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This book examines the process of Poland s accession negotiations to the European Union between 1998-2003. An empirical

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Poland’s EU Accession
 0415680212, 9780415680219

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Poland’s EU Accession

This book examines the pro­cess of Poland’s accession nego­ti­ations to the Euro­ pean Union between 1998 and 2003. An empirical study based on Robert Putnam’s two-­level game model, it charts the influence and role of key do­mestic actors and groups on the nego­ti­ations, espe­cially in three crit­ical, controversial, areas – areas where EU accession threatened to bring about a profound trans­ forma­tion to Polish life: agri­cul­ture, with par­ticu­lar emphasis on direct payments and production quotas; the purchase of real estate by foreigners; and the free movement of labour. This book dem­on­strates the complex inter­action between the do­mestic and inter­na­tional levels of nego­ti­ations and furthermore, shows how crit­ical this link can be to nego­ti­ation outcomes at the inter­na­tional level. It reveals how suscep­ tible Poland’s nego­ti­ation pro­cess was to do­mestic pressure, par­ticu­larly pub­lic opinion and inter­est groups. Drawing heavily on qualit­at­ive ana­lysis – such as press releases, news wires, pol­icy docu­ments, as well as quantitative ana­lyses, such as the use of opinion polls, and sup­ported by in-­depth, unrestricted inter­views with key Polish decision-­makers, this book examines the dy­namics of pol­icy formation in Poland and shows how this translated into the final con­ditions of accession. Sergiusz Trzeciak is Lecturer in Political Marketing at Collegium Civitas, Poland and an inde­pend­ent polit­ical consultant.

Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series

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10 The Rebuilding of Greater Russia Putin’s foreign policy towards the CIS countries Bertil Nygren 11 A Russian Factory Enters the Market Economy Claudio Morrison 12 Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-­Soviet Armenia Armine Ishkanian 13 NATO–Russia Relations in the Twenty-­First Century Aurel Braun 14 Russian Military Reform A failed exercise in defence decision making Carolina Vendil Pallin 15 The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy Edited by Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen 16 Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia Edited by Marlène Laruelle 17 The Caucasus – An Introduction Frederik Coene 18 Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union Edited by Galina M. Yemelianova 19 Russia’s European Agenda and the Baltic States Janina Šleivytė 20 Regional Development in Central and Eastern Europe Development processes and policy challenges Edited by Grzegorz Gorzelak, John Bachtler and Maciej Smętkowski 21 Russia and Europe Reaching agreements, digging trenches Kjell Engelbrekt and Bertil Nygren 22 Russia’s Skinheads Exploring and rethinking subcultural lives Hilary Pilkington, Elena Omel’chenko and Al’bina Garifzianova

23 The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics Successes and failures Edited by Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese 24 Russian Mass Media and Changing Values Edited by Arja Rosenholm, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Elena Trubina 25 The Heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies Edited by Michael Kemper and Stephan Conermann 26 Religion and Language in Post-­Soviet Russia Brian P. Bennett 27 Jewish Women Writers in the Soviet Union Rina Lapidus 28 Chinese Migrants in Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe Edited by Felix B. Chang and Sunnie T. Rucker-­Chang 29 Poland’s EU Accession Sergiusz Trzeciak

Poland’s EU Accession

Sergiusz Trzeciak

First published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Sergiusz Trzeciak The right of Sergiusz Trzeciak to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Trzeciak, Sergiusz. Poland’s EU accession/Sergiusz Trzeciak. p. cm. – (Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series; 29) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. European Union–Poland. 2. European Union countries–Relations– Poland. 3. Poland–Relations–European Union countries. I. Title. HC240.25.P7T78 2011 341.242′209438–dc22 2011015240 ISBN: 978-0-415-68021-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-80128-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To my father, Wiesław

Contents



List of figures and tables Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

  1 Introduction Defining terms  3 Contribution of the book  6 Justification for choosing the three case studies  8 Outline of the book  11 Book methods  12   2 Two levels of analysis in international negotiations: domestic versus foreign policy The level of ana­lysis prob­lem  14 Systemic theories  17 Unit-­level ana­lysis  17 Negotiation strat­egy and tactics  23 Foreign pol­icy and do­mestic pol­itics  27 Domestic pressure: pub­lic opinion, elites, inter­est groups  28 Questions and hypotheses  33   3 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Why did Poland desire to join the EU?  37 Establishing relations between Poland and the com­munit­ies, and negotiating the Europe Agreement (1988–91)  40 Submission of the Polish applica­tion concerning accession and the pre-­accession strat­egy  46 Negotiation pro­cess  49 Organisational structure for the accession nego­ti­ations  53 Conclusions  61

xii xiv xv xvi 1

14

37

x   Contents   4 Negotiations concerning agriculture The nature of the Common Agriculture Policy  63 Opening nego­ti­ations and the screening pro­cess  64 Presenting nego­ti­ation positions on agri­cul­ture  69 Negotiations concerning the lib­eralisation agreement  71 The change of the gov­ern­ment in Poland  74 Acceleration in nego­ti­ations and the gov­ern­mental crisis  81 Stiffening of the negotiating stances  87 Modification of the nego­ti­ation positions  89 The Copen­hagen nego­ti­ations  92 Between the Copen­hagen Summit and the Accession Treaty  97 Conclusions  101

62

  5 Purchase of real estate by EU residents Why the issue of purchase of real estate was im­port­ant do­mestically  104 The prob­lem of purchase of real estate in other acceding coun­tries  107 Screening and EU assessment  108 Pre­para­tion of the Polish position  109 Negotiation pro­cess  113 Concluding nego­ti­ations  121 Conclusions  127

103

  6 Freedom of movement of labour Why the issue of freedom of movement of labour became an im­port­ant do­mestic mat­ter  131 Screening pro­cess and preparing of the position papers  134 Opening of nego­ti­ations  136 Acceleration of nego­ti­ations  141 The change of the gov­ern­ment in Poland and the concluding of nego­ti­ations  149 Conclusions  154

130

  7 Concluding remarks Why the three case studies were im­port­ant for the do­mestic con­text  157 Dynamics of the accession nego­ti­ations in Polish do­mestic pol­itics  159 Size of the win-­sets and its determinants  160 Theorising Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy  162

157

Contents   xi Theorising nego­ti­ation strat­egy of the EU  165 Lessons from the case studies and further research  167

Appendix: list of interviewees Notes Bibliography Index

169 171 204 212

Figures and tables

Figures 3.1 Pre­para­tion of Poland’s position papers 3.2 Accession pro­cess 3.3 Scheme of the organ­isa­tional structure for EU accession nego­ti­ations in Poland (1998–2001) 3.4 Organisational structure for EU accession nego­ti­ations in Poland (2001–02) 4.1 Agriculture – what Poles should do when they become a member of the EU 4.2 Do you accept the level of payments for farmers proposed by the Euro­pean Commission? 4.3 How would you vote in a referendum on EU accession? 4.4 Opinion of rural inhabitants and of farmers re­gard­ing direct agricultural payments 4.5 Attitudes towards direct agricultural payments among electorates of polit­ical par­ties 4.6 Would accession to the EU be ad­vant­ageous or dis­advant­ageous for Polish agri­cul­ture? 4.7 Public opinion on agri­cul­ture 4.8 Impact of the EU accession on the situ­ation in agri­cul­ture 5.1 Should foreigners be allowed to buy real estate? 5.2 How long should Poland maintain restrictions in the purchase of farmland by foreigners? 5.3 A) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of farmland fol­low­ing a three-­year lease period? B) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of land for re­cre­ational use? 5.4 Assessment of the trans­ition period in the purchase of farmland and in the purchase of re­cre­ational plots 6.1 What it means to be an EU cit­izen (in the opinion of Poles) 6.2 In which EU coun­try would you like to work? 6.3 Acceptance for a seven-­year trans­ition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles in other EU coun­tries

52 54 56 57 67 79 80 84 85 85 90 91 106 118

119 120 132 146 151

Figures and tables   xiii 6.4 To what trans­ition period in the free undertaking of work by Poles in the EU coun­tries should Polish negotiators agree? 6.5 For how long a period would you decide to work in the given coun­try? 6.6 In what coun­try of the EU would you like to work?

151 152 152

Tables 3.1 Different nego­ti­ation styles of the two Polish chief negotiators 4.1 Agriculture nego­ti­ations – size of the do­mestic win-­set 5.1 Opinion about statement that current EU cit­izens should be granted full rights to purchase real estate from the date of the accession 5.2 Assessment of negotiated mem­ber­ship con­ditions 5.3 Purchase of real estate by foreigners – size of the do­mestic win-­set 6.1 Are you inter­ested in taking a job in one of the EU coun­tries after Poland’s accession to the EU? 6.2 Public acceptance for a ten-­year trans­itional period in the free movement of workers and for a lib­eralisation of the purchase of real estate by foreigners 6.3 Public assessment of free movement of workers 6.4 What do you think about the Euro­pean Commission’s pro­posi­tion that the acceding coun­tries should not be allowed for seven years to work in the current EU coun­tries? 6.5 How long is a trans­itional period neces­sary? 6.6 Public acceptance for a seven-­year trans­ition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles and Czechs 6.7 Maximum trans­itional periods for the acceding coun­tries 6.8 Free movement of labour – size of the do­mestic win-­set 7.1 The impact of the size of do­mestic win-­sets on the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and results

60 102 112 125 128 137 138 140 147 148 148 154 156 168

Preface

This book presents the details and results of a sci­ent­ific study on accession nego­ti­ations between Poland and the EU. During the research conducted between 2001 and 2006, I was a Chevening scholar at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and, beginning in the autumn of 2002, a doctoral student in the Department of Inter­ national Relations, London School of Economics. In London, I taught classes in foreign pol­icy ana­lysis and con­tempor­ary foreign policy. When I started my doctoral coursework, accession nego­ti­ations were coming to an end. Using the boon of the Internet, I was sup­porting Polish negotiators from a distance. Influenced by the emotions accom­panying accession to the Euro­pean Union, I decided to devote my doctoral dissertation to nego­ti­ations. Over the next few years, I travelled between London, my hometown of Poznań, Brussels and Warsaw, gath­er­ing mater­ials for the dissertation and holding inter­ views with the negotiators and polit­ical decision-­makers. My polit­ical consultant ex­peri­ence and training that I held for politicians also helped me in analysing the polit­ical aspects of negotiations. Negotiations were sort of a game, and for this reason to de­scribe them I decided to use a model of Robert Putnam’s two-­level game used for analysing the pro­gress of inter­na­tional negotiations. This book is not a theor­et­ical paper. It is, rather, reconstructing and analysing the pro­gress of nego­ti­ations. It is of an empirical nature due to my inter­views with leading negotiators and polit­ical decision-­makers. What’s more, the data­ bases avail­able from the Internet have allowed me to read thou­sands of agency dispatches, art­icles and press releases, thus reconstructing the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess almost day by day. The several years that have gone by since the end of nego­ti­ations and Poland’s accession into the Euro­pean Union allow for viewing the nego­ti­ation pro­cess from a distance and without any emotions, as well as for arriving at appropriate conclusions for the future. My intention is that this book is used not only by students of polit­ical science and inter­na­tional relations, doctoral students or researchers. It is best to learn from someone’s mis­takes; therefore, the negotiators and polit­ical decision-­makers partic­ ipating in the current nego­ti­ations held within the Euro­pean Union may also find this book use­ful. I will be grateful for merit-­based remarks from the readers and, in such case, please send them to my email at [email protected].

Acknowledgements

Writing a book is usually an isolating ex­peri­ence, yet it is obviously not pos­sible without the personal and prac­tical sup­port of numerous people. Credits go to my super­visor Karen E Smith, PhD from the Department of International Relations, LSE and Jan Zielonka, professor of Euro­pean pol­itics at Oxford University, who reviewed my doctoral dissertation and encouraged me to introduce changes and thoroughly revise the text, as well as publish it as a book. I am grateful to Peter Sowden at Routledge, who from the beginning was able to see value in my work and assisted me in the pro­cess of publishing it. Thanks go to Joanna Żeber for her research. Special gratitude goes to Dominika Fereniec for her great patience and in­valu­ able assistance in creating the final draft. Finally, completion of this book would not have been pos­sible without the sup­port and encouragement of my friends and family. I am par­ticu­larly grateful to my father, Wiesław, and my wife, Hanna, for their love, sup­port and patience.

Abbreviations

AP AWS BATNA CEE CEEC EC EU FAPA KIE LPR NPPM MP OPZZ PAP PiS PO PSL SLD UKIE UW ZChN

Accession Partnership Solidarity Electoral Action Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe Countries European Community European Union Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture Committee for European Integration League of Polish Families National Programme of Preparations for Membership Member of Parliament the Polish Alliance of Trade Unions Polish Press Agency Law and Justice Citizens Platform Polish Peasants’ Party Democratic Left Alliance Office of the Committee for European Integration Freedom Union Christian National Union

1 Introduction

This book argues that Poland’s negotiating stances vis-­à-vis the Euro­pean Union and the overall nego­ti­ation pro­cess (1998–2003) were susceptible to do­mestic pressure, par­ticu­larly pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties that often acted as inter­est groups. By using a coun­try study of Poland, this book disputes sys­temic theories that as­sume decision-­makers and negotiators operate in an envir­on­ment isolated from do­mestic considerations. This is an empirical study based on Robert Putnam’s two-­level game model, with a par­ticu­lar emphasis on the concept of win-­sets. It focuses on three case studies which have drawn con­sider­able con­tro­versy and pub­lic attention within Poland: agri­cul­ture, with a par­ticu­lar emphasis on direct payments and production quotas; the purchase of real estate by foreigners; and the free movement of labour. The question that puzzles most of the researchers using the two-­level game model is whether the size of the do­mestic win-­set is influenced by do­mestic pressure. But even more puzz­ling is the extent to which it is influenced and what are the determinants of the size of the win-­set, specifically pos­sible do­mestic co­ali­ tions, do­mestic polit­ical institutions and the role of nego­ti­ation strategies. A perplexing dilemma is not only the question of whether do­mestic win-­sets can be manipulated, but also how this happens (using strat­egies and tactics), under what con­ditions, and by whom (do­mestic groups). Another factor that will be ex­plored is the interplay between pub­lic opinion and do­mestic groups. Internal dy­namics of the polit­ical game on the do­mestic side, and the manner in which this game can influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and its outcome, are also of great interest. Traditional sys­temic theories make the as­sump­tion that foreign policy­makers operate in an envir­on­ment that is rel­at­ively isolated from do­mestic con­sidera­ tions. This book questions that as­sump­tion by examining the extent to which Poland’s negotiating stances in relation to joining the Euro­pean Union were susceptible to do­mestic pressure. It has long been recog­nised that do­mestic con­sidera­tions have played a role in accession nego­ti­ations. This has been a typical feature during the previous EU enlargements. However, the Polish case presents par­ticu­larities that merit further study. What makes the Polish case different and inter­esting is the scope of issues

2   Introduction that gained pub­lic inter­est during the pro­cess. Unlike the situ­ation in most other acceding coun­tries, freedom to purchase real estate became a signi­fic­ant issue. A second distinctive feature was the charac­ter­istic and influ­en­tial nature of Polish do­mestic pressure and the extent to which Poland’s negotiators were influenced by it. One example is illus­trated by the fact that one of the nation’s biggest and most influ­en­tial polit­ical par­ties was acting as an inter­est group and seeking to protect farmers’ inter­ests. Finally, the case of Poland confirms an argument derived from Robert Putnam’s work: a small do­mestic win-­set, to accept initial EU con­ditions, became a bargaining ad­vant­age that helped the Polish side gain certain concessions from the EU. Another charac­ter­istic feature of the 2004 enlargement was the fact that Poland (as well as some other CEEC) was, from the very beginning, in a much weaker position than its negotiating partners.1 The Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy was determined by the lack of a cred­ible Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), since the key Polish foreign pol­icy goal was to enter the EU and no other al­tern­atives were ser­iously con­sidered.2 This created asymmetry between the negotiating sides and estab­lished further short-­term strat­egies and tactics. As Ulrich Sedelmeier describes: the case of eastern enlargement, the relationship between the EU and the CEEC’s is characterised by asymmetrical – rather than instrumental – interdependence. The CEEC depends far more on market access to the EU than vice versa. In other words, the bargaining power of CEEC gov­ern­ments is not sufficient to exact concessions from the EU member states.3 This made the case of Poland different from cases of some other coun­tries facing EU accession during the previous enlargements, including the UK, Austria and Sweden. The de­cision to expand on the part of the EU was guided by a wider stra­tegic imperative to enlarge in order to overcome the divisions of Europe and to ensure stability, secur­ity and prosperity throughout the region. A wider stra­tegic imperative played an im­port­ant role, espe­cially within the coun­tries advocating for the enlargement pro­cess. Among these was Ger­many, which mobilised other EU coun­tries to sup­port the enlargement pro­cess.4 One could also agree with a lib­eral, intergov­ern­mentalist argument and its ‘cost bene­fit ana­lysis’. As Andrew Moravcsik pointed out, the geopolit­ical and eco­nomic bene­fits of enlargement for the ‘old members’ came at quite a limited cost to the EU‑15, in large part because the existing member gov­ern­ments used their bargaining powers to limit their liabil­ity.5 However, given this asymmetry and the stronger bargaining power of the EU, in prin­ciple the EU expansion repres­ented a gen­eral win-­win situ­ation and was recog­nised as such by the decision-­makers from the candidate coun­tries.6 With regards to these reasons, the question for both negotiating sides was not ‘whether to enlarge’, but rather ‘on what terms’ to enlarge. The stra­tegic de­cision was made even before the nego­ti­ations started. If we bear this in mind, we can

Introduction   3 see nego­ti­ations as a two-­level game in which both sides were going to bene­fit, but in which the distribution of the bene­fits depended upon do­mestic pref­er­ences and co­ali­tions, institutions and ratification pro­ced­ures, and in par­ticu­lar the strat­ egies and tactics used by the players.7 The nego­ti­ation pro­cess was determined by the stra­tegic imperative to enlarge. The major danger in this pro­ced­ure was disillusionment concerning the opposing side’s approach to the nego­ti­ations. The EU was rather disappointed with the slow pace of accession and the sluggish acquisition of the aqua communautaire. On the other hand, the Polish side emphasised that the deal offered was less than generous and that the EU wanted to take ad­vant­age of its position as a stronger party, thereby to ‘dictate, not negotiate’. Thus, the real danger for both negotiating sides was not that the nego­ti­ations would collapse, but rather that the nego­ti­ations could conclude in major disappointment and disillusionment, producing a sense of frustration that could create a poor start for future coopera­tion within the EU. Indeed, both sides were teetering on the verge of such disillusionment, espe­cially during the last nego­ti­ation round in Copen­hagen in Decem­ber 2003. However, when we ana­lyse the beha­vi­our of both par­ties, the key observation is that the size of the do­mestic win-­set could indeed determine the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and eventual outcomes. In this book, I will argue on the basis of the three case studies – agri­cul­ture, freedom of purchase of real estate and free movement of labour – that Polish do­mestic groups crit­ically influenced the nego­ ti­ation pro­cess and its outcomes. Each of the case studies shows the different dy­namics of nego­ti­ations. Before continuing, how­ever, we must define some terms.

Defining terms The influence of do­mestic pressure on inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations need not be direct, since the very nature of the demo­cratic pro­cess as­sumes indirect influence. Initially inter­est groups can influence the gov­ern­ment and ultimately they can influence inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations by manipulating pub­lic opinion. But, pub­lic opinion may press the gov­ern­ment to adopt pol­icies that are favour­ able to it. A sociologist might ask how one would identi­fy and meas­ure factors that constitute an influence. This book does not attempt to answer this question, but instead focuses on the capa­city of Polish do­mestic groups to affect the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess. To meas­ure this, I will focus on three indic­ators that show this capa­city: pub­lic opinion polls,8 journ­al­ists and media, and perceptions of the influence of do­mestic groups, as expressed by the major decision-­makers. None of these indic­ators is exclusive, nor can we rely on any one uncrit­ically. When investigating opinion polls and press art­icles, or talking to negotiators and other decision-­makers, one should allow for bias. Public opinion polls often show opposi­tion to or sup­port for issues, not the influence on the pol­icy pro­cess. That being said, most decision-­makers whom I inter­viewed9 admitted that the

4   Introduction views of the gen­eral pub­lic were im­port­ant factors in creating Poland’s nego­ti­ ation stances and were studied carefully during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. It is not a coincidence that the issues that arose most often in opinion polls (such as agri­ cul­ture, purchase of real estate by foreigners and free movement of labour) became the key issues during the nego­ti­ation process. Opinion polls should be treated with caution, and with this caveat in mind a careful ana­lysis of these sources will allow us to draw more synthetic conclusions concerning the influence of do­mestic pressure on inter­na­tional negotiations. This book will examine the actions of Polish do­mestic groups that changed Poland’s nego­ti­ation stances towards EU accession and the rhet­oric used to express Poland’s position during the nego­ti­ation process. The term ‘do­mestic pressure’ will be used to define the effect of pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties. The term ‘do­mestic groups’ will also be used, although this term is limited to inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties. There is a clear distinction between the do­mestic group and do­mestic pressure. The term ‘do­mestic pressure’ seems to be a more ac­cur­ate description of what is loosely called pub­lic opinion, because I do not de­scribe a passive group of cit­ izens, but rather the col­lect­ive view of a specific popu­la­tion.10 In defining pub­lic opinion, one should avoid confusing sources of pub­lic opinion with channels for expressing opinion such as the press, demonstrations, elections and referenda. Many authors, such as Thomas Risse, distinguish between mass pub­lic opinion; the attentive pub­lic, which has a gen­eral inter­est in pol­itics or foreign pol­icy; and issue pub­lics, which are par­ticu­larly attentive to specific questions.11 This prob­lem will be discussed in the section on do­mestic pressure. The term ‘inter­est group’ will be applied to any organ­isa­tion that makes direct or indirect policy-­related appeals to the gov­ern­ment.12 Using this definition, not all organ­isa­tions constitute inter­est groups, but those that attempt to influence a gov­ern­ment do. These inter­est groups can be identified as two distinctive types. One focuses on lobbying ac­tiv­ities behind the scenes. They often represent a narrow sectoral inter­est and are not par­ticu­larly inter­ested in media and pub­lic opinion attention. Their goal is merely to influence the decision-­makers. The second group, which I will focus on, is one where the leaders, instead of acting behind the scenes, want to express their aims in a pub­lic manner in order to gain media and pub­lic attention. Such inter­est groups often represent a larger group such as farmers’ unions. The clamour that such groups make is deliberately intended to be conveyed in the media. These groups want to show to their sup­ porters, which often comprise a large part of the gen­eral pub­lic, that they represent their inter­ests. Among these ‘clamorous’ inter­est groups, the focus in this book how­ever will be on those that tried to influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess relating to Euro­pean Union mem­ber­ship in such issues as direct payments or production quotas within the Common Agricultural Policy, nego­ti­ations concerning land ownership and, last but not least, freedom of movement of labour.13 Indeed, as will be argued, the inter­est groups may not only directly influence decision-­makers, as is usually suggested, but also mobilise cit­izens outside the

Introduction   5 pol­icymaking com­mun­ity to contact or pressure policy­makers. This pro­cess is known as outside lobbying.15 The term ‘polit­ical party’ seems to be rather simple. The most basic definition of a polit­ical party is found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: it is a group of persons organ­ised to acquire and exercise polit­ical power.16 Even though this definition, as will be argued, ac­cur­ately de­scribes a polit­ical party, some Polish polit­ical par­ties, the Polish Peasants’ Party in par­ticu­lar, even though they were organ­ised to acquire and exercise power, act as an inter­est group representing narrow sectoral interests. The term ‘nego­ti­ation’ refers to ‘a pro­cess in which expli­cit proposals are put forward ostens­ibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common inter­est where conflicting inter­ests are present’.17 Briefly, nego­ti­ation is an ‘exchange of proposals designed to arrive at a mutually accept­able outcome in a situ­ation of inde­pend­ent inter­ests’.18 This definition, how­ever, seems to be too gen­eral to be directly applic­able to the case of Poland’s nego­ti­ations with the EU and hence requires further speci­fica­tion. Negotiations between Poland and the EU can be characterised as leading towards an in­nova­ tion agreement,19 which is ‘meant to create a new relationship or new undertaking between par­ties’.20 Obviously one may ask why Poland’s nego­ti­ations can be clas­si­fied as an in­nova­tion agreement since the Euro­pean Union already existed and Poland was merely joining the existing structure. In this case, the term ‘in­nova­tion’ applies only to the agreement between Poland and the EU, not to the existing EU structure. Thus, this agreement creates a new relationship between Poland and the EU. When discussing nego­ti­ations I will focus on the polit­ical dy­namics rather than technicalities of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess.21 This is because technical details were not of inter­est to the do­mestic pressure, or pub­lic opinion in par­ticu­lar. Dynamics of the polit­ical pro­cess were de­pend­ent upon pub­lic opinion and do­mestic group pressure as well as the polit­ical will of the gov­ern­ment and polit­ical parties. In all cases, the polit­ical dy­namics sur­round­ing the nego­ti­ation pro­cess are unique. Since each of the case studies is different, one cannot draw a uni­ver­sal conclusion of the polit­ical pro­cess. In the case of agri­cul­ture, the polit­ical nego­ ti­ations were the longest and most complicated, with ups and downs and with a par­ticu­lar involvement of Polish do­mestic polit­ical elites, inter­est groups and pub­lic opinion. In the case of the free movement of workers, an issue which was actu­ally vital for the pub­lic did not gain much attention from polit­ical par­ties and inter­est groups in Poland. This justifies why the three case studies should be discussed in separate chapters, because they show that the polit­ical dy­namics of nego­ti­ations do not have to follow their technical stages. When examining the influence of do­mestic pressure on inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations, pri­or­ity should thus be given to polit­ical pro­cesses of nego­ti­ations rather than technicalities. In examining the theory of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations and the practice of Poland’s nego­ti­ations re­gard­ing the EU, one should draw a clear line between the stages of prenego­ti­ations and the nego­ti­ation pro­cess itself. According to one of the classical definitions: 14

6   Introduction prenego­ti­ation begins when one or more par­ties con­siders nego­ti­ation as a pol­icy option and com­munic­ates this intention to other par­ties. It ends when the par­ties agree to formal nego­ti­ations [. . .] or when one party aban­dons the con­sidera­tion of nego­ti­ations as an option.22 The first docu­ment that mentioned Poland’s willingness to join the Euro­pean Communities23 was the Association Agreement, which was signed in 1991 and came into opera­tion in 1994.24 However, this does not imply that prenego­ti­ation talks started in 1991. At that time, the pro­spect of mem­ber­ship was rather vague. It is difficult to pinpoint the date when prenego­ti­ation talks began, or even to argue that there was a formal prenego­ti­ation talk stage. Even though it is difficult to draw a clear line between the prenego­ti­ation phase and the nego­ti­ation phase, it is crucial to do so since it defines the time-­framework for this book. This framework includes only the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and the ratification of the Accession Treaty by Poland in the referendum: that is, the time between the year 1998 when formal accession nego­ti­ations opened, and the year 2003 when the Accession Treaty was ratified in the referendum.

Contribution of the book With regard to empirical ana­lysis, there is a large body of liter­at­ure on Poland’s relations with the EU by a number of authors including George Błażyca, Karl Cordell, Andrew Michta and Jan Zielonka.25 These pub­lications, even though of high aca­demic merit, focus prim­arily on the formu­la­tion of Polish foreign pol­icy towards the EU in the early 1990s, which is well before the nego­ti­ation talks began.26 Later pub­lications often present either a more gen­eral assessment of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess or a policy-­oriented approach.27 Finally, many pub­lications often ex­plore eco­nomic aspects of Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU28 or constitute a collection of papers covering a broad variety of subjects related to the nego­ti­ations.29 There is a substantial body of liter­at­ure on EU Eastern enlargement and on EU Foreign Policy.30 These pub­lications, how­ever valu­able to the study of the enlargement pro­cess, represent a different approach to the subject since they look at it from the per­spect­ive of the EU’s external relations and are often comparative studies on the accession of Central and Eastern Euro­pean coun­tries, rather than single coun­try studies.31 There is one par­ticu­larly im­port­ant aspect that is covered by the Western liter­ at­ure on EU enlargement – beginning discussions by asking a funda­mental question, ‘why expand?’.32 Sedelmeier, Schimmelfennig or Sjursen by asking this question are correct since one cannot understand the nego­ti­ation pro­cess fully without taking into con­sidera­tion the rationale of the enlargement pro­cess.33 Western liter­at­ure also raises the question of ‘why enlarge?’ from the per­ spect­ive of the EU stra­tegic imperative and tries to provide an answer from the per­spect­ive of three different types of reasoning: pragmatic, ethical–polit­ical and moral.34 Such authors as Sedelmeier or Schimmelfennig emphasise that the EU

Introduction   7 de­cision to expand was driven by ethical–polit­ical or norm­ative reasons. These norm­ative reasons were emphasised by the proponents of accession (states for example), which influenced other entities (states) driven by pragmatic reasons or even egoistic calculations.35 When explaining enlargement, Frank Schimmelfennig argued that ‘Constitutive lib­eral rules of the Western inter­na­tional com­mun­ity, rather than constellations of mater­ial, secur­ity and eco­nomic inter­ests and power’, are the key explan­at­ory factors in the expansion of the EU.36 Furthermore, Schimmelfennig, in order to provide the missing link between egoistic pref­er­ences and a norm conforming outcome, introduced the concept of ‘rhet­orical action’, by which he meant a stra­ tegic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s pref­er­ences. In order to overcome an unfavour­able constellation of pref­er­ ences and power, the CEE gov­ern­ments and their Western sup­porters turned to rhet­orical action. They based their argument on col­lect­ive identity and lib­eral values. Thus, according to Schimmelfennig: The op­pon­ents of Eastern enlargement found themselves rhet­orically entrapped. They could neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without pub­licly renegating on prior com­mit­ ments and damaging their cred­ib­il­ity as com­mun­ity members in good standing.37 Schimmelfennig’s argument re­gard­ing ‘rhet­orical entrapment’ can be more im­port­ant if we look at some poorer EU members such as Spain, Greece or Portugal, where pos­sible costs (for instance, cutting down structural funds) could outweigh bene­fits. However, in gen­eral, eco­nomic costs for the EU were rather mar­ginal and the pos­sible bene­fits for the EU (for example, opening new markets) exceeded the costs. Finally, one could agree with Moravcsik: geopolit­ ical and eco­nomic bene­fits of enlargement to existing member states came at a limited cost to the EU‑15 because during nego­ti­ations, EU‑15 gov­ern­ments used their bargaining powers to limit their liabil­ity.38 It should be pointed out that the strongest proponents of the EU accession, like Ger­many, were not only driven by lib­eral values, but by an evid­ent eco­nomic and geopolit­ical inter­est. Nevertheless, this eco­nomic and geopolit­ical inter­est was mutual, which was indeed recog­nised in the accession countries. According to empirical data provided by Ania Krok-­Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka, based on several inter­views of the candidate coun­tries’ officials to the Euro­pean Union, there were three most frequently used reasons why EU enlargement could be also bene­fi­cial for the EU‑15 coun­tries: eco­nomic, secur­ity and geo-­political.39 The question ‘why expand?’ was vital for the future nego­ti­ation pro­cess. Without understanding this theor­et­ical concept of the de­cision behind enlargement, it would be difficult to comprehend the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. Unfortunately, in Poland the question ‘why enlarge?’ or precisely ‘why join the EU?’ was not given enough intellectual attention since the overall as­sump­tion, of the proponents, of the integration was that Poland should join the EU because, ‘It is a his­ tor­ical chance and necessity’ or because ‘It is an evid­ent national inter­est.’ Thus, the question ‘why join?’ was not ser­iously con­sidered and was almost imme­ diately replaced by the question of ‘on what con­ditions?’.

8   Introduction Such an erroneous logical sequence determined the whole nego­ti­ation strat­ egy and tactics of the Polish side, which often proposed detailed con­ditions, without defining their rationale. Often these con­ditions were put forth only because pub­lic opinion or par­ticu­lar groups wanted this or pro­hibited assent on certain terms, as was, for example, the case with the freedom to purchase real estate by foreigners. Consequently, the debate on EU enlargement and the efforts of the Polish negotiating side were largely subordinated to do­mestic pressure: pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups or polit­ical par­ties, as will be discussed in future chapters. There is a gap in both theor­et­ical and empirical liter­at­ure covering the influence of Polish do­mestic pressure on nego­ti­ations towards EU accession. The Western liter­at­ure on the impact of pub­lic opinion on foreign pol­icy or on inter­ na­tional nego­ti­ations in par­ticu­lar, is usually based on case studies from the per­spect­ive of a de­veloped lib­eral demo­cracy.40 One may ask, how­ever, to what extent the case of Poland is different from that of other coun­tries and what is inter­esting and unique about it. Even though there are certain Western models or patterns that may be trans­ferred to the case of Poland, the approach of the Western liter­at­ure as­sumes the exist­ence of a well-­developed polit­ical sys­tem with a well-­established elite and a division of roles between the major players, which is not the case with coun­tries undergoing a sys­temic trans­forma­tion such as Poland. Whilst during the sys­temic trans­forma­tion, elites were emerging, changing and turning themselves over, inter­est groups were less de­veloped, although oddly enough they were often stronger than the elites, due to the absence or weakness of balancing inter­est groups and other social partners. In most cases of coun­tries experiencing a sys­temic trans­forma­tion, the polit­ical scene is in a state of constant flux, with new par­ties rising up and falling.41 In these situ­ations, pub­lic opinion is more prone to manipulation, yet at the same time more capricious, easily altering the elected elites. This book hopes to con­trib­ute to the liter­at­ure on Poland’s nego­ti­ations towards EU accession. It will challenge traditional sys­temic theories and their focus on a sys­temic level of ana­lysis. Instead, the spotlight will be put on the link between the do­mestic and sys­temic level in inter­na­tional negotiations. In order to test and verify the argument mentioned above, I will focus on three case studies which I have found the most im­port­ant in the debate on EU accession, case studies which have drawn the most con­tro­versy and pub­lic attention, and which show the specific nature of the case of Poland in comparison with the other accession countries.

Justification for choosing the three case studies These specifics of sys­temic trans­forma­tion make the Polish case worthy of investigation and different from the same pro­cess in West Euro­pean coun­tries. Nevertheless, one may also ask to what extent the case of Poland’s nego­ti­ations with the EU is different from that of other post-­communist coun­tries, which were also

Introduction   9 experiencing sys­temic trans­forma­tions. The answer to this question is provided in the ana­lysis of the three case studies (direct payments within the CAP, the land ownership case and the free movement of labour) discussed in this book. The cases were par­ticu­larly emphasised during the debate on EU mem­ber­ship and therefore gained pub­lic attention. These par­ticu­lar cases were emphasised by the Polish gov­ern­ment, pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties. Last, but not least, the impact of these issues on the nego­ti­ation pro­cess in Poland was different from that in other candidate coun­tries and hence justifies a study of the specific nature of Poland’s nego­ti­ation towards EU accession. The chosen cases illus­trate the three dimensions of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. First, the prob­lem of direct payment illus­trates the eco­nomic im­port­ance of nego­ti­ations, since these issues have a signi­fic­ant eco­nomic impact, not only on farmers, but on the Polish state budget and hence on the whole popu­la­tion. The prob­lem of land ownership indicates the ideo­logical dimension of nego­ti­ations. It shows that an issue, even though it is eco­nomic­ally insigni­fic­ant, can be crucial for do­mestic groups. Finally, the free movement of labour became a vital social prob­lem, as indicated in a number of opinion polls. This does not mean that each of the case studies has only one dimension, how­ever; they actu­ally have one predominant feature. Therefore, from these three different case studies one may draw the hypo­thesis that polit­ical par­ties and some inter­est groups, by using different kinds of eco­nomic, ideo­logical and social rhet­oric, managed to raise inter­est among the pub­lic. In other words, pub­lic opinion was prone to believe this rhetoric. A pos­sible critique of the three cases is that they can be regarded as ‘easy cases’ and perhaps other nego­ti­ation themes would counter the argument. According to this logic, it may be difficult to draw a hypo­thesis only on the three case studies, since there were nego­ti­ations on several other chapters that perhaps were not so much influenced by pub­lic opinion or do­mestic groups. However, the answer to this reser­va­tion is simple: other negotiating chapters were not so much affected by the do­mestic pressure, because they did not even gain pub­lic attention. Other issues, though im­port­ant, rarely received much attention in opinion polls, in the media or in pub­lic debates. Therefore, if such cases were selected (e.g. envir­on­ment, com­pany law or com­peti­tion pol­icy), this would not shed much light on the influence of do­mestic pressure, since the do­mestic inter­ est for these issues was rather mar­ginal. Indeed, such a thesis can be confirmed after the careful ana­lysis of the Polish media, as well as by inter­views with most of the decision-­makers. Thus, the three case studies were do­mestically salient. With respect to the first case study, nego­ti­ations concerning direct payments within the Common Agricultural Policy were par­ticu­larly im­port­ant, since the number of farms and farmers in Poland is the highest not only in comparison with other candidate coun­tries or in comparison with current EU members, but also per capita. At the moment of accession there were about 1.5 million farms in the coun­try and about eight million people were either directly employed by them or were indirectly de­pend­ent on the farming industry, which is to say more than 20 per cent of the whole popu­la­tion. This makes the issue of direct

10   Introduction payments par­ticu­larly im­port­ant for not only the farm par­ties and unions, but also for a large part of the pub­lic.42 Farmers have to struggle for the survival of their very livelihood, which largely depends on the level and con­ditions of direct payments. No gov­ern­ment could ignore their voice without ser­ious polit­ical consequences. It was determined that Poland would receive equal direct payments, whilst initially the EU (as was reflected in the Agenda of 2000) did not anticipate any direct payments to the accession coun­tries.43 There was a very small win-­set within the EU coun­tries to grant direct payments to the acceding coun­tries. The Polish gov­ern­ment was determined to receive sub­sidies equal to that of the old members, because it was aware that there was a strong opposi­tion among pub­lic opinion and some inter­est groups to accepting the EU proposal.44 The gov­ern­ment officially declared its goal of achieving the same level of sub­sidies as the member coun­tries, but in fact understood that this goal was unrealistic and realised that in the EU there was also a very small win-­set involved in giving candidate coun­tries the same rights on this issue. Being aware of this and trying to enlarge its win-­set, the Polish gov­ern­ment negotiated a concession by which up to 20 per cent of the already secured EU structural funds for the de­velopment of rural areas would be moved to finance CAP sub­sidies.45 Farmers would receive sub­sidies from the Polish national budget.46 To use Robert Putnam’s metaphor of the two-­level game,47 for the price of side-­payments the gov­ern­ment hoped to enlarge the win-­ set among the pub­lic in Poland. Thus, the EU, by moving the money from structural funds to direct payments, could enlarge the Level II win-­set in Poland with little extra cost. The case of Poland justifies the hypo­thesis that if the Level I negotiators are determined to achieve a compromise, it is pos­sible for the win-­set to overlap, but this requires side-­payments to be paid. Moreover, in the pro­cess leading towards ‘overlap’, win-­sets can be subject to extensive nego­ti­ations and, as will be de­scribed later, sometimes can be manipulated. The second case, concerning the purchase of real estate, illus­trates the hypo­ thesis that symbolic pol­itics and ideo­logy can play a vital role in shaping the pub­lic attitude towards certain issues and hence cause a subject to be extensively debated in pub­lic. The op­pon­ents of integration used his­tor­ical arguments and symbolic pol­itics, in par­ticu­lar the image of Polish land being sold to foreign investors and above all to Germans. One may argue, how­ever, that the ideo­logy was often sup­ported by rational arguments. Thus, the opinion that land in Poland, which was almost ten times cheaper than land in Ger­many, would be subject to speculative buying, was strong enough for Poland to demand the longest trans­itional period among the candidate coun­tries. Poland’s strong initial stance on land ownership was to demand an 18-year trans­itional period for EU entities to buy land in Poland. Eventually, a 12-year trans­ition period was negotiated for the Western and some Northern provinces and a seven-year trans­itional period was negotiated for the Eastern provinces. Indeed, 12 years is the longest trans­itional period conceded to any candidate countries. Even though the prob­lem of land ownership was subject to extensive nego­ti­ations, the EU showed less determination to sup­port the free-­market

Introduction   11 regime on this issue and therefore a compromise was easily achieved. This issue in fact was vital neither for Euro­pean pub­lic opinion nor for the most power­ful inter­est groups in Europe. There was more room for compromise here than in the case of nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture. Therefore, it can be hypo­thesised that a large win-­set among Polish pub­lic opinion to demand trans­itional periods was accompanied by a rel­at­ively large win-­set among the EU to accept a shorter trans­itional period. Poland’s position, on the purchase of real estate issue, was also different from the other candidate coun­tries, which requested a shorter trans­itional period from the EU. In the Czech Repub­lic, for example, the pub­lic was less inter­ested in these issues.48 Finally, the farmers’ lobby in the other candidate coun­tries was much weaker than it was in Poland. To further explain this point, on the initiative of the Polish Peasants’ Party, the Polish par­lia­ment issued a bill limiting the pos­sib­il­ity of buying farmland in Poland. Although the declared ratio legis for this act was to limit profiteering by foreign entities, the bill is the most restrictive in Europe, since it even restricts the abil­ity of Polish cit­izens to buy farmland in Poland. This action allows us to draw certain hypotheses, which will be subject to further ana­lysis. While we can as­sume that the long trans­itional period was agreed to because the weight of pub­lic opinion sup­ported it, the Polish Peasants’ Party bill, severely criticised as legally dubious and unconsti­tu­tional, passed because it was sponsored by a strong inter­est group. It could be argued that the mo­tiva­tion for the statute was to stop the de­velopment of large farms, to per­petu­ate small family farms, and thus protect the electorate of the Peasants’ Party from di­min­ishing.49 The final case study that needs elucidation is the free movement of labour. It was one of the key negotiating issues within the chapter on free movement of persons and the third key prob­lem that raised major concern for pub­lic opinion. Even though freedom of the movement of labour and the sale of land to foreigners were initially in­form­ally linked by the EU within a larger package deal, their natures remained quite different. The issue of land was seized by some polit­ical forces in Poland and ex­ploited in order to pursue their polit­ical ad­vant­ages. The prob­lem of the free movement of workers, although it attracted a lot of pub­lic attention, was actu­ally used to a very limited extent by the polit­ical par­ties in Poland.

Outline of the book Chapter 1 introduces the premise of this book to the reader. Terms are defined, the three case studies used in the book are outlined, justification for these par­ ticu­lar studies is explained, and the con­tri­bu­tion of this book is discussed. Putnam’s two-­level game is introduced, as well as the term ‘win-­set’. The second chapter is a theor­et­ical overview of the existing liter­at­ure on the interplay between do­mestic and sys­temic factors in inter­na­tional relations in gen­eral, and inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations in par­ticu­lar. It ex­plores the scope of the influence of do­mestic groups on foreign pol­icy. The chapter will raise certain questions and hypotheses, which will be examined in the empirical parts of the study of Poland.

12   Introduction The third chapter provides an his­tor­ical overview of Poland’s relations towards the EEC and the Union from the early 1990s to the closing of accession nego­ti­ations. It examines ob­ject­ives and goals of the EU accession, and the turning points in the path towards EU mem­ber­ship. Finally, it gives some gen­ eral in­forma­tion concerning nego­ti­ation pro­cesses and structures. This part serves to give a brief background to the issue of why and how do­mestic pressure influenced the nego­ti­ation process. Chapters 4 through 6 ana­lyse the three chosen case studies of this book: land ownership; the nego­ti­ations on agri­cul­ture, with a par­ticu­lar emphasis on the nego­ti­ations concerning direct payments and production quotas; and the free movement of labour. These three cases constitute the empirical core of the book. Even though they cover only certain aspects of the nego­ti­ations, these chapters will raise and con­sequently test the hypo­thesis that Poland’s positions during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess were strongly influenced by pub­lic opinion. Finally, the concluding remarks will draw some ‘lessons’ from the three case studies. First, they will con­sider why these issues were im­port­ant to generate do­mestic pressure in their different eco­nomical, emotional or social dimensions. Second, the overall polit­ical dy­namics of polit­ical nego­ti­ations will be briefly examined. This will allow us to make certain theor­et­ical as­sump­tions about links between certain theories (mainly Putnam’s two-­level game and nego­ti­ation strat­ egies) and empirical evid­ence. This chapter will also recon­sider the hypotheses and questions raised in the first two chapters and draw appropriate conclusions.

Book methods This book is an empirical study using a qualit­at­ive method of sci­ent­ific ana­lysis. I did not focus prim­arily on numerical meas­ure­ments (e.g. stat­ist­ical ana­lyses), although some, like opinion polls, were used extensively. The research was based on data such as press releases, news wires, art­icles in the press, pol­icy docu­ments and ana­lyses, sci­ent­ific books and articles. Particular attention was given to the in-­depth inter­views with the Polish decision-­makers and negotiators involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, as well as experts in the field. I was fortunate to inter­view several indi­viduals, including the two Chief Negotiators Jan Kułakowski and Jan Truszczyński, and some other negotiators in the three nego­ti­ation areas including Jerzy Plewa and Paweł Samecki; Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek; the Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski; the Ministers respons­ible for Euro­pean integration and the chiefs of the Office of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration: Ryszard Czarnecki, Jacek Saryusz-­ Wolski, Danuta Huebner and Jarosław Pietras; and former Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek. I have talked to some of the gov­ern­ment experts and advisors such as Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz, Leszek Jesień and Władysław Piskorz. I have also discussed the questions of accession with a group of senior civil ser­vants directly involved in the organ­isa­tion of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, including Ewa Kubis and Sławomir Tokarski. Finally, I have talked to the people representing the EU side, including Alan Mayhew, who was the EU Commission

Introduction   13 adviser serving the Polish gov­ern­ment, and the senior EU Commission officials including Petra Erler, Rudolf Moegele and Veronica Veitz. Even though the EU officials are not the main target group, these inter­views helped me to understand the EU perception of nego­ti­ations with Poland and to get a broader per­spect­ive on the subject. These inter­views with a variety of parti­cip­ants often involved long and detailed discussions. These in-­depth inter­views were helpful in highlighting the most im­port­ant events and docu­ments, and for collecting the personal opinions of indi­viduals directly involved in the decision-­making pro­cess, espe­cially on issues that are rarely mentioned in the existing published liter­at­ure. With regard to the pol­icy docu­ments, I used such docu­ments as: Poland’s National Strategy for Integration, Poland’s position papers, the Chief Negotiator Kułakowski’s report on accession nego­ti­ations, the Accession Treaty and the EU Commission reports, to name but a few. I will rely on both a textual and a con­textual understanding of a given source. Questions and hypotheses discussed in the next chapter will mainly concern the level at which the ana­lysis was conducted (the unit versus sys­temic level) and in par­ticu­lar, Putnam’s metaphor of the two-­level game, and its modifications and critiques. The question will be posed whether indeed this metaphor is use­ful in understanding and explaining the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. As Robert Putnam expressed, ‘far-­ranging empirical research is needed now to test and deepen our understanding of how two-­level games are played.’50 Thus, this book may be con­sidered such an attempt.

2 Two levels of analysis in international negotiations Domestic versus foreign policy

This chapter aims to define the level of ana­lysis prob­lem and to present an overview of some of the existing liter­at­ure highlighting the interplay between inter­ na­tional and do­mestic levels in inter­na­tional coopera­tion in gen­eral, and nego­ti­ations in par­ticu­lar. The emphasis will be put on the do­mestic level and Putnam’s two-­level game metaphor, some criticism of it, and al­tern­ative explanations and hypotheses. Here I will attempt to answer the question, to what extent the two-­level game ana­lysis can be use­ful in explaining and understanding the conduct and outcomes of Poland’s nego­ti­ations for EU accession. This chapter highlights strat­egy and tactics used by both sides, espe­cially in the con­text of the two-­level game approach, examining such issues as the asymmetry between negotiating sides and the lack of cred­ible BATNA on the Polish side. This chapter will also emphasise the interplay between foreign pol­icy and do­mestic pressure. In order to understand the ten­sion between do­mestic pol­itics and foreign pol­icy, one should define its actors. This entails not only an examination of the theory, but also the con­sidera­tion of a par­ticu­lar consti­tu­tional framework of a state or other actor. The focus of this section will be on defining do­mestic pressure (pub­lic opinion, polit­ical elites and inter­est groups). In the course of this ex­posi­tion, two basic questions will be addressed. First, to what extent did do­mestic pressure influence foreign pol­icy in gen­eral and Polish foreign pol­icy in par­ticu­lar, in the pro­cess of Poland’s nego­ti­ation with the EU? Second, and more im­port­antly, can Poland’s nego­ti­ation pro­cess towards EU accession be regarded as foreign pol­icy at all? Finally, the chapter will draw a number of hypotheses that can be empirically tested on the three case studies of this book.

The level of analysis problem Kenneth Waltz specifies three levels of ana­lysis: the indi­vidual, the state and the state sys­tem (inter­na­tional). When examining the indi­vidual level, the explanation of the decision-­maker’s beha­vi­our involves human nature and the psychological charac­ter­istics of the person. On the state level, the explanation focuses

Domestic versus foreign policy   15 on polit­ical institutions, do­mestic elites and pub­lic opinion. Finally, the third level of ana­lysis looks at the position of states within the inter­na­tional sys­tem.1 Waltz emphasises the third level, which ‘de­scribes the framework of world pol­ itics’.2 As he points out, without the first and second levels, there can be no know­ledge of the forces that determine them; the first and the second levels de­scribe the forces in world pol­itics, but without the third level ‘It is im­pos­sible to assess their im­port­ance or predict their results.’3 As K. J. Holsti al­tern­atively emphasised: ‘Each level of ana­lysis – indi­vidual, state, sys­temic and global – will make us look at different things, so the student must be aware of the dif­fer­ ences among them.’4 Waltz’s ana­lysis, even though it may be subject to criticism, provides a good overview of the three levels of ana­lysis.5 His notion of the first level is examined in theories that look to human nature as a source of beha­vi­our (mainly in classical realism) or to perception as a source of decision-­makers’ beha­vi­our (decision-­making theory) or the impact of ideas and beliefs on decision-­makers as put forward in constructivism. With regard to the second, larger image, unit level ana­lysis is present in classical realism, neo-­realism and in regime-­type theories, for example Marxism or lib­eralism. Finally, this type of ana­lysis is also present in the ana­lyses of constructivism, which takes into con­sidera­tion national identity,6 or ‘the culture of national secur­ity’.7 The do­mestic level of ana­lysis can also be found in models of bur­eau­cratic pol­icies.8 Finally, the sys­temic level of ana­lysis can be found both in neo-­realism which emphasises the role of the sys­tem and its anarchical nature, as well as in neo-­liberal institutionalism or the constructivist approach that emphasises the role of inter­na­tional institutions. The sys­temic level of ana­lysis is even present in Marxist ana­lysis of global capitalism. There are several criticisms that can be made of Waltz’s three levels of ana­ lysis. First, can do­mestic and sys­temic levels be separated rigorously? Putnam avoids this difficulty by linking the do­mestic and inter­na­tional levels. Hence, this critique can be found in approaches that combine levels of ana­lysis, mostly in the two-­level game approach or ‘second image reversed’. According to the ‘second image reversed’, pro­cesses at the inter­na­tional level reverberate into the do­mestic pol­itics level, thereby shaping the factors that determine foreign pol­icy.9 The second weakness of Waltz’s approach is found in its emphasis on the inter­na­tional level, and the fact that it does not give enough attention to the role of polit­ical par­ties, pressure groups, and pub­lic opinion in par­ticu­lar. This oversight is explained by Holsti’s argument that until the Vietnam War, there was an ‘Almond–Lipmann consensus’ within the inter­na­tional relations theories that ignored the role of pub­lic opinion in foreign pol­icy. The consensus that dominated the debate gave rise to three major as­sump­tions. First, that pub­lic opinion was highly volatile and con­sequently provided a dubious founda­tion for sound foreign pol­icy. Second, those pub­lic attitudes towards foreign affairs were seen as lacking structure and coher­ence. Finally, pub­lic opinion was con­sidered to have a very limited impact on the conduct of foreign pol­icy.10 This neg­lect of the gen­eral pub­lic was par­ticu­larly emphasised by Matthew Gabel, who argued that different

16   Domestic versus foreign policy ‘inter­est groups’ theories largely ignored the mass pub­lic, espe­cially as they might respond to organ­ised eco­nomic inter­ests.11 All of the as­sump­tions neg­lecting do­mestic pressure favoured the emphasis on the sys­temic level and underemphasised the link between the do­mestic and inter­na­tional levels of ana­lysis.12 Waltz’s argument can be clas­si­fied as an inter­na­tional explanation, which regards states as unitary actors responding to external incentives. Thus, foreign pol­icy is seen as being determined by sys­temic constraints. Such an explanation dominated the debate within the realist and neo-­realist camps. Domestic explanations, on the contrary, locate the determinants of foreign pol­icy within the nation state.13 As Andrew Moravcsik argues, do­mestic theories can be divided into three subcat­egor­ies according to the specific theor­et­ical source of do­mestic pol­icy. Society-­centred theories stress the role of do­mestic groups. State-­centred do­mestic theories claim that foreign pol­icy de­cisions are determined by the administrative and decision-­making ap­par­atus of the executive branch of the state. A third group looks for explanations in state–soci­ety relations. That is, they ‘emphasise the institutions of repres­enta­tion, education and administration that link the state and soci­ety’.14 These theories focus on the unit level and hence, can be clas­si­fied as unit-­level theories. In this chapter, not all the approaches that have been mentioned will be discussed, but only those that appear to be par­ticu­larly im­port­ant in explaining Poland’s nego­ti­ations towards EU accession. I will not focus on the indi­vidual, the first ‘image’, since the personal level is in­ad­equate to explain the nature of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. However, this is not to under­mine the role of person­ al­ity in inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. It does have some im­port­ance, but it is hard to determine on a theor­et­ical level and it is easier to discuss par­ticu­lar case studies. An example of this is the case of the foreign min­is­ter of Poland (1997–2000) Bronisław Geremek, the former leader of the Freedom Union (UW), the smaller party in the co­ali­tion whose other member was Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS). Geremek was more influ­en­tial in foreign pol­icy than the latter foreign min­is­ter (2001–04) Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the foreign min­is­ter in the Democratic Left Alliance gov­ern­ment. This is another argument to sup­port the thesis that do­mestic polit­ical circumstances can indeed influence foreign pol­icy, since Cimoszewicz’s position within his party was weaker than that of Geremek while he was the foreign min­is­ter. There are certain person­al­ity dif­fer­ences between them. The impact of person­al­ity can be also examined with regard to the two Polish Chief Negotiators Jan Kułakowski and Jan Truszczyński. Both were con­ sidered civil ser­vants or diplomats rather than inde­pend­ent polit­ical actors.15 Thus, person­al­ity plays a role; how­ever, the nature of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations and a nation’s foreign pol­icy lies in group de­cisions and inter­actions between different groups, both on the do­mestic and inter­na­tional levels. Authors such as Putnam emphasise the notion of elite polit­ical culture – the set of polit­ically rel­ev­ant beliefs, values and habits of the leaders of the polit­ical sys­tem.16 The major premise of this approach is that the character and de­velopment of a polit­ical sys­tem is con­ditioned by what Sidney Verba calls,

Domestic versus foreign policy   17 ‘the sys­tem of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situ­ation in which polit­ical action takes place’.17 Even though one should not underemphasise the personal level of ana­lysis, the chapter will emphasise the second and third level theories, and par­ticu­larly approaches that combine the two levels of ana­lysis. Before moving to these theories, some con­sidera­tion will first be given to sys­temic theories.

Systemic theories The nature of inter­na­tional coopera­tion and the interplay between the do­mestic and sys­temic factors in inter­na­tional relations constitute a broad theor­et­ical question. Systemic theories such as neo-­realism18 and neo-­liberal institutionalism19 emphasise the influence of the sys­tem, thus di­min­ishing the role of do­mestic factors. With regard to the major debate within the realist school between ‘third image’ (structural) and ‘second image’ realism, Kenneth Waltz, as a structural realist, emphasises both do­mestic and inter­na­tional sys­tems as separate. Whilst do­mestic pol­itics is the realm of authority, administration and law, inter­na­tional pol­itics is the realm of power, struggle and accommodation.20 Some neo-­realists like Stephen Walt, often regarded as ‘second image’ realists,21 admit that do­mestic pol­itics may have an influence on the cre­ation or collapse of an alli­ ance; they emphasise that this requires inter­na­tional level factors to be taken into account.22 As Stephen Walt argues, alli­ances may survive because self-­interested groups in one or more coun­tries need the alli­ance to sup­port their indi­vidual self­interests, even though the exist­ence of an alli­ance may not serve the inter­ests of the larger com­mun­ity of which they are a part.23 By giving an example of what he calls ‘elite manipulation’, Walt shows that do­mestic pol­itics influences inter­ na­tional pol­itics and that such pol­itics may have an influence on the cre­ation of alli­ances or their duration. While underemphasising this factor, even some neo-­ realists such as Walt agree that under certain circumstances, do­mestic pol­itics may have an influence on alli­ance formation, duration or collapse. From this point of view, sys­temic theory such as neo-­realism and neo-­liberal institutionalism, although vital in understanding and explaining the nature of the inter­na­tional sys­tem and the ten­sion between do­mestic and sys­temic factors in world pol­itics, does not seem par­ticu­larly use­ful in examining the influence of pub­lic opinion and inter­est groups on Poland’s nego­ti­ations towards the EU accession. Neo-­realism in par­ticu­lar, with a few exceptions such as Stephen Walt, underestim­ates the influence of do­mestic groups on the inter­na­tional sys­ tem. Therefore, bearing in mind the complex nature of the inter­na­tional sys­tem, I will focus on the unit level of analysis.

Unit-­level analysis One of the major attempts to link do­mestic and inter­na­tional theories in inter­na­ tional pol­itics was made by Robert Putnam. His approach was widely discussed

18   Domestic versus foreign policy and criticised, and became the subject of extensive empirical ana­lyses. As a result of this discussion, one can draw certain hypotheses concerning the links between the level of the nation’s state with its do­mestic constraints and the sys­ temic level. The question that is often raised is not whether the link between do­mestic and inter­na­tional pol­itics exists, but how this link operates in the inter­ na­tional sys­tem. We can thus ask if Putnam’s model is applic­able to Poland’s case. The nature of the two-­level game The nature of Putnam’s model is clearly formulated in the metaphor of the two-­ level game. As Putnam eloquently argues: The pol­itics of many inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations can use­fully be conceived as a two-­level game. At the national level do­mestic groups pursue their inter­ ests by pressing the gov­ern­ment to adopt favour­able pol­icies and politicians seek power by constructing co­ali­tions among those groups. At the inter­na­ tional level, national gov­ern­ments seek to maximize their own abil­ity to satisfy do­mestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse con­sequences of foreign de­velopments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-­makers, so long as their coun­tries remain inde­pend­ent, yet sover­eign.24 These two games are played simul­tan­eously, and each national polit­ical leader appears at both game boards. Across the inter­na­tional table sit his (or her) foreign counterparts and at his elbows sit diplomats and other inter­na­tional advisers. Around the do­mestic table sit party politicians and representatives of key do­mestic groups and polit­ical advisers. Domestic inter­est groups can be players ‘not because of their direct lobbying but because of their anticipated reactions to pos­sible moves as in­ter­preted by their bur­eau­cratic patrons or by the leader’s polit­ical counsellors’.25 The complexity of the two-­level game model may be that moves rational for a player at one board may be quite irrational for that same player at the other board. As Putnam emphasised, for this reason players will tolerate some dif­fer­ ences in rhet­oric between the two-­level games treating it as a part of the game.26 Indeed, such rhet­oric was par­ticu­larly im­port­ant in the accession nego­ti­ations with Poland. This rhet­oric influenced the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, stimulating vivid debates within the do­mestic arena. Finally, as Putnam argued: ‘Any key player who is dissatisfied with the outcome can upset the game board. [. . .] Conversely, any national leader who fails to satisfy an adequate number of players at the do­mestic table, risks being evicted from his seat.’27 Putnam’s ana­lysis of the links between diplo­macy and do­mestic pol­itics in the pro­cess of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations can be divided into two stages. Level I, the inter­na­tional stage, regards the bargaining between the (inter­na­tional)

Domestic versus foreign policy   19 negotiators and Level II, the national or do­mestic. It is made up of separate discussions within do­mestic groups whether to ratify, reject or change the agreement achieved at Level I. The ‘ratification’ can include a formal voting pro­ced­ure at Level II or a more or less formal de­cision.28 In order to be ratified, Level I agreements need to be a ‘win-­set’ agreement.29 This type of agreement can be defined as ‘a set of all pos­sible Level I agreements that would “win” – that is, to gain the neces­sary majority among the constituents [Level II]’.30 Conversely, if win-­sets of the negotiating sides are small, the pos­sib­il­ity of agreement is marginal. Larger win-­sets make Level I agreement more likely. For this reason, any successful agreement must fall within the Level II win-­set of each of the par­ties. For this reason, ‘Agreement is pos­sible only if those win-­sets overlap and the larger each win-­set, the more likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller the win-­sets, the greater the risk that the nego­ti­ations will break down.’31 The question arises as to whether Putnam’s theory of two-­level games provides a theor­et­ical framework that enables us to understand and explain the nature of Poland’s nego­ti­ations re­gard­ing the Euro­pean Union. Does Poland’s case fit into Putnam’s theor­et­ical as­sump­tion of the two-­level game and, if so, to what extent? This requires his theory to be examined and discussed in further detail, espe­cially with regard to the prob­lem of win-­sets. Let us ima­gine Poland’s nego­ti­ation with the EU as a two-­level game. At Level I, we have inter­na­tional negotiators, representing the Polish gov­ern­ment on one side and EU negotiators on the other. At Level II, we have various do­mestic inter­ests, mainly pub­lic opinion and inter­est groups. By con­sidering the three case studies, direct payments within the CAP, land ownership and the free movement of workers, and by analysing them from Poland’s per­spect­ive, I will try to build certain hypotheses concerning the impact of do­mestic groups on the inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations and on the par­ties involved, from the biggest to the smallest win-­sets, bearing in mind the pos­sib­il­ity of ‘overlapping’, for each single issue. The first key issue is the size of win-­sets and their determinants. As Putnam argues, the situ­ation is complicated by the prob­lem that the rel­at­ive size of the respective Level II win-­sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. The larger the win-­set of a negotiator, the more he is prone to be pushed around by his Level I counterpart. Conversely, as Putnam argued: ‘A small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining ad­vant­age: “I’d like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home”.’32 As a result, win-­sets can be manipulated. Putnam sets forth certain determinants of a win-­set size by examining three main sets of factors. The first includes Level II pref­er­ences and co­ali­tions. As he argued: ‘The size of the win-­set depends on the distribution of power, pref­er­ ences, and pos­sible co­ali­tions among Level II.’33 Therefore, any testable two-­ level game model can be rooted in a theory of do­mestic pol­itics and the pref­er­ences of the do­mestic actors. According to this, in the case of Poland, the rel­at­ive large win-­sets (in other words, sup­port for the nego­ti­ation agreements)

20   Domestic versus foreign policy within the do­mestic groups were determined by the mainly pro-­EU orientation of the polit­ical and media elites, of some inter­est groups and of the majority of the pub­lic. In addition, it was accompanied by the as­sumed large costs of no-­ agreement and the lack of cred­ible BATNA. The result: the higher the costs of non-­agreement, the bigger the win-­set within Level II. The second factor Putnam draws attention to, is that the size of the win-­set depends on the Level II institutions. Hence, ratification pro­ced­ures affect the size of the win-­set.34 According to the Polish Constitution, for instance, a nationwide [Euro­pean] referendum is binding if more than half of the number of those having the right to vote has parti­cip­ated in it.35 The same abso­lute majority is required for the de­cision to be implemented. Thus, the min­imum size of the win-­ set in this par­ticu­lar case is 50 per cent of the electorate who took part in the referendum. However, in practice, nego­ti­ation pro­ced­ures require several levels of ratification on both sides and it is always pos­sible to meas­ure win-­sets.36 This is mainly because at each level of ratification the win-­set may be slightly different, and on each game board there are several different players representing different interests. Finally, the size of the win-­set depends on the strat­egies of the Level I negotiators. Putnam sheds light on an inter­esting tactical dilemma that the Level I negotiator faces. Even though the negotiator has an inter­est in maximising the other side’s win-­set, with regard to his own win-­set his motives are mixed. ‘The larger the win-­set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position in relation to the other negotiator.’37 As Putnam argued: Each Level I negotiator has a strong inter­est in the pop­ularity of his oppos­ite number, since Part A’s pop­ularity increases the size of his win-­set, and thus increases both the odds of success and the rel­at­ive bargaining leverage of party B.38 If we as­sume that the Level I negotiator wishes to expand his win-­set at the price of weakening his bargaining position, as would be the case if he is afraid of the risk of no-­agreement, then he has to be prepared for side-­payments in order to attract mar­ginal sup­porters on Level II. As Putnam expressed it: ‘What counts at Level II is not total costs and bene­fits, but their incidence rel­at­ive to existing co­ali­tions and protoco­ali­tions.’39 Finally, there is yet another aspect of the two-­level games that should be elucidated. This is the question: To what extent and in what aspects does this theory depart from previous theories dealing with inter­na­tional negotiations? The two-­level game approach as a departure from previous theories According to Andrew Moravcsik, the two-­level game approach differs from previous theories about inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations in three major areas. First, it implies a theory of inter­na­tional bargaining that creates new oppor­tun­ities for

Domestic versus foreign policy   21 creative statecraft. Hence, it enters into the field of International Relations. The second departure from previous theories is that it regards the statesman as the central stra­tegic actor in the two-­level game. Finally, the double-­edged calculation (do­mestic and inter­na­tional) is reflected in the strat­egies of statesmen.40 With regard to the first departure, Moravcsik observes: ‘Complex patterns of interdependence do not simply constrain statesmen.’41 As Moravcsik argues, this has much in common with the realist theory, which also focuses on the determinants of the state’s bargaining power, which he defines as ‘proportional to the rel­at­ive value that it places on an agreement compared to an outcome of its best al­tern­ative pol­icy’.42 The second departure from previous theories is, according to Moravcsik, the focus on the statesman as the central stra­tegic actor. Thus, the pub­lic official’s choice of strat­egy is the core element in inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. As a result, the two-­level game model invites us to ex­plore different speci­fica­tions of statesmen’s inter­ests. These may include a traditional realist view of a statesman faced with do­mestic constraints or a more lib­eral approach that the statesman is a pure agent of soci­ety or honest broker seeking to maximise do­mestic polit­ical sup­ port, or finally the notion of the statesman seeking to realise personal goals.43 Robert Putnam examines the role of a chief negotiator, by which he means also a chief of state. He admits that his two-­level model as­sump­tion that the negotiator ‘acts merely as an honest broker’ is unrealistic, and empirically the negotiator’s pref­er­ences may differ from those of his constituents. His motives may differ because he might be seeking pop­ularity (this is espe­cially the case of elected politicians), because results of the agreement may be polit­ically rewarding to him or finally because the negotiator may be inclined to pursue his own conception of national inter­est in the inter­na­tional con­text. Hence, the impact of person­al­ity on negotiators’ motives and tactics should not be ignored, but this is an indi­vidual level of ana­lysis. However, if we look at do­mestic versus inter­na­ tional levels of ana­lysis, as Robert Putnam points out, the Chief Negotiator usually gives primacy emphasis to the do­mestic calculus.44 Indeed, the notion of do­mestic versus inter­na­tional calculus is, according to Moravcsik, the third distinctive departure from previous theories. As Moravcsik argues, in the two-­level game approach, ‘The statesman’s strat­egies reflect a simultaneous double-­edged calculation of constraints and oppor­tun­ities on both the do­mestic and inter­na­tional boards.’45 Domestic pol­itics can be used to affect the outcomes of inter­na­tional bargaining and ‘inter­na­tional moves may be solely aimed at achieving do­mestic goals’.46 The above-­mentioned tactics with regard to the opposing member and its own pub­lic opinion show only one side of the relationship between the negotiator and do­mestic groups. They show the negotiator as a player; how­ever, what neither Putnam nor Moravcsik emphasises enough is that he or she can be manipulated by certain do­mestic groups, e.g. trade unions. This is par­ticu­larly true if negotiators (or decision-­makers instructing them) fail to de­velop clear ob­ject­ives and strat­egy; and, in this case, the negotiator may seek guidance from the pub­lic. Nonetheless, mass media or power­ful inter­est groups can play around with the

22   Domestic versus foreign policy argument that ‘Public opinion wants us to sup­port this position.’ This can lead to manipulation of the polit­ical elite by media and inter­est groups, and as a result, the real mood of pub­lic opinion can be genu­inely misjudged.47 In summary, from these theor­et­ical as­sump­tions we may draw some prac­tical hypotheses. The liter­at­ure on inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations emphasises certain aspects of nego­ti­ation tactics. First of all the negotiator plays a double game with his op­pon­ent’s number and with his own pub­lic opinion. However, the negoti­ ator may also be influenced by inter­est groups and the media, which are also participating in the game and sometimes ex­ploiting pub­lic opinion. Before going into the subject of do­mestic groups, a crit­ical ana­lysis of the two-­level game model should be briefly explained. The two-­level game model critique and alternative hypotheses Putnam’s approach of two-­level games has been subject to extensive criticism. First, his critics argue that the two-­level game model for the most part has focused on the do­mestic level at the expense of explaining the nature of the inter­na­tional level.48 In addition, this approach treats the inter­na­tional level as bi­lat­eral nego­ti­ations, without fully accounting for more complex interstate relationships. Thus, according to this argument his approach needs further de­velopment with regard to multi­lateral agreements or agreements involving inter­na­tional organisations. This form of critique does not under­mine Putnam’s core as­sump­tions, but instead refines and expands his model into new levels of ana­lysis. Lee Ann Peterson, when examining agricultural pol­icy reform in the Euro­pean Community, uses Putnam’s two-­level game model and expands it to con­sider the simultaneous inter­action of nego­ti­ations at three levels: the national level, the EC level and the inter­na­tional level. She concludes that a three-­level interactive strat­egy is im­port­ant in achieving the accept­able agreement at each level of the game.49 The second critique concerns the lack of a precise definition of actors on Level I and Level II and their roles. In par­ticu­lar, it notes Putnam’s failure to set up con­ditions under which pub­lic opinion can act as a do­mestic constraint in the two-­level game and the lack of speci­fica­tion of the nature of the win-­set.50 As  Andrew Moravcsik argues, Putnam’s ana­lysis requires a more restrictive definition. In order to achieve that, three essential theor­et­ical building blocks are required: speci­fica­tion of do­mestic pol­itics (the nature of the win-­set), speci­fica­tion of the inter­na­tional negotiating envir­on­ment (the determinants of interstate bargaining outcomes)51 and speci­fica­tion of the statesman’s pref­er­ences.52 Indeed, Moravcsik’s critique is justified, espe­cially with regard to the nature of the win-­set, and requires us to specify the con­ditions under which pub­lic opinion can act. This can be achieved in an empirical case study ana­lysis, and thus in examining Poland’s nego­ti­ation position the nature of the win-­set will be

Domestic versus foreign policy   23 examined in detail. However, even though crit­ical in certain aspects, Moravcsik incorp­or­ated ana­lysis of two-­level games into his lib­eral intergov­ern­mentalist theory.53 In par­ticu­lar, he stresses a lib­eral point of view concerning the centrality of state–soci­ety relations. Nevertheless, Moravcsik, as opposed to Putnam, over­emphasises the role of inter­est groups and elite bargaining and underemphasises the role of pub­lic opinion and mass pol­itics. What is more, Moravcsik seems to be too focused on the strengths of inter­est groups in the EU integration pro­cess, ignoring other variables. An entirely different stance is presented by Thomas Risse, who criticises the very nature of intergov­ern­mentalism. He argues that even though intergov­ern­ mental bargaining exists, many de­cisions, espe­cially within the EU, are influenced by the notion of ‘communicative action’. He derives his theory from the debate between social constructivism and rational choice theories, which he defines as one of the most signi­fic­ant debates in the field of inter­na­tional relations. He argues that this debate largely focuses on the dif­fer­ences between the ‘logic of consequentialism’ theorised by rational choice approaches and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ conceptualised by mostly sociological institutionalism. He claims that ‘Processes of argumentation, deliberation, and per­sua­sion constitute a distinct mode of social inter­action to be differentiated from both stra­tegic bargaining – the realm of rational choice – and rule-­guided beha­vi­our – the realm of sociological institutionalism.’54 Risse’s notion of ‘communicative action’ re­sembles the already de­scribed Frank Schimmelfennig concept of ‘rhet­ orical action’ as a stra­tegic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s pref­er­ences.55 To summar­ise the core criticisms of the two-­level game approach, the major weakness of Putnam’s approach is that the focus is put on the two levels themselves, without carefully defining the actors on each level and the inter­action between them. Moreover, there is a lack of plausibility in Putnam’s description of the actors in his using a certain terminology to name them and to define their roles in an ab­stract way. This is partly because the schematic treatment of the players in this model serves the sim­pli­city of Putnam’s argument and makes the argument more coherent. However, when setting a theor­et­ical framework it is of crucial im­port­ance to define the actors playing on each level. The question arises as to whether a modified version of the two-­level game model can serve as a framework for testing the three case studies of this book. The answer requires careful ana­lysis of the Level II players and the nego­ti­ation strat­egy and tactics.

Negotiation strategy and tactics Poland’s nego­ti­ation strat­egy was determined by the lack of a plaus­ible best al­tern­ative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). This is not only obvious from the ana­lysis of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess but becomes clear when we read the National Strategy for Integration, where in the first paragraphs we find that ‘The al­tern­ative to accession would be to consciously choose to remain behind

24   Domestic versus foreign policy the mainstream of Euro­pean Integration.’56 The stra­tegic docu­ment emphasised that Polish determination to become a member of the Union was explained by the notion of national inter­est.57 The docu­ment defined the overall polit­ical, eco­ nomic, institutional, legal and educational-­information framework re­gard­ing Poland’s pre­para­tions for EU mem­ber­ship.58 However, its core as­sump­tion was the lack of a cred­ible al­tern­ative to EU membership. Asymmetry between the negotiating sides Consequently, one of the core theor­et­ical as­sump­tions that the lack of a reli­able BATNA implies a substantial asymmetry between the negotiating sides finds its confirmation in the case of Poland’s nego­ti­ation toward the EU accession. This explains the rel­at­ively weak nego­ti­ation position of Poland. CEEC did not posses the bargaining power to make the reluct­ant majority of EU‑15 coun­tries accept their bid to join the EU. This was due to the asymmetrical eco­nomic interdependence between the members and the applicants favouring the Union.59 According to Lykke Friis and Anna Jarosz, the lack of bargaining power leading towards asymmetry was derived from three factors. The first is linked to the factor that an outsider such as Poland who wants to join the club, by definition, has dif­ficult­ies in demanding too much. The outsider must adjust to the club rules, not vice versa. Thus, for Poland and other CEEC, acceptance of acquis communautaire was even regarded as a pre-­condition of entering nego­ti­ations.60 The second factor leading to asymmetry is the asymmetry of in­forma­tion, since the outsider is by definition negotiating with a partner that not only has a far better know­ledge of the nego­ti­ation subjects, but also is empowered with the ‘last word’ on an applicant’s abil­ity to take on the acquis. This argument was shared by the former chief of the Polish Office for Euro­pean Integration and a member of the Negotiation Team, Paweł Samecki. He argued that the adopted sequence of closing chapters had more negat­ive con­sequences for the Polish side and this was premeditated on the part of the EU side. The most difficult and controversial issues were left until the final stage of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. Then Poland was put under a strong time-­pressure to close the most controversial chapters, which usually meant agreeing to accept the EU con­ditions.61 The final factor con­trib­ut­ing to the asymmetry is the dual character of any accession nego­ti­ation. This is because the first in­ternal nego­ti­ations required a compromise among the 15 member states. Thus, it is difficult for a single outsider to change the compromise, espe­cially in the second part of the nego­ti­ations, where every new concession of the EU requires compromise by the 15 member coun­tries.62 For this reason the outsider has to choose between accepting EU proposals or sending the EU back to the nego­ti­ation table, which is both time-­ consuming and unpleasant. However, there are even more factors that confirm the asymmetry. The candidate coun­tries that wanted to join the Union were in a difficult position, since they were competing among themselves mainly in terms of the number of closed chapters. This often weakened their bargaining positions and led to

Domestic versus foreign policy   25 asymmetry. An example of such a situ­ation was the strong com­peti­tion among the Visegrad coun­tries. As a result, solid­arity within the Visegrad coun­tries was soon broken, since each of the coun­tries was focused on protecting its own interests. The Polish accession negotiation objective The Polish nego­ti­ation goal and its overall strat­egy were determined by the asymmetry between the negotiating sides and the lack of cred­ible BATNA, since the key Polish foreign pol­icy goal was to enter the EU. No other al­tern­atives were ser­iously con­sidered.63 This implied that Poland desired to enter the EU quickly and on the best terms. In order to achieve this goal, the gov­ern­ment and the Negotiation Team used do­mestic pressure. Indeed, a hypo­thesis may be drawn that the size of the do­mestic win-­set influenced the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and outcome, and con­sequently determined further short-­term strat­egies and tactics. Particularities of negotiation strategy and tactics In his model, Putnam emphasises bargaining power and tactics as the core elements of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. Therefore, certain tricks and smart tactics are used. For instance, a utility-­maximising statesman (Level I negotiator) aims to convince his counterpart that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favour­able to the op­pon­ent is unlikely to be ratified. Another pos­sible tactic is for a negotiator to submit a trial agreement for ratification or consultation, in order to dem­on­strate that the con­ditions offered are not in his win-­set.64 These tactics were also, to a certain extent, used by the Polish gov­ ern­ment when they presented the EU proposals with regard to the level of direct payment to farmers’ unions and these organ­isa­tions strongly rejected the offer. They threatened the gov­ern­ment that if the Union did not increase sub­sidies, they would encourage the pub­lic to vote no on the referendum. Another obvious bargaining tactic is used when statesmen (negotiators) claim that their side has made more concessions in comparison to the op­pon­ents. Hence, negotiators emphasise their concessions in order to induce the other side to make their own concessions.65 This negotiating tactic is, how­ever, risky. The negotiator must be cau­tious not to magnify his own concessions, since in that case do­mestic par­ties and the media in par­ticu­lar may turn against him or even attack him for being soft on protecting the national inter­est.66 Thus, the negotiator is often playing a double game. On the one hand, he shows concessions to the op­pon­ent, but on the other, he sells the image of a tough negotiator to the pub­lic. Undeniably, the Polish side often emphasised concessions, in par­ticu­lar on the costs of integration and on pos­sible bene­fits for the Euro­pean Union, while at the same time declaring to its own pub­lic its determination to enter the EU on good terms. Obviously, as in the case of Poland, the op­pon­ent is fully aware of this strat­egy, since it is im­pos­sible to keep such a strat­egy secret. However, the op­pon­ent may be willing to turn a blind eye, or to accept the rules of the game, since he often

26   Domestic versus foreign policy applies the same rules to its own pub­lic opinion. To summar­ise, bargaining tactics are the core element of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. Negotiating tactics can be used to manipulate the size of a win-­set, and as a result negotiate better con­ditions or ensure protection of its own group’s inter­ests. Tactics are used by both Level I negotiators to influence his/her opposing number and by the Level II do­mestic constituents to influence the Level I negotiator. According to Friis and Jarosz, who base their arguments mainly on Putnam’s as­sump­tion, bargaining can be clas­si­fied into five different bargaining strat­ egies.67 The first, which may be called tying hands, is based on Putnam’s argument that ‘A small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining ad­vant­age.’68 Thus, the negotiator may use the trick ‘I would like to accept your proposal, but this would be not accepted on my do­mestic level (Level II)’, for example it will not be ratified in the referendum. This strat­egy was used by Poland, espe­cially in the last round of nego­ti­ations during the Copen­hagen Summit in Decem­ber 2002. The second is threat, which goes much further than tying hands. This is when the negotiator threatens to leave the nego­ti­ation room. Nevertheless, this requires a cred­ible BATNA for the negotiating side that is using it. Otherwise, it can play against the negotiator. For this reason, it seems that in the long run the Polish negotiators could not use this nego­ti­ation strat­egy without ser­ious polit­ical con­ sequences. From the EU side, this strat­egy was used on a limited scale. It was based on an as­sump­tion that if Poland would not move from this position it would weaken its position on other issues. Moreover, Poland’s stubbornness and inflex­ib­il­ity could prolong the nego­ti­ation process. Nevertheless, it was more often used within the gov­ern­ment, for example when the Polish Peasants’ Party was threatening its co­ali­tion partner Democratic Left Alliance that it would withdraw from the government. The next nego­ti­ation strat­egy is clustered around such issues as side-­payments and package deals. As Putnam indicated, on the do­mestic level (Level II) what counts are not total costs and bene­fits, but their incidence rel­at­ive to existing co­ali­tions.69 Thus, the negotiator has to be prepared for side-­payments or package deals. For instance, ‘If you agree on the proposed level of direct payments, we will alloc­ate more resources for structural funds.’ This last proposal is an example of a package deal. Indeed, the prob­lem of side-­payments existed not only within incumbents, but also within the member states. EU members that expect net losses from enlargement can agree to enlargement if their bargaining power is sufficient to obtain full compensation through side-­payments by the winning EU‑15 states.70 Such a strat­egy was used by Spain and other poorer coun­tries afraid of losing some structural funds. The fourth pos­sible strat­egy is dead-­weight catching. This is when the negoti­ ator catches his counterpart in the dead weight of his former actions. It seems that this strat­egy was partly used by Poland during the Copen­hagen Summit when arguing for the equal level of direct payments. The question was raised as to why Poland should fulfil its obli­ga­tions when con­ditions of mem­ber­ship equal to previous EU enlargements were not offered. However, such an argument was less effect­ive in the case of signi­fic­ant asymmetry between the negotiating partners.

Domestic versus foreign policy   27 Finally, there is the strat­egy of co-­ordination within the enlargement wave. This last strat­egy can be effect­ive, not only when the applicant coun­tries co­ordinate their nego­ti­ation stances, but also when they are determined to defend such stances. This nego­ti­ation strat­egy was partly used during the nego­ti­ations concerning the level of direct payments. However, the determination to defend their common position on full direct payments varied between the candidate coun­tries. As a result, this strat­egy with regards to this aspect was unsuccessful. If all, or at least a majority, of the applicant coun­tries had threatened to walk out of the nego­ti­ation room, this would have had a stronger effect. Nevertheless, the threat strat­egy was inefficient if made by only one applicant. Such a co­ordinated strat­egy was also able to under­mine the EU’s pos­sible battering ram strat­egy. For instance, when the EU negotiated with the applicant coun­tries, it had an inter­est in using one coun­try as a battering ram in order to persuade the other acceding coun­tries into signing a sim­ilar negotiating deal.71 The accession nego­ti­ation can be characterised by a number of different nego­ ti­ation strat­egies and tactics as used by both negotiating sides on both do­mestic and foreign pol­icy boards. Indeed, to understand this it may be use­ful to examine the interplay between foreign pol­icy and do­mestic pol­itics. This is a largely unexamined area where different working hypotheses will need to be raised and open questions addressed.

Foreign policy and domestic politics In discussing the interplay between foreign pol­icy and do­mestic constraints, one should start by stating a definition of foreign pol­icy and by describing the models which have been used to explain its workings. However, the key empirical question remains whether do­mestic groups indeed have an influence on foreign policy. Defining foreign policy Even though one may formulate different definitions of foreign pol­icy, there is a basic agreement on the key charac­ter­istics of this term. According to Christopher Hill, foreign pol­icy is ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an inde­pend­ent actor (usually a state) in inter­na­tional relations’.72 Thus, foreign pol­icy is regarded as the sum of external relations ‘because other­wise every par­ticu­lar action could be seen as a separate foreign pol­icy’. External relations are official ‘to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mech­an­ism of a state or enterprise’. Finally, the phrase ‘an inde­pend­ent actor’, according to Hill, ‘enables the inclusion of phenomena such as the Euro­pean Union’.73 A question arises as to whether Poland’s nego­ti­ation stances vis-­à-vis the Union can be defined as foreign pol­icy at all.74 Can we, in keeping with Hill’s definition, claim that Poland’s foreign pol­icy towards the EU is the sum of Poland’s official relations with the Union during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess? If it is not foreign pol­icy, then how can Poland’s pol­icy towards the Union be defined?

28   Domestic versus foreign policy In order to answer this question, one may refer to an approach towards defining foreign pol­icy taken by Michael Clarke. According to his method, the term ‘foreign pol­icy’ should be broken down into two separate terms: foreign and pol­ icy. As he argues, one should begin by giving a definition of pol­icy itself. As Clarke explicates this issue: on the one hand, pol­icy can be regarded as an ‘expli­ cit plan of action tailored to serve specific purposes’, but on the other, it may be regarded as a ‘series of habitual responses to events occurring in the inter­na­ tional envir­on­ment’.75 Thus, to sim­plify, the term ‘pol­icy’ can be understood as a plan and/or as the practice of certain beha­vi­ours. The term ‘foreign’ refers to official external relations. Thus, foreign pol­icy can be regarded as a plan or practice of certain beha­vi­our towards the world outside the state. In discussing Poland’s stance, the emphasis will be put on pol­icy and this will be understood as the conducting of a certain kind of beha­vi­our according to an already planned goal: mem­ber­ship in the EU. The focus will be on Poland’s reaction or adaptation to situ­ations that emerged during the nego­ti­ations. This approach therefore sees pol­icy as a structural reaction to external stimuli.76 Thus, in this con­text pol­icy is understood as a dynamic rather than a static pro­cess. Indeed, going back to Hill’s definition, we may draw a hypo­thesis that Polish– EU relations were a subject of foreign policy. It might seem that in the normal course of events, sub­sidies for farming would be regarded as a subject lying within the do­mestic pol­icy agenda. However, when these are placed in the inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations scheme they become mat­ ters of foreign pol­icy. If Poland’s pol­icy towards the EU lies in the scope of foreign pol­icy, the next question is who makes the policy? The traditional para­digm of a state as the only actor is changing and inter­na­tional organ­isa­tions, both inter-­governmental and non-­governmental, can be regarded as inde­pend­ent actors in foreign pol­icy. Nevertheless, the question for this book is who is in charge of foreign pol­icymaking in Poland and who was respons­ible for the accession nego­ti­ations?77 This prob­lem will be discussed in future chapters. However, at this stage, one may ask about the role of do­mestic pressure.

Domestic pressure: public opinion, elites, interest groups The question for this section is how can the role of pub­lic opinion, elites and inter­est groups be defined and explained with respect to Poland’s foreign pol­icy in relation to the Union? Is the gen­eral pub­lic manipulated by polit­ical elites or inter­est groups? The purpose of this section is therefore to shed light on the prob­lem of how prevailing theor­et­ical concepts of the role of do­mestic groups fit with the case study of Poland. Public opinion With regard to the concept of pub­lic opinion, one can point out many different, often mutually exclusive, definitions. I will focus, how­ever, only on those that are widely accepted and used in social sciences. In defining pub­lic opinion, one

Domestic versus foreign policy   29 should avoid confusing sources of pub­lic opinion with channels for expressing opinion such as the press, demonstrations, elections and referenda. In practice, many authors confuse these terms and sometimes it is difficult to set up a clear line between these terms and that of pub­lic opinion itself. Nevertheless, in essence, pub­lic opinion means the col­lect­ive view that a defined popu­la­tion takes towards an issue. It is commonly accepted that there is a major dif­fer­ence between the gen­eral pub­lic and the attentive pub­lic. Whilst the first is characterised by a limited know­ledge of and inter­est in foreign pol­icy, the attentive pub­lic is better informed and inter­ested in foreign pol­icy and thus constitutes an audience for the foreign pol­icy debates among the elites. Thus, the rel­ev­ant pub­lic in foreign pol­icy is not the mass pub­lic, but the attentive pub­lic whose inter­ests and respons­ibil­ities require them to pay attention to foreign affairs.78 Some authors identi­fy a third group within pub­lic opinion, namely pol­icy and opinion elites that articulate the concerns of the ‘policy-­bearing stratum of the popu­la­tion’. A pol­icy elite is not a homogenous group and hence one can single out pol­icy leadership: executives, legislators or civil ser­vants.79 The decision-­makers, according to Christopher Hill, hold the power of initiative, the capa­city to define external threats and exercise control over in­forma­tion and the ultimate power of the state to coerce.80 The distinction between the gen­eral pub­lic and the elite has a vital prac­tical implication. The first is neither inter­ested nor informed, and hence unable to parti­cip­ate fully in the pol­icymaking pro­cess. It rather parti­cip­ates in the pro­cess in an indirect and passive way. Their moods, inter­ests and expectations limit the room for manoeuvrabil­ity of their representatives and elites. The gen­eral pub­lic has an impact on the selection of elites through elections, the private elect­oral pro­cesses of inter­est groups or espe­cially through accepting or refusing to accept the pol­icy re­com­mendations as expressed by the media.81 For Gabriel Almond, pub­lic opinion only sets the limits for decision-­makers.82 This thought is de­veloped by Thomas Risse who argues that pub­lic opinion only sets certain limits, but their restrictiveness varies according to the do­mestic structure and the coalition-­building pro­cess in the respective coun­try.83 Moreover, Risse emphasises that one should not only distinguish mass pub­lic opinion and the attentive pub­lic, but also take into con­sidera­tion pub­lics which are par­ ticu­larly attentive to specific questions.84 These specific questions are often reflected in opinion polls or sometimes become the subject of a referendum or the big issues during elections. Indeed, Risse’s concept may be use­ful in explaining the case of Poland’s accession nego­ti­ations. It seems that Polish pub­lic opinion, even though in gen­eral not par­ticu­larly inter­ested in foreign pol­icy, was par­ticu­larly attentive to certain issues such as the impact of EU mem­ber­ship on Polish agri­cul­ture, purchase of real estate by foreigners or free movement of workers. Furthermore, when ex­plor­ing Poland’s foreign pol­icy, one can see that it is influenced by opinion polls and election results. The rapid shifting of the post-­ communist movement Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) pol­icy in the year 1993

30   Domestic versus foreign policy from ‘Euro-­sceptic’ to ‘Euro enthusiast’ may serve as the best example. Moreover, the decrease in sup­port for mem­ber­ship in the last years of nego­ti­ation was accompanied by the cre­ation and the growing pop­ularity of anti-­EU par­ties. This led the gov­ern­ment to change its attitude in the nego­ti­ations, espe­cially in the last round, where it de­veloped a tough negotiating stance (par­ticu­larly on the issue of direct payments) in order to court pub­lic opinion. Elites and public opinion Even though pub­lic opinion has an impact on decision-­makers through accepting or refusing to accept their pol­icy, many authors note that in certain aspects there is a prob­lem for elites in exercising control over mass opinion. John R. Zaller defines elite domination as a situ­ation in which ‘elites induce cit­izens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best avail­able in­forma­tion and ana­lyses’.85 Zaller’s argument is indeed very im­port­ant because it shows the nature of elite domination or what may even be called manipulation. This argument is par­ticu­larly vital in the case of the Polish polit­ical elites manipulating pub­lic opinion by bringing certain issues such as purchase of real estate to the pub­lic debate.86 This is what is often de­scribed in the liter­at­ure as the ‘top-­down’ pro­cess. An al­tern­ative ‘bottom-­up’ concept as­sumes that ‘elites follow masses’. Sometimes, how­ever, both the elites and the masses share common foreign pol­icy goals.87 It may be argued that in the case of Poland’s nego­ti­ations towards the EU mem­ber­ ship there was a gen­eral consensus among elites and pub­lic opinion concerning the aim of EU mem­ber­ship. Nevertheless, whilst the case of nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture re­sembled rather the bottom up model, where mostly polit­ical elites and inter­est groups follow mass opinion, the issue of purchase of real estate was closer to the ‘top down’ concept, where masses were manipulated by elites. Elites are not homogenous. However, even though they belong to different groups (policy­makers, bur­eau­crats, journ­al­ists), when they share common inter­ ests, they constitute foreign pol­icy elite.88 Hence, from this viewpoint, in the case of Poland and other Central and Eastern Euro­pean coun­tries, one may talk not only about polit­ical or inter­est elites, but also about ‘pro’ or ‘anti-­Euro­pean’ elites. Interest groups Interest groups, as one of the elite groups, require par­ticu­lar attention. The usually broad definition of an inter­est group em­braces not only ‘mem­ber­ship organ­iza­tions, but also ad­vo­cacy organ­iza­tions that do not accept members, businesses or any organ­isa­tions that make pol­icy related appeals to the gov­ern­ment’. According to this definition, not all organ­isa­tions constitute an inter­est group, but only those which attempt to influence a gov­ern­ment.89 Moreover, some inter­ est groups are more power­ful than others, espe­cially eco­nomic inter­est groups, which pressure the gov­ern­ment to protect their own eco­nomic inter­ests.90

Domestic versus foreign policy   31 Many authors, including Christopher Hill, make a further distinction between an inter­est group and a pressure group and between an inter­est group and a cause group. Whilst the pressure groups exist to exert pressure on the gov­ern­ment, an inter­est group can mobilise its sup­porters around a common inter­est and only occasionally act as a pressure group. At the same time a cause group can mobilise its sup­porters around common value positions, often based on altruistic ideas.91 A few authors include in inter­est groups linkage groups, which have special links to foreign nations through a common eth­ni­city or ideo­logy. Linkage groups have been known to influence the gov­ern­ment in the dir­ec­tion preferred by the foreign gov­ern­ment with which a group identifies.92 Thus, the Polish Diaspora in the Euro­pean Union may serve as an example of such a linkage group, because it enlarged sup­port for the idea of Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the Euro­pean Union. A final question regards the impact of inter­est groups on foreign pol­icy. Many authors suggest that ‘The impact of inter­est groups on foreign pol­icy decision-­ making is extremely limited since such groups have no author­itat­ive position in the foreign-­policy pro­cess.’93 It is true that the direct impact of inter­est groups in the making of a state’s foreign pol­icy may be limited. Some authors underestim­ ate the fact that most inter­est groups have no expli­cit inter­est in influ­en­cing foreign pol­icy directly, since they can pursue their inter­ests in the do­mestic arena. Nevertheless, some do­mestic issues have a foreign dimension. An inter­est group, by influ­en­cing the gov­ern­ment to pursue a certain pol­icy, can indirectly influence a state’s foreign pol­icy. This phenomenon is confirmed in the case of Polish farmers’ unions and organ­isa­tions, even though they did not have an author­itat­ive position in foreign pol­icy. By demanding more sub­sidies and higher production quotas, they forced the gov­ern­ment to introduce a tough nego­ti­ation stance aimed at getting a higher level of direct payments from the EU budget. The above-­mentioned classification of inter­est groups, how­ever, does not tackle the prob­lem of how inter­est groups using certain channels of communication (for example, the media) can influence the decision-­making pro­cess. As indicated in the introductory chapter, we may observe ‘silent’ inter­est groups that focus on lobbying ac­tiv­ities behind the scenes, often representing a narrow sectoral inter­est. However, I will focus on the ‘noisy’ inter­est group. Their leaders, instead of acting behind the scenes, want to express their postulates in a demonstrative manner, using the media to acquire pub­lic attention. Such inter­est groups often represent a larger group like farmers. Among these ‘noisy’ inter­est groups, the focus in this book will be placed only on those that tried to influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess re­gard­ing the Euro­pean Union in the three case studies of this book. It would be counterproductive to discuss inter­est groups without seeing the interrelationship between inter­est groups and other do­mestic pressure. In order to understand this prob­lem, one should carefully look into an al­tern­ative definition of do­mestic pressure. An alternative definition of domestic pressure An entirely different approach towards defining pub­lic opinion and inter­est groups is presented by Bernard C. Cohen.94 He defines pub­lic opinion not

32   Domestic versus foreign policy through enumerating its groups, but instead by identi­fying and classifying its sources – either identi­fi­able or those unidentified sources that are im­per­sonal or faceless. The latter should also be regarded as channels of expressing pub­lic opinion. The identi­fi­able sources may be combined into three major groupings: Intimates, Specialists and Institutions. The first group, Intimates, includes persons or other entities who are not regarded as signi­fic­ant bearers of opinion, but who belong to the personal circle of a decision-­maker: his family, friends and colleagues. Specialists include people who have know­ledge, ex­peri­ence and skills in the pol­icy area. Finally, Institutions comprise organ­isa­tions or less formal groups, mainly inter­est groups and those within the official branches of the gov­ern­ment such as within legis­la­tion and the media. These, according to Cohen’s previous works, play a signi­fic­ant role in driving pub­lic attention to foreign affairs.95 Although fewer in number, im­per­sonal sources, as Cohen suggests, are larger in terms of the number of people whose opinions they reflect. Within this group, one may place such sources as letters, lectures or briefing sessions, pub­lic opinion polls and demonstrations.96 Cohen’s classification of pub­lic opinion finds its confirmation in de­veloped demo­cratic sys­tems and civil soci­eties, such as the US, where the position and role of Specialists and Institutions is par­ticu­larly strong, whilst in the Western de­veloped demo­cra­cies there are professionally trained specialists, experts and negotiators. Poland, as was the case with other post-­communist coun­tries in the early 1990s, had no diplomatic ser­vice or civil ser­vants specialising in foreign pol­icy. Hence, even though there has been a new wave of civil ser­vants and foreign pol­icy specialists educated in the last decade, admittedly, this is still a limited and not very influ­en­tial com­mun­ity. For this reason, Poland, in comparison to most EU coun­tries, lacks a professional diplomatic ser­vice and negotiators, not to mention the pres­ence of only a few under-­funded think tanks. The group of Specialists is rather narrow and they do not have a major influence on pub­lic opinion. The role normally reserved in Western coun­tries for Specialists is held by the media and journ­al­ists specialising in foreign pol­icy. These are rel­ at­ively power­ful and, as could be observed, by and large sup­ported integration. In Poland, even though inter­est groups also exist, they operate in a completely different envir­on­ment. Instead of being organ­ised into formal structures, they operate in a less formal and less transparent envir­on­ment. In an under-­developed party sys­tem, inter­est groups, instead of being separate pressure groups, can either become polit­ical par­ties or exercise con­sider­able influence upon them. Hence, the gov­ern­ment of Solidarity Election Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność) and the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności)97 were dominated and sometimes led by the trade union activists from the Solidarity trade union (Solidarność). When the post-­communists won the elections in 2001, they formed a gov­ern­ment with the Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), which also plays the role of a farmers’ trade union and lobby. The party was par­ticu­larly active in demanding a tough nego­ti­ation stance on the issue of direct payments. After the Peasants’ Party left the gov­ern­ment in 2002, the minor­ity gov­ern­ment was tactically sup­ported in the most im­port­ant

Domestic versus foreign policy   33 parlia­ment­ary votes by an opposi­tion party called Self-­Defence (Samoobrona).98 The case of Poland thus illus­trates that without having de­veloped Western-­type organ­ised inter­est groups, a polit­ical party can act as an inter­est group serving narrow sectoral interests. With regard to im­per­sonal opinion sources, the case of Poland shows that whilst pub­lic opinion polls and demonstrations were im­port­ant as forms of pub­lic opinion pressure during the nego­ti­ations, pub­lic lectures or briefing sessions did not play an im­port­ant role. With some exceptions, these tactics (in par­ ticu­lar peti­tions, letters and, to a limited extent, talks) were used mostly by an anti-­integration movements clustered around Radio Maryja.99 Interestingly, according to Cohen’s definition, inter­est groups constitute sources of pub­lic opinion. Indeed, the inter­est groups may not only directly influence decision-­makers, as is usually suggested, but also mobilise cit­izens outside the pol­icymaking com­mun­ity to contact or pressure policy­makers.100 This pro­ cess is known as outside lobbying and accomplishes two tasks simul­tan­eously. On the elite level it com­munic­ates aspects of pub­lic opinion to policy­makers. These actions, which may take the form of pub­licising issue positions, protesting or demonstrating, have a signalling role. This role is that of an inter­est group that wants to signal the amount of its pop­ular sup­port to policy­makers. The second role (conflict expansion) for outside lobbying is to influence members of the mass pub­lic by changing the way selected members of the pub­lic con­sider and respond to pol­icy issues.101 As will be argued, the tactic of outside lobbying was also used during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess both by pro- and anti-­integration elements in the form of issuing peti­tions, protesting and demonstrating. Nevertheless, it seems that the anti-­integration movement in Poland was more active in this respect. This is under­stand­able since the decision-­makers and most polit­ical par­ties were strongly pro-­EU.

Questions and hypotheses The liter­at­ure discussed above illus­trates the interplay between inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations, foreign pol­icy and do­mestic pol­itics. In such a situ­ation, foreign pol­icy goals should be reflected in the nego­ti­ation stances. Although the latter may be clustered around do­mestic issues, the fact that they are brought to the inter­na­tional pol­icy agenda means that they become the subject of foreign pol­ icy. In practice, the nego­ti­ation stances are often influenced by pressure coming from both pub­lic opinion and do­mestic groups. The two-­level game provides a theor­et­ical framework and my research hypotheses are clustered around this model. In the two-­level game model, pub­lic opinion or inter­est groups may press the gov­ern­ment to adopt favour­able pol­icies, although their usual goal is not to change the foreign pol­icy itself, but to protect their inter­ests or fulfil their expectations. Nevertheless, by pressing the gov­ern­ment or negotiators, those groups can indirectly influence the outcome of foreign pol­icy. Thus, although one may rightly argue that the gen­eral pub­lic is

34   Domestic versus foreign policy not inter­ested in foreign pol­icy, this does not imply, as is often claimed in the liter­at­ure,102 that do­mestic pressure does not have an influence on foreign pol­ icy. Such a situ­ation may occur if a do­mestic issue is placed on the inter­na­tional agenda. This happened during Poland’s nego­ti­ations with the EU, where the subject of the most extensive nego­ti­ation was not the future position of Poland within the EU institutions, but the protection of the Polish farmers’ inter­est, an issue that normally belongs to the realm of do­mestic pol­itics. This took place despite the fact that the nego­ti­ations concerning the level and con­ditions of direct payments were not prim­arily aimed at creating an external agreement between different coun­tries, but merely at solving an in­ternal prob­lem of Poland. Thus, this might create the core presumption that do­mestic pol­itics can influence inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations and hence indirectly can influence foreign policy. From the under­lying presumption, specific hypotheses re­gard­ing the interplay between do­mestic and sys­temic factors in inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations can be derived. There are certain hypotheses and questions that can be tested in the three case studies of this book. If a hypo­thesis is not confirmed by empirical data, then the viabil­ity of the two-­level game approach from which the hypo­ thesis was derived may be questioned. However, before formulating concurring hypotheses, a number of additional questions should be raised. Research questions The first set of questions to con­sider are those concerning the level of ana­lysis and the interplay between do­mestic and sys­temic levels, in par­ticu­lar the question whether or not the metaphor of the two-­level game provides a better theor­et­ ical framework for the case study than sys­temic level theories. The other im­port­ant prob­lem is whether Putnam’s approach provides a convincing answer to how inter­na­tional and do­mestic levels can be combined. A major issue of this study is whether the size of the win-­set can influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and outcomes, and whether, as Putnam argued, the win-­set size is determined by three major as­sump­tions: (a) the distribution of power and pref­er­ences and pos­sible co­ali­tions among Level II, (b) the Level II polit­ical institutions and (c) the strat­egies of the Level I negotiator. Then the question arises whether these three as­sump­tions can be empirically proved in the case of Poland. There are, how­ever, several additional questions re­gard­ing win-­sets. 1 2 3 4

Can we as­sume that the size of do­mestic win-­sets is constant or rather postulate that it can be manipulated, and if so by whom and for what purpose? Can the size of the win-­set constitute a bargaining advantage? What are the side-­payments and when does the price of side-­payments have to be paid? Is the outcome of nego­ti­ations determined by the choice of nego­ti­ation strat­ egy and tactics, and is the chosen strat­egy influenced by do­mestic pressure?

Domestic versus foreign policy   35 The next set of questions regards the impact of do­mestic pressure on the accession process. 1 2 3 4 5

How is ‘do­mestic pressure’ defined for the purpose of this book? What is the dif­fer­ence between pub­lic opinion and major do­mestic groups? What is the interplay between polit­ical par­ties, inter­est groups and pub­lic opinion? Can inter­est groups and pub­lic opinion influence the decision-­maker and, if so, under what conditions? Can they employ a two-­level strat­egy, for example by influ­en­cing other do­mestic groups and at the same time having impact on the decision-­maker?

From the questions asked above, several competing hypotheses can be drawn. Research hypotheses The key hypo­thesis as­sumes that Poland’s nego­ti­ations with the EU were influenced by do­mestic pressure. Thus, the size of the do­mestic win-­set can influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and its outcome. The size of the win-­set is determined by do­mestic pref­er­ences and co­ali­tions, polit­ical institutions and ratification pro­ced­ ures, and should be emphasised in the strat­egies of negotiators. With regard to the first determinant: do­mestic pref­er­ences and co­ali­tions, the rel­at­ively large win-­set to join the EU was determined by a pro-­EU orientation of the polit­ical elite, inter­est groups and the gen­eral pub­lic. With respect to the second determinant: institutions and ratification pro­ced­ures, the overall as­sump­tion is that nego­ ti­ation required several different levels of ratification requiring both formal and informal pro­ced­ures, with sometimes different win-­set sizes among each level of ratification. The third determinant is the choice of nego­ti­ation strat­egies and tactics as used by negotiators. This determinant was par­ticu­larly vital and this is the place where Putnam’s arguments may be expanded. The overall as­sump­tion is that there was a strong interplay between Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy and the size of the do­mestic win-­set. A competing hypo­ thesis would as­sume that decision-­makers and negotiators operated in an envir­ on­ment which was rel­at­ively isolated from do­mestic con­sidera­tions. While the size of the do­mestic win-­set may have an influence on in­ternal pol­icymaking, it will not influence foreign pol­icy. In other words, the inter­na­tional and do­mestic ‘boards’ should be con­sidered separately. From the major hypo­thesis that the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and outcomes are influenced by do­mestic pressure, we may derive several more specific hypotheses, and their al­tern­atives, espe­cially with regard to the nego­ti­ation strategies. The first is that Poland’s nego­ti­ation strat­egy was determined by the lack of cred­ ible BATNA. A competing hypo­thesis would as­sume that Poland had al­tern­atives such as an idea of a Central and Eastern Euro­pean secur­ity zone or closer collaboration with the US. Nevertheless, polit­ical elite and inter­est groups were pushing towards the mem­ber­ship in the EU and other al­tern­atives were abandoned.

36   Domestic versus foreign policy The next hypo­thesis concerns the size of the do­mestic win-­set. In the pro­cess of nego­ti­ations, the win-­set can be manipulated by various do­mestic groups, polit­ical par­ties in par­ticu­lar. Thus, polit­ical negotiators may use the size of the do­mestic win-­set as part of their nego­ti­ation strat­egy. For example, Polish representatives during nego­ti­ations may use a small do­mestic win-­set as a bargaining ad­vant­age, but in order to get ratification in a referendum they may wish to enlarge a do­mestic win-­set by using certain nego­ti­ation tricks and PR instruments. An al­tern­ative hypo­thesis would as­sume that the size of the do­mestic win-­set was rather constant. Although it fluctuated, this was due to factors that were inde­pend­ent from the do­mestic con­text that underlies inter­na­tional pol­itics, for example pub­lic opinion in Poland was prone to inter­na­tional signals sent from Brussels rather than from Warsaw. Another hypo­thesis would as­sume that the size of the win-­set could differ for both do­mestic as well as different players in the three case studies. There is an interplay between various do­mestic groups and the gen­eral pub­lic. Hence, for instance there might be a small do­mestic win-­set among the gen­eral pub­lic to accept trans­itional periods in the free movement of labour. However, at the same time the polit­ical elite may be willing to make a deal: ‘We will agree on the trans­itional period in the free movement of labour (EU proposal) for the price of acceptance of a long trans­itional period in the purchase of real estate by foreigners (Polish proposal).’ Hence, the agreement for the trans­itional period in the nego­ti­ation for free movement of labour may be treated as a side-­payment to achieve other negotiating goals. Consequently, the size of do­mestic win-­sets may be different in each of the case studies, for instance smaller in the case of agri­ cul­ture and larger with respect to the free movement of labour. An al­tern­ative hypo­thesis would as­sume that the size of the do­mestic win-­set is a means of different do­mestic win-­sets. Discussing the above-­mentioned hypotheses and questions in an empirical case study will enable us to understand and explain the nature of Poland’s nego­ ti­ations during EU accession: in par­ticu­lar, the interplay between different actors and agents. Finally, this research will help us to understand the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess itself, the key charac­ter­istics of the Polish case and the dif­fer­ences concerning other cases. The arguments will enable us to conclude that the key question of this book is not whether the link between Polish do­mestic groups and the pro­ cess of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations exists. Instead, the main aim is to explain how this interplay is organ­ised and its consequences.

3 Polish–EU relations 1990–2003

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of Poland’s his­tor­ical path to the EU. First, it briefly summar­ises the mo­tiva­tions behind Poland’s de­cision to join the EU. Then, it reviews Polish–EU relations from 1990 to 1998 (beginning at the time of the estab­lishment of bi­lat­eral relations between the EC and Poland, through the Association Agreement, the Copen­hagen Summit of 1993 and the submission of the mem­ber­ship applica­tion, to the official opening of nego­ti­ ations). Even though this book does not focus on the prenego­ti­ations, the early Polish–EU relationship and the prenego­ti­ation period are vital for understanding the future dy­namics of the negotiations. One can differentiate among certain stages of Poland’s integration with the EU. The first step towards integration was the estab­lishment of relations between Poland and the Communities. The next phase included the nego­ti­ations on the Europe Agreement (1990–91). The Copen­hagen Summit of 1993 was a turning point, which opened a window of oppor­tun­ity for Poland’s mem­ber­ship and made clear the requirements for this (the so-­called Copen­hagen cri­teria). The Europe Agreement was finally put in force in 1994. The asso­ci­ation agreement allowed Poland to prepare an applica­tion for mem­ber­ship in the EU. The next phase included the pre­para­tion before formal nego­ti­ations (1994–98). The last phase, which will be the main focus of this book, was the official nego­ti­ations, the pre­para­tion and ratification of the Accession Treaty. The purpose of this chapter is to give an his­tor­ical overview of the Polish–EU relations, as well as to explain the overall nego­ti­ation structure and pro­cess. Without this discussion, it would be im­pos­sible to understand and explain the impact of do­mestic pressure as discussed in the three case studies.

Why did Poland desire to join the EU? Without going deeply into the avail­able liter­at­ure on the motives for Poland joining the EU, one should briefly examine why Poland desired to join the Union. Polish decision-­makers1, when asked ‘What is the major reason behind Poland’s de­cision to join the EU?’, emphasised two major aspects: 1) the com­mun­ity of values and 2) the com­mun­ity of inter­ests between Poland and the EU.

38   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Community of values The first major group of reasons behind the de­cision to join the EU, often reflected in social surveys and emphasised by decision-­makers, was the com­ mun­ity of values and common Euro­pean identity. This concept ref­er­enced self-­ perception, symbolic pol­itics, certain polit­ical rhet­oric and the acceptance of lib­eral values. Both par­ties shared this notion of com­mun­ity. According to Ulrich Sedelmeier, on the EU side, the funda­mental puzzle for the enlargement was why the EU committed itself to enlargement despite the cost that would arise for indi­vidual member states. As Sedelmeier argued, this de­cision was driven by non-­material factors, mainly the role of col­lect­ive identity including the ‘special respons­ib­ility’ towards the CEEC.2 Schimmelfennig argued that through rhet­ orical action, the self-­interested ad­voc­ates of Eastern enlargement persistently appealed to the col­lect­ive identity, lib­eral values and norms of the com­mun­ity organ­isa­tions.3 This argument of common values was pre­val­ent not only in Poland but also in other CEEC as a widespread sense of the coun­try belonging to Europe and of being a Euro­pean nation, which of course con­trib­uted to the pro-­EU choice.4 Often, the discourse re­gard­ing EU mem­ber­ship used a par­ticu­lar terminology related to the prob­lem of creating Polish national identity. In post-­Westphalian Europe, national identity was built around the nation state. Polish national iden­ tity was built without an inde­pend­ent state. This identity was neither linked with the concept of cit­izen­ship nor connected with loy­alty to the state. It was rather based on the notion of Polish culture, one deeply rooted in Euro­pean her­it­age. Even when Poland regained inde­pend­ence after the First World War, the inter-­ war generation was introduced to an image of their coun­try as Euro­pean.5 Hence, after the communist regime collapsed, Poles, instead of using the term ‘joining Europe’, preferred using the term ‘re-­joining’ or ‘reunification’. Among polit­ical elites in the CEEC, there was widespread agreement that the EU had an ‘his­tor­ ical respons­ib­ility to reunite the two halves of Europe’.6 Thus, mem­ber­ship in the EU was regarded as a symbol of the definite end to the division of Europe and the re-­inclusion of Poland and other CEEC into the Euro­pean family.7 Polish identity is deeply rooted in the notion of Euro­pean civilisation, and Poles con­ sider themselves to be Euro­peans, whatever this means.8 Indeed, there was a dispute about the meaning of Europe or what it meant to become a Euro­pean. This dispute implied a range of ideo­logical positions from strong pro-­EU to more Euro-­sceptic.9 Surprisingly enough, even those strongly criticising the EU emphasised that Poland’s future should be built on ‘true Euro­pean values’ and stressed the coun­try’s strong cultural belonging to the Euro­pean tradition, based on its Chris­tian her­it­age.10 For the great majority of Poles, mem­ber­ship in the EU was con­sidered as an act of his­tor­ical justice and the end of the Yalta formula (which is always in­ter­preted to mean the betrayal of Poland by its allies when the Western powers agreed with the Soviet determination to include Poland in the Soviet sphere of inter­est). For this reason, it was felt that Poland deserved EU mem­ber­ship since the coun­try suffered communist oppression against its

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   39 will. The best example of this need to confirm Poland’s Euro­pean identity may be found in the National Strategy of Integration, which states: ‘For over one thou­sand years Poland has belonged to Europe in the geo-­political, cultural and eco­nomic sense. Our coun­try has shared its basic values, which it helped to create and defend.’12 Such declarations are deeply rooted in symbolic pol­itics; how­ever, they often limit the space for a debate on the meaning of Euro­pean identity. Unfortunately, the pub­lic debate on this prob­lem was almost non-­ existent. One of the pos­sible reasons for this lack of pub­lic debate was to keep a pub­lic consensus on Poland’s pro-­EU choices.13 11

Community of interests The com­mun­ity of inter­ests is reflected in the attitude shared by most Poles, that ‘A return’ to Europe had both a strong psychological and an eco­nomic com­pon­ ent. On the one hand, many Poles were eager to be included in Western institu­ tions, specifically the Council of Europe, OECD, NATO or the Euro­pean Union. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the ‘return to Europe’ depended on the coun­try’s abil­ity to negotiate an eco­nomic parity with her Western neigh­bours in which the gap between them would decline and ultimately disappear.14 Accord­ ing to this logic, Poland had to turn towards the West, because other­wise it would be polit­ically and eco­nomic­ally mar­ginalised.15 It does not mean, how­ ever, that the question whether EU mem­ber­ship would serve Polish national inter­est was not controversial. Indeed, it was a subject of heated polit­ical or, to be more precise, ideo­logical disputes. The soci­ety was divided into two camps: winners of the sys­tem who have bene­fited from the trans­ition, and losers who have been hurt by the polit­ical and eco­nomic trans­ition. Obviously, the winners were more likely to sup­port the EU accession.16 Thus, the attitude towards the sys­temic trans­forma­tion often reflected the gen­eral attitude towards the idea of EU mem­ber­ship. The often-­raised argument was that EU mem­ber­ship would serve Polish inter­est because it would be the logical con­sequence of the sys­temic trans­forma­tion and would help Poland to strengthen the free market, demo­cracy and the rule of law. It seemed that in Poland, as well as in other Central Euro­pean coun­ tries, the rejection of the communist sys­tem based on socialist demo­cracy, a regulated eco­nomy, ‘social justice’ and rights, and finally Soviet hege­mony implied absorption of the Western sys­tem and the values of lib­eral demo­cracy, the market eco­nomy, rule of law and human rights. This pro­cess was accom­ panied by constant polit­ical turmoil and the lack of Western-­type polit­ical elites. Under these circumstances, other al­tern­atives for EU mem­ber­ship (such as the idea of Intermarium – Inde­pend­ent Central Euro­pean Security Commu­ nity) were rejected without even being ser­iously con­sidered. Instead, Poland was ready to accept the Western structures and fully adapt to the EU requirements.17 EU accession was thus seen, espe­cially by the winners of the sys­tem and by elites, as a cornerstone of sys­temic trans­forma­tion that would strengthen

40   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 demo­cracy, market eco­nomy and the rule of law. Some Euro-­enthusiasts even argued that without Polish mem­ber­ship in the EU, these values would be threatened. On the other hand, polit­ical elites, in the acceding coun­tries, deeply believed that the enlargement would also serve EU inter­ests. When asked why the Union should take in the applicant coun­tries, they often referred to common eco­nomic and secur­ity inter­ests. The common eco­nomic inter­est was to create a larger market helping Europe to compete in the global market, whilst the common secur­ity inter­est was to ensure greater stability and prevent pos­sible conflicts.18 The motives of a com­mun­ity of values and inter­ests enable an understanding of the par­ticu­larities of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess from a broader per­spect­ive. Without understanding the question of why Poland was determined to become an EU member, one would not understand the details and par­ticu­larities of Poland’s nego­ti­ations over EU accession.

Establishing relations between Poland and the communities, and negotiating the Europe Agreement (1988–91) The first stage of diplo­macy included estab­lishing relations and the negotiating and signing of the Europe Agreement. Establishing relations Diplomatic relations between Poland and the Euro­pean Community were offi­ cially estab­lished in Septem­ber 1988 when Poland was still a People’s Repub­lic. Before this, the 12 EC coun­tries had agreed on a pol­icy of prudent encourage­ ment of change in Eastern Europe. The reason for the advice to be prudent and cau­tious was because Gorbatchev’s mo­tiva­tions were not entirely clear.19 This polit­ical position on the part of the 12 coun­tries began to change after the Polish gov­ern­ment started nego­ti­ations with the opposi­tion in Febru­ary 1989 and after the Hun­gar­ian leader, Janos Kadar, was forced to resign in 1989. In the mean­ time, the Trilateral Commission on East–West relations comprising Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Henry Kissinger prepared a report in which they argued for a less cau­tious and more courageous approach towards Eastern Europe. It suggested that the Community should devise a special cat­ egory of asso­ci­ation towards Eastern Europe. The report also claimed that if reform in the East were successful, the integration of these coun­tries into the Community would be inev­it­able.20 Euro­pean gov­ern­ments, the German and British in par­ticu­lar, started to recon­sider their cau­tious approach, and suggested the need to sup­port the trans­forma­tion in Eastern Europe, espe­cially after the over­whelm­ing victory of solid­arity in Poland in the semi-­democratic elections of June 1989.21 A month later, the repres­enta­tion of Poland at the Euro­pean Com­ munity in Brussels was estab­lished. Simultaneously, the coun­try began nego­ti­ ations with the Communities on a trade and eco­nomic coopera­tion treaty, which was signed in Warsaw on 19 Septem­ber 1989.22

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   41 Negotiations concerning the Association Agreement On 25 May 1990 Poland made an official applica­tion in Brussels to begin nego­ ti­ations for an Association Agreement with the Community. In Au­gust 1990 the Commission Communication on Association Agreements contained an im­port­ ant declaration: In the light of the rel­at­ively more advanced eco­nomic and demo­cratic situ­ ation in Czecho­slo­vakia, Hun­gary and Poland, exploratory discussions for estab­lishing a series of asso­ci­ation agreements with the EEC should take place in these coun­tries first. The Euro­pean Commission’s report outlined the ob­ject­ives and requirements of the future ‘Europe Agreements’ which were expected to create a climate of stability favouring eco­nomic and polit­ ical reform.23 But the EU felt that these asso­ci­ation accords, unlike that signed with Turkey, would not provide for ultimate accession to the Community.24 The opening of preliminary nego­ti­ations with Hun­gary, Poland and Czecho­slo­vakia, on the pos­ sib­il­ity of future asso­ci­ation agreements, was only given the go-­ahead by the EEC’s Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers’ meeting in Brussels on 17 Septem­ ber 1990. The Council repeated after the Commission that the accords would not provide for the ultimate accession of CEE states into the Community.25 Even though Poland achieved success, the coun­try was not fully satisfied. As the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki said imme­diately after meeting in Warsaw with Franz Andriessen, Deputy President of the EEC Commission in Septem­ber 1990: I, on my part, have strongly encouraged Mr. Andriessen and, through him, the Community, to increase its territorial extent because we believe that after the great historic breakthrough and rejection of totalitarianism and com­mun­ism, a further impulse is needed to achieve Euro­pean integration. But that is not pos­sible unless the eco­nomic division is overcome. I suppose the Community should give it a try.26 Andriessen stated that no EEC member coun­try held any pre­ju­dice against Poland and it striving for asso­ci­ation. He added that he was impressed by the determination of the Polish gov­ern­ment in implementing reforms.27 Exploratory talks on proposed asso­ci­ation agreements with the three Central Euro­pean coun­tries were concluded on 17 Octo­ber 1990 and officially announced by the Euro­pean Commission on 23 Octo­ber. The discussions served mainly to clarify the basis of such accords and restate the CEEC and EC inten­ tion of gradually integrating these coun­tries into the Euro­pean Community.28 After a few months of rel­at­ive non-­activity, on 6 and 7 March 1991 Andriessen visited Poland and completed a series of meetings with the top-­level Polish politicians. One of the key topics was the discussion about the Europe

42   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Agreement, the PHARE programme and its eco­nomic reforms. The official com­ ments from the Commission did not go beyond mere diplomatic language, stating: The discussions were held in an extremely cooperative and friendly atmo­ sphere, underlining the increasing in­tens­ity of the relations between the Polish Repub­lic and the Euro­pean Community, and reflecting the Commu­ nity’s continuing sup­port for Poland’s efforts to create an open, pluralistic, free-­market soci­ety.29 The Polish side was rather dissatisfied, espe­cially with regard to the absence of ref­er­ence to the CEEC’s accession ob­ject­ive. As President Walesa pub­licly com­ plained: the EU replaced the ‘iron curtain with a silver curtain’. Despite some sym­pathy towards Polish officials from the DG of External Relations, he found some of the Polish claims and moralistic rhet­oric from the Polish side unhelpful.30 The third round of nego­ti­ations between the EC and Poland over Europe Agreements took place on 18–19 March 1991 in Brussels. The nego­ti­ations focused on fin­an­cial coopera­tion and trade, polit­ical dialogue, the approximation of legis­la­tion to Community norms, the free movement of capital and ser­vices, and the estab­lishment of new institutions.31 In Au­gust 1991 EC foreign min­is­ters agreed to speed up the Europe Agree­ ments with Poland, Hun­gary and Czecho­slo­vakia. These had been held up by the refusal of the 12 coun­tries to open their markets to import, in par­ticu­lar coal, steel, textiles and agricultural products. At that time the Commission President Jacques Delors said accusingly of Euro­pean politicians that they first make ‘tearful speeches’ about demo­cracy and free markets and then ‘slam the door to Polish veal or wheat’. At the same time, Delors asked for a flex­ible negotiating mandate.32 His request was repeated in Septem­ber 1991 by the Commissioner Andriessen, who was also pleading for a more flex­ible negotiating mandate from the Foreign Ministers. Andriessen asked the Council to grant him a con­sider­ably enlarged margin of manoeuvrabil­ity in the most sensitive sectors: agri­cul­ture and textiles.33 His request for a flex­ible nego­ti­ation mandate was prompted by the lack of a coherent pol­icy within the EC coun­tries, which was par­ticu­larly clear during the final phase of nego­ti­ations. This resulted from the fact that some Europe Agreement proposals, instead of offering generous trade concessions most appropriate to CEEC market needs, were restrictive.34 What is more, some of the EC coun­tries treated trade concessions as a first step towards the pos­sib­il­ ity of the CEEC entering the Community and in fact, the EC coun­tries were strongly divided on whether or not the CEEC should join the Euro­pean Community. Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s sup­port for closer coopera­tion leading to EC mem­ ber­ship of the CEEC differed markedly from fears usually expressed by French politicians that a doub­ling in size of the EC would adversely affect French power and influence. Britain, on the other hand, even though sup­porting CEEC

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   43 accession to the EC was prim­arily involved in the discussion over the single Euro­pean currency.35 However, there was also a co­ali­tion of ad­voc­ates of enlargement not only within some of the EU coun­tries, but also within the EU Commission and the DG Enlargement, in par­ticu­lar.36 In fact, it was only due to the strong demand from Czecho­slo­vakia, Hun­gary and Poland, and sup­port from the enlargement ad­voc­ates within the Commission and the EU‑15, that the pre­amble to the Europe Agreement mentioned that the ultimate, but not automatic, goal of the associated states was accession to the EC (although it was not said that this was the goal of the Community itself ).37 The bi­lat­eral talks resulted in the ‘Agreement Establishing an Association between the Repub­lic of Poland and the Euro­pean Communities and their Member States’, signed in Decem­ber 1991. The Copenhagen Summit of 1993 The period between Janu­ary 1992 and May 1993 can be characterised as a period of rel­at­ive stasis in bi­lat­eral relations, which par­ticu­larly disappointed the Polish side. The Europe Agreement did not guarantee Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU, but only set up a framework for polit­ical and eco­nomic coopera­tion, gradual integration into the Community and access to its in­ternal markets. For the asso­ ciate coun­tries, trade concessions were not enough, and the fact that no dates or con­ditions for eventual mem­ber­ship were set caused their disappointment.38 Just before the Copen­hagen Summit, the Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka had sent a letter to the EC Member States’ Prime Ministers and the President of the EC, lambasting the Community for its paltry attempts to integrate Poland into its fold. She emphasised that Poland was experiencing a growing disillusionment among the popu­la­tion as they were suffering the high costs of trans­ition, and several pressure groups were seeking a change in pol­icy that would threaten parts of the reform pro­cess. And, she concluded that Poland signed the Associa­ tion Agreement in good faith, ‘convinced that it provided for openness in trade relations which would stimulate reforms and help integrate Poland into the Com­ munity’. She called for a ‘clear polit­ical message’ from the Copen­hagen Summit to the effect that the Community would strive for EC mem­ber­ship for the associ­ ated coun­tries and would accelerate and improve market access for the CEEC.39 The pol­icy of the Europe Agreement, as a long-­term pol­icy towards the region, proved short-­lived. Even before the Europe Agreement had been formally rati­ fied, the EC, at the Copen­hagen Summit of June 1993, launched a major pol­icy change by making an expli­cit link between the Euro­pean secur­ity order and mem­ ber­ship, and by assuming that stability in Europe and the secur­ity of its own members could be provided for only by moving institutional and legal bound­ar­ies farther to the East.40 The change in EC pol­icy was also connected to the EC pro­ cess of governance. Until mid-­1993, the EC was engaged in nego­ti­ations at a number of tables, which often influenced each other. In par­ticu­lar, until the second part of 1993, the EU pol­icies towards CEEC were overshadowed by the EU’s ambition to introduce a single currency at the expense of Eastern

44   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 enlargement.41 What is more, in mid-­1993 the parallel nego­ti­ations re­gard­ing German unification, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and nego­ti­ations on the fin­an­cial per­spect­ive of the EC, which had prevented the opening of enlargement nego­ti­ations with the EFTA states, had been settled. At the same time, the de­cision to offer mem­ber­ship to a few CEEC was accomplished by the Euro­pean Council at the Copen­hagen Summit of 21–22 June 1993.42 This de­cision would not have been pos­sible without the backing of some pol­icy ad­voc­ates from some EU coun­tries and within the EU Commission and DG for Enlargement in par­ticu­ lar. This was the beginning of the moving of EU pol­icy beyond the asso­ci­ation formula. The central element of their ad­vo­cacy was a formal en­dorsement of the CEEC’s eventual accession as the ob­ject­ive of the EU.43 The EU adopted three gen­eral polit­ical and eco­nomic con­ditions for can­did­ ates: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing demo­cracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minor­it­ies; 2) the exist­ence of a func­ tioning market eco­nomy as well as the capa­city to cope with com­petit­ive pres­ sure and market forces within the Union; and 3) the abil­ity to take on the obli­ga­tions of mem­ber­ship, including adherence to the aims of polit­ical, eco­ nomic and monetary union.44 These con­ditions were designed to minimise the risk of the polit­ical and eco­ nomic in­stability of CEEC. Heather Grabble assessed these con­ditions by stating: They were formulated as much to reas­sure member states as to guide the applicant coun­tries and introduced to provide a safeguard against the EU responding to geo-­political and stra­tegic con­sidera­tions alone and thus allowing the coun­try to join before it is fully able to compete in the single market.45 Whilst the first two con­ditions were about the polit­ical and eco­nomic reforms, the third was more complicated since it entailed full acceptance of the acquis communautaire, including parti­cipa­tion in all three pillars estab­lished in the Treaty on Euro­pean Union. The Euro­pean Council stipulated that ‘The Union’s capa­city to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of Euro­pean integration, is also an im­port­ant factor in the gen­eral inter­est of both the Union and the candidate coun­tries.’46 During the Copen­hagen Euro­pean Council in June 1993, the Union took a further step in the Europe Agreements towards estab­lishing free trade with the CEE within the next few years by re­du­cing some ori­ginal restrictions. According to a timetable, the sides agreed that by 1 Janu­ary 1996, the EU would have abol­ ished all remaining tariffs on steel and coal. By 1 Janu­ary 1997 it would have abol­ished all remaining tariffs on textiles, while by 1 Janu­ary 1998 it would have elim­in­ated all remaining quantitative restrictions on textiles. By July 1995 the EU would have pro­gressively reduced EU tariffs and duties on some agricultural products and have increased tariff quotas. Poland was expected to have removed all remaining tariffs on industrial products by the end of 1998. According to a

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   45 timetable for other pro­vi­sions, by the end of 1994 Poland was to introduce com­ peti­tion rules and was to have defined their position in terms of pub­lic com­panies and undertakings with special or exclusive rights. By the end of 1997 Poland was to have introduced meas­ures to adjust monopolies of a commercial nature.47 Ratification of the Association Agreement The Copen­hagen Summit not only opened up a pos­sib­il­ity for future enlarge­ ment, but also provided a better framework for the ratification of the Europe Agreements that finally went into force on 1 Febru­ary 1994, more than two years after the ori­ginal agreements were signed. The final aim of the Agreements was to provide an appropriate framework for polit­ical dialogue and to encourage expansion of trade and har­moni­ous eco­nomic relations between the par­ties. It was also aimed to provide a basis for the Communities’ technical and fin­an­cial assistance to Poland and an appropriate framework for Poland’s gradual integra­ tion into the Community.48 The first com­pon­ent of the treaty was polit­ical dialogue. It was stated in the Agreement that such a dialogue would ‘Allow the par­ties to discuss issues of mutual inter­est at the highest level’, paving the way for the formal estab­lishment of the Association Council, the Association Committee and the Joint Parliamen­ tary Committee. The first of these bodies would provide a forum for the Foreign Ministers to discuss and resolve dis­par­ate prob­lems that might arise in the frame­ work of the Association Agreement. The Association Committee would bring together senior civil ser­vants from the EU and the two associated states – Poland and Hun­gary – to discuss certain bi­lat­eral and Euro­pean issues. Finally, the Joint Parliamentary Committee would provide a forum for a polit­ical debate. The second element of the Agreement was trade lib­eralisation. The ori­ginal lib­eralisation pro­vi­sions, as drafted in 1991, allowed for a gradual removal of tariff bar­riers for industrial products over a ten-­year period, and par­ticu­larly sen­ sitive sectors such as agri­cul­ture, steel and textiles were granted de­roga­tions.49 Later on, lib­eralisation, espe­cially in the agri­cul­ture sector, became one of the key nego­ti­ation topics. The asymmetrical reduction of tariffs and quotas could not prevent an increasing CEEC trade deficit with the EU.50 The Agreements opened the door to the free movement of ser­vices, people and capital and to a much closer form of polit­ical dialogue. They also included the long-­term ob­ject­ ive of Poland and Hun­gary joining the Union. This was the first step towards further accession, since the Agreement contained re­cog­ni­tion that Poland’s ultimate ob­ject­ive was mem­ber­ship in the Euro­pean Community.51 The goal of future mem­ber­ship was highlighted by the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski. As he emphasised, The 1991 Europe Agreement [. . .] lays the founda­tions for Poland’s future mem­ber­ship in the EU. [. . .] In fact, our goal was to guarantee Poland a lasting and safe position in Europe. [. . .] Here the link with do­mestic pol­icy is unbreakable and decisive for the success of the whole grand design.52

46   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 However, the issue of whether indeed the Europe Agreement laid the founda­tion for future mem­ber­ship seems controversial. It seems that the Polish side over-­ emphasised its im­plica­tions for future mem­ber­ship, in par­ticu­lar those connected to the pos­sib­il­ity and timetable for future nego­ti­ations.53 It ought to be emphasised that the EC coun­tries’ goals were slightly different. As Karen E. Smith de­scribed it: They were to: create a climate of confidence and stability favouring reform and allowing the de­velopment of close polit­ical relations; strengthen the founda­tions of the new Euro­pean architecture; improve the climate for trade and investment; and help the East Euro­pean coun­tries better manage the trans­ition pro­cess. Membership was not an ob­ject­ive.54 Indeed, despite the official pol­icy of overcoming the ‘unnat­ural’ divisions of Europe, the EC was not ready for enlargement. The EC had great difficulty in de­veloping a coherent pol­icy towards its new neigh­bours and treated relations with the CEEC as part of the foreign relations of the EC rather than as part of its in­ternal relations.55 Nevertheless, there was light at the end of the tunnel. In the pre­amble to the Europe Agreement with Poland, the par­ties recog­nised ‘the fact that the final ob­ject­ive of Poland was to become a member of the Community, and this accession in the view of the par­ties would help to achieve this ob­ject­ive’.56

Submission of the Polish application concerning accession and the pre-­accession strategy The preliminary step to the attainment of Poland’s full integration was made on 8 April 1994 by the submission of the official ‘Application concerning Poland’s Accession to the Euro­pean Union’ by Poland’s Foreign Minister Andrzej Ole­ chowski. Just a day earl­ier, when speaking before the Polish par­lia­ment, he declared that the gov­ern­ment believed Poland met all the con­ditions for mem­ ber­ship, including stable demo­cratic institutions, ob­serv­ance of civil rights, a market eco­nomy and the adaptation of its laws to EU stand­ards.57 He pointed out that opinion polls showed more than 70 per cent of Poles across the whole polit­ ical spectrum sup­ported joining the EU.58 In a Novem­ber 1994 opinion poll, this percentage increased to 77.59 On 4 and 5 Octo­ber 1994 in Luxemburg, the Euro­pean Union’s Foreign Min­ isters examined the Commission’s proposed pre-­accession strat­egy of the coun­ tries of Central and Eastern Europe for the first time.60 The strat­egy was adopted by the Euro­pean Council Summit in Essen on 9–10 Decem­ber 1994 as preparing associated coun­tries for mem­ber­ship in the Union. The purpose of the strat­egy was to guide applicants towards fulfilling the Copen­hagen cri­teria. Moreover, the strat­egy used and incorp­or­ated earl­ier com­mit­ments, in par­ticu­lar the Europe Agreement, into the pre-­accession strat­egy.61 The pre-­accession strat­egy was based on initiatives in five areas: strengthening the structured relationship;

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   47 approximation of laws; enhancing trade oppor­tun­ities; promoting coopera­tion in areas such as energy, transport and the envir­on­ment; and assistance for integra­ tion and reform (with PHARE and EC loans).62 Structural dialogue and the PHARE programme One of the most im­port­ant new and in­teg­ral elements of the EU pre-­accession strat­egy was the so-­called structural dialogue, which took the form of regu­lar meetings of heads of states and min­is­ters of member states and associated states. The idea of the dialogue was to facilitate the pro­cess of adjusting to EU mem­ ber­ship. The dialogue was intended as a forum for multi­lateral discussion of issues; how­ever, it was rel­at­ively ineffect­ive since it lacked decision-­making powers and any clear focus. Consequently, it tended to be given rel­at­ively little attention by Western politicians and was sometimes referred to as an unstruc­ tured monologue.63 Whilst the structural dialogue was intended as a polit­ical meas­ure, the PHARE programme was regarded as an eco­nomic element of the pre-­accession strat­egy.64 Even though it was estab­lished in 1990 to provide technical assistance to sup­port the pro­cess of eco­nomic trans­ition, it was later incorp­or­ated as an eco­ nomic instrument of the pre-­accession strat­egy. The efficacy and appropriateness of the advice received is difficult to assess.65 However, overall it provided im­port­ant technical assistance to the candidate states. The White Paper The Council also requested the Euro­pean Commission to draw up annual reports on the implementation of the pre-­accession strat­egy, as well as to present an ana­ lysis of the expansion of the EU.66 In order to sup­port the pro­cess of adjustment to EU stand­ards and as an element of pre-­accession strat­egy, a ‘White Paper con­ cerning integration of the Associated Central and Eastern Euro­pean coun­tries into the in­ternal market of the Euro­pean Union’ was drafted.67 Unlike the Europe Agreements, the White Paper had no legal force; it imposed many obli­ga­tions on CEEC and put them in a weak bargaining position because they had to accept the White Paper demands as applicants. This gave them little room for polit­ical manoeuvrabil­ity in relations with the EU.68 Indeed, as Poland’s Secretary of State for Euro­pean Affairs Jacek Saryusz-­ Wolski put it, there was some concern in the Association coun­tries at the rigour of the demands being made, the lack of resources being made avail­able and the absence of in­dica­tions of reci­pro­city from the EU in the easing of bar­riers. This, according to Saryusz-­Wolski, weakened Poland’s enthusiasm for the pro­ject.69 Jan Kułakowski, at that time Polish Ambassador to the EU, argued that it was crucial that the White Paper should not be in­ter­preted as a device for deferring accession. Hence, full com­pliance with the letter of every pro­vi­sion in it, accord­ ing to him, ought not to be seen as a precon­dition to accession nego­ti­ations, and he confirmed that Poland would be ‘select­ive’ in its implementation pro­cess.70

48   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 The White Paper was a very im­port­ant docu­ment guiding the applicant coun­ tries towards mem­ber­ship, in par­ticu­lar towards legis­lat­ive approximation, prim­ arily at the formal level of writing EU directives into national law.71 In conjunction with the Euro­pean Council in Madrid on 15–16 Decem­ber 1995, the Commission also prepared two other reports: one on a strat­egy for integration of Central and Eastern Euro­pean farming with the Common Agricultural Policy and the other on the impact of enlargement re­gard­ing other com­mun­ity pol­icies, espe­cially structural pol­icy.72 The EU Commission questionnaire The next im­port­ant step was accomplished on 26 April 1996, when the Euro­pean Commission gave each gov­ern­ment of the associated states an extensive ques­ tionnaire covering 23 areas of the state’s polit­ical, eco­nomic and social life. Through a Polish Council of Ministers de­cision, the Government Plenipotentiary for Euro­pean Integration and Foreign Assistance was requested to co­ordinate the response to the Commission’s questionnaire. In June 1996 the gov­ern­ment approved the entire package of responses, which filled 26 volumes. The docu­ment was used by the Commission as a basis for pre­ para­tion of its Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union.73 Support for the accession in the EU countries In the inter­na­tional polit­ical dimension, the push for enlargement was pos­sible due to the strong backing for this pro­cess by Ger­many and the UK in par­ticu­lar. German pol­icy was very consistent in advocating the idea of mem­ber­ship of the Central Euro­pean coun­tries in the EU. The German mo­tiva­tion for EU enlarge­ ment had not only an eco­nomic, polit­ical and geo-­political dimension, but also a strong moral dimension.74 Ger­many and Britain were par­ticu­larly concerned that failure to finalise pro­spective mem­ber­ship might intensify eco­nomic and polit­ ical turmoil in CEE, or could even lead to the revival of a dangerous nationalism or put the region in the sphere of Russian influence. Unlike Ger­many and the UK, France insisted that before enlargement, the EU would have to carry out its own in­ternal reforms. The view was shared by some Mediterranean coun­tries, which also feared the cost of pos­sible enlargement and the fact that some current EU members would lose sub­sidies and structural funds.75 The pro­gressive integration pro­cess was strongly sup­ported by pub­lic opinion in Poland. The highest sup­port was noted in 1994 and 1995, when about 80 per cent of the whole popu­la­tion sup­ported integration. Nevertheless, this tend­ency steadily declined to around 60 per cent in 1997. It seems that, paradoxically, this had an impact on fostering the integration pro­cess. The EU understood that Polish pub­lic opinion was becoming more and more disillusioned with the EU promises and that Euro-­scepticism, after the ori­ginal Euro-­euphoria, was increas­ ing. Thus, the EU realised that if the Union wanted to keep its influence in

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   49 Central Europe, it had to offer mem­ber­ship to the post-­communist coun­tries. However, it was anxious about the complexity of the new wave of EU accession and, in gen­eral, they lacked a clear vision of the enlargement process. As Jan Zielonka argued, most EU pol­icies towards CEEC ‘emerged by default rather than by design’. Even though the Union invested fin­an­cial and polit­ical capital in CEEC, this investment lacked a clearly defined stra­tegic purpose. This resulted from three major deficiencies of the Union towards the CEEC: first, there was a lack of vision for the region; second, pol­icies towards CEEC were dominated by the EU’s in­ternal agenda; and finally, the Union failed to reform its own institutional structure.76

Negotiation process The complexities of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess have many facets. There was a basic dif­fer­ence between the nego­ti­ations of Association Agreements and accession nego­ti­ations. According to a Commission negotiator: An asso­ci­ation nego­ti­ation is a game, where you can try to impose your will on the other party. He might not like it and then you go back home and change a bit, but then that is basically it. In an accession game, conversely, we are talking about planning a marriage. And just like in ‘real life’ you cannot have a marriage, when one of the par­ties after the first day is mis­er­ able. At least it will be very costly, since you are bound also to pay for your partner’s prob­lems.77 The pro­cess of Poland’s nego­ti­ations towards EU accession can be divided into four main stages: screening or the review of Poland’s legis­la­tion; pre­para­tion of position papers; proper nego­ti­ations based on nego­ti­ation positions; and settle­ ment and ratification of the Accession Treaty. The nego­ti­ations will be examined in detail in the three case studies. At this stage, I will give a gen­eral overview of the nego­ti­ation process. Preparing negotiations In the pursuit of EU mem­ber­ship in Janu­ary 1997, the Polish Council of Minis­ ters adopted the National Strategy for Integration, a docu­ment that laid down the tasks in the pro­cess of accession to the EU. This was followed by appointment of an intermin­is­ter­ial team respons­ible for preparing nego­ti­ations. On 9 May 1997 the Council for Euro­pean Integration was appointed as a body of advisors to the chairman of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration. In June 1997 the Council of Ministers adopted a timetable for implementation of the National Strategy for Integration. In July 1997 the Euro­pean Commission presented its opinion on the Polish applica­tion for EU mem­ber­ship, praising the effort made by the coun­try and, simul­tan­eously, re­com­mending improvements, mainly in the opera­tion of courts, in the fight against corruption, in reform of the social

50   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 insurance and pension sys­tems, in agri­cul­ture and in law harmon­isa­tion.78 On 16 July 1997 the Euro­pean Commission published Agenda 2000, a proposal for comprehensive reform of institutions and pro­ced­ures in the main fields of EU pol­icy and proposed that enlargement nego­ti­ations should open with five Central and Eastern Euro­pean coun­tries (Poland, Hun­gary, the Czech Repub­lic, Slovenia and Estonia) and Cyprus.79 In Decem­ber 1997 the Euro­pean Council in Luxemburg decided that the Accession Partnership (AP) would be the key feature of the pre-­accession strat­egy, mobilising all forms of assistance to the candidate coun­tries. Thus, its purpose was to set out in a single framework the pri­or­ity areas for further work identified in the Commission’s Regular Reports on the pro­gress made by Poland towards mem­ber­ship of the Union, the fin­an­cial means avail­able to help Poland implement these pri­or­ities and the con­ditions that would apply to that assistance. Even though, from a legal point of view, the Accession Partnership was not binding, it provided a basis for a number of pol­icy instruments used to help the candidate coun­tries in their pre­para­tions for mem­ber­ship.80 In par­ticu­lar, the AP set out the basis for the National Programme of Pre­para­tions for Membership (NPPM) adopted on 23 June 1998.81 Indeed, the AP pro­vi­sions were implemented through the NPPM. The implementation of the AP pro­vi­sions and the correlation between the NPPM and the AP pro­vi­sions were guaranteed by the prin­ciple of con­ditionality, according to which only pro­jects submitted by  candidate coun­tries that fully recog­nised the AP pri­or­ities could hope for PHARE financing.82 The AP pro­vi­sions also opened up the pos­sib­il­ity of the accession talks. The official nego­ti­ations began on 31 March 1998, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek, in the opening statement to the EU, declared that Poland committed herself to adopt the whole of the acquis communautaire.83 The par­ties also agreed on two basic negotiating prin­ciples. The first negotiating rule was that the position adopted by one of the par­ties in one nego­ tiating area in no way would pre­ju­dice its position re­gard­ing other areas. The second prin­ciple was that ‘As long as nego­ti­ations lasted and until every­thing is settled, nothing would be settled.’ This meant that pro­vi­sional conclusions of a given chapter were subject to the final settlement of the text of the Accession Treaty.84 Screening of Polish legislation The next step in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess was so-­called screening, which is the examination of the conformity of legis­la­tion in Poland with the acquis communautaire. In an attempt to get the screening pro­cess off the ground quickly, the EU decided to start with the easiest chapters first. The first chapters to be screened were science and research, telecommunications and in­forma­tion tech­ no­logy, education and training, culture and audio-­visual pol­icy, industrial pol­icy, small- and medium-­sized enterprises, common foreign and secur­ity pol­icy and

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   51 com­pany law. Confirming the strat­egy of the EU, these first chapters did not really cause any prob­lems. Poland was the first coun­try to submit its nego­ti­ation position on the first seven chapters to the Council and the Commission. The screening pro­cess began on 27 April 1998.85 The review of the law in each of the 31 nego­ti­ation chapters was divided into multi­lateral and bi­lat­eral parts. The multi­lateral parts were meant to provide the bare essence of a given fragment of the acquis, whilst the purpose of the bi­lat­ eral part was to examine the legis­la­tion of par­ticu­lar candidate coun­tries. Screen­ ing gave the par­ties a preliminary chance to identi­fy the potential prob­lems that would arise during nego­ti­ations.86 After the screening, a draft report was pre­ pared by the Commission and was sent for approval to the candidate coun­tries. In Poland, the report was accepted by consensus by the Negotiating Team. In certain areas, the Negotiating Team suggested corrections to the draft report. Then the EU con­sidered the proposed corrections and sent a corrected version of the report until the final version was agreed upon.87 Preparing position papers As a result of the screening pro­cess, a list of incompatibilities between Polish and EU law was compiled, which resulted in Poland’s response in the form of position papers. The Polish negotiating position was a docu­ment divided into chapters and adopted by the Council of Ministers. The docu­ment de­scribed the legis­la­tion in a given field, the extent to which the acquis was transported into Polish law or the time limit within which a given legal act was to be adopted. If a given act could not be (for polit­ical, budgetary, eco­nomic or social reasons) incorp­or­ated into national law before the enlargement date, Poland could ask for a trans­itional period. Moreover, each negotiating position contained an assess­ ment of budgetary, eco­nomic and social con­sequences of the paper’s implementation.88 The pro­cess leading to the adoption of the position paper included several stages. First, the draft paper prepared by a Task Sub-­Group was submitted for debate by the Negotiation Team. Second, the Negotiation Team made the neces­ sary amend­ments in accordance with the nego­ti­ation strat­egy. As a next step, the already adopted draft position paper was sent to the Task Sub-­Groups 32 (respons­ible for the ana­lysis and social and eco­nomic impact assessment) and 34 (respons­ible for budget and financing of pre­para­tions for nego­ti­ations), to appraise, respectively, the social and eco­nomic, and budgetary con­sequences of the obli­ga­tions contained in the draft position paper. After con­sidering com­ ments from the Task Sub-­Groups, the negotiating team adopted the paper. Fol­ lowing this, the paper was con­sidered by the Office for Euro­pean Integration and finally by the Council of Ministers. Then the EU Commission Directorate-­ General for Enlargement prepared a response in the form of an EU common position.89 This enabled the opening of nego­ti­ations, in a given area based on negotiating positions, to take place. This pro­cess of the pre­para­tion of Poland’s position papers is de­scribed in Figure 3.1.

Task Sub-Groups within the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations to the European Union Prepare a draft position paper

The Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union headed by the Chief Negotiator Approves the draft position paper

Task Sub-Group 32 of the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations to the EU

Task Sub-Group 34 of the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations to the EU

Appraises the socio-economic effects of the negotiation obligations contained in the draft position paper

Appraises the budgetary effects of the negotiation obligations contained in the draft position paper

The Committee for European Integration headed by the Prime Minister Recommends adoption of a position paper to the Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers Adopts the position paper

The Council of the European Union The position paper is handed over to the permanent representative of the Member State currently holding the EU Presidency

Figure 3.1 Preparation of Poland’s position papers (source: Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report Accession Negotia­ tions, p. 18).

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   53 Negotiations based on negotiation positions The candidate coun­tries could then prepare and send an extensive commentary on the EU common position. This commentary was prepared in Poland in the form of a draft docu­ment by the Negotiating Team in coopera­tion with an appro­ priate task group and inter­ested min­is­ters, and then adopted by the Negotiation Team. As a next step, the proposed solution was implemented into the Polish position and was presented to the Committee for Euro­pean Integration and the Council of Ministers as a draft amend­ment to the position paper, which together with the replies provided by a candidate coun­try constituted a basis for the Euro­ pean Commission to create a revised common EU position, which was next adopted by the Council of the EU. Finally, when consensus in a given area was reached, the nego­ti­ations in that area were con­sidered pro­vi­sionally closed.90 The Accession Treaty and the ratification process The Accession Treaty was signed by Poland in Copen­hagen in Decem­ber 2002. Then the Treaty was ratified by the EU par­lia­ment. The par­lia­ment could only vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’, and had no right to change the text. Its approval was neces­ sary to sign the treaty. The approval of the Accession Treaty by the Euro­pean par­lia­ment proceeded smoothly. The Treaty was also adopted by the EU par­lia­ ment’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 Febru­ary 2003. Then the docu­ment was ratified by the 15 member states and ten pro­spective member states. The formal ratification took place either by referendum or by legis­lat­ive bodies. In Poland, the accession referendum took place on 8 June 2003. In line with predictions and the trend set by other post-­communist candidate states, Poles voted over­whelm­ ingly to join the EU by 77.45 per cent to 22.55 per cent. However, more surpris­ ingly the 50 per cent turnout required to make the referendum consti­tu­tionally valid was also comfortably reached, with 58.85 per cent of Poles voting. The fact that most opposi­tion par­ties (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) cam­ paigned for a ‘yes’ vote also helped to de-­couple the issue of EU mem­ber­ship from that of confidence in the extremely unpop­ular gov­ern­ment.91

Organisational structure for the accession negotiations It is im­port­ant to note that the organ­isa­tional structure for the accession nego­ti­ ations is complicated by one major factor. There was one major dif­fer­ence between this and any previous enlargement – the size and complexity of the pro­ posed accession. No previous accession included as many as ten new members in the pro­cess of trans­ition to demo­cracy and market economy. Complexity of the accession negotiations The size of this proposed accession led to the complexity of the nego­ti­ations. It should be noted that even though the Copen­hagen Summit in 1993 formally

54   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 A European state submits an Application for EU Membership to the European Council The Council of the European Union asks the European Commission to present an Opinion on the application The Commission presents the Opinion on the candidate’s application to the Council The Council unanimously adopts a decision to start negotiations with the candidate state The Council chaired by the Council Presidency conducts negotiations with the candidate state The Commission proposes, and the Council agrees to and unanimously adopts, guidelines for the EU position in the negotiations with the candidate state The draft of the Accession Treaty is agreed on between the EU and the candidate state The Accession Treaty is submitted to the Council and the European Parliament The European Parliament approves the Accession Treaty with a simple majority vote The Council unanimously approves the Accession Treaty The Member States and the candidate officially sign the Accession Treaty The Member States and the candidate state ratify the Accession Treaty Upon ratification the Accession Treaty becomes effective: the candidate state becomes a Member of the European Union

Figure 3.2 Accession process (source: Chart by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA).

offered the pro­spect of mem­ber­ship to all associated states, this was rather a polit­ical ges­ture, since the de­cision to offer mem­ber­ship only to a few CEEC could be perceived by those excluded states as a redrawing of geopolit­ical and cultural bound­ar­ies.92 In 1993 there were fewer associate coun­tries (the Baltic states and Slovenia were at that stage excluded), so there was no expectation within the Union that the enlargement pro­cess would be so big. However, not only the number of new accession states, but also the different levels at which nego­ti­ations took place, influenced the pro­cess. In fact, there were several different levels at which nego­ti­ations took place. The main two

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   55 were the do­mestic level within each coun­try, comprising different do­mestic groups and the national authority, and the inter­na­tional level where the Polish gov­ern­ment negotiated with the EU bodies. However, there were other nego­ti­ ations on different levels. First, there were nego­ti­ations between Poland and the member states of the EU in the Inter-­Governmental Conference on Accession. Second, there were nego­ti­ations among the current member states of the Union to agree on the EU position for the accession nego­ti­ations. Third, there were nego­ti­ations among the EU bodies, for example, between the Euro­pean par­lia­ ment and the Council of the Euro­pean Union on certain parts of the Accession Treaty. At the same time, nego­ti­ations were taking place in each member state to define the position of the gov­ern­ment in the nego­ti­ations in Brussels. The acces­ sion also had, to a certain extent, an impact on third par­ties, coun­tries and inter­ na­tional organ­isa­tions, on Poland’s relations with NATO, the World Bank and relations with Russia.93 It would be im­pos­sible to examine in detail all pos­sible configurations of nego­ti­ations among different par­ties. The focus of this book is restricted to the interplay between the two levels: the national level, with an emphasis on do­mestic actors, and the inter­na­tional one – the interplay between Poland’s authorities and the EU bodies. This requires careful examination of the organ­isa­ tional structure of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess on both the Polish and the EU level. Organisational structure of the accession negotiations It should be emphasised that the nego­ti­ation pro­cess required the setting up of an efficient structure in the administration for working out the nego­ti­ation positions. There were two periods in our accession nego­ti­ations with two different structures. The first period between 1998 and 2001 was more complex, with more actors involved and more extensive intermin­is­ter­ial consultations. In the period between 2001 and 2002, the structure was streamlined to ensure that the decision-­making pro­cess in the last phase of the nego­ti­ations was as efficient as pos­sible. Both structures are de­scribed in the next sections. The accession nego­ti­ations required the estab­lishment of structures respons­ ible for their pro­gress both in Poland and in the EU. On the Polish side, we can enumerate two major groups involved in the nego­ti­ations: the polit­ical leader­ ship and the Negotiation Team. Political leadership The polit­ical leadership was exercised by the Prime Minister sup­ported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration and the Governmental Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union. The Prime Minister, together with the above-­mentioned officials, adopted the guiding de­cisions related to the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess. His efforts were sup­ported by an ad­vis­ory body, the Intermin­is­ter­ial Team for the Pre­para­tion of Accession Negotiations. The Intermin­is­ter­ial Team

Council of Ministers: adopted the position papers prepared by the Negotiation Team

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ): • MSZ coordinated the accession negotiations on the political level • Minister was the Head of the Polish Delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession • MSZ assisted the Minister in his duties as the Head of the Delegation to the IGC as well as in his foreign activities as the Government Plenipotentiary • The Department of the European Union • Polish Diplomatic Missions • Representation of Poland to the EU in Brussels

Committee for European Integration (KIE): • Chaired by the Prime Minister – Political Leadership • Composed of selected members of Cabinet including: − The Minister of Foreign Affairs, − The Secretary of Committee for European Integration, − The Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU The Negotiation Team (ZN): • Consisted of 19 members – negotiators • Head: the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU The Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU: • Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister • Deputy Head of the Polish Delegation to the IGC on Accession

Secretariat of the Government Plenipotentiary: • Placed in the structure of the State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister • Support staff of the Government Plenipotentiary • Interministerial coordinating of the negotiation process

Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE): • Supported the Chief Negotiator; the support was provided particularly by: − the Accession Negotiations Department − the Integration Policy Department − the Law Harmonisation Department

Figure 3.3 Scheme of the organizational structure for EU accession negotiations in Poland (1998–2001) (source: Paweł Świeboda, Director, Department of the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, Warsaw World Bank Institute Seminar, Ankara, 28 March 2006).

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   57 Committee for European Integration (KIE): • Chaired by the Prime Minister

The Negotiation Team (ZN): • Consisted on 19 members – negotiators • Head: the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiation to the EU

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) • The Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiation to the EU • Department of the European Union and Accession Negotiations • Support staff of the Government Plenipotentiary

Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) • Law Harmonisation Department • Integration Policy Department

Line Ministries • European Union Departments

Parliament • European Integration Committee of the Sejm • Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm • Foreign Affairs and European Integration Committee of the Senate • Parliament Commission for EU Law (started in 2000) established to speed up the implementation of EU legislation

Figure 3.4 Organizational structure for EU accession negotiations in Poland (2001–2002) (source: Paweł Świeboda, Director, Department of the European Union, Min­ istry of Foreign Affairs, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, Warsaw World Bank Institute Seminar, Ankara, 28 March 2006).

was divided into sub-­task groups, which prepared docu­mentation and proposals of nego­ti­ation positions presented to the Negotiating Team.94 The Council of Ministers95 approved the position papers prepared by the Negotiation Team and re­com­mended them to the Council by the Committee for Euro­pean Integration. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was the head of the Polish delegation to the Inter-­Governmental Conference on Accession. A Secretary of State in the Ministry, and simul­tan­eously a Deputy Head of the Negotiation Team, supervised the division of Euro­pean Integration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.96 The Ministry also assisted in the conducting of foreign

58   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 ac­tiv­ities of the state secretaries in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, par­ ticu­larly the Chief Negotiator. In the period of 2001–02, it conducted the nego­ti­ ations after the trans­fer of the Chief Negotiator from the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. In 2001 a single Department of the Euro­pean Union and Acces­ sion Negotiations was created.97 Finally, the diplomatic missions in the candidate and EU member states ful­ filled a key role in co-­ordinating foreign contacts and organ­ising multi­lateral and bi­lat­eral meetings within the framework of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess.98 In addition to the gov­ern­mental prerogatives, one must mention the less formal role of the President in accession nego­ti­ations. According to the Polish Constitution, the President of the Repub­lic is the representative of the State in foreign affairs. The Constitution states that the President ‘shall’ cooperate with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In par­ticu­lar, the Consti­ tution gives the President the right to ratify and renounce inter­na­tional agree­ ments99 and also states that the Council of Ministers conducts the foreign pol­icy of Poland. Moreover, it grants to the Council the power ‘to exercise gen­eral control in the field of relations with other States and inter­na­tional organ­isa­tions and conclude inter­na­tional agreements requiring ratification as well as accept and renounce other inter­na­tional agreements’.100 Parliament also had an im­port­ant role to play, espe­cially in the implementa­ tion of Polish nego­ti­ation obli­ga­tions. Collaboration with the two chambers of Polish gov­ern­ment, the Sejm and the Senate, gave legitimacy to the nego­ti­ations of the gov­ern­ment. In the pro­cess of accession nego­ti­ation pre­para­tion, the par­ lia­ment was presented with the main nego­ti­ation docu­ments. The Chief Negotia­ tor submitted the position papers to par­lia­ment and presented them to the Speakers of both Houses, the Chairmen of the Sejm Euro­pean Integration Com­ mittee and the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs and Euro­pean Integration Committee. The Chief Negotiator and the Members of the Negotiation Team parti­cip­ated in parlia­ment­ ary debates on Euro­pean integration. The parlia­ment­ary debates pertaining to EU integration played a vital inform­at­ive role. During the debates, the representa­ tives of the gov­ern­ment presented before the par­lia­ment, the state of the acces­ sion nego­ti­ations and addressed the queries of the Member of Parliament. The Sejm was regu­larly presented with in­forma­tion on the nego­ti­ation pro­cess pre­ pared by the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU. It contained in­forma­tion on the nego­ti­ation and harmon­isa­tion pro­ cesses and was updated every half year. The MPs also received the full texts of the Polish position papers.101 The next key player was the Committee for Euro­pean Integration, the supreme organ of state administration charged with programming and co-­ ordinating the pol­icy of Poland’s integration with the Euro­pean Union. The Committee was composed of the Chairman of the Committee, the Secretary and the key min­is­ters respons­ible for foreign affairs, in­ternal affairs, eco­nomy, agri­ cul­ture and justice. The major task of the Committee included the res­olu­tion of issues relating to the pro­cess of Poland’s integration with the EU, presenting a

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   59 programme of adjustment and integration tasks to the Council of Ministers, and drafting legal acts under­lying these actions. The administrative sup­port structure of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration was the Office of the Committee, which comprised several de­part­ments of which the Law Harmonisation Depart­ ment, the Integration Policy Department and the Euro­pean Legislation Depart­ ment played the key roles.102 The Negotiation Team The 18-member Negotiation Team was respons­ible for the formu­la­tion and implementation of the negotiating strat­egy, including the elaboration of position papers and other docu­ments. The team, headed by the Chief Negotiator, con­ sisted of members of the rank of Secretary or Under-­secretary of State nomi­ nated by the Prime Minister.103 The key role was played by the Chief Negotiator, who was officially titled as the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union. The position of the Government Plenipotentiary was initially filled by a Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and in 2001 it was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.104 The tasks of the Chief Negotiator included the conceptual pre­para­tion and co-­ordination of the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess. His pri­mary tasks also included: setting the agenda of team meet­ ings; inviting guests of honour; convening and chairing team meetings; signing res­olu­tions on behalf of the team; supervising the implementation of team res­ olu­tions and de­cisions; and finally, representing the Team to outside bodies.105 Moreover, with the Prime Minister’s consent, the Plenipotentiary could present to the Council of Ministers legal acts re­gard­ing the scope of his work. The Chief Negotiator was also obliged to present regu­lar reports on his ac­tiv­ities.106 In practice, the scope of activity depended also on the person­al­ity of chief negotiators. It should be emphasised that Jan Kułakowski and his team were rather focused on implementing the overall polit­ical strat­egy,107 whilst during the Jan Truszczyński term the spotlight was on the details of the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess.108 Their dif­fer­ences were determined by their respective different back­ grounds. These dif­fer­ences are presented in Table 3.1. Indeed, the different negotiating styles had an influence on nego­ti­ations. In Febru­ary 1998 Jan Kułakowski announced to the Sejm Euro­pean Integration Committee that stra­tegic guidelines for Poland’s negotiators at the EU accession talks in Brussels would be submitted to the Sejm fol­low­ing their approval by the gov­ern­ment. It was planned to split up Poland’s Negotiation Team into polit­ical counselling and negotiating sections. The polit­ical section would co­ordinate the team’s work, but make no de­cisions unless forced to do so under extra­ordinary con­ditions. The negotiating section would largely consist of ministry staff and the counselling section would have chairs avail­able for trade and employer union representatives. The team’s job was to prepare negotiating positions and tactics for each of the nego­ti­ation chapters. Its members acted as a collegiate body rather than one

60   Polish–EU relations 1990–2003 Table 3.1 Different negotiation styles of the two Polish chief negotiators Polish chief negotiator

Jan Kułakowski

Jan Truszczyński

in office

1998–2001

2001–2003

background

academic, trade union and diplomatic background

diplomatic and public administration background

negotiation style

informal

formal

objectives

focused on achieving basic strategic and political goals

focused on technicalities of the accession process

extent of the focus on the domestic public opinion

paying attention to the role of public opinion and domestic groups

paying less attention to the role of public opinion

strategy

more focused on package deals and political bargaining strategy

more focused on ‘salami slicing’ tactics

representing the min­is­ters of whom they were the delegates. The major task of the Negotiation Team included: formulating opinions on Euro­pean Commission reports; revising draft nego­ti­ation instructions; preparing and approving draft position papers of the Polish gov­ern­ment; preparing and approving responses to EU queries within the mandate resulting from the position papers; preparing package deals based on nego­ti­ation instructions and co-­ordinating the entire nego­ti­ation pro­cess.109 The team held meetings at least once a week and all de­cisions were reached by consensus. In cases where this proved im­pos­sible, voting was conducted. The Chairman–Chief Negotiator had the deciding vote.110 Negotiation structure of the EU Even though my focus is on the nego­ti­ation structure within Poland, the nego­ ti­ation structure of the EU should be briefly de­scribed. As already mentioned, one should differentiate between different actors within the EU. First, the member states were a party to the nego­ti­ations. They approved the EU common positions and finally adopted the Accession Treaty. Second, there was the Council of the Euro­pean Union (including the Presidency). The Council is the most im­port­ant decision-­making institution of the EU, which represents the national inter­ests of the EU member states. Its members are the min­is­ters of the member states respons­ible for specific fields of activity. The Council holds its meetings in different configurations. The Council of the Euro­pean Union has legis­lat­ive powers: in conjunction with the Euro­pean par­lia­ment, on the basis of proposals of the Euro­pean Commission. It passes regulations, direc­ tives, de­cisions and re­com­mendations constituting the core of acquis communautaire.111

Polish–EU relations 1990–2003   61 The Council presented the agreed common positions of the Union and conducted nego­ti­ations at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or their deputies within the framework of the Intergov­ern­mental Conference on Accession. The IGC was an official forum for accession nego­ti­ations. Ministers of Foreign Affairs from candi­ date states were partners to Ministers of Foreign Affairs from EU Members.112 The sessions of the Council were chaired by the min­is­ter of the coun­try holding the Presidency. The Presidency was par­ticu­larly active in the screening pro­cess as well as during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. The most im­port­ant tasks of the coun­try holding the Presidency are medi­ation and seeking a compromise in the event of conflicts of inter­est among the member states as well as between the member states and the acceding coun­tries. Finally, the Presidency organ­ises the work of Councils and sets semi-­annual and daily agendas of sessions, which have signi­fic­ant influence on the work of the EU.113 In the accession pro­cess, the Euro­pean Commission shared the major respons­ib­ ility. The Commission itself did not conduct nego­ti­ations, but its duty was to produce the EU draft’s common positions. After submission to the working group for enlargement at the Council of the Euro­pean Union and consultation among member states, the final version was approved by the Member States’ Ambassadors (COREPER) and then as a common position by the Council of Ministers. Only then was the common position presented to a candidate coun­try.114 Nonetheless, within the Commission, the Directorate General for Enlargement played a par­ticu­lar role, since it conducted the law review pro­cess, prepared EU draft common positions and prepared draft legal acts relating to the nego­ti­ations. In order to fulfil its duties, the DG for Enlargement worked in 12 task groups, which had been assigned horizontal respons­ibil­ities; thus each group was respons­ible for nego­ti­ations in a par­ticu­lar number of nego­ti­ation chapters.115 The institutions respons­ible for approval of the final text of the Accession Treaty were the Euro­pean par­lia­ment, which required an abso­lute majority of votes, and the EU Council, which needed unanimous approval. Some ad­vis­ory roles were also played by the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

Conclusions This chapter provided an overview of Poland’s path to the EU from the estab­ lishment of bi­lat­eral relations between the EC and Poland, through the Associa­ tion Agreement, the Copen­hagen Summit of 1993 and the submission of the applica­tion to the official opening of negotiations. Also, this chapter provided a gen­eral overview of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and nego­ti­ation structures, leaving aside the three case studies to be carefully exam­ ined in the next chapters. The purpose of this chapter was to give an his­tor­ical overview of the Polish– EU relations, as well as to explain the overall nego­ti­ation structure and pro­cess. Without this, it would be im­pos­sible to understand and explain the impact of do­mestic pressure as discussed in the three case studies.

4 Negotiations concerning agriculture

The purpose of this chapter is to de­scribe, ana­lyse and explain the accession nego­ti­ations with respect to agri­cul­ture. A step-­by step description of the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess will enable us to understand the influence of do­mestic pressure (mainly pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties) on the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. This will help us to understand why the nego­ti­ations on agri­cul­ture were so im­port­ant do­mestically. I will first briefly examine the nature of the CAP sys­tem and the impact that CAP might have had on Central and Eastern Euro­ pean agriculture. While discussing the nego­ti­ations, this chapter will first examine the opening of nego­ti­ations and the screening pro­cess. Second, it will present Polish nego­ti­ation positions on agri­cul­ture and the EU response towards them. It will ex­plore nego­ti­ ations concerning the lib­eralisation agreement. The lib­eralisation agreement became a turning point where the nego­ti­ations moved from a more technical to a more polit­ ical phase. Negotiations concerning lib­eralisations brought more polit­ical issues into the debate. The politicisation of nego­ti­ations increased after the gov­ern­mental change that was followed by the acceleration of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. A gov­ern­ mental crisis caused by this acceleration resulted in a stiffening of the nego­ti­ation stances of both sides, which finally led to modification and clarification of their positions by both the Polish and the EU sides. This prepared the ground for the  Copen­hagen accords. Finally, the chapter discusses the pro­vi­sions of the Copen­hagen deal, its clarification and ratification before the Athens Summit. While discussing these prob­lems the emphasis is put on the influence of do­mestic pressure on inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations and on the interplay between different players’ inter­est groups, polit­ical par­ties, media and pub­lic opinion. This chapter highlights strat­egy and tactics used by both sides, espe­cially in the con­text of the two-­level game approach. It argues that indeed do­mestic pressure had a far-­reaching influence on the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, espe­cially during the last round of nego­ti­ations at the Copen­hagen Summit, where tough negotiating stances were put forth by the Polish gov­ern­ment. In the case of agri­cul­ture, there was a very small do­mestic win-­set in Poland to accept the initial EU proposals (in par­ticu­lar, not granting direct payments and production quotas). Nevertheless, the initial small do­mestic win-­set in Poland was accompanied by a rel­at­ively small win-­set, in the EU coun­tries, to accept the full sub­sidies. A final

Negotiations concerning agriculture   63 compromise was achieved by enlarging both Polish and EU win-­sets. Thus, the par­ticu­lar emphasis in this chapter will be on the impact of the size of the do­mestic win-­sets during nego­ti­ations re­gard­ing agri­cul­ture, the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess itself and the outcomes of the nego­ti­ations. Finally, nego­ti­ation strat­egy and tactics will also be examined.

The nature of the Common Agriculture Policy The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was formally announced in 1957 as one of the key elements of the Treaty of Rome and was de­veloped by the Community in the 1960s and 1970s. Because of EEC regulations, the levels of protection were high and a sys­tem of inter­ven­tion re­gard­ing purchases ensured that high prices were maintained when supply exceeded demand. The main reason for this stemmed from the as­sump­tion that Euro­pean agri­cul­ture, without protectionist meas­ures, would not survive com­peti­tion from non-­EU coun­tries. Thus, some products where inter­na­tional agreements prevented high protection, were subsidised. The EEC budget and external trade relations led to reform of this pol­icy in 1992. Consequently, two different and contra­dict­ory approaches were taken re­gard­ing this reform: production control and price reductions compensated by direct payments to farmers. Production control was undertaken either through production quotas (limits on production with penalties for excess production) or a sys­tem called set-­aside (paying farmers to leave land fallow).1 The 1992 reform of the CAP moved prices closer to world market prices, but it did not tackle the under­lying prob­lems of Euro­pean farming’s dependence on sup­port and the pol­icy’s excessive cost.2 The reform has become even more complex since 1992 and this has made it even more expensive to admin­is­ter. The production quotas, in par­ticu­lar those applied to milk and sugar, require the monitoring of each indi­vidual farm’s production. Price reduction, even though this has moved EC prices in line with world prices, as­sumes a substantial money trans­fer from consumers and taxpayers to farmers and food pro­cessors in the form of sub­sidies. Finally, the CAP pol­icy has an impact on the Third World, since it destabil­ises world prices and makes it more difficult for poorer coun­tries to compete in the agricultural market.3 The next im­port­ant step towards reforming the sys­tem was taken in 1997. Agenda 2000 estim­ated that extending CAP to the ten Central and Eastern Euro­ pean coun­tries would amount to an expenditure of e17.8 billion over the 2000–06 period.4 Nonetheless, the estim­ates presented in Agenda 2000 were based on the as­sump­tion that a rad­ical reform would be implemented, entailing a 20 per cent reduction in the inter­ven­tion price for cereals, 10 per cent reduction in market sup­port for dairy products and 30 per cent in the sup­port of prices for beef. At the same time the Commission proposed a move towards direct income subsidy, that is, a payment in relation to the crop area, with max­imum limits to be estab­lished for farms receiving direct income subsidy. It also reinforced a rural de­velopment pol­icy. Agenda 2000 restated that reductions in market sup­ port are neces­sary to make Euro­pean agri­cul­ture com­petit­ive at the world level.

64   Negotiations concerning agriculture The March 1999 Euro­pean Council Summit in Berlin introduced certain corrections to the Agenda 2000 proposals, but did not result in any breakthroughs. One of the major de­cisions was to estab­lish a 15 per cent reduction in the inter­ ven­tion price for cereals, which meant greater stability for the market. However, the de­cision was made that expenditure in agri­cul­ture remained constant in real terms, which meant that the Euro­pean Council failed to reach a de­cision on a sliding-­scale reduction in direct aid as a means of re­du­cing the agri­cul­ture bill. Finally, the reform of the dairy sector was deferred.5 The pro­spect of EU enlargement brought new challenges, since extending CAP to new CEEC has not only polit­ical, but also, and more im­port­antly, major fin­an­cial im­plica­tions.6 The signi­fic­ant challenges for the EU were the costs of extending the CAP to new members. The im­port­ance of agri­cul­ture varied widely across CEEC; there was a substantial dif­fer­ence between the signi­fic­ant role the sector played in the Polish, Romanian or Bulgarian eco­ nom­ies when looked at in comparison to its rel­at­ively minor role in the Czech Repub­lic, Slovenia or Estonia. This prob­lem had a socio-­demographic dimension. While in most coun­tries the agricultural sector had been collectivised under the previous regimes, in Poland and Slovenia it resisted this pro­cess. This meant that, par­ticu­larly in the case of Poland, the exist­ence of a substantial private agricultural sector under the previous polit­ical sys­tem caused prob­ lems because of the small size of the average farm, which had made it more difficult to compete.7 This created a par­ticu­lar prob­lem that was present during the accession talks.

Opening negotiations and the screening process Before the accession nego­ti­ations started, agri­cul­ture, together with sales of farmland (negotiated within the free movement of capital chapter) and the free movement of persons, was recog­nised as a major area of difficulty, and one likely to cause nego­ti­ation prob­lems.8 According to the Polish Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski, from the very start of nego­ti­ations both the EU and the Polish side realised that agri­cul­ture would be the most difficult issue throughout the nego­ti­ations.9 Within the chapter on agri­cul­ture, the nego­ti­ations were initially dominated by the issue of adjustment to the acquis communautaire and modernisation of agri­cul­ture. Nevertheless, soon after the screening pro­cess ended the subject of acute polit­ical con­tro­versy re­gard­ing the issues of direct payments and production quotas arose. Opening of negotiations The Polish–EU nego­ti­ations started with both sides taking a different and contra­dict­ory position. Even though the discussion concerning the adjustment of Polish agri­cul­ture was mentioned from the time Poland applied for mem­ber­ ship, it did not have any formal framework. The initial nego­ti­ation pro­cess began in 1997. On 20 July 1997, Rolf Timans, the Euro­pean Communities

Negotiations concerning agriculture   65 representative in Warsaw, and the Deputy Agriculture Minister Jerzy Plewa met to discuss Poland’s request for EU assistance for Polish agri­cul­ture. They exchanged views on the EU’s evalu­ation of the pro­gress of Poland in the adjustment of its agri­cul­ture to EU stand­ards, in the con­text of the Agenda 2000. Poland asked the EU for aid neces­sary for the adjustment of the agricultural and food industry for the years 1998–2000. The Union, how­ever, planned to grant this aid after the year 2000. According to an initial proposal as set out in the Agenda 2000, the estim­ated amount of aid was up to 500 million ECU annually for every state invited to the nego­ti­ations, in addition to an annual one billion ECU for regional structural aid. Poland planned to use the EU aid for the modernisation of the agricultural and food sectors, in­teg­rated de­velopment of the coun­tryside, and the cre­ation of sys­tems and administrative structures for the introduction to the EU legis­la­tion.10 The Euro­pean Commission, in its first 1997 Opinion on Poland, emphasised that the EU’s CAP could be applied in Poland on accession ‘in the medium term’, if veterinary and plant health requirements could be met and the administrative structures to apply the CAP were strengthened. At the same time, the EU admitted that estab­lishing a coherent structural and rural de­velopment pol­icy ‘would require a long-­term approach’.11 Just after the official opening of nego­ti­ations in April 1998, Brussels, rather than granting fin­an­cial aid, was more willing to grant trans­itional periods. Franz Fischler, the EU Commissioner for agri­cul­ture, strongly emphasised this during a visit to Warsaw on 12 April 1998. He admitted that ‘It is under­stand­able that Poland is inter­ested in gaining full access to the funds from the very start’, but added, ‘We must be realistic. This is not pos­sible. I do not understand these demands.’12 Indeed, this incident indicated that the EU was rather cau­tious in promising any subsidies. In May 1998 Fischler was more willing to make a compromise, and he confirmed that the EU would assign one billion ECU to assist eco­nomic reforms in coun­tries aspiring to EU mem­ber­ship and 500 million for agricultural reforms. He as­sured Poland that since it had the highest agricultural potential among the EU aspirants, it would get a large part of the assistance funds from the year 1999 until the signing of the Accession Treaty.13 Screening process In Septem­ber 1998 the accession coun­tries started mutual legis­la­tion compatibility screening in agri­cul­ture. Poland began bi­lat­eral screening on 7–8 Octo­ber 1998. The essential questions for the applicant coun­tries during the screening were related to how fast they would be able – and would choose – to bring their national agricultural sectors in line with EU norms, and how far they would choose to seek trans­itional periods for parts of the acquis communautaire. Hence, par­ticu­lar attention was given to the rel­ev­ant legis­la­tion concerning the rules governing the produce market, such as farm and production registration sys­tems, pro­curement, produce pro­cessing and market inter­ven­tionism.14

66   Negotiations concerning agriculture According to a senior Polish official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, screening sessions, espe­cially in the initial phases, were very fruitful and conducted in a friendly atmo­sphere. There were also several informal meetings and consultations with negotiators from the other acceding coun­tries during the screening sessions. In his opinion, it was a good forum for the exchange of in­forma­tion. As a result, Polish negotiators were informed of the attitudes of the other coun­tries during the screening.15 This opinion was confirmed by Władysław Piskorz, a member of the negotiating team. As he stated, there were extensive consultations and exchange of docu­ments between the acceding coun­ tries. There were also consultations on how to make counterclaims against positions of the EU‑15 coun­tries. The coopera­tion was extensive and as he argued,‘helped us to better achieve our goals’.16 These informal meetings also helped to co­ordinate stances with regard to direct payments and production quotas.17 Just a day after the first screening session, Poland openly declared that it did not want trans­ition periods in agri­cul­ture, claiming it would fully adjust its farming to EU stand­ards by the end of 2002. Concurrently, the Polish Deputy Minister respons­ible for agri­cul­ture, Jerzy Plewa, admitted that before this could take place, Poland had to prepare the ground for the com­mun­ity organ­isa­tion of markets, and for inter­ven­tion consistent with EU prin­ciples.18 During this time, Polish pub­lic opinion on accession began to change. Simultaneously with the opening of the screening, in Septem­ber 1998, a major pub­lic opinion poll on assessment of Polish agri­cul­ture was conducted. Although a con­ sider­able majority of Poles sup­ported the entry into the EU, there was a decline in pub­lic sup­port for EU mem­ber­ship. This was espe­cially so when compared with the 80 per cent in favour in May 1996, when indeed the highest level of acceptance for Poland’s entry into the EU was re­corded. In the 1998 survey, the number of persons declaring their willingness to vote for Poland’s mem­ber­ship in a referendum had fallen to 63 per cent. The reason for the fall appears to be the strong fear connected with Poland’s entry into the EU and the area of agri­ cul­ture. Despite Poland’s anxiety about the situ­ation of rural Poland and agri­cul­ ture after Poland’s entry into the EU, respondents were rather con­ser­vat­ive in their views. They opted for defending the inter­est of Polish farming. Exactly half of the respondents believed that do­mestic agricultural produce should be protected by high import duties on agricultural products, while only two-­fifths sup­ ported gradual aboli­tion of these duties in order to force Polish agri­cul­ture to become more com­petit­ive. The concept of restructuring agri­cul­ture, for instance, sup­porting the de­velopment of large, efficient farms and encouraging owners of small farms to seek employment outside agri­cul­ture, had rel­at­ively low social sup­port (27 per cent). Generally, the number of respondents convinced that Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU would be bene­fi­cial for city dwellers was much larger (31 per cent of those polled) than the number of those who believed that it would improve the situ­ation of the Polish coun­tryside signi­fic­antly.19 This in­forma­tion shows that pub­lic opinion did not sup­port lib­eralisation and thus lib­eralisation talks with the EU seemed to be par­ticu­larly difficult.

Negotiations concerning agriculture   67

IN A FEW YEARS TIME POLAND MAY BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. IN VIEW OF THIS FACT SHOULD WE: Protect Polish agriculture from foreign competition by maintaining high import duties on agricultural products for as long as possible

50%

Gradually decrease duties of foreign agricultural products in order to make Polish farming more competitive

40%

Difficult to say

10%

First of all, support development of large, efficient farms. At the same time, encourage owners of small, inefficient farms to seek employment outside agriculture

27%

Offer equal support to large, medium and small farms

64%

Difficult to say

9%

Figure 4.1 Agriculture – what Poles should do when they become a member of the EU (source: CBOS, September 1998).

In early Novem­ber 1998 the Commission had published a pro­gress report on the screening pro­cess. The report provided data for the situ­ation in agri­cul­ture and made an assessment of the gov­ern­ment’s agri­cul­ture pol­icy together with a number of pol­icy re­com­mendations. Even though the report was rather complimentary about Poland and was warmly welcomed in Warsaw, it emphasised the need for the upgrading of veterinary and phytosanitary facilities to EU stand­ards. Moreover, it stressed the necessity of estab­lishing sectoral market organ­isa­tions and law enforcement. Finally, the docu­ment called attention to administrative capa­city relating to management of the CAP and veterinary administration at the central level.20 The first few months of 1999 can be characterised as a standstill in relations.21 According to a senior Polish official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, this was due to a lack of determination on both sides to accelerate the nego­ti­ation pro­cess.22 In May 1999 the EU accused Poland of increasing sugar production in order to gain a higher production quota after joining the EU. The Polish side rejected this claim, counterclaiming that the Union was trying to force Poland into lower

68   Negotiations concerning agriculture production levels in sugar and also in other areas of farming output.23 This indeed was the first incident in the EU battle for lib­eralisation and was understood as introducing a free market approach towards agricultural trade with Poland. According to a senior Polish official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, the EU treated lib­eralisation as an element of their nego­ti­ation strat­egy and hence brought the lib­eralisation agreement leading towards sup­porting free movement of agri­cul­ture goods to the nego­ti­ation table. This strat­egy was prompted by the fact that the EU preferred to complain that Poland did not want to lib­eralise their agri­cul­ture sector as opposed to discussing direct payments or production quotas.24 Indeed, the EU had used lib­eralisation as an element in creating pressure during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess.25 Furthermore, as a senior-­level EU official argued, lib­eralisation was a very im­port­ant point for the EU and as such was also used in nego­ti­ations.26 In July 1999 the Union offered Poland a signi­fic­ant change in the rules for food trade, according to which both sides were to abol­ish customs duties on farm products and export sub­sidies, replacing them with incrementally increased import quotas.27 However, a ser­ious conflict occurred when on 21 Septem­ber 1999 Fischler sent a letter to the Polish Agriculture Minister, Artur Balazs, expressing concern over Poland’s plans to raise duties on a range of agricultural and food imports from the EU. According to Fischler, the Polish gov­ern­ment should have consulted the EU before it made its de­cisions to raise tariffs on sugar, wheat and dairy products imported from EU coun­tries. The hikes, the EU believed, were incongruent with the EU’s proposal to lib­eralise agricultural trade with the candidate coun­tries. Jerzy Plewa promised that Fischler’s letter would not cast a shadow on the planned talks on lib­eralisation. At the same time, he made it understood that Poland would con­tinue to protect its agricultural market, espe­cially since the EU was protecting its own market to a much greater extent than Poland was.28 In Octo­ber 1999 Poland declared that from the beginning of 2003, its target date for joining the EU, Polish agri­cul­ture would be ready to adopt the CAP. It seems that this date was rather unrealistic, mainly because of the delay in the implementation of the IACS sys­tem. However, Poland also expected that its agricultural sector would share in all the CAP bene­fits, prim­arily sub­sidies to agricultural production.29 Minister Balazs wanted the 2000 export quota of agricultural goods to the EU to be reduced by 50 per cent. Limiting the quota was the only way for Poland to protect the do­mestic market.30 On 13 Octo­ber 1999 the Commission published a report on Poland’s pro­gress, which emphasised challenges to the integration of Poland’s agri­cul­ture into that of the EU. It emphasised the need for a ‘coherent structural pol­icy’ as a first step in this dir­ec­tion. Moreover, the report called for accom­panying pol­icies designed to sup­port and transform rural soci­ety. The Commission also criticised price sup­port and increasing protectionism as worsening rather than enhancing the future of the agri­cul­ture sector. Indeed, the EU was very much pushing towards lib­eralisation and used the report to put pressure on Poland to lib­eralise the sector that was much more bene­fi­cial for the EU than for the Polish side, since the EU was better for

Negotiations concerning agriculture   69 lib­eralisation than the Polish side. Nevertheless, according to a senior-­level EU official, by insisting on the lib­eralisation agreement, the EU wanted to protect Poland from ‘shock therapy’ when one day high tariffs would have to be removed, causing a major distur­bance in the agri­cul­ture market.32 Even though pro­gress in adoption of the acquis was made, the report also argued that the planning and budgetisation of the neces­sary institutional structures remained outstanding.33 It did claim that some pro­gress had been made with the reorgan­isa­tion of the veterinary and phytosanitary ser­vices. The docu­ ment agreed that the agricultural structural pol­icy docu­ment adopted by the gov­ ern­ment in July 1999 was only a first step towards a rural de­velopment pol­icy and stated that signi­fic­ant attention would be required to ensure that this pol­icy would cor­res­pond with EU requirements.34 The report summar­ised Polish efforts and finished the screening pro­cess that was finally concluded in Novem­ber 1999. 31

Presenting negotiation positions on agriculture On 16 Decem­ber 1999 the Polish gov­ern­ment submitted its negotiating position to the EU Commission in Brussels. The negotiating position envisaged targets for preparing Poland’s farming sector for EU entry by 2003. Poland expected full access to the Union’s subsidy sys­tem, how­ever it decided not to ask for any trans­ition periods in agri­cul­ture.35 Polish negotiation targets Poland had four basic nego­ti­ation goals. The first of these was the full incorporation of Polish agri­cul­ture into the Common Agriculture Policy in order to ensure that Polish agri­cul­ture and rural areas would be fully sup­ported by the CAP mech­an­ism, including sub­sidies with regard to prices, income and structural de­velopment, while allowing equal access to direct payments.36 The second was to set up a high level of production quotas, in par­ticu­lar re­gard­ing dairy products, sugar, isoglucose, potato starch, dried fodder and raw tobacco.37 The third goal was to ensure the maintenance of stable income sources for agricultural popu­la­tion. Finally, the nego­ti­ation strat­egy as­sumed the inclusion of the Polish agro-­food products market into the Single Euro­pean Market.38 Achieving these targets was con­sidered as a way of ensuring that Polish farmers had con­ditions for equal com­peti­tion in the common market and as a way of accelerating and modernising agri­cul­ture and the rural areas. According to the Polish gov­ern­ment, the estim­ated cost of adjusting the Polish agri­cul­ture to EU stand­ards would be 25 billion zlotys and would be spread over six years. Poland had indicated its intention to accept the Community acquis under the CAP and not to demand trans­ition periods per se to come into com­pliance. It was expli­citly asking for access to direct payments under the  agri­cul­ture section of Agenda 2000 imme­diately fol­low­ing accession. Furthermore, Warsaw had presented 60 requests for special treatment ‘limited in time’ and emphasised that it reserved the right to review its position, notably in

70   Negotiations concerning agriculture the light of the evolution of EU agricultural legis­la­tion. Indeed, such an approach cor­res­ponded with a basic rule of the EU nego­ti­ations according to which ‘nothing was settled until every­thing was settled’. Polish negotiators were fully aware that Agenda 2000 did not provide a budgetary margin for granting direct aid to new Central and Eastern Euro­pean member states before 2006. Warsaw therefore argued that this de­cision should be open to nego­ti­ation, as it was deemed discriminatory and a source of distortion of com­peti­tion. Polish experts pointed to a report from the Brussels-­based Centre for Euro­pean Policy Studies (CEPS), which suggested that Eastern Euro­ pean coun­tries’ mem­ber­ship in the EU would only succeed if they received fair treatment, ensuring they bene­fited from all the ad­vant­ages extended to member states, including direct payments. Finally, the Polish negotiating position also expressed the fol­low­ing more detailed demands:39 1 2 3 4

The setting of ref­er­ence periods for rapeseed (and in par­ticu­lar the payment of direct aid to producers in this sector). Gradual incorporation into the CAP’s in­teg­rated administration and control sys­tem (IACS) and Euro­pean co-­financing for its implementation (as was the case for other member states). The exist­ence of a safeguard clause which would permit the coun­try to temporarily close its borders, under the control of the Commission, in case of ser­ ious market imbalances caused by imports from one or more member states. The re­ten­tion of stricter Polish stand­ards in the plant health field to prevent the introduction of diseases or insects not currently found in Poland.

The setting of nego­ti­ation targets was con­sidered by Prime Minister Buzek as an im­port­ant step towards ensuring success in nego­ti­ations and prompted the gov­ern­ ment to de­velop a social dialogue with its do­mestic partners, the major farmers’ unions including Kółka Rolnicze, which were expressing farmers’ views. In par­ ticu­lar, farmers were demanding protectionism of the Polish market, but at the same time were increasing fin­an­cial aid from the EU. According to Buzek, the gov­ern­ment’s major aim was to ensure sup­port for its pol­icy from do­mestic opinion. As he stated, the attitude of the pub­lic towards the accession nego­ti­ations was noticed by the gov­ern­ment and influenced the decision-­making pro­cess.40 As the Polish Chief Negotiator admitted, even though the farmers’ lobby was power­ful in both the EU and Poland, in the EU coun­tries it repres­ented a rather small group. Thus, the Polish farmers’ lobby had a huge impact on every gov­ern­ mental proposal, no mat­ter whether it was a right-­wing or left-­wing gov­ern­ment.41 EU response to the Polish position The majority of the EU leaders excluded the pos­sib­il­ity of extending direct farm payments to new member states from the former Eastern bloc, arguing that it would be ‘too costly’.42 In addition, the EU budget for 2000–06 had no funds to

Negotiations concerning agriculture   71 extend the direct payment scheme. Franz Fischler stated, ‘Giving generous direct farm payments to poorer new members would distort local eco­nom­ies and remove any incentive for reform.’43 According to a senior-­level EU official, this argument became a key element of the EU nego­ti­ation position.44 According to Władysław Piskorz, such an approach was an element of the EU strat­egy. Thus, the Polish side counterclaimed that it would be im­pos­sible to reform the agri­cul­ture sector without having money. The Polish side was rightly emphasising that other EU coun­tries such as Spain and Greece entered the EU on better terms.45 In this case, the Polish side used a so-­called dead-­weight catching strategy.

Negotiations concerning the liberalisation agreement Brussels was not very willing to discuss direct payments and production quotas. Instead, they accused Warsaw of breaking the lib­eralisation agreement that would expand free trade of agricultural goods. According to a Polish senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, the EU, instead of giving a direct response to the Polish proposals as set out in the position papers, focused on lib­eralisation and used this issue as part of their nego­ti­ation strat­egy.46 Soon after this, nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture were dominated by a single-­issue lib­eralisation agreement. EU critique of Poland In Decem­ber 1999 Fischler accused Poland of acting against the goals of market lib­eralisation when it introduced higher duties on EU food products. His critique was prompted by the fact that on 21 Decem­ber the Polish gov­ern­ment had indeed decided to raise customs duties on cereals. Fischler claimed that the Polish side wanted only privileges and was rejecting obli­ga­tions by, for example, its demands to lower quality stand­ards for products destined for both Poland and EU market at the same time.47 Fischler’s critique was shared by the EU’s main negotiator with Poland, Francoise Gaudenzi. She had warned the Polish authorities that it would be a very bad signal for enlargement if Warsaw were to follow through with a plan to further increase duties on other agri­cul­ture products.48 To show its goodwill, the EU had made a proposal for dispersing up to Q3.6 billion to CEEC seeking EU mem­ber­ship within the Sapard programme to help them overcome ‘huge structural weaknesses’ in their agri­cul­ture sectors. As the Commission argued, the EU would direct at least some farming aid towards restructuring rather than giving it all in direct payments to farmers. Fischler maintained that direct payments were undesir­able initially and claimed that ‘simply grafting our sys­tem on could lead to social ten­sions in the applicant coun­tries’. Consequently, farmers would be given an ad­vant­age over other sectors of soci­ety and could be discouraged from de­veloping ‘sound agricultural programmes’.49 According to a senior-­level EU official, this argument was widely used by the EU negotiators and even became part of the EU nego­ti­ation strat­egy.50

72   Negotiations concerning agriculture As a response, the Polish side counterclaimed that in other poorer accession coun­tries such as Greece, direct payments also put farmers in a better situ­ation in comparison to other social groups, and social ten­sion did not occur.51 The Polish side therefore often used a dead-­weight catching strat­egy, by catching the EU in the dead weight of its former actions.52 Such rhet­oric proved to be effect­ive since, in Febru­ary 2000, Fischler conceded that the Polish farmers may be granted direct sub­sidies for production during the first few years of Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU. Simultaneously, how­ever, he repeated his previous suggestion that EU money should be concentrated for structural aid to help farms modernise equipment and practices to be more com­petit­ive.53 With regard to nego­ti­ations on lib­eralising agricultural trade between Poland and the EU, Fischler declared that the EU might consent to lib­ eralise its food market more quickly than would Poland so as to enable both sides to increase agricultural exports to each other.54 The EU gradually softened its negotiating stances, and to the surprise of some ob­ser­vers in May 2000, the EU Agriculture Commissioner warned that denying CEE the aid could lead to the re-­emergence of food mountains. Without direct payments, it would be im­pos­sible to implement supply control mech­an­isms like requiring farmers to set aside land from production. To illus­trate, Fischler argued that ‘ser­ious production surpluses could result’. Indeed, this was the first time that the EU commissioner admitted that direct payments were required for a balanced market.55 According to a Polish senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, the EU realised that it must provide direct payments, how­ever the Commission was under strong contrary pressure from the EU capitals, which, due to strong do­mestic pressure, wanted to minimise the costs of enlargement.56 In June 2000 the EU again criticised Poland for protectionist meas­ures. The EU Agriculture Commissioner said Poland would not be able to bene­fit from a free trade agreement between the EU and its pro­spective new members from 1 July unless it ended its ‘protectionist practices’ in agri­cul­ture and cut down tariffs on farm produce from the EU.57 A sim­ilar demand was repeated by Commissioner Verheugen.58 Nevertheless, according to a senior Polish official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, Verheugen and the rest of the EU negotiators were trying to find an argument to counterclaim Polish demands for equally direct sub­sidies and high quotas, by saying that Poland wanted full rights, but was not prepared to accept reason­able EU requirements.59 At the same time, the EU emphasised that the nego­ti­ations should be a win-­win situ­ation. Franz Fischler stressed the need to see enlargement as a two-­sided pro­ject where both sides would gain from it. As he emphasised: ‘Threats and demands will get us no­where, nego­ti­ations consist of both give and take.’60 Poland had some reser­va­tions about lib­eralising food trade with the EU by elim­in­ating tariff bar­riers and export sub­sidies, since such a lib­eralisation did not seem favour­able for the coun­try. According to some studies,61 the limiting of market integration to elim­in­ate trade barrier risks created unequal com­peti­tion con­ditions. Even if the EU stopped subsidising its exports, it would still have

Negotiations concerning agriculture   73 numerous other instruments to affect its food trade with Poland. By accepting Fischler’s proposal, Poland would open its food market to EU products without being able to use direct sub­sidies.62 Signing of the liberalisation agreement According to a senior official involved in nego­ti­ations, Poland had no ser­ious al­tern­ative but to sign the lib­eralisation agreement in a slightly modified version, which at this time included certain concessions directed at Poland. As a carrot, the EU en­dorsed rural de­velopment programmes within the Sapard programme for the six candidate coun­tries, including not only Poland but Bulgaria, the Czech Repub­lic, Hun­gary, Latvia and Slovenia.63 However, as a stick, the EU used a battering ram strat­egy by saying that other CEEC had already signed the agreement. Thus, under this pressure, after seven months of nego­ti­ations, on 28 Septem­ber 2000 Poland decided to sign the food trade lib­eralisation agreement.64 According to the deal, import duties were revoked by both par­ties on over 75 per cent of food products, including fruit, veget­ables, horsemeat, livestock and mushrooms. For the remaining, ‘sensitive’ products, such as pork, beef, poultry, veal, milk and wheat, duty-­free import quotas were introduced that would be increased by 10 per cent each year. At the same time, the EU agreed to revoke its export sub­sidies on all products. Poland was the last candidate coun­try to sign the food trade lib­eralisation agreement, but as Franz Fischler admitted, ‘This agreement had the widest and the deepest scope among all agreements signed in those times with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean coun­tries.’ The enlargement commissioner, Verheugen, said it was an ‘honest and balanced agreement that opened the way for nego­ti­ations on agri­cul­ture in a spirit of mutual goodwill’.65 Even though officially Polish negotiators declared their satis­fac­tion, unofficially they argued that the deal, though bene­fi­cial for both sides, favoured EU inter­ests, since by nature EU was eco­nomic­ally stronger. As one of the senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess honestly admitted: ‘The deal was more favour­able for the EU, how­ever the gov­ern­ment had to pay attention to the farmers’ opinion and sell the agreement as a polit­ical success.’66 In Novem­ber 2000, after the agreement had already been signed, the Commission Report brought out a more detailed assessment of the pre­para­tions for integration. It stressed that the pre­para­tion for the integration of Poland’s agri­ cul­ture sector into the EU still needed con­sider­able efforts at both the legal and institutional levels.67 Even though the rural de­velopment plan had been initiated, implementation was still in a very early stage. It stressed the prob­lems in the area of import bar­riers and improvement of com­petit­iveness. Overall, as the docu­ment concluded, there was only limited pro­gress in meeting the short-­term pri­or­ities of the Accession Partnership.68 According to a Polish senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, the purpose of these crit­ical reports was to put pressure on the Polish gov­ern­ment. The conclusions of the report were often used to counter Polish demands by saying that Poland demanded full direct payments, without conceding even a

74   Negotiations concerning agriculture slower pace of adjustments to the EU requirements.69 A senior-­level EU official responded to this argument by stating that the fact that the EU was using the Commission report to exert pressure on the Polish side was nothing new; ‘This was a kind of meas­ure, of course, that had to be used.’70 The lib­eralisation agreement was a major step towards accession and a turning point in the nego­ti­ations. From then on, nego­ti­ations became more politicised and focused on direct payments and production quotas. This period also saw some polit­ical changes in Poland.

The change of the government in Poland There were some major changes that occurred during this period to the gov­ern­ ment in Poland. Nevertheless, the first few months after the signing of the lib­ eralisation agreement can be characterised as a rel­at­ive standstill in the nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture.71 In April 2001 Poland’s Deputy Agriculture Minister and negotiator with the EU, Jerzy Plewa, had criticised the Euro­ pean Union for its failure to present a clear position on direct payments for agri­cul­ture by candidate coun­tries.72 In July 2001 the EU rejected Polish proposals to adjust the shape of the CAP to the specificity of Polish small farming and small producer groups, espe­cially by granting fin­an­cial aid to small farming. The second difficult issue was direct payments.73 The Polish side saw light at the end of the tunnel, and as Jerzy Plewa declared, ‘Many Western Euro­pean politicians have vis­ibly changed their views. Only a few months ago they still said “no” to direct payments for Poland’s agricultural sector.’74 However, according to a senior-­level EU official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, Jerzy Plewa was really under great polit­ical pressure, as he explained: ‘On the one hand, he had to explain at home what was going on and on the other, explain to us that it is difficult to go home with results that are not accept­able.’75 There was, how­ever, a polit­ical reason behind the slowing down of the nego­ ti­ation pro­cess. The summer of 2001 was a difficult time for the AWS, which was in power at that moment, since their sup­port declined to 7 per cent and it became obvious that the opposi­tion Democratic Left Alliance was going to win the Septem­ber 2001 elections. Just a few months earl­ier the Liberal Freedom Union left the co­ali­tion and the gov­ern­ment was polit­ically weaker. Under such circumstances, the gov­ern­ment tried to avoid controversial de­cisions related to the EU negotiations. The pri­mary opposi­tion, mainly the Democratic Left Alliance, used this oppor­tun­ity to warn against delaying Poland’s entry into the Euro­pean Union. The opposi­tion used every oppor­tun­ity to severely criticise the Buzek gov­ern­ ment, espe­cially arguing that postponing Poland’s entry date until 2004 would mean that the nego­ti­ation strat­egy of Jerzy Buzek’s gov­ern­ment had broken down. Nevertheless, as Jan Kułakowski de­scribed, the slowing down of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess was a side-­payment for keeping the direct sub­sidies. We could not slow the direct payments, but this would be regarded as an even bigger mis­take.76

Negotiations concerning agriculture   75 The new coalition and the acceleration of the negotiation process In Octo­ber 2001, fol­low­ing a parlia­ment­ary election, a new co­ali­tion gov­ern­ment created by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) came into power. Interestingly, the two par­ties held quite diverging attitudes towards Euro­pean integration. The goal of the SLD was to dem­on­strate to the voters that its politicians were in favour of EU mem­ber­ship, and that Poland would join Euro­pean structures smoothly if they were elected. The PSL tried to convince the voters that it was only by voting for that party’s can­did­ates that the full protection of their inter­ests would be ensured in the upcoming accession talks. Whilst SLD was referring to EU mem­ber­ship as a win-­win situ­ation, the PSL was referring to the image of nego­ti­ations as a zero-­result game in which Poland could gain something only if the EU would lose something at the same time. The change of gov­ern­ment and the acceleration of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess brought more attention from the Polish media. In Novem­ber 2001 the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita claimed to have uncovered a scandal involving the implementation of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) in Poland. According to the daily, the implementation might cause prob­lems for Poland’s accession nego­ti­ations and reduce the aid that the coun­try was receiving from pre-­accession funds. Nevertheless, Petra Erler, Member of the Cabinet of Commissioner, Gunter Verheugen, partly defused the scandal, by saying: ‘The story is strongly exaggerated.’77 According to Jarosław Pietras, a member of the Negotiation Team, the Polish media were at that time behaving like a wind that would blow in different dir­ec­tions depending upon the par­ticu­lar whim of the moment. They neither opposed the gov­ern­ment nor sup­ported it. However, if any prob­lems occurred, they were often exaggerated just to make a front page story.78 A sim­ilar view was shared by a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, Władysław Piskorz, who argued that some Polish journ­al­ists were trying desperately to make the front page without con­sidering whether their beha­vi­our would act against Poland’s inter­est. As a result, some of them made nego­ti­ations more difficult for the Polish side.79 As the former Prime Minister Buzek emphasised, the media were pressuring the gov­ern­ment to speed up nego­ ti­ations because they treated nego­ti­ations as a race against time. Nevertheless, the post-­communist gov­ern­ment was put under even greater pressure to accelerate the nego­ti­ations even at the price of the softening of nego­ti­ation stances.80 The new co­ali­tion gov­ern­ment almost imme­diately decided to speed up nego­ ti­ations and soften its nego­ti­ation stance on eight out of eleven remaining EU negotiating chapters and to focus on the toughest issues. Even though the gov­ ern­ment decided to soften its nego­ti­ation stance on the free movement of persons and the free movement of capital, including the most controversial issues within each chapter, the free movement of workers and the purchase of land by foreigners, agri­cul­ture, together with the Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments and Financial and Budgetary Provisions, remained the most difficult issues, even though the Polish gov­ern­ment had to make certain concessions.81

76   Negotiations concerning agriculture The more flexible approach to negotiations According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, increased elasticity in the other positions was neces­sary to ensure that Poland would complete nego­ti­ations by the end of 2002. This time was con­sidered the prere­quis­ite for joining the EU with the first group of can­did­ates, planned for 2004. Indeed, the new ‘Negotiation Strategy for the Polish gov­ern­ment’ was approved by the Polish gov­ern­ment on 15 Novem­ber 2001. Cimoszewicz offered extensive warnings against any negotiating tricks or ultimatums that would leave Poland exposed to the threat of being left out of the first group of can­did­ates. In his statement on the nego­ti­ation position he emphasised that the final stage of the nego­ti­ations was to be focused fully on mat­ters of utmost im­port­ance: agri­cul­ ture, regional pol­icy, budget and finance. As he emphasised, Poland’s unique chance was linked, first and foremost, to these chapters. Poland, he said, must do every­thing in its power not to fail the expectations of its cit­izens when the time for joining the Union came.82 Cimoszewicz felt great pressure coming from pub­lic opinion, which was indicated in opinion polls, and therefore he knew that pro­gress in the nego­ti­ations would be one of the most crucial issues re­gard­ing pub­lic opinion.83 In fact, Cimoszewicz opposed the EU strat­egy of the battering ram when the EU exerted pressure by referring to the good example of other coun­tries that were ahead of Poland in concluding their nego­ti­ations. In the opinion of many Polish negotiators, most Polish media were in fact used by the EU to send a clear message to the Polish pub­lic that if the gov­ern­ment did not move as fast as the other accession coun­tries, Poland would be left behind.84 The EU used the Polish media, and in par­ticu­lar Polish cor­res­pondents in Brussels, to exert pressure on the do­mestic level, while at the same time exerting external pressure and using the 2001 report to criticise the gov­ern­ment.85 In the pro­gress report published in Novem­ber, the Commission emphasised the lack of a coherent strat­egy and substantial trans­forma­tion of the agri­cul­ture sector in Poland. Even though there had been some pro­gress with regard to veterinary legis­la­tion, the administrative capa­city was still weak, in par­ticu­lar with regard to the IACS sys­tem and border inspection, both in veterinary and phytosanitary fields.86 With respect to the assessment of meeting the pri­or­ities as set up in the Accession Partnership, the report concluded that there was limited pro­gress in meeting its short- and medium-­term pri­or­ities.87 EU Commission proposals and their critique by the Polish side On 23 Janu­ary 2002 the EU dir­ector in charge of enlargement, Eneko Landaburu, declared in Warsaw that the EU would do ‘all it could’ to finish nego­ti­ ations with Poland before the end of 2002. Even though he was reluct­ant to promise anything concrete, there was a leak that the Euro­pean Commission was unofficially ready to give from 10 to 30 per cent of what EU farmers receive in direct payments to farmers in new EU member coun­tries. The dir­ector warned

Negotiations concerning agriculture   77 that the state administration in Poland and other candidate states were not prepared to receive aid, and added that EU enlargement would not be bene­fi­cial to new members. One may argue that the leak was a controlled part of the EU strat­egy. As Putnam emphasises, a utility-­maximising statesman (Level I negotiator) aims to convince his counterpart that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favour­able to the op­pon­ent is unlikely to be ratified.88 Hence by this the EU was saying, ‘Look, there is a pos­sib­il­ity of granting you 10 to 30 per cent of direct payments, but this will be difficult and the issue is still under discussion.’ Thus, Poland should have taken what was being offered on the table. On 25 Janu­ary Fischler signed pre-­accession financing agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The agreements outlined EU management and control rules for agri­cul­ture and rural de­velopment programmes in the candidate coun­tries. The signature was a vital step towards making the pre-­accession agri­ cul­ture programmes opera­tional.89 On 30 Janu­ary the EU Commission made the re­com­mendation that direct payments should begin at 25 per cent of eli­gible direct payments upon expected accession in 2004, and were to move up to 30 per cent in 2005 and 35 per cent in 2006 of the level enjoyed by the EU-­15 members, and eventually be completely phased in over ten years. The overall agri­cul­ture sub­sidies to the ten candidate coun­tries were proposed to be at Q2.0 billion, Q3.6 billion and Q4.0 billion for the 2004 to 2006 period. According to the proposal, this aid could also be increased with national funds. Franz Fischler commented on the proposal: ‘This is a fair, balanced and reason­able package. Our strat­egy makes sense in eco­nomic, eco­lo­gical and social terms. It ensures that EU money is well spent in boosting the neces­sary restructuring pro­cess in the new member states.’90 A sim­ilar view was shared by another senior-­level EU official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. As he argued, Poland’s demands were rather unrealistic, since Poland requested imme­diate introduction of full-­scale payments which for the EU was completely out of the question for two reasons: First, this would have made accession im­pos­sible for fin­an­cial reasons since it would be much too expensive. Second, according to many studies we had carried out starting the direct payments at 100 per cent in a coun­try like Poland would lead to enorm­ous social and eco­nomic disruption. We would give amounts to farmers, which would be completely disproportionate in comparison to some other social groups.91 Nevertheless, Poland’s prime min­is­ter imme­diately de­scribed the Euro­pean Commission’s proposal to phase in direct payments as ‘disappointing’ and the proposed trans­ition period as ‘definitely too long’, adding that Poland would push for full payments by 2006. Miller asked his advisers to prepare an ana­lysis of the Commission’s position, on the basis of which Poland would form an official negotiating stance. He used the argument that the gov­ern­ment, if it were to

78   Negotiations concerning agriculture accept the Commission’s current proposals, would face attack from Euro-­sceptic and rural par­ties, which formed a signi­fic­ant bloc in par­lia­ment. Indeed, Miller’s gov­ern­ment was criticised for giving too many concessions to the EU, espe­cially by the League of Polish Families, which accused the gov­ern­ment of making Poland ‘move toward Europe on its knees’.92 Indeed, this rhet­oric was used by the rural and Euro-­sceptic par­ties, since they realised that pub­lic opinion, farmers in par­ticu­lar, are sensitive towards rhet­oric referring to national pride and inde­ pend­ence. This was par­ticu­larly due to a small win-­set among Polish pub­lic opinion to accept the EU proposal. The Polish gov­ern­ment used a tying hands strat­egy, based on Putnam’s argument that ‘a small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining ad­vant­age’.93 The negotiator can use the tactic of saying that he would like to accept his opposi­tion’s proposal, but this would not be accepted by polit­ical par­ties and pub­lic opinion in the negotiator’s home coun­try. Indeed, this strat­egy was used extensively during the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. As a senior-­level EU official noted: I had an impression that the room for manoeuvrabil­ity for the Polish negotiator was extremely limited, espe­cially in comparison with negotiators from the other acceding coun­tries. Polish negotiators had prob­lems in making concessions always making ref­er­ence to the do­mestic polit­ical situ­ation and the pub­lic opinion in Poland. My overall impression was that the Polish gov­ern­ment was acting under strong do­mestic pressure.94 Public pressure Opposition par­ties reflected major areas of pub­lic opinion. The payments for farmers proposed by the Euro­pean Commission were unaccept­able for most Poles. In a Febru­ary 2002 CBOS survey, over half of the respondents believed that Poland should strongly demand full payments for the Polish farmers imme­ diately after the accession, even if it was associated with the risk of a deadlock in nego­ti­ations and the failure of the accession pro­cess. The opinion that Poland should demand full payments for farmers prevailed in all social groups. Among the farmers, 10 per cent would accept partial payments and 80 per cent believed that Poland should uncon­ditionally demand full direct payments beginning on the date of the accession. The proposals to accept partial payments while maintaining customs duties for agricultural products did not meet with the respondents’ approval (28 per cent for and 44 per cent against). This solution was sup­ported by 21 per cent of farmers and rejected by 61 per cent.95 Among the gen­eral pub­lic, 59 per cent demanded full payments for farmers. The Commission’s proposal was not only severely criticised by pub­lic opinion, but also by the main opposi­tion par­ties and by the junior co­ali­tion partner, the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL). Jarosław Kalinowski, the Deputy Prime Minister respons­ible for agri­cul­ture and the leader of the PSL, called the Commission proposals unaccept­able, breaking solid­arity between stronger and weaker regions.96 He also added that the Commission proposal was set to be one

Negotiations concerning agriculture   79

IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD POLAND:

59%

Accept partial payments for Polish farmers in the first years of Poland’s membership in the European Union, trying to make them as high as possible

25%

Absolutely demand full payments for farmers from the moment of access to EU, even if it is associated with a risk of deadlock in negotiations and failure of the accession process

16% Difficult to say

Figure 4.2 Do you accept the level of payments for farmers proposed by the European Commission? (source: CBOS, February 2002).

of the crucial factors that would determine the outcome of the Polish referendum on EU accession in June 2003. As he pointed out, ‘I need to convince our farmers to vote for accession [. . .] But how am I supposed to convince them if they are to expect lower incomes after accession?’97 According to Jarosław Kalinowski, it was a ser­ious polit­ical dilemma, and he was aware that if Poland would not get a better deal, farmers would not sup­port accession.98 Indeed, opinion polls provided arguments to sup­port his claims, since just after the Commission, proposals were announced the sup­port of the Poles for the accession decreased by 4 per cent. The proportion of the op­pon­ents grew by 6 per cent. According to Piskorz, the argument that Poland ‘Feels the breath of pub­lic opinion and farmers on its back’ was extensively used as part of Polish nego­ti­ ation strat­egy. Even though the EU side perfectly understood this approach, it still gave Poland a strong argument in the nego­ti­ations with the EU.99 Indeed, this was another attempt to use the tying hands strat­egy. Even though it was part of the strat­egy for SLD, the PSL was indeed afraid of losing the rural electorate and being taking over by a more rad­ical and Euro-­sceptic party – the Self-­ Defence. Jarosław Kalinowski admitted that the Commission’s proposals on the financing of enlargement increased the pub­lic’s opposi­tion and also that of some parlia­ment­ary groups to EU mem­ber­ship.100 Indeed, it was not that difficult to predict that MPs from all quarters would politicise the issue, and espe­cially criticise the proposed level of direct sub­sidies for farmers. A week later, Kalinowski reiterated the warning that if the EU states insisted on keeping the sub­sidies for new EU states at a level inferior to that of the payments for present EU states, farmers in Poland would seek to introduce taxes on present EU farmers’ products, as they would have a com­petit­ive ad­vant­age in comparison to farmers from

80   Negotiations concerning agriculture

HOW WOULD YOU VOTE IN A REFERENDUM:* January 2002 February 2002

69%

For Poland’s access to the European Union

65%

18%

Against Poland’s access to the European Union

24%

13%

Difficult to say

11%

*Answers of persons declaring an intention to take part in the referendum on Poland’s access to EU

Figure 4.3 How would you vote in a referendum on EU accession? (source: CBOS, February 2002).

new EU states.101 Kalinowski used a modified threat strat­egy. He threatened that there would be certain un­pleas­ant repercussions for the EU. In order to pacify these threats, Franz Fischler gave assurances that farmers’ incomes would increase after the accession. Thus, as he argued, farmers from new member coun­tries would imme­diately get access to guaranteed prices thanks to inter­ven­tion purchases and would also bene­fit, since the prices of most farm produce would go up.102 In late Febru­ary and March, the par­ties left aside nego­ti­ation on agri­cul­ture and focused on negotiating and closing another two chapters. On 22 March 2002 the chapters on the free movement of capital and on taxation were signed. Jan Truszczyński, Poland’s Chief Negotiator, declared in Brussels that closing the two nego­ti­ation areas ‘confirmed that Poland remains decidedly on the right track and that the Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy, designed to successfully complete mem­ber­ship nego­ti­ations by the end of the year, was feasible and realistic’. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, expressed satis­fac­tion

Negotiations concerning agriculture   81 with the agreement with Poland on the sale of farmland, one of the most controversial issues of the nego­ti­ations. As he declared: ‘Closing nego­ti­ations with Poland on the free movement of capital is a turning point.’103

Acceleration in negotiations and the governmental crisis Just after the two sides concluded nego­ti­ations in the other two controversial issues, the nego­ti­ations on agri­cul­ture accelerated. In order to sup­port their positions, both sides decided to back their arguments with expert opinions. In March 2002 the EU presented a report. The report con­sidered four different pol­icy scen­arios (‘no enlargement’, ‘introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) without direct payments’, ‘CAP with direct payments’ and ‘Candidate Country Negotiating Position’), which showed that even under the most pess­im­istic restructuring scen­ arios, EU accession would have pos­it­ive effects on the income of farmers in the candidate coun­tries. The report also underscored the Commission’s view that imme­ diately paying 100 per cent of direct payments would create signi­fic­ant social distortions and in­equal­it­ies and would hamper the neces­sary restructuring, because farmers’ incomes in the candidate coun­tries could more than double.104 Nevertheless, according to Piskorz, this argument was part of a wider EU strat­egy. Soon after, the Polish side responded to these arguments by using their own estim­ates.105 Just two weeks after the Commission report was presented, Poland’s Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA) prepared a report that stood in clear contrast to the EU estim­ates. Polish experts assessed Euro­pean Commission proposals as disappointing, espe­cially the vari­able level of the direct payments for new members. According to the report, the proposals on direct payments appeared to violate EU com­peti­tion law. By granting 25 per cent of the payments to can­did­ates at the beginning, the Commission was prepared to make a supplement with them from the national funds, but only up to the level of payments received by present members. The report under­mined the Commission’s argument that a situ­ation where farmers from new member states received more sup­port than present members would be contrary to art­icle 87 of the EC Treaty on equal com­peti­tion. The report stated that the Commission did not recog­nise the discrimination. Much attention was paid to production quotas proposed by the Commission, which meant that Poland would remain a net importer of agro-­food products from EU member states.106 The role of the farmers’ unions and public opinion The report estim­ates provided strong polit­ical arguments that were widely used in nego­ti­ations and in the pub­lic debate. These estim­ates were used not only by the Polish gov­ern­ment but by farmers’ unions to criticise the EU.107 As the chief of the leading Polish farmers’ union Kółka Rolnicze,108 Władysław Serafin stated EU proposals concerning the con­ditions for farmers from candidate coun­tries would preclude Polish mem­ber­ship. As he argued, the proposal made Poland a second-­class member in the EU. He argued that ‘If we are to go to the Euro­pean

82   Negotiations concerning agriculture Union and lose our national eco­nomy, I don’t want such a Union.’ The leader of the biggest farmers’ union was also backed by Jarosław Kalinowski, who agreed that the proposed level of direct payments for agri­cul­ture was unaccept­able to Poland.109 The FAPA report provided very strong arguments that were widely used by the gov­ern­ment’s polit­ical par­ties and inter­est groups.110 These polit­ical declarations were strongly sup­ported in the opinion polls. In a CBOS opinion survey done in May 2002, only 37 per cent of farmers declared their sup­port for the EU integration.111 According to a specialist report prepared by the Warsaw-­based Institute for Public Affairs, 51 per cent of rural area inhabitants and 59 per cent of farmers declared that Poland should not join the EU unless equal con­ditions of mem­ber­ship (direct payments and other sub­sidies) would be implemented imme­diately after the accession.112 Even though the rural popu­la­tion and farmers, in par­ticu­lar, demanded sub­sidies, 55 per cent thought that the EU sub­sidies would not decrease their pov­erty and only 28 per cent argued the oppos­ite. The pess­im­ism of these groups was obvious, since 52 per cent of farmers declared that sub­sidies would result in increased unemployment and 70 per cent argued that it would cause conflicts within the rural popu­la­ tion.113 At the same time, more than 85 per cent of rural inhabitants and 90 per cent of farmers were afraid that the accession would lead to the bankruptcy of many farms, whilst 71 per cent and 77 per cent respectively were afraid that the enlargement would increase unemployment within the sector.114 These stat­ist­ics show a small do­mestic win-­set within the major farmers’ unions and pub­lic opinion to accept the con­ditions offered by the EU and indeed made the pro­spects for pos­sible future ratification more difficult.115 EU position before the Seville Summit On the EU side, the direct payments for some coun­tries were also unaccept­able. On 11 June 2002 the EU gov­ern­ments meeting before the Seville Summit failed to agree on granting any direct payments to farmers in candidate coun­tries. Ger­ many, the Neth­er­lands, Britain and Sweden led opposi­tion to payments to the ten can­did­ates.116 At the same time, the EU heads of state warned that the ob­ject­ive of completing accession talks by the end of the year could only be met if each candidate coun­try adopted a ‘constructive and realistic approach’. The EU leaders were seeking to prepare the can­did­ates for tough nego­ti­ations. The situ­ ation was made even tougher because of huge EU in­ternal prob­lems in reaching a common position to present to the can­did­ates.117 On 28 June 2002 Truszczyński reiterated in Brussels the major goals by focusing on equal com­petit­ive footing for Polish farmers within the EU Single Market, espe­cially with regard to direct payments. The second funda­mental element, emphasised by Poland, was ensuring a high level of production quotas.118 Indeed, the Polish side had used the dead-­weight catching strat­egy by catching the EU on the dead weight of its former action and sending a message saying ‘Sorry, but we can not accept your offer, when it is less generous than the one you gave to the coun­tries during previous enlargements.’119

Negotiations concerning agriculture   83 Crisis within the coalition The polit­ical situ­ation in the coun­try became more complex because of the in­ternal conflict within the co­ali­tion par­ties in Poland. In early July 2002 the Cabinet decided to delegate decision-­making in the area of nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture from the Minister of Agriculture to the Minister for Euro­pean Affairs, Danuta Huebner, who was seen as more compromising than the head of the farmers’ party. It should be emphasised that the de­cision was made just before the nego­ti­ation round on agri­cul­ture that was scheduled for 9 July. As a response, Jarosław Kalinowski threatened to step down as the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture if he were to have no control on nego­ti­ ation talks in the area of agri­cul­ture. His resignation could have triggered a collapse of the governing co­ali­tion by the withdrawal of his party. At the same time, Kalinowski warned that Warsaw would impose protective import duties on EU agricultural products should Brussels not grant Polish farmers bigger sub­ sidies.120 As Jarosław Kalinowski later admitted, he had to strongly oppose this on the pub­lic forum since he realised that bringing this issue to the pub­lic agenda would strengthen his argument and allow him to keep pub­lic sup­port within the farmers’ groups. Indeed, as he pointed out: ‘Even though they called us Euroblackmailers, this brought desir­able results since we remained in control of nego­ ti­ation positions within agri­cul­ture.’121 Kalinowski used a double threat strat­egy, since he used the threat on the do­mestic level by threatening his co­ali­tion partner and on the inter­na­tional level by threatening the EU that Poland would impose duties. The Euro­pean Commission called Kalinowski’s threats nothing more than a nego­ti­ation trick.122 Indeed, Kalinowski was representing the inter­est of PSL, which repres­ ented the farmers’ union, and as Putnam emphasised: ‘The group with the greatest inter­est in a specific issue is also likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue.’ However, his ‘extreme position’ was blocked by his co­ali­ tion partner, since SLD were aware that if they allowed PSL to fix the Level I negotiating position for its issue: ‘The resulting package would be non-­ negotiable (that is, not-­ratifiable in the EU‑15 capitals).’123 What is more, both SLD and the EU were aware that the Polish side did not have a cred­ible BATNA and obviously the threat strat­egy could be successful only if a negotiating side had a cred­ible BATNA. Kalinowski’s beha­vi­our was prompted not only by his party and the farmers’ unions, but by opinion polls published in May 2002.124 According to 56 per cent of respondents, Poland should have demanded that Polish farmers receive, after the accession, the same amounts as the farmers from the other EU coun­tries, even at the risk of blocking nego­ti­ations and leaving Poland outside the EU.125 This opinion was espe­cially pop­ular among the residents of rural areas (68 per cent), par­ticu­larly farmers (86 per cent). Only 29 per cent of people inhabiting the coun­tryside and 14 per cent of farmers believed that the Polish negotiators should accept partial payments in the first years of mem­ber­

84   Negotiations concerning agriculture ship. The min­imum accept­able level of direct payments in the first years of mem­ber­ship on average amounted to 66 per cent of the payments received by the farmers from the EU coun­tries.126 This figure cor­res­ponded with later demands to allow the gov­ern­ment to increase direct payments to the level of around 60 per cent. In keeping with expectations of structural changes in rural areas, over half of respondents (55 per cent) believed that EU funds should in the first place be appropriated to boost rural de­velopment via the cre­ation of new jobs outside the agricultural production sector.127 Obviously, respondents’ attitudes towards direct payments were tied to their place in the social structure. For this reason, city inhabitants were much more willing to agree to a lim­ita­tion of direct payments than were persons directly affected by them. But opinions on this issue were also tied to polit­ical pref­er­ences. Supporters of the League of Polish Families (LPR), of the farmers’ Self-­Defence (Samoobrona) party and of the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) flatly refused to agree to partial payments and demanded 100 per cent payments, even at the risk of blocking nego­ti­ations and leaving Poland outside the EU. Supporters of par­ties, in which farmers were not as numerously repres­ented, were more willing to accept the Euro­pean Commission’s position on direct payments.128 Furthermore, a comparison of Febru­ary and June (Ipsos-­Demoskop) surveys on the pos­it­ive effects of accession pointed to smaller pos­it­ive expectations relating to agri­cul­ture (down from 34 per cent to 28 per cent).129

100 90 80

Percentage

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Consent to partial payments All respondents

Demand for entire payments Rural inhabitants

Farmers

Figure 4.4 Opinion of rural inhabitants and of farmers regarding direct agricultural payments (source: CBOS, May 2002).

80 70

Percentage

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Consent to partial payments PO

PiS

SLD

Demand for entire payments PSL

Samoobrona

LPR

Figure 4.5 Attitudes towards direct agricultural payments among electorates of political parties (source: CBOS, May 2002). Notes PO – Citizens Platform, PiS – Law and Justice, SLD – Democratic Left Alliance, PSL – Polish Peasants’ Party, Samoobrona – Self-Defence, LPR – League of Polish Families.

60 50

48% 42%

Percentage

40 34% 30

28%

20 10 0

II ’02

VI ’02 Advantageous

Disadvantageous

Figure 4.6 Would accession to the EU be advantageous or disadvantageous for Polish agriculture? (source: Ipsos-Demoskop/OCEI).

86   Negotiations concerning agriculture Pressure coming from political parties and interest groups The closer the Summit came, the more pressure was put on the gov­ern­ment. This pressure was mainly exerted by major polit­ical par­ties. Indeed, the agricultural lobby had dominated the Polish debate on joining the EU. Politicians, from the SLD to the LPR, spoke with a single voice. They were becoming increasingly more rad­ical in criticising the nego­ti­ations with the EU. The atmo­sphere in the Sejm was heated due to the fact that debates were broadcasted by the Public TV.130 Therefore, politicians appealed directly to pub­lic opinion (farmers in par­ticu­lar) and reflected their moods. The debate was therefore full of theatrical ges­tures. According to one of the senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, most politicians remained completely ig­nor­ant in respect to nego­ti­ations in agri­cul­ture and cared only for the voice of pub­lic opinion. Therefore, they simply repeated polit­ical slogans that would appeal to the pub­lic.131 The nego­ti­ations were obviously criticised by the main opposi­tion. Szymon Giziński from Law and Justice (PiS) thundered: ‘The gov­ern­ment has not persuaded pub­lic opinion that it will defend Polish agri­cul­ture and rural Poland in nego­ti­ations with the EU bur­eau­cracy.’ The leader of Self-­Defence, Andrzej Lepper, advised the Polish Peasants’ Party leader outright: ‘When you go to Brussels, don’t become a good little Jarosław, but rather a tough representative of the peasant class.’ On another occasion, he made the accusation: ‘They are making fools of us; they need us as a sales market.’132 The strongest critique, how­ever, came from the nationalist League of Polish Families. Roman Giertych, deputy head of the LPR Parliamentary Club, had a bleak vision: ‘Poland’s joining the EU will mean the complete elimination of Polish agri­cul­ture.’ The LPR specialist on agri­cul­ture, Gabriel Janowski, advised the head negotiator to take a revolver with him to the latest round of nego­ti­ations in Brussels in order to shoot himself in the head.133 Such a rad­ical atmo­sphere and the fact of losing farmers’ sup­port prompted PSL to criticise the official gov­ern­mental stances. As a result, PSL as a co­ali­tion party was also in opposi­tion to the position of its own gov­ern­ment. As the leader of PSL, Kalinowski rhet­orically asked, ‘If our farmers were to be treated worse than those of the 15 member states, what sense would this all make?’ Indeed, Kalinowski’s situ­ation re­sembled a form of polit­ical ‘schizophrenia’. As the Deputy Prime Minister, he had to defend the gov­ern­mental stances, but as a leader of the PSL, he was forced to criticise it. One group concentrated around Kalinowski realised that compromise was neces­sary in negotiating with the EU. But Kalinowski could not allow himself to disclose such views, since this would open himself up to attacks from the in­ternal opposi­tion in his own party. In fact, Kalinowski admitted that he was put in an extremely difficult situ­ation and that, provided nego­ti­ation con­ditions did not improve, PSL would simply vanish from the polit­ical scene.134 Such a polit­ical dilemma was de­scribed by Putnam, when he emphasised that ‘Politicians may be willing to risk a few of their normal sup­porters in the cause

Negotiations concerning agriculture   87 of ratifying an inter­na­tional agreement, but the greater the potential loss, the greater their reluctance.’ Thus, in Putnam’s opinion, the politicians have to calculate ‘How great a realignment of prevailing co­ali­tions at Level II would be required to ratify a par­ticu­lar proposal.’135 The price for this polit­ical reluctance was very high. The major sign of in­ternal division in the PSL was evid­ent when one of its prominent MPs, Bogdan Pęk, departed from the PSL and joined the League of Polish Families, calling Kalinowski’s beha­vi­our ‘a sin against the nation and the state’. Pęk added: ‘The con­ditions that the EU is proposing to us could be proposed to a state that initiated and lost a war, and is being forced to capitulate uncon­ditionally.’136 There were a few different voices in the debate. Marcin Libicki (PiS) believed that rural issues should not dominate the debate on Poland’s joining the EU. ‘Agriculture is im­port­ant, but it receives excessive exposure,’ he stressed. Libicki repres­ented a different view on CAP in gen­eral by arguing that CAP was nonsense and a complete waste of pub­lic money that ruined agri­cul­ture in the Third World coun­tries. This made him different from his party colleagues. Thus, in his opinion, Common Agriculture Policy should be aban­doned. Janusz Lewandowski, PO Civic Platform Deputy Chairman of the Sejm’s Euro­pean Committee, believed that the ‘topic of agri­cul­ture had impaired the relationship of Poland and the EU’. He complained that ‘Every Polish debate on the topic of the EU revolved around agri­cul­ture and ended with direct sub­sidies.’137

Stiffening of the negotiating stances Stiffening of the EU position On 12 July 2002, during his visit to Poland, Commissioner Verheugen said he was disappointed that Polish pub­lic opinion was inter­ested mainly in sub­sidies for agri­cul­ture in the EU entry talks.138 Verheugen also used another nego­ti­ation trick by arguing that lower payments would be in Poland’s own inter­est, because ‘the social con­sequences of directing such funds to a single professional group would be appalling’. He argued that full sub­sidies would preserve the archaic structure of the Polish coun­tryside. He was also concerned about other professional groups that were in a difficult situ­ation. ‘What about shipyard workers, steelworkers?’ Verheugen asked. ‘It would be unfair and harmful if a rel­at­ively small group like farmers were to receive huge aid.’139 According to a senior Polish official involved in the negotiating pro­cess, these arguments were part of the EU nego­ti­ation tactic to break solid­arity within Polish pub­lic opinion by getting them to accept the idea that those larger sub­sidies would bene­fit only one group and this would be at the expense of others. Verheugen tried to make a direct appeal to Polish pub­lic opinion, using the Polish media for that purpose. Contrary to Verheugen’s objections, pub­lic opinion simply took the EU position as showing discrimination against Poland, and Verheugen’s remarks did not bring about the desired results from his point of view.140

88   Negotiations concerning agriculture A sim­ilar direct appeal to the Polish do­mestic audience was taken by the EU Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz Fischler, who, just before his visit to Poland, expressed his major ob­ject­ives as follows: I am looking forward to discussing with the Polish President and the gov­ ern­ment and the par­lia­ment, but also with farm representatives and the broader pub­lic. I think it is time to stress the pos­it­ives: For the Polish rural sector, being in the EU is far better, and offers a far more stable and secure future, than staying out. I intend to use my trip to Poland to inform, to address the concerns and fears of the popu­la­tion and to reinforce sup­port for EU integration.141 During his visit to Poland, Franz Fischler also called on the Polish gov­ern­ment to be realistic and responsible. It would be a big mis­take to nourish false illusions within the Polish farm com­mun­ity. The room of manoeuvre for compromises in the nego­ti­ation package is limited. Certain member states are reluct­ant to pay direct payments at all and the EU budget is tight. I do see some limited flex­ib­il­ity for the setting of quotas and other supply management instruments – but only on the basis of solid arguments.142 The EU used a threat strat­egy, which was believable since the Polish side lacked a cred­ible BATNA. According to Alan Mayhew, nego­ti­ations were one-­sided by their nature. On the EU side, very gen­eral threats were used all the time and amounted to saying: ‘If you don’t agree on this, then of course enlargement will be delayed; you are not among the best groups anyway.’143 This strat­egy was rather risky, and caused further conflicts and stiffening of the Polish nego­ti­ation positions. Stiffening of the Polish negotiation positions Fischler’s inter­ven­tion drew an imme­diate negat­ive response. MPs of the LPR and the PSL pulled out whistles and blew loudly as Fischler finished speaking at a joint meeting of the legislature’s agri­cul­ture committees. The EU commissioner responded, ‘A lively demo­cracy also needs opposi­tion, and such a demo­ cracy also needs criticism.’ He also remarked that Polish lawmakers’ ‘specific culture is not com­par­able to other par­lia­ments in Europe’.144 Fischler as­sured Kalinowski that the Euro­pean Commission would do every­thing to see that Poland received (net) financing from day one. Nevertheless, Kalinowski retorted, ‘But we have the impression, and we fear, that we will have to finance enlargement ourselves.’145 It should be pointed out that Kalinowski’s response re­sembled a modification of the dead-­weight catching strat­egy. This is when the negotiator is catching his counterpart in the dead weight of his former actions. However, such an argument

Negotiations concerning agriculture   89 is less effect­ive in the case of signi­fic­ant asymmetry between the nego­ti­ation partners, since the bargaining power of Poland was weaker in comparison to that of the EU. On 12 Septem­ber 2002 Jarosław Kalinowski, after meeting Franz Fischler, de­scribed the initial nego­ti­ation position of the Polish side: ‘In order to guarantee a level playing field, the position will include three possib­il­ities: additional funds in the budget, trans­fer of funds or select­ive protection of the market.’ The second proposal, the trans­fer of funds, involved moving money slated for Union­financed rural de­velopment programmes into direct payments for farmers. Poland also threatened to impose select­ive trade protections to cushion its farmers from open com­peti­tion with the EU‑15 farmers.146 Poland used a threat strat­egy; how­ever, at the same time, a side-­payment strat­egy was used. As Putnam indicated, on the do­mestic level (Level II) what counts are not total costs and bene­fits, but their incidence rel­at­ive to existing co­ali­tions.147 Thus, the Polish side indirectly suggested: ‘If you agree on the moving money slated for Union-­financed rural de­velopment programs into direct payments for farmers and to finance direct sub­sidies from the Polish budget, we won’t have to introduce protective meas­ures.’ Indeed, this re­sembled a package deal. The Commission, in response, declared that they would present a revised position, which would be discussed during an Octo­ber EU summit in Brussels.148

Modification of the negotiation positions Modification of the Polish position On 8 Octo­ber 2002 the Polish gov­ern­ment en­dorsed changes to the EU agri­cul­ ture nego­ti­ation position by making a concrete declaration that Poland was ready to accept an EU offer re­gard­ing lower payments, but under three con­ditions. First, a right to equalise the level of payouts for Polish and EU farmers from the national budget in order to enable some additional trans­fers for farmers who were hit hardest by the removal of bar­riers in agricultural trade between Poland and the EU. Second, they wanted Brussels to redesign some 60 per cent of fin­an­ cial sources offered for rural de­velopment after accession, and use this money to boost direct payments. The Polish gov­ern­ment also foresaw a third meas­ure in case Polish farmers would still face signi­fic­ant losses. That included a tariff protection for some sort of agricultural commodities including grains, tobacco and hops.149 Such protectionist meas­ures and budget trans­fers reflected pub­lic opinion and in par­ticu­lar that of farmers’ inter­est groups. This pol­icy was sup­ ported by the FAPA report, which argued that Polish agri­cul­ture was unable to generate eco­nomic surplus and hence required budget trans­fers.150 In a CBOS opinion poll conducted in July 2002 (published in Octo­ber 2002), 83 per cent of respondents agreed that the gov­ern­ment should provide more sub­sidies for the agri­cul­ture sector and protect this segment of the market from imported products.151 Even though the majority of the pub­lic agreed that Polish agri­cul­ture was

90   Negotiations concerning agriculture backward and inefficient, the suggestion that the number of em­ployees within the sector should be decreased was sup­ported by only one-­third of the pub­lic.152 In another opinion poll conducted in Octo­ber 2002, about 62 per cent of respondents maintained that Poland should demand equal sub­sidies (on the same level as the ‘old’ members), even at the expense of blocking Poland’s mem­ber­ ship in the Union. In fact, there was a 4 per cent increase in comparison to a sim­ ilar poll conducted in April 2002.153

DO YOU AGREE OR NOT WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? All respondents

Farmers

43% 55%

Polish farming is underdeveloped and not efficient enough

2% 63%

There are too many small farms in Poland

26% 11% 33% 55% 12%

The number of people working in agriculture should be reduced

44% 46%

Farmers are not active enough and have little initiative

10% 99%

The state should spend much more on agriculture

0% 1% 96% 0% 4% 90% 6% 4% 61% 26% 13%

The government should organise intervention purchases of agricultural produce The state should protect Polish agriculture by maintaining high customs duties for imported products Better farms must take over the land from those with serious problems

Yes

No

52% 41% 7% 73% 17% 10% 34% 52% 15% 49% 38% 13% 83% 10% 7% 87% 6% 7% 83% 11% 6% 71% 15% 14%

Difficult to say

Figure 4.7 Public opinion on agriculture (source: CBOS, October 2002).

Negotiations concerning agriculture   91 Such a rad­ical view was mainly shared by farmers, whilst the majority of the pub­lic opinion was more moderate. Thus, the farmers remained deeply Euro-­ sceptical. Less than a quarter of them (23 per cent) expected that the integration would have a pos­it­ive effect on agri­cul­ture.154 At the same time, 44 per cent of respondents asserted that the party that protected the farmers’ best inter­est was the populist and Euro-­sceptical Self-­ Defence. About 36 per cent declared that the Euro-­sceptical Polish Peasants’ Party provided the best repres­enta­tion of farmers’ inter­ests.155 EU response to a Polish modified position The new Polish proposals, reflecting the mood of pub­lic opinion, were moderately criticised by the EU Agricultural Commissioner. In Fischler’s opinion, even though Poland’s modified position was ‘more realistic’, the pos­sib­il­ity of maintaining the tariff sys­tem was incom­pat­ible with the idea of a common market.156 The EU Commissioner argued that obtaining additional funds for Polish farm sub­sidies would be ‘exceptionally difficult’. He also noted that the shifting of funds was aimed to sup­port big agricultural producers at the expense of smaller farms, a move which was also incom­pat­ible with EU targets. As a response, Jan Truszczyński said Fischler’s remarks were ‘essential’, but he warned that none of the Polish proposals should be ruled out automatically and be regarded as non-­negotiable.157 In Octo­ber 2002 the EU published a report on Poland’s pro­gress. This report emphasised that Poland had made steady pro­gress in the alignment of the EC agricultural acquis. With regard to strengthening the administrative capa­city, rather slow pro­gress had been made. The Commission emphasised that par­ticu­ lar efforts were needed in the fol­low­ing areas: the estab­lishment of a coherent structural and rural de­velopment pol­icy to deal with the prob­lem of Poland’s agri­cul­ture structure; the implementation and enforcement of veterinary and WILL POLAND’S ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION HELP IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN AGRICULTURE? II 1999 Definitely not Rather not

16%

Definitely yes 8% 23%

25%

Rather yes

28%

Difficult to say

VII 2002 Definitely yes

Definitely not

11%

Rather yes

8% 38%

24% 19%

Rather not

Difficult to say

igure 4.8 Impact of the EU accession on the situation in agriculture (source: CBOS, November 2002).

92   Negotiations concerning agriculture phytosanitary requirements and upgrading of estab­lishments to meet EC stand­ ards; and the strengthening of administrative structures to ensure the neces­sary capa­city to implement and enforce the pol­icy instruments of the CAP.158 According to a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, these calls for being realistic as well as the pro­gress report were mainly used by the EU side to exert pressure on the Polish side and became part of a wider EU strat­egy.159 As a senior-­level EU official admitted, the fact that the EU reports were used to mobilise EU coun­tries or even to exert pressure was nothing new. This was the kind of meas­ure the EU had to use.160 Clarification of the Polish position In mid-­November Minister Cimoszewicz insisted that Poland’s pri­or­ity ob­ject­ive was to ensure that Polish farmers enjoyed equal com­petit­ive con­ditions to the farmers in the current EU member states: ‘In this con­text we call for the amounts of direct payments to be increased as well as for the trans­ition period to be shortened and for the EU offer on quotas and para-­quotas to be improved [. . .].’161 In late Novem­ber 2002 Polish negotiators changed their line of attack in talks. Instead of a simple increase in the percentage of the full subsidy granted to Polish farmers on entry, the pressure was being switched to par­ticu­lar production quotas, mainly for milk and corn. For milk, negotiators were pushing for a rise from 9 million to 13 million tonnes of milk annually, despite the fact that the 9m tonne figure cor­res­ponded to the actual annual production of the Polish industry between 1995 and 2001.162 According to Jarosław Pietras, the issue of the milk quota was a purely polit­ical one. SLD decided to push for higher milk quotas because SLD feared that PSL would leave the co­ali­tion.163 Poland also chose a simplified area-­based, not production-­based, sys­tem for the receipt of EU direct payments for farmers.164 According to the simplified sys­ tem, the subsidy was to be alloc­ated per hec­tare of arable land. As the Polish gov­ern­ment highlighted, this sys­tem would be more bene­fi­cial for the Polish farmers because it would enable them to optim­ise the level of payments and would not require the complicated pro­ced­ures used in the stand­ard sys­tem.165 The strongest proponent of the simplified sys­tem was Jarosław Kalinowski; how­ever, as he later claimed, he was the only Polish min­is­ter strongly advocating for the simplified sys­tem. Most of the members of the Cabinet remained strongly scep­tical.166 However, many experts remained crit­ical. Jacek Saryusz Wolski, the former min­is­ter for Europe, even before argued that the simplified sys­tem provided a social bene­fit, but gave no incentive for modernisation and special­isation.167

The Copenhagen negotiations The message from the Polish side before the Copen­hagen Summit was clear. Poland demanded not only more sub­sidies, but also increased quotas. As a high-­ ranking Polish diplomat expressed: ‘The EU cannot underestim­ate the strength

Negotiations concerning agriculture   93 of feeling among the pub­lic when it comes to being told how much we can produce and what our yields should be. This is the issue that could make or break a referendum.’168 Yet again, this was an attempt to use the tying hands strategy. The Danish proposal In response to Polish demands, the Danish side presented a package deal, which was de­scribed by the Presidency as ‘between the Brussels Summit conclusions and what the Euro­pean Commission offered – or perhaps even more generous’. There was no change to the Q23 billion offer on structural instruments, but small amounts of additional and imme­diately avail­able aid were being proposed: Q900 million for a ‘Schengen facility’ to reimburse can­did­ates for expenditures, and to accelerate their pre­para­tions on border control; Q600 million for decommissioning nuclear power plants; and Q1 billion as a lump sum for budgetary compensation, to be distributed among the new member states on the basis of their Gross National Income.169 There would also be more spending possib­il­ities on rural de­velopment. The final package was constructed in the light of the can­did­ates’ prin­cipal concern – agri­cul­ture. The renewed compromise package went further than the agreed terms of the Brussels Summit at the end of Octo­ber. It left the 25 per cent starting point for direct payments unchanged, but offered a pos­sib­il­ity of state aid for farmers and the trans­fer of 20 per cent of the funds for rural de­velopment, which together could raise the level up to 40 per cent of the current payments existing in the EU. The Danish Premier, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declared that he had received a very clear mandate from the EU states; he said there was sup­port for the proposed package, but that there would be limited room for manoeuvrability. I urge the can­did­ates to do their utmost to conclude nego­ti­ations. I warn against raising demands too high as there is the risk that nego­ti­ations will not be concluded at Copen­hagen, which would postpone enlargement for many years. We are prepared to conclude nego­ti­ations with the candidate coun­tries that are ready. No candidate coun­try should wait for the others.170 The Danish presidency simul­tan­eously used a few different strat­egies. By saying that no candidate coun­try should wait for the others they used the so-­called battering ram strat­egy. The Danish presidency had an inter­est in using other CEEC as a battering ram in order to persuade Poland to sign a sim­ilar nego­ti­ation deal. They were saying, in other words, ‘Look, the other coun­tries are way ahead and nobody is going to wait for you.’ At the same time, the Danish presidency used package deal and threat strategies. According to Sławomir Tokarski, Director of the Department for Economic and Social Analyses, Office of the Committee of Euro­pean Integration, the Danish presidency suggested to the Polish side that their proposals were unofficial and were not yet accepted by other EU‑15 coun­tries. Therefore, they were

94   Negotiations concerning agriculture suggesting that the Poles should happily accept what was offered, because other­ wise some EU coun­tries might reject the offer and con­ditions would worsen. The Danes suggested that Poland did not have time and should cut down the number of demands, other­wise a compromise would not be achieved. Consequently, Poland was forced against the wall.171 Indeed, this situ­ation re­sembled the tactic where the negotiators seek to ex­ploit divisions within their own side by saying, ‘You’d better make a deal with me because the al­tern­ative is even worse.’172 Thus, the Danish side tried to persuade the Polish side that the Danish ‘win-­set was kinky’ and that the Danish deal was certain to be ratified, but a deal that would be slightly more favour­able to Poland was unlikely to be ratified by the EU.173 Polish response to the Danish proposal and the second crisis within the government Polish negotiators were not satisfied with the Danish proposals. Prime Minister Miller knew that he could count on Kalinowski’s opposi­tion and therefore used another nego­ti­ation trick by using a tying hands strat­egy, arguing that the Polish gov­ern­ment might collapse because of the difficult polit­ical situ­ation within the gov­ern­ment and because of the pressure being exerted by the opposi­tion and pub­lic opinion. Nevertheless, just four days before the final summit in early Decem­ber 2002, Poland was still unhappy with the Danish proposal. Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz declared after the meeting with the Danish presidency and the Commission that Poland had decided to con­tinue talks in some major issues, espe­cially on the level of fin­an­cial sup­port for the national budget and sup­port to farmers. Such a position caused irritation from the Danish side. The Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig Moller, used a threat strat­egy by saying, ‘If Poland doesn’t want to be part of the Union, I will have to accept that.’174 An already hot atmo­sphere became even more heated, when on the eve of the Summit Kalinowski announced: ‘The Polish side has reached the limit of concessions on agri­cul­ture and it cannot go any further than that.’ As he emphasised: I submitted certain levels for the nego­ti­ations to the prime min­is­ter and the Council of Ministers. If the levels are lower than that, I will have to say no [. . .]. Poland’s dialogue with the EU in the last two weeks could not be called nego­ti­ations [. . .]. The Euro­pean Commission is trying to force Poland to make abso­lute concessions or simply to capitulate.175 Poland’s Chief Negotiator Jan Truszczyński said reassuringly: ‘I find it hard to ima­gine a situ­ation where the EU-­15 says the fol­low­ing in Copen­hagen: either you accept what you are being offered, or you can well leave Copen­hagen.’ Truszczyński declared: ‘The nego­ti­ations never looked like this.’ Yet again, by saying this Truszczyński used ‘dead-­weight’ catching. By this, he suggested

Negotiations concerning agriculture   95 that during previous enlargements, the EU treated other acceding coun­tries on better terms. Kalinowski went even further, when on 28 Novem­ber, two weeks earl­ier, he threatened for the second time176 to quit the co­ali­tion unless Warsaw secured better terms for its farmers. As he explained, ‘The Peasants’ Party cannot allow itself to sacrifice Polish agri­cul­ture on the altar of integration.’ He added: ‘It is difficult to ima­gine a situ­ation where one of the co­ali­tion partners accepts the con­ditions (proposed by the EU) and the other does not.’177 This caused a genu­ine crisis within the gov­ern­ment. As Jarosław Kalinowski later explained his position, Miller wanted to accept EU con­ditions. Thus, after a long struggle with his Cabinet colleagues when all of his proposals were rejected by the SLD, he threatened that if his con­ditions concerning the term of payments and production quotas in milk would not be accepted by the Cabinet, he would not go to Brussels.178 Kalinowski used a double-­threat strat­egy, since he not only used the threat on the do­mestic level (to leave the gov­ern­ment), but also at the inter­na­tional level. His threat was prompted both by the farmers’ pressure and the fear of growing sup­port for Samoobrona, the main rival of the PSL. According to the IPSOS-­ Demoscop Opinion Poll published in Octo­ber 2002, Samoobrona was the second most pop­ular party with about 13 per cent, while PSL got only 6 per cent, losing 4 percentage points in comparison to the previous survey.179 Just a few days before the Summit, 64 per cent of respondents admitted that Polish inter­ests during the nego­ti­ations were not being prop­erly protected, and only 10 per cent argued the oppos­ite. The gov­ern­ment was therefore aware of the strong pressure coming from the pub­lic to negotiate better con­ditions, and this goal was even straight­forwardly expressed by Prime Minister Miller while negotiating with his Danish counterpart Rasmussen.180 Leszek Miller ac­know­ledged that he felt pub­lic opinion breathing down his neck, and that if Poland was not seen to be negotiating toughly, it was pos­sible that the Accession Treaty would not be ratified in the referendum. This obviously re­sembled the tying hands strat­egy based on Putnam’s argument that a small do­mestic win-­set can be used as a bargaining ad­vant­age.181 Thus, according to this strat­egy, the negotiator may use the trick, ‘I would like to accept your proposal, but this would not be accepted by the pub­lic.’ The EU prepared itself for tough nego­ti­ations before the Copen­hagen Summit, being itself under strong do­mestic pressure. As one senior EU diplomat argued: ‘We will just have to be firm with the Poles. I know they have terrible pub­lic opinion at home – but we all do!’182 The Copenhagen deal The Commission was desperate to get the nego­ti­ations over and done with by the end of the Danish presidency. Indeed, the nego­ti­ation deal was the aim of the Danish presidency. Verheugen was very keen to finish the nego­ti­ations, since it was at a turning point in his career. However, a major role in Polish–EU nego­ti­ ations was played by Chancellor Schroeder and other German negotiators.183

96   Negotiations concerning agriculture In this last-­minute bargaining, Heads of States and Government from the EU and ten candidate coun­tries reached agreement on a formula for enlarging the EU. The de­cision was made that Cyprus, the Czech Repub­lic, Estonia, Hun­gary, Latvia, Lithu­ania, Malta, Poland, The Slovak Repub­lic and Slovenia could join the EU on 1 May 2004. According to the Copen­hagen Agreement, the new member states would receive a rural de­velopment package. The amount avail­ able for the ten candidate coun­tries was fixed at about Q5.1 billion for 2004–06. Direct aids for the new member states would be phased in over ten years. Poland would receive 25 per cent of the full EU rate in 2004, rising to 30 per cent in 2005 and 35 per cent in 2006. This level could be increased by 30 per cent up to 55 per cent in 2004, 60 per cent in 2005 and 65 per cent in 2006. Until 2006, the ‘top-­up’ payments could be co-­financed up to the level of 40 per cent from each coun­try’s rural de­velopment funds. From 2007, the new member states could con­tinue to increase EU direct payments by up to 30 per cent above the applic­ able phasing-­in level in the rel­ev­ant year, but financed entirely by national funds. The farmers from the new member states would have full and imme­diate access to CAP market meas­ures, such as export refunds, and cereal, skimmed milk powder or butter inter­ven­tion, which would con­trib­ute to stabilising their prices and incomes.184 Poland managed to increase some production quotas including the wholesale quota for milk (a difficult issue right up until the end of the talks), sugar, isoglucose, flax, hemp and tomatoes. The most difficult issue was definitely milk quota production. According to Jarosław Kalinowski, the EU’s initially proposed level of 7.5 million tonnes was unaccept­able for the Polish side, which demanded 8.5 million tonnes. Then the EU Commissioner Romano Prodi proposed a compromise of eight million tonnes, and since it was already very late, he expected Poland to accept the EU proposal. Indeed, according to Jarosław Kalinowski: Leszek Miller asked me to accept the EU proposal. However, I told him that I would not change my stance and we would have to get 8.5 million. Then he said: ‘Look, we will vote out this de­cision within our team, you will abstain from voting and by this you will be covered within the farmers and the pub­lic opinion’. I told him that in such circumstances there should be no abstention votes, we must each vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Then he asked me: ‘What are you going to tell journ­al­ists?’ I said: ‘I am going to tell them that I will not allow pun­ishing milk producers by imposing low production quotas’. Then he said: ‘And what about the co­ali­tion?’ I said: ‘When we go back to Poland there will be no co­ali­tion’. Then he went back to the EU negotiators and said: ‘We have to get 8.5 million, since if we don’t get it, the co­ali­tion will break down and if this happens, the accession referendum results would be un­cer­tain’. I really appreciated his position.185 However, according to a senior-­level EU official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess, re­gard­ing agri­cul­ture, the acceptance of 8.5 billion tonnes was not a big deal on the EU side. This was because there was a shift within dairy production

Negotiations concerning agriculture   97 levels between the two quotas: for direct sales and for dairy wholesale production. He argued: ‘I have an impression that the Polish side always wanted to have something, which could be to sell to the gen­eral pub­lic.’186 A sim­ilar view was shared by another EU official who argued that it was not a ser­ious concession for the EU because the overall quantity did not change; it was only a change of the character. However, for whatever reason it was sold by the Polish side as a big success. For us, it was just a polit­ical way out of a difficult situ­ation.187

Between the Copenhagen Summit and the Accession Treaty The text of the Accession Treaty was finally approved by the EU-­15 ambas­ sadors on 5 Febru­ary 2003. The Polish gov­ern­ment accepted a compromise with the EU on direct payments for agricultural production. Clarification of the treaty provisions and the final approval of the Accession Treaty The compromise meant that Polish producers of pota­toes, beets, pork and other products not subsidised by the EU would only receive base sub­sidies, or 25 per cent of what EU farmers would get, in 2004; the fol­low­ing year, they would get 30 per cent, and in 2006 they would get 35 per cent. The volume of sub­sidies would be de­pend­ent upon farm size. The money would be granted to all farmers who had at least one hec­tare of land. Apart from base sub­sidies, there would be two more pools of sub­sidies. The first, accounting for 15 per cent of the average EU level, would consist of money that would be trans­ferred from the EU fund for rural de­velopment. Poland wanted to divide it in the same way as the basis pool, while the EU demanded that funds be granted only to those farmers who grew products subsidised in the EU. With the compromise, the money from this pool would go only to those farmers who would be subsidised in the EU. However, the funds would be paid through a more simple sys­tem than that in use in the 15 member states. The other pool would include money from the Polish budget. If it were granted at all – and that would be decided by the gov­ern­ment and par­lia­ment when drafting the budget law – it would also amount to 15 per cent of the average EU sub­sidies. This pool would also be divided according to the types of crops. Additional assistance would be provided for producers of hops and tobacco, whose fields take up little space, so they would lose out in the division sys­tem based on farm size. The Union agreed to simpler applica­tion forms for Polish farmers in the first years of mem­ber­ship. Leszek Miller said this would limit potential bur­eau­ cratic prob­lems. The applica­tion speci­fied the total size of farmland owned, the portion of meadows and pastures, and the portion of land planted for EU-­ subsidised crops. Jarosław Kalinowski said that this sys­tem ‘is a good solution for all cat­egor­ies of farms’.188

98   Negotiations concerning agriculture The pre­para­tion of Poland for EU mem­ber­ship was assessed for the last time in the Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 2003. The most ser­ious concern was the implementation of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS). Assessment of the negotiation results by public opinion The gov­ern­ment declared success because the nego­ti­ations had won, for Poles, an extra billion euros. This was rather a bluff. According to Alan Mayhew, the Polish side indeed origin­ally thought that an extra billion euros were on the table. However, soon after, they realised that the Germans had played an extremely nasty trick on them. According to Jarosław Kalinowski, Miller went to Brussels with the expectation that he would receive an extra billion or even two billion dollars. He was prepared to announce it as a sound nego­ti­ation success. As Kalinowski later de­scribed on 13 December: When we arrived in Brussels at 12 pm, Truszczyński came to us and said that every­thing was open for further nego­ti­ations. I was angry at him [. . .]. However, when I saw Miller after the first meeting he looked so much like a nerv­ous wreck that I could not recog­nise him. He only said that we have to find an al­tern­ative solution and I think this move of structural funds toward direct payment, even though it was a PR trick, was a good tactical de­cision.189 When the budget subsidy came up for discussion, this was not linked to a loss of structural funds, and in the discussions between Schroeder and Miller that connection was not made. So the negotiators thought that there was an extra billion on the table, but this was the case only later when Schroeder said that the EU was going to take this from the structural funds.190 Thus, in fact, this was a virtual billion euros, since the Union agreed to move only Q500 million from already secured structural funds for the de­velopment of rural areas in order to finance CAP sub­sidies. The other 500 million was the exemption of Poland from co-­financing structural funds, but this did not mean that Poland would receive the cash. It was rather a tactical manoeuvre of moving money around within the same alloca­tion. The only additional cash was Q172 million (an increase from 108 to 280) from a special Euro­pean fund to finance the sealing of EU Eastern borders. Obviously, such a solution was accept­able for the EU coun­tries, since their leaders could also declare that Poland did not get extra money. Manipulating win-­sets The Polish gov­ern­ment managed to sell the image of successful nego­ti­ations and that Poland would get extra money from the EU in order to finance CAP sub­ sidies. The impression of Prime Minister Miller was that of a steely negotiator

Negotiations concerning agriculture   99 and indeed it brought desir­able results. Miller realised that the pub­lic wanted to enter the EU quickly but on good terms. He was inter­ested in increasing the Polish do­mestic win-­set to sup­port the accession not before the Copen­hagen Summit (since a small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining ad­vant­age), but just after the closing of nego­ti­ations, for the fol­low­ing reasons. First, because the comparison of a lower do­mestic win-­set to accept accession before nego­ti­ations and the increase of the Polish do­mestic win-­set to enter the EU after the Copen­ hagen Summit would suggest that the gen­eral pub­lic accessed nego­ti­ation successfully for the Polish side. Second, it would help him to accomplish a bigger turnout and more sup­port for the accession in the referendum on Polish mem­ber­ ship in the EU. Since the high turnout and sup­port could be used polit­ically to argue that his gov­ern­ment ensured good con­ditions for Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU, it would strengthen his polit­ical position on the do­mestic scene. Finally, this would also show his foreign counterparts that the tying hands strat­egy was not a bluff and indeed would ensure better con­ditions for Polish farmers by enlarging their win-­set to accept the accession. The number of respondents that pos­it­ively assessed con­ditions of Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU increased to 62 per cent, while negat­ive assessment dropped to only 8.3 per cent. This was a huge increase of pos­it­ive assessment, since in an opinion poll just before the Summit, 64 per cent claimed that Polish inter­ests during nego­ti­ations were not prop­erly protected. Thus, one may argue that the image of the toughness of Poland’s nego­ti­ations had a crucial impact on the assessment of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. Public opinion in Poland was also as­sured that it would achieve good con­ditions by the EU side when welcoming the Summit de­cision. Franz Fischler commented: This is a great day for Europe – for the EU, for the candidate coun­tries and for their farmers. The leaders of the candidate coun­tries can return home with their heads held high. They have achieved a farm package which is perfectly saleable to their farm com­mun­ity. The deal is fair, far-­sighted and tailor-­made for the needs of the farm sectors of the 10 new member states.191 This shows that the do­mestic win-­set can be easily manipulated by the polit­ical elites. While the Polish side was quite successful in persuading Polish media and pub­lic opinion that Copen­hagen was a success, at the same time it was less successful in persuading the media of the EU coun­tries. The Polish side won the PR battle in Poland but lost the same battle in the EU. As a result, Poland was presented as selfish, un­reli­able and greedy. According to Tokarski, Poland was too concerned with the nego­ti­ations and forgot about the PR in the Western coun­ tries.192 Assessment of the Copenhagen Summit by political parties Polish politicians were more crit­ical about the results. Obviously, the most severe criticism came from the two Euro-­sceptic par­ties. Roman Giertych,

100   Negotiations concerning agriculture leader of LPR, called the nego­ti­ation’s climax ‘choreographed’, and promised his party would run ‘a very strong pre-­referendum cam­paign’.193 Meanwhile, in Febru­ary 2003 the situ­ation within the co­ali­tion was quite difficult. The unpop­ular road vignette bill194 proved the perfect oppor­tun­ity for PSL to launch a polit­ical offensive. As Jarosław Kalinowski declared, he realised that SLD did not want PSL as a co­ali­tion partner and that it was time to leave the co­ali­tion. The Polish Peasants’ Party rejected the gov­ern­mental bill and counted upon their position strengthening within the gov­ern­ment, as they had shown that their sup­port was in­dis­pens­able to the gov­ern­ment’s plans. However, they were soon proven wrong – at a Cabinet meeting two days later, Leszek Miller told the Peasants’ Party that they were no longer wanted in the co­ali­tion. According to most media commentaries, Jarosław Kalinowski was surprised by Miller’s de­cision. He never expected that Miller would get rid of the Peasants’ Party so quickly, even after the collapse of the vignette bill.195 However, according to Jarosław Kalinowski, PSL did not feel comfortable within the co­ali­tion, and their opposi­tion towards the vignette bill was a tactical de­cision to find a pretext to leave the co­ali­tion and the bill provided a perfect oppor­tun­ity.196 After the PSL was kicked out, party leaders agreed that in order to secure itself for the future, PSL had to rebuild closer ties with the right-­wing opposi­tion.197 On 14 March the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) and Law and Justice (PiS) appealed to President Aleksander Kwasniewski to file Poland’s EU Accession Treaty for screening by the Constitutional Tribunal. Both par­ties stressed that the move would be a formal meas­ure and that they had not found anything unconsti­tu­tional in the treaty.198 The PSL’s pop­ularity declined as it maintained a more EU sup­portive stance as a junior co­ali­tion partner in gov­ern­ment. Its main sup­porters – farmers – belonged to the group which was the most crit­ical of EU mem­ber­ship in Polish soci­ety. Simultaneously, Kalinowski warned that his party would withdraw sup­ port for EU integration unless the par­lia­ment adopted three bills, im­port­ant for Polish farmers. The three bills demanded by the PSL were related to increasing the direct payments from the national budget and giving legal guarantees for agricultural sub­sidies agreed upon in Copen­hagen. The other two bills were related to bio-­fuels and the shape of the agricultural regime.199 According to Kalinowski, this last bill was of crucial im­port­ance since it was even more im­port­ant to protect Polish inter­est (read limit the sale of land) than to have the long trans­itional period.200 At the same time, PSL warned that if their proposals were not taken into account, it would call upon farmers to vote ‘No’ in the referendum. In light of the deep Euro-­scepticism of farmers, PSL had to become more Euro-­sceptical in their rhet­oric. Such beha­vi­our is explained by Putnam when he argues that politicians may be willing to risk losing a few of their sup­porters in the cause of ratifying an inter­na­tional agreement, but the greater the potential loss, the greater their reluctance.201

Negotiations concerning agriculture   101

Conclusions The case of Poland’s nego­ti­ation with the EU within the agri­cul­ture chapter shows that do­mestic pressure can indeed influence decision-­makers and con­ sequently the outcome of nego­ti­ations. It dem­on­strates interplay on the do­mestic level, among pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical elites. In par­ticu­lar, it explains how the growing Euro-­scepticism among farmers and their inter­est groups was used by anti-­establishment agrarian par­ties to gain pub­lic sup­port. At the same time, the Polish Peasants’ Party fostered Euro-­scepticism to increase their sup­port. As a result, they became hostages of their own polit­ical rhet­oric and of the farmers’ electorate. Polish negotiators, being pushed by the pub­lic, farmers’ groups and anti-­ establishment par­ties, had to dem­on­strate their tough nego­ti­ation stances, espe­ cially during the last round of nego­ti­ations in Copen­hagen. A small Polish do­mestic win-­set (to accept limited direct payments and low-­level production quotas) was used by the Polish decision-­makers in a tying hand strat­egy based on the as­sump­tion that: ‘I would like to accept your proposals, but this will not be approved in the accession referendum.’ This indeed confirms Putnam’s argument that a small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining advantage. The EU win-­set to accept the high-­level direct payments and production quotas was also diminutive. Polish and EU win-­sets did not overlap. This made compromise par­ticu­larly difficult, but still pos­sible due to the high cost of no agreement. Poland’s nego­ti­ation strat­egy was determined by the lack of a plaus­ ible best al­tern­ative to negotiated agreement (BATNA), which implied major asymmetry between the nego­ti­ation sides. Thus, the cost of non-­membership for Poland was too high and this forced the negotiators to achieve a compromise. The lack of cred­ible BATNA was indeed used by the EU negotiators, since the EU realised that the higher the cost of non-­agreement, the bigger the win-­set within Level II. The nego­ti­ation outcome was quite distant from the ori­ginal demands, yet Polish decision-­makers managed to sell it to the gen­eral pub­lic with success. Miller managed to increase the Polish do­mestic win-­set after the closing of nego­ti­ations and before the referendum on accession in order to get a high turnout and sup­port for the EU mem­ber­ship into the referendum. This was used to strengthen his position on the do­mestic scene. The cost of no agreement was also high for the EU side. Such coun­tries as Ger­many were inter­ested in getting access to the large and attractive CEE market, but also there were some grand stra­tegic arguments based on a combination of values favouring enlargement. Poland’s mem­ber­ship was of crucial im­port­ance for the stability of the whole region. For this reason, the EU was willing to make some limited concessions in order to make the deal. Polish–EU nego­ti­ations within the chapter on agri­cul­ture provide an inter­ esting case study for the two-­level game approach, as de­scribed by Putnam. In the nego­ti­ations, both on the do­mestic level and on the inter­na­tional level, several different nego­ti­ation strat­egies were used, from tying hands and the battering ram to dead-­weight catching. Even though there was only a small

102   Negotiations concerning agriculture do­mestic win-­set, that was the potential for Polish negotiators to use do­mestic pressure as a means of getting better terms in nego­ti­ation. This potential was ex­ploited in the Polish nego­ti­ation strategies. To sum up, nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture were complicated and difficult due to both Polish and EU small do­mestic win-­sets. As Putnam stated: ‘The smaller the win-­set, the more difficult it is to conclude an agreement.’ Since the win-­set did not overlap, compromise was neces­sary and both sides were willing to do so because of the rel­at­ive high costs of no agreement. Table 4.1 Agriculture negotiations – size of the domestic win-set Size of win-set Case study Poland

EU

Result

Agriculture Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties.

Small within interest groups and political parties. Public opinion less interested in this issue.

Compromise very difficult, but possible due to a high cost of no agreement. Both sides had to enlarge their win-sets by making certain concessions.

5 Purchase of real estate by EU residents

To discuss the influence of do­mestic pressure on nego­ti­ations concerning the purchase of real estate by foreigners, one first needs to ex­plore whether this issue was given much attention by the pub­lic, by inter­est groups and by polit­ical par­ ties. An obvious starting point is to ask the question: ‘Why was this issue im­port­ ant for the do­mestic audience and what were the main factors behind this inter­est?’ Second, one needs to ask to what extent the Polish case was different from the case of the other acceding coun­tries. To this end, the sys­tems in opera­tion and the positions taken by other acceding coun­tries will be briefly reviewed. In order to examine the influence of do­mestic pressure on Poland’s nego­ti­ations concerning land purchase by foreigners, one must understand the sequence of nego­ti­ations. The first step was the so-­called screening pro­cess, which was a review pro­cess re­gard­ing its com­pliance with the acquis communautaire that enabled formu­la­tion of nego­ti­ation positions. Poland’s position was dictated by her specific his­tor­ical, social and eco­nomical circumstances and had the backing of pub­lic opinion, as was shown in a number of opinion polls. One should differentiate between the two nego­ti­ation periods, which were each characterised by a different dynamic of polit­ical nego­ti­ations. The first period, under the co­ali­tion AWS–UW gov­ern­ment, from 1998 to 2001, can be characterised by a rel­at­ive standstill in nego­ti­ations concerning the sale of land. This was mainly because of the tough Polish negotiating positions and the lack of determination on both negotiating sides to achieve a reason­able compromise. However, the main reason that determined the pace of nego­ti­ations was the sequence of nego­ti­ation chapters imposed by the EU that set aside the most prob­ lematic chapters until the later stages of nego­ti­ations. The second period under the SLD–­PSL gov­ern­ment, after 2001, brought a slight softening of the nego­ti­ ation stances. This was due to the determination of the gov­ern­ment to speed up the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, even at the price of having to make limited concessions to the EU. Although the Polish side softened its nego­ti­ation stances, it was rather a limited concession since the proposed trans­ition period was reduced from 18 to 12 years.1 This softening of nego­ti­ation positions, even though limited in scope, brought much criticism from do­mestic groups, mainly polit­ical par­ties, which used it for polit­ical purposes. The modification of the Polish position, how­ever,

104   Purchase of real estate by EU residents enabled a compromise to be achieved in which Poland secured the longest trans­ itional period among the acceding coun­tries. Negotiation outcomes were subject to criticism from not only the opposi­tion or the farmers’ unions, but even from the junior co­ali­tion partner PSL. This caused an in­ternal polit­ical crisis until the signing and ratification of the nego­ti­ation treaty. The prob­lems mentioned above will enable us to answer the key question of this chapter: To what extent did the size of the do­mestic win-­set in nego­ti­ations concerning purchase of real estate influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and the nego­ti­ation results?

Why the issue of purchase of real estate was important domestically There are at least three main reasons why the purchase of real estate negotiated within the chapter of free movement of capital became a highly politicised issue that raised the concerns of both the pub­lic and inter­est groups. This inter­est may be explained by his­tor­ical, social and eco­nomical factors. These reasons prompted the Polish side to demand a trans­itional period with regard to freedom to purchase real estate by foreigners. It should be emphasised that this freedom was guaranteed under art­icle 56 of the Treaty estab­lishing the Euro­pean Community, which pro­hibited all restric­ tions on the movement of capital (including land sales) among member states and between member states and third coun­tries.2 The sensitivity of Polish pub­lic opinion in this area is a result of Polish his­ tory, and may be traced back to the nineteenth-­century partition and par­ticu­larly the Second World War. After the war, Polish borders were moved westwards and resulted in the inclusion of some of the land that belonged to the former Ger­many. Most real estate re­gis­ters were destroyed during the war. Therefore, the status of real estate, par­ticu­larly in Western Poland, is in many cases legally dubious. Polish refu­gees from the Eastern part of Poland seized by the Soviet Union were resettled in the Western part; how­ever, this was done without grant­ ing them the full right of ownership, and usually giving them only a lifetime lease. Much of the land in current Western Poland before the Second World War was owned by Germans. Therefore, a large part of the pub­lic was afraid that Polish mem­ber­ship in the EU would be an oppor­tun­ity for the Germans to reclaim the real estate lost in the aftermath of the Second World War, or in the best case buy it cheaply in the market.3 The Polish gov­ern­ment was afraid of a certain in­ter­pretation of the German Constitution, which might open the pos­sib­ il­ity for claims of German cit­izens towards their lost properties in Poland.4 The second reason why this issue was im­port­ant and raised both pub­lic and inter­est group concern stems from socio-­cultural factors. Polish culture is very much a ‘land based’ gentry culture. Even though this pattern is changing, rem­ nants of this culture have remained. Poland’s culture and mentality have been very much dominated by a nineteenth-­century romantic notion of land as the major attribute of nationhood.5

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   105 Therefore, land, together with the language and the Cath­olic faith, became one of the attributes of nationhood in the time when Poland was partitioned and occupied. One famous pat­riotic song, which Polish chil­dren have to learn by heart, is called Rota, and it starts with the fol­low­ing phrase: ‘Don’t take the land from under the feet of the people.’ One of the novels of required reading in most secondary schools is Boleslaw Prus’s 1886 novel The Outpost, where a Polish peasant resists pressure to sell his plot of land to German settlers. His wife, on her deathbed, makes him swear that he will never sell. ‘God spare us from this plague of Germans,’ she declares in an oath. The novel shows how the attach­ ment of Poles to their land is an emotion with deep his­tor­ical roots.6 Hence, these socio-­cultural factors should not be underestim­ated when examining why this issue gets so much attention from pub­lic opinion. Public inter­est in this issue was also driven by eco­nomic factors, which were par­ticu­larly emphasised by the Polish gov­ern­ment in the EU nego­ti­ation position papers. The argument for the necessity of introducing the trans­itional period was based on the very low prices of land in Poland, and a fear that the fin­an­cial capa­ city of business entities originating in the EU member states would impair the equality of oppor­tun­ity for Polish cit­izens in the field of real estate acquisition.7 This argument was indeed emphasised by Alan Mayhew, who pointed out three ser­ious issues: 1 2 3

the danger that social ten­sion would result if large enough areas of land were bought up by foreigners, the danger that foreigners would buy land simply for the capital gains that they expected to make, the danger that rising prices due to the entry of foreigners into the market would make the restructuring of farming more complicated.

Mayhew argued: The key factor is the price differential between land in the EU and in the applicant coun­tries. Liberalisation of the land market will, in the next decade, cause that prices will rise con­sider­ably, closing some of the gap with those in the EU‑15. This will lead to signi­fic­ant capital gains for both Polish and foreign landowners. Clearly while the applicants have an inter­est in welcoming foreign direct investment in agri­cul­ture, in order to de­velop the sector, they have no inter­est in speculative land purchase.8 Indeed, this argument was widely ac­know­ledged by the people participating in the negotiating pro­cess.9 Finally, it should be emphasised that this prob­lem was different from other prob­lems negotiated within the chapter on free movement of capital. Despite a gen­erally pos­it­ive attitude towards foreign investment, as indicated in opinion polls, there were clear doubts connected with land ownership. In a June 1998 survey, conducted just after the nego­ti­ations started, most Poles did not accept the

106   Purchase of real estate by EU residents

IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD FOREIGNERS BE ALLOWED TO BUY: 3% Woodland

15% 74%

Water reservoirs (lakes, etc.) Recreational areas with beautiful landscape

3% 17% 71% 4% 20% 68% 5% 26%

Farmland

63% Building grounds in towns

5% 32% 55% 11%

Houses

30% 51% 8%

Manufacturing plants

35% 48% 16%

Flats

31% 45%

Newspapers, publishing houses

14% 28% 45%

Yes, without limitation Yes, but only by special permission No, they should not be allowed to buy it at all ‘Difficult to say’ and ‘I don’t care’ answers were disregarded

Figure 5.1 Should foreigners be allowed to buy real estate? (source: CBOS, June 1998).

involvement of foreign capital if it were to be connected with the buying of real estate by foreigners. The con­sider­able majority of respondents believed that for­ eigners should not be allowed to buy woodland, water reser­voirs and re­cre­ational areas at all. As far as farmland is con­sidered, the opinions were a little more mod­ erate, but the majority of Poles were against foreigners buying it as well.10 To sum up, his­tor­ical, social and eco­nomic reasons elucidate why the issue became one of the crucial issues in the accession nego­ti­ations that raised pub­lic fears and inter­est group concern.11

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   107

The problem of purchase of real estate in other acceding countries One may ask to what extent the Polish case is different from other acceding coun­tries.12 Indeed, as one senior-­level EU official declared: ‘The sharpest dis­ tinction between nego­ti­ations of Poland and other acceding coun­tries was with regards to the issue of the purchase of agricultural land.’13 Some lib­eralisation has taken place as the five fast-­track can­did­ates in Eastern Europe brought their legis­la­tion in line with EU stand­ards. It seems that the most restrictive regime, quite closely resembling the Polish one, was in Hun­gary, where only Hun­gar­ian cit­izens could own agricultural land, and only up to 300 hec­tares. Even do­mestic firms were banned from buying farmland in an effort to protect small family farms. Nevertheless, restrictions were looser in cities: foreign com­panies could buy properties for business use without a permit. Licences for purchases of secondary homes and real estate for investment pur­ poses were easy to obtain. Hun­gary’s gov­ern­ment con­sidered the idea of a land ownership sys­tem based on the Danish model: title would be awarded only to those who live per­man­ently on farms and are well versed in agri­cul­ture, re­gard­less of their cit­izen­ship. In addition, Hun­gary demanded a ten-­year trans­itional period for the purchase of farmland and a five-­year one for the purchase of land for foreign investments. Indeed, the Hun­gar­ian Position Paper used a sim­ilar eco­nomic justification as that found in the Polish position. The position paper argued that the predicted increase in land prices would prevent Hun­gar­ian farmers from having access to land at affordable prices and hence would interfere with the pol­icy of the Hun­ gar­ian gov­ern­ment, which was aiming at the cre­ation of a more viable ownership structure. As Alan Mayhew argued, the restructuring pro­cess would rely on dynamic farmers in coun­tries such as Hun­gary and Poland buying or leasing the land from farmers who were giving up the profession. If prices were to rise con­ sider­ably because of foreign buying, this pro­cess of restructuring would be made much more difficult in these coun­tries.14 A sim­ilar nego­ti­ation position was also taken in Slovakia, where the coun­try demanded a ten-­year trans­itional period for the purchase of farmland and a five-­ year trans­itional period for the purchase of land for foreign investments. The Czech Repub­lic had also demanded a trans­itional period, but did not specify the length of the proposed period. During nego­ti­ations, the Czech Repub­lic banned foreign indi­viduals from acquiring land or im­mov­able prop­erty, but many did so anyway through Czech-­registered legal entities. Foreign com­panies could gain access to land and real estate through locally re­gis­tered subsidiaries, though geo­ graphical restrictions applied. A lib­eral approach was taken in Slovenia, even though it faced a challenge from Italy on the land issue during talks on the asso­ci­ation agreement. Neverthe­ less, EU cit­izens who had lived in the coun­try for more than three years were able to acquire prop­erty on the prin­ciple of reci­pro­city. Until the year 2000, only 49 EU cit­izens bought real estate in the coun­try. Hence, Slovenia in its

108   Purchase of real estate by EU residents negotiating positions did not demand any trans­itional period for purchasing land by foreigners. However, there were mainly pragmatic reasons behind this de­cision, since land prices in Slovenia are com­par­able to those in the EU. Public opinion was not very much inter­ested in EU nego­ti­ations and the issue of pur­ chasing land by foreigners did not even exist in the pub­lic debate. It seems that the most lib­eralised sys­tem was introduced in Estonia, as foreign indi­viduals and legal entities could acquire land and prop­erty with per­mis­sion from the rel­ev­ant coun­try governors. Requests were usually approved. Estonia declared that restrictions, except in border zones (for national secur­ity reasons), would end upon EU entry.15 Consequently, only Slovenia and Estonia did not demand any restrictions on the purchase of real estate from the date of accession. From this short overview, we may draw the conclusion that Poland took the most restrictive approach in regard to this issue. Indeed, this prob­lem was recog­ nised and emphasised during the screening and later reflected in Polish negotiat­ ing positions.

Screening and EU assessment The purchase of real estate by foreigners was regarded as a sensitive and vital issue from the very beginning of nego­ti­ations. As the Polish National Strategy of Integration declared: ‘The prin­ciples of land sale will be shaped by taking into account the inter­ests of the Polish eco­nomy and by using the instruments applied in the Member States of the EU.’16 According to the Polish gov­ern­ment advisor Leszek Jesień, from the begin­ ning of nego­ti­ations the polit­ical class and the negotiators realised that the subject would raise great inter­est from the pub­lic. It was so obvious that the gov­ ern­ment did not have to study pub­lic opinion surveys to realise that this would be a major prob­lem.17 On the EU side, the prob­lem of the purchase of real estate by foreigners was mentioned officially for the first time in Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union. As was indicated in the docu­ment, ‘Legislation re­gard­ing the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals remains in­ad­equate and will require clarification and align­ ment in the medium term.’ It was also pointed out that ‘the applica­tion of the acquis re­gard­ing the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals may present a signi­fic­ant prob­lem in the medium term’. As a result, the report emphasised the need to lib­eralise the sys­tem.18 After the official opening of the nego­ti­ations in March 1998, Poland started its accession nego­ti­ations with a review of the law re­gard­ing its com­pliance with the acquis communautaire (the so-­called screening), which began on 27 April 1998. The purchase of real estate by foreigners was subject to screening within the chapter on free movement of capital. It also examined such issues as the har­ monising of inter­na­tional obli­ga­tions with regard to the movement of capital and payments in those cases where violation of the acquis would be likely.19

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   109 However, the issue of purchase of real estate by foreigners gained most attention from both sides of the nego­ti­ation table and from do­mestic parti­cip­ants in the debate. The Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski, emphasised that sale of land is a specific issue for Poland that should be dealt with in a different manner than other negotiating dilemmas.20 On 22 July 1998 Françoise Gaudenzi, the Euro­pean Commission representa­ tive for nego­ti­ations with Poland, declared that the Polish gov­ern­ment and the Sejm should come up with a detailed timetable of adjusting Polish legis­la­tion, institutions and the practice of eco­nomic and social life to Euro­pean Union stand­ards. She also gave the opinion that any delay should be avoided in this respect, as the technical aspects were of decisive significance for the EU acces­ sion pro­cess. Gaudenzi declared that Poland should not ask the EU for a trans­ itional period with regard to the sale of land, as ‘The Union was keen to see all its new members accept the largest pos­sible part of the EU acquis communautaire without objections, the moment they enter the EU.’21 In the first 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland’s Progress Toward Accession EU Commission Report on Poland, the issue of sale of land to foreigners was not even mentioned. Nevertheless, the 1999 Commission Report mentioned that restrictions still applied to the purchase of land by non-­ nationals.22 Furthermore, as the report con­tinued: ‘Acquisition of real estate by foreign entities is still subject to the granting of an authorisation, espe­cially in the case of agricultural land, with the exception of some specific transactions, which may be freely carried out.’ The report mentioned that according to the Polish authorities, there had been a moderate increase in the amount of land pur­ chased by non-­nationals.23 In Decem­ber 1999 the EU accused Poland of allegedly failing to realise its Association Treaty com­mit­ments by restricting the sale of land to foreigners by using certain in­ter­pretations of laws discriminating against foreign entities. Polish officials claimed, though, that there were no restrictions, since the Minis­ try of Internal Affairs and Administration, which clears every transaction to for­ eigners involving land sales exceeding 4,000 square metres, only verified whether the land was neces­sary for Poland’s eco­nomy. Meanwhile, the EU made Poland’s trans­ition to the second asso­ci­ation stage contingent on Poland lifting all land sale restrictions.24 The conclusion, therefore, may be drawn re­gard­ing the screening pro­cess that the EU only pointed out the non-­compliance of Polish legis­la­tion with regard to the purchase of land by foreigners with the acquis communautaire, which was indeed admitted by the Polish side. This, how­ever, opened a pos­sib­il­ity for the pre­para­tion of the Polish nego­ti­ation positions and further negotiations.

Preparation of the Polish position The screening pro­cess constituted a basis for the elaboration of the position paper of the Polish gov­ern­ment. The position paper adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Repub­lic of Poland on 13 July 1999 contained a Polish proposal

110   Purchase of real estate by EU residents to resolve those incompatibilities and to set a suggested timetable for Poland’s incorporation of EU law.25 The paper re­com­mended par­ticu­lar solutions, such as trans­ition periods or specific clauses to be introduced in the Accession Treaty.26 Justification for the Polish position With respect to the acquisition of real estate by non-­citizens, the Polish position ac­know­ledged that the coun­try’s legis­la­tion in this field was inconsistent with art­icle 56 of the Treaty estab­lishing the Euro­pean Community, which says: ‘All restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third coun­tries shall be pro­hibited.’27 However, this incon­ sistency was justified in order to elim­in­ate a pos­sib­il­ity of uncontrolled trade in these assets.28 Therefore, Poland requested certain trans­ition periods upon acces­ sion: five years for real estate for investment purposes and 18 years for agricul­ tural and woodland real estate. Poland’s position, according to the docu­ment, was dictated by its specific his­tor­ical, social and eco­nomic circumstances. The first reason that justified the idea of trans­itional periods stems from his­tory: ‘In Western Europe the pro­cess of Euro­pean integration was parallel and much con­trib­uted to the pro­cess of his­tor­ical recon­cili­ation. In Poland the pro­cess of recon­cili­ation began just a few years ago.’ The docu­ment said that the ‘sensitivity of the Polish pub­lic opinion in the area, ensues from our his­tory and in par­ticu­lar it results from World War II’. Although the coun­try had this his­tor­ical background, the paper claimed, Poland was now participating in the pro­cess of Euro­pean inte­ gration. Nevertheless, it argued that the approval of Poles, as well as of other Euro­ pean nations, for Euro­pean integration was a neces­sary precon­dition for the success of this his­tor­ical pro­cess. Finally, the docu­ment stated: ‘This approval is also a neces­sary precon­dition if the integration pro­cess is to en­com­pass the whole continent and thus help overcome the Yaltan division of Europe.’29 What should be emphasised is that this last argument refers to the approval of nego­ti­ation outcomes by pub­lic opinion. As people directly involved in the nego­ ti­ation pro­cess admitted, these his­tor­ical factors were indeed of crucial im­port­ ance, par­ticu­larly given the fact that in Western Poland the legal status of land was largely unsettled. It was backed by a number of opinion polls that confirmed the im­port­ance of this issue.30 According to Alan Mayhew, this way of looking at his­tor­ical ex­peri­ence was typical, not only for Poland, but also in those coun­ tries which have had to contend with foreign occupation of their land in the rel­ at­ively recent past.31 The second reason mentioned by the position paper stems from social factors, with a par­ticu­lar emphasis on the social consensus. As we may read in the docu­ ment, ‘Polish pub­lic opinion is par­ticu­larly sensitive to the issue of land owner­ ship. Therefore, nego­ti­ation results in the area of freedom of real estate acquisition can be a decisive factor for the approval of the future Accession Treaty by Poles.’ Some of the foreign advisers to the Polish gov­ern­ment, such as Alan Mayhew, even argued that there would clearly be social ten­sion and a backlash against accession if large areas of land were to be bought up by

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   111 foreigners. In fact, there was a strong link between his­tor­ical and social factors, and indeed, it was difficult to draw a clear line between his­tor­ical and social jus­ tification of the Polish position. The last reason mentioned in the position paper to jus­tify the necessity of trans­itional periods was the eco­nomic factors. As the docu­ment puts it: ‘In its attempt to pursue har­moni­ous, balanced and sus­tain­able de­velopment, Poland aims at providing Polish residents with a share in real estate acquisition on par with that enjoyed by cit­izens of the Euro­pean Union.’ However, as we may read further in the paper, the ‘fin­an­cial capa­city of entities originating in the EU Member States can impair equality of oppor­tun­ity for Polish cit­izens in the field of real estate acquisition’. Moreover, ‘The rel­at­ively lower purchasing power of Polish cit­izens does not allow them to compete effect­ively with the Western capital since real estate prices in Poland are lower than real estate prices in EU Member States.’33 According to the docu­ment, those eco­nomic factors con­trib­uted to spreading fears among Polish cit­izens of the pos­sib­il­ity of mass acquisition of real estate by foreigners. Hence, the trans­ition periods Poland requested also aimed at providing Polish cit­izens with an oppor­tun­ity to parti­cip­ate in the broadly understood pro­cess of Euro­pean integration. Transition periods asked for by Poland would help to stimulate the de­velopment of the national eco­nomy and provide for an increase in the purchasing power of Polish cit­izens. This would allow for more oppor­tun­ity for the acquisition of land in the open market, and thereby disperse the fears of excessive foreign acquisition.34 In making the eco­nomic case for the trans­ition period, the Polish negotiators always included a strong ref­er­ence to the fears expressed by the pub­lic. This eco­nomic argument was also widely ac­know­ledged by the leading experts involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess.35 From the ana­lysis of the Polish position paper, we may draw the conclusion that no mat­ter whether the justification for trans­itional periods is based on his­tor­ ical, socio-­cultural or eco­nomical factors, it always refers to the voice of the pub­lic. Therefore, when preparing its position paper, the gov­ern­ment used a tying hands nego­ti­ation strat­egy, based on Putnam’s argument that ‘a small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining ad­vant­age’.36 Thus, the negotiator used a common trick: ‘We could lib­eralise the regime on the purchase of land, but this would not be accepted on our do­mestic level (Level II).’ Indeed, as Putnam argued, such a message is ‘the nat­ural thing to say at the beginning of tough nego­ti­ations’.37 Obviously, the EU was aware of this nego­ti­ation trick; never­the­ less, the EU realised that full lib­eralisation would not be accepted or might cause ser­ious polit­ical crises in Poland. According to this logic, long trans­itional periods should be kept, because other­wise pub­lic opinion in Poland would not accept the compromise and therefore would not ratify the agreement in the refer­ endum on EU accession. There was a large win-­set in the EU to accept the trans­ itional period because, as Alan Mayhew put it bluntly, ‘Most EU coun­tries did not care about this issue’ and ‘The EU was using it in order to obstruct other concessions from the Poles.’38 In par­ticu­lar, the EU tied this issue with free movement of labour in a package deal.39 32

112   Purchase of real estate by EU residents Domestic support for the Polish position There was a common, widespread agreement among the experts that in drafting Polish position papers, concern for pub­lic opinion was a driving force40 and there is indeed polling evid­ence to sup­port this thesis. For instance, a May 1999 CBOS survey found that only 25 per cent of respondents agreed with a statement that current EU cit­izens should be granted full rights to purchase real estate from the date of the accession. In sim­ilar surveys performed consecutively every year from 1993 onwards, the highest rate of pos­it­ive answers to the question whether foreign­ ers should be granted the right to purchase real estate without any lim­ita­tions was only 31 per cent in March 1997, a few months before the accession talks began, and dropped to the lowest level of only 23 per cent, as shown in the Table 5.1.41 This data indicates that the lim­ita­tion of the sale of land to foreigners was sup­ported by the majority of the pub­lic. A crit­ical attitude towards the idea of lib­eralisation was shown in a number of other opinion polls, no mat­ter how the question was asked. In a May 2000 survey, only 18 per cent of respondents agreed that the Polish eco­nomy could bene­fit from a lib­eralisation of land sales, whilst 50 per cent opposed this.42 In a July 2000 survey, only 26 per cent agreed with full lib­eralisation of the land market without any trans­itional periods.43 In a survey completed in Decem­ber 2000, 63 per cent sup­ported a tough nego­ti­ation position which would demand the introduction of trans­itional periods.44 In a survey made in Octo­ber 2000, 60 per cent argued that Poland should resign from EU mem­ber­ship if this meant that freedom to buy land without any restriction would be introduced.45 The issue of land ownership became so im­port­ant that in a survey from Octo­ ber 2000, 36 per cent argued that it would be better to ban EU cit­izens from buying land in Poland even if this came at the price of banning Polish cit­izens from working in the EU. Only 26 per cent argued that it would be better to grant the right to EU cit­izens to buy land for the sake of granting the right to Polish cit­izens to work in current EU coun­tries.46 As we may see from this opinion poll, the nego­ti­ation positions reflected strongly the mood of the pub­lic. Indeed, as Table 5.1 Opinion about statement that current EU citizens should be granted full rights to purchase real estate from the date of the accession Do you agree that there should be introduced into Poland such obligatory regulations of the European Union as:

Percentage of positive answers June March May May March April April May ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’97 ’98 ’99

24 the right to buy real estate, houses and so on, without any exceptions being made for citizens of other countries in Poland and for Polish citizens in other countries of the EU Source: CBOS, May 1999.

28

31

26

23

28

26

25

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   113 was admitted by Prime Minister Buzek, opinion polls were carefully studied and taken into account when drafting position papers.47 EU assessment of the Polish position Even though the EU was reluct­ant to reject the Polish proposal, it emphasised the need to implement the acquis. During his visit to Warsaw in late Febru­ary 2000, Commissioner Verheugen explained that what mat­ters is real implementa­ tion of the acquis communautaire. He recalled that full respect of the acquis communautaire is a con­dition sine qua non for joining the Euro­pean Union and the way to speed up the nego­ti­ations without undermining the quality of the enlargement pro­cess.48 With regard to trans­itional meas­ures, the EU distinguished between cases that the Commission con­sidered accept­able, negotiable or unaccept­able. Such issues as purchase of real estate were regarded as negotiable, since this cat­egory included those requests with a more signi­fic­ant impact in terms of com­peti­tion or the in­ternal market, or in time and scope. In such circumstances, the Commis­ sion might re­com­mend that trans­itional meas­ures could be accepted in this cat­ egory, under certain con­ditions and within a certain timeframe. At the same time, the Commission proposed a ‘road map’ for nego­ti­ations in the form of pri­or­ity schedules that would allow the nego­ti­ations to pro­gress on chapters that remained open. Indeed, free movement of capital was regarded as a pri­or­ity schedule for the first half of 2001.49 The first three EU Commission reports on Poland’s pro­gress towards acces­ sion (1999–2001) only mentioned that the acquisition of real estate by foreign legal or nat­ural persons required a permit of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration. The reports concluded that no legal or institutional changes took place in this area.50 With regard to the Council, the common position with regard to the chapter on free movement of capital was adopted in June 2000.51 The turning point was the year 2002, when the Commission report for the first time admitted that the Polish gov­ern­ment’s efforts to lib­eralise capital move­ ments had met with con­sider­able success. It added, how­ever, that further efforts were still required to elim­in­ate the remaining restrictions on the movement of capital and that the applica­tion of the acquis re­gard­ing the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals might present a signi­fic­ant prob­lem in the medium term. Nevertheless, the docu­ment admitted that Poland had made steady pro­gress, both in aligning its legis­la­tion and in de­veloping the neces­sary admin­ istrative structures. However, the report drew only gen­eral conclusions and did not go beyond gen­eral recommendations.

Negotiation process Poland’s nego­ti­ation position on free movement of capital was prepared by the centre–right gov­ern­ment, which consisted of the co­ali­tion of the Solidarity Electoral Action and the Freedom Union, and it was adopted by the Council of

114   Purchase of real estate by EU residents Ministers of the Repub­lic of Poland on 13 July 1999.52 According to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski, this issue was highly politicised from the first day of nego­ti­ations. This prob­lem was im­port­ant and often raised by both pub­lic opinion and polit­ical par­ties. The AWS–UW co­ali­tion was unanimous in the prin­ciple that a trans­ition period is neces­sary. However, whilst AWS and one of its main par­ties ZChN (its representative was the min­is­ter respons­ible for Euro­ pean Integration when nego­ti­ation started) was in favour of a 25-year trans­itional period or even a constant de­roga­tion (which was obviously against the EU law), the lib­eral Freedom Union agreed with a much shortened 12-year trans­ition period.53 As Kułakowski admitted, he was ‘in between the devil and the deep blue sea’ since he was criticised by both sides. UW thought that he should be more resist­ ant to the polit­ical pressure coming from AWS par­ties, Chris­tian National Union (ZChN) in par­ticu­lar. Meanwhile, the AWS par­ties accused Kułakowski of taking a more lib­eral approach, closer to that of the Freedom Union (UW).54 Nonetheless, as the leader of ZChN and the Minister for Euro­pean Affairs in an early AWS gov­ern­ment. Ryszard Czarnecki later admitted that polit­ical elites used the long trans­itional period for polit­ical purposes and by this stirred up debate within pub­lic opinion. This was because the gov­ern­ment wanted to allevi­ ate social fears.55 However, in 2000 and 2001, even though nego­ti­ations on other chapters and less controversial issues were moving on, there was a rel­at­ive standstill with regard to nego­ti­ations concerning land ownership. The reasons behind this standstill and why it was followed by a sudden acceleration in nego­ ti­ations shall be explained in detail. Tough negotiations (1999–2001) A lively moment came on 4 May 2001, when the EU Commission drew up a common position for nego­ti­ations with the applicants and recog­nised ‘the high polit­ical sensitivity of purchasing real estate in a majority of candidate coun­tries, in par­ticu­lar the issue of investment in agricultural and forestry land and the acquisition of secondary residences’. The Commission’s proposal was therefore to grant the concerned candidate coun­tries a seven-­year period of trans­ition for purchasing by EU cit­izens of agricultural land and forest, and a five-­year period for re­cre­ational land from the moment candidate coun­tries joined the EU.56 The Commission would have to use ob­ject­ive, stable, transparent and pub­lic cri­teria for the authorisation pro­ced­ures for real estate acquisitions. These cri­ teria should not differentiate among other EU residents. The Commission also proposed that a review should take place after three years. This review would be based on a factual report from the Commission, which might be accompanied by a proposal to the Council of Ministers. The Council could then act unanimously to shorten or lift the trans­itional period.57 However, the Commission proposals were countered by a Polish proposal of a five-year period of trans­ition for the purchase of land for investments and an 18-year period for other types of land. This Polish proposal was imme­diately

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   115 criticised by the Euro­pean Council. According to the Euro­pean Council, there should be no period of trans­ition for the purchase of land for investments because new members would need direct investments. Another explanation was that there should be no violation of the settlement law of EU citizens. Indeed, the Commission proposals fell short of demands from the applicants and were likely to disappoint Poland, since it demanded an 18-year trans­ition period for purchasing farmland.58 Nevertheless, the Polish Chief Negotiator declared that until an official docu­ment from the EU was presented, Poland would stick to its ori­ginal position of assuming an 18-year trans­itional period on the pur­ chase of agricultural land by foreigners.59 However, as Kułakowski later admitted, even though the ori­ginal position was 18 years, he counted on a 12-year trans­ itional period and treated the 18-year position as a nego­ti­ation tactic.60 This rigid gov­ern­ment stance was criticised not only inter­na­tionally, but also do­mestically by the pres­id­en­tial palace. According to an official of the pres­id­en­ tial chancellery in charge of the integration pro­cess, a national debate should be held in Poland on the issue of land purchases by foreigners. Paweł Świeboda declared that because of Poland’s demand for an 18-year trans­itional period, certain social groups, notably farmers, had become more entrenched in their opposi­tion to free trade in land than they had been before. Poland’s rigid negoti­ ating position had led to increased fears in the popu­la­tion about the whole ques­ tion of trade in land, and these needed to be dispelled as quickly as pos­sible. The point of departure for the proposed debate should be ‘the re­cog­ni­tion that free trade in land is one of the basic rules of the game in the EU, one of the funda­ mental freedoms, and we have to accept that in prin­ciple’.61 Indeed, this state­ ment could be regarded as one of the signals forecasting a change in negotiating strat­egy. This is because it was anticipated that the post-­communist co­ali­tion would win the elections. Softening of the negotiation positions A major turning point came in Septem­ber 2001, after the co­ali­tion par­ties of Sol­ idarity Electoral Action and its former junior partner, the Freedom Union, lost the election. The post-­communist co­ali­tion of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Labour Union (UP) won 216 seats out of a pos­sible 460. In Octo­ ber 2001 a new gov­ern­ment was launched, consisting of the Democratic Left Alliance and a much weaker, agrarian Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL).62 Almost imme­diately, the gov­ern­ment sent a signal to Brussels that it was ready for a compromise, espe­cially in such issues as land purchase and free movement of labour. Possible room for a compromise in these issues was also identified by the Euro­pean Commission.63 On 14 Octo­ber Prime Minister Miller officially declared a change in the nego­ ti­ation strat­egy, espe­cially the gov­ern­ment’s readiness to accept the EU proposal concerning the previous gov­ern­ment’s position on the purchase of real estate by foreigners. He declared that the gov­ern­ment was ready to accept trans­itional periods with regard to the access into the labour market of some EU countries.

116   Purchase of real estate by EU residents Before Prime Minister Miller’s above-­mentioned statement, the pace of the nego­ti­ations was rather slow. According to a senior official involved in the nego­ ti­ation pro­cess, nego­ti­ations concerning the sale of land by foreigners were rather sluggish, mainly because the late AWS gov­ern­ment was not willing to make a concession towards the EU before the elections. This issue was highly politicised and too controversial to be handled just before elections. Further­ more, a softening of the nego­ti­ation stance by the AWS gov­ern­ment could cause in­ternal polit­ical conflict within the AWS.64 A sim­ilar explanation was given by Leszek Miller, when asked why his pred­ ecessor, Jerzy Buzek, had not managed to close this stage of nego­ti­ations. The SLD leader answered: ‘It had to do with the election year and the fear that he will be attacked by all forces, which would use any means neces­sary to delay Poland’s EU accession.’ Miller was indeed aware that his idea of speeding up nego­ti­ations for the price of certain nego­ti­ation concessions would make the gov­ern­ment the target of polit­ical attacks.65 Nevertheless, he decided to take the risk and soon after Miller’s declaration on speeding up nego­ti­ations, the leading SLD expert on the EU and informal inter­na­tional spokesman, Tadeusz Iwiński, confirmed that the Democratic Left Alliance was ready to accelerate Poland’s mem­ber­ship nego­ti­ations with the EU. As he stated: ‘The SLD and the gov­ern­ment are undoubtedly ready for rational compromises.’66 Similar declarations were made by a newly appointed Chief of the Negotiation Team, Jan Truszczyński.67 According to Jan Truszczyński, speeding up of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess should not only be credited to the Miller gov­ern­ment, since it had already been prepared by his negotiating team. Miller simply streamlined more of the negotiating areas in comparison to the previous gov­ern­ment, which was neces­sary and a nat­ural con­sequence of the pro­gress of the nego­ti­ations.68 This speeding up of nego­ti­ations was prompted by the re­cog­ni­tion that the softening of the Polish position was the price that had to be paid in order to accelerate the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, which was also a result of do­mestic pres­ sure.69 As Putnam indicated, on the do­mestic level, the decision-­makers, instead of focusing on total costs and bene­fits, should focus on rel­at­ive costs and bene­ fits, espe­cially given the current do­mestic envir­on­ment.70 The SLD realised that softening of the ori­ginal nego­ti­ation stance was a cost that should be paid in order to bene­fit from the acceleration of the nego­ti­ation process. Whilst there was a common agreement within the SLD to speed up the nego­ ti­ation pro­cess, their junior co­ali­tion partner, PSL, was regarded by the post-­ communists SLD as a permanent troublemaker. This was because PSL was always slightly scep­tical towards Europe. To placate PSL, the SLD added a clause in the co­ali­tion agreement about heading towards integration with the EU. Miller made a polit­ical ges­ture towards his co­ali­tion partner and sup­ported the idea of introducing land trade regulations. He was aware that if Poland were to pass such a bill, the discussions about the length of a trans­ition period might lose some of their im­port­ance. Thus, Miller agreed that the length of the trans­ition period for land purchases by foreigners should not exceed ten to 12 years.71

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   117 In order to speed up nego­ti­ations, the new gov­ern­ment also agreed to accept a two-year ban on access by Polish workers to EU labour markets and to scale back to 12 years from 18 the length of a moratorium the previous gov­ern­ment demanded on the sale of farmland to foreigners.72 Even though the 12-year pro­ posal was not a drastic change in itself, Miller sent a signal to Brussels that further concessions were pos­sible. Under Poland’s new proposal, foreigners would be able to purchase houses and apartments imme­diately after Poland was admitted to the EU, and farmers from EU coun­tries would be able to purchase land to run their own farms after a three-­year lease period, which indeed was a major concession.73 Domestic critique of the new government’s position This new Polish proposal encountered severe criticism from the opposi­tion. First, the critique was aggravated by concessions made by Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Secretary of State for Euro­pean Affairs Danuta Huebner. This was because two days earl­ier they had declared in Brussels that Poland approved plans for EU cit­izens to buy second homes and land for summer homes in Poland after a seven-­year trans­ition period and for EU farmers to buy land for cultivation after a three-­year lease.74 The Polish Foreign Minister was also severely criticised by the opposi­tion for misleading par­lia­ment and pub­lic opinion by not informing par­lia­ment and the pub­lic about a change in negotiating position and withholding vital in­forma­tion. As a response, on 21 Novem­ber 2001 the caucuses of the two right-­wing opposi­tion par­ties, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Law and Justice (PiS), announced that they would submit a motion to hold a national referendum on sale of land to foreign­ ers in connection with ‘the con­dem­nable and scandalous position of Leszek Miller’s gov­ern­ment’, who had failed to inform soci­ety about the scope of con­ cessions in EU accession nego­ti­ations with regard to the sale of land.75 This motion of the opposi­tion par­ties to call for a referendum was prompted by a polit­ical calculation and the fact that the great majority of the pub­lic were against lib­eralisation of the regime. An opinion poll conducted in July 2001 showed that 65 per cent of respondents agreed that Poland should demand a long trans­itional period for purchasing land by foreigners.76 This rapid reaction of the opposi­tion also caused an inter­ven­tion from the SLD junior co­ali­tion partner, the Peasants’ Party. Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski announced that he would submit draft regulations on the sale of agricultural land to foreigners. He also declared that the planned regulations would secure Poland’s national inter­ests and used this oppor­ tun­ity to criticise the senior co­ali­tion partner for ‘a mis­take’ made by the Polish Foreign Minister. Kalinowski stressed that his party would insist that ‘such an im­port­ant mat­ter as the sale of agricultural land to foreigners be settled favourably and Polish agricultural land be in the hands of Polish farmers’.77 According to a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, the beha­vi­our of PSL and the main opposi­tion par­ties was directed towards playing on emotions rather than making rational judgments, and was made for polit­ical purposes.78

118   Purchase of real estate by EU residents Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz responded imme­diately, calling the criticism an ‘emotional overreaction’. He emphasised that the gov­ern­ment never intended to keep anything secret, and said that any lack of full in­forma­tion about Poland’s position stemmed from a temporary strat­egy and was designed to secure the best mem­ber­ship terms for Poland. Cimoszewicz stressed that Poland should be flex­ ible in EU mem­ber­ship nego­ti­ations if it wanted to ‘meet its his­tor­ical chance’ to complete talks in the next year and join the Union in 2004.79 Nevertheless, on 28 Novem­ber 2001, under growing pressure from the opposi­tion, the Peasants’ Party, the media and pub­lic opinion, Cimoszewicz admitted that it was an organ­isa­tional and technical mis­take to present the Polish position on the sale of land to foreigners in Brussels instead of Warsaw. The Foreign Minister declared that this was a mis­take caused by the absence of certain pro­ced­ures of gov­ern­ment, which would have made it neces­sary that any such change in position should first be presented within Poland itself. He also stressed that the intention of the Miller Cabinet was to inform Polish pub­lic opinion about the nego­ti­ations with the Euro­pean Union. As Cimoszewicz declared: ‘Poles have the right to get acquainted with this in­forma­tion.’ He added that this was neces­sary to convince Poles to sup­port the mem­ber­ship in the referendum.80 A change in Poland’s position paper re­gard­ing the free sale of land de­cisively rad­icalised pub­lic opinion on that issue. The strongest sign of this was the signi­ fic­ant increase in the percentage of respondents favouring a complete ban on allowing foreigners to freely buy and sell land, re­gard­less of what use the land was to be put. This was shown in a number of opinion polls, as shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.

HOW LONG SHOULD POLAND MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN THE PURCHASE OF FARMLAND BY FOREIGNERS? Hard to say 1% A complete ban should be imposed 36%

No restrictions 7% 1–3 years 5% 4–5 years 9% 6–7 years 9%

Over 12 years 20%

8–12 years 13%

Figure 5.2 How long should Poland maintain restrictions in the purchase of farmland by foreigners? (source: IPSOS-Demoskop, December 2001/OCEI).

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   119 HOW LONG SHOULD POLAND MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN FOREIGNERS’ PURCHASE OF FARMLAND FOLLOWING A THREE-YEAR LEASE PERIOD?

A complete ban should be imposed 34%

Hard to say No restrictions 2% 9% 1–3 years 8% 4–5 years 11%

6–7 years 8% A

8–12 years 11%

Over 12 years 17%

HOW LONG SHOULD POLAND MAINTAIN RESTRICTIONS IN FOREIGNERS’ PURCHASE OF LAND FOR RECREATIONAL USE? A complete ban should be imposed 27%

Hard to say 2%

No restrictions 11% 1–3 years 9%

4–5 years 13%

Over 12 years 16% B

8–12 years 12%

6–7 years 10%

Figure 5.3 A) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of farmland following a three-year lease period? B) How long should Poland maintain restrictions in foreigners’ purchase of land for recreational use? (source: IPSOS-Demoskop, December 2001/OCEI).

These surveys conducted on Decem­ber 2001 clearly indicated the pressure, coming from pub­lic opinion, on the gov­ern­ment. The situ­ation also revealed how polit­ical par­ties can use the pub­lic mood to achieve their own goals. Indeed, the post-­communist gov­ern­ment was put under strong pressure that prompted it to change its tactic in order to dem­on­strate its toughness during the negotiations. Most respondents accepted the trans­ition periods for the free purchase of farmland (12 years) and re­cre­ational plots (seven years) proposed by the Polish gov­ern­ment in the new nego­ti­ation position. Farmers, how­ever, had par­ticu­larly

120   Purchase of real estate by EU residents restrictive views with regard to the trans­ition periods for the purchase of land. In the opinion of over half of them (53 per cent), the 12-year trans­ition period for the purchase of farmland was too short. Moreover, almost half of all farmers (48 per cent) thought that the seven-­year trans­ition period for the purchase of re­cre­ ational plots was insufficient. The opinion that these periods were too long was very sparse in this group of respondents (5 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively). In this regard, the managers and the intelligentsia were situated on the oppos­ite end of the scale of opinion, par­ticu­larly with regard to the 12-year period. In this group, more respondents thought that this period was too long rather than too short (24 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively).81 The demonstration of resistance to the EU from the Polish government An oppor­tun­ity to dem­on­strate gov­ern­ment inde­pend­ence from EU pressure came when, in Janu­ary 2002, the Euro­pean Commission Director General for enlargement, Eneko Landaburu, made a comment that the EC agreed with IN YOUR OPINION, IS THE TRANSITION PERIOD CURRENTLY PROPOSED BY POLAND FOR...: Purchase of farmland Purchase of recreational (12 years) plots (7 years)

31%

Too short

32%

43%

Adequate

41%

12%

Too long

11%

3%

Unnecessary

4%

11%

Difficult to say

12%

Figure 5.4 Assessment of the transition period in the purchase of farmland and in the purchase of recreational plots (source: CBOS, December 2001).

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   121 Poland’s call for a 12-year control over the sale of land, starting from the year Poland would become an EU member. However, Landaburu declared that, in his opinion, the period of land lease preceding the purchase of land should also include the years before EU mem­ber­ship.82 In imme­diate response to this statement, Spokeswoman for the Committee for Euro­pean Integration (KIE), Ewa Haczyk, emphasised that Poland’s gov­ern­ment and negotiators must maintain auto­nomy and sover­eignty during the nego­ti­ ations. As she put quite bluntly, Surely comments by the EC dir­ector gen­eral for enlargement are valu­able and also our negotiators will take them into con­sidera­tion, but maybe the gov­ern­ment and negotiators should be left with their own auto­nomy and sover­eignty in nego­ti­ations and in settling the tactics of holding such nego­ti­ ations.83 The gov­ern­ment was under pressure, how­ever, not only from the EU, but also – in a contrary dir­ec­tion – from do­mestic forces, that is from the right-­wing opposi­tion and from the Peasants’ Party within the co­ali­tion. The PSL used every oppor­tun­ity to declare to the pub­lic that it would ‘firmly watch over’ Polish inter­ests during the ten months which Poland had remaining to close its EU mem­ber­ship nego­ti­ations.84 The party leaders also agreed that they would press the SLD to be tough during nego­ti­ations and that the PSL should be pre­ pared to leave the gov­ern­ment in case the SLD did not take its suggestions into account. The Peasants’ Party hence used a strat­egy of threatening to leave the co­ali­tion and of obstructing the nego­ti­ation pro­cess as an opposi­tion party. By this threat, the party sent a clear signal to Brussels, and it was not an accident that this polit­ical declaration was made just a day before the visit to Warsaw on 28 Febru­ary 2002 by Euro­pean Union Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen.

Concluding negotiations The idea behind Verheugen’s visit to Warsaw in Febru­ary 2002 was to pave the way for agreement on the sale of land to foreigners and to discuss direct pay­ ments and quotas. The Febru­ary agreement enabled nego­ti­ations to be concluded with the pro­vi­sional closure of the chapter. Achieving a compromise The meeting between Miller and Verheugen was yet another signi­fic­ant turning point of the accession nego­ti­ations. Miller presented the position of the Polish gov­ ern­ment in which three con­ditions of integration with the EU were treated as the most im­port­ant: the new and old members should be treated on an equal basis; new member coun­tries could not lose out on accession; and the funds set aside by the EU to cover the costs of enlargement in 1999 could not be reduced.85

122   Purchase of real estate by EU residents Verheugen discussed the purchase of real estate and other issues with Prime Minister Miller and Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski. The main con­tro­versy between the gov­ern­ment and the EU involved the starting point from which the period of leasing Polish land by EU farmers should be counted. Brussels demanded that the period of lease prior to accession should also count for those EU farmers who were living and cultivating land in Poland. However, the Polish Peasants’ Party was worried that there might be thou­sands of such cases, includ­ ing contracts signed by foreigners through fictitious com­panies.86 According to estim­ates presented by the PSL, 200,000 hec­tares of Polish land were leased to foreign entities.87 This issue was highly politicised and caused a crisis within the co­ali­tion. PSL went so far as to warn that it would leave the gov­ern­ment co­ali­tion if the gov­ern­ment did not look after Polish inter­ests. Indeed, PSL used a classical threat strategy. After the talks between Verheugen and Kalinowski on 28 Febru­ary 2002, an agreement was made by the par­ties re­gard­ing the calculation of the period for leasing land by EU farmers before they acquire the right to buy it. Nevertheless, Kalinowski and Miller, after the meeting, refused to give details of the compro­ mise, arguing that the details of the agreement would be declared soon.88 Ver­ heugen was also op­tim­istic and alleged that Brussels would accept a modified Polish position.89 He gave his interlocutors ‘friendly advice’ to review the entire fin­an­cial package presented by the EC as a whole, and not its respective parts, separately. According to him, only in this way could one see all the bene­fits that Poland might gain. As he stressed: ‘We are undertaking de­cisions which will define the future of the Polish nation and not only the future of one, con­sider­ably small, part of the soci­ety.’90 Yet again, the EU side had used a package deal strat­egy. According to a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, this package deal was used by the EU to press Poland to accept con­ditions that were not in Poland’s best inter­ests by saying: ‘Look, you should have a broader pic­ture; perhaps this solution will not be in the inter­ests of a small group but other concessions will compensate for losses.’ These arguments were often used when lib­eralisation was discussed.91 Even though Kalinowski was not ‘fully satisfied’ with the compromise, he claimed: ‘We managed to include in the agreement, legal pro­vi­sions on the sale of land, which will elim­in­ate the pos­sib­il­ity of specu­la­tion and purchase of land.’92 Most of his party colleagues were, nonetheless, disappointed with the result, espe­cially since Jarosław Kalinowski, during the previous weeks, was calling for a harder line in nego­ti­ations with Brussels. Hence, in the PSL, the compromise was widely regarded as a victory for the senior co­ali­tion partner. Both the SLD and Kalinowski were sending a message to pub­lic opinion and farmers’ inter­est groups that this was a hard-­won compromise, which included a range of con­ditions relating to where the land was and how long it was to be leased in order to protect Polish inter­ests.93 As Prime Minister Miller declared: Land in Poland is not just a commodity. Land in Poland has a significance stemming from our traditions and his­tory, and this issue undoubtedly has to

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   123 be treated differently – and it has been treated differently by the Union. We have found understanding for this issue.94 Indeed, the Commission ac­know­ledged that due to his­tor­ical and polit­ical cir­ cumstances, the EU needed another approach for Poland. The question was whether or not a 12-year period would be sufficient for Poland.95 One may, how­ever, ask why the EU Commission was so willing to make a compromise on this issue and grant such a long trans­itional period, espe­cially since there was big counter pressure on this point coming from the Dutch. The Neth­er­ lands, whose farmers were leasing land in Poland, called on the Polish gov­ern­ment at the EU Summit in Barcelona to provide a definition of what constituted a farmer in Poland and whether the lease period for EU farmers who had signed leasing agreements as legal entities would be counted from the day these agreements were signed, or from the day they began leasing land as private indi­viduals.96 According to Alan Mayhew, while this issue was im­port­ant for a few member states, in par­ticu­lar for the Neth­er­lands97 and to a certain extent for Ger­many, it was not im­port­ant for most EU coun­tries and the EU Commission itself. Even the Dutch position ‘was all about forcing other concessions somewhere else’.98 Therefore, the EU was using this issue in order to obstruct other concessions from Poland, mainly in the area of free movement of workers.99 As a result, in March 2002 Poland managed to close the controversial chapter on the free movement of capital. Poland was granted a 12-year trans­itional period, which for many was still con­sidered the best deal with regard to this chapter of any that were achieved by the candidate coun­tries. The EU was even afraid that the deal obtained by Poland might prompt other candidate coun­tries to reopen their chapters on free movement of capital, a move which the Commission was hoping would not occur.100 Jan Truszczyński, Poland’s Chief Negotiator, said in Brussels that closing the two nego­ti­ation areas ‘confirmed that Poland remains decidedly on the right track and that the Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy, designed to successfully complete mem­ber­ship nego­ti­ations by the end of the year, is feasible and realistic’.101 Provisional closing of the negotiation chapter In March 2002 nego­ti­ations on this chapter were pro­vi­sionally closed. However, this did not mean that all prob­lems related to the prob­lem of purchase of real estate by foreigners were already solved. Commissioner Gunter Verheugen wel­ comed the pro­vi­sional closure of this chapter, describing it as a ‘breakthrough’, and hoped that Poland would fully implement what was agreed. As he declared: This chapter, which includes sensitive questions such as purchase of land and secondary residences, has been the most difficult – polit­ically and psy­ chologically – in the nego­ti­ations with Poland so far. The Euro­pean Union made great efforts to accommodate Poland’s par­ticu­lar needs. This proves that the Union takes the sensitivities and par­ticu­lar concerns of the different candidate coun­tries ser­iously.102

124   Purchase of real estate by EU residents The EU was afraid that Poland would not elim­in­ate remaining restrictions in time and these fears were reflected in the 2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards EU Accession. According to its re­com­mendations, in order to complete pre­para­tions for mem­ber­ship, Poland’s efforts should focus on passing the legis­la­tion neces­sary to ensure the timely elimination of all remain­ ing restrictions, including those on the purchase of land.103 The 2003 Compre­ hensive Monitoring Report on Poland assessed the outcomes of the accession nego­ti­ations. As the docu­ment pointed out, in accordance with the trans­itional ar­range­ment that had been granted, Poland would remove restrictions on the acquisition of secondary residences by EU nationals not resident in Poland by May 2009 at the latest, and would remove restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land and forests by EU nationals by May 2016 at the latest. According to the Commission re­com­mendations, Poland also needed to ensure that restrictions re­gard­ing the acquisition of real estate that were not covered by the trans­itional ar­range­ments were effect­ively removed by the date of accession. In addition, Poland should dem­on­strate that the recently adopted authorisation pro­ced­ure for acquiring land respected the terms of the Acces­ sion Treaty.104 Reactions from the domestic level The official announcement of the nego­ti­ation results in the area of purchase of real estate provoked a severe reaction from the opposi­tion, which called for a referendum. However, a parlia­ment­ary majority once again rejected, this time on 20 March, the second proposal of the Euro-­sceptic League of Polish Families (LPR), which sought to introduce a referendum on the sale of land.105 Further­ more, the Self-­Defence and the LPR were preparing a vote of non-­confidence in the Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski.106 Not only was the opposi­tion dissatisfied with the nego­ti­ation results, but Kalinowski and his party colleagues were also not fully satisfied with the outcome of nego­ti­ations. They used every oppor­tun­ity to criticise the Union and did so in the spotlight. In April 2002 a new initiative was taken by the Peasants’ Party, which it claimed was in order to protect the inter­ests of Polish farmers. The PSL called for an acceleration of work on the draft law on the agricultural sys­tem in order for it to be adopted before 16 April 2003, which was the date of the planned signing of the Accession Treaty. Kalinowski also warned that if a regulation were not passed before the Acces­ sion Treaty, buyers of Polish farmland from the present Euro­pean Union would be in a better situ­ation than Polish cit­izens. This would be because, unlike EU cit­izens, Polish farmers would have to meet requirements concerning max­imum farmland stand­ards, adequate qualifications, and other requirements, which would not apply to EU cit­izens.107 The polit­ical par­ties reflected the mood of the gen­eral pub­lic. Indeed, the results of the nego­ti­ation de­cisively rad­icalised pub­lic opinion on that issue. According to the opinion polls, a vast majority of cit­izens were against the way

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   125 in which the gov­ern­ment had come to an agreement in nego­ti­ation talks on sales of land. The strongest sign of this was the signi­fic­ant increase in the percentage of respondents favouring a complete ban on allowing foreigners to freely buy and sell land, re­gard­less of the land’s envisioned use.108 Most negat­ive expectations of EU mem­ber­ship were connected with purchase of land by foreigners. This issue was more pressing than any other that raised pub­lic fears, as indicated in Table 5.2. Despite the negotiating by Poland of a rel­at­ively favour­able trans­ition period for purchase of land by foreigners, respondents were strongly polarised in assess­ ing the negotiated results. Supporters of the League of Polish Families and the Self-­Defence Union were most crit­ical.109 Taking ad­vant­age of this climate, in Octo­ber 2002 the League of Polish Fami­ lies made a third attempt to present a motion calling for a referendum on the sale of land to foreigners. This time the LPR lodged with the Sejm (the lower chamber of par­lia­ment) a cit­izens’ motion calling for the staging of a referendum on the sale of land to foreigners.110 The motion had been signed by some 600,000 people.111 The right-­wing Law and Justice (PiS) Party also en­dorsed the motion and likewise claimed that Polish land was not adequately protected.112 Neverthe­ less, the whole opposi­tion was not united, and indeed the lib­eral and pro-­EU Cit­ izens Platform was rather moderate in criticising the gov­ern­ment. Therefore, the gov­ern­ment managed to pacify these voices coming from PSL and the right-­ wing parties.

Table 5.2 Assessment of negotiated membership conditions In many areas, Polish negotiators were forced to reconcile the terms of EU membership with Poland’s capacity to assume the obligations of membership. In your opinion, are the negotiated conditions good or bad with regard to: Decidedly Rather good (%) good (%)

Doesn’t matter (%)

Rather bad (%)

Decidedly Don’t bad (%) know (%)

co-financing regional investments from EU funds

17

39

 7

 5

 3

29

undertaking work in EU countries

 8

39

 8

19

 7

19

7% VAT on construction services

12

32

 8

10

 6

32

practising law in Poland by EU citizens

 3

17

14

11

 8

47

purchase of farm land by foreigners in Poland

 1

13

11

33

25

17

Source: Office of the Committee for European Integration, December 2002.

126   Purchase of real estate by EU residents The Accession Treaty and the ratification process The pro­vi­sional closing of nego­ti­ations on free movement of capital and, in par­ ticu­lar, purchase of land by foreigners in March 2002, did not put an end to the debate within polit­ical elites and pub­lic opinion on this issue. Even though the Commission adopted a favour­able opinion on the accession of Poland and other candidate coun­tries,113 Poland and the EU could not reach an agreement on the con­dition of land purchasing by EU farmers. The Euro­pean Commission wanted to estab­lish precise land purchase con­ditions. Poland’s dip­ lomats claimed that the con­ditions concerning the sale of land to EU cit­izens negotiated in March 2002 were very complicated. EU experts, in turn, suspected that Poland’s Ministry of Agriculture wanted to make the pro­ced­ures stricter. According to the agreed pro­posi­tions, EU farmers would be obliged until 2016 to become tenants of the land before they would get a permit for its purchase. The tenancy period was to amount to seven years in the case of Western and Northern Poland, and three years in the case of other areas.114 The situ­ation was made even more complicated in Febru­ary 2003 by a major polit­ical crisis after the break-­up of the SLD–PSL co­ali­tion. The crisis was imme­diately prompted by the PSL’s de­cision to vote against a gov­ern­ment road vignette bill, but there were several other issues that caused dis­agree­ment. The break-­up of the co­ali­tion was caused by PSL demands for guarantees of budget sub­sidies to EU direct farming subsidy payments, greater state inter­ven­tion on the farming market and the introduction of a land trade bill, which was par­ticu­ larly emphasised by PSL and was aimed at regulating and limiting land sales.115 Prime Minister Miller, explaining the reasons behind the split, declared that it was neces­sary for the gov­ern­ment to have stable partners. As Miller argued: ‘You cannot be in co­ali­tion and at the same time in opposi­tion’, adding that the gov­ern­ment was not going to be ‘held hostage by anybody.’ Other SLD officials accused PSL of not making clear their position on the EU referendum, acting as if it were only inter­ested in the rural voters and the bene­fits of being in the gov­ ern­ment.116 Finally, PSL made its sup­port for a ‘Yes’ vote in the EU referendum con­ditional on the passing of several bills the PSL deemed crucial, including the land trade bill.117 On 7 April 2003 the League of Polish Families issued an appeal to the Prime Minister asking him not to sign the EU Accession Treaty and to cancel Poland’s parti­cipa­tion in the EU Summit in Athens. The Self-­Defence party prepared a sim­ilar appeal. The party leader, Andrzej Lepper, added that Poland should not sign the Treaty without stricter land sale laws. As he put it bluntly: ‘For us to sign the EU Treaty without laws protecting Polish land is unaccept­able.’118 This last-­minute polit­ical obstruction was criticised by the Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who argued that Poland’s accession to the EU should not be the subject of polit­ical tussles. Cimoszewicz called the Treaty ‘the best pos­sible’ for Poland and stressed that the signing on 16 April in Athens would officially seal the EU accession talks. He admitted that not all of Poland’s wishes were reflected in the Treaty, but stressed that the docu­ment was ‘as good

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   127 as it could be’ and that after joining, Poland would receive more from the EU than it would pay into it.119 The Treaty was signed on 16 April 2003. As a result, the fol­low­ing regu­latory meas­ures were taken. First, Poland could maintain, in force, for five years from the date of acces­ sion, the rules re­gard­ing the acquisition of secondary residences. However, this trans­itional period would not apply to nationals of the EU and EEA member states that had been legally resident in Poland for four years continuously. Second, with regard to the lim­ita­tions concerning acquisition of agricultural land and forests, Poland could maintain these in force for 12 years from the date of accession. Nevertheless, this would not apply to those nationals of the EU and EEA member states who wanted to estab­lish themselves as self‑employed farmers and who had been legally resident and leasing lands in Poland, as a nat­ ural or legal person, for at least three years con­tinu­ously. With the exception of the Western and Northern parts of Poland,120 the residence and leasing period, as mentioned earl­ier, was to extend to seven years. As a result, the new rules would postpone (and tem­porally limit) the purchase of land by foreigners, but in the long run would not stop the pro­cess. The lease period preceding the purchase of land would be calculated indi­vidually for each national of a Member State who had been leasing land in Poland from the certified date of the ori­ginal lease agreement.121 The Accession Treaty was formally approved in the referendum held in July 2003. Final data released by the election commission showed that 77.4 per cent of those who parti­cip­ated in the referendum on EU accession voted in favour, while the turnout at 58.8 per cent of all eli­gible voters was well in excess of the 50 per cent threshold required to validate the outcome.122

Conclusions The purchase of real estate was used by polit­ical forces and some inter­est groups in Poland in order to gain polit­ical capital. This is a good example of how politi­ cisation and manipulation from the side of do­mestic groups can influence the size of the win-­set. It seems that there was interplay among different groups and pub­lic opinion. This indicates a small do­mestic win-­set in Poland to accept lib­ eralisation of land sales. The negotiated con­ditions, even though they required certain flex­ib­il­ity from the Polish side, can be regarded as a success. Thus, Poland, by negotiating the longest trans­itional period, did better than other acceding countries. The assessment of the nego­ti­ation outcomes depends very much on whether such an assessment is made from a polit­ical or from an eco­nomic per­spect­ive. One can agree with Alan Mayhew, who pointed out that nego­ti­ations concerning purchase of real estate ‘were a success from the polit­ical point of view in terms of Polish nego­ti­ation ob­ject­ives but from the eco­nom­ist point of view, it was a waste of time’.123 This is because, as eco­nom­ists argued, the trans­itional period at best would not have any influence on the eco­nomic de­velopment of Poland or, as some argued, it could have a negat­ive influence.

128   Purchase of real estate by EU residents The nego­ti­ation period from 1998 to 2002 can be divided into two major stages. The first period, under the AWS–UW gov­ern­ment and later the AWS minor­ity gov­ern­ment, from 1998 to 2001, can be characterised by a rel­at­ive standstill in nego­ti­ations concerning the purchase of real estate by foreigners. This was mainly because of the tough Polish negotiating positions and the lack of determination to achieve a reason­able compromise showed by both negotiating sides. However, it was also determined by a set aside strat­egy used by the EU, where the most difficult chapters, including free movement of capital, were negotiated at a later stage. Public opinion did not want to introduce a lib­eral regime in purchasing real estate. Thus, a small do­mestic win-­set in Poland to introduce a lib­eral regime was used by the AWS–UW gov­ern­ment as a bargaining ad­vant­age. The Polish side thus used a tying hands strat­egy. The SLD–PSL gov­ern­ment brought changes to this nego­ti­ ation tactic as a result of the softening of the nego­ti­ation stances in order to accelerate the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. However, the concessions made by the Polish side were rather limited. Poland did not resign from the trans­itional period and only reduced its ori­ginal stance from 18 to 12 years.124 This con­ firms Putnam’s thesis that a small do­mestic win-­set can be a bargaining ad­vant­age. The fact that Poland was rel­at­ively successful in nego­ti­ations was prompted by the fact that the EU do­mestic win-­set to accept the trans­itional period was rather large. Neither pub­lic opinion nor major polit­ical forces and inter­est groups in the EU coun­tries cared about the issue. Transitional periods in land sales were not so im­port­ant for the EU, since it did not require money trans­fers, a par­ticu­lar concern for the EU politicians. Finally, those EU coun­ tries that emphasised this issue, like the Neth­er­lands, treated this prob­lem as an element of their nego­ti­ation tactics aimed at achieving better deals in other, more im­port­ant areas like direct payments and production quotas. With regard to par­ticu­larities of nego­ti­ation strat­egies and tactics, these were used by both sides extensively. The Polish side, through the nego­ti­ ations, used such nego­ti­ation strat­egies and tactics as tying hands and threats. The EU side used battering ram and package deals, espe­cially when tying the Table 5.3 Purchase of real estate by foreigners – size of the domestic win-set Size of win-set Case study

Poland

EU

Rather large: public opinion did not Purchase of Small within real estate by public opinion, care about this issue, interest groups foreigners interest groups rather weak, political parties and and political politicians treated this issue as an parties. element of a package deal (with free movement of labour) in order to negotiate transitional periods in free movement of labour.

Result Win-sets overlapped. Poland managed to negotiate a long transitional period.

Purchase of real estate by EU residents   129 purchase of real estate issue with the free movement of labour, as will be dis­ cussed in the next chapter. To sum up, in Poland, due to strong do­mestic pressure expressed unani­ mously by polit­ical par­ties, farmers’ unions and pub­lic opinion, there was a small do­mestic win-­set to accept the lib­eralisation. In the EU coun­tries there was a large win-­set to accept the trans­itional periods, since polit­ical par­ties and inter­est groups in member states treated this issue only as an element of a wider package, mainly aimed at protecting inter­est in the area of free move­ ment of workers. Thus, the Polish and the EU win-­sets finally overlapped. This indeed confirms Putnam’s idea that when win-­sets overlap, the nego­ti­ ation agreement can be easily achieved. The case of nego­ti­ations concerning purchase of real estate can serve as empirical evid­ence to sup­port this claim.

6 Freedom of movement of labour

Freedom of movement of workers was one of the key negotiating issues within the chapter on the free movement of persons. It was also one of the key prob­lems (together with the agri­cul­ture and the sale of land) that raised major concerns from pub­lic opinion, which was indicated in a number of opinion polls. Even though freedom of movement of labour and sale of land to foreigners were closely linked and tied mainly by the EU to a larger package deal, their nature and dy­namics remained quite different. Whilst the argument over the length of trans­itional periods for land sales was initiated by the Polish side, the prob­lem of free move­ ment of labour was gen­er­ated by the EU side in par­ticu­lar. The question for the Polish gov­ern­ment was how to sell a compromise to the gen­eral pub­lic.1 This chapter aims to answer the question why the free movement of labour became an im­port­ant do­mestic issue. It also examines the polit­ical stages of nego­ti­ations, including the screening pro­cess and the preparing of position papers, the opening of proper nego­ti­ations, the acceleration of nego­ti­ations, the change of the gov­ern­ment and the concluding of nego­ti­ations, and the ratifica­ tion of their results in the Accession Treaty. This chapter argues that the dy­namics of the polit­ical nego­ti­ations within the two Polish gov­ern­ments were different. The Buzek gov­ern­ment’s tough nego­ti­ ation stances were based on a small do­mestic win-­set within Polish pub­lic opinion to accept a trans­itional period. This issue was unofficially linked to a package deal with the purchase of real estate by foreigners. The Miller gov­ern­ment, in contrast, treated the agreements for trans­itional ar­range­ment in the area of free movement of labour as a neces­sary side-­payment, according to Putnam’s rule that the value of an inter­na­tional side-­payment should be calculated in terms of its mar­ginal con­tri­ bu­tion to the likelihood of ratification of the negotiated agreement, rather than its overall value to the recipient nation.2 The gov­ern­ment was aware that do­mestic pressure expected it to accelerate the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and to conclude the nego­ ti­ations together with the other acceding coun­tries. The different dy­namics of negotiating in this area were made even more complex. The prob­lems mentioned above will enable us to answer the key question of this chapter, to what extent the size of the do­mestic win-­set in nego­ti­ations con­ cerning free movement of labour influenced the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and the nego­ti­ation outcomes.

Freedom of movement of labour   131

Why the issue of freedom of movement of labour became an important domestic matter Freedom of movement of labour means the unlimited right to settle, engage in commercial ac­tiv­ities and take up employment in any of the EU coun­tries. The freedom of movement for workers within the Community is guaranteed in art­icle 48 of the Treaty estab­lishing the Euro­pean Community.3 That freedom implies aboli­tion of any discrimination on grounds of nationality in employment, com­ pensation and other working con­ditions. In par­ticu­lar, it includes the right of a national, of an EU member state, to reside and take up employment in a Member State of which he or she is not a national. It became one of the most im­port­ant issues during the nego­ti­ations that aroused do­mestic inter­est, mainly with pub­lic opinion and in the trade unions, not only in the acceding coun­tries, but also in some EU coun­tries, par­ticu­larly Ger­many and Austria. There are three major reasons why this issue became so im­port­ant: eco­nomic, social and polit­ical. The polit­ical dimension was im­port­ant since it became a com­pon­ent of a larger package deal and was closely linked to the prob­lem of the purchase of real estate by foreigners.4 Economic fears The issue of freedom of movement of workers had vital eco­nomic significance.5 The eco­nomic arguments were overshadowed by polit­ical ones and it was this issue that raised certain eco­nomic fears, par­ticu­larly in the EU‑15 coun­tries.6 This prob­lem had its eco­nomic dimension since the movement from the less de­veloped member states to the more de­veloped ones has always been an im­port­ ant part of the improvement of the quality of life of the workforce that decided to move abroad.7 In the case of Poland, this was a ser­ious eco­nomic and social issue, since the sal­ar­ies, espe­cially of unskilled labour, were even a few times lower than the EU average. The unemployment rate was around 12 per cent when Poland started nego­ti­ations, peaking at 18 per cent when the nego­ti­ations were completed.8 It was therefore expected that there would be an increase in the amount of cross-­border employment and that there might be larger movements in some spe­ cific areas or professions, but there was very little expectation that there would be major flows from east to west.9 It was judged that the flow of labour would prob­ably consist of lower skilled and young workers. These workers would obvi­ ously compete on the price with the same groups of workers in the Union. One pos­sible solution to this prob­lem is the lib­eralisation and reform of the labour market in Western Europe and stronger eco­nomic growth throughout the whole continent.10 Nevertheless, some inter­est groups, mainly trade unions in Ger­many, sought an ‘easy solution’ by demanding a long seven-­year trans­itional period on the free movement of labour. Their concerns were expressed by the German polit­ical elites. This was very much because the unemployment rate in Ger­many was also rel­at­ively high, peaking at 10 per cent. A fear of im­mig­rants and

132   Freedom of movement of labour workers from the acceding coun­tries existed.11 Those fears were not only felt by the Germans, they were also shared by Austrians and to a certain extent by the British pub­lic. In a survey done in April 2002, in Great Britain almost three in every five respondents were concerned that enlargement would mean low wage com­peti­tion from workers in the applicant coun­tries.12 This pub­lic voice could not be ignored by politicians anxious at the pro­spect of losing pub­lic support. Social aspects The second major reason why this issue was of vital im­port­ance stems from some social factors. The strong feelings of pub­lic opinion in Poland were indeed reflected in a number of opinion polls, where the significance of this prob­lem was strongly emphasised not only by the respondents who declared their willing­ ness to work abroad, but by a substantive majority of the gen­eral pub­lic.13 One of the pos­sible explanations of this phenomenon stems from the Polish percep­ tion of being a Euro­pean nation, which is deeply rooted in the nation’s mentality. Freedom of movement of workers was con­sidered one of the funda­mental freedoms and was often discussed by the pub­lic in a lively and vociferous way.14 The introducing of the trans­itional period was con­sidered a way of limiting or even depriving people of their nat­ural freedoms.15 This freedom was con­sidered as a core element of becoming an EU cit­izen, as indicated in the Figure 6.1. Thus, limiting this freedom was con­sidered to be a way of treating Poles as second-­class Euro­peans who were not equal to cit­izens of the other member states. 80 70

Percentage

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Right to work in EU countries

Right to study in EU countries

Right to reside in another EU country

Figure 6.1 What it means to be an EU citizen (in the opinion of Poles) (source: Euro­ barometer, March 2002/OCEI).

Freedom of movement of labour   133 Hence, according to some sociologists, more people declared their willingness to work in the EU coun­tries than actu­ally planned to do so. This was because in this way they wanted to emphasise that they con­sidered themselves Euro­peans.16 Political factors Finally, this prob­lem had a polit­ical dimension since it became an element of the nego­ti­ation strat­egy of the Polish side and subject to an extensive nego­ti­ation game between the nego­ti­ation par­ties. There was a strong nego­ti­ation linkage between freedom of movement of labour and the purchase of real estate by foreigners. Such a linkage had been made since both are funda­mental freedoms in the Treaty and requests for trans­ition periods were highly politicised. Consequently, these issues were tied up into a package deal. First, such a link was unofficially made by the Polish gov­ern­ment, which soon withdrew from this idea. However, later on, the EU proposed a sim­ilar package deal.17 According to Alan Mayhew, the linkage was most unfortunate for three main reasons. First, the prob­lems involved were very different and the impact of a trade-­off on the candidate coun­tries would be very negat­ive. Second, the land ownership question is eco­nomic­ally far less signi­ fic­ant than the free movement of labour in the twenty-­first century. Finally, there are coun­tries where land purchase is not a nego­ti­ation prob­lem – Estonia and Lithu­ania, for instance.18 Nevertheless, both were made polit­ical issues, because they have been made so by politicians and the media.19 Freedom of movement of persons as a strategic goal of Poland The free movement of workers, negotiated within the chapter on the freedom of movement of persons, was regarded as a sensitive, but vital, issue from the very beginning of nego­ti­ations. As the 1997 Polish National Strategy of Integration declared: The fastest pos­sible implementation of the free movement of labour, and of em­ployees in par­ticu­lar, is in Poland’s inter­est. This means elim­in­ating, or keeping short, trans­ition periods in achieving full access to the labour markets of the Union. The only area, where Poland may be inter­ested in interim solu­ tions, is certain costly social regulations currently in force in the Union.20 The National Strategy of Integration emphasised that one of the most im­port­ant tasks of the gov­ern­ment would be to increase access for Polish em­ployees to the EU labour market. The government would take steps designed to bring about reciprocal re­cog­ni­tion of degrees, qualifications and of the right to practice a profession, and would carry out a review of the laws concerning the right to practice professions, of labour law, and of other social regulations in order to make them com­pat­ible with the rules existing in the EU.21 The Strategy emphasised the eco­nomic significance of free movement of labour.22

134   Freedom of movement of labour The EU, even though it had confirmed the freedom of the movement of workers as a funda­mental freedom in the Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union – it did not have a detailed pol­icy on this question.23 Even though this issue was emphasised as a stra­tegic goal, it was not so strongly emphasised in the polit­ical debate by polit­ical par­ties and inter­est groups in Poland.24 This was because some other issues such as land sales and agri­cul­ture were a better area for polit­ical games and manipulation.

Screening process and preparing of the position papers From the early days of nego­ti­ations, free movement of workers was identified as one of the most controversial issues that would require extensive polit­ical nego­ti­ ations. As a result, the EU had focused on identi­fying incompatibilities with the acquis, rather than proper nego­ti­ations on the free movement of persons.25 The accession nego­ti­ations, in other areas, started on 31 March 1998 and were carried out in several stages. The screening in the first seven areas was concluded during the British presidency in mid 1998.26 During the Austrian presidency in the second half of 1998, the nego­ti­ation partners entered into substantive nego­ti­ations and urged the Council, the Commission and the candidate coun­tries to maintain the momentum in order to allow intensive nego­ti­ations in the first half of 1999.27 Screening The screening in the area of free movement of persons was carried out on multi­ lateral (with some other acceding coun­tries) and bi­lat­eral levels (between Poland and the EU). In the area of the freedom of movement of persons on the multi­lateral level, it took place on 6–7 April 1999 and on the bi­lat­eral level on 8–9 April 1999 in Brussels. During the second stage of nego­ti­ations, based on the screening results, the applicant coun­tries prepared their position papers in indi­vidual areas and presented them to the Euro­pean Union.28 According to the EU, the de­velopment of the administrative capa­city was an essential pre-­condition for future mem­ber­ship. According to the first EU Report, Poland had made pro­gress in setting up the neces­sary structures, but in terms of the abil­ity to take on the obli­ga­ tions of mem­ber­ship and, more par­ticu­larly, the Community acquis, the Commis­ sion pointed out enigmatically that ‘Poland have a mixed record, with signi­fic­ant pro­gress in certain areas offset by delays in others.’29 Nevertheless, the screening pro­cess enabled elaboration of the position paper of the Polish government. Polish position The position paper contained a Polish proposal to resolve those incompatibilities and to set a suggested timetable for Poland’s incorporation of the EU law. The paper re­com­mended par­ticu­lar solutions such as trans­ition periods or specific clauses to be introduced into the Accession Treaty.30

Freedom of movement of labour   135 The key Polish legis­la­tion concerning the movement of workers across Polish borders included the Aliens Act of 25 June 1997 and the Act of 14 Decem­ber 1994 on Employment and Combating Unemployment. Those acts were not com­ pat­ible with the prin­ciple of free movement of workers as derived from art­icle 48 of the Treaty and a number of EEC Commission and Council Directives that followed.31 The Act on Employment and Combating Unemployment required foreign nationals wishing to take up employment in Poland to apply for an employment permit. Similarly, under the Polish laws, family members of migrant workers do not enjoy any special rights of residence and employment in Poland. Nevertheless, as Poland’s position paper emphasised: ‘Upon Poland’s accession to the Euro­pean Union the rel­ev­ant EC regulations will apply directly in Poland and will automatically elim­in­ate the present restrictions concerning the EU Member State nationals.’32 As we may see from the docu­ment, Poland stood firmly on the prin­ciple of freedom of movement of persons.33 For this reason, both the 1999 and 2000 National Programme of Pre­para­tions for Membership in the EU recog­nised adjustment of Polish legis­la­tion to the acquis communautaire. The ob­ject­ive of Poland was entered imme­diately into the sys­tem of freedom of movement for workers, based on art­icle 48 of the EC Treaty. As the National Programme recog­nised, the achievement of this goal would require Poland to be ready to join the sys­tem with all its elements by the date of accession, at the latest.34 The public assessment of the Polish negotiating position As existed in the case of real estate purchases by foreigners, in the case of freedom of movement of persons there was widespread agreement among the experts that in drafting Polish position papers, the concern for pub­lic opinion was a driving force, as admitted by the Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski,35 and there were opinion polls sup­porting this thesis. For instance, in the CBOS survey in two consecutive years, 1998 and 1999, as many as 75 per cent of respondents agreed with a statement that there should be freedom to take jobs in the EU coun­tries from the date of the accession. For most people, limiting freedom of movement of workers was regarded as depriving them of one of the funda­mental freedoms or was even con­sidered as a way of humiliating them. As Jerzy Buzek de­scribed it, the im­port­ance of this issue was so obvious that his gov­ern­ment did not even have to consult with social partners on the issue.36 According to the adviser to Prime Minister Buzek respons­ible for investigation of pub­lic opinion, this factor was of vital im­port­ ance and indeed was reflected in a number of opinion polls.37 To use Putnam’s metaphor, due to strong do­mestic pressure, Polish negoti­ ators had a small win-­set on the do­mestic level to accept any trans­itional period in the area of free movement of workers. However, unlike in the case of land pur­ chase by foreigners, the prob­lem of the free movement of labour was a sensitive issue not only for Polish pub­lic opinion, but also for pub­lic opinion in the EU coun­tries, mainly Ger­many, which was not so willing to accept liberalisation.

136   Freedom of movement of labour One of the first signals that a future Social Democratic gov­ern­ment in Ger­ many would seek a lengthy delay in granting free movement to workers from CEEC, due to strong pressure from the pub­lic opinion and trade unions, was sent in June 1998. As Deputy Chairman of the SPD Heidemarie Wieczorek-­Zeul declared, a new German gov­ern­ment should present a report to Brussels spelling out all the specific prob­lems and inter­ests for coun­tries such as Ger­many. She agreed that ‘a long delay in enforcing the regulations for free labour movement would be essential for any future German gov­ern­ment to negotiate’.38 As we may see, due to strong do­mestic pressure in Ger­many there was a small win-­set to accept the free movement of workers without any trans­itional period. According to Putnam, the smaller the win-­sets, the greater the risk that nego­ti­ations would break down.39 The win-­sets on both the Polish do­mestic level and on the German do­mestic level were small and did not overlap. That is why nego­ti­ations in the field of free movement of workers were recog­nised as diffi­ cult from the very beginning of talks when the positions were drafted. In fact, this prob­lem was widely recog­nised in Poland, and it was predicted that this would be the subject of protracted nego­ti­ations between the acceding coun­tries (Poland in par­ticu­lar) and that this issue would become subject to complex polit­ ical games.

Opening of negotiations On 26 May 2000 Poland and EU opened entry nego­ti­ations in three polit­ically sensitive areas: free movement of labour, justice and finance. The opening of nego­ti­ations was pos­sible because Ger­many, Austria and Spain had all agreed to the EU position on labour movement, which was not to call for introducing a trans­ition period right away, but to ‘return to the issue at a later date’.40 Poland and the EU sides met to formally exchange prepared positions and docu­ments. The Polish gov­ern­ment was, how­ever, aware that if it wanted to seek successful labour rights for Poles in the EU, it must convince the Union that the EU would not be threatened with a mass inflow of cheap labour. This goal was par­ticu­larly difficult since Ger­many and Austria strongly feared that they would be swamped with cheap Eastern labour once they opened their doors to Polish workers.41 These fears were mainly driven by do­mestic factors in the EU member states. When taking their nego­ti­ation positions, both the German and Austrian gov­ern­ments were acting under strong pressure coming from both pub­lic opinion and local trade unions.42 Therefore, to use Putnam’s terminology, it was rather unlikely that Ger­many and Austria would ratify a solution allowing free movement of labour. In early May 2000 the EU published figures according to which Ger­many would face an inflow of 220,000 migrant workers a year fol­low­ing the Euro­pean Union enlargement. The figures were based on a study written by Ger­many’s DIW Institute and indeed caused a furore in Berlin. German politicians were already deeply concerned about the social and labour force repercussions of enlargement and were fighting to persuade fellow EU gov­ern­ments to place

Freedom of movement of labour   137 curbs on the free movement of workers imme­diately after enlargement. In refer­ ring to the study, Anna Diamantopoulou, EU employment commissioner, insisted that freedom of movement of people was one of the funda­mental freedoms of the EU and the Commission would sup­port that. As she emphasised: Do we – the applicants, the member states – do we have to be frightened of each other? [. . .] Fears – on both sides – are unfounded. There are eco­nomic and employment bene­fits to be gained from eco­nomic and polit­ical integra­ tion both for the applicants and for the existing member states. We can gain from the enlarged polit­ical and eco­nomic com­mun­ity that enlargement will create, and we can gain from having a common and level eco­nomic and social playing field for all our coun­tries.43 However, the pressure from some EU member states was very strong, and on another occasion, Commissioner Diamantopoulou argued that in previous enlargements there had been temporary ar­range­ments on labour mobility and ‘that will be for the negotiators to con­sider’.44 Public opinion pressure In the acceding coun­tries, Poland in par­ticu­lar, there was strong do­mestic pres­ sure to introduce a free movement regime. Furthermore, opinion surveys showed a rel­at­ively high inter­est of Poles in working in the EU coun­tries. A July 2000 CBOS survey found that about 35 per cent declared that they would be inter­ested in working in the EU coun­tries,45 while 53 per cent declared that they would not be inter­ested in working abroad even if offered a job. For only 12 per cent, it was difficult to answer the question. These figures are shown in Table 6.1.46 The Octo­ber 2000 Demoskop Survey brought even more un­equi­vocal results.47 The two par­ticu­lar issues brought to pub­lic attention were the free movement of labour and the purchase of land by foreigners. Table 6.1 Are you interested in taking a job in one of the EU countries after Poland’s accession to the EU? Are you interested in taking a job in one of the EU countries after Poland’s accession to the EU? Yes, I would be interested and will definitely try. Yes, I would be and will probably try. Yes, I would be interested if offered a job, but I am not going to try myself. Difficult to say. No, I am not particularly interested. No, I am definitely not interested. Source: CBOS, July 2000.

13%   7% 15% 12% 21% 32%

138   Freedom of movement of labour Table 6.2 Public acceptance for a ten-year transitional period in the free movement of workers and for a liberalisation of the purchase of real estate by foreigners Do you think Poland should accept the following conditions of accession of Poland to the EU? Alternatively, should Poland in case of such conditions resign from membership?

Accept (%)

Resign (%)

Ten-year transitional ban from taking job in the EU countries Freedom to buy land in Poland by EU citizens

12 13

57 60

Source: Demoskop, October 2000.

As we see from these surveys, pub­lic opinion in Poland was very much in favour of introducing a lib­eral regime. Therefore, there was a small do­mestic win-­set in Poland to accept the trans­itional period. Trade unions and employers’ organisations positions Several trade unions from the acceding coun­tries demanded free movement of labour. The strongest position was taken by the Polish trade unions, ‘Solidarity’ in par­ticu­lar. As a former member of the Negotiation Team, Ewa Kubis noted that trade unions had only a very gen­eral view on Euro­pean integration and did not express their position in detail. Nevertheless, the ‘Solidarity’ position, expressed by their foreign affairs spokesman, Józef Niemiec, clearly sup­ported the idea of freedom of movement. According to ‘Solidarity’, trans­itional ar­range­ ments in the field of free movement of workers and at the same time a lib­eral regime in free movement in capital are eco­nomic­ally unjustifiable and socially detrimental. This could create social dumping because of the movement of capital investment and ex­ploita­tion of cheap labour from the acceding coun­tries (often within the shadow eco­nomy) before the aboli­tion of any restrictions. Con­ sequently, this could also increase unemployment in Western Europe since many potential employers would choose to pay low wages in the shadow eco­nomy. Transitional ar­range­ments could also have a negat­ive impact on the comparabil­ ity of sal­ar­ies between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ members. Because of this pro­cess, there would be a lower GDP in the new members and more funds would be pumped into structural aid in the poorer regions of new member states. The other major Polish trade union OPZZ was initially rather silent, but became more active during nego­ti­ations on the freedom of movement of labour. In fact, its position was in gen­eral sim­ilar to that of ‘Solidarity’, although more crit­ical towards Poland’s Negotiation Team. This can be explained by the fact that the OPZZ was a member of the Democratic Left Alliance, which at the beginning and at the early stage of nego­ti­ations was in the opposi­tion. In par­ticu­ lar, OPZZ argued that counteracting German fears by agreeing to trans­itional ar­range­ments would be a polit­ical mistake. Polish trade unions’ lobbying ac­tiv­ities on the inter­na­tional arena were mainly limited to fellow trade unions from the most EU coun­tries and indeed to a certain

Freedom of movement of labour   139 extent brought results, since Euro­pean trade unions by and large sup­ported the prin­ciple. There was no solid­arity and coopera­tion between Polish and Germans trade unions, since they clearly had different views on the issue. Labour unions, mainly in Ger­many and Austria, were also worried that existing pay and bene­fit levels might be eroded as the new workers arrived.48 Polish negotiators, how­ever, were usually crit­ical in assessing the involve­ ment of trade unions. According to one of the Polish senior officials, ‘We did not expect any sup­port or expertise from the trade unions to back up our positions. We could rely on expertise from the leading universities, and pub­lic opinion polls obviously provided good sup­port for our claims.’49 A sim­ilar opinion was shared by Ryszard Czarnecki, even though he admitted the pos­it­ive role played by trade union leader Józef Niemiec. Czarnecki argued that Polish trade unions were not prepared for the accession pro­cess.50 It seems that the trade unions in Ger­many were much more active than the trade unions in Poland.51 One of the pos­sible explanations often mentioned by the Polish officials was the fact that German trade unions were fighting for the protection of the labour market, whilst Polish trade unions did not have a direct inter­est in demanding lib­eralisation.52 This was largely due to the strong personal position of the Polish Chief Nego­ tiator Jan Kułakowski, formerly the Secretary of Euro­pean Trade Union Confed­ eration and the Secretary General of World Labour Confederation. Euro­pean trade unions, by and large, tried to subordinate par­ticu­lar, national inter­ests in the name of solid­arity. However, the German and Austrian trade unions repres­ ented rather narrow-­minded par­ticu­lar inter­ests.53 A position strongly opposing any trans­itional ar­range­ments was taken by employers’ organ­isa­tions in Poland, in par­ticu­lar by the two most influ­en­tial ones, the Polish Confederation of Private Employers and the National Chamber of the Economy. Even though these organ­isa­tions sup­ported the Polish gov­ern­ ment’s position and agreed with the trade unions’ gen­eral opposi­tion towards any labour movement restrictions, the justification of their stance was definitely eco­nomic rather than social. They argued that the German fears of a huge influx of cheap labour from the acceding coun­tries were unjustified. Even though both trade unions and employers’ organ­isa­tions were in favour of lib­eralisation, their ac­tiv­ities and polit­ical pressure on decision-­makers were rather limited. This was because the trade union leaders were focused on do­mestic issues and narrow-­minded sectoral inter­ests and free movement of labour, which, even though im­port­ant for the gen­eral pub­lic, were not im­port­ant to the union leaders. Such an opinion was shared by most of the decision-­makers whom I inter­viewed.54 EU proposals and the Polish response The issue of free movement of workers, unlike the prob­lem of the purchase of land, brought more inter­est in the EU coun­tries than the EU itself. Ger­many was par­ticu­larly active in demanding trans­itional periods. The German position was

140   Freedom of movement of labour strongly sup­ported by Austria, but some other states, including Spain and the Neth­er­lands, declared no post-­accession restrictions.55 The Chancellor’s remarks prompted imme­diate criticism from accession can­ didate states, which all sought unrestricted entry to labour markets. Poland’s Prime Minister declared, ‘Our position is that labour markets should be opened for Poles at the moment when we join the Euro­pean Union.’56 Indeed, Buzek’s position was backed by pub­lic opinion. In the Decem­ber 2000 OBOP survey, about 58 per cent of respondents backed the Polish gov­ern­ment’s demands for Polish cit­izens to enjoy the full bene­fits of the free movement of labour within the EU without any trans­itional periods. Only 12 per cent of OBOP respondents said that extending the free movement of labour prin­ciple to Poland without any trans­ition period would be unfavour­able for Poland, 3 per cent said it would be decidedly unfavour­able and 27 per cent declared themselves undecided.57 Gerhard Schroeder, on 21 Decem­ber 2000, defended his aim of barring low-­ wage workers for a time after the Euro­pean Union expanded, rejecting criticism by Eastern Euro­pean gov­ern­ments as ‘inappropriate’. He declared: ‘If you look at the whole sys­tem in its flex­ib­il­ity, I can’t see what there is to complain about.’58 Nevertheless, the German attitude was widely criticised by the other EU members. According to the Dutch position, the increase in labour mobility could be bene­fi­cial in macro-­economic terms, and enlargement could offer ‘major oppor­tun­ities for a labour market where there are shortages in certain sectors – as in the Neth­er­lands’. The Dutch gov­ern­ment also ‘called for the mobility of labour to be strengthened and for any obs­tacles to be elim­in­ated’.59 France imme­diately made clear that she did not share the German viewpoint. Even Austrian President Thomas Klestil said Ger­many should not fear a wave of im­mig­rants from new Euro­pean Union member states. The German position was also criticised by the other acceding coun­tries, the Czech Repub­lic in par­ticu­lar. President Vaclav Havel expressed a common affront in claiming that German fears of an influx of cheap labour were unfounded: ‘This is a statement of a single member coun­try of the Euro­pean Union, and we are Table 6.3 Public assessment of free movement of workers What consequences for the development of Poland can the following regulation have? Definitely Favourable Unfavourable Definitely Difficult favourable (%) (%) unfavourable to say (%) (%) (%) 21 Acceptance, without any transition periods, of the rule for the free movement of workers, which is obligatory in the EU Source: OBOP, December 2000.

37

12

3

27

Freedom of movement of labour   141 waiting for the common position.’ The Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman declared, ‘I can ima­gine that there are some fears, even if unreason­able, from the side of Ger­many and Austria. At the same time, there are no fears from Ireland, Scan­din­avian coun­tries, Spain, Portugal, France and so on.’60 A breakthrough in the nego­ti­ation talks came in Janu­ary 2001, when, suc­ cumbing to pressure from Ger­many and Austria, the Euro­pean Commission adopted a draft proposal on the free movement of labour nego­ti­ations with Poland, offering Poles the right to unrestricted employment in EU coun­tries between 2007 and 2010. According to the Euro­pean Commission, the restric­ tions would not slow down the integration of Poland with the EU fol­low­ing its expected admission between 2004 and 2005. The EC also planned to implement several options to cushion the impact of the restrictions, such as allowing resi­ dence permits to Poles who have signed official contracts with their pro­spective employers, and setting up strict quotas for certain professional groups.61 In the same month, the EU and Poland had signed a Joint Assessment Paper on the employment situ­ation in Poland. This docu­ment had identified a number of meas­ures whereby employment pol­icy could be reinforced and it addressed structural prob­lems in the labour market.62 The paper committed Poland to a set of agreed employment and labour market ob­ject­ives and committed both par­ties to a regu­lar assessment of pro­gress until enlargement.63 Indeed, this docu­ment gave an impetus to the pace of the negotiations.

Acceleration of negotiations On 7 March 2001, during talks with Euro­pean Commission President Romano Prodi, Prime Minister Buzek lobbied for the EU’s labour market to be opened imme­diately after enlargement. Buzek realised that this was unlikely, but treated his request as an element of the nego­ti­ation tactics.64 Buzek discussed the pos­sib­il­ity of speeding up Euro­pean Union mem­ber­ship talks. Polish officials said Ger­many’s request for a seven-­year trans­ition period on the free movement of labour was un­neces­sary, as it was unlikely that large numbers of Poles would move to the EU imme­diately in search of jobs. As Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski, Poland’s min­is­ter respons­ible for EU integration, declared, We hear from Brussels, all the time, praise of the common market and we are trying to adopt Euro­pean norms in a multitude of areas, but on the other hand, they try to exclude us from the two most im­port­ant markets which are the labour and agricultural markets.65 In fact, Saryusz-­Wolski was using a modification of the dead-­weight catching strat­egy. According to this strat­egy, outsiders can move the nego­ti­ation game by catching the EU in the dead weight of its former actions, i.e. by reminding the EU that its present nego­ti­ation offer is less generous than the one it has given to other applicants or indeed more demanding than what is required of present member states.66 This strat­egy translates as follows: ‘You are not generous since

142   Freedom of movement of labour you are asking us to fulfil aspects of the acquis by imposing obli­ga­tions at the time of accession, but you exclude us from using rights that were granted during the previous enlargement wave.’ Nevertheless, this prob­lem was rather down­ played by Romano Prodi, who declared that ‘such a trans­ition period is very likely, but it is not a big prob­lem’.67 EU Commission proposal Simultaneously, in March 2001 the Euro­pean Commission presented to the member states a working paper on the free movement of labour. The paper sparked heated debates in Ger­many and Poland. A Commission study estim­ated that initial migration from the ten CEEC would be around 330,000 people – assuming free movement of labour in 2002. It reckoned that 850,000 people from CEEC were already in the 15 member states. Of those, 300,000 or 0.2 per cent of the EU labour force are per­man­ently employed – 80 per cent of them in Ger­many and Austria. Against this background of different views and ex­peri­ ences of the member states, the Commission threw open the debate to them, hoping to draft a common negotiating position. It put forth five options for debate. One was full and imme­diate applica­tion of EU laws and regulations, ruling out any trans­itional ar­range­ments for free movement of workers. A second was a sys­tem of safeguarding clauses related to region, sector and duration that would take into account disruptions in the labour market in certain coun­tries. Other options included a flex­ible sys­tem of trans­itional ar­range­ments, like those applied in Spain and Portugal, or estab­lishment of a fixed quota sys­tem in which member states would impose a limit on the number of workers from various can­ didate coun­tries. Finally, there was the option of a gen­eral suspension of the usual EU labour movement rights for a limited period. Whatever the result, the Commission insisted that if it proposed trans­itional meas­ures ‘in the inter­ests of the union’, these would have to be fully justified.68 Candidate members claimed trans­itional ar­range­ments would make a mockery of the EC Treaty in which free movement of labour is one of its four funda­ mental freedoms. As one of the Polish diplomats expressed: ‘We do not want to be treated as second class cit­izens by the EU.’ ‘We have enough prob­lems in dealing with growing anti-­EU sentiments at home.’69 This approach was a way to use a small do­mestic win-­set as a bargaining ad­vant­age. As Putnam said, this attitude is based on the as­sump­tion that ‘we understand your position, but this would not be accepted at our do­mestic level’. It forms part of a so-­called tying hands strat­egy.70 This was true, since free movement of workers was regarded as one of the funda­mental freedoms by not only the polit­ical elites or pub­lic opinion but also by inter­est groups, par­ticu­larly trade unions. On 11 April 2001, under strong pressure from Austria and Ger­many, the Euro­pean Commission proposed a plan. Commissioner Verheugen declared that the EU’s executive branch was suggesting a ‘gen­eral trans­ition period’ of five years from the date of accession for each enlargement coun­try. During that period, each of the member states would con­tinue to operate their own national

Freedom of movement of labour   143 meas­ures on foreign labour. However, after two years of the five-­year period, an automatic review based on a factual report from the Commission to the Council would be held. On the basis of a Commission proposal, the Council, acting by unanimity, and fol­low­ing consultation with the par­lia­ment, would decide whether to shorten or lift the trans­ition period. Member states would be able to con­tinue with national meas­ures for the remaining three years. Finally, once the five years were up, any member state would be able to maintain its national pro­ vi­sions for an extra two years ‘in the case of ser­ious distur­bances in its labour market’.71 Verheugen declared that he did not expect cheap labour to flood Western Europe once the doors to the East were open. Yet he had to con­sider the pos­sib­il­ity of social upheaval. As Verheugen admitted, this was an extremely sensitive issue for Euro­pean Union nations and for the applicant coun­tries.72 Kułakowski criticised Verheugen’s proposal by declaring: It is very clear we are not in agreement with the proposals of Commissioner Verheugen. It simply gives the Austrians and Germans what they want. Nat­ urally we don’t accept that position [. . .] Our position today is that no trans­ ition period is neces­sary in the area of free movement of people.73 The Spanish proposal Just a few days later, Spain threw a new stone into the already turbulent waters of the EU accession nego­ti­ation pool. Spain brought up one of the other tough subjects: regional funding, a subject in which it had a par­ticu­lar inter­est since it was a major beneficiary of current pol­icies.74 Obviously, Spain’s position was mainly driven by its do­mestic pol­itics and the fact that the Spanish gov­ern­ment was afraid of losing pub­lic sup­port because of a pos­sibly lower level of struc­ tural funds. In fact, Spain warned that it would block EU–Poland accession talks on opening up EU labour markets to new member states, including Poland, unless it received guarantees that it would con­tinue to receive the same amount of regional aid after enlargement. Spain’s position was to sup­port the demands of Ger­many and Austria, which wanted seven-­year bans on labour movement from Poland and other new members when they joined the EU. Spain wanted the Union to guarantee that Spain would not lose structural aid to the much poorer Central and Eastern Euro­pean coun­tries that would make up most of the first wave of new members. Nevertheless, the Spanish position was deemed unaccept­ able by the EU’s remaining 14 members.75 Even the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, commenting on the Spanish proposal, said, ‘We must not mix up things that should not be mixed up.’76 In fact, Spain had used two different strat­egies. First, it tried to make a package deal and improve its bargaining position by tying the prob­lem of struc­ tural funds in with the issue of free movement of workers. At the same time, the coun­try used a strat­egy of threat, by using the argument, ‘If you will not guaran­ tee that we will con­tinue to get the same amount of funding after the new enlargement, we will not agree on free the movement of labour.’77

144   Freedom of movement of labour Poland failed to convince Spain to remove its objections, which were block­ ing a Euro­pean Union de­cision on the free movement of workers from candidate coun­tries after they became members.78 Therefore, the already complicated and difficult nego­ti­ations became even more complex. Jan Kułakowski admitted that Poland was only now starting the most difficult stage of accession talks. As he declared, ‘Poland now enters the last phase of nego­ti­ations which will require polit­ical de­cisions and compromise from both par­ties.’79 The united front of the acceding countries against the EU proposals and its breakdown In comparison with other acceding coun­tries, Poland appeared to be setting out some of the toughest negotiating stances, though Polish officials maintained they were simply working to ensure a smooth trans­ition to full mem­ber­ship. As an adviser to Prime Minister Buzek, Leszek Jesień explained the Polish position: We want to prepare the coun­try [for accession] and get a good deal from the other side at the end of nego­ti­ations that will be suit­able for the position of this coun­try’ [. . .] [We] think it is difficult to compare the other coun­tries with Poland. Whether we are tougher or not it is difficult to judge. Our demands are formulated so as to be the most suit­able for this coun­try while being also accept­able to the EU.80 At the same time, an attempt was made to co­ordinate nego­ti­ation stances with the other acceding coun­tries. In late May 2001 the leading candidate coun­tries made a united front against EU proposals to restrict the circulation of workers from the new coun­tries upon accession. When meeting in Prague, the leaders of Hun­gary, the Czech Repub­lic, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland and Cyprus called on the EU to allow as much flex­ib­il­ity as pos­sible for the free movement of workers from the new coun­tries, hoping the EU would revise its stance since, as they argued, there was no risk of massive immigration after accession. The min­is­ters of foreign affairs of the six foremost accession coun­tries ana­lysed the state of play of the enlargement pro­cess ahead of the EU Goteborg Summit, where the 15 were set to unveil a strat­egy for enlargement.81 The acceding coun­tries appealed to the member states to agree a common position on the free movement of persons as soon as pos­sible, and to take a dif­ ferentiated and flex­ible approach to the issue of free movement of labour ‘which takes into account the eco­nomic, social and geographical real­it­ies both in the member states and in the candidate coun­tries, based on rel­ev­ant stat­ist­ical data and sci­ent­ific ana­lyses’. In addition, they politely ‘invited’ the member states to ‘avoid complicating the accession nego­ti­ations with candidate coun­tries by cre­ ating undue linkages between different negotiating issues and by putting forward short-­term polit­ical inter­ests’.82 Hun­gary strongly opposed these linkages and the Hun­gar­ian position was backed by the EU–Hun­gary Joint Consultative Committee.83 This was, to a certain extent, an attempt to use what is called in the

Freedom of movement of labour   145 liter­at­ure the co-­ordination within the enlargement-­wave: this strat­egy is linked to the fact that applicants within the same enlargement wave can increase their bargaining power by co-­ordinating their positions.84 Meanwhile, Spain’s gov­ern­ment backed down from a dispute with Ger­many over Madrid’s bid to link an agreement on Euro­pean Union enlargement to guar­ antees on future regional aid. A foreign ministry spokeswoman in Madrid on 29 May 2001 confirmed that Spain would now sup­port Ger­many’s proposal for a trans­itional seven-­year limit on the free movement of workers from new member states at a meeting of EU ambas­sadors in Brussels.85 This, on the one hand, broke the deadlock and created a good polit­ical climate for accelerating nego­ti­ations, but on the other, weakened the nego­ti­ation position of the acceding states and, in par­ticu­lar, its solid­arity. Poland’s battle for imme­ diate access to EU labour markets and for an 18-year trans­itional ban on land purchases by EU cit­izens was then dealt a blow by its fellow Central Euro­pean can­did­ates, Hun­gary in par­ticu­lar. This was because the Hun­gar­ian gov­ern­ment had taken a position closer to the EU’s and agreed to a seven-­year ban on the free movement of labour. The Hun­gar­ian gov­ern­ment was more willing to com­ promise, since the unemployment rate in Hun­gary had been much lower than in Poland and was declining whilst in Poland the tend­ency was exactly the oppos­ ite.86 Poland’s position was still rigid, and as the Chief Negotiator declared: ‘As a large coun­try with many prob­lems we cannot give concessions where others can.’ Kułakowski also called ‘unjustified’ the tight labour market restrictions that had been put forward by Austria and Ger­many.87 Jan Kułakowski’s position was backed up in some opinion polls, as seen in Table 6.2. The Polish resistance was criticised in an indirect manner by the EU Enlarge­ ment Commissioner, who said that Hun­gary, the Czech Repub­lic, Slovenia and Cyprus were expected to complete nego­ti­ations by the end of 2002. Poland, as he declared, is further behind, as the negotiators found it difficult to make con­ cessions before Septem­ber’s parlia­ment­ary elections.88 In fact, Verheugen used the so-­called battering ram strat­egy. Indeed, according to Lykke Friis and Anna Jarosz, the logic behind this strat­egy was linked to the ‘eco­nom­ies of scale’ argu­ ment. Therefore, in the case of accession nego­ti­ations, when the EU negotiates with a group of ten coun­tries, it has an inter­est in using one coun­try (or even more coun­tries) as a battering ram in order to persuade the other coun­tries into signing more or less the same nego­ti­ation deal. Otherwise, the enlargement nego­ti­ations could take a long time. In the course of nego­ti­ations, this strat­egy uses a ‘bluff-­tactic’. As Friis and Jarosz argued: The EU can play on the fact that all coun­tries are eager to join in the first round in order to avoid a situ­ation where their accession will require the re-­ opening of even more package deals. Telling one applicant that it is just about to sign with one of the other applicants can force the remaining appli­ cants into making some compromises they would not have made other­wise – unless obviously the applicants are able to call the EU’s bluff by co-­ ordinating their views in the end game.89

IN WHICH EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRY WOULD YOU LIKE TO WORK? (the most frequently mentioned countries) Germany 32% France

3% 3%

6%

10% 5%

14%

11%

Austria 1% Italy

Sweden

Netherlands

Denmark

Spain

Belgium

Ireland

Difficult to say

5% 3% 3% 2% 5% 0% 2% 6% 4% 1% 3% 2% 2% 0% 1% 5% 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 3% 8% 6%

48%

9%

9%

United Kingdom

43% 40%

17% 24%

11%

9% Poles (N � 379) Czechs (N � 223) Hungarians (N � 350) Lithuanians (N � 340)

Figure 6.2 In which EU country would you like to work? (source: CBOS, May 2001).

Freedom of movement of labour   147 At a meeting on 18 June 2001, Schroeder and Buzek politely clashed over the key reform issues standing in the way of Poland’s future acceptance into the Euro­pean Union and over free movement of workers and sales of land in par­ ticu­lar. German officials had expressed hopes that Poland would show more flex­ ib­il­ity on issues such as the EU’s demand of an up to seven-­year trans­ition period before new members’ cit­izens could work anywhere in the bloc. Poland had rejected this restriction and irritated many EU states by insisting on an up to 18-year trans­ition period fol­low­ing its acceptance into the bloc before foreigners could buy Polish prop­erty. Schroeder said of the seven-­year restriction on labour: ‘I can understand that you criticize this in prin­ciple. My Polish colleague did this repeatedly. But this (restriction) is among the necessities.’ As a response, Buzek said he ‘respected’ the German position and hoped they would reach a compro­ mise solution. ‘I think each of our opinions will gradually grow more sim­ilar and that is also a good sign for our joining the EU.’90 Poland, together with Estonia, was one of the remaining coun­tries strongly opposing the proposed trans­itional ar­range­ments.91 On 19 June 2001 the Latvian gov­ern­ment decided to accept an EU proposal limiting the free movement of its workers for seven years after it joined the Union,92 whilst on 27 June Slovakia closed the EU chapter and accepted a seven-­year trans­itional period.93 In Poland and the Czech Repub­lic, unlike in some other acceding coun­tries, there was strong pressure from pub­lic opinion not to accept the trans­itional period. An over­whelm­ing majority of cit­izens of the Czech Repub­lic, 69 per cent, and 73 per cent of inhabitants of Poland thought that it was not neces­sary to give in to the demands of the Euro­pean Union to introduce restrictions on the free movement of the workforce from new EU members. The oppos­ite opinion was held by 15 per cent of Czechs and 11 per cent of Poles. This was according to a July 2001 survey from the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CVVM). In Poland, a survey was also conducted by CBOS. According to 7 per cent of people asked from the Czech Repub­lic and 6 per cent of those asked from Table 6.4 What do you think about the European Commission’s proposition that the acceding countries should not be allowed for seven years to work in the current EU countries? The EU countries and the European Commission have proposed that Poles Czechs the citizens from the acceding countries to the EU (including Poland (%) (%) and Czech Republic) should not be allowed for seven years to take a job in the current EU countries. Do you think that such a transitional arrangement would be appropriate slightly longer than necessary much longer than necessary not necessary it is difficult to say Source: CBOS, July 2001.

 6  6 15 57 16

 7 17 18 45 13

148   Freedom of movement of labour Poland, a seven-­year postponement of free movement of persons was dispropor­ tionately lengthy. About 17 per cent of Czechs and 6 per cent of Poles con­ sidered it longer than necessary. Among those who argued that a trans­itional period is neces­sary, most respondents opted for a trans­itional period between one and ten years, as indi­ cated in Table 6.5. This question was asked only of those respondents who argued that the trans­ itional period was neces­sary. Furthermore, only 11 per cent of Poles and 15 per cent of Czechs argued that their gov­ern­ment should accept a seven-­year trans­ itional period. This survey shows that both in Poland and in the Czech Repub­lic, pub­lic opinion sup­ported the prin­ciple of free movement of labour. It was predicted that the Polish strat­egy of tough nego­ti­ations might change after the gen­eral elections in Septem­ber 2001. The German paper, Die Presse, rightly argued that if the new Polish gov­ern­ment were to accept the trans­ition period, the remaining coun­tries that were against it – Slovenia, Estonia and the Czech Repub­lic – could not stay behind. In Poland and in Czech Repub­lic, the gov­ern­ments could draw sup­port for standing out against the long trans­itional period from pub­lic opinion. One-­ half of the Polish popu­la­tion and one-­third of the Czech popu­la­tion wanted their Table 6.5 How long is a transitional period necessary? How long (in your opinion) is a transitional period necessary?

Poles (N = 637) Czechs (N = 609) (%) (%)

1–5 years 6–10 years 11–15 years 16–20 years 21 years and more It is difficult to say

20 36  9 14  5 16

19 37  3  5 22 14

Source: CBOS, July 2001.

Table 6.6 Public acceptance for a seven-year transition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles and Czechs Do you think that the Polish/Czech government should accept the Poles seven-year transitional period during which Poles/Czechs would not be (%) able to work in other EU countries after joining this organisation?

Czechs (%)

Definitely yes Probably yes Probably no Definitely no Difficult to say

 2 13 32 37 16

Source: CBOS, July 2001.

 3  8 26 47 16

Freedom of movement of labour   149 Cabinets not to accept such con­ditions. However, after the elections it was pre­ dicted that Warsaw might want to exchange their concession on this regulation with EU consent to further postponement of the right to purchase land in Poland or for higher agricultural sub­sidies. This indeed was more likely since five coun­ tries had accepted the EU con­ditions, namely Hun­gary, Slovakia, Latvia, Cyprus and Malta.94

The change of the government in Poland and the concluding of negotiations Political turmoil in Poland after the elections in Octo­ber 2001 brought certain modifications to the nego­ti­ation tactics. Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimosze­ wicz declared that Poland’s integration with the Euro­pean Union was regarded as a pri­or­ity of the foreign pol­icy of Miller’s gov­ern­ment. However, at the same time, he stated that such complicated issues as the free movement of labour, land trade and sub­sidies for agri­cul­ture were yet to be negotiated. Cimoszewicz declared: ‘We must be realistic about the future, and nat­urally, the most difficult issues in nego­ti­ations are normally dealt with at the latest phase, and in those difficult issues we will have to seek a compromise.’ He also ac­know­ledged that the gov­ern­ment of Miller needed several more days to familiarise itself with the state of EU nego­ti­ations. According to Cimoszewicz, the talks would start in Novem­ber 2001, which would give the new gov­ern­ment little time to prepare.95 Change of the Polish position On 14 Novem­ber 2001 the gov­ern­mental Euro­pean Integration Committee (KIE) adopted a new strat­egy in Poland’s accession nego­ti­ations with the Euro­pean Union, announcing that the coun­try would reduce, to 12 years, the trans­ition period for the purchase of land by EU cit­izens and would accept restrictions on the free movement of labour. This obviously changed the strong previous gov­ ern­ment stances on an 18-year ban on the purchase of land and no restrictions on labour immigration. Prime Minister Miller declared: ‘It is in the inter­est of the coun­try to resign from the trans­ition period for the purchase of land for invest­ ment purposes’, arguing that the coun­try needed investments and new jobs. In addition, Poland’s Foreign Minister said that despite a crit­ical attitude towards restrictions on the free movement of labour, Poland would accept them and would try to reduce the trans­ition period in that area through bi­lat­eral agreements with EU coun­tries.96 This new position was based on the stra­tegic goal of achieving mem­ber­ship in 2004. The softening of the nego­ti­ation stances and giving a green light for the trans­itional ar­range­ments was regarded as a side-­payment to be paid in order to speed up nego­ti­ations and secure the ratification of the agreement by the current members, Ger­many in par­ticu­lar. As Putnam argued, the value of inter­na­tional side-­payments should be calculated in terms of their mar­ginal con­tri­bu­tions to the pos­sib­il­ity of ratification rather than in terms of their overall value to the

150   Freedom of movement of labour recipient nation.97 Miller calculated that in order to secure accession and its rati­ fication by the EU‑15 coun­tries on their do­mestic level, he had to give up on the demand for the imme­diate free movement of labour. This was because the win-­ set in the EU coun­tries to allow lib­eralisation was small. However, the win-­set in Poland to accept the trans­itional period, espe­cially among the pub­lic opinion in Poland, was also marginal. Domestic critique of the new position The new strat­egy was severely criticised by the opposi­tion and in par­ticu­lar by some of the former members of the Negotiation Team, espe­cially with regard to acceptance of the proposed restrictions on the free movement of labour and soften­ ing the nego­ti­ation stance with regard to the purchase of real estate by foreigners. The opposi­tion criticised the gov­ern­ment for wanting to accelerate nego­ti­ations at any price. According to the opposi­tion, the gov­ern­ment should set aside the most difficult issues until the last round of nego­ti­ations. As the previous Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek argued, the softening of the nego­ti­ation stance on free movement of workers was a polit­ical mis­take, since Poland did not get anything in return.98 Nev­ ertheless, it should be emphasised that the critique was not as strong as in other cases like land and agri­cul­ture. This was because there was no inter­est group in Poland to organ­ise such a focused, reasoned opposi­tion. This, to a certain extent, explains why Miller was strong enough to resist the do­mestic critique. On 6 Decem­ber 2001 Leszek Miller went to Brussels for talks with Euro­pean Commission President Prodi. Miller was eager to close the two most con­tentious chapters: free movement of people and free movement of capital. The Polish gov­ern­ment also hoped to win enough promises from indi­vidual EU member states to be able to sell the negotiated deal to its increasingly scep­tical pub­lic. Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the Neth­er­lands had indicated they would not impose any restrictions on Polish workers after accession. Spain, France, the UK and Greece were also moving in that dir­ec­tion. Poland therefore lobbied for a pub­lic declaration from as many EU‑15 coun­tries as pos­sible that they would not impose any restrictions.99 On 21 Decem­ber 2001 Poland made a very im­port­ant step towards EU accession by completing talks on the free movement of labour and accepting the proposed up to seven-­year trans­ition period.100 Assessment of the negotiations by the public opinion Once the issue of free movement of labour was already agreed upon, it became a subject of extensive opinion surveys. Although pop­ular backing for Euro­pean integration rose from a mid-­year 53 per cent to 60 per cent in Novem­ber 2001, simul­tan­eously 44 per cent of respondents criticised the new gov­ern­ment for offering concessions to Brussels on issues such as free movement of labour and land sales to foreigners.101 In fact, 66 per cent of respondents regarded the seven-­ year trans­itional period as too long, only 5 per cent thought it was appropriate and a mere 2 per cent thought it was too short. This is indicated in Figure 6.3.

Freedom of movement of labour   151

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH A SEVEN YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD RESTRICTING THE UNDERTAKING OF WORK BY POLES IN OTHER EU COUNTRIES? Appropriate 5% Too short 2% Not needed at all 20%

Too long 66%

Hard to say 7%

Figure 6.3 Acceptance of a seven-year transition period restricting the undertaking of work by Poles in other EU countries (source: PBS, November 2001/OCEI).

Among respondents claiming that the seven-­year trans­itional period was too long, 19 per cent opted for one year, 31 per cent argued that it should be two years, 28 per cent sup­ported three years, 8 per cent four years and only 4 per cent five years. None of the respondents opted for a six-­year trans­itional period. Even though over 30 per cent of respondents declared readiness to undertake short-­term work, usually seasonal work in farming in the current EU member states, after Poland’s accession to the EU the majority of those were planning to TO WHAT TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE FREE UNDERTAKING OF WORK BY POLES IN THE EU COUNTRIES SHOULD POLISH MEDIATORS AGREE? 2 years 31%

3 years 28%

4 years 8% 1 year 19%

5 years 4% 6 years 0% Hard to say 10%

Figure 6.4 To what transition period in the free undertaking of work by Poles in the EU countries should Polish negotiators agree? (respondents claiming that the transitional period proposed is too long) (source: PBS, December 2001/OCEI).

152   Freedom of movement of labour seek employment for a longer period. For most of them, this was for longer than a year, but they were mostly not seeking permanent work. Only about 18 per cent declared their willingness to seek permanent employment. Among those respondents claiming that they wanted to undertake work in the EU coun­tries, about 38 per cent of Poles declared their willingness to work in Ger­many. This partly explains why many Germans were worried about an influx 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

I would decide to undertake permanent work For longer than one year, but not permanently For more than six months, up to 12 months For more than one month, up to six months For approximately four weeks

Figure 6.5 For how long a period would you decide to work in the given country? (respondents declaring that they would decide to seek employment in one of the current 15 EU Member States if it were possible from today to freely undertake work in those countries) (source: PBS, December 2001/OCEI). 0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Not decided yet Italy Great Britain Sweden Germany Luxembourg Ireland Netherlands Spain Greece France Finland Denmark Belgium Austria

Figure 6.6 In what country of the EU would you like to work? (respondents declaring that they would decide to seek work in one of the current 15 EU Member States if it were possible from today to freely undertake work in any of those countries) (source: PBS, December 2001/OCEI).

Freedom of movement of labour   153 of cheap labour from the CEEC. The second most pop­ular coun­try was Great Britain with only 12 per cent of respondents. In surveys made before signing the Accession Treaty, the gen­eral assessment of negotiated EU work con­ditions was pos­it­ive. In Febru­ary 2003 almost 50 per cent of respondents (the same proportion as in Febru­ary 2002) said EU accession would reduce unemployment in Poland. Provisions of the Accession Treaty The chapter on free movement of persons was pro­vi­sionally closed in March 2002. As a next step, the EU decided to assess the situ­ation on the labour market of both member states and the acceding coun­tries. A few months after this closure in Au­gust 2002, the EU conducted an extensive survey on unemploy­ ment in the EU and the candidate coun­tries.102 This showed a huge discrepancy in unemployment in member states and acceding coun­tries, ranging from 1 to 33 per cent. The same month, the EU conducted a survey on the employment situ­ ation in both EU and the acceding coun­tries. The report concluded that the employment rate was falling in some acceding coun­tries, including Poland.103 The Accession Treaty negotiated between the EU and the accession coun­tries provided that the current member states were entitled to impose national restric­ tions on the free movement of workers for two years after accession, renew­able by another three, and then potentially another two years, making a max­imum pos­sible seven-­year trans­ition period. For the first two-­year period fol­low­ing the date of accession of the new members, the access to the labour market would depend on national meas­ures, or those resulting from bi­lat­eral agreements, which would regulate access to their labour markets by Polish nationals. The present member states were allowed to con­tinue to apply such meas­ures until the end of the five-­year period fol­low­ing the date of the accession.104 At the end of the first two years of pos­sible national meas­ures, it was decided that the Commission would draft a report on the basis of which the Council would review how the trans­itional ar­range­ments were working. In addition, each of the 15 member states would have to make a formal notification to the Com­ mission about whether they intended to con­tinue with national meas­ures for up to three more years, or whether they would apply the Community regime of full free movement of workers.105 There was also the pos­sib­il­ity for the 15 member states to ask the Commission for authorisation to con­tinue to apply national meas­ures for a further two years, but only if they ex­peri­enced ser­ious distur­ bances in their labour market or the threat thereof. The trans­itional ar­range­ments were not to extend beyond a max­imum of seven years after accession. The current member states could not make access to their labour markets more restrictive than they were at the date of signature of the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003.106 A new member could take reciprocal national meas­ures against a member state, which had imposed restrictions against it. Finally, the Accession Treaty

154   Freedom of movement of labour Table 6.7 Maximum transitional periods for the acceding countries State

Poland Cyprus Czech Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Slovakia Slovenia Rep.

Max. 7 period

No restr.

7

7

7

7

7

No 7 restr.

7

protected the rights of the members of a worker’s family by granting them the right to reside legally with the worker.107 Poland was among seven other candi­ date coun­tries upon which the trans­itional periods were imposed. The only coun­ tries that were not subject to any restriction were Cyprus and Malta.108 The states that opened their labour markets were mostly Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden. The most restrictive approach was taken by Ger­many and Austria, which will prob­ably keep their borders closed for a max­imum period of seven years.109

Conclusions In concluding this chapter, it is worth comparing the issue of free movement of workers with the issue of land sales. First, purchase of land by foreigners was seized by some polit­ical forces and inter­est groups in Poland and ex­ploited in order to pursue polit­ical ad­vant­ages. The prob­lem of the free movement of workers, although it attracted pub­lic attention, was actu­ally only focused on to a limited extent by trade unions and polit­ical par­ties. Even though the polit­ical par­ties were sup­ porting lib­eralisation, this issue was overshadowed by the polit­ical debate on agri­cul­ture and land sales. Nevertheless, it was used by polit­ical par­ties and trade unions in many EU‑15 member states. Unlike the issue of the sale of land, the case of the free movement of workers was subject to a broader inter­na­tional debate. From the beginning of accession nego­ti­ations, in many EU member coun­tries, Ger­many in par­ticu­lar, trade unions and the gen­eral pub­lic exerted strong pressure on national gov­ern­ments to introduce trans­itional meas­ures in this area. This obviously implied a small win-­set in these coun­tries to accept the free move­ ment regime. Conversely, there was a rel­at­ively small win-­set among the pub­lic opinion in the acceding coun­tries, Poland in par­ticu­lar, to accept the trans­itional ar­range­ments as proposed by the EU. When examining Polish do­mestic pol­itics, we should emphasise a change in the dy­namics of nego­ti­ation between the two different gov­ern­ments. Buzek’s strat­egy can be characterised as tying hands by using a small do­mestic win-­set as a bargaining ad­vant­age according to the rule: ‘We under­ stand Ger­many’s fears of the influx of cheap labour, but the trans­itional ar­range­ments will not be accepted by Polish pub­lic opinion in the referendum on accession.’

Freedom of movement of labour   155 Poland and the other acceding states were too weak to oppose the power­ful Euro­pean lobby driven by the Germans. The Polish position was much weaker because of the asymmetry between the negotiating sides, and the lack of a cred­ ible best al­tern­ative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) for Poland. This obvi­ ously made the threat and tying hands strat­egies par­ticu­larly difficult to use by the Polish side.110 Miller as­sumed that he would be forced to accept the EU con­ ditions. Therefore, he decided to speed up the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and catch up with the other acceding coun­tries in terms of the number of chapters pro­vi­ sionally closed. The beha­vi­our of Miller’s gov­ern­ment was in a sense rational, since pub­lic opinion, driven by the Polish media, expected the gov­ern­ment to speed up the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. Hence, the concessions towards the EU were regarded as side-­payments paid to ensure the ratification of the negotiated agreement.111 The EU also exercised a battering ram strat­egy when it used Hun­gary and the Czech Repub­lic as a battering ram in order to persuade Poland to accept the EU con­ditions. According to some negotiators and officials involved in the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess, this technique worked on the Polish media.112 In return, the acced­ ing coun­tries used co-­ordination within the enlargement wave in order to under­mine the battering ram strategy. The free movement of labour was the best example of where co­ali­tion within the enlargement wave could occur, because all of the accession coun­tries (unlike in the case of purchase of real estate) had an inter­est in demanding the free movement regime. This last strat­egy was unsuccessful, since the EU managed to break down the solid­arity within the acceding coun­tries.113 Both negotiating sides used a number of different nego­ti­ation strat­egies, which have been de­scribed by Putnam and Friis. In par­ticu­lar, they used tying hands, side-­payment, linkages and package deals, espe­cially when linkage between land sales with free movement of labour was made. According to Buzek, even though these issues were initially linked, later in the nego­ti­ations the Polish side wanted to separate them.114 There was, at some point, a saying coined by the Polish negotiators that ‘one should not sell land for labour’.115 Nevertheless, at a later stage, the EU had used this strat­egy, by saying that if Poland would not insist on free movement of persons, then they would not insist on lib­eralisation of land purchases. The acceding coun­tries, Poland in par­ticu­lar, also used a dead-­weight catching strat­egy when they argued that the Union wanted to impose full obli­ga­tions without granting them full rights. To sum up, due to strong do­mestic pressure in some EU coun­tries there was a small do­mestic win-­set to accept the free movement of workers without any trans­itional periods. In Poland, there was rather a small do­mestic win-­set to accept trans­itional periods. Therefore, Polish and EU do­mestic win-­sets were small and initially did not overlap. As Putnam argued: ‘The smaller the win-­sets, the greater the risk that nego­ti­ations would break down.’116 Unlike in the EU coun­tries, in Poland the issue of free movement of labour was overshadowed by the nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture and land sales. These two issues were more emphasised and more often used by polit­ical par­ties

156   Freedom of movement of labour and inter­est groups in Poland. Thus, the case study of free movement of labour provides empirical evid­ence that inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations can be influenced by do­mestic groups, provided that there is a united front among them. Taking into con­sidera­tion the fact that there was no strong united do­mestic front on this issue, and given the asymmetry between the negotiating sides, Poland agreed to accept the EU conditions. Table 6.8 Free movement of labour – size of the domestic win-set Size of win-set Case study Poland

EU

Result

Free Small within public opinion, but movement no strong interest groups to of labour support liberalisation. Political parties focused rather on agriculture and the purchase of real estate by foreigners.

Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties in many powerful EU countries.

The EU had a strong bargaining advantage and thus Poland was prone to agree on transitional periods.

7 Concluding remarks

The key question of this book concerns the impact of the size of the do­mestic win-­set (within pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties) in Poland on the accession nego­ti­ations. This book provides empirical evid­ence for Putnam’s claim that the size of the win-­set depends on such factors as do­mestic pref­er­ ences and co­ali­tions, do­mestic institutions and ratification pro­ced­ures and finally strat­egies as used by the Level I negotiator. By this, we can show the impact of do­mestic pressure on Poland’s nego­ti­ation positions towards EU accession. This book centred on nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture (mainly the level and con­ditions of direct payments and production quotas), land ownership and the free movement of labour. Domestic groups brought these issues to the pub­lic agenda (through the mass media), because these prob­lems sparked emotions and pub­lic inter­est. A careful look at the nego­ti­ations enabled us to understand why these and not other aspects of nego­ti­ations, which were perhaps even more rel­ ev­ant, captured pub­lic and mass-­media attention, and to what extent pub­lic opinion and do­mestic groups have influenced the nego­ti­ation process. These concluding remarks will draw up some ‘lessons’ from the three case studies. We can see this first, by answering why these issues were im­port­ant for the do­mestic pressure in different eco­nomic, polit­ical or social dimensions. Second, the overall polit­ical dy­namics of nego­ti­ations will be briefly examined. This will allow us to make a linkage between Putnam’s two-­level games and nego­ti­ation strat­egies, and empirical observations. This can be done by answering to what extent the empirical ana­lysis cor­res­ponds with the concept of the two-­level game. This will lead us to a conclusion concerning the key question of this book: the impact of the size of the Polish do­mestic win-­set on the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess and outcomes. Finally, it should be emphasised that this is only a coun­try study that opens up a pos­sib­il­ity for further research with regard to other accession coun­tries or other comparative studies.

Why the three case studies were important for the domestic context There were a number of nego­ti­ation chapters which do relate to the well-­being of the great majority of the pub­lic, but which did not catch pub­lic or media

158   Concluding remarks attention. These were, for example, Consumer and Health Protection, Energy, Company Law or Competi­tion Policy. These topics, even though signi­fic­ant for the state and the well-­being of cit­izens, will never become subject to a lively pub­lic debate. The three case studies versus other negotiating issues The three case studies brought pub­lic attention because, as many senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess admitted, pub­lic opinion does not understand the complexities of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations.1 Hence, rather than paying attention to issues signi­fic­ant for the eco­nomy and coun­try de­velopment, pub­lic opinion focuses on simple mat­ters. The gen­eral pub­lic may even be aware of its lack of know­ledge in certain areas.2 This ignorance becomes obvious when we go into specific questions. Often such questions, for example those concerning industrial pol­icy, are not even raised in opinion polls. Instead, questions are formulated broadly and usually reflect simple and symbolic issues such as direct payments within CAP or selling land to foreigners. In the best case, the polls enquire whether EU mem­ber­ship will have a pos­it­ive impact on the Polish eco­ nomy or on the functioning of com­panies and farms.3 The mass media can act as a trigger of pub­lic attention. This is because they show an inter­est in controversial issues that easily attract the human imagination. Nevertheless, most journ­al­ists are not aware of the details and complexities of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess. Instead of explaining the complex nature of the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess, they often rely on simplified statements made by politicians; these are more newsworthy. Simplifications based on emotional perceptions have become the language of media. Another reason why often less rel­ev­ant issues are brought to the pub­lic agenda is the manipulation of some inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties. Politicians, in par­ticu­lar, follow pub­lic opinion surveys and prim­arily raise those issues that can attract their potential electorate. They understand that by urging certain nego­ti­ation tactics, such as demanding more sub­sidies within the CAP and not allowing the sale of land to foreigners, they can attract pub­lic sup­port. Even though it is often Euro-­sceptics who bring these issues to pub­lic attention, they can then become subject to a pub­lic debate within a wide range of opinions. Only certain aspects of nego­ti­ations, not neces­sar­ily the most rel­ev­ant, are brought to the pub­lic agenda. The three dimensions of accession negotiations The chosen cases are also im­port­ant since they illus­trate the three dimensions of the accession nego­ti­ations. First, the case study concerning agri­cul­ture indicates mainly the eco­nomic significance of the accession nego­ti­ations. Indeed, such nego­ti­ation prob­lems as the level of direct payments or production quotas have not only eco­nomic im­plica­tions for farmers, but also for the Polish budget and hence for the whole popu­la­tion. Next, the case of purchase of real estate by

Concluding remarks   159 foreigners indicates an ideo­logical dimension of the accession nego­ti­ations, based on symbolic pol­itics. It shows that an issue eco­nomic­ally less signi­fic­ant can become crucial in the do­mestic con­text. Finally, the free movement of labour became a vital social prob­lem and, as indicated in a number of opinion polls, gained par­ticu­lar attention from the pub­lic. This does not mean that each of the case studies has only one dimension; how­ever, they usually have one predominant feature. From these three different case studies, we can draw the conclusion that polit­ ical par­ties, and some inter­est groups, by using different rhet­oric – eco­nomic, ideo­logical and social – managed to raise inter­est from the pub­lic. However, at the same time, by manipulating pub­lic opinion, they became hostages to the gen­ eral pub­lic and this meant that certain polit­ical ges­tures had to be made to please the pub­lic. As a result, using Schimmelfennig’s terminology, they become ‘rhet­ orically entrapped’ and as a result became hostages of their own polit­ical rhet­ oric. Espe­cially in the case of nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture and freedom to purchase real estate, the manipulation from the side of polit­ical par­ties and inter­est groups caused a growing EU scep­ti­cism and hence the shrinking of the do­mestic win-­set. When analysing the three case studies we could also observe the interplay among different do­mestic actors on the do­mestic level, which influenced the inter­na­tional level. In order to understand this interplay, one should focus on the polit­ical dy­namics of inter­na­tional negotiations.

Dynamics of the accession negotiations in Polish domestic politics The focus of this book was put on the polit­ical pro­cess of nego­ti­ations. The dy­namics of the polit­ical nego­ti­ations was, how­ever, different within the two gov­ern­ments and depended on solving certain nego­ti­ation dilemmas: should the nego­ti­ations be soft or tough, conducted quickly or more cau­tiously, and should issues be negotiated separately or connected in a package deal? Buzek’s gov­ern­ment was more prone to the influence of pub­lic opinion.4 This gov­ern­ment was cau­tious in moving the polit­ically sensitive issues ahead when it realised that the softening of the nego­ti­ation stance might not be accepted by the majority of the pub­lic. The closer it was to the elections, the more cau­tious the gov­ern­ment was. A few months before the election, the AWS gov­ern­ment was afraid that it would not be able to finish nego­ti­ations before the end of term of par­lia­ment. The gov­ern­ment was at that time polit­ically weak, since after the Freedom Union left the co­ali­tion in the year 2000, it was a minor­ity gov­ern­ment. Finally, it could not count on the sup­port from the main opposi­tion party, SLD, which was using every oppor­tun­ity on the do­mestic and inter­na­tional levels to attack the right-­wing gov­ern­ment. In addition, the level of sup­port for the gov­ ern­ment dropped to a few per cent.5 Finally, the AWS gov­ern­ment was polit­ ically divided and there were different approaches within it towards nego­ti­ations. Whilst the Chief Negotiator, Kułakowski, was more prone to compromises and

160   Concluding remarks indeed accepted in Brussels, Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski, the min­is­ter respons­ible for EU integration, was more confrontational and dominant.6 However, a more cau­ tious approach was under­stand­able in the initial stage of the nego­ti­ations.7 The new SLD–PSL gov­ern­ment was in a different position from its predecessor because when the de­cision to accelerate the nego­ti­ation pro­cess was made, it had a strong pub­lic mandate. The SLD itself received 35 per cent of votes in the autumn 2001 elections. During the first few weeks of the gov­ern­ment, its sup­port was peaking at 40 per cent. It was much easier to make polit­ical de­cisions with a strong pub­lic mandate and on the as­sump­tion that the next elections would take place in four years time. Decision-­makers in the SLD–PSL gov­ern­ment were initially psychologically in a much better position as compared with the decision-­ makers from the unpop­ular late AWS gov­ern­ment.8 Finally, the major ambition of the SLD gov­ern­ment was to finish nego­ti­ations by the end of 2002 and make them a sound polit­ical success. Thus, in such circumstances acceleration was much easier and cor­res­ponded with a basic Polish foreign pol­icy goal, which was to enter the EU during the term of the SLD gov­ ern­ment. The acceleration of the nego­ti­ation pro­cess was also rational, bearing in mind that there was very strong do­mestic pressure to complete nego­ti­ations in the year 2002.

Size of the win-­sets and its determinants The key theor­et­ical assignment of this book is to examine whether Putnam’s as­sump­tion concerning determinants of a win-­set size can be applic­able to the case of Poland. There are basically three determinants of the sizes of the do­mestic wins-­sets: do­mestic pref­er­ences and co­ali­tions, institutions and ratification pro­ced­ures, and strat­egies of the negotiators. Level II preferences and coalitions The first determinant includes Level II pref­er­ences and co­ali­tions. As Putnam argued: ‘The size of the win-­set depends on the distribution of power, pref­er­ ences and pos­sible co­ali­tions among Level II.’9 Thus, the rel­at­ively large win-­ sets within the do­mestic con­text in Poland were determined by the mainly pro-­EU orientation of the polit­ical and media elites, by some inter­est groups and by the gen­eral pub­lic. What is more, it was accompanied by the as­sumed large costs of non-­agreement and the lack of a cred­ible BATNA. The composition of the do­mestic constituency (and character of the win-­set) also varies with the politicisation of negotiated issues. Thus, ‘politicisation often activates groups who are less worried about the cost of non-­agreement, thus re­du­cing the effect­ ive win-­set’.10 The case studies of this book confirm this phenomenon. When examining the first case study on agri­cul­ture, the ori­ginal small do­mestic win-­set to accept the EU con­ditions, e.g. the lack of direct payments or even the level of 25 per cent of direct payments or small production quotas, was mar­ginal. There was a strong co­ali­tion on the Polish do­mestic level influ­en­cing

Concluding remarks   161 polit­ical par­ties, inter­est groups and pub­lic opinion. Polish do­mestic actors did not want to accept the ori­ginal EU proposal and demanded full sub­sidies. Even though Polish negotiators realised that Poland would not manage to achieve full payments, they treated it as part of the nego­ti­ation tactics. Obviously, the Polish side used the small do­mestic win-­set as a bargaining ad­vant­age. On the EU side, there was a co­ali­tion of some EU coun­tries to limit spending on the new member states. The EU and the Commission in par­ticu­lar realised that the only way to increase the Polish do­mestic win-­set was to increase direct payments. The easiest solution that avoided granting extra money was to move money from structural funds to financing direct payments. By agreeing to this solution, the EU managed to increase the Polish do­mestic win-­set. The Polish side also managed to increase its own win-­set by using certain strat­egies, for example side-­payments.11 The second case study, the purchase of real estate by foreigners, shows the influence of a do­mestic co­ali­tion composed of polit­ical par­ties and farmers’ unions. By politicising the issue of land sales and by playing on pub­lic emotions and symbolic pol­itics, this co­ali­tion managed to reduce the win-­set within pub­lic opinion. This is a perfect example of how politicisation and manipulation from the side of do­mestic groups can influence the size of the win-­set. On the EU side, there was no strong co­ali­tion of do­mestic groups, since this issue was vital neither in pub­lic opinion nor among the other do­mestic groups. Thus, the EU win-­set to accept the trans­itional period was rel­at­ively large. A slightly different situ­ation occurred with regard to the free movement of labour. Even though pub­lic opinion sup­ported free movement and opposed a trans­itional period, there was no strong co­ali­tion within the Polish polit­ical par­ ties or trade unions to sup­port this issue because do­mestic groups did not have a direct inter­est in demanding lib­eralisation. This issue was, to an extent, overshadowed by the nego­ti­ations on agri­cul­ture or the sale of land. However, the Polish win-­set to accept a trans­itional period for free movement of labour was larger than the Polish do­mestic win-­set to introduce freedom to purchase real estate. Even though this issue was im­port­ant to the gen­eral pub­lic, it was used only to a limited extent by do­mestic groups. Polish trade unions, employers’ organ­ isa­tions and polit­ical par­ties, even though officially sup­porting the free movement of workers, did not have a direct inter­est in demanding lib­eralisation.12 At the same time, they met strong opposi­tion from the side of some EU coun­tries to accept the free movement of workers. Consequently, we can confirm the hypo­thesis that, indeed, the size of the win-­set depends on a co­ali­tion of do­mestic groups. In other words, a certain nego­ti­ation stance is sup­ported not merely by pub­lic opinion, but strong inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties stand behind it. On the EU side, how­ever, the situ­ation was entirely different. The issue was politicised mainly in Ger­many and Austria, where there was a strong co­ali­tion of polit­ical par­ties and trade unions opposing the free movement regime. Thus, the EU win-­set to accept free movement of workers was rather small.

162   Concluding remarks Domestic institutions and ratification procedures The second factor Robert Putnam emphasised is that the size of the win-­set depends on do­mestic institutions and ratification pro­ced­ures.13 Ratification can take the form of a formal voting pro­ced­ure, e.g. within the Council of Ministers when accepting Polish nego­ti­ation stances or during the referendum on accession. In addition to the formal ratification, there is an informal ratification within the different do­mestic groups. In practice, nego­ti­ation pro­ced­ures required several levels of ratification on both sides, and it was not always pos­sible to meas­ure a fixed win-­set.14 This occurs mainly because, at each level of ratification, the win-­set may be slightly different, and each game board has several different players representing different inter­ests. In the case of nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture, on the Polish side there were, prim­arily, the senior co­ali­ tion partner SLD and the junior partner PSL representing farmers, opposi­tion par­ties and the farmers’ trade union Kółka Rolnicze. Since at each game board the size of the win-­set might be different, the overall win-­set is a result of the bargaining that goes on within the do­mestic pressure groups. Therefore, ratification required consensus within the co­ali­tion to accept the level of direct payments and production quotas. Further, ratification also required acceptance of the nego­ti­ation agreement by the farmers’ unions. The Polish Peasants’ Party realised that opposing the farmers could bring disastrous results for the party. With regard to the sale of land, the politicisation of this issue drew pub­lic attention. Consequently, the gov­ern­ment was afraid that Poland’s failure to negotiate satis­ fact­ory con­ditions in agri­cul­ture and in the purchase of real estate could cause it to lose the referendum on Poland’s mem­ber­ship in the EU. With regard to the free movement of labour, the Polish gov­ern­ment realised that, because of a small EU do­mestic win-­set and the EU’s bargaining ad­vant­age, Poland had to accept trans­itional periods. It counted on pub­lic dissatis­fac­tion with the results being limited, since some coun­tries, such as the UK and Ireland, would open their labour markets and, as a result, the agreement would be ratified by do­mestic pressure. The final factor emphasised by Putnam was the strat­egy as used by the negotiators.

Theorising Polish negotiation strategy Scientific ana­lysis of nego­ti­ations requires us to name certain types of strat­egies and tactics in order to put the empirical ana­lysis of negotiators into a theor­et­ical framework. This does not mean that negotiators, when using certain strat­egies, thought of Putnam’s win-­set or battering ram strat­egy. They did it because they were driven by ‘in­tu­ition’ or it was ‘the nat­ural thing to do’. When theorising Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy, we should examine both the overall strat­egy and short-­term strat­egies or nego­ti­ation tactics. When examining the overall strat­egy, one should emphasise that the Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy was determined by the lack of cred­ible BATNA, since the key Polish foreign

Concluding remarks   163 pol­icy goal was to enter the EU. No other al­tern­atives were ser­iously con­sidered. This meant that asymmetry between the nego­ti­ation sides determined further short-­term strat­egies and tactics. There were also some short-­term nego­ti­ation strat­egies and tactics used extensively by the Polish sides, such as tying hands, threats, side-­payments and package deals. Others such as dead-­weight catching or co­ordination within the enlargement wave, were occasionally used.15 It should be emphasised that nego­ti­ation strat­egy and tactics can be used to manipulate the size of a win-­set, and as a result they will negotiate better con­ditions or ensure protection of its own/group inter­ests. Strategies and tactics are used by both do­mestic negotiators to influence their opposi­tion and by the do­mestic constituents to influence the do­mestic negotiators. What should be highlighted is that there was a strong interplay between Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy and the size of the do­mestic win-­set. In examining this prob­lem, certain aspects ought to be elucidated. As Putnam argued, the size of the win-­set depends on the strat­egies of the do­mestic negotiators. Putnam sheds light on an inter­esting tactical dilemma that the do­mestic negotiator faces. Even though the negotiator has an inter­est in maximising the other side’s win-­ set, with regard to his own do­mestic win-­set, his motives are mixed. ‘The larger the win-­set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but, the weaker his bargaining position re­gard­ing the other negotiator.’16 Thus, the Polish do­mestic negotiator could conclude an agreement more easily with a large win-­set; how­ ever, this would come at the price of weakening his bargaining position. This shows that paradoxically, Euro-­scepticism was used by the gov­ern­ment to strengthen Poland’s bargaining position. Indeed, this tactic was used extensively and, as was later admitted by a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess, the strong do­mestic pressure (polit­ical par­ties, inter­est groups and those expressed in the opinion polls) helped the Polish side to negotiate concessions in Copen­hagen in Decem­ber 2002, predominantly in agri­cul­ture (mostly direct payments and production quotas).17 The gov­ern­ment was aware of the strong pressure coming from the pub­lic and some do­mestic groups to negotiate better con­ditions, and this goal was even straight­forwardly expressed by Polish Prime Minister Miller while negotiating with his Danish counterpart, Rasmussen. Leszek Miller ac­know­ledged that he felt pub­lic opinion breathing down his neck and that if Poland was not recog­nised as negotiating toughly, it was pos­sible that the Accession Treaty would not be ratified in the referendum. This obviously re­sembles the tying hands strat­egy based on Putnam’s argument, that a small do­mestic win-­set can be used as a bargaining ad­vant­age.18 According to this strat­egy, the negotiator may use the trick, ‘I would like to accept your proposal, but this would not be accepted by the pub­lic.’ Miller was pressed by his co­ali­ tion partner PSL, which threatened to leave the co­ali­tion unless the gov­ern­ment would protect better mem­ber­ship con­ditions, in par­ticu­lar the increase in the level of production quotas for milk. However, in the case when the size of the do­mestic win-­set is small, compromise is pos­sible for the price of side-­payments. Thus, side-­payments need to be paid in order to enlarge its win-­set, as was evid­ent in the case of Poland

164   Concluding remarks negotiating direct payments and production quotas in Copen­hagen. The EU, by moving the money from structural funds to direct payment, could enlarge the Level II win-­set in Poland with a little extra cost. The case of Poland justifies the hypo­thesis that if the Level I negotiators are determined to achieve a compromise, it is pos­sible for the win-­sets to overlap, but this requires side-­payments to be paid. This small do­mestic win-­set also helped to achieve rel­at­ively good terms when negotiating freedom to purchase real estate by foreigners.19 One may, how­ever, ask why in those two case studies the do­mestic win-­set was small. Consequently, the Polish gov­ern­ment was put under strong pressure from farmers’ unions, the opposi­tion and even by the junior co­ali­tion partner, PSL. Therefore, the gov­ern­ment was more determined to conduct tougher nego­ ti­ations since it felt the pressure from all do­mestic quarters. PSL and some opposi­tion par­ties also had polit­ical inter­est in demanding a long trans­itional period for lib­eralisation in land sales.20 They were mainly afraid of losing the farmers’ electorate. Furthermore, some members of the co­ali­tion and opposi­tion par­ties had even personal inter­est in demanding higher direct payments and production quotas.21 The case of free movement of labour is different, even though this issue was im­port­ant for the gen­eral pub­lic. It was used only to a limited extent by do­mestic groups. Polish trade unions, employers’ organ­isa­tions and polit­ical par­ties, even though officially sup­porting the free movement of workers, did not have a direct inter­est in demanding lib­eralisation.22 At the same time, they met a strong opposi­tion from the side of some EU coun­tries to accept free movement of workers. Thus, to meas­ure win-­set within the do­mestic pressure, we should take into account pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical elites. If we as­sume that the do­mestic negotiator wishes to expand his win-­set at the price of weakening his bargaining position, as would be the case if he is afraid of the risk of no-­ agreement, then it is also apparent that he has to be prepared for side-­payments to attract sup­porters (for example farmers’ unions) on the do­mestic level (Level II). As Putnam expressed, ‘What counts at Level II is not total costs and bene­fits, but their incidence, rel­at­ive to existing co­ali­tions.’23 Indeed, Poland’s gov­ern­ ment, being afraid that the agreement would be rejected in the referendum, was inter­ested in expanding its win-­set (espe­cially after the closing of nego­ti­ations in Copen­hagen and before the accession referendum), but at the same time, it had to pay side-­payments, for example, a promise to ‘top up’ direct payments to farmers or, with regard to freedom to purchase land by foreigners, demand a long trans­itional period and introduce a land bill that would protect the polit­ical inter­ests of PSL. In his model, Putnam emphasises bargaining power and tactics as the core elements of inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations. Therefore, certain tricks and smart tactics are used. For instance, a utility-­maximising statesman (do­mestic negotiator) aims to convince his counterpart that the proposed deal is certain to be ratified, but that a deal slightly more favour­able to the op­pon­ent is unlikely to be ratified. This tactic was used extensively by the Polish side during nego­ti­ations on

Concluding remarks   165 agri­cul­ture and the purchase of land by foreigners. Another pos­sible tactic is for a negotiator to submit a trial agreement for ratification or consultation in order to dem­on­strate that the offered con­ditions are not in his win-­set.24 These tactics were also used to a certain extent by the Polish gov­ern­ment when they presented the EU proposals with regard to the level of direct payments to farmers’ unions and these organ­isa­tions strongly rejected the offer. These organ­isa­tions threatened the gov­ern­ment that if the Union did not increase sub­sidies, they would encourage the pub­lic to vote ‘No’ on the referendum. Another obvious bargaining tactic is used when statesmen (negotiators) claim that their side has made more concessions in comparison to the op­pon­ent. Hence, negotiators emphasise their concessions in order to induce the other side to make their own concessions.25 This negotiating tactic is, how­ever, risky. The negotiator must be cau­tious not to magnify his own concessions, since then do­mestic par­ties, and the media in par­ticu­lar, may turn against him or even attack him for being soft in protecting the national inter­est.26 Thus, the negotiator is often playing a double game. On the one hand, he shows concessions to the op­pon­ent, but on the other, he sells the image of a tough negotiator to the pub­lic. Undeniably, the Polish side often emphasised concessions, in par­ticu­lar on the costs of integration and on pos­sible bene­fits for the Euro­pean Union. At the same time, how­ever, it declared to its own pub­lic its determination to enter the EU on sound terms. Such a situ­ation was used in nego­ti­ations concerning lib­eralisation in agri­ cul­ture and the free movement of labour.27 If we look at do­mestic versus inter­na­tional levels of ana­lysis, as Robert Putnam shows, decision-­makers usually give primacy to the do­mestic calculus. This definitely finds its confirmation when we ana­lyse the beha­vi­our of the Polish gov­ern­ment, which, acting under pressure coming from the pub­lic, was determined to show its tough stance during nego­ti­ations. This was done even at the price of irritating its nego­ti­ation partners by demanding much more than was offered on the table. To sum up, the Polish gov­ern­ment was using its small win-­set and the growing Euro-­scepticism to gain bargaining ad­vant­age. At the same time, the gov­ern­ment was afraid of the polit­ical cost of no-­agreement, and was willing to increase its own win-­set and win sup­port from pub­lic opinion and even the opposi­tion par­ties to win the referendum, even at the price of side-­payments. The three case studies indicate that the size of the do­mestic win-­set can indeed influence the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and outcomes. As Putnam argued: ‘The size of the win-­set depends on the strat­egies of the do­mestic negotiators.’

Theorising the negotiation strategy of the EU Even though the focus of this book emphasised Polish nego­ti­ation strat­egy, in order to understand this strat­egy more fully one should briefly examine the nego­ ti­ation strat­egy of the EU. There was no balance between the two negotiating sides. The EU made a tactical de­cision to slow down the nego­ti­ation pro­cess to allow all the others to catch up; in fact, there was no room for a Polish strat­egy.

166   Concluding remarks According to Polish senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, this de­cision was taken by the EU in order to get a bargaining ad­vant­age by using the battering ram strat­egy, pressing the Polish gov­ern­ment and showing that the other accessing coun­tries are doing much better.28 Thus, nego­ti­ations were one-­ sided by their nature.29 The EU, conversely, in order to maximise its own win-­ sets and weaken Poland’s bargaining position, had an inter­est in increasing the level of euro-­enthusiasm in Poland.30 The Union funded organ­isa­tions and par­ ticu­lar programmes promoting the idea of integration. As Putnam argued: Each Level I negotiator has a strong inter­est in the pop­ularity of his oppos­ite number, since part A’s pop­ularity increases the size of his win-­set, and thus increases both the odds of success and the rel­at­ive bargaining leverage of party B.31 The issue of freedom to purchase real estate was easier to negotiate, since the concessions towards the Polish side did not require trans­fers from the EU budget. The Euro­pean Union instead, espe­cially in a latter stage of nego­ti­ations, tied this issue with free movement of labour into a package deal. In the case of free movement of labour, there was rather a small do­mestic win-­set in some EU coun­tries to accept lib­eralisation. Nevertheless, according to Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski, tying these two issues into a package deal was a mis­taken strat­egy of ‘two fears to be swapped’.32 Thus, the fear of cheap workers from the acceding coun­tries flooding EU coun­tries was swapped with a fear of Polish land being sold to foreigners. The case study of free movement of labour also shows how do­mestic inter­est of the member states in the EU coun­tries influenced the final EU negotiating position. It shows that power­ful inter­est groups such as trade unions and polit­ical par­ties in some EU coun­tries (mainly Ger­many and Austria) managed to influence the Euro­pean negotiators. The EU had used several different strat­egies and nego­ti­ation tactics. Indeed, bargaining tactics are the core element of inter­na­ tional negotiations. According to a senior-­level EU official involved in the nego­ti­ations, the EU strat­egy was based on the as­sump­tion that Poland does not have a real BATNA to the accession. Thus, the EU was aware of its bargaining ad­vant­age in comparison to Poland and other CEEC.33 The often-­used strat­egy was a set aside method, which was accompanied by a certain sequence of nego­ti­ation chapters. The most difficult issues were not set aside until the last minute of nego­ti­ations, and then the EU was pressing the accession coun­tries by using the battering ram strat­egy and by arguing that Poland stay behind other acceding countries. The EU often used the battering ram strat­egy by arguing that other coun­tries were doing much better, so Poland ‘should hurry up’. As was discussed above, the EU also decided to tie issues to larger package deals, par­ticu­larly tying the purchase of real estate by foreigners with free movement of labour; thus, the EU was willing to agree to trans­itional periods on the sale of land issue on the con­ dition that Poland would agree to trans­itional periods in the area of the free movement of workers.

Concluding remarks   167

Lessons from the case studies and further research This empirical study has im­port­ant theor­et­ical im­plica­tions. It confirms Putnam’s hypo­thesis that the size of the do­mestic win-­set can, under certain con­ditions, be influenced by do­mestic pressure – par­ticu­larly pub­lic opinion, inter­est groups and polit­ical elites. Three factors determined the size of the win-­set. The first factor was do­mestic power, pref­er­ences and pos­sible co­ali­tions. The second factor was do­mestic institutions and ratification pro­ced­ures, like ratification pro­ ced­ures for nego­ti­ation stances within the gov­ern­ment or in the accession referendum. Finally, the size of the win-­set depended on the strat­egies of Level I negotiators. Among the three case studies, nego­ti­ations concerning agri­cul­ture were the most complicated and difficult because both win-­sets were small. Both sides had to enlarge their win-­sets: Poland by deciding to increase the level of direct payments from the national budget, and the EU by moving money from already secured structural funds to finance direct sub­sidies. Only after the intensive nego­ti­ations in Copen­hagen could those win-­sets overlap. With regard to the second case study, agreement was easier, since the small Polish do­mestic win-­set to accept lib­eralisation of land sales was accompanied by a rel­at­ively large win-­set within the EU coun­tries to accept trans­itional periods. Thus, the Polish and the EU win-­sets overlapped. This indeed confirms Putnam’s idea that when win-­sets overlap, the agreement can easily be achieved. In the sale of land case, the EU was ready for a compromise and treated this case as an element of a package deal with the free movement of labour. Finally, Poland, unlike in the case of free movement of labour, managed to achieve polit­ ical success. The case study of free movement of labour is almost ‘a mirror image’ case study of the freedom of purchase of real estate. Whilst in the labour case there was a small EU do­mestic win-­set to accept lib­eralisation on the labour market and the lack of strong inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties’ pressure, in the land issue, there was a large EU do­mestic win-­set to accept the trans­itional period, accompanied by strong pressure from some Polish inter­est groups and polit­ical par­ties. Thus, in the case of free movement of labour, the strongest side (EU) managed to impose trans­itional periods. The impact of the size of do­mestic win-­ sets on the nego­ti­ation pro­cess and results is illus­trated in Table 7.1. As shown above, the three case studies provide good empirical evid­ence to meas­ure the impact of do­mestic pressure on the size of the win-­set. However, it would be inter­esting to conduct a sim­ilar study with regard to the other acceding coun­tries, for example by asking whether the two-­level game model may be applic­able, and if so, in which negotiating areas, i.e. one can as­sume that, in the case of small coun­tries such as Malta, Cyprus or Estonia, agri­cul­ture is not a big issue. What is more, it would be inter­esting to examine the two-­level game model against current EU disputes, for example the Common Agricultural Policy reform, the Constitutional Treaty or nego­ti­ations with other acceding coun­tries, for instance Croatia. It may be of inter­est to compare these results. Thus, what I

168   Concluding remarks Table 7.1 The impact of the size of domestic win-sets on the negotiation process and results Size of win-set Case study

Poland

EU

Result

Agriculture

Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties.

Small within interest groups and political parties. Public opinion less interested in the issue.

Compromise very difficult, but possible. Both sides had to make concessions in order to enlarge its win-sets.

Purchase of Small within public real estate by opinion, interest foreigners groups and political parties.

Rather large (public opinion did not care about this issue), interest groups rather weak, political parties and politicians treated this issue as an element of a package deal (with free movement of labour) in order to negotiate transitional periods.

Compromise easier. Poland managed to get a good deal. Winsets after negotiations overlapped.

Free Small within public movement of opinion, but no strong labour interest groups to support liberalisation. Political parties focused on the first two issues.

Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties in many powerful EU countries, e.g. Germany.

Compromise possible due to concessions on the Polish side. Poland had to agree on transitional periods.

carried out in Poland can be done for other coun­tries or with regard to other case studies. In this way, further studies may aid in proving or disproving the two-­ level game model. The Putnam two-­level game model has proved to be use­ful in describing, explaining and understanding the influence of do­mestic pressure on Poland’s nego­ti­ation position on EU accession. However, one should be cau­tious to treat it as a model and not as a dog­matic theory; thus, whether the same model can be use­ful for other coun­tries or cases will remain subject to further research. Indeed, as Putnam argued: ‘Far-­ranging empirical research is needed now to test and deepen our understanding of how two-­level games are played.’34 The goal of my book is merely to provide a small con­tri­bu­tion to this wide-­ranging research.

Appendix List of interviewees

  1 Jerzy Buzek, Prime Minister of Poland (1997–2001). Interview date: 9 Septem­ber 2004.   2 Ryszard Czarnecki, Minister for Euro­pean Affairs (1997–99); Head of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration (1997–98). Interview date: 27 April 2005.   3 Petra Erler, Head of the Cabinet to the EU Commissioner Günter Verheugen. Interview date: 2 Octo­ber 2006.   4 Bronisław Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997–2000). Interview date: 28 April 2005.   5 Danuta Huebner, Head of Office of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration and Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001–03); Government Plenipotentiary for estab­lishing the Committee for Euro­pean Integration (KIE), Secretary of KIE with the rank of Secretary of State and Head of the Office of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration (UKIE) (1996–97). Interview date: 5 July 2005.   6 Leszek Jesień, Polish Government Advisor on Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union (1998–2001). Interview date: 22 June2005.   7 Jarosław Kalinowski, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (2001–03). Interview date: 20 July 2006.   8 Ewa Kubis, Director of the Department of Information and Public Communication, Office of the Committee of Euro­pean Integration (UKIE) (2002), Member of the Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union (2001–03). Interview date: 25 Au­gust 2004.   9 Jan Kułakowski, Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union (1998–2001). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 10 Alan Mayhew, Adviser to the Minister for Euro­pean Affairs, Government of Poland. Interview date: 9 June 2006. 11 Rudolf Moegele, Head of Unit for Enlargement in the Directorate General for Agriculture. Interview date: 26 Septem­ber 2006. 12 Jarosław Pietras, Under-­Secretary of State in the Office of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration (UKIE) (1997–2004); Secretary of the Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union (1998–2002). Interview date: 29 June 2005.

170   Appendix: list of interviewees 13 Władysław Piskorz, Counsellor Minister, Permanent Repre­senta­tion of Poland to the EU in Brussels. Former Head of Agricultural Policy Analysis Unit Ministry of Agriculture. Interview date: 24 May 2005. 14 Jerzy Plewa, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, a Member of the Polish Negotiation Team respons­ible for Agriculture (1998–2003). Interview date: 7 Janu­ary 2005. 15 Paweł Samecki, Under-­Secretary at the Office of the Committee for Euro­ pean Integration (UKIE) (1998–2002). Interview date: 12 July 2004. 16 Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski, Minister for Euro­pean Affairs (1991–96; 2000–01), Chief adviser to the Prime Minister on Euro­pean Integration (1999–2001). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 17 Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz, Adviser to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski. Consultant and Member of the Information Strategy Council of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration. Interview date: 19 Au­gust 2004. 18 Sławomir Tokarski, Adviser to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski (1998–99). Director of Economic and Social Analyses Department, Committee for Euro­pean Integration (2001–04). Interview date: 28 April 2005. 19 Jan Truszczyński, Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union (2001–03). Head of the repres­enta­tion of the Repub­lic of Poland to the Euro­pean Union (1996–2001). Interview date: 22 June 2005. 20 Veronika Veits, Directorate General for Agriculture, Desk officer for Poland. Interview date: 26 July 2006.

Notes

1  Introduction   1 See further H. Wallace, ‘Enlarging the Euro­pean Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 287–305.   2 According to Jan Kułakowski, it was a mis­take that the Polish side as­sumed that there was no al­tern­ative. As he argued, ‘In pol­itics there is always an al­tern­ative, to admit that we do not have an al­tern­ative is a nego­ti­ation mis­take.’ See the inter­view with Jan Kułakowski.   3 U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 5.   4 See, for instance, U. Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role-­ com­pliance’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds), The State of the Union Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 164–85.   5 A. Moravcsik and M. A. Vachudova, ‘Pref­er­ences, Power and Equilibrium, the Causes and Consequences of EU Enlargement’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 204.   6 See further A. Krok-­Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, p. 12.   7 This game was full of theatrical ges­tures. For example, such a game was played by some Polish politicians when they threatened that Poland could only enter the EU with full and equal direct payments.   8 It is argu­able whether opinion polls themselves could constitute an indic­ator of an influence. However, I will show how opinion polls influenced decision-­makers and therefore had an indirect influence on the nego­ti­ation process.   9 For example Jan Kułakowski, the Chief Negotiator, or the former Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek. 10 Such views may be expressed through opinion polls, peti­tions or demonstrations. 11 T. Risse-­Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 482. 12 This definition was used by F. R. Baumgarter and B. Leech, Basic Interests: The Influence of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1998, p. xii. 13 The last issue, even though it was not subject to nego­ti­ations with the EU, influenced the debate on EU mem­ber­ship and had an indirect influence on the nego­ti­ation process. 14 K. Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies, Prince­ ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1998, p. 3.

172    Notes 15 This term will be de­scribed in detail in the next chapter. 16 Online. Available: www.britannica.com. 17 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 3. 18 I. W. Zartman, ‘Prenegotations: Phases and Function’, in J. Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenego­ti­ations, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 4. 19 I will not go into details in describing other types of agreements since they are not rel­ ev­ant to the core ana­lysis here. 20 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 35. 21 Technicalities are understood as detailed technical solutions to the prob­lems that occurred during negotiations. 22 I. W. Zartman, ‘Prenegotations: Phases and Function’, in J. Gross Stein (ed.) Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenego­ti­ations, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 4. 23 The Treaty was signed before the Maastricht Treaty. 24 The so-­called ‘Europe Agreements’ were signed by Poland, Czecho­slo­vakia and Hun­ gary on 16 Decem­ber 1991. The agreement aims to estab­lish a free trade area over a period of ten years and institutes a permanent dialogue at the highest gov­ern­mental levels. It came into force on 1 Febru­ary 1994. Poland applied for mem­ber­ship to the EU on 5 April 1994. 25 See for example K. Cordell (ed.) Poland and the Euro­pean Union, London: Routledge, 2000. 26 See for example A. Michta, I. Prizel (eds) Polish Foreign Policy Recon­sidered, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995 or P. Ch. Muller-­Graf, A. Stępniak (eds), Poland and the Euro­pean Union: Between Association and Membership, Baden-­Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997. 27 See for example R. Trzaskowski, ‘From Candidate to Member State: Poland and the Future of EU’, Paris Institute for Strategic Studies Occasional Paper, 2002, No. 37. See also Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU, Warsaw: Euro­pean Centre in Natolin, 2003. 28 See for example M. Dąbrowski and J. Rostowski (eds) The Eastern Enlargement of the EU, Boston Warsaw: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001 or R. Stawarska, ‘EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective’, Journal of Euro­pean Public Policy, 1999, Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 822–38. 29 See for example J. Adamowski and K. A. Wojtaszczyk (eds) Negotiations of the EU Candidate Countries, Warsaw: The Institute of Political Science of Warsaw University, 2001. 30 See K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999. S. Senior Nello and K. E. Smith, The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998. K. E. Smith, Euro­pean Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cam­bridge: Polity Press, 2003. K. E. Smith, ‘Enlargement and Euro­pean Order’, in Ch. Hill and M. Smith (eds) International Relations and the Euro­pean Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. K. E. Smith and H. Sjursen, ‘Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement’, in T. Chris­tiansen, B. Tonra (eds) Rethinking EU Foreign Policy, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. J. Zielonka (ed.) Paradoxes of Euro­pean Foreign Policy, London: Kluwer Law International, 1998. P. Mair and J. Zielonka (eds) The Enlarged Euro­pean Union: Diversity and Adaptation, London: Frank Cass, 2002. J. Zielonka, Explaining Euro-­Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1998. K. Henderson (ed.) Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the Euro­pean Union, London: UCL Press, 1999. S.  Croft, J. Redmond, G. Wynrees and M. Webber, The Enlargement of Europe,

Notes    173 Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Eastward Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997. M. J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. H. Wallace, ‘Enlarging the Euro­pean Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis’, Journal of Euro­pean Public Policy, 2002, No. 9:4, pp. 658–65. 31 D. Papadimitriou, Negotiating the New Europe – The Euro­pean Union and Eastern Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Papadimitriou for instance is focusing on the comparative study of Bulgaria and Romania. 32 See for instance F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005. U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research’, Journal of Euro­pean Public Policy, 2002, Vol. 9, No. 4. 33 Sedelmeier or Schimmelfennig, how­ever, have complained that the enlargement of the EU for many years has suffered from a theor­et­ical neg­lect in the studies of Euro­ pean integration. 34 See for example H. Sjursen, ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 491–513. 35 F. Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union’, International Organization, 2001, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 76. 36 F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cam­bridge: Cam­ bridge University Press, 2003, p. 3. 37 F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cam­bridge: Cam­ bridge University Press, 2003, p. 5. 38 A. Moravcsik and M. A. Vachudova, ‘Pref­er­ences, Power and Equilibrium, the Causes and Consequences of EU Enlargement’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 142. 39 A. Krok-­Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, pp. 3–4. This will be de­scribed further on in the book. 40 See for instance B. C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Lanham NY: University Press of Amer­ica, 1983 (orig. published Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). See also T. Risse-­Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 479–512. 41 See for instance J. Higley, J. Pakulski and W. Wesołowski (eds) Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1998. 42 This does not imply that all farmers produce goods for commercial purposes. It has been estim­ated that up to 50 per cent produced mainly for their own consumption. Moreover, for a large number among this group, farming, though im­port­ant, only provided an additional source of income. 43 See ‘Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-­op-en.pdf. 44 According to an inde­pend­ent ana­lysis, the min­imum sub­sidies that would enable com­ peti­tion with the EU farmers (how­ever still not equal com­peti­tion) were 40 per cent in the year 2004. However, in order to improve the situ­ation of farmers, minimal sub­ sidies should have been 55 per cent in 2004. See the report: ‘Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU’, Warsaw: Euro­pean Centre in Natolin, 2003, pp. 111–13.

174    Notes 45 In the years 2004–07 this equalled 562 203 946 euro. See the report: ‘Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU’, Warsaw: Euro­pean Centre in Natolin, 2003, p. 112. 46 The max­imum pos­sible sub­sidies (allowed by the EU) from the Polish budget between the years 2004–12 will be 5879 459 723 euro. See the report: ‘Costs and Benefits of Poland’s Membership in the EU’, Warsaw: Euro­pean Centre in Natolin, 2003, p. 112. 47 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3. 48 Nevertheless, in some coun­tries such as Slovenia, freedom in the purchase of real estate was the big issue even before nego­ti­ations started. The coun­try introduced a lib­eral regime and it is apparent now, given the small numbers of foreign entities, that fears of buying out land by foreigners proved to be unjustified. 49 Such an opinion was widely expressed by the Polish decision-­makers whom I interviewed. 50 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3., p. 460. 2  Two levels of analysis in international negotiations: domestic versus foreign policy     1 See K. Waltz, The Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. Waltz uses the term ‘image’ when describing the level of ana­lysis, but in order to avoid ambiguity in terms, I will stick to the term level.     2 K. Waltz, The Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, p. 238.     3 K. Waltz, The Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, p. 238.     4 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-­Hall, 1992, p. 6.     5 See J. D. Singer, ‘International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis’, World Politics, 1960, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 453–61 and J. D. Singer, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations’, World Politics, 1961, Vol. 14:1, pp. 77–92.     6 See for instance M. Marcussen, T. Risse, D. Engelmann-­Martin, ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities’, Journal of Euro­pean Public Policy, 1999, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 614–33.     7 See P. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.     8 See G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Exploring Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.     9 See P. Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed’, International Organization, 1978, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 881–912.   10 O. R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-­ Lippmann Consensus’, International Studies Quarterly, 1992, No. 36, pp. 439–66. See further G. A. Almond, ‘Public Opinion and National Security’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1956, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp.  371–8 or W. Lipmann, Public Opinion, New York: Macmillan, 1992.   11 M. Gabel, ‘Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the Euro­pean Union’, Amer­ican Journal of Political Science, 1998, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 936.   12 At this point, one should make a distinction between the level of ana­lysis, for example do­mestic and sys­temic, and the unit of ana­lysis, for example focusing on a nation state as a unit. Therefore, one might study the national foreign pol­icy, but take a sys­temic approach or, al­tern­atively, as in this book, one may study accession to an inter­na­tional organ­isa­tion from the do­mestic level of ana­lysis, examining the influence of the do­mestic pressure on the accession process.

Notes    175   13 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 5.   14 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 6.   15 The detailed charac­ter­istics of the two negotiators will be given in later chapters.   16 R. D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 1.   17 L. Pye and S. Verba (eds) Political Culture and Political Development, Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1965, p. 513.   18 Neo-­realism, also known as structural realism, is a theory of inter­na­tional relations which emerged in 1975 with the pub­lication of K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. Waltz argues in favour of a sys­temic approach: the inter­na­tional structure acts as a constraint on state beha­vi­our, so that different states behave in a sim­ilar rational manner.   19 Neo-­liberal institutionalism refers to a school of thought which believes that nation-­ states are concerned with abso­lute gains (eco­nomic, polit­ical or stra­tegic), rather than rel­at­ive gains to other nation-­states.   20 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 113.   21 Whether Stephen Walt is a ‘structural’ realist or ‘second image realist’ is debatable.   22 See S. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival, 1997, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 165.   23 See S. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, Survival, 1997, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 165.   24 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 430.   25 R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Coopera­tion and Conflict in the Seven-­Power Summits, London: Sage, 1987, p. 10.   26 R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Coopera­tion and Conflict in the Seven-­Power Summits, London: Sage, 1987, p. 11.   27 R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, Hanging Together: Coopera­tion and Conflict in the Seven-­Power Summits, London: Sage, 1987, p. 11.   28 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 436.   29 The concept of win-­set was origin­ally used by K. A. Shepsle and B. R. Weingast, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power’, Amer­ican Political Science Review, 1987, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp.  85–104. See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 437.   30 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 437.   31 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 437–8.   32 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440.   33 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 442.   34 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 448.

176    Notes   35 Constitution of the Repub­lic of Poland. Online. Available: www.senat.gov.pl/k5eng/ dok/konstytu/konstytu.htm, Art. 125.   36 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 449.   37 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450.   38 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 451.   39 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450.   40 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 16.   41 Putnam does not give a precise definition of the Level I actors. Therefore, by talking about statesmen, Moravcsik meant Putnam’s Level I negotiator.   42 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 62.   43 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 16.   44 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 456–7.   45 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 17.   46 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 17.   47 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, pp. 141–2.   48 D. Mitchell, ‘International Institutions and Janus Faces: The Influence of International Institutions on Central Negotiators within Two-­Level Games’, International Negotiation, 2001, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25–48, in par­ticu­lar p. 44.   49 See A. Lee Patterson, ‘Agricultural Policy Reform in the Euro­pean Community: A Three-­Level Game Analysis’, International Organization, 1997, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 135–65.   50 See P. F. Trumbore, ‘Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-­level Games in the Anglo-­Irish Peace Process’, International Studies Quarterly, 1998, No. 42, pp. 545–65.   51 See D. Mitchell, ‘International Institutions and Janus Faces: The Influence of International Institutions on Central Negotiators within Two-­Level Games’, International Negotiation, 2001, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25–48.   52 A. Moravcsik, ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double-­Edged Diplomacy, International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 23.   53 See A. Moravcsik, ‘Pref­er­ences and Power in the Euro­pean Community: A Liberal Intergov­ern­mentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 473–524, par­ticu­larly pp. 514–16.

Notes    177   54 T. Risse, ‘ “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization, 2000, No. 54, No. 1, pp. 1–39.   55 F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cam­bridge: Cam­bridge University Press, 2003, p.  3. This concept was already discussed in Chapter 1.   56 ‘National Strategy for Integration’, 1997, p. 1.   57 ‘National Strategy for Integration’, 1997.   58 ‘National Strategy for Integration’, 1997, p. 5.   59 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 21.   60 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, p. 3.   61 Interview with Paweł Samecki.   62 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, pp. 3–4.   63 According to the Chief Negotiator, Jan Kułakowski, it was a stra­tegic mis­take that the Polish side as­sumed that there was no al­tern­ative. Interview with Jan Kułakowski.   64 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453.   65 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 136.   66 F. Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 137.   67 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, pp. 4–5.   68 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440.   69 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450.   70 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, ‘The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives’, in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, The Politics of Euro­pean Union Enlargement, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 14.   71 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, p. 5.   72 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3.   73 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3. See also B. White, ‘The Euro­pean Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis’, Euro­pean Journal of International Relations, 1999, Vol. 5(1), pp. 37–66. See in par­ ticu­lar pp. 43–5.   74 The candidate coun­tries often declared that achieving mem­ber­ship in the nego­ti­ ations with the EU was the major goal of their foreign policies.   75 M. Clarke, ‘Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches’, in Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, pp. 6–7.   76 M. Clarke, ‘Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches’, in Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989, p. 7.

178    Notes   77 The question arises whether an inter­na­tional negotiator is an actor. It depends whether the negotiator is just an agent submitting instructions from the gov­ern­ment or an inde­pend­ent actor, as would be the case when a chief of gov­ern­ment is also acting as an inter­na­tional negotiator.   78 W. Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process, London: Macmillan, 1971, p. 44.   79 G. A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 269.   80 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 264.   81 G. A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 269.   82 See O. R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-­ Lippmann Consensus’, International Studies Quarterly, 1992, No. 36, pp. 439–66.   83 T. Risse-­Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 480.   84 T. Risse-­Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 482.   85 J. R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cam­bridge: Cam­bridge University Press, 1992, p. 313.   86 This prob­lem will be de­scribed later on when discussing the case of purchase of real estate by foreigners.   87 T. Risse-­Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 1991, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 480–1.   88 G. A. Almond, ‘The Elites and Foreign Policy’, in J. N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 269.   89 F. R. Baumgarter and B. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1998, p. xii. See also pp. 25–30.   90 W. Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process, London: Macmillan, 1971, p. 46.   91 Ch. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 269.   92 L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey Prentice-­Hall, 1982, p. 138.   93 L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey Prentice-­Hall, 1982, p. 137.   94 B. C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Lanham NY: University Press of Amer­ica, 1983, pp. 79–80. See further pp. 80–126.   95 See further B. C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1963. For empirical evid­ence of Cohen’s thesis (based on the US and the UK), see for example S. N. Soroka, ‘Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy’, Press/Politics, 2003, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 27–48.   96 B. C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy, Lanham NY: University Press of Amer­ica, 1983, pp. 80–126.   97 Solidarity Electoral Action, a central–right co­ali­tion of a party representing the Solidarity trade union and a number of post-­solidarity polit­ical par­ties, in 1997 won 201 seats of 460 and formed a co­ali­tion with the lib­eral Freedom Union, which won 74 seats. However, the Freedom Union withdrew from the gov­ern­ment in 2000.   98 Samoobrona is a rad­ical populist party created in the early 1990s initially as a trade-­ union representing bankrupted farmers.   99 Radio Maryja is a rad­ical Cath­olic Radio Station very influ­en­tial among some right-­ wing polit­ical elites.

Notes    179 100 K. Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies, Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1998, p. 3. 101 K. Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies, Prince­ton: Prince­ton University Press, 1998, p. 8. 102 See for instance B. Frankel (ed.) Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London: Routledge, 1997. 3  Polish–EU relations 1990–2003     1 I refer to the decision-­makers whom I interviewed.     2 U. Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role Compliance’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds) The State of the Union Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 165.     3 See F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cam­bridge: Cam­bridge University Press, 2003.     4 See A. Krok-­Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 2000, No. 54.     5 See Z. Mach Heritage, ‘Dream and Anxiety: The Euro­pean Identity of Poles’, in Z. Mach and D. Niedźwiedzki, Euro­pean Enlargement and Identity, Kraków: Universitas, 1997, p. 38.     6 A. Krok-­Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, p. 4.     7 H. Sjursen, ‘Enlarging the Union’, in S. Stavridis and others (eds) New Challenges to the Euro­pean Union: Policies and Policy Making, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 158–9.     8 See also C. Mc Manus-­Czubińska, W. L. Miller, R. Markowski and J. Kwaśniewski, ‘Understanding Dual Identities in Poland’, Political Studies, 2003, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp.  121–43. The authors argue that contrary to fears that Euro­peanism in Poland might be narrow and culturally restrictive, dual Polish and Euro­pean identity reflects broader cosmo­pol­itan per­spect­ives as well as specifically Euro­pean and Western sympathies.     9 See further S. Sowiński, ‘A Europe of Nations but What Kind of Nations? The Nation in the Debate on Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2002, Vol. 2, No. 3(4), pp. 81–105.   10 See I. Prizel and A. Michta (eds) Polish Foreign Policy Recon­sidered, London: Macmillan, 1995, pp. 60–4.   11 See Z. Mach Heritage, ‘Dream and Anxiety: The Euro­pean Identity of Poles’, in Z. Mach and D. Niedźwiedzki, Euro­pean Enlargement and Identity, Kraków: Universitas, 1997, pp. 38–9.   12 National Strategy for Integration, 1997, para 1.1.   13 See further R. Stemplowski, ‘Poland in The World System: Transformation of the Political System and Foreign Policy Making’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 105–6.   14 I. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy – Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cam­bridge: Cam­bridge University Press, 1998, p. 418.   15 See H. Wydra, Continuities in Poland’s Permanent Transition, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 113–38.   16 See J. A. Tucker, A. C. Pacek and A. J. Berinsky, ‘Transitional Winners and Losers, Attitudes towards EU Membership in Post-­Communist Countries’, Amer­ican Journal of Political Science, 2002, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 557–71.   17 See L. Kolarska-­Bobińska, ‘The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe’, East Euro­pean Politics and Societies, 2003, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp.  91–8. The author is discussing the impact of EU accession on building and strengthening demo­cratic institutions during the pro­cess of sys­temic transformation.

180    Notes   18 A. Krok-­Paszkowska and J. Zielonka, ‘The EU’s Next Big Enlargement: Empirical Data on the Candidates’ Perception’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 2000, No. 54, pp. 3–4.   19 J. I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p. 32.   20 J. I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 39–40.   21 J. I. Torreblanca, The Reuniting of Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p. 40.   22 See further K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 52–65.   23 Euro­pean Report, No. 1608, Europe Information Service, 1 Au­gust 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   24 Euro­pean Report, No. 1608, Europe Information Service, 1 Au­gust 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   25 ‘EEC/Eastern Europe: Council Grants Mandate for new Europe Agreements’, Euro­ pean Report, No. 1614, Europe Information Service, 19 Septem­ber 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   26 ‘EEC’s Special Ties with Poland’, Polish News Bulletin, 24 Septem­ber 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   27 ‘EEC’s Special Ties with Poland’, Polish News Bulletin, 24 Septem­ber 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   28 ‘EEC/Eastern Europe: Update on Europe Accords’, Europe Information Service, 24 Octo­ber 1990. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   29 ‘Visit of Mr. Frans Andriessen to Poland – 6 and 7 March 1991’, Commission of the Euro­pean Communities, 8 March 1991. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/ rapid/.   30 U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 67.   31 ‘EEC/Poland: Negotiations Stumble Again Over Commercial Aspects’, Europe Information Service, 20 March 1991. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   32 ‘Europe After the Coup’, The Times, 22 Au­gust 1991.   33 ‘EEC/Eastern Europe: Commission Moves to Extend Europe Accords to Other States’, Europe Information Service, 7 Septem­ber 1991. Online. Available: www. lexis-­nexis.com.   34 See Friis and Murphy, ‘The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 219.   35 G. Brock, ‘Three East Euro­pean States Bargain their Way Nearer EC Membership’, The Times, 23 Novem­ber 1991.   36 U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 73–4.   37 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 94.   38 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 103.   39 ‘EC/Poland: Suchocka Chastises Community Inaction’, Europe Information Service, 5 June 1993. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   40 Friis and Murphy, ‘The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 220.   41 J. Zielonka, ‘Policies without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 1997, No. 97/72, p. 9.   42 Friis and Murphy, ‘The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 221.

Notes    181   43 Sedelmeier, 2000, U. Sedelmeier, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role Compliance’, in M. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds) The State of the Union Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 175. See also U. Sedelmeier, Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 73–4.   44 These are so-­called Copen­hagen cri­teria as set by the Euro­pean Council.   45 H. Grabbe, Profiting from EU Enlargement, London: Centre for Euro­pean Reform, 2001, p. 11.   46 Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union and Chancellery of the Prime Minister Repub­lic of Poland, Accession Negotiations, Poland on the Road to the Euro­pean Union, Warsaw, 2000, Ch.1 footnote 8. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   47 ‘EU/Poland/Hun­gary: Association Agreements Finally Take Force’, Europe Information Service, 2 Febru­ary 1994. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   48 Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between the Euro­pean Communities and their Member States, of the one Part, and the Repub­lic of Poland, of the other Part, 1994, Art. 1. P. 2. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl.   49 ‘EU/Poland/Hun­gary: Association Agreements Finally Take Force’, Europe Information Service, 2 Febru­ary 1994. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   50 J. Zielonka, ‘Policies without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 1997, No. 97/72, p. 10.   51 See the pre­amble to the Europe Agreement.   52 K. Skubiszewski, ‘Perspectives of Poland’s Foreign Policy in Europe’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1994, p. 27.   53 See further L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copen­hagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997.   54 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 94.   55 Friis and Murphy, ‘The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 218.   56 See the Preamble to the Europe Agreement with Poland.   57 However, this was a polit­ical overstatement, which was not taken ser­iously by the EU.   58 J. Palmer, ‘Nervous Poles Apply for EU Membership’, The Guardian, 8 April 1994.   59 CBOS Opinion Poll, Novem­ber 1994.   60 See also ‘EU/East Europe: Council to Examine Pre-­Accession Strategy for the First Time’, Europe Information Service, 1 Octo­ber 1994. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com.   61 See H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 30–4.   62 K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 122.   63 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 38.   64 See further K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 70–7.   65 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 37–8.   66 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 12.   67 See ‘White Paper Concerning Integration of the Associated Central and Eastern Euro­pean Countries into the Internal Market of the Euro­pean Union’. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/peco-­w/en/index.html.

182    Notes   68 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 34.   69 ‘EU/East Europe: A White Paper Approved for Nine CEEC’s’, Europe Information Service, 23 June 1995. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   70 ‘EU/Poland: Prudent Optimism over Accession Progress’, Europe Information Service, 23 June 1995. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   71 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 34.   72 See M. Popowski, ‘Relations with the Euro­pean Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1996, p. 39. See further pp. 39–45.   73 See ‘Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-­op-en.pdf and ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 13. See also M. Popowski, ‘Relations with the Euro­pean Union in 1996’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1997, pp. 43–9.   74 See R. Freudenstein, ‘Poland, Ger­many and the EU’, International Affairs, 1998, Vol. 74, No. 1, in par­ticu­lar pp. 45–49. On the details on Polish–German relations see also M. A. Cichocki, ‘Polish–German Relations in the Light of Poland’s Accession to the Euro­pean Union’, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2002, Vol. 2, No. 1(2), pp. 169–74.   75 See K. E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 120–1.   76 J. Zielonka, ‘Policies without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe’, EUI Working Paper RSC, 1997, No. 97/72, p. 2.   77 Cited in L. Friis, ‘And Then They Were 15 . . . The EC’s EFTA-­Enlargement Negotiations’, Coopera­tion and Conflict, 1999, Vol. 33, No. 1.   78 See Agenda 2000. See also J. Czaputowicz, ‘Review of Poland’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Ministry Activity in 1997’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1998, p. 20.   79 See Agenda 2000.   80 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, Accession part­ner­ship, Ch. 1 Introduction, Ch. 2 Objectives, 2000.   81 See ‘National Programmes of Pre­para­tions for Membership’. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl.   82 M. Popowski, ‘Poland’s Relations with the Euro­pean Union in 1998’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1999, p. 60.   83 M. Popowski, ‘Poland’s Relations with the Euro­pean Union in 1998’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1999, p. 63.   84 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 62.   85 L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copen­hagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997, p. 14.   86 M. Popowski, ‘Poland’s Relations with the Euro­pean Union in 1998’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 1999, pp. 64–5.   87 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 35.   88 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 62.   89 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, pp. 35–6.   90 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, pp. 37–9.   91 See further A. Szczerbiak, Referendum Briefing, No. 5, ‘The Polish EU Accession Referendum 7–8 June 2003’, Europe Research Network. Online. Available: www.

Notes    183 sussex.ac.uk/sei/docu­ments/poland5.pdf. See also R. Markowski and J. A. Tucker, ‘Pocketbooks, Politics, and Parties: The 2003 Polish Referendum on EU Membership’, 21 Au­gust 2003. Online. Available: www.princeton.edu/~csdp/research/pdfs/ Markowski_Tucker_2003.pdf.   92 Friis and Murphy, ‘The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 221.   93 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 70–2.   94 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 61.   95 This is a Polish consti­tu­tional body comprising the gov­ern­ment ministers.   96 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 24–5.   97 P. Świeboda, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, World Bank Institute Seminar Ankara, 28 March 2006, p. 3.   98 Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union and Chancellery of the Prime Minister Repub­lic of Poland, Accession Negotiations: Poland on the Road to the Euro­pean Union, Warszawa, 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, pp. 24–5.   99 Constitution of the Repub­lic of Poland, Art. 133. 100 Constitution of the Repub­lic of Poland, Art. 146. 101 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 26. 102 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 21–2. 103 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 61. 104 P. Świeboda, Administrative Structures Adopted to Manage EU Negotiations – The Polish Experience, World Bank Institute Seminar Ankara, 28 March 2006, p. 2. 105 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 23. 106 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, pp. 21–2. 107 See further L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli. Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, pp. 227–31. 108 This opinion was shared by many decision-­makers whom I interviewed. 109 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 23. 110 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, 23–4. 111 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report – Glossary’, 2000, pp. 99–100. 112 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 24. 113 The chairmanship of the Euro­pean Council and the Council of the Euro­pean Union were held by the member states on a rotation basis for a half-­year term. Until 1995, an alphabetic rotation sys­tem was used. Then, the alphabetic rotation sys­tem was aban­doned and the order of Presidency until 2002 was estab­lished in the fol­ low­ing way: 1997, Holland and Luxembourg; 1998, Great Britain and Austria; 1999, Ger­many and Finland; 2000, Portugal and France; 2001, Sweden and Belgium; 2002, Spain and Denmark; 2003, Greece. See further ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report – Glossary’, 2000, p. 100.

184    Notes 114 E. Haczyk, ‘Negotiations on Poland’s Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 2001, p. 62. 115 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession to the EU Negotiations Report’, 2000, p. 30. 4  Negotiations concerning agriculture     1 B. Ardy, ‘Agriculture, Structural Policy and Budget and Eastern Enlargement of the Union’, in K. Henderson, Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the Euro­pean Union, London: UCL Press, 1999, p. 114.     2 See further ‘Euro­pean Agriculture: The Case for Radical Reform’, Conclusions of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food’s CAP Review Group, 1995, pp. 3–4.     3 See S. Senior Nello and K. E. Smith, The Euro­pean Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The Implications of Enlargement in Stages, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 37–8.     4 See Agenda 2000.     5 Agriculture: Karl-­Heinz Funke, ‘Satisfied with Berlin Agreement’, Europe Information Service, 2 April 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.     6 For the im­plica­tions of extending the CAP to CEEC see S. Tangermann and J. F. M. Swinnen, ‘Conclusions and Implications for Food and Agriculture Policy in the Process of Accession to the EU’, in S. Tangermann and M. Banse, Central and Eastern Euro­pean Agriculture in an Expanding Euro­pean Union, Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2000.     7 For details on im­plica­tions of CAP reform on Poland see W. Guba and W. Piskorz, Implications of CAP Reforms for Poland, Warsaw: Office of the Committees for Euro­pean Integration, 2002 and H. Ingham, M. Ingham and G. Węcławowicz, ‘Agricultural Reform in Post-­Transition Poland’, Tijdschrift voor Economische and Sociale Geografie, 1998, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp.  150–60, see in par­ticu­lar p.  154 and J. Wolf, The Future of Euro­pean Agriculture, London: Centre for Euro­pean Reform, 2002, pp. 71–5.     8 This view is shared by the majority of officials and experts involved in the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess whom I inter­viewed. In par­ticu­lar, it is shared by the former chief of the Office of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration Paweł Samecki, the former Prime Minister Buzek and the former advisor to the Chief Negotiator Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz, to name but a few.     9 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska Europa Świat – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 262.   10 ‘Polish Agriculture and EU Integration Discussed’, PAP, 20 July 1997. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   11 EU Enlargement: ‘Agriculture Questions Loom Large in Debates with First-­Wave Candidates’, 19 June 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   12 ‘Polish Farming Needs Transitional Period’, PAP, 22 April 1998. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   13 ‘EU to Assist Polish Agriculture’, PAP, 18 June 1998. Online. Available: www. lexis-­nexis.com.   14 ‘Agriculture Screening Begins’, Polish News Bulletin, 22 Septem­ber 1998. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   15 Interview with a Polish senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   16 Interview with Władysław Piskorz.   17 Interview with a Polish senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   18 ‘Poland Does Not Want Transition Periods in Farming’, PAP, 9 Octo­ber 1998. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.

Notes    185   19 CBOS Opinion Poll, Septem­ber 1998, pp. 1–2. More in­forma­tion on this subject can be found in the CBOS reports: ‘The Level of Acceptance for Polish Integration into the Euro­pean Union’, Septem­ber 1998, ‘Agricultural Policy in the Context of our Prospective Membership in the Euro­pean Union’, Au­gust 1998.   20 Euro­pean Commission, ‘1998 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession’, pp. 29–31.   21 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   22 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   23 ‘EU Accuses Poland of Boosting Sugar Production’, PAP, 27 May 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   24 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees.   25 This inter­view was shared by the former Minister for Euro­pean Integration Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski. Interview with Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski.   26 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   27 ‘On the EU’s Plate’, The Warsaw Voice, 12 July 1999.   28 ‘On the EU’s Plate’, The Warsaw Voice, 12 July 1999.   29 ‘Poland Declares Readiness to Comply with EU Agricultural Policy by 2003’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 Octo­ber 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   30 ‘Food Imports to be Cut by Half ’, Polish News Bulletin, 12 Novem­ber 1999.   31 The view was expressed by a senior Polish official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   32 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   33 Euro­pean Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Octo­ber 1999. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, pp. 40–2.   34 Euro­pean Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Octo­ber 1999. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 79.   35 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the Euro­pean Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   36 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the Euro­pean Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, pp. 109–12.   37 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the Euro­pean Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, p. 114.   38 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the Euro­pean Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, p. 109.   39 See ‘Poland’s Negotiation Position in the Area of Agriculture in Poland’s Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the Euro­pean Union’, Warsaw, 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl, p. 109.   40 Interview with Jerzy Buzek.   41 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska Europa Świat – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 263.   42 According to Polish Agriculture Minister Artur Balasz’s estim­ate, the coun­try’s farmers would receive thir­teen billion zlotys (EUR 3.14 billion) from the EU in the first year of mem­ber­ship, which was expected to be covered by the direct payment scheme. But restructuring the agricultural sector and bringing thou­sands of small farms in Poland to EU health and quality stand­ards, he calculated, would require more than twenty-­five billion zlotys in the three years after mem­ber­ship. See further ‘Tough Farm Policy for EU Entry Talks’, Financial Times, 17 Decem­ber 1999.   43 ‘Tough Farm Policy for EU Entry Talks’, Financial Times, 17 Decem­ber 1999.

186    Notes   44   45   46   47

Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. Interview with Władysław Piskorz. Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. ‘EU Commissioner 5 Criticises Polish Stand’, Polish News Bulletin, 18 Janu­ary 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   48 EU/Poland: ‘Warsaw Outlines Ambitious Position on Agricultural Negotiations’, Europe Information Service, 6 Janu­ary 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis. com.   49 ‘EU Commission Proposes New Farm Funding Rules for Candidate Countries’, IP/00/77, Brussels, 26 Janu­ary 2000. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   50 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   51 Interview with Władysław Piskorz.   52 See L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copen­hagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997.   53 M. Smith and S. Wagstyl, ‘Brussels May Extend Direct Farming Aid’, Financial Times, 9 Febru­ary 2000.   54 ‘EU May Offer Direct Subsidies to Polish Farmers’, Polish News Bulletin, 1 Febru­ ary 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   55 M. Smith, ‘Europe Farmers Set for Direct Payments’, Financial Times, 29 March 2000.   56 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   57 ‘EU says Poland to be Left Out of Free Trade Deal if “Protectionism” Continues’, AFX Europe, 9 June 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   58 Verheugen Urges Compromise’, Polish News Bulletin, 23 June 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   59 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees.   60 ‘Commissioner Fischler in Poland: Enlargement Should be a Win-­win Situation’, IP/00/1057, Krakow, 25 Septem­ber 2000. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/ rapid/.   61 See for instance E. Kawecka-­Wyrzykowska, ‘The Potential Effects of Liberalising Food Trade between Poland and the EU’, in Costs and Advantages of Poland’s Membership in the EU, Warsaw: Institute for Foreign Trade Trends and Prices (IKCHZ), 2000.   62 ‘EU Negotiations on Agriculture: Double Zero Not Very Favourable’, Polish News Bulletin, 25 July 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   63 ‘Rural Development Programmes for Poland, Hun­gary, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovenia, Endorsed’, IP 00/1009, Brussels, 14 Septem­ber 2000. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/.   64 J. Reed and M. Smith, ‘Poland’s Tough Farm Stance Pays off ’, Financial Times, 28 Septem­ber 2000.   65 ‘Poland and EU Sign Agriculture Deal’, Polish News Bulletin, 28 Septem­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   66 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   67 Euro­pean Commission, ‘2000 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 8 Novem­ber 2000. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, pp. 46–7.   68 Euro­pean Commission, ‘2000 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Octo­ber 1999. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 91.   69 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees.   70 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   71 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees.   72 ‘Plewa Calls on EU for Clear Position in Agriculture’, PAP, 20 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.

Notes    187   73 ‘Plewa Calls on EU for Clear Position in Agriculture’, PAP, 20 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   74 ‘Growing Support for Subsidizing Polish Agriculture’, PAP, 7 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   75 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   76 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska Europa Świat – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 238.   77 D. Spinant, ‘Possible Faults in Poland Exaggerated’, 5 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www. euob­ser­ver.com.   78 Interview with Jaroslaw Pietras.   79 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. Indeed, most senior officials, for example Samecki, Tokarski and Jesień, expressed sim­ilar feelings with regard to the role of the media.   80 Interview with Jerzy Buzek.   81 This opinion was shared by many senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess, for example Paweł Samecki.   82 ‘Position of the Government of the Repub­lic of Poland in Negotiations with the Euro­pean Union’ – Statement by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, to the Diet of the Repub­lic of Poland Warsaw, 29 Novem­ber 2001, p. 10.   83 ‘Poland Softens Stance on 8 of 11 Remaining EU Negotiating’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 27 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   84 This argument was often repeated by Polish negotiators Paweł Samecki and Władysław Piskorz.   85 In fact, according to many senior officials involved in the negotiating pro­cess, conclusions from the reports were often uncrit­ically referred to by the Polish media. The EU realised this and used the Polish media to exert pressure on the government.   86 Euro­pean Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 109.   87 Euro­pean Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 109 and p. 111.   88 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453.   89 ‘Commissioner Fischler Signs Pre-­Accession Financing Agreement with Estonia, Latvia and Poland’, IP/01/113, Brussels, 25 Janu­ary 2001. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/.   90 ‘Enlargement and Agriculture: An Integration Strategy for the EU’s New Member States’, IP/02/176, Brussels, 30 Janu­ary 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu. int/rapid/.   91 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   92 J. Reed, ‘Poland Seeks Shorter Transition’, Financial Times, 31 Janu­ary 2002. See for instance M. Fletche, ‘EU Selling us Short, Say Polish Farmers’, The Times, 7 Febru­ary 2002.   93 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440.   94 Interview with a senior EU official involved – see the List of Interviewees.   95 CBOS Opinion Poll, Febru­ary 2002, Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl.   96 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland Unhappy About Agriculture Proposals’, 1 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com.   97 M. Mann, ‘Poland Steps up Campaign over EU Farm Subsidies’, Financial Times, 12 Febru­ary 2002.   98 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski.

188    Notes   99 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 100 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland Unhappy About Agriculture Proposals’, 1 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 101 S. Spiteri and D. Spinant, ‘Poles More EU-­sceptical after Farm Money Proposal’, 11 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 102 ‘EU Agriculture Commissioner Promises More Money to Polish Farmers’, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 103 ‘Accession – Two Steps Closer to the EU’, The Warsaw Voice, 31 March 2002. 104 ‘Candidate Countries’ Farmers Better off in EU, Says Commission Study’, IP/02/428, Brussels, 18 March 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 105 Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 106 M. Frydrych, ‘Polish Report Undermines EU proposals’, 4 April 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 107 Such a statement was made by Władysław Piskorz. Interview with Władysław Piskorz. 108 The farmers’ union Kółka Rolnicze has more than one million members. 109 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland: Farmers’ Frustration with EU Offer Grows’, 19 April 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 110 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 111 See CBOS Opinion Poll, May 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 112 K. Pankowski, ‘Proces integracji w opinii mieszkańców wsi’, Table 12, in L. Kolarska-­Bobinska (ed.) Mieszkańcy Wsi o integracji Europejskiej: opinia, wiedza, poinformowanie, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002, p. 54. 113 Farmers are afraid that direct payments may cause further in­equal­it­ies that could lead to an escalation of social conflicts, K. Pankowski, ‘Proces integracji w opinii mieszkańców wsi’, Figure 3, in L. Kolarska-­Bobinska (ed.) Mieszkańcy Wsi o integracji Europejskiej: opinia, wiedza, poinformowanie, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002, p. 46. 114 K. Pankowski, ‘Proces integracji w opinii mieszkańców wsi’, Table 5,  in L. Kolarska-­Bobinska (ed.) Mieszkańcy Wsi o integracji Europejskiej: opinia, wiedza, poinformowanie, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002, p. 44. 115 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 435–7. 116 I. Black, ‘New Dispute on Subsidies Threatens EU enlargement’, The Guardian, 11 June 2002. 117 D. Spinant, ‘EU Leaders Reassuring on Enlargement’, 22 June 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 118 Statement of Mr Jan Truszczyński, ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union’, Conference at deputy level, Brussels, 28 June 2002. Online. Available: www. polrepeu.be/arch.html. 119 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, p. 5. 120 M. Frydrych, ‘Polish Farm Minister Says Will Quit over EU Talks’, 4 July 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 121 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 122 ‘Euro­pean Commission Sees Poland’s Tough Stand on Subsidies as Trick’, Polish News Bulletin, 5 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 123 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 446. 124 According to most of the senior officials whom I inter­viewed, Kalinowski was acting under strong pressure from both pub­lic opinion, espe­cially farmers, and his own party.

Notes    189 125 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 11. 126 CBOS Opinion Poll, May 2000. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 127 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 11. 128 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 12. 129 ‘Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 7. 130 Public TV in Poland has the highest viewing figures. 131 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 132 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 133 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 134 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 135 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 458. 136 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 137 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 138 ‘Visiting EU Commissioner Disappointed Polish Talks Focus Solely on Agriculture’, BBC Monitoring International, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 139 A. Stankiewicz and J. Bielecki, ‘Growing Polish Radicalism on Agriculture Casts Doubt on EU Referendum’, Financial Times Information, 12 July 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 140 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 141 ‘Fischler Visits Poland, “Time to Stress the Positives” ’, IP/02/1278, Brussels/ Warsaw, 10 Septem­ber 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 142 ‘Fischler in Poland, “EU is Neither Heaven, nor Hell – but Simply Better for Polish Farmers” ’, EU Press Release; IP: 02/1294, 12 Septem­ber 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 143 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 144 J. Reed, ‘Fischler Gets Rough Ride from Poles’, Financial Times, 13 Septem­ber 2002. 145 J. Reed, ‘Fischler Gets Rough Ride from Poles’, Financial Times, 13 Septem­ber 2002. 146 ‘Poland Wants to Negotiate more EU Cash for Farmers – AgriMin’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 17 Septem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 147 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 148 ‘Poland Wants to Negotiate More EU Cash for Farmers – AgriMin’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 17 Septem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 149 ‘Polish Government Endorses Changes to EU Agriculture Negotiating Positions’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 14 Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 150 See for instance A. Woś, ‘Polish Agriculture with Regard to the Prospect of Euro­ pean Integration’, Moct-­Most, 1998, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 167–77.

190    Notes 151 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Postrzeganie Problemów Rolnictwa w kontekście Unii Europejskiej’, Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 152 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Postrzeganie Problemów Rolnictwa w kontekście Unii Europejskiej’, Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, Table 1. 153 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Opinie o negocjacjach Polski z Unia Europejska’, Octo­ber 2002. The number of respondents who demanded equal direct payments increased by 6 per cent in comparison to the opinion poll taken just six months before. Compare Figure 3, p. 4. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 154 CBOS Opinion Poll, Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 155 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Postrzeganie Problemów Rolnictwa w kontekście Unii Europejskiej’, Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1. 156 ‘Polish Official Says Agricultural Proposals to EU Negotiable’, PAP, 10 Octo­ber 2002. A sim­ilar call was made towards the other acceding coun­tries; see for example ‘Fischler Calls for Realism in the Enlargement End Game’, IP/02/1642, Prague, 8 Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 157 ‘Polish Official Says Agricultural Proposals to EU Negotiable’, PAP, 10 Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 158 Euro­pean Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, pp. 65–73. 159 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 160 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 161 Statement by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Repub­ lic of Poland, Brussels, 18 Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.polrepeu.be. 162 ‘Poles Change EU Farm Subsidies Tactics, Steel Terms Worsen’, Polish News Bulletin, 12 Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 163 Interview with Jarosław Pietras. 164 ‘Chooses Simplified Area-­Based Agricultural EU Direct Payment System’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 25 Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis. com. 165 Rada Ministrów, ‘Raport na temat rezultatów negocjacji o członkostwa RP w Unii Europejskiej’, Warsaw, Decem­ber 2002, p. 17. 166 Interwiew with Jarosław Kalinowski. 167 J. Solska, ‘Wojny Chłopsko Polskie’, Polityka, 7 Janu­ary 2001. 168 J. Dempsey, ‘EU Hopefuls Hammer Home Quota Message’, Financial Times, 26 Novem­ber 2002. 169 See further L. Friis, ‘The Danish Presidency: Wonderful Copen­hagen’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review, 2003, Vol. 41, pp. 49–51. 170 S. Spiteri, ‘Rasmussen Predicts Hard Negotiations at Copen­hagen’, 8 Decem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 171 Interview with Sławomir Tokarski. 172 ‘Synder and Dresing, Conflict Among Nations’, p.  517, cited in R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 173 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 174 M. Gherghisan and M. Frydrych, ‘Candidates Conduct Tough Final Negotiations’, 9 Decem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 175 See Report by J. Bielecki from Brussels, A. Stankiewicz, E. S. Z. and A. N.: ‘Copen­ hagen – the Great Finish’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 Decem­ber 2002. 176 He threatened for the first time in July 2002. 177 S. Waszak, ‘As EU Talks Deadline Approaches, Structures in Poland’s Ruling Coalition’, Agence France Presse, 28 Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com.

Notes   191 178 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 179 IPSOS-­Demoskop Opinion Poll, Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.demoskop. pl/1_2_1.html. 180 CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Na drodze do Unii Europejskiej’, see Table 6 – opinion conducted in Decem­ber 1998. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl. 181 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 182 S. Castle, ‘Analysis Euro­pean Enlargement: Bears, Birdcatchers and Herring: The Price of EU Expansion; On the Eve of the Copen­hagen Summit’, The Inde­pend­ent, 11 Decem­ber 2002. 183 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 184 ‘Enlargement and Agriculture: Summit Adopts Fair and Tailor-­made Package which Benefits Farmers in Accession Countries’, IP: 02/1882, 16 Decem­ber 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 185 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 186 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 187 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 188 ‘EU Accession-­Mixed System, Mixed Feelings’, The Warsaw Voice, 16 Febru­ary 2003. 189 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 190 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 191 ‘Enlargement and Agriculture: Summit Adopts Fair and Tailor-­made Package which Benefits Farmers in Accession Countries’, IP: 02/1882, 16 Decem­ber 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 192 Interview with Sławomir Tokarski. 193 R. Anderson, J. Reed and R. Wright, ‘Success Fails to Silence Dissent East Euro­ pean Reaction’, Financial Times, 16 Decem­ber 2002. 194 The idea of this draft bill was to introduce an additional tax for drivers to build road infrastructure in Poland. 195 ‘After the Coalition Break-­up PSL Shifts to the Right to Discern Itself from Self-­ Defence’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 196 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 197 ‘After the Coalition Break-­up PSL Shifts to the Right to Discern Itself from Self-­ Defence’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 198 ‘PSL, PiS: EU Treaty to Tribunal’, PAP, 14 March 2003. Online. Available: www. lexis-­nexis.com. 199 M. Frydrych, ‘Poland: Former Coalition Partner Questions EU Support’, 14 March 2003. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 200 Interview with Jarosław Kalinowski. 201 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 458. 5  Purchase of real estate by EU residents     1 According to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski, the Polish side from the early beginning as­sumed that the 18-year trans­itional period origin­ally proposed by the Polish side would be reduced – inter­view with Jan Kułakowski.     2 Treaty Establishing the Euro­pean Community (Consolidated version), Euro-­Lex. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/eur-­lex/en/treat­ies/dat/C_2002325EN.003301. html, Art. 56. Para 1.     3 See ‘Looking East, Looking West’, The Economist, 25 Octo­ber 2001.     4 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz.

192    Notes     5 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz.     6 J. Reed, ‘Poland Looks to History as it Holds the Line over Land: Euro­pean Union Pressure Builds on Warsaw over Liberalisation of its Land Market after Accession’, Financial Times, 30 Octo­ber 2001.     7 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, p. 75.     8 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, pp. 36–7.     9 See inter­view with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz and Paweł Samecki.   10 CBOS Opinion Poll, June 1998. Online. Available: www.cbos.org.pl, p. 1.   11 See also B. Koblański, ‘Poles Fear Foreigners Buying Land’, Polish News Bulletin, 19 June 1996.   12 This overview is based on ‘Eastern Europe: Land of Opportunity’, EIU Business Eastern Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 19 July 1999, and ‘EU Enlargement: Turf War’, EIU Business Eastern Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 28 July 1999. See also ‘Both EU and Candidates Should Put Emotions Aside’, Czech News Agency CTK, 27 July 1999. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   13 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   14 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37.   15 ‘EU Enlargement: Turf War’, EIU Business Eastern Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 28 July 1999.   16 National Strategy for Integration, 1997, para. 2.110.   17 Interview with Leszek Jesień.   18 Agenda 2000 – ‘Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union’ DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997, p. 43. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-­op-en.pdf.   19 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 75.   20 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 245.   21 ‘EU Representative on Negotiations with Poland’, Polish News Bulletin, 23 July 1998, based on 23 July 1998 issues of Gazeta Wyborcza, No. 171, p. 11 and Rzeczpospolita, No. 171, p. 9.   22 Euro­pean Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Novem­ber, 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 17.   23 Euro­pean Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, Brussels, 13 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 31.   24 ‘Successive Poland–EU Negotiation Round Opened’, Polish News Bulletin, 8 Decem­ber 1999.   25 See ‘Poland’s Negotiations Position – Free Movement of Capital’. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   26 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000.   27 Treaty Establishing the Euro­pean Community (Consolidated version), Euro-­Lex. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/eur-­lex/en/treat­ies/dat/C_2002325EN.003301. html, Art. 56, Para 1.   28 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 14.   29 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, pp. 75–6.   30 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz.

Notes    193   31 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37. This strong his­tor­ical argument was also used by Hun­gar­ian negotiators.   32 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37.   33 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 76.   34 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’.   35 See A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 37.   36 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440.   37 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440.   38 Interview with Alan Mayhew. This issue will be discussed in the part on EU assessment of the Polish position.   39 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski. This prob­lem was indicated by many people whom I interviewed.   40 Most politicians and experts whom I inter­viewed agreed with this statement, for example Alan Mayhew, Ryszard Czarnecki, Paweł Samecki and Jan Kułakowski, to name but a few.   41 See CBOS Survey, ‘Czy warto przystąpić do Unii Europejskiej – Plusy i Minusy Integracji’, Table 6, July 1999. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   42 CBOS Survey, ‘Ocena negocjacji akcesyjnych oraz nadzieje i obawy związane z wejściem Polski do Unii Europejskiej’, May 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   43 CBOS Survey, ‘Opinie o skutkach integracji Polski z Unią Europejską i przebiegu negocjacji akcesyjnych’, Table 5, July 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje. gov.pl.   44 CBOS Survey, Decem­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   45 Demoskop Survey, Octo­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   46 This is inter­esting, espe­cially when put into the con­text that the unemployment rate in Poland in Octo­ber 2000 was around 15 per cent.   47 Interview with Jerzy Buzek.   48 ‘Euro­pean Commissioner Verheugen Urges Poland to Speed Up its Pre­para­tion Effort towards Accession’, IP/00/192, Warsaw, 25 Febru­ary 2000. Online. Available: www.europa.eu.int/rapid/.   49 ‘A New Momentum for Enlargement’, IP/00/1264, Brussels, 8 Novem­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.europa.eu.int/rapid/.   50 See ‘1998 Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, 2000, p. 17, 39 and 44; 2001, p. 52. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_ documents/.   51 See ‘2271 Council’s Meeting’, Conceil/00/205, Luxembourg, 13 June 2000, 9274/00 (Presse 205). Online. Available: www.eu.int/rapid/.   52 See ‘Poland’s Negotiations Position – Free Movement of Capital’. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   53 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. See further L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004. pp. 244–5.   54 Interview with Jan Kułakowski.   55 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki.   56 See ‘Commission Proposes Transitional Periods for Purchase of Real Estate by Candidate Countries’, IP 01/645, Brussels, 4 May 2001. Online. Available: http://europa. eu.int/rapid/.

194   Notes   57 ‘Commission Proposes Transitional Periods for Purchase of Real Estate by Candidate Countries’, IP 01/645, Brussels, 4 May 2001. Online. Available: http://europa. eu.int/rapid/.   58 P. Norman, ‘Curbs Proposed on Sales of Land’, Financial Times, 5 May 2001.   59 ‘Poland Will Wait for Official EU Stand on Land Sales’, PAP, 6 May 2001.   60 Interview with Jan Kułakowski.   61 ‘Poland Will Wait for Official EU Stand on Land Sales’, PAP, 6 May 2001.   62 Coalition of the SLD and the UP won 216, whilst PSL 42 in 460 seats of the Parliament.   63 See ‘Commission Welcomes Progress of Accession Negotiations since Adoption of the “Road Map” ’ IP/01/1356, Brussels, 2 Octo­ber 2001. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/.   64 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   65 ‘Miller’s Goals: EU Accession and Economic Growth’, Polish News Bulletin, 16 Octo­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   66 ‘Poland’s Ruling Party Wants to Speed Up Negotiations with EU’, PAP, 31 Octo­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   67 See A. Stankiewicz, ‘Postęp w negocjacjach jest potrzebny – an inter­view with the Chief Negotiator Jan Truszczyński’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 Novem­ber 2001.   68 L. Jesień, Spotkania na Bagateli Polska. Europa. Świat. – rozmowa z Janem Kułakowskim, Warszawa: Rhetos, 2004, p. 241.   69 Interview with a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess – see the List of Interviewees.   70 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450.   71 ‘Miller’s Goals: EU Accession and Economic Growth’, Polish News Bulletin, 16 Octo­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   72 K. Małcużynski, ‘Polish Foreign Minister Rejects Criticism of Government Concessions in EU Negotiations’, Associated Press, 23 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   73 K. Małcużynski, ‘Polish Foreign Minister Rejects Criticism of Government Concessions in EU Negotiations’, Associated Press, 23 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   74 ‘LPR, PiS Call for Referendum on Land Sale’, PAP, 21 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   75 ‘Polish Opposition Parties Call for Referendum in EU Land Sales’, PAP, 21 Novem­ ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   76 See CBOS Survey, Figure 2, July 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   77 ‘Kalinowski on Regulations Concerning Sales of Land to Foreigners’, PAP, 22 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   78 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   79 ‘Kalinowski on Regulations Concerning Sales of Land to Foreigners’, PAP, 22 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   80 ‘Cimoszewicz: We Made Organizational and Technical Mistake’, PAP, 28 Novem­ ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   81 CBOS Opinion Poll, Decem­ber 2001, pp. 1–2.   82 ‘Landaburu: Funds for EU Accession Pre­para­tions Should Not be Cut’, PAP, 10 Janu­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   83 ‘Polish EU Negotiators Must Maintain Decision-­Making Autonomy’, PAP, 11 Janu­ ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   84 ‘Polish Coalition Junior Party Promises to Defend Polish Interests in EU Talks’, PAP, 27 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   85 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002.   86 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002.

Notes    195   87 ‘Government Waits for Verheugen with Decision on EU Land Sale Terms’, Polish News Bulletin, 28 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   88 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002. See also A. Styliński, ‘Verheugen Optimistic about Poland’s EU Accession Sees Compromise on Sensitive Land Sales’, Associated Press, 28 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   89 A. Styliński, ‘Verheugen Optimistic about Poland’s EU Accession Sees Compromise on Sensitive Land Sales’, Associated Press, 28 Febru­ary 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com .   90 ‘Polish Premier Promises Government Stance on Land: Ease for EU by End of Week’, PAP, 28 Febru­ary 2002.   91 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees.   92 ‘EU Accession – a Step Closer’, The Warsaw Voice, 10 March 2002.   93 See further ‘EU/Poland: Deal In Sight on Land Sales?’, Europe Information Service, 6 March 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   94 ‘Poland’s Contribution to EU to be Revised, Premier Says’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 March 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   95 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees.   96 ‘Central Europe/Baltic Media Roundup on EU-­related issues 14–20 Mar 2002’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 March 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   97 The reason why Dutch was par­ticu­larly im­port­ant is because there were many Dutch-­leased farms in Poland.   98 Interview with Alan Mayhew.   99 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 100 S. Spiteri, ‘Poland Given Best Deal on Sales of Land’, 22 March 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 101 ‘Accession – Two Steps Closer to the EU’, The Warsaw Voice, 31 March 2002. 102 ‘Günter Verheugen Welcomes Provisional Closure of Chapters on Free Movement of Capital with Poland’, IP 02/452, Brussels, 21 March 2002. Online. Available: www.eu.int/rapid/. 103 See ‘2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession’, p. 60. 104 See Euro­pean Commission, ‘2003 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland’s Pre­para­tions for Membership’. Online. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ archives/key_docu­ments/, p. 25. 105 M. Frydrych, ‘No to Referendum on Sale of Land to Foreigners’, 21 March 2002. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com. 106 ‘Brussels OKs, Holland May Object’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2002. 107 ‘PSL: Farmland Turnover Law Should be Adopted Before April 16’, PAP, 27 April 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 108 ‘The Attitude of Poles towards Integration’, Decem­ber 2001 – Janu­ary 2002, The CBOS Opinion Poll, The PBS Polling Centre, UKIE. Online. Available: www.ukie. gov.pl, p. 5. 109 ‘Public Attitude towards Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union – Decem­ber 2002’, Office of the Committee for Euro­pean Integration. Online. Available: www. ukie.gov.pl, p. 4. 110 ‘Radical Party Wants Referendum on Land Sale to Foreigners’, BBC Monitoring International, 15 Octo­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl. 111 ‘LPR Proposes Referendum on Land Sale to Foreigners’, PAP, 15 Octo­ber 2002. 112 ‘Law and Justice Wants Stronger Protection of Polish Land’, Polish News Bulletin, 13 Novem­ber 2002. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 113 See further ‘Commission Adopts Favourable Opinion on the Accession of Ten Candidate Countries’, IP/03/263 Brussels, 19 Febru­ary 2003. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/.

196    Notes 114 ‘Land Purchase – Bone of Contention in EU Accession Process’, Polish News Bulletin, 20 Janu­ary 2003 based on 18–19 Janu­ary issue of Rzeczpospolita, p. B2. 115 ‘Ruling Coalition’s Break-­up Leaves SLD with Choice of Minority Government or Earlier Elections’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 116 ‘Ruling Coalition’s Break-­up Leaves SLD with Choice of Minority Government or Earlier Elections’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 117 ‘Ruling Coalition’s Break-­up Leaves SLD with Choice of Minority Government or Earlier Elections’, Polish News Bulletin, 6 March 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 118 ‘Radical Parties Against Signing EU Accession Treaty’, PAP, 7 April 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 119 ‘Minister: No Tussles over EU Membership’, PAP, 11 April 2003. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 120 These include the fol­low­ing voivodships: Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Pomorskie, Kujawsko‑Pomorskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Dolnośląskie, Opolskie and Wielkopolskie. 121 See the Accession Treaty, 2003. Online. Available: www.europarl.europs.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/. 122 The State Electoral Commission (PKW). Online. Available: www.pkw.gov.pl. 123 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 124 It should be emphasised that the prob­lem of land sales was stimulated by polit­ical elites. Decision-­makers from all quarters agree that the issue was politicised. This opinion was shared by the former Minister respons­ible for Euro­pean Integration (1997–99), Ryszard Czarnecki, and the Minister respons­ible for Euro­pean Integration in the Miller gov­ern­ment, Danuta Huebner, among others. 6  Freedom of movement of labour     1 Interview with Leszek Jesień.     2 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 450.     3 See ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the Euro­pean Community’, Official Journal of the Euro­pean Communities, C 325/33, 24 Decem­ber 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/, Art. 48.     4 According to L. Friis and A. Jarosz, in inter­na­tional nego­ti­ations outsiders (and in­siders) can improve their bargaining position by tying certain issues together in a package. See further L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 4.     5 There is a great body of liter­at­ure on the issue of the impact of eco­nomic factors and migration. However, this prob­lem will only be touched upon here. For further details see D. Corry (ed.) Economics and Euro­pean Union Migration Policy, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1996, or P. Rees, Population Migration in the Euro­ pean Union, Chichester: Wiley, 1996, or J. Handoll, Free Movement of Persons in the EU, Chichester: Wiley, 1995.     6 The case of the lib­eralisation of the labour market in Britain and Ireland proved most eco­nomic fears to be unjustified, since im­mig­rants are usually taking less attractive jobs on the local labour market.     7 See further A. Stępniak (ed.) Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union to the East. Consequences for Prosperity and Employment in Europe, Opinion on The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Report, Warsaw: Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union, 2000.

Notes    197     8 See ‘CIA – The World Factbook’. Online. Available: www.cia.gov/cia/pub­lications/ factbook/.     9 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 35. See also A. Stępniak, (ed.) Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union to the East. Consequences for Prosperity and Employment in Europe, Opinion on The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Report, Warsaw: Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the Euro­pean Union, 2000, p. 70.   10 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, p. 35.   11 See Eurobarometer ‘Special Bureaux’, Executive Summary Survey Carried Out for the Euro­pean Commission’s Repre­senta­tion in Ger­many, 2002, After the Euro: ‘Information Behaviour, Attitudes towards Enlargement and the EU’. Online. Available: http://europa.EU.int/comm/pub­lic_opinion/enlargement_en.htm, accessed 14 March 2005, pp. 5–6. For stat­ist­ical data concerning unemployment see ‘Unemployment in the EU and the Central Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, Eurostat News Release, Stat 02/93, 5 Au­gust 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   12 Flash Eurobarometer 124 ‘Euro­pean Union Enlargement’, UK Opinion Poll, April 2002. Online. Available: http://Europa.EU.Int/Comm/Public_Opinion/Enlargement_ en.htm, accessed 14 March 2005, p. 18.   13 According to CBOS Opinion Poll, July 2000, about 35 per cent were inter­ested in working abroad, but in a survey in a CBOS made in May 2000, about 78 per cent of respondents declared sup­port for the prin­ciple of freedom of movement of persons.   14 According to an Opinion Poll conducted on May 2002, 51 per cent of Poles discussed the work possib­il­ities in the EU and the issue of unemployment. See ‘The Report: Public Attitude toward Poland’s Integration with the Euro­pean Union’, May 2002. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl, p. 2.   15 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz.   16 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz and Sławomir Tokarski.   17 Interview with Alan Mayhew.   18 A. Mayhew, ‘Enlargement of the Euro­pean Union: An Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, SEI Working Paper, 2000, No. 39, pp. 56–7.   19 Interview with Alan Mayhew.   20 The Committee for Euro­pean Integration, ‘National Strategy for Integration’, Warsaw 1997, Para 2.69. These costly solutions espe­cially apply to unemployment and other social benefits.   21 National Strategy of Integration, 1997, Para. 2.67.   22 National Strategy of Integration, 1997, Para. 2.62 and Para. 2.69.   23 Agenda 2000 – ‘Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Euro­pean Union’, DOC/97/16, Brussels, 15 July 1997. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-­op-en.pdf, p. 47.   24 Interview with Ewa Kubis.   25 Most senior officials emphasised that the set aside method was one of the core elements of the EU nego­ti­ation strat­egy. Thus, the EU emphasised the incompatibilities of certain regulations with the acquis; how­ever, it was not very willing to start proper negotiations.   26 See ‘Cardiff Euro­pean Council 15 and 16 June 1998 Presidency Conclusions’, Doc 98/10. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   27 ‘Vienna Euro­pean Council 11 and 12 Decem­ber 1998, Presidency Conclusions’, D/98/12. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   28 ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000, pp. 16–17.

198    Notes   29 ‘Commission Adopts Reports on Progress by Candidate Countries’, IP/98/964, Brussels, 4 Novem­ber 1998. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   30 See ‘Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU Report’, 2000.   31 See further Council and Commission Directives and Regulations on the Freedom of Movement of Workers, in par­ticu­lar Council Directive 68/1612/EEC as amended (Commission Directive 70/1251/EEC), Council Directive 68/360/EEC, further extended by Council Directive 72/194/EEC, Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC, Commission Regulation 1251/70/EEC.   32 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 47.   33 ‘Poland’s Position Papers’, p. 48.   34 See ‘1999 National Programme of Pre­para­tions for Membership in the EU’, Para 3.1.5.1. and ‘2000 National Programme of Pre­para­tions for Membership in the EU’, Para 2.1. Online. Available: www.ukie.gov.pl.   35 Interview with Jan Kułakowski.   36 Interview with Jerzy Buzek.   37 Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz.   38 Q. Peel and F. Studemann, ‘Ger­many Social Democrats Would Seek “Lengthy Delay” to Free Movement of Workers from East’, Financial Times, 2 June 1998.   39 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 438.   40 ‘EU Negotiations on Labour Movement to open on 26 May’, Polish News Bulletin, 22 May 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   41 ‘Poland, EU Open Entry Negotiations in Three Sensitive Areas’, PAP, 26 May 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   42 See further ‘Slovak Press Survey’, Czech News Agency CTK, 9 May 2001 and ‘Transition Period in Labour Movement Supported by Austria’, Czech News Agency CTK, 22 Janu­ary 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   43 A. Diamantopoulou, ‘Speech on the Conference on Euro­pean Employment and Social Policy and Enlargement’, SPEECH/00/176, Prague, 11 May 2000. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   44 M. Smith, ‘Europe: EU Expansion May Trigger Worker Inflow’, Financial Times, 20 May 2000.   45 The number of people declaring their willingness to work abroad was higher than the actual number of people who would really work abroad. According to a sociologist Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz, it indicates the fact that this issue was im­port­ant for the pub­lic and people want to have such an oppor­tun­ity. Interview with Elżbieta Skotnicka-­Illasiewicz.   46 CBOS Survey, July 2000, negocjacje.gov.pl.   47 CBOS Survey, Octo­ber 2000, negocjacje.gov.pl.   48 C. Brand, ‘EC Proposes Delayed Entrance for Free Movement of Workers from East’, Associated Press, 11 April 2001. See also D. Lister, ‘EC Plans to Curb Influx from Ex-­Communist Bloc’, The Times, 12 April 2001.   49 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees.   50 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki. The great majority of senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess are crit­ical in their assessment of Polish trade unions, although they often do not want to be named and simply preferred to speak about it ‘off the record’.   51 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki.   52 According to a senior official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, one can even go further in this argument to say that lib­eralisation could weaken the inter­est of trade unions. First, due to migration, the number of trade union members in Poland could drop. Second, the unemployment rate might drop, which paradoxically does not serve trade unions since workers are more willing to join trade unions if the fear of losing employment is high.

Notes   199   53 Interview with Ewa Kubis, Member of the Kułakowski and Truszczyński Negotiation Teams and Secretary to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kułakowski.   54 See Ryszard Czarnecki and Paweł Samecki, to name but a few.   55 H. Simonian, ‘Schroder in Warning on Jobs Access’, Financial Times, 19 Decem­ber 2000.   56 H. Simonian, ‘Schroder in Warning on Jobs Access’, Financial Times, 19 Decem­ber 2000.   57 OBOP Opinion Poll, Decem­ber 2000, negocjacje.gov.pl.   58 T. Czuczka, ‘Ger­many’s Schroeder Defends Curbs on East Euro­pean Workers’, Associated Press, 21 Decem­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   59 ‘EU Enlargement: Neth­er­lands Suggests Softer Schengen and Full Free Movement’, Europe Information Service, 20 Decem­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com.   60 ‘EU Enlargement: Year-­End Suggests New-­Year Problems’, Europe Information Service, 23 Decem­ber 2000. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   61 ‘Poles to Seek Employment in EU after 2007’, Polish News Bulletin, 16 Janu­ary 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   62 A. Diamantopoulou, Euro­pean Commissioner respons­ible for Employment and Social Affairs, ‘The Euro­pean Employment Strategy and Social Model Signing of Joint Assessment Paper with Poland’, SPEECH/01/29 Warsaw, 29 Janu­ary 2001. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   63 ‘Employment and Labour Markets: Poland and Commission Sign Agreement to Accelerate Reform of Employment Systems in Pre­para­tion for Enlargement’, IP/01/127 Brussels, 29 Janu­ary 2001. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/.   64 Interview with Jerzy Buzek.   65 ‘Poland to Push for Free Movement of Labour in EU Talks’, Agence France Presse, 7 March 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   66 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 4.   67 ‘Poland to Push for Free Movement of Labour in EU Talks’, Agence France Presse, 7 March 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   68 J. Dempsey, ‘Europe: Brussels Sets Out Migration Options. Free Movement of Labour Commission Plays Down Fears of Massive Influx from Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 8 March 2001. See also B. Evans-­Pritchard, ‘Commission Working Paper on Free Labour Movement’, 8 March 2001. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ ver.com.   69 J. Dempsey, ‘Europe: Brussels Sets Out Migration Options. Free Movement of Labour Commission Plays Down Fears of Massive Influx from Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 8 March 2001.   70 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 440.   71 ‘Enlargement: Commission Proposes Flexible Transitional Arrangements for the Free Movement of Workers’, IP/01/561 Brussels, 11 April 2001. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. ‘Will Western Europe Receive the Great Unwashed-­One Day?’, The Economist, 21 April 2001.   72 C. Brand, ‘EC Proposes Delayed Entrance for Free Movement of Workers from East’, Associated Press, 11 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   73 ‘Poland Opposes 7-Year Restriction on Free Movement of Labour after EU Entry’, Agence France Presse, April 11 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   74 ‘EU Enlargement: Spain Strikes a New Note in Accession Talks’, Europe Information Service, 28 April 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   75 ‘Spain Blocks EU–Poland Negotiations on Free Movement of Labour’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 21 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.

200    Notes See also J. Sparshott, ‘News Spain Calls Halt to Polish–EU Negotiations in a Move to Protect Funds for Its Own Underde­veloped Regions, Spain Put the Breaks on Accession Talks’, Warsaw Business Journal, 21 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   76 R. Macpherson, ‘EU to Keep Hammering Away on Free-­Movement Deal’, Agence France Presse, 14 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. See also I. Black, ‘Comment and Analysis: Putting the Squeeze On: Inside Europe’, The Guardian, 21 May 2001.   77 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 4.   78 ‘Poland Fails to Budge Spain on Labour Movement in EU’, Agence France Presse, 16 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   79 R. Macpherson, ‘EU to Keep Hammering Away on Free-­Movement Deal’, Agence France Presse, 14 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   80 J. Sparshott, ‘News Poland Set to Close Next Stage of EU Negotiations EU Member Countries are Busy Figuring out How to Dive up Funds that Promote Economic Development Once a Wave of Central and Eastern Euro­pean Candidate Countries Become Members’, Financial Times Information, Warsaw Business Journal, 28 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   81 D. Spinant, ‘Candidates Make United Front Ahead of EU Summit’, 24 May 2001. Online. Available: www.euob­ser­ver.com.   82 ‘EU Enlargement: Pressure to Break the Deadlock’, Europe Information Service, 30 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   83 See further ‘Euro­pean Economic and Social Committee, EU–Hun­gary JCC: Excessive Restrictions on the Free Movement of Labour are Unjustified’, CES 01/62 Brussels, 29 May 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   84 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 5.   85 L. Crawford and H. Simonian, Financial Times, 30 May 2001.   86 In 2000 the unemployment rate in Hun­gary was 9.4 and was declining to 5.5 per cent in 2004, whilst in Poland the unemployment had increased from 12 per cent in 1999 to 19.4 per cent in 2004. See ‘The World Fact Book CIA’. Online. Available: www.cia.gov.   87 ‘Poland’s Position on EU Labour and Land Talks Undercut’, Interfax Poland Business Review, 11 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   88 J. Dempsey, ‘Hun­gary Unlocks Progress in EU Enlargement Talks’, Financial Times, 13 June 2001.   89 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999. Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.htm, p. 5.   90 D. Cole, ‘Frankfurt-­an-der-­Oder, Ger­many’, Agence France Presse, 18 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   91 ‘Ambassador Says Poland against Restrictions on Work Force Movement’, Baltic News Service, 5 July 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   92 ‘Latvia Accepts Seven-­Year EU Labour Restrictions’, Agence France Presse, 19 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   93 ‘Slovakia Closes EU Chapter on Free Movement of Labour’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 June 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   94 ‘Czechs May Stay Alone with Opposition to 7-Year Period – Die Presse’, Czech News Agency CTK, 6 Au­gust 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   95 ‘Poland’s Foreign Minister Says Final Phase in EU Negotiations Most Difficult’, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 Octo­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.

Notes    201   96 ‘Poland Wants to Change Strategy in EU Accession Negotiations’, Polish News Bulletin, 15 Novem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com.   97 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 450.   98 Interview with Jerzy Buzek.   99 ‘EU/Poland: Polish Prime Minister Meets Romano Prodi’, Europe Information Service, 8 Decem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 100 ‘Poland Makes “Important Step” towards EU Accession – EU Commission Spokesman’, AFX Euro­pean Focus, 21 Decem­ber 2001. Online. Available: www.lexis-­ nexis.com. 101 ‘Key Developments: Poland’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 21 Janu­ary 2002. 102 See ‘Unemployment in the EU and the Central Euro­pean Candidate Countries’, Eurostat News Release, STAT/02/93, 5 Au­gust 2002. Online. Available: http:// europa.eu.int/rapid/. 103 See ‘Labour Force Survey’, Eurostat News Release, STAT/02/101, 29 Au­gust 2002. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/. 104 Treaty of Accession, 2003. Online. Available: www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/, p. 3749. 105 Before the Athens Summit, the EU Commission published another report on employment in the candidate coun­tries: Commission reports on data and challenges. See ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro­pean Parliament, the Euro­pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, Brussels, 30 Janu­ary 2003, COM 37. Online. Available: http://europa.eu.int/comm/ employment/. 106 Treaty of Accession, 2003, pp. 3749–52. 107 Treaty of Accession, 2003, p. 3753. 108 See further ‘Report on the Results of the Negotiations on the Accession of Cyprus, Malta, Hun­gary, Poland, The Slovak Repub­lic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithu­ania, The Czech Repub­lic and Slovenia to the Euro­pean Union’, prepared by the Commission’s Departments, p. 7. 109 See for instance C. Brand, ‘EU’s Prodi Critical of Current EU National Restrictions on New Country Migrant Workers’, Associated Press, 25 Febru­ary 2004. Online. Available: www.lexis-­nexis.com. 110 L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copen­hagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997, p. 8. 111 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 450. 112 Most politicians whom I inter­viewed, argued that Polish media cor­res­pondents were manipulated by the EU press ser­vice, which argued that Poland is impeding the accession process. 113 See R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3 and L. Friis, When Europe Negotiates. From Europe Agreement to Eastern Enlargement, Copen­hagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997. 114 Interview with Jerzy Buzek. 115 Interview with Jan Kułakowski. 116 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, No. 42, Vol. 3, p. 438. 7  Concluding remarks   1 According to Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz, adviser to Prime Minister Buzek, this was indicated in a number of opinion polls. See inter­view with Elżbieta Skotnicka Illasiewicz. This opinion was shared by most senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ ation pro­cess, whom I interviewed.

202    Notes   2 See for instance Demoskop Opinion Poll, April 2001, where 67 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that the great majority of people do not know why Poland should join the EU, Demoskop Opinion Poll, ‘Opinie na temat integracji z Unią Europejską’, Table 2, April 2001. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   3 See CBOS Opinion Poll, ‘Czy warto przystąpić do Unii Europejskiej – Plusy i Minusy Integracji’, Table 3, July 1999. Online. Available: www.negocjacje.gov.pl.   4 Such an opinion was shared by most of the people whom I interviewed.   5 Nevertheless, the drop in sup­port for the gov­ern­ment was mainly caused by a dis­ integ­ration of the AWS and a series of polit­ical and corruption scandals.   6 Such an opinion was shared by a few officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess, including Jaroslaw Pietras.   7 This opinion was expressed by a few senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation process.   8 One should remember that before the elections, AWS was struggling for further exist­ ence in pol­itics and in fact, the co­ali­tion did not even manage to pass the 8 per cent elect­oral threshold in the 2001 parlia­ment­ary election and con­sequently was wiped out from the polit­ical scene.   9 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 442. 10 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 445. 11 See the part re­gard­ing theorising Polish nego­ti­ation strategy. 12 Such an opinion was shared by a great majority of decision-­makers whom I interviewed. 13 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 448. 14 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 449. 15 L. Friis and A. Jarosz, ‘When the Going Gets Tough. The EU’s Enlargement Negotiations with Poland’, Danish Institute of International Affairs Working Papers, 1999, Online. Available: www.dupi.dk/webtxt/wp9905.html, pp. 4–5. 16 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 17 Even the strong polit­ical op­pon­ents of Deputy Prime Minister Kalinowski admitted that due to his pressure, milk quotas were raised to the level of 8.5 million tonnes from the level of 7 million tonnes. 18 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 440. 19 Interview with a senior official – see the List of Interviewees. 20 Espe­cially PSL, which after the closing nego­ti­ations promoted a bill that limits the free trade of farmland, even on the do­mestic market. PSL was afraid that consolidation of farmland would reduce the number of family farms and as a result the number of voters in the agricultural area. Thus, since the PSL electorate is almost entirely agri­cul­ture based, its electorate would shrink. 21 Since the majority of PSL and Samoobrona MPs are either farmers or their direct incomes depend on farming. 22 Such an opinion was shared by a great majority of decision-­makers whom I interviewed. 23 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 450. 24 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 453. 25 Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 136.

Notes    203 26 Ch. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964, p. 137. 27 This opinion was shared by a senior-­level EU official involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­ cess – see the List of Interviewees. 28 Interview with a senior Polish official – see the List of Interviewees. 29 Most senior officials involved in the nego­ti­ation pro­cess share this view, for example Ryszard Czarnecki and Alan Mayhew. 30 However, it would be to sim­plify the prob­lem to argue that EU increased euro-­ enthusiasm in Poland only to increase their bargaining position. 31 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 451. 32 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-­Wolski. 33 Interview with a senior EU official – see the List of Interviewees. 34 R. D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games’, International Organization, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 460.

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News Agence France Presse BBC Worldwide Monitoring CTK Europe Information Service Financial Times Gazeta Prawna Gazeta Wyborcza Interfax PAP Polish News Bulletin Polityka Reuters Rzeczpospolita The Associated Press The Economist The Economist Intelligence Unit Guardian Independent The Times The Warsaw Voice

Opinion surveys CBOS Demoskop Eurobarometer OPOP PBS

Index

Bold page numbers indicate figures; italics indicate tables. accession application, submission of 46 accession countries, real estate purchase 107–108 accession negotiations see negotiations Accession Partnership 50 accession process 54 accession, support in EU countries 48–49 Accession Treaty 53, 55, 60–61, 95, 97–98, 100, 124, 126–127, 134, 153–154, 163 acquis communautaire 50, 64, 69, 103, 108–109, 113, 135 Agenda 2000 63–64, 70 agriculture acceleration of negotiations 75, 81–87 clarification of Polish position 92 Copenhagen negotiations 92–97 Danish proposal 93–94 domestic win-set 102 EU critique of Poland 71–73 EU proposals 76–77 EU response 70–71 EU response to modified position 91–92 farmers’ views 70 flexibility in negotiations 76 impact of EU accession 91 importance of 9–10 liberalisation negotiations 71–74 modification of Polish position 89–91 negotiating positions 69–71 negotiation targets 69–70 opening negotiations 64–65 overview of negotiations 62–63 Polish response to Danish proposal 94–95 political negotiations 5 pressure from political parties and interest groups 86–87 production surpluses 72 progress report 67 public opinion 66–67, 78–82 role of farmers’ unions 81–82 screening 65–69 stiffening of EU position 87–88 stiffening of Polish position 88–89

summary and conclusions 101–102 win-sets 101–102 aid 65, 71, 93, 143 Almond, Gabriel 29 Almond–Lipmann consensus 15 analysis, level of see level of analysis Andriessen, Franz 41–42 Application concerning Poland’s Accession to the European Union 46 Association Agreement 6, 41–43, 45 asymmetry of information 24 asymmetry, of negotiating sides 24–25 attentive public 29 Austria, free movement of labour 136, 140 AWS–UW government 103, 114, 120, 128 Balazs, Artur 68 bargaining power 2, 25 bargaining, strategies 26–27 battering ram strategy 27, 73, 76, 93, 128, 145, 155, 162, 166 Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 2, 14, 23, 83, 88, 101, 162, 166bias 3 bottom-up process 30 Buzek, Jerzy 70, 74, 130, 135, 141, 147, 150, 154–155, 159 candidates, conditions for 44 case studies importance of 157–159 lessons learned 167–168 reasons for choosing 8–11 cause groups 31 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) report 70 Chief Negotiator 21, 59; see also Kułakowski, Jan; Truszczyński, Jan Christian National Union (ZChN) 114 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz 16, 76, 92, 94, 117–118, 126, 149 Clarke, Michael 28 classical realism 15

Index   213 coalition governments 75, 83–85, 126; see also AWS–UW government; SLD-PSL government coalitions 19 Cohen, Bernard C. 31–32 collective identity 38 Committee for European Integration (KIE) 58–59, 121, 149 Common Agricultural Policy 63–64 communicative action 23 communism, rejection of 39 community of interests 39–40 community of values 38–39 competition rules 44–45 complexity, of negotiations 53–55 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland 2003 124 concessions, managing image of 25–26 conditionality 50 conditions, for candidates 44 constructivism 15 coordination within the enlargement wave 26, 145, 163 Copenhagen criteria 37 Copenhagen Summit, 1993 43–45, 92–97, 99–100 costs, adjusting agriculture to EU standards 69 Council of the European Union, role of 60–61 culture European heritage 38 land-based 104–105 Czarnecki, Ryszard 114, 139 Czech Republic 107, 140–141, 147 Danish proposal 93–95 dead-weight catching 26, 72, 82, 94, 155, 163 decision-making theory 15 Delors, Jacques 42 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 29, 74–75, 79, 83, 92, 95, 100, 115–116, 121–122, 126, 159–160, 162 democratic process 3 Diamantopoulou, Anna 137 diplomatic relations 40 direct payments acceptability 84 desirability of 71–72 EU position on 82 modified position 89 opposition to 70–71 overview 9–10 phasing in 77–78 request for 69 simplified system 92 Directorate General for Enlargement 61 disillusionment, danger of 3 domestic calculus 21, 165 domestic groups 4 domestic institutions 162 domestic politics 27–28, 159–160 domestic pressure 1–4, 8, 28–33, 35–36 domestic theories 16 domestic win-sets 35–36, 157

double-threat 95 dual character, of negotiations 24 duty-free import quotas 73 EC policy, lack of coherence 42 elite manipulation 17, 30 elite political culture 16–17 elites 29–30 empirical analysis, literature 6 enlargement benefits of 2 literature 6–7 motives for 40 reasons for 7 support for 48–49 Erler, Petra 75 Estonia 108 EU Commission questionnaire 48 EU Commission Reports 109, 113 EU countries, support for application 48–49 Europe Agreement 43 European Commission Opinion on Poland 65 role of 61 European heritage 38 European Integration Committee (KIE) 58–59, 121, 149 European Parliament 53, 55, 60–61 European Union basis of decision to expand 2 conditions for candidates 44 critique of Poland 71–73 negotiation structure 60–61 position before Seville Summit 82 report 2002 81 unemployment survey 153 faceless sources, of public opinion 32 farm subsidies 97–98 farmers’ unions 81–82 farmers, views of 70 Fischler, Franz 65, 68, 71–72, 77, 80, 88, 99 food mountains 72 foreign policy 27–28 Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA) report 81, 89 free movement of labour 9 acceleration of negotiations 141–149 Accession Treaty 153–154 assessment of negotiating position 135–136 change of government 149 change of position 149–150 domestic critique of position 150 domestic importance 131–134 economic fears 131–132 employers’ positions 139 EU Commission proposal 142–143 EU proposals 139–141 favoured countries 146 German position 136–137, 139–140, 147 guarantee 131 legislation 135 opening negotiations 136–141

214   Index free movement of labour continued overview 11, 130 Polish position 134–135 political factors 133 political negotiations 5 public opinion 137–138, 140, 140, 147–148, 150–151 screening 134 social aspects 132–133 Spanish proposal 143 strategic goal 133–134 summary and conclusions 154–156 trade unions’ positions 138–139 transition periods 141–143, 148, 148, 151, 151, 154 transitional arrangements 138, 153–154 unity amongst accession countries 144–149 win-sets 135–136, 154–156 workers wishes 152 free trade, moves towards 44–45 Freedom Union (UW) 16, 32, 113–115, 159 Friis, Lykke 24, 26, 145

power of 21–22 pressure from 86–87 Intergovernmental Conference on Accession (IGC) 61 intergovernmentalism, Risse’s critique of 23 Intermarium 39 international calculus, vs. domestic 21 Intimates 32 Iwiński, Tadeusz 116

Gabel, Matthew 15–16 Gaudenzi, Françoise 71, 109 Geremek, Bronisław 50 Germany free movement of labour 136–137, 139–140, 147 support for enlargement 48–49 Giertych, Roman 86, 99–100 Giziński, Szymon 86 goal, of accession negotiation 25 Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union 59 Grabble, Heather 44

land ownership 9–11; see also real estate purchase Landaburu, Eneko 76, 120 Latvia 147 Law and Justice Party (PiS) 100, 117, 125 League of Polish Families (LPR) 78, 84, 86, 117, 124–126 legislation free movement of labour 135 screening 50–51 legitimacy 58 Lepper, Andrzej 86, 126 Level I agreement 19 Level II agreement 19, 26 Level II preferences and coalitions 160–161 level of analysis overview 14 problem 14–17 Waltz’s three levels 14–15 liberalisation attitudes towards 68–69, 112 lack of public support 66 negotiations 71–74 trade 45 liberalisation agreement 73–74 Libicki, Marcin 87 linkage groups 31

Haczyk, Ewa 121 Havel, Vaclav 140–141 heritage, as European 38 Hill, Christopher 27, 29, 31 Holsti, K.J. 15 Huebner, Danuta 83, 117 Hungary 107, 144–145 hypotheses 35–36 identity 38 ideological dispute, over membership 39 ideology, and public opinion 10 impersonal sources, of public opinion 32–33 import duties 73 influence 3–4 Institutions 32 Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) 68, 70, 75–76, 98 Inter-Governmental Conference on Accession 55 interest groups defining 4–5 noisy 31 in Poland 32–33 and policy making 30–31

Janowski, Gabriel 86 Jarosz, Anna 24–26, 145 Jesień, Leszek 108, 144 Kalinowski, Jarosław 78–79, 83, 86, 88–89, 92, 94–98, 100, 117, 122, 124 Klestil, Thomas 140 Kohl, Helmut 42 Krok-Paszkowska, Anna 7 Kułakowski, Jan 16, 47, 59, 64, 74, 109, 114–115, 135, 139, 143–145 Kubis, Ewa 138

Marxism 15 mass media 21–22, 75 mass public 29 Mayhew, Alan 88, 98, 105, 107, 110–111, 123, 127, 133 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 41 member states, role of 60–61 membership conditions, assessment of 125 methods, research 12–13 milk quota 96–97 Miller, Leszek 77–78, 94–95, 97–100, 115–116, 121–122, 126, 149–150, 155, 163

Index   215 Moller, Per Stig 94 Moravcsik, Andrew 2, 7, 16, 20–23 motives, for joining EU 37–40 movement of capital 110 National Chamber of the Economy 139 national identity 38 National Programme of Preparations for Membership (NPPM) 50 National Strategy of Integration 23–24, 39, 133–134 negotiating sides, asymmetry of 24–25 negotiating styles 59–60 negotiation periods, characteristics 103–104 negotiation process 49–52 Accession Treaty 53 position papers 51–52 positions 53 preparation 49–50 screening 50–51 negotiation strategies 20, 23–27 negotiation strategy, EU, theorising 165–166 ‘Negotiation Strategy for the Polish government’ 76 negotiation strategy, Poland, theorising 162–165 negotiation structure, European Union 60–61 negotiation team 59–60 negotiations complexity of 53–55 defining 5 dual character of 24 dynamics in domestic politics 159–160 goal of 25 levels of 54–55 organisational structure 53–61 political leadership 55–59 as two-level game 3 neo-liberal institutionalism 15, 17 neo-realism 15, 17 Netherlands 140 Niemiec, Józef 138 noisy interest groups 31 Olechowski, Andrzej 46 opinion polls 4, 66–67, 78–80, 83–85, 89–91, 95, 106, 112, 117–120, 124–125, 135, 137–138, 140, 147, 150–151; see also public opinion OPZZ 138 organisational structure 53–61 outside lobbying 5, 33 outsiders, negotiating disadvantage 24 package deals 26, 93, 122, 128, 130, 133, 143, 155, 163, 166 parliament, role of 58 Pęk, Bogdan 87 personality, effect of 16, 21 Peterson, Lee Ann 22 PHARE programme 42, 47, 50 Pietras, Jarosław 75, 92 Piskorz, Władysław 65–69, 71, 75, 79, 81 Plewa, Jerzy 65–66, 68, 74

policy and opinion elites 29 Polish Confederation of Private Employers 139 Polish National Strategy of Integration 108 Polish Peasants’ Party bill 11 Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) 75, 78–79, 83–84, 86–88, 92, 100, 104, 116–117, 121–122, 124, 126, 162–164 political crisis 83–85, 126 political dynamics, uniqueness of 5 political leadership 55–59 political parties, pressure from 86–87 political party, defining 5 politics, symbolic 10 position papers 51–52 power, distribution 19 pre-accession financing agreements 77 pre-accession strategy 46–49 preferences 19 preliminary negotiations 41 prenegotiation 5–6 President, role of 58 pressure groups 31 Prodi, Romano 96, 141–142, 150 production quotas 96–97 production surpluses 72 protectionism 68, 72, 89 public interest, issues 1–2 public, mass and attentive 29 public opinion 1, 3–4; see also opinion polls agriculture 81–82, 87, 89–91, 99 change in 66–67 defining 4 and elites 30 EU citizenship 132 free movement of labour 135–138, 140, 140, 147–148, 150–151 influence of 8 on liberalisation 117 of negotiation results 98 and policy making 28–30 pressure from 78–81 real estate purchase 104, 106, 112–113, 117–119, 124–125, 138 sources of 32 Putnam, Robert 1–2, 16–23, 25, 83, 86–87, 89, 102, 110, 116, 149–150, 164–166 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 93 ratification 53, 126, 162 rational choice theories, and social constructivism 23 real estate purchase; see also land ownership Accession Treaty 126 compromise 121 concluding negotiations 121–123 domestic critique of position 117–120 domestic importance 104–106 domestic reactions 124–125 domestic win-set 128–129 EU assessment of Polish position 113 justification of position 110 negotiation process 113–121

216   Index real estate purchase continued in other acceding countries 107–108 overview 103–104 preparation of position 109–113 provisional closing of negotiations 123–124 public opinion 112–113, 117–120, 138 resistance to EU 120–121 screening and EU assessment 108–109 softening of positions 115–117 stages of negotiation 128 summary and conclusions 127 tough negotiations 114–115 win-sets 127–129 referendum 117 regime-type theories 15 regional funding 143 research methods 12–13 research questions 33–35 rhetorical action 7, 23, 38 Risse, Thomas 4, 23, 29 Samecki, Paweł 24 Samoobrona Party 33, 84, 86, 91, 95, 124–126 Sapard programme 71 Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek 47, 92, 141, 166 Schengen facility 93 Schimmelfennig, Frank 6–7, 23, 38 Schroeder, Gerhard 98, 140, 147 screening 103 agriculture 65–69 free movement of labour 134 of legislation 50–51 real estate purchase 108–109 second image realism 17 Sedelmeier, Ulrich 2, 6–7, 38 Self Defence Party see Samoobrona Party Serafin, Władysław 81–82 set aside strategy 128, 166 side-payments 26, 74, 89, 130, 149–150, 155, 163–164 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof 45 SLD–PSL government 103, 126, 128, 160 Slovakia free movement of labour 147 real estate purchase 107 Slovenia 107–108 Smith, Karen E. 46 social consensus 110 social constructivism, and rational choice theories 23 society-centred theories 16 Solidarity 32, 138 Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 74, 114, 116, 120, 128, 159 sources, of public opinion 32 Spain 143, 145 special treatment, requests for 69 Specialists 32 state-centred theories 16 statesmen, role of 21 strategies, pre-accession 46–49 structural dialogue 47

structural realism 17 subsidies 97 Suchocka, Hanna 43 symbolic politics, and public opinion 10 systemic theories 1, 17 tactics 25 tariffs raising 68 removal of 44–45 terms, defining 3–6 theory of international negotiations 5–6 third image realism 17 threat 26–27, 83, 88–89, 93–94, 121–122, 143, 155, 163 Timans, Rolf 64 Tokarski, Sławomir 93–94 top-down process 30 trade liberalisation 45 transition periods 65–66, 69, 110–111, 114–115, 117–123, 127, 141, 148, 148, 151, 151, 154 transitional arrangements, free movement of labour 138, 153–154 Trilateral Commission on East–West relations 40 Truszczyński, Jan 16, 59, 80, 94–95, 116, 121, 123 two-level game model 1, 3, 17–23 tying hands 26, 78–79, 94–95, 99, 101, 110, 128, 154–155, 163 unemployment survey, European Union 153 unit-level theories 16–23 United Kingdom, support for enlargement 48–49 utility-maximising statesman 25, 164 Verba, Sydney 16–17 Verheugen, Gunter 72, 80–81, 87, 113, 121–123, 142 Visegrad countries 25 Walesa, Lech 42 Walt, Stephen 17 Waltz, Kenneth 14–15, 17 White Paper 47–48 Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidi 136 win-sets 1–2 agriculture 101–102 domestic 35–36, 128–129, 168 free movement of labour 135–136, 154–156 manipulating 98–99 overlap 10 real estate purchase 127–129 size and determinants 19–20, 160–162 summary and conclusions 167–168 Zaller, John R. 30 Zeman, Milos 141 Zielonka, Jan 7, 49