Poland’s EU Accession 0415680212, 9780415680219
This book examines the process of Poland s accession negotiations to the European Union between 1998-2003. An empirical
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Poland’s EU Accession
This book examines the process of Poland’s accession negotiations to the Euro pean Union between 1998 and 2003. An empirical study based on Robert Putnam’s two-level game model, it charts the influence and role of key domestic actors and groups on the negotiations, especially in three critical, controversial, areas – areas where EU accession threatened to bring about a profound trans formation to Polish life: agriculture, with particular emphasis on direct payments and production quotas; the purchase of real estate by foreigners; and the free movement of labour. This book demonstrates the complex interaction between the domestic and international levels of negotiations and furthermore, shows how critical this link can be to negotiation outcomes at the international level. It reveals how suscep tible Poland’s negotiation process was to domestic pressure, particularly public opinion and interest groups. Drawing heavily on qualitative analysis – such as press releases, news wires, policy documents, as well as quantitative analyses, such as the use of opinion polls, and supported by in-depth, unrestricted interviews with key Polish decision-makers, this book examines the dynamics of policy formation in Poland and shows how this translated into the final conditions of accession. Sergiusz Trzeciak is Lecturer in Political Marketing at Collegium Civitas, Poland and an independent political consultant.
Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series
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Poland’s EU Accession
Sergiusz Trzeciak
First published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Sergiusz Trzeciak The right of Sergiusz Trzeciak to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Trzeciak, Sergiusz. Poland’s EU accession/Sergiusz Trzeciak. p. cm. – (Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series; 29) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. European Union–Poland. 2. European Union countries–Relations– Poland. 3. Poland–Relations–European Union countries. I. Title. HC240.25.P7T78 2011 341.242′209438–dc22 2011015240 ISBN: 978-0-415-68021-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-80128-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
To my father, Wiesław
Contents
List of figures and tables Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations
1 Introduction Defining terms 3 Contribution of the book 6 Justification for choosing the three case studies 8 Outline of the book 11 Book methods 12 2 Two levels of analysis in international negotiations: domestic versus foreign policy The level of analysis problem 14 Systemic theories 17 Unit-level analysis 17 Negotiation strategy and tactics 23 Foreign policy and domestic politics 27 Domestic pressure: public opinion, elites, interest groups 28 Questions and hypotheses 33 3 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Why did Poland desire to join the EU? 37 Establishing relations between Poland and the communities, and negotiating the Europe Agreement (1988–91) 40 Submission of the Polish application concerning accession and the pre-accession strategy 46 Negotiation process 49 Organisational structure for the accession negotiations 53 Conclusions 61
xii xiv xv xvi 1
14
37
x Contents 4 Negotiations concerning agriculture The nature of the Common Agriculture Policy 63 Opening negotiations and the screening process 64 Presenting negotiation positions on agriculture 69 Negotiations concerning the liberalisation agreement 71 The change of the government in Poland 74 Acceleration in negotiations and the governmental crisis 81 Stiffening of the negotiating stances 87 Modification of the negotiation positions 89 The Copenhagen negotiations 92 Between the Copenhagen Summit and the Accession Treaty 97 Conclusions 101
62
5 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Why the issue of purchase of real estate was important domestically 104 The problem of purchase of real estate in other acceding countries 107 Screening and EU assessment 108 Preparation of the Polish position 109 Negotiation process 113 Concluding negotiations 121 Conclusions 127
103
6 Freedom of movement of labour Why the issue of freedom of movement of labour became an important domestic matter 131 Screening process and preparing of the position papers 134 Opening of negotiations 136 Acceleration of negotiations 141 The change of the government in Poland and the concluding of negotiations 149 Conclusions 154
130
7 Concluding remarks Why the three case studies were important for the domestic context 157 Dynamics of the accession negotiations in Polish domestic politics 159 Size of the win-sets and its determinants 160 Theorising Polish negotiation strategy 162
157
Contents xi Theorising negotiation strategy of the EU 165 Lessons from the case studies and further research 167
Appendix: list of interviewees Notes Bibliography Index
169 171 204 212
Figures and tables
Figures 3.1 Preparation of Poland’s position papers 3.2 Accession process 3.3 Scheme of the organisational structure for EU accession negotiations in Poland (1998–2001) 3.4 Organisational structure for EU accession negotiations in Poland (2001–02) 4.1 Agriculture – what Poles should do when they become a member of the EU 4.2 Do you accept the level of payments for farmers proposed by the European Commission? 4.3 How would you vote in a referendum on EU accession? 4.4 Opinion of rural inhabitants and of farmers regarding direct agricultural payments 4.5 Attitudes towards direct agricultural payments among electorates of political parties 4.6 Would accession to the EU be advantageous or disadvantageous for Polish agriculture? 4.7 Public opinion on agriculture 4.8 Impact of the EU accession on the situation in agriculture 5.1 Should foreigners be allowed to buy real estate? 5.2 How long should Poland maintain restrictions in the purchase of farmland by foreigners? 5.3 A) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of farmland following a three-year lease period? B) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of land for recreational use? 5.4 Assessment of the transition period in the purchase of farmland and in the purchase of recreational plots 6.1 What it means to be an EU citizen (in the opinion of Poles) 6.2 In which EU country would you like to work? 6.3 Acceptance for a seven-year transition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles in other EU countries
52 54 56 57 67 79 80 84 85 85 90 91 106 118
119 120 132 146 151
Figures and tables xiii 6.4 To what transition period in the free undertaking of work by Poles in the EU countries should Polish negotiators agree? 6.5 For how long a period would you decide to work in the given country? 6.6 In what country of the EU would you like to work?
151 152 152
Tables 3.1 Different negotiation styles of the two Polish chief negotiators 4.1 Agriculture negotiations – size of the domestic win-set 5.1 Opinion about statement that current EU citizens should be granted full rights to purchase real estate from the date of the accession 5.2 Assessment of negotiated membership conditions 5.3 Purchase of real estate by foreigners – size of the domestic win-set 6.1 Are you interested in taking a job in one of the EU countries after Poland’s accession to the EU? 6.2 Public acceptance for a ten-year transitional period in the free movement of workers and for a liberalisation of the purchase of real estate by foreigners 6.3 Public assessment of free movement of workers 6.4 What do you think about the European Commission’s proposition that the acceding countries should not be allowed for seven years to work in the current EU countries? 6.5 How long is a transitional period necessary? 6.6 Public acceptance for a seven-year transition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles and Czechs 6.7 Maximum transitional periods for the acceding countries 6.8 Free movement of labour – size of the domestic win-set 7.1 The impact of the size of domestic win-sets on the negotiation process and results
60 102 112 125 128 137 138 140 147 148 148 154 156 168
Preface
This book presents the details and results of a scientific study on accession negotiations between Poland and the EU. During the research conducted between 2001 and 2006, I was a Chevening scholar at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and, beginning in the autumn of 2002, a doctoral student in the Department of Inter national Relations, London School of Economics. In London, I taught classes in foreign policy analysis and contemporary foreign policy. When I started my doctoral coursework, accession negotiations were coming to an end. Using the boon of the Internet, I was supporting Polish negotiators from a distance. Influenced by the emotions accompanying accession to the European Union, I decided to devote my doctoral dissertation to negotiations. Over the next few years, I travelled between London, my hometown of Poznań, Brussels and Warsaw, gathering materials for the dissertation and holding inter views with the negotiators and political decision-makers. My political consultant experience and training that I held for politicians also helped me in analysing the political aspects of negotiations. Negotiations were sort of a game, and for this reason to describe them I decided to use a model of Robert Putnam’s two-level game used for analysing the progress of international negotiations. This book is not a theoretical paper. It is, rather, reconstructing and analysing the progress of negotiations. It is of an empirical nature due to my interviews with leading negotiators and political decision-makers. What’s more, the data bases available from the Internet have allowed me to read thousands of agency dispatches, articles and press releases, thus reconstructing the negotiation pro cess almost day by day. The several years that have gone by since the end of negotiations and Poland’s accession into the European Union allow for viewing the negotiation process from a distance and without any emotions, as well as for arriving at appropriate conclusions for the future. My intention is that this book is used not only by students of political science and international relations, doctoral students or researchers. It is best to learn from someone’s mistakes; therefore, the negotiators and political decision-makers partic ipating in the current negotiations held within the European Union may also find this book useful. I will be grateful for merit-based remarks from the readers and, in such case, please send them to my email at [email protected].
Acknowledgements
Writing a book is usually an isolating experience, yet it is obviously not possible without the personal and practical support of numerous people. Credits go to my supervisor Karen E Smith, PhD from the Department of International Relations, LSE and Jan Zielonka, professor of European politics at Oxford University, who reviewed my doctoral dissertation and encouraged me to introduce changes and thoroughly revise the text, as well as publish it as a book. I am grateful to Peter Sowden at Routledge, who from the beginning was able to see value in my work and assisted me in the process of publishing it. Thanks go to Joanna Żeber for her research. Special gratitude goes to Dominika Fereniec for her great patience and invalu able assistance in creating the final draft. Finally, completion of this book would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my friends and family. I am particularly grateful to my father, Wiesław, and my wife, Hanna, for their love, support and patience.
Abbreviations
AP AWS BATNA CEE CEEC EC EU FAPA KIE LPR NPPM MP OPZZ PAP PiS PO PSL SLD UKIE UW ZChN
Accession Partnership Solidarity Electoral Action Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe Countries European Community European Union Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture Committee for European Integration League of Polish Families National Programme of Preparations for Membership Member of Parliament the Polish Alliance of Trade Unions Polish Press Agency Law and Justice Citizens Platform Polish Peasants’ Party Democratic Left Alliance Office of the Committee for European Integration Freedom Union Christian National Union
1 Introduction
This book argues that Poland’s negotiating stances vis-à-vis the European Union and the overall negotiation process (1998–2003) were susceptible to domestic pressure, particularly public opinion, interest groups and political parties that often acted as interest groups. By using a country study of Poland, this book disputes systemic theories that assume decision-makers and negotiators operate in an environment isolated from domestic considerations. This is an empirical study based on Robert Putnam’s two-level game model, with a particular emphasis on the concept of win-sets. It focuses on three case studies which have drawn considerable controversy and public attention within Poland: agriculture, with a particular emphasis on direct payments and production quotas; the purchase of real estate by foreigners; and the free movement of labour. The question that puzzles most of the researchers using the two-level game model is whether the size of the domestic win-set is influenced by domestic pressure. But even more puzzling is the extent to which it is influenced and what are the determinants of the size of the win-set, specifically possible domestic coali tions, domestic political institutions and the role of negotiation strategies. A perplexing dilemma is not only the question of whether domestic win-sets can be manipulated, but also how this happens (using strategies and tactics), under what conditions, and by whom (domestic groups). Another factor that will be explored is the interplay between public opinion and domestic groups. Internal dynamics of the political game on the domestic side, and the manner in which this game can influence the negotiation process and its outcome, are also of great interest. Traditional systemic theories make the assumption that foreign policymakers operate in an environment that is relatively isolated from domestic considera tions. This book questions that assumption by examining the extent to which Poland’s negotiating stances in relation to joining the European Union were susceptible to domestic pressure. It has long been recognised that domestic considerations have played a role in accession negotiations. This has been a typical feature during the previous EU enlargements. However, the Polish case presents particularities that merit further study. What makes the Polish case different and interesting is the scope of issues
2 Introduction that gained public interest during the process. Unlike the situation in most other acceding countries, freedom to purchase real estate became a significant issue. A second distinctive feature was the characteristic and influential nature of Polish domestic pressure and the extent to which Poland’s negotiators were influenced by it. One example is illustrated by the fact that one of the nation’s biggest and most influential political parties was acting as an interest group and seeking to protect farmers’ interests. Finally, the case of Poland confirms an argument derived from Robert Putnam’s work: a small domestic win-set, to accept initial EU conditions, became a bargaining advantage that helped the Polish side gain certain concessions from the EU. Another characteristic feature of the 2004 enlargement was the fact that Poland (as well as some other CEEC) was, from the very beginning, in a much weaker position than its negotiating partners.1 The Polish negotiation strategy was determined by the lack of a credible Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), since the key Polish foreign policy goal was to enter the EU and no other alternatives were seriously considered.2 This created asymmetry between the negotiating sides and established further short-term strategies and tactics. As Ulrich Sedelmeier describes: the case of eastern enlargement, the relationship between the EU and the CEEC’s is characterised by asymmetrical – rather than instrumental – interdependence. The CEEC depends far more on market access to the EU than vice versa. In other words, the bargaining power of CEEC governments is not sufficient to exact concessions from the EU member states.3 This made the case of Poland different from cases of some other countries facing EU accession during the previous enlargements, including the UK, Austria and Sweden. The decision to expand on the part of the EU was guided by a wider strategic imperative to enlarge in order to overcome the divisions of Europe and to ensure stability, security and prosperity throughout the region. A wider strategic imperative played an important role, especially within the countries advocating for the enlargement process. Among these was Germany, which mobilised other EU countries to support the enlargement process.4 One could also agree with a liberal, intergovernmentalist argument and its ‘cost benefit analysis’. As Andrew Moravcsik pointed out, the geopolitical and economic benefits of enlargement for the ‘old members’ came at quite a limited cost to the EU‑15, in large part because the existing member governments used their bargaining powers to limit their liability.5 However, given this asymmetry and the stronger bargaining power of the EU, in principle the EU expansion represented a general win-win situation and was recognised as such by the decision-makers from the candidate countries.6 With regards to these reasons, the question for both negotiating sides was not ‘whether to enlarge’, but rather ‘on what terms’ to enlarge. The strategic decision was made even before the negotiations started. If we bear this in mind, we can
Introduction 3 see negotiations as a two-level game in which both sides were going to benefit, but in which the distribution of the benefits depended upon domestic preferences and coalitions, institutions and ratification procedures, and in particular the strat egies and tactics used by the players.7 The negotiation process was determined by the strategic imperative to enlarge. The major danger in this procedure was disillusionment concerning the opposing side’s approach to the negotiations. The EU was rather disappointed with the slow pace of accession and the sluggish acquisition of the aqua communautaire. On the other hand, the Polish side emphasised that the deal offered was less than generous and that the EU wanted to take advantage of its position as a stronger party, thereby to ‘dictate, not negotiate’. Thus, the real danger for both negotiating sides was not that the negotiations would collapse, but rather that the negotiations could conclude in major disappointment and disillusionment, producing a sense of frustration that could create a poor start for future cooperation within the EU. Indeed, both sides were teetering on the verge of such disillusionment, especially during the last negotiation round in Copenhagen in December 2003. However, when we analyse the behaviour of both parties, the key observation is that the size of the domestic win-set could indeed determine the negotiation process and eventual outcomes. In this book, I will argue on the basis of the three case studies – agriculture, freedom of purchase of real estate and free movement of labour – that Polish domestic groups critically influenced the nego tiation process and its outcomes. Each of the case studies shows the different dynamics of negotiations. Before continuing, however, we must define some terms.
Defining terms The influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations need not be direct, since the very nature of the democratic process assumes indirect influence. Initially interest groups can influence the government and ultimately they can influence international negotiations by manipulating public opinion. But, public opinion may press the government to adopt policies that are favour able to it. A sociologist might ask how one would identify and measure factors that constitute an influence. This book does not attempt to answer this question, but instead focuses on the capacity of Polish domestic groups to affect the negoti ation process. To measure this, I will focus on three indicators that show this capacity: public opinion polls,8 journalists and media, and perceptions of the influence of domestic groups, as expressed by the major decision-makers. None of these indicators is exclusive, nor can we rely on any one uncritically. When investigating opinion polls and press articles, or talking to negotiators and other decision-makers, one should allow for bias. Public opinion polls often show opposition to or support for issues, not the influence on the policy process. That being said, most decision-makers whom I interviewed9 admitted that the
4 Introduction views of the general public were important factors in creating Poland’s negoti ation stances and were studied carefully during the negotiation process. It is not a coincidence that the issues that arose most often in opinion polls (such as agri culture, purchase of real estate by foreigners and free movement of labour) became the key issues during the negotiation process. Opinion polls should be treated with caution, and with this caveat in mind a careful analysis of these sources will allow us to draw more synthetic conclusions concerning the influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations. This book will examine the actions of Polish domestic groups that changed Poland’s negotiation stances towards EU accession and the rhetoric used to express Poland’s position during the negotiation process. The term ‘domestic pressure’ will be used to define the effect of public opinion, interest groups and political parties. The term ‘domestic groups’ will also be used, although this term is limited to interest groups and political parties. There is a clear distinction between the domestic group and domestic pressure. The term ‘domestic pressure’ seems to be a more accurate description of what is loosely called public opinion, because I do not describe a passive group of cit izens, but rather the collective view of a specific population.10 In defining public opinion, one should avoid confusing sources of public opinion with channels for expressing opinion such as the press, demonstrations, elections and referenda. Many authors, such as Thomas Risse, distinguish between mass public opinion; the attentive public, which has a general interest in politics or foreign policy; and issue publics, which are particularly attentive to specific questions.11 This problem will be discussed in the section on domestic pressure. The term ‘interest group’ will be applied to any organisation that makes direct or indirect policy-related appeals to the government.12 Using this definition, not all organisations constitute interest groups, but those that attempt to influence a government do. These interest groups can be identified as two distinctive types. One focuses on lobbying activities behind the scenes. They often represent a narrow sectoral interest and are not particularly interested in media and public opinion attention. Their goal is merely to influence the decision-makers. The second group, which I will focus on, is one where the leaders, instead of acting behind the scenes, want to express their aims in a public manner in order to gain media and public attention. Such interest groups often represent a larger group such as farmers’ unions. The clamour that such groups make is deliberately intended to be conveyed in the media. These groups want to show to their sup porters, which often comprise a large part of the general public, that they represent their interests. Among these ‘clamorous’ interest groups, the focus in this book however will be on those that tried to influence the negotiation process relating to European Union membership in such issues as direct payments or production quotas within the Common Agricultural Policy, negotiations concerning land ownership and, last but not least, freedom of movement of labour.13 Indeed, as will be argued, the interest groups may not only directly influence decision-makers, as is usually suggested, but also mobilise citizens outside the
Introduction 5 policymaking community to contact or pressure policymakers. This process is known as outside lobbying.15 The term ‘political party’ seems to be rather simple. The most basic definition of a political party is found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: it is a group of persons organised to acquire and exercise political power.16 Even though this definition, as will be argued, accurately describes a political party, some Polish political parties, the Polish Peasants’ Party in particular, even though they were organised to acquire and exercise power, act as an interest group representing narrow sectoral interests. The term ‘negotiation’ refers to ‘a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present’.17 Briefly, negotiation is an ‘exchange of proposals designed to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation of independent interests’.18 This definition, however, seems to be too general to be directly applicable to the case of Poland’s negotiations with the EU and hence requires further specification. Negotiations between Poland and the EU can be characterised as leading towards an innova tion agreement,19 which is ‘meant to create a new relationship or new undertaking between parties’.20 Obviously one may ask why Poland’s negotiations can be classified as an innovation agreement since the European Union already existed and Poland was merely joining the existing structure. In this case, the term ‘innovation’ applies only to the agreement between Poland and the EU, not to the existing EU structure. Thus, this agreement creates a new relationship between Poland and the EU. When discussing negotiations I will focus on the political dynamics rather than technicalities of the negotiation process.21 This is because technical details were not of interest to the domestic pressure, or public opinion in particular. Dynamics of the political process were dependent upon public opinion and domestic group pressure as well as the political will of the government and political parties. In all cases, the political dynamics surrounding the negotiation process are unique. Since each of the case studies is different, one cannot draw a universal conclusion of the political process. In the case of agriculture, the political nego tiations were the longest and most complicated, with ups and downs and with a particular involvement of Polish domestic political elites, interest groups and public opinion. In the case of the free movement of workers, an issue which was actually vital for the public did not gain much attention from political parties and interest groups in Poland. This justifies why the three case studies should be discussed in separate chapters, because they show that the political dynamics of negotiations do not have to follow their technical stages. When examining the influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations, priority should thus be given to political processes of negotiations rather than technicalities. In examining the theory of international negotiations and the practice of Poland’s negotiations regarding the EU, one should draw a clear line between the stages of prenegotiations and the negotiation process itself. According to one of the classical definitions: 14
6 Introduction prenegotiation begins when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations [. . .] or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiations as an option.22 The first document that mentioned Poland’s willingness to join the European Communities23 was the Association Agreement, which was signed in 1991 and came into operation in 1994.24 However, this does not imply that prenegotiation talks started in 1991. At that time, the prospect of membership was rather vague. It is difficult to pinpoint the date when prenegotiation talks began, or even to argue that there was a formal prenegotiation talk stage. Even though it is difficult to draw a clear line between the prenegotiation phase and the negotiation phase, it is crucial to do so since it defines the time-framework for this book. This framework includes only the negotiation process and the ratification of the Accession Treaty by Poland in the referendum: that is, the time between the year 1998 when formal accession negotiations opened, and the year 2003 when the Accession Treaty was ratified in the referendum.
Contribution of the book With regard to empirical analysis, there is a large body of literature on Poland’s relations with the EU by a number of authors including George Błażyca, Karl Cordell, Andrew Michta and Jan Zielonka.25 These publications, even though of high academic merit, focus primarily on the formulation of Polish foreign policy towards the EU in the early 1990s, which is well before the negotiation talks began.26 Later publications often present either a more general assessment of the negotiation process or a policy-oriented approach.27 Finally, many publications often explore economic aspects of Poland’s membership in the EU28 or constitute a collection of papers covering a broad variety of subjects related to the negotiations.29 There is a substantial body of literature on EU Eastern enlargement and on EU Foreign Policy.30 These publications, however valuable to the study of the enlargement process, represent a different approach to the subject since they look at it from the perspective of the EU’s external relations and are often comparative studies on the accession of Central and Eastern European countries, rather than single country studies.31 There is one particularly important aspect that is covered by the Western liter ature on EU enlargement – beginning discussions by asking a fundamental question, ‘why expand?’.32 Sedelmeier, Schimmelfennig or Sjursen by asking this question are correct since one cannot understand the negotiation process fully without taking into consideration the rationale of the enlargement process.33 Western literature also raises the question of ‘why enlarge?’ from the per spective of the EU strategic imperative and tries to provide an answer from the perspective of three different types of reasoning: pragmatic, ethical–political and moral.34 Such authors as Sedelmeier or Schimmelfennig emphasise that the EU
Introduction 7 decision to expand was driven by ethical–political or normative reasons. These normative reasons were emphasised by the proponents of accession (states for example), which influenced other entities (states) driven by pragmatic reasons or even egoistic calculations.35 When explaining enlargement, Frank Schimmelfennig argued that ‘Constitutive liberal rules of the Western international community, rather than constellations of material, security and economic interests and power’, are the key explanatory factors in the expansion of the EU.36 Furthermore, Schimmelfennig, in order to provide the missing link between egoistic preferences and a norm conforming outcome, introduced the concept of ‘rhetorical action’, by which he meant a stra tegic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences. In order to overcome an unfavourable constellation of prefer ences and power, the CEE governments and their Western supporters turned to rhetorical action. They based their argument on collective identity and liberal values. Thus, according to Schimmelfennig: The opponents of Eastern enlargement found themselves rhetorically entrapped. They could neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without publicly renegating on prior commit ments and damaging their credibility as community members in good standing.37 Schimmelfennig’s argument regarding ‘rhetorical entrapment’ can be more important if we look at some poorer EU members such as Spain, Greece or Portugal, where possible costs (for instance, cutting down structural funds) could outweigh benefits. However, in general, economic costs for the EU were rather marginal and the possible benefits for the EU (for example, opening new markets) exceeded the costs. Finally, one could agree with Moravcsik: geopolit ical and economic benefits of enlargement to existing member states came at a limited cost to the EU‑15 because during negotiations, EU‑15 governments used their bargaining powers to limit their liability.38 It should be pointed out that the strongest proponents of the EU accession, like Germany, were not only driven by liberal values, but by an evident economic and geopolitical interest. Nevertheless, this economic and geopolitical interest was mutual, which was indeed recognised in the accession countries. According to empirical data provided by Ania Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka, based on several interviews of the candidate countries’ officials to the European Union, there were three most frequently used reasons why EU enlargement could be also beneficial for the EU‑15 countries: economic, security and geo-political.39 The question ‘why expand?’ was vital for the future negotiation process. Without understanding this theoretical concept of the decision behind enlargement, it would be difficult to comprehend the negotiation process. Unfortunately, in Poland the question ‘why enlarge?’ or precisely ‘why join the EU?’ was not given enough intellectual attention since the overall assumption, of the proponents, of the integration was that Poland should join the EU because, ‘It is a his torical chance and necessity’ or because ‘It is an evident national interest.’ Thus, the question ‘why join?’ was not seriously considered and was almost imme diately replaced by the question of ‘on what conditions?’.
8 Introduction Such an erroneous logical sequence determined the whole negotiation strat egy and tactics of the Polish side, which often proposed detailed conditions, without defining their rationale. Often these conditions were put forth only because public opinion or particular groups wanted this or prohibited assent on certain terms, as was, for example, the case with the freedom to purchase real estate by foreigners. Consequently, the debate on EU enlargement and the efforts of the Polish negotiating side were largely subordinated to domestic pressure: public opinion, interest groups or political parties, as will be discussed in future chapters. There is a gap in both theoretical and empirical literature covering the influence of Polish domestic pressure on negotiations towards EU accession. The Western literature on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy or on inter national negotiations in particular, is usually based on case studies from the perspective of a developed liberal democracy.40 One may ask, however, to what extent the case of Poland is different from that of other countries and what is interesting and unique about it. Even though there are certain Western models or patterns that may be transferred to the case of Poland, the approach of the Western literature assumes the existence of a well-developed political system with a well-established elite and a division of roles between the major players, which is not the case with countries undergoing a systemic transformation such as Poland. Whilst during the systemic transformation, elites were emerging, changing and turning themselves over, interest groups were less developed, although oddly enough they were often stronger than the elites, due to the absence or weakness of balancing interest groups and other social partners. In most cases of countries experiencing a systemic transformation, the political scene is in a state of constant flux, with new parties rising up and falling.41 In these situations, public opinion is more prone to manipulation, yet at the same time more capricious, easily altering the elected elites. This book hopes to contribute to the literature on Poland’s negotiations towards EU accession. It will challenge traditional systemic theories and their focus on a systemic level of analysis. Instead, the spotlight will be put on the link between the domestic and systemic level in international negotiations. In order to test and verify the argument mentioned above, I will focus on three case studies which I have found the most important in the debate on EU accession, case studies which have drawn the most controversy and public attention, and which show the specific nature of the case of Poland in comparison with the other accession countries.
Justification for choosing the three case studies These specifics of systemic transformation make the Polish case worthy of investigation and different from the same process in West European countries. Nevertheless, one may also ask to what extent the case of Poland’s negotiations with the EU is different from that of other post-communist countries, which were also
Introduction 9 experiencing systemic transformations. The answer to this question is provided in the analysis of the three case studies (direct payments within the CAP, the land ownership case and the free movement of labour) discussed in this book. The cases were particularly emphasised during the debate on EU membership and therefore gained public attention. These particular cases were emphasised by the Polish government, public opinion, interest groups and political parties. Last, but not least, the impact of these issues on the negotiation process in Poland was different from that in other candidate countries and hence justifies a study of the specific nature of Poland’s negotiation towards EU accession. The chosen cases illustrate the three dimensions of international negotiations. First, the problem of direct payment illustrates the economic importance of negotiations, since these issues have a significant economic impact, not only on farmers, but on the Polish state budget and hence on the whole population. The problem of land ownership indicates the ideological dimension of negotiations. It shows that an issue, even though it is economically insignificant, can be crucial for domestic groups. Finally, the free movement of labour became a vital social problem, as indicated in a number of opinion polls. This does not mean that each of the case studies has only one dimension, however; they actually have one predominant feature. Therefore, from these three different case studies one may draw the hypothesis that political parties and some interest groups, by using different kinds of economic, ideological and social rhetoric, managed to raise interest among the public. In other words, public opinion was prone to believe this rhetoric. A possible critique of the three cases is that they can be regarded as ‘easy cases’ and perhaps other negotiation themes would counter the argument. According to this logic, it may be difficult to draw a hypothesis only on the three case studies, since there were negotiations on several other chapters that perhaps were not so much influenced by public opinion or domestic groups. However, the answer to this reservation is simple: other negotiating chapters were not so much affected by the domestic pressure, because they did not even gain public attention. Other issues, though important, rarely received much attention in opinion polls, in the media or in public debates. Therefore, if such cases were selected (e.g. environment, company law or competition policy), this would not shed much light on the influence of domestic pressure, since the domestic inter est for these issues was rather marginal. Indeed, such a thesis can be confirmed after the careful analysis of the Polish media, as well as by interviews with most of the decision-makers. Thus, the three case studies were domestically salient. With respect to the first case study, negotiations concerning direct payments within the Common Agricultural Policy were particularly important, since the number of farms and farmers in Poland is the highest not only in comparison with other candidate countries or in comparison with current EU members, but also per capita. At the moment of accession there were about 1.5 million farms in the country and about eight million people were either directly employed by them or were indirectly dependent on the farming industry, which is to say more than 20 per cent of the whole population. This makes the issue of direct
10 Introduction payments particularly important for not only the farm parties and unions, but also for a large part of the public.42 Farmers have to struggle for the survival of their very livelihood, which largely depends on the level and conditions of direct payments. No government could ignore their voice without serious political consequences. It was determined that Poland would receive equal direct payments, whilst initially the EU (as was reflected in the Agenda of 2000) did not anticipate any direct payments to the accession countries.43 There was a very small win-set within the EU countries to grant direct payments to the acceding countries. The Polish government was determined to receive subsidies equal to that of the old members, because it was aware that there was a strong opposition among public opinion and some interest groups to accepting the EU proposal.44 The government officially declared its goal of achieving the same level of subsidies as the member countries, but in fact understood that this goal was unrealistic and realised that in the EU there was also a very small win-set involved in giving candidate countries the same rights on this issue. Being aware of this and trying to enlarge its win-set, the Polish government negotiated a concession by which up to 20 per cent of the already secured EU structural funds for the development of rural areas would be moved to finance CAP subsidies.45 Farmers would receive subsidies from the Polish national budget.46 To use Robert Putnam’s metaphor of the two-level game,47 for the price of side-payments the government hoped to enlarge the win- set among the public in Poland. Thus, the EU, by moving the money from structural funds to direct payments, could enlarge the Level II win-set in Poland with little extra cost. The case of Poland justifies the hypothesis that if the Level I negotiators are determined to achieve a compromise, it is possible for the win-set to overlap, but this requires side-payments to be paid. Moreover, in the process leading towards ‘overlap’, win-sets can be subject to extensive negotiations and, as will be described later, sometimes can be manipulated. The second case, concerning the purchase of real estate, illustrates the hypo thesis that symbolic politics and ideology can play a vital role in shaping the public attitude towards certain issues and hence cause a subject to be extensively debated in public. The opponents of integration used historical arguments and symbolic politics, in particular the image of Polish land being sold to foreign investors and above all to Germans. One may argue, however, that the ideology was often supported by rational arguments. Thus, the opinion that land in Poland, which was almost ten times cheaper than land in Germany, would be subject to speculative buying, was strong enough for Poland to demand the longest transitional period among the candidate countries. Poland’s strong initial stance on land ownership was to demand an 18-year transitional period for EU entities to buy land in Poland. Eventually, a 12-year transition period was negotiated for the Western and some Northern provinces and a seven-year transitional period was negotiated for the Eastern provinces. Indeed, 12 years is the longest transitional period conceded to any candidate countries. Even though the problem of land ownership was subject to extensive negotiations, the EU showed less determination to support the free-market
Introduction 11 regime on this issue and therefore a compromise was easily achieved. This issue in fact was vital neither for European public opinion nor for the most powerful interest groups in Europe. There was more room for compromise here than in the case of negotiations concerning agriculture. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that a large win-set among Polish public opinion to demand transitional periods was accompanied by a relatively large win-set among the EU to accept a shorter transitional period. Poland’s position, on the purchase of real estate issue, was also different from the other candidate countries, which requested a shorter transitional period from the EU. In the Czech Republic, for example, the public was less interested in these issues.48 Finally, the farmers’ lobby in the other candidate countries was much weaker than it was in Poland. To further explain this point, on the initiative of the Polish Peasants’ Party, the Polish parliament issued a bill limiting the possibility of buying farmland in Poland. Although the declared ratio legis for this act was to limit profiteering by foreign entities, the bill is the most restrictive in Europe, since it even restricts the ability of Polish citizens to buy farmland in Poland. This action allows us to draw certain hypotheses, which will be subject to further analysis. While we can assume that the long transitional period was agreed to because the weight of public opinion supported it, the Polish Peasants’ Party bill, severely criticised as legally dubious and unconstitutional, passed because it was sponsored by a strong interest group. It could be argued that the motivation for the statute was to stop the development of large farms, to perpetuate small family farms, and thus protect the electorate of the Peasants’ Party from diminishing.49 The final case study that needs elucidation is the free movement of labour. It was one of the key negotiating issues within the chapter on free movement of persons and the third key problem that raised major concern for public opinion. Even though freedom of the movement of labour and the sale of land to foreigners were initially informally linked by the EU within a larger package deal, their natures remained quite different. The issue of land was seized by some political forces in Poland and exploited in order to pursue their political advantages. The problem of the free movement of workers, although it attracted a lot of public attention, was actually used to a very limited extent by the political parties in Poland.
Outline of the book Chapter 1 introduces the premise of this book to the reader. Terms are defined, the three case studies used in the book are outlined, justification for these par ticular studies is explained, and the contribution of this book is discussed. Putnam’s two-level game is introduced, as well as the term ‘win-set’. The second chapter is a theoretical overview of the existing literature on the interplay between domestic and systemic factors in international relations in general, and international negotiations in particular. It explores the scope of the influence of domestic groups on foreign policy. The chapter will raise certain questions and hypotheses, which will be examined in the empirical parts of the study of Poland.
12 Introduction The third chapter provides an historical overview of Poland’s relations towards the EEC and the Union from the early 1990s to the closing of accession negotiations. It examines objectives and goals of the EU accession, and the turning points in the path towards EU membership. Finally, it gives some gen eral information concerning negotiation processes and structures. This part serves to give a brief background to the issue of why and how domestic pressure influenced the negotiation process. Chapters 4 through 6 analyse the three chosen case studies of this book: land ownership; the negotiations on agriculture, with a particular emphasis on the negotiations concerning direct payments and production quotas; and the free movement of labour. These three cases constitute the empirical core of the book. Even though they cover only certain aspects of the negotiations, these chapters will raise and consequently test the hypothesis that Poland’s positions during the negotiation process were strongly influenced by public opinion. Finally, the concluding remarks will draw some ‘lessons’ from the three case studies. First, they will consider why these issues were important to generate domestic pressure in their different economical, emotional or social dimensions. Second, the overall political dynamics of political negotiations will be briefly examined. This will allow us to make certain theoretical assumptions about links between certain theories (mainly Putnam’s two-level game and negotiation strat egies) and empirical evidence. This chapter will also reconsider the hypotheses and questions raised in the first two chapters and draw appropriate conclusions.
Book methods This book is an empirical study using a qualitative method of scientific analysis. I did not focus primarily on numerical measurements (e.g. statistical analyses), although some, like opinion polls, were used extensively. The research was based on data such as press releases, news wires, articles in the press, policy documents and analyses, scientific books and articles. Particular attention was given to the in-depth interviews with the Polish decision-makers and negotiators involved in the negotiation process, as well as experts in the field. I was fortunate to interview several individuals, including the two Chief Negotiators Jan Kułakowski and Jan Truszczyński, and some other negotiators in the three negotiation areas including Jerzy Plewa and Paweł Samecki; Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek; the Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski; the Ministers responsible for European integration and the chiefs of the Office of the Committee for European Integration: Ryszard Czarnecki, Jacek Saryusz- Wolski, Danuta Huebner and Jarosław Pietras; and former Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek. I have talked to some of the government experts and advisors such as Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz, Leszek Jesień and Władysław Piskorz. I have also discussed the questions of accession with a group of senior civil servants directly involved in the organisation of the negotiation process, including Ewa Kubis and Sławomir Tokarski. Finally, I have talked to the people representing the EU side, including Alan Mayhew, who was the EU Commission
Introduction 13 adviser serving the Polish government, and the senior EU Commission officials including Petra Erler, Rudolf Moegele and Veronica Veitz. Even though the EU officials are not the main target group, these interviews helped me to understand the EU perception of negotiations with Poland and to get a broader perspective on the subject. These interviews with a variety of participants often involved long and detailed discussions. These in-depth interviews were helpful in highlighting the most important events and documents, and for collecting the personal opinions of individuals directly involved in the decision-making process, especially on issues that are rarely mentioned in the existing published literature. With regard to the policy documents, I used such documents as: Poland’s National Strategy for Integration, Poland’s position papers, the Chief Negotiator Kułakowski’s report on accession negotiations, the Accession Treaty and the EU Commission reports, to name but a few. I will rely on both a textual and a contextual understanding of a given source. Questions and hypotheses discussed in the next chapter will mainly concern the level at which the analysis was conducted (the unit versus systemic level) and in particular, Putnam’s metaphor of the two-level game, and its modifications and critiques. The question will be posed whether indeed this metaphor is useful in understanding and explaining the negotiation process. As Robert Putnam expressed, ‘far-ranging empirical research is needed now to test and deepen our understanding of how two-level games are played.’50 Thus, this book may be considered such an attempt.
2 Two levels of analysis in international negotiations Domestic versus foreign policy
This chapter aims to define the level of analysis problem and to present an overview of some of the existing literature highlighting the interplay between inter national and domestic levels in international cooperation in general, and negotiations in particular. The emphasis will be put on the domestic level and Putnam’s two-level game metaphor, some criticism of it, and alternative explanations and hypotheses. Here I will attempt to answer the question, to what extent the two-level game analysis can be useful in explaining and understanding the conduct and outcomes of Poland’s negotiations for EU accession. This chapter highlights strategy and tactics used by both sides, especially in the context of the two-level game approach, examining such issues as the asymmetry between negotiating sides and the lack of credible BATNA on the Polish side. This chapter will also emphasise the interplay between foreign policy and domestic pressure. In order to understand the tension between domestic politics and foreign policy, one should define its actors. This entails not only an examination of the theory, but also the consideration of a particular constitutional framework of a state or other actor. The focus of this section will be on defining domestic pressure (public opinion, political elites and interest groups). In the course of this exposition, two basic questions will be addressed. First, to what extent did domestic pressure influence foreign policy in general and Polish foreign policy in particular, in the process of Poland’s negotiation with the EU? Second, and more importantly, can Poland’s negotiation process towards EU accession be regarded as foreign policy at all? Finally, the chapter will draw a number of hypotheses that can be empirically tested on the three case studies of this book.
The level of analysis problem Kenneth Waltz specifies three levels of analysis: the individual, the state and the state system (international). When examining the individual level, the explanation of the decision-maker’s behaviour involves human nature and the psychological characteristics of the person. On the state level, the explanation focuses
Domestic versus foreign policy 15 on political institutions, domestic elites and public opinion. Finally, the third level of analysis looks at the position of states within the international system.1 Waltz emphasises the third level, which ‘describes the framework of world pol itics’.2 As he points out, without the first and second levels, there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine them; the first and the second levels describe the forces in world politics, but without the third level ‘It is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.’3 As K. J. Holsti alternatively emphasised: ‘Each level of analysis – individual, state, systemic and global – will make us look at different things, so the student must be aware of the differ ences among them.’4 Waltz’s analysis, even though it may be subject to criticism, provides a good overview of the three levels of analysis.5 His notion of the first level is examined in theories that look to human nature as a source of behaviour (mainly in classical realism) or to perception as a source of decision-makers’ behaviour (decision-making theory) or the impact of ideas and beliefs on decision-makers as put forward in constructivism. With regard to the second, larger image, unit level analysis is present in classical realism, neo-realism and in regime-type theories, for example Marxism or liberalism. Finally, this type of analysis is also present in the analyses of constructivism, which takes into consideration national identity,6 or ‘the culture of national security’.7 The domestic level of analysis can also be found in models of bureaucratic policies.8 Finally, the systemic level of analysis can be found both in neo-realism which emphasises the role of the system and its anarchical nature, as well as in neo-liberal institutionalism or the constructivist approach that emphasises the role of international institutions. The systemic level of analysis is even present in Marxist analysis of global capitalism. There are several criticisms that can be made of Waltz’s three levels of ana lysis. First, can domestic and systemic levels be separated rigorously? Putnam avoids this difficulty by linking the domestic and international levels. Hence, this critique can be found in approaches that combine levels of analysis, mostly in the two-level game approach or ‘second image reversed’. According to the ‘second image reversed’, processes at the international level reverberate into the domestic politics level, thereby shaping the factors that determine foreign policy.9 The second weakness of Waltz’s approach is found in its emphasis on the international level, and the fact that it does not give enough attention to the role of political parties, pressure groups, and public opinion in particular. This oversight is explained by Holsti’s argument that until the Vietnam War, there was an ‘Almond–Lipmann consensus’ within the international relations theories that ignored the role of public opinion in foreign policy. The consensus that dominated the debate gave rise to three major assumptions. First, that public opinion was highly volatile and consequently provided a dubious foundation for sound foreign policy. Second, those public attitudes towards foreign affairs were seen as lacking structure and coherence. Finally, public opinion was considered to have a very limited impact on the conduct of foreign policy.10 This neglect of the general public was particularly emphasised by Matthew Gabel, who argued that different
16 Domestic versus foreign policy ‘interest groups’ theories largely ignored the mass public, especially as they might respond to organised economic interests.11 All of the assumptions neglecting domestic pressure favoured the emphasis on the systemic level and underemphasised the link between the domestic and international levels of analysis.12 Waltz’s argument can be classified as an international explanation, which regards states as unitary actors responding to external incentives. Thus, foreign policy is seen as being determined by systemic constraints. Such an explanation dominated the debate within the realist and neo-realist camps. Domestic explanations, on the contrary, locate the determinants of foreign policy within the nation state.13 As Andrew Moravcsik argues, domestic theories can be divided into three subcategories according to the specific theoretical source of domestic policy. Society-centred theories stress the role of domestic groups. State-centred domestic theories claim that foreign policy decisions are determined by the administrative and decision-making apparatus of the executive branch of the state. A third group looks for explanations in state–society relations. That is, they ‘emphasise the institutions of representation, education and administration that link the state and society’.14 These theories focus on the unit level and hence, can be classified as unit-level theories. In this chapter, not all the approaches that have been mentioned will be discussed, but only those that appear to be particularly important in explaining Poland’s negotiations towards EU accession. I will not focus on the individual, the first ‘image’, since the personal level is inadequate to explain the nature of international negotiations. However, this is not to undermine the role of person ality in international negotiations. It does have some importance, but it is hard to determine on a theoretical level and it is easier to discuss particular case studies. An example of this is the case of the foreign minister of Poland (1997–2000) Bronisław Geremek, the former leader of the Freedom Union (UW), the smaller party in the coalition whose other member was Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). Geremek was more influential in foreign policy than the latter foreign minister (2001–04) Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the foreign minister in the Democratic Left Alliance government. This is another argument to support the thesis that domestic political circumstances can indeed influence foreign policy, since Cimoszewicz’s position within his party was weaker than that of Geremek while he was the foreign minister. There are certain personality differences between them. The impact of personality can be also examined with regard to the two Polish Chief Negotiators Jan Kułakowski and Jan Truszczyński. Both were con sidered civil servants or diplomats rather than independent political actors.15 Thus, personality plays a role; however, the nature of international negotiations and a nation’s foreign policy lies in group decisions and interactions between different groups, both on the domestic and international levels. Authors such as Putnam emphasise the notion of elite political culture – the set of politically relevant beliefs, values and habits of the leaders of the political system.16 The major premise of this approach is that the character and development of a political system is conditioned by what Sidney Verba calls,
Domestic versus foreign policy 17 ‘the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place’.17 Even though one should not underemphasise the personal level of analysis, the chapter will emphasise the second and third level theories, and particularly approaches that combine the two levels of analysis. Before moving to these theories, some consideration will first be given to systemic theories.
Systemic theories The nature of international cooperation and the interplay between the domestic and systemic factors in international relations constitute a broad theoretical question. Systemic theories such as neo-realism18 and neo-liberal institutionalism19 emphasise the influence of the system, thus diminishing the role of domestic factors. With regard to the major debate within the realist school between ‘third image’ (structural) and ‘second image’ realism, Kenneth Waltz, as a structural realist, emphasises both domestic and international systems as separate. Whilst domestic politics is the realm of authority, administration and law, international politics is the realm of power, struggle and accommodation.20 Some neo-realists like Stephen Walt, often regarded as ‘second image’ realists,21 admit that domestic politics may have an influence on the creation or collapse of an alli ance; they emphasise that this requires international level factors to be taken into account.22 As Stephen Walt argues, alliances may survive because self-interested groups in one or more countries need the alliance to support their individual selfinterests, even though the existence of an alliance may not serve the interests of the larger community of which they are a part.23 By giving an example of what he calls ‘elite manipulation’, Walt shows that domestic politics influences inter national politics and that such politics may have an influence on the creation of alliances or their duration. While underemphasising this factor, even some neo- realists such as Walt agree that under certain circumstances, domestic politics may have an influence on alliance formation, duration or collapse. From this point of view, systemic theory such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, although vital in understanding and explaining the nature of the international system and the tension between domestic and systemic factors in world politics, does not seem particularly useful in examining the influence of public opinion and interest groups on Poland’s negotiations towards the EU accession. Neo-realism in particular, with a few exceptions such as Stephen Walt, underestimates the influence of domestic groups on the international sys tem. Therefore, bearing in mind the complex nature of the international system, I will focus on the unit level of analysis.
Unit-level analysis One of the major attempts to link domestic and international theories in interna tional politics was made by Robert Putnam. His approach was widely discussed
18 Domestic versus foreign policy and criticised, and became the subject of extensive empirical analyses. As a result of this discussion, one can draw certain hypotheses concerning the links between the level of the nation’s state with its domestic constraints and the sys temic level. The question that is often raised is not whether the link between domestic and international politics exists, but how this link operates in the inter national system. We can thus ask if Putnam’s model is applicable to Poland’s case. The nature of the two-level game The nature of Putnam’s model is clearly formulated in the metaphor of the two- level game. As Putnam eloquently argues: The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level domestic groups pursue their inter ests by pressing the government to adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the interna tional level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain independent, yet sovereign.24 These two games are played simultaneously, and each national political leader appears at both game boards. Across the international table sit his (or her) foreign counterparts and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisers. Around the domestic table sit party politicians and representatives of key domestic groups and political advisers. Domestic interest groups can be players ‘not because of their direct lobbying but because of their anticipated reactions to possible moves as interpreted by their bureaucratic patrons or by the leader’s political counsellors’.25 The complexity of the two-level game model may be that moves rational for a player at one board may be quite irrational for that same player at the other board. As Putnam emphasised, for this reason players will tolerate some differ ences in rhetoric between the two-level games treating it as a part of the game.26 Indeed, such rhetoric was particularly important in the accession negotiations with Poland. This rhetoric influenced the negotiation process, stimulating vivid debates within the domestic arena. Finally, as Putnam argued: ‘Any key player who is dissatisfied with the outcome can upset the game board. [. . .] Conversely, any national leader who fails to satisfy an adequate number of players at the domestic table, risks being evicted from his seat.’27 Putnam’s analysis of the links between diplomacy and domestic politics in the process of international negotiations can be divided into two stages. Level I, the international stage, regards the bargaining between the (international)
Domestic versus foreign policy 19 negotiators and Level II, the national or domestic. It is made up of separate discussions within domestic groups whether to ratify, reject or change the agreement achieved at Level I. The ‘ratification’ can include a formal voting procedure at Level II or a more or less formal decision.28 In order to be ratified, Level I agreements need to be a ‘win-set’ agreement.29 This type of agreement can be defined as ‘a set of all possible Level I agreements that would “win” – that is, to gain the necessary majority among the constituents [Level II]’.30 Conversely, if win-sets of the negotiating sides are small, the possibility of agreement is marginal. Larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely. For this reason, any successful agreement must fall within the Level II win-set of each of the parties. For this reason, ‘Agreement is possible only if those win-sets overlap and the larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk that the negotiations will break down.’31 The question arises as to whether Putnam’s theory of two-level games provides a theoretical framework that enables us to understand and explain the nature of Poland’s negotiations regarding the European Union. Does Poland’s case fit into Putnam’s theoretical assumption of the two-level game and, if so, to what extent? This requires his theory to be examined and discussed in further detail, especially with regard to the problem of win-sets. Let us imagine Poland’s negotiation with the EU as a two-level game. At Level I, we have international negotiators, representing the Polish government on one side and EU negotiators on the other. At Level II, we have various domestic interests, mainly public opinion and interest groups. By considering the three case studies, direct payments within the CAP, land ownership and the free movement of workers, and by analysing them from Poland’s perspective, I will try to build certain hypotheses concerning the impact of domestic groups on the international negotiations and on the parties involved, from the biggest to the smallest win-sets, bearing in mind the possibility of ‘overlapping’, for each single issue. The first key issue is the size of win-sets and their determinants. As Putnam argues, the situation is complicated by the problem that the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from international negotiations. The larger the win-set of a negotiator, the more he is prone to be pushed around by his Level I counterpart. Conversely, as Putnam argued: ‘A small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage: “I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home”.’32 As a result, win-sets can be manipulated. Putnam sets forth certain determinants of a win-set size by examining three main sets of factors. The first includes Level II preferences and coalitions. As he argued: ‘The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, prefer ences, and possible coalitions among Level II.’33 Therefore, any testable two- level game model can be rooted in a theory of domestic politics and the preferences of the domestic actors. According to this, in the case of Poland, the relative large win-sets (in other words, support for the negotiation agreements)
20 Domestic versus foreign policy within the domestic groups were determined by the mainly pro-EU orientation of the political and media elites, of some interest groups and of the majority of the public. In addition, it was accompanied by the assumed large costs of no- agreement and the lack of credible BATNA. The result: the higher the costs of non-agreement, the bigger the win-set within Level II. The second factor Putnam draws attention to, is that the size of the win-set depends on the Level II institutions. Hence, ratification procedures affect the size of the win-set.34 According to the Polish Constitution, for instance, a nationwide [European] referendum is binding if more than half of the number of those having the right to vote has participated in it.35 The same absolute majority is required for the decision to be implemented. Thus, the minimum size of the win- set in this particular case is 50 per cent of the electorate who took part in the referendum. However, in practice, negotiation procedures require several levels of ratification on both sides and it is always possible to measure win-sets.36 This is mainly because at each level of ratification the win-set may be slightly different, and on each game board there are several different players representing different interests. Finally, the size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators. Putnam sheds light on an interesting tactical dilemma that the Level I negotiator faces. Even though the negotiator has an interest in maximising the other side’s win-set, with regard to his own win-set his motives are mixed. ‘The larger the win-set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position in relation to the other negotiator.’37 As Putnam argued: Each Level I negotiator has a strong interest in the popularity of his opposite number, since Part A’s popularity increases the size of his win-set, and thus increases both the odds of success and the relative bargaining leverage of party B.38 If we assume that the Level I negotiator wishes to expand his win-set at the price of weakening his bargaining position, as would be the case if he is afraid of the risk of no-agreement, then he has to be prepared for side-payments in order to attract marginal supporters on Level II. As Putnam expressed it: ‘What counts at Level II is not total costs and benefits, but their incidence relative to existing coalitions and protocoalitions.’39 Finally, there is yet another aspect of the two-level games that should be elucidated. This is the question: To what extent and in what aspects does this theory depart from previous theories dealing with international negotiations? The two-level game approach as a departure from previous theories According to Andrew Moravcsik, the two-level game approach differs from previous theories about international negotiations in three major areas. First, it implies a theory of international bargaining that creates new opportunities for
Domestic versus foreign policy 21 creative statecraft. Hence, it enters into the field of International Relations. The second departure from previous theories is that it regards the statesman as the central strategic actor in the two-level game. Finally, the double-edged calculation (domestic and international) is reflected in the strategies of statesmen.40 With regard to the first departure, Moravcsik observes: ‘Complex patterns of interdependence do not simply constrain statesmen.’41 As Moravcsik argues, this has much in common with the realist theory, which also focuses on the determinants of the state’s bargaining power, which he defines as ‘proportional to the relative value that it places on an agreement compared to an outcome of its best alternative policy’.42 The second departure from previous theories is, according to Moravcsik, the focus on the statesman as the central strategic actor. Thus, the public official’s choice of strategy is the core element in international negotiations. As a result, the two-level game model invites us to explore different specifications of statesmen’s interests. These may include a traditional realist view of a statesman faced with domestic constraints or a more liberal approach that the statesman is a pure agent of society or honest broker seeking to maximise domestic political sup port, or finally the notion of the statesman seeking to realise personal goals.43 Robert Putnam examines the role of a chief negotiator, by which he means also a chief of state. He admits that his two-level model assumption that the negotiator ‘acts merely as an honest broker’ is unrealistic, and empirically the negotiator’s preferences may differ from those of his constituents. His motives may differ because he might be seeking popularity (this is especially the case of elected politicians), because results of the agreement may be politically rewarding to him or finally because the negotiator may be inclined to pursue his own conception of national interest in the international context. Hence, the impact of personality on negotiators’ motives and tactics should not be ignored, but this is an individual level of analysis. However, if we look at domestic versus interna tional levels of analysis, as Robert Putnam points out, the Chief Negotiator usually gives primacy emphasis to the domestic calculus.44 Indeed, the notion of domestic versus international calculus is, according to Moravcsik, the third distinctive departure from previous theories. As Moravcsik argues, in the two-level game approach, ‘The statesman’s strategies reflect a simultaneous double-edged calculation of constraints and opportunities on both the domestic and international boards.’45 Domestic politics can be used to affect the outcomes of international bargaining and ‘international moves may be solely aimed at achieving domestic goals’.46 The above-mentioned tactics with regard to the opposing member and its own public opinion show only one side of the relationship between the negotiator and domestic groups. They show the negotiator as a player; however, what neither Putnam nor Moravcsik emphasises enough is that he or she can be manipulated by certain domestic groups, e.g. trade unions. This is particularly true if negotiators (or decision-makers instructing them) fail to develop clear objectives and strategy; and, in this case, the negotiator may seek guidance from the public. Nonetheless, mass media or powerful interest groups can play around with the
22 Domestic versus foreign policy argument that ‘Public opinion wants us to support this position.’ This can lead to manipulation of the political elite by media and interest groups, and as a result, the real mood of public opinion can be genuinely misjudged.47 In summary, from these theoretical assumptions we may draw some practical hypotheses. The literature on international negotiations emphasises certain aspects of negotiation tactics. First of all the negotiator plays a double game with his opponent’s number and with his own public opinion. However, the negoti ator may also be influenced by interest groups and the media, which are also participating in the game and sometimes exploiting public opinion. Before going into the subject of domestic groups, a critical analysis of the two-level game model should be briefly explained. The two-level game model critique and alternative hypotheses Putnam’s approach of two-level games has been subject to extensive criticism. First, his critics argue that the two-level game model for the most part has focused on the domestic level at the expense of explaining the nature of the international level.48 In addition, this approach treats the international level as bilateral negotiations, without fully accounting for more complex interstate relationships. Thus, according to this argument his approach needs further development with regard to multilateral agreements or agreements involving international organisations. This form of critique does not undermine Putnam’s core assumptions, but instead refines and expands his model into new levels of analysis. Lee Ann Peterson, when examining agricultural policy reform in the European Community, uses Putnam’s two-level game model and expands it to consider the simultaneous interaction of negotiations at three levels: the national level, the EC level and the international level. She concludes that a three-level interactive strategy is important in achieving the acceptable agreement at each level of the game.49 The second critique concerns the lack of a precise definition of actors on Level I and Level II and their roles. In particular, it notes Putnam’s failure to set up conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint in the two-level game and the lack of specification of the nature of the win-set.50 As Andrew Moravcsik argues, Putnam’s analysis requires a more restrictive definition. In order to achieve that, three essential theoretical building blocks are required: specification of domestic politics (the nature of the win-set), specification of the international negotiating environment (the determinants of interstate bargaining outcomes)51 and specification of the statesman’s preferences.52 Indeed, Moravcsik’s critique is justified, especially with regard to the nature of the win-set, and requires us to specify the conditions under which public opinion can act. This can be achieved in an empirical case study analysis, and thus in examining Poland’s negotiation position the nature of the win-set will be
Domestic versus foreign policy 23 examined in detail. However, even though critical in certain aspects, Moravcsik incorporated analysis of two-level games into his liberal intergovernmentalist theory.53 In particular, he stresses a liberal point of view concerning the centrality of state–society relations. Nevertheless, Moravcsik, as opposed to Putnam, overemphasises the role of interest groups and elite bargaining and underemphasises the role of public opinion and mass politics. What is more, Moravcsik seems to be too focused on the strengths of interest groups in the EU integration process, ignoring other variables. An entirely different stance is presented by Thomas Risse, who criticises the very nature of intergovernmentalism. He argues that even though intergovern mental bargaining exists, many decisions, especially within the EU, are influenced by the notion of ‘communicative action’. He derives his theory from the debate between social constructivism and rational choice theories, which he defines as one of the most significant debates in the field of international relations. He argues that this debate largely focuses on the differences between the ‘logic of consequentialism’ theorised by rational choice approaches and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ conceptualised by mostly sociological institutionalism. He claims that ‘Processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion constitute a distinct mode of social interaction to be differentiated from both strategic bargaining – the realm of rational choice – and rule-guided behaviour – the realm of sociological institutionalism.’54 Risse’s notion of ‘communicative action’ resembles the already described Frank Schimmelfennig concept of ‘rhet orical action’ as a strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences.55 To summarise the core criticisms of the two-level game approach, the major weakness of Putnam’s approach is that the focus is put on the two levels themselves, without carefully defining the actors on each level and the interaction between them. Moreover, there is a lack of plausibility in Putnam’s description of the actors in his using a certain terminology to name them and to define their roles in an abstract way. This is partly because the schematic treatment of the players in this model serves the simplicity of Putnam’s argument and makes the argument more coherent. However, when setting a theoretical framework it is of crucial importance to define the actors playing on each level. The question arises as to whether a modified version of the two-level game model can serve as a framework for testing the three case studies of this book. The answer requires careful analysis of the Level II players and the negotiation strategy and tactics.
Negotiation strategy and tactics Poland’s negotiation strategy was determined by the lack of a plausible best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). This is not only obvious from the analysis of the negotiation process but becomes clear when we read the National Strategy for Integration, where in the first paragraphs we find that ‘The alternative to accession would be to consciously choose to remain behind
24 Domestic versus foreign policy the mainstream of European Integration.’56 The strategic document emphasised that Polish determination to become a member of the Union was explained by the notion of national interest.57 The document defined the overall political, eco nomic, institutional, legal and educational-information framework regarding Poland’s preparations for EU membership.58 However, its core assumption was the lack of a credible alternative to EU membership. Asymmetry between the negotiating sides Consequently, one of the core theoretical assumptions that the lack of a reliable BATNA implies a substantial asymmetry between the negotiating sides finds its confirmation in the case of Poland’s negotiation toward the EU accession. This explains the relatively weak negotiation position of Poland. CEEC did not posses the bargaining power to make the reluctant majority of EU‑15 countries accept their bid to join the EU. This was due to the asymmetrical economic interdependence between the members and the applicants favouring the Union.59 According to Lykke Friis and Anna Jarosz, the lack of bargaining power leading towards asymmetry was derived from three factors. The first is linked to the factor that an outsider such as Poland who wants to join the club, by definition, has difficulties in demanding too much. The outsider must adjust to the club rules, not vice versa. Thus, for Poland and other CEEC, acceptance of acquis communautaire was even regarded as a pre-condition of entering negotiations.60 The second factor leading to asymmetry is the asymmetry of information, since the outsider is by definition negotiating with a partner that not only has a far better knowledge of the negotiation subjects, but also is empowered with the ‘last word’ on an applicant’s ability to take on the acquis. This argument was shared by the former chief of the Polish Office for European Integration and a member of the Negotiation Team, Paweł Samecki. He argued that the adopted sequence of closing chapters had more negative consequences for the Polish side and this was premeditated on the part of the EU side. The most difficult and controversial issues were left until the final stage of the negotiation process. Then Poland was put under a strong time-pressure to close the most controversial chapters, which usually meant agreeing to accept the EU conditions.61 The final factor contributing to the asymmetry is the dual character of any accession negotiation. This is because the first internal negotiations required a compromise among the 15 member states. Thus, it is difficult for a single outsider to change the compromise, especially in the second part of the negotiations, where every new concession of the EU requires compromise by the 15 member countries.62 For this reason the outsider has to choose between accepting EU proposals or sending the EU back to the negotiation table, which is both time- consuming and unpleasant. However, there are even more factors that confirm the asymmetry. The candidate countries that wanted to join the Union were in a difficult position, since they were competing among themselves mainly in terms of the number of closed chapters. This often weakened their bargaining positions and led to
Domestic versus foreign policy 25 asymmetry. An example of such a situation was the strong competition among the Visegrad countries. As a result, solidarity within the Visegrad countries was soon broken, since each of the countries was focused on protecting its own interests. The Polish accession negotiation objective The Polish negotiation goal and its overall strategy were determined by the asymmetry between the negotiating sides and the lack of credible BATNA, since the key Polish foreign policy goal was to enter the EU. No other alternatives were seriously considered.63 This implied that Poland desired to enter the EU quickly and on the best terms. In order to achieve this goal, the government and the Negotiation Team used domestic pressure. Indeed, a hypothesis may be drawn that the size of the domestic win-set influenced the negotiation process and outcome, and consequently determined further short-term strategies and tactics. Particularities of negotiation strategy and tactics In his model, Putnam emphasises bargaining power and tactics as the core elements of international negotiations. Therefore, certain tricks and smart tactics are used. For instance, a utility-maximising statesman (Level I negotiator) aims to convince his counterpart that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favourable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified. Another possible tactic is for a negotiator to submit a trial agreement for ratification or consultation, in order to demonstrate that the conditions offered are not in his win-set.64 These tactics were also, to a certain extent, used by the Polish gov ernment when they presented the EU proposals with regard to the level of direct payment to farmers’ unions and these organisations strongly rejected the offer. They threatened the government that if the Union did not increase subsidies, they would encourage the public to vote no on the referendum. Another obvious bargaining tactic is used when statesmen (negotiators) claim that their side has made more concessions in comparison to the opponents. Hence, negotiators emphasise their concessions in order to induce the other side to make their own concessions.65 This negotiating tactic is, however, risky. The negotiator must be cautious not to magnify his own concessions, since in that case domestic parties and the media in particular may turn against him or even attack him for being soft on protecting the national interest.66 Thus, the negotiator is often playing a double game. On the one hand, he shows concessions to the opponent, but on the other, he sells the image of a tough negotiator to the public. Undeniably, the Polish side often emphasised concessions, in particular on the costs of integration and on possible benefits for the European Union, while at the same time declaring to its own public its determination to enter the EU on good terms. Obviously, as in the case of Poland, the opponent is fully aware of this strategy, since it is impossible to keep such a strategy secret. However, the opponent may be willing to turn a blind eye, or to accept the rules of the game, since he often
26 Domestic versus foreign policy applies the same rules to its own public opinion. To summarise, bargaining tactics are the core element of international negotiations. Negotiating tactics can be used to manipulate the size of a win-set, and as a result negotiate better conditions or ensure protection of its own group’s interests. Tactics are used by both Level I negotiators to influence his/her opposing number and by the Level II domestic constituents to influence the Level I negotiator. According to Friis and Jarosz, who base their arguments mainly on Putnam’s assumption, bargaining can be classified into five different bargaining strat egies.67 The first, which may be called tying hands, is based on Putnam’s argument that ‘A small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage.’68 Thus, the negotiator may use the trick ‘I would like to accept your proposal, but this would be not accepted on my domestic level (Level II)’, for example it will not be ratified in the referendum. This strategy was used by Poland, especially in the last round of negotiations during the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. The second is threat, which goes much further than tying hands. This is when the negotiator threatens to leave the negotiation room. Nevertheless, this requires a credible BATNA for the negotiating side that is using it. Otherwise, it can play against the negotiator. For this reason, it seems that in the long run the Polish negotiators could not use this negotiation strategy without serious political con sequences. From the EU side, this strategy was used on a limited scale. It was based on an assumption that if Poland would not move from this position it would weaken its position on other issues. Moreover, Poland’s stubbornness and inflexibility could prolong the negotiation process. Nevertheless, it was more often used within the government, for example when the Polish Peasants’ Party was threatening its coalition partner Democratic Left Alliance that it would withdraw from the government. The next negotiation strategy is clustered around such issues as side-payments and package deals. As Putnam indicated, on the domestic level (Level II) what counts are not total costs and benefits, but their incidence relative to existing coalitions.69 Thus, the negotiator has to be prepared for side-payments or package deals. For instance, ‘If you agree on the proposed level of direct payments, we will allocate more resources for structural funds.’ This last proposal is an example of a package deal. Indeed, the problem of side-payments existed not only within incumbents, but also within the member states. EU members that expect net losses from enlargement can agree to enlargement if their bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensation through side-payments by the winning EU‑15 states.70 Such a strategy was used by Spain and other poorer countries afraid of losing some structural funds. The fourth possible strategy is dead-weight catching. This is when the negoti ator catches his counterpart in the dead weight of his former actions. It seems that this strategy was partly used by Poland during the Copenhagen Summit when arguing for the equal level of direct payments. The question was raised as to why Poland should fulfil its obligations when conditions of membership equal to previous EU enlargements were not offered. However, such an argument was less effective in the case of significant asymmetry between the negotiating partners.
Domestic versus foreign policy 27 Finally, there is the strategy of co-ordination within the enlargement wave. This last strategy can be effective, not only when the applicant countries coordinate their negotiation stances, but also when they are determined to defend such stances. This negotiation strategy was partly used during the negotiations concerning the level of direct payments. However, the determination to defend their common position on full direct payments varied between the candidate countries. As a result, this strategy with regards to this aspect was unsuccessful. If all, or at least a majority, of the applicant countries had threatened to walk out of the negotiation room, this would have had a stronger effect. Nevertheless, the threat strategy was inefficient if made by only one applicant. Such a coordinated strategy was also able to undermine the EU’s possible battering ram strategy. For instance, when the EU negotiated with the applicant countries, it had an interest in using one country as a battering ram in order to persuade the other acceding countries into signing a similar negotiating deal.71 The accession negotiation can be characterised by a number of different nego tiation strategies and tactics as used by both negotiating sides on both domestic and foreign policy boards. Indeed, to understand this it may be useful to examine the interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics. This is a largely unexamined area where different working hypotheses will need to be raised and open questions addressed.
Foreign policy and domestic politics In discussing the interplay between foreign policy and domestic constraints, one should start by stating a definition of foreign policy and by describing the models which have been used to explain its workings. However, the key empirical question remains whether domestic groups indeed have an influence on foreign policy. Defining foreign policy Even though one may formulate different definitions of foreign policy, there is a basic agreement on the key characteristics of this term. According to Christopher Hill, foreign policy is ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’.72 Thus, foreign policy is regarded as the sum of external relations ‘because otherwise every particular action could be seen as a separate foreign policy’. External relations are official ‘to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mechanism of a state or enterprise’. Finally, the phrase ‘an independent actor’, according to Hill, ‘enables the inclusion of phenomena such as the European Union’.73 A question arises as to whether Poland’s negotiation stances vis-à-vis the Union can be defined as foreign policy at all.74 Can we, in keeping with Hill’s definition, claim that Poland’s foreign policy towards the EU is the sum of Poland’s official relations with the Union during the negotiation process? If it is not foreign policy, then how can Poland’s policy towards the Union be defined?
28 Domestic versus foreign policy In order to answer this question, one may refer to an approach towards defining foreign policy taken by Michael Clarke. According to his method, the term ‘foreign policy’ should be broken down into two separate terms: foreign and pol icy. As he argues, one should begin by giving a definition of policy itself. As Clarke explicates this issue: on the one hand, policy can be regarded as an ‘expli cit plan of action tailored to serve specific purposes’, but on the other, it may be regarded as a ‘series of habitual responses to events occurring in the interna tional environment’.75 Thus, to simplify, the term ‘policy’ can be understood as a plan and/or as the practice of certain behaviours. The term ‘foreign’ refers to official external relations. Thus, foreign policy can be regarded as a plan or practice of certain behaviour towards the world outside the state. In discussing Poland’s stance, the emphasis will be put on policy and this will be understood as the conducting of a certain kind of behaviour according to an already planned goal: membership in the EU. The focus will be on Poland’s reaction or adaptation to situations that emerged during the negotiations. This approach therefore sees policy as a structural reaction to external stimuli.76 Thus, in this context policy is understood as a dynamic rather than a static process. Indeed, going back to Hill’s definition, we may draw a hypothesis that Polish– EU relations were a subject of foreign policy. It might seem that in the normal course of events, subsidies for farming would be regarded as a subject lying within the domestic policy agenda. However, when these are placed in the international negotiations scheme they become mat ters of foreign policy. If Poland’s policy towards the EU lies in the scope of foreign policy, the next question is who makes the policy? The traditional paradigm of a state as the only actor is changing and international organisations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, can be regarded as independent actors in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the question for this book is who is in charge of foreign policymaking in Poland and who was responsible for the accession negotiations?77 This problem will be discussed in future chapters. However, at this stage, one may ask about the role of domestic pressure.
Domestic pressure: public opinion, elites, interest groups The question for this section is how can the role of public opinion, elites and interest groups be defined and explained with respect to Poland’s foreign policy in relation to the Union? Is the general public manipulated by political elites or interest groups? The purpose of this section is therefore to shed light on the problem of how prevailing theoretical concepts of the role of domestic groups fit with the case study of Poland. Public opinion With regard to the concept of public opinion, one can point out many different, often mutually exclusive, definitions. I will focus, however, only on those that are widely accepted and used in social sciences. In defining public opinion, one
Domestic versus foreign policy 29 should avoid confusing sources of public opinion with channels for expressing opinion such as the press, demonstrations, elections and referenda. In practice, many authors confuse these terms and sometimes it is difficult to set up a clear line between these terms and that of public opinion itself. Nevertheless, in essence, public opinion means the collective view that a defined population takes towards an issue. It is commonly accepted that there is a major difference between the general public and the attentive public. Whilst the first is characterised by a limited knowledge of and interest in foreign policy, the attentive public is better informed and interested in foreign policy and thus constitutes an audience for the foreign policy debates among the elites. Thus, the relevant public in foreign policy is not the mass public, but the attentive public whose interests and responsibilities require them to pay attention to foreign affairs.78 Some authors identify a third group within public opinion, namely policy and opinion elites that articulate the concerns of the ‘policy-bearing stratum of the population’. A policy elite is not a homogenous group and hence one can single out policy leadership: executives, legislators or civil servants.79 The decision-makers, according to Christopher Hill, hold the power of initiative, the capacity to define external threats and exercise control over information and the ultimate power of the state to coerce.80 The distinction between the general public and the elite has a vital practical implication. The first is neither interested nor informed, and hence unable to participate fully in the policymaking process. It rather participates in the process in an indirect and passive way. Their moods, interests and expectations limit the room for manoeuvrability of their representatives and elites. The general public has an impact on the selection of elites through elections, the private electoral processes of interest groups or especially through accepting or refusing to accept the policy recommendations as expressed by the media.81 For Gabriel Almond, public opinion only sets the limits for decision-makers.82 This thought is developed by Thomas Risse who argues that public opinion only sets certain limits, but their restrictiveness varies according to the domestic structure and the coalition-building process in the respective country.83 Moreover, Risse emphasises that one should not only distinguish mass public opinion and the attentive public, but also take into consideration publics which are par ticularly attentive to specific questions.84 These specific questions are often reflected in opinion polls or sometimes become the subject of a referendum or the big issues during elections. Indeed, Risse’s concept may be useful in explaining the case of Poland’s accession negotiations. It seems that Polish public opinion, even though in general not particularly interested in foreign policy, was particularly attentive to certain issues such as the impact of EU membership on Polish agriculture, purchase of real estate by foreigners or free movement of workers. Furthermore, when exploring Poland’s foreign policy, one can see that it is influenced by opinion polls and election results. The rapid shifting of the post- communist movement Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) policy in the year 1993
30 Domestic versus foreign policy from ‘Euro-sceptic’ to ‘Euro enthusiast’ may serve as the best example. Moreover, the decrease in support for membership in the last years of negotiation was accompanied by the creation and the growing popularity of anti-EU parties. This led the government to change its attitude in the negotiations, especially in the last round, where it developed a tough negotiating stance (particularly on the issue of direct payments) in order to court public opinion. Elites and public opinion Even though public opinion has an impact on decision-makers through accepting or refusing to accept their policy, many authors note that in certain aspects there is a problem for elites in exercising control over mass opinion. John R. Zaller defines elite domination as a situation in which ‘elites induce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best available information and analyses’.85 Zaller’s argument is indeed very important because it shows the nature of elite domination or what may even be called manipulation. This argument is particularly vital in the case of the Polish political elites manipulating public opinion by bringing certain issues such as purchase of real estate to the public debate.86 This is what is often described in the literature as the ‘top-down’ process. An alternative ‘bottom-up’ concept assumes that ‘elites follow masses’. Sometimes, however, both the elites and the masses share common foreign policy goals.87 It may be argued that in the case of Poland’s negotiations towards the EU member ship there was a general consensus among elites and public opinion concerning the aim of EU membership. Nevertheless, whilst the case of negotiations concerning agriculture resembled rather the bottom up model, where mostly political elites and interest groups follow mass opinion, the issue of purchase of real estate was closer to the ‘top down’ concept, where masses were manipulated by elites. Elites are not homogenous. However, even though they belong to different groups (policymakers, bureaucrats, journalists), when they share common inter ests, they constitute foreign policy elite.88 Hence, from this viewpoint, in the case of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, one may talk not only about political or interest elites, but also about ‘pro’ or ‘anti-European’ elites. Interest groups Interest groups, as one of the elite groups, require particular attention. The usually broad definition of an interest group embraces not only ‘membership organizations, but also advocacy organizations that do not accept members, businesses or any organisations that make policy related appeals to the government’. According to this definition, not all organisations constitute an interest group, but only those which attempt to influence a government.89 Moreover, some inter est groups are more powerful than others, especially economic interest groups, which pressure the government to protect their own economic interests.90
Domestic versus foreign policy 31 Many authors, including Christopher Hill, make a further distinction between an interest group and a pressure group and between an interest group and a cause group. Whilst the pressure groups exist to exert pressure on the government, an interest group can mobilise its supporters around a common interest and only occasionally act as a pressure group. At the same time a cause group can mobilise its supporters around common value positions, often based on altruistic ideas.91 A few authors include in interest groups linkage groups, which have special links to foreign nations through a common ethnicity or ideology. Linkage groups have been known to influence the government in the direction preferred by the foreign government with which a group identifies.92 Thus, the Polish Diaspora in the European Union may serve as an example of such a linkage group, because it enlarged support for the idea of Poland’s membership in the European Union. A final question regards the impact of interest groups on foreign policy. Many authors suggest that ‘The impact of interest groups on foreign policy decision- making is extremely limited since such groups have no authoritative position in the foreign-policy process.’93 It is true that the direct impact of interest groups in the making of a state’s foreign policy may be limited. Some authors underestim ate the fact that most interest groups have no explicit interest in influencing foreign policy directly, since they can pursue their interests in the domestic arena. Nevertheless, some domestic issues have a foreign dimension. An interest group, by influencing the government to pursue a certain policy, can indirectly influence a state’s foreign policy. This phenomenon is confirmed in the case of Polish farmers’ unions and organisations, even though they did not have an authoritative position in foreign policy. By demanding more subsidies and higher production quotas, they forced the government to introduce a tough negotiation stance aimed at getting a higher level of direct payments from the EU budget. The above-mentioned classification of interest groups, however, does not tackle the problem of how interest groups using certain channels of communication (for example, the media) can influence the decision-making process. As indicated in the introductory chapter, we may observe ‘silent’ interest groups that focus on lobbying activities behind the scenes, often representing a narrow sectoral interest. However, I will focus on the ‘noisy’ interest group. Their leaders, instead of acting behind the scenes, want to express their postulates in a demonstrative manner, using the media to acquire public attention. Such interest groups often represent a larger group like farmers. Among these ‘noisy’ interest groups, the focus in this book will be placed only on those that tried to influence the negotiation process regarding the European Union in the three case studies of this book. It would be counterproductive to discuss interest groups without seeing the interrelationship between interest groups and other domestic pressure. In order to understand this problem, one should carefully look into an alternative definition of domestic pressure. An alternative definition of domestic pressure An entirely different approach towards defining public opinion and interest groups is presented by Bernard C. Cohen.94 He defines public opinion not
32 Domestic versus foreign policy through enumerating its groups, but instead by identifying and classifying its sources – either identifiable or those unidentified sources that are impersonal or faceless. The latter should also be regarded as channels of expressing public opinion. The identifiable sources may be combined into three major groupings: Intimates, Specialists and Institutions. The first group, Intimates, includes persons or other entities who are not regarded as significant bearers of opinion, but who belong to the personal circle of a decision-maker: his family, friends and colleagues. Specialists include people who have knowledge, experience and skills in the policy area. Finally, Institutions comprise organisations or less formal groups, mainly interest groups and those within the official branches of the government such as within legislation and the media. These, according to Cohen’s previous works, play a significant role in driving public attention to foreign affairs.95 Although fewer in number, impersonal sources, as Cohen suggests, are larger in terms of the number of people whose opinions they reflect. Within this group, one may place such sources as letters, lectures or briefing sessions, public opinion polls and demonstrations.96 Cohen’s classification of public opinion finds its confirmation in developed democratic systems and civil societies, such as the US, where the position and role of Specialists and Institutions is particularly strong, whilst in the Western developed democracies there are professionally trained specialists, experts and negotiators. Poland, as was the case with other post-communist countries in the early 1990s, had no diplomatic service or civil servants specialising in foreign policy. Hence, even though there has been a new wave of civil servants and foreign policy specialists educated in the last decade, admittedly, this is still a limited and not very influential community. For this reason, Poland, in comparison to most EU countries, lacks a professional diplomatic service and negotiators, not to mention the presence of only a few under-funded think tanks. The group of Specialists is rather narrow and they do not have a major influence on public opinion. The role normally reserved in Western countries for Specialists is held by the media and journalists specialising in foreign policy. These are rel atively powerful and, as could be observed, by and large supported integration. In Poland, even though interest groups also exist, they operate in a completely different environment. Instead of being organised into formal structures, they operate in a less formal and less transparent environment. In an under-developed party system, interest groups, instead of being separate pressure groups, can either become political parties or exercise considerable influence upon them. Hence, the government of Solidarity Election Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność) and the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności)97 were dominated and sometimes led by the trade union activists from the Solidarity trade union (Solidarność). When the post-communists won the elections in 2001, they formed a government with the Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), which also plays the role of a farmers’ trade union and lobby. The party was particularly active in demanding a tough negotiation stance on the issue of direct payments. After the Peasants’ Party left the government in 2002, the minority government was tactically supported in the most important
Domestic versus foreign policy 33 parliamentary votes by an opposition party called Self-Defence (Samoobrona).98 The case of Poland thus illustrates that without having developed Western-type organised interest groups, a political party can act as an interest group serving narrow sectoral interests. With regard to impersonal opinion sources, the case of Poland shows that whilst public opinion polls and demonstrations were important as forms of public opinion pressure during the negotiations, public lectures or briefing sessions did not play an important role. With some exceptions, these tactics (in par ticular petitions, letters and, to a limited extent, talks) were used mostly by an anti-integration movements clustered around Radio Maryja.99 Interestingly, according to Cohen’s definition, interest groups constitute sources of public opinion. Indeed, the interest groups may not only directly influence decision-makers, as is usually suggested, but also mobilise citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure policymakers.100 This pro cess is known as outside lobbying and accomplishes two tasks simultaneously. On the elite level it communicates aspects of public opinion to policymakers. These actions, which may take the form of publicising issue positions, protesting or demonstrating, have a signalling role. This role is that of an interest group that wants to signal the amount of its popular support to policymakers. The second role (conflict expansion) for outside lobbying is to influence members of the mass public by changing the way selected members of the public consider and respond to policy issues.101 As will be argued, the tactic of outside lobbying was also used during the negotiation process both by pro- and anti-integration elements in the form of issuing petitions, protesting and demonstrating. Nevertheless, it seems that the anti-integration movement in Poland was more active in this respect. This is understandable since the decision-makers and most political parties were strongly pro-EU.
Questions and hypotheses The literature discussed above illustrates the interplay between international negotiations, foreign policy and domestic politics. In such a situation, foreign policy goals should be reflected in the negotiation stances. Although the latter may be clustered around domestic issues, the fact that they are brought to the international policy agenda means that they become the subject of foreign pol icy. In practice, the negotiation stances are often influenced by pressure coming from both public opinion and domestic groups. The two-level game provides a theoretical framework and my research hypotheses are clustered around this model. In the two-level game model, public opinion or interest groups may press the government to adopt favourable policies, although their usual goal is not to change the foreign policy itself, but to protect their interests or fulfil their expectations. Nevertheless, by pressing the government or negotiators, those groups can indirectly influence the outcome of foreign policy. Thus, although one may rightly argue that the general public is
34 Domestic versus foreign policy not interested in foreign policy, this does not imply, as is often claimed in the literature,102 that domestic pressure does not have an influence on foreign pol icy. Such a situation may occur if a domestic issue is placed on the international agenda. This happened during Poland’s negotiations with the EU, where the subject of the most extensive negotiation was not the future position of Poland within the EU institutions, but the protection of the Polish farmers’ interest, an issue that normally belongs to the realm of domestic politics. This took place despite the fact that the negotiations concerning the level and conditions of direct payments were not primarily aimed at creating an external agreement between different countries, but merely at solving an internal problem of Poland. Thus, this might create the core presumption that domestic politics can influence international negotiations and hence indirectly can influence foreign policy. From the underlying presumption, specific hypotheses regarding the interplay between domestic and systemic factors in international negotiations can be derived. There are certain hypotheses and questions that can be tested in the three case studies of this book. If a hypothesis is not confirmed by empirical data, then the viability of the two-level game approach from which the hypo thesis was derived may be questioned. However, before formulating concurring hypotheses, a number of additional questions should be raised. Research questions The first set of questions to consider are those concerning the level of analysis and the interplay between domestic and systemic levels, in particular the question whether or not the metaphor of the two-level game provides a better theoret ical framework for the case study than systemic level theories. The other important problem is whether Putnam’s approach provides a convincing answer to how international and domestic levels can be combined. A major issue of this study is whether the size of the win-set can influence the negotiation process and outcomes, and whether, as Putnam argued, the win-set size is determined by three major assumptions: (a) the distribution of power and preferences and possible coalitions among Level II, (b) the Level II political institutions and (c) the strategies of the Level I negotiator. Then the question arises whether these three assumptions can be empirically proved in the case of Poland. There are, however, several additional questions regarding win-sets. 1 2 3 4
Can we assume that the size of domestic win-sets is constant or rather postulate that it can be manipulated, and if so by whom and for what purpose? Can the size of the win-set constitute a bargaining advantage? What are the side-payments and when does the price of side-payments have to be paid? Is the outcome of negotiations determined by the choice of negotiation strat egy and tactics, and is the chosen strategy influenced by domestic pressure?
Domestic versus foreign policy 35 The next set of questions regards the impact of domestic pressure on the accession process. 1 2 3 4 5
How is ‘domestic pressure’ defined for the purpose of this book? What is the difference between public opinion and major domestic groups? What is the interplay between political parties, interest groups and public opinion? Can interest groups and public opinion influence the decision-maker and, if so, under what conditions? Can they employ a two-level strategy, for example by influencing other domestic groups and at the same time having impact on the decision-maker?
From the questions asked above, several competing hypotheses can be drawn. Research hypotheses The key hypothesis assumes that Poland’s negotiations with the EU were influenced by domestic pressure. Thus, the size of the domestic win-set can influence the negotiation process and its outcome. The size of the win-set is determined by domestic preferences and coalitions, political institutions and ratification proced ures, and should be emphasised in the strategies of negotiators. With regard to the first determinant: domestic preferences and coalitions, the relatively large win-set to join the EU was determined by a pro-EU orientation of the political elite, interest groups and the general public. With respect to the second determinant: institutions and ratification procedures, the overall assumption is that nego tiation required several different levels of ratification requiring both formal and informal procedures, with sometimes different win-set sizes among each level of ratification. The third determinant is the choice of negotiation strategies and tactics as used by negotiators. This determinant was particularly vital and this is the place where Putnam’s arguments may be expanded. The overall assumption is that there was a strong interplay between Polish negotiation strategy and the size of the domestic win-set. A competing hypo thesis would assume that decision-makers and negotiators operated in an envir onment which was relatively isolated from domestic considerations. While the size of the domestic win-set may have an influence on internal policymaking, it will not influence foreign policy. In other words, the international and domestic ‘boards’ should be considered separately. From the major hypothesis that the negotiation process and outcomes are influenced by domestic pressure, we may derive several more specific hypotheses, and their alternatives, especially with regard to the negotiation strategies. The first is that Poland’s negotiation strategy was determined by the lack of cred ible BATNA. A competing hypothesis would assume that Poland had alternatives such as an idea of a Central and Eastern European security zone or closer collaboration with the US. Nevertheless, political elite and interest groups were pushing towards the membership in the EU and other alternatives were abandoned.
36 Domestic versus foreign policy The next hypothesis concerns the size of the domestic win-set. In the process of negotiations, the win-set can be manipulated by various domestic groups, political parties in particular. Thus, political negotiators may use the size of the domestic win-set as part of their negotiation strategy. For example, Polish representatives during negotiations may use a small domestic win-set as a bargaining advantage, but in order to get ratification in a referendum they may wish to enlarge a domestic win-set by using certain negotiation tricks and PR instruments. An alternative hypothesis would assume that the size of the domestic win-set was rather constant. Although it fluctuated, this was due to factors that were independent from the domestic context that underlies international politics, for example public opinion in Poland was prone to international signals sent from Brussels rather than from Warsaw. Another hypothesis would assume that the size of the win-set could differ for both domestic as well as different players in the three case studies. There is an interplay between various domestic groups and the general public. Hence, for instance there might be a small domestic win-set among the general public to accept transitional periods in the free movement of labour. However, at the same time the political elite may be willing to make a deal: ‘We will agree on the transitional period in the free movement of labour (EU proposal) for the price of acceptance of a long transitional period in the purchase of real estate by foreigners (Polish proposal).’ Hence, the agreement for the transitional period in the negotiation for free movement of labour may be treated as a side-payment to achieve other negotiating goals. Consequently, the size of domestic win-sets may be different in each of the case studies, for instance smaller in the case of agri culture and larger with respect to the free movement of labour. An alternative hypothesis would assume that the size of the domestic win-set is a means of different domestic win-sets. Discussing the above-mentioned hypotheses and questions in an empirical case study will enable us to understand and explain the nature of Poland’s nego tiations during EU accession: in particular, the interplay between different actors and agents. Finally, this research will help us to understand the negotiation pro cess itself, the key characteristics of the Polish case and the differences concerning other cases. The arguments will enable us to conclude that the key question of this book is not whether the link between Polish domestic groups and the pro cess of international negotiations exists. Instead, the main aim is to explain how this interplay is organised and its consequences.
3 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of Poland’s historical path to the EU. First, it briefly summarises the motivations behind Poland’s decision to join the EU. Then, it reviews Polish–EU relations from 1990 to 1998 (beginning at the time of the establishment of bilateral relations between the EC and Poland, through the Association Agreement, the Copenhagen Summit of 1993 and the submission of the membership application, to the official opening of negoti ations). Even though this book does not focus on the prenegotiations, the early Polish–EU relationship and the prenegotiation period are vital for understanding the future dynamics of the negotiations. One can differentiate among certain stages of Poland’s integration with the EU. The first step towards integration was the establishment of relations between Poland and the Communities. The next phase included the negotiations on the Europe Agreement (1990–91). The Copenhagen Summit of 1993 was a turning point, which opened a window of opportunity for Poland’s membership and made clear the requirements for this (the so-called Copenhagen criteria). The Europe Agreement was finally put in force in 1994. The association agreement allowed Poland to prepare an application for membership in the EU. The next phase included the preparation before formal negotiations (1994–98). The last phase, which will be the main focus of this book, was the official negotiations, the preparation and ratification of the Accession Treaty. The purpose of this chapter is to give an historical overview of the Polish–EU relations, as well as to explain the overall negotiation structure and process. Without this discussion, it would be impossible to understand and explain the impact of domestic pressure as discussed in the three case studies.
Why did Poland desire to join the EU? Without going deeply into the available literature on the motives for Poland joining the EU, one should briefly examine why Poland desired to join the Union. Polish decision-makers1, when asked ‘What is the major reason behind Poland’s decision to join the EU?’, emphasised two major aspects: 1) the community of values and 2) the community of interests between Poland and the EU.
38 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Community of values The first major group of reasons behind the decision to join the EU, often reflected in social surveys and emphasised by decision-makers, was the com munity of values and common European identity. This concept referenced self- perception, symbolic politics, certain political rhetoric and the acceptance of liberal values. Both parties shared this notion of community. According to Ulrich Sedelmeier, on the EU side, the fundamental puzzle for the enlargement was why the EU committed itself to enlargement despite the cost that would arise for individual member states. As Sedelmeier argued, this decision was driven by non-material factors, mainly the role of collective identity including the ‘special responsibility’ towards the CEEC.2 Schimmelfennig argued that through rhet orical action, the self-interested advocates of Eastern enlargement persistently appealed to the collective identity, liberal values and norms of the community organisations.3 This argument of common values was prevalent not only in Poland but also in other CEEC as a widespread sense of the country belonging to Europe and of being a European nation, which of course contributed to the pro-EU choice.4 Often, the discourse regarding EU membership used a particular terminology related to the problem of creating Polish national identity. In post-Westphalian Europe, national identity was built around the nation state. Polish national iden tity was built without an independent state. This identity was neither linked with the concept of citizenship nor connected with loyalty to the state. It was rather based on the notion of Polish culture, one deeply rooted in European heritage. Even when Poland regained independence after the First World War, the inter- war generation was introduced to an image of their country as European.5 Hence, after the communist regime collapsed, Poles, instead of using the term ‘joining Europe’, preferred using the term ‘re-joining’ or ‘reunification’. Among political elites in the CEEC, there was widespread agreement that the EU had an ‘histor ical responsibility to reunite the two halves of Europe’.6 Thus, membership in the EU was regarded as a symbol of the definite end to the division of Europe and the re-inclusion of Poland and other CEEC into the European family.7 Polish identity is deeply rooted in the notion of European civilisation, and Poles con sider themselves to be Europeans, whatever this means.8 Indeed, there was a dispute about the meaning of Europe or what it meant to become a European. This dispute implied a range of ideological positions from strong pro-EU to more Euro-sceptic.9 Surprisingly enough, even those strongly criticising the EU emphasised that Poland’s future should be built on ‘true European values’ and stressed the country’s strong cultural belonging to the European tradition, based on its Christian heritage.10 For the great majority of Poles, membership in the EU was considered as an act of historical justice and the end of the Yalta formula (which is always interpreted to mean the betrayal of Poland by its allies when the Western powers agreed with the Soviet determination to include Poland in the Soviet sphere of interest). For this reason, it was felt that Poland deserved EU membership since the country suffered communist oppression against its
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 39 will. The best example of this need to confirm Poland’s European identity may be found in the National Strategy of Integration, which states: ‘For over one thousand years Poland has belonged to Europe in the geo-political, cultural and economic sense. Our country has shared its basic values, which it helped to create and defend.’12 Such declarations are deeply rooted in symbolic politics; however, they often limit the space for a debate on the meaning of European identity. Unfortunately, the public debate on this problem was almost non- existent. One of the possible reasons for this lack of public debate was to keep a public consensus on Poland’s pro-EU choices.13 11
Community of interests The community of interests is reflected in the attitude shared by most Poles, that ‘A return’ to Europe had both a strong psychological and an economic compon ent. On the one hand, many Poles were eager to be included in Western institu tions, specifically the Council of Europe, OECD, NATO or the European Union. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the ‘return to Europe’ depended on the country’s ability to negotiate an economic parity with her Western neighbours in which the gap between them would decline and ultimately disappear.14 Accord ing to this logic, Poland had to turn towards the West, because otherwise it would be politically and economically marginalised.15 It does not mean, how ever, that the question whether EU membership would serve Polish national interest was not controversial. Indeed, it was a subject of heated political or, to be more precise, ideological disputes. The society was divided into two camps: winners of the system who have benefited from the transition, and losers who have been hurt by the political and economic transition. Obviously, the winners were more likely to support the EU accession.16 Thus, the attitude towards the systemic transformation often reflected the general attitude towards the idea of EU membership. The often-raised argument was that EU membership would serve Polish interest because it would be the logical consequence of the systemic transformation and would help Poland to strengthen the free market, democracy and the rule of law. It seemed that in Poland, as well as in other Central European coun tries, the rejection of the communist system based on socialist democracy, a regulated economy, ‘social justice’ and rights, and finally Soviet hegemony implied absorption of the Western system and the values of liberal democracy, the market economy, rule of law and human rights. This process was accom panied by constant political turmoil and the lack of Western-type political elites. Under these circumstances, other alternatives for EU membership (such as the idea of Intermarium – Independent Central European Security Commu nity) were rejected without even being seriously considered. Instead, Poland was ready to accept the Western structures and fully adapt to the EU requirements.17 EU accession was thus seen, especially by the winners of the system and by elites, as a cornerstone of systemic transformation that would strengthen
40 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 democracy, market economy and the rule of law. Some Euro-enthusiasts even argued that without Polish membership in the EU, these values would be threatened. On the other hand, political elites, in the acceding countries, deeply believed that the enlargement would also serve EU interests. When asked why the Union should take in the applicant countries, they often referred to common economic and security interests. The common economic interest was to create a larger market helping Europe to compete in the global market, whilst the common security interest was to ensure greater stability and prevent possible conflicts.18 The motives of a community of values and interests enable an understanding of the particularities of the negotiation process from a broader perspective. Without understanding the question of why Poland was determined to become an EU member, one would not understand the details and particularities of Poland’s negotiations over EU accession.
Establishing relations between Poland and the communities, and negotiating the Europe Agreement (1988–91) The first stage of diplomacy included establishing relations and the negotiating and signing of the Europe Agreement. Establishing relations Diplomatic relations between Poland and the European Community were offi cially established in September 1988 when Poland was still a People’s Republic. Before this, the 12 EC countries had agreed on a policy of prudent encourage ment of change in Eastern Europe. The reason for the advice to be prudent and cautious was because Gorbatchev’s motivations were not entirely clear.19 This political position on the part of the 12 countries began to change after the Polish government started negotiations with the opposition in February 1989 and after the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, was forced to resign in 1989. In the mean time, the Trilateral Commission on East–West relations comprising Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Henry Kissinger prepared a report in which they argued for a less cautious and more courageous approach towards Eastern Europe. It suggested that the Community should devise a special cat egory of association towards Eastern Europe. The report also claimed that if reform in the East were successful, the integration of these countries into the Community would be inevitable.20 European governments, the German and British in particular, started to reconsider their cautious approach, and suggested the need to support the transformation in Eastern Europe, especially after the overwhelming victory of solidarity in Poland in the semi-democratic elections of June 1989.21 A month later, the representation of Poland at the European Com munity in Brussels was established. Simultaneously, the country began negoti ations with the Communities on a trade and economic cooperation treaty, which was signed in Warsaw on 19 September 1989.22
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 41 Negotiations concerning the Association Agreement On 25 May 1990 Poland made an official application in Brussels to begin nego tiations for an Association Agreement with the Community. In August 1990 the Commission Communication on Association Agreements contained an import ant declaration: In the light of the relatively more advanced economic and democratic situ ation in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, exploratory discussions for establishing a series of association agreements with the EEC should take place in these countries first. The European Commission’s report outlined the objectives and requirements of the future ‘Europe Agreements’ which were expected to create a climate of stability favouring economic and polit ical reform.23 But the EU felt that these association accords, unlike that signed with Turkey, would not provide for ultimate accession to the Community.24 The opening of preliminary negotiations with Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the pos sibility of future association agreements, was only given the go-ahead by the EEC’s Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers’ meeting in Brussels on 17 Septem ber 1990. The Council repeated after the Commission that the accords would not provide for the ultimate accession of CEE states into the Community.25 Even though Poland achieved success, the country was not fully satisfied. As the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki said immediately after meeting in Warsaw with Franz Andriessen, Deputy President of the EEC Commission in September 1990: I, on my part, have strongly encouraged Mr. Andriessen and, through him, the Community, to increase its territorial extent because we believe that after the great historic breakthrough and rejection of totalitarianism and communism, a further impulse is needed to achieve European integration. But that is not possible unless the economic division is overcome. I suppose the Community should give it a try.26 Andriessen stated that no EEC member country held any prejudice against Poland and it striving for association. He added that he was impressed by the determination of the Polish government in implementing reforms.27 Exploratory talks on proposed association agreements with the three Central European countries were concluded on 17 October 1990 and officially announced by the European Commission on 23 October. The discussions served mainly to clarify the basis of such accords and restate the CEEC and EC inten tion of gradually integrating these countries into the European Community.28 After a few months of relative non-activity, on 6 and 7 March 1991 Andriessen visited Poland and completed a series of meetings with the top-level Polish politicians. One of the key topics was the discussion about the Europe
42 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Agreement, the PHARE programme and its economic reforms. The official com ments from the Commission did not go beyond mere diplomatic language, stating: The discussions were held in an extremely cooperative and friendly atmo sphere, underlining the increasing intensity of the relations between the Polish Republic and the European Community, and reflecting the Commu nity’s continuing support for Poland’s efforts to create an open, pluralistic, free-market society.29 The Polish side was rather dissatisfied, especially with regard to the absence of reference to the CEEC’s accession objective. As President Walesa publicly com plained: the EU replaced the ‘iron curtain with a silver curtain’. Despite some sympathy towards Polish officials from the DG of External Relations, he found some of the Polish claims and moralistic rhetoric from the Polish side unhelpful.30 The third round of negotiations between the EC and Poland over Europe Agreements took place on 18–19 March 1991 in Brussels. The negotiations focused on financial cooperation and trade, political dialogue, the approximation of legislation to Community norms, the free movement of capital and services, and the establishment of new institutions.31 In August 1991 EC foreign ministers agreed to speed up the Europe Agree ments with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These had been held up by the refusal of the 12 countries to open their markets to import, in particular coal, steel, textiles and agricultural products. At that time the Commission President Jacques Delors said accusingly of European politicians that they first make ‘tearful speeches’ about democracy and free markets and then ‘slam the door to Polish veal or wheat’. At the same time, Delors asked for a flexible negotiating mandate.32 His request was repeated in September 1991 by the Commissioner Andriessen, who was also pleading for a more flexible negotiating mandate from the Foreign Ministers. Andriessen asked the Council to grant him a considerably enlarged margin of manoeuvrability in the most sensitive sectors: agriculture and textiles.33 His request for a flexible negotiation mandate was prompted by the lack of a coherent policy within the EC countries, which was particularly clear during the final phase of negotiations. This resulted from the fact that some Europe Agreement proposals, instead of offering generous trade concessions most appropriate to CEEC market needs, were restrictive.34 What is more, some of the EC countries treated trade concessions as a first step towards the possibil ity of the CEEC entering the Community and in fact, the EC countries were strongly divided on whether or not the CEEC should join the European Community. Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s support for closer cooperation leading to EC mem bership of the CEEC differed markedly from fears usually expressed by French politicians that a doubling in size of the EC would adversely affect French power and influence. Britain, on the other hand, even though supporting CEEC
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 43 accession to the EC was primarily involved in the discussion over the single European currency.35 However, there was also a coalition of advocates of enlargement not only within some of the EU countries, but also within the EU Commission and the DG Enlargement, in particular.36 In fact, it was only due to the strong demand from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and support from the enlargement advocates within the Commission and the EU‑15, that the preamble to the Europe Agreement mentioned that the ultimate, but not automatic, goal of the associated states was accession to the EC (although it was not said that this was the goal of the Community itself ).37 The bilateral talks resulted in the ‘Agreement Establishing an Association between the Republic of Poland and the European Communities and their Member States’, signed in December 1991. The Copenhagen Summit of 1993 The period between January 1992 and May 1993 can be characterised as a period of relative stasis in bilateral relations, which particularly disappointed the Polish side. The Europe Agreement did not guarantee Poland’s membership in the EU, but only set up a framework for political and economic cooperation, gradual integration into the Community and access to its internal markets. For the asso ciate countries, trade concessions were not enough, and the fact that no dates or conditions for eventual membership were set caused their disappointment.38 Just before the Copenhagen Summit, the Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka had sent a letter to the EC Member States’ Prime Ministers and the President of the EC, lambasting the Community for its paltry attempts to integrate Poland into its fold. She emphasised that Poland was experiencing a growing disillusionment among the population as they were suffering the high costs of transition, and several pressure groups were seeking a change in policy that would threaten parts of the reform process. And, she concluded that Poland signed the Associa tion Agreement in good faith, ‘convinced that it provided for openness in trade relations which would stimulate reforms and help integrate Poland into the Com munity’. She called for a ‘clear political message’ from the Copenhagen Summit to the effect that the Community would strive for EC membership for the associ ated countries and would accelerate and improve market access for the CEEC.39 The policy of the Europe Agreement, as a long-term policy towards the region, proved short-lived. Even before the Europe Agreement had been formally rati fied, the EC, at the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993, launched a major policy change by making an explicit link between the European security order and mem bership, and by assuming that stability in Europe and the security of its own members could be provided for only by moving institutional and legal boundaries farther to the East.40 The change in EC policy was also connected to the EC pro cess of governance. Until mid-1993, the EC was engaged in negotiations at a number of tables, which often influenced each other. In particular, until the second part of 1993, the EU policies towards CEEC were overshadowed by the EU’s ambition to introduce a single currency at the expense of Eastern
44 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 enlargement.41 What is more, in mid-1993 the parallel negotiations regarding German unification, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and negotiations on the financial perspective of the EC, which had prevented the opening of enlargement negotiations with the EFTA states, had been settled. At the same time, the decision to offer membership to a few CEEC was accomplished by the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of 21–22 June 1993.42 This decision would not have been possible without the backing of some policy advocates from some EU countries and within the EU Commission and DG for Enlargement in particu lar. This was the beginning of the moving of EU policy beyond the association formula. The central element of their advocacy was a formal endorsement of the CEEC’s eventual accession as the objective of the EU.43 The EU adopted three general political and economic conditions for candid ates: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) the existence of a func tioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pres sure and market forces within the Union; and 3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, eco nomic and monetary union.44 These conditions were designed to minimise the risk of the political and eco nomic instability of CEEC. Heather Grabble assessed these conditions by stating: They were formulated as much to reassure member states as to guide the applicant countries and introduced to provide a safeguard against the EU responding to geo-political and strategic considerations alone and thus allowing the country to join before it is fully able to compete in the single market.45 Whilst the first two conditions were about the political and economic reforms, the third was more complicated since it entailed full acceptance of the acquis communautaire, including participation in all three pillars established in the Treaty on European Union. The European Council stipulated that ‘The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important factor in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.’46 During the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, the Union took a further step in the Europe Agreements towards establishing free trade with the CEE within the next few years by reducing some original restrictions. According to a timetable, the sides agreed that by 1 January 1996, the EU would have abol ished all remaining tariffs on steel and coal. By 1 January 1997 it would have abolished all remaining tariffs on textiles, while by 1 January 1998 it would have eliminated all remaining quantitative restrictions on textiles. By July 1995 the EU would have progressively reduced EU tariffs and duties on some agricultural products and have increased tariff quotas. Poland was expected to have removed all remaining tariffs on industrial products by the end of 1998. According to a
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 45 timetable for other provisions, by the end of 1994 Poland was to introduce com petition rules and was to have defined their position in terms of public companies and undertakings with special or exclusive rights. By the end of 1997 Poland was to have introduced measures to adjust monopolies of a commercial nature.47 Ratification of the Association Agreement The Copenhagen Summit not only opened up a possibility for future enlarge ment, but also provided a better framework for the ratification of the Europe Agreements that finally went into force on 1 February 1994, more than two years after the original agreements were signed. The final aim of the Agreements was to provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue and to encourage expansion of trade and harmonious economic relations between the parties. It was also aimed to provide a basis for the Communities’ technical and financial assistance to Poland and an appropriate framework for Poland’s gradual integra tion into the Community.48 The first component of the treaty was political dialogue. It was stated in the Agreement that such a dialogue would ‘Allow the parties to discuss issues of mutual interest at the highest level’, paving the way for the formal establishment of the Association Council, the Association Committee and the Joint Parliamen tary Committee. The first of these bodies would provide a forum for the Foreign Ministers to discuss and resolve disparate problems that might arise in the frame work of the Association Agreement. The Association Committee would bring together senior civil servants from the EU and the two associated states – Poland and Hungary – to discuss certain bilateral and European issues. Finally, the Joint Parliamentary Committee would provide a forum for a political debate. The second element of the Agreement was trade liberalisation. The original liberalisation provisions, as drafted in 1991, allowed for a gradual removal of tariff barriers for industrial products over a ten-year period, and particularly sen sitive sectors such as agriculture, steel and textiles were granted derogations.49 Later on, liberalisation, especially in the agriculture sector, became one of the key negotiation topics. The asymmetrical reduction of tariffs and quotas could not prevent an increasing CEEC trade deficit with the EU.50 The Agreements opened the door to the free movement of services, people and capital and to a much closer form of political dialogue. They also included the long-term object ive of Poland and Hungary joining the Union. This was the first step towards further accession, since the Agreement contained recognition that Poland’s ultimate objective was membership in the European Community.51 The goal of future membership was highlighted by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. As he emphasised, The 1991 Europe Agreement [. . .] lays the foundations for Poland’s future membership in the EU. [. . .] In fact, our goal was to guarantee Poland a lasting and safe position in Europe. [. . .] Here the link with domestic policy is unbreakable and decisive for the success of the whole grand design.52
46 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 However, the issue of whether indeed the Europe Agreement laid the foundation for future membership seems controversial. It seems that the Polish side over- emphasised its implications for future membership, in particular those connected to the possibility and timetable for future negotiations.53 It ought to be emphasised that the EC countries’ goals were slightly different. As Karen E. Smith described it: They were to: create a climate of confidence and stability favouring reform and allowing the development of close political relations; strengthen the foundations of the new European architecture; improve the climate for trade and investment; and help the East European countries better manage the transition process. Membership was not an objective.54 Indeed, despite the official policy of overcoming the ‘unnatural’ divisions of Europe, the EC was not ready for enlargement. The EC had great difficulty in developing a coherent policy towards its new neighbours and treated relations with the CEEC as part of the foreign relations of the EC rather than as part of its internal relations.55 Nevertheless, there was light at the end of the tunnel. In the preamble to the Europe Agreement with Poland, the parties recognised ‘the fact that the final objective of Poland was to become a member of the Community, and this accession in the view of the parties would help to achieve this objective’.56
Submission of the Polish application concerning accession and the pre-accession strategy The preliminary step to the attainment of Poland’s full integration was made on 8 April 1994 by the submission of the official ‘Application concerning Poland’s Accession to the European Union’ by Poland’s Foreign Minister Andrzej Ole chowski. Just a day earlier, when speaking before the Polish parliament, he declared that the government believed Poland met all the conditions for mem bership, including stable democratic institutions, observance of civil rights, a market economy and the adaptation of its laws to EU standards.57 He pointed out that opinion polls showed more than 70 per cent of Poles across the whole polit ical spectrum supported joining the EU.58 In a November 1994 opinion poll, this percentage increased to 77.59 On 4 and 5 October 1994 in Luxemburg, the European Union’s Foreign Min isters examined the Commission’s proposed pre-accession strategy of the coun tries of Central and Eastern Europe for the first time.60 The strategy was adopted by the European Council Summit in Essen on 9–10 December 1994 as preparing associated countries for membership in the Union. The purpose of the strategy was to guide applicants towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, the strategy used and incorporated earlier commitments, in particular the Europe Agreement, into the pre-accession strategy.61 The pre-accession strategy was based on initiatives in five areas: strengthening the structured relationship;
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 47 approximation of laws; enhancing trade opportunities; promoting cooperation in areas such as energy, transport and the environment; and assistance for integra tion and reform (with PHARE and EC loans).62 Structural dialogue and the PHARE programme One of the most important new and integral elements of the EU pre-accession strategy was the so-called structural dialogue, which took the form of regular meetings of heads of states and ministers of member states and associated states. The idea of the dialogue was to facilitate the process of adjusting to EU mem bership. The dialogue was intended as a forum for multilateral discussion of issues; however, it was relatively ineffective since it lacked decision-making powers and any clear focus. Consequently, it tended to be given relatively little attention by Western politicians and was sometimes referred to as an unstruc tured monologue.63 Whilst the structural dialogue was intended as a political measure, the PHARE programme was regarded as an economic element of the pre-accession strategy.64 Even though it was established in 1990 to provide technical assistance to support the process of economic transition, it was later incorporated as an eco nomic instrument of the pre-accession strategy. The efficacy and appropriateness of the advice received is difficult to assess.65 However, overall it provided important technical assistance to the candidate states. The White Paper The Council also requested the European Commission to draw up annual reports on the implementation of the pre-accession strategy, as well as to present an ana lysis of the expansion of the EU.66 In order to support the process of adjustment to EU standards and as an element of pre-accession strategy, a ‘White Paper con cerning integration of the Associated Central and Eastern European countries into the internal market of the European Union’ was drafted.67 Unlike the Europe Agreements, the White Paper had no legal force; it imposed many obligations on CEEC and put them in a weak bargaining position because they had to accept the White Paper demands as applicants. This gave them little room for political manoeuvrability in relations with the EU.68 Indeed, as Poland’s Secretary of State for European Affairs Jacek Saryusz- Wolski put it, there was some concern in the Association countries at the rigour of the demands being made, the lack of resources being made available and the absence of indications of reciprocity from the EU in the easing of barriers. This, according to Saryusz-Wolski, weakened Poland’s enthusiasm for the project.69 Jan Kułakowski, at that time Polish Ambassador to the EU, argued that it was crucial that the White Paper should not be interpreted as a device for deferring accession. Hence, full compliance with the letter of every provision in it, accord ing to him, ought not to be seen as a precondition to accession negotiations, and he confirmed that Poland would be ‘selective’ in its implementation process.70
48 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 The White Paper was a very important document guiding the applicant coun tries towards membership, in particular towards legislative approximation, prim arily at the formal level of writing EU directives into national law.71 In conjunction with the European Council in Madrid on 15–16 December 1995, the Commission also prepared two other reports: one on a strategy for integration of Central and Eastern European farming with the Common Agricultural Policy and the other on the impact of enlargement regarding other community policies, especially structural policy.72 The EU Commission questionnaire The next important step was accomplished on 26 April 1996, when the European Commission gave each government of the associated states an extensive ques tionnaire covering 23 areas of the state’s political, economic and social life. Through a Polish Council of Ministers decision, the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance was requested to coordinate the response to the Commission’s questionnaire. In June 1996 the government approved the entire package of responses, which filled 26 volumes. The document was used by the Commission as a basis for pre paration of its Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union.73 Support for the accession in the EU countries In the international political dimension, the push for enlargement was possible due to the strong backing for this process by Germany and the UK in particular. German policy was very consistent in advocating the idea of membership of the Central European countries in the EU. The German motivation for EU enlarge ment had not only an economic, political and geo-political dimension, but also a strong moral dimension.74 Germany and Britain were particularly concerned that failure to finalise prospective membership might intensify economic and polit ical turmoil in CEE, or could even lead to the revival of a dangerous nationalism or put the region in the sphere of Russian influence. Unlike Germany and the UK, France insisted that before enlargement, the EU would have to carry out its own internal reforms. The view was shared by some Mediterranean countries, which also feared the cost of possible enlargement and the fact that some current EU members would lose subsidies and structural funds.75 The progressive integration process was strongly supported by public opinion in Poland. The highest support was noted in 1994 and 1995, when about 80 per cent of the whole population supported integration. Nevertheless, this tendency steadily declined to around 60 per cent in 1997. It seems that, paradoxically, this had an impact on fostering the integration process. The EU understood that Polish public opinion was becoming more and more disillusioned with the EU promises and that Euro-scepticism, after the original Euro-euphoria, was increas ing. Thus, the EU realised that if the Union wanted to keep its influence in
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 49 Central Europe, it had to offer membership to the post-communist countries. However, it was anxious about the complexity of the new wave of EU accession and, in general, they lacked a clear vision of the enlargement process. As Jan Zielonka argued, most EU policies towards CEEC ‘emerged by default rather than by design’. Even though the Union invested financial and political capital in CEEC, this investment lacked a clearly defined strategic purpose. This resulted from three major deficiencies of the Union towards the CEEC: first, there was a lack of vision for the region; second, policies towards CEEC were dominated by the EU’s internal agenda; and finally, the Union failed to reform its own institutional structure.76
Negotiation process The complexities of the negotiation process have many facets. There was a basic difference between the negotiations of Association Agreements and accession negotiations. According to a Commission negotiator: An association negotiation is a game, where you can try to impose your will on the other party. He might not like it and then you go back home and change a bit, but then that is basically it. In an accession game, conversely, we are talking about planning a marriage. And just like in ‘real life’ you cannot have a marriage, when one of the parties after the first day is miser able. At least it will be very costly, since you are bound also to pay for your partner’s problems.77 The process of Poland’s negotiations towards EU accession can be divided into four main stages: screening or the review of Poland’s legislation; preparation of position papers; proper negotiations based on negotiation positions; and settle ment and ratification of the Accession Treaty. The negotiations will be examined in detail in the three case studies. At this stage, I will give a general overview of the negotiation process. Preparing negotiations In the pursuit of EU membership in January 1997, the Polish Council of Minis ters adopted the National Strategy for Integration, a document that laid down the tasks in the process of accession to the EU. This was followed by appointment of an interministerial team responsible for preparing negotiations. On 9 May 1997 the Council for European Integration was appointed as a body of advisors to the chairman of the Committee for European Integration. In June 1997 the Council of Ministers adopted a timetable for implementation of the National Strategy for Integration. In July 1997 the European Commission presented its opinion on the Polish application for EU membership, praising the effort made by the country and, simultaneously, recommending improvements, mainly in the operation of courts, in the fight against corruption, in reform of the social
50 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 insurance and pension systems, in agriculture and in law harmonisation.78 On 16 July 1997 the European Commission published Agenda 2000, a proposal for comprehensive reform of institutions and procedures in the main fields of EU policy and proposed that enlargement negotiations should open with five Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia) and Cyprus.79 In December 1997 the European Council in Luxemburg decided that the Accession Partnership (AP) would be the key feature of the pre-accession strategy, mobilising all forms of assistance to the candidate countries. Thus, its purpose was to set out in a single framework the priority areas for further work identified in the Commission’s Regular Reports on the progress made by Poland towards membership of the Union, the financial means available to help Poland implement these priorities and the conditions that would apply to that assistance. Even though, from a legal point of view, the Accession Partnership was not binding, it provided a basis for a number of policy instruments used to help the candidate countries in their preparations for membership.80 In particular, the AP set out the basis for the National Programme of Preparations for Membership (NPPM) adopted on 23 June 1998.81 Indeed, the AP provisions were implemented through the NPPM. The implementation of the AP provisions and the correlation between the NPPM and the AP provisions were guaranteed by the principle of conditionality, according to which only projects submitted by candidate countries that fully recognised the AP priorities could hope for PHARE financing.82 The AP provisions also opened up the possibility of the accession talks. The official negotiations began on 31 March 1998, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek, in the opening statement to the EU, declared that Poland committed herself to adopt the whole of the acquis communautaire.83 The parties also agreed on two basic negotiating principles. The first negotiating rule was that the position adopted by one of the parties in one nego tiating area in no way would prejudice its position regarding other areas. The second principle was that ‘As long as negotiations lasted and until everything is settled, nothing would be settled.’ This meant that provisional conclusions of a given chapter were subject to the final settlement of the text of the Accession Treaty.84 Screening of Polish legislation The next step in the negotiation process was so-called screening, which is the examination of the conformity of legislation in Poland with the acquis communautaire. In an attempt to get the screening process off the ground quickly, the EU decided to start with the easiest chapters first. The first chapters to be screened were science and research, telecommunications and information tech nology, education and training, culture and audio-visual policy, industrial policy, small- and medium-sized enterprises, common foreign and security policy and
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 51 company law. Confirming the strategy of the EU, these first chapters did not really cause any problems. Poland was the first country to submit its negotiation position on the first seven chapters to the Council and the Commission. The screening process began on 27 April 1998.85 The review of the law in each of the 31 negotiation chapters was divided into multilateral and bilateral parts. The multilateral parts were meant to provide the bare essence of a given fragment of the acquis, whilst the purpose of the bilat eral part was to examine the legislation of particular candidate countries. Screen ing gave the parties a preliminary chance to identify the potential problems that would arise during negotiations.86 After the screening, a draft report was pre pared by the Commission and was sent for approval to the candidate countries. In Poland, the report was accepted by consensus by the Negotiating Team. In certain areas, the Negotiating Team suggested corrections to the draft report. Then the EU considered the proposed corrections and sent a corrected version of the report until the final version was agreed upon.87 Preparing position papers As a result of the screening process, a list of incompatibilities between Polish and EU law was compiled, which resulted in Poland’s response in the form of position papers. The Polish negotiating position was a document divided into chapters and adopted by the Council of Ministers. The document described the legislation in a given field, the extent to which the acquis was transported into Polish law or the time limit within which a given legal act was to be adopted. If a given act could not be (for political, budgetary, economic or social reasons) incorporated into national law before the enlargement date, Poland could ask for a transitional period. Moreover, each negotiating position contained an assess ment of budgetary, economic and social consequences of the paper’s implementation.88 The process leading to the adoption of the position paper included several stages. First, the draft paper prepared by a Task Sub-Group was submitted for debate by the Negotiation Team. Second, the Negotiation Team made the neces sary amendments in accordance with the negotiation strategy. As a next step, the already adopted draft position paper was sent to the Task Sub-Groups 32 (responsible for the analysis and social and economic impact assessment) and 34 (responsible for budget and financing of preparations for negotiations), to appraise, respectively, the social and economic, and budgetary consequences of the obligations contained in the draft position paper. After considering com ments from the Task Sub-Groups, the negotiating team adopted the paper. Fol lowing this, the paper was considered by the Office for European Integration and finally by the Council of Ministers. Then the EU Commission Directorate- General for Enlargement prepared a response in the form of an EU common position.89 This enabled the opening of negotiations, in a given area based on negotiating positions, to take place. This process of the preparation of Poland’s position papers is described in Figure 3.1.
Task Sub-Groups within the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations to the European Union Prepare a draft position paper
The Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union headed by the Chief Negotiator Approves the draft position paper
Task Sub-Group 32 of the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations to the EU
Task Sub-Group 34 of the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations to the EU
Appraises the socio-economic effects of the negotiation obligations contained in the draft position paper
Appraises the budgetary effects of the negotiation obligations contained in the draft position paper
The Committee for European Integration headed by the Prime Minister Recommends adoption of a position paper to the Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers Adopts the position paper
The Council of the European Union The position paper is handed over to the permanent representative of the Member State currently holding the EU Presidency
Figure 3.1 Preparation of Poland’s position papers (source: Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report Accession Negotia tions, p. 18).
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 53 Negotiations based on negotiation positions The candidate countries could then prepare and send an extensive commentary on the EU common position. This commentary was prepared in Poland in the form of a draft document by the Negotiating Team in cooperation with an appro priate task group and interested ministers, and then adopted by the Negotiation Team. As a next step, the proposed solution was implemented into the Polish position and was presented to the Committee for European Integration and the Council of Ministers as a draft amendment to the position paper, which together with the replies provided by a candidate country constituted a basis for the Euro pean Commission to create a revised common EU position, which was next adopted by the Council of the EU. Finally, when consensus in a given area was reached, the negotiations in that area were considered provisionally closed.90 The Accession Treaty and the ratification process The Accession Treaty was signed by Poland in Copenhagen in December 2002. Then the Treaty was ratified by the EU parliament. The parliament could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’, and had no right to change the text. Its approval was neces sary to sign the treaty. The approval of the Accession Treaty by the European parliament proceeded smoothly. The Treaty was also adopted by the EU parlia ment’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 February 2003. Then the document was ratified by the 15 member states and ten prospective member states. The formal ratification took place either by referendum or by legislative bodies. In Poland, the accession referendum took place on 8 June 2003. In line with predictions and the trend set by other post-communist candidate states, Poles voted overwhelm ingly to join the EU by 77.45 per cent to 22.55 per cent. However, more surpris ingly the 50 per cent turnout required to make the referendum constitutionally valid was also comfortably reached, with 58.85 per cent of Poles voting. The fact that most opposition parties (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) cam paigned for a ‘yes’ vote also helped to de-couple the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in the extremely unpopular government.91
Organisational structure for the accession negotiations It is important to note that the organisational structure for the accession negoti ations is complicated by one major factor. There was one major difference between this and any previous enlargement – the size and complexity of the pro posed accession. No previous accession included as many as ten new members in the process of transition to democracy and market economy. Complexity of the accession negotiations The size of this proposed accession led to the complexity of the negotiations. It should be noted that even though the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 formally
54 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 A European state submits an Application for EU Membership to the European Council The Council of the European Union asks the European Commission to present an Opinion on the application The Commission presents the Opinion on the candidate’s application to the Council The Council unanimously adopts a decision to start negotiations with the candidate state The Council chaired by the Council Presidency conducts negotiations with the candidate state The Commission proposes, and the Council agrees to and unanimously adopts, guidelines for the EU position in the negotiations with the candidate state The draft of the Accession Treaty is agreed on between the EU and the candidate state The Accession Treaty is submitted to the Council and the European Parliament The European Parliament approves the Accession Treaty with a simple majority vote The Council unanimously approves the Accession Treaty The Member States and the candidate officially sign the Accession Treaty The Member States and the candidate state ratify the Accession Treaty Upon ratification the Accession Treaty becomes effective: the candidate state becomes a Member of the European Union
Figure 3.2 Accession process (source: Chart by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA).
offered the prospect of membership to all associated states, this was rather a political gesture, since the decision to offer membership only to a few CEEC could be perceived by those excluded states as a redrawing of geopolitical and cultural boundaries.92 In 1993 there were fewer associate countries (the Baltic states and Slovenia were at that stage excluded), so there was no expectation within the Union that the enlargement process would be so big. However, not only the number of new accession states, but also the different levels at which negotiations took place, influenced the process. In fact, there were several different levels at which negotiations took place. The main two
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 55 were the domestic level within each country, comprising different domestic groups and the national authority, and the international level where the Polish government negotiated with the EU bodies. However, there were other negoti ations on different levels. First, there were negotiations between Poland and the member states of the EU in the Inter-Governmental Conference on Accession. Second, there were negotiations among the current member states of the Union to agree on the EU position for the accession negotiations. Third, there were negotiations among the EU bodies, for example, between the European parlia ment and the Council of the European Union on certain parts of the Accession Treaty. At the same time, negotiations were taking place in each member state to define the position of the government in the negotiations in Brussels. The acces sion also had, to a certain extent, an impact on third parties, countries and inter national organisations, on Poland’s relations with NATO, the World Bank and relations with Russia.93 It would be impossible to examine in detail all possible configurations of negotiations among different parties. The focus of this book is restricted to the interplay between the two levels: the national level, with an emphasis on domestic actors, and the international one – the interplay between Poland’s authorities and the EU bodies. This requires careful examination of the organisa tional structure of the negotiation process on both the Polish and the EU level. Organisational structure of the accession negotiations It should be emphasised that the negotiation process required the setting up of an efficient structure in the administration for working out the negotiation positions. There were two periods in our accession negotiations with two different structures. The first period between 1998 and 2001 was more complex, with more actors involved and more extensive interministerial consultations. In the period between 2001 and 2002, the structure was streamlined to ensure that the decision-making process in the last phase of the negotiations was as efficient as possible. Both structures are described in the next sections. The accession negotiations required the establishment of structures respons ible for their progress both in Poland and in the EU. On the Polish side, we can enumerate two major groups involved in the negotiations: the political leader ship and the Negotiation Team. Political leadership The political leadership was exercised by the Prime Minister supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration and the Governmental Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union. The Prime Minister, together with the above-mentioned officials, adopted the guiding decisions related to the negoti ation process. His efforts were supported by an advisory body, the Interministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations. The Interministerial Team
Council of Ministers: adopted the position papers prepared by the Negotiation Team
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ): • MSZ coordinated the accession negotiations on the political level • Minister was the Head of the Polish Delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession • MSZ assisted the Minister in his duties as the Head of the Delegation to the IGC as well as in his foreign activities as the Government Plenipotentiary • The Department of the European Union • Polish Diplomatic Missions • Representation of Poland to the EU in Brussels
Committee for European Integration (KIE): • Chaired by the Prime Minister – Political Leadership • Composed of selected members of Cabinet including: − The Minister of Foreign Affairs, − The Secretary of Committee for European Integration, − The Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU The Negotiation Team (ZN): • Consisted of 19 members – negotiators • Head: the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU The Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU: • Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister • Deputy Head of the Polish Delegation to the IGC on Accession
Secretariat of the Government Plenipotentiary: • Placed in the structure of the State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister • Support staff of the Government Plenipotentiary • Interministerial coordinating of the negotiation process
Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE): • Supported the Chief Negotiator; the support was provided particularly by: − the Accession Negotiations Department − the Integration Policy Department − the Law Harmonisation Department
Figure 3.3 Scheme of the organizational structure for EU accession negotiations in Poland (1998–2001) (source: Paweł Świeboda, Director, Department of the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, Warsaw World Bank Institute Seminar, Ankara, 28 March 2006).
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 57 Committee for European Integration (KIE): • Chaired by the Prime Minister
The Negotiation Team (ZN): • Consisted on 19 members – negotiators • Head: the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiation to the EU
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) • The Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiation to the EU • Department of the European Union and Accession Negotiations • Support staff of the Government Plenipotentiary
Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) • Law Harmonisation Department • Integration Policy Department
Line Ministries • European Union Departments
Parliament • European Integration Committee of the Sejm • Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm • Foreign Affairs and European Integration Committee of the Senate • Parliament Commission for EU Law (started in 2000) established to speed up the implementation of EU legislation
Figure 3.4 Organizational structure for EU accession negotiations in Poland (2001–2002) (source: Paweł Świeboda, Director, Department of the European Union, Min istry of Foreign Affairs, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, Warsaw World Bank Institute Seminar, Ankara, 28 March 2006).
was divided into sub-task groups, which prepared documentation and proposals of negotiation positions presented to the Negotiating Team.94 The Council of Ministers95 approved the position papers prepared by the Negotiation Team and recommended them to the Council by the Committee for European Integration. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was the head of the Polish delegation to the Inter-Governmental Conference on Accession. A Secretary of State in the Ministry, and simultaneously a Deputy Head of the Negotiation Team, supervised the division of European Integration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.96 The Ministry also assisted in the conducting of foreign
58 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 activities of the state secretaries in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, par ticularly the Chief Negotiator. In the period of 2001–02, it conducted the negoti ations after the transfer of the Chief Negotiator from the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. In 2001 a single Department of the European Union and Acces sion Negotiations was created.97 Finally, the diplomatic missions in the candidate and EU member states ful filled a key role in co-ordinating foreign contacts and organising multilateral and bilateral meetings within the framework of the negotiation process.98 In addition to the governmental prerogatives, one must mention the less formal role of the President in accession negotiations. According to the Polish Constitution, the President of the Republic is the representative of the State in foreign affairs. The Constitution states that the President ‘shall’ cooperate with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In particular, the Consti tution gives the President the right to ratify and renounce international agree ments99 and also states that the Council of Ministers conducts the foreign policy of Poland. Moreover, it grants to the Council the power ‘to exercise general control in the field of relations with other States and international organisations and conclude international agreements requiring ratification as well as accept and renounce other international agreements’.100 Parliament also had an important role to play, especially in the implementa tion of Polish negotiation obligations. Collaboration with the two chambers of Polish government, the Sejm and the Senate, gave legitimacy to the negotiations of the government. In the process of accession negotiation preparation, the par liament was presented with the main negotiation documents. The Chief Negotia tor submitted the position papers to parliament and presented them to the Speakers of both Houses, the Chairmen of the Sejm European Integration Com mittee and the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs and European Integration Committee. The Chief Negotiator and the Members of the Negotiation Team participated in parliament ary debates on European integration. The parliamentary debates pertaining to EU integration played a vital informative role. During the debates, the representa tives of the government presented before the parliament, the state of the acces sion negotiations and addressed the queries of the Member of Parliament. The Sejm was regularly presented with information on the negotiation process pre pared by the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU. It contained information on the negotiation and harmonisation pro cesses and was updated every half year. The MPs also received the full texts of the Polish position papers.101 The next key player was the Committee for European Integration, the supreme organ of state administration charged with programming and co- ordinating the policy of Poland’s integration with the European Union. The Committee was composed of the Chairman of the Committee, the Secretary and the key ministers responsible for foreign affairs, internal affairs, economy, agri culture and justice. The major task of the Committee included the resolution of issues relating to the process of Poland’s integration with the EU, presenting a
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 59 programme of adjustment and integration tasks to the Council of Ministers, and drafting legal acts underlying these actions. The administrative support structure of the Committee for European Integration was the Office of the Committee, which comprised several departments of which the Law Harmonisation Depart ment, the Integration Policy Department and the European Legislation Depart ment played the key roles.102 The Negotiation Team The 18-member Negotiation Team was responsible for the formulation and implementation of the negotiating strategy, including the elaboration of position papers and other documents. The team, headed by the Chief Negotiator, con sisted of members of the rank of Secretary or Under-secretary of State nomi nated by the Prime Minister.103 The key role was played by the Chief Negotiator, who was officially titled as the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union. The position of the Government Plenipotentiary was initially filled by a Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and in 2001 it was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.104 The tasks of the Chief Negotiator included the conceptual preparation and co-ordination of the negoti ation process. His primary tasks also included: setting the agenda of team meet ings; inviting guests of honour; convening and chairing team meetings; signing resolutions on behalf of the team; supervising the implementation of team res olutions and decisions; and finally, representing the Team to outside bodies.105 Moreover, with the Prime Minister’s consent, the Plenipotentiary could present to the Council of Ministers legal acts regarding the scope of his work. The Chief Negotiator was also obliged to present regular reports on his activities.106 In practice, the scope of activity depended also on the personality of chief negotiators. It should be emphasised that Jan Kułakowski and his team were rather focused on implementing the overall political strategy,107 whilst during the Jan Truszczyński term the spotlight was on the details of the negotiation pro cess.108 Their differences were determined by their respective different back grounds. These differences are presented in Table 3.1. Indeed, the different negotiating styles had an influence on negotiations. In February 1998 Jan Kułakowski announced to the Sejm European Integration Committee that strategic guidelines for Poland’s negotiators at the EU accession talks in Brussels would be submitted to the Sejm following their approval by the government. It was planned to split up Poland’s Negotiation Team into political counselling and negotiating sections. The political section would coordinate the team’s work, but make no decisions unless forced to do so under extraordinary conditions. The negotiating section would largely consist of ministry staff and the counselling section would have chairs available for trade and employer union representatives. The team’s job was to prepare negotiating positions and tactics for each of the negotiation chapters. Its members acted as a collegiate body rather than one
60 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Table 3.1 Different negotiation styles of the two Polish chief negotiators Polish chief negotiator
Jan Kułakowski
Jan Truszczyński
in office
1998–2001
2001–2003
background
academic, trade union and diplomatic background
diplomatic and public administration background
negotiation style
informal
formal
objectives
focused on achieving basic strategic and political goals
focused on technicalities of the accession process
extent of the focus on the domestic public opinion
paying attention to the role of public opinion and domestic groups
paying less attention to the role of public opinion
strategy
more focused on package deals and political bargaining strategy
more focused on ‘salami slicing’ tactics
representing the ministers of whom they were the delegates. The major task of the Negotiation Team included: formulating opinions on European Commission reports; revising draft negotiation instructions; preparing and approving draft position papers of the Polish government; preparing and approving responses to EU queries within the mandate resulting from the position papers; preparing package deals based on negotiation instructions and co-ordinating the entire negotiation process.109 The team held meetings at least once a week and all decisions were reached by consensus. In cases where this proved impossible, voting was conducted. The Chairman–Chief Negotiator had the deciding vote.110 Negotiation structure of the EU Even though my focus is on the negotiation structure within Poland, the nego tiation structure of the EU should be briefly described. As already mentioned, one should differentiate between different actors within the EU. First, the member states were a party to the negotiations. They approved the EU common positions and finally adopted the Accession Treaty. Second, there was the Council of the European Union (including the Presidency). The Council is the most important decision-making institution of the EU, which represents the national interests of the EU member states. Its members are the ministers of the member states responsible for specific fields of activity. The Council holds its meetings in different configurations. The Council of the European Union has legislative powers: in conjunction with the European parliament, on the basis of proposals of the European Commission. It passes regulations, direc tives, decisions and recommendations constituting the core of acquis communautaire.111
Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 61 The Council presented the agreed common positions of the Union and conducted negotiations at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or their deputies within the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession. The IGC was an official forum for accession negotiations. Ministers of Foreign Affairs from candi date states were partners to Ministers of Foreign Affairs from EU Members.112 The sessions of the Council were chaired by the minister of the country holding the Presidency. The Presidency was particularly active in the screening process as well as during the negotiation process. The most important tasks of the country holding the Presidency are mediation and seeking a compromise in the event of conflicts of interest among the member states as well as between the member states and the acceding countries. Finally, the Presidency organises the work of Councils and sets semi-annual and daily agendas of sessions, which have significant influence on the work of the EU.113 In the accession process, the European Commission shared the major responsib ility. The Commission itself did not conduct negotiations, but its duty was to produce the EU draft’s common positions. After submission to the working group for enlargement at the Council of the European Union and consultation among member states, the final version was approved by the Member States’ Ambassadors (COREPER) and then as a common position by the Council of Ministers. Only then was the common position presented to a candidate country.114 Nonetheless, within the Commission, the Directorate General for Enlargement played a particular role, since it conducted the law review process, prepared EU draft common positions and prepared draft legal acts relating to the negotiations. In order to fulfil its duties, the DG for Enlargement worked in 12 task groups, which had been assigned horizontal responsibilities; thus each group was responsible for negotiations in a particular number of negotiation chapters.115 The institutions responsible for approval of the final text of the Accession Treaty were the European parliament, which required an absolute majority of votes, and the EU Council, which needed unanimous approval. Some advisory roles were also played by the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Conclusions This chapter provided an overview of Poland’s path to the EU from the estab lishment of bilateral relations between the EC and Poland, through the Associa tion Agreement, the Copenhagen Summit of 1993 and the submission of the application to the official opening of negotiations. Also, this chapter provided a general overview of the negotiation process and negotiation structures, leaving aside the three case studies to be carefully exam ined in the next chapters. The purpose of this chapter was to give an historical overview of the Polish– EU relations, as well as to explain the overall negotiation structure and process. Without this, it would be impossible to understand and explain the impact of domestic pressure as discussed in the three case studies.
4 Negotiations concerning agriculture
The purpose of this chapter is to describe, analyse and explain the accession negotiations with respect to agriculture. A step-by step description of the negoti ation process will enable us to understand the influence of domestic pressure (mainly public opinion, interest groups and political parties) on the negotiation process. This will help us to understand why the negotiations on agriculture were so important domestically. I will first briefly examine the nature of the CAP system and the impact that CAP might have had on Central and Eastern Euro pean agriculture. While discussing the negotiations, this chapter will first examine the opening of negotiations and the screening process. Second, it will present Polish negotiation positions on agriculture and the EU response towards them. It will explore negoti ations concerning the liberalisation agreement. The liberalisation agreement became a turning point where the negotiations moved from a more technical to a more polit ical phase. Negotiations concerning liberalisations brought more political issues into the debate. The politicisation of negotiations increased after the governmental change that was followed by the acceleration of the negotiation process. A govern mental crisis caused by this acceleration resulted in a stiffening of the negotiation stances of both sides, which finally led to modification and clarification of their positions by both the Polish and the EU sides. This prepared the ground for the Copenhagen accords. Finally, the chapter discusses the provisions of the Copenhagen deal, its clarification and ratification before the Athens Summit. While discussing these problems the emphasis is put on the influence of domestic pressure on international negotiations and on the interplay between different players’ interest groups, political parties, media and public opinion. This chapter highlights strategy and tactics used by both sides, especially in the context of the two-level game approach. It argues that indeed domestic pressure had a far-reaching influence on the negotiation process, especially during the last round of negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit, where tough negotiating stances were put forth by the Polish government. In the case of agriculture, there was a very small domestic win-set in Poland to accept the initial EU proposals (in particular, not granting direct payments and production quotas). Nevertheless, the initial small domestic win-set in Poland was accompanied by a relatively small win-set, in the EU countries, to accept the full subsidies. A final
Negotiations concerning agriculture 63 compromise was achieved by enlarging both Polish and EU win-sets. Thus, the particular emphasis in this chapter will be on the impact of the size of the domestic win-sets during negotiations regarding agriculture, the negotiation pro cess itself and the outcomes of the negotiations. Finally, negotiation strategy and tactics will also be examined.
The nature of the Common Agriculture Policy The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was formally announced in 1957 as one of the key elements of the Treaty of Rome and was developed by the Community in the 1960s and 1970s. Because of EEC regulations, the levels of protection were high and a system of intervention regarding purchases ensured that high prices were maintained when supply exceeded demand. The main reason for this stemmed from the assumption that European agriculture, without protectionist measures, would not survive competition from non-EU countries. Thus, some products where international agreements prevented high protection, were subsidised. The EEC budget and external trade relations led to reform of this policy in 1992. Consequently, two different and contradictory approaches were taken regarding this reform: production control and price reductions compensated by direct payments to farmers. Production control was undertaken either through production quotas (limits on production with penalties for excess production) or a system called set-aside (paying farmers to leave land fallow).1 The 1992 reform of the CAP moved prices closer to world market prices, but it did not tackle the underlying problems of European farming’s dependence on support and the policy’s excessive cost.2 The reform has become even more complex since 1992 and this has made it even more expensive to administer. The production quotas, in particular those applied to milk and sugar, require the monitoring of each individual farm’s production. Price reduction, even though this has moved EC prices in line with world prices, assumes a substantial money transfer from consumers and taxpayers to farmers and food processors in the form of subsidies. Finally, the CAP policy has an impact on the Third World, since it destabilises world prices and makes it more difficult for poorer countries to compete in the agricultural market.3 The next important step towards reforming the system was taken in 1997. Agenda 2000 estimated that extending CAP to the ten Central and Eastern Euro pean countries would amount to an expenditure of e17.8 billion over the 2000–06 period.4 Nonetheless, the estimates presented in Agenda 2000 were based on the assumption that a radical reform would be implemented, entailing a 20 per cent reduction in the intervention price for cereals, 10 per cent reduction in market support for dairy products and 30 per cent in the support of prices for beef. At the same time the Commission proposed a move towards direct income subsidy, that is, a payment in relation to the crop area, with maximum limits to be established for farms receiving direct income subsidy. It also reinforced a rural development policy. Agenda 2000 restated that reductions in market sup port are necessary to make European agriculture competitive at the world level.
64 Negotiations concerning agriculture The March 1999 European Council Summit in Berlin introduced certain corrections to the Agenda 2000 proposals, but did not result in any breakthroughs. One of the major decisions was to establish a 15 per cent reduction in the inter vention price for cereals, which meant greater stability for the market. However, the decision was made that expenditure in agriculture remained constant in real terms, which meant that the European Council failed to reach a decision on a sliding-scale reduction in direct aid as a means of reducing the agriculture bill. Finally, the reform of the dairy sector was deferred.5 The prospect of EU enlargement brought new challenges, since extending CAP to new CEEC has not only political, but also, and more importantly, major financial implications.6 The significant challenges for the EU were the costs of extending the CAP to new members. The importance of agriculture varied widely across CEEC; there was a substantial difference between the significant role the sector played in the Polish, Romanian or Bulgarian eco nomies when looked at in comparison to its relatively minor role in the Czech Republic, Slovenia or Estonia. This problem had a socio-demographic dimension. While in most countries the agricultural sector had been collectivised under the previous regimes, in Poland and Slovenia it resisted this process. This meant that, particularly in the case of Poland, the existence of a substantial private agricultural sector under the previous political system caused prob lems because of the small size of the average farm, which had made it more difficult to compete.7 This created a particular problem that was present during the accession talks.
Opening negotiations and the screening process Before the accession negotiations started, agriculture, together with sales of farmland (negotiated within the free movement of capital chapter) and the free movement of persons, was recognised as a major area of difficulty, and one likely to cause negotiation problems.8 According to the Polish Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski, from the very start of negotiations both the EU and the Polish side realised that agriculture would be the most difficult issue throughout the negotiations.9 Within the chapter on agriculture, the negotiations were initially dominated by the issue of adjustment to the acquis communautaire and modernisation of agriculture. Nevertheless, soon after the screening process ended the subject of acute political controversy regarding the issues of direct payments and production quotas arose. Opening of negotiations The Polish–EU negotiations started with both sides taking a different and contradictory position. Even though the discussion concerning the adjustment of Polish agriculture was mentioned from the time Poland applied for member ship, it did not have any formal framework. The initial negotiation process began in 1997. On 20 July 1997, Rolf Timans, the European Communities
Negotiations concerning agriculture 65 representative in Warsaw, and the Deputy Agriculture Minister Jerzy Plewa met to discuss Poland’s request for EU assistance for Polish agriculture. They exchanged views on the EU’s evaluation of the progress of Poland in the adjustment of its agriculture to EU standards, in the context of the Agenda 2000. Poland asked the EU for aid necessary for the adjustment of the agricultural and food industry for the years 1998–2000. The Union, however, planned to grant this aid after the year 2000. According to an initial proposal as set out in the Agenda 2000, the estimated amount of aid was up to 500 million ECU annually for every state invited to the negotiations, in addition to an annual one billion ECU for regional structural aid. Poland planned to use the EU aid for the modernisation of the agricultural and food sectors, integrated development of the countryside, and the creation of systems and administrative structures for the introduction to the EU legislation.10 The European Commission, in its first 1997 Opinion on Poland, emphasised that the EU’s CAP could be applied in Poland on accession ‘in the medium term’, if veterinary and plant health requirements could be met and the administrative structures to apply the CAP were strengthened. At the same time, the EU admitted that establishing a coherent structural and rural development policy ‘would require a long-term approach’.11 Just after the official opening of negotiations in April 1998, Brussels, rather than granting financial aid, was more willing to grant transitional periods. Franz Fischler, the EU Commissioner for agriculture, strongly emphasised this during a visit to Warsaw on 12 April 1998. He admitted that ‘It is understandable that Poland is interested in gaining full access to the funds from the very start’, but added, ‘We must be realistic. This is not possible. I do not understand these demands.’12 Indeed, this incident indicated that the EU was rather cautious in promising any subsidies. In May 1998 Fischler was more willing to make a compromise, and he confirmed that the EU would assign one billion ECU to assist economic reforms in countries aspiring to EU membership and 500 million for agricultural reforms. He assured Poland that since it had the highest agricultural potential among the EU aspirants, it would get a large part of the assistance funds from the year 1999 until the signing of the Accession Treaty.13 Screening process In September 1998 the accession countries started mutual legislation compatibility screening in agriculture. Poland began bilateral screening on 7–8 October 1998. The essential questions for the applicant countries during the screening were related to how fast they would be able – and would choose – to bring their national agricultural sectors in line with EU norms, and how far they would choose to seek transitional periods for parts of the acquis communautaire. Hence, particular attention was given to the relevant legislation concerning the rules governing the produce market, such as farm and production registration systems, procurement, produce processing and market interventionism.14
66 Negotiations concerning agriculture According to a senior Polish official involved in the negotiation process, screening sessions, especially in the initial phases, were very fruitful and conducted in a friendly atmosphere. There were also several informal meetings and consultations with negotiators from the other acceding countries during the screening sessions. In his opinion, it was a good forum for the exchange of information. As a result, Polish negotiators were informed of the attitudes of the other countries during the screening.15 This opinion was confirmed by Władysław Piskorz, a member of the negotiating team. As he stated, there were extensive consultations and exchange of documents between the acceding coun tries. There were also consultations on how to make counterclaims against positions of the EU‑15 countries. The cooperation was extensive and as he argued,‘helped us to better achieve our goals’.16 These informal meetings also helped to coordinate stances with regard to direct payments and production quotas.17 Just a day after the first screening session, Poland openly declared that it did not want transition periods in agriculture, claiming it would fully adjust its farming to EU standards by the end of 2002. Concurrently, the Polish Deputy Minister responsible for agriculture, Jerzy Plewa, admitted that before this could take place, Poland had to prepare the ground for the community organisation of markets, and for intervention consistent with EU principles.18 During this time, Polish public opinion on accession began to change. Simultaneously with the opening of the screening, in September 1998, a major public opinion poll on assessment of Polish agriculture was conducted. Although a con siderable majority of Poles supported the entry into the EU, there was a decline in public support for EU membership. This was especially so when compared with the 80 per cent in favour in May 1996, when indeed the highest level of acceptance for Poland’s entry into the EU was recorded. In the 1998 survey, the number of persons declaring their willingness to vote for Poland’s membership in a referendum had fallen to 63 per cent. The reason for the fall appears to be the strong fear connected with Poland’s entry into the EU and the area of agri culture. Despite Poland’s anxiety about the situation of rural Poland and agricul ture after Poland’s entry into the EU, respondents were rather conservative in their views. They opted for defending the interest of Polish farming. Exactly half of the respondents believed that domestic agricultural produce should be protected by high import duties on agricultural products, while only two-fifths sup ported gradual abolition of these duties in order to force Polish agriculture to become more competitive. The concept of restructuring agriculture, for instance, supporting the development of large, efficient farms and encouraging owners of small farms to seek employment outside agriculture, had relatively low social support (27 per cent). Generally, the number of respondents convinced that Poland’s membership in the EU would be beneficial for city dwellers was much larger (31 per cent of those polled) than the number of those who believed that it would improve the situation of the Polish countryside significantly.19 This information shows that public opinion did not support liberalisation and thus liberalisation talks with the EU seemed to be particularly difficult.
Negotiations concerning agriculture 67
IN A FEW YEARS TIME POLAND MAY BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. IN VIEW OF THIS FACT SHOULD WE: Protect Polish agriculture from foreign competition by maintaining high import duties on agricultural products for as long as possible
50%
Gradually decrease duties of foreign agricultural products in order to make Polish farming more competitive
40%
Difficult to say
10%
First of all, support development of large, efficient farms. At the same time, encourage owners of small, inefficient farms to seek employment outside agriculture
27%
Offer equal support to large, medium and small farms
64%
Difficult to say
9%
Figure 4.1 Agriculture – what Poles should do when they become a member of the EU (source: CBOS, September 1998).
In early November 1998 the Commission had published a progress report on the screening process. The report provided data for the situation in agriculture and made an assessment of the government’s agriculture policy together with a number of policy recommendations. Even though the report was rather complimentary about Poland and was warmly welcomed in Warsaw, it emphasised the need for the upgrading of veterinary and phytosanitary facilities to EU standards. Moreover, it stressed the necessity of establishing sectoral market organisations and law enforcement. Finally, the document called attention to administrative capacity relating to management of the CAP and veterinary administration at the central level.20 The first few months of 1999 can be characterised as a standstill in relations.21 According to a senior Polish official involved in the negotiation process, this was due to a lack of determination on both sides to accelerate the negotiation process.22 In May 1999 the EU accused Poland of increasing sugar production in order to gain a higher production quota after joining the EU. The Polish side rejected this claim, counterclaiming that the Union was trying to force Poland into lower
68 Negotiations concerning agriculture production levels in sugar and also in other areas of farming output.23 This indeed was the first incident in the EU battle for liberalisation and was understood as introducing a free market approach towards agricultural trade with Poland. According to a senior Polish official involved in the negotiation process, the EU treated liberalisation as an element of their negotiation strategy and hence brought the liberalisation agreement leading towards supporting free movement of agriculture goods to the negotiation table. This strategy was prompted by the fact that the EU preferred to complain that Poland did not want to liberalise their agriculture sector as opposed to discussing direct payments or production quotas.24 Indeed, the EU had used liberalisation as an element in creating pressure during the negotiation process.25 Furthermore, as a senior-level EU official argued, liberalisation was a very important point for the EU and as such was also used in negotiations.26 In July 1999 the Union offered Poland a significant change in the rules for food trade, according to which both sides were to abolish customs duties on farm products and export subsidies, replacing them with incrementally increased import quotas.27 However, a serious conflict occurred when on 21 September 1999 Fischler sent a letter to the Polish Agriculture Minister, Artur Balazs, expressing concern over Poland’s plans to raise duties on a range of agricultural and food imports from the EU. According to Fischler, the Polish government should have consulted the EU before it made its decisions to raise tariffs on sugar, wheat and dairy products imported from EU countries. The hikes, the EU believed, were incongruent with the EU’s proposal to liberalise agricultural trade with the candidate countries. Jerzy Plewa promised that Fischler’s letter would not cast a shadow on the planned talks on liberalisation. At the same time, he made it understood that Poland would continue to protect its agricultural market, especially since the EU was protecting its own market to a much greater extent than Poland was.28 In October 1999 Poland declared that from the beginning of 2003, its target date for joining the EU, Polish agriculture would be ready to adopt the CAP. It seems that this date was rather unrealistic, mainly because of the delay in the implementation of the IACS system. However, Poland also expected that its agricultural sector would share in all the CAP benefits, primarily subsidies to agricultural production.29 Minister Balazs wanted the 2000 export quota of agricultural goods to the EU to be reduced by 50 per cent. Limiting the quota was the only way for Poland to protect the domestic market.30 On 13 October 1999 the Commission published a report on Poland’s progress, which emphasised challenges to the integration of Poland’s agriculture into that of the EU. It emphasised the need for a ‘coherent structural policy’ as a first step in this direction. Moreover, the report called for accompanying policies designed to support and transform rural society. The Commission also criticised price support and increasing protectionism as worsening rather than enhancing the future of the agriculture sector. Indeed, the EU was very much pushing towards liberalisation and used the report to put pressure on Poland to liberalise the sector that was much more beneficial for the EU than for the Polish side, since the EU was better for
Negotiations concerning agriculture 69 liberalisation than the Polish side. Nevertheless, according to a senior-level EU official, by insisting on the liberalisation agreement, the EU wanted to protect Poland from ‘shock therapy’ when one day high tariffs would have to be removed, causing a major disturbance in the agriculture market.32 Even though progress in adoption of the acquis was made, the report also argued that the planning and budgetisation of the necessary institutional structures remained outstanding.33 It did claim that some progress had been made with the reorganisation of the veterinary and phytosanitary services. The docu ment agreed that the agricultural structural policy document adopted by the gov ernment in July 1999 was only a first step towards a rural development policy and stated that significant attention would be required to ensure that this policy would correspond with EU requirements.34 The report summarised Polish efforts and finished the screening process that was finally concluded in November 1999. 31
Presenting negotiation positions on agriculture On 16 December 1999 the Polish government submitted its negotiating position to the EU Commission in Brussels. The negotiating position envisaged targets for preparing Poland’s farming sector for EU entry by 2003. Poland expected full access to the Union’s subsidy system, however it decided not to ask for any transition periods in agriculture.35 Polish negotiation targets Poland had four basic negotiation goals. The first of these was the full incorporation of Polish agriculture into the Common Agriculture Policy in order to ensure that Polish agriculture and rural areas would be fully supported by the CAP mechanism, including subsidies with regard to prices, income and structural development, while allowing equal access to direct payments.36 The second was to set up a high level of production quotas, in particular regarding dairy products, sugar, isoglucose, potato starch, dried fodder and raw tobacco.37 The third goal was to ensure the maintenance of stable income sources for agricultural population. Finally, the negotiation strategy assumed the inclusion of the Polish agro-food products market into the Single European Market.38 Achieving these targets was considered as a way of ensuring that Polish farmers had conditions for equal competition in the common market and as a way of accelerating and modernising agriculture and the rural areas. According to the Polish government, the estimated cost of adjusting the Polish agriculture to EU standards would be 25 billion zlotys and would be spread over six years. Poland had indicated its intention to accept the Community acquis under the CAP and not to demand transition periods per se to come into compliance. It was explicitly asking for access to direct payments under the agriculture section of Agenda 2000 immediately following accession. Furthermore, Warsaw had presented 60 requests for special treatment ‘limited in time’ and emphasised that it reserved the right to review its position, notably in
70 Negotiations concerning agriculture the light of the evolution of EU agricultural legislation. Indeed, such an approach corresponded with a basic rule of the EU negotiations according to which ‘nothing was settled until everything was settled’. Polish negotiators were fully aware that Agenda 2000 did not provide a budgetary margin for granting direct aid to new Central and Eastern European member states before 2006. Warsaw therefore argued that this decision should be open to negotiation, as it was deemed discriminatory and a source of distortion of competition. Polish experts pointed to a report from the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which suggested that Eastern Euro pean countries’ membership in the EU would only succeed if they received fair treatment, ensuring they benefited from all the advantages extended to member states, including direct payments. Finally, the Polish negotiating position also expressed the following more detailed demands:39 1 2 3 4
The setting of reference periods for rapeseed (and in particular the payment of direct aid to producers in this sector). Gradual incorporation into the CAP’s integrated administration and control system (IACS) and European co-financing for its implementation (as was the case for other member states). The existence of a safeguard clause which would permit the country to temporarily close its borders, under the control of the Commission, in case of ser ious market imbalances caused by imports from one or more member states. The retention of stricter Polish standards in the plant health field to prevent the introduction of diseases or insects not currently found in Poland.
The setting of negotiation targets was considered by Prime Minister Buzek as an important step towards ensuring success in negotiations and prompted the govern ment to develop a social dialogue with its domestic partners, the major farmers’ unions including Kółka Rolnicze, which were expressing farmers’ views. In par ticular, farmers were demanding protectionism of the Polish market, but at the same time were increasing financial aid from the EU. According to Buzek, the government’s major aim was to ensure support for its policy from domestic opinion. As he stated, the attitude of the public towards the accession negotiations was noticed by the government and influenced the decision-making process.40 As the Polish Chief Negotiator admitted, even though the farmers’ lobby was powerful in both the EU and Poland, in the EU countries it represented a rather small group. Thus, the Polish farmers’ lobby had a huge impact on every govern mental proposal, no matter whether it was a right-wing or left-wing government.41 EU response to the Polish position The majority of the EU leaders excluded the possibility of extending direct farm payments to new member states from the former Eastern bloc, arguing that it would be ‘too costly’.42 In addition, the EU budget for 2000–06 had no funds to
Negotiations concerning agriculture 71 extend the direct payment scheme. Franz Fischler stated, ‘Giving generous direct farm payments to poorer new members would distort local economies and remove any incentive for reform.’43 According to a senior-level EU official, this argument became a key element of the EU negotiation position.44 According to Władysław Piskorz, such an approach was an element of the EU strategy. Thus, the Polish side counterclaimed that it would be impossible to reform the agriculture sector without having money. The Polish side was rightly emphasising that other EU countries such as Spain and Greece entered the EU on better terms.45 In this case, the Polish side used a so-called dead-weight catching strategy.
Negotiations concerning the liberalisation agreement Brussels was not very willing to discuss direct payments and production quotas. Instead, they accused Warsaw of breaking the liberalisation agreement that would expand free trade of agricultural goods. According to a Polish senior official involved in the negotiation process, the EU, instead of giving a direct response to the Polish proposals as set out in the position papers, focused on liberalisation and used this issue as part of their negotiation strategy.46 Soon after this, negotiations concerning agriculture were dominated by a single-issue liberalisation agreement. EU critique of Poland In December 1999 Fischler accused Poland of acting against the goals of market liberalisation when it introduced higher duties on EU food products. His critique was prompted by the fact that on 21 December the Polish government had indeed decided to raise customs duties on cereals. Fischler claimed that the Polish side wanted only privileges and was rejecting obligations by, for example, its demands to lower quality standards for products destined for both Poland and EU market at the same time.47 Fischler’s critique was shared by the EU’s main negotiator with Poland, Francoise Gaudenzi. She had warned the Polish authorities that it would be a very bad signal for enlargement if Warsaw were to follow through with a plan to further increase duties on other agriculture products.48 To show its goodwill, the EU had made a proposal for dispersing up to Q3.6 billion to CEEC seeking EU membership within the Sapard programme to help them overcome ‘huge structural weaknesses’ in their agriculture sectors. As the Commission argued, the EU would direct at least some farming aid towards restructuring rather than giving it all in direct payments to farmers. Fischler maintained that direct payments were undesirable initially and claimed that ‘simply grafting our system on could lead to social tensions in the applicant countries’. Consequently, farmers would be given an advantage over other sectors of society and could be discouraged from developing ‘sound agricultural programmes’.49 According to a senior-level EU official, this argument was widely used by the EU negotiators and even became part of the EU negotiation strategy.50
72 Negotiations concerning agriculture As a response, the Polish side counterclaimed that in other poorer accession countries such as Greece, direct payments also put farmers in a better situation in comparison to other social groups, and social tension did not occur.51 The Polish side therefore often used a dead-weight catching strategy, by catching the EU in the dead weight of its former actions.52 Such rhetoric proved to be effective since, in February 2000, Fischler conceded that the Polish farmers may be granted direct subsidies for production during the first few years of Poland’s membership in the EU. Simultaneously, however, he repeated his previous suggestion that EU money should be concentrated for structural aid to help farms modernise equipment and practices to be more competitive.53 With regard to negotiations on liberalising agricultural trade between Poland and the EU, Fischler declared that the EU might consent to lib eralise its food market more quickly than would Poland so as to enable both sides to increase agricultural exports to each other.54 The EU gradually softened its negotiating stances, and to the surprise of some observers in May 2000, the EU Agriculture Commissioner warned that denying CEE the aid could lead to the re-emergence of food mountains. Without direct payments, it would be impossible to implement supply control mechanisms like requiring farmers to set aside land from production. To illustrate, Fischler argued that ‘serious production surpluses could result’. Indeed, this was the first time that the EU commissioner admitted that direct payments were required for a balanced market.55 According to a Polish senior official involved in the negotiation process, the EU realised that it must provide direct payments, however the Commission was under strong contrary pressure from the EU capitals, which, due to strong domestic pressure, wanted to minimise the costs of enlargement.56 In June 2000 the EU again criticised Poland for protectionist measures. The EU Agriculture Commissioner said Poland would not be able to benefit from a free trade agreement between the EU and its prospective new members from 1 July unless it ended its ‘protectionist practices’ in agriculture and cut down tariffs on farm produce from the EU.57 A similar demand was repeated by Commissioner Verheugen.58 Nevertheless, according to a senior Polish official involved in the negotiation process, Verheugen and the rest of the EU negotiators were trying to find an argument to counterclaim Polish demands for equally direct subsidies and high quotas, by saying that Poland wanted full rights, but was not prepared to accept reasonable EU requirements.59 At the same time, the EU emphasised that the negotiations should be a win-win situation. Franz Fischler stressed the need to see enlargement as a two-sided project where both sides would gain from it. As he emphasised: ‘Threats and demands will get us nowhere, negotiations consist of both give and take.’60 Poland had some reservations about liberalising food trade with the EU by eliminating tariff barriers and export subsidies, since such a liberalisation did not seem favourable for the country. According to some studies,61 the limiting of market integration to eliminate trade barrier risks created unequal competition conditions. Even if the EU stopped subsidising its exports, it would still have
Negotiations concerning agriculture 73 numerous other instruments to affect its food trade with Poland. By accepting Fischler’s proposal, Poland would open its food market to EU products without being able to use direct subsidies.62 Signing of the liberalisation agreement According to a senior official involved in negotiations, Poland had no serious alternative but to sign the liberalisation agreement in a slightly modified version, which at this time included certain concessions directed at Poland. As a carrot, the EU endorsed rural development programmes within the Sapard programme for the six candidate countries, including not only Poland but Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia.63 However, as a stick, the EU used a battering ram strategy by saying that other CEEC had already signed the agreement. Thus, under this pressure, after seven months of negotiations, on 28 September 2000 Poland decided to sign the food trade liberalisation agreement.64 According to the deal, import duties were revoked by both parties on over 75 per cent of food products, including fruit, vegetables, horsemeat, livestock and mushrooms. For the remaining, ‘sensitive’ products, such as pork, beef, poultry, veal, milk and wheat, duty-free import quotas were introduced that would be increased by 10 per cent each year. At the same time, the EU agreed to revoke its export subsidies on all products. Poland was the last candidate country to sign the food trade liberalisation agreement, but as Franz Fischler admitted, ‘This agreement had the widest and the deepest scope among all agreements signed in those times with the Central and Eastern European countries.’ The enlargement commissioner, Verheugen, said it was an ‘honest and balanced agreement that opened the way for negotiations on agriculture in a spirit of mutual goodwill’.65 Even though officially Polish negotiators declared their satisfaction, unofficially they argued that the deal, though beneficial for both sides, favoured EU interests, since by nature EU was economically stronger. As one of the senior officials involved in the negotiation process honestly admitted: ‘The deal was more favourable for the EU, however the government had to pay attention to the farmers’ opinion and sell the agreement as a political success.’66 In November 2000, after the agreement had already been signed, the Commission Report brought out a more detailed assessment of the preparations for integration. It stressed that the preparation for the integration of Poland’s agri culture sector into the EU still needed considerable efforts at both the legal and institutional levels.67 Even though the rural development plan had been initiated, implementation was still in a very early stage. It stressed the problems in the area of import barriers and improvement of competitiveness. Overall, as the document concluded, there was only limited progress in meeting the short-term priorities of the Accession Partnership.68 According to a Polish senior official involved in the negotiation process, the purpose of these critical reports was to put pressure on the Polish government. The conclusions of the report were often used to counter Polish demands by saying that Poland demanded full direct payments, without conceding even a
74 Negotiations concerning agriculture slower pace of adjustments to the EU requirements.69 A senior-level EU official responded to this argument by stating that the fact that the EU was using the Commission report to exert pressure on the Polish side was nothing new; ‘This was a kind of measure, of course, that had to be used.’70 The liberalisation agreement was a major step towards accession and a turning point in the negotiations. From then on, negotiations became more politicised and focused on direct payments and production quotas. This period also saw some political changes in Poland.
The change of the government in Poland There were some major changes that occurred during this period to the govern ment in Poland. Nevertheless, the first few months after the signing of the lib eralisation agreement can be characterised as a relative standstill in the negotiations concerning agriculture.71 In April 2001 Poland’s Deputy Agriculture Minister and negotiator with the EU, Jerzy Plewa, had criticised the Euro pean Union for its failure to present a clear position on direct payments for agriculture by candidate countries.72 In July 2001 the EU rejected Polish proposals to adjust the shape of the CAP to the specificity of Polish small farming and small producer groups, especially by granting financial aid to small farming. The second difficult issue was direct payments.73 The Polish side saw light at the end of the tunnel, and as Jerzy Plewa declared, ‘Many Western European politicians have visibly changed their views. Only a few months ago they still said “no” to direct payments for Poland’s agricultural sector.’74 However, according to a senior-level EU official involved in the negotiation process, Jerzy Plewa was really under great political pressure, as he explained: ‘On the one hand, he had to explain at home what was going on and on the other, explain to us that it is difficult to go home with results that are not acceptable.’75 There was, however, a political reason behind the slowing down of the nego tiation process. The summer of 2001 was a difficult time for the AWS, which was in power at that moment, since their support declined to 7 per cent and it became obvious that the opposition Democratic Left Alliance was going to win the September 2001 elections. Just a few months earlier the Liberal Freedom Union left the coalition and the government was politically weaker. Under such circumstances, the government tried to avoid controversial decisions related to the EU negotiations. The primary opposition, mainly the Democratic Left Alliance, used this opportunity to warn against delaying Poland’s entry into the European Union. The opposition used every opportunity to severely criticise the Buzek govern ment, especially arguing that postponing Poland’s entry date until 2004 would mean that the negotiation strategy of Jerzy Buzek’s government had broken down. Nevertheless, as Jan Kułakowski described, the slowing down of the negotiation process was a side-payment for keeping the direct subsidies. We could not slow the direct payments, but this would be regarded as an even bigger mistake.76
Negotiations concerning agriculture 75 The new coalition and the acceleration of the negotiation process In October 2001, following a parliamentary election, a new coalition government created by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) came into power. Interestingly, the two parties held quite diverging attitudes towards European integration. The goal of the SLD was to demonstrate to the voters that its politicians were in favour of EU membership, and that Poland would join European structures smoothly if they were elected. The PSL tried to convince the voters that it was only by voting for that party’s candidates that the full protection of their interests would be ensured in the upcoming accession talks. Whilst SLD was referring to EU membership as a win-win situation, the PSL was referring to the image of negotiations as a zero-result game in which Poland could gain something only if the EU would lose something at the same time. The change of government and the acceleration of the negotiation process brought more attention from the Polish media. In November 2001 the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita claimed to have uncovered a scandal involving the implementation of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) in Poland. According to the daily, the implementation might cause problems for Poland’s accession negotiations and reduce the aid that the country was receiving from pre-accession funds. Nevertheless, Petra Erler, Member of the Cabinet of Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen, partly defused the scandal, by saying: ‘The story is strongly exaggerated.’77 According to Jarosław Pietras, a member of the Negotiation Team, the Polish media were at that time behaving like a wind that would blow in different directions depending upon the particular whim of the moment. They neither opposed the government nor supported it. However, if any problems occurred, they were often exaggerated just to make a front page story.78 A similar view was shared by a senior official involved in the negotiation process, Władysław Piskorz, who argued that some Polish journalists were trying desperately to make the front page without considering whether their behaviour would act against Poland’s interest. As a result, some of them made negotiations more difficult for the Polish side.79 As the former Prime Minister Buzek emphasised, the media were pressuring the government to speed up nego tiations because they treated negotiations as a race against time. Nevertheless, the post-communist government was put under even greater pressure to accelerate the negotiations even at the price of the softening of negotiation stances.80 The new coalition government almost immediately decided to speed up nego tiations and soften its negotiation stance on eight out of eleven remaining EU negotiating chapters and to focus on the toughest issues. Even though the gov ernment decided to soften its negotiation stance on the free movement of persons and the free movement of capital, including the most controversial issues within each chapter, the free movement of workers and the purchase of land by foreigners, agriculture, together with the Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments and Financial and Budgetary Provisions, remained the most difficult issues, even though the Polish government had to make certain concessions.81
76 Negotiations concerning agriculture The more flexible approach to negotiations According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, increased elasticity in the other positions was necessary to ensure that Poland would complete negotiations by the end of 2002. This time was considered the prerequisite for joining the EU with the first group of candidates, planned for 2004. Indeed, the new ‘Negotiation Strategy for the Polish government’ was approved by the Polish government on 15 November 2001. Cimoszewicz offered extensive warnings against any negotiating tricks or ultimatums that would leave Poland exposed to the threat of being left out of the first group of candidates. In his statement on the negotiation position he emphasised that the final stage of the negotiations was to be focused fully on matters of utmost importance: agricul ture, regional policy, budget and finance. As he emphasised, Poland’s unique chance was linked, first and foremost, to these chapters. Poland, he said, must do everything in its power not to fail the expectations of its citizens when the time for joining the Union came.82 Cimoszewicz felt great pressure coming from public opinion, which was indicated in opinion polls, and therefore he knew that progress in the negotiations would be one of the most crucial issues regarding public opinion.83 In fact, Cimoszewicz opposed the EU strategy of the battering ram when the EU exerted pressure by referring to the good example of other countries that were ahead of Poland in concluding their negotiations. In the opinion of many Polish negotiators, most Polish media were in fact used by the EU to send a clear message to the Polish public that if the government did not move as fast as the other accession countries, Poland would be left behind.84 The EU used the Polish media, and in particular Polish correspondents in Brussels, to exert pressure on the domestic level, while at the same time exerting external pressure and using the 2001 report to criticise the government.85 In the progress report published in November, the Commission emphasised the lack of a coherent strategy and substantial transformation of the agriculture sector in Poland. Even though there had been some progress with regard to veterinary legislation, the administrative capacity was still weak, in particular with regard to the IACS system and border inspection, both in veterinary and phytosanitary fields.86 With respect to the assessment of meeting the priorities as set up in the Accession Partnership, the report concluded that there was limited progress in meeting its short- and medium-term priorities.87 EU Commission proposals and their critique by the Polish side On 23 January 2002 the EU director in charge of enlargement, Eneko Landaburu, declared in Warsaw that the EU would do ‘all it could’ to finish negoti ations with Poland before the end of 2002. Even though he was reluctant to promise anything concrete, there was a leak that the European Commission was unofficially ready to give from 10 to 30 per cent of what EU farmers receive in direct payments to farmers in new EU member countries. The director warned
Negotiations concerning agriculture 77 that the state administration in Poland and other candidate states were not prepared to receive aid, and added that EU enlargement would not be beneficial to new members. One may argue that the leak was a controlled part of the EU strategy. As Putnam emphasises, a utility-maximising statesman (Level I negotiator) aims to convince his counterpart that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favourable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified.88 Hence by this the EU was saying, ‘Look, there is a possibility of granting you 10 to 30 per cent of direct payments, but this will be difficult and the issue is still under discussion.’ Thus, Poland should have taken what was being offered on the table. On 25 January Fischler signed pre-accession financing agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The agreements outlined EU management and control rules for agriculture and rural development programmes in the candidate countries. The signature was a vital step towards making the pre-accession agri culture programmes operational.89 On 30 January the EU Commission made the recommendation that direct payments should begin at 25 per cent of eligible direct payments upon expected accession in 2004, and were to move up to 30 per cent in 2005 and 35 per cent in 2006 of the level enjoyed by the EU-15 members, and eventually be completely phased in over ten years. The overall agriculture subsidies to the ten candidate countries were proposed to be at Q2.0 billion, Q3.6 billion and Q4.0 billion for the 2004 to 2006 period. According to the proposal, this aid could also be increased with national funds. Franz Fischler commented on the proposal: ‘This is a fair, balanced and reasonable package. Our strategy makes sense in economic, ecological and social terms. It ensures that EU money is well spent in boosting the necessary restructuring process in the new member states.’90 A similar view was shared by another senior-level EU official involved in the negotiation process. As he argued, Poland’s demands were rather unrealistic, since Poland requested immediate introduction of full-scale payments which for the EU was completely out of the question for two reasons: First, this would have made accession impossible for financial reasons since it would be much too expensive. Second, according to many studies we had carried out starting the direct payments at 100 per cent in a country like Poland would lead to enormous social and economic disruption. We would give amounts to farmers, which would be completely disproportionate in comparison to some other social groups.91 Nevertheless, Poland’s prime minister immediately described the European Commission’s proposal to phase in direct payments as ‘disappointing’ and the proposed transition period as ‘definitely too long’, adding that Poland would push for full payments by 2006. Miller asked his advisers to prepare an analysis of the Commission’s position, on the basis of which Poland would form an official negotiating stance. He used the argument that the government, if it were to
78 Negotiations concerning agriculture accept the Commission’s current proposals, would face attack from Euro-sceptic and rural parties, which formed a significant bloc in parliament. Indeed, Miller’s government was criticised for giving too many concessions to the EU, especially by the League of Polish Families, which accused the government of making Poland ‘move toward Europe on its knees’.92 Indeed, this rhetoric was used by the rural and Euro-sceptic parties, since they realised that public opinion, farmers in particular, are sensitive towards rhetoric referring to national pride and inde pendence. This was particularly due to a small win-set among Polish public opinion to accept the EU proposal. The Polish government used a tying hands strategy, based on Putnam’s argument that ‘a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage’.93 The negotiator can use the tactic of saying that he would like to accept his opposition’s proposal, but this would not be accepted by political parties and public opinion in the negotiator’s home country. Indeed, this strategy was used extensively during the negotiation process. As a senior-level EU official noted: I had an impression that the room for manoeuvrability for the Polish negotiator was extremely limited, especially in comparison with negotiators from the other acceding countries. Polish negotiators had problems in making concessions always making reference to the domestic political situation and the public opinion in Poland. My overall impression was that the Polish government was acting under strong domestic pressure.94 Public pressure Opposition parties reflected major areas of public opinion. The payments for farmers proposed by the European Commission were unacceptable for most Poles. In a February 2002 CBOS survey, over half of the respondents believed that Poland should strongly demand full payments for the Polish farmers imme diately after the accession, even if it was associated with the risk of a deadlock in negotiations and the failure of the accession process. The opinion that Poland should demand full payments for farmers prevailed in all social groups. Among the farmers, 10 per cent would accept partial payments and 80 per cent believed that Poland should unconditionally demand full direct payments beginning on the date of the accession. The proposals to accept partial payments while maintaining customs duties for agricultural products did not meet with the respondents’ approval (28 per cent for and 44 per cent against). This solution was supported by 21 per cent of farmers and rejected by 61 per cent.95 Among the general public, 59 per cent demanded full payments for farmers. The Commission’s proposal was not only severely criticised by public opinion, but also by the main opposition parties and by the junior coalition partner, the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL). Jarosław Kalinowski, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for agriculture and the leader of the PSL, called the Commission proposals unacceptable, breaking solidarity between stronger and weaker regions.96 He also added that the Commission proposal was set to be one
Negotiations concerning agriculture 79
IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD POLAND:
59%
Accept partial payments for Polish farmers in the first years of Poland’s membership in the European Union, trying to make them as high as possible
25%
Absolutely demand full payments for farmers from the moment of access to EU, even if it is associated with a risk of deadlock in negotiations and failure of the accession process
16% Difficult to say
Figure 4.2 Do you accept the level of payments for farmers proposed by the European Commission? (source: CBOS, February 2002).
of the crucial factors that would determine the outcome of the Polish referendum on EU accession in June 2003. As he pointed out, ‘I need to convince our farmers to vote for accession [. . .] But how am I supposed to convince them if they are to expect lower incomes after accession?’97 According to Jarosław Kalinowski, it was a serious political dilemma, and he was aware that if Poland would not get a better deal, farmers would not support accession.98 Indeed, opinion polls provided arguments to support his claims, since just after the Commission, proposals were announced the support of the Poles for the accession decreased by 4 per cent. The proportion of the opponents grew by 6 per cent. According to Piskorz, the argument that Poland ‘Feels the breath of public opinion and farmers on its back’ was extensively used as part of Polish negoti ation strategy. Even though the EU side perfectly understood this approach, it still gave Poland a strong argument in the negotiations with the EU.99 Indeed, this was another attempt to use the tying hands strategy. Even though it was part of the strategy for SLD, the PSL was indeed afraid of losing the rural electorate and being taking over by a more radical and Euro-sceptic party – the Self- Defence. Jarosław Kalinowski admitted that the Commission’s proposals on the financing of enlargement increased the public’s opposition and also that of some parliamentary groups to EU membership.100 Indeed, it was not that difficult to predict that MPs from all quarters would politicise the issue, and especially criticise the proposed level of direct subsidies for farmers. A week later, Kalinowski reiterated the warning that if the EU states insisted on keeping the subsidies for new EU states at a level inferior to that of the payments for present EU states, farmers in Poland would seek to introduce taxes on present EU farmers’ products, as they would have a competitive advantage in comparison to farmers from
80 Negotiations concerning agriculture
HOW WOULD YOU VOTE IN A REFERENDUM:* January 2002 February 2002
69%
For Poland’s access to the European Union
65%
18%
Against Poland’s access to the European Union
24%
13%
Difficult to say
11%
*Answers of persons declaring an intention to take part in the referendum on Poland’s access to EU
Figure 4.3 How would you vote in a referendum on EU accession? (source: CBOS, February 2002).
new EU states.101 Kalinowski used a modified threat strategy. He threatened that there would be certain unpleasant repercussions for the EU. In order to pacify these threats, Franz Fischler gave assurances that farmers’ incomes would increase after the accession. Thus, as he argued, farmers from new member countries would immediately get access to guaranteed prices thanks to intervention purchases and would also benefit, since the prices of most farm produce would go up.102 In late February and March, the parties left aside negotiation on agriculture and focused on negotiating and closing another two chapters. On 22 March 2002 the chapters on the free movement of capital and on taxation were signed. Jan Truszczyński, Poland’s Chief Negotiator, declared in Brussels that closing the two negotiation areas ‘confirmed that Poland remains decidedly on the right track and that the Polish negotiation strategy, designed to successfully complete membership negotiations by the end of the year, was feasible and realistic’. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, expressed satisfaction
Negotiations concerning agriculture 81 with the agreement with Poland on the sale of farmland, one of the most controversial issues of the negotiations. As he declared: ‘Closing negotiations with Poland on the free movement of capital is a turning point.’103
Acceleration in negotiations and the governmental crisis Just after the two sides concluded negotiations in the other two controversial issues, the negotiations on agriculture accelerated. In order to support their positions, both sides decided to back their arguments with expert opinions. In March 2002 the EU presented a report. The report considered four different policy scenarios (‘no enlargement’, ‘introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) without direct payments’, ‘CAP with direct payments’ and ‘Candidate Country Negotiating Position’), which showed that even under the most pessimistic restructuring scen arios, EU accession would have positive effects on the income of farmers in the candidate countries. The report also underscored the Commission’s view that imme diately paying 100 per cent of direct payments would create significant social distortions and inequalities and would hamper the necessary restructuring, because farmers’ incomes in the candidate countries could more than double.104 Nevertheless, according to Piskorz, this argument was part of a wider EU strategy. Soon after, the Polish side responded to these arguments by using their own estimates.105 Just two weeks after the Commission report was presented, Poland’s Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA) prepared a report that stood in clear contrast to the EU estimates. Polish experts assessed European Commission proposals as disappointing, especially the variable level of the direct payments for new members. According to the report, the proposals on direct payments appeared to violate EU competition law. By granting 25 per cent of the payments to candidates at the beginning, the Commission was prepared to make a supplement with them from the national funds, but only up to the level of payments received by present members. The report undermined the Commission’s argument that a situation where farmers from new member states received more support than present members would be contrary to article 87 of the EC Treaty on equal competition. The report stated that the Commission did not recognise the discrimination. Much attention was paid to production quotas proposed by the Commission, which meant that Poland would remain a net importer of agro-food products from EU member states.106 The role of the farmers’ unions and public opinion The report estimates provided strong political arguments that were widely used in negotiations and in the public debate. These estimates were used not only by the Polish government but by farmers’ unions to criticise the EU.107 As the chief of the leading Polish farmers’ union Kółka Rolnicze,108 Władysław Serafin stated EU proposals concerning the conditions for farmers from candidate countries would preclude Polish membership. As he argued, the proposal made Poland a second-class member in the EU. He argued that ‘If we are to go to the European
82 Negotiations concerning agriculture Union and lose our national economy, I don’t want such a Union.’ The leader of the biggest farmers’ union was also backed by Jarosław Kalinowski, who agreed that the proposed level of direct payments for agriculture was unacceptable to Poland.109 The FAPA report provided very strong arguments that were widely used by the government’s political parties and interest groups.110 These political declarations were strongly supported in the opinion polls. In a CBOS opinion survey done in May 2002, only 37 per cent of farmers declared their support for the EU integration.111 According to a specialist report prepared by the Warsaw-based Institute for Public Affairs, 51 per cent of rural area inhabitants and 59 per cent of farmers declared that Poland should not join the EU unless equal conditions of membership (direct payments and other subsidies) would be implemented immediately after the accession.112 Even though the rural population and farmers, in particular, demanded subsidies, 55 per cent thought that the EU subsidies would not decrease their poverty and only 28 per cent argued the opposite. The pessimism of these groups was obvious, since 52 per cent of farmers declared that subsidies would result in increased unemployment and 70 per cent argued that it would cause conflicts within the rural popula tion.113 At the same time, more than 85 per cent of rural inhabitants and 90 per cent of farmers were afraid that the accession would lead to the bankruptcy of many farms, whilst 71 per cent and 77 per cent respectively were afraid that the enlargement would increase unemployment within the sector.114 These statistics show a small domestic win-set within the major farmers’ unions and public opinion to accept the conditions offered by the EU and indeed made the prospects for possible future ratification more difficult.115 EU position before the Seville Summit On the EU side, the direct payments for some countries were also unacceptable. On 11 June 2002 the EU governments meeting before the Seville Summit failed to agree on granting any direct payments to farmers in candidate countries. Ger many, the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden led opposition to payments to the ten candidates.116 At the same time, the EU heads of state warned that the objective of completing accession talks by the end of the year could only be met if each candidate country adopted a ‘constructive and realistic approach’. The EU leaders were seeking to prepare the candidates for tough negotiations. The situ ation was made even tougher because of huge EU internal problems in reaching a common position to present to the candidates.117 On 28 June 2002 Truszczyński reiterated in Brussels the major goals by focusing on equal competitive footing for Polish farmers within the EU Single Market, especially with regard to direct payments. The second fundamental element, emphasised by Poland, was ensuring a high level of production quotas.118 Indeed, the Polish side had used the dead-weight catching strategy by catching the EU on the dead weight of its former action and sending a message saying ‘Sorry, but we can not accept your offer, when it is less generous than the one you gave to the countries during previous enlargements.’119
Negotiations concerning agriculture 83 Crisis within the coalition The political situation in the country became more complex because of the internal conflict within the coalition parties in Poland. In early July 2002 the Cabinet decided to delegate decision-making in the area of negotiations concerning agriculture from the Minister of Agriculture to the Minister for European Affairs, Danuta Huebner, who was seen as more compromising than the head of the farmers’ party. It should be emphasised that the decision was made just before the negotiation round on agriculture that was scheduled for 9 July. As a response, Jarosław Kalinowski threatened to step down as the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture if he were to have no control on negoti ation talks in the area of agriculture. His resignation could have triggered a collapse of the governing coalition by the withdrawal of his party. At the same time, Kalinowski warned that Warsaw would impose protective import duties on EU agricultural products should Brussels not grant Polish farmers bigger sub sidies.120 As Jarosław Kalinowski later admitted, he had to strongly oppose this on the public forum since he realised that bringing this issue to the public agenda would strengthen his argument and allow him to keep public support within the farmers’ groups. Indeed, as he pointed out: ‘Even though they called us Euroblackmailers, this brought desirable results since we remained in control of nego tiation positions within agriculture.’121 Kalinowski used a double threat strategy, since he used the threat on the domestic level by threatening his coalition partner and on the international level by threatening the EU that Poland would impose duties. The European Commission called Kalinowski’s threats nothing more than a negotiation trick.122 Indeed, Kalinowski was representing the interest of PSL, which repres ented the farmers’ union, and as Putnam emphasised: ‘The group with the greatest interest in a specific issue is also likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue.’ However, his ‘extreme position’ was blocked by his coali tion partner, since SLD were aware that if they allowed PSL to fix the Level I negotiating position for its issue: ‘The resulting package would be non- negotiable (that is, not-ratifiable in the EU‑15 capitals).’123 What is more, both SLD and the EU were aware that the Polish side did not have a credible BATNA and obviously the threat strategy could be successful only if a negotiating side had a credible BATNA. Kalinowski’s behaviour was prompted not only by his party and the farmers’ unions, but by opinion polls published in May 2002.124 According to 56 per cent of respondents, Poland should have demanded that Polish farmers receive, after the accession, the same amounts as the farmers from the other EU countries, even at the risk of blocking negotiations and leaving Poland outside the EU.125 This opinion was especially popular among the residents of rural areas (68 per cent), particularly farmers (86 per cent). Only 29 per cent of people inhabiting the countryside and 14 per cent of farmers believed that the Polish negotiators should accept partial payments in the first years of member
84 Negotiations concerning agriculture ship. The minimum acceptable level of direct payments in the first years of membership on average amounted to 66 per cent of the payments received by the farmers from the EU countries.126 This figure corresponded with later demands to allow the government to increase direct payments to the level of around 60 per cent. In keeping with expectations of structural changes in rural areas, over half of respondents (55 per cent) believed that EU funds should in the first place be appropriated to boost rural development via the creation of new jobs outside the agricultural production sector.127 Obviously, respondents’ attitudes towards direct payments were tied to their place in the social structure. For this reason, city inhabitants were much more willing to agree to a limitation of direct payments than were persons directly affected by them. But opinions on this issue were also tied to political preferences. Supporters of the League of Polish Families (LPR), of the farmers’ Self-Defence (Samoobrona) party and of the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) flatly refused to agree to partial payments and demanded 100 per cent payments, even at the risk of blocking negotiations and leaving Poland outside the EU. Supporters of parties, in which farmers were not as numerously represented, were more willing to accept the European Commission’s position on direct payments.128 Furthermore, a comparison of February and June (Ipsos-Demoskop) surveys on the positive effects of accession pointed to smaller positive expectations relating to agriculture (down from 34 per cent to 28 per cent).129
100 90 80
Percentage
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Consent to partial payments All respondents
Demand for entire payments Rural inhabitants
Farmers
Figure 4.4 Opinion of rural inhabitants and of farmers regarding direct agricultural payments (source: CBOS, May 2002).
80 70
Percentage
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Consent to partial payments PO
PiS
SLD
Demand for entire payments PSL
Samoobrona
LPR
Figure 4.5 Attitudes towards direct agricultural payments among electorates of political parties (source: CBOS, May 2002). Notes PO – Citizens Platform, PiS – Law and Justice, SLD – Democratic Left Alliance, PSL – Polish Peasants’ Party, Samoobrona – Self-Defence, LPR – League of Polish Families.
60 50
48% 42%
Percentage
40 34% 30
28%
20 10 0
II ’02
VI ’02 Advantageous
Disadvantageous
Figure 4.6 Would accession to the EU be advantageous or disadvantageous for Polish agriculture? (source: Ipsos-Demoskop/OCEI).
86 Negotiations concerning agriculture Pressure coming from political parties and interest groups The closer the Summit came, the more pressure was put on the government. This pressure was mainly exerted by major political parties. Indeed, the agricultural lobby had dominated the Polish debate on joining the EU. Politicians, from the SLD to the LPR, spoke with a single voice. They were becoming increasingly more radical in criticising the negotiations with the EU. The atmosphere in the Sejm was heated due to the fact that debates were broadcasted by the Public TV.130 Therefore, politicians appealed directly to public opinion (farmers in particular) and reflected their moods. The debate was therefore full of theatrical gestures. According to one of the senior officials involved in the negotiation process, most politicians remained completely ignorant in respect to negotiations in agriculture and cared only for the voice of public opinion. Therefore, they simply repeated political slogans that would appeal to the public.131 The negotiations were obviously criticised by the main opposition. Szymon Giziński from Law and Justice (PiS) thundered: ‘The government has not persuaded public opinion that it will defend Polish agriculture and rural Poland in negotiations with the EU bureaucracy.’ The leader of Self-Defence, Andrzej Lepper, advised the Polish Peasants’ Party leader outright: ‘When you go to Brussels, don’t become a good little Jarosław, but rather a tough representative of the peasant class.’ On another occasion, he made the accusation: ‘They are making fools of us; they need us as a sales market.’132 The strongest critique, however, came from the nationalist League of Polish Families. Roman Giertych, deputy head of the LPR Parliamentary Club, had a bleak vision: ‘Poland’s joining the EU will mean the complete elimination of Polish agriculture.’ The LPR specialist on agriculture, Gabriel Janowski, advised the head negotiator to take a revolver with him to the latest round of negotiations in Brussels in order to shoot himself in the head.133 Such a radical atmosphere and the fact of losing farmers’ support prompted PSL to criticise the official governmental stances. As a result, PSL as a coalition party was also in opposition to the position of its own government. As the leader of PSL, Kalinowski rhetorically asked, ‘If our farmers were to be treated worse than those of the 15 member states, what sense would this all make?’ Indeed, Kalinowski’s situation resembled a form of political ‘schizophrenia’. As the Deputy Prime Minister, he had to defend the governmental stances, but as a leader of the PSL, he was forced to criticise it. One group concentrated around Kalinowski realised that compromise was necessary in negotiating with the EU. But Kalinowski could not allow himself to disclose such views, since this would open himself up to attacks from the internal opposition in his own party. In fact, Kalinowski admitted that he was put in an extremely difficult situation and that, provided negotiation conditions did not improve, PSL would simply vanish from the political scene.134 Such a political dilemma was described by Putnam, when he emphasised that ‘Politicians may be willing to risk a few of their normal supporters in the cause
Negotiations concerning agriculture 87 of ratifying an international agreement, but the greater the potential loss, the greater their reluctance.’ Thus, in Putnam’s opinion, the politicians have to calculate ‘How great a realignment of prevailing coalitions at Level II would be required to ratify a particular proposal.’135 The price for this political reluctance was very high. The major sign of internal division in the PSL was evident when one of its prominent MPs, Bogdan Pęk, departed from the PSL and joined the League of Polish Families, calling Kalinowski’s behaviour ‘a sin against the nation and the state’. Pęk added: ‘The conditions that the EU is proposing to us could be proposed to a state that initiated and lost a war, and is being forced to capitulate unconditionally.’136 There were a few different voices in the debate. Marcin Libicki (PiS) believed that rural issues should not dominate the debate on Poland’s joining the EU. ‘Agriculture is important, but it receives excessive exposure,’ he stressed. Libicki represented a different view on CAP in general by arguing that CAP was nonsense and a complete waste of public money that ruined agriculture in the Third World countries. This made him different from his party colleagues. Thus, in his opinion, Common Agriculture Policy should be abandoned. Janusz Lewandowski, PO Civic Platform Deputy Chairman of the Sejm’s European Committee, believed that the ‘topic of agriculture had impaired the relationship of Poland and the EU’. He complained that ‘Every Polish debate on the topic of the EU revolved around agriculture and ended with direct subsidies.’137
Stiffening of the negotiating stances Stiffening of the EU position On 12 July 2002, during his visit to Poland, Commissioner Verheugen said he was disappointed that Polish public opinion was interested mainly in subsidies for agriculture in the EU entry talks.138 Verheugen also used another negotiation trick by arguing that lower payments would be in Poland’s own interest, because ‘the social consequences of directing such funds to a single professional group would be appalling’. He argued that full subsidies would preserve the archaic structure of the Polish countryside. He was also concerned about other professional groups that were in a difficult situation. ‘What about shipyard workers, steelworkers?’ Verheugen asked. ‘It would be unfair and harmful if a relatively small group like farmers were to receive huge aid.’139 According to a senior Polish official involved in the negotiating process, these arguments were part of the EU negotiation tactic to break solidarity within Polish public opinion by getting them to accept the idea that those larger subsidies would benefit only one group and this would be at the expense of others. Verheugen tried to make a direct appeal to Polish public opinion, using the Polish media for that purpose. Contrary to Verheugen’s objections, public opinion simply took the EU position as showing discrimination against Poland, and Verheugen’s remarks did not bring about the desired results from his point of view.140
88 Negotiations concerning agriculture A similar direct appeal to the Polish domestic audience was taken by the EU Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz Fischler, who, just before his visit to Poland, expressed his major objectives as follows: I am looking forward to discussing with the Polish President and the gov ernment and the parliament, but also with farm representatives and the broader public. I think it is time to stress the positives: For the Polish rural sector, being in the EU is far better, and offers a far more stable and secure future, than staying out. I intend to use my trip to Poland to inform, to address the concerns and fears of the population and to reinforce support for EU integration.141 During his visit to Poland, Franz Fischler also called on the Polish government to be realistic and responsible. It would be a big mistake to nourish false illusions within the Polish farm community. The room of manoeuvre for compromises in the negotiation package is limited. Certain member states are reluctant to pay direct payments at all and the EU budget is tight. I do see some limited flexibility for the setting of quotas and other supply management instruments – but only on the basis of solid arguments.142 The EU used a threat strategy, which was believable since the Polish side lacked a credible BATNA. According to Alan Mayhew, negotiations were one-sided by their nature. On the EU side, very general threats were used all the time and amounted to saying: ‘If you don’t agree on this, then of course enlargement will be delayed; you are not among the best groups anyway.’143 This strategy was rather risky, and caused further conflicts and stiffening of the Polish negotiation positions. Stiffening of the Polish negotiation positions Fischler’s intervention drew an immediate negative response. MPs of the LPR and the PSL pulled out whistles and blew loudly as Fischler finished speaking at a joint meeting of the legislature’s agriculture committees. The EU commissioner responded, ‘A lively democracy also needs opposition, and such a demo cracy also needs criticism.’ He also remarked that Polish lawmakers’ ‘specific culture is not comparable to other parliaments in Europe’.144 Fischler assured Kalinowski that the European Commission would do everything to see that Poland received (net) financing from day one. Nevertheless, Kalinowski retorted, ‘But we have the impression, and we fear, that we will have to finance enlargement ourselves.’145 It should be pointed out that Kalinowski’s response resembled a modification of the dead-weight catching strategy. This is when the negotiator is catching his counterpart in the dead weight of his former actions. However, such an argument
Negotiations concerning agriculture 89 is less effective in the case of significant asymmetry between the negotiation partners, since the bargaining power of Poland was weaker in comparison to that of the EU. On 12 September 2002 Jarosław Kalinowski, after meeting Franz Fischler, described the initial negotiation position of the Polish side: ‘In order to guarantee a level playing field, the position will include three possibilities: additional funds in the budget, transfer of funds or selective protection of the market.’ The second proposal, the transfer of funds, involved moving money slated for Unionfinanced rural development programmes into direct payments for farmers. Poland also threatened to impose selective trade protections to cushion its farmers from open competition with the EU‑15 farmers.146 Poland used a threat strategy; however, at the same time, a side-payment strategy was used. As Putnam indicated, on the domestic level (Level II) what counts are not total costs and benefits, but their incidence relative to existing coalitions.147 Thus, the Polish side indirectly suggested: ‘If you agree on the moving money slated for Union-financed rural development programs into direct payments for farmers and to finance direct subsidies from the Polish budget, we won’t have to introduce protective measures.’ Indeed, this resembled a package deal. The Commission, in response, declared that they would present a revised position, which would be discussed during an October EU summit in Brussels.148
Modification of the negotiation positions Modification of the Polish position On 8 October 2002 the Polish government endorsed changes to the EU agricul ture negotiation position by making a concrete declaration that Poland was ready to accept an EU offer regarding lower payments, but under three conditions. First, a right to equalise the level of payouts for Polish and EU farmers from the national budget in order to enable some additional transfers for farmers who were hit hardest by the removal of barriers in agricultural trade between Poland and the EU. Second, they wanted Brussels to redesign some 60 per cent of finan cial sources offered for rural development after accession, and use this money to boost direct payments. The Polish government also foresaw a third measure in case Polish farmers would still face significant losses. That included a tariff protection for some sort of agricultural commodities including grains, tobacco and hops.149 Such protectionist measures and budget transfers reflected public opinion and in particular that of farmers’ interest groups. This policy was sup ported by the FAPA report, which argued that Polish agriculture was unable to generate economic surplus and hence required budget transfers.150 In a CBOS opinion poll conducted in July 2002 (published in October 2002), 83 per cent of respondents agreed that the government should provide more subsidies for the agriculture sector and protect this segment of the market from imported products.151 Even though the majority of the public agreed that Polish agriculture was
90 Negotiations concerning agriculture backward and inefficient, the suggestion that the number of employees within the sector should be decreased was supported by only one-third of the public.152 In another opinion poll conducted in October 2002, about 62 per cent of respondents maintained that Poland should demand equal subsidies (on the same level as the ‘old’ members), even at the expense of blocking Poland’s member ship in the Union. In fact, there was a 4 per cent increase in comparison to a sim ilar poll conducted in April 2002.153
DO YOU AGREE OR NOT WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? All respondents
Farmers
43% 55%
Polish farming is underdeveloped and not efficient enough
2% 63%
There are too many small farms in Poland
26% 11% 33% 55% 12%
The number of people working in agriculture should be reduced
44% 46%
Farmers are not active enough and have little initiative
10% 99%
The state should spend much more on agriculture
0% 1% 96% 0% 4% 90% 6% 4% 61% 26% 13%
The government should organise intervention purchases of agricultural produce The state should protect Polish agriculture by maintaining high customs duties for imported products Better farms must take over the land from those with serious problems
Yes
No
52% 41% 7% 73% 17% 10% 34% 52% 15% 49% 38% 13% 83% 10% 7% 87% 6% 7% 83% 11% 6% 71% 15% 14%
Difficult to say
Figure 4.7 Public opinion on agriculture (source: CBOS, October 2002).
Negotiations concerning agriculture 91 Such a radical view was mainly shared by farmers, whilst the majority of the public opinion was more moderate. Thus, the farmers remained deeply Euro- sceptical. Less than a quarter of them (23 per cent) expected that the integration would have a positive effect on agriculture.154 At the same time, 44 per cent of respondents asserted that the party that protected the farmers’ best interest was the populist and Euro-sceptical Self- Defence. About 36 per cent declared that the Euro-sceptical Polish Peasants’ Party provided the best representation of farmers’ interests.155 EU response to a Polish modified position The new Polish proposals, reflecting the mood of public opinion, were moderately criticised by the EU Agricultural Commissioner. In Fischler’s opinion, even though Poland’s modified position was ‘more realistic’, the possibility of maintaining the tariff system was incompatible with the idea of a common market.156 The EU Commissioner argued that obtaining additional funds for Polish farm subsidies would be ‘exceptionally difficult’. He also noted that the shifting of funds was aimed to support big agricultural producers at the expense of smaller farms, a move which was also incompatible with EU targets. As a response, Jan Truszczyński said Fischler’s remarks were ‘essential’, but he warned that none of the Polish proposals should be ruled out automatically and be regarded as non-negotiable.157 In October 2002 the EU published a report on Poland’s progress. This report emphasised that Poland had made steady progress in the alignment of the EC agricultural acquis. With regard to strengthening the administrative capacity, rather slow progress had been made. The Commission emphasised that particu lar efforts were needed in the following areas: the establishment of a coherent structural and rural development policy to deal with the problem of Poland’s agriculture structure; the implementation and enforcement of veterinary and WILL POLAND’S ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION HELP IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN AGRICULTURE? II 1999 Definitely not Rather not
16%
Definitely yes 8% 23%
25%
Rather yes
28%
Difficult to say
VII 2002 Definitely yes
Definitely not
11%
Rather yes
8% 38%
24% 19%
Rather not
Difficult to say
igure 4.8 Impact of the EU accession on the situation in agriculture (source: CBOS, November 2002).
92 Negotiations concerning agriculture phytosanitary requirements and upgrading of establishments to meet EC stand ards; and the strengthening of administrative structures to ensure the necessary capacity to implement and enforce the policy instruments of the CAP.158 According to a senior official involved in the negotiation process, these calls for being realistic as well as the progress report were mainly used by the EU side to exert pressure on the Polish side and became part of a wider EU strategy.159 As a senior-level EU official admitted, the fact that the EU reports were used to mobilise EU countries or even to exert pressure was nothing new. This was the kind of measure the EU had to use.160 Clarification of the Polish position In mid-November Minister Cimoszewicz insisted that Poland’s priority objective was to ensure that Polish farmers enjoyed equal competitive conditions to the farmers in the current EU member states: ‘In this context we call for the amounts of direct payments to be increased as well as for the transition period to be shortened and for the EU offer on quotas and para-quotas to be improved [. . .].’161 In late November 2002 Polish negotiators changed their line of attack in talks. Instead of a simple increase in the percentage of the full subsidy granted to Polish farmers on entry, the pressure was being switched to particular production quotas, mainly for milk and corn. For milk, negotiators were pushing for a rise from 9 million to 13 million tonnes of milk annually, despite the fact that the 9m tonne figure corresponded to the actual annual production of the Polish industry between 1995 and 2001.162 According to Jarosław Pietras, the issue of the milk quota was a purely political one. SLD decided to push for higher milk quotas because SLD feared that PSL would leave the coalition.163 Poland also chose a simplified area-based, not production-based, system for the receipt of EU direct payments for farmers.164 According to the simplified sys tem, the subsidy was to be allocated per hectare of arable land. As the Polish government highlighted, this system would be more beneficial for the Polish farmers because it would enable them to optimise the level of payments and would not require the complicated procedures used in the standard system.165 The strongest proponent of the simplified system was Jarosław Kalinowski; however, as he later claimed, he was the only Polish minister strongly advocating for the simplified system. Most of the members of the Cabinet remained strongly sceptical.166 However, many experts remained critical. Jacek Saryusz Wolski, the former minister for Europe, even before argued that the simplified system provided a social benefit, but gave no incentive for modernisation and specialisation.167
The Copenhagen negotiations The message from the Polish side before the Copenhagen Summit was clear. Poland demanded not only more subsidies, but also increased quotas. As a high- ranking Polish diplomat expressed: ‘The EU cannot underestimate the strength
Negotiations concerning agriculture 93 of feeling among the public when it comes to being told how much we can produce and what our yields should be. This is the issue that could make or break a referendum.’168 Yet again, this was an attempt to use the tying hands strategy. The Danish proposal In response to Polish demands, the Danish side presented a package deal, which was described by the Presidency as ‘between the Brussels Summit conclusions and what the European Commission offered – or perhaps even more generous’. There was no change to the Q23 billion offer on structural instruments, but small amounts of additional and immediately available aid were being proposed: Q900 million for a ‘Schengen facility’ to reimburse candidates for expenditures, and to accelerate their preparations on border control; Q600 million for decommissioning nuclear power plants; and Q1 billion as a lump sum for budgetary compensation, to be distributed among the new member states on the basis of their Gross National Income.169 There would also be more spending possibilities on rural development. The final package was constructed in the light of the candidates’ principal concern – agriculture. The renewed compromise package went further than the agreed terms of the Brussels Summit at the end of October. It left the 25 per cent starting point for direct payments unchanged, but offered a possibility of state aid for farmers and the transfer of 20 per cent of the funds for rural development, which together could raise the level up to 40 per cent of the current payments existing in the EU. The Danish Premier, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declared that he had received a very clear mandate from the EU states; he said there was support for the proposed package, but that there would be limited room for manoeuvrability. I urge the candidates to do their utmost to conclude negotiations. I warn against raising demands too high as there is the risk that negotiations will not be concluded at Copenhagen, which would postpone enlargement for many years. We are prepared to conclude negotiations with the candidate countries that are ready. No candidate country should wait for the others.170 The Danish presidency simultaneously used a few different strategies. By saying that no candidate country should wait for the others they used the so-called battering ram strategy. The Danish presidency had an interest in using other CEEC as a battering ram in order to persuade Poland to sign a similar negotiation deal. They were saying, in other words, ‘Look, the other countries are way ahead and nobody is going to wait for you.’ At the same time, the Danish presidency used package deal and threat strategies. According to Sławomir Tokarski, Director of the Department for Economic and Social Analyses, Office of the Committee of European Integration, the Danish presidency suggested to the Polish side that their proposals were unofficial and were not yet accepted by other EU‑15 countries. Therefore, they were
94 Negotiations concerning agriculture suggesting that the Poles should happily accept what was offered, because other wise some EU countries might reject the offer and conditions would worsen. The Danes suggested that Poland did not have time and should cut down the number of demands, otherwise a compromise would not be achieved. Consequently, Poland was forced against the wall.171 Indeed, this situation resembled the tactic where the negotiators seek to exploit divisions within their own side by saying, ‘You’d better make a deal with me because the alternative is even worse.’172 Thus, the Danish side tried to persuade the Polish side that the Danish ‘win-set was kinky’ and that the Danish deal was certain to be ratified, but a deal that would be slightly more favourable to Poland was unlikely to be ratified by the EU.173 Polish response to the Danish proposal and the second crisis within the government Polish negotiators were not satisfied with the Danish proposals. Prime Minister Miller knew that he could count on Kalinowski’s opposition and therefore used another negotiation trick by using a tying hands strategy, arguing that the Polish government might collapse because of the difficult political situation within the government and because of the pressure being exerted by the opposition and public opinion. Nevertheless, just four days before the final summit in early December 2002, Poland was still unhappy with the Danish proposal. Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz declared after the meeting with the Danish presidency and the Commission that Poland had decided to continue talks in some major issues, especially on the level of financial support for the national budget and support to farmers. Such a position caused irritation from the Danish side. The Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Moller, used a threat strategy by saying, ‘If Poland doesn’t want to be part of the Union, I will have to accept that.’174 An already hot atmosphere became even more heated, when on the eve of the Summit Kalinowski announced: ‘The Polish side has reached the limit of concessions on agriculture and it cannot go any further than that.’ As he emphasised: I submitted certain levels for the negotiations to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. If the levels are lower than that, I will have to say no [. . .]. Poland’s dialogue with the EU in the last two weeks could not be called negotiations [. . .]. The European Commission is trying to force Poland to make absolute concessions or simply to capitulate.175 Poland’s Chief Negotiator Jan Truszczyński said reassuringly: ‘I find it hard to imagine a situation where the EU-15 says the following in Copenhagen: either you accept what you are being offered, or you can well leave Copenhagen.’ Truszczyński declared: ‘The negotiations never looked like this.’ Yet again, by saying this Truszczyński used ‘dead-weight’ catching. By this, he suggested
Negotiations concerning agriculture 95 that during previous enlargements, the EU treated other acceding countries on better terms. Kalinowski went even further, when on 28 November, two weeks earlier, he threatened for the second time176 to quit the coalition unless Warsaw secured better terms for its farmers. As he explained, ‘The Peasants’ Party cannot allow itself to sacrifice Polish agriculture on the altar of integration.’ He added: ‘It is difficult to imagine a situation where one of the coalition partners accepts the conditions (proposed by the EU) and the other does not.’177 This caused a genuine crisis within the government. As Jarosław Kalinowski later explained his position, Miller wanted to accept EU conditions. Thus, after a long struggle with his Cabinet colleagues when all of his proposals were rejected by the SLD, he threatened that if his conditions concerning the term of payments and production quotas in milk would not be accepted by the Cabinet, he would not go to Brussels.178 Kalinowski used a double-threat strategy, since he not only used the threat on the domestic level (to leave the government), but also at the international level. His threat was prompted both by the farmers’ pressure and the fear of growing support for Samoobrona, the main rival of the PSL. According to the IPSOS- Demoscop Opinion Poll published in October 2002, Samoobrona was the second most popular party with about 13 per cent, while PSL got only 6 per cent, losing 4 percentage points in comparison to the previous survey.179 Just a few days before the Summit, 64 per cent of respondents admitted that Polish interests during the negotiations were not being properly protected, and only 10 per cent argued the opposite. The government was therefore aware of the strong pressure coming from the public to negotiate better conditions, and this goal was even straightforwardly expressed by Prime Minister Miller while negotiating with his Danish counterpart Rasmussen.180 Leszek Miller acknowledged that he felt public opinion breathing down his neck, and that if Poland was not seen to be negotiating toughly, it was possible that the Accession Treaty would not be ratified in the referendum. This obviously resembled the tying hands strategy based on Putnam’s argument that a small domestic win-set can be used as a bargaining advantage.181 Thus, according to this strategy, the negotiator may use the trick, ‘I would like to accept your proposal, but this would not be accepted by the public.’ The EU prepared itself for tough negotiations before the Copenhagen Summit, being itself under strong domestic pressure. As one senior EU diplomat argued: ‘We will just have to be firm with the Poles. I know they have terrible public opinion at home – but we all do!’182 The Copenhagen deal The Commission was desperate to get the negotiations over and done with by the end of the Danish presidency. Indeed, the negotiation deal was the aim of the Danish presidency. Verheugen was very keen to finish the negotiations, since it was at a turning point in his career. However, a major role in Polish–EU negoti ations was played by Chancellor Schroeder and other German negotiators.183
96 Negotiations concerning agriculture In this last-minute bargaining, Heads of States and Government from the EU and ten candidate countries reached agreement on a formula for enlarging the EU. The decision was made that Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, The Slovak Republic and Slovenia could join the EU on 1 May 2004. According to the Copenhagen Agreement, the new member states would receive a rural development package. The amount avail able for the ten candidate countries was fixed at about Q5.1 billion for 2004–06. Direct aids for the new member states would be phased in over ten years. Poland would receive 25 per cent of the full EU rate in 2004, rising to 30 per cent in 2005 and 35 per cent in 2006. This level could be increased by 30 per cent up to 55 per cent in 2004, 60 per cent in 2005 and 65 per cent in 2006. Until 2006, the ‘top-up’ payments could be co-financed up to the level of 40 per cent from each country’s rural development funds. From 2007, the new member states could continue to increase EU direct payments by up to 30 per cent above the applic able phasing-in level in the relevant year, but financed entirely by national funds. The farmers from the new member states would have full and immediate access to CAP market measures, such as export refunds, and cereal, skimmed milk powder or butter intervention, which would contribute to stabilising their prices and incomes.184 Poland managed to increase some production quotas including the wholesale quota for milk (a difficult issue right up until the end of the talks), sugar, isoglucose, flax, hemp and tomatoes. The most difficult issue was definitely milk quota production. According to Jarosław Kalinowski, the EU’s initially proposed level of 7.5 million tonnes was unacceptable for the Polish side, which demanded 8.5 million tonnes. Then the EU Commissioner Romano Prodi proposed a compromise of eight million tonnes, and since it was already very late, he expected Poland to accept the EU proposal. Indeed, according to Jarosław Kalinowski: Leszek Miller asked me to accept the EU proposal. However, I told him that I would not change my stance and we would have to get 8.5 million. Then he said: ‘Look, we will vote out this decision within our team, you will abstain from voting and by this you will be covered within the farmers and the public opinion’. I told him that in such circumstances there should be no abstention votes, we must each vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Then he asked me: ‘What are you going to tell journalists?’ I said: ‘I am going to tell them that I will not allow punishing milk producers by imposing low production quotas’. Then he said: ‘And what about the coalition?’ I said: ‘When we go back to Poland there will be no coalition’. Then he went back to the EU negotiators and said: ‘We have to get 8.5 million, since if we don’t get it, the coalition will break down and if this happens, the accession referendum results would be uncertain’. I really appreciated his position.185 However, according to a senior-level EU official involved in the negotiation pro cess, regarding agriculture, the acceptance of 8.5 billion tonnes was not a big deal on the EU side. This was because there was a shift within dairy production
Negotiations concerning agriculture 97 levels between the two quotas: for direct sales and for dairy wholesale production. He argued: ‘I have an impression that the Polish side always wanted to have something, which could be to sell to the general public.’186 A similar view was shared by another EU official who argued that it was not a serious concession for the EU because the overall quantity did not change; it was only a change of the character. However, for whatever reason it was sold by the Polish side as a big success. For us, it was just a political way out of a difficult situation.187
Between the Copenhagen Summit and the Accession Treaty The text of the Accession Treaty was finally approved by the EU-15 ambas sadors on 5 February 2003. The Polish government accepted a compromise with the EU on direct payments for agricultural production. Clarification of the treaty provisions and the final approval of the Accession Treaty The compromise meant that Polish producers of potatoes, beets, pork and other products not subsidised by the EU would only receive base subsidies, or 25 per cent of what EU farmers would get, in 2004; the following year, they would get 30 per cent, and in 2006 they would get 35 per cent. The volume of subsidies would be dependent upon farm size. The money would be granted to all farmers who had at least one hectare of land. Apart from base subsidies, there would be two more pools of subsidies. The first, accounting for 15 per cent of the average EU level, would consist of money that would be transferred from the EU fund for rural development. Poland wanted to divide it in the same way as the basis pool, while the EU demanded that funds be granted only to those farmers who grew products subsidised in the EU. With the compromise, the money from this pool would go only to those farmers who would be subsidised in the EU. However, the funds would be paid through a more simple system than that in use in the 15 member states. The other pool would include money from the Polish budget. If it were granted at all – and that would be decided by the government and parliament when drafting the budget law – it would also amount to 15 per cent of the average EU subsidies. This pool would also be divided according to the types of crops. Additional assistance would be provided for producers of hops and tobacco, whose fields take up little space, so they would lose out in the division system based on farm size. The Union agreed to simpler application forms for Polish farmers in the first years of membership. Leszek Miller said this would limit potential bureau cratic problems. The application specified the total size of farmland owned, the portion of meadows and pastures, and the portion of land planted for EU- subsidised crops. Jarosław Kalinowski said that this system ‘is a good solution for all categories of farms’.188
98 Negotiations concerning agriculture The preparation of Poland for EU membership was assessed for the last time in the Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 2003. The most serious concern was the implementation of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS). Assessment of the negotiation results by public opinion The government declared success because the negotiations had won, for Poles, an extra billion euros. This was rather a bluff. According to Alan Mayhew, the Polish side indeed originally thought that an extra billion euros were on the table. However, soon after, they realised that the Germans had played an extremely nasty trick on them. According to Jarosław Kalinowski, Miller went to Brussels with the expectation that he would receive an extra billion or even two billion dollars. He was prepared to announce it as a sound negotiation success. As Kalinowski later described on 13 December: When we arrived in Brussels at 12 pm, Truszczyński came to us and said that everything was open for further negotiations. I was angry at him [. . .]. However, when I saw Miller after the first meeting he looked so much like a nervous wreck that I could not recognise him. He only said that we have to find an alternative solution and I think this move of structural funds toward direct payment, even though it was a PR trick, was a good tactical decision.189 When the budget subsidy came up for discussion, this was not linked to a loss of structural funds, and in the discussions between Schroeder and Miller that connection was not made. So the negotiators thought that there was an extra billion on the table, but this was the case only later when Schroeder said that the EU was going to take this from the structural funds.190 Thus, in fact, this was a virtual billion euros, since the Union agreed to move only Q500 million from already secured structural funds for the development of rural areas in order to finance CAP subsidies. The other 500 million was the exemption of Poland from co-financing structural funds, but this did not mean that Poland would receive the cash. It was rather a tactical manoeuvre of moving money around within the same allocation. The only additional cash was Q172 million (an increase from 108 to 280) from a special European fund to finance the sealing of EU Eastern borders. Obviously, such a solution was acceptable for the EU countries, since their leaders could also declare that Poland did not get extra money. Manipulating win-sets The Polish government managed to sell the image of successful negotiations and that Poland would get extra money from the EU in order to finance CAP sub sidies. The impression of Prime Minister Miller was that of a steely negotiator
Negotiations concerning agriculture 99 and indeed it brought desirable results. Miller realised that the public wanted to enter the EU quickly but on good terms. He was interested in increasing the Polish domestic win-set to support the accession not before the Copenhagen Summit (since a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage), but just after the closing of negotiations, for the following reasons. First, because the comparison of a lower domestic win-set to accept accession before negotiations and the increase of the Polish domestic win-set to enter the EU after the Copen hagen Summit would suggest that the general public accessed negotiation successfully for the Polish side. Second, it would help him to accomplish a bigger turnout and more support for the accession in the referendum on Polish member ship in the EU. Since the high turnout and support could be used politically to argue that his government ensured good conditions for Poland’s membership in the EU, it would strengthen his political position on the domestic scene. Finally, this would also show his foreign counterparts that the tying hands strategy was not a bluff and indeed would ensure better conditions for Polish farmers by enlarging their win-set to accept the accession. The number of respondents that positively assessed conditions of Poland’s membership in the EU increased to 62 per cent, while negative assessment dropped to only 8.3 per cent. This was a huge increase of positive assessment, since in an opinion poll just before the Summit, 64 per cent claimed that Polish interests during negotiations were not properly protected. Thus, one may argue that the image of the toughness of Poland’s negotiations had a crucial impact on the assessment of the negotiation process. Public opinion in Poland was also assured that it would achieve good conditions by the EU side when welcoming the Summit decision. Franz Fischler commented: This is a great day for Europe – for the EU, for the candidate countries and for their farmers. The leaders of the candidate countries can return home with their heads held high. They have achieved a farm package which is perfectly saleable to their farm community. The deal is fair, far-sighted and tailor-made for the needs of the farm sectors of the 10 new member states.191 This shows that the domestic win-set can be easily manipulated by the political elites. While the Polish side was quite successful in persuading Polish media and public opinion that Copenhagen was a success, at the same time it was less successful in persuading the media of the EU countries. The Polish side won the PR battle in Poland but lost the same battle in the EU. As a result, Poland was presented as selfish, unreliable and greedy. According to Tokarski, Poland was too concerned with the negotiations and forgot about the PR in the Western coun tries.192 Assessment of the Copenhagen Summit by political parties Polish politicians were more critical about the results. Obviously, the most severe criticism came from the two Euro-sceptic parties. Roman Giertych,
100 Negotiations concerning agriculture leader of LPR, called the negotiation’s climax ‘choreographed’, and promised his party would run ‘a very strong pre-referendum campaign’.193 Meanwhile, in February 2003 the situation within the coalition was quite difficult. The unpopular road vignette bill194 proved the perfect opportunity for PSL to launch a political offensive. As Jarosław Kalinowski declared, he realised that SLD did not want PSL as a coalition partner and that it was time to leave the coalition. The Polish Peasants’ Party rejected the governmental bill and counted upon their position strengthening within the government, as they had shown that their support was indispensable to the government’s plans. However, they were soon proven wrong – at a Cabinet meeting two days later, Leszek Miller told the Peasants’ Party that they were no longer wanted in the coalition. According to most media commentaries, Jarosław Kalinowski was surprised by Miller’s decision. He never expected that Miller would get rid of the Peasants’ Party so quickly, even after the collapse of the vignette bill.195 However, according to Jarosław Kalinowski, PSL did not feel comfortable within the coalition, and their opposition towards the vignette bill was a tactical decision to find a pretext to leave the coalition and the bill provided a perfect opportunity.196 After the PSL was kicked out, party leaders agreed that in order to secure itself for the future, PSL had to rebuild closer ties with the right-wing opposition.197 On 14 March the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) and Law and Justice (PiS) appealed to President Aleksander Kwasniewski to file Poland’s EU Accession Treaty for screening by the Constitutional Tribunal. Both parties stressed that the move would be a formal measure and that they had not found anything unconstitutional in the treaty.198 The PSL’s popularity declined as it maintained a more EU supportive stance as a junior coalition partner in government. Its main supporters – farmers – belonged to the group which was the most critical of EU membership in Polish society. Simultaneously, Kalinowski warned that his party would withdraw sup port for EU integration unless the parliament adopted three bills, important for Polish farmers. The three bills demanded by the PSL were related to increasing the direct payments from the national budget and giving legal guarantees for agricultural subsidies agreed upon in Copenhagen. The other two bills were related to bio-fuels and the shape of the agricultural regime.199 According to Kalinowski, this last bill was of crucial importance since it was even more important to protect Polish interest (read limit the sale of land) than to have the long transitional period.200 At the same time, PSL warned that if their proposals were not taken into account, it would call upon farmers to vote ‘No’ in the referendum. In light of the deep Euro-scepticism of farmers, PSL had to become more Euro-sceptical in their rhetoric. Such behaviour is explained by Putnam when he argues that politicians may be willing to risk losing a few of their supporters in the cause of ratifying an international agreement, but the greater the potential loss, the greater their reluctance.201
Negotiations concerning agriculture 101
Conclusions The case of Poland’s negotiation with the EU within the agriculture chapter shows that domestic pressure can indeed influence decision-makers and con sequently the outcome of negotiations. It demonstrates interplay on the domestic level, among public opinion, interest groups and political elites. In particular, it explains how the growing Euro-scepticism among farmers and their interest groups was used by anti-establishment agrarian parties to gain public support. At the same time, the Polish Peasants’ Party fostered Euro-scepticism to increase their support. As a result, they became hostages of their own political rhetoric and of the farmers’ electorate. Polish negotiators, being pushed by the public, farmers’ groups and anti- establishment parties, had to demonstrate their tough negotiation stances, espe cially during the last round of negotiations in Copenhagen. A small Polish domestic win-set (to accept limited direct payments and low-level production quotas) was used by the Polish decision-makers in a tying hand strategy based on the assumption that: ‘I would like to accept your proposals, but this will not be approved in the accession referendum.’ This indeed confirms Putnam’s argument that a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage. The EU win-set to accept the high-level direct payments and production quotas was also diminutive. Polish and EU win-sets did not overlap. This made compromise particularly difficult, but still possible due to the high cost of no agreement. Poland’s negotiation strategy was determined by the lack of a plaus ible best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA), which implied major asymmetry between the negotiation sides. Thus, the cost of non-membership for Poland was too high and this forced the negotiators to achieve a compromise. The lack of credible BATNA was indeed used by the EU negotiators, since the EU realised that the higher the cost of non-agreement, the bigger the win-set within Level II. The negotiation outcome was quite distant from the original demands, yet Polish decision-makers managed to sell it to the general public with success. Miller managed to increase the Polish domestic win-set after the closing of negotiations and before the referendum on accession in order to get a high turnout and support for the EU membership into the referendum. This was used to strengthen his position on the domestic scene. The cost of no agreement was also high for the EU side. Such countries as Germany were interested in getting access to the large and attractive CEE market, but also there were some grand strategic arguments based on a combination of values favouring enlargement. Poland’s membership was of crucial importance for the stability of the whole region. For this reason, the EU was willing to make some limited concessions in order to make the deal. Polish–EU negotiations within the chapter on agriculture provide an inter esting case study for the two-level game approach, as described by Putnam. In the negotiations, both on the domestic level and on the international level, several different negotiation strategies were used, from tying hands and the battering ram to dead-weight catching. Even though there was only a small
102 Negotiations concerning agriculture domestic win-set, that was the potential for Polish negotiators to use domestic pressure as a means of getting better terms in negotiation. This potential was exploited in the Polish negotiation strategies. To sum up, negotiations concerning agriculture were complicated and difficult due to both Polish and EU small domestic win-sets. As Putnam stated: ‘The smaller the win-set, the more difficult it is to conclude an agreement.’ Since the win-set did not overlap, compromise was necessary and both sides were willing to do so because of the relative high costs of no agreement. Table 4.1 Agriculture negotiations – size of the domestic win-set Size of win-set Case study Poland
EU
Result
Agriculture Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties.
Small within interest groups and political parties. Public opinion less interested in this issue.
Compromise very difficult, but possible due to a high cost of no agreement. Both sides had to enlarge their win-sets by making certain concessions.
5 Purchase of real estate by EU residents
To discuss the influence of domestic pressure on negotiations concerning the purchase of real estate by foreigners, one first needs to explore whether this issue was given much attention by the public, by interest groups and by political par ties. An obvious starting point is to ask the question: ‘Why was this issue import ant for the domestic audience and what were the main factors behind this interest?’ Second, one needs to ask to what extent the Polish case was different from the case of the other acceding countries. To this end, the systems in operation and the positions taken by other acceding countries will be briefly reviewed. In order to examine the influence of domestic pressure on Poland’s negotiations concerning land purchase by foreigners, one must understand the sequence of negotiations. The first step was the so-called screening process, which was a review process regarding its compliance with the acquis communautaire that enabled formulation of negotiation positions. Poland’s position was dictated by her specific historical, social and economical circumstances and had the backing of public opinion, as was shown in a number of opinion polls. One should differentiate between the two negotiation periods, which were each characterised by a different dynamic of political negotiations. The first period, under the coalition AWS–UW government, from 1998 to 2001, can be characterised by a relative standstill in negotiations concerning the sale of land. This was mainly because of the tough Polish negotiating positions and the lack of determination on both negotiating sides to achieve a reasonable compromise. However, the main reason that determined the pace of negotiations was the sequence of negotiation chapters imposed by the EU that set aside the most prob lematic chapters until the later stages of negotiations. The second period under the SLD–PSL government, after 2001, brought a slight softening of the negoti ation stances. This was due to the determination of the government to speed up the negotiation process, even at the price of having to make limited concessions to the EU. Although the Polish side softened its negotiation stances, it was rather a limited concession since the proposed transition period was reduced from 18 to 12 years.1 This softening of negotiation positions, even though limited in scope, brought much criticism from domestic groups, mainly political parties, which used it for political purposes. The modification of the Polish position, however,
104 Purchase of real estate by EU residents enabled a compromise to be achieved in which Poland secured the longest trans itional period among the acceding countries. Negotiation outcomes were subject to criticism from not only the opposition or the farmers’ unions, but even from the junior coalition partner PSL. This caused an internal political crisis until the signing and ratification of the negotiation treaty. The problems mentioned above will enable us to answer the key question of this chapter: To what extent did the size of the domestic win-set in negotiations concerning purchase of real estate influence the negotiation process and the negotiation results?
Why the issue of purchase of real estate was important domestically There are at least three main reasons why the purchase of real estate negotiated within the chapter of free movement of capital became a highly politicised issue that raised the concerns of both the public and interest groups. This interest may be explained by historical, social and economical factors. These reasons prompted the Polish side to demand a transitional period with regard to freedom to purchase real estate by foreigners. It should be emphasised that this freedom was guaranteed under article 56 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which prohibited all restric tions on the movement of capital (including land sales) among member states and between member states and third countries.2 The sensitivity of Polish public opinion in this area is a result of Polish his tory, and may be traced back to the nineteenth-century partition and particularly the Second World War. After the war, Polish borders were moved westwards and resulted in the inclusion of some of the land that belonged to the former Germany. Most real estate registers were destroyed during the war. Therefore, the status of real estate, particularly in Western Poland, is in many cases legally dubious. Polish refugees from the Eastern part of Poland seized by the Soviet Union were resettled in the Western part; however, this was done without grant ing them the full right of ownership, and usually giving them only a lifetime lease. Much of the land in current Western Poland before the Second World War was owned by Germans. Therefore, a large part of the public was afraid that Polish membership in the EU would be an opportunity for the Germans to reclaim the real estate lost in the aftermath of the Second World War, or in the best case buy it cheaply in the market.3 The Polish government was afraid of a certain interpretation of the German Constitution, which might open the possib ility for claims of German citizens towards their lost properties in Poland.4 The second reason why this issue was important and raised both public and interest group concern stems from socio-cultural factors. Polish culture is very much a ‘land based’ gentry culture. Even though this pattern is changing, rem nants of this culture have remained. Poland’s culture and mentality have been very much dominated by a nineteenth-century romantic notion of land as the major attribute of nationhood.5
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 105 Therefore, land, together with the language and the Catholic faith, became one of the attributes of nationhood in the time when Poland was partitioned and occupied. One famous patriotic song, which Polish children have to learn by heart, is called Rota, and it starts with the following phrase: ‘Don’t take the land from under the feet of the people.’ One of the novels of required reading in most secondary schools is Boleslaw Prus’s 1886 novel The Outpost, where a Polish peasant resists pressure to sell his plot of land to German settlers. His wife, on her deathbed, makes him swear that he will never sell. ‘God spare us from this plague of Germans,’ she declares in an oath. The novel shows how the attach ment of Poles to their land is an emotion with deep historical roots.6 Hence, these socio-cultural factors should not be underestimated when examining why this issue gets so much attention from public opinion. Public interest in this issue was also driven by economic factors, which were particularly emphasised by the Polish government in the EU negotiation position papers. The argument for the necessity of introducing the transitional period was based on the very low prices of land in Poland, and a fear that the financial capa city of business entities originating in the EU member states would impair the equality of opportunity for Polish citizens in the field of real estate acquisition.7 This argument was indeed emphasised by Alan Mayhew, who pointed out three serious issues: 1 2 3
the danger that social tension would result if large enough areas of land were bought up by foreigners, the danger that foreigners would buy land simply for the capital gains that they expected to make, the danger that rising prices due to the entry of foreigners into the market would make the restructuring of farming more complicated.
Mayhew argued: The key factor is the price differential between land in the EU and in the applicant countries. Liberalisation of the land market will, in the next decade, cause that prices will rise considerably, closing some of the gap with those in the EU‑15. This will lead to significant capital gains for both Polish and foreign landowners. Clearly while the applicants have an interest in welcoming foreign direct investment in agriculture, in order to develop the sector, they have no interest in speculative land purchase.8 Indeed, this argument was widely acknowledged by the people participating in the negotiating process.9 Finally, it should be emphasised that this problem was different from other problems negotiated within the chapter on free movement of capital. Despite a generally positive attitude towards foreign investment, as indicated in opinion polls, there were clear doubts connected with land ownership. In a June 1998 survey, conducted just after the negotiations started, most Poles did not accept the
106 Purchase of real estate by EU residents
IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD FOREIGNERS BE ALLOWED TO BUY: 3% Woodland
15% 74%
Water reservoirs (lakes, etc.) Recreational areas with beautiful landscape
3% 17% 71% 4% 20% 68% 5% 26%
Farmland
63% Building grounds in towns
5% 32% 55% 11%
Houses
30% 51% 8%
Manufacturing plants
35% 48% 16%
Flats
31% 45%
Newspapers, publishing houses
14% 28% 45%
Yes, without limitation Yes, but only by special permission No, they should not be allowed to buy it at all ‘Difficult to say’ and ‘I don’t care’ answers were disregarded
Figure 5.1 Should foreigners be allowed to buy real estate? (source: CBOS, June 1998).
involvement of foreign capital if it were to be connected with the buying of real estate by foreigners. The considerable majority of respondents believed that for eigners should not be allowed to buy woodland, water reservoirs and recreational areas at all. As far as farmland is considered, the opinions were a little more mod erate, but the majority of Poles were against foreigners buying it as well.10 To sum up, historical, social and economic reasons elucidate why the issue became one of the crucial issues in the accession negotiations that raised public fears and interest group concern.11
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 107
The problem of purchase of real estate in other acceding countries One may ask to what extent the Polish case is different from other acceding countries.12 Indeed, as one senior-level EU official declared: ‘The sharpest dis tinction between negotiations of Poland and other acceding countries was with regards to the issue of the purchase of agricultural land.’13 Some liberalisation has taken place as the five fast-track candidates in Eastern Europe brought their legislation in line with EU standards. It seems that the most restrictive regime, quite closely resembling the Polish one, was in Hungary, where only Hungarian citizens could own agricultural land, and only up to 300 hectares. Even domestic firms were banned from buying farmland in an effort to protect small family farms. Nevertheless, restrictions were looser in cities: foreign companies could buy properties for business use without a permit. Licences for purchases of secondary homes and real estate for investment pur poses were easy to obtain. Hungary’s government considered the idea of a land ownership system based on the Danish model: title would be awarded only to those who live permanently on farms and are well versed in agriculture, regardless of their citizenship. In addition, Hungary demanded a ten-year transitional period for the purchase of farmland and a five-year one for the purchase of land for foreign investments. Indeed, the Hungarian Position Paper used a similar economic justification as that found in the Polish position. The position paper argued that the predicted increase in land prices would prevent Hungarian farmers from having access to land at affordable prices and hence would interfere with the policy of the Hun garian government, which was aiming at the creation of a more viable ownership structure. As Alan Mayhew argued, the restructuring process would rely on dynamic farmers in countries such as Hungary and Poland buying or leasing the land from farmers who were giving up the profession. If prices were to rise con siderably because of foreign buying, this process of restructuring would be made much more difficult in these countries.14 A similar negotiation position was also taken in Slovakia, where the country demanded a ten-year transitional period for the purchase of farmland and a five- year transitional period for the purchase of land for foreign investments. The Czech Republic had also demanded a transitional period, but did not specify the length of the proposed period. During negotiations, the Czech Republic banned foreign individuals from acquiring land or immovable property, but many did so anyway through Czech-registered legal entities. Foreign companies could gain access to land and real estate through locally registered subsidiaries, though geo graphical restrictions applied. A liberal approach was taken in Slovenia, even though it faced a challenge from Italy on the land issue during talks on the association agreement. Neverthe less, EU citizens who had lived in the country for more than three years were able to acquire property on the principle of reciprocity. Until the year 2000, only 49 EU citizens bought real estate in the country. Hence, Slovenia in its
108 Purchase of real estate by EU residents negotiating positions did not demand any transitional period for purchasing land by foreigners. However, there were mainly pragmatic reasons behind this decision, since land prices in Slovenia are comparable to those in the EU. Public opinion was not very much interested in EU negotiations and the issue of pur chasing land by foreigners did not even exist in the public debate. It seems that the most liberalised system was introduced in Estonia, as foreign individuals and legal entities could acquire land and property with permission from the relevant country governors. Requests were usually approved. Estonia declared that restrictions, except in border zones (for national security reasons), would end upon EU entry.15 Consequently, only Slovenia and Estonia did not demand any restrictions on the purchase of real estate from the date of accession. From this short overview, we may draw the conclusion that Poland took the most restrictive approach in regard to this issue. Indeed, this problem was recog nised and emphasised during the screening and later reflected in Polish negotiat ing positions.
Screening and EU assessment The purchase of real estate by foreigners was regarded as a sensitive and vital issue from the very beginning of negotiations. As the Polish National Strategy of Integration declared: ‘The principles of land sale will be shaped by taking into account the interests of the Polish economy and by using the instruments applied in the Member States of the EU.’16 According to the Polish government advisor Leszek Jesień, from the begin ning of negotiations the political class and the negotiators realised that the subject would raise great interest from the public. It was so obvious that the gov ernment did not have to study public opinion surveys to realise that this would be a major problem.17 On the EU side, the problem of the purchase of real estate by foreigners was mentioned officially for the first time in Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union. As was indicated in the document, ‘Legislation regarding the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals remains inadequate and will require clarification and align ment in the medium term.’ It was also pointed out that ‘the application of the acquis regarding the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals may present a significant problem in the medium term’. As a result, the report emphasised the need to liberalise the system.18 After the official opening of the negotiations in March 1998, Poland started its accession negotiations with a review of the law regarding its compliance with the acquis communautaire (the so-called screening), which began on 27 April 1998. The purchase of real estate by foreigners was subject to screening within the chapter on free movement of capital. It also examined such issues as the har monising of international obligations with regard to the movement of capital and payments in those cases where violation of the acquis would be likely.19
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 109 However, the issue of purchase of real estate by foreigners gained most attention from both sides of the negotiation table and from domestic participants in the debate. The Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski, emphasised that sale of land is a specific issue for Poland that should be dealt with in a different manner than other negotiating dilemmas.20 On 22 July 1998 Françoise Gaudenzi, the European Commission representa tive for negotiations with Poland, declared that the Polish government and the Sejm should come up with a detailed timetable of adjusting Polish legislation, institutions and the practice of economic and social life to European Union standards. She also gave the opinion that any delay should be avoided in this respect, as the technical aspects were of decisive significance for the EU acces sion process. Gaudenzi declared that Poland should not ask the EU for a trans itional period with regard to the sale of land, as ‘The Union was keen to see all its new members accept the largest possible part of the EU acquis communautaire without objections, the moment they enter the EU.’21 In the first 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland’s Progress Toward Accession EU Commission Report on Poland, the issue of sale of land to foreigners was not even mentioned. Nevertheless, the 1999 Commission Report mentioned that restrictions still applied to the purchase of land by non- nationals.22 Furthermore, as the report continued: ‘Acquisition of real estate by foreign entities is still subject to the granting of an authorisation, especially in the case of agricultural land, with the exception of some specific transactions, which may be freely carried out.’ The report mentioned that according to the Polish authorities, there had been a moderate increase in the amount of land pur chased by non-nationals.23 In December 1999 the EU accused Poland of allegedly failing to realise its Association Treaty commitments by restricting the sale of land to foreigners by using certain interpretations of laws discriminating against foreign entities. Polish officials claimed, though, that there were no restrictions, since the Minis try of Internal Affairs and Administration, which clears every transaction to for eigners involving land sales exceeding 4,000 square metres, only verified whether the land was necessary for Poland’s economy. Meanwhile, the EU made Poland’s transition to the second association stage contingent on Poland lifting all land sale restrictions.24 The conclusion, therefore, may be drawn regarding the screening process that the EU only pointed out the non-compliance of Polish legislation with regard to the purchase of land by foreigners with the acquis communautaire, which was indeed admitted by the Polish side. This, however, opened a possibility for the preparation of the Polish negotiation positions and further negotiations.
Preparation of the Polish position The screening process constituted a basis for the elaboration of the position paper of the Polish government. The position paper adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland on 13 July 1999 contained a Polish proposal
110 Purchase of real estate by EU residents to resolve those incompatibilities and to set a suggested timetable for Poland’s incorporation of EU law.25 The paper recommended particular solutions, such as transition periods or specific clauses to be introduced in the Accession Treaty.26 Justification for the Polish position With respect to the acquisition of real estate by non-citizens, the Polish position acknowledged that the country’s legislation in this field was inconsistent with article 56 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which says: ‘All restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.’27 However, this incon sistency was justified in order to eliminate a possibility of uncontrolled trade in these assets.28 Therefore, Poland requested certain transition periods upon acces sion: five years for real estate for investment purposes and 18 years for agricul tural and woodland real estate. Poland’s position, according to the document, was dictated by its specific historical, social and economic circumstances. The first reason that justified the idea of transitional periods stems from history: ‘In Western Europe the process of European integration was parallel and much contributed to the process of historical reconciliation. In Poland the process of reconciliation began just a few years ago.’ The document said that the ‘sensitivity of the Polish public opinion in the area, ensues from our history and in particular it results from World War II’. Although the country had this historical background, the paper claimed, Poland was now participating in the process of European inte gration. Nevertheless, it argued that the approval of Poles, as well as of other Euro pean nations, for European integration was a necessary precondition for the success of this historical process. Finally, the document stated: ‘This approval is also a necessary precondition if the integration process is to encompass the whole continent and thus help overcome the Yaltan division of Europe.’29 What should be emphasised is that this last argument refers to the approval of negotiation outcomes by public opinion. As people directly involved in the nego tiation process admitted, these historical factors were indeed of crucial import ance, particularly given the fact that in Western Poland the legal status of land was largely unsettled. It was backed by a number of opinion polls that confirmed the importance of this issue.30 According to Alan Mayhew, this way of looking at historical experience was typical, not only for Poland, but also in those coun tries which have had to contend with foreign occupation of their land in the rel atively recent past.31 The second reason mentioned by the position paper stems from social factors, with a particular emphasis on the social consensus. As we may read in the docu ment, ‘Polish public opinion is particularly sensitive to the issue of land owner ship. Therefore, negotiation results in the area of freedom of real estate acquisition can be a decisive factor for the approval of the future Accession Treaty by Poles.’ Some of the foreign advisers to the Polish government, such as Alan Mayhew, even argued that there would clearly be social tension and a backlash against accession if large areas of land were to be bought up by
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 111 foreigners. In fact, there was a strong link between historical and social factors, and indeed, it was difficult to draw a clear line between historical and social jus tification of the Polish position. The last reason mentioned in the position paper to justify the necessity of transitional periods was the economic factors. As the document puts it: ‘In its attempt to pursue harmonious, balanced and sustainable development, Poland aims at providing Polish residents with a share in real estate acquisition on par with that enjoyed by citizens of the European Union.’ However, as we may read further in the paper, the ‘financial capacity of entities originating in the EU Member States can impair equality of opportunity for Polish citizens in the field of real estate acquisition’. Moreover, ‘The relatively lower purchasing power of Polish citizens does not allow them to compete effectively with the Western capital since real estate prices in Poland are lower than real estate prices in EU Member States.’33 According to the document, those economic factors contributed to spreading fears among Polish citizens of the possibility of mass acquisition of real estate by foreigners. Hence, the transition periods Poland requested also aimed at providing Polish citizens with an opportunity to participate in the broadly understood process of European integration. Transition periods asked for by Poland would help to stimulate the development of the national economy and provide for an increase in the purchasing power of Polish citizens. This would allow for more opportunity for the acquisition of land in the open market, and thereby disperse the fears of excessive foreign acquisition.34 In making the economic case for the transition period, the Polish negotiators always included a strong reference to the fears expressed by the public. This economic argument was also widely acknowledged by the leading experts involved in the negotiation process.35 From the analysis of the Polish position paper, we may draw the conclusion that no matter whether the justification for transitional periods is based on histor ical, socio-cultural or economical factors, it always refers to the voice of the public. Therefore, when preparing its position paper, the government used a tying hands negotiation strategy, based on Putnam’s argument that ‘a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage’.36 Thus, the negotiator used a common trick: ‘We could liberalise the regime on the purchase of land, but this would not be accepted on our domestic level (Level II).’ Indeed, as Putnam argued, such a message is ‘the natural thing to say at the beginning of tough negotiations’.37 Obviously, the EU was aware of this negotiation trick; neverthe less, the EU realised that full liberalisation would not be accepted or might cause serious political crises in Poland. According to this logic, long transitional periods should be kept, because otherwise public opinion in Poland would not accept the compromise and therefore would not ratify the agreement in the refer endum on EU accession. There was a large win-set in the EU to accept the trans itional period because, as Alan Mayhew put it bluntly, ‘Most EU countries did not care about this issue’ and ‘The EU was using it in order to obstruct other concessions from the Poles.’38 In particular, the EU tied this issue with free movement of labour in a package deal.39 32
112 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Domestic support for the Polish position There was a common, widespread agreement among the experts that in drafting Polish position papers, concern for public opinion was a driving force40 and there is indeed polling evidence to support this thesis. For instance, a May 1999 CBOS survey found that only 25 per cent of respondents agreed with a statement that current EU citizens should be granted full rights to purchase real estate from the date of the accession. In similar surveys performed consecutively every year from 1993 onwards, the highest rate of positive answers to the question whether foreign ers should be granted the right to purchase real estate without any limitations was only 31 per cent in March 1997, a few months before the accession talks began, and dropped to the lowest level of only 23 per cent, as shown in the Table 5.1.41 This data indicates that the limitation of the sale of land to foreigners was supported by the majority of the public. A critical attitude towards the idea of liberalisation was shown in a number of other opinion polls, no matter how the question was asked. In a May 2000 survey, only 18 per cent of respondents agreed that the Polish economy could benefit from a liberalisation of land sales, whilst 50 per cent opposed this.42 In a July 2000 survey, only 26 per cent agreed with full liberalisation of the land market without any transitional periods.43 In a survey completed in December 2000, 63 per cent supported a tough negotiation position which would demand the introduction of transitional periods.44 In a survey made in October 2000, 60 per cent argued that Poland should resign from EU membership if this meant that freedom to buy land without any restriction would be introduced.45 The issue of land ownership became so important that in a survey from Octo ber 2000, 36 per cent argued that it would be better to ban EU citizens from buying land in Poland even if this came at the price of banning Polish citizens from working in the EU. Only 26 per cent argued that it would be better to grant the right to EU citizens to buy land for the sake of granting the right to Polish citizens to work in current EU countries.46 As we may see from this opinion poll, the negotiation positions reflected strongly the mood of the public. Indeed, as Table 5.1 Opinion about statement that current EU citizens should be granted full rights to purchase real estate from the date of the accession Do you agree that there should be introduced into Poland such obligatory regulations of the European Union as:
Percentage of positive answers June March May May March April April May ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’97 ’98 ’99
24 the right to buy real estate, houses and so on, without any exceptions being made for citizens of other countries in Poland and for Polish citizens in other countries of the EU Source: CBOS, May 1999.
28
31
26
23
28
26
25
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 113 was admitted by Prime Minister Buzek, opinion polls were carefully studied and taken into account when drafting position papers.47 EU assessment of the Polish position Even though the EU was reluctant to reject the Polish proposal, it emphasised the need to implement the acquis. During his visit to Warsaw in late February 2000, Commissioner Verheugen explained that what matters is real implementa tion of the acquis communautaire. He recalled that full respect of the acquis communautaire is a condition sine qua non for joining the European Union and the way to speed up the negotiations without undermining the quality of the enlargement process.48 With regard to transitional measures, the EU distinguished between cases that the Commission considered acceptable, negotiable or unacceptable. Such issues as purchase of real estate were regarded as negotiable, since this category included those requests with a more significant impact in terms of competition or the internal market, or in time and scope. In such circumstances, the Commis sion might recommend that transitional measures could be accepted in this cat egory, under certain conditions and within a certain timeframe. At the same time, the Commission proposed a ‘road map’ for negotiations in the form of priority schedules that would allow the negotiations to progress on chapters that remained open. Indeed, free movement of capital was regarded as a priority schedule for the first half of 2001.49 The first three EU Commission reports on Poland’s progress towards acces sion (1999–2001) only mentioned that the acquisition of real estate by foreign legal or natural persons required a permit of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration. The reports concluded that no legal or institutional changes took place in this area.50 With regard to the Council, the common position with regard to the chapter on free movement of capital was adopted in June 2000.51 The turning point was the year 2002, when the Commission report for the first time admitted that the Polish government’s efforts to liberalise capital move ments had met with considerable success. It added, however, that further efforts were still required to eliminate the remaining restrictions on the movement of capital and that the application of the acquis regarding the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals might present a significant problem in the medium term. Nevertheless, the document admitted that Poland had made steady progress, both in aligning its legislation and in developing the necessary admin istrative structures. However, the report drew only general conclusions and did not go beyond general recommendations.
Negotiation process Poland’s negotiation position on free movement of capital was prepared by the centre–right government, which consisted of the coalition of the Solidarity Electoral Action and the Freedom Union, and it was adopted by the Council of
114 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Ministers of the Republic of Poland on 13 July 1999.52 According to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski, this issue was highly politicised from the first day of negotiations. This problem was important and often raised by both public opinion and political parties. The AWS–UW coalition was unanimous in the principle that a transition period is necessary. However, whilst AWS and one of its main parties ZChN (its representative was the minister responsible for Euro pean Integration when negotiation started) was in favour of a 25-year transitional period or even a constant derogation (which was obviously against the EU law), the liberal Freedom Union agreed with a much shortened 12-year transition period.53 As Kułakowski admitted, he was ‘in between the devil and the deep blue sea’ since he was criticised by both sides. UW thought that he should be more resist ant to the political pressure coming from AWS parties, Christian National Union (ZChN) in particular. Meanwhile, the AWS parties accused Kułakowski of taking a more liberal approach, closer to that of the Freedom Union (UW).54 Nonetheless, as the leader of ZChN and the Minister for European Affairs in an early AWS government. Ryszard Czarnecki later admitted that political elites used the long transitional period for political purposes and by this stirred up debate within public opinion. This was because the government wanted to allevi ate social fears.55 However, in 2000 and 2001, even though negotiations on other chapters and less controversial issues were moving on, there was a relative standstill with regard to negotiations concerning land ownership. The reasons behind this standstill and why it was followed by a sudden acceleration in nego tiations shall be explained in detail. Tough negotiations (1999–2001) A lively moment came on 4 May 2001, when the EU Commission drew up a common position for negotiations with the applicants and recognised ‘the high political sensitivity of purchasing real estate in a majority of candidate countries, in particular the issue of investment in agricultural and forestry land and the acquisition of secondary residences’. The Commission’s proposal was therefore to grant the concerned candidate countries a seven-year period of transition for purchasing by EU citizens of agricultural land and forest, and a five-year period for recreational land from the moment candidate countries joined the EU.56 The Commission would have to use objective, stable, transparent and public criteria for the authorisation procedures for real estate acquisitions. These cri teria should not differentiate among other EU residents. The Commission also proposed that a review should take place after three years. This review would be based on a factual report from the Commission, which might be accompanied by a proposal to the Council of Ministers. The Council could then act unanimously to shorten or lift the transitional period.57 However, the Commission proposals were countered by a Polish proposal of a five-year period of transition for the purchase of land for investments and an 18-year period for other types of land. This Polish proposal was immediately
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 115 criticised by the European Council. According to the European Council, there should be no period of transition for the purchase of land for investments because new members would need direct investments. Another explanation was that there should be no violation of the settlement law of EU citizens. Indeed, the Commission proposals fell short of demands from the applicants and were likely to disappoint Poland, since it demanded an 18-year transition period for purchasing farmland.58 Nevertheless, the Polish Chief Negotiator declared that until an official document from the EU was presented, Poland would stick to its original position of assuming an 18-year transitional period on the pur chase of agricultural land by foreigners.59 However, as Kułakowski later admitted, even though the original position was 18 years, he counted on a 12-year trans itional period and treated the 18-year position as a negotiation tactic.60 This rigid government stance was criticised not only internationally, but also domestically by the presidential palace. According to an official of the presiden tial chancellery in charge of the integration process, a national debate should be held in Poland on the issue of land purchases by foreigners. Paweł Świeboda declared that because of Poland’s demand for an 18-year transitional period, certain social groups, notably farmers, had become more entrenched in their opposition to free trade in land than they had been before. Poland’s rigid negoti ating position had led to increased fears in the population about the whole ques tion of trade in land, and these needed to be dispelled as quickly as possible. The point of departure for the proposed debate should be ‘the recognition that free trade in land is one of the basic rules of the game in the EU, one of the funda mental freedoms, and we have to accept that in principle’.61 Indeed, this state ment could be regarded as one of the signals forecasting a change in negotiating strategy. This is because it was anticipated that the post-communist coalition would win the elections. Softening of the negotiation positions A major turning point came in September 2001, after the coalition parties of Sol idarity Electoral Action and its former junior partner, the Freedom Union, lost the election. The post-communist coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Labour Union (UP) won 216 seats out of a possible 460. In Octo ber 2001 a new government was launched, consisting of the Democratic Left Alliance and a much weaker, agrarian Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL).62 Almost immediately, the government sent a signal to Brussels that it was ready for a compromise, especially in such issues as land purchase and free movement of labour. Possible room for a compromise in these issues was also identified by the European Commission.63 On 14 October Prime Minister Miller officially declared a change in the nego tiation strategy, especially the government’s readiness to accept the EU proposal concerning the previous government’s position on the purchase of real estate by foreigners. He declared that the government was ready to accept transitional periods with regard to the access into the labour market of some EU countries.
116 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Before Prime Minister Miller’s above-mentioned statement, the pace of the negotiations was rather slow. According to a senior official involved in the nego tiation process, negotiations concerning the sale of land by foreigners were rather sluggish, mainly because the late AWS government was not willing to make a concession towards the EU before the elections. This issue was highly politicised and too controversial to be handled just before elections. Further more, a softening of the negotiation stance by the AWS government could cause internal political conflict within the AWS.64 A similar explanation was given by Leszek Miller, when asked why his pred ecessor, Jerzy Buzek, had not managed to close this stage of negotiations. The SLD leader answered: ‘It had to do with the election year and the fear that he will be attacked by all forces, which would use any means necessary to delay Poland’s EU accession.’ Miller was indeed aware that his idea of speeding up negotiations for the price of certain negotiation concessions would make the government the target of political attacks.65 Nevertheless, he decided to take the risk and soon after Miller’s declaration on speeding up negotiations, the leading SLD expert on the EU and informal international spokesman, Tadeusz Iwiński, confirmed that the Democratic Left Alliance was ready to accelerate Poland’s membership negotiations with the EU. As he stated: ‘The SLD and the government are undoubtedly ready for rational compromises.’66 Similar declarations were made by a newly appointed Chief of the Negotiation Team, Jan Truszczyński.67 According to Jan Truszczyński, speeding up of the negotiation process should not only be credited to the Miller government, since it had already been prepared by his negotiating team. Miller simply streamlined more of the negotiating areas in comparison to the previous government, which was necessary and a natural consequence of the progress of the negotiations.68 This speeding up of negotiations was prompted by the recognition that the softening of the Polish position was the price that had to be paid in order to accelerate the negotiation process, which was also a result of domestic pres sure.69 As Putnam indicated, on the domestic level, the decision-makers, instead of focusing on total costs and benefits, should focus on relative costs and bene fits, especially given the current domestic environment.70 The SLD realised that softening of the original negotiation stance was a cost that should be paid in order to benefit from the acceleration of the negotiation process. Whilst there was a common agreement within the SLD to speed up the nego tiation process, their junior coalition partner, PSL, was regarded by the post- communists SLD as a permanent troublemaker. This was because PSL was always slightly sceptical towards Europe. To placate PSL, the SLD added a clause in the coalition agreement about heading towards integration with the EU. Miller made a political gesture towards his coalition partner and supported the idea of introducing land trade regulations. He was aware that if Poland were to pass such a bill, the discussions about the length of a transition period might lose some of their importance. Thus, Miller agreed that the length of the transition period for land purchases by foreigners should not exceed ten to 12 years.71
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 117 In order to speed up negotiations, the new government also agreed to accept a two-year ban on access by Polish workers to EU labour markets and to scale back to 12 years from 18 the length of a moratorium the previous government demanded on the sale of farmland to foreigners.72 Even though the 12-year pro posal was not a drastic change in itself, Miller sent a signal to Brussels that further concessions were possible. Under Poland’s new proposal, foreigners would be able to purchase houses and apartments immediately after Poland was admitted to the EU, and farmers from EU countries would be able to purchase land to run their own farms after a three-year lease period, which indeed was a major concession.73 Domestic critique of the new government’s position This new Polish proposal encountered severe criticism from the opposition. First, the critique was aggravated by concessions made by Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Secretary of State for European Affairs Danuta Huebner. This was because two days earlier they had declared in Brussels that Poland approved plans for EU citizens to buy second homes and land for summer homes in Poland after a seven-year transition period and for EU farmers to buy land for cultivation after a three-year lease.74 The Polish Foreign Minister was also severely criticised by the opposition for misleading parliament and public opinion by not informing parliament and the public about a change in negotiating position and withholding vital information. As a response, on 21 November 2001 the caucuses of the two right-wing opposition parties, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Law and Justice (PiS), announced that they would submit a motion to hold a national referendum on sale of land to foreign ers in connection with ‘the condemnable and scandalous position of Leszek Miller’s government’, who had failed to inform society about the scope of con cessions in EU accession negotiations with regard to the sale of land.75 This motion of the opposition parties to call for a referendum was prompted by a political calculation and the fact that the great majority of the public were against liberalisation of the regime. An opinion poll conducted in July 2001 showed that 65 per cent of respondents agreed that Poland should demand a long transitional period for purchasing land by foreigners.76 This rapid reaction of the opposition also caused an intervention from the SLD junior coalition partner, the Peasants’ Party. Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski announced that he would submit draft regulations on the sale of agricultural land to foreigners. He also declared that the planned regulations would secure Poland’s national interests and used this oppor tunity to criticise the senior coalition partner for ‘a mistake’ made by the Polish Foreign Minister. Kalinowski stressed that his party would insist that ‘such an important matter as the sale of agricultural land to foreigners be settled favourably and Polish agricultural land be in the hands of Polish farmers’.77 According to a senior official involved in the negotiation process, the behaviour of PSL and the main opposition parties was directed towards playing on emotions rather than making rational judgments, and was made for political purposes.78
118 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz responded immediately, calling the criticism an ‘emotional overreaction’. He emphasised that the government never intended to keep anything secret, and said that any lack of full information about Poland’s position stemmed from a temporary strategy and was designed to secure the best membership terms for Poland. Cimoszewicz stressed that Poland should be flex ible in EU membership negotiations if it wanted to ‘meet its historical chance’ to complete talks in the next year and join the Union in 2004.79 Nevertheless, on 28 November 2001, under growing pressure from the opposition, the Peasants’ Party, the media and public opinion, Cimoszewicz admitted that it was an organisational and technical mistake to present the Polish position on the sale of land to foreigners in Brussels instead of Warsaw. The Foreign Minister declared that this was a mistake caused by the absence of certain procedures of government, which would have made it necessary that any such change in position should first be presented within Poland itself. He also stressed that the intention of the Miller Cabinet was to inform Polish public opinion about the negotiations with the European Union. As Cimoszewicz declared: ‘Poles have the right to get acquainted with this information.’ He added that this was necessary to convince Poles to support the membership in the referendum.80 A change in Poland’s position paper regarding the free sale of land decisively radicalised public opinion on that issue. The strongest sign of this was the signi ficant increase in the percentage of respondents favouring a complete ban on allowing foreigners to freely buy and sell land, regardless of what use the land was to be put. This was shown in a number of opinion polls, as shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
HOW LONG SHOULD POLAND MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PURCHASE OF FARMLAND BY FOREIGNERS? Hard to say 1% A complete ban should be imposed 36%
No restrictions 7% 1–3 years 5% 4–5 years 9% 6–7 years 9%
Over 12 years 20%
8–12 years 13%
Figure 5.2 How long should Poland maintain restrictions in the purchase of farmland by foreigners? (source: IPSOS-Demoskop, December 2001/OCEI).
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 119 HOW LONG SHOULD POLAND MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN FOREIGNERS’ PURCHASE OF FARMLAND FOLLOWING A THREE-YEAR LEASE PERIOD?
A complete ban should be imposed 34%
Hard to say No restrictions 2% 9% 1–3 years 8% 4–5 years 11%
6–7 years 8% A
8–12 years 11%
Over 12 years 17%
HOW LONG SHOULD POLAND MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN FOREIGNERS’ PURCHASE OF LAND FOR RECREATIONAL USE? A complete ban should be imposed 27%
Hard to say 2%
No restrictions 11% 1–3 years 9%
4–5 years 13%
Over 12 years 16% B
8–12 years 12%
6–7 years 10%
Figure 5.3 A) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of farmland following a three-year lease period? B) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of land for recreational use? (source: IPSOS-Demoskop, December 2001/OCEI).
These surveys conducted on December 2001 clearly indicated the pressure, coming from public opinion, on the government. The situation also revealed how political parties can use the public mood to achieve their own goals. Indeed, the post-communist government was put under strong pressure that prompted it to change its tactic in order to demonstrate its toughness during the negotiations. Most respondents accepted the transition periods for the free purchase of farmland (12 years) and recreational plots (seven years) proposed by the Polish government in the new negotiation position. Farmers, however, had particularly
120 Purchase of real estate by EU residents restrictive views with regard to the transition periods for the purchase of land. In the opinion of over half of them (53 per cent), the 12-year transition period for the purchase of farmland was too short. Moreover, almost half of all farmers (48 per cent) thought that the seven-year transition period for the purchase of recre ational plots was insufficient. The opinion that these periods were too long was very sparse in this group of respondents (5 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively). In this regard, the managers and the intelligentsia were situated on the opposite end of the scale of opinion, particularly with regard to the 12-year period. In this group, more respondents thought that this period was too long rather than too short (24 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively).81 The demonstration of resistance to the EU from the Polish government An opportunity to demonstrate government independence from EU pressure came when, in January 2002, the European Commission Director General for enlargement, Eneko Landaburu, made a comment that the EC agreed with IN YOUR OPINION, IS THE TRANSITION PERIOD CURRENTLY PROPOSED BY POLAND FOR...: Purchase of farmland Purchase of recreational (12 years) plots (7 years)
31%
Too short
32%
43%
Adequate
41%
12%
Too long
11%
3%
Unnecessary
4%
11%
Difficult to say
12%
Figure 5.4 Assessment of the transition period in the purchase of farmland and in the purchase of recreational plots (source: CBOS, December 2001).
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 121 Poland’s call for a 12-year control over the sale of land, starting from the year Poland would become an EU member. However, Landaburu declared that, in his opinion, the period of land lease preceding the purchase of land should also include the years before EU membership.82 In immediate response to this statement, Spokeswoman for the Committee for European Integration (KIE), Ewa Haczyk, emphasised that Poland’s government and negotiators must maintain autonomy and sovereignty during the negoti ations. As she put quite bluntly, Surely comments by the EC director general for enlargement are valuable and also our negotiators will take them into consideration, but maybe the government and negotiators should be left with their own autonomy and sovereignty in negotiations and in settling the tactics of holding such negoti ations.83 The government was under pressure, however, not only from the EU, but also – in a contrary direction – from domestic forces, that is from the right-wing opposition and from the Peasants’ Party within the coalition. The PSL used every opportunity to declare to the public that it would ‘firmly watch over’ Polish interests during the ten months which Poland had remaining to close its EU membership negotiations.84 The party leaders also agreed that they would press the SLD to be tough during negotiations and that the PSL should be pre pared to leave the government in case the SLD did not take its suggestions into account. The Peasants’ Party hence used a strategy of threatening to leave the coalition and of obstructing the negotiation process as an opposition party. By this threat, the party sent a clear signal to Brussels, and it was not an accident that this political declaration was made just a day before the visit to Warsaw on 28 February 2002 by European Union Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen.
Concluding negotiations The idea behind Verheugen’s visit to Warsaw in February 2002 was to pave the way for agreement on the sale of land to foreigners and to discuss direct pay ments and quotas. The February agreement enabled negotiations to be concluded with the provisional closure of the chapter. Achieving a compromise The meeting between Miller and Verheugen was yet another significant turning point of the accession negotiations. Miller presented the position of the Polish gov ernment in which three conditions of integration with the EU were treated as the most important: the new and old members should be treated on an equal basis; new member countries could not lose out on accession; and the funds set aside by the EU to cover the costs of enlargement in 1999 could not be reduced.85
122 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Verheugen discussed the purchase of real estate and other issues with Prime Minister Miller and Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski. The main controversy between the government and the EU involved the starting point from which the period of leasing Polish land by EU farmers should be counted. Brussels demanded that the period of lease prior to accession should also count for those EU farmers who were living and cultivating land in Poland. However, the Polish Peasants’ Party was worried that there might be thousands of such cases, includ ing contracts signed by foreigners through fictitious companies.86 According to estimates presented by the PSL, 200,000 hectares of Polish land were leased to foreign entities.87 This issue was highly politicised and caused a crisis within the coalition. PSL went so far as to warn that it would leave the government coalition if the government did not look after Polish interests. Indeed, PSL used a classical threat strategy. After the talks between Verheugen and Kalinowski on 28 February 2002, an agreement was made by the parties regarding the calculation of the period for leasing land by EU farmers before they acquire the right to buy it. Nevertheless, Kalinowski and Miller, after the meeting, refused to give details of the compro mise, arguing that the details of the agreement would be declared soon.88 Ver heugen was also optimistic and alleged that Brussels would accept a modified Polish position.89 He gave his interlocutors ‘friendly advice’ to review the entire financial package presented by the EC as a whole, and not its respective parts, separately. According to him, only in this way could one see all the benefits that Poland might gain. As he stressed: ‘We are undertaking decisions which will define the future of the Polish nation and not only the future of one, considerably small, part of the society.’90 Yet again, the EU side had used a package deal strategy. According to a senior official involved in the negotiation process, this package deal was used by the EU to press Poland to accept conditions that were not in Poland’s best interests by saying: ‘Look, you should have a broader picture; perhaps this solution will not be in the interests of a small group but other concessions will compensate for losses.’ These arguments were often used when liberalisation was discussed.91 Even though Kalinowski was not ‘fully satisfied’ with the compromise, he claimed: ‘We managed to include in the agreement, legal provisions on the sale of land, which will eliminate the possibility of speculation and purchase of land.’92 Most of his party colleagues were, nonetheless, disappointed with the result, especially since Jarosław Kalinowski, during the previous weeks, was calling for a harder line in negotiations with Brussels. Hence, in the PSL, the compromise was widely regarded as a victory for the senior coalition partner. Both the SLD and Kalinowski were sending a message to public opinion and farmers’ interest groups that this was a hard-won compromise, which included a range of conditions relating to where the land was and how long it was to be leased in order to protect Polish interests.93 As Prime Minister Miller declared: Land in Poland is not just a commodity. Land in Poland has a significance stemming from our traditions and history, and this issue undoubtedly has to
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 123 be treated differently – and it has been treated differently by the Union. We have found understanding for this issue.94 Indeed, the Commission acknowledged that due to historical and political cir cumstances, the EU needed another approach for Poland. The question was whether or not a 12-year period would be sufficient for Poland.95 One may, however, ask why the EU Commission was so willing to make a compromise on this issue and grant such a long transitional period, especially since there was big counter pressure on this point coming from the Dutch. The Nether lands, whose farmers were leasing land in Poland, called on the Polish government at the EU Summit in Barcelona to provide a definition of what constituted a farmer in Poland and whether the lease period for EU farmers who had signed leasing agreements as legal entities would be counted from the day these agreements were signed, or from the day they began leasing land as private individuals.96 According to Alan Mayhew, while this issue was important for a few member states, in particular for the Netherlands97 and to a certain extent for Germany, it was not important for most EU countries and the EU Commission itself. Even the Dutch position ‘was all about forcing other concessions somewhere else’.98 Therefore, the EU was using this issue in order to obstruct other concessions from Poland, mainly in the area of free movement of workers.99 As a result, in March 2002 Poland managed to close the controversial chapter on the free movement of capital. Poland was granted a 12-year transitional period, which for many was still considered the best deal with regard to this chapter of any that were achieved by the candidate countries. The EU was even afraid that the deal obtained by Poland might prompt other candidate countries to reopen their chapters on free movement of capital, a move which the Commission was hoping would not occur.100 Jan Truszczyński, Poland’s Chief Negotiator, said in Brussels that closing the two negotiation areas ‘confirmed that Poland remains decidedly on the right track and that the Polish negotiation strategy, designed to successfully complete membership negotiations by the end of the year, is feasible and realistic’.101 Provisional closing of the negotiation chapter In March 2002 negotiations on this chapter were provisionally closed. However, this did not mean that all problems related to the problem of purchase of real estate by foreigners were already solved. Commissioner Gunter Verheugen wel comed the provisional closure of this chapter, describing it as a ‘breakthrough’, and hoped that Poland would fully implement what was agreed. As he declared: This chapter, which includes sensitive questions such as purchase of land and secondary residences, has been the most difficult – politically and psy chologically – in the negotiations with Poland so far. The European Union made great efforts to accommodate Poland’s particular needs. This proves that the Union takes the sensitivities and particular concerns of the different candidate countries seriously.102
124 Purchase of real estate by EU residents The EU was afraid that Poland would not eliminate remaining restrictions in time and these fears were reflected in the 2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards EU Accession. According to its recommendations, in order to complete preparations for membership, Poland’s efforts should focus on passing the legislation necessary to ensure the timely elimination of all remain ing restrictions, including those on the purchase of land.103 The 2003 Compre hensive Monitoring Report on Poland assessed the outcomes of the accession negotiations. As the document pointed out, in accordance with the transitional arrangement that had been granted, Poland would remove restrictions on the acquisition of secondary residences by EU nationals not resident in Poland by May 2009 at the latest, and would remove restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land and forests by EU nationals by May 2016 at the latest. According to the Commission recommendations, Poland also needed to ensure that restrictions regarding the acquisition of real estate that were not covered by the transitional arrangements were effectively removed by the date of accession. In addition, Poland should demonstrate that the recently adopted authorisation procedure for acquiring land respected the terms of the Acces sion Treaty.104 Reactions from the domestic level The official announcement of the negotiation results in the area of purchase of real estate provoked a severe reaction from the opposition, which called for a referendum. However, a parliamentary majority once again rejected, this time on 20 March, the second proposal of the Euro-sceptic League of Polish Families (LPR), which sought to introduce a referendum on the sale of land.105 Further more, the Self-Defence and the LPR were preparing a vote of non-confidence in the Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski.106 Not only was the opposition dissatisfied with the negotiation results, but Kalinowski and his party colleagues were also not fully satisfied with the outcome of negotiations. They used every opportunity to criticise the Union and did so in the spotlight. In April 2002 a new initiative was taken by the Peasants’ Party, which it claimed was in order to protect the interests of Polish farmers. The PSL called for an acceleration of work on the draft law on the agricultural system in order for it to be adopted before 16 April 2003, which was the date of the planned signing of the Accession Treaty. Kalinowski also warned that if a regulation were not passed before the Acces sion Treaty, buyers of Polish farmland from the present European Union would be in a better situation than Polish citizens. This would be because, unlike EU citizens, Polish farmers would have to meet requirements concerning maximum farmland standards, adequate qualifications, and other requirements, which would not apply to EU citizens.107 The political parties reflected the mood of the general public. Indeed, the results of the negotiation decisively radicalised public opinion on that issue. According to the opinion polls, a vast majority of citizens were against the way
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 125 in which the government had come to an agreement in negotiation talks on sales of land. The strongest sign of this was the significant increase in the percentage of respondents favouring a complete ban on allowing foreigners to freely buy and sell land, regardless of the land’s envisioned use.108 Most negative expectations of EU membership were connected with purchase of land by foreigners. This issue was more pressing than any other that raised public fears, as indicated in Table 5.2. Despite the negotiating by Poland of a relatively favourable transition period for purchase of land by foreigners, respondents were strongly polarised in assess ing the negotiated results. Supporters of the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defence Union were most critical.109 Taking advantage of this climate, in October 2002 the League of Polish Fami lies made a third attempt to present a motion calling for a referendum on the sale of land to foreigners. This time the LPR lodged with the Sejm (the lower chamber of parliament) a citizens’ motion calling for the staging of a referendum on the sale of land to foreigners.110 The motion had been signed by some 600,000 people.111 The right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) Party also endorsed the motion and likewise claimed that Polish land was not adequately protected.112 Neverthe less, the whole opposition was not united, and indeed the liberal and pro-EU Cit izens Platform was rather moderate in criticising the government. Therefore, the government managed to pacify these voices coming from PSL and the right- wing parties.
Table 5.2 Assessment of negotiated membership conditions In many areas, Polish negotiators were forced to reconcile the terms of EU membership with Poland’s capacity to assume the obligations of membership. In your opinion, are the negotiated conditions good or bad with regard to: Decidedly Rather good (%) good (%)
Doesn’t matter (%)
Rather bad (%)
Decidedly Don’t bad (%) know (%)
co-financing regional investments from EU funds
17
39
7
5
3
29
undertaking work in EU countries
8
39
8
19
7
19
7% VAT on construction services
12
32
8
10
6
32
practising law in Poland by EU citizens
3
17
14
11
8
47
purchase of farm land by foreigners in Poland
1
13
11
33
25
17
Source: Office of the Committee for European Integration, December 2002.
126 Purchase of real estate by EU residents The Accession Treaty and the ratification process The provisional closing of negotiations on free movement of capital and, in par ticular, purchase of land by foreigners in March 2002, did not put an end to the debate within political elites and public opinion on this issue. Even though the Commission adopted a favourable opinion on the accession of Poland and other candidate countries,113 Poland and the EU could not reach an agreement on the condition of land purchasing by EU farmers. The European Commission wanted to establish precise land purchase conditions. Poland’s dip lomats claimed that the conditions concerning the sale of land to EU citizens negotiated in March 2002 were very complicated. EU experts, in turn, suspected that Poland’s Ministry of Agriculture wanted to make the procedures stricter. According to the agreed propositions, EU farmers would be obliged until 2016 to become tenants of the land before they would get a permit for its purchase. The tenancy period was to amount to seven years in the case of Western and Northern Poland, and three years in the case of other areas.114 The situation was made even more complicated in February 2003 by a major political crisis after the break-up of the SLD–PSL coalition. The crisis was immediately prompted by the PSL’s decision to vote against a government road vignette bill, but there were several other issues that caused disagreement. The break-up of the coalition was caused by PSL demands for guarantees of budget subsidies to EU direct farming subsidy payments, greater state intervention on the farming market and the introduction of a land trade bill, which was particu larly emphasised by PSL and was aimed at regulating and limiting land sales.115 Prime Minister Miller, explaining the reasons behind the split, declared that it was necessary for the government to have stable partners. As Miller argued: ‘You cannot be in coalition and at the same time in opposition’, adding that the government was not going to be ‘held hostage by anybody.’ Other SLD officials accused PSL of not making clear their position on the EU referendum, acting as if it were only interested in the rural voters and the benefits of being in the gov ernment.116 Finally, PSL made its support for a ‘Yes’ vote in the EU referendum conditional on the passing of several bills the PSL deemed crucial, including the land trade bill.117 On 7 April 2003 the League of Polish Families issued an appeal to the Prime Minister asking him not to sign the EU Accession Treaty and to cancel Poland’s participation in the EU Summit in Athens. The Self-Defence party prepared a similar appeal. The party leader, Andrzej Lepper, added that Poland should not sign the Treaty without stricter land sale laws. As he put it bluntly: ‘For us to sign the EU Treaty without laws protecting Polish land is unacceptable.’118 This last-minute political obstruction was criticised by the Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who argued that Poland’s accession to the EU should not be the subject of political tussles. Cimoszewicz called the Treaty ‘the best possible’ for Poland and stressed that the signing on 16 April in Athens would officially seal the EU accession talks. He admitted that not all of Poland’s wishes were reflected in the Treaty, but stressed that the document was ‘as good
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 127 as it could be’ and that after joining, Poland would receive more from the EU than it would pay into it.119 The Treaty was signed on 16 April 2003. As a result, the following regulatory measures were taken. First, Poland could maintain, in force, for five years from the date of acces sion, the rules regarding the acquisition of secondary residences. However, this transitional period would not apply to nationals of the EU and EEA member states that had been legally resident in Poland for four years continuously. Second, with regard to the limitations concerning acquisition of agricultural land and forests, Poland could maintain these in force for 12 years from the date of accession. Nevertheless, this would not apply to those nationals of the EU and EEA member states who wanted to establish themselves as self‑employed farmers and who had been legally resident and leasing lands in Poland, as a nat ural or legal person, for at least three years continuously. With the exception of the Western and Northern parts of Poland,120 the residence and leasing period, as mentioned earlier, was to extend to seven years. As a result, the new rules would postpone (and temporally limit) the purchase of land by foreigners, but in the long run would not stop the process. The lease period preceding the purchase of land would be calculated individually for each national of a Member State who had been leasing land in Poland from the certified date of the original lease agreement.121 The Accession Treaty was formally approved in the referendum held in July 2003. Final data released by the election commission showed that 77.4 per cent of those who participated in the referendum on EU accession voted in favour, while the turnout at 58.8 per cent of all eligible voters was well in excess of the 50 per cent threshold required to validate the outcome.122
Conclusions The purchase of real estate was used by political forces and some interest groups in Poland in order to gain political capital. This is a good example of how politi cisation and manipulation from the side of domestic groups can influence the size of the win-set. It seems that there was interplay among different groups and public opinion. This indicates a small domestic win-set in Poland to accept lib eralisation of land sales. The negotiated conditions, even though they required certain flexibility from the Polish side, can be regarded as a success. Thus, Poland, by negotiating the longest transitional period, did better than other acceding countries. The assessment of the negotiation outcomes depends very much on whether such an assessment is made from a political or from an economic perspective. One can agree with Alan Mayhew, who pointed out that negotiations concerning purchase of real estate ‘were a success from the political point of view in terms of Polish negotiation objectives but from the economist point of view, it was a waste of time’.123 This is because, as economists argued, the transitional period at best would not have any influence on the economic development of Poland or, as some argued, it could have a negative influence.
128 Purchase of real estate by EU residents The negotiation period from 1998 to 2002 can be divided into two major stages. The first period, under the AWS–UW government and later the AWS minority government, from 1998 to 2001, can be characterised by a relative standstill in negotiations concerning the purchase of real estate by foreigners. This was mainly because of the tough Polish negotiating positions and the lack of determination to achieve a reasonable compromise showed by both negotiating sides. However, it was also determined by a set aside strategy used by the EU, where the most difficult chapters, including free movement of capital, were negotiated at a later stage. Public opinion did not want to introduce a liberal regime in purchasing real estate. Thus, a small domestic win-set in Poland to introduce a liberal regime was used by the AWS–UW government as a bargaining advantage. The Polish side thus used a tying hands strategy. The SLD–PSL government brought changes to this negoti ation tactic as a result of the softening of the negotiation stances in order to accelerate the negotiation process. However, the concessions made by the Polish side were rather limited. Poland did not resign from the transitional period and only reduced its original stance from 18 to 12 years.124 This con firms Putnam’s thesis that a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage. The fact that Poland was relatively successful in negotiations was prompted by the fact that the EU domestic win-set to accept the transitional period was rather large. Neither public opinion nor major political forces and interest groups in the EU countries cared about the issue. Transitional periods in land sales were not so important for the EU, since it did not require money transfers, a particular concern for the EU politicians. Finally, those EU coun tries that emphasised this issue, like the Netherlands, treated this problem as an element of their negotiation tactics aimed at achieving better deals in other, more important areas like direct payments and production quotas. With regard to particularities of negotiation strategies and tactics, these were used by both sides extensively. The Polish side, through the negoti ations, used such negotiation strategies and tactics as tying hands and threats. The EU side used battering ram and package deals, especially when tying the Table 5.3 Purchase of real estate by foreigners – size of the domestic win-set Size of win-set Case study
Poland
EU
Rather large: public opinion did not Purchase of Small within real estate by public opinion, care about this issue, interest groups foreigners interest groups rather weak, political parties and and political politicians treated this issue as an parties. element of a package deal (with free movement of labour) in order to negotiate transitional periods in free movement of labour.
Result Win-sets overlapped. Poland managed to negotiate a long transitional period.
Purchase of real estate by EU residents 129 purchase of real estate issue with the free movement of labour, as will be dis cussed in the next chapter. To sum up, in Poland, due to strong domestic pressure expressed unani mously by political parties, farmers’ unions and public opinion, there was a small domestic win-set to accept the liberalisation. In the EU countries there was a large win-set to accept the transitional periods, since political parties and interest groups in member states treated this issue only as an element of a wider package, mainly aimed at protecting interest in the area of free move ment of workers. Thus, the Polish and the EU win-sets finally overlapped. This indeed confirms Putnam’s idea that when win-sets overlap, the negoti ation agreement can be easily achieved. The case of negotiations concerning purchase of real estate can serve as empirical evidence to support this claim.
6 Freedom of movement of labour
Freedom of movement of workers was one of the key negotiating issues within the chapter on the free movement of persons. It was also one of the key problems (together with the agriculture and the sale of land) that raised major concerns from public opinion, which was indicated in a number of opinion polls. Even though freedom of movement of labour and sale of land to foreigners were closely linked and tied mainly by the EU to a larger package deal, their nature and dynamics remained quite different. Whilst the argument over the length of transitional periods for land sales was initiated by the Polish side, the problem of free move ment of labour was generated by the EU side in particular. The question for the Polish government was how to sell a compromise to the general public.1 This chapter aims to answer the question why the free movement of labour became an important domestic issue. It also examines the political stages of negotiations, including the screening process and the preparing of position papers, the opening of proper negotiations, the acceleration of negotiations, the change of the government and the concluding of negotiations, and the ratifica tion of their results in the Accession Treaty. This chapter argues that the dynamics of the political negotiations within the two Polish governments were different. The Buzek government’s tough negoti ation stances were based on a small domestic win-set within Polish public opinion to accept a transitional period. This issue was unofficially linked to a package deal with the purchase of real estate by foreigners. The Miller government, in contrast, treated the agreements for transitional arrangement in the area of free movement of labour as a necessary side-payment, according to Putnam’s rule that the value of an international side-payment should be calculated in terms of its marginal contri bution to the likelihood of ratification of the negotiated agreement, rather than its overall value to the recipient nation.2 The government was aware that domestic pressure expected it to accelerate the negotiation process and to conclude the nego tiations together with the other acceding countries. The different dynamics of negotiating in this area were made even more complex. The problems mentioned above will enable us to answer the key question of this chapter, to what extent the size of the domestic win-set in negotiations con cerning free movement of labour influenced the negotiation process and the negotiation outcomes.
Freedom of movement of labour 131
Why the issue of freedom of movement of labour became an important domestic matter Freedom of movement of labour means the unlimited right to settle, engage in commercial activities and take up employment in any of the EU countries. The freedom of movement for workers within the Community is guaranteed in article 48 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.3 That freedom implies abolition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality in employment, com pensation and other working conditions. In particular, it includes the right of a national, of an EU member state, to reside and take up employment in a Member State of which he or she is not a national. It became one of the most important issues during the negotiations that aroused domestic interest, mainly with public opinion and in the trade unions, not only in the acceding countries, but also in some EU countries, particularly Germany and Austria. There are three major reasons why this issue became so important: economic, social and political. The political dimension was important since it became a component of a larger package deal and was closely linked to the problem of the purchase of real estate by foreigners.4 Economic fears The issue of freedom of movement of workers had vital economic significance.5 The economic arguments were overshadowed by political ones and it was this issue that raised certain economic fears, particularly in the EU‑15 countries.6 This problem had its economic dimension since the movement from the less developed member states to the more developed ones has always been an import ant part of the improvement of the quality of life of the workforce that decided to move abroad.7 In the case of Poland, this was a serious economic and social issue, since the salaries, especially of unskilled labour, were even a few times lower than the EU average. The unemployment rate was around 12 per cent when Poland started negotiations, peaking at 18 per cent when the negotiations were completed.8 It was therefore expected that there would be an increase in the amount of cross-border employment and that there might be larger movements in some spe cific areas or professions, but there was very little expectation that there would be major flows from east to west.9 It was judged that the flow of labour would probably consist of lower skilled and young workers. These workers would obvi ously compete on the price with the same groups of workers in the Union. One possible solution to this problem is the liberalisation and reform of the labour market in Western Europe and stronger economic growth throughout the whole continent.10 Nevertheless, some interest groups, mainly trade unions in Germany, sought an ‘easy solution’ by demanding a long seven-year transitional period on the free movement of labour. Their concerns were expressed by the German political elites. This was very much because the unemployment rate in Germany was also relatively high, peaking at 10 per cent. A fear of immigrants and
132 Freedom of movement of labour workers from the acceding countries existed.11 Those fears were not only felt by the Germans, they were also shared by Austrians and to a certain extent by the British public. In a survey done in April 2002, in Great Britain almost three in every five respondents were concerned that enlargement would mean low wage competition from workers in the applicant countries.12 This public voice could not be ignored by politicians anxious at the prospect of losing public support. Social aspects The second major reason why this issue was of vital importance stems from some social factors. The strong feelings of public opinion in Poland were indeed reflected in a number of opinion polls, where the significance of this problem was strongly emphasised not only by the respondents who declared their willing ness to work abroad, but by a substantive majority of the general public.13 One of the possible explanations of this phenomenon stems from the Polish percep tion of being a European nation, which is deeply rooted in the nation’s mentality. Freedom of movement of workers was considered one of the fundamental freedoms and was often discussed by the public in a lively and vociferous way.14 The introducing of the transitional period was considered a way of limiting or even depriving people of their natural freedoms.15 This freedom was considered as a core element of becoming an EU citizen, as indicated in the Figure 6.1. Thus, limiting this freedom was considered to be a way of treating Poles as second-class Europeans who were not equal to citizens of the other member states. 80 70
Percentage
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Right to work in EU countries
Right to study in EU countries
Right to reside in another EU country
Figure 6.1 What it means to be an EU citizen (in the opinion of Poles) (source: Euro barometer, March 2002/OCEI).
Freedom of movement of labour 133 Hence, according to some sociologists, more people declared their willingness to work in the EU countries than actually planned to do so. This was because in this way they wanted to emphasise that they considered themselves Europeans.16 Political factors Finally, this problem had a political dimension since it became an element of the negotiation strategy of the Polish side and subject to an extensive negotiation game between the negotiation parties. There was a strong negotiation linkage between freedom of movement of labour and the purchase of real estate by foreigners. Such a linkage had been made since both are fundamental freedoms in the Treaty and requests for transition periods were highly politicised. Consequently, these issues were tied up into a package deal. First, such a link was unofficially made by the Polish government, which soon withdrew from this idea. However, later on, the EU proposed a similar package deal.17 According to Alan Mayhew, the linkage was most unfortunate for three main reasons. First, the problems involved were very different and the impact of a trade-off on the candidate countries would be very negative. Second, the land ownership question is economically far less signi ficant than the free movement of labour in the twenty-first century. Finally, there are countries where land purchase is not a negotiation problem – Estonia and Lithuania, for instance.18 Nevertheless, both were made political issues, because they have been made so by politicians and the media.19 Freedom of movement of persons as a strategic goal of Poland The free movement of workers, negotiated within the chapter on the freedom of movement of persons, was regarded as a sensitive, but vital, issue from the very beginning of negotiations. As the 1997 Polish National Strategy of Integration declared: The fastest possible implementation of the free movement of labour, and of employees in particular, is in Poland’s interest. This means eliminating, or keeping short, transition periods in achieving full access to the labour markets of the Union. The only area, where Poland may be interested in interim solu tions, is certain costly social regulations currently in force in the Union.20 The National Strategy of Integration emphasised that one of the most important tasks of the government would be to increase access for Polish employees to the EU labour market. The government would take steps designed to bring about reciprocal recognition of degrees, qualifications and of the right to practice a profession, and would carry out a review of the laws concerning the right to practice professions, of labour law, and of other social regulations in order to make them compatible with the rules existing in the EU.21 The Strategy emphasised the economic significance of free movement of labour.22
134 Freedom of movement of labour The EU, even though it had confirmed the freedom of the movement of workers as a fundamental freedom in the Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union – it did not have a detailed policy on this question.23 Even though this issue was emphasised as a strategic goal, it was not so strongly emphasised in the political debate by political parties and interest groups in Poland.24 This was because some other issues such as land sales and agriculture were a better area for political games and manipulation.
Screening process and preparing of the position papers From the early days of negotiations, free movement of workers was identified as one of the most controversial issues that would require extensive political negoti ations. As a result, the EU had focused on identifying incompatibilities with the acquis, rather than proper negotiations on the free movement of persons.25 The accession negotiations, in other areas, started on 31 March 1998 and were carried out in several stages. The screening in the first seven areas was concluded during the British presidency in mid 1998.26 During the Austrian presidency in the second half of 1998, the negotiation partners entered into substantive negotiations and urged the Council, the Commission and the candidate countries to maintain the momentum in order to allow intensive negotiations in the first half of 1999.27 Screening The screening in the area of free movement of persons was carried out on multi lateral (with some other acceding countries) and bilateral levels (between Poland and the EU). In the area of the freedom of movement of persons on the multilateral level, it took place on 6–7 April 1999 and on the bilateral level on 8–9 April 1999 in Brussels. During the second stage of negotiations, based on the screening results, the applicant countries prepared their position papers in individual areas and presented them to the European Union.28 According to the EU, the development of the administrative capacity was an essential pre-condition for future membership. According to the first EU Report, Poland had made progress in setting up the necessary structures, but in terms of the ability to take on the obliga tions of membership and, more particularly, the Community acquis, the Commis sion pointed out enigmatically that ‘Poland have a mixed record, with significant progress in certain areas offset by delays in others.’29 Nevertheless, the screening process enabled elaboration of the position paper of the Polish government. Polish position The position paper contained a Polish proposal to resolve those incompatibilities and to set a suggested timetable for Poland’s incorporation of the EU law. The paper recommended particular solutions such as transition periods or specific clauses to be introduced into the Accession Treaty.30
Freedom of movement of labour 135 The key Polish legislation concerning the movement of workers across Polish borders included the Aliens Act of 25 June 1997 and the Act of 14 December 1994 on Employment and Combating Unemployment. Those acts were not com patible with the principle of free movement of workers as derived from article 48 of the Treaty and a number of EEC Commission and Council Directives that followed.31 The Act on Employment and Combating Unemployment required foreign nationals wishing to take up employment in Poland to apply for an employment permit. Similarly, under the Polish laws, family members of migrant workers do not enjoy any special rights of residence and employment in Poland. Nevertheless, as Poland’s position paper emphasised: ‘Upon Poland’s accession to the European Union the relevant EC regulations will apply directly in Poland and will automatically eliminate the present restrictions concerning the EU Member State nationals.’32 As we may see from the document, Poland stood firmly on the principle of freedom of movement of persons.33 For this reason, both the 1999 and 2000 National Programme of Preparations for Membership in the EU recognised adjustment of Polish legislation to the acquis communautaire. The objective of Poland was entered immediately into the system of freedom of movement for workers, based on article 48 of the EC Treaty. As the National Programme recognised, the achievement of this goal would require Poland to be ready to join the system with all its elements by the date of accession, at the latest.34 The public assessment of the Polish negotiating position As existed in the case of real estate purchases by foreigners, in the case of freedom of movement of persons there was widespread agreement among the experts that in drafting Polish position papers, the concern for public opinion was a driving force, as admitted by the Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski,35 and there were opinion polls supporting this thesis. For instance, in the CBOS survey in two consecutive years, 1998 and 1999, as many as 75 per cent of respondents agreed with a statement that there should be freedom to take jobs in the EU countries from the date of the accession. For most people, limiting freedom of movement of workers was regarded as depriving them of one of the fundamental freedoms or was even considered as a way of humiliating them. As Jerzy Buzek described it, the importance of this issue was so obvious that his government did not even have to consult with social partners on the issue.36 According to the adviser to Prime Minister Buzek responsible for investigation of public opinion, this factor was of vital import ance and indeed was reflected in a number of opinion polls.37 To use Putnam’s metaphor, due to strong domestic pressure, Polish negoti ators had a small win-set on the domestic level to accept any transitional period in the area of free movement of workers. However, unlike in the case of land pur chase by foreigners, the problem of the free movement of labour was a sensitive issue not only for Polish public opinion, but also for public opinion in the EU countries, mainly Germany, which was not so willing to accept liberalisation.
136 Freedom of movement of labour One of the first signals that a future Social Democratic government in Ger many would seek a lengthy delay in granting free movement to workers from CEEC, due to strong pressure from the public opinion and trade unions, was sent in June 1998. As Deputy Chairman of the SPD Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul declared, a new German government should present a report to Brussels spelling out all the specific problems and interests for countries such as Germany. She agreed that ‘a long delay in enforcing the regulations for free labour movement would be essential for any future German government to negotiate’.38 As we may see, due to strong domestic pressure in Germany there was a small win-set to accept the free movement of workers without any transitional period. According to Putnam, the smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk that negotiations would break down.39 The win-sets on both the Polish domestic level and on the German domestic level were small and did not overlap. That is why negotiations in the field of free movement of workers were recognised as diffi cult from the very beginning of talks when the positions were drafted. In fact, this problem was widely recognised in Poland, and it was predicted that this would be the subject of protracted negotiations between the acceding countries (Poland in particular) and that this issue would become subject to complex polit ical games.
Opening of negotiations On 26 May 2000 Poland and EU opened entry negotiations in three politically sensitive areas: free movement of labour, justice and finance. The opening of negotiations was possible because Germany, Austria and Spain had all agreed to the EU position on labour movement, which was not to call for introducing a transition period right away, but to ‘return to the issue at a later date’.40 Poland and the EU sides met to formally exchange prepared positions and documents. The Polish government was, however, aware that if it wanted to seek successful labour rights for Poles in the EU, it must convince the Union that the EU would not be threatened with a mass inflow of cheap labour. This goal was particularly difficult since Germany and Austria strongly feared that they would be swamped with cheap Eastern labour once they opened their doors to Polish workers.41 These fears were mainly driven by domestic factors in the EU member states. When taking their negotiation positions, both the German and Austrian governments were acting under strong pressure coming from both public opinion and local trade unions.42 Therefore, to use Putnam’s terminology, it was rather unlikely that Germany and Austria would ratify a solution allowing free movement of labour. In early May 2000 the EU published figures according to which Germany would face an inflow of 220,000 migrant workers a year following the European Union enlargement. The figures were based on a study written by Germany’s DIW Institute and indeed caused a furore in Berlin. German politicians were already deeply concerned about the social and labour force repercussions of enlargement and were fighting to persuade fellow EU governments to place
Freedom of movement of labour 137 curbs on the free movement of workers immediately after enlargement. In refer ring to the study, Anna Diamantopoulou, EU employment commissioner, insisted that freedom of movement of people was one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU and the Commission would support that. As she emphasised: Do we – the applicants, the member states – do we have to be frightened of each other? [. . .] Fears – on both sides – are unfounded. There are economic and employment benefits to be gained from economic and political integra tion both for the applicants and for the existing member states. We can gain from the enlarged political and economic community that enlargement will create, and we can gain from having a common and level economic and social playing field for all our countries.43 However, the pressure from some EU member states was very strong, and on another occasion, Commissioner Diamantopoulou argued that in previous enlargements there had been temporary arrangements on labour mobility and ‘that will be for the negotiators to consider’.44 Public opinion pressure In the acceding countries, Poland in particular, there was strong domestic pres sure to introduce a free movement regime. Furthermore, opinion surveys showed a relatively high interest of Poles in working in the EU countries. A July 2000 CBOS survey found that about 35 per cent declared that they would be interested in working in the EU countries,45 while 53 per cent declared that they would not be interested in working abroad even if offered a job. For only 12 per cent, it was difficult to answer the question. These figures are shown in Table 6.1.46 The October 2000 Demoskop Survey brought even more unequivocal results.47 The two particular issues brought to public attention were the free movement of labour and the purchase of land by foreigners. Table 6.1 Are you interested in taking a job in one of the EU countries after Poland’s accession to the EU? Are you interested in taking a job in one of the EU countries after Poland’s accession to the EU? Yes, I would be interested and will definitely try. Yes, I would be and will probably try. Yes, I would be interested if offered a job, but I am not going to try myself. Difficult to say. No, I am not particularly interested. No, I am definitely not interested. Source: CBOS, July 2000.
13% 7% 15% 12% 21% 32%
138 Freedom of movement of labour Table 6.2 Public acceptance for a ten-year transitional period in the free movement of workers and for a liberalisation of the purchase of real estate by foreigners Do you think Poland should accept the following conditions of accession of Poland to the EU? Alternatively, should Poland in case of such conditions resign from membership?
Accept (%)
Resign (%)
Ten-year transitional ban from taking job in the EU countries Freedom to buy land in Poland by EU citizens
12 13
57 60
Source: Demoskop, October 2000.
As we see from these surveys, public opinion in Poland was very much in favour of introducing a liberal regime. Therefore, there was a small domestic win-set in Poland to accept the transitional period. Trade unions and employers’ organisations positions Several trade unions from the acceding countries demanded free movement of labour. The strongest position was taken by the Polish trade unions, ‘Solidarity’ in particular. As a former member of the Negotiation Team, Ewa Kubis noted that trade unions had only a very general view on European integration and did not express their position in detail. Nevertheless, the ‘Solidarity’ position, expressed by their foreign affairs spokesman, Józef Niemiec, clearly supported the idea of freedom of movement. According to ‘Solidarity’, transitional arrange ments in the field of free movement of workers and at the same time a liberal regime in free movement in capital are economically unjustifiable and socially detrimental. This could create social dumping because of the movement of capital investment and exploitation of cheap labour from the acceding countries (often within the shadow economy) before the abolition of any restrictions. Con sequently, this could also increase unemployment in Western Europe since many potential employers would choose to pay low wages in the shadow economy. Transitional arrangements could also have a negative impact on the comparabil ity of salaries between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ members. Because of this process, there would be a lower GDP in the new members and more funds would be pumped into structural aid in the poorer regions of new member states. The other major Polish trade union OPZZ was initially rather silent, but became more active during negotiations on the freedom of movement of labour. In fact, its position was in general similar to that of ‘Solidarity’, although more critical towards Poland’s Negotiation Team. This can be explained by the fact that the OPZZ was a member of the Democratic Left Alliance, which at the beginning and at the early stage of negotiations was in the opposition. In particu lar, OPZZ argued that counteracting German fears by agreeing to transitional arrangements would be a political mistake. Polish trade unions’ lobbying activities on the international arena were mainly limited to fellow trade unions from the most EU countries and indeed to a certain
Freedom of movement of labour 139 extent brought results, since European trade unions by and large supported the principle. There was no solidarity and cooperation between Polish and Germans trade unions, since they clearly had different views on the issue. Labour unions, mainly in Germany and Austria, were also worried that existing pay and benefit levels might be eroded as the new workers arrived.48 Polish negotiators, however, were usually critical in assessing the involve ment of trade unions. According to one of the Polish senior officials, ‘We did not expect any support or expertise from the trade unions to back up our positions. We could rely on expertise from the leading universities, and public opinion polls obviously provided good support for our claims.’49 A similar opinion was shared by Ryszard Czarnecki, even though he admitted the positive role played by trade union leader Józef Niemiec. Czarnecki argued that Polish trade unions were not prepared for the accession process.50 It seems that the trade unions in Germany were much more active than the trade unions in Poland.51 One of the possible explanations often mentioned by the Polish officials was the fact that German trade unions were fighting for the protection of the labour market, whilst Polish trade unions did not have a direct interest in demanding liberalisation.52 This was largely due to the strong personal position of the Polish Chief Nego tiator Jan Kułakowski, formerly the Secretary of European Trade Union Confed eration and the Secretary General of World Labour Confederation. European trade unions, by and large, tried to subordinate particular, national interests in the name of solidarity. However, the German and Austrian trade unions repres ented rather narrow-minded particular interests.53 A position strongly opposing any transitional arrangements was taken by employers’ organisations in Poland, in particular by the two most influential ones, the Polish Confederation of Private Employers and the National Chamber of the Economy. Even though these organisations supported the Polish govern ment’s position and agreed with the trade unions’ general opposition towards any labour movement restrictions, the justification of their stance was definitely economic rather than social. They argued that the German fears of a huge influx of cheap labour from the acceding countries were unjustified. Even though both trade unions and employers’ organisations were in favour of liberalisation, their activities and political pressure on decision-makers were rather limited. This was because the trade union leaders were focused on domestic issues and narrow-minded sectoral interests and free movement of labour, which, even though important for the general public, were not important to the union leaders. Such an opinion was shared by most of the decision-makers whom I interviewed.54 EU proposals and the Polish response The issue of free movement of workers, unlike the problem of the purchase of land, brought more interest in the EU countries than the EU itself. Germany was particularly active in demanding transitional periods. The German position was
140 Freedom of movement of labour strongly supported by Austria, but some other states, including Spain and the Netherlands, declared no post-accession restrictions.55 The Chancellor’s remarks prompted immediate criticism from accession can didate states, which all sought unrestricted entry to labour markets. Poland’s Prime Minister declared, ‘Our position is that labour markets should be opened for Poles at the moment when we join the European Union.’56 Indeed, Buzek’s position was backed by public opinion. In the December 2000 OBOP survey, about 58 per cent of respondents backed the Polish government’s demands for Polish citizens to enjoy the full benefits of the free movement of labour within the EU without any transitional periods. Only 12 per cent of OBOP respondents said that extending the free movement of labour principle to Poland without any transition period would be unfavourable for Poland, 3 per cent said it would be decidedly unfavourable and 27 per cent declared themselves undecided.57 Gerhard Schroeder, on 21 December 2000, defended his aim of barring low- wage workers for a time after the European Union expanded, rejecting criticism by Eastern European governments as ‘inappropriate’. He declared: ‘If you look at the whole system in its flexibility, I can’t see what there is to complain about.’58 Nevertheless, the German attitude was widely criticised by the other EU members. According to the Dutch position, the increase in labour mobility could be beneficial in macro-economic terms, and enlargement could offer ‘major opportunities for a labour market where there are shortages in certain sectors – as in the Netherlands’. The Dutch government also ‘called for the mobility of labour to be strengthened and for any obstacles to be eliminated’.59 France immediately made clear that she did not share the German viewpoint. Even Austrian President Thomas Klestil said Germany should not fear a wave of immigrants from new European Union member states. The German position was also criticised by the other acceding countries, the Czech Republic in particular. President Vaclav Havel expressed a common affront in claiming that German fears of an influx of cheap labour were unfounded: ‘This is a statement of a single member country of the European Union, and we are Table 6.3 Public assessment of free movement of workers What consequences for the development of Poland can the following regulation have? Definitely Favourable Unfavourable Definitely Difficult favourable (%) (%) unfavourable to say (%) (%) (%) 21 Acceptance, without any transition periods, of the rule for the free movement of workers, which is obligatory in the EU Source: OBOP, December 2000.
37
12
3
27
Freedom of movement of labour 141 waiting for the common position.’ The Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman declared, ‘I can imagine that there are some fears, even if unreasonable, from the side of Germany and Austria. At the same time, there are no fears from Ireland, Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, France and so on.’60 A breakthrough in the negotiation talks came in January 2001, when, suc cumbing to pressure from Germany and Austria, the European Commission adopted a draft proposal on the free movement of labour negotiations with Poland, offering Poles the right to unrestricted employment in EU countries between 2007 and 2010. According to the European Commission, the restric tions would not slow down the integration of Poland with the EU following its expected admission between 2004 and 2005. The EC also planned to implement several options to cushion the impact of the restrictions, such as allowing resi dence permits to Poles who have signed official contracts with their prospective employers, and setting up strict quotas for certain professional groups.61 In the same month, the EU and Poland had signed a Joint Assessment Paper on the employment situation in Poland. This document had identified a number of measures whereby employment policy could be reinforced and it addressed structural problems in the labour market.62 The paper committed Poland to a set of agreed employment and labour market objectives and committed both parties to a regular assessment of progress until enlargement.63 Indeed, this document gave an impetus to the pace of the negotiations.
Acceleration of negotiations On 7 March 2001, during talks with European Commission President Romano Prodi, Prime Minister Buzek lobbied for the EU’s labour market to be opened immediately after enlargement. Buzek realised that this was unlikely, but treated his request as an element of the negotiation tactics.64 Buzek discussed the possibility of speeding up European Union membership talks. Polish officials said Germany’s request for a seven-year transition period on the free movement of labour was unnecessary, as it was unlikely that large numbers of Poles would move to the EU immediately in search of jobs. As Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Poland’s minister responsible for EU integration, declared, We hear from Brussels, all the time, praise of the common market and we are trying to adopt European norms in a multitude of areas, but on the other hand, they try to exclude us from the two most important markets which are the labour and agricultural markets.65 In fact, Saryusz-Wolski was using a modification of the dead-weight catching strategy. According to this strategy, outsiders can move the negotiation game by catching the EU in the dead weight of its former actions, i.e. by reminding the EU that its present negotiation offer is less generous than the one it has given to other applicants or indeed more demanding than what is required of present member states.66 This strategy translates as follows: ‘You are not generous since
142 Freedom of movement of labour you are asking us to fulfil aspects of the acquis by imposing obligations at the time of accession, but you exclude us from using rights that were granted during the previous enlargement wave.’ Nevertheless, this problem was rather down played by Romano Prodi, who declared that ‘such a transition period is very likely, but it is not a big problem’.67 EU Commission proposal Simultaneously, in March 2001 the European Commission presented to the member states a working paper on the free movement of labour. The paper sparked heated debates in Germany and Poland. A Commission study estimated that initial migration from the ten CEEC would be around 330,000 people – assuming free movement of labour in 2002. It reckoned that 850,000 people from CEEC were already in the 15 member states. Of those, 300,000 or 0.2 per cent of the EU labour force are permanently employed – 80 per cent of them in Germany and Austria. Against this background of different views and experi ences of the member states, the Commission threw open the debate to them, hoping to draft a common negotiating position. It put forth five options for debate. One was full and immediate application of EU laws and regulations, ruling out any transitional arrangements for free movement of workers. A second was a system of safeguarding clauses related to region, sector and duration that would take into account disruptions in the labour market in certain countries. Other options included a flexible system of transitional arrangements, like those applied in Spain and Portugal, or establishment of a fixed quota system in which member states would impose a limit on the number of workers from various can didate countries. Finally, there was the option of a general suspension of the usual EU labour movement rights for a limited period. Whatever the result, the Commission insisted that if it proposed transitional measures ‘in the interests of the union’, these would have to be fully justified.68 Candidate members claimed transitional arrangements would make a mockery of the EC Treaty in which free movement of labour is one of its four funda mental freedoms. As one of the Polish diplomats expressed: ‘We do not want to be treated as second class citizens by the EU.’ ‘We have enough problems in dealing with growing anti-EU sentiments at home.’69 This approach was a way to use a small domestic win-set as a bargaining advantage. As Putnam said, this attitude is based on the assumption that ‘we understand your position, but this would not be accepted at our domestic level’. It forms part of a so-called tying hands strategy.70 This was true, since free movement of workers was regarded as one of the fundamental freedoms by not only the political elites or public opinion but also by interest groups, particularly trade unions. On 11 April 2001, under strong pressure from Austria and Germany, the European Commission proposed a plan. Commissioner Verheugen declared that the EU’s executive branch was suggesting a ‘general transition period’ of five years from the date of accession for each enlargement country. During that period, each of the member states would continue to operate their own national
Freedom of movement of labour 143 measures on foreign labour. However, after two years of the five-year period, an automatic review based on a factual report from the Commission to the Council would be held. On the basis of a Commission proposal, the Council, acting by unanimity, and following consultation with the parliament, would decide whether to shorten or lift the transition period. Member states would be able to continue with national measures for the remaining three years. Finally, once the five years were up, any member state would be able to maintain its national pro visions for an extra two years ‘in the case of serious disturbances in its labour market’.71 Verheugen declared that he did not expect cheap labour to flood Western Europe once the doors to the East were open. Yet he had to consider the possibility of social upheaval. As Verheugen admitted, this was an extremely sensitive issue for European Union nations and for the applicant countries.72 Kułakowski criticised Verheugen’s proposal by declaring: It is very clear we are not in agreement with the proposals of Commissioner Verheugen. It simply gives the Austrians and Germans what they want. Nat urally we don’t accept that position [. . .] Our position today is that no trans ition period is necessary in the area of free movement of people.73 The Spanish proposal Just a few days later, Spain threw a new stone into the already turbulent waters of the EU accession negotiation pool. Spain brought up one of the other tough subjects: regional funding, a subject in which it had a particular interest since it was a major beneficiary of current policies.74 Obviously, Spain’s position was mainly driven by its domestic politics and the fact that the Spanish government was afraid of losing public support because of a possibly lower level of struc tural funds. In fact, Spain warned that it would block EU–Poland accession talks on opening up EU labour markets to new member states, including Poland, unless it received guarantees that it would continue to receive the same amount of regional aid after enlargement. Spain’s position was to support the demands of Germany and Austria, which wanted seven-year bans on labour movement from Poland and other new members when they joined the EU. Spain wanted the Union to guarantee that Spain would not lose structural aid to the much poorer Central and Eastern European countries that would make up most of the first wave of new members. Nevertheless, the Spanish position was deemed unaccept able by the EU’s remaining 14 members.75 Even the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, commenting on the Spanish proposal, said, ‘We must not mix up things that should not be mixed up.’76 In fact, Spain had used two different strategies. First, it tried to make a package deal and improve its bargaining position by tying the problem of struc tural funds in with the issue of free movement of workers. At the same time, the country used a strategy of threat, by using the argument, ‘If you will not guaran tee that we will continue to get the same amount of funding after the new enlargement, we will not agree on free the movement of labour.’77
144 Freedom of movement of labour Poland failed to convince Spain to remove its objections, which were block ing a European Union decision on the free movement of workers from candidate countries after they became members.78 Therefore, the already complicated and difficult negotiations became even more complex. Jan Kułakowski admitted that Poland was only now starting the most difficult stage of accession talks. As he declared, ‘Poland now enters the last phase of negotiations which will require political decisions and compromise from both parties.’79 The united front of the acceding countries against the EU proposals and its breakdown In comparison with other acceding countries, Poland appeared to be setting out some of the toughest negotiating stances, though Polish officials maintained they were simply working to ensure a smooth transition to full membership. As an adviser to Prime Minister Buzek, Leszek Jesień explained the Polish position: We want to prepare the country [for accession] and get a good deal from the other side at the end of negotiations that will be suitable for the position of this country’ [. . .] [We] think it is difficult to compare the other countries with Poland. Whether we are tougher or not it is difficult to judge. Our demands are formulated so as to be the most suitable for this country while being also acceptable to the EU.80 At the same time, an attempt was made to coordinate negotiation stances with the other acceding countries. In late May 2001 the leading candidate countries made a united front against EU proposals to restrict the circulation of workers from the new countries upon accession. When meeting in Prague, the leaders of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland and Cyprus called on the EU to allow as much flexibility as possible for the free movement of workers from the new countries, hoping the EU would revise its stance since, as they argued, there was no risk of massive immigration after accession. The ministers of foreign affairs of the six foremost accession countries analysed the state of play of the enlargement process ahead of the EU Goteborg Summit, where the 15 were set to unveil a strategy for enlargement.81 The acceding countries appealed to the member states to agree a common position on the free movement of persons as soon as possible, and to take a dif ferentiated and flexible approach to the issue of free movement of labour ‘which takes into account the economic, social and geographical realities both in the member states and in the candidate countries, based on relevant statistical data and scientific analyses’. In addition, they politely ‘invited’ the member states to ‘avoid complicating the accession negotiations with candidate countries by cre ating undue linkages between different negotiating issues and by putting forward short-term political interests’.82 Hungary strongly opposed these linkages and the Hungarian position was backed by the EU–Hungary Joint Consultative Committee.83 This was, to a certain extent, an attempt to use what is called in the
Freedom of movement of labour 145 literature the co-ordination within the enlargement-wave: this strategy is linked to the fact that applicants within the same enlargement wave can increase their bargaining power by co-ordinating their positions.84 Meanwhile, Spain’s government backed down from a dispute with Germany over Madrid’s bid to link an agreement on European Union enlargement to guar antees on future regional aid. A foreign ministry spokeswoman in Madrid on 29 May 2001 confirmed that Spain would now support Germany’s proposal for a transitional seven-year limit on the free movement of workers from new member states at a meeting of EU ambassadors in Brussels.85 This, on the one hand, broke the deadlock and created a good political climate for accelerating negotiations, but on the other, weakened the negotiation position of the acceding states and, in particular, its solidarity. Poland’s battle for imme diate access to EU labour markets and for an 18-year transitional ban on land purchases by EU citizens was then dealt a blow by its fellow Central European candidates, Hungary in particular. This was because the Hungarian government had taken a position closer to the EU’s and agreed to a seven-year ban on the free movement of labour. The Hungarian government was more willing to com promise, since the unemployment rate in Hungary had been much lower than in Poland and was declining whilst in Poland the tendency was exactly the oppos ite.86 Poland’s position was still rigid, and as the Chief Negotiator declared: ‘As a large country with many problems we cannot give concessions where others can.’ Kułakowski also called ‘unjustified’ the tight labour market restrictions that had been put forward by Austria and Germany.87 Jan Kułakowski’s position was backed up in some opinion polls, as seen in Table 6.2. The Polish resistance was criticised in an indirect manner by the EU Enlarge ment Commissioner, who said that Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus were expected to complete negotiations by the end of 2002. Poland, as he declared, is further behind, as the negotiators found it difficult to make con cessions before September’s parliamentary elections.88 In fact, Verheugen used the so-called battering ram strategy. Indeed, according to Lykke Friis and Anna Jarosz, the logic behind this strategy was linked to the ‘economies of scale’ argu ment. Therefore, in the case of accession negotiations, when the EU negotiates with a group of ten countries, it has an interest in using one country (or even more countries) as a battering ram in order to persuade the other countries into signing more or less the same negotiation deal. Otherwise, the enlargement negotiations could take a long time. In the course of negotiations, this strategy uses a ‘bluff-tactic’. As Friis and Jarosz argued: The EU can play on the fact that all countries are eager to join in the first round in order to avoid a situation where their accession will require the re- opening of even more package deals. Telling one applicant that it is just about to sign with one of the other applicants can force the remaining appli cants into making some compromises they would not have made otherwise – unless obviously the applicants are able to call the EU’s bluff by co- ordinating their views in the end game.89
IN WHICH EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRY WOULD YOU LIKE TO WORK? (the most frequently mentioned countries) Germany 32% France
3% 3%
6%
10% 5%
14%
11%
Austria 1% Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
Denmark
Spain
Belgium
Ireland
Difficult to say
5% 3% 3% 2% 5% 0% 2% 6% 4% 1% 3% 2% 2% 0% 1% 5% 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 3% 8% 6%
48%
9%
9%
United Kingdom
43% 40%
17% 24%
11%
9% Poles (N � 379) Czechs (N � 223) Hungarians (N � 350) Lithuanians (N � 340)
Figure 6.2 In which EU country would you like to work? (source: CBOS, May 2001).
Freedom of movement of labour 147 At a meeting on 18 June 2001, Schroeder and Buzek politely clashed over the key reform issues standing in the way of Poland’s future acceptance into the European Union and over free movement of workers and sales of land in par ticular. German officials had expressed hopes that Poland would show more flex ibility on issues such as the EU’s demand of an up to seven-year transition period before new members’ citizens could work anywhere in the bloc. Poland had rejected this restriction and irritated many EU states by insisting on an up to 18-year transition period following its acceptance into the bloc before foreigners could buy Polish property. Schroeder said of the seven-year restriction on labour: ‘I can understand that you criticize this in principle. My Polish colleague did this repeatedly. But this (restriction) is among the necessities.’ As a response, Buzek said he ‘respected’ the German position and hoped they would reach a compro mise solution. ‘I think each of our opinions will gradually grow more similar and that is also a good sign for our joining the EU.’90 Poland, together with Estonia, was one of the remaining countries strongly opposing the proposed transitional arrangements.91 On 19 June 2001 the Latvian government decided to accept an EU proposal limiting the free movement of its workers for seven years after it joined the Union,92 whilst on 27 June Slovakia closed the EU chapter and accepted a seven-year transitional period.93 In Poland and the Czech Republic, unlike in some other acceding countries, there was strong pressure from public opinion not to accept the transitional period. An overwhelming majority of citizens of the Czech Republic, 69 per cent, and 73 per cent of inhabitants of Poland thought that it was not necessary to give in to the demands of the European Union to introduce restrictions on the free movement of the workforce from new EU members. The opposite opinion was held by 15 per cent of Czechs and 11 per cent of Poles. This was according to a July 2001 survey from the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CVVM). In Poland, a survey was also conducted by CBOS. According to 7 per cent of people asked from the Czech Republic and 6 per cent of those asked from Table 6.4 What do you think about the European Commission’s proposition that the acceding countries should not be allowed for seven years to work in the current EU countries? The EU countries and the European Commission have proposed that Poles Czechs the citizens from the acceding countries to the EU (including Poland (%) (%) and Czech Republic) should not be allowed for seven years to take a job in the current EU countries. Do you think that such a transitional arrangement would be appropriate slightly longer than necessary much longer than necessary not necessary it is difficult to say Source: CBOS, July 2001.
6 6 15 57 16
7 17 18 45 13
148 Freedom of movement of labour Poland, a seven-year postponement of free movement of persons was dispropor tionately lengthy. About 17 per cent of Czechs and 6 per cent of Poles con sidered it longer than necessary. Among those who argued that a transitional period is necessary, most respondents opted for a transitional period between one and ten years, as indi cated in Table 6.5. This question was asked only of those respondents who argued that the trans itional period was necessary. Furthermore, only 11 per cent of Poles and 15 per cent of Czechs argued that their government should accept a seven-year trans itional period. This survey shows that both in Poland and in the Czech Republic, public opinion supported the principle of free movement of labour. It was predicted that the Polish strategy of tough negotiations might change after the general elections in September 2001. The German paper, Die Presse, rightly argued that if the new Polish government were to accept the transition period, the remaining countries that were against it – Slovenia, Estonia and the Czech Republic – could not stay behind. In Poland and in Czech Republic, the governments could draw support for standing out against the long transitional period from public opinion. One- half of the Polish population and one-third of the Czech population wanted their Table 6.5 How long is a transitional period necessary? How long (in your opinion) is a transitional period necessary?
Poles (N = 637) Czechs (N = 609) (%) (%)
1–5 years 6–10 years 11–15 years 16–20 years 21 years and more It is difficult to say
20 36 9 14 5 16
19 37 3 5 22 14
Source: CBOS, July 2001.
Table 6.6 Public acceptance for a seven-year transition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles and Czechs Do you think that the Polish/Czech government should accept the Poles seven-year transitional period during which Poles/Czechs would not be (%) able to work in other EU countries after joining this organisation?
Czechs (%)
Definitely yes Probably yes Probably no Definitely no Difficult to say
2 13 32 37 16
Source: CBOS, July 2001.
3 8 26 47 16
Freedom of movement of labour 149 Cabinets not to accept such conditions. However, after the elections it was pre dicted that Warsaw might want to exchange their concession on this regulation with EU consent to further postponement of the right to purchase land in Poland or for higher agricultural subsidies. This indeed was more likely since five coun tries had accepted the EU conditions, namely Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Cyprus and Malta.94
The change of the government in Poland and the concluding of negotiations Political turmoil in Poland after the elections in October 2001 brought certain modifications to the negotiation tactics. Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimosze wicz declared that Poland’s integration with the European Union was regarded as a priority of the foreign policy of Miller’s government. However, at the same time, he stated that such complicated issues as the free movement of labour, land trade and subsidies for agriculture were yet to be negotiated. Cimoszewicz declared: ‘We must be realistic about the future, and naturally, the most difficult issues in negotiations are normally dealt with at the latest phase, and in those difficult issues we will have to seek a compromise.’ He also acknowledged that the government of Miller needed several more days to familiarise itself with the state of EU negotiations. According to Cimoszewicz, the talks would start in November 2001, which would give the new government little time to prepare.95 Change of the Polish position On 14 November 2001 the governmental European Integration Committee (KIE) adopted a new strategy in Poland’s accession negotiations with the European Union, announcing that the country would reduce, to 12 years, the transition period for the purchase of land by EU citizens and would accept restrictions on the free movement of labour. This obviously changed the strong previous gov ernment stances on an 18-year ban on the purchase of land and no restrictions on labour immigration. Prime Minister Miller declared: ‘It is in the interest of the country to resign from the transition period for the purchase of land for invest ment purposes’, arguing that the country needed investments and new jobs. In addition, Poland’s Foreign Minister said that despite a critical attitude towards restrictions on the free movement of labour, Poland would accept them and would try to reduce the transition period in that area through bilateral agreements with EU countries.96 This new position was based on the strategic goal of achieving membership in 2004. The softening of the negotiation stances and giving a green light for the transitional arrangements was regarded as a side-payment to be paid in order to speed up negotiations and secure the ratification of the agreement by the current members, Germany in particular. As Putnam argued, the value of international side-payments should be calculated in terms of their marginal contributions to the possibility of ratification rather than in terms of their overall value to the
150 Freedom of movement of labour recipient nation.97 Miller calculated that in order to secure accession and its rati fication by the EU‑15 countries on their domestic level, he had to give up on the demand for the immediate free movement of labour. This was because the win- set in the EU countries to allow liberalisation was small. However, the win-set in Poland to accept the transitional period, especially among the public opinion in Poland, was also marginal. Domestic critique of the new position The new strategy was severely criticised by the opposition and in particular by some of the former members of the Negotiation Team, especially with regard to acceptance of the proposed restrictions on the free movement of labour and soften ing the negotiation stance with regard to the purchase of real estate by foreigners. The opposition criticised the government for wanting to accelerate negotiations at any price. According to the opposition, the government should set aside the most difficult issues until the last round of negotiations. As the previous Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek argued, the softening of the negotiation stance on free movement of workers was a political mistake, since Poland did not get anything in return.98 Nev ertheless, it should be emphasised that the critique was not as strong as in other cases like land and agriculture. This was because there was no interest group in Poland to organise such a focused, reasoned opposition. This, to a certain extent, explains why Miller was strong enough to resist the domestic critique. On 6 December 2001 Leszek Miller went to Brussels for talks with European Commission President Prodi. Miller was eager to close the two most contentious chapters: free movement of people and free movement of capital. The Polish government also hoped to win enough promises from individual EU member states to be able to sell the negotiated deal to its increasingly sceptical public. Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands had indicated they would not impose any restrictions on Polish workers after accession. Spain, France, the UK and Greece were also moving in that direction. Poland therefore lobbied for a public declaration from as many EU‑15 countries as possible that they would not impose any restrictions.99 On 21 December 2001 Poland made a very important step towards EU accession by completing talks on the free movement of labour and accepting the proposed up to seven-year transition period.100 Assessment of the negotiations by the public opinion Once the issue of free movement of labour was already agreed upon, it became a subject of extensive opinion surveys. Although popular backing for European integration rose from a mid-year 53 per cent to 60 per cent in November 2001, simultaneously 44 per cent of respondents criticised the new government for offering concessions to Brussels on issues such as free movement of labour and land sales to foreigners.101 In fact, 66 per cent of respondents regarded the seven- year transitional period as too long, only 5 per cent thought it was appropriate and a mere 2 per cent thought it was too short. This is indicated in Figure 6.3.
Freedom of movement of labour 151
TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH A SEVEN YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD RESTRICTING THE UNDERTAKING OF WORK BY POLES IN OTHER EU COUNTRIES? Appropriate 5% Too short 2% Not needed at all 20%
Too long 66%
Hard to say 7%
Figure 6.3 Acceptance of a seven-year transition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles in other EU countries (source: PBS, November 2001/OCEI).
Among respondents claiming that the seven-year transitional period was too long, 19 per cent opted for one year, 31 per cent argued that it should be two years, 28 per cent supported three years, 8 per cent four years and only 4 per cent five years. None of the respondents opted for a six-year transitional period. Even though over 30 per cent of respondents declared readiness to undertake short-term work, usually seasonal work in farming in the current EU member states, after Poland’s accession to the EU the majority of those were planning to TO WHAT TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE FREE UNDERTAKING OF WORK BY POLES IN THE EU COUNTRIES SHOULD POLISH MEDIATORS AGREE? 2 years 31%
3 years 28%
4 years 8% 1 year 19%
5 years 4% 6 years 0% Hard to say 10%
Figure 6.4 To what transition period in the free undertaking of work by Poles in the EU countries should Polish negotiators agree? (respondents claiming that the transitional period proposed is too long) (source: PBS, December 2001/OCEI).
152 Freedom of movement of labour seek employment for a longer period. For most of them, this was for longer than a year, but they were mostly not seeking permanent work. Only about 18 per cent declared their willingness to seek permanent employment. Among those respondents claiming that they wanted to undertake work in the EU countries, about 38 per cent of Poles declared their willingness to work in Germany. This partly explains why many Germans were worried about an influx 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
I would decide to undertake permanent work For longer than one year, but not permanently For more than six months, up to 12 months For more than one month, up to six months For approximately four weeks
Figure 6.5 For how long a period would you decide to work in the given country? (respondents declaring that they would decide to seek employment in one of the current 15 EU Member States if it were possible from today to freely undertake work in those countries) (source: PBS, December 2001/OCEI). 0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Not decided yet Italy Great Britain Sweden Germany Luxembourg Ireland Netherlands Spain Greece France Finland Denmark Belgium Austria
Figure 6.6 In what country of the EU would you like to work? (respondents declaring that they would decide to seek work in one of the current 15 EU Member States if it were possible from today to freely undertake work in any of those countries) (source: PBS, December 2001/OCEI).
Freedom of movement of labour 153 of cheap labour from the CEEC. The second most popular country was Great Britain with only 12 per cent of respondents. In surveys made before signing the Accession Treaty, the general assessment of negotiated EU work conditions was positive. In February 2003 almost 50 per cent of respondents (the same proportion as in February 2002) said EU accession would reduce unemployment in Poland. Provisions of the Accession Treaty The chapter on free movement of persons was provisionally closed in March 2002. As a next step, the EU decided to assess the situation on the labour market of both member states and the acceding countries. A few months after this closure in August 2002, the EU conducted an extensive survey on unemploy ment in the EU and the candidate countries.102 This showed a huge discrepancy in unemployment in member states and acceding countries, ranging from 1 to 33 per cent. The same month, the EU conducted a survey on the employment situ ation in both EU and the acceding countries. The report concluded that the employment rate was falling in some acceding countries, including Poland.103 The Accession Treaty negotiated between the EU and the accession countries provided that the current member states were entitled to impose national restric tions on the free movement of workers for two years after accession, renewable by another three, and then potentially another two years, making a maximum possible seven-year transition period. For the first two-year period following the date of accession of the new members, the access to the labour market would depend on national measures, or those resulting from bilateral agreements, which would regulate access to their labour markets by Polish nationals. The present member states were allowed to continue to apply such measures until the end of the five-year period following the date of the accession.104 At the end of the first two years of possible national measures, it was decided that the Commission would draft a report on the basis of which the Council would review how the transitional arrangements were working. In addition, each of the 15 member states would have to make a formal notification to the Com mission about whether they intended to continue with national measures for up to three more years, or whether they would apply the Community regime of full free movement of workers.105 There was also the possibility for the 15 member states to ask the Commission for authorisation to continue to apply national measures for a further two years, but only if they experienced serious distur bances in their labour market or the threat thereof. The transitional arrangements were not to extend beyond a maximum of seven years after accession. The current member states could not make access to their labour markets more restrictive than they were at the date of signature of the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003.106 A new member could take reciprocal national measures against a member state, which had imposed restrictions against it. Finally, the Accession Treaty
154 Freedom of movement of labour Table 6.7 Maximum transitional periods for the acceding countries State
Poland Cyprus Czech Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Slovakia Slovenia Rep.
Max. 7 period
No restr.
7
7
7
7
7
No 7 restr.
7
protected the rights of the members of a worker’s family by granting them the right to reside legally with the worker.107 Poland was among seven other candi date countries upon which the transitional periods were imposed. The only coun tries that were not subject to any restriction were Cyprus and Malta.108 The states that opened their labour markets were mostly Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden. The most restrictive approach was taken by Germany and Austria, which will probably keep their borders closed for a maximum period of seven years.109
Conclusions In concluding this chapter, it is worth comparing the issue of free movement of workers with the issue of land sales. First, purchase of land by foreigners was seized by some political forces and interest groups in Poland and exploited in order to pursue political advantages. The problem of the free movement of workers, although it attracted public attention, was actually only focused on to a limited extent by trade unions and political parties. Even though the political parties were sup porting liberalisation, this issue was overshadowed by the political debate on agriculture and land sales. Nevertheless, it was used by political parties and trade unions in many EU‑15 member states. Unlike the issue of the sale of land, the case of the free movement of workers was subject to a broader international debate. From the beginning of accession negotiations, in many EU member countries, Germany in particular, trade unions and the general public exerted strong pressure on national governments to introduce transitional measures in this area. This obviously implied a small win-set in these countries to accept the free move ment regime. Conversely, there was a relatively small win-set among the public opinion in the acceding countries, Poland in particular, to accept the transitional arrangements as proposed by the EU. When examining Polish domestic politics, we should emphasise a change in the dynamics of negotiation between the two different governments. Buzek’s strategy can be characterised as tying hands by using a small domestic win-set as a bargaining advantage according to the rule: ‘We under stand Germany’s fears of the influx of cheap labour, but the transitional arrangements will not be accepted by Polish public opinion in the referendum on accession.’
Freedom of movement of labour 155 Poland and the other acceding states were too weak to oppose the powerful European lobby driven by the Germans. The Polish position was much weaker because of the asymmetry between the negotiating sides, and the lack of a cred ible best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) for Poland. This obvi ously made the threat and tying hands strategies particularly difficult to use by the Polish side.110 Miller assumed that he would be forced to accept the EU con ditions. Therefore, he decided to speed up the negotiation process and catch up with the other acceding countries in terms of the number of chapters provi sionally closed. The behaviour of Miller’s government was in a sense rational, since public opinion, driven by the Polish media, expected the government to speed up the negotiation process. Hence, the concessions towards the EU were regarded as side-payments paid to ensure the ratification of the negotiated agreement.111 The EU also exercised a battering ram strategy when it used Hungary and the Czech Republic as a battering ram in order to persuade Poland to accept the EU conditions. According to some negotiators and officials involved in the negoti ation process, this technique worked on the Polish media.112 In return, the acced ing countries used co-ordination within the enlargement wave in order to undermine the battering ram strategy. The free movement of labour was the best example of where coalition within the enlargement wave could occur, because all of the accession countries (unlike in the case of purchase of real estate) had an interest in demanding the free movement regime. This last strategy was unsuccessful, since the EU managed to break down the solidarity within the acceding countries.113 Both negotiating sides used a number of different negotiation strategies, which have been described by Putnam and Friis. In particular, they used tying hands, side-payment, linkages and package deals, especially when linkage between land sales with free movement of labour was made. According to Buzek, even though these issues were initially linked, later in the negotiations the Polish side wanted to separate them.114 There was, at some point, a saying coined by the Polish negotiators that ‘one should not sell land for labour’.115 Nevertheless, at a later stage, the EU had used this strategy, by saying that if Poland would not insist on free movement of persons, then they would not insist on liberalisation of land purchases. The acceding countries, Poland in particular, also used a dead-weight catching strategy when they argued that the Union wanted to impose full obligations without granting them full rights. To sum up, due to strong domestic pressure in some EU countries there was a small domestic win-set to accept the free movement of workers without any transitional periods. In Poland, there was rather a small domestic win-set to accept transitional periods. Therefore, Polish and EU domestic win-sets were small and initially did not overlap. As Putnam argued: ‘The smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk that negotiations would break down.’116 Unlike in the EU countries, in Poland the issue of free movement of labour was overshadowed by the negotiations concerning agriculture and land sales. These two issues were more emphasised and more often used by political parties
156 Freedom of movement of labour and interest groups in Poland. Thus, the case study of free movement of labour provides empirical evidence that international negotiations can be influenced by domestic groups, provided that there is a united front among them. Taking into consideration the fact that there was no strong united domestic front on this issue, and given the asymmetry between the negotiating sides, Poland agreed to accept the EU conditions. Table 6.8 Free movement of labour – size of the domestic win-set Size of win-set Case study Poland
EU
Result
Free Small within public opinion, but movement no strong interest groups to of labour support liberalisation. Political parties focused rather on agriculture and the purchase of real estate by foreigners.
Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties in many powerful EU countries.
The EU had a strong bargaining advantage and thus Poland was prone to agree on transitional periods.
7 Concluding remarks
The key question of this book concerns the impact of the size of the domestic win-set (within public opinion, interest groups and political parties) in Poland on the accession negotiations. This book provides empirical evidence for Putnam’s claim that the size of the win-set depends on such factors as domestic prefer ences and coalitions, domestic institutions and ratification procedures and finally strategies as used by the Level I negotiator. By this, we can show the impact of domestic pressure on Poland’s negotiation positions towards EU accession. This book centred on negotiations concerning agriculture (mainly the level and conditions of direct payments and production quotas), land ownership and the free movement of labour. Domestic groups brought these issues to the public agenda (through the mass media), because these problems sparked emotions and public interest. A careful look at the negotiations enabled us to understand why these and not other aspects of negotiations, which were perhaps even more rel evant, captured public and mass-media attention, and to what extent public opinion and domestic groups have influenced the negotiation process. These concluding remarks will draw up some ‘lessons’ from the three case studies. We can see this first, by answering why these issues were important for the domestic pressure in different economic, political or social dimensions. Second, the overall political dynamics of negotiations will be briefly examined. This will allow us to make a linkage between Putnam’s two-level games and negotiation strategies, and empirical observations. This can be done by answering to what extent the empirical analysis corresponds with the concept of the two-level game. This will lead us to a conclusion concerning the key question of this book: the impact of the size of the Polish domestic win-set on the negoti ation process and outcomes. Finally, it should be emphasised that this is only a country study that opens up a possibility for further research with regard to other accession countries or other comparative studies.
Why the three case studies were important for the domestic context There were a number of negotiation chapters which do relate to the well-being of the great majority of the public, but which did not catch public or media
158 Concluding remarks attention. These were, for example, Consumer and Health Protection, Energy, Company Law or Competition Policy. These topics, even though significant for the state and the well-being of citizens, will never become subject to a lively public debate. The three case studies versus other negotiating issues The three case studies brought public attention because, as many senior officials involved in the negotiation process admitted, public opinion does not understand the complexities of international negotiations.1 Hence, rather than paying attention to issues significant for the economy and country development, public opinion focuses on simple matters. The general public may even be aware of its lack of knowledge in certain areas.2 This ignorance becomes obvious when we go into specific questions. Often such questions, for example those concerning industrial policy, are not even raised in opinion polls. Instead, questions are formulated broadly and usually reflect simple and symbolic issues such as direct payments within CAP or selling land to foreigners. In the best case, the polls enquire whether EU membership will have a positive impact on the Polish eco nomy or on the functioning of companies and farms.3 The mass media can act as a trigger of public attention. This is because they show an interest in controversial issues that easily attract the human imagination. Nevertheless, most journalists are not aware of the details and complexities of the negotiation process. Instead of explaining the complex nature of the negoti ation process, they often rely on simplified statements made by politicians; these are more newsworthy. Simplifications based on emotional perceptions have become the language of media. Another reason why often less relevant issues are brought to the public agenda is the manipulation of some interest groups and political parties. Politicians, in particular, follow public opinion surveys and primarily raise those issues that can attract their potential electorate. They understand that by urging certain negotiation tactics, such as demanding more subsidies within the CAP and not allowing the sale of land to foreigners, they can attract public support. Even though it is often Euro-sceptics who bring these issues to public attention, they can then become subject to a public debate within a wide range of opinions. Only certain aspects of negotiations, not necessarily the most relevant, are brought to the public agenda. The three dimensions of accession negotiations The chosen cases are also important since they illustrate the three dimensions of the accession negotiations. First, the case study concerning agriculture indicates mainly the economic significance of the accession negotiations. Indeed, such negotiation problems as the level of direct payments or production quotas have not only economic implications for farmers, but also for the Polish budget and hence for the whole population. Next, the case of purchase of real estate by
Concluding remarks 159 foreigners indicates an ideological dimension of the accession negotiations, based on symbolic politics. It shows that an issue economically less significant can become crucial in the domestic context. Finally, the free movement of labour became a vital social problem and, as indicated in a number of opinion polls, gained particular attention from the public. This does not mean that each of the case studies has only one dimension; however, they usually have one predominant feature. From these three different case studies, we can draw the conclusion that polit ical parties, and some interest groups, by using different rhetoric – economic, ideological and social – managed to raise interest from the public. However, at the same time, by manipulating public opinion, they became hostages to the gen eral public and this meant that certain political gestures had to be made to please the public. As a result, using Schimmelfennig’s terminology, they become ‘rhet orically entrapped’ and as a result became hostages of their own political rhet oric. Especially in the case of negotiations concerning agriculture and freedom to purchase real estate, the manipulation from the side of political parties and interest groups caused a growing EU scepticism and hence the shrinking of the domestic win-set. When analysing the three case studies we could also observe the interplay among different domestic actors on the domestic level, which influenced the international level. In order to understand this interplay, one should focus on the political dynamics of international negotiations.
Dynamics of the accession negotiations in Polish domestic politics The focus of this book was put on the political process of negotiations. The dynamics of the political negotiations was, however, different within the two governments and depended on solving certain negotiation dilemmas: should the negotiations be soft or tough, conducted quickly or more cautiously, and should issues be negotiated separately or connected in a package deal? Buzek’s government was more prone to the influence of public opinion.4 This government was cautious in moving the politically sensitive issues ahead when it realised that the softening of the negotiation stance might not be accepted by the majority of the public. The closer it was to the elections, the more cautious the government was. A few months before the election, the AWS government was afraid that it would not be able to finish negotiations before the end of term of parliament. The government was at that time politically weak, since after the Freedom Union left the coalition in the year 2000, it was a minority government. Finally, it could not count on the support from the main opposition party, SLD, which was using every opportunity on the domestic and international levels to attack the right-wing government. In addition, the level of support for the gov ernment dropped to a few per cent.5 Finally, the AWS government was polit ically divided and there were different approaches within it towards negotiations. Whilst the Chief Negotiator, Kułakowski, was more prone to compromises and
160 Concluding remarks indeed accepted in Brussels, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the minister responsible for EU integration, was more confrontational and dominant.6 However, a more cau tious approach was understandable in the initial stage of the negotiations.7 The new SLD–PSL government was in a different position from its predecessor because when the decision to accelerate the negotiation process was made, it had a strong public mandate. The SLD itself received 35 per cent of votes in the autumn 2001 elections. During the first few weeks of the government, its support was peaking at 40 per cent. It was much easier to make political decisions with a strong public mandate and on the assumption that the next elections would take place in four years time. Decision-makers in the SLD–PSL government were initially psychologically in a much better position as compared with the decision- makers from the unpopular late AWS government.8 Finally, the major ambition of the SLD government was to finish negotiations by the end of 2002 and make them a sound political success. Thus, in such circumstances acceleration was much easier and corresponded with a basic Polish foreign policy goal, which was to enter the EU during the term of the SLD gov ernment. The acceleration of the negotiation process was also rational, bearing in mind that there was very strong domestic pressure to complete negotiations in the year 2002.
Size of the win-sets and its determinants The key theoretical assignment of this book is to examine whether Putnam’s assumption concerning determinants of a win-set size can be applicable to the case of Poland. There are basically three determinants of the sizes of the domestic wins-sets: domestic preferences and coalitions, institutions and ratification procedures, and strategies of the negotiators. Level II preferences and coalitions The first determinant includes Level II preferences and coalitions. As Putnam argued: ‘The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, prefer ences and possible coalitions among Level II.’9 Thus, the relatively large win- sets within the domestic context in Poland were determined by the mainly pro-EU orientation of the political and media elites, by some interest groups and by the general public. What is more, it was accompanied by the assumed large costs of non-agreement and the lack of a credible BATNA. The composition of the domestic constituency (and character of the win-set) also varies with the politicisation of negotiated issues. Thus, ‘politicisation often activates groups who are less worried about the cost of non-agreement, thus reducing the effect ive win-set’.10 The case studies of this book confirm this phenomenon. When examining the first case study on agriculture, the original small domestic win-set to accept the EU conditions, e.g. the lack of direct payments or even the level of 25 per cent of direct payments or small production quotas, was marginal. There was a strong coalition on the Polish domestic level influencing
Concluding remarks 161 political parties, interest groups and public opinion. Polish domestic actors did not want to accept the original EU proposal and demanded full subsidies. Even though Polish negotiators realised that Poland would not manage to achieve full payments, they treated it as part of the negotiation tactics. Obviously, the Polish side used the small domestic win-set as a bargaining advantage. On the EU side, there was a coalition of some EU countries to limit spending on the new member states. The EU and the Commission in particular realised that the only way to increase the Polish domestic win-set was to increase direct payments. The easiest solution that avoided granting extra money was to move money from structural funds to financing direct payments. By agreeing to this solution, the EU managed to increase the Polish domestic win-set. The Polish side also managed to increase its own win-set by using certain strategies, for example side-payments.11 The second case study, the purchase of real estate by foreigners, shows the influence of a domestic coalition composed of political parties and farmers’ unions. By politicising the issue of land sales and by playing on public emotions and symbolic politics, this coalition managed to reduce the win-set within public opinion. This is a perfect example of how politicisation and manipulation from the side of domestic groups can influence the size of the win-set. On the EU side, there was no strong coalition of domestic groups, since this issue was vital neither in public opinion nor among the other domestic groups. Thus, the EU win-set to accept the transitional period was relatively large. A slightly different situation occurred with regard to the free movement of labour. Even though public opinion supported free movement and opposed a transitional period, there was no strong coalition within the Polish political par ties or trade unions to support this issue because domestic groups did not have a direct interest in demanding liberalisation. This issue was, to an extent, overshadowed by the negotiations on agriculture or the sale of land. However, the Polish win-set to accept a transitional period for free movement of labour was larger than the Polish domestic win-set to introduce freedom to purchase real estate. Even though this issue was important to the general public, it was used only to a limited extent by domestic groups. Polish trade unions, employers’ organ isations and political parties, even though officially supporting the free movement of workers, did not have a direct interest in demanding liberalisation.12 At the same time, they met strong opposition from the side of some EU countries to accept the free movement of workers. Consequently, we can confirm the hypothesis that, indeed, the size of the win-set depends on a coalition of domestic groups. In other words, a certain negotiation stance is supported not merely by public opinion, but strong interest groups and political parties stand behind it. On the EU side, however, the situation was entirely different. The issue was politicised mainly in Germany and Austria, where there was a strong coalition of political parties and trade unions opposing the free movement regime. Thus, the EU win-set to accept free movement of workers was rather small.
162 Concluding remarks Domestic institutions and ratification procedures The second factor Robert Putnam emphasised is that the size of the win-set depends on domestic institutions and ratification procedures.13 Ratification can take the form of a formal voting procedure, e.g. within the Council of Ministers when accepting Polish negotiation stances or during the referendum on accession. In addition to the formal ratification, there is an informal ratification within the different domestic groups. In practice, negotiation procedures required several levels of ratification on both sides, and it was not always possible to measure a fixed win-set.14 This occurs mainly because, at each level of ratification, the win-set may be slightly different, and each game board has several different players representing different interests. In the case of negotiations concerning agriculture, on the Polish side there were, primarily, the senior coali tion partner SLD and the junior partner PSL representing farmers, opposition parties and the farmers’ trade union Kółka Rolnicze. Since at each game board the size of the win-set might be different, the overall win-set is a result of the bargaining that goes on within the domestic pressure groups. Therefore, ratification required consensus within the coalition to accept the level of direct payments and production quotas. Further, ratification also required acceptance of the negotiation agreement by the farmers’ unions. The Polish Peasants’ Party realised that opposing the farmers could bring disastrous results for the party. With regard to the sale of land, the politicisation of this issue drew public attention. Consequently, the government was afraid that Poland’s failure to negotiate satis factory conditions in agriculture and in the purchase of real estate could cause it to lose the referendum on Poland’s membership in the EU. With regard to the free movement of labour, the Polish government realised that, because of a small EU domestic win-set and the EU’s bargaining advantage, Poland had to accept transitional periods. It counted on public dissatisfaction with the results being limited, since some countries, such as the UK and Ireland, would open their labour markets and, as a result, the agreement would be ratified by domestic pressure. The final factor emphasised by Putnam was the strategy as used by the negotiators.
Theorising Polish negotiation strategy Scientific analysis of negotiations requires us to name certain types of strategies and tactics in order to put the empirical analysis of negotiators into a theoretical framework. This does not mean that negotiators, when using certain strategies, thought of Putnam’s win-set or battering ram strategy. They did it because they were driven by ‘intuition’ or it was ‘the natural thing to do’. When theorising Polish negotiation strategy, we should examine both the overall strategy and short-term strategies or negotiation tactics. When examining the overall strategy, one should emphasise that the Polish negotiation strategy was determined by the lack of credible BATNA, since the key Polish foreign
Concluding remarks 163 policy goal was to enter the EU. No other alternatives were seriously considered. This meant that asymmetry between the negotiation sides determined further short-term strategies and tactics. There were also some short-term negotiation strategies and tactics used extensively by the Polish sides, such as tying hands, threats, side-payments and package deals. Others such as dead-weight catching or coordination within the enlargement wave, were occasionally used.15 It should be emphasised that negotiation strategy and tactics can be used to manipulate the size of a win-set, and as a result they will negotiate better conditions or ensure protection of its own/group interests. Strategies and tactics are used by both domestic negotiators to influence their opposition and by the domestic constituents to influence the domestic negotiators. What should be highlighted is that there was a strong interplay between Polish negotiation strategy and the size of the domestic win-set. In examining this problem, certain aspects ought to be elucidated. As Putnam argued, the size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the domestic negotiators. Putnam sheds light on an interesting tactical dilemma that the domestic negotiator faces. Even though the negotiator has an interest in maximising the other side’s win- set, with regard to his own domestic win-set, his motives are mixed. ‘The larger the win-set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but, the weaker his bargaining position regarding the other negotiator.’16 Thus, the Polish domestic negotiator could conclude an agreement more easily with a large win-set; how ever, this would come at the price of weakening his bargaining position. This shows that paradoxically, Euro-scepticism was used by the government to strengthen Poland’s bargaining position. Indeed, this tactic was used extensively and, as was later admitted by a senior official involved in the negotiation pro cess, the strong domestic pressure (political parties, interest groups and those expressed in the opinion polls) helped the Polish side to negotiate concessions in Copenhagen in December 2002, predominantly in agriculture (mostly direct payments and production quotas).17 The government was aware of the strong pressure coming from the public and some domestic groups to negotiate better conditions, and this goal was even straightforwardly expressed by Polish Prime Minister Miller while negotiating with his Danish counterpart, Rasmussen. Leszek Miller acknowledged that he felt public opinion breathing down his neck and that if Poland was not recognised as negotiating toughly, it was possible that the Accession Treaty would not be ratified in the referendum. This obviously resembles the tying hands strategy based on Putnam’s argument, that a small domestic win-set can be used as a bargaining advantage.18 According to this strategy, the negotiator may use the trick, ‘I would like to accept your proposal, but this would not be accepted by the public.’ Miller was pressed by his coali tion partner PSL, which threatened to leave the coalition unless the government would protect better membership conditions, in particular the increase in the level of production quotas for milk. However, in the case when the size of the domestic win-set is small, compromise is possible for the price of side-payments. Thus, side-payments need to be paid in order to enlarge its win-set, as was evident in the case of Poland
164 Concluding remarks negotiating direct payments and production quotas in Copenhagen. The EU, by moving the money from structural funds to direct payment, could enlarge the Level II win-set in Poland with a little extra cost. The case of Poland justifies the hypothesis that if the Level I negotiators are determined to achieve a compromise, it is possible for the win-sets to overlap, but this requires side-payments to be paid. This small domestic win-set also helped to achieve relatively good terms when negotiating freedom to purchase real estate by foreigners.19 One may, however, ask why in those two case studies the domestic win-set was small. Consequently, the Polish government was put under strong pressure from farmers’ unions, the opposition and even by the junior coalition partner, PSL. Therefore, the government was more determined to conduct tougher nego tiations since it felt the pressure from all domestic quarters. PSL and some opposition parties also had political interest in demanding a long transitional period for liberalisation in land sales.20 They were mainly afraid of losing the farmers’ electorate. Furthermore, some members of the coalition and opposition parties had even personal interest in demanding higher direct payments and production quotas.21 The case of free movement of labour is different, even though this issue was important for the general public. It was used only to a limited extent by domestic groups. Polish trade unions, employers’ organisations and political parties, even though officially supporting the free movement of workers, did not have a direct interest in demanding liberalisation.22 At the same time, they met a strong opposition from the side of some EU countries to accept free movement of workers. Thus, to measure win-set within the domestic pressure, we should take into account public opinion, interest groups and political elites. If we assume that the domestic negotiator wishes to expand his win-set at the price of weakening his bargaining position, as would be the case if he is afraid of the risk of no- agreement, then it is also apparent that he has to be prepared for side-payments to attract supporters (for example farmers’ unions) on the domestic level (Level II). As Putnam expressed, ‘What counts at Level II is not total costs and benefits, but their incidence, relative to existing coalitions.’23 Indeed, Poland’s govern ment, being afraid that the agreement would be rejected in the referendum, was interested in expanding its win-set (especially after the closing of negotiations in Copenhagen and before the accession referendum), but at the same time, it had to pay side-payments, for example, a promise to ‘top up’ direct payments to farmers or, with regard to freedom to purchase land by foreigners, demand a long transitional period and introduce a land bill that would protect the political interests of PSL. In his model, Putnam emphasises bargaining power and tactics as the core elements of international negotiations. Therefore, certain tricks and smart tactics are used. For instance, a utility-maximising statesman (domestic negotiator) aims to convince his counterpart that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favourable to the opponent is unlikely to be ratified. This tactic was used extensively by the Polish side during negotiations on
Concluding remarks 165 agriculture and the purchase of land by foreigners. Another possible tactic is for a negotiator to submit a trial agreement for ratification or consultation in order to demonstrate that the offered conditions are not in his win-set.24 These tactics were also used to a certain extent by the Polish government when they presented the EU proposals with regard to the level of direct payments to farmers’ unions and these organisations strongly rejected the offer. These organisations threatened the government that if the Union did not increase subsidies, they would encourage the public to vote ‘No’ on the referendum. Another obvious bargaining tactic is used when statesmen (negotiators) claim that their side has made more concessions in comparison to the opponent. Hence, negotiators emphasise their concessions in order to induce the other side to make their own concessions.25 This negotiating tactic is, however, risky. The negotiator must be cautious not to magnify his own concessions, since then domestic parties, and the media in particular, may turn against him or even attack him for being soft in protecting the national interest.26 Thus, the negotiator is often playing a double game. On the one hand, he shows concessions to the opponent, but on the other, he sells the image of a tough negotiator to the public. Undeniably, the Polish side often emphasised concessions, in particular on the costs of integration and on possible benefits for the European Union. At the same time, however, it declared to its own public its determination to enter the EU on sound terms. Such a situation was used in negotiations concerning liberalisation in agri culture and the free movement of labour.27 If we look at domestic versus international levels of analysis, as Robert Putnam shows, decision-makers usually give primacy to the domestic calculus. This definitely finds its confirmation when we analyse the behaviour of the Polish government, which, acting under pressure coming from the public, was determined to show its tough stance during negotiations. This was done even at the price of irritating its negotiation partners by demanding much more than was offered on the table. To sum up, the Polish government was using its small win-set and the growing Euro-scepticism to gain bargaining advantage. At the same time, the government was afraid of the political cost of no-agreement, and was willing to increase its own win-set and win support from public opinion and even the opposition parties to win the referendum, even at the price of side-payments. The three case studies indicate that the size of the domestic win-set can indeed influence the negotiation process and outcomes. As Putnam argued: ‘The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the domestic negotiators.’
Theorising the negotiation strategy of the EU Even though the focus of this book emphasised Polish negotiation strategy, in order to understand this strategy more fully one should briefly examine the nego tiation strategy of the EU. There was no balance between the two negotiating sides. The EU made a tactical decision to slow down the negotiation process to allow all the others to catch up; in fact, there was no room for a Polish strategy.
166 Concluding remarks According to Polish senior officials involved in the negotiation process, this decision was taken by the EU in order to get a bargaining advantage by using the battering ram strategy, pressing the Polish government and showing that the other accessing countries are doing much better.28 Thus, negotiations were one- sided by their nature.29 The EU, conversely, in order to maximise its own win- sets and weaken Poland’s bargaining position, had an interest in increasing the level of euro-enthusiasm in Poland.30 The Union funded organisations and par ticular programmes promoting the idea of integration. As Putnam argued: Each Level I negotiator has a strong interest in the popularity of his opposite number, since part A’s popularity increases the size of his win-set, and thus increases both the odds of success and the relative bargaining leverage of party B.31 The issue of freedom to purchase real estate was easier to negotiate, since the concessions towards the Polish side did not require transfers from the EU budget. The European Union instead, especially in a latter stage of negotiations, tied this issue with free movement of labour into a package deal. In the case of free movement of labour, there was rather a small domestic win-set in some EU countries to accept liberalisation. Nevertheless, according to Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, tying these two issues into a package deal was a mistaken strategy of ‘two fears to be swapped’.32 Thus, the fear of cheap workers from the acceding countries flooding EU countries was swapped with a fear of Polish land being sold to foreigners. The case study of free movement of labour also shows how domestic interest of the member states in the EU countries influenced the final EU negotiating position. It shows that powerful interest groups such as trade unions and political parties in some EU countries (mainly Germany and Austria) managed to influence the European negotiators. The EU had used several different strategies and negotiation tactics. Indeed, bargaining tactics are the core element of interna tional negotiations. According to a senior-level EU official involved in the negotiations, the EU strategy was based on the assumption that Poland does not have a real BATNA to the accession. Thus, the EU was aware of its bargaining advantage in comparison to Poland and other CEEC.33 The often-used strategy was a set aside method, which was accompanied by a certain sequence of negotiation chapters. The most difficult issues were not set aside until the last minute of negotiations, and then the EU was pressing the accession countries by using the battering ram strategy and by arguing that Poland stay behind other acceding countries. The EU often used the battering ram strategy by arguing that other countries were doing much better, so Poland ‘should hurry up’. As was discussed above, the EU also decided to tie issues to larger package deals, particularly tying the purchase of real estate by foreigners with free movement of labour; thus, the EU was willing to agree to transitional periods on the sale of land issue on the con dition that Poland would agree to transitional periods in the area of the free movement of workers.
Concluding remarks 167
Lessons from the case studies and further research This empirical study has important theoretical implications. It confirms Putnam’s hypothesis that the size of the domestic win-set can, under certain conditions, be influenced by domestic pressure – particularly public opinion, interest groups and political elites. Three factors determined the size of the win-set. The first factor was domestic power, preferences and possible coalitions. The second factor was domestic institutions and ratification procedures, like ratification pro cedures for negotiation stances within the government or in the accession referendum. Finally, the size of the win-set depended on the strategies of Level I negotiators. Among the three case studies, negotiations concerning agriculture were the most complicated and difficult because both win-sets were small. Both sides had to enlarge their win-sets: Poland by deciding to increase the level of direct payments from the national budget, and the EU by moving money from already secured structural funds to finance direct subsidies. Only after the intensive negotiations in Copenhagen could those win-sets overlap. With regard to the second case study, agreement was easier, since the small Polish domestic win-set to accept liberalisation of land sales was accompanied by a relatively large win-set within the EU countries to accept transitional periods. Thus, the Polish and the EU win-sets overlapped. This indeed confirms Putnam’s idea that when win-sets overlap, the agreement can easily be achieved. In the sale of land case, the EU was ready for a compromise and treated this case as an element of a package deal with the free movement of labour. Finally, Poland, unlike in the case of free movement of labour, managed to achieve polit ical success. The case study of free movement of labour is almost ‘a mirror image’ case study of the freedom of purchase of real estate. Whilst in the labour case there was a small EU domestic win-set to accept liberalisation on the labour market and the lack of strong interest groups and political parties’ pressure, in the land issue, there was a large EU domestic win-set to accept the transitional period, accompanied by strong pressure from some Polish interest groups and political parties. Thus, in the case of free movement of labour, the strongest side (EU) managed to impose transitional periods. The impact of the size of domestic win- sets on the negotiation process and results is illustrated in Table 7.1. As shown above, the three case studies provide good empirical evidence to measure the impact of domestic pressure on the size of the win-set. However, it would be interesting to conduct a similar study with regard to the other acceding countries, for example by asking whether the two-level game model may be applicable, and if so, in which negotiating areas, i.e. one can assume that, in the case of small countries such as Malta, Cyprus or Estonia, agriculture is not a big issue. What is more, it would be interesting to examine the two-level game model against current EU disputes, for example the Common Agricultural Policy reform, the Constitutional Treaty or negotiations with other acceding countries, for instance Croatia. It may be of interest to compare these results. Thus, what I
168 Concluding remarks Table 7.1 The impact of the size of domestic win-sets on the negotiation process and results Size of win-set Case study
Poland
EU
Result
Agriculture
Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties.
Small within interest groups and political parties. Public opinion less interested in the issue.
Compromise very difficult, but possible. Both sides had to make concessions in order to enlarge its win-sets.
Purchase of Small within public real estate by opinion, interest foreigners groups and political parties.
Rather large (public opinion did not care about this issue), interest groups rather weak, political parties and politicians treated this issue as an element of a package deal (with free movement of labour) in order to negotiate transitional periods.
Compromise easier. Poland managed to get a good deal. Winsets after negotiations overlapped.
Free Small within public movement of opinion, but no strong labour interest groups to support liberalisation. Political parties focused on the first two issues.
Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties in many powerful EU countries, e.g. Germany.
Compromise possible due to concessions on the Polish side. Poland had to agree on transitional periods.
carried out in Poland can be done for other countries or with regard to other case studies. In this way, further studies may aid in proving or disproving the two- level game model. The Putnam two-level game model has proved to be useful in describing, explaining and understanding the influence of domestic pressure on Poland’s negotiation position on EU accession. However, one should be cautious to treat it as a model and not as a dogmatic theory; thus, whether the same model can be useful for other countries or cases will remain subject to further research. Indeed, as Putnam argued: ‘Far-ranging empirical research is needed now to test and deepen our understanding of how two-level games are played.’34 The goal of my book is merely to provide a small contribution to this wide-ranging research.
Appendix List of interviewees
1 Jerzy Buzek, Prime Minister of Poland (1997–2001). Interview date: 9 September 2004. 2 Ryszard Czarnecki, Minister for European Affairs (1997–99); Head of the Committee for European Integration (1997–98). Interview date: 27 April 2005. 3 Petra Erler, Head of the Cabinet to the EU Commissioner Günter Verheugen. Interview date: 2 October 2006. 4 Bronisław Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997–2000). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 5 Danuta Huebner, Head of Office of the Committee for European Integration and Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001–03); Government Plenipotentiary for establishing the Committee for European Integration (KIE), Secretary of KIE with the rank of Secretary of State and Head of the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) (1996–97). Interview date: 5 July 2005. 6 Leszek Jesień, Polish Government Advisor on Accession Negotiations to the European Union (1998–2001). Interview date: 22 June2005. 7 Jarosław Kalinowski, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (2001–03). Interview date: 20 July 2006. 8 Ewa Kubis, Director of the Department of Information and Public Communication, Office of the Committee of European Integration (UKIE) (2002), Member of the Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union (2001–03). Interview date: 25 August 2004. 9 Jan Kułakowski, Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union (1998–2001). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 10 Alan Mayhew, Adviser to the Minister for European Affairs, Government of Poland. Interview date: 9 June 2006. 11 Rudolf Moegele, Head of Unit for Enlargement in the Directorate General for Agriculture. Interview date: 26 September 2006. 12 Jarosław Pietras, Under-Secretary of State in the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) (1997–2004); Secretary of the Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union (1998–2002). Interview date: 29 June 2005.
170 Appendix: list of interviewees 13 Władysław Piskorz, Counsellor Minister, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU in Brussels. Former Head of Agricultural Policy Analysis Unit Ministry of Agriculture. Interview date: 24 May 2005. 14 Jerzy Plewa, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, a Member of the Polish Negotiation Team responsible for Agriculture (1998–2003). Interview date: 7 January 2005. 15 Paweł Samecki, Under-Secretary at the Office of the Committee for Euro pean Integration (UKIE) (1998–2002). Interview date: 12 July 2004. 16 Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Minister for European Affairs (1991–96; 2000–01), Chief adviser to the Prime Minister on European Integration (1999–2001). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 17 Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Adviser to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski. Consultant and Member of the Information Strategy Council of the Committee for European Integration. Interview date: 19 August 2004. 18 Sławomir Tokarski, Adviser to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski (1998–99). Director of Economic and Social Analyses Department, Committee for European Integration (2001–04). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 19 Jan Truszczyński, Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union (2001–03). Head of the representation of the Republic of Poland to the European Union (1996–2001). Interview date: 22 June 2005. 20 Veronika Veits, Directorate General for Agriculture, Desk officer for Poland. Interview date: 26 July 2006.
Notes
1 Introduction 1 See further H. Wallace, ‘Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 287–305. 2 According to Jan Kułakowski, it was a mistake that the Polish side assumed that there was no alternative. As he argued, ‘In politics there is always an alternative, to admit that we do not have an alternative is a negotiation mistake.’ See the interview with Jan Kułakowski. 3 U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 5. 4 See, for instance, U. Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role- compliance’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds), The State of the Union Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 164–85. 5 A. Moravcsik and M. A. Vachudova, ‘Preferences, Power and Equilibrium, the Causes and Consequences of EU Enlargement’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 204. 6 See further A. Krok-Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, p. 12. 7 This game was full of theatrical gestures. For example, such a game was played by some Polish politicians when they threatened that Poland could only enter the EU with full and equal direct payments. 8 It is arguable whether opinion polls themselves could constitute an indicator of an influence. However, I will show how opinion polls influenced decision-makers and therefore had an indirect influence on the negotiation process. 9 For example Jan Kułakowski, the Chief Negotiator, or the former Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek. 10 Such views may be expressed through opinion polls, petitions or demonstrations. 11 T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 482. 12 This definition was used by F. R. Baumgarter and B. Leech, Basic Interests: The Influence of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. xii. 13 The last issue, even though it was not subject to negotiations with the EU, influenced the debate on EU membership and had an indirect influence on the negotiation process. 14 K. Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies, Prince ton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 3.
172 Notes 15 This term will be described in detail in the next chapter. 16 Online. Available: www.britannica.com. 17 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 3. 18 I. W. Zartman, ‘Prenegotations: Phases and Function’, in J. Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenegotiations, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 4. 19 I will not go into details in describing other types of agreements since they are not rel evant to the core analysis here. 20 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 35. 21 Technicalities are understood as detailed technical solutions to the problems that occurred during negotiations. 22 I. W. Zartman, ‘Prenegotations: Phases and Function’, in J. Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenegotiations, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 4. 23 The Treaty was signed before the Maastricht Treaty. 24 The so-called ‘Europe Agreements’ were signed by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hun gary on 16 December 1991. The agreement aims to establish a free trade area over a period of ten years and institutes a permanent dialogue at the highest governmental levels. It came into force on 1 February 1994. Poland applied for membership to the EU on 5 April 1994. 25 See for example K. Cordell (ed.) Poland and the European Union, London: Routledge, 2000. 26 See for example A. Michta, I. Prizel (eds) Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995 or P. Ch. Muller-Graf, A. Stępniak (eds), Poland and the European Union: Between Association and Membership, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997. 27 See for example R. Trzaskowski, ‘From Candidate to Member State: Poland and the Future of EU’, Paris Institute for Strategic Studies Occasional Paper, 2002, No. 37. See also Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU, Warsaw: European Centre in Natolin, 2003. 28 See for example M. Dąbrowski and J. Rostowski (eds) The Eastern Enlargement of the EU, Boston Warsaw: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001 or R. Stawarska, ‘EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy, 1999, Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 822–38. 29 See for example J. Adamowski and K. A. Wojtaszczyk (eds) Negotiations of the EU Candidate Countries, Warsaw: The Institute of Political Science of Warsaw University, 2001. 30 See K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999. S. Senior Nello and K. E. Smith, The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. K. E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. K. E. Smith, ‘Enlargement and European Order’, in Ch. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. K. E. Smith and H. Sjursen, ‘Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement’, in T. Christiansen, B. Tonra (eds) Rethinking EU Foreign Policy, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. J. Zielonka (ed.) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, London: Kluwer Law International, 1998. P. Mair and J. Zielonka (eds) The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation, London: Frank Cass, 2002. J. Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1998. K. Henderson (ed.) Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, London: UCL Press, 1999. S. Croft, J. Redmond, G. Wynrees and M. Webber, The Enlargement of Europe,
Notes 173 Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Eastward Enlargement of the European Union, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997. M. J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. H. Wallace, ‘Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2002, No. 9:4, pp. 658–65. 31 D. Papadimitriou, Negotiating the New Europe – The European Union and Eastern Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Papadimitriou for instance is focusing on the comparative study of Bulgaria and Romania. 32 See for instance F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005. U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2002, Vol. 9, No. 4. 33 Sedelmeier or Schimmelfennig, however, have complained that the enlargement of the EU for many years has suffered from a theoretical neglect in the studies of Euro pean integration. 34 See for example H. Sjursen, ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 491–513. 35 F. Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization, 2001, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 76. 36 F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 2003, p. 3. 37 F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press, 2003, p. 5. 38 A. Moravcsik and M. A. Vachudova, ‘Preferences, Power and Equilibrium, the Causes and Consequences of EU Enlargement’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 142. 39 A. Krok-Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, pp. 3–4. This will be described further on in the book. 40 See for instance B. C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Lanham NY: University Press of America, 1983 (orig. published Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). See also T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 479–512. 41 See for instance J. Higley, J. Pakulski and W. Wesołowski (eds) Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1998. 42 This does not imply that all farmers produce goods for commercial purposes. It has been estimated that up to 50 per cent produced mainly for their own consumption. Moreover, for a large number among this group, farming, though important, only provided an additional source of income. 43 See ‘Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union’, DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op-en.pdf. 44 According to an independent analysis, the minimum subsidies that would enable com petition with the EU farmers (however still not equal competition) were 40 per cent in the year 2004. However, in order to improve the situation of farmers, minimal sub sidies should have been 55 per cent in 2004. See the report: ‘Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU’, Warsaw: European Centre in Natolin, 2003, pp. 111–13.
174 Notes 45 In the years 2004–07 this equalled 562 203 946 euro. See the report: ‘Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU’, Warsaw: European Centre in Natolin, 2003, p. 112. 46 The maximum possible subsidies (allowed by the EU) from the Polish budget between the years 2004–12 will be 5879 459 723 euro. See the report: ‘Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU’, Warsaw: European Centre in Natolin, 2003, p. 112. 47 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3. 48 Nevertheless, in some countries such as Slovenia, freedom in the purchase of real estate was the big issue even before negotiations started. The country introduced a liberal regime and it is apparent now, given the small numbers of foreign entities, that fears of buying out land by foreigners proved to be unjustified. 49 Such an opinion was widely expressed by the Polish decision-makers whom I interviewed. 50 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3., p. 460. 2 Two levels of analysis in international negotiations: domestic versus foreign policy 1 See K. Waltz, The Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. Waltz uses the term ‘image’ when describing the level of analysis, but in order to avoid ambiguity in terms, I will stick to the term level. 2 K. Waltz, The Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, p. 238. 3 K. Waltz, The Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, p. 238. 4 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992, p. 6. 5 See J. D. Singer, ‘International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis’, World Politics, 1960, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 453–61 and J. D. Singer, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations’, World Politics, 1961, Vol. 14:1, pp. 77–92. 6 See for instance M. Marcussen, T. Risse, D. Engelmann-Martin, ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 1999, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 614–33. 7 See P. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 8 See G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Exploring Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 9 See P. Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed’, International Organization, 1978, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 881–912. 10 O. R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond- Lippmann Consensus’, International Studies Quarterly, 1992, No. 36, pp. 439–66. See further G. A. Almond, ‘Public Opinion and National Security’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1956, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 371–8 or W. Lipmann, Public Opinion, New York: Macmillan, 1992. 11 M. Gabel, ‘Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union’, American Journal of Political Science, 1998, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 936. 12 At this point, one should make a distinction between the level of analysis, for example domestic and systemic, and the unit of analysis, for example focusing on a nation state as a unit. Therefore, one might study the national foreign policy, but take a systemic approach or, alternatively, as in this book, one may study accession to an international organisation from the domestic level of analysis, examining the influence of the domestic pressure on the accession process.
Notes 175 13 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 5. 14 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 6. 15 The detailed characteristics of the two negotiators will be given in later chapters. 16 R. D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 1. 17 L. Pye and S. Verba (eds) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 513. 18 Neo-realism, also known as structural realism, is a theory of international relations which emerged in 1975 with the publication of K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. Waltz argues in favour of a systemic approach: the international structure acts as a constraint on state behaviour, so that different states behave in a similar rational manner. 19 Neo-liberal institutionalism refers to a school of thought which believes that nation- states are concerned with absolute gains (economic, political or strategic), rather than relative gains to other nation-states. 20 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 113. 21 Whether Stephen Walt is a ‘structural’ realist or ‘second image realist’ is debatable. 22 See S. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival, 1997, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 165. 23 See S. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival, 1997, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 165. 24 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 430. 25 R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, London: Sage, 1987, p. 10. 26 R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, London: Sage, 1987, p. 11. 27 R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, London: Sage, 1987, p. 11. 28 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 436. 29 The concept of win-set was originally used by K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power’, American Political Science Review, 1987, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 85–104. See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 437. 30 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 437. 31 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 437–8. 32 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 33 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 442. 34 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 448.
176 Notes 35 Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Online. Available: www.senat.gov.pl/k5eng/ dok/konstytu/konstytu.htm, Art. 125. 36 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 449. 37 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 38 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 451. 39 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 40 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 16. 41 Putnam does not give a precise definition of the Level I actors. Therefore, by talking about statesmen, Moravcsik meant Putnam’s Level I negotiator. 42 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 62. 43 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 16. 44 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 456–7. 45 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 17. 46 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 17. 47 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, pp. 141–2. 48 D. Mitchell, ‘International Institutions and Janus Faces: The Influence of International Institutions on Central Negotiators within Two-Level Games’, International Negotiation, 2001, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25–48, in particular p. 44. 49 See A. Lee Patterson, ‘Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three-Level Game Analysis’, International Organization, 1997, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 135–65. 50 See P. F. Trumbore, ‘Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process’, International Studies Quarterly, 1998, No. 42, pp. 545–65. 51 See D. Mitchell, ‘International Institutions and Janus Faces: The Influence of International Institutions on Central Negotiators within Two-Level Games’, International Negotiation, 2001, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25–48. 52 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 23. 53 See A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 473–524, particularly pp. 514–16.
Notes 177 54 T. Risse, ‘ “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 2000, No. 54, No. 1, pp. 1–39. 55 F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 3. This concept was already discussed in Chapter 1. 56 ‘National Strategy for Integration’, 1997, p. 1. 57 ‘National Strategy for Integration’, 1997. 58 ‘National Strategy for Integration’, 1997, p. 5. 59 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 21. 60 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, p. 3. 61 Interview with Paweł Samecki. 62 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, pp. 3–4. 63 According to the Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski, it was a strategic mistake that the Polish side assumed that there was no alternative. Interview with Jan Kułakowski. 64 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 65 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 136. 66 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 137. 67 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, pp. 4–5. 68 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 69 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 70 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of European Union Enlargement, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 14. 71 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, p. 5. 72 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3. 73 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3. See also B. White, ‘The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis’, European Journal of International Relations, 1999, Vol. 5(1), pp. 37–66. See in par ticular pp. 43–5. 74 The candidate countries often declared that achieving membership in the negoti ations with the EU was the major goal of their foreign policies. 75 M. Clarke, ‘Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches’, in Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, pp. 6–7. 76 M. Clarke, ‘Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches’, in Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, p. 7.
178 Notes 77 The question arises whether an international negotiator is an actor. It depends whether the negotiator is just an agent submitting instructions from the government or an independent actor, as would be the case when a chief of government is also acting as an international negotiator. 78 W. Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process, London: Macmillan, 1971, p. 44. 79 G. A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 269. 80 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 264. 81 G. A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 269. 82 See O. R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond- Lippmann Consensus’, International Studies Quarterly, 1992, No. 36, pp. 439–66. 83 T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 480. 84 T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 482. 85 J. R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 313. 86 This problem will be described later on when discussing the case of purchase of real estate by foreigners. 87 T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 480–1. 88 G. A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 269. 89 F. R. Baumgarter and B. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. xii. See also pp. 25–30. 90 W. Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process, London: Macmillan, 1971, p. 46. 91 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 269. 92 L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey Prentice-Hall, 1982, p. 138. 93 L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey Prentice-Hall, 1982, p. 137. 94 B. C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Lanham NY: University Press of America, 1983, pp. 79–80. See further pp. 80–126. 95 See further B. C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. For empirical evidence of Cohen’s thesis (based on the US and the UK), see for example S. N. Soroka, ‘Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy’, Press/Politics, 2003, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 27–48. 96 B. C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Lanham NY: University Press of America, 1983, pp. 80–126. 97 Solidarity Electoral Action, a central–right coalition of a party representing the Solidarity trade union and a number of post-solidarity political parties, in 1997 won 201 seats of 460 and formed a coalition with the liberal Freedom Union, which won 74 seats. However, the Freedom Union withdrew from the government in 2000. 98 Samoobrona is a radical populist party created in the early 1990s initially as a trade- union representing bankrupted farmers. 99 Radio Maryja is a radical Catholic Radio Station very influential among some right- wing political elites.
Notes 179 100 K. Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 3. 101 K. Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 8. 102 See for instance B. Frankel (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London: Routledge, 1997. 3 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 1 I refer to the decision-makers whom I interviewed. 2 U. Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role Compliance’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds) The State of the Union Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 165. 3 See F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 4 See A. Krok-Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 2000, No. 54. 5 See Z. Mach Heritage, ‘Dream and Anxiety: The European Identity of Poles’, in Z. Mach and D. Niedźwiedzki, European Enlargement and Identity, Kraków: Universitas, 1997, p. 38. 6 A. Krok-Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, p. 4. 7 H. Sjursen, ‘Enlarging the Union’, in S. Stavridis and others (eds) New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy Making, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 158–9. 8 See also C. Mc Manus-Czubińska, W. L. Miller, R. Markowski and J. Kwaśniewski, ‘Understanding Dual Identities in Poland’, Political Studies, 2003, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 121–43. The authors argue that contrary to fears that Europeanism in Poland might be narrow and culturally restrictive, dual Polish and European identity reflects broader cosmopolitan perspectives as well as specifically European and Western sympathies. 9 See further S. Sowiński, ‘A Europe of Nations but What Kind of Nations? The Nation in the Debate on Poland’s Integration with the European Union’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2002, Vol. 2, No. 3(4), pp. 81–105. 10 See I. Prizel and A. Michta (eds) Polish Foreign Policy Reconsidered, London: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 60–4. 11 See Z. Mach Heritage, ‘Dream and Anxiety: The European Identity of Poles’, in Z. Mach and D. Niedźwiedzki, European Enlargement and Identity, Kraków: Universitas, 1997, pp. 38–9. 12 National Strategy for Integration, 1997, para 1.1. 13 See further R. Stemplowski, ‘Poland in The World System: Transformation of the Political System and Foreign Policy Making’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 105–6. 14 I. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy – Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 418. 15 See H. Wydra, Continuities in Poland’s Permanent Transition, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 113–38. 16 See J. A. Tucker, A. C. Pacek and A. J. Berinsky, ‘Transitional Winners and Losers, Attitudes towards EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries’, American Journal of Political Science, 2002, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 557–71. 17 See L. Kolarska-Bobińska, ‘The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe’, East European Politics and Societies, 2003, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 91–8. The author is discussing the impact of EU accession on building and strengthening democratic institutions during the process of systemic transformation.
180 Notes 18 A. Krok-Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, pp. 3–4. 19 J. I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p. 32. 20 J. I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 39–40. 21 J. I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p. 40. 22 See further K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 52–65. 23 European Report, No. 1608, Europe Information Service, 1 August 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 24 European Report, No. 1608, Europe Information Service, 1 August 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 25 ‘EEC/Eastern Europe: Council Grants Mandate for new Europe Agreements’, Euro pean Report, No. 1614, Europe Information Service, 19 September 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 26 ‘EEC’s Special Ties with Poland’, Polish News Bulletin, 24 September 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 27 ‘EEC’s Special Ties with Poland’, Polish News Bulletin, 24 September 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 28 ‘EEC/Eastern Europe: Update on Europe Accords’, Europe Information Service, 24 October 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 29 ‘Visit of Mr. Frans Andriessen to Poland – 6 and 7 March 1991’, Commission of the European Communities, 8 March 1991. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/ rapid/. 30 U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 67. 31 ‘EEC/Poland: Negotiations Stumble Again Over Commercial Aspects’, Europe Information Service, 20 March 1991. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 32 ‘Europe After the Coup’, The Times, 22 August 1991. 33 ‘EEC/Eastern Europe: Commission Moves to Extend Europe Accords to Other States’, Europe Information Service, 7 September 1991. Online. Available: www. lexis-nexis.com. 34 See Friis and Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 219. 35 G. Brock, ‘Three East European States Bargain their Way Nearer EC Membership’, The Times, 23 November 1991. 36 U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 73–4. 37 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 94. 38 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 103. 39 ‘EC/Poland: Suchocka Chastises Community Inaction’, Europe Information Service, 5 June 1993. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 40 Friis and Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 220. 41 J. Zielonka, ‘Policies without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 1997, No. 97/72, p. 9. 42 Friis and Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 221.
Notes 181 43 Sedelmeier, 2000, U. Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role Compliance’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds) The State of the Union Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 175. See also U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 73–4. 44 These are so-called Copenhagen criteria as set by the European Council. 45 H. Grabbe, Profiting from EU Enlargement, London: Centre for European Reform, 2001, p. 11. 46 Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union and Chancellery of the Prime Minister Republic of Poland, Accession Negotiations, Poland on the Road to the European Union, Warsaw, 2000, Ch.1 footnote 8. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 47 ‘EU/Poland/Hungary: Association Agreements Finally Take Force’, Europe Information Service, 2 February 1994. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 48 Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one Part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other Part, 1994, Art. 1. P. 2. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl. 49 ‘EU/Poland/Hungary: Association Agreements Finally Take Force’, Europe Information Service, 2 February 1994. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 50 J. Zielonka, ‘Policies without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 1997, No. 97/72, p. 10. 51 See the preamble to the Europe Agreement. 52 K. Skubiszewski, ‘Perspectives of Poland’s Foreign Policy in Europe’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1994, p. 27. 53 See further L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997. 54 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 94. 55 Friis and Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 218. 56 See the Preamble to the Europe Agreement with Poland. 57 However, this was a political overstatement, which was not taken seriously by the EU. 58 J. Palmer, ‘Nervous Poles Apply for EU Membership’, The Guardian, 8 April 1994. 59 CBOS Opinion Poll, November 1994. 60 See also ‘EU/East Europe: Council to Examine Pre-Accession Strategy for the First Time’, Europe Information Service, 1 October 1994. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 61 See H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 30–4. 62 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 122. 63 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 38. 64 See further K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 70–7. 65 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 37–8. 66 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 12. 67 See ‘White Paper Concerning Integration of the Associated Central and Eastern European Countries into the Internal Market of the European Union’. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/peco-w/en/index.html.
182 Notes 68 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 34. 69 ‘EU/East Europe: A White Paper Approved for Nine CEEC’s’, Europe Information Service, 23 June 1995. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 70 ‘EU/Poland: Prudent Optimism over Accession Progress’, Europe Information Service, 23 June 1995. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 71 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 34. 72 See M. Popowski, ‘Relations with the European Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1996, p. 39. See further pp. 39–45. 73 See ‘Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union’, DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op-en.pdf and ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 13. See also M. Popowski, ‘Relations with the European Union in 1996’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1997, pp. 43–9. 74 See R. Freudenstein, ‘Poland, Germany and the EU’, International Affairs, 1998, Vol. 74, No. 1, in particular pp. 45–49. On the details on Polish–German relations see also M. A. Cichocki, ‘Polish–German Relations in the Light of Poland’s Accession to the European Union’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2002, Vol. 2, No. 1(2), pp. 169–74. 75 See K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 120–1. 76 J. Zielonka, ‘Policies without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 1997, No. 97/72, p. 2. 77 Cited in L. Friis, ‘And Then They Were 15 . . . The EC’s EFTA-Enlargement Negotiations’, Cooperation and Conflict, 1999, Vol. 33, No. 1. 78 See Agenda 2000. See also J. Czaputowicz, ‘Review of Poland’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Ministry Activity in 1997’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1998, p. 20. 79 See Agenda 2000. 80 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, Accession partnership, Ch. 1 Introduction, Ch. 2 Objectives, 2000. 81 See ‘National Programmes of Preparations for Membership’. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl. 82 M. Popowski, ‘Poland’s Relations with the European Union in 1998’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1999, p. 60. 83 M. Popowski, ‘Poland’s Relations with the European Union in 1998’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1999, p. 63. 84 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the European Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 62. 85 L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997, p. 14. 86 M. Popowski, ‘Poland’s Relations with the European Union in 1998’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1999, pp. 64–5. 87 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 35. 88 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the European Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 62. 89 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, pp. 35–6. 90 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, pp. 37–9. 91 See further A. Szczerbiak, Referendum Briefing, No. 5, ‘The Polish EU Accession Referendum 7–8 June 2003’, Europe Research Network. Online. Available: www.
Notes 183 sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/poland5.pdf. See also R. Markowski and J. A. Tucker, ‘Pocketbooks, Politics, and Parties: The 2003 Polish Referendum on EU Membership’, 21 August 2003. Online. Available: www.princeton.edu/~csdp/research/pdfs/ Markowski_Tucker_2003.pdf. 92 Friis and Murphy, ‘The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 221. 93 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 70–2. 94 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the European Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 61. 95 This is a Polish constitutional body comprising the government ministers. 96 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 24–5. 97 P. Świeboda, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, World Bank Institute Seminar Ankara, 28 March 2006, p. 3. 98 Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union and Chancellery of the Prime Minister Republic of Poland, Accession Negotiations: Poland on the Road to the European Union, Warszawa, 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, pp. 24–5. 99 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 133. 100 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 146. 101 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 26. 102 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 21–2. 103 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the European Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 61. 104 P. Świeboda, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, World Bank Institute Seminar Ankara, 28 March 2006, p. 2. 105 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 23. 106 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 21–2. 107 See further L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli. Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, pp. 227–31. 108 This opinion was shared by many decision-makers whom I interviewed. 109 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 23. 110 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, 23–4. 111 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report – Glossary’, 2000, pp. 99–100. 112 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 24. 113 The chairmanship of the European Council and the Council of the European Union were held by the member states on a rotation basis for a half-year term. Until 1995, an alphabetic rotation system was used. Then, the alphabetic rotation system was abandoned and the order of Presidency until 2002 was established in the fol lowing way: 1997, Holland and Luxembourg; 1998, Great Britain and Austria; 1999, Germany and Finland; 2000, Portugal and France; 2001, Sweden and Belgium; 2002, Spain and Denmark; 2003, Greece. See further ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report – Glossary’, 2000, p. 100.
184 Notes 114 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the European Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 62. 115 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 30. 4 Negotiations concerning agriculture 1 B. Ardy, ‘Agriculture, Structural Policy and Budget and Eastern Enlargement of the Union’, in K. Henderson, Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, London: UCL Press, 1999, p. 114. 2 See further ‘European Agriculture: The Case for Radical Reform’, Conclusions of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food’s CAP Review Group, 1995, pp. 3–4. 3 See S. Senior Nello and K. E. Smith, The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The Implications of Enlargement in Stages, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 37–8. 4 See Agenda 2000. 5 Agriculture: Karl-Heinz Funke, ‘Satisfied with Berlin Agreement’, Europe Information Service, 2 April 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 6 For the implications of extending the CAP to CEEC see S. Tangermann and J. F. M. Swinnen, ‘Conclusions and Implications for Food and Agriculture Policy in the Process of Accession to the EU’, in S. Tangermann and M. Banse, Central and Eastern European Agriculture in an Expanding European Union, Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2000. 7 For details on implications of CAP reform on Poland see W. Guba and W. Piskorz, Implications of CAP Reforms for Poland, Warsaw: Office of the Committees for European Integration, 2002 and H. Ingham, M. Ingham and G. Węcławowicz, ‘Agricultural Reform in Post-Transition Poland’, Tijdschrift voor Economische and Sociale Geografie, 1998, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 150–60, see in particular p. 154 and J. Wolf, The Future of European Agriculture, London: Centre for European Reform, 2002, pp. 71–5. 8 This view is shared by the majority of officials and experts involved in the negoti ation process whom I interviewed. In particular, it is shared by the former chief of the Office of the Committee for European Integration Paweł Samecki, the former Prime Minister Buzek and the former advisor to the Chief Negotiator Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz, to name but a few. 9 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska Europa Świat – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 262. 10 ‘Polish Agriculture and EU Integration Discussed’, PAP, 20 July 1997. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 11 EU Enlargement: ‘Agriculture Questions Loom Large in Debates with First-Wave Candidates’, 19 June 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 12 ‘Polish Farming Needs Transitional Period’, PAP, 22 April 1998. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 13 ‘EU to Assist Polish Agriculture’, PAP, 18 June 1998. Online. Available: www. lexis-nexis.com. 14 ‘Agriculture Screening Begins’, Polish News Bulletin, 22 September 1998. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 15 Interview with a Polish senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 16 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 17 Interview with a Polish senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 18 ‘Poland Does Not Want Transition Periods in Farming’, PAP, 9 October 1998. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com.
Notes 185 19 CBOS Opinion Poll, September 1998, pp. 1–2. More information on this subject can be found in the CBOS reports: ‘The Level of Acceptance for Polish Integration into the European Union’, September 1998, ‘Agricultural Policy in the Context of our Prospective Membership in the European Union’, August 1998. 20 European Commission, ‘1998 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession’, pp. 29–31. 21 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 22 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 23 ‘EU Accuses Poland of Boosting Sugar Production’, PAP, 27 May 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 24 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 25 This interview was shared by the former Minister for European Integration Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. 26 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 27 ‘On the EU’s Plate’, The Warsaw Voice, 12 July 1999. 28 ‘On the EU’s Plate’, The Warsaw Voice, 12 July 1999. 29 ‘Poland Declares Readiness to Comply with EU Agricultural Policy by 2003’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 October 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 30 ‘Food Imports to be Cut by Half ’, Polish News Bulletin, 12 November 1999. 31 The view was expressed by a senior Polish official involved in the negotiation pro cess. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 32 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 33 European Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 October 1999. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, pp. 40–2. 34 European Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 October 1999. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, p. 79. 35 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 36 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, pp. 109–12. 37 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, p. 114. 38 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, p. 109. 39 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, p. 109. 40 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 41 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska Europa Świat – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 263. 42 According to Polish Agriculture Minister Artur Balasz’s estimate, the country’s farmers would receive thirteen billion zlotys (EUR 3.14 billion) from the EU in the first year of membership, which was expected to be covered by the direct payment scheme. But restructuring the agricultural sector and bringing thousands of small farms in Poland to EU health and quality standards, he calculated, would require more than twenty-five billion zlotys in the three years after membership. See further ‘Tough Farm Policy for EU Entry Talks’, Financial Times, 17 December 1999. 43 ‘Tough Farm Policy for EU Entry Talks’, Financial Times, 17 December 1999.
186 Notes 44 45 46 47
Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. Interview with Władysław Piskorz. Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. ‘EU Commissioner 5 Criticises Polish Stand’, Polish News Bulletin, 18 January 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 48 EU/Poland: ‘Warsaw Outlines Ambitious Position on Agricultural Negotiations’, Europe Information Service, 6 January 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis. com. 49 ‘EU Commission Proposes New Farm Funding Rules for Candidate Countries’, IP/00/77, Brussels, 26 January 2000. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 50 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 51 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 52 See L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997. 53 M. Smith and S. Wagstyl, ‘Brussels May Extend Direct Farming Aid’, Financial Times, 9 February 2000. 54 ‘EU May Offer Direct Subsidies to Polish Farmers’, Polish News Bulletin, 1 Febru ary 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 55 M. Smith, ‘Europe Farmers Set for Direct Payments’, Financial Times, 29 March 2000. 56 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 57 ‘EU says Poland to be Left Out of Free Trade Deal if “Protectionism” Continues’, AFX Europe, 9 June 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 58 Verheugen Urges Compromise’, Polish News Bulletin, 23 June 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 59 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 60 ‘Commissioner Fischler in Poland: Enlargement Should be a Win-win Situation’, IP/00/1057, Krakow, 25 September 2000. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/ rapid/. 61 See for instance E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, ‘The Potential Effects of Liberalising Food Trade between Poland and the EU’, in Costs and Advantages of Poland’s Membership in the EU, Warsaw: Institute for Foreign Trade Trends and Prices (IKCHZ), 2000. 62 ‘EU Negotiations on Agriculture: Double Zero Not Very Favourable’, Polish News Bulletin, 25 July 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 63 ‘Rural Development Programmes for Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovenia, Endorsed’, IP 00/1009, Brussels, 14 September 2000. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/. 64 J. Reed and M. Smith, ‘Poland’s Tough Farm Stance Pays off ’, Financial Times, 28 September 2000. 65 ‘Poland and EU Sign Agriculture Deal’, Polish News Bulletin, 28 September 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 66 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 67 European Commission, ‘2000 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 8 November 2000. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, pp. 46–7. 68 European Commission, ‘2000 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 October 1999. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, p. 91. 69 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 70 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 71 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 72 ‘Plewa Calls on EU for Clear Position in Agriculture’, PAP, 20 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com.
Notes 187 73 ‘Plewa Calls on EU for Clear Position in Agriculture’, PAP, 20 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 74 ‘Growing Support for Subsidizing Polish Agriculture’, PAP, 7 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 75 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 76 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska Europa Świat – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 238. 77 D. Spinant, ‘Possible Faults in Poland Exaggerated’, 5 November 2001. Online. Available: www. euobserver.com. 78 Interview with Jaroslaw Pietras. 79 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. Indeed, most senior officials, for example Samecki, Tokarski and Jesień, expressed similar feelings with regard to the role of the media. 80 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 81 This opinion was shared by many senior officials involved in the negotiation pro cess, for example Paweł Samecki. 82 ‘Position of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Negotiations with the European Union’ – Statement by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, to the Diet of the Republic of Poland Warsaw, 29 November 2001, p. 10. 83 ‘Poland Softens Stance on 8 of 11 Remaining EU Negotiating’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 27 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 84 This argument was often repeated by Polish negotiators Paweł Samecki and Władysław Piskorz. 85 In fact, according to many senior officials involved in the negotiating process, conclusions from the reports were often uncritically referred to by the Polish media. The EU realised this and used the Polish media to exert pressure on the government. 86 European Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 November 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, p. 109. 87 European Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 November 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, p. 109 and p. 111. 88 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 89 ‘Commissioner Fischler Signs Pre-Accession Financing Agreement with Estonia, Latvia and Poland’, IP/01/113, Brussels, 25 January 2001. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/. 90 ‘Enlargement and Agriculture: An Integration Strategy for the EU’s New Member States’, IP/02/176, Brussels, 30 January 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu. int/rapid/. 91 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 92 J. Reed, ‘Poland Seeks Shorter Transition’, Financial Times, 31 January 2002. See for instance M. Fletche, ‘EU Selling us Short, Say Polish Farmers’, The Times, 7 February 2002. 93 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 94 Interview with a senior EU official involved – see the List of Interviewees. 95 CBOS Opinion Poll, February 2002, Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 96 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland Unhappy About Agriculture Proposals’, 1 February 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 97 M. Mann, ‘Poland Steps up Campaign over EU Farm Subsidies’, Financial Times, 12 February 2002. 98 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski.
188 Notes 99 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 100 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland Unhappy About Agriculture Proposals’, 1 February 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 101 S. Spiteri and D. Spinant, ‘Poles More EU-sceptical after Farm Money Proposal’, 11 February 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 102 ‘EU Agriculture Commissioner Promises More Money to Polish Farmers’, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 February 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 103 ‘Accession – Two Steps Closer to the EU’, The Warsaw Voice, 31 March 2002. 104 ‘Candidate Countries’ Farmers Better off in EU, Says Commission Study’, IP/02/428, Brussels, 18 March 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 105 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 106 M. Frydrych, ‘Polish Report Undermines EU proposals’, 4 April 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 107 Such a statement was made by Władysław Piskorz. Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 108 The farmers’ union Kółka Rolnicze has more than one million members. 109 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland: Farmers’ Frustration with EU Offer Grows’, 19 April 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 110 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 111 See CBOS Opinion Poll, May 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 112 K. Pankowski, ‘Proces integracji w opinii mieszkańców wsi’, Table 12, in L. Kolarska-Bobinska (ed.) Mieszkańcy Wsi o integracji Europejskiej: opinia, wiedza, poinformowanie, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002, p. 54. 113 Farmers are afraid that direct payments may cause further inequalities that could lead to an escalation of social conflicts, K. Pankowski, ‘Proces integracji w opinii mieszkańców wsi’, Figure 3, in L. Kolarska-Bobinska (ed.) Mieszkańcy Wsi o integracji Europejskiej: opinia, wiedza, poinformowanie, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002, p. 46. 114 K. Pankowski, ‘Proces integracji w opinii mieszkańców wsi’, Table 5, in L. Kolarska-Bobinska (ed.) Mieszkańcy Wsi o integracji Europejskiej: opinia, wiedza, poinformowanie, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002, p. 44. 115 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 435–7. 116 I. Black, ‘New Dispute on Subsidies Threatens EU enlargement’, The Guardian, 11 June 2002. 117 D. Spinant, ‘EU Leaders Reassuring on Enlargement’, 22 June 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 118 Statement of Mr Jan Truszczyński, ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union’, Conference at deputy level, Brussels, 28 June 2002. Online. Available: www. polrepeu.be/arch.html. 119 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, p. 5. 120 M. Frydrych, ‘Polish Farm Minister Says Will Quit over EU Talks’, 4 July 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 121 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 122 ‘European Commission Sees Poland’s Tough Stand on Subsidies as Trick’, Polish News Bulletin, 5 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 123 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 446. 124 According to most of the senior officials whom I interviewed, Kalinowski was acting under strong pressure from both public opinion, especially farmers, and his own party.
Notes 189 125 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the European Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 11. 126 CBOS Opinion Poll, May 2000. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 127 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the European Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 11. 128 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the European Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 12. 129 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the European Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 7. 130 Public TV in Poland has the highest viewing figures. 131 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 132 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 133 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 134 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 135 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 458. 136 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 137 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 138 ‘Visiting EU Commissioner Disappointed Polish Talks Focus Solely on Agriculture’, BBC Monitoring International, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 139 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 140 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 141 ‘Fischler Visits Poland, “Time to Stress the Positives” ’, IP/02/1278, Brussels/ Warsaw, 10 September 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 142 ‘Fischler in Poland, “EU is Neither Heaven, nor Hell – but Simply Better for Polish Farmers” ’, EU Press Release; IP: 02/1294, 12 September 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 143 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 144 J. Reed, ‘Fischler Gets Rough Ride from Poles’, Financial Times, 13 September 2002. 145 J. Reed, ‘Fischler Gets Rough Ride from Poles’, Financial Times, 13 September 2002. 146 ‘Poland Wants to Negotiate more EU Cash for Farmers – AgriMin’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 17 September 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 147 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 148 ‘Poland Wants to Negotiate More EU Cash for Farmers – AgriMin’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 17 September 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 149 ‘Polish Government Endorses Changes to EU Agriculture Negotiating Positions’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 14 October 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 150 See for instance A. Woś, ‘Polish Agriculture with Regard to the Prospect of Euro pean Integration’, Moct-Most, 1998, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 167–77.
190 Notes 151 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Postrzeganie Problemów Rolnictwa w kontekście Unii Europejskiej’, October 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 152 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Postrzeganie Problemów Rolnictwa w kontekście Unii Europejskiej’, October 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, Table 1. 153 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Opinie o negocjacjach Polski z Unia Europejska’, October 2002. The number of respondents who demanded equal direct payments increased by 6 per cent in comparison to the opinion poll taken just six months before. Compare Figure 3, p. 4. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 154 CBOS Opinion Poll, November 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 155 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Postrzeganie Problemów Rolnictwa w kontekście Unii Europejskiej’, October 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 156 ‘Polish Official Says Agricultural Proposals to EU Negotiable’, PAP, 10 October 2002. A similar call was made towards the other acceding countries; see for example ‘Fischler Calls for Realism in the Enlargement End Game’, IP/02/1642, Prague, 8 November 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 157 ‘Polish Official Says Agricultural Proposals to EU Negotiable’, PAP, 10 October 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 158 European Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 November 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, pp. 65–73. 159 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 160 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 161 Statement by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Repub lic of Poland, Brussels, 18 November 2002. Online. Available: www.polrepeu.be. 162 ‘Poles Change EU Farm Subsidies Tactics, Steel Terms Worsen’, Polish News Bulletin, 12 November 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 163 Interview with Jarosław Pietras. 164 ‘Chooses Simplified Area-Based Agricultural EU Direct Payment System’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 25 November 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis. com. 165 Rada Ministrów, ‘Raport na temat rezultatów negocjacji o członkostwa RP w Unii Europejskiej’, Warsaw, December 2002, p. 17. 166 Interwiew with Jarosław Kalinowski. 167 J. Solska, ‘Wojny Chłopsko Polskie’, Polityka, 7 January 2001. 168 J. Dempsey, ‘EU Hopefuls Hammer Home Quota Message’, Financial Times, 26 November 2002. 169 See further L. Friis, ‘The Danish Presidency: Wonderful Copenhagen’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review, 2003, Vol. 41, pp. 49–51. 170 S. Spiteri, ‘Rasmussen Predicts Hard Negotiations at Copenhagen’, 8 December 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 171 Interview with Sławomir Tokarski. 172 ‘Synder and Dresing, Conflict Among Nations’, p. 517, cited in R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 173 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 174 M. Gherghisan and M. Frydrych, ‘Candidates Conduct Tough Final Negotiations’, 9 December 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 175 See Report by J. Bielecki from Brussels, A. Stankiewicz, E. S. Z. and A. N.: ‘Copen hagen – the Great Finish’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 December 2002. 176 He threatened for the first time in July 2002. 177 S. Waszak, ‘As EU Talks Deadline Approaches, Structures in Poland’s Ruling Coalition’, Agence France Presse, 28 November 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com.
Notes 191 178 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 179 IPSOS-Demoskop Opinion Poll, October 2002. Online. Available: www.demoskop. pl/1_2_1.html. 180 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Na drodze do Unii Europejskiej’, see Table 6 – opinion conducted in December 1998. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 181 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 182 S. Castle, ‘Analysis European Enlargement: Bears, Birdcatchers and Herring: The Price of EU Expansion; On the Eve of the Copenhagen Summit’, The Independent, 11 December 2002. 183 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 184 ‘Enlargement and Agriculture: Summit Adopts Fair and Tailor-made Package which Benefits Farmers in Accession Countries’, IP: 02/1882, 16 December 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 185 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 186 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 187 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 188 ‘EU Accession-Mixed System, Mixed Feelings’, The Warsaw Voice, 16 February 2003. 189 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 190 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 191 ‘Enlargement and Agriculture: Summit Adopts Fair and Tailor-made Package which Benefits Farmers in Accession Countries’, IP: 02/1882, 16 December 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 192 Interview with Sławomir Tokarski. 193 R. Anderson, J. Reed and R. Wright, ‘Success Fails to Silence Dissent East Euro pean Reaction’, Financial Times, 16 December 2002. 194 The idea of this draft bill was to introduce an additional tax for drivers to build road infrastructure in Poland. 195 ‘After the Coalition Break-up PSL Shifts to the Right to Discern Itself from Self- Defence’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 196 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 197 ‘After the Coalition Break-up PSL Shifts to the Right to Discern Itself from Self- Defence’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 198 ‘PSL, PiS: EU Treaty to Tribunal’, PAP, 14 March 2003. Online. Available: www. lexis-nexis.com. 199 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland: Former Coalition Partner Questions EU Support’, 14 March 2003. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 200 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 201 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 458. 5 Purchase of real estate by EU residents 1 According to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski, the Polish side from the early beginning assumed that the 18-year transitional period originally proposed by the Polish side would be reduced – interview with Jan Kułakowski. 2 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated version), Euro-Lex. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301. html, Art. 56. Para 1. 3 See ‘Looking East, Looking West’, The Economist, 25 October 2001. 4 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz.
192 Notes 5 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz. 6 J. Reed, ‘Poland Looks to History as it Holds the Line over Land: European Union Pressure Builds on Warsaw over Liberalisation of its Land Market after Accession’, Financial Times, 30 October 2001. 7 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 75. 8 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, pp. 36–7. 9 See interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz and Paweł Samecki. 10 CBOS Opinion Poll, June 1998. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 11 See also B. Koblański, ‘Poles Fear Foreigners Buying Land’, Polish News Bulletin, 19 June 1996. 12 This overview is based on ‘Eastern Europe: Land of Opportunity’, EIU Business Eastern Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 19 July 1999, and ‘EU Enlargement: Turf War’, EIU Business Eastern Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 28 July 1999. See also ‘Both EU and Candidates Should Put Emotions Aside’, Czech News Agency CTK, 27 July 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 13 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 14 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37. 15 ‘EU Enlargement: Turf War’, EIU Business Eastern Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 28 July 1999. 16 National Strategy for Integration, 1997, para. 2.110. 17 Interview with Leszek Jesień. 18 Agenda 2000 – ‘Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union’ DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997, p. 43. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op-en.pdf. 19 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 75. 20 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 245. 21 ‘EU Representative on Negotiations with Poland’, Polish News Bulletin, 23 July 1998, based on 23 July 1998 issues of Gazeta Wyborcza, No. 171, p. 11 and Rzeczpospolita, No. 171, p. 9. 22 European Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 November, 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, p. 17. 23 European Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 November 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/, p. 31. 24 ‘Successive Poland–EU Negotiation Round Opened’, Polish News Bulletin, 8 December 1999. 25 See ‘Poland’s Negotiations Position – Free Movement of Capital’. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 26 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000. 27 Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated version), Euro-Lex. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301. html, Art. 56, Para 1. 28 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 14. 29 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, pp. 75–6. 30 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz.
Notes 193 31 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37. This strong historical argument was also used by Hungarian negotiators. 32 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37. 33 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 76. 34 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’. 35 See A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37. 36 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 37 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 38 Interview with Alan Mayhew. This issue will be discussed in the part on EU assessment of the Polish position. 39 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. This problem was indicated by many people whom I interviewed. 40 Most politicians and experts whom I interviewed agreed with this statement, for example Alan Mayhew, Ryszard Czarnecki, Paweł Samecki and Jan Kułakowski, to name but a few. 41 See CBOS Survey, ‘Czy warto przystąpić do Unii Europejskiej – Plusy i Minusy Integracji’, Table 6, July 1999. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 42 CBOS Survey, ‘Ocena negocjacji akcesyjnych oraz nadzieje i obawy związane z wejściem Polski do Unii Europejskiej’, May 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 43 CBOS Survey, ‘Opinie o skutkach integracji Polski z Unią Europejską i przebiegu negocjacji akcesyjnych’, Table 5, July 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje. gov.pl. 44 CBOS Survey, December 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 45 Demoskop Survey, October 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 46 This is interesting, especially when put into the context that the unemployment rate in Poland in October 2000 was around 15 per cent. 47 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 48 ‘European Commissioner Verheugen Urges Poland to Speed Up its Preparation Effort towards Accession’, IP/00/192, Warsaw, 25 February 2000. Online. Available: www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 49 ‘A New Momentum for Enlargement’, IP/00/1264, Brussels, 8 November 2000. Online. Available: www.europa.eu.int/rapid/. 50 See ‘1998 Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, 2000, p. 17, 39 and 44; 2001, p. 52. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_ documents/. 51 See ‘2271 Council’s Meeting’, Conceil/00/205, Luxembourg, 13 June 2000, 9274/00 (Presse 205). Online. Available: www.eu.int/rapid/. 52 See ‘Poland’s Negotiations Position – Free Movement of Capital’. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 53 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. See further L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004. pp. 244–5. 54 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. 55 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki. 56 See ‘Commission Proposes Transitional Periods for Purchase of Real Estate by Candidate Countries’, IP 01/645, Brussels, 4 May 2001. Online. Available: http://europa. eu.int/rapid/.
194 Notes 57 ‘Commission Proposes Transitional Periods for Purchase of Real Estate by Candidate Countries’, IP 01/645, Brussels, 4 May 2001. Online. Available: http://europa. eu.int/rapid/. 58 P. Norman, ‘Curbs Proposed on Sales of Land’, Financial Times, 5 May 2001. 59 ‘Poland Will Wait for Official EU Stand on Land Sales’, PAP, 6 May 2001. 60 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. 61 ‘Poland Will Wait for Official EU Stand on Land Sales’, PAP, 6 May 2001. 62 Coalition of the SLD and the UP won 216, whilst PSL 42 in 460 seats of the Parliament. 63 See ‘Commission Welcomes Progress of Accession Negotiations since Adoption of the “Road Map” ’ IP/01/1356, Brussels, 2 October 2001. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/. 64 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 65 ‘Miller’s Goals: EU Accession and Economic Growth’, Polish News Bulletin, 16 October 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 66 ‘Poland’s Ruling Party Wants to Speed Up Negotiations with EU’, PAP, 31 October 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 67 See A. Stankiewicz, ‘Postęp w negocjacjach jest potrzebny – an interview with the Chief Negotiator Jan Truszczyński’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 November 2001. 68 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 241. 69 Interview with a senior official involved in the negotiation process – see the List of Interviewees. 70 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 71 ‘Miller’s Goals: EU Accession and Economic Growth’, Polish News Bulletin, 16 October 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 72 K. Małcużynski, ‘Polish Foreign Minister Rejects Criticism of Government Concessions in EU Negotiations’, Associated Press, 23 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 73 K. Małcużynski, ‘Polish Foreign Minister Rejects Criticism of Government Concessions in EU Negotiations’, Associated Press, 23 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 74 ‘LPR, PiS Call for Referendum on Land Sale’, PAP, 21 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 75 ‘Polish Opposition Parties Call for Referendum in EU Land Sales’, PAP, 21 Novem ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 76 See CBOS Survey, Figure 2, July 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 77 ‘Kalinowski on Regulations Concerning Sales of Land to Foreigners’, PAP, 22 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 78 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 79 ‘Kalinowski on Regulations Concerning Sales of Land to Foreigners’, PAP, 22 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 80 ‘Cimoszewicz: We Made Organizational and Technical Mistake’, PAP, 28 Novem ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 81 CBOS Opinion Poll, December 2001, pp. 1–2. 82 ‘Landaburu: Funds for EU Accession Preparations Should Not be Cut’, PAP, 10 January 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 83 ‘Polish EU Negotiators Must Maintain Decision-Making Autonomy’, PAP, 11 Janu ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 84 ‘Polish Coalition Junior Party Promises to Defend Polish Interests in EU Talks’, PAP, 27 February 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 85 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002. 86 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002.
Notes 195 87 ‘Government Waits for Verheugen with Decision on EU Land Sale Terms’, Polish News Bulletin, 28 February 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 88 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002. See also A. Styliński, ‘Verheugen Optimistic about Poland’s EU Accession Sees Compromise on Sensitive Land Sales’, Associated Press, 28 February 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 89 A. Styliński, ‘Verheugen Optimistic about Poland’s EU Accession Sees Compromise on Sensitive Land Sales’, Associated Press, 28 February 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com . 90 ‘Polish Premier Promises Government Stance on Land: Ease for EU by End of Week’, PAP, 28 February 2002. 91 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 92 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002. 93 See further ‘EU/Poland: Deal In Sight on Land Sales?’, Europe Information Service, 6 March 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 94 ‘Poland’s Contribution to EU to be Revised, Premier Says’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 March 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 95 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 96 ‘Central Europe/Baltic Media Roundup on EU-related issues 14–20 Mar 2002’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 March 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 97 The reason why Dutch was particularly important is because there were many Dutch-leased farms in Poland. 98 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 99 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 100 S. Spiteri, ‘Poland Given Best Deal on Sales of Land’, 22 March 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 101 ‘Accession – Two Steps Closer to the EU’, The Warsaw Voice, 31 March 2002. 102 ‘Günter Verheugen Welcomes Provisional Closure of Chapters on Free Movement of Capital with Poland’, IP 02/452, Brussels, 21 March 2002. Online. Available: www.eu.int/rapid/. 103 See ‘2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, p. 60. 104 See European Commission, ‘2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland’s Preparations for Membership’. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ archives/key_documents/, p. 25. 105 M. Frydrych, ‘No to Referendum on Sale of Land to Foreigners’, 21 March 2002. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 106 ‘Brussels OKs, Holland May Object’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2002. 107 ‘PSL: Farmland Turnover Law Should be Adopted Before April 16’, PAP, 27 April 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 108 ‘The Attitude of Poles towards Integration’, December 2001 – January 2002, The CBOS Opinion Poll, The PBS Polling Centre, UKIE. Online. Available: www.ukie. gov.pl, p. 5. 109 ‘Public Attitude towards Poland’s Integration with the European Union – December 2002’, Office of the Committee for European Integration. Online. Available: www. ukie.gov.pl, p. 4. 110 ‘Radical Party Wants Referendum on Land Sale to Foreigners’, BBC Monitoring International, 15 October 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl. 111 ‘LPR Proposes Referendum on Land Sale to Foreigners’, PAP, 15 October 2002. 112 ‘Law and Justice Wants Stronger Protection of Polish Land’, Polish News Bulletin, 13 November 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 113 See further ‘Commission Adopts Favourable Opinion on the Accession of Ten Candidate Countries’, IP/03/263 Brussels, 19 February 2003. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/.
196 Notes 114 ‘Land Purchase – Bone of Contention in EU Accession Process’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 January 2003 based on 18–19 January issue of Rzeczpospolita, p. B2. 115 ‘Ruling Coalition’s Break-up Leaves SLD with Choice of Minority Government or Earlier Elections’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 116 ‘Ruling Coalition’s Break-up Leaves SLD with Choice of Minority Government or Earlier Elections’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 117 ‘Ruling Coalition’s Break-up Leaves SLD with Choice of Minority Government or Earlier Elections’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 118 ‘Radical Parties Against Signing EU Accession Treaty’, PAP, 7 April 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 119 ‘Minister: No Tussles over EU Membership’, PAP, 11 April 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 120 These include the following voivodships: Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Pomorskie, Kujawsko‑Pomorskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Dolnośląskie, Opolskie and Wielkopolskie. 121 See the Accession Treaty, 2003. Online. Available: www.europarl.europs.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/. 122 The State Electoral Commission (PKW). Online. Available: www.pkw.gov.pl. 123 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 124 It should be emphasised that the problem of land sales was stimulated by political elites. Decision-makers from all quarters agree that the issue was politicised. This opinion was shared by the former Minister responsible for European Integration (1997–99), Ryszard Czarnecki, and the Minister responsible for European Integration in the Miller government, Danuta Huebner, among others. 6 Freedom of movement of labour 1 Interview with Leszek Jesień. 2 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 450. 3 See ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community’, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325/33, 24 December 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/, Art. 48. 4 According to L. Friis and A. Jarosz, in international negotiations outsiders (and insiders) can improve their bargaining position by tying certain issues together in a package. See further L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 4. 5 There is a great body of literature on the issue of the impact of economic factors and migration. However, this problem will only be touched upon here. For further details see D. Corry (ed.) Economics and European Union Migration Policy, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1996, or P. Rees, Population Migration in the Euro pean Union, Chichester: Wiley, 1996, or J. Handoll, Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Chichester: Wiley, 1995. 6 The case of the liberalisation of the labour market in Britain and Ireland proved most economic fears to be unjustified, since immigrants are usually taking less attractive jobs on the local labour market. 7 See further A. Stępniak (ed.) Enlargement of the European Union to the East. Consequences for Prosperity and Employment in Europe, Opinion on The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Report, Warsaw: Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union, 2000.
Notes 197 8 See ‘CIA – The World Factbook’. Online. Available: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/. 9 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 35. See also A. Stępniak, (ed.) Enlargement of the European Union to the East. Consequences for Prosperity and Employment in Europe, Opinion on The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Report, Warsaw: Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union, 2000, p. 70. 10 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 35. 11 See Eurobarometer ‘Special Bureaux’, Executive Summary Survey Carried Out for the European Commission’s Representation in Germany, 2002, After the Euro: ‘Information Behaviour, Attitudes towards Enlargement and the EU’. Online. Available: http://europa.EU.int/comm/public_opinion/enlargement_en.htm, accessed 14 March 2005, pp. 5–6. For statistical data concerning unemployment see ‘Unemployment in the EU and the Central European Candidate Countries’, Eurostat News Release, Stat 02/93, 5 August 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 12 Flash Eurobarometer 124 ‘European Union Enlargement’, UK Opinion Poll, April 2002. Online. Available: http://Europa.EU.Int/Comm/Public_Opinion/Enlargement_ en.htm, accessed 14 March 2005, p. 18. 13 According to CBOS Opinion Poll, July 2000, about 35 per cent were interested in working abroad, but in a survey in a CBOS made in May 2000, about 78 per cent of respondents declared support for the principle of freedom of movement of persons. 14 According to an Opinion Poll conducted on May 2002, 51 per cent of Poles discussed the work possibilities in the EU and the issue of unemployment. See ‘The Report: Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the European Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 2. 15 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz. 16 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz and Sławomir Tokarski. 17 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 18 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, pp. 56–7. 19 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 20 The Committee for European Integration, ‘National Strategy for Integration’, Warsaw 1997, Para 2.69. These costly solutions especially apply to unemployment and other social benefits. 21 National Strategy of Integration, 1997, Para. 2.67. 22 National Strategy of Integration, 1997, Para. 2.62 and Para. 2.69. 23 Agenda 2000 – ‘Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union’, DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op-en.pdf, p. 47. 24 Interview with Ewa Kubis. 25 Most senior officials emphasised that the set aside method was one of the core elements of the EU negotiation strategy. Thus, the EU emphasised the incompatibilities of certain regulations with the acquis; however, it was not very willing to start proper negotiations. 26 See ‘Cardiff European Council 15 and 16 June 1998 Presidency Conclusions’, Doc 98/10. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 27 ‘Vienna European Council 11 and 12 December 1998, Presidency Conclusions’, D/98/12. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 28 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, pp. 16–17.
198 Notes 29 ‘Commission Adopts Reports on Progress by Candidate Countries’, IP/98/964, Brussels, 4 November 1998. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 30 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000. 31 See further Council and Commission Directives and Regulations on the Freedom of Movement of Workers, in particular Council Directive 68/1612/EEC as amended (Commission Directive 70/1251/EEC), Council Directive 68/360/EEC, further extended by Council Directive 72/194/EEC, Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC, Commission Regulation 1251/70/EEC. 32 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 47. 33 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 48. 34 See ‘1999 National Programme of Preparations for Membership in the EU’, Para 3.1.5.1. and ‘2000 National Programme of Preparations for Membership in the EU’, Para 2.1. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl. 35 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. 36 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 37 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz. 38 Q. Peel and F. Studemann, ‘Germany Social Democrats Would Seek “Lengthy Delay” to Free Movement of Workers from East’, Financial Times, 2 June 1998. 39 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 438. 40 ‘EU Negotiations on Labour Movement to open on 26 May’, Polish News Bulletin, 22 May 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 41 ‘Poland, EU Open Entry Negotiations in Three Sensitive Areas’, PAP, 26 May 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 42 See further ‘Slovak Press Survey’, Czech News Agency CTK, 9 May 2001 and ‘Transition Period in Labour Movement Supported by Austria’, Czech News Agency CTK, 22 January 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 43 A. Diamantopoulou, ‘Speech on the Conference on European Employment and Social Policy and Enlargement’, SPEECH/00/176, Prague, 11 May 2000. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 44 M. Smith, ‘Europe: EU Expansion May Trigger Worker Inflow’, Financial Times, 20 May 2000. 45 The number of people declaring their willingness to work abroad was higher than the actual number of people who would really work abroad. According to a sociologist Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, it indicates the fact that this issue was important for the public and people want to have such an opportunity. Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz. 46 CBOS Survey, July 2000, negocjacje.gov.pl. 47 CBOS Survey, October 2000, negocjacje.gov.pl. 48 C. Brand, ‘EC Proposes Delayed Entrance for Free Movement of Workers from East’, Associated Press, 11 April 2001. See also D. Lister, ‘EC Plans to Curb Influx from Ex-Communist Bloc’, The Times, 12 April 2001. 49 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 50 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki. The great majority of senior officials involved in the negotiation process are critical in their assessment of Polish trade unions, although they often do not want to be named and simply preferred to speak about it ‘off the record’. 51 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki. 52 According to a senior official involved in the negotiation process, one can even go further in this argument to say that liberalisation could weaken the interest of trade unions. First, due to migration, the number of trade union members in Poland could drop. Second, the unemployment rate might drop, which paradoxically does not serve trade unions since workers are more willing to join trade unions if the fear of losing employment is high.
Notes 199 53 Interview with Ewa Kubis, Member of the Kułakowski and Truszczyński Negotiation Teams and Secretary to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski. 54 See Ryszard Czarnecki and Paweł Samecki, to name but a few. 55 H. Simonian, ‘Schroder in Warning on Jobs Access’, Financial Times, 19 December 2000. 56 H. Simonian, ‘Schroder in Warning on Jobs Access’, Financial Times, 19 December 2000. 57 OBOP Opinion Poll, December 2000, negocjacje.gov.pl. 58 T. Czuczka, ‘Germany’s Schroeder Defends Curbs on East European Workers’, Associated Press, 21 December 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 59 ‘EU Enlargement: Netherlands Suggests Softer Schengen and Full Free Movement’, Europe Information Service, 20 December 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 60 ‘EU Enlargement: Year-End Suggests New-Year Problems’, Europe Information Service, 23 December 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 61 ‘Poles to Seek Employment in EU after 2007’, Polish News Bulletin, 16 January 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 62 A. Diamantopoulou, European Commissioner responsible for Employment and Social Affairs, ‘The European Employment Strategy and Social Model Signing of Joint Assessment Paper with Poland’, SPEECH/01/29 Warsaw, 29 January 2001. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 63 ‘Employment and Labour Markets: Poland and Commission Sign Agreement to Accelerate Reform of Employment Systems in Preparation for Enlargement’, IP/01/127 Brussels, 29 January 2001. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 64 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 65 ‘Poland to Push for Free Movement of Labour in EU Talks’, Agence France Presse, 7 March 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 66 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 4. 67 ‘Poland to Push for Free Movement of Labour in EU Talks’, Agence France Presse, 7 March 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 68 J. Dempsey, ‘Europe: Brussels Sets Out Migration Options. Free Movement of Labour Commission Plays Down Fears of Massive Influx from Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 8 March 2001. See also B. Evans-Pritchard, ‘Commission Working Paper on Free Labour Movement’, 8 March 2001. Online. Available: www.euobser ver.com. 69 J. Dempsey, ‘Europe: Brussels Sets Out Migration Options. Free Movement of Labour Commission Plays Down Fears of Massive Influx from Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 8 March 2001. 70 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 440. 71 ‘Enlargement: Commission Proposes Flexible Transitional Arrangements for the Free Movement of Workers’, IP/01/561 Brussels, 11 April 2001. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. ‘Will Western Europe Receive the Great Unwashed-One Day?’, The Economist, 21 April 2001. 72 C. Brand, ‘EC Proposes Delayed Entrance for Free Movement of Workers from East’, Associated Press, 11 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 73 ‘Poland Opposes 7-Year Restriction on Free Movement of Labour after EU Entry’, Agence France Presse, April 11 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 74 ‘EU Enlargement: Spain Strikes a New Note in Accession Talks’, Europe Information Service, 28 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 75 ‘Spain Blocks EU–Poland Negotiations on Free Movement of Labour’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 21 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com.
200 Notes See also J. Sparshott, ‘News Spain Calls Halt to Polish–EU Negotiations in a Move to Protect Funds for Its Own Underdeveloped Regions, Spain Put the Breaks on Accession Talks’, Warsaw Business Journal, 21 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 76 R. Macpherson, ‘EU to Keep Hammering Away on Free-Movement Deal’, Agence France Presse, 14 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. See also I. Black, ‘Comment and Analysis: Putting the Squeeze On: Inside Europe’, The Guardian, 21 May 2001. 77 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 4. 78 ‘Poland Fails to Budge Spain on Labour Movement in EU’, Agence France Presse, 16 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 79 R. Macpherson, ‘EU to Keep Hammering Away on Free-Movement Deal’, Agence France Presse, 14 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 80 J. Sparshott, ‘News Poland Set to Close Next Stage of EU Negotiations EU Member Countries are Busy Figuring out How to Dive up Funds that Promote Economic Development Once a Wave of Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries Become Members’, Financial Times Information, Warsaw Business Journal, 28 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 81 D. Spinant, ‘Candidates Make United Front Ahead of EU Summit’, 24 May 2001. Online. Available: www.euobserver.com. 82 ‘EU Enlargement: Pressure to Break the Deadlock’, Europe Information Service, 30 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 83 See further ‘European Economic and Social Committee, EU–Hungary JCC: Excessive Restrictions on the Free Movement of Labour are Unjustified’, CES 01/62 Brussels, 29 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 84 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 5. 85 L. Crawford and H. Simonian, Financial Times, 30 May 2001. 86 In 2000 the unemployment rate in Hungary was 9.4 and was declining to 5.5 per cent in 2004, whilst in Poland the unemployment had increased from 12 per cent in 1999 to 19.4 per cent in 2004. See ‘The World Fact Book CIA’. Online. Available: www.cia.gov. 87 ‘Poland’s Position on EU Labour and Land Talks Undercut’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 11 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 88 J. Dempsey, ‘Hungary Unlocks Progress in EU Enlargement Talks’, Financial Times, 13 June 2001. 89 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 5. 90 D. Cole, ‘Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, Germany’, Agence France Presse, 18 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 91 ‘Ambassador Says Poland against Restrictions on Work Force Movement’, Baltic News Service, 5 July 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 92 ‘Latvia Accepts Seven-Year EU Labour Restrictions’, Agence France Presse, 19 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 93 ‘Slovakia Closes EU Chapter on Free Movement of Labour’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 94 ‘Czechs May Stay Alone with Opposition to 7-Year Period – Die Presse’, Czech News Agency CTK, 6 August 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 95 ‘Poland’s Foreign Minister Says Final Phase in EU Negotiations Most Difficult’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 October 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com.
Notes 201 96 ‘Poland Wants to Change Strategy in EU Accession Negotiations’, Polish News Bulletin, 15 November 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 97 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 450. 98 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 99 ‘EU/Poland: Polish Prime Minister Meets Romano Prodi’, Europe Information Service, 8 December 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 100 ‘Poland Makes “Important Step” towards EU Accession – EU Commission Spokesman’, AFX European Focus, 21 December 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis- nexis.com. 101 ‘Key Developments: Poland’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 21 January 2002. 102 See ‘Unemployment in the EU and the Central European Candidate Countries’, Eurostat News Release, STAT/02/93, 5 August 2002. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/. 103 See ‘Labour Force Survey’, Eurostat News Release, STAT/02/101, 29 August 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 104 Treaty of Accession, 2003. Online. Available: www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/, p. 3749. 105 Before the Athens Summit, the EU Commission published another report on employment in the candidate countries: Commission reports on data and challenges. See ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, Brussels, 30 January 2003, COM 37. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/ employment/. 106 Treaty of Accession, 2003, pp. 3749–52. 107 Treaty of Accession, 2003, p. 3753. 108 See further ‘Report on the Results of the Negotiations on the Accession of Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, The Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, The Czech Republic and Slovenia to the European Union’, prepared by the Commission’s Departments, p. 7. 109 See for instance C. Brand, ‘EU’s Prodi Critical of Current EU National Restrictions on New Country Migrant Workers’, Associated Press, 25 February 2004. Online. Available: www.lexis-nexis.com. 110 L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997, p. 8. 111 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 450. 112 Most politicians whom I interviewed, argued that Polish media correspondents were manipulated by the EU press service, which argued that Poland is impeding the accession process. 113 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3 and L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997. 114 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 115 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. 116 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 438. 7 Concluding remarks 1 According to Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz, adviser to Prime Minister Buzek, this was indicated in a number of opinion polls. See interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz. This opinion was shared by most senior officials involved in the negoti ation process, whom I interviewed.
202 Notes 2 See for instance Demoskop Opinion Poll, April 2001, where 67 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that the great majority of people do not know why Poland should join the EU, Demoskop Opinion Poll, ‘Opinie na temat integracji z Unią Europejską’, Table 2, April 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 3 See CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Czy warto przystąpić do Unii Europejskiej – Plusy i Minusy Integracji’, Table 3, July 1999. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl. 4 Such an opinion was shared by most of the people whom I interviewed. 5 Nevertheless, the drop in support for the government was mainly caused by a dis integration of the AWS and a series of political and corruption scandals. 6 Such an opinion was shared by a few officials involved in the negotiation process, including Jaroslaw Pietras. 7 This opinion was expressed by a few senior officials involved in the negotiation process. 8 One should remember that before the elections, AWS was struggling for further exist ence in politics and in fact, the coalition did not even manage to pass the 8 per cent electoral threshold in the 2001 parliamentary election and consequently was wiped out from the political scene. 9 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 442. 10 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 445. 11 See the part regarding theorising Polish negotiation strategy. 12 Such an opinion was shared by a great majority of decision-makers whom I interviewed. 13 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 448. 14 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 449. 15 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999, Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, pp. 4–5. 16 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 17 Even the strong political opponents of Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski admitted that due to his pressure, milk quotas were raised to the level of 8.5 million tonnes from the level of 7 million tonnes. 18 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 19 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 20 Especially PSL, which after the closing negotiations promoted a bill that limits the free trade of farmland, even on the domestic market. PSL was afraid that consolidation of farmland would reduce the number of family farms and as a result the number of voters in the agricultural area. Thus, since the PSL electorate is almost entirely agriculture based, its electorate would shrink. 21 Since the majority of PSL and Samoobrona MPs are either farmers or their direct incomes depend on farming. 22 Such an opinion was shared by a great majority of decision-makers whom I interviewed. 23 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 24 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 25 Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 136.
Notes 203 26 Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 137. 27 This opinion was shared by a senior-level EU official involved in the negotiation pro cess – see the List of Interviewees. 28 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 29 Most senior officials involved in the negotiation process share this view, for example Ryszard Czarnecki and Alan Mayhew. 30 However, it would be to simplify the problem to argue that EU increased euro- enthusiasm in Poland only to increase their bargaining position. 31 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 451. 32 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. 33 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 34 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 460.
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News Agence France Presse BBC Worldwide Monitoring CTK Europe Information Service Financial Times Gazeta Prawna Gazeta Wyborcza Interfax PAP Polish News Bulletin Polityka Reuters Rzeczpospolita The Associated Press The Economist The Economist Intelligence Unit Guardian Independent The Times The Warsaw Voice
Opinion surveys CBOS Demoskop Eurobarometer OPOP PBS
Index
Bold page numbers indicate figures; italics indicate tables. accession application, submission of 46 accession countries, real estate purchase 107–108 accession negotiations see negotiations Accession Partnership 50 accession process 54 accession, support in EU countries 48–49 Accession Treaty 53, 55, 60–61, 95, 97–98, 100, 124, 126–127, 134, 153–154, 163 acquis communautaire 50, 64, 69, 103, 108–109, 113, 135 Agenda 2000 63–64, 70 agriculture acceleration of negotiations 75, 81–87 clarification of Polish position 92 Copenhagen negotiations 92–97 Danish proposal 93–94 domestic win-set 102 EU critique of Poland 71–73 EU proposals 76–77 EU response 70–71 EU response to modified position 91–92 farmers’ views 70 flexibility in negotiations 76 impact of EU accession 91 importance of 9–10 liberalisation negotiations 71–74 modification of Polish position 89–91 negotiating positions 69–71 negotiation targets 69–70 opening negotiations 64–65 overview of negotiations 62–63 Polish response to Danish proposal 94–95 political negotiations 5 pressure from political parties and interest groups 86–87 production surpluses 72 progress report 67 public opinion 66–67, 78–82 role of farmers’ unions 81–82 screening 65–69 stiffening of EU position 87–88 stiffening of Polish position 88–89
summary and conclusions 101–102 win-sets 101–102 aid 65, 71, 93, 143 Almond, Gabriel 29 Almond–Lipmann consensus 15 analysis, level of see level of analysis Andriessen, Franz 41–42 Application concerning Poland’s Accession to the European Union 46 Association Agreement 6, 41–43, 45 asymmetry of information 24 asymmetry, of negotiating sides 24–25 attentive public 29 Austria, free movement of labour 136, 140 AWS–UW government 103, 114, 120, 128 Balazs, Artur 68 bargaining power 2, 25 bargaining, strategies 26–27 battering ram strategy 27, 73, 76, 93, 128, 145, 155, 162, 166 Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 2, 14, 23, 83, 88, 101, 162, 166bias 3 bottom-up process 30 Buzek, Jerzy 70, 74, 130, 135, 141, 147, 150, 154–155, 159 candidates, conditions for 44 case studies importance of 157–159 lessons learned 167–168 reasons for choosing 8–11 cause groups 31 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) report 70 Chief Negotiator 21, 59; see also Kułakowski, Jan; Truszczyński, Jan Christian National Union (ZChN) 114 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz 16, 76, 92, 94, 117–118, 126, 149 Clarke, Michael 28 classical realism 15
Index 213 coalition governments 75, 83–85, 126; see also AWS–UW government; SLD-PSL government coalitions 19 Cohen, Bernard C. 31–32 collective identity 38 Committee for European Integration (KIE) 58–59, 121, 149 Common Agricultural Policy 63–64 communicative action 23 communism, rejection of 39 community of interests 39–40 community of values 38–39 competition rules 44–45 complexity, of negotiations 53–55 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland 2003 124 concessions, managing image of 25–26 conditionality 50 conditions, for candidates 44 constructivism 15 coordination within the enlargement wave 26, 145, 163 Copenhagen criteria 37 Copenhagen Summit, 1993 43–45, 92–97, 99–100 costs, adjusting agriculture to EU standards 69 Council of the European Union, role of 60–61 culture European heritage 38 land-based 104–105 Czarnecki, Ryszard 114, 139 Czech Republic 107, 140–141, 147 Danish proposal 93–95 dead-weight catching 26, 72, 82, 94, 155, 163 decision-making theory 15 Delors, Jacques 42 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 29, 74–75, 79, 83, 92, 95, 100, 115–116, 121–122, 126, 159–160, 162 democratic process 3 Diamantopoulou, Anna 137 diplomatic relations 40 direct payments acceptability 84 desirability of 71–72 EU position on 82 modified position 89 opposition to 70–71 overview 9–10 phasing in 77–78 request for 69 simplified system 92 Directorate General for Enlargement 61 disillusionment, danger of 3 domestic calculus 21, 165 domestic groups 4 domestic institutions 162 domestic politics 27–28, 159–160 domestic pressure 1–4, 8, 28–33, 35–36 domestic theories 16 domestic win-sets 35–36, 157
double-threat 95 dual character, of negotiations 24 duty-free import quotas 73 EC policy, lack of coherence 42 elite manipulation 17, 30 elite political culture 16–17 elites 29–30 empirical analysis, literature 6 enlargement benefits of 2 literature 6–7 motives for 40 reasons for 7 support for 48–49 Erler, Petra 75 Estonia 108 EU Commission questionnaire 48 EU Commission Reports 109, 113 EU countries, support for application 48–49 Europe Agreement 43 European Commission Opinion on Poland 65 role of 61 European heritage 38 European Integration Committee (KIE) 58–59, 121, 149 European Parliament 53, 55, 60–61 European Union basis of decision to expand 2 conditions for candidates 44 critique of Poland 71–73 negotiation structure 60–61 position before Seville Summit 82 report 2002 81 unemployment survey 153 faceless sources, of public opinion 32 farm subsidies 97–98 farmers’ unions 81–82 farmers, views of 70 Fischler, Franz 65, 68, 71–72, 77, 80, 88, 99 food mountains 72 foreign policy 27–28 Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA) report 81, 89 free movement of labour 9 acceleration of negotiations 141–149 Accession Treaty 153–154 assessment of negotiating position 135–136 change of government 149 change of position 149–150 domestic critique of position 150 domestic importance 131–134 economic fears 131–132 employers’ positions 139 EU Commission proposal 142–143 EU proposals 139–141 favoured countries 146 German position 136–137, 139–140, 147 guarantee 131 legislation 135 opening negotiations 136–141
214 Index free movement of labour continued overview 11, 130 Polish position 134–135 political factors 133 political negotiations 5 public opinion 137–138, 140, 140, 147–148, 150–151 screening 134 social aspects 132–133 Spanish proposal 143 strategic goal 133–134 summary and conclusions 154–156 trade unions’ positions 138–139 transition periods 141–143, 148, 148, 151, 151, 154 transitional arrangements 138, 153–154 unity amongst accession countries 144–149 win-sets 135–136, 154–156 workers wishes 152 free trade, moves towards 44–45 Freedom Union (UW) 16, 32, 113–115, 159 Friis, Lykke 24, 26, 145
power of 21–22 pressure from 86–87 Intergovernmental Conference on Accession (IGC) 61 intergovernmentalism, Risse’s critique of 23 Intermarium 39 international calculus, vs. domestic 21 Intimates 32 Iwiński, Tadeusz 116
Gabel, Matthew 15–16 Gaudenzi, Françoise 71, 109 Geremek, Bronisław 50 Germany free movement of labour 136–137, 139–140, 147 support for enlargement 48–49 Giertych, Roman 86, 99–100 Giziński, Szymon 86 goal, of accession negotiation 25 Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union 59 Grabble, Heather 44
land ownership 9–11; see also real estate purchase Landaburu, Eneko 76, 120 Latvia 147 Law and Justice Party (PiS) 100, 117, 125 League of Polish Families (LPR) 78, 84, 86, 117, 124–126 legislation free movement of labour 135 screening 50–51 legitimacy 58 Lepper, Andrzej 86, 126 Level I agreement 19 Level II agreement 19, 26 Level II preferences and coalitions 160–161 level of analysis overview 14 problem 14–17 Waltz’s three levels 14–15 liberalisation attitudes towards 68–69, 112 lack of public support 66 negotiations 71–74 trade 45 liberalisation agreement 73–74 Libicki, Marcin 87 linkage groups 31
Haczyk, Ewa 121 Havel, Vaclav 140–141 heritage, as European 38 Hill, Christopher 27, 29, 31 Holsti, K.J. 15 Huebner, Danuta 83, 117 Hungary 107, 144–145 hypotheses 35–36 identity 38 ideological dispute, over membership 39 ideology, and public opinion 10 impersonal sources, of public opinion 32–33 import duties 73 influence 3–4 Institutions 32 Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) 68, 70, 75–76, 98 Inter-Governmental Conference on Accession 55 interest groups defining 4–5 noisy 31 in Poland 32–33 and policy making 30–31
Janowski, Gabriel 86 Jarosz, Anna 24–26, 145 Jesień, Leszek 108, 144 Kalinowski, Jarosław 78–79, 83, 86, 88–89, 92, 94–98, 100, 117, 122, 124 Klestil, Thomas 140 Kohl, Helmut 42 Krok-Paszkowska, Anna 7 Kułakowski, Jan 16, 47, 59, 64, 74, 109, 114–115, 135, 139, 143–145 Kubis, Ewa 138
Marxism 15 mass media 21–22, 75 mass public 29 Mayhew, Alan 88, 98, 105, 107, 110–111, 123, 127, 133 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 41 member states, role of 60–61 membership conditions, assessment of 125 methods, research 12–13 milk quota 96–97 Miller, Leszek 77–78, 94–95, 97–100, 115–116, 121–122, 126, 149–150, 155, 163
Index 215 Moller, Per Stig 94 Moravcsik, Andrew 2, 7, 16, 20–23 motives, for joining EU 37–40 movement of capital 110 National Chamber of the Economy 139 national identity 38 National Programme of Preparations for Membership (NPPM) 50 National Strategy of Integration 23–24, 39, 133–134 negotiating sides, asymmetry of 24–25 negotiating styles 59–60 negotiation periods, characteristics 103–104 negotiation process 49–52 Accession Treaty 53 position papers 51–52 positions 53 preparation 49–50 screening 50–51 negotiation strategies 20, 23–27 negotiation strategy, EU, theorising 165–166 ‘Negotiation Strategy for the Polish government’ 76 negotiation strategy, Poland, theorising 162–165 negotiation structure, European Union 60–61 negotiation team 59–60 negotiations complexity of 53–55 defining 5 dual character of 24 dynamics in domestic politics 159–160 goal of 25 levels of 54–55 organisational structure 53–61 political leadership 55–59 as two-level game 3 neo-liberal institutionalism 15, 17 neo-realism 15, 17 Netherlands 140 Niemiec, Józef 138 noisy interest groups 31 Olechowski, Andrzej 46 opinion polls 4, 66–67, 78–80, 83–85, 89–91, 95, 106, 112, 117–120, 124–125, 135, 137–138, 140, 147, 150–151; see also public opinion OPZZ 138 organisational structure 53–61 outside lobbying 5, 33 outsiders, negotiating disadvantage 24 package deals 26, 93, 122, 128, 130, 133, 143, 155, 163, 166 parliament, role of 58 Pęk, Bogdan 87 personality, effect of 16, 21 Peterson, Lee Ann 22 PHARE programme 42, 47, 50 Pietras, Jarosław 75, 92 Piskorz, Władysław 65–69, 71, 75, 79, 81 Plewa, Jerzy 65–66, 68, 74
policy and opinion elites 29 Polish Confederation of Private Employers 139 Polish National Strategy of Integration 108 Polish Peasants’ Party bill 11 Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) 75, 78–79, 83–84, 86–88, 92, 100, 104, 116–117, 121–122, 124, 126, 162–164 political crisis 83–85, 126 political dynamics, uniqueness of 5 political leadership 55–59 political parties, pressure from 86–87 political party, defining 5 politics, symbolic 10 position papers 51–52 power, distribution 19 pre-accession financing agreements 77 pre-accession strategy 46–49 preferences 19 preliminary negotiations 41 prenegotiation 5–6 President, role of 58 pressure groups 31 Prodi, Romano 96, 141–142, 150 production quotas 96–97 production surpluses 72 protectionism 68, 72, 89 public interest, issues 1–2 public, mass and attentive 29 public opinion 1, 3–4; see also opinion polls agriculture 81–82, 87, 89–91, 99 change in 66–67 defining 4 and elites 30 EU citizenship 132 free movement of labour 135–138, 140, 140, 147–148, 150–151 influence of 8 on liberalisation 117 of negotiation results 98 and policy making 28–30 pressure from 78–81 real estate purchase 104, 106, 112–113, 117–119, 124–125, 138 sources of 32 Putnam, Robert 1–2, 16–23, 25, 83, 86–87, 89, 102, 110, 116, 149–150, 164–166 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 93 ratification 53, 126, 162 rational choice theories, and social constructivism 23 real estate purchase; see also land ownership Accession Treaty 126 compromise 121 concluding negotiations 121–123 domestic critique of position 117–120 domestic importance 104–106 domestic reactions 124–125 domestic win-set 128–129 EU assessment of Polish position 113 justification of position 110 negotiation process 113–121
216 Index real estate purchase continued in other acceding countries 107–108 overview 103–104 preparation of position 109–113 provisional closing of negotiations 123–124 public opinion 112–113, 117–120, 138 resistance to EU 120–121 screening and EU assessment 108–109 softening of positions 115–117 stages of negotiation 128 summary and conclusions 127 tough negotiations 114–115 win-sets 127–129 referendum 117 regime-type theories 15 regional funding 143 research methods 12–13 research questions 33–35 rhetorical action 7, 23, 38 Risse, Thomas 4, 23, 29 Samecki, Paweł 24 Samoobrona Party 33, 84, 86, 91, 95, 124–126 Sapard programme 71 Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek 47, 92, 141, 166 Schengen facility 93 Schimmelfennig, Frank 6–7, 23, 38 Schroeder, Gerhard 98, 140, 147 screening 103 agriculture 65–69 free movement of labour 134 of legislation 50–51 real estate purchase 108–109 second image realism 17 Sedelmeier, Ulrich 2, 6–7, 38 Self Defence Party see Samoobrona Party Serafin, Władysław 81–82 set aside strategy 128, 166 side-payments 26, 74, 89, 130, 149–150, 155, 163–164 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof 45 SLD–PSL government 103, 126, 128, 160 Slovakia free movement of labour 147 real estate purchase 107 Slovenia 107–108 Smith, Karen E. 46 social consensus 110 social constructivism, and rational choice theories 23 society-centred theories 16 Solidarity 32, 138 Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 74, 114, 116, 120, 128, 159 sources, of public opinion 32 Spain 143, 145 special treatment, requests for 69 Specialists 32 state-centred theories 16 statesmen, role of 21 strategies, pre-accession 46–49 structural dialogue 47
structural realism 17 subsidies 97 Suchocka, Hanna 43 symbolic politics, and public opinion 10 systemic theories 1, 17 tactics 25 tariffs raising 68 removal of 44–45 terms, defining 3–6 theory of international negotiations 5–6 third image realism 17 threat 26–27, 83, 88–89, 93–94, 121–122, 143, 155, 163 Timans, Rolf 64 Tokarski, Sławomir 93–94 top-down process 30 trade liberalisation 45 transition periods 65–66, 69, 110–111, 114–115, 117–123, 127, 141, 148, 148, 151, 151, 154 transitional arrangements, free movement of labour 138, 153–154 Trilateral Commission on East–West relations 40 Truszczyński, Jan 16, 59, 80, 94–95, 116, 121, 123 two-level game model 1, 3, 17–23 tying hands 26, 78–79, 94–95, 99, 101, 110, 128, 154–155, 163 unemployment survey, European Union 153 unit-level theories 16–23 United Kingdom, support for enlargement 48–49 utility-maximising statesman 25, 164 Verba, Sydney 16–17 Verheugen, Gunter 72, 80–81, 87, 113, 121–123, 142 Visegrad countries 25 Walesa, Lech 42 Walt, Stephen 17 Waltz, Kenneth 14–15, 17 White Paper 47–48 Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidi 136 win-sets 1–2 agriculture 101–102 domestic 35–36, 128–129, 168 free movement of labour 135–136, 154–156 manipulating 98–99 overlap 10 real estate purchase 127–129 size and determinants 19–20, 160–162 summary and conclusions 167–168 Zaller, John R. 30 Zeman, Milos 141 Zielonka, Jan 7, 49