, 16 May. Koru, F. 2002a. ‘İki tarafı keskin bıçak.’ Yeni Şafak, 26 June. Koru, F. 2002b. ‘Hem uzun, hem ince….’ Yeni Şafak, 14 December. Koru, F. 2005. ‘Türkiye: Fırsatlar ülkesi?’ Yeni Şafak, 1 January. Özel, I. 1995. ‘Türkler: Sahte Avrupalılar.’ Yeni Şafak, 26 July. Taşgetiren, A. 2002. ‘AB, AKP ve SP.’ Yeni Şafak, 8 June. Yücel, S. 2003. ‘Nasıl AB kafalı bir insan olabilirsiniz?’ Yeni Şafak, 3 June.

231

Index Accession Partnership Document 102-103, 107-108, 117, 120, 138, 168, 205 acquis 13, 61, 102-104, 134, 139 AKP 16, 20-21, 35, 101, 121-122, 125, 137, 150, 153, 158-159, 168, 171-172, 175, 178-179, 184-185, 189-190, 192, 206 alienation 18, 97 ANAP 16, 20, 57, 63, 70, 101-102, 121-122, 125, 127, 140, 164 assimilation 20, 111, 148 Atatürk 19, 53, 67, 110, 124, 127-128, 133, 143, 147, 166 Bahçeli Devlet 19, 69, 98, 106-107, 116-118, 122-123, 126, 141-142, 152, 164, 175-176, 178, 184-185 Baykal Deniz 59, 67, 127-128, 140, 151, 161, 163, 170-171, 175, 179-180, 185 CDA 21, 23-25 Cem İsmail 77, 80-83, 85, 89, 91, 93-94, 99, 103, 107, 111-112, 116, 120, 140, 190, 204 CHP 19-20, 30, 57, 59, 63-64, 67, 69, 106, 121, 124-125, 127-128, 137, 141, 151, 163, 171-172, 179-180, 184, 195 Christian 17, 20, 48, 52, 69, 74, 82-84, 86-89, 112-114, 129-131, 135-136, 146-147, 150-151, 168, 175, 196-197, 199, 205 Christian civilization 86 Christian club 20, 69, 84, 87, 89, 112-114, 129-131, 135, 146-147, 150-151, 196-197, 205 Christian culture 175 Christian ghetto 114 Christian identity 82, 86, 113-114, 131, 150, 196 Christian union 74, 84 Christian values 150 Christian world 150, 168 Çiller Tansu 59, 62-66, 68-69, 71, 86, 105, 127 civilization 35, 50, 52, 54, 82, 85-87, 99, 109, 111, 113, 124-125, 128-133, 136, 147, 149-151, 153, 165, 167-168, 170-175, 178-180, 183-184, 186-187, 191, 196, 200-201, 204-208 Civilizations Alliance Initiative 196 clash of civilizations 35, 48, 80, 85-86, 99, 129-130, 136, 147, 151, 174, 204-205 Eastern civilization 133, 174, 186 European civilizations 50, 52, 111, 132, 167 Islamic civilization 48 Western civilization 20, 48, 50, 131-133, 174, 184, 201 Cold War 50-51, 59, 65-66, 86, 190-191 conditionality 13, 28, 62, 106 Constructivism 17, 46

Copenhagen criteria 18, 33, 47, 90, 103, 120, 124-125, 137, 145, 148-149, 153, 155-156, 169 Copenhagen Summit 28, 105, 128-131, 134, 136-137, 139-140, 145-147, 151, 205-206 Crusade(r) 17, 84, 86, 87-88, 99 Customs Union 14-15, 20, 27-28, 32, 34, 58-71, 73-78, 95, 98-99, 106, 109, 114, 138, 203-205 Cyprus 16-17, 19-20, 28, 31-33, 53, 60, 62-63, 70, 75-76, 78-80, 83, 90, 92, 102, 104-108, 116-119, 124-125, 138-140, 143, 151-153, 155-158, 160-163, 171, 175-176, 189, 192, 201, 204 Davutoğlu Ahmet 182, 189-194, 198 Demirel Süleyman 75, 89, 120, 122 DP 20, 30, 172 DSP 16, 19, 57, 92, 102, 121-125, 140 DTP 57, 119, 177, 185 DYP 20-21, 57, 62-64, 69, 86, 96, 102, 105, 122, 125, 137 Ecevit Bülent 19, 57, 63, 78, 80-81, 85, 87, 90, 92, 94, 97-98, 104, 107-108, 111-113, 116, 119-120, 122-123, 126, 132, 137, 140-141, 159 election 16, 18-21, 35, 57-58, 66-69, 71, 73, 92, 101, 121-122, 124-125, 127, 141, 152, 157-158, 172, 202 elite 15, 21, 23-25, 29-30, 40-41, 48-51, 54-56, 98, 136, 175, 190, 203 enemy 17, 29, 53, 75, 93, 95-98, 126, 128, 135, 149, 151-152, 165, 170-171, 177, 184-185, 199 Erbakan Necmettin 20-21, 64, 70-71, 74, 80, 114 Erdoğan Tayyip 129-131, 133, 136-137, 145, 147-151, 159-161, 164-166, 168, 170, 175, 177-179, 181, 183, 185, 192, 194-199 estrangement 16-17, 96, 140, 146, 170, 197, 201, 203 Eurobarometer 29-30, 156, 158 Europeanization 13, 23, 65, 71, 115, 133, 165 Europeanness 16, 25, 28, 34, 47, 51, 57, 61, 65-68, 70-74, 82-84, 93-94, 98-99, 101, 109-113, 115-117, 132, 142, 144-145, 147-148, 150, 152-153, 174-175, 203-206, 208 foreign policy 18, 26, 48, 52-53, 57, 80-81, 83-84, 92-93, 99, 101, 115, 124, 138, 168, 181-182, 184-185, 189-195, 197, 200, 207-208 FP 20-21, 102, 105-106, 117 France 31, 71, 110, 159, 177, 189 Germany 69, 76-77, 177, 189 Greece 16, 19, 31-33, 76, 78, 80, 91, 107, 139-140, 173, 191 Gül Abdullah 70, 130-132, 139, 146-147, 149-150, 156-157, 159, 165, 167-168, 179, 182, 194

234  Helsinki Summit 28, 34, 90-93, 98, 101, 103, 105-106, 109-114, 152, 205 identity Asian identity 93-94, 99, 111, 204 collective identity 25, 43, 47 dual identity 93, 149, 166-167, 173, 182, 187, 201-202, 207 Eastern identity 112, 145, 173 European identity 14, 17, 25-26, 33, 47, 65, 70-72, 82, 85-86, 88, 93-94, 98-99, 106, 110-113, 132, 146, 148, 173-174, 191, 204 group identity 38, 43-44, 46 Islamic identity 20, 58, 69, 71-73, 115, 150 identity crises 41, 48 multidimensional identity 35, 80-81, 83-86, 93-94, 112, 131, 149, 153, 173, 179, 187, 189, 191, 193-194, 197, 200, 203, 205-208 national identity 16, 21, 24-26, 29-32, 34, 37, 41-43, 45-46, 48-51, 53, 55-56, 175 religious identity 82-83, 86, 89, 92-93, 109, 111, 114-115, 131, 135, 146, 151, 175, 191, 197, 206-207 social identity 22-24, 42-45, 47, 72 state identity 13, 40 Western identity 15, 49-51, 68, 201, 203 integration 19-20, 60, 62, 71, 78, 87, 92, 101, 105, 113, 121, 123, 126, 129, 132, 143, 160, 181, 193, 201, 206 Kılıçdaroğlu Kemal 184 Kurd 31-32, 52, 62, 75, 91, 107-108, 117, 120-121, 141-144, 151, 164, 176-177, 200 Kurdish issue 16-17, 20, 28, 31-33, 62-64, 74-75, 79-80, 86, 90-91, 93, 95-96, 98-99, 105-107, 109, 116, 118-121, 139-140, 142, 144, 152-153, 156, 161, 163-164, 168-172, 176-178, 184, 187, 199, 207 Kurdish rights 107, 121, 141-142; see also minority rights Lausanne Treaty 19, 96, 118, 142, 151, 157, 171, 176 Luxembourg Summit 34, 60-61, 76-91, 99, 130, 204 metaphor 25, 43, 67, 83, 85-86, 98, 109-111, 123, 127, 133, 139, 145-146, 160, 163, 165, 173, 190 Berlin Wall 65, 83, 85-86, 89 bridge 35, 48, 84, 86, 94, 99, 109, 113, 133, 153, 167-168, 173-174, 179, 187, 190-191, 205-207 door 67-68, 71, 86, 94, 126-127, 132, 139, 146-147, 151, 167, 171, 174 family 77, 109-111, 121, 123, 145, 163-165 house 127, 139, 146-147 journey 67, 69, 84, 110-111, 117-118, 123, 132, 145-146, 165, 206 marriage 109-111, 123, 163 path 123, 145-146, 165

TURKEY’S ‘SELF’ AND ‘OTHER’ DEFINITIONS

MHP 16, 18-20, 57, 69, 73, 92, 102-103, 105, 108, 117, 120-121, 123-126, 140-142, 169, 172, 178, 185, 195 Middle East 35, 52, 66, 69, 83, 112, 127, 132, 174, 180-183, 185, 189-195, 197, 199-200, 202-203, 207-208 Egypt 198-200 Iran 156, 181-182, 192, 195 Iraq 31-32, 53, 91-92, 101, 121, 152, 172, 177, 182-183, 190, 192 Israel 168, 177, 181-182, 192-193, 200, 208 Syria 150, 181-182, 191-192, 198-200, 207 uprisings 35, 197-200, 202, 207-208 minority rights 15-16, 18, 39, 51, 107-108, 119, 143, 151, 157, 176 modernization 14, 19, 48-50, 52, 54, 84, 92, 98, 105, 110, 125, 128-129, 132-133, 142, 145, 147-148, 165, 172, 187, 189, 201, 206 Muslim 17, 35, 52-56, 65, 68, 70-74, 76, 82-84, 86, 88-89, 93, 95, 98-99, 101, 109, 111-116, 118, 128-132, 135-136, 146-147, 149-153, 157, 166-168, 173-175, 179-181, 183, 186, 191-193, 199-206, 208 Muslim civilization 131 Muslim country 35, 52, 56, 71, 88, 95, 112-113, 115, 128, 130-132, 149, 167, 173-175, 180, 183, 186, 191-192, 199-201, 206, 208 Muslim identity 65, 68, 70-71, 76, 83-84, 89, 98, 109, 111, 114-115, 128-131, 135-136, 149-153, 166, 180, 193, 202-205 Muslim world 71, 116, 130, 150, 167, 174, 180, 205 NATO 12, 14-15, 26, 51-52, 67, 85, 195, 198, 200, 208 othering 27, 40, 74, 133 otherness 25, 35, 43-44, 51, 70, 72-74, 98, 114, 152, 173, 193, 204 Ottoman Empire 14, 16, 26, 49-50, 53-54, 72-73, 84, 87, 98, 128, 147, 174, 194 Öymen Onur 79, 121, 163, 169, 171, 195 PKK 31-32, 53, 58, 61-62, 64, 69, 75, 92, 98, 118-120, 141-142, 169, 172, 176-178, 184-186, 189, 200, 204, 207 progress report 76, 107, 134-135, 151, 155-159, 162-163, 168, 175-176, 184-185 reforms 15, 19-20, 28, 32, 35, 50, 59-61, 63, 68, 74, 84, 90, 101, 103, 107, 110, 124, 134, 137-138, 140, 147, 153, 155, 159, 169, 172, 178-179, 181, 183, 193, 195, 204 RP 20-21, 57, 64, 68-69, 71, 73, 150 secularism 49, 53-56, 85, 92, 94, 113, 127, 130, 148, 158, 199 secularization 19, 50, 53 September 11th 35, 109, 115, 131, 153, 173, 202, 205

235

Index

Sèvres Syndrome 35, 52-53, 74, 109; see also Treaty of Sèvres socialization 11-15, 17, 23, 27, 34, 36-42, 46-47, 110, 117, 137, 153, 155, 157, 172, 201 socializee 11, 15, 38-41, 46 socializer 11, 38-39, 41 SP 20-21, 57, 122-125 terrorism 31, 59, 79-80, 102, 135, 141-142, 149, 169, 172, 177-178, 189, 200, 208 topoi (topos) advantages 124-125, 131, 149, 194 benefit 81, 99, 109, 111, 113-115, 128, 132, 152-153, 202, 204. civilization 128, 133, 150, 153, 205 clash of civilizations 35, 80, 85, 99, 129, 147, 151, 204 culture 65, 70, 72-73, 83, 93, 98-99, 204 danger 65-67, 69-70, 73-75, 80-81, 83, 93, 96, 98, 204 geography 65, 70, 72-73, 83, 93, 98-99, 147, 204 good example 128, 131, 153, 205 history 35, 65-67, 70, 73-75, 80-81, 83, 85-86, 93, 98-99, 109, 124, 129, 135, 147, 152, 204 model 149-150, 167 modernization 133

principles 147-148 religion 72, 93-94, 99, 114, 130 right 80-81, 83, 106 threat 35, 74, 80-81, 84-86, 89, 99, 109, 113, 115, 118, 124, 128-129, 134, 136, 149, 153, 173, 202, 204 uniqueness 113, 180, 187, 206 usefulness 35, 65, 80-81, 84, 93-94, 98-99, 109, 113-115, 124, 128-129, 149, 153, 173, 179-180, 187, 196, 202, 204-206 values 35, 65, 128-130, 145, 147, 153, 180, 187, 205-206 Treaty of Sèvres 31, 33, 52-53, 73-75, 93, 95-97, 99, 118-120, 137, 142, 153, 170-171, 185, 187, 201, 207 USA 51, 85, 177, 184-185, 189, 200, 208 Welfare Party 20, 57-58, 66, 69-71, 73-74; see also RP westernization 14, 19, 21, 26, 49-50, 55, 83, 115, 118, 128-129, 132-133, 142, 145, 148, 189-190, 201, 205-206 Yılmaz Mesut 20, 63, 70, 77, 93, 101, 104, 107, 114, 118, 120-121, 140