The Spirituality of Responsibility: Fethullah Gülen and Islamic Thought 9781350009288, 9781350009295, 9781350009325, 9781350009318

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1 Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade
2 Responsibility
3 Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues
4 Social and Environmental Responsibility
5 Responsibility and Peace-Building
6 Responsibility and Dialogue
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Author Index
Subject Index

Citation preview

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Also available from Bloomsbury European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, edited by Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz The Muslim World and Politics in Transition, edited by Greg Barton, Paul Weller and Ihsan Yilmaz Religion or Belief, Discrimination and Equality, Paul Weller, Kingsley Purdam, Nazila Ghanea and Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor

The Spirituality of Responsibility Fethullah Gülen and Islamic Thought Simon Robinson

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway London New York WC1B 3DP NY 10018 UK USA www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2017 © Simon Robinson 2017 Simon Robinson has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-3500-0928-8 PB: 978-1-3500-0929-5 ePDF: 978-1-3500-0931-8 ePub: 978-1-3500-0930-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Robinson, Simon, 1951- author. Title: The spirituality of responsibility : Fethullah Gèulen and Islamic thought / Simon Robinson. Description: New York, NY : Bloomsbury Academic, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016048839| ISBN 9781350009288 (hardback) | ISBN 9781350009318 (epdf) Subjects: LCSH: Islam–Turkey. | Gèulen, Fethullah–Influence. | Social movements–Religious aspects–Islam. | Responsibility–Religious aspects–Islam. | BISAC: RELIGION / Spirituality. | SOCIAL SCIENCE / Islamic Studies. | SOCIAL SCIENCE / Sociology of Religion. | RELIGION / Ethics. Classification: LCC BP63.T8 R63 2017 | DDC 297.092–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016048839 Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

This book is dedicated to Arthur and Bertie. Watching my two wonderful grandsons (four and two, respectively) reminds me that issues of justice and responsibility begin at the earliest age, with assumptions that justice has not been done, and that responsibility lies elsewhere. The future of responsibility begins there, as parents and children try to make sense of it, and hear what they have to teach each other.

Contents Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

1

1 Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade 2 Responsibility 3 Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues 4 Social and Environmental Responsibility 5 Responsibility and Peace-Building 6 Responsibility and Dialogue

7 33 59 87 113 135

Conclusions

161

Notes Bibliography Author Index Subject Index

185 188 202 205

Acknowledgements I am not an Islamic studies expert. My area of interest is in Christian Pastoral Theology and Applied Ethics, with responsibility central to both. Since meeting Fethullah Gülen, however, I have been fascinated about his contributions to the area of responsibility, such that I have at least become a student of his thinking. Hence, I needed guidance and critique aplenty. I want to thank Ismail Sezgin and Fatih Isik, who I have worked with over the last five years. They taught me more than I taught them about Fethullah Gülen and the Islamic faith. I thank them also for pointing to and translating parts of articles and books not available in English. I also want to thank Ozcan Keles and Cem Erbil of the Dialogue Society in the UK. They have encouraged me to write this book, and have provided tremendous support at every stage.

Introduction

Responsibility is at the heart of what it is to be human. The challenge is to practise it, and so become human. Most public debates come crashing back to this, and are focused in leadership and governance crises of recent decades, not least the credit crisis of 2007/2008. Attempts to ‘solve’ the crises have had little effect, partly because they rely on ‘systems solutions’ which do not address the nature and dynamics of responsibility. It is to that debate, about the meaning of responsibility in practice, that I hope this book will contribute. The book explores a distinctive view of responsibility which is offered by the Turkish Islamic scholar and leader Fethullah Gülen. Influenced by both orthodox Islam and the Sufi tradition, Gülen’s writing contributes a dynamic, holistic and interactive view of responsibility which locates personal identity, agency and freedom in plural relationships. Freedom is found in service, fulfilling responsibility to diverse relationships from social (citizenship) to environmental, and ultimately responsibility to the Creator. In all this Gülen is not a systematic theologian. He does not present a sustained analysis of the concept of responsibility. Hence, my aim in the book has been to draw together thinking which is expressed in books, articles, sermons and interviews. The writings contribute both to the theological and philosophical debate about responsibility but also to the practice of responsibility (focused in creative action), and so to the debates in business and society about responsible governance and enterprise. Hence, I have tried to compare Gülen to significant Western thinkers at various points. What makes Gülen so interesting is that he sits at the centre of a dynamic

2

The Spirituality of Responsibility

and ongoing relationship. Not only does he offer thinking about faith and practice, he is also a public figure. His writings and work in Turkey have inspired the development of a remarkable religious and social phenomenon, the Hizmet Movement. The Movement has developed beyond Turkey and seeks to embody much of the focus on service and responsibility that Gülen writes about. However, in these developments, this dynamic has made Gülen a public figure who has become part of the ongoing social and political dynamics of Turkey. He and the Movement have had things to say about business, democracy, education and so on. Perhaps inevitably this has raised questions about how Gülen and the Movement relate to politics, and how his views on democracy might be developed in practice. It has also led to a major breakdown in relationships with the present government of Turkey.1 This raises major questions then not just about what Gülen means by responsibility, but how it is practised, in the Hizmet Movement but also by Gülen himself. In particular this raises questions about role and leadership. Is Gülen simply a writer or are his words of immediate political relevance? How is the Movement led? Gülen himself disavows any leadership role, but if that is the case how is leadership responsibility effected? For instance, how does the Movement practise accountability? These issues are focused on in the final chapter. The book then aims to address practical as well as theological questions about responsibility, and for this reason I begin Chapter  1 not with an exposition of Gülen’s view of responsibility but rather with his practice in response to a major crisis that occurred in 2010, the Gaza Flotilla Raid. Relations between Israel and Turkey are only reaching resolution in 2016. Gülen’s response to this provides clues about what he means by responsibility, and the case illustrates the centrality of responsibility, and the issues involved, in a public context. Chapter  2 analyses in more detail the concept of responsibility by providing a broad definition of different ‘modes’ of responsibility: imputability, accountability and positive responsibility. This provides the basis for a more detailed analysis of Gülen’s views over this and the following two chapters. This chapter then focuses on responsibility as agency, in effect

Introduction

3

the responsibility to know ones thoughts, values and practice, stressing Gülen’s view of the responsibility of the person to critically examine ideas, values and practice, both in the self and in any organization. This involves a consideration in some detail of Gülen’s moral psychology and the importance of the intellect (tying in with a strong stress on science) as part of a holistic view, and the focus of identity, which stresses relationship with the self as well as to God and others. The implications of Gülen’s views for the debate on responsibility and free will and determinism will then be examined, involving comparison with Western philosophers. This contrasts narrow views of freedom which do not take account of relational reality, with a rich view of freedom based in relationships and the capacity to respond. It also explores potential contradictions in Gülen’s thought on freedom. The chapter will end on the importance of Gülen’s view in working through a framework of spirituality that can both hold its own in the debate and help others involved, from different cultures and disciplines, to locate their spirituality (significant relationships and meaning). Chapter 3 develops Gülen’s moral psychology further focusing on the practice of responsibility as a continued struggle, and the importance of key moral virtues in the development of responsibility. Together these complete a rich and dynamic view of moral agency. Chapter 4 begins to develop responsibility in Gülen in relation to action. It focuses on several aspects of this: stewardship, universal responsibility, environmental responsibility and social responsibility. The first of these focuses on the framework of accountability to God, which lies at the heart of Gülen’s view of responsibility. The second extends the idea of liability for to a position of universal responsibility. It critically examines this in comparison to existentialist and post-holocaust views (Sartre, Arendt, Levinas and Bauman). The importance of a transcendent perspective in enabling this attitude, and tying liability for something or someone into relational accountability is stressed. The third extends Gülen’s view of stewardship, showing how it relates to environmental responsibility. This is compared to Jonas (environmental responsibility), showing how the dynamics of this aspect of responsibility are developed, including

4

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the importance of sharing and negotiating of responsibility. The fourth focus examines social responsibility. In particular this examines the way in which businesspersons in the Hizmet Movement make decisions about and practice social responsibility, and the contributions which Gülen makes to the corporate responsibility debates. This will include an example of professional responsibility based in the Zaman Media group. In a final discussion I consider critiques of this view of responsibility, leading to the next chapter’s consideration of civil responsibility and peace-building. Chapter  5 focuses on Gülen and peace-building, showing how it emerges from his view of responsibility. It compares Gülen with a prominent writer on peace-building John Paul Lederach, setting out illuminating contrasts. Gülen articulates the peace-centredness of Islam, built on universal responsibility and accountability to God for creation. Peace-building is then part of the response of stewardship, responding to the diversity of nature. Creation is also the basis for plurality, and plural identity, demanding respect for and dialogue with the other, based in tolerance and other virtues. It leads to creative response focused in Hizmet and embodied in key projects of health, well-being and education, but with broader cultural implications focused in peace. Chapter 6 aims to show how dialogue in Gülen’s view is not simply a means of communication but rather a key dimension of the practice of responsibility and of the related virtues. Having noted the importance of interfaith dialogue it examines the underlying theology of dialogue, focused in the holistic greater jihad (inner struggle), and the ongoing critical dialogue with tradition, scripture and wider human rights. It goes on to argue that underpinning all of these modes of responsibility for Gülen is dialogue. Indeed, dialogue is key to the practice of responsibility because it enables the development of agency, consciousness of creation and the call to care for it, the capacity to give an account of thought and action, tolerance and the development of shared creative action. Chapter  7 sums up the plurality at the heart of Gülen’s view of responsibility, in relation to politics, business and science. Gülen provides an effective framework which bridges enterprise and social responsibility,

Introduction

5

individual rights and civic responsibility, individual and collective responsibility and the theory, practice and spirituality of responsibility. The chapter then explores weaknesses of Gülen’s view of responsibility and particular critiques, focused on leadership and responsibility. These focus on not simply the ideas of Gülen but how responsibility is worked out in his relationship to the Hizmet Movement, and in relation to wider society. The chapter concludes that the attempt to place Gülen and the Hizmet Movement into a conventional view of accountability precisely misses the point that his view of leadership is based in dialogue, narrative and prophecy (in the sense of speaking truth to power). This suggests a more dynamic and relational view of accountability which demands both conventional organizational accountability (from the different formal organizations within the Movement to the multiple stakeholders) and ongoing dialogic accountability, around core values, justice, relationships and creative practice. This is illustrated by recent inputs from Gülen himself. In sum, the book tries to show a grounded view of the spirituality of responsibility. For Gülen this is grounded in response to God, in reflection on meaning which is grounded in dialogue linking to other theological and philosophical positions and in science, and in dialogue which develops creative response. By definition, this view of responsibility moves away from defence of interests, because it looks beyond institutions to what is possible for the wider world. Hence, it continues to evolve.

1

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

The chapter serves to introduce one of the major themes of this book, responsibility. At different points in history the concept of responsibility is ‘newly discovered’. The late twentieth century, for instance, saw responsibility set up as a key part of business relationships with the social and physical environment. Corporate social responsibility, however, did not seem able to handle the many crises of the past decade, from Mid Staffs hospital Trust in the UK (Francis 2013), where the constraints of managing a large institution led to professional practice which ignored the needs of patients, to the credit crisis, where the focus on immediate reward and successful business led to professionals ignoring the effects of their practice on the finance industry and the wider social context, local and global (Lanchester 2010). These and many other cases raised fundamental questions about the nature and practice of responsibility. The behaviour in these cases is often characterized as irresponsible, leading to world figures such as Barak Obama demanding a new age or responsibility (Randerson 2009). But quite what responsibility might actually involve is often not spelled out clearly in practice. The debate about responsibility is often one about who is to blame, who is legally or morally responsible. Before starting this book, the UK experienced severe floods and the blame was moving in many different directions (Press Association 2014). Is the suffering of many people the responsibility of the local or national politicians, or the environment agency or possibly even the people who choose to buy or build houses on a flood plain? The dynamic of blaming, of course, is about finding

8

The Spirituality of Responsibility

someone else to shoulder the responsibility. It was the other fellow’s fault. But sometimes things happen that we cannot blame others for. The flooding in the UK, for the most part, was not actually caused by anyone, and we have to respond to something that has been determined, it is beyond our control. Previous responses to floods were limited by lack of resources, so it was difficult to plan ahead. But the introduction of the idea of planning suggests that responsibility is not simply about what happened in the past, but also for what happens in the future. This means we can be responsible both for what we have done but also not done. Did the authorities in question, that is exactly those governing bodies given responsibility for the environment, act with prudence in determining priorities and what might be the best way of responding future disasters? Here, the lack of resources is not a sufficient excuse. Responsibility is not simply about failure of action, but about the practice of the key virtues, practical wisdom, awareness of the physical environment and how it connects to the social communities. Prudence would at least have led to some searching for the best possible plans. If these were judged not adequate then the authorities might have looked to others. The problem then begins to multiply. Who else might have the responsibility for this issue: national, regional or local government, different environmental agencies? And is the responsibility of any of these to contribute proactively to the planning, or to regulate the planning (commenting on the adequacy of the plans so far)? It begins to look as if responsibility might not be simply to discrete individuals or groups but is actually a function of continuous negotiation. How easily such responsibility then falls between several stools. In the credit crisis (Lanchester 2010) and the Mid Staffs case (Francis 2013) many agencies were involved, often with responsibility for regulation, and they failed in their task, as much as did the boards of governance and practitioners of the banks and the hospital. The dynamic of denial soon creeps in – ‘that was not my job’. Some would argue for the need to recognize shared responsibility, something at the heart of Gülen’s thinking. I have begun to raise some of these issues partly to reinforce the view that responsibility is not primarily about abstract philosophy,

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

9

but about real issues, roles, relationships and crises which affect lives. As such, we are constantly talking about it in response to major crises and in response to our own work or family life. Of course, this all echoes philosophical and theological debates about the meaning of responsibility, not least the question of whether we really have freedom of will, such that we can be held responsible for our actions. Are all our actions, in different degrees perhaps, determined by culture, conditioning, chemicals or even the divine, who knows all. It also echoes debates in law, psychology and sociology about the dynamics of relationships (Callender 2010). This chapter will also introduce the second theme of this book Fethullah Gülen. Gülen is a remarkable figure. A Turkish Islamic thinker and ‘social advocate’ (Gülen 2015), Gülen engages with all the different shades of responsibility, as I will show. He does so more through direct dialogue than distant philosophy, because he is concerned about meaning and practice. Gülen is not then a systemic theorist of responsibility, and in the following chapters I will be trying to bring together his ideas under key strands of the concept of responsibility. Gülen has also inspired the development of a significant Islamic movement, the Hizmet Movement, and his involvement with this group and their attempts to live out his philosophy raise further issues about responsibility, not least the responsibility of leadership. Because he bridges theology, values and practice I have decided not to begin with an analysis of his thinking. I attempt to bring that together in Chapters 2–4, and in the following chapters to test the implications for practice in the Hizmet Movement. To introduce him and his thinking, however, I will begin with another crisis, which raised questions about responsibility in practice, with which Gülen himself became involved. The case is that of the Mavi Marmara (the Turkish ship the Blue Marmara) incident. This was an incident which led a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel. Into that crisis came the voice of Fethullah Gülen, a voice unknown to many in the West. For some the voice was intriguing. Here was a Muslim thinker who seemed to be supporting Israel, and certainly wasn’t supporting what were perceived by many as the liberating efforts of a largely Muslim non-governmental

10

The Spirituality of Responsibility

organization (NGO). This meant that for others, inside and outside the Hizmet Movement, his message was surprising or even shocking. The case serves to introduce a person who is hard to categorize. In this chapter then I set out and analyse the case, the response of Fethullah Gülen to the events and how immediate and later response relates to responsibility. From the complexity of his response I will examine Gülen himself and the movement, noting how he and they reflect plural narratives and a view of responsibility which in turn is complex. I will return to the case in the final chapter when I look in more detail at leadership responsibility and offer a conclusion which is complex and challenges both those who would demonize Gülen and those who would sanctify him.

The Mavi Marmara incident On 30  May  2010, a Turkish NGO, the IHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı: translated, Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief Foundation1) Humanitarian Aid charity, in coordination with the Free Gaza Movement organized an international aid flotilla to sail to Gaza with the aim of breaking the Israeli blockade on the Gaza strip. IHH is made up, predominantly, of Turkish Muslims, and has been active in over one hundred countries. Established in 1992, at the time of the Bosnian crisis, IHH aims to provide humanitarian relief in disaster areas. Awarded Special Consultative Status by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 2004, the goal of the Foundation was to extend humanitarian aid to anyone distressed, oppressed, victimized, wounded, crippled, made homeless and subjected to famine by wars, disasters, etc., and take necessary steps to prevent any violations against their basic rights and liberties, and to carry out educational works at all levels to fight poverty and train qualified persons.2

The Free Gaza Movement was a human rights group set up specifically to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. In their own words,

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

11

We sail as an expression of citizen nonviolent, direct action, confronting Israel’s ongoing abuses of Palestinian human and political rights and will continue to challenge Israel’s illegal siege on Gaza by participating and supporting other initiatives to break the blockade of Gaza by sea.3

The Free Gaza Movement was a coalition of human rights activists and pro-Palestinian groups, supported at points by major figures such as Desmond Tutu and Noam Chomsky. In the action there were members of various Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious organizations. Israeli intelligence agencies claimed it also had connections to organizations posing a threat to the Jewish state, such as Hamas.

The Flotilla The Gaza Freedom Flotilla, comprising six ships, set out with over 20 million dollars’ worth of humanitarian aid and construction materials for the people of Gaza. Before dawn on the 31st May, the flotilla came into contact with the Israeli navy in international waters off the coast of Gaza. The flotilla had already refused an Israeli request to change course to the port of Ashdod, where the Israeli government had said it would inspect the aid and let humanitarian organizations deliver Israeli-approved items to Gaza. Subsequently, without warning, Israeli commandoes boarded the Mavi Marmara, from speedboats and helicopters launched from three missile ships. The commandos reported they were attacked with knives and clubs, and that they opened fire in response to one activist who fired on them. The flotilla organizers claimed the troops opened fire as soon as they stormed the ships. Nine of the flotilla were killed, eight Turkish nationals and one American Turk, and over 100 injured. Nine soldiers were also injured, two of them seriously. The Mavi Marmara was the main site of conflict. Passengers on the rest of the flotilla offered only passive resistance. Subsequently, the ships were towed to port and the passengers imprisoned and then deported to their home countries.

12

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Response As the news of the incident spread there was condemnation of Israel’s actions, from the United Nations, and particularly from Turkey. In Turkey there were major protests and the returning activists were greeted as heroes. The IHH claimed that the attack on the flotilla was planned, and lawyers representing the Turkish victims and IHH wrote to the International Criminal Court (ICC), requesting prosecution of the Israelis involved in the action. The incident precipitated a major diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel.4 The Turkish media and public were unanimous in their condemnation of Israel’s action. Turkey recalled its ambassador, cancelled joint military exercises and called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. The Turkish Grand National Assembly held a debate on whether to impose sanctions on Israel. Criticizing the attack as illegal, the Assembly demanded an apology from Israel, the payment of compensation to the families of those killed and the other victims and the prosecution of the individuals involved. Subsequently, the Turkish prime minister added a further condition for the return of normal relations with Israel, the lifting of the Gaza blockade itself. Israel–Turkey relations remained tense. Following Israel’s refusal to apologize, Turkey expelled its ambassador and all senior diplomatic personnel, also reducing its own diplomatic presence in Israel. It was announced that Turkish warships would escort any future aid flotillas to Gaza, and that Turkey would prevent Israel from ‘unilaterally exploiting’ natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thereafter, Turkey increased air and naval operations in the Mediterranean, and there were a number of alleged incidents involving breaches of airspace by both sides.

Responsibility Initial responses focused on the responsibility for the nine deaths, and quickly became polarized. The Israeli case was that the activists had preplanned the action, and had secreted weapons on board to respond to

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

13

any attempts to board the ship. The response of the Israeli commandos was claimed to be an action of self-defence. In a sense this meant that the action of the Israeli commandoes was determined; they could no other. The Turkish response was that the commando action was disproportionate and that far from this being an act of self-defence there was evidence of proactive and planned aggression. Questions about responsibility for the deaths soon moved also to the context of the incident and the legal and moral status of the blockade itself. The Turks argued that it was illegal, and therefore, the action of the flotilla was morally correct in trying to break the blockade. On this argument Israel was responsible for the very context of the incident, quite apart from the immediate issue of the deaths and injuries. Inevitably, there were also questions about who the wider stakeholders were and who might be responsible for resolving the issue, from the ICC to the United Nations.

Fethullah Gülen In the midst of all this came a response from Fethullah Gülen. Before examining this in more detail I will look briefly at the things that make Gülen and the associated Hizmet Movement so distinctive. Fethullah Gülen is an influential thinker. He is a prolific Muslim scholar whose ideas have been appreciated or criticized in and outside Turkey, attracting the attention of not only the Muslim but also the nonMuslim world. He has had over eighty books published and thousands of speeches, sermons or conference presentations have been recorded (Çetin 2007, 71). He also contributes to several journals and magazines. He writes the editorial page for Sızıntı (Seepage), Fountain, Hira, Yağmur (Rain) and Yeni Ümit (New Hope) magazines (Ünal & Williams 2009, 41). He regularly publishes one article and a short talk usually about half an hour long in his personal website (herkul.org). This is not to say that Gülen is a very systematic writer and thinker. Fethullah Gülen has had a variety of roles and attributes throughout his

14

The Spirituality of Responsibility

life. In Harrington’s words, he is a ‘Turkish Muslim scholar, progressive preacher rooted in tradition, prominent Sufi thinker, writer, poet, theoretician, pious intellectual, author, philanthropist, moral leader, and advocate of education’ (Harrington 2011, 6). Born in eastern Turkey in 1941,5 Gülen became a state-licensed imam at seventeen, after three years of formal education and studies with Sufi masters. In the context of a strongly secular society and government he gradually built an organization of Islamic study and boarding halls, gaining support of many wealthy Muslims. Even in his early sermons, he did not simply focus on theology and faith but also on social justice, human rights, morality, science and education (2011). His sermons expanded to lectures, often informal, given in conference halls, theatres and coffee houses. Even his presentations in mosques were distinctive, developing dialogue through question and answer sessions, offering unrehearsed responses to questions around religion and faith, and their practice in the modern age Gülen is credited with inspiring a movement, estimated between three and eight million people who are dedicated to living Islam as an action-centred faith, which responds to the ills of ignorance, poverty and disunity. Over the past two decades there has risen what amounts to an academic sub-discipline that might almost be called ‘Gülen studies’. It has generated great numbers of global conferences looking at different aspects of Gülen’s thinking and the phenomenon referred to as the Hizmet Movement. In turn this has given rise to many research projects looking at the philosophy and practice of the movement. There have been major concerns about the purpose and identity of the Hizmet Movement. In 2008 Gülen came out on top in a poll on the world’s leading intellectual, organized by Prospect magazine. It was noted that the number of people from Turkey voting for him increased after the Gülen-inspired newspaper Zaman Daily highlighted the poll. So was there something sinister here, with willing followers being manipulated? Conspiracy theories abound in Turkey and beyond, and thus it has been a short step to see the movement as funded by the CIA,

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

15

Iran or even the Turkish State (Park 2008). Other critics suggest this is an Islamist movement, designed to subvert the Turkish secular state by stealth, through building an Islamic middle-class power base. The many accusations are rehearsed elsewhere.6 Against all this others suggest the evidence points to a group that is transparent, open to critique and concerned for the common good (see Yilmaz et al. 2007). Sociological analysis (Troeltsche 1981) might attempt to place the movement into a typology of religious groups. In particular there have been suggestions of a sect, a ‘neo Sufi brotherhood’, or a neofundamentalist movement, often referred to as a cult (Çetin 2007; Gulay 2007). The definition of these different types has differed over time, so I will focus on their broad meaning. In the first of these it is hard to see the movement as either a formal ‘church’ or as a sect. The Movement works against institutional formalization. There is no central hierarchy or related organizational system of bureaucracy. On  the contrary, it is more like a network with different groups spread across Turkey and the world. These include media outlets such as the Zaman newspaper, various groups in Turkey, including the Journalists and Writers Foundation,7 a teacher’s foundation and the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUKSON8), and various related groups spread across the world. Followers have run an insurance company and an Islamic bank, Bank Asya, with its 2008 annual report recording r$5.2 billion in assets.9 They have also founded Turkey’s largest daily newspaper, Zaman; the magazine Aksiyon10; a wire service; publishing companies; a radio station; and the television network STV. These are all focused in developing dialogue around education and social responsibility, and in developing creative responses to need, resulting in the establishment of Gülen-inspired schools, several hundred in more than 100 countries, and universities across the world. The  development and spread of the schools is not obviously or centrally planned, but comes as a result of dialogue between different parts of the movement about priorities and resources. Hence, cases have to be argued critically. This suggests distributed and shared

16

The Spirituality of Responsibility

leadership. The theological dynamic here is precisely to move away from any sense of ownership or centralized power. Service to God transcends any institutional manifestation and can only be focused in the attitude and action of service. Hence, the focus is purpose, not the person who is leader. I will test this more critically in reference to cults below. Sects tend to be defined in terms of their tension with the founding church or institution. They are moving into a new path. Membership is not formalized and members tend to come and go. Again it is not clear that the Movement can be seen simply in this light. Certainly there seem to be no clear boundaries, but it does not exclusively define itself in terms of tensions with any higher institution. Given the fact that there is no one single institution in Islam to be in tension with, Çetin (2007, 378) notes that one Islamic view of a sect is that it enacts a new, possibly deviant form, of Islam. It is not clear that the Hizmet Movement could fall into that category, given that Gülen’s stress is radical, in the sense of going back to the roots of Islam, that is, the Qur’an. His focus is on orthodox thinking, and on how this worked through in practice. It is this stress on practice that makes it distinctive. The Movement is influenced by the Sufi tradition; hence it might be seen as a Sufi order. However, classical tariqa Sufism would require initiation, and involve esoteric religious practices and arcane terminology (Çetin 2007, 382). This is the opposite of a movement that aims to make itself clear through it actions. Gulay (2007) notes that Gülen also goes against the traditionalist Sufi paradigm by playing down the role of a Sufi master as mediator between the disciples and God. Gülen sees himself as an inspirational leader, but claiming no formal authority. Rather, he points to the infinite wisdom of the Qur’an, and the many different ways of accessing that (Gulay 2007, 57). Nonetheless, Gülen and the movement are characterized by a strong neo-Sufi theology that stresses holism, combining a strong affective spirituality with reflection on the Qur’an and the stress on action in one’s social context. Perhaps then the Movement can best be seen as a cult or New Religious Movement (NRM) (Barker 1989). NRMs have received a bad press in recent decades due to negative examples. However, cults are not per se

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

17

aggressive or bad. On the contrary, they may fulfil many different needs, including, self-improvement, the desire to make a difference in life, a sense of purpose and direction, companionship and a sense of belonging, structured community, guidance and a sense of self-worth and hope, all of which can be claimed by the Hizmet Movement. Cults involve groups that are generally smaller than sects, and are characterized by focus on fulfilment of affective needs only by that group. Hence, members are given great attention upon joining the group such that they feel unconditionally accepted. The strength of the bond is then tested by the group both in terms of ensuring orthodoxy of belief and through involvement in spreading the influence of the group. The continued love and care of the group becomes dependent on the person accepting the first and getting involved with the second. With that, there emerges an exclusive and conditional community – you are only valued if you sustain this commitment to the group. In one sense then the cultic experience keeps the person in a form of a conforming child, with no responsibility for decision making (Robinson 2008). Conditionality is associated with polarized thinking and thus we see the member of the cult gradually turning his or her back on the outside world and viewing that as the source of evil, leading to conflict with the families of converts to the NRM in question. Conditionality is related directly to the incapacity to handle the plurality and ambiguity of the ‘other’. Hence, the cult member will tend to see the family as accepting the conditions of the cult or not, as either good or bad. I will note later how this polarization goes against Sufi thinking. The dynamics of dependence are also rooted in the perception of the leader of the NRM as the source of truth, and thus, by extension, the ground of faith. All this leads to a judgemental ethics, based around fulfilling conditions and rules. It is not surprising that cults tend to have small numbers of members, that they are not transparent, but indeed are secretive, and that they focus on orthodox thinking rather than public or practical action. In extreme cases they are associated with myths and rites that are anti-rational and even subversive, leading to violence (Çetin 2007).

18

The Spirituality of Responsibility

The Hizmet Movement differs markedly from a cult in several ways. First, it is not small. Second, Gülen does not take on the directive role of a cult leader. On the contrary, he points to the primacy of the scriptures, and from that the imperative of service, and stresses the responsibility of the individual or the different groups within the Movement to develop ideas and practice, to put flesh on the obligation to serve (hizmet meaning service). There is no doubt that Gülen remains a charismatic leader and that members of the Movement hold him in the highest respect (Park 2008). However, he avoids attempts to institutionalize power, to perceive him as the source of truth, or as taking responsibility for the movement. Hence, Gülen himself specifically denies that the Movement can be termed the Gülen Movement or that the schools developed by the Hizmet Movement can be described as his (Graskemper 2007). He does not issue directives or make any attempt to influence the direction of the different groups associated with him. He usually only pronounces on issues when he is asked (cf. Lauria 2010). Even the briefest of attempts then to place the movement in traditional religious categories fails. It contains elements of all these types and can be seen to be both the development of different traditions, but also a simple orthodox Islamic group. It has a unifying leader and focus but has diversity within the movement. It sees the search for truth as a continuing reflective and creative activity, with God at the centre. Gülen portrayed himself an apolitical teacher; ‘I do not consider myself someone who has followers’, (Lauria 2010). This suggests a unique model of leadership, which in one sense as I will show in this and the final chapter, was radically tested in the flotilla incident. Gülen doesn’t sit on the boards of Bank Aysia or any foundation or editorial boards of Gülen-sympathetic magazines, newspapers or television stations. Hendricks (2013) argues, against Ebaugh (2009), that despite the lack of formal institutional power structures, or any formal power or authority held by Gülen, there are nonetheless intentional activities aimed at growing the movement, and that Gülen holds significant power. I will return to this in the final chapter, when considering leadership and responsibility.

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

19

Gülen’s response to the flotilla In this context one would not expect to hear from Gülen an answer that would easily fit into the framework of responsibility which was being worked through at the time. Most striking is the brevity of his response, and the tone, one of distance and evenness, compared to the lengthy, emotional and partial responses noted above. The second thing to note about his response is that it was not planned, in the sense that it did not come through any of the Hizmet Movement’s media outlets, or couched as a press statement. Gülen did not take the initiative but rather responded to the request for an interview from the Wall Street Journal (Lauria 2010). Third, the comments about the flotilla incident were only part of an interview which ranged across the Hizmet Movement, his leadership and his presence in the United States. This was also his first interview with a US news organization. The response was surprising to Lauria precisely because it seemed to conflict with much Muslim thinking about the incident. He was still learning about Gülen and the Hizmet Movement. In the article only three comments are reported. First, he gives his feeling about news coverage of the incident. ‘What I saw was not pretty,’ he said ‘It was ugly’ (Lauria 2010). In a sense Gülen is stating the obvious, but then getting the incident into perspective, knowing what you saw, is critical, and something that all parties would agree on. Rather than focusing on who is to blame he is focusing on what the outcomes were. Then, second, comes perhaps the most surprising of his comments. He focuses on the flotilla organizers’ failure to ‘seek accord’ with Israel before attempting to deliver aid. This, he says, ‘is a sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters’. This comment involves two connected insights, both of which directly work against simplistic reflection on responsibility. The first looks to the proactive responsibility to make peace with the other, whatever the context. This seems to place making an accord before issues of justice. However, second, even the brevity of response reveals that Gülen is not seeing the two as in opposition. Rather he focuses on the key purpose of

20

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the activity, in this case the delivery of goods to relieve the poverty of the Gazans. Later I will develop this issue in more detail because it raises critical questions about the purpose of NGOs, in general and particular, seen as either agents of change and thus concerned with justice or as answering specific needs. In terms of Gülen’s response, at this stage it simply raises the issue of purpose and underlies an assumption of the importance of the exercise of practical wisdom of some sort (see Chapter 5). The issue of authority, and the need to respect authority is perhaps the most surprising aspect of this response. In the light of the commitment of the activists and some members of the Hizmet Movement11 to challenge the justice of the blockade and of the general treatment of the Palestinians, it is not surprising that this might sound shocking. For the activists the authority of the Israeli government and its view of justice was precisely in question. Of course, Gülen’s point also takes responsibility to involve a practical concern for the outcomes. He suggests that not working through issues of authority would lead outcomes that will not be fruitful. Again Gülen is not apportioning blame, but rather encouraging a critical reflection on outcomes as much as on purpose and values. It is unusual for a Turkish Muslim scholar to even risk appearing as though he is giving approval to the actions of the Israeli authorities by criticizing the flotilla organizers, but, clearly, this did not deter Gülen from maintaining his principles. On the one hand, criticizing some aspect of the flotilla organizers’ actions did not put Gülen in a position of approving Israel’s intervention. On the other hand, however, he did not begin to address the actual issue of justice. As we shall see later justice is important to Gülen, however, this case does not address it, suggesting lack of engagement with all the key issues of this case. Sezgin (2015) offers several reasons for Gülen’s response. First, the action did not fulfil the principle of ‘positive contribution’ (Nursi 2002; cf. Gülen 2007, 74, 218). The flotilla operation was primarily aimed at raising awareness of the blockade, and its injustice, and thus to put the Israeli State under pressure to end it. The principle of positive contribution is a form of positive consequential assessment, aiming to make any situation better rather than worse. In this case the action led to nine deaths, further injuries,

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

21

distress for relatives and friends and a political crisis between Turkey and Israel (with potential further major negative consequences), no movement from Israel about the blockade, and therefore no direct improvement in the living conditions in Gaza attributable to the action. Elsewhere, Gülen (2007, 70) argues against the performance of kahramanlik (an heroic act) if this leads to negative consequences for others. Even heroic acts viewed in terms of greater good or justice need, therefore, to be questioned. This is already raising issues about responsibility which move beyond any simplistic view of social responsibility for others, focused in some view of justice or the common good. Just what such justice involves needs to be questioned, as does the motivation of the agent responsible for the action. The consequences which were attributable to the activists also raise questions about values and motivations. Gülen argues that virtuous actions should be, ideally, carried out for the right reasons with the right methods. Political aims in this case were not clear and the relation of this to the aim poverty relief had not been thought through. Ultimately, in this case the actions and consequences even begin to question the nature of the principle of justice and how this was used in the case. Gülen suggests that responsible action requires avoiding means that will create further problems. A second principle espoused by Gülen is that any action focused in social responsibility should use non-violent means (2008, 136). The organizers failed to ensure non-violent response discipline, which led to the violence. Even the refusal to allow the ship to go to port for unloading set in motion actions that were not controllable. This is not to deny the Israeli’s part in the use of violence. However, there is an element in this thinking of responsibility not only for intended but also unintended consequences. Gülen has claimed on many occasions that a moral agent is responsible for the outcomes of his actions. He also (1990) argues that the accountability may even include the unintended outcomes of an action. He refers to a verse in the Qur’an which claims that people will be confronted with things which they had not taken into account (Qur’an 39:47). This, alongside the principle of being responsible for putting oneself in the way of danger,12 will be further examined below.

22

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Sezgin (2015) notes Gülen’s criticism of one of the Ottoman sultan’s use of violence against a religious sect to resolve a conflict. Gülen argued that the use of such violence contributed directly to the long-term sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Alawites (cf. Mercan 2012, 175). A third possible principle for Gülen was respect for the law. This demands, at least initially, use of democratic, peaceful and non-violent methods to challenge any government and respecting the rights of all those involved (Sezgin 2015). Not only did the activists lead the flotilla to violence but they also set out to influence leaders in the context of one of the most complicated political disputes in the world. This connects to the broader principle of respect for the other, involving three stages: getting to know one another; enabling dialogue which affirms the other and respects differences; cooperating to solve common problems together. This also involves enabling the other to fulfil responsibility and respect for all parties. Without that positive respect there is little likelihood of reaching a solution. The case of Palestine is focused in polarized perspectives and thus a lack of respect. This suggests the importance of maintaining respect for the people and government of Israel as well as all other parties. For Gülen, ethical identity and the support of other stakeholders are not enough. There is need for practice of practical wisdom (phronesis) which will involve care filled and critical reflection of one’s own meaning and practice and on the social context of any decision (Gülen 2008, 136). Gülen argues (2008, 137) that each person is responsible for acting in a truthful manner and for representing truthfulness in his life. This clearly suggests the need for patience and attention to the complexity of any situation, including the narratives of meaning of the different stakeholders. None of this precludes sympathy with the Gazans, and awareness of their need for both immediate aid and longer term stable political and social conditions. The rest of Gülen’s comments reported by Lauria were made in the same tone. He mentioned that he had only recently heard of IHH, and therefore he is not in a position to say whether the NGO is ‘politicized or not’, that is whether it is dedicated to a political rather than a relief end. At this point he simply notes that when a charity organization

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

23

linked to the Hizmet Movement wanted to help Gazans, he advised that they work through Israel. Once again he is not apportioning blame but rather reflecting on responsible practice in the situation. He adds that apportioning blame should rather be the responsibility of the United Nations, as an organization which can be disinterested and thus stand back from the situation. Already in this case then Gülen is raising many issues about responsibility, from responsibility for perception; critical examination of values, ethical identity and motivation; awareness of the complexity of a situation; relationships to other groups and individuals; consequences, even unintended and long term. This suggests a broad and deep view of responsibility, but also one that invites reflection of how such responsibility might be worked through in practice, how it might relate to broader values and principles and how it might be negotiated in the light of limitations, resources, legitimate authority and so on. It also focuses on a responsibility for peace making, finding ways of responding to needs which attend not simply to the immediate needs of members of the community but also finding what can be done, which contribute to the overall social balance – and thus ultimately actions which are positive and proactive.

The responses to Gülen Gülen, as I have noted, is a man who is proud of his plural identity, principally as Turk and Muslim. It is not surprising that comments made in America might cause consternation amongst Turks and Muslims, including members of the Hizmet Movement. Some in the Movement tried to convince Gülen to change his statements about the flotilla but Gülen chose to disagree with his followers’ opinion (Ergil 2010). The comments created problems in wider Turkey. The organizers of the flotilla and the general public objected to the comments (ntvmsnbc 2010; haber7.com 2011). It was even suggested that he made them under pressure from the interviewer and had not really intended to refer to the issue in the words recorded. Even the Zaman Daily newspaper suggested alternative interpretations of

24

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Gülen’s criticisms of IHH. They reported that Gülen’s concern for victims and their families whilst criticizing the methods of the flotilla (Bilici 2010). Ergil (2010) argues that in itself this shows that the Hizmet Movement is not monolithic. In particular it shows that some elements of the Movement were concerned to manage the situation so that the comments did not give the ‘wrong’ impression. The response suggests that the Hizmet Movement was not fully prepared for the difficulties of dialogue that would involve not just the Movement, but politicians, Turkish citizens, bereaved families, other Muslims and Islamic scholars, different professions, NGOs and others. This involved both plural and holistic dialogue, with different perspectives and different emotions fuelling those perspectives. The fact that Gülen chose to enter into such a debate suggests he felt it was part of his responsibility. It also suggests that subsequent dialogue, whilst complex and difficult, was important to play out in public. I will return to the issue of dialogue and responsibility in Chapter 5, and again in Chapter 7 where I will argue that this event was an important learning experience for both Gülen and the Hizmet Movement. It should come as no surprise that the dialogue continued more widely yet and with reflections from different stakeholders which mirrored Gülen’s views.

The wider responsibility debate The wider debate about responsibility continued. As the different parties tried to argue their case the Israeli government refused to submit to an independent enquiry into the incident. Instead they commissioned their own, the Turkel Commission. This was exhaustive, examining all aspects of the issue, and involving independent members, David Trimble from Northern Ireland, and Brig.-Gen. (Ret.) Ken Watkin, from Canada. Trimble and Watkin both argued that the Commission made every effort to be independent, with efforts to hear both sides of the issue. However, many inside and outside Israel saw this as an attempt to justify Israeli’s position rather than resolve conflict. This raised questions about whose responsibility it actually was to report. The Commission concluded that,

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

25

whilst the loss of life was regrettable, the blockade and the action on Mavi Marmara were both within the law. In August  2010, the United Nations launched a Commission chaired by Geoffrey Palmer, former prime minister of New Zealand. The investigation panel included representatives from Israel and Turkey. Its aim was not to make definitive findings ‘either of fact or law’. Rather did it attempt a rigorous reflection on events and their cause, and on lessons to be learned. It took a year to report, partly to allow Turkey and Israel to continue talks. The Commission’s findings in many ways mirrored the tone and logic of Gülen’s comments, beginning with the premise that there were no winners and that strenuous efforts should be made ‘to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future’ (Palmer et al. 2011). It goes on to accept that there can be few exceptions to the freedom of navigation of the high seas, but that Israel was justified in its blockade, noting that, The naval blockade was imposed as a legitimate security measure in order to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea and its implementation complied with the requirements of international law. (2011)

In other words, Israel had a responsibility to defend its nation, and in any case did provide means of allowing assistance in to the Gaza strip. At the same time the report acknowledged that the restrictions on goods were the main reason for an unsustainable and unacceptable humanitarian situation in Gaza. The report found that the flotilla organizers, and particularly the IHH, had acted recklessly in attempting to breach the blockade. Whilst organizations and individuals have a right to express their political views, this cannot extend to putting lives at risk. Palmer  accepted that the majority of people involved had no violent intentions, but the actions of the flotilla needlessly carried the potential for escalation. Focusing on the responsibility of the Turkey and Israeli governments, the report acknowledged that both governments took steps ‘in an

26

The Spirituality of Responsibility

attempt to ensure that events did not occur in a manner that endangered individuals’ lives and international peace and security’ (Palmer et  al. 2011). It argued, however, that more could have been done to warn the flotilla participants of the actual risks involved and to dissuade them from their actions. This stresses the need for greater dialogue with all stakeholders, something that the later Lindenstrauss report reinforces (see below). However, the decision to board the vessels with ‘such substantial force at a great distance from the blockade zone, and with no final warning immediately prior to the boarding, was excessive and unreasonable’ (2011). The report argued that non-violent options should have been in place initially, including warnings of the intention to board and clear demonstration of the desire to avoid violent confrontation and the force that would be available if this was not possible. Once initial violence did occur, then there should have been an immediate reassessment of the options, echoing the concerns of Gülen. Initial violent response from some passengers of the Mavi Marmara threatened the lives of at least three Israeli commandos, and did demand self-defence. However, the deaths of nine passengers, and serious wounding of many others, were deemed to be disproportionate. The Commission noted that there was a failure by the commandos and the Israeli government to give a convincing account of key evidence, such as multiple shots in one passenger’s back. The Commission also found there was significant mistreatment of passengers by Israeli authorities after the takeover of the vessels had been completed through until their deportation. The Commission goes on to make recommendations in what becomes an exercise in working through responsibilities in relation to all major stakeholders. First, it recommends that any naval blockade be kept under regular review, to ensure that all stakeholders are responded to and that an ongoing account is given to all stakeholders. Second, given the unsustainable humanitarian situation in Gaza, Israel should continue to address means of easing restrictions on the flow of necessary

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

27

goods and persons across borders. It argued that this should be carried out in accordance with the Security Council resolution 1860, and in partnership with the United Nations. Israel should also work with the Palestinian Authority General to ensure assistance gets through. Even the imposition of a naval blockade as self-defence should be worked through with the UN Security Council following the procedures of Article 51 of the UN Charter. This has the effect both of reinforcing the legitimacy of the action and also of widening awareness of any implications for international peace and security, properly the responsibility of the United Nations. The Commission’s focus then was on responsibility, not simply for what happened, but for rapprochement, and sharing responsibility for the future, paralleling Gülen’s link between responsibility and peace building (see Chapter 5).

Responsibility and governance By 2012 the reflection on the incident was becoming more measured. Israeli State Comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss, issued a report on the decision-making dynamics (BBC 2012). If the Palmer Commission focused on responsibility of the different parties, Lindenstrauss focused on responsibility for governance and leadership and how responsible decisions are reached. A major finding was that the Israeli decisionmaking process was not coordinated. No cabinet meeting was called to deliberate on the matter. Instead the prime minster simply consulted the defense and foreign ministers, in unrecorded meetings. There was an informal meeting of several cabinet ministers several days before the incident but this did not involve the justice and internal security ministers. The National Security Council (NSC) was not included in the process, despite requests for it to be involved. The whole process was not in line with national security-related decision-making protocols or the recommendations of previous Commissions about decision making following the 2006 Lebanon War.

28

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Underlying the report is the importance of enabling the most responsible deliberation, without which governance is ineffective. Such deliberation requires three things. First, there is need of a critical group which can hold executive leaders to account, not least through challenging perceptions of priorities and values (Robinson 2011). Part of the holding to account over time also involves appropriate recording of meetings. Second, responsible deliberation requires awareness of the social and environmental context. The wider the decision-making group, the more awareness there is of the different stakeholders and how they might be affected. This also demands increased dialogue with stakeholders. Third, responsible deliberation, which involves critical dialogue and awareness, also leads to an increase in options and with that greater flexibility. Lindenstrauss found that the lack of dialogue, not least with Turkey, led to failures to pursue diplomatic attempts at resolution prior to the launch of the flotilla. There is of course a balance to be struck in governance between too little dialogue and involving so many in the dialogue process that decisions are not made. However, the Lindenstrauss report suggests that the Israeli leadership did not attain this balance and thus locked itself in to defensive behaviour throughout the incident. Only with the apology of the prime minister in 2013 was dialogue effectively achieved.

Responsibility and justice The debate around governance and responsibility echoes wider debate about the responsibility of NGOs, focused in IHH, and the lack of clarity about their responsibility. NGOs are accountable to donors who are different from the beneficiaries of their work. This can lead to many different problems, not least around purpose. The two main purposes of NGOs are service provision and advocacy. In the first NGOs may work closely with governments in providing services in areas such as famine relief. In advocacy, the NGOs look to stand up for the cause of minorities, which may involve critiquing the governments or big business. This leads to criticisms from developmental agencies about

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

29

working too closely with service provision (to satisfy donors), and not enough on advocacy, and from business about stress on advocacy, getting in the way of the service provision role. In some developing countries the service provision is further skewed with multinational corporations (MNCs) subcontracting to NGOs their CSR policy and practice. At its best this exemplifies good practice with the NGO and MNC negotiating shared responsibility for relief and development. At its worst this leads to accusations of green washing, helping MNCs to develop a responsible image. IHH in this case seem to have blurred the line between relief and advocacy. Indeed, it seems to have been using the delivery of relief as a means of pursuing not simply advocacy of the Gazan people’s cause but a specific action designed to subvert the blockade, something they perceived as an illegal action. Hence, this suggests that IHH moved not simply to advocacy for the Palestinians but to a direct political action as part of advocacy. Gülen’s comment about the politicization of IHH was if anything very moderate. At the least, the question is raised about whether IHH has gone beyond its legitimate or reasonable responsibility, and how accountable it has been in its actions. It was not clear that the leadership IHH had given an account of their stance to their own donors. It was equally not clear if, or how, they understood any sense of accountability to either the Turkish government or to any Islamic institution. The  question of accountability extends to the relationship with Hamas. Had the leadership consulted with donors or other stakeholders about this relationship? Did the IHH have any sense of accountability to Hamas itself? None of these questions suggest that, for instance, IHH should not in some way relate to Hamas. It does, however, suggest that accountability for that relationship and for any purpose or action related to it needed to be set out. The dangers of not working through these issues of responsibility are several. First, morally or legally it could lead to following a purpose which either contradicts a founding purpose or contradicts a broader focus on common good. Goodpaster (2007) refers to this as teleopathy. Second, the responsibility felt for the people of Gaza can radically affect the

30

The Spirituality of Responsibility

identity of the organization, that is as a key advocate of the people concerned. In turn, this can lead to the polarization of ethical debate, where it is in the interest of the NGO to be perceived as occupying the moral high ground and businesses or governments seen as a ‘the enemy’. It is precisely this moral high ground that the IHH seemed to want to occupy. The danger of such an emotive and heroic self-image is that it affects perception of the situation, possible consequences and estimates of the related risks. Hence, IHH and partner groups did not work through a risk analysis, and thus did not take responsible account of the possibility of violence. Of course, had it done so it might still have gone ahead, believing the overall cause to be more important than the danger of any violent consequences. In reflection on a similar incident involving Greenpeace and BP (Entine 2002) Kaldor (2003, see also Elkington 2001) suggests three things that are required to address such issues for NGOs. First, NGOs should not be privileged in the debate, but should be accountable as any other organization. Second, regulation of NGOs should be better developed, in part by bringing donors and beneficiaries closer together, including both in discussion about role, purpose and targets, thus developing the exercise of responsibility. Third, spaces for dialogue in civil society have to be created. It is precisely this kind of dialogue that the Palmer Commission advocated. As we shall see later this also focuses on Gülen’s concern for dialogue.

Conclusions The Marvi Marmara case shows how responsibility lies at the heart of much personal and public debate. Gülen entered a debate that questioned who was responsible for a series of actions which led to loss of life and ongoing political unrest. Was it the immediate participants or wider government? How far was the action determined by the avowed identity of the participants and how they saw their purpose in relation to the people of Palestine? Who determined the responsibility of the different

Responsibility in Practice: Testing the Blockade

31

stakeholders? For Gülen, even at this stage, responsibility is something proactive, which demands critical reflection on motives and purpose (wisdom), careful reflection on consequences (intended and not) and thus an awareness and appreciation of the social context, and careful reflection on key values, including justice, and how they determine a view of the world. Responsibility in all this is not something abstract but rather at the heart of relationships at whatever level. And practical response to those relationships demands a certain distance from emotions which are connected to core values, and the practice of dialogue to ensure that actions and relationships are kept in perspective. Already this is contributing to the meaning and practice of responsibility in governance, political or in NGOs, and in this Gülen’s response chimes with the views of the major reports over time. Nonetheless, there is a feeling that Gülen did not gauge the response with total success. Emotions were running high, attached to the issue of justice, and to the relationship between Israel and Palestine. Even the name of one boat in the flotilla, the Rachel Corrie, was emotionally charged, referring to a young American activist who died trying to prevent the flattening of Palestinian villages by Israeli bulldozers (Robinson & Dowson 2012). Faced by this, was it sufficient to urge wisdom? I will return to this in the final chapter. In the meantime I will try to find out in more detail what Gülen’s view of responsibility has to offer.

2

Responsibility

In the previous chapter I began to look at some of the issues surrounding responsibility, and how these are key to reflection, deliberation and planning. I also showed how Gülen, as an Islamic thinker, entered a public debate about an incident which was of both highly political and had a religious dimension, not least because the main protagonist was an institution which involved mostly Muslims and some of the Hizmet Movement might have supported the flotilla. The Muslim support of the flotilla was deemed by many to be positive, because it suggested strong Islamic support for human rights, and for Islamic involvement in action related to these. In this chapter I will begin to analyse further the idea of responsibility by providing a broad definition of different ‘modes’ of responsibility, noting some of the key issues. This will provide the basis for a more detailed analysis of Gülen’s view in this and the following two chapters. This chapter will then focus on responsibility as agency, in effect the responsibility to know one’s thoughts, values and practice, stressing Gülen’s view of the responsibility of the person to critically examine ideas, values and practice, both in the self and in any organization. This will involve a consideration in some detail of Gülen’s moral psychology and the importance of the intellect (tying in with a strong stress on science) as part of a holistic view, and the focus of identity, which stresses relationship with the self as well as to God and others. The implications of Gülen’s views for the debate on responsibility and free will and determinism will then be examined, involving comparison with Western philosophers. This will contrast narrow views of freedom

34

The Spirituality of Responsibility

which do not take account of relational reality, with a rich view of freedom based in relationships and the capacity to respond. It will also explore potential contradictions in Gülen’s thought on freedom. The chapter will end on the importance of Gülen’s view in working through a framework of spirituality that can both hold its own in the debate and help others, from different cultures and disciplines, in the debate to locate their spirituality (significant relationships and meaning).

The concept of responsibility Schweiker (1995, see also Robinson 2009) suggests three interrelated modes of responsibility, the first two of which originate in Aristotle’s thinking: imputability, accountability and liability.

Imputability Imputability is simply about making a causal connection – the imputing of a cause that is responsible for something, from a belief to an action. There are strong and weak views of this. The weak views (McKenney 2005) simply refer to the causal connection between the person and any action. Person A has caused, or was responsible for, action B. Such a view does not help in determining just how much the person is actually involved in and therefore fully responsible for the action. Hence, a person may cause action B but not actually intend to do so. A stronger view suggests that to be fully responsible for something necessitates a rational decision-making process. Taylor (1989) argues that this decision making constitutes a strong valuation that connects action to deep decision making. This owning of the thoughts and related decision making is what constitutes the moral agency of the person or group. Hence, this process of decision making becomes key to the development of identity. Closely connected to this is the concept of moral or retrospective responsibility that focuses on blame for actions (cf. Ricoeur 1992).

Responsibility

35

This seeks to identify the person or persons responsible for actions. Key to this is either intentionality or role. The first determines if an action was intended, and thus who was responsible. The second, role responsibility, suggests that certain roles are focused in purpose (notably leadership, professional or family roles), and thus apportions blame even if consequences were not intended. A medical practitioner, for instance, may be deemed to be responsible for patient’s death, even if he did not intend it. This will emerge as a key aspect of Gülen’s view of responsibility. Key to the development of rational agency is developing responsibility for ideas, values and practice. Ideas This demands clarity about the concepts that are used, and the capacity to justify them rationally. We can hardly be said to be responsible for our thoughts if we cannot provide some account of and justification for them. Core to this is some understanding of purpose. Any account and justification of thoughts and actions also demands openness to critical intellectual challenge. In the credit crisis of 2008 this was illustrated by the use of CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) involving the repackaging of mortgage debts and selling them on. As Lanchester (2010) notes, those who pursued this practice based it on a mathematical formula none of them understood. Their focus was purely on the profits that this action would make, regardless of the effects of the action on the finance industry, financial policy and the wider stakeholders. Values This demands the capacity to appreciate values underlying thoughts and action. This is not just that they are coherent; it is also that they have distinct meaning and value, such that one prefers one practice to others. Even at this stage, responsibility involves a comparison with other practices and their values (Taylor 1989). Hence, deciding upon one’s own values or the values of the organization does not take place in social isolation, or apart from the core relationships to the social and physical

36

The Spirituality of Responsibility

environment. This also engages feelings, not least because values connect to purpose and identity and thus any sense of self-worth. Responsibility around feelings requires two things. First, it demands responsibility be taken for the feelings. It might be thought that by definition one cannot control feelings. When you feel afraid, for instance, this feeling takes over the person, it controls you. However, psychotherapeutic research supports the idea that whilst feeling may arise spontaneously we nonetheless are responsible for what we do with them (Robinson 2008). Second, it demands responsibility for critically examining those feelings, and the underlying world views and related values that may be responsible for keeping those feelings in place. Practice At the heart of the third focus is social awareness, of the effects of one’s actions, and thus the connection between oneself and the other. In  business, for instance, does one fully understand the practice of an organization and the effect that this might have on the wider social and physical environment? None of this prescribes a particular response. What it does demand is awareness of what one is doing, how that fits into the purpose of the organization and how that effects the internal and external environment. In other words, there is a relational context to agency that goes beyond the individual self or organization and that demands awareness and responsiveness. Critically then, the idea of responsibility includes responsibility for meaning in practice, involving what Taylor (1989) calls self-interpretation, seen as key to identity. Mustakova-Possardt (2004, 245) sums up this responsibility for both world views and awareness of the social and physical environment in the idea of ‘critical moral consciousness’. This involves a moral sense of identity; a sense of responsibility and agency; a deep sense of relatedness on all levels of living; sense of ‘life meaning or purpose’, linking to underlying beliefs. These connect: Core intellectual values, not least the development of rational agency. Ethical values. These include core principles such as justice and respect.

Responsibility

37

Spirituality. Spirituality here is used as a generic term pointing to underlying beliefs about the world, sometimes expressed in terms of worldviews. Competency values, not least professional and technical skills and values – from communication, to teamwork, to concern for excellence. The idea of self-interpretation also involves the idea of being answerable to the self and thus dialogue with the self as key to agency. This also will emerge as central to Gülen’s thinking. Taking responsibility for ideas and values also suggests that human beings are responsible for their perceptions of the social and physical environments. The core values held by a person or organization will determine the perceived value of the wider world and how that world is viewed. Hence, the leadership of the finance industry in the credit crisis focused on shareholder value and literally did not perceive the connections with the wider world that would lead to the crisis. This ties to a sense of worth in one’s community.

Accountability to The second interconnected mode of responsibility is accountability to another. This focuses on the ethical environment. Typically we will have different kinds of accountability, depending on the kind of relationship we have to people or groups. This is focused often in contract relationships, formal or informal. The contract sets up a series of mutual expectations. At one level, these are about discernible targets that form the basis of any shared project, and without which the competence of the person cannot be assessed. At another level, there will be broader moral expectations of how one should behave in any contract. This would include the importance of openness and transparency in relationships and other such behaviours that provide the basis for trust. Any contract can be modified and developed by the parties, and thus contract between shareholders and executives, for instance, need not be confined to a single purpose. The contract also sets up the sense answerability to another. I owe, and thus give, an account to that person or group of my thoughts and actions,

38

The Spirituality of Responsibility

thus connecting imputability to accountability. This may involve several different kinds of accountability relationships, from family to community to work organization to profession. Many writers argue that accountability in business is best understood through stakeholder theory. A stakeholder was initially defined as individuals or groups which were critical to the survival of an organization, especially business, including employees, customers, lenders and suppliers (Freeman 1984). This has been further developed to ‘any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the actions, decisions, policies, practices or goals of the organization’ (Carroll & Buchholtze 2000). In  examining social responsibility (Chapter  4) I will note how Gülen moves beyond this kind of thinking.

Responsibility for Moral liability (as distinct from legal liability) goes beyond accountability, into the idea of wider responsibility for projects, people or place. Each person or group has to work these out in context, without necessarily an explicit contract. Working that out demands awareness of the limitations of the person or organization, avoiding taking too much responsibility, and a capacity to work together with others and to negotiate and share responsibility. This is responsibility for people and projects in the past, present and future. Most relationships involve a mixture of accountability and liability. A good example is a doctor, who is both accountable for and to the patient. Once again this can have a strictly legal sense or a wider moral one encompassing the broadest possible view of stakeholders, from those directly affected by any business or project to the social and natural environment in which these operate. Like accountability this often involves multiple responsibilities. This is reinforced by feminist ethics of care, which point to a web of stakeholder relations that stress connectivity, interdependence, power sharing, collective action and conflict resolution (Koehn 1998). Any organization, including business, is a part of society, and its identity is established through how it relates to society, not least in its conduct with those who are affected by, and affect, it. Just as dialogue is

Responsibility

39

required for moral agency, dialogue is required in working out a creative and feasible response to the wider social and physical environment. This begins to move responsibility into a more proactive stance, such that it provides the basis for ethical theory based in responsibility itself (see in particular Bauman 1989; Ricoeur 1992; Levinas 1998).

Fethullah Gülen Fethullah Gülen sets responsibility firmly in the mode of accountability. This, in turn, is based in his creation theology. God created the world and appointed humanity to be the vicegerent (Qur’an 2:30). Humankind is thus responsible for the management of creation. Humankind in this sense stands in for God, as deputy, but also stands before him, judged. Hence, humanity is both responsible with God and accountable to God for the world in its fullness. This responsibility connects action to this world and the next. What we do now will have an effect on both realms and thus on our appreciation of both realms. I will examine this in more detail in Chapter 4.

Agency It is from this relational accountability that Gülen draws out responsibility and agency. In order to be fully responsible the person would have to be aware of his or her self (including ideas and feelings) and social context, the significant relationships, the mutual effect of those relationships and so on (Gülen 2006). Agency in Gülen emerges from the framework of accountability. Agency and, with that, personal autonomy is a gift from God that enables the person to fulfil the role of khalifa (deputy). This agency gives the person freedom to transform society, so long as the source of that freedom and agency is acknowledged. God ‘alone determines, apportions, creates, and spreads all out provisions before us’ (Gülen 1999, 94). This then is a mediated agency, a limited form of subjectivity that is, in Vahdat’s words, ‘projected onto

40

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the attributes of monotheistic deity – attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and volition and then partially reappropriated by humans. In this scheme, human subjectivity is contingent on God’s subjectivity. Thus, although human subjectivity is not denied, it is never independent of God’s subjectivity, and in this sense, it is mediated’ (Vahdat 2002, 134). Such agency is teleological, virtue centred and action centred. Teleology The vicegerent is to fulfil the divine purpose. Hence, any sense of response has to be seen in terms of overall sovereignty of God and his desire to see humanity fulfilling his purpose and plans, to develop humankind and the world as a whole. This mode of responsibility, however, is developed in significant ways. The task of the vicegerent is not simply to believe in God but also to understand ‘the mysteries within things and the cause of natural phenomena, and therefore to be able to interfere in nature’ (Gülen 2004, 122). The term interfere does not denote a dominant relationship to the ecosystem but rather involvement as co-creators. In this, humanity is the ‘brightest mirror’ of the Creator, and needs ‘to discover the mysteries imbedded in the soul of the universe, to uncover the hidden power, might and potential, to use everything to its purpose, and to be the representatives of characteristics that belong to Him, such as knowledge will and might’ (Gülen 2004, 122). Gülen takes those who do this to be ‘genuine human beings’ and argues that they exercise their free will ‘in a constructive manner, working with and developing the world, protecting the harmony between existence and humanity, reaping the bounties of the Earth and Heavens for the benefit of humanity, trying to raise the hue, from and flavour of life to a more humane level within the framework of the Creator’s orders and rules’ (Gülen 2004, 124). There is then a consequentialist element, that is, it is for the good of mankind, but it is also about the very nature of humanity and how this should reflect the creative and loving stance of God. There are two implications from this. First, Gülen builds on Nursi’s writings in stressing we have to take science seriously (see Vicini 2007, 435). Science is not something which is autonomous or against religion. Rather science reveals to us the

Responsibility

41

laws of nature and, by implication, helps us to see the telos or purpose of creation. Second, the free will that is key to any sense of responsibility is exercised in the light of the relationship with the divine, and thus focused in service. This aims to sustain the balance between the environment and humanity, making the most of the resources given in creation, all for the benefit of humanity as a whole and all with a purpose of raising the level of civilization for all. The natural world then can be manipulated for positive ends. All this suggests a continual reflection on God’s purpose in context, hence the need to use science. The practice of vicegerency then becomes essentially social and dialogic (Gülen 2004). I will develop this further in Chapter 4. Virtue centred Agency for Gülen is based in a holistic and dynamic anthropology that brings together emotion, spirit, rationality and action. He sees the seat of power and, with that, agency, in the terms of R.H. Tawney (1930), as ‘in the soul’. The soul for Gülen involves both rationality and more emotionbased drives (Mohamed 2007, 556). This requires the four cardinal virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance and justice which moderate lust and anger, leading to a degree of rational self-control, focused in ‘natural reason’ (Gülen 2009, 207, 2002). Such a moral psychology does not see agency as a simple assertion of rational thinking but as a continued dynamic, critically handling emotional drives and the narratives related to those drives, as well as any rational arguments. This form of holism then is not about mystical acceptance but about continual reflection and critical testing. Hence, the development of moral character, not simply the capacity for choice, is core to Gülen’s view of agency and responsibility. This enables the establishment of personal responsibility and from that any approach to corporate or civic responsibility (Toguslu 2007, 450). Any responsibility is based in universal values such as ‘devotion, simplicity, trust, loyalty, fidelity, humility, modesty and connectedness’ (2007, 455). By extension, education is based in the development of character, focusing on continual self-criticism and self-renewal. Such self-examination ‘enables the believer

42

The Spirituality of Responsibility

to make amends for past mistakes and be absolved in the sight of God, for it provides a constant realization of the self-renewal in one’s inner world’ (Gülen 1999). In effect this enables the development of responsibility for one’s own thinking and underlying values and how these are embodied in practice. Thus responsibility is directly connected to virtues (cf. Ladd 1991; Williams 2008), and I will draw the connection out in more detail in the next chapter. Action At the heart of much of this is a great stress on action. Responsibility demands creative action not passive submission. At the core of this is the concept of Hizmet that is about the embodying of the inner awareness of God in the practice of service. Hence, there is no question of pietism; ‘Those who always feel themselves in the presence of God do not need to seclude themselves from people’ (Gülen 1995, 87). Free will is centred in the context of Hizmet, focused on the example of the Prophet as a man of action, who stressed learning, trading, agriculture, action and thought. Moreover, he ‘encouraged his people to do perfectly what he did, and condemned inaction and begging’ (Gülen 1995, 105). The motivation for this action is not salvation but rather to please God, ‘thinking only of his approval in everyday speech, behaviour and thought’ (Gülen 2004b, 6). Hence, intention is critical to the practice of responsibility.1 The person is engaged without ceasing in particular and focused activity, always asking ‘Oh my Lord, what else can I do?’ Hence, Gülen stresses the importance of good time management and well-planned activity, all part of what it means to be responsible. The more that such responsibility is practised in all contexts, the more that this leads to increased responsibility; ‘more blessings mean more responsibility’ (Gülen 2000, 133). Agency in all this is relational, not focused purely in the individual, but part and parcel of continued interaction with the social network. This strongly parallels Niebuhr’s view of responsibility, ‘What is implicit in the idea of responsibility is the image of man – the answerer, man engaged in dialogue, man acting in response to action upon him’ (1963, 56). For

Responsibility

43

Gülen humankind cannot stand outside, and has to assert responsibility within that relational framework, precisely to avoid a loss of agency. He writes, Remaining aloof from action, not interfering in the things happening around us, not being a part of the events around us and staying indifferent to them is like letting ourselves melt away, like ice turning to water. (Gülen 2005, 96)

Gülen does not analyse the dynamics of responsibility here. However, in not responding, not acting, it could be argued that we deny or disclaim responsibility for action and give that responsibility to others. In this sense responsibility, similar to Tawney’s (1930) view of power, is social, and will be taken up in some form or other by others if we do not claim it. Nasr (2006, 300) suggests a slight further development of responsibility as both individual and social, echoing Levinas (1989) and giving further point to Gülen’s view. He analyses verse 7: 172 of the Qur’an, where before creation God asks of human beings ‘Am I not your Lord? They said: Yea verily. We testify.’ He argues that the verb in the case of the human response is plural. Hence, the positive response is not of an individual person, any more than it is a particular gender, but of all human beings. As Nasr puts it, ‘to be human is to have said yes, and we hear the mark of this affirmation deep within our beings’ (1989). Responsibility then is shared, a social response. This points up the enormous responsibility that is placed upon humankind as a whole, one that Nasr notes is all the more profound, precisely because humankind, unlike the rest of nature, is free to respond.

Free will and determinism The issue of free will is located in the concept of moral agency. The debate has been dominated by the tension between free will and determinism. Broadly, if the action of an individual is determined by what has gone before then it is hard to see how free will can be a reality

44

The Spirituality of Responsibility

(Callender 2010). The debate has been dominated by different schools. Incompatibilists argue that determinism is incompatible with free will, and that either free will is not real or the concept of free will is not useful. Libertarianism argues for the dominance of free will. Indeed, it argues that there is an imperative to assert free will. This glories in the capacity of the individual to innovate, to create genuinely different possibilities. The tension, however, remains, exemplified in it oldest form by Prometheus. The Titan looks to create new possibilities for humanity, but succumbs to the power of Zeus. This sense of man having to work against determinism is later reinforced by the myth of Pandora letting loose the many evils that oppress man. The fact that hope is the one thing she manages to retain in the jar remains ambiguous. Is this the hope felt by man despite all the evils of the world? Or is this simply a false sense of hope which makes man foolishly try to overcome the evils that dominate his life? Other schools of thought are referred to as compatibilist. They take determinism seriously but argue that, nonetheless, humanity can exercise free will. Strawson (2003) argues that human relationships are based in ‘reactive attitudes’ which ascribe praise or blame to others. The attitudes range from affection to anger, and they presume the moral agency of the other. Strawson’s argument is that praise and blame are deep-seated attitudes that make who we are as human beings. Without these it is difficult to understand the idea of relationships, indeed of human identity which distinguishes between different people. A second compatibilist argument for moral agency, proposed by Frankfurt (2003), sets out conditions for free will. In particular it argues that free will is based in the principle of alternative possibilities. If there are no alternative possibilities then is could be said that action is determined. Extreme cases of this might be physical or psychological determinism. In the first of these, for example, I cannot be held responsible for my car injuring a cyclist if it was the car behind that caused mine to move. The  second in its most extreme form might involve, for instance, a psychosis causing someone to injure another,

Responsibility

45

based on a paranoid delusion about the intentions of the other person. However, even such discrete examples of determinism are problematic, partly precisely because they are discrete. Looked at in the wider personal or social narrative the first case does not, over time, require determinism excluding free will. Once the action has occurred, then I as driver have the capacity to respond in a different way in future. For instance, I may ensure that in such situations I always put my break on whilst stationary, ensuing that no collision will have a knock on effect. Or, I may take more care to use wing and rear mirrors so that I am aware of developing situations on the road. In the case of psychosis, such a diagnosis would lead to different possibilities, including different forms of treatment. The learning point then may be the importance of taking necessary anti-psychotic drugs, and possibly the development of community care that would ensure that drugs were being taken. These two actions of prescription and community care then change future views of such a case because the psychotic patient, and his carers, could both be held responsible for future problems if the prescribed drugs had not been taken. This all suggest that free will goes beyond any simplistic view of alternative possibilities. In terms of narrative over time there are always different possibilities, which develop over time and with critical reflection. This is based on the capacity to learn. Alternative possibilities may be a function of social relations, not simply individual decision making (Griffiths & Stotz 2000). There are very different kinds of determining factors, including psychological, socio/cultural and physical (coercion, individual limitation, lack of resource/money and neurological). Each of these involves different aspects of dealing with relationships. The relational view of agency locates Gülen as a compatibilist, that is, recognizing that a person can exercise agency even in a relational context that partly determines understanding and action. Such relationships do not totally determine the response of the person, not least because of his critical interpretive stance. Hence, for Gülen (2000, 152), even the concept of destiny, whereby God knows the end of all, does not ‘negate our free

46

The Spirituality of Responsibility

will’ (2000, 152). This suggests that Gülen distinguishes pre-determinism and divine foreknowledge. God has foreknowledge of what we will do but still, in time, relates to us directly. It is not clear that Gülen resolves a major tension here. For instance, if God already knows how we will make decisions, how can his relationship of love, which urges us to respond, be authentic? Can love actually be genuine if the lover already knows the outcome of the relationship? For the most part Gülen (2000) simply stresses the ongoing relationship of love which sustains and challenges humankind. Gülen (2007, 6) describes hurriya (freedom) as one of the most valuable gifts from God to humanity. He also claims that freedom is an ‘individual’s assertion and enjoyment of his/her basic rights’ (2007, 6). This suggests that the opposite of freedom is dependence on others for the enjoyment of those rights, ‘a form of servanthood’ (in a negative sense). Central to this is the ability to choose. This ties in with general Hanafi/Maturidi thinking, explaining freedom as not being a slave or servant to or under the control of anybody or anything (Gülen 2007, 6). Hence, freedom and sense of agency for Gülen includes the liberal view of negative freedom (Berlin 1969), freedom from coercion. Gülen, however, has little time for Berlin’s (1969) other, egalitarian, view of freedom. Each person is responsible for developing his actual capacity (Gülen 2007). Gülen is much closer to writers such as Michael Novak in his focus on moral freedom (1990). Novak’s idea of moral freedom is based in the work of Aquinas, stressing self-mastery and ordering the passions. This is about the individual developing autonomy and agency through reflective deliberative decision making. Agency is precisely gained through the development of the virtues that underlie these activities (1990, 16). Novak in all of this is primarily concerned about the individual taking responsibility for their decisions. It is precisely such freedom that lies at the ‘root of human autonomy, responsibility and dignity’ (1990, 18) all of which enable the individual to act in God’s image. Like Gülen, Novak sees the exercise of personal responsibility as then leading to broader social responsibility.

Responsibility

47

Gülen takes those who do this to be ‘genuine human beings’ and argues that they exercise their free will ‘in a constructive manner, working with and developing the world, protecting the harmony between existence and humanity, reaping the bounties of the Earth and Heavens for the benefit of humanity, trying to raise the hue, from and flavour of life to a more humane level within the framework of the Creator’s orders and rules’ (Gülen 2004, 124). Hence, Gülen (2007, 7) ultimately interprets freedom in a God-centred way. He claims that every human being who has this basic freedom has to exercise and develop it ‘by freeing one’s heart from worldly worries and anxieties about the things of this world’. As we shall see in the next chapter, this can be achieved by taming and controlling the nafs and increasing other capacities such as reason and consciousness. Gülen (2007, 8) goes on to explain that freedom would be realized by fulfilling one’s obligations in the relationship with God, as the sole higher authority. In the light of this approach free will cannot be viewed in terms of a simplistic compatibilism. The very term can miss the critical relationship between the self and the ‘determinants’. Such factors only determine behaviour if the individual allows them. Furthermore, the ‘determinants’ are part of different relationships, with the self and the social and physical environment, and it is down to how the person fulfils these relationship. Hence, character development becomes key to freedom, which I will note in the next sections and the following chapters. Freedom is also social in the sense that we affect each other’s freedom through our relationships. This leads Gülen to stress the importance of democracy and social responsibility, which I will examine in Chapters 4 and 5.

Moral psychology Gülen (2004b) argues that human beings are created as responsible moral agents of God and have been afforded key attributes unique to human beings, and in particular aql (reason), wijdan (conscience) and nafs. I will

The Spirituality of Responsibility

48

examine nafs and moral virtues in the next chapter and aql and wijdan in this. These are focused in the spirit (ruh).

Spirit (ruh) Gülen (2009, 134) stresses a spiritual as well as a physical focus to humanity. The spiritual body is rational in nature, partly involving reflection on metaphysics. It is made up of wijdan, aql, nafs and related attributes, providing the basis of responsibility for actions (2009, 134). This ruh (2009, 135) is the source of life and energy for all beings, and is distinguished from animal spirit in being ‘the sole source of life, motion, perception, feelings, and consciousness’ (2009, 135). It provides motivating energy, and makes human beings in turn more accountable. Gülen (2009, 134ff) argues that the ‘non-material entity’ of the ruh has three different interdependent energies. First, ‘the spirit itself ’ is a divine gift focusing on life and existence, and provides evidence of the non-material manifestation of God. It exists before human life begins, but without self-consciousness, and survives post-mortem. The ruh as a whole were created before the creation of the universe and come together at the creation of humans (Qur’an 7:173). Second, the ruh is involved in what Aquinas (1981) referred to as ‘ensoulment’, the spirit entering the physical body, It is [the spirit] often called ‘the speaking soul’ which is favoured with reason, willpower, spiritual intellect, certain inner senses, and consciousness, and with the capacity for developing through learning and belief. It is a living, conscious Divine law or command breathed into the embryo in a certain stage of its development in the womb of the mother. (Gülen 2009, 181)

This is the point at which personhood begins. The idea of the ‘speaking soul’ is striking, focusing on the importance of articulation of words in relationship to the self, others and God.2 The third element of the ruh is ‘the biological spirit’, referred to in Sufism as the ‘animal spirit’ (nafs), and connecting ruh and physical body (Gülen

Responsibility

49

2009b). The growth and development of the physical also involves spiritual development and awareness, leading at puberty to the development of mature moral responsibility. It is precisely in this stage that the moral agent has to handle the ambiguity of humanity, as capable of both good and evil. It is ‘the tides of humans between guidance and straying, good and evil, and happiness and misery, which occur in relation to the animal spirit’ (Gülen 2009b). Moral freedom is not possible without the struggle involved in this. Indeed, this is the nature of morality, involving rational reflection on and engagement with, not simply purpose as expressed in principles and concepts, but with the existential and relational dynamics which express such principles in the being and identity of the person. This involves a continued ontological connection with God.

Aql This involves reasoning which enables reflection on and understanding of the five external senses and inner senses. It is ‘a Divine light with which a person can perceive things’ (Gülen 2009, 206). This squarely distinguishes the spirit from the simple activities of the brain (in Western philosophy often characterized as the mind, cf. Callender 2010). Aql collects and processes data from the five external senses, but also engages inner data including inspiration and feelings, showing a holistic focus. Kuvve-i Akliye (Reason) Gülen defines reason as ‘a Divine light with which a person can perceive the things that cannot be comprehended with external senses’ (Gülen 2009, 206). It differentiates true from false, good from evil and beautiful from ugly (Gülen 2009). It also can distinguish between facts, premises, truth and theoretical knowledge. It can view external reality in a scientific perspective. Reason is critical to analysis, synthesis, holistic and synoptic thinking, and is thus the central aspect of critical and integrated thinking (Gülen 2009; Ünal & Williams, 2009). Gülen sums this up in terms of analogy, induction and deduction:

The Spirituality of Responsibility

50

Its journeying or making comparisons between two individual things or situations or processes and drawing conclusions is called ‘analogy’; its making a judgment about the whole based on the information about one or some of its parts, or using known facts to produce general rules, is called ‘induction’. Most scientifically established facts have been concluded through this latter process of reason. There is also another process which is called ‘deduction’, which involves making a judgment about a part based on general information or facts concerning the whole. (Gülen 2009, 210)

However, whilst this is necessary, it is not sufficient. Without the guidance of conscience, it cannot reveal metaphysical reality, including embodiment or nature of the Divine, including God’s qualities, attributes and names (2009, 210). Gülen distinguishes two forms of reason, transcendent and worldly. Akl-ı mead (other worldly reason) is focused in affect and spirit, based in the practice of reflection (tezekkür), contemplation (tedebbür) and deliberation (tefekkür) (Gülen 2009, 207). Akl-ı meaş (wordly reason) is focused on worldly concerns, dominated by the evil-commanding soul (nefsi emmare, see Chapter 3), and focused in satisfying desire and image rather than integrity. It is thus unaware of the divine. The ‘reason of the Hereafter’ is both far more critical and profound, trying to understand both cause and effect, and the significance or meaning and action (Gülen 2009, 208). It facilitates openness to and constant learning about the self and the wider environment, and thus ongoing renewal. Gülen argues for three aspects of this reasoning, with reason-related capacities (2009, 207). These are natural reason (akl-ı fıtri), evidential reason (akl-ı hüccet) and universal reason (akl-ı tecrübi). In each of these the moral agent engages the same responsibilities but the understanding of these and related actions might vary. Natural reason This is basic reasoning involved in understanding perception and feelings. It can distinguish right and wrong, both in terms of good and bad consequences, and an understanding of good and evil. A person with this level of reasoning is responsible for religious duty and responsibilities

Responsibility

51

(Gülen 2009, 207). This forms the starting point for moral agency in Islam. Those with this level of reasoning see responsibility as focused in obeying rules, and fulfilling related responsibilities set out by the institution to which they belong. Evidential reason The second level of reasoning (akl-ı hüccet) ‘is conscious of itself, perceives the instances of wisdom in and basic purposes for Divine injunctions and prohibitions, evaluating the past and present with their relationships to one another, and which is aware of where its worldly and otherworldly benefits’ (Gülen 2009, 207). Such reasoning reflects greater maturity, in critical reflection and contemplation. It focuses on the values and narratives behind codes and moral rules. Hence, as I will note in Chapter  3, this requires the development of virtues which enable this level of deliberative judgement. This level of reasoning characterizes moral agency, focusing on responsibility for a more proactive and context-related stance to fulfilling the purpose behind the any rules. Gülen encourages this more mature reasoning, and thus the practice of wisdom and principles behind rules, and the development of this is a key aim of education. Experiential reason Reason of experience (aklu’t-tecribe) involves the capacity to read the Divine laws of nature and how they operate. It also perceives the purpose behind religious disciplines. This is comparable to reflection in Christian writings on natural law, looking behind even the laws of nature to God’s underlying purpose (Aquinas 1981). It can be seen as an analogue to the stress on action because it involves a constant and conscious pursuit of true knowledge, that is, the nature of God’s purpose in the context of practice. It functions through the use of deliberation, intellect and perception. This level of reason involves an even higher level of understanding, involving the capacity to read ‘the Divine laws of creation and operation in the universe, perceive the essence of the religious sciences, and

52

The Spirituality of Responsibility

uninterruptedly advance toward accurate knowledge and knowledge of God, by making analyses of all that it reads and reaching a synthesis of the “reason of experience”’ (Gülen 2009, 207). The moral agent in this is able to take responsibility for relating legal and ethical rules (sharia) with context of daily events, and to embody these in relating to the world. All three levels of reasoning are key to moral agency. Several factors, however, need to be added. First, this agency can be improved through the practice of techniques such as reflection, deliberation and recollection. These improve reason as a means of gathering and assessing data. Second, Gülen argues that the practice of reason enables the development of ‘potential humanity’ into ‘real humanity’. The individual comes to realize and internalize the wisdom behind creation through a higher level of understanding of God. This leads to the practice of a more virtuous life. Third, it is tempting to see Gülen’s ideas on the development of reason as comparable to the stage view of faith and moral development set out by Fowler (1997) and Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg 2011), respectively. However, Gülen does not see the stages being invariant, that is, the need to pass through each stage always in the same order for moral maturity to be reached. I will examine this more closely in the next chapter on moral development and the virtues. Fourth, whilst reason enables differentiation between good and evil, Gülen is careful to note that it is not the final authority on morality; that is God. However: Even though it cannot be considered an authority – able to give the final judgment concerning good or evil, or what is beautiful or ugly – it nonetheless provides truthful evidence for judging these and similar matters. As it can distinguish between what is beneficial and what is harmful, in many cases, it can also perceive the difference between facts, premises, what is unquestionably true and theoretical knowledge. (Gülen 2009, 205)

Reason is one of the tools for human beings to realize God’s morality. Precisely because it is a tool, it can used to pursue moral or immoral

Responsibility

53

ends. This can involve the danger of aql being dominated and directed by the ‘evil-commanding soul’, becoming a tool to get what the nafs desires (Gülen 2009, 211). It is sufficient at this point to note similarities with Bauman (1989) and also the Frankfurt School (Geuss 1981). They also argue that rationality is not good per se, and that it can be used to evil ends. The difference with Gülen is that they suggest ‘instrumental rationality’ involves focus purely on means, whereas Gülen argues that there is always an end, either bad or good. If aql is not dominated by evil ends, then it provides a means of reflection, contemplation and deliberation, which enable moral agents to reach out to God. It is thus one of the most important tools given by God to human beings (Gülen 2009, 211). This is rooted in the Maturidi tradition of reason (Diyanet Vakfi 2004, 26). All three levels of reason embody moral agency. However, responsibility increases with the development of the reasoning ability for the agent. Once more then there is a dynamic aspect to Gülen’s view of responsibility, which impels and empowers the person to accept more responsibility. The more he or she is aware of both the underlying morality of God and of the context of the surrounding world, the more moral agency involves active engagement with both. As I will note in Chapter 4, this forms the basis for universal responsibility. How then do we avoid taking on too much responsibility? Gülen suggests that this is a function of God, ‘Allah does not burden any human being with a responsibility heavier than he can bear’ (Qur’an 2:286). Reason then is critical to moral agency, but it is not sufficient.

Conscience (wijdan) If reason connects to the five senses, and beyond, providing a source for awareness, understanding and assessment of the social and physical environment and their relationship to God, then wijdan is another source of knowledge, based rather on inner experiences and intuitions (Gülen 2009, 188). Without reference to observation or thought, a moral agent may feel that something is right or wrong according to his conscience.

The Spirituality of Responsibility

54

This source, which leads humans to true knowledge through inner personal experiences without needing any means to discover or establish the truth, is the conscience. (Gülen 2009, 189)

The moral agent is able to feel whether his action is right or wrong before moving into action. This contrasts with the view of conscience as an affective conviction of having done wrong (Strohm 2011). Sezgin (2015) notes that Gülen’s view of conscience is based in four elements. The first, fuad (spiritual intellect), connects God to humanity. This triggers feelings or sensation (his) about the potential action (Gülen 2009, 203). Willpower (irade) is then required, enabling moral agents to follow or abstain from action. The final aspect of wijdan is the mind (zihin). It acts as a repository or library of memories of feelings and associated actions, which can be drawn upon in choosing future actions. In effect, this is the affective aspect of learning from experience. I will examine each of these in turn.

The spiritual intellect (fuad) Fuad is like a ‘polished mirror’ which reflects the divine attributes and representations of God. This is the point of connection to God, and thus the means of accessing the source of morality (Gülen 2009, 229). Whilst it is part of human nature, it has, like Aristotelian virtues, to be practised to be maintained. Negative conditioning can also cause this capacity to wither. The intuitions or feelings associated with fuad form the basis of ethics, and seem at first sight to relate to Hume’s view of moral intuitions. Gülen (2009) distinguishes his view from Hume, stressing that fuad involves the recognition of divine inspiration.

Willpower (irade) Willpower is the power to choose, central to autonomy and decision making (Gülen 2009, 233). Once again this is a natural power, requiring practice. Moral agents choose to act in a given way with their irade

Responsibility

55

and God facilitates their action. They are responsible for their choice and its outcomes in so far as they are conscious of value and purpose and  outcomes. Gülen (2009, 236) stresses the central Islam distinction between choice and putting  choice in to practice. Responsibility as agents demands both.  Choice, and thus freedom, is actualized by the exercise of irade. This further establishes moral agency as a function of character, and the exercise of capacities. The exercise of choice is deemed part of ‘dynamic fate’, that is, still their choice, even though the choices are known by God,  as part of the person’s destiny. As I noted earlier, this raises questions  about theological determinism. Destiny is static, involving predetermined context such as family, ethnicity and so on. Such determination does not affect the free will of the individual, any more than accidents or natural disasters (Gülen 2009, 167). Critically, Gülen argues that whilst God knows context and outcomes, he does not decide, and therefore determine how the individual will exercise his or her will power.

Sensation (his) The sensations involved in his enable apprehension of the person’s interior world. Gülen (2009, 203) writes, ‘a person also has certain inner senses or powers such as the faculties or powers of imagination, will, conception or conceptualization, manipulation, understanding, supposition, and recollection’. Apprehension of the external world is based in scientific knowledge, whereas apprehension of the self is based in subjective feelings. With the other aspects of wijdan these feelings inform and influence the moral agent. Once more, the apprehension, focused on the meaning of the action involved, is divinely inspired, whilst the sensations per se are developed through previous experience and practice, and nurtured through positive conditioning. Gülen suggests that the development of this sensibility is facilitated both through the practice of activities, such as reflection and deliberation, and also the practice virtues such as empathy (see the next chapter).

The Spirituality of Responsibility

56

The Mind (zihin) This involves a consciousness of actions, events and meaning which is stored over time, at conscious and subconscious levels. Hence, it is key to learning and to the development of moral agency. The experiences are both stored and evaluated, and can be addressed and used in deliberation on future action. The four elements in wijdan thus work together and work with aql to form a holistic base for moral agency, enabling both wider consciousness of the external and internal world, and the capacity to make sense of that world in relation to God and in the context of time, society and the environment. Hence, moral agency involves the integration of these different aspects, rational and affective, and the integration is enabled through the practice of choice in relation to value and action. This practice holds in tension all of these aspects, including worldly and spiritual dimensions. Gülen (2013) argues that human nature is made up of both material and divine components, often styling this in different pairing held in tension, such as material–moral, corporeal–spiritual and sensual– conscientious (cf. Tawney 1930). Humans are created with the potential of developing from the lowest aspect of the worldly (esfel-i safilin) to the highest, spiritual, state of being (a’la-yı illiyyin). Hence there is never a point at which human nature is pre-fixed for good or evil. The person is always faced with the moral demand requiring choice. Hence, the moral life is always a struggle, and agency is always active, critical and aware, and thus always struggling towards transparency, enabling the self to give an account of the internal and external world in relation to God. Gülen focuses on these inner spiritual struggles and the interplay between the material and spiritual worlds of human nature. Hence, The world came to know chaos and the immorality behind it through human beings: the human beings who did not surrender their minds to God, who were unable to slam on the brakes of their willpower and to stimulate their feelings for the good. Humans are creatures vulnerable to  a great variety of ambitions and they have a greater number and variety of weaknesses than other creatures. The emotions

Responsibility

57

of destruction, feelings of anarchy, and eddies of disorder are manifest in different  frequencies in almost all our weaknesses, such as greed, ambition, anger, hatred, malice,  violence, and lust. It is impossible for humanity to save itself  from the negative consequences of these without taking control of all the evil feelings. (Gülen 2005, 112)

If aql and wijdan are key to humanity’s response to these existential challenges they, even together, are not sufficient without an awareness and responsiveness to the inner power which can take to the person to the depths or the heights. Shakespeare brilliantly illustrates these struggles in his tragedies, not least in Macbeth. Macbeth is man of deep ambition, which in itself can be used for good, but which he uses for evil. Hence, despite initial reflection on his choices and actions, he increasingly tries to avoid any a sense of awareness of his deeds and their meaning, and thus prevents any transparency, internal or external, Stars, hide your fires: Let not light see my black and deep desires. The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be Which the eye fears when it is done to see. (Macbeth Act 1 scene 4, l 55)

This brings us to the nafs and it is to them and the related development of the moral virtues that I will turn to in the next chapter.

Conclusions In this chapter I have tried to set the scene for a consideration of responsibility as such. I then began to examine the idea of responsibility as moral agency, and how Gülen has treated this in his writings. This has revealed a complex view of moral agency, involving the person operating in relation to both feeling and rationality and internal and external context. Moral agency is thus based in a holistic and dynamic anthropology that brings together emotion, spirit, rationality and action (cf. Solomon 2007). Critical reflection on world view and higher purpose are part of

58

The Spirituality of Responsibility

what responsibility is about and these should be part of normal discourse. The stress on agency also requires an understanding of what one is doing, how that affects the other, and how that relates to the past, present and future. Free will in this is based in capacities to make choice and awareness of the self and the external environment. Such free will is lost when we stop, or are prevented from, the exercise of those capacities. Hence, free will is dynamic and interactive. It is also relational in the sense of responding to God’s care and commands. The freedom is not simply to respond. It is a freedom in how we respond within the framework of God’s values. It is this freedom that places humankind as genuinely accountable, answerable, to God. Such a freedom demands that responsibility be always taken for working through the meaning of God’s values in practice, none of which can be formulaic. In one sense this takes Gülen beyond Novak’s view of the freedom to one’s duty. Rationality and conscience take Gülen beyond simply the recognition of and response to duty and into an increasing awareness of God, the source of morality. This leads Gülen to focus on freedom as the capacity for choice, reinforcing the negative freedom of Berlin (1969) but arguing against positive liberty, the provision of means to freedom. On the one hand, this values the individual in all his or her particularity. On the other hand it stands out against dependency. This raises a question about Gülen’s view of moral agency and freedom which I will examine in more detail in the final chapter. The key issue here is about the nature of dependency, and how this fits in with a moral anthropology. The dynamic and developmental nature of human life involves dependency over time and the question then is how Gülen fits this into his account of moral agency.

3

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

In the previous chapter I focused on contemporary discussions about responsibility and then on Gülen’s view of moral responsibility. I looked at the first two elements of Gülen’s view of moral responsibility, focused in moral agency, reason and conscience. In this chapter I will develop the third element of ruh, the nafs, and then move into Gülen’s view of the moral virtues. Together these complete a rich and dynamic view of moral agency.

The Nafs The final aspect of the ruh, alongside aql and wijdan, is nafs. Nafs is to do with the visceral spirit of humanity, focusing on human desires, including survival instincts. The nafs fully develops with the onset of puberty and the capacity for adult desires. Hence, this is the moment when the Hanafi school of law acknowledges adult responsibility. The nafs is irreducibly ambiguous. On the one hand nafs involve what the Christian tradition (cf. Foot 1979) suggests are passions or vices, such as lust and anger. The task of the moral agent in this case is to control the passions. On the other hand, such ‘passions’ and instincts are critical for sustainable human existence, creativity, enterprise and growth, and thus are key to the ruh. The responsible agent thus is not simply exercising rationality, reflecting on the good and making choices, he is also having to relate to his visceral nature, through control and through properly channelling the

60

The Spirituality of Responsibility

forces. Hence, Gülen defines nafs as the base of faculties such as lust, anger, ill will, grudge, hatred and irritation, but argues that nafs can be transformed and refined in the proper development of human existence (Gülen 2009, 218). This involves a constant ‘battle’ because whilst the nafs is essential to physical survival, the desires can never be fully satisfied. Gülen sees the nafs as a key means for human beings to actualize their human potential humanity, ‘Indeed, the nafs is also of great importance for humans to maintain a metaphysical tension. It is like a mainspring allowing them to rise from being only potentially human to true humanity’ (Gülen 2009, 219). The tension within the nafs itself leads to the use of aql and wijdan, weighing up whether to follow or how to channel the desires. As I will note in Chapter 6, this is the basis of the central definition of the ‘greater jihad’, or inner struggle, requiring an internal dialogue. As we shall also see in Chapter 4, this applies directly to business and social responsibility. In that context, the desire to create wealth is a key motivator and energizer for business success. However, wealth creation for its own sake, without reference to the greater framework of God’s creation and man’s purpose in that, can lead to lack of control, involving fraudulent methods and uncontrolled desire. I will explore this in more detail below. Involved in the nafs is ene, the sense of identity or ‘I-ness’. In the tradition of Nursi Gülen sees the sense of self as illusory. The person does not own the self but rather depends upon the Other (God) for meaning an existence. In Nursi’s words: That is to say, the ‘I’ realises that it serves one other than itself. Its essence only has indicative meaning. That is, it understands that it carries the meaning of another. Its existence is dependent: that is that, it believes that it existence is due only to the existence of another, and that the continuance of its existence is due solely to the creativity of that other. Its ownership is illusory; that is, it knows that with the permission of its owner it has an apparent and temporary ownership. (Turner 2008, 61)

Man, however, can come to believe that the ‘I’ is real and belongs to him. Claiming this leads man to become proud, arrogant and vain. If ene is used

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

61

as it was intended it becomes a tool allowing man to at once develop a sense of understanding in relation to God (a mirror) whilst also acknowledging one’s servanthood by giving all to Him; knowing that as the created all belongs to Him. This forms the sense of identity, a consciousness of the self and of God, which differentiates us from the angels. Gülen refers to the seven levels or stages of nafs which are part of the Sufi tradition (2009, 213f). By restraining and channelling the urges and desires of the nafs, a person is able to develop spiritually. The stages are negotiated and worked out through dialogue between the nafs and the conscience. In early stages, the nafs dominate. In the higher stages, the nafs is tamed by the conscience.

Stages of spiritual development The journey of a Sufi student begins with the stage of nefsi emmare. This may be termed the primal stage, involving a soul or self which demands satisfaction of needs and desires without limitation, hence ‘evil commanding’ (Gülen 2002). This stage is inherent in one’s nature (2002), with the nafs dominant, and thought and action not focused in ethical awareness. A person at this stage lacks self-regulation and needs supervision and guidance from a teacher (Eris 2006, 178). This demands developing the practice of self-critical reflection and learning (Gülen 2009), and the development of a self-critical faculty is precisely what leads to the next stage. The second stage is levvame (the blaming self). This is quite a stark stage. All desires from the nafs are questioned and resistance is the primary response. Self-condemnation for any lack of resistance predominates (Gülen 2013, 62). Riyazat (austerity) is critical in disciplining the self. Good and bad behaviour are mixed in this stage, with regret and repentance a regular dynamic. Over time, however, the self-questioning and regret sensitizes the person, with pain felt at the least moral failure. This in turn increases aspirations to consistently achieve more good deeds. The result of this struggle is divine guidance towards the good (Eris 1998, 179). At one level this sets up what is a continued struggle, but Gülen

62

The Spirituality of Responsibility

counsels that blame should be moderated by some form of hope, based in the acceptance and forgiveness of God. In the third stage, mulheme, the choice of the good is less focused in pain and the avoidance of pain and more positive experience of choosing the good. Hence, the person begins to feel inspired to listen to the wijdan and to act in a good way (Gülen 2013, 62). The person becomes more aware of the social and physical environment and appreciative of the right response to these. The pleasures of this world and even those of the next become secondary. A person in this stage begins to disengage from the world, often cutting down on food and even sleep, and goodness begins to become habitual. This marks the beginning of a second nature or character. The fourth stage involves the self at rest (mutmainne). This finds the person at peace with and communicating well with the self (2013, 62). For the Sufi this also involves the existential experience of God. Everything else pales before Him and this can only be understood through direct experience. In the light of this the person develops an inclusive love based in God. The development of virtues, such as tolerance, is associated with this stage. The higher stages are only experienced by an exceptional minority. Radiye (stage five) involves a soul well-pleased with God and his creation (Gülen 2013). By this stage the nafs directly enable the person’s response to that creation. The person is thus content in his relationship with God and accepts both the general role of vicegerent and particular roles and responsibilities on earth. The person is pleased with what God provides and how he has responded. Stage six (marziyye) sees the self as focused on pleasing God. This is deemed the ultimate stage involving the person fulfilling responsibilities in every respect – the final point an ordinary person can reach. Hence, the stage of Safiye (the purified and innocent soul) involves such perfection as to be only reached by the Prophets. This stage no longer involves the dialogue associated with the practice of agency. It is associated with attributes such as fetanet (outstanding reasoning power), ismet (not committing sins), sidq (truthfulness) and emanet (trustworthiness), all which God has blessed

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

63

the person with. This reflects the character of Gülen’s ideal person and ‘universal man’. He writes: Those who rise to this degree are the nearest to God. You remember God when you see them, for they are like polished mirrors in which all of His attributes are reflected. The Companions’ desire to follow the education system provided by Prophet Muhammad enabled almost all of them to reach this degree of moral and spiritual perfection. Millions of people have followed and continue to follow their example. (Gülen 2002, 189)

Gülen argues that moral agents are responsible for developing an awareness of the nafs and of the associated challenges and problems. The moral agent then has to tame and channel the nafs to realize his responsibility. None of this demands the destruction of the nafs. It remains central to human survival, and the achievement of true human potential in creation. Two examples from the nafs are anger and lust.

Kuvve-i gadabiye (Anger) The capacity of kuvve-i gadabiye is key to responsive to the need for selfdefence against signs of external aggression (Çelik 2009). It is part of human nature and should not be denied, but must be used in the proper context. Hence, Islamic jurisprudence sets out key contexts where anger is acceptable, including defence of life, sanity, property, family, faith and sacred values (Ünal & Williams 2000, 306). Gülen develops this as an aspect of both rights and responsibility: A human being, be they man or woman, young or old, white or black, is respectable, protected and inviolate. Their belongings cannot be taken away, nor can their chastity be touched. They cannot be driven out of their native land, and their independence cannot be denied. They cannot be prevented from living in accordance with their principles, either. Moreover, they are prohibited from committing such crimes against others as well. (Gülen 2004, 114)

64

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Such rights are based in the person’s relationship with God. Anger provides the necessary motivation and energy to enable their defence. This also brings Gülen perilously close to the questioning his own view of the Mavi Marmara. He notes that persons may revolt against and resist exploitation, injustice, persecution, invasion and violence with the power of anger. Those who murder innocent people and pursue terror activities to encourage disunity do not deserve any pity or mercy (2004, 9). In the Mavi Marmara case it could be argued that the activists were precisely standing out against exploitation, injustices and persecution on behalf of the Palestinians. This would suggest in the logic of Gülen’s thinking that the feeling of righteous anger is not sufficient, that is, there has to be proper cause (focused in the exercise of aql and wijdan) and proper end, such as the pursuit of unity. It also raises the question as to whether one can be responsible for acting on behalf of others in such matters. This broad capacity also links to feelings of fear, hatred, grudge, enmity, animosity, revenge, aggression, recklessness and being offended (Gülen 2013), all of which need to be tested. Campbell (1986) suggests a similar reading of anger in the Judeo Christian tradition. This focuses on the capacity of God Himself to express anger, the appropriateness of righteous anger, the negative effects on psychological health when anger is repressed and the negative effects on others of such repression. This reinforces the view of moral agency as involving taking responsibility for feelings and recognizing what values, principles and ends they are based in (Robinson 2008).

Kuvve-i şeheviye (Lust) The capacity of kuvve-i şeheviye involves appetite and physical pleasures1 (Ünal & Williams 2009, 306). The power of lust can manifest itself in different forms in different contexts, summed up in the Qur’an (3:14): Decked out for humanity is the passionate love of desires for the opposite sex and offspring; for hoarded treasures of gold and silver; for branded horses, cattle, and plantations; and for all kinds of worldly things.

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

65

Lust can express itself in the form of sexual desire but its expression is not limited to that. A person naturally desires more power, property, higher status, reputation and other worldly things. Lust also involves desire that which is essential to human reproduction, just as hunger is key sustaining physical existence. It can, however, manifest itself in jealousy, hatred, enmity, hypocrisy and excess (Ünal & Williams 2009, 307). Hence, without careful control and channelling such lust can lead to negative ends. Lust can be seen then as analogous to eros, love which is based in the attraction of the other (Robinson 2008). Whilst eros finds proper expression in sexual love, it is also a motivator to sustain our lives. The  search for comfort and relief is a driving force for scientific development often expressed in the attraction of creative practice, from exploration, to research, to enterprise. A good example of this is the profession of engineering. Florman (1976) refers to the existential pleasures of engineering. Engineering he suggests is an attempt to engage with and utilize the social and physical environment in order to fulfil human needs, desire and aspirations. This brings together the joy of making a difference and the joy of creation itself. There is finally the pleasure of  service. Florman (2008, 147) writes, ‘The main existential pleasure of the engineer will always be to contribute to the well-being of his fellow man.’ Again, the key to proper expression of this is the context and purpose, and how  the person relates to the social and physical environment. Hence,  the greater struggle (jihad) for dealing with the nafs is not defined as its destruction  but as the acknowledgement and control  of the nafs, diverting and harnessing these energies towards a beneficial, positive end.2 The area of nafs overlaps the issue of vices in Christian theology and also in applied ethics. The same tension is summed up in debates about greed. On  the one hand there is a well-developed philosophical strand which argues that greed is good, providing a motivator for wealth creation, but also leading to good consequences for wider society. Hence, Mandeville (2003) in the eighteenth century recounts the fable of the bees, with selfcentred activity leading to good for all. On the other hand greed itself tends

66

The Spirituality of Responsibility

to take away from awareness of the needs of others and from focus on and consciousness of wider connection and purpose (Robinson & Smith 2014).

Moral agency Moral agency then for Gülen involves the three principle elements of the ruh working together. There are three aspects to the development of the moral agent. The first is that it is based in the development of character, the second is that it can be helped with the practice of certain techniques and the third is that it is associated with the practice and development of key virtues.

Character Gülen argues that human beings enter the world with a fixed character (fitrah). Hence, the Qur’an reads, ‘We have certainly created man in the best of stature’ (95:4). Character at this point is pure and innocent. It is developed though interaction with the social environment primarily through family, friends, relatives and education. After puberty, nature and nurture together consolidate and fix the primary fitrah, such that it is hard to change. Nonetheless, both aql and nafs can be changed and developed. Rather than changing the primary character this involves ‘creating a second fitrah’. This involves a better character focused in freedom of choice, self and environmental awareness (social and physical) critical reflection and engaging willpower and related disciplined activity. Hence, this demands awareness of how the Prophet and his Companions model this character and practice and a willingness to follow their example. It also demands self-knowledge (Gülen 2006, 147. Cf. the concept of metacognition, Metcalfe & Shimamura 1994). This makes the individual responsible for developing his own character, replacing bad elements and developing the good. However, such responsibility remains in the context of the relationship to the Prophet and the Companions. Gülen stresses the

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

67

narratives of transformation in the Companions of the Prophet and how they provide models of self-transformation. He also notes the possibility of broader cultural transformation.

Spiritual techniques The disciplining and redirecting of the nafs is central to the different schools of Islam, in particular to Sufism. It begins with developing an awareness and acceptance of the nafs and its functions. The second step involves awareness of the distress at losing control to the nafs, and the accompanying feeling of shame and repentance (tawba). This leads to the use of core techniques, such as riyada (austerity) and tefekkur (contemplation), which assist the development of autonomy and agency. The concept of the second fitrah is a strong metaphor in Gülen’s work. It starts with the recognition of a weak character that needs strengthening. For instance, if a person recognizes that he is intemperate, this recognition is the first step of establishing the second fitrah. The second step is to determine the shortest route to take in order to establish a better character. This then demands developing skills related to temperance. This might be practised in family relationships or in work-based situations where, for instance, the person as leader needs to cultivate reflective decision making, not immediate reactions to challenges. This can develop such that a person can dedicate his life to helping others, as the ultimate generosity to humankind (Gülen 2007, 11). Moral development, according to Gülen, starts with an awareness of the self with its weaknesses and strengths to fulfil the potential (Çelik 2009). Morality is a journey for realizing the self-potential which takes a person to the rank of insanı kamil, the universal human. He also refers to this process as a way of gaining divinity through which a person attains and develops Godly names and attributes in his nature. So it can be called a process of establishing the balance between the internal and external worlds, between the physical and spiritual self under the guidance of the laws of nature and divine revelation (Gülen 2005, 160).

68

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Moral agency then is only possible with a developed nafs in the individual and in his engagement with that nafs. The moral agent can be wise and have a developed wijdan before he reaches puberty, but this does not endow him with moral agency.

Virtues Responsibility itself can be seen as a virtue (Williams 2008) akin to conscientiousness in fulfilling one’s responsibilities. Drawing on several different views of responsibility Williams suggest that responsibility as a virtue involves the capacity to ‘respond to a plurality of normative demands’ (2008, 14, author’s italics). This involves an awareness of those demands, an appreciation of them (what they involve and what value they represent) and the capacity to respond. This includes the capacity to fulfil role-related obligations. At the heart of this is the capacity to make judgements in the light of the different normative demands. There would be little content to the idea of a virtue of responsibility if it simply involved responding to a single shared narrative. In other words responsibility at least demands the exercise of moral agency. Williams offers examples such as professional responsibility being worked out amid various regulations and professional codes, short-term priorities and longer-term goals; or parental responsibility, balancing a child’s security with concern for its growing independence, and holding in tension such concerns with other duties in the workplace or wider community. It is the nature of such tensions that they occur over time, and involve potential conflict. This means that normative claims cannot be taken at face value. It has to be tested logically, empirically (in terms of consequences) and in terms of affect. Any moral demand is focused in value and identity and thus involves emotions. The focus on identity can also lead to a sense of partiality, not least in any defence of that identity. Responsibility for Williams holds out against such defensiveness, looking rather to assess the proper response at any time to the different relationships. By definition this means that the exercise of responsibility is not practised in an ideal situation. Because of the complexity it is inevitable that things will go wrong. William’s notes that part of Weber’s ‘ethics

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

69

of responsibility’ was that leaders (or in general, the responsible person) cannot rely solely on ‘principles’. The ‘wrongdoing’ (involving perceptions, practice and so on) of others has to be addressed (cf. Weber 1919). Certainly, it requires complex judgements about how far agents have lived up to particular or general responsibilities, and who should exact what sort of accountability (‘hold them responsible’). Responsibility is always a matter of living with agents as they are, as well as what they might become, and doing so in terms of one’s particular relationships and responsibilities towards them. Much of this overlaps Gülen’s view of responsibility, not least with idea of the ‘consciousness of responsibility’ (2005, 99). This links to the wider consciousness of the social and physical environments. Such consciousness is not simply an awareness of these environments but also awareness of one’s relationship to the environment. This links back to the role responsibility of the human being as vicegerent and thus to the universal responsibility noted above (cf. Carroll 2007). For Gülen, the virtues are based in spirituality. First, they emerge around this response to the creation narrative. The narrative establishes the responsive identity of the vicegerent, and from this and the core purpose of the vicegerent, the virtues emerge. Of course, the response is not simply to a narrative, but  to the lived presence of God, expressed in his creation. Second, therefore, the pattern of the virtues themselves is  not simply moral. It is built up of what might be termed, spiritual, moral,  intellectual and practical virtues, all of which work together. Third, because the focus is on the response to  the creator and the effect on the created, the social and environmental, the virtues embrace plurality and difference, and how these are handled. Finally, these virtues bring together thought and action, never allowing one or the other to dominate. In all this consciousness does not lead to a simplistic sense of being at one with the world but rather strong painful emotions about how the competing demands of the social and physical environment are to be responded to. Hence: They feel the pain of all these responsibilities in their heart; they make themselves felt as maddening palpitations, exasperation in the soul,

70

The Spirituality of Responsibility

always competing for their attention. The pain and distress that arise from the consciousness of responsibility, if it is not temporary, is a prayer, a supplication which is not rejected, and a powerful source of further alternative projects. (Gülen 2005, 95)

This powerful statement involves several important elements. First, Gülen shows that much of his theology is what in the West might be viewed as practical or praxis theology. He bases his points on reflection on the particular practice of others, rather than applying generalized concepts. Second, without drawing out the implications he begins to connect responsibility and consciousness. This is very much at the heart of the New Testament gospels (Robinson 2008) where the responsibility for the beggar at the gate is connected to the consciousness of the beggar’s presence there; suggesting that consciousness of the other always has an ethical not simply epistemological foundation. This means that consciousness is not value free. We chose to be conscious, and what to be conscious of. And that choice is based on perceived value. For Gülen that value is based in the relationship with God. Creation itself, and each created thing within it, is a manifestation of God’s names and art. Hence all events and time itself is focused in this value and meaning, and consciousness of this in effect becomes ongoing prayer relating to God. It is not easy, though, to see this as a single virtue. On the contrary, for Gülen the things ascribed by Williams to responsibility quickly move across to other virtues, virtues that become critical for the practice of responsibility.

Virtues and the mean In focusing on virtues, Gülen focuses on the mean, a middle way (Sirat-i Mustakim, Qur’an 1.5) between the two extremes. In one respect this shows the influence of Aristotelian thinking, with virtues located in the mean. Courage, for instance, is located between cowardice and foolhardiness. Temperance is located between abstinence and incontinence (in its broadest sense). This ties directly into how the nafs are dealt with, a middle way between avoiding them (leading to deficiency tefrit) and

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

71

excess (ifrat) which leads to the person being ruled by them. The Qur’an (2:143) also refers to Muslims as ummeten vasatan, ‘the community of the middle way’. Gülen (2006, 71) argues that moral development is achieved through not eliminating specific faculties or feelings but by rechanneling them to the right direction and satisfying them in lawful ways. Hence Ünal and Williams (2009, 300) note that in Gülen, Jealousy and rivalry can be transformed into competition in charitable and good deeds. Enmity can be transformed into enmity against Satan, our greatest enemy, and against the feeling of enmity itself and hatred. Greed and rage can become a drive that will force one to perform good deeds without tiredness. Egoism can point out the evil aspects of the carnal soul, thereby seeking to train and purify the soul by not excusing its evil actions.

Gülen (Kuru 2003) also looks to this mean in developing pathways for social justice. At the extreme of excess lies the destruction of property or environment in the name of justice whereas not speaking out against injustice shows deficiency. Again this raises questions about Gülen’s view of the Mavi Marmara case. Did he balance the concern about excess, and the negative effects of the actions with a concern about the injustice which has been experienced by the Palestinians? Part of the issue is how one speaks out. This ties the thinking into other virtues not least modesty and humility (2003), and involves not asserting the self in the way in which justice is communicated.3 Gülen (2003) also writes about pride. This can be seen as a middle way between vanity and having no sense of pride in the self. The middle way is clearly more complex than simply finding and embodying the mean between two extremes. It is also about the mean in any relationship with the self and with others. Hence, humility involves not asserting the self above the relationships at hand. Hence, the middle way provides a principle of balance that can be applied to a range of situations, including love for one’s child, the world and the hereafter, rewarding success and reflecting of emotions and excitement. Middle way thinking in Gülen extends beyond moral issues to

The Spirituality of Responsibility

72

wider conceptual issues, suggesting a general disposition, a life style or a philosophy. This can be summed up in his view of Islam: Islam, being the ‘middle way’ of absolute balance – balance between materialism and spirituality, between rationalism and mysticism, between worldliness and excessive asceticism, between this world and the next – and inclusive of the ways of all the previous prophets, makes a choice according to the situation. (1995, 200)

Gülen balances excessive rationalism with love and humility, both in the Sufi tradition. Yavuz (2013) suggests that Gülen’s discourse is a synthesis of reason and revelation, religion and science, individuals and community, stability and change and globalization and nationalism (cf. Kuru 2003, 130). This also suggests a middle way between tradition and modernity (2003). Wettstein (2007, 57) goes further arguing that Gülen provides a middle way between religious fundamentalism and scientism, ethical universalism and particularism. It is important to add that the idea of the mean is not formulaic; balance not a simplistic activity. Gülen’s theology stresses connection to the whole of creation and thus comprehensiveness. This is focused in mindfulness of the internal and external realities. This also relates to the integration of values, worth, perception, relation and practice. I will now begin to map this out in relation to the major moral virtues including wisdom, respect, tolerance and chastity. Wisdom (hikmet) As noted in the previous chapter, Gülen sees reason as expressing itself in a variety of ways depending on whether it is used in the right way or abused, distinguishing akl-i mead (the reason of the Hereafter) and akl-i meas (worldly reason). Reason which is dominated by the nafs lacks wisdom (Gülen 2009). At one extreme deficiency of reason leads to stupidity, foolishness or ignorance (Kuru 2003; Çelik 2009; Ünal & Williams 2009). At the other extreme the practice of reason expresses itself through demagogy and thus a shallow form of rhetoric, ultimately designed to pursue personal ends and worldly gains. Demagogy obscures

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

73

truth, leading away to false values which based in self or group interest. Gülen (2009) suggests that this misuse of reason is characterized by superficial quick wittedness, lack of reflection and acts of cunning.4 Reason finds its true expression in wisdom (hikme). This involves the capacity to evaluate actions and relationships with the social and wider environment and discriminating between harmful and beneficial ends (Gülen 2009). Hence, through wisdom a person is aware of and appreciates the wider universe, relating the different aspects of this environment and seeking the underlying purpose in all aspects of this relational web. Wisdom functions through reflection, contemplation and deliberation. Gülen stresses this sense of interconnectivity and constant reflection, with wisdom exploring ‘in the depths of the fields of perception of all inner and outer faculties, getting into the inner dimension of existence and thoroughly studying the apparent causes, shuttling between causes and effects’ (Gülen 2009, 208). Wisdom is precisely a bridging capacity spanning beneficial knowledge and virtuous practice, so it cannot be taken as an intellectual endeavour alone, but needs to be considered on the practical level as well. In this respect, it is very close to Aristotle’s (2009) virtue of practical wisdom, phronesis. This is the capacity for rational deliberation that enables the wise person to reflect on her conception of the good and to embody this in practice. Phronesis is a virtue that is brought into play most obviously whenever there is a value conflict, or an uncertainty about ends, picking up Williams’ (2008) earlier point about responsibility. Hence, it directly applies to the ongoing internal struggle and attempts to embody the good and in the Gülen’s case God’s purpose in practice. Aristotle sees this not as a moral virtue but one of the intellectual virtues. The other intellectual virtues are knowledge how (techne), intuition (nous), rational understanding (sophia) and scientific or empirical knowledge (episteme). It is important to stress that this views the intellect not as something apart from practice but rather a key part in relating to practice. The virtue of phronesis in particular is essentially for practice. As the manager signs off the marketing strategy, has she considered the purpose of the strategy, how purpose and strategy are viewed by key

74

The Spirituality of Responsibility

stakeholders and where there are different views of how the business might contribute to the wider good? How she decides between those different views of purpose will depend on how she sees both the values and consequence of those purposes, and how the board sees them. This is about coming to a considered view of the good in that situation, something that requires openness to other perspectives and a wrestling with competing ideas of the good (cf. Taylor 1989). Hence, phronesis is not confined to simply rationality, involving reflection on value and therefore involving awareness of affect. This is key for Gülen, with reason long being practised in the study of the physical and metaphysical worlds through the affective lens. This leads to continual learning, creating a virtuous circle of inquiry (Gülen 2009, 208). There are parallels with T.S. Eliot’s view of learning circles, where we may return to the same place but see it for the first time, We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time. (Eliot 2009)

Wisdom functions best when it works steadily, followed by practice, resulting in enthusiasm for more wisdom and new ways of reasoning. Gülen argues that the practice of wisdom should be deliberate, steady and ongoing, focused in proactive mode (aktif akıl) (Gülen 2010). Practical wisdom as detailed by Aquinas (Latin prudentia) included elements such as openness to the past (memoria), openness to the present, involving the capacity to be still and listen actively, taking account of diversity and possible deception (docilitas), openness to the future and how goals may be achieved (providentia). This stresses openness and care before any hasty judgement or decision. In being open to the present and the future it also stresses an appreciation of reality and thus of both constraints and possibilities in any situation. This also involves intelligentia (understanding of first principles), solertia (the capacity to quickly assess a situation) and ratio (the capacity to research and compare alternative possibilities- discursive reasoning). In turn, all this is tempered by circumspection and caution, capacities that enable the persons to

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

75

assess risk and take into account all aspects. Because of this concerns for reality, Aquinas saw this as the foundation of the virtues. It works against a primarily target-centred approach to leadership and management. It also ties directly into the first mode of responsibility, taking responsibility for perception and awareness of the social and physical environment over time. Hence, it is not simply about living in the moment.5 For Gülen there are also fundamental and cardinal virtues (ümmühât-ı huluk) of morality, including tolerance, courage, chastity and justice. Tolerance Tied very closely to the creation response is the idea of tolerance, a virtue that is critical to Gülen, and once again emerges from spirituality, in the sense of the relationship to creator and creation. Tolerance here is not a weak form of acceptance, but rather an emphatic acceptance (hosgoru). Tolerance is embodied in God, in his compassion, mercy and forgiveness. In the response of humankind these virtues are mirrored (2006, 37). Creation itself is an embodiment of God’s love for humanity. It is this love that is at the heart of tolerance (2006, 37). Such tolerance is inherent in Islam, but is not just for Muslims. It is for the whole of creation. This means accepting others the way they are in all their difference, moral and culture (see Chapter 5 below on dialogue). Gülen is clear that difference is inherent in creation and in humanity in particular (Qur’an 7:40). This is the basis too for a sense of shared responsibility, with different groups working together for the whole. Such a tolerance involves a commitment to the other, and a recognition of equal dignity in humanity created by God, and energizes any sense of shared response, and in that sense if unconditional. Tolerance, nonetheless does not involve collusion in or acceptance of immoral behaviour. On the contrary, as Tyler suggests, this provides the grounds for which unpalatable behaviour can be challenged (Tyler 2008, 741). It is precisely such tolerance that acts as the basis for dialogue, and reconciliation, not least because it leads to creative dialogue and proactive peace building. Such practice becomes part of a reciprocal relationship. Not to show tolerance in turn means risking a loss of tolerance from others and from God (Gülen 2006, 34).

76

The Spirituality of Responsibility

This suggests that reasoning and critical thinking are most effective in the context of tolerance, such that the other is respected for who they are. It also points up how the virtues work together. Tolerance is close to equality of respect (Outka 1972) most often expressed as respect for the rational autonomy of the other or unconditional positive regard. The first of these is very Kantian and runs the danger of excluding those who are not rational individuals from respect. The second runs the danger of including all without challenge of their responsibility. The Christian analogue of respect is agape (Robinson 2001). Often seen as unconditional love it is rather an attitude of care that sees the other as of ultimate worth, as well as capable of negative practice. As such it directly affects how the other is seen and empowered, but retains an awareness of reality. Agape is often seen as a virtue that is entirely other centred. However, first, it is relation centred, thus focusing care of and respect for the self as much as the other. Second, it is not based in the attraction of the other, seeing the other as of worth regardless of attraction. This does not exclude attraction from respect. Hence, whilst it is inclusive in its range it does not simply treat all other as the same but responds to the particularity of the other. Critically tied to this virtue is spiritual or theological virtue of faith in the creator. It is the faith in the creator that enables the person to see purpose and identity (Gülen 2005, 31). Closely tied to this is the virtue of love. As described by Gülen, this does not sit easily alongside the virtue espoused by Aquinas and other Christian writers (Robinson 2008). It is not simply the unconditional love that Aquinas saw as the foundation of the virtues. This is closer to equal respect and commitment (Robinson 2001). Gülen’s love is, in one sense, closer to eros. Hence, Gülen writes of both ‘a vast love for all creation’ (2005, 32), and also an all-embracing love that involves ‘being in a state of rapture and ecstasy, attraction, and the feeling of being attracted towards God, and spiritual pleasures’ (2005, 32–33). This is a love which is passionate, sustains commitment and fuels response. Close to that, but distinct is the virtue of compassion. This takes more of the altruistic caring sense found in agape. Part of the meaning of compassion is specifically care for those who suffer.

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

77

Courage (Şecâat) Gülen links courage with anger. As noted earlier, the expression of anger can be either constructive or destructive, depending on its rightful use or abuse. Cowardice (cebânet), expressed by Aristotle as one extreme of the mean of courage, is seen by Gülen as a deficient expression of anger (Kuru 2003; Çelik 2009). Gülen writes forcefully of cowards who feel fear at even the slightest challenge, reflecting a negative view of the world, leading to paranoia (literally wrong notions) (Gülen 2013). This can lead to uncritical submission in extreme cases such as the invasion or exploitation of a country. Gülen argues that those who remain silent when family members are threatened are no different from dead people, in terms of their failure to respond when needed (Gülen 2010). Once again this can be extended to everyday activities, including the workplace, with need to stand against abuse or injustice, or in wider contexts to stand up for human rights. The opposite of this is reckless reaction or rage, tehevvür. This involves the expression of anger, which loses all judgement. It is close to Aristotle’s other extreme of foolhardiness, though foolhardy actions might be motivated by other than anger. Hence, Gülen notes that anger has to be balanced with wisdom (2010). Gülen (2010) gave the example of suicide bombers which takes this beyond simply foolhardiness. Such extremists act out of unrestrained anger. The lack of wisdom is not simply about pragmatism, or even awareness of and care about consequences of actions. It is also about a lack of proper regard for underlying values, including human rights, and a lack of careful reflection on the Islamic scriptures. The balanced expression of anger is courage (şecâat). Courage is important in reacting to potential threats, enabling proper caution. This reinforces the point about Gülen’s overall theology and spirituality. Though God’s creation is in essence good, the social and physical environment are irreducibly ambiguous, capable of posing threats to persons and groups, as much as capable of sustaining them. A courageous person is careful in his response to potential threats, capable of standing firm and responding to them rapidly. For Gülen this also involves self-

78

The Spirituality of Responsibility

respect and respect for dignity of the person, and by extension integrity (Gülen 2010). Much of this resonates with the more complex view of courage set out by Plato (cf. Reid 2002). It is not about thoughtless bravery. It includes a capacity to persevere with an aim, whilst also holding a critical relationship to that aim, enabling one to modify it as and when it is right to do so (Parry et  al. 2007). Again there is tension in this virtue, between the courage to stick something out, literally going the extra mile, surviving perhaps great suffering and knowing when to stop. Any leader will need courage to articulate, test and stay with, or alter, a moral purpose, faced by competing purposes. Harle (2005) suggests that this also involves ataraxia, or peace of mind, enabling steadiness under stress. Chastity (İffet) Chastity is perhaps closest to the Aristotelian virtue of temperance, not least because neither term signifies abstinence.6 İffet can also be understood as ‘purity’, and links to the idea of a modifier of lust. ‘Chastity’ is the common translation (Ünal & Williams 2009, 307). Lust (sehvet), as I noted earlier, can be used to good or bad ends. Its association with vice in the Western traditions suggests that a better translation might be passion or even eros. In its excess, it causes the person to be unaware of the need for modesty, leading to lack of awareness of the community and sinful behaviour (licentiousness, fısk-u fücûr) (Çelik 2009). In its deficient form, there is no recognition of appetite or desires, even positive ones (frigidity humûd). The mean in lust is chastity (iffet) (Gülen 2006). Chastity, for Gülen, involves cultivating desires focused in acceptable ends. This requires self-discipline and control of all senses and actions (2006). Gülen is careful to locate this in relation to legitimacy (halal), and illegitimacy (haram). The latter is where unrestrained lust can lead, and he argues for the importance or not placing oneself on any slippery slope that might lead that. This is a critical issue around responsibility and alcohol, for instance. Whilst an individual may take alcohol and remain sober, the person is responsible for not putting himself into position where

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

79

he might lose his controlling faculties, leading to impropriety (Robinson & Kenyon 2009, 130–131). Hence, Gülen argues that humans must be satisfied with the pleasures focused in halal and maintain great caution by keeping away even from the borders of haram (sedd-i zerâî). Another aspect of chastity is expressed by Gülen not being in need of another, in the sense of being indebted or obligated to them (Gülen 2013). Need should only be located in the need for God. This further relates to the concept of ikhlas, sincerity or purity of heart. This involves lack of attachment to interested groups and to any system of reward or profit in return for deeds. This demands a focus on the response to God, showing gratitude for his creation and call, and aiming to please Him, not on responding through self-interest or fear (Graskemper 2008, 742). Hence, for Gülen this rules out any self-interested reward as the basis for responding to God, such as assured salvation. In a professional context this approach to motivation is about disinterestedness, not being drawn into any interested group which takes practice away from the core purpose. Justice (Adalet) Whilst Gülen does not view justice as a means, it is by nature about moderation. At one level it involves fairness (cf. Rawls 1971), ensuring that balance is maintained between interests, rights are maintained and abuse of power, including victimization of everyone and everything, avoiding wrongs, victimization, persecution and tyranny (Gülen 2013). In discussing justice Gülen focuses on how one should respond to unfairness addressed to oneself. It is permissible to respond with exact reciprocity, measure for measure (Gülen 2013). However, Gülen (2011), developing Nursi, argues that this can lead to a vicious circle, involving lack of control. Any response reflects the person’s moral disposition, and this should not be compromised because one is harmed (2011). Hence, the response should be characterized by wisdom and patience (another Aristotelian virtue) (Gülen 2013). It is preferable to answer misdeed with good deed enabling a more tolerant dynamic to develop. This begins to move through justice as fairness, and justice as desert to justice as

80

The Spirituality of Responsibility

restorative. What is clear is that the practice of justice cannot be formulaic, and once again demands practice with the other virtues to empower the person to come to a right mind on any issue concerning justice. Hence, justice is properly a virtue. As part of this thoughtful response Gülen does not think that a response should be avoided. Rather should be in its legitimate terms. Hence, if someone slanders you, justice requires that the slander be corrected (Gülen 2011), not least because without refutation this might be accepted as truth. The practice of justice often relates to the core moral good of a profession of institution, such as the distribution of health care or educational frameworks of assessment. Justice can also relate to ikhlas enabling fair and disinterested practice in professional relationships. Ikhlas is closely related to humility, styled as an appreciation of limitations and qualities of the self (Togoslu 2008). The development of such virtues, focused in character, like Aristotle’s view, requires practice in community. This is well illustrated in Gülen’s view of the virtues related to education. Graskemper (2007) suggests that this involves four major virtues, which are close to the learning virtues espoused by the Jesuits: commitment, responsibility, virtue and service. Commitment picks up elements of tolerance and love, but also includes a sense of staying with the project over time, and in spite of hardships (Graskemper 2007, 626). This resilience and resolve is dramatically described by Gülen, ‘People of service must resolve, for the sake of the cause to which they have given their heart, to cross over seas of pus and blood’ (Gülen 2000, 83). Whilst the virtues of character were indeed directly Aristotelian, such a view of virtue is very different from a virtue of the mean. Responsibility picks up the sense of responsibility as imputability, the capacity of the person to take responsibility for his or her thoughts, values and actions. It also picks up the sense of being responsible for others. Together they make moral and intellectual enlightenment (Gülen 1996). The third virtue is virtue, itself. This is very close to Plato’s idea of areté, or human excellence (Robinson 2007, 174). Plato sees virtues such as courage and justice as necessary for its development. Gülen is

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

81

clear that this is about always striving for excellence. Three things are important here. First, this striving means that Islam is not simply about being virtuous but about always becoming virtuous. This developmental and cyclical model means that the person is never completely satisfied. Second, the development of virtue is not simply developing moral virtues. Once again, intellectual virtues, especially focused in scientific thinking, are essential to any moral life not least because they enable the awareness and proper appreciation of data that are necessary for any response to God (Gülen 1998). Third, the stress on both the importance of transparent data collection in moral decision making, responsiveness to the environment, social and physical, and its needs, and dialogue that results in action, and developing partnerships of shared responsibility, provides a context for developing ethics, and by extension virtue and the virtues, that is universal (Gülen 1996). This is not a matter of universal principles per se, though there is a strong support in Gülen and members of the Hizmet Movement for universal human rights (Keles 2007) and he has a strong sense of natural law. Rather is the universal anchored in the consciousness of creation, and the core purpose of human development in response to creation. Hence, intellectual and moral virtues link to environmental virtues. The final virtue noted by Graskemper is that of service (hizmet) itself. In a sense this also takes Gülen’s ethics into a universal mode. The virtuous person is the person for others (cf. Bonhoeffer 1995), and this is connected to human telos. One only becomes human, and experiences human well-being, through service, of God and others. The importance of hizmet to responsibility, especially to universal responsibility will be discussed in the next chapter, not least because it is focused in an understanding of dynamic anthropology. At this stage it is sufficient to note that service takes a discussion of the virtues away from virtues as simply located to a religious community. Service focuses on action and therefore on embodied meaning which is focused in the public domain. In the next chapters I will note how the ideas of universal responsibility, universal values and human rights reinforce this. Gülen does not spend time systematically working through the idea of integrity. It is clear, however that he locates integrity in the action of

82

The Spirituality of Responsibility

responsibility, focusing on the continued reflection on the inner and outer worlds, responding to the challenges of both: Those who want to reform the world must first reform themselves. If they want to lead others to a better world, they must purify their inner worlds of hatred, rancour, and jealousy, and adorn their outer worlds with virtue. The words of those who cannot control and discipline themselves, and who have not refined their feelings, may seem attractive and insightful at first. However, even if they somehow manage to inspire others, which they sometimes do, the sentiments they arouse will soon wither. (Gülen 1998, 110)

This sets up a distinction between image, attractive projections of the self, and integrity which is developed over time and through the consistent practice of the virtues. Integrity is very much a collection of virtues, focusing on consistency, coherence and congruence, between past, present and future, thought, value and action (Robinson 2008). These are central themes for Gülen (Michel 2003, 72–73; Graskemper 2007, 629). Once again then it is virtue which enables the practice of responsibility.

Other views of virtue Virtues are central to the thinking of Gülen. He focuses on the heroes who embody these virtues and has strong sense of narrative. Like MacIntyre (1981) he focuses on Aristotelian virtues that form the basis of control and discipline in character, and stresses continual reflection and development. Like MacIntyre, Gülen is focused in telos, but the telos is based in response to the creator. Hence, the underlying good is always being worked out in relation to that. Unlike MacIntyre, Gülen does not distinguish between internal and external goods. On the contrary, the goods that are focused in the role of vicegerent are focused in the common good and form the basis for a plurality of roles, from citizen to professional to family. These are actively worked out through the practice of moral agency. For MacIntyre the reflective stress is very much historical – the narrative of the community. For Gülen, the stress is more immediate,

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

83

the present response to the creative action of God. Hence, the virtues are servants to response and to the future not the past. They are embodied in service and the sharing of responsibility. In the light of all that the moral virtues emerge from the response to God’s creation and, if anything, are based in the creative action of God. The stress on action, service and the diversity of creation mean that key virtues involve awareness of that diversity, the capacity to respond and the capacity to address diversity in creative response, not least through partnership. In all this Gülen can happily work in the global and diverse context of post-modernity, building bridges through tolerance and dialogue. Side by side with Aristotelian virtues of the mean Gülen can also have a context of virtues which lead outwards to creative action. The virtues for Gülen, focused not least in the constant creative imperative of hizmet, and purpose of vicegerent, come together in the creative impulse, and hence the constant urge to transform and change, rather than simply focusing on the mean. Because of this the virtues always have a social aspect. They cannot be confined to the individual. A comparison with Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas (1984), Hauerwas and Wells (2004) is in many ways even more significant, because of its religious context. Hauerwas evinces a limited and negative view of the Enlightenment, and perhaps above all wants to distinguish the Christian narrative and virtues from what he perceives to be the secular rationalist narrative. The result is a much more extreme view of virtue than MacIntyre, with the core virtue described in terms of absolute practice, non-violence. By definition this cuts off the Christian narrative from meaningful dialogue with outside groups, around either virtue or practice. Hence, there is little possibility for critical debate around, for instance, the meaning of justice. In contrast, Gülen also holds a more complex view of virtues, focused in the creative response and service. That set of positive virtues, far from cutting off wider perspectives on virtue and purpose, directly engages these. A sense of universal responsibility is able to relate directly to the global responsibility of writers such a Jonas (1984, see below). The stress on action allows direct dialogue about what responsibility means in any context. Moreover, whilst Hauerwas and Gülen

84

The Spirituality of Responsibility

may be seen as ‘orthodox’ thinkers, Hauerwas’s virtue ethics is based in a discrete community, with meaning focused in stories. This suggests that ethical meaning is focused in religious identity. For Gülen, ethical meaning is focused in religious identity but is lived out in plural identity, including religious, national, professional and civic. The values lived out in these identities are also universal. Once more this involves a tension, held between universal ethical meaning and particular responsibilities. Because of this, Gülen, unlike Hauerwas, is able to have a genuine ethical dialogue with people and groups in the public sphere. Because of this he is able to develop ethical dialogue that can relate positively to modernity and meaningfully to post-modernity.

Conclusions In this and the preceding chapter I have mapped out the key aspects of what is a complex and profound view of moral agency. Ultimately, it is based in man’s relationships to God leading to relational freedom. Hence, reality is not simply socially constructed but relationally constructed, in response to God and His creation. This leads to a view moral agency which is as much about balancing of internal and external consciousness, involving the working out of responsibility in practice. This connects agency to action, and moral virtues to intellectual, psychological and environmental virtues. Hence, alongside action the virtues have an epistemic dimension, enabling a focus on truth in relationships (cf. Scherkoske 2013).7 Character and the practice of virtue are central to this, with virtues enabling the practice of responsibility. Moral agency in all this is not focused purely in the individual, but is part and parcel of continued interaction, and humankind cannot stand outside that. This echoes strongly Niebuhr’s (1963) view of the existential response to the interconnected web of human and natural life. Gülen (2005, 96) also points up the need to practise responsibility within that relational framework, precisely to avoid a loss of agency, ‘Remaining aloof from action, not interfering in the things happening around us, not being

Responsibility, Agency and the Virtues

85

a part of the events around us and staying indifferent to them is like letting ourselves melt away, like ice turning to water’ (Gülen 2005, 96). Similarly, remaining aloof from society is not an option, linking personal responsibility to social or civic responsibility (Toguslu 2007, 450), to which I will now turn.

4

Social and Environmental Responsibility

This chapter begins to develop responsibility in Gülen in relation to action. It will focus on several aspects of this responsibility: stewardship, universal responsibility, environmental responsibility and social responsibility. The  first of these focuses on the framework of accountability to God, which lies at the heart of Gülen’s view of responsibility. The  second extends the idea of liability for to a position of universal responsibility. I will critically examine this and compare to existential and post-holocaust views (Sartre, Arendt, Levinas and Bauman). The importance of a transcendent perspective in enabling this attitude, and tying liability for something or someone into relational accountability, is stressed. The third extends the Gülen’s view of stewardship, showing how it relates to environmental responsibility. This will be compared to Jonas (environmental responsibility). I will also develop the dynamics of this aspect of responsibility, including the importance of sharing and negotiating of responsibility. The fourth focus examines social responsibility. In particular this will examine the way in which businesspersons in the Hizmet Movement make decisions about and practise social responsibility, and the contributions which Gülen makes to the corporate responsibility debates. This will include an example of professional responsibility based in the Zaman Media group. In a final discussion I consider critiques of this view of responsibility, leading to the next chapter’s consideration of civil responsibility and peace-building.

88

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Stewardship I discussed in the previous chapter how accountability in Gülen was focused in his view of creation and man as the steward of creation. Gülen writes, If humanity is the vicegerent of God on Earth, the favourite of all His creation, the essence and substance of existence in its entirety and the brightest mirror of the Creator – and there is no doubt that this is so – then the Divine Being that has sent humanity to this realm will have given us the right, permission, and ability to discover the mysteries imbedded in the soul of the universe, to uncover the hidden power, might and potential, to use everything to its purpose, and to be the representatives of characteristics that belong to Him, such as knowledge will and might. (Gülen 2004, 122)

Gülen’s view of responsibility is grounded in accountability. For Gülen this is focused in the relationship with God, based in his creation theology. God created the world and appointed humanity to be the vicegerent (Qur’an 2:30). At its heart this is about stewardship, hence Gülen refers to human beings as ‘carriers of trust’ (2004, 4). Humankind in this sense stands in for God, as deputy, but also stands before him, both responsible with God for creation and accountable to him for its flourishing. Working with God involves partly being open to the divine power. Accountability is not simply for creative action and its contribution to flourishing, but also being accountable for not flourishing. Accountability is then set up in the context of a transcendent relationship of trust. Relation-centred accountability contrasts with contract-centred accountability which focuses on specific targets, and roles that relate to those targets. Relation-centred accountability has a different dynamic, aiming to nurture the relationship and respond to the call of the other. The call of God in creation, Gülen argues, is focused in love, which is ‘the reason for existence and its essence, and is the strongest tie that binds creation together’ (Pratt 2010, 198). The responsibility of the person or organization is to work out how to respond in context.

Social and Environmental Responsibility

89

May (1989) refers to this as covenant thinking, something which is based in gift and openness, enabling the space for creative response, and community (involving a consciousness and responsiveness to the social environment). This contrasts, he argues, with contract thinking which sums up obligations in specific terms, including targets, and sees the fulfilment of the contract as discharging all accountability. It is possible to polarize covenant and contract thinking (cf. Titmuss 1973), but there is clear need for both, with covenant suited to high views of the professions, as fulfilling a call from an other (Khurana & Nohria 2008), and contract needed to sustain projects. There are several elements that make this relational accountability so powerful for Gülen and other religious writers. First, it is eschatological, offering, a sense of judgement over time. The person will have to give an account of actions before another, in religion’s case God, and this will involve reflecting on and testing of beliefs, ideas and practice. For Gülen the final judgement does not involve simplistic or prescriptive judgements on orthodoxy or orthopraxy, but rather a testing that fully involves the person reflecting and giving an account, one that links judgement to ongoing introspection and self-interrogation (Gülen 1990; cf. Robinson 2008). This deepens any view of transparency, as not being simply about openness but also the capacity to give an account, and thus be open to testing (cf. O’Neill 2002). The steward then operates under judgement. This is not a judgemental framework, with focus on fear of failure but a creative framework focused on being alert to all possibilities in relation to God and His creation. All of this provides the context for moral agency discussed in the previous chapters. Second, this sets up a perspective of inclusivity. If the person to whom one is accountable transcends all interests then the focus of responsibility does not a priori exclude any aspect of the social or physical environment. The fulfilment of accountability is a function of being responsive to social context, making it hard for anyone, including businesspersons, to predetermine precisely what obligations are owed to which stakeholders. This connects accountability to liability as universal responsibility (see below), and provides a more effective motivation to practice responsibility.

90

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Relational accountability engages the affective as well as cognitive aspects of value. If you know and trust the person you are accountable to then there is a desire to fulfil responsibility. Transcendent points of value such as principles, or broad concepts such as the common good, are important but remain firmly cognitive, without any sense of relational identification. Third, as noted in Chapter  2, responsibility is teleological. All the resources are to be used to fulfil the divine purpose. Hence, any sense of response has to be seen in terms of the overall sovereignty of God and his desire to see humanity fulfilling his plans. This level of accountability is, however, developed in significant ways. The task of the vicegerent is not simply to believe in God but also to understand ‘the mysteries within things and the cause of natural phenomena, and therefore to be able to interfere in nature’ (Gülen 2004, 122). Gülen takes those who do this to be ‘genuine human beings’ and argues that they exercise their free will ‘in a constructive manner, working with and developing the world, protecting the harmony between existence and humanity, reaping the bounties of the Earth and Heavens for the benefit of humanity, trying to raise the hue, from and flavour of life to a more humane level within the framework of the Creator’s orders and rules’ (Gülen 2004, 124). The implication of this soon becomes apparent. First, as noted above, we have to take science seriously. This is not something that is seen to be autonomous or to be against religion. Rather science reveals to us the laws of nature and, by implication, helps us to see the telos of creation. This clearly shows why Gülen, despite being firmly a creationist (and hence not supporting evolutionary theory), is concerned for science as a key part of his educational work. Second, the pursuit of science becomes part of humankind’s developing consciousness of creation. I will develop thoughts on that consciousness later. Third, the free will that is key to any sense of responsibility should be used in service, and this should be used to sustain the balance between the environment and humanity, making the most of the resources given in creation, all for the benefit of humanity as a whole and all with a purpose of raising the level of civilization for all. He is clear in all this that the natural world can be manipulated for positive ends. For ecologists this brings to mind questions about whether stewardship involves the domination of creation, or whether the vicegerent

Social and Environmental Responsibility

91

works with God as co-creator (cf. White 1967). If the vicegerent has worked through the telos then this is about creative working with God, not about imposing domination upon the created world. Gülen (2005) notes that the role of vicegerent is based in the servanthood of human beings, not the assertion of human power or domination. Nonetheless, humanity is given authority by God and this notes humankind’s position of superiority in creation, not least because of the capacity to be aware of and appreciate (i.e. judge the value of) that creation, focused in reason and conscience. This superior position is not one of absolute power, partly because of the limitations of humanity (moral and physical) and partly because of the framework of judgement. Humanity remains accountable to God. This places Gülen’s view of humanity’s right ‘to intervene in nature’ in context (2005, 126–127). As noted in Chapter 2 humankind is, in effect, joining in with the ongoing creation, actively developing it. This establishes humanity’s responsibility for creation but also sets limitations, which will be examined in more detail below. This requires continual reflection on the teloi in context; hence, the need to use science. Such a continual reflective process, of course, cannot be simplistic, or even univocal. This is so for two reasons. First, it is not clear that science per se can determine the teloi. God’s purposes are a matter of value rather than scientific truth. The science may support and confirm that value but cannot ultimately decide the value. Second, any judgement about teloi, or about the scientific support for teloi, will inevitably be contested. Hence, there is need for continual debate around the understanding of teloi. The practice of vicegerency then makes it centrally social and dialogic. I will examine the nature and dynamic of this dialogue and ongoing interpretation in Chapter 6.

Universal responsibility Given the approach of Gülen to the accountability and moral agency, it is not surprising that Gülen should assert responsibility for everything. In reflecting on major Turkish figures, he writes:

92

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Their responsibility is such that whatever enters an individual comprehension and conscious will power never remains outside of theirs: responsibility for the creation of events, nature and society, the past and the futures, the dead and the living, the young and the old, the literate and the illiterate, administration and security … . Everybody and everything. (Gülen 2005, 95)

Universal responsibility has echoes of Sartre’s view of responsibility. Sartre’s (2007) existentialism is rooted in his view of subjectivity and the exercise of the individual will. Humanity, on the one hand, is forlorn, argues Sartre, without any idea of a priori good, because there is no God. On the other hand, Sartre neatly flips the argument, suggesting that this precisely means that man no longer has any excuse for inaction (cf. Carroll 2007, 88). This links to Voltaire’s critique of religion which locates responsibility for everything with God, leading to simple acceptance of all things as determined by Him, even disasters. If it is God who is responsible for the world there is little that we can be held responsible for (Voltaire 2006). Without God then the buck stops with man. At one level this means that man is responsible for what is before him, not least for making sense of an incomprehensible world. Not to exercise this subjectivity involves what Sartre refers to as bad faith – a form of selfdeception. Sartre is careful not to rest this argument for responsibility on the absence of God. On the contrary, he notes Christian writers who argue that the existence of God does not take away from individual responsibility (Sartre 2004). How then does personal responsibility lead to the idea that we are responsible for the world? Sartre recognizes that we cannot be morally responsible for all that happens in the world. Ultimately, the limitations of human mortality mean that we can never actually know the long-term effects of what we try to do. However, in effect, he argues, humanity, and with that reality, is only developed through action, The doctrine I am presenting here is the very opposite of quietism, since it declares, ‘there is no reality except in action’. Moreover, it goes further since it adds ‘Man is nothing other than his plan’; he exists only

Social and Environmental Responsibility

93

to the extent that he fulfils himself; he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life. (Sartre 2004, 357)

Such an action is, moreover, not confined to the individual, for ‘In fashioning myself I fashion man’ (Sartre 2007, 4). Sartre’s final logic is strained when it comes to this last step. This is along the lines of: if man is fully responsible for his self-presentation in action, he is responsible for all men. This makes more sense if responsibility is seen as providing a witness to humanity, representing authentic responsiveness. This is partially about being accountable to humanity and partly about a form of leadership, providing an example to humanity, and in this sense being responsible. In other words any action I take makes a statement which speaks to the relationships and community to which I belong, and beyond. May (1992) extends this to suggest that whatever the effect of the action it contributes to the community and the perception of purpose and practice (even inaction), leading to a sense of shared responsibility. Gülen shares with Sartre the concern for individual responsibility. However, the logic of his view of universal responsibility is more relational than Sartre, and thus avoids Sartre’s strained logic. As noted earlier, this is partly because of the inclusivity demanded by the relationship with God. By definition this sets the steward as responsible for the whole of creation. The  steward’s actions are focused in God’s inclusiveness. Also the inclusiveness of Gülen’s position is focused in the values of tolerance, compassion and love, an unconditional love for all creation (see Chapter 3), and a belief in the innate value of creation (see below on the environment). This position means that Gülen is closer, for instance to the Christian position than to Sartre. This brings consciousness, of the social and physical environment, and responsibility together. It is exemplified in the New Testament gospels (Robinson 2008) where the responsibility for the beggar at the gate is connected to the consciousness of his presence there (Luke 19:19–31); suggesting that consciousness of the other always has an ethical not simply epistemological foundation. I know the other because I am aware of him or her as of ultimate value.

94

The Spirituality of Responsibility

In post-Holocaust ethics, writers such as Bauman (1994) reflect on the experience of the Holocaust (the industrialized murder of over six million Jews in the Second World War). The Holocaust happened because of the way in which certain groups of people were excluded from humanity. Responsibility for the other was, in these cases, denied. This denial was exacerbated by management techniques such as the division of labour, which further distanced any sense of responsibility. Rationality in all this was focused on efficiency, not response to the wider environment. The basis of ethics, Bauman argues, then has to be inclusive awareness and appreciation of the other. Hence, ethics begins with taking responsibility for the other, and the rest is how that responsibility is worked out, with others. Levinas (1998) thus sees ethics as beginning with the ‘face’ of the other. Like Gülen then Bauman argues that unless one begins from an attitude of universal responsibility or responsibility to and for the whole, in addition to any individual or role responsibility, we run the danger of excluding others from the moral realm. The unconditional nature of this takes us back to the Holocaust where people with ‘difference’, from disabilities to different cultures were deemed to be outside the accepted circle. Hence, no one took responsibility for them, or for defending them. Alongside this it is important to have a critical pluralism, requiring different perspectives to critically question any view of value. The thrust of this is that universal responsibility requires the criticality of responsible agency. Hence Bauman notes of the Milgram experiments,1 ‘A most remarkable conclusion flowing from the full set of the Milgram experiments is that pluralism is the best preventative medicine against morally normal people engaging in morally abnormal actions’ (Bauman 1989, see also Chapters 5 and 6 and the importance of plurality and diversity in Gülen’s thinking). The idea of having only one moral view point embedded in a community which cannot be questioned tends to lead to denial of responsibility both for people outside that community and of responsibility for relationships within the community. As a theory of ethics this does not literally mean we have to be responsible for everything. Rather one begins with the attitude of responsibility. This cannot be totally fulfilled by the one person. In the light of that, Gülen

Social and Environmental Responsibility

95

shares with several writers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and with Bauman (1989) and Levinas (1989), a strong sense of the suffering that goes with an awareness of universal responsibility. For Bauman ‘the moral self is always haunted by the suspicion that it is not moral enough’ (1989). For Gülen no response can completely fulfil the call of the other, and thus the person can never be satisfied (Vicini 2007, 438). As Carroll observes (2007, 98), this also echoes more mystical and relational themes of Rumi that see pain as a condition of loving another, and thus being responsible for that other, ‘It is a yearning, a suffering, a palpitation of the heart, and a quivering consciousness that is never avoided as long as one is “in love”’ (Gülen 2005, 98). Inevitably then there is a strong existential aspect to Gülen, providing a bridge even between him and writers such as Sartre. There are also echoes in all this of the universal responsibility espoused by Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov. The Character Markel recognizes his connection with everything, and says ‘everyone is really responsible to all men, for all men and for everything’ (Dostoevsky 1993, 41), a view later echoed by Father Zossima. Zossima, however, moves responsibility across from liability for consequences to liability for the sins of humankind, ‘as soon as you make yourself sincerely responsible for everything and for all men, you will see at once that it is really so, and that you are to blame for everyone and for all things’ (Dostoevsky 1993, 78). Williams (2010, 164) notes that this is reached through an argument focused on man’s awareness of the God’s presence in nature. Hence, Zossima can pray for forgiveness for the rest of the natural world because he has offended them by not appreciating that they reveal God’s presence. If he has offended against all then he must take responsibility for all. This is a different form of a God-centred view of responsibility, both for one’s own perceptions and for the social and physical environment. However, like Sartre this has a strained logic in making the final step of taking responsibility, and with that blame, for everyone and everything. For Gülen, this view would have major problems not least because it brings into question human agency. If we are to blame for everyone then it is hard to see how personal moral responsibility could be taken seriously. Gülen is rather closer to Arendt. She defines humanity as the

96

The Spirituality of Responsibility

view ‘that in one form or another men must assume responsibility for all crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil committed by all others’ (Arendt 1991, 282). Here, Arendt does not necessarily mean strict moral liability for the sins of others, but more the sense that human kind must take responsibility for learning from those sins. Bauman (1989) suggests a context in which human beings tend to avoid responsibility. Hence, the need to continually work at responsibility for the social environment becomes inevitable, even if this can never be fully achieved. Gülen (1990, cf. 2009b), nonetheless, suggests that we will remain responsible even for unintended consequences. The Day of Judgement will reveal this. Inevitably, ‘Something will confront them from God, which they never reckoned’ (Qur’an 39:47). Hence, as noted in Chapter 2, we remain responsible for more than the things we intend (despite the importance of intentionality), but not blameworthy, especially if, as Gülen (1990) notes, we have been continually reflecting on our responsibility and developing the related consciousness of the social and physical environment in life. Part of the logic of this approach involves the presumption of responsibility. This acts as another motivator for the person to increase awareness of the social and physical environment, directly relating personal responsibility to universal responsibility, taking responsibility beyond the codes of the narrow ethnic group. In turn, it relates personal responsibility directly to collective responsibility, partly because all are called to respond and partly because response can be more effective if responsibility for action is negotiated with other stakeholders. Hence, Gülen (2004, 231) writes of ‘a shared responsibility’ to build a happier world. As I noted in Chapter 2, Nasr (2006, 300) reinforces this view with reference to Qur’an (7:172), where before creation God asks of human beings ‘Am I not your Lord? They said: Yea verily. We testify.’ The plural case of the verb points collective human responsibility. Just as responsibility is for all, all are responsible for freely responding to God. This drills down to being responsible for all that we can do and all that we have not done. Such responsibility leads to the demand to remain aware, of God and of His creation, and of the possibilities of action. This leads to

Social and Environmental Responsibility

97

a non-judgemental attitude to others, and a concern to link with them in action. There are several potential problems with extreme forms of universal responsibility. First, there is the danger that it could lead to taking too much responsibility, and thus taking organizations like business away from core purposes. Gülen’s view of moral agency works against this. Second, the way in which Levinas and others characterize the ‘other’ as the basis of ethics ignores reality. It is not reasonable to simply be drawn into caring for the other. The ‘other’ as we have noted is always ambiguous, capable of both bad and good, and as such care has to be taken how one responds. Again Gülen’s view works against simply being drawn into the other person, partly because it is accountable to God which draws the person ever into Him and ever on to action. Third, the relationship with the other is also mutual, which requires a balancing of concern for the self and other. The self is also ‘another’, and the other shares responsibility in any situation. Hence, the other in any social environment is also someone who is the bearer of responsibility. They are not simply the bearer of need, but have an interactive part to play in any relationship. Hence, any theory that is based in responsibility has to focus on the way in which universal responsibility, responsibility for the common good, is shared and negotiated. Gülen’s stress on action and shared and mutual responsibility addresses this issue.

Environmental responsibility As noted earlier, Gülen’s view of responsibility for creation does not involve domination by the vicegerent, not least because of the need to account to God. The responsibility for creation naturally extends to the environment. This is further refined by specific guidance referred to by Gülen, including any action being based in the name of God, the ethical boundaries of haram and halal, and ethical injunctions against excessive consumption. Gülen stresses the identity of vicegerent, which should be articulated (in effect given an account of) in any action,

98

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Human beings, as the khalifa of God on Earth, shall operate in the name of Allah, start in the name of Allah, love in the name of Allah, abstain in the name of Allah and to intervene the creation within the boundaries and rules laid down by Allah. (Gülen 2005, 129)

The force of this is integrative, bringing together love and stewardship. This imperative is reinforced by the rules of halal and haram to do with animals and plants. In addition Gülen suggests that overuse (israf) of any resources is deemed a grave sin. Israf is defined as consuming more than one needs or exploiting God’s gifts (nimet) without a need. The Qur’an (7:31) forbids extravagance: O children of Adam, take your adornment at every masjid, and eat and drink, but be not excessive. Indeed, He likes not those who commit excess.

Gülen argues it is acceptable to see the instrumental worth of environmental resources, such as animals and plants, for human survival. Nonetheless, such resources also have intrinsic worth, based in their particular relationship with the ultimate source of worth, God Himself (Gülen 2005, 75). Hence, the accountability to God is held together with, and leads naturally into, responsibility for His creation. This includes commands against any action that may lead to the extinction of any animal species (Qur’an 55:8), and commands to maintain the balance of nature. This contrasts with philosophical approaches which stress responsibility to future generations per se, and develop arguments about the basis and nature of what we might owe to these generations (Robinson & Dixon 2007). Nonetheless, the powerful relational framework of accountability does have analogues in the philosophical sphere, not least Hans Jonas (1984). Focusing on philosophy, though recognizing the usefulness of creator myths to reinforce the sense of environmental transcendence, Jonas offers a view of the social and physical environment over time. This is a recognition of environments whose identity, interest and responsibility transcend the individual or organization, suggesting a level of answerability for all actions in relation to these. The voice of God for religious spirituality

Social and Environmental Responsibility

99

may seem singular and powerful because it is located in a ‘person’ but the wider environment in all its complex relations is also relational, and thus like the religious God, able to ‘call’ humankind to respond and thus to account, to be answerable for our actions. It is perhaps not surprising that this sense of the transcendent has led some thinkers to personify the physical environment, as in the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock 1979). The theist approach rather looks to respond to the care of the creator, built in the singular relationship with God. The more philosophical approach looks to the call of future generations, the wider environment, with accountability to the next generation. Jonas (2001, 269) uses the mythic idea of the ‘book of life’ which sets up a ‘timeless seat of justice’ – again an eschatological frame. An important point in relational accountability, as Jonas (1984) and Levinas (1989) stress, is that it provides the basis for a shared, inclusive, morality, without making it prescriptive or totalizing. Jonas (1984) operates as a philosopher from a Jewish background aiming to provide an ontological rather than theological justification for responsibility for the whole global environment. Nonetheless, as Vogel (2006, 215) notes, his ontological grounding of this is an analogue of Jewish creation theology. He argues, first, that living nature is good in itself, attested to by matter’s capacity to organize itself for life (the analogue of God attesting to the goodness of his creation). Second, he argues that the creation of humankind is an event of the highest importance, establishing a reflective stewardship responsibility for nature (the analogue of man created in God’s image). Third, he argues that the imperative to be responsible is answered by the capacity of humankind to feel responsible for the whole (the analogue of God writing in man’s heart the consciousness of the good). Responsibility in this is based on an identification with the environment and an acute awareness of man’s role in relation to the environment. Jonas makes a parallel point to Sartre, noting that ethical thinking prior to the Enlightenment did not take responsibility for the future seriously. God was responsible for the future. Modernity posits a world where mankind is now responsible for the future. Gülen’s universal responsibility is based rather in the Creator than the created, identifying with God’s role as Creator and responding as

100

The Spirituality of Responsibility

co-creator. Jonas tends to see liability as to do with responsibility for the consequences or potential consequences of human actions. Gülen sees liability as very much for the project of God’s creation. Nonetheless, coming from different world views and justifications both articulate the imperative to be responsible for the whole of creation and to actively cherish creation. The dynamic in this is for the idea of sustainability to emerge from the core idea and demands of responsibility. The link to the creator provides a level of consciousness which itself is key to motivation. In this Gülen once more links to Nursi, who writes of God creating conscious beings who can be aware of and appreciate God’s creation, from that deducing the names and attributes of God (see Turner 2008, 26ff). Such conscious beings are mirrors to God, displaying His attributes, allowing others to see His beauty. Hence, humans first and foremost have a responsibility to be aware of and appreciate the environment. And from it see the unique combination of infinite names and attributes manifested in each ‘specimen’ of creation (not just the entire species). Those specimens were created so that man could make that connection. If man does not – the environment ceases to have purpose. Once the environment is seen from this perspective, the death of any plant is a great sin (unless for a justified cause) as it manifests a combination of God’s names and attributes that was entirely unique to it – like a fingerprint that will thenceforth be lost to us and only remain in God’s consciousness.

Corporate and professional responsibility If Gülen’s view of accountability to and responsibility for is focused in stewardship and the wider universal responsibility and sustainability, then it begins to raise major questions for corporate and professional institutions, not least because Gülen argues that responsibility has to be worked out in one’s own situation. I will now begin to look at his contribution to this debate.

Social and Environmental Responsibility

101

Corporate responsibility has tended to divide into the liberal approach of Friedman (1983) or Sternberg (2000), and the more interactive views based in stakeholder analysis (Robinson Smith 2014). Gülen’s views are very distinct from Friedman and Sternberg. They base responsibility simply in a narrow framework of accountability, focused on the relationship between executive and owner. Hence, the purpose of business is defined as increasing profits for the owner, within a legal framework. Gülen’s view of responsibility forms a major challenge to this view. First, accountability to God means that any narrow view of defining or ascribing responsibility is left behind. Responsibility precisely transcends narrow interests. Second, the Friedman view tries to restrict a definition of responsibility purely to accountability. There is no sense of the wider liability of business, including that of board, executive, employees and shareholders. Third, despite the affinity of Friedman’s approach to the so-called agency theory of governance (Robinson 2014), there is little actual attention paid to the meaning of agency, and in particular to an ongoing reflection on purpose. The executive agent in Friedman’s world is not in fact free to reflect on purpose, or even to discuss this with others. Hence, he argued that it is only possible to have one purpose, to make money. The Islamic position, as set out by Gülen, rather resonates with the post-credit crunch search for a purpose in business that would go beyond functional goals and touch on the moral or pre-moral good of a ‘true profession’, focused in stewardship and the common good (cf. Khurana & Nohria 2008). The stakeholder theories approach to corporate responsibility is based more on an interactive and interdependent view of the social and physical environment (Heath & Norman 2004), and thus shares something of Gülen’s perspective. However, stakeholder theory tends to focus on the interests, needs and demands of the stakeholders. Gülen’s view pays more attention to the underlying values and spirituality, and thus to response. Because of this, responsibility is not simply about answering the needs of the stakeholder, but also about engaging the stakeholder as responsible other, and thus empowering the other to share in responsibility. Hence, the Gülen view of responsibility questions any simplistic stakeholder theory based purely on interest or need. In that light, stakeholders are not passive

102

The Spirituality of Responsibility

recipients, but active participants in responsible practice which seeks to respond to the wider environments. This demands that business practice is centred in dialogue and the practice of all three modes of responsibility. The idea of shared responsibility then naturally leads to the negotiation of responsibility. The negotiation of responsibility leads in turn to the development and confirmation of identity. Finch and Mason (1993) argue that the negotiation of responsibility is at the heart of moral decision making. In their research with single parent families they conclude that such negotiation is the more common approach to moral decision making, than, for instance reference to principles. Importantly, they argue that the very act of negotiation develops a shared sense of moral meaning and ethical identity, and with that a sense of worth. The effect of all of this is to extend the imagination and develop creativity. It shows what is possible, especially where responsibility is shared, and so increases the capacity to respond. In this respect it enables the development of hope (see Chapter 5). All of this involves effective partnerships and everyone involved to engage personal as well as group responsibility. Such a view of responsibility has a limitless horizon (Gülen 2005). In  turn, this requires taking responsibility for developing consciousness of the social environment (ubudiyah) so that no ‘stakeholder’ is excluded (Gülen 2006). This links back once more to moral agency, and importance of awareness and appreciation of the complex social context, contrasting sharply with recent debates in business and society which have focused on the limitation of responsibility, not least through the stress on limited roles and responsibility of the businessperson, or a narrowing of responsibility to areas, targets or groups. In the context of business, Gülen tends to sacralize science and the economy. In terms of science, this points to the sense of the technologist as creator, exploiting natural resources (Gülen 1995, 17). This raises major questions about how responsibility is seen in terms of liability for how the natural resources are exploited. All this fits well with the responsibility and the identity of the professional in general, and with work on responsibility and the engineer in particular (Robinson 2007). The

Social and Environmental Responsibility

103

engineer’s responsibility is seen in relation to the engineering profession, the key stakeholders, the environment and the future generations. This is based in the identity of the engineer as technological creator. In terms of business, there is an acceptance in Gülen of the free market framework. This looks similar to Michael Novak’s view of the Catholic Work Ethic, which sees wealth creation per as acceptable, and the market place as a potential positive force for good and even the creation of community (Novak 1990). Novak does not see this as unfettered capitalism and argues for the development of a different kind of freedom at the base of this capitalism, a framework of shared moral values (1990). For Gülen there is also a moral framework. This has to place the activity of wealth creation into a wider social context. Even basic transactions must be submitted to God’s ethical law, By doing so, Muslims submit to God’s decree in that particular matter and so transcend their own worldly preferences. For example, Muslim merchants must inform their customers of any defect in the merchandise. While this may lower or even cancel the resulting profit. [they] will have the satisfaction of obeying God and not serving their own desires. (Gülen 2000, 29)

Recent ongoing research with Hizmet businessmen in Istanbul2 has suggested three things so far. First, the model of responsibility in business is largely focused in small to medium businesses (cf. Uygur 2007). One of the exceptions I will examine below. Second, the business leaders in a local area meet on a weekly basis and discuss issues about responsibility and how they might exercise that in relation to different needs. The practice of responsibility is focused in critical dialogue which genuinely tests ideas and practice, and maximizing outcomes through cooperation with each other and different agencies. Third, the research confirms the view that stakeholders are seen more as equally responsible together for the wider environment. One business man referred to his eighteen employees as being part of his extended family, and of his desire to empower them in their different relationships at home and work. This included offering interest free loans for housing. Such empowerment he took to be both good for business and good in itself.

104

The Spirituality of Responsibility

This also suggests that small and medium businesses can best develop responsible practice more effectively through working together. Such negotiation recognizes resources and limitations, in the light of a sense of shared responsibility, and begins to identify how the common good can be effected in context. This is particularly important for small and medium businesses that have limited resources compared to the major corporations. Together, they can make their most effective contributions to the community. The work around business supporting education introduces a very particular dynamic. In one sense this is about business investing in the future of responsibility. The business leaders provide the resources for education centres that precisely focus on the development of character. The  focus on this telos is thus very clearly worked through. The movement has been responsible for the founding and development of almost a thousand schools worldwide. These schools have not been ‘Islamic’, in the sense of teaching Islamic values. On the contrary the pupils have been from many different religions and cultures and the education has focused on educational excellence, universal values, democracy and critical dialogue. Some of the schools are partly funded by fees, but depend mostly on the resources from businessmen working together often with Gülen NGOs. The dynamic, as described by Uygur (2007), is of the business leaders coming together and reflecting on the educational needs in their area and also globally. From that basis they determine what their funding priorities will be. This way of ‘doing’ corporate responsibility then is essentially dialogic and cooperative. Moreover, the focus on education clearly looks to the response to the transcendent call to act as co-creators, in effect being responsible for the future of responsibility  through education which itself focuses on agency, accountability, character and citizenship. The negotiation of responsibility inevitably takes the work well beyond a narrow view of religion. Hence, business becomes involved with other stakeholders as co-creators in forming social capital (cf. Maak 2007). This is developed further in Chapter 5 in relation to peace building. The practice of responsibility then is not business-centred but response-

Social and Environmental Responsibility

105

centred, with business as a stakeholder in creation, focusing on its enterprise and how universal responsibility might be fulfilled, in the light of limitations and possibilities. Reporting responsibility then is less about hitting responsibility targets and more around narratives that embody intentional creativity. Gülen does not develop any sustained argument about whistleblowing. However, it is clear from his remarks about the need for concern for an ethical approach to even the smallest of trading issues that he is less concerned with the developing of a system to work against unethical behaviour and more with the virtues and action of the individual. This involves the practice of critical reflection at all levels of business practice. The key to any individual or group business activity then is less about putting in place systems that will monitor practice and more about individual responsibility and the need to view all actions in the light of a higher purpose. An implication of this stress on individual responsibility for action is that the actions of others should be challenged at source, as part of the ongoing relationship at work, involving non-heroic challenge rather than through a system of whistleblowing. Gülen’s view about the control and channelling of the nafs also has relevance to responsibility in business. Since Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1714, 2003) there has been an argument that passionate concern for individual financial success was good, partly because it motivated individual enterprise and partly because it led to increased wealth for all. This is echoed in Boris Johnson’s Mansion House speech 2013. Johnson, in writing about equality argues that ‘some measure of inequality is essential for the spirit of envy and keeping up with the Joneses that is, like greed, a valuable spur to economic activity’ (Watt 2013). At one level this seems to echo the points noted in the last chapter about the way in which an emotion like greed might be channelled to the good. However, two things work against the idea of greed as good. First, as noted in Chapter 2 Gülen is clear that key to the middle way is the use of wisdom, and that this is focused in the overall purpose and wider good of any activity. Johnson begins to approach this later when talking about

106

The Spirituality of Responsibility

what business leaders can give to society. This, however, is secondary to the task of making money. For Gülen, the businessman is focused in the response to God’s creation and is thus primarily concerned with how his work can enhance that. Hence, more fundamental motivation is focused not in increased financial reward, but in sense of vocation and purpose.3 Second, the term greed is itself problematic in that it is based in the extreme. Its focus is exclusive of others, and thus, by definition, the person is less able to be aware of or appreciate the social and physical environment.

Big business An example of a major business focused in the Hizmet principles is Bank Aysa. First, this is a major Islamic bank which thus focuses on Islamic principles of banking, not least interest free loans. However, the bank is careful to do two things. It notes the origins of interest-free banking as dating back to 2000 BC. It also notes that the argument for interest-free banking is based less on ideology and more on results.4 The dynamic underlying interest-free banking is in fact based in a strong sense of responsibility and co-creatorship. The bank receives 20 per cent of profits made by the companies they lend to, focusing on the responsibility of those companies to develop their enterprise. At the same time shareholders are not guaranteed their return. They thus bear greater responsibility for the success or failure of the bank and, indeed, of wider enterprise. A key part of their rationale for the company is that this works. Projects will succeed and fail, but overall this leads to profit for the bank (ibid.), with responsibility more clearly shared. In addition, the bank links into the banking profession’s framework of regulation, further demonstrating multiple accountability, that is, to the industry as well as to other stakeholders. The bank also has a focus on corporate social responsibility, and this prioritizes educational needs. The Bank then demonstrates all three modes of responsibility, without focusing on an exclusive Islamic value base, and able to link into and work responsibly with all stakeholders, including shareholders. This also involves empowering, through stakeholders taking responsibility.

Social and Environmental Responsibility

107

Professional responsibility Professional responsibility moves beyond responsibility in business institutions. A good example is journalism and Zaman Media, one of the media outlets of the Hizmet Movement. The outlets include television channels, publishing outlets and newspapers. Behind many of these projects is the Writers and Journalists Foundation which focuses on the development of interfaith and intercultural dialogue (see Chapter 1). Zaman Daily offers both a focus of responsible practice and perhaps more importantly the conditions for responsibility. Kerim Balci5 has suggested that there are five key principles embodied in the Zaman Media group. The principles are not a written code of conduct, but are drawn from practice by Balci. These are: good news is also good news; no sensationalism; no denigration, or defamation; text-intensivity; being in equal closeness to all the political parties. Strikingly, these do not speak directly of responsibility. However, they provide a context for the responsible practice of journalism. The first principle is partly focused in Turkish media history, where the press had practised mainly pejorative journalism, reflecting a negative, pessimistic view of human nature, society and the state and God. The principle demands a clear awareness of the social and physical environment, an appreciation of the positive aspects of creation and the capacity to communicate good news, and thus hope. The second principle refines the first, noting that sensationalist journalism tends to focus not on data so much as entertaining the reader, often through causing pain of others. Hence, if there is news of violence it should be accompanied by analysis and possible solutions. Both of these principles have their roots in Sufi tradition. Not only is the universe created in the best possible way, but depiction of the world should also be in a good way, one which reflects the divine presence (cf. Turner 2008, 28ff). An event and its story are two distinct elements of reality, each with distinct moral value, not least because the depiction can affect responses to the story. In 2001 it was decided to find criteria for measuring how well the story was told. This led, for example, to the use of full verbal sentences in headlines so that they were not ambiguous, avoiding large character

108

The Spirituality of Responsibility

headlines that imply sensation. If the headline in itself is not enough to clearly state the content of the news item, then use is made of extra spot lines to explain the reader rapidly the content of the article. This goes against the UK journalistic ‘convention’ that headlines should always be read with the article. All this drills down responsibility to the minutiae of practice. It focuses on developing clear communication which reflects the truth of the story, and which is not influenced by other ends, not least the making a profit through sensational reporting. The third principle involves avoiding denigration of groups or individuals, but also about ensuring that the voices of different ethnic, religious groups and other groups are heard in the paper (through hiring columnists from different cultural and intellectual perspectives). Again this reflects the importance of hearing different narratives and how they relate to the story. The effect is to hold together narrative, narrator and events. In other words, journalism moves from simply reporting events to awareness and appreciation of different narratives and the narrators themselves and how they relate the story and the wider environments. At one level this models the practice of dialogue. This sharpens the understanding of the story. In effect this encourages rational, critical reflection and tolerance of others and thus the development moral agency – enabling a self-critical dynamic and increased understanding of one’s own and other’s value and values, and increased awareness of the wide social environment, its complexity and diversity, and the issues related to this. The fourth principle begins to focus further on the means of communication. Zaman Daily is text intensive. This means more space for lengthy, analytical pieces often supplied by academics and thus setting up more different perspectives. More text needs more time for the readers to engage with the discourse. This in turn leads to the development of a stabilized readership (further committed through subscription), which begins also to contribute to the debate and dialogue. Zaman Daily also uses a high Turkish in the search for a richer vocabulary and more rigorous articulation of ideas. Dialogue, and with that the development of responsibility, requires a clarity and rigour which tests the narrative.

Social and Environmental Responsibility

109

This relates directly to accountability. Part of accountability involves the engagement with the relationships of account – reporting to those we owe an account to. As noted earlier, in terms of professional responsibility this might involve several different groups or persons over time. Accountability, however, also involves the skills and capacities of giving an account. For the journalist this involves a responsibility to give an account which is clear to all, engaging both different perspectives and the emergence of truth, whose perception is constructed (cf. Turner 2008, 28ff). The final principle is of political disinterestedness (core to any professional ethics), in the sense of equal distance from all political parties. This does not preclude reporting views of political policies, not least support for transparent governance, democracy, minority rights and responsible capitalism. Key to this stance is the capacity to challenge all parties and interests, both in political and civil society, thus encouraging further dialogue. This is exemplified by having writers from different perspectives. Zaman Daily then is a good example of Gülen’s dialogue focused in professional practice, providing a framework for dialogue and supporting mutual responsibility. It develops agency, the capacity to give an account and test narratives, listening skills and with that empathy, a commitment to the community of dialogue, and a preparedness to look at different options. With that comes the development of accountability and a preparedness to learn. Such dialogue builds a practice which transcends interest or ideology. In effect this is the practice of practical wisdom (phronesis), reflection on the good of any practice, focused in dialogue. It is also a good example of grounded spirituality, that is, meaning and practice which is not simply grounded in theological concepts but also in identity, thus involving holistic understanding and relationships, in this case the identity of professional journalists. Hence, this can contribute to public issues and identities whilst maintaining Islamic identity. However, there is no dialogic safety net for such practice. Once in the public domain those in power can interpret these kinds of open values as a threat, and even project on to such institution’s polarized perspectives.6

110

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Conclusions Gülen’s approach to responsibility is holistic and connective. It holds together three different modes of responsibility: accountability, moral agency and positive responsibility. Accountability provides an effective ethical framework which fuels response to the call of the other. Moral agency holds together the affective, cognitive and social aspects of the person and organization, offering a critical perspective on each of these. Shared universal responsibility focuses on intentional action which is a function of critical dialogue and negotiation. All this provides an approach to responsibility which integrates virtues and universal principles, focused in relationality and rationality. It also provides a way of integrating ethics, CSR and sustainability, moving beyond CSR which is increasingly dominated by measurements and targets, because it is more concerned about culture, character and creative practice – hence the integrated practice of responsibility. In all this, external regulation is less important than accountability based in the call of God and the call of the ‘other’ and working with stakeholders. This approach provides a means of holding together different aspects of responsibility, personal and collective, corporate and civic, not least because its focus transcends narrow interest in any of these areas. Many of the responses to the credit crisis from Islam have been around Islamic banking. The values and practice of such banking have little time for ideas such as selling on debts. However, the thinking and practice noted in this chapter takes religious values and identity in business into more public dialogue around the nature and practice of responsibility. Second, business becomes part of the public domain. Many business ethics writers have attempted to show why business is an exception to the norm of public life. Gülen argues that it has to give an account of its actions as part of society. Third, this moves to a view of responsibility that is essentially shared. This means that business can challenge other agents and agencies to reflect on their responsibilities. It opens up a mutual dialogue and negotiation that enables effective response to the needs of the social and physical

Social and Environmental Responsibility

111

environment. This challenges the limiting philosophies of Friedman and Sternberg. Responsibility based in accountability to God sets up a second challenge and bridge, not least in the area of business and public life. At one and the same time, there can be dialogue with all parties in public life that is practice-centred, about how responsibility is fulfilled, something that all are concerned about, along with sharing about underlying belief and value systems, something that is conspicuously avoided even in applied ethics (Robinson 2008). Gülen’s thinking and the work of business leaders associated with his movement challenges business to address all these areas of responsibility, and so to see the workplace and the relationship of business to society as space for reflection on and development of civil society. This takes responsibility beyond a simplistic existentialist response and into reflection, dialogue and planning together. Gülen’s strong view of agency with its focus on rationality and dialogue sets up the most important bridge of all. Practice-centred dialogue sets up shared commitment to learning and action in such a way that all can engage responsibility. It means that power has to be shared and cannot be asserted, relationally or politically. In all this it embodies the twin principles of respect and justice. Respect involves awareness, appreciation and tolerance, and is necessary if there is to be a dialogue that genuinely involves hearing the difference and particularity of the other. Responsibility is tied to identity, and this further demands respect, not least because any learning will involve emotions connected to that identity. Justice affirms the universality of human values, and therefore may challenge tradition that has become self-absorbed or inward looking. The two balance each other in the practice of responsibility. Chapter  6 will take a closer look at Gülen’s view of dialogue.

5

Responsibility and Peace-Building

This chapter focuses on Gülen and peace-building, showing how it emerges from his view of responsibility. I compare Gülen to a prominent writer on peace-building John Paul Lederach, setting out illuminating contrasts. Gülen articulates the peace-centredness of Islam, built on universal responsibility and accountability to God for creation. Peace-building is then part of the response of stewardship, responding to the diversity of nature. Creation is also the basis for plurality, and plural identity, demanding respect for and dialogue with the other, based in tolerance and other virtues. It leads to creative response focused in Hizmet and embodied in key projects of health, well-being and education, but with broader cultural implications focused in peace. This informs responsibility for and in civil society. Lederach’s position is built on the premise that conflict is inevitable, stressing the need for internal dialogue. Decision making and learning are based in circular not linear thinking, demanding openness to the networks of alterity, and attention to serendipity, paradoxical curiosity, the ambiguity of the other and plural narratives rather than single truth. Central to this is the moral imagination, built on virtues such as wisdom and creative hope. The chapter will conclude that there are similarities around the virtues of peace-building, and a contrast between process and outcome approaches. Both, for instance, want to extend responsibility for peace, with Lederach focusing on the relationship between formal peacebuilding and ‘eccentric’ contributions emerging from seemingly weak groups, not least women’s. Gülen and the Hizmet Movement focus rather

114

The Spirituality of Responsibility

on the pathways through which Muslims can generate projects, often involving more powerful groups, such as businessmen. For Lederach peace-building is a journey of managed uncertainty. For Gülen peacebuilding is more deliberate, focused in a spirituality of service.

Peace-building Both Gülen and Lederach are focused in the practice of peace-building. The definition of this term is not exact. Some argue that it includes postconflict reformation (Boutros-Ghalis 1992). Neither Gülen nor Lederach easily fit into that definition. Lederach has formally practised as a peacebuilder in the post-conflict phase (including work in Somalia, Nicaragua and Northern Ireland), linking directly to the political process. However, much like George Mitchell (1999) he recognizes that the skills of peacebuilding are often in play well before the conflict has ceased. It is part of the commitment to the process of listening and building trust that leads to the cessation of conflict in the first place. In all this, Lederach suggests that the peace-building is less about techniques and more about ontology, the very being of the person and the social and environmental networks of  which he or she is a part. Lederach (2005) is a committed Mennonite  Christian, but the spirituality of his peace-building is not based in theology so much as a broad generic spirituality. Gülen’s approach to peace-building is less formal or tied to the political framework, with the Hizmet Movement not claiming a formal peacebuilding role, but nonetheless informed by his views on peace-building. It is also more firmly based in theology, and the role of humanity in relation to creation. For him peace-building is part of the response to God and is evidenced in the development of key institutions and relationships which enable the right response to God and His creation. From that theological position he moves to a broader spirituality focused in human relationships, quite complementary to Lederach. Gülen and Lederach both span any divide between sacred and secular because of their focus on the network or web of the social and physical environments and the

Responsibility and Peace-Building

115

responsibility of humanity to respond and create. This reveals a spirituality which is genuinely holistic, based in tolerance and care, focused in action and tempered by rationality.

Gülen and peace-building Peace, and thus the responsibility for pursuing peace is central to Islam (Qur’an 4:128), and Gülen stresses how conflict is against the core vision of Islam (Gülen 2006, 29). Esposito and Yilmaz (2010, 9) suggest that Gülen’s view of peace-building is based in a proactive stance, involving optimism. However, I want to suggest rather the term hope (cf. Saritoprak 2010b). There are many attempts to define optimism, not least in relation to hope, both seen as a positive emotion (see Bruininks & Malle 2005). Elsewhere (Robinson 2008), I have suggested a clear distinction between optimism as a generalized positive attitude to the future, and hope as a virtue, involving the capacity to envision the future in a positive way. Hope as a virtue suggests that this is a disposition that can be practised and developed. Snyder (2000) argues that this is related to action, indeed to the capacity to make things happen, and as such is based in clear goals, agency and awareness and development of pathways.

Goals The capacity to hope is generated through a sense of morally significant purpose. Such good hope provides meaning which affirms the worth of the person or group. In the light of such purposes realistic goals need to be set out. Hopefulness develops through goals which can be achieved. Hope may be a major virtue but it needs specific aims for it to be meaningful, aims worked through in dialogue.

Pathways Hopeful thinking looks to find ways to the goals. This involves a development of the creative imagination to be able to see what ways forward there are. This is enabled through the development of method

116

The Spirituality of Responsibility

and through practice, not least the widening of possibilities through negotiation of responsibilities. Snyder (2000) notes that hope is associated with the development of multiple pathways. Such pathways increase through collaborative work with others, which is enabled as resolution and shared responsibility is achieved. Through that real possibilities began to emerge as the basis of hope.

Agency Hope centres in the experience of the person as subject, capable of determining and achieving the goals she looks to. This is achieved to begin with through the development of the narrative and its related skills. In particular hope is generated when the person finds she is able to own and take responsibility for the feelings which may have dominated her life. It is also achieved by the owning of values, the development of one’s own method and by the practice which demonstrates capacity in the relationship. In all this the virtue of hope is tied directly to responsibility, through empowerment of agency and action, and links directly with Gülen’s view of peace-building. Taking each of those aspects of hope we first see that Gülen is focused in core morally significant goals, not least service (Hizmet). This is focused in response to God as creator, and taking the responsibility for His creation. Humanity takes on the role of vicegerent (Gülen 2004, 122). The created world embodies difference and plurality. Hence, Gülen is less concerned about providing exact equality of outcome or resources, and more about response to the particularity and particular needs in the social and physical environment. Service itself then is focused in accountability to God and responsibility for the social and physical environment. In social terms, Gülen notes three significant factors which are necessary to engage these environments: knowledge, material resources and unity, of purpose and action. Behind these are three evils which Gülen aims to address, ignorance, poverty and disunity (Gürbüz 2007), focusing Gülen in the Sufi tradition (Nursi 1996). It partially chimes with the thinking

Responsibility and Peace-Building

117

of Tawney (1930), and Beveridge in pre-war Great Britain. The Beveridge Report (1943, see Timmins 2001) identified five giants: Want, Disease, Squalor, Ignorance and Idleness (unemployment). Much of the report and the subsequent development of the UK Welfare State attempts to address the deficits of these giants. Key to that was a social contract through which the state took responsibility for education, health, poverty eradication and support for the unemployed. Whilst Gülen and Beveridge share an understanding of social evils, however, they are very different in response. For Gülen the key responsibility of the state is the maintenance of democracy rather than developing social policy (see Weller 2012a, 3ff; Yavuz 2013, 62 ff). Responsibility for responding to the three evils is a function rather of civil society, providing clear goals based in significant, indeed ultimate, purpose. Hence, it is important not to marginalize religion from that service and wider public life, not least because it contributes to the dialogue around meaning, but also to resources for service and thus to the development of social capital (Weller 2012a, 3ff). Civil society precisely provides the link between wider social responsibility and the practice of individual responsibility. Like Novak, Gülen is concerned for subsidiarity, ensuring that the State does not take over personal responsibility. Significantly, and quite distinct from Beveridge, Gülen sees the underlying problem as one of disunity. At one level this suggests that disunity, and thus at least potential conflict, is part of the fabric of the social environment. In the light of that, peace-building becomes central to any view of responsibility. That is, any attempt to serve God inevitably has to address the issue of conflict. Second, then, in the light of these significant purposes, the pathways are focused in education and development. Education in one sense is the direct pathway to addressing the evil of ignorance. However, for Gülen education as an endeavour enables and exemplifies the development of peace-building through particular practice which contributes to the building of community, often focusing the educational developments in areas of conflict. There are good examples of the contribution of Hizmet Movement schools to conflict and post-conflict

118

The Spirituality of Responsibility

situations. One instance is the school on Skopje where children from across the conflict divide were educated together (Saritoprack 2007, 637). This generated a situation analogous to Lederach’s web-watching and connecting (see below) where persons and groups from all sides can begin to see where they all connect in the social web. Again this focuses on relationality and roles; not on the child as an abstract idea but on the relationship and responsibilities of parent and grandparent, both of which show shared needs, values and hopes which transcend the interests or fears of groups. Michel (2003) notes the example of a school in Philippines established by the Hizmet Movement. The island had suffered sustained armed conflict between Moro separatists and the Philippine state, including kidnapping and guerrilla warfare. Michel (2008) referred to the school as ‘a haven of peace’ involving students from all sides. In particular it involved Muslim and Christian children demonstrating how differences could be effectively bridged through a focus on universal values and shared virtues. The school itself was called the Philippine-Turkish School of Tolerance. Another example was schools established in Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq. In Kirkuk, Hizmet Movement schools provided a bridge between Turks and Kurds (Akyol 2008, 2011). Akyol (2008) contrasts this approach with the formal nation-state approach to peacebuilding, built around issues of national sovereignty and state boundaries. With this approach there is little chance to work through the culture of peace-building, and so begin to break down the polarized way of thinking which is often sustained precisely at the political level, often focused in political solution rather than the underlying relational problem of how we relate to those perceived as the enemy. Behind this lies a basic fear of the other (Akyol 2008), and it is precisely this fear which the work of the schools can begin to address. With scholars from both sides coming together in out of school clubs, the schools begin to bring together key stakeholders in the conflict. This enables face to face relationships around shared learning, and further intellectual reflection around the spirituality of the different groups, including values, sense of worth and significant meaning. Such relationships begin to transcend the focus on terrorism.

Responsibility and Peace-Building

119

Gülen sums up this core concern for peace-building, focused in the response to terrorism, To show the bright face of Islam which is stained by the actions of terrorism by suicide bombers, to live Islam rightly as was done in the time of the Prophet, and to prepare an environment in which the idea of divine acceptance grows in hearts of people; in short, to live and express Islam in its real form. Today, the world of humanity is slipping towards a negative direction with these horrific weapons. If human beings get into conflict this world will be an unliveable place. Therefore we need to create islands of peace in order to prevent these highly possible future conflicts. We need to make our efforts in this direction so we can create peace, reconciliation, and sharing. (Saritoprak 2010a, 2)

The third element of hope, agency, is, for Gülen, central both to the response to God in creation and to the experience of learning, and thus is once more focused in education. Education for Gülen is based in the development of character, which focuses on continual self-criticism and self-renewal. Such self-examination ‘enables the believer to make amends for past mistakes and be absolved in the sight of God, for it provides a constant realization of the self- renewal in one’s inner world’ (Gülen 1999). At its heart then are core peace virtues of renewal and reconciliation, with the self and others. This character development involves, in effect, the development of responsibility for one’s own thinking and underlying values and how these are embodied in practice (Gülen 2006, 16). This is not prescriptive, but focused precisely in the development of moral agency, the capacity to give an account of thought, values, feelings and action, and the capacity to work together in creative response. This forms the basis of the  autonomy at the centre of education and moral development (Isik 2015),  stressing self-mastery and ordering the passions, and the development autonomy and agency through reflective deliberative decision making. Agency is  precisely gained through the development of  the virtues that underlie these activities. This involves modelling values and virtues in the practice in the school community and culture, also drawing in families, thus connecting different aspects of the students’ lives (Isik 2015).

120

The Spirituality of Responsibility

The founding of these schools then provides a clear pathway, enabling a response to ignorance, and the development of human agency. Hence, Gülen schools are centred in science, language skills and educational excellence (not in ideology or prescription, educational or religious), enabling the development of people who can take responsible leadership roles in business and society. In all this, it becomes possible for Islam to take its place in a post-modern age as key for the development of society. As Ünal and Williams (2009, 308) put it, Education through learning and a commendable way of life is a sublime duty that manifests the Divine Name Rabb (Upbringer and Sustainer). By fulfilling it, we attain the rank of true humanity and become a beneficial element to society.

The pathways to peace are also the pathways to building civil society, developing social capital. The response to that society is made more effective the more that responsibility is shared. In turn, this generates further hope through opening up multiple transparent pathways, generated, for instance by the work of business leaders who finance the schools, thus widening possibilities through negotiation of responsibilities (cf. Lester 1995). This provides a core personal and community framework focused in the development of peace. This is further reinforced by establishing educational institutions at tertiary level, including universities (Küçükcan 2007, 187), and on developing inclusivity in education in general, not least with reference to gender (Hefner 2005, 27). Good examples of this are in the Hizmet Movement’s work in Kenya and Uganda, which has focused on building up local resources rather than international aid (Kalyoncu 2008, 350). This has included educating women, reinforcing the roles of women in education and wider society. As Yilmaz and Esposito (2010) note, studies have suggested that where women are empowered, in social, economic and political terms, societies are less likely to become involved in conflict (cf. Gizelis 2009, 505).This is also connected to poverty alleviation, partly through developing education in post-conflict areas such as Kyrgyzstan. This links economics into peace-building; partly through business

Responsibility and Peace-Building

121

investment in these areas, and partly through the development or individual enterprise, linking back to the philosophy of avoiding dependence. George Mitchell (1999) shows how economics and sustainable post-conflict development link directly to post-conflict development, in the example of the Northern Ireland peace project. Like Novak (1990), Gülen sees the empowerment and exercise of personal responsibility as leading to broader social responsibility, involving better distribution of resources and more cooperation for social ends. This includes now the work of poverty relief and humanitarian aid organizations such as the Gülen-inspired charity Kimse Yok Mu? (Michel 2008). The development of schools in areas of conflict then (Uygur 2007) moves the centre of concern away from faith evangelism to response to need, and in turn involves other stakeholders to become involved as co-creators in the development of peace. Lacey (2013) also notes the contribution of Hizmet dialogue groups in areas of conflict, in this case Northern Ireland. Lacey’s example shows how the perspective of the Islamic ‘other’ can begin to break down polarized perspectives. Peace in all this is not just the absence of war but the positive, proactive development of community. This places any hope about peace not in the future but in the present. And key to the creative response to the present is the inclusive acceptance of the other, Let the entire world hear that our heart is open to those that love us and to those that attack us. It is open to everyone because we believe that every human being is created by God in the most beautiful form. Today there is an utmost need for this understanding. (Saritoprak 2010a, 3)

To develop responsibility for service requires the practice of the virtues noted earlier – compassion, wisdom and tolerance. These virtues enable peace-building which is realistic and aware of the ambiguities of the social and physical environment. In this sense the value of education itself is that it begins to enable the development of moral agents who can make peace and bring hope. Hence, key to hope and peace-building is tolerance. Tolerance for Gülen is focused in God’s compassion and love (Graskemper 2007; Saritoprak 2010a), and though he accepts that there must be limits

122

The Spirituality of Responsibility

to tolerance (Gülen 2006), this is no anodyne sense of tolerance. On the contrary this provides both the strong grounds for the acceptance of the other, but also the ground for challenge of the other – to fulfil God’s call to service. It is both of these which motivate peace-building.

Islam, conflict and the other A key aspect of peace-building and Islam is then the perception of the other in historical context of the relationship between Islam and the West. Most recently the relationship between Islam and the West has been seen in terms of polar opposites. Huntington’s (1998) thesis, for instance, suggests a clash of civilizations, which cannot but lead to conflict. This has been amplified through fears of terrorism and fears about the West in some way affecting the purity of Muslim values (cf. Weller 2012b). Sezgin (2015) argues that Gülen provides a perspective which is quite the opposite. First, he counsels against viewing the ‘other’ as adversary or a threat to Islam. Second, he is a realist about differences within Islam. He is clear, for instance, that the idea of the Caliphate is an impossibility, given difference and vision within Islam and the problem of creating a monolithic other over against the West (Gülen 2005, 457). Hence, he focuses not on Islam as a political ideology but rather on the practice of the religion of Islam (Penaskovic 2010). Third, and perhaps most interesting, Gülen sees the West as an ambiguous other, focused both on values and practices which transcend group interests, but also experiencing different forms of corruption. Once more this echoes Nursi’s thinking: It should not be misunderstood: Europe is two. One follows the sciences which serve justice and right and the industries beneficial for the life of society through the inspiration it has received from true Christianity; this first Europe I am not addressing. I am rather addressing the second corrupt Europe which, through the darkness of the philosophy of Naturalism, supposing the evils of civilization to be its virtues, has driven mankind to vice and misguidance. (Nursi 1996, 160)

Responsibility and Peace-Building

123

Gülen notes that, despite the central and positive Judeo Christian spirituality, the West became involved in the Crusades, which were focused in political interest rather than spiritual value and which led to the death of far more Muslims killed by Christians than Christians killed by Muslims over history (Gülen 2002, 33; cf. Penaskovic 2010). Broadly, Gülen views the history of East and West as the East losing sight of science and the intellect and the West losing sight of the key spiritual and moral verities (Gülen 2002). Hence, writers such as Sacks (2005) look to rehabilitation of Judeo Christian values. However, the underlying vision of an integrated and holistic focus, which involves proper attention to the intellect, to values and feelings and to practice, provides a solid conceptual and practical bridge between the East and the West. Hence, Gülen is happy to join with the West in those areas which focus on universal values (Gülen 2000, 189, 191).

Human rights The stress on universal responsibility is reinforced by the stress on universal values and human rights (Gülen 2011; cf. Krause 2012; Keles 2013) and hence on values which transcend exclusively religious values. Discourse on human rights often balances the issue of responsibility. Ladd (1991), for instance, argues against human rights and for an ethics of responsibility based in proactive relationships. His concern is about an exclusive approach to human rights leading to passivity, with the bearer of human rights precisely not an active agent. Ketchum and Pierce (1981) argue that whilst this seems initially plausible, it does not take account of the key issue of power and thus imbalance in power that might lead to coercion. Human rights are thus important to assert, in balance with responsibility. Gülen, as I have noted, cannot be accused of encouraging passivity. On the contrary, his view of responsibility demands active service. But this is also balanced with arguments for the human rights and their protection. At one level this is the key focus of the state. Gülen argues that Islam is not prescriptive on this matter. Hence, he writes,

124

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstance. (Keles 2013, 202)

These fundamental principles and values include justice, human rights, freedom of religion and belief, freedom of thought and expression, rule of law, meritocracy in public appointment, public order, a balanced approach, consultation and elections (Gülen 2006, 88–92). For Gülen, human rights are Islamic principles which the state should uphold. Human rights are thus directly part of concern for humanity which transcends any particular community or institution. In the best sense, this is about disinterestedness. Gülen then stands out against the politicization of Islam, and can write of the reconciliation between Islam and secularism: If reconciliation is being sought between Islam and secularism, then according to some views of Islam, in fact according to some Qu’ranic verses, like ‘Your religion for you, mine for me’, there is no big problem. If secularism is understood as not basing the state in religion, not interfering in religion or in the believer’s religious life, I do not think secularism is in danger now or in the future. (Gülen 2005, 28)

Democracy The proper context for this is democracy, precisely because democracy seeks to include all in the process of government and to defend the rights of all. In doing so, of course, this is in the interest of Islam, because all different schools of Islam can practise their faith, limited only by actions which go against the law (Gülen 2005, 451). The basis of human rights here is not ideological so much as instrumental or enabling (Keles 2013, 202). Gülen takes this beyond the responsibility of the state to transnational institutions such as the UN and international law frameworks, endorsing international codification of human rights (Gülen 2005, 451). This provides a framework for his universal perspective.

Responsibility and Peace-Building

125

In one sense the concern for human rights emerges once more from Gülen’s acceptance of the plurality of humanity, and critically for the respect for human agency and thus for the freedom to respond to God’s creation. It is this freedom which marries human rights and responsibility. In the light of this Gülen even views rights as a form of debt which the individual feels bound to pay (Keles 2013). Hence, the alms tax (zakah) involves both a right of the poor to receive this and the responsibility of the rich to pay (2013). Human rights are focused in relationships and thus include not simply the right not to be tortured, but the right to be not hurt by slander. Keles (2013, 203) sums this up as, ‘legal rules to protect human rights work best when supported by social norms that embody care and good citizenship’ (author’s italics). In all this civil responsibility is focused in the wider universal responsibility. Preserving freedom, as bestowed by God on humans, involves respecting an inalienable human right. This is what it means to be human: Being free and enjoying freedom are a significant depth of human will power and a mysterious door through which man may set forth into the secrets of the self. One unable to set forth into that depth and unable to pass through that door can hardly be called human. (Gülen 2005, 15)

The second basis of human rights is the freedom necessary to develop as a human being. This ties directly back into the development of the human being as a moral agent. Hence, key freedoms are freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of the will. At one level this is about freeing the human mind from whatever hinders ‘material and spiritual’ progress. Clearly, human rights are necessary for such development but not sufficient. This brings us back to the focus on man’s relationship with God and His Creation, and the freedom enabled through the development of character and the related virtues. Tolerance, human rights, democracy and freedom then provide focus on the underlying values of peace-building. Peace-building is not simply about the cessation of conflict but about the development of a good life based in these. The same values are there central to learning and teaching,

126

The Spirituality of Responsibility

which is partly why the nature of education is connected intimately to peace-building. Religion in all this has a key part in peace-building, not least through interfaith dialogue (Musser & Sunderland 2005).

Lederach and peace-building John Paul Lederach echoes many of these themes. Both he and Gülen have strong sense of spirituality, and the capacity to articulate that in the public sphere. Both are concerned for a holistic approach to peace-building and focus on the virtues needed to develop that. For Lederach, however, there is a slightly different feel to the theory and practice of peace-building. Lederach is less concerned about clear pathways and more concerned with character that enables an ongoing, flexible response. The key image is of the journey, and of response to that journey that is more about the practice of an art than the development of scientific thinking. This is less about confidence in core goals and pathways and more about the capacity to manage uncertainty. Hence, the holism that he espouses is more focused in feeling, empathy and interpretation of the social context than in the interpretation of the scriptures (cf. Keles 2013). There is in Lederach as a peace-builder a strong sense of social construction, both about the self (dialogic) and about wider society. I will examine Lederach in terms of perception of conflict, the centrality of relationships rather than values, peace-building as part of ongoing learning, finding a voice and action which embodies meaning. First, Lederach builds on Ricoeur (1992), recognizing that identity, and, with that, perception, is constructed. Conflict is, ‘among other things, the process of building and sustaining very different perceptions and interpretations of reality’ (cf. Cooper-White 2009; Lederach 2010). Conflict is thus based in personal and cultural dynamics, often focused on the perceived need to sustain difference. Such difference, expressed in different narratives and interests within organizations and beyond, is an inevitable part of the social and physical environment. In the worst cases this leads to cycles of conflict in which the perception,

Responsibility and Peace-Building

127

and relate values and world view, is reinforced by the response of the other. It is important then to address the perception of difference and underlying emotional narrative that has emerged, leading to the possibility of transformation. For Lederach this means that conflict requires reconciliation, not simply the focus on interests of the parties or the cessation of peace. This echoes Gülen’s view that difference is written into the creation and that the peace-builder aims to recognize the positive nature of difference and the need therefore to know, and thus actively engage, the particularity of the other. Like Gülen, Lederach focuses on dialogue as key to forgiveness, reconciliation and transformation. However, he roots the transformation in perception and subsequent practice, in the capacity to ‘talk-to-our-selves’ – to have an internal dialogue. Space for this is rarely created within organizations, as part of the normal professional reflection, and Lederach argues that without such ‘personal space’ for internal dialogue, dialogue with others is less successful. The process of reconciliation then has to address perception and with that the underlying dynamic and the resulting meaning as much as any practice. Dialogue then is complex and plural, requiring examination of the myths that provide meaning for the self or organization, and how they have been used to set polarized perception in place. This sets up in Lederach a relationship which is not developed in Gülen, between core values, including care and compassion, and the sense of worth which is critical to self-esteem and to the sense of organizational esteem. This may be based in role or purpose, from professions to families. Peace-building itself has a strong sense of worth, which is based in the person showing sacrificial and altruistic behaviour. However, focus on self-worth or self-esteem does not sit easily with Gülen’s view, which focuses primarily on service. For Lederach this places relationships at the centre of peace-building not values or principles. The critical questions that are asked of the other are part of what enables a different perception of the other to emerge. Imagination is central here, both in seeing the self and the other differently and in seeing new possibilities. Hence, for Lederach hope is based in the dynamic of changed relationships, and the capacity to

128

The Spirituality of Responsibility

perceive things at a deeper level, through empathy. He argues that this is often seen most effectively when the web of human relationships is focused on. Imagination here begins to shade into consciousness of that web. This involves the ‘craft of watching webs’ (Lederach 2005, 101), requiring stillness, humility and holistic awareness. This goes beyond tolerance, to an awareness of the social and cultural ‘geography’, how the web interconnects and how we relate to the web over time. It is here that Lederach focuses on examples such as the shared sense of the worth of grandparenting and intergenerational relations which cross conflict boundaries. Hence, Lederach puts more stress on mutuality than Gülen. Such mutuality, rather than altruism, is seen as the core of peace-building. This leads Lederach (2005) down a path of spirituality which affects perception, including perception of time and space as more focused in mutual relationships and inter-community narrative. Lederach focuses less, then, on the development of individual character, and primarily a rational approach, and more on the relationships, perception and the achievement of reconciliation and transformation at a personal and social level. All of this chips away at narrow views of identity and community, and begins to extend Gülen’s view of tolerance, but also echoes the sense of plurality, difference and the ambiguity of the other. For Lederach all important in this transformation is the attitude of journey and discovery. This involves several things. First, the journey requires the capacity to learn as one goes along, referred to as serendipity. This involves ‘making discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of things … not in quest of ’ (Horace Walpole, quoted in Lederach 2005, 114).1 Sagacity takes this away from luck and into the capacity to see connections and so to begin to understand the significance of things even whilst pursuing other ends (cf. Kay 2011). Serendipity in peace-building requires a mind focused on the goal but living in the paradox of reality. This requires smart flexible ‘learning platforms’ based in processes and structures. All of this resonates with the idea of spirituality as an essentially heuristic journey (Robinson 2007). The spiritual journey of Gülen is one of learning in a slightly different way. It creates peace through the particular objectives. Resources, aims, outcomes are all set, and members of the movement work

Responsibility and Peace-Building

129

together to achieve these, all be they in different contexts. The possibility of linking with other groups in civil society is less clear, and the possibility of such other groups setting the agenda for the peace-building is also less obvious. Second, and connected, this involves the embracing of paradoxical curiosity and thinking. This is based again firmly in relationships rather than simply logic. Logic tends to be linear, and relationship less clear or predictable. Focus of goals and pathways is important but runs the danger of taking the eye off the wider environment. Paradox involves capacity to hold together seemingly contradictory truths in order to locate a greater truth. The paradoxical curiosity that Lederach speaks about is the capacity to visualize the truth in the different and usually opposing viewpoints. Dealing with such paradox involves curiosity, looking to see what the meaning and implication of the paradox is. Paradoxical curiosity sustains and provokes the moral imagination, precisely because it demands response to dissonances (cf. Bakhtin 1981). This, echoed in the Jainist concept of anekantavada, and Keat’s idea of negative capability, the ability to see the different aspects of the other, without having to impose a single view or overall meaning (Ou 2009, 1).2 This links to forgiveness, itself is a significant acceptance of ambiguity, that the other has both wronged one and is also able to re-establish relationships. Alongside imagination Lederach (2005) argues for the importance of the gift of pessimism. Given the paradoxes noted above one might expect this, something which is part of the critical response to meaning and practice. It is a form of systematic scepticism which is very much focused in peacebuilding in areas of deep conflict. This is the pessimism that recognizes that deep conflict cannot be transformed easily, and therefore easy promises are not to be trusted. This is a realistic approach to sustainable change, testing the validity and sustainability of proposed creative response. It aims not to escape the past but engage it, suggesting a parallel with Aquinas’s view of practical wisdom (prudentia3). The test is located in relationships sustained over time not in formula or processes. All of this links memory, narrative, identity and vocation. It also means attention to time and space as part of the development of a culture of peace-building.4 This further develops

130

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the idea of spiritual journey beyond the individual, because the journey is made with others and in relation to others along the way. Journey also suggests intentionality – you may not know the end but you are moving and along the journey you are making meaning, in effect mapping the social and physical environment. This leads to a focus on finding voice, a narrative, in the journey, and Lederach’s evocative idea of ‘voice walkers’. This captures a dynamic view of integrity, developing awareness of the different voices in the social and physical environment, and finding one’s own voice through dialogue and ongoing learning. At this point Lederach comes closer to Gülen, with a focus on awareness of different narratives and response. Lederach gives greater weight to the interaction with the different voices and the development of narratives. In particular this involves ‘restorying’ (2005, 148) as a key aspect of transformation, developing new narratives in response to the challenge and ‘call’ of the social and physical environment, rather than the divine call. Gülen’s restorying is rather more about the reinterpretation of the ground story of the Qur’an. For Lederach the voices which are developed are those of all the different groups within the social environment. This in turn develops the responsibility and accountability of those different speakers. All of this leads to ongoing learning and development, with time seen not as linear but as circular, hence as the product of continued reflection, often revisiting the same place but with different perceptions (Eliot 2009). Lederach suggests that the ‘soul’ is found not in a dualistic aspect of the person (i.e. a non-material centre of the self, found within the body), but in these active and reflective relationships. The development of this soul involves three things: stillness, humility and sensuous perception. By stillness he means pause to be open to the other. It involves the practice of attentiveness and awareness. This is again to do with ontology, the person, not with tools. Humility is enabled through engagement with the other, showing one’s place in wider projects and narratives, involving the recognition of one’s relationship with the other and therefore that the world is not summed up in the needs of the self. Sensuous perception involves perception of the physicality of space, and an appreciation of that. This requires a sense of physical otherness, involving

Responsibility and Peace-Building

131

light, colour, texture, touch or smell, such as might be found in gardens or wilder nature or religious buildings. This reminds us that holistic meaning is as much as about the somatic (body) as about the cognitive and affective aspects of the person. Lederach like Gülen sees action as critical. His stress is less on service, however, and more on the aesthetic. Work here embodies meaning, acting much like the creative arts in bridging feeling and thinking. The  term aesthetics is from the Greek meaning ‘being sharp in the senses’, that is, being capable of grasping the connections, the web and the beauty of relationships, to see the picture and draw the change. This locates what Lederach means by the soul of peace-building, something found as much in images as in analytical reflection, reinforcing the sense of meaning through physical medium and creative action. This focus on the aesthetic and moral imagination further enables an awareness of vocation – to see the other and the social environment in their complexity calling one. This ties in directly with responsibility, because it is recognizing the human calling of the other, setting up accountability to the other and responsibility for the other, without prescribing what that means. Peace-building for Lederach then looks to establish a quality of transcendence. It breaks out of difference as divide. The moral imagination finds a way to transcend the seen and the common, and link to the experience of the different stakeholders involved (cf. Pelz & Reeves 2008). The change is often focused in unlikely places and people, with leadership even taken up by groups outside the organization or in culturally weak positions. Lederach notes several examples in Africa of women’s’ groups that have played significant parts in peace-building. For Gülen, leadership tends to stay fixed in the Movement, with very clear and effective ways of developing service in action, but little negotiation of power and responsibilities with other groups. Nonetheless, this can lead to empowering weaker groups as noted earlier. Lederach focuses on social transformation as a whole not simply the development of the community or a part of the community. Hence, it looks to multiple dialogues and processes at different levels and in different social spaces taking place at the same time. Like Gülen, this takes

132

The Spirituality of Responsibility

away from the idea of peace-building as focused in trained professionals and moves to the individual and groups taking their responsibility for peace. Lederach (2005, 97), however, begins to chart the effect of this on wider society, arguing that ‘the perspective of meditative capacity focuses attention on introducing a quality of interaction into a strategic set of social spaces within the web of systemic relationships in order to promote constructive change processes in the conflict-affected setting as a whole.’ Lederach (2005, 91) suggests that this is less about critical mass in terms of volume and more about critical ‘yeast’, focusing on the quality of the peace-building relationships. The peace-builders for Lederach are looking to create outcomes that will affect the whole of society. This means ensuring that the different groups at levels of civil society and government connect and take on leadership roles, and work together at shaping and being shaped, leading to a work which is owned by them and yet not having a life of its own. The action is actual and symbolic, and like music or art, has the power to move, give significant meaning, reminding us of shared humanity and to challenge. Hence, such creativity has a tremendous transformative power. This cannot be forced, but is worked through in its own time. The work of peace-building and social change thus moves beyond analytical techniques and taps into people’s more artistic, creative selves (cf. Nussbaum 1992). Creative action for Gülen’s peace-building ties into the practice of the virtues, such as tolerance, compassion and wisdom – focusing on commitment and service in action, not least through the development of schools. He targets the evils of ignorance, poverty and disunity and focuses on clear pathways. Through this he offers hope based in a positive view of humanity. Placing schools in areas of conflict is not without risk, but the process has been worked through. Moreover, it is a process which seeks to set the grounds for peace and the skills of peace-building in place so that it will influence the future. This does not directly try to transform the future or try to engage others in that transformation. Such transformation might well happen to the parents of Macedonian children, for instance, but that is not the specific intention. Hence, for Gülen and the Hizmet Movement, the aim is to keep faith with the core pathways.

Responsibility and Peace-Building

133

Lederach is less about the end of the action and more about the effect that action has on others in society who will be affected by the embodied meaning of the action. Lederach provides an almost mystical picture in which risk is central. The journey does not have a specific plan but enables, through dialogue and learning on the way, the voices to gain strength, and an openness to the possibilities of working with the widest possible number of groups. Lederach describes the ‘moral imagination’ as the capacity to recognize turning points and possibilities in order to venture down unknown paths and create what does not yet exist. There is a real risk and uncertainty in this that has to be managed, paralleled in the risk of letting go of power to others in the peace process, often to those with much less power. Nonetheless, despite the lack of clear pathways in comparison to Gülen, there is also an intentionality in Lederach’s approach to peacebuilding, focused in finding ways to challenge and transcend destructive perceptions and patterns. Unlike Gülen, then this leads Lederach to engage more directly the different groups in society, enabling a bigger picture of co-creation. Hence, whilst Gülen and the Hizmet Movement explore and practise creative dialogue, Lederach extends that dialogue, enabling perhaps even more mutual responsibility, in an overarching approach to peace-building.

Conclusions This chapter has tried to show how peace-building emerges from Gülen’s view of responsibility. At one level this is a natural outgrowth of the core elements of moral agency, and accountability, focused in response to the creator God. The comparison with Lederach points up the key aspect of agency which is as much spiritual as it is moral and the importance of awareness and appreciation of the social network. The interconnectivity of this is summed up in Lederach’s use of the term web. Gülen is also focused in universal responsibility and service, and peace-building is an organic part of that, arising from the practice of key virtues and values,

134

The Spirituality of Responsibility

from tolerance to freedom. The focus on virtues is interesting to compare with the Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas (1984), who adds a central virtue of peaceability. Hauerwas sees the virtue of peaceability focused in the Christian community, and expresses the character of Christ as peacemaker. However, this makes it difficult to contribute to a wider practice of peace-building and civic responsibility, without acceptance of the core narrative. For Gülen the responsibility to embody virtues in action is there for all, and so includes business leaders, broader civil society and so on. This stresses moral agency but moves beyond an individualistic view of citizenship and into one of citizenship as mutual responsibility, and thus as essentially social in expression. Gülen in this sees the importance of a civil society, and of the responsibility of the Muslim to contribute towards that civil society, not simply to focus on the Muslim community (cf. Vicini 2007). Hence, the Gülen practice goes beyond narrow views of responsibility to the development of civil society and democracy, a concern that is achievable through cooperation between small and medium businesses and between business and other agents in society. Lederach provides an illuminating contrast to that, because the end of peace is more focused and the means of developing new ways of seeing the present and imagining future relationships. This is anchored in an articulated spirituality which in turn connects to a view of learning which dynamically engages complexity. This suggests a limitation in Gülen’s perspective, precisely because he does not spend time on how engagement with the plural narratives of other groups in civil society can establish a culture of peace. Both, however, dare to locate peace and peace-building at the centre of the human enterprise, and as something that all are responsible for. In so doing they locate the search for peace at the heart of every debate and action.

6

Responsibility and Dialogue

The analysis of responsibility moves naturally to dialogue. This chapter aims to show how dialogue in Gülen’s view is not simply a tool of communication but rather a key dimension of the practice of responsibility and of the related virtues. Having noted the importance of interfaith dialogue I examine the underlying theology of dialogue, focused in the holistic greater jihad, and the ongoing dialogue with tradition and scripture. I then go on to argue that underpinning all of the modes of responsibility for Gülen is dialogue. Indeed, dialogue is key to the practice of responsibility (Esposito & Yilmaz 2010; Pratt 2010), because it enables the development of agency, consciousness of creation and the call to care for it; the capacity to give an account of thought and action; and tolerance and the development of shared creative action. I will end by briefly exploring the foundations of dialogue and comparing Gülen’s view of dialogue with several thinkers. For Gülen dialogue is critical, and this has been expressed most effectively initially in the sphere of interfaith dialogue, practised through many different groups, such as the Journalists and Writers Foundation,1 the Dialogue Society in London2 and the development of dialogue platforms, not least the Abant Platform of the Journalists and Writers Foundation3 (see Ugur 2013). These efforts have brought together intellectuals, activists, journalists and leaders of different groups. The stress on interfaith and intrafaith dialogue is one that includes accepting responsibility for peace-making. Hence, in 2007 the Abant Platform, for instance, developed intrafaith dialogue in Turkey between the Sunni and

136

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the Alevi minority. As Küng suggests, inter- and intrafaith dialogue are key to wider peace-building, There will be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions. There will be no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions. (Musser & Sunderland 2005, 1)

Yavuz (2013) develops this theme, arguing that interfaith engagement such as that enabled by the Hizmet Movement contributes not simply to the bonding of religious institutions but to a wider bridging activity which contributes to the ‘thickening of civil society in multi-religious states’ (cf. Weller & Yilmaz 2012; Yavuz 2013, 175). Hence, whilst Gülen recognizes the importance of interfaith dialogue, his thinking moves beyond that to intercultural dialogue and dialogue focused in professional and civic practice (Vainovski-Mihai 2010). This is based in a theology of dialogue.

Theology of dialogue Dialogue is inherently important (Sleap et al. 2012, 87), emerging from the very nature of creation. Creation is inherently diverse and at the centre of it is humanity made up of particular and therefore different human beings. Interaction is therefore the very stuff of what it means to be human, based in two Qur’anic texts: O mankind, we created you from a single (pair) of male and female, and made you into races and tribes so that you should get to know one another. (Qur’an 49:13)

And If God had so willed, He would have made all of you one community, but he has not done so that He may test you in what He has given you; so compete in goodness. (Qur’an 16:93)

Dialogue is thus key to learning about each other, the diversity of creation and about God himself. The diversity of creation reflects the

Responsibility and Dialogue

137

diversity of God’s attributes, and thus names (Gülen 2007, 87). For Gülen, unity is not about single communities, and in interfaith dialogue nor about the imposing single perspectives, but rather about unity in diversity (Gülen 2006, 116 ff). Indeed, Gülen suggests that diversity of religion was intended by God, and thus engaging that diversity is a responsibility. This sets up the key tensions for responsibility and for dialogue. This is not easy ground, not least because there is continued tension within religions about the theological ground of such a vision. This is well illustrated by Jewish theologian Jonathan Sacks in his work on the dignity of difference (Sacks 2002). He offers a positive and negative argument for the importance of difference. The first focuses on natural and individual difference, in ways similar to Gülen (Kayaoglu 2007). This is developed further in his book on the ethics of responsibility (Sacks 2005) where he argues that the universalism of the Jewish perspective is precisely focused in the particular, that is the call to respond to the particular needs of the person and the planet, focused in love. The negative argument is that religions, like all institutions, have to avoid the problem of asserting a universalism which demands that all perceive and think in the same way. This is precisely the point noted in Bauman (1989) when he argues that plurality is the only way in which to fight against the domination of one perspective. Sacks in the first edition of the Dignity of Difference reinforces this by arguing against the universalism evidenced by some forms of Islam and Christianity, but nonetheless arguing that the Abrahamic religions all access this vision of a universal perspective focused in the particular. The divine initiative in this transcends any particular religious expression (2002, 55). In the second edition of the book Sacks changes the focus to an historical primacy of the Jews, with whom God made a particular covenant. He suggests that this does not exclude the possibility of other peoples, cultures and faith finding their own relationships with God within the ‘shared frame of the Noahide laws’ (cf. Goshen-Gottstein 2013). This might be interpreted as an assertion of the primacy of the Jewish perspective. It might equally be seen as a good example of the tensions which are inevitable in any attempt at interfaith dialogue. Any dialogue inevitably involves reflection on the identity of

138

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the participants, individually and institutionally. This means that the dialogue will inevitably engage issues of value and worth. Issues of value include concerns about the loss of values and the fear of ethical relativism. Issues of worth include recognition of identity, status and contribution. Hence, Sacks’ conversations within his religion before the second edition of his book seem to have reminded him of the historical importance of the Jewish faith. All of this is part of any dialogue. Open and challenging dialogue might accept the historical point set out by Sacks, whilst testing any hint of primacy. As I shall note below, Sacks’ great vision is further developed in his book on the ethics of responsibility (Sacks 2005). Wolpe (2006) suggests that the major issue with Sacks’ position is a lack of selfcriticality, that is, criticality of the Jewish religion. Sacks’ original position in 2002 would happily live with such criticality, the idea that any religion is in itself in a continued struggle, involving, dialogue with God, dialogue with the institution (core values), dialogue with others, and dialogue with the self. This is because in his original position Sacks sees difference as intentional to creation and thus to ways of relating (cf. Goshen-Gottstein 2013), which is very close to Gülen. Yavuz (2013, 176 ff) argues that Gülen is strongly influenced by Sufi tradition in this. In interfaith terms this is characterized as inclusive, that is, focused on recognition of difference, and of the importance of mutual dialogue focused in action. Nonetheless, like Sacks (who stresses Judaism as involved the first covenant with God) he has, at points, stressed the importance of Islam, with Muhammad as the last prophet with complete revelation (Yavuz 2013, 180). Significantly, Yavuz suggests that this is not an exclusivist position, and that Gülen’s own position has been developing as a result of dialogue (2013, 180). In both writers this begins to recognize that dialogue involves both engagement with difference and, what Markham (2003) refers to as, location. Location involves articulating and thus establishing one’s identity in relation to other’s. Hence, dialogue continuously interrogates not only ideas and but also identity, perception and underlying views of and feelings about worth. As I will note below, this links directly to responsibility, and ongoing development. It is precisely this sense of continued struggle which takes Gülen into a deeper theological basis for dialogue, found first in jihad.

Responsibility and Dialogue

139

Dialogue and jihad One aspect of the tension noted earlier is summed up in the different views of jihad. For extremists jihad is precisely about imposing a single view, through force. Jihad, however, is a complex idea which, as Kurucan and Erol (2012) show, has suffered distortions over time. Some historians have argued for it in terms of Muslim expansionism, a ‘law of war’ which encourages conversion, subjugation or killing of men (Schacht 1964). Others have viewed the term as essentially defensive, not least in defence of the key goods of faith, person, family, property and land from attack. This occurs in the context of a formal state declaration of war (Kurucan & Erol 2012, 62). A third use of the term is connected with extremist activities, and acts of terror against civilians. The attempt to justify the acts of terror has been focused precisely on the argument that this is part of a defence of Islam, not least against the corrupting influence of the West. This polarization takes no account of the diversity within Islam (reflecting the plurality within in creation theology), no account of formal state identity (preferring orthodox thinking as the basis to ‘state’ identity, rather than democracy) and with that no account of the need for dialogue. The hallmark of such positions is that questioning of meaning and action is devalued. Even the killing of innocents cannot be questioned. In fact, acts of such terror are clearly against Qur’anic and universal principles. Gülen notes the polarized view of Jihad is based in hatred, not a considered view of the Qur’an, There are always going to be battles, which are an inescapable reality of humanity. However, the verses in the Koran revealed to Muhammad (pbuh) specifying the conditions for Jihad are misinterpreted by others to mean the main aim of Islam. In essence, these people, who have failed to grasp the true spirit of Islam, are unable to strike a balance between the broad and the finer points and this, when coupled to the fact that they are consumed with hatred, leads them to misinterpret Islam. Whereas, the breast of a genuine Muslim community is full of love and affection for all of creation. (Gülen 2006, 3)

140

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Jihad is a complex concept, which includes both physical and psychological struggle. Physical struggle also does not simply involve war. Where it does, it, at least, implies formal deliberation about values and outcomes to determine if this is a right course of action for a state. This presumes the accountability of leaders. Hence, any attempt at establishing a jihad in this sense requires dialogue and deliberation. This is parallel, though not exact, to the Christian concept of Just War. There are different accounts of the Just War theory (Guthrie & Quinlan 2010), however, all involve deliberation around key principles and ends. Such deliberation is the opposite of polarized thinking precisely because it subjects motivation and justification to rational challenge. Physical struggle may also involve the struggle to develop society or the struggle to work against evils of ignorance poverty and disunity (as noted in the previous chapter). At least two hadiths speak of such a wider struggle. The first (Kurucan & Erol 2012, 65) focuses on social  care, ‘A person who works for the good of widows and the helpless is like those who fight in the name of God.’

The second focuses on prophecy in the sense of telling truth to power, ‘The most virtuous jihad is speaking truth to a despotic and tyrannical ruler’s face.’ (2012, 65)

Once more such hadiths provide a principled position, requiring ongoing dialogue to determine how they will be addressed in practice. Psychological struggle is focused in the ‘battle’ with what might be termed the will (as noted in Chapter 3). The will in this case is the nafs which can be used to good or ill. Three things are clear about this struggle. First, it is the real or greater jihad. Hence, the Prophet can say, on returning from war, ‘We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad’ (Kurucan & Erol 2012, 64). When asked to explain the greater jihad he explicitly states that it is the struggle against our own nafs. In effect, this an internal warfare. Second, this struggle is precisely based in ongoing internal dialogue. As I noted in Chapter  4, the practice of accountability is focused in ongoing

Responsibility and Dialogue

141

internal dialogue, which is reflected in the final judgement. The internal dialogue is holistic, with rational reflection on how the affective aspects of the nafs might be focused in creative rather than destructive acts. Third, the struggle with the nafs, as Kurucan and Erol (2012, 65) note, is also able to facilitate further external dialogue, not least through making the person ‘more humble, gentle, compassionate and empathetic’. In this light then the greater jihad is focused in dialogue which struggles with right motivation and good practice. It only focuses on armed warfare when proper conditions have been fulfilled, not least that the war is focused in self-defence and had been determined by a properly constituted authority.

Tajdid Parallel to the dialogue of jihad is the dialogue focused in the ongoing reflection on and application of scripture and tradition. Yilmaz (2002; cf. Keles 2013) argues that Gülen embodies this engagement in ‘tajdid by conduct’. This involves a renewal, reviving and restoring of religion. Tajdid can only be practised by a mujaddid. A mujaddid will use the tool of ijtihad (reasoning). Ijtihad is a re-reading and re-evaluation of religious text and sources which keeps to the spirit of the text whilst reaching a contemporary interpretation. Ijtihad has its limits, rules and conditions and should not be confused with reform. A mujtahid has historically been a unique individual in each age who has given guidance through the practice of ijtihad. This does not always sit easily with Gülen’s view of leadership, not least because it once more could lead to a lack of questioning. Hence, he does not himself claim to be engaged in this (Keles 2013). In addition, he argues that because of the hyper-complexity of the modern world no single mujtahid would be able to offer coherent interpretation (Gülen 1995). Hence, he looks to the possibility of committees, perhaps based in groups of scholars and even supported by the State. In effect Gülen sees dialogue as critical for the ongoing renewal and application of the scriptures. This opens out tajid and makes it more flexible. Several factors

142

The Spirituality of Responsibility

emerge in this. First, the process of renewal is incremental. It goes on over time and in response to new situations. Second, it is open to much wider multiple dialogues (Keles 2013). Third, dialogues are focused in action. Hence, Yilmaz (2002, 349) argues that Gülen has reinterpreted Islamic understanding in tune with contemporary times and has developed and put into practice a new Muslim discourse … ‘on religion, pluralism, jurisprudence, secularism, democracy, politics and international relations’. Yilmaz (2002, 349.) argues that Gülen is undertaking this tajdid through conduct, because his ideas are put into immediate effect, through the Movement, and affects the wider society in the long term. In effect, the tajdid is collectively constructed by the movement’s dialogue and conduct, in relation to Gülen’s views. Thus, Gülen is aware that his general views and teachings will be locally received, interpreted and adapted in the process of application. Key to this is the active response of the Movement on the ground, interpreting core principles in relation to local context, available resources and so on. Hence, as Keles (2013, 196) puts it, ‘it is possible to suggest that the tajid is collectively constructed (and communicated) through Gülen’s views and the movement’s practice’. Given that the Movement operates in more than a hundred countries, the dialogue becomes even richer. This is also inevitable in a movement which prizes the intellect and well-educated members. They embody critical and creative dialogue between members and with Gülen, something he actively promotes. Hence, Keles (2013) suggests that Gülen acts as a form a chairperson in the practice of tajdid. He clarifies vision, values, aims, guidelines, objectives and principles. Then there has to be interpretation of this for the local context. The movement’s dialogue efforts then tell us much more about Gülen’s tajdid about Islam and society than any of his essays or interviews on the topic (Keles 2013). What emerges from this view of dialogue is a complex and ongoing picture which brings together different elements: internal dialogue, dialogue around the meaning and application of scripture, dialogue which inevitably broadens to practitioners, dialogue around different functions, relationships and responsibilities. These interconnecting dialogues embody

Responsibility and Dialogue

143

all the elements of responsibility, not least because Gülen’s spirituality stresses both individual and collective responsibility for developing meaning and action.

Dialogue and responsibility Dialogue is both a key aspect of all the modes of responsibility and also the means of developing that responsibility in practice.

Moral agency Internal dialogue (cf. Lederach 2005) enables the development of agency. It demands articulation of value and practice, which clarifies both what we think and do. Articulation, the development of narrative, becomes essential for reflection and learning, involving ongoing hermeneutics (Vainovski-Mihai 2010). Hence, this is the key vehicle for istihad. This ‘proper intellectual and spiritual struggle’ (Pratt 2010, 200), reflects the richer view of agency in the light of Gülen’s holism and synoptic thinking. It is not simply around ideas, and with that the danger of moving into the defence of ideas. Huntington’s (1998) thesis of the clash of civilizations, that is, post–Cold War conflict will be focused in religious or cultural identities, is precisely located there. It is ironic that the defence of ideas, and the related assertion of orthodoxy, has historically led to conflict. A  holistic perspective, however, involves getting to know the self and other in relation to mutual plural culture, involving feelings as well as ideas, all focused in responsive action (Yilmaz 2002; Pratt 2010). This involves internal challenge and learning, with an output not of defence but action. This is what pleases God, not simply defending right thinking. All of these elements demand this involve not simply responsibility for critical thinking but also for the feelings that emerge around any felt sense of identity or around core values. This suggests that dialogue in all this is not simply a vehicle for thoughts, or a means to communication. It involves the engagement of the whole person in relationship. For Gülen, this inevitably

144

The Spirituality of Responsibility

involves internal dialogue which engages the different internal narratives, including his Turkish cultural and historical narratives.

Mutual dialogue Mutual dialogue, through providing different perspectives on the social and physical environment, tests and develops the participants’ awareness of these and their relationship to them. This tests not simply awareness but also perception (cf. Nussbaum 1992) and how far that perception is influenced by underlying values. This places dialogue beyond the self as well as with the self, at the heart of ‘self-transformation’, demanding genuine engagement with the other, as person, project or place, and not the assertion of the organization’s location or identity in the public realm. Yavuz (2013) suggests that this is similar to Gadamar’s (1975) understanding of dialogue as developing self-understanding, by testing and stretching the cognitive maps of understanding, with their underlying prejudices. This partly involves a fusion of world views, with other different world views providing mutual testing. Dialogue thus becomes key to learning. This suggests also parallels with Michael Oakeshott’s vision for learning in higher education. He argues that higher education (in the UK) should provide a place where conversation is explicitly given priority (Oakeshott 1989). This conversation is an ‘unrehearsed intellectual adventure’ (1989, 138) which enables awareness and appreciation of all the narratives which make up one’s culture; awareness of learning as exploration and discovery; the capacity to handle plurality, many different voices. Gülen can thus engage both the plural narratives which are involved in the self and those involved in others. The person takes responsibility for their own learning, but only through engaging the self and others in dialogue (cf. Yavuz 2013, 180 ff). This differs from debate. Debate is primarily about communicating an argument and winning that argument. Hence, it is not focused in a holistic understanding of the other narratives or a critical engagement with one’s own views. If there is any such engagement, it is functional, that is, a means of making one’s own argument more successful. Dialogue is

Responsibility and Dialogue

145

rather a disciplined act of communicating and listening. It is respectful, engaged and reciprocal and calls forth our greatest powers of empathy and understanding. Even at this stage dialogue enables us to perceive things differently (cf. Nussbaum 1990). This also suggests that dialogue is critical to awareness and appreciation of the social and physical environment. Only when the ‘other’ actually gives an account does he or she show who she is. Only in developing the elements of responsibility does one begin to reveal the true self, that is, the engaged self, the self that is possible (cf. Yavuz 2013, 181). This means that awareness is a function of the continued relationships. Some Christian pastoral writers (cf. Robinson 2008) suggest that this is facilitated not simply by empathy, but by interpathy, involving the development of mutual empathy and cultural awareness.

Accountability Dialogue is a key to accountability. Critically, it sets up an environment in which persons can respectfully challenge and be challenged. Important to the first is the capacity to hear the account of the other and to explore what it means in terms of idea and practice. Important to the second is the capacity to give an account and to critically reflect on that account. Once more this requires another perspective to enable such reflection. Accountability then becomes something far more complex and interactive than simply giving a report to someone in authority and trying to justify idea and practice. Gülen, as I noted in the last chapter, underlines this point by arguing that the final judgement is not about a final report but is the culmination of ongoing dialogue. In one sense this suggests that only dialogue can provide genuine transparency (see Gülen 1990; cf. O’Neill 2002). By giving an account of ideas and practice one is also giving an account of one’s identity and relationships and thus also of one’s worth. This makes one accountable for his or her meaning and actions to the self, to person or group that forms the basis of one’s significance (in Gülen’s case God), to others who form relationships of significance – from family, to workplace, to profession. This

146

The Spirituality of Responsibility

suggests that dialogue is both plural and ongoing, over time. Transparency then becomes a function not of developing single reports but of how the person or organization opens itself to and engages in dialogue and the questions and plural relationships entailed in this. This reinforces the importance of getting right and refining the use of words, stressed by the Zaman Media principles (see Chapter  4). It also echoes the work of Epley (2014). Epley notes that knowledge of the other is often seen as mediated primarily through body language. With the aid of empathy we become able to read the feelings and thought of the other from their body. However, Epley notes research in psychology which suggests that such ‘body language’ offers only limited access to knowledge of the other. Only when the other is engaged in critical dialogue is there a genuine revelation of the other. Until this process of dialogue is entered into, one or more of the parties may not actually realize that this is how they think or this is what they have done or intend to do. In writing about trust O’Neill (2002) suggests that bland views of transparency are insufficient. The key to trust is not to simply ‘open the books’ but to development practices that avoid deception. The focus on dialogue takes this further to suggest that dialogue enables the critical examination of intended, but also unintended, deception. Hence, dialogue reinforces accountability as a way of life, and thus a way of shaping the character of the person and enabling the development of the soul. This raises questions of the Hizmet Movement itself. On the one hand accountability through dialogue at is at the heart of individual transformation and development. On the other hand, Park (2008) suggests that the Hizmet Movement is not institutionally transparent. In one sense this is true. With many different groups involved in the Movement it is hard to see how accountability can be worked through in a simple or linear way. However, the dynamic of dialogue itself embodies transparency, precisely because it requires all parties to give an account of their meaning and practice, and thus be held accountable for it. In many of the conferences organized by the Hizmet Movement over the last decade this has involved openness to critiques from different perspectives, not least in dialogue around the role of women in and the governance of the

Responsibility and Dialogue

147

movement (Ebaugh 2009). I will examine this in greater detail in the final chapter.

Dialogue and commitment Whilst dialogue enables learning through examination of different perspectives and values, Gülen also argues that it involves recognition of the sameness of the other and thus the development commitment to the self and the other (Graskemper 2007). It is not possible to pursue dialogue without giving space and time for it to develop, and this in turn demands a non-judgemental attitude. Commitment to the self and others is also essential if the potential critique of values and practice is to emerge from articulation and reflection. Hence, as Gülen stresses, dialogue enables the development of tolerance and empathy (Vainovski-Mihai 2010). This sense of identification with the other is key to any sense of universal responsibility.

Dialogue and practice Dialogue reaches its most creative time when it becomes the creative focus for universal responsibility. At its simplest level this involves dialogue as negotiation of responsibility. This provides a means for enabling the sharing of responsibility, exemplified in the work of the Hizmet Movement business men working through their contributions to ‘slaying’ the giants of poverty, ignorance and disunity. However, as Finch and Mason (1993) noted in their research on the negotiation of responsibility in families, this involves more than a means of working through responsibility. The  negotiations also involve a working through of ethical values and value in practice. They enable core ethical values to be embodied, core virtues to be practised and the ethical identity of the person or group to be established and developed over time.4 Dialogue then leads to more authentic and effective engagement, and action. Gülen (1995) suggests that we do not have to reach absolute agreement before working through the shared social issues such as

148

The Spirituality of Responsibility

ignorance, poverty and discrimination. On the contrary, these provide a shared area of concern and along with the shared values can be worked through regardless of differences, working through a negotiation of responsibility. Action also tests the accountability and commitment of those involved in the dialogue. Being accountable for actions involves testing the actions against purpose and meaning. The actions themselves then become the basis for reflection on meaning. Such reflection then becomes the basis for the development of integrity, connecting the different voices and practice. Gülen sets up this model of plural responsibility in the context of Islam, enabling him to show why Islam shares responsibility for public life, without embracing theocracy.5 Hence, Vicini (2007, 441) notes that in the stress on action, and therefore the public nature of the Islamic responsiveness, Gülen sees Muslims as also citizens, able to share responsibility for social debate and practice. Importantly, this suggests that dialogue is never simply bipartite. As I noted earlier, any open dialogue links to and is carried on in different ways with many different dialogues (see also Robinson & Smith 2014). Mutual and plural dialogue, then, enables the development of agency and intention, demanding articulation of value and practice, which clarifies both what we think and do. Articulation, the development of narrative, becomes essential for reflection and learning, enabling the person or institution to see just how values and practice relate, leading to learning. Dialogue also demands the development of commitment to the self and the other. It is not possible to pursue dialogue without giving space and time for it to develop, and this in turn demands a non-judgemental attitude. Commitment to the self and others is also essential if the potential critique of values and practice is to emerge from articulation and reflection. The practice of dialogue also enables listening, and with that, empathy, appreciation and responsiveness. We learn about the other as well as ourselves only if we are open to both. The development of a more realistic and truthful assessment of the data in any situation is also enabled by dialogue. In a case such as Brent Spar, noted in Chapter  1, the lack of dialogue led to diametrically opposite views of data, distortions of the truth and ineffective action (Entine 2002). Dialogue

Responsibility and Dialogue

149

itself also sets up a continued accountability with those involved. This is partly because it sets up a contract, formal or informal, that establishes expectations that are continually tested by that dialogue. Gülen’s stress on ongoing reflection, dialogue, interpretation, innovative thinking, critical rationality and renewal (tajdid) places him firmly in the Islamic tradition of intellectual enquiry, including figures such as Sayyid Ahmed, Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Abduh (Moosa 2003, 117). Ongoing ijtihad is not simply an add-on to theological thinking, but rather a necessary element of responsibility-centred dialogue. His Nursi-inspired stress on consciousness, the use of science, openness to truth outside strict revelation and service in action (Eldridge 2007; Vicini 2007; Weller & Yilmaz 2012) takes him also firmly into the arena of public discourse. This is partly because of his stress on spirituality, that is, the livedness or praxis of responsibility rather than simply its theology (cf. Vicini 2007).6 Different disciplines and cultures can thus see what he means in action and are engaged in dialogue about action. This enables the development of a movement which, as noted earlier, is quite distinct from traditional Sufi tariqa. Hence, the Movement looks to maintain Islamic tradition, focused in the Qur’an, but enabling openness to dialogue with plurality inside and outside Islam. His stress on science as a key means of discovering truth about creation and on universal values and principles further enhances the need for dialogue (Eldridge 2007). Indeed, interdisciplinary, conceptual, intercultural, international and interfaith dialogues become critical, because Gülen aims to hold together both tradition and innovation. In effect, the shared responsibility is embodied in action, and the negotiation of responsibility extends the imagination and develops creativity. It shows what is possible, especially where responsibility is shared, and so increases the capacity to respond. Directly connected to the development of responsibility through dialogue is the practice of virtues, such as phronesis. Gülen also offers what is characterized in Christian terms as theological virtues, not least hope (Saritoprak 2010). Hope, as noted in Chapter  5, can be characterized as the capacity to envision the future in a positive and creative way, and Snyder (2000)

150

The Spirituality of Responsibility

suggests that it involves agency, support and pathways to action. The first element of dialogue enables a sense of agency, personal and collective, in the participants as they develop a clear understanding of purpose and identity, around knowledge of ideas, values and practice in relation to the social and physical environment. The  stress on action looks to the development of pathways. Through the use of imagination and the negotiation of responsibility pathways embodying core values are created. The commitment to action-based dialogue further enhances a sense of support and genuine engagement with the issues. Underlying this is Gülen’s idea of positive action (müsbet hareket, cf. Keles & Sezgin 2016). Positive action becomes a mind-set which focuses on hizmet. It is not just about ‘being positive’ but about asserting the person’s unique response – and therefore thought and action not being determined reactively. This also provides a framework for seeing the other. The other is seen in positive light. For Gülen Husnuzan involves two connected meanings; positive thinking about God’s purpose and guidance and positive thinking the created world, including humanity (2016). This deepens the idea of non-judgementalism. Viewing people in a negative light (suizan), Gülen argues, precisely leads to a false superiority. Hence, this loses the essential mutuality of dialogue. Viewing people positively precisely enables a focus on their capacities and potential for good and so on possibilities rather than past failures. He understands that others inevitably have faults. However, he argues for the importance of empathic acceptance of the other. This involves identifying with the other, and the practice of tolerance, acceptance of the other and acceptance of the other in themselves, including limitations. This balances the virtue of humility. Humility, as noted in Chapter 3, involves the acceptance of the self, with an awareness of the limitations of the self and of the possibilities of the self. This also develops Nursi’s thinking on dialogue (cf. Berghout 2008, 250– 254), and echoes aspects of Augustine’s view of love. Nursi suggests that in dialogue the different aspects should be broken down, from attributes to actions, and respond to these appropriately. This involves love for the person qua human. Any negative feelings should be limited to the person’s problematic actions, and in particular to the underlying attribute which

Responsibility and Dialogue

151

causes such actions. Hence, we should accept the person but not the underlying negative attribute, such as untruthfulness or hubris. This firmly echoes Augustine’s dictum to ‘love the sinner but hate the sin’ (Augustine 2003, 14.6). Yavuz (2013, 183) argues that love and tolerance are both foundations of dialogue along with recognition and developing a shared language of common concerns. Gülen sees the love of God as the purest form of love. Such love is the base of real dialogue precisely because, in the best sense, it is disinterested. It is not focused in ‘the egotistical nonsense of “I”, “you”, and to label each other as “reactionary”, “infidel, fanatic”, and to constantly produce scenarios to dethrone one another’ (Yavuz 2013, 184). Love does not thereby get rid of the difference in the other. On the contrary it focuses on the equal worth of the other and the particularity of the other. This reinforces the importance of perception of the other in and through dialogue. It is the transcendent context of love of God that precisely what enables the person to love others. In the light of our relationship with God, conflict-centred difference, based in uncertainty about one’s own identity and worth, and thus the need to assert the self, are no longer critical for survival (Yavuz 2013, 188). As I have noted in earlier chapters, tolerance for Gülen is not the passive acceptance of the other of common parlance (cf. Pratt 2010), and so is either careful to use the concept in relation to love and recognition (Yavuz 2013) or to use the term hoshgoru (emphatic acceptance). Tolerance in this sense emerges from love and is focused on several factors, including the capacity to forgive the other; a clearer perception of the other; a balanced and a secure knowledge of one’s own worth in relation to God. Hence, Gülen writes about ‘respecting one’s dignity and exercising self-control’ (Yavuz 2013, 188). All this enables positive learning. We can learn even from opposing ideas, not least because they force us to ‘keep our heart, spirit, and conscience active and aware’ (2013). This leads to proactive engagement with the other – both seeing the other as part of humanity and as potential co-creator (Graskemper 2007). Such dialogue enables the development of a realistic and truthful

152

The Spirituality of Responsibility

assessment of the data in any situation, and the development of agency. It demands articulation of value and practice, which clarifies both what we think and do. Dialogue itself, though, also develops critical thinking. Even just the different perspective of the other questions and sharpens one’s own values and core concepts. This dialogue becomes even richer in the light of Gülen’s holism, synoptic thinking and plural identity. Emerging from love and tolerance is recognition. This might be summed up as mutual awareness and appreciation, accepting other persons for who they are and enabling them to appreciate you. Recognition acknowledges that identity and tradition, and related worth and value are key to any relationship. Gülen’s concept of temsil stresses the importance of how others see us. At one level this is about learning from the perceptions of others (Yavuz 2013, 189). The perceptions of others are also a key aspect of how we see ourselves. This means that we have focus on our good, that is, loving and tolerant behaviour with others, so that this is recognized by the other. This involves focus on conduct and practice and not preaching. In relation to interfaith dialogue he contrasts this mutual acceptance with behaviour which ostracizes the other person or group. Gülen sees this as a denial of the other person’s dignity. Love, tolerance and recognition then all enable the practice of responsibility. In addition, Gülen prizes the development of shared language of common concerns. This is to do with the purpose or outcomes of dialogue. It also involves reflection on ideas and perspectives which lead to conflict, such as narrow views of religions or materialistic world views; key shared principles of care, compassion, inclusiveness and so on; practices which lead to conflict. It does not require exact shared meaning, but it provides shared view of problems and possible solutions (Yavuz 2013, 190). This echoes Bakhtin’s distinction between dialectics and dialogue. The former is focused in rationality and attempts to test the logic of a proposition. The latter involves engagement with different voices and the social context (cf. Wegerif 2008). These foundations of dialogue relate quite closely to Carl Rogers (1980). Rogers suggests three conditions for the dialogue at the heart of

Responsibility and Dialogue

153

counselling: congruence, unconditional positive regard and empathy. This provides a foundation for dialogue which is both mutual and symmetrical. The unconditional acceptance of the other is key to enabling him or her give an account of narratives. The stress on mutuality and dialogue is strikingly different from two other key writers on universal responsibility, Levinas (1998) and Buber (1942). Levinas focuses on dialogue that is always asymmetrical, that is, never from equal positions such as both sides knowing the same or having the same resources or power (Werner 2010). For Levinas this is largely because he argues that the other who we are responsible for is never fully knowable, so that we are always moving out to them. Buber (1942) acknowledges some symmetricality in dialogue, but stresses less the rational sense of dialogue and more the deeper sense of personal awareness that precludes the need for critical rational dialogue. Gülen’s view of dialogue is more robust. It is based in mutuality, recognizing that there will be asymmetricality involved. In a sense this is inevitable given the stress on handling plurality in dialogue. All the parties will have different resources and needs. Against Levinas’, Gülen’s view of responsibility is focused in creative action and hence in the embodiment of responsibility. Far from a continual journey towards the other this suggests a shared journey on which the other is discovered through intentional action. It is the imperative of action that moves dialogue forward. Against Buber’s, Gülen’s view of dialogue and responsibility precisely demands rational articulation. This is both at the heart of accountability, important for the expression of respect or care, and key to the development of shared responsibility. In both cases responsibility takes dialogue out of the simple dyadic relationship. It is always a function of plurality. Any immediate dialogue is connected to dialogue in a wider social context and has implications for related other dialogues. This also works through issues of power and responsibility. Negotiation involves working with stakeholders that have different levels of power, personally and institutionally, and involves recognition of limitations, different possibilities through increasing options and empowerment of those involved. Because it is

154

The Spirituality of Responsibility

relation-centred, it includes the need for forgiveness and reconciliation (Pratt 2010). The implication of Gülen’s position is that responsibility should empower all involved to contribute most effectively to creative action. That creative action takes Gülen back to the foundation of accountability to the creator, showing the three modes of responsibility as intimately connected. Such cooperation also opens up a mutual dialogue and negotiation that enables effective response to the needs of the social and physical environment. Importantly, the very act of negotiation develops the shared sense of moral meaning, responsibility and ethical identity, which in turn establishes identity and worth. Such transparency enables the Movement to give an account to society in general, and this is an important development of dialogue beyond simple bilateral relationships. This is not a free flowing of meaning between participants, such as Bohm’s (1996) theory of dialogue. Rather the dialogue is focused in shared accountability to God and the global environment, and with that accountability to many different stakeholders, from the state to religion to other nations. This multiple accountability, which has echoes of Bakhtin’s (1981) focus on the interplay of many different voices, demands an awareness of the different stakeholders, and is held together by the stress on hizmet. There are also echoes of Friere’s (1972) view of dialogue (as non-directive) in the way that leadership is dispersed in the Movement. Grinell (2010) suggests that all of this makes it easy for Gülen to be a ‘boarder transgressor’, to operate beyond boundaries. I would argue, however, that the idea of transgression does not easily fit the dynamic of dialogue or responsibility. Gülen’s stress on plurality, dialogue and responsibility (cf. Robinson & Smith 2014) rather points to a sense of multiple responsibility, built around the person’s relationships with different areas in the social environment. In this sense the person has responsibilities which transcend different boundaries. Bridges across those boundaries are then based in the capacity of the person or group to inhabit the different areas, and to generate dialogue with the different narratives and narrators. Nonetheless boundaries are critical to identity, personal and national, and thus have to be respected.

Responsibility and Dialogue

155

Such a dynamic also enables the development of shared responsibility, not simply the recognition of shared interests. It leads to the negotiation of responsibility, exemplified in the way that businesses develop decisions around funding the work of the movement. This is very different from Habermas’s view of dialogue based primarily in developing conceptual consensus (De Bolt 2005). The effect of working through shared responsibility is to extend the imagination and develop creativity. It shows what is possible, especially where responsibility is shared, and so increases the capacity to respond.

Gülen, Riceour and Sacks The vision of responsibility, focused in dialogue, set out by Gülen bears a resemblance to Paul Ricoeur’s (1992) position. Ricoeur also focuses on the moral agency of the person, founded in personal identity. The two aspects of that identity are idem identity, establishing sameness over time, and ipse identity, focused in the capacity to initiate new actions and projects (Ricoeur 1992). This agency focuses on meaning and action, and like Gülen’s is essentially responsive to the call of the other, though Ricoeur does not have the same central focus on the creator God. Agency is thus connected to giving an account, which Ricoeur views as narrative, the authorship of which constitutes the identity of the self, because it makes a statement, reinforced by action, about the worth the person (attestation of the self), the worth of the one who calls and the worth of the action. This demonstrates the significance of purpose. Accountability in all this is about giving and sharing meaning. Agency naturally moves to action, and to a sense of universal responsibility which impels one to act and find ways of fulfilling that responsibility which takes into account limitations of capacity and power, and the creative possibilities of cooperation (Ricoeur 1992, 273). A key part of moral agency is the practice of practical wisdom, and in relation to the personal relations this involves an attitude of ‘critical solicitude’ (Ricoeur 1992, 273), involving both care and the capacity to test the other. At the heart of this is interpretation and dialogue. Again, Gülen’s view of responsibility is focused more on interpretation of the God’s

156

The Spirituality of Responsibility

narrative and commands, but still demands internal and external dialogue. For Ricoeur then, personal identity is always involved with the identity of others, but is developed through the individual taking responsibility for his or her own meaning and action in relation to others. One of the differences between Ricoeur and Gülen is the stress on service. Whilst both see responsibility as ‘other facing’, concerned primarily with the other and not the self, Ricoeur (1992) argues that reflective responsibility, in addition to any sense of service, also develops a sense of self-esteem. Hence, he is more explicit about the need to recognize self-worth. Jonathan Sacks (2005), more explicitly and systematically than Gülen, argues for an ethics based in responsibility. Like Gülen, this is based in relationship with God. Rather than a broad creation theology this is focused in the particularity of the Noahide Covenant. Despite questions about the primacy of God’s calling, Sacks, as noted above, stresses the universality of that call, providing a basis for responsibility which transcends any particular institutional expression. In this light it might be added that institutional expressions of religion are assertions of responsibility. In a Ricoeurian sense they attest to the identity of the institution in relation to responsibility for the relationship with God. A key danger for institutions, as with individuals, is taking on too much responsibility, and not negotiating this with others. The relationship with God who transcends particular institutions, and narrow interests, always reinforces critical reflection on the danger of turning too much responsibility into a totalizing position, leading to maintaining defensive positions. For Sacks this sets up a view of responsibility as focused in constant question and struggle. At one level this is a struggle with meaning. For the Jewish people this is focused in the shared experience of pain and suffering, through historical persecutions to the Holocaust. For Gülen pain is largely located in the responsive service, always looking for ways to serve; for Sacks there is the struggle for meaning in the face of pain inflicted upon the Jewish people, and hence upon their very identity. Finding meaning in that experience begins to transform suffering. Sacks also sees responsibility as located in the practice of virtues. This enables the continuation of identity and the fulfilment of responsibility over time. This connects to a sense of universal responsibility, partly because

Responsibility and Dialogue

157

of the collective responsibility for creation, partly because of the sense of interdependence and partly because of consequences that can never be fully understood. The last point is stressed in Sacks ‘chaos theory of virtue’ – the view that even the slighted kindness may have great consequences for good, which we may never know about or understand (Sacks 2005, 226). Precisely because of that we become responsible for unintended consequences, as noted also by Gülen.7 For Gülen this brings us back to the practice of the virtues, focused in the middle way. It is precisely the disinterested practice of virtues that enables the practice of responsibility which remains positive and most likely to affect others in a positive and creative way. That creativity is a key focus for Sacks. He ties this to hope, developing, like Lederach, the importance of the imagination, not simply as a means of aiding the negotiation of responsibility, through developing pathways and purpose, but also through the development of vision, and even the articulation of dreams. In Yeats’ words ‘in dreams begin responsibilities’ (Sacks 2005, 273). Dreams in this sense are focused in value narratives which inform and generate responsibility. These transcends present practice and demand dialogue. Hence, Sacks sums this up in terms very close to Gülen: To heal where others harm, mend where others destroy, to redeem evil by turning its negative energies to good: these are the marks of the ethics of responsibility, born in the radical faith that God calls us to exercise our freedom by becoming his partners in the work of creation. That seems to me a life-affirming vision: the courage to take the risk of responsibility, becoming co-authors with God of the world that ought to be. (2005, 273)

Diversity, modernity and multiculturalism Gülen is at home with diversity partly because of his focus on the inherent plurality and particularity of creation, partly because of his awareness of identity as made up of multiple narratives and associated roles and relationships and partly because of his understanding of dialogue focused

158

The Spirituality of Responsibility

in difference as well as equal value of the other. This ties in with debates which connect philosophy, religion, the self and spirituality (Scruton 2014) and a more dialogic view of spirituality (Robinson & Smith 2014). Gülen’s view then has a direct contribution to the debate about multiculturalism (cf. Farrar et al. 2012). The idea of multiple responsibility, effected through plural dialogue, precisely works against a naïve and simplistic view of multiculturalism based simply in the contributions of different cultures to society. This assumes the worth of different cultures without any framework of responsibility or obligation. However, Gülen’s position suggests that different cultures also have responsibilities based in citizenship. This in turn provides another value narrative beyond narrow culture with which to test or challenge behaviour. Hence, dialogue is neither within cultures nor simply between cultures, but between different cultures and between those cultures and the shared framework of politics. Once more this places dialogue firmly into the public sphere – giving account beyond groups to civil society, providing more of an intercultural model. What fuels this plural dialogue is service. Hence, as Weller (2012b, 157; cf. Yilmaz 2003) notes, This reflects a development away from the instrumentalization of religion in politics to a public life of service based on religious motivations and contributing to civil society as one contribution alongside others.

Conclusions Dialogue for Gülen is at the heart of responsibility. It opens up, tests, builds and enables creativity, lifting participants’ gaze beyond the horizon. As such, dialogue is key to any sense of interiority and to any sense of identity. Gülen, like Sacks and Ricoeur, does not base his ethics in identity per se. It is based in responsibility, which is, in turn, based in relationships, first with God and then with others. The foundation of the ethics is both the relationship with God and the development of dialogue which keeps open the relationship with God, the self and others. Responsibility involves the engagement of those relationships,

Responsibility and Dialogue

159

embodying care and creativity. In response to God, the person takes on multiple dialogues, which inevitably places such dialogue in the public sphere. This is reinforced by responsibility for action as well as meaning. Action by definition is public, and the creation of meaning by extension becomes public. Dialogue in all this is not a tool or instrument, however fine the end. It is central to the development of the person, and about learning and ontology – developing the responsive self (Sidorkin 1999). Sometimes Gülen writes about striving for perfect humanity. However, the approach of Gülen precisely doesn’t presume perfection but rather continual dialogic reinterpretation, both of the Qur’an and of action, with the first step of accepting responsibility, and then working through how that might be embodied in service. This provides, as noted earlier, the basis for a more proactive view of corporate responsibility, linked to the common good. And because of its capacity to address multiple narratives, with related responsibilities, it embodies a means of including religion in that public dialogue, and a means of engaging the multiple narratives of postmodernity.

Conclusions

In this final chapter I will first try to bring together the main themes of the book, and focus these in Gülen’s grounded spirituality. I will then explore some of the potential weaknesses around Gülen’s view of responsibility. The greater part of the chapter will focus on leadership responsibility. I  will introduce this by exploring a major critique of the governance of the Movement and Gülen’s leadership by Joshua Hendricks. The important point of that critique for this book is around the accountability of the Movement and the responsibility of leadership. I will suggest that the terms of Hendrick’s debate are problematic. Finally I will return to the case explored in the first chapter and argue that the lived responsibility of the Movement is being developed over time and that this is perhaps the most remarkable achievement. I will also note the development of dispersed leadership responsibility based in dialogue.

A spirituality of responsibility This book has been an exploration of responsibility in Gülen. I have suggested that he has an immense amount to contribute to the debate about meaning and the development of practice. His writings offer something of a grounded spirituality of responsibility which enables bridges to be built. I take this term from Markham (2008). Markham, in reflecting on Nursi, notes that spirituality is increasingly seen as free floating, and argues for spirituality which is grounded in and responsive to prior relationships, expressed in terms of the divine or of community focused in the divine.

162

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Gülen’s spirituality is precisely grounded in his relationship with God, and provides the basis for a spirituality of responsibility which is both relational, responding to God, the needs of creation and the needs of society, and focused in the ongoing demand on the individual. This is a comprehensive view of responsibility which does not allow for polarization or denial. On the contrary, the message is that the buck stops with each of us. However, because it is founded in relationality (cf. Niebuhr 1963) it bridges individual and collective responsibility (parallel to the later existentialists, cf. May 1992). This provides the basis not for a settled view of agency, but one that is in constant struggle with human nature. Like Ricoeur (1992) key to this agency is ongoing interpretation. In Gülen’s case this interpretation is of the religious scripture in the light of both the struggles with the self and engagement with the wider social and physical environment. This is the context of his view of self-determination. At the heart of Gülen’s position is a holistic spirituality. Holism is also central his view of human agency, which begins not from freedom as separation or independence, but from freedom as found in relationship to God. Freedom then is both found in consciousness of God and his creation, and in the capacity to respond. At the heart of this is the freedom of judgment which enables the person to appreciate the relationship with God and determine how he or she will respond to his call. Such deliberation involves a struggle both in engaging different narratives and in managing the ‘passions’ which provide both the power for creative service but also involve the danger of obscuring the perception of creation and the focus on response. This provides a sense of psychological realism. Freedom cannot be experienced without struggle which engages the cognitive and affective domains, focused in identity, meaning and worth. Gülen’s spirituality, as it stands then, can both challenge and support other views of responsibility in the twenty-first century. It challenges groundless spirituality to examine the basis of its calling, but it also supports responsive responsibility, precisely because it is based in practice, in seeking to create. His spirituality of responsibility, through this focus on service, thus bridges the inner and outer world of humanity; thoughts, feelings and practice.

Conclusions

163

This provides an effective framework which bridges enterprise and social responsibility, individual rights and civic responsibility, individual and collective responsibility. This also enables a way of working with others because all attempts to develop responsibility are ultimately judged by creative action, and by integrity, not by narrow views of orthodoxy or orthopraxis. Integrity is in a sense there throughout Gülen’s writings, focused in the awareness of the self, and the truthful re-presentation of the self in relation to God (cf. Curzer 2014). This is not a discrete theory of responsibility, designed to help us understand responsibility. It rather is focused in the commitment to action, and is judged not by the elegance of the thought but by the impact, that is, by how it empowers others, builds relationships and builds peace. This is not a spirituality which has time for much ritual; prayer and practice are the foundations of this praxis. Hence, the spirituality is also grounded in practice. One of the most powerful aspects of this view of responsibility is that there is no hiding place; we always have a choice. Here Gülen outdoes the existentialists. We are responsible not simply for meaning and for searching for the best ways of responding, but for being aware of the complexity of creation. Hence, we are responsible for what has not been done as much as for what could be done. This provides the most fundamental challenge to public thinking and professional practice. In this light, attempts to limit responsibility, such as after the credit crisis of 2007/2008, have little credibility. There is in this the basis for what in the Judeo Christian terms may be referred to as prophetic action, speaking truth to power and challenging injustices, and I will return to this below. All of this suggests that we are accountable for thinking and practice. Again this is something which challenges the managerialist perspective (cf. Thompson & Bevan 2013) which focuses on accountability for narrow targets. The account that is given in Gülen’s vision of responsibility could be said to be of ourselves in action. Hence, dialogue is at the heart of accountability, focused in communication of the self in action, not establishing propositions, or providing ‘solutions’ which do not engage

164

The Spirituality of Responsibility

relationships. This relational groundedness enables Gülen to contribute to the major questions of business and politics. This also connects directly to peace-building, not simply as a way of ending conflict per se, but rather as a way developing individuals and communities as creative entities, and as central to all human enterprise. It is dialogue that brings people together, increases the awareness of the social and physical environment, increases awareness of possibilities and empowers response. And all of this connects back to the virtues at the heart of Gülen’s view of agency. It is precisely those virtues which are practised in dialogue, focused in responsible practice. Hence, we can see phronesis as a function of dialogue, but also see virtues as having an epistemic function, allowing both person and organization to see better and value the self and the social and physical environment. Gülen then provides the basis for a view of responsibility which links moral and intellectual development eventually to peace-building, and which enables dialogue across cultures, religions, disciplines and professions. This provides not simply a spirituality of responsibility, that is, setting out responsibility in terms of holistic meaning and interaction with the social and physical environment, it also suggests that responsibility is itself at the heart of spirituality. This moves away from views of spirituality as either passive or focused largely in ritual or prayer, to spirituality which is fully lived in relationships, and whose meaning is fully owned. It is perhaps not surprising that, though Gülen does not have a systematic philosophy or power, this should provide the basis for a spirituality of power, seated in the soul, but not in an individualistic sense. The power of intellect and affect is developed and practised in relation to God and the world. This enables a robust testing of rationality and motivations at personal, organizational and political levels (telling truth to power, cf. Weller 2012b). The power of the passions is focused in creative response. Power is developed through dialogue, which recognizes the reality of asymmetricality in relationships (and therefore the inevitability of power imbalance) but enables mutuality and empowerment.

Conclusions

165

Ultimately, for Gülen power lies in truth (cf. Sykiainen 2013), and is focused in the responsibility to reflect the truth of God and his creation in creative response. Hence, different aspects of truth emerge from the practice of each mode of responsibility: rational coherence, affective congruence and relational consciousness in the development of critical and caring agency; accountability which can give an account of humanity’s relationships to the social and physical environments and commitment to justice in different senses; and creative responsibility which looks to embody the truth of God’s creation in action, not least through peacebuilding, and the dispersion of leadership. Gülen in all this connects to the Islamic perspective of spheres of responsibility: institutional, political, family, personal and spiritual (cf. Weller & Yilmaz 2013). All are connected, precisely because all are part of God’s creation. They are also part of individual identity in a complex creation, and therefore responsibility begins with the individual ownership of the self and relationships. This challenges the old distinction between agency and structure, because agency operates in relationships, structures are relational and meaning is found in, but transcends, relationships. It is not surprising then that Gülen’s response to the flotilla crisis should have provoked such surprise. He was trying to focus on responsibility as relational precisely when different groups were focusing on judgement and polarized difference, and focus on the responsibility to stand back and reflect when the call was for action. I will begin to explore how this connects to leadership responsibility shortly. Before that I want to note the limitations of Gülen’s view of responsibility.

Limitations There are a number of weaknesses around Gülen’s treatment of responsibility which I have briefly flagged up in the text and which I will summarize under agency, universal responsibility and social responsibility.

166

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Agency As noted Gülen has a rich psychology of agency. Hence this aspect of responsibility has a realism to it, focused in the internal jihad, which is absent from many philosophical accounts. However, the exclusive focus on accountability to God can easily make this view of agency both individualistic and hard-edged. The worth of the person is focused in the worth of the act, and ultimately the worth of the creator. This leads to a lack of reflection on self-worth. Self-worth in this framework of responsibility is precisely conditional upon action, and there is little sense of unconditionality in this. The stress on sacrifice further focuses on the individual effort and thus has little sense of interdependency as a part of agency. Yes, there is a strong sense of internal frailties and how we fight them, but little sense of the need for others in that fight. Hence, the mutuality of responsibility is not effectively worked through. Yes, we are all mutually responsible for responding to the Creator, but there is less a sense of mutual accountability and mutual need. As I suggested in Chapter 2, this reflects a view of the self which does not fully engage human dependency and interdependency. Alongside the lack of mutuality is a lack of focus on the joy in the practice of agency. As noted in Chapter  3, Gülen accepts the need to harness the passions in creative action. However, there is little sense of the existential pleasure to be gained in the creative act, the intrinsic reward. This is reinforced in the experience of education often dominated by competition and success in ‘Language and Culture Olympiads’ (formerly Turkish Olympiads) rather than the intrinsic joy of learning.

Universal responsibility This element to Gülen’s responsibility is further intensified by the sense of individual universal responsibility. The stress on universal responsibility is, of course, partly meant to help the individual focus on a consciousness of the social and physical environment. Once again, however, the human limitations of consciousness are profound, requiring the perspectives of others not simply to develop responses but also to help with awareness of

Conclusions

167

the social situation. There is the room within Gülen’s thinking to develop this, not least in the stress on dialogue, but the stress remains on individual responsibility. Such a sense of responsibility can easily lead to over-caution in responding to the God’s call, not taking advantage of possibilities and partnerships, precisely because of fear of unintended consequences.

Social responsibility Building on Nursi’s three evils of poverty, ignorance and conflict provides Gülen with a focus for social responsibility. However, there is little attention to working through how individual responsibility relates to the responsibility of society or community as expressed in local, national or transnational governance structures. Gülen is strong on the response of the individual to social ills but not on the social policy or social care responsibility of government. Hence, there is little sense of subsidiarity, with responsibilities appropriate to different levels. We might expect this, given both the stress on individual liberty and responsibility and on the avoidance of associating the Movement with party politics. However, both of these arguments mean that there is no engagement with politics about how subsidiarity might be negotiated, how government might work with other agencies, or how government might develop regulation which both reinforces the meaning of responsibility, and the need to exercise responsibility. I suspect that this partly comes from the assumption that agency is primarily personal and individual. Hence, there is little sense of the agency of an institution or corporation, or of any sense of inter-institutional agency. It follows that there is little sense in Gülen of institutional responsibility. There is also a lack of thinking around organizational accountability which I will look at more closely below. It is also interesting that in focusing on the three evils set out by Nursi, Gülen does not suggest any others, and in particular global warming and the effects of man’s enterprise on God’s creation. The focus on that creation is worked through in detail, but the ways in which humanity has radically affected the balance of that creation are not. Once the enormity of creation is accepted this means that the responsibility of governments

168

The Spirituality of Responsibility

for the environment and to each other and their nations has to be worked through. This sense of working with others beyond the Islamic response is not stressed by Gülen. Hence, when this comes to working, for instance, with NGOs, in contributing to civil society, there is not strong evidence that the Movement works through responsibility with others. This reflects a view of civil society and of politics which is not sophisticated. In Gülen’s attempt to distance the Movement from political interest he ignores the fact that all dialogue is in some sense political. This is partly because dialogue is endemically asymmetrical, involving difference in power, and partly because dialogue focused in creative action will affect not only possibilities for action but also possibilities for social and thus political arrangements. Hence, whatever Gülen or the Movement articulate will affect political thinking or action. In attempting to avoid the primacy of institutional interest Gülen precisely ignores the tension between institutional identity and identity which transcends institutional goods, and the tension between legitimate self or institutional interest (focused in the sustainability of the organization) and service which transcends interest.1 None of these criticisms take away from the Gülen contribution to the meaning and practice of responsibility. On the contrary they provide a basis for ongoing dialogue between religious and secular thinkers and practitioners about the nature and practice of responsibility. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of Gülen’s approach to responsibility is in the area of power and leadership. Both of these come together, highlighting some of the tensions noted above, in a major critique of Gülen and his leadership by Joshua Hendricks and I will turn to that now.

Strategic ambiguity and accountability Hendricks (2013), in effect, questions the integrity and exercise of accountability in Gülen and the Hizmet Movement. Focused in research he did with the Movement he argues that it uses two key dynamics which enable it to hold together very different values and objectives: strategic ambiguity and the charismatic leadership of Gülen. The first systematically

Conclusions

169

keeps ambiguity in place, and the second focuses on the person of Gülen as leader. Hendricks sketches a dichotomous picture of the Movement, with irrational altruism on one side and rational self-interest on the other, found in financial value, the development of status and increased opportunity. His focus dwells on the measurable gains of affiliates. At the centre of his argument is the proposition that the Hizmet Movement exploits ambiguity. This involves a strategy used ‘to achieve a variety of goals that may complement or contradict one another’ (Hendricks 2013, 56). Eisenberg (1984) used the term strategic ambiguity, referring to ‘those instances where individuals use ambiguity purposefully to accomplish their goals’ (Hendricks 2013, 230). This has utility in attempting to promote unity in diversity, and enabling organizational change. The strategic use of ambiguity allows ‘divergent interpretations to coexist’, enabling different perspectives and so different groups to operate together (Eisenberg & Witten 1987, 422). The dynamics of this ambiguity, according to Eisenberg, are focused in values which are abstract or general and which can lead to general agreement (1984, 231). This general agreement allows a plurality of perspectives to occur in the more detailed organizational discourse. This develops organizational utility in at least three ways. First, it enables conflict resolution. It allows difficult issues to be addressed when ‘the circumstances seriously limit the probability of successful persuasion’ through focusing on the more abstract concepts on which they agree instead of the specific disagreements (Goss & Williams 1973). Second, it provides a mechanism whereby ‘various constituencies can claim victory’ (Eisenberg 1984, 423). Third, it can reinforce the credibility of the leader. Goss and Williams (1973, 166) argue that in the absence of a contradictory message followers will ‘attach a meaning that is congruent with his attitudes, thus assimilating the message’. In effect, this gives the impression of integrity, with the leader’s communication focused in consistent general values. Hence, this allows a leader to deny responsibility for any actions in the organization (Eisenberg 1984). This carries with it the implication of intentional or unintentional lack of integrity (1984), raising the question of the responsibility of the leader for his or her organization.

170

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Hendricks argues then that the benefits of strategic ambiguity for the Hizmet Movement include promotion of a unified diversity, facilitation of organizational change, ‘autonomy’ of individual Hizmet followers, organizational flexibility in the face of maladaptive policies that inhibit expansion over time, plausible deniability of institutional connectivity, including financial overlaps and politically motivated self-promotion, and the preservation of positions of privilege, particularly that of Gülen (Hendricks 2013, 58). The context of any ambiguity is complex, not least because Gülen himself is part of a complex tradition – both Sufi and orthodox Islam – but also because the Movement is part of a complex Turkish Society and wider relationships to Europe. Gülen himself has stressed this sense of plural identity. In the light of that, Hendricks argues that the whilst the stress in Gülen’s writing is on altruism and in many of the sub-groups of the Movement is on care, there are actually several other agendas which the movement intentionally or unintentionally take forward. First, he argues that the Movement is part of a conscious attempt to develop the politics of the new Turkey. Much of his evidence for this is in the way in which members of the movement worked with Erdogan and the AK Party to get into power in 2002 and 2004. This is really to do with social power, ‘an intra-elite struggle for the hearts and minds of the Turkish nation’ (2013, 233). Hendricks argues that the Movement operated as a propaganda machine, holding up the AK Party as the embodiment of secular modernity. This allowed Islamic issues to be seen as more general human rights issues, opening up the treatment of Islam in Turkey to a global gaze (Hendricks 2013, 193). Second, the Movement, it is argued, is connected to the development of capitalism and enterprise in Turkey. Hence, many Hizmet business people are key to the development of the movement. There is a suggestion, reinforced by the work of Arslan (2001), that this is part of a passive revolution of piety, based in a bourgeois Islamic work ethic, with hard work, individualism and privatization as integral parts of religion (Hendricks 2013, 25). This is reinforced by the concept and practice of Hizmet.

Conclusions

171

Third, the Movement itself, whilst being focused in good works, clearly appeals to the self-interest of those involved. In addition to the development of business interests there is assistance, through scholarships and supplemental education for instance. Hendricks argues that this is also connected to winning the hearts and minds of Turkey’s youth. The Movement is also using the education system as a recruiting mechanism. Hendricks sets out Hizmet’s rise in the private education sector during the 1980s, involving, ‘Structural shifts in the education system, an increasingly competitive centralized examination requirement, and a newly open market for private sector interests collectively facilitated the GM’s [Gülen Movement] shift from a relatively small community of students to one of Turkey’s most influential players in youth education’ (2013, 128). For Hendricks then, strategic ambiguity allows Hizmet members to claim that ‘Gülen is at once the reason, motivator, and instigator’ behind Hizmet’s transnational efforts ‘and that he leads no one and manages nothing’ (Hendricks 2013, 72). Hendricks argues that this is an intentional part of Gülen’s leadership strategy. As teacher, intellectual and quasi mystic Hendricks suggests that Gülen avoids any accountability for his evident authority. His authority, argues Hendricks, does not require rational justification, but is rather substantiated through the fruitfulness of the Movement, including the market success. The expansion of the Movement is in this argument the ‘miracle’ wrought by Gülen and thus the sign of his grace (2013, 80). Hendricks argues that this sets the movement out as a ‘charismatic aristocracy’ whose actions and events promote their leader, seeking to legitimize him (2013, 81). Hence, the many conferences about Gülen’s thinking focus less on shared dialogue which engages core issues, and more on what Markham (2003) refers to as location, that is, concern about social location or identity, in this case specifically the promotion of Gülen to the West but also within Turkey. This involves an intentional missionary strategy of core groups and more marginal groups, all of which needed to be cultivated. In the Hizmet Movement Hendricks argues that this involves three strata: the cemaat (community), arkadaşlar (friends) and yandaşlar (supporters) (Hendricks 2013, 89). All three levels are

172

The Spirituality of Responsibility

critical in building up the movement, argues Hendricks. Hence, he argues not only that Gülen is not truly accountable but also that the real purpose of Gülen and the Hizmet Movement is religious outreach. He pursues cultural globalization which focuses on the acceptance of the other (2013, 163), but this is rather a form of ‘da’wa, an invitation to Islam, proselytization’ (2013, 164). All this explains Hizmet’s massive use of media for its social mobility projects.

Response to Hendricks The first problem with the Hendricks’ use of the term strategic ambiguity is that it infers intentional action. However, Hendricks cannot provide clear evidence of planning that demonstrates that this is how it is developed.2 Given the complexity of the Movement it is not clear what evidence Hendricks could have gained of the intentional planning of this strategy. Intentional strategic ambiguity also infers a lack of integrity. Hendricks, however, does not offer a definition of integrity and above all not one which relates to a complex phenomenon such as the Hizmet Movement. Second, Hendricks does not take account of diversity within the Movement. As with any movement of this size, there will be many different perspectives and motivations, and Hendricks’ analysis ignores the possibility of such complexity. In his treatment of teachers he accepts that there is good evidence of the altruistic motivation of the teachers in the Movement, including working lengthy hours, engaging with families outside school and focusing on the purpose and quality of teaching. However, he argues that this is simply part of the larger aims of the movement in the attempt to develop greater economic power. This remains speculation. Business leaders will of course be concerned about profit but there is also clear evidence that they many view their business as part of their response to God. In my own research in Istanbul in 2013 I interviewed over twenty small to medium business leaders. It was evident that a critical part of their practice was precisely to do with

Conclusions

173

core values, but that disagreement between each other and with Gülen was accepted. Third, there is clear evidence which goes against the argument that the Movement aligned itself as a whole with the AK Party. There has been a breakdown with the party, focused in ongoing condemnation from Gülen and the wider Movement about the corrupt practices which have been alleged to be carried out in the AK Party (Steinvorth 2014). The subsequent backlash from the Turkish president (Butler 2014) effectively shows that the two groups are quite distinct. Perhaps most clearly Gülen wrote an article for the New York Times (Gülen 2015) which explicitly set out his position in relation to the AK Party. I will examine this in more detail below. However, it is important to note at this point that there is little in that letter which is ambiguous. Gülen takes on a prophetic3 role which challenges the ruling party to address corruption charges, and to fulfil its responsibility for the rule of law and the protection of freedom. He goes on to justify his prophetic stance, based in religious and civic responsibility, Speaking against oppression is a democratic right, a civic duty and for believers, a religious obligation. (2015)

Fourth, Hendricks does not critically reflect on the nature of ambiguity. At one level it may be argued that ambiguity is a critical part of any social or moral relationships (de Beauvoir 2000). It is possible to identify moral ambiguity in any ethical reflection. Moral theory which relies on general principles inevitably involves ambiguity because these have to be applied in particular social contexts which may be very different. This demands the practice of judgement and critical dialogue as to how it will be achieved. The ambiguity is there in the attempt to bring together two distinct but connected moral ideas: a shared understanding of meaning, worth and values and the freedom to determine how those values will be embodied in practice. This is central to the thought of Gülen in his attempts to continually reinterpret Islamic faith. Hence, Keles (2014) argues that Gülen provides the ‘interpretational framework’ for Hizmet’s ideas and principles, which are then dialogically developed and embodied through Hizmet’s praxis and actions. Recognizing and handling ambiguity, part of which is

174

The Spirituality of Responsibility

handling difference, is core to the rich view of responsibility. Ambiguity in a global movement (sited across more than 160 countries) is then inevitable. Ethically this will involve very different views of core principles, but it may also involve very different motivations, from the desire develop the core values, to the desire to develop legacy, to missionary zeal and so on. In a sense, the absence of such ambiguity in the development of a movement of this size would be much more problematic. Absence of ambiguity would precisely indicate totalizing of thought and cult dynamics (cf. Bauman 1989). Gülen recognizes this in relation to action, accepting that there is not a need for total agreement. Social ambiguity is also then an inevitable part of the plural narratives in society and the individual. Moreover, whilst there may be the appearance of ambiguity, many of the ‘differences’ reflect the diverse context of any multicultural society in which religious groups operate. It is perfectly possible to be focused in accountability to God but also to have civic responsibilities, requiring judgement in how multiple accountability might be fulfilled. Indeed a theology which looks to values which transcend the interest of any group, including religious groups, provides a coherent and congruent framework which can be both faith inspired (in world view) but also faith neutral (in actions) (Keles 2014), predominantly Muslim but proactively engaging with wider society and responding constructively to modern and post-modern ideas and lifestyles. Much of Gülen’s thinking suggests that this places the responsibility for contextcentred action with the Movement. Because this involves the practice of responsibility, in all its modes, by every member of the Movement, this suggests rather dispersed leadership. This is part of the ambiguity of ethics. Far from being based in the application of particular ethical theory it is based in the experience of responsibility, including taking responsibility for how we see the world and how we determine our response to the world. This then is the practice of responsibility which will enable the practice of consciousness of relationships in the social environment. Given the global nature of the Movement, including the focus on learning, it is hardly surprising that there will be apparent discrepancies

Conclusions

175

between theology, values and practice. An example of this is in gender issues. Hizmet’s practice in this is ahead of much of the culture in Turkey, but also behind Gülen’s teachings, which continue to critique cultural, as distinct from Qur’anic views (Keles 2014). This points to different rates of learning, often in response to ongoing dialogue.

Responsibility The issue of responsibility is at the heart of the Hendricks debate, not least in the denial of responsibility being attributed to strategic ambiguity. However, once more, a more complex picture emerges. First, it is very hard for a movement, as such, to be fully accountable. This is partly because it does not have a formal constitution and thus has not institutional relationships through which to express that accountability. It could be argued that this has become precisely the function of some formal groups within the Movement, such as the Rumi Forum or the Dialogue Society, often expressed through the conferences on Gülen across the globe. The conferences focus on Gülen, rather than on shared areas of concern or practice. However, the evidence of such conferences is that they do give an account of Gülen’s thought and of the actions of the Hizmet Movement, opening it to critical conversation. Hence, Hendricks was invited to one conference in Washington,4 with a panel convened to discuss his work; a good example of transparency and openness. Nonetheless, it remains self-evidently true that a social movement per se does not have the formal capacity to work through accountability. For that to happen there would have to be clear stakeholder relationships. Second, the accountability of the Movement is more complex in that the work is carried out through many different institutions. Such institutions are focused in many different countries and as such are accountable through the different legal frameworks which regulate practice in these areas. Hence, as noted earlier, banks, for instance, are accountable to the government and to the banking industry. Third, there may be more ad hoc organizations which work together, for example, for building and

176

The Spirituality of Responsibility

developing schools. Again these become accountable to the different regulations in the different countries. Hence, the schools in the UK, for instance, are accountable to the Department of Education. Fourth, this accountability sets up a complex series of dialogues, sometimes because of wider shared issues such as public safety. This reminds us that accountability is not simply about working within a professional or legal framework. In the light of terrorist threats and Islamic radicalization, for instance, Islamic organizations come under greater scrutiny. A good example of this recently was in the Netherlands. The Minister for Social Affairs in 2008 (Edel 2013) instigated an investigation by security services into the Hizmet Movement following a television item and subsequent questions in parliament. The investigation found no threat to Dutch society. Then in 2012, academic Martin van Bruinessen (2013) was commissioned by the government to write a report. This concluded that the Movement was ‘arguably the most successfully integrated immigrantbased organization in the country’ (van Bruinessen 2013, 165). Following this the minister announced that three other Islamic groups would be investigated as part of the government’s response to radicalization. For a third time the Movement was added to this investigation, after negative comments were made about integration by the editor of Zaman Vandaag (a newspaper associated with the Movement). There was also some controversy about whether the Movement was still running dormitory schools, which some had argued were not inclusive. Accountability and civil society is a matter of ongoing debate. However, several things are clear. The radicalization agenda will always question Islamic groups about educational practices. In a sense, this is part of accountability that comes with the territory of being Islamic. Second, the Gülen groups in the Netherlands did open themselves up for scrutiny, leading to positive reports (Sunier & Landman 2014). Third, at this point the leaders of the Gülen Movement in the Netherlands have begun a series of dialogues with the government, focusing on the key criteria for civic transparency and how these are applied to similar groups across society. This has led to an opening up of a wider debate in the Netherlands

Conclusions

177

about the nature of civic accountability. The key point about this level of accountability was the willingness of the group to enter into dialogue and work through the issues. This further suggests that accountability to the government and wider society is not simply a matter adhering to reporting mechanisms, but also being able to engage ongoing dialogue. Such dialogue would, on the one hand, take account of the social context, in this case the anxiety about Muslim groups and the dangers of radicalization. In that situation governments are obliged to respond to expressed anxiety. On the other hand, this raises questions of justice, and the nature of transparency and accountability in civil society. If a Muslim group has gone through investigations and fulfils the same levels accountability as other civil society groups, why should it be subjected to higher levels of monitoring? Such dialogue both develops the communication core to Gülen philosophy, but also begins to raise further, broader, questions of the meaning around accountability and wider responsibility in society. In the Netherlands this feeds into ongoing debate and dialogue about transparency and civil society (Michels & Meijer 2008; Meijer 2013). Hence, we have the signs of genuine inclusive dialogue which goes beyond simply the process of reinterpretation, leading to a challenge of narrow views of accountability in civil society in general. This increasingly suggests that dialogue has to take account of multiple dialogue, focusing on values,  practice and the different narratives (including affective elements) (cf. Robinson & Smith 2014). At this point the Movement moves away from simply defending its rights, to contributing to the wider debate about civic responsibility. This is exactly the dynamic of the responsibility outlined above, moving away from simply defending interest to a relatively disinterested position. It is precisely this focus on dialogue, engaging values, people and practice, and working against dissociation and polarization, which works against Hendricks’s simplistic thesis. Dialogue is in fact the most transparent form of communication, not least because it tests the assumptions of the self and others about society and responsibility. It is what is lacking in all proto-cultic organizations.

178

The Spirituality of Responsibility

Responsibility and leadership The argument now takes us back to the first chapter and the case of the Mavi Marmara. As I have suggested that case was focused in different stakeholders trying to determine responsibility for what happened. The  response of Gülen, albeit brief, was almost an attempt to raise the question of what responsible decision making would look like in that situation. Its stress was on gaining distance, practising disinterestedness, all the better to understand options and their consequences. This was certainly not the proto-cultic model. As I noted earlier, the leader of a cult would not have opened the issue up at all, preferring to communicate with followers only and keeping tight control. Çelik and Alan (2006) point to the Sufi tradition of servant leadership, involving a psychological contract with followers and embodiment in the leader of justice, trust, righteousness, self-improvement and promise-keeping. Aspiring Islamic leaders focus on strength of character, patience, humility, magnanimity, self-understanding, the willingness to seek consultation, equity (impartiality), modesty (simplicity) and responsibility. These point to an attitude which purposefully avoids the kind of charismatic leadership which elevates the leader (Western 2009; cf. Robinson 2011). It also seeks to avoid what Çelik and Alan (2006) refer to, in Islamic thinking, as ‘guardian leadership’, involving protecting the community from external threats. Part of the issue there is that guardian leadership moves into defence of the organization and thus defence of ‘interests’. Gülen clearly shows elements of that servant leadership in the flotilla incident, but does not attempt guardian leadership. However, there is an element of work in progress involved, first because as the leader of a movement there is no formal accountability of him to the Movement. In Western governance terms this is usually expressed in terms of contract and properly constituted board, with the leader reporting to the board. This lack of accountability process and structure partly accounts for why the response to the Mavi Marmara was so difficult. As I noted in the first chapter (cf. Ergil 2010), this led to confusion amongst members of the Movement who found it hard to agree with Gülen’s approach to the issue,

Conclusions

179

some providing different interpretations of what he had said. Second, part of the reason why there was confusion was the number of different stakeholders in Turkey and beyond, and in Islam and beyond. The different stakeholders had different agendas, perceptions, views about values and faith and view about justice. This had moved beyond a simple leadership model based around the general value articulation and members of the Movement developing interpretation (cf. Keles 2014). The stakeholders included the victims and their families, and wider political and activist groups, and thus people and groups who were experiencing grief and anger. Because there was no obvious engagement with the stakeholders, he also did not address the issues which were central to the stakeholders. Hence, he did not address the pastoral concerns of the victims, the debates about justice (from activists to the UN) or the responsibility of the different governments. This case indicates a lack of engagement with complex dialogue, albeit unintentional. Using Gülen’s own exacting view of responsibility, there is a challenge here to the responsibility of leadership and to communication. Was an interview the right time and place to even enter this maelstrom? In honestly answering the questions he did enter the maelstrom. If we move forward now to 2015 we see a very different example of leadership in his letter the New York Times. This provides real evidence that the problems with accountability that may have been there in the Mavi Marmara case are being addressed. It might be thought that in this Gülen has moved from spiritual leader to guidance leader – defending the Movement. However, its focus is much more interesting. First, it focuses on legitimate democracy and its development in Turkey, stressing the need to uphold ‘universal human rights, gender equality, the rule of law and the rights of Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens’ (Gülen 2015). In the light of that he argues that the present government is suppressing dissent, and that the outcome of this puts them on the path towards totalitarianism. Second, he notes particular examples of suppression, including the press and government officials. Third, he notes the position of Turkey as a bridge between the West and the Middle East and how this depends on upholding democracy. Fourth, underscoring the previous points he notes

180

The Spirituality of Responsibility

how the universal values of democracy are also Islamic values. Fifth, he challenges other Islamic scholars who have supported the government. Sixth, he argues for the religious duty to speak out against injustice: The Quran makes clear that people should not remain silent in the face of injustice: ‘O you who believe! Be upholders and standard-bearers of justice, bearing witness to the truth for God’s sake, even though it be against your own selves, or parents or kindred’. (2015)

Only then does he begin to defend the Hizmet Movement. Critical to that defence is articulating the identity of the Movement, as a civil society movement, with no party political ambitions, and made up of people from across the social spectrum. He notes how the Movement had supported the AKP based in their espousal of core democratic values but had stood out against acts of corruption in the government, and now against government harassment, something not confined to the Hizmet Movement. He styles himself as an Islamic scholar, preacher and social advocate, and ends the letter with these words, Turkey has now reached a point where democracy and human rights have almost been shelved. I hope and pray that those in power reverse their current domineering path. In the past the Turkish people have rejected elected leaders who strayed from a democratic path. I hope they will exercise their legal and democratic rights again to reclaim the future of their country. (2015)

This communication moves beyond the response to the Mavi Marmara. Gülen is not dealing in generalities. He stresses the general principles of democracy, but also focuses on the actual cases and events – alleged corruption in the government, alleged harassment by the government, alleged attempts to silence legitimate political challenge. This moves away from picture of a scholar who provides generalities for others to one who put flesh on value. Gülen also precisely avoids ambiguity and this would seem to suggest a responsibility to speak out for justice when deemed necessary. In turn this demonstrates firmly the importance of political responsibility for Gülen. This means that dialogue with and challenge of political parties, that is, some involvement in political debate, is an important part of

Conclusions

181

ongoing dialogue. This clearly sets out what Gülen is thinking, evidencing real agency and thus owning the narrative of the Movement and how it relates to society. He knows what he is speaking of and makes that clear to his listeners. Underlying this is an accountability not evident in the earlier crisis. In a sense this accountability links into multiple narratives and related dialogues. By choosing a prominent international media source he is giving an account to many different stakeholders, including wider Islam; the people of Turkey; the government and all political parties in Turkey; the West; the Middle East; the Hizmet Movement (as leader showing public support for those who stood put against corruption) and so on. His skilful reference to different values, narratives and contexts sets up an active engagement with different dialogues, which is both rational and focused in affect, as in his appeal to the Qur’an and to the government. In short, Gülen is demonstrating accountability to the Movement, in defending it, and in engaging many different stakeholders through one simple letter. The  fact that he takes control of the communication (as against an interview) reinforces this sense of careful responsibility. Accountability, in all this, is focused in relating to different groups, involving clarity both about the key values and about what justice actually looks like – the actual context. Without this clarity the ongoing dialogue of the movement becomes difficult. The New York Times letter gives an example then of leadership responsibility which is radically different from traditional models of governance. Whilst there is no formal method of organizational accountability, it grounds accountability in dialogue, prophecy, and narrative. There is a sense of finding a clear voice which sums up the basic views of Gülen, embodies responsibility and which does not deal in general principles, so much as show us what these principles look like and what he, as leader, stands by. This reinforces the role of a prophetic leadership which does not polarize or become politicized (cf. Weller & Yilmaz 2012; Barton et  al. 2013). Leadership in all this is focused in dialogue which aims to challenge, and to develop individual responsibility, mutual accountability and shared creative service. If it avoids the political dimension of power, it focuses rather on

182

The Spirituality of Responsibility

the power of individual and collective responsibility in a political context, thus contributing to a spirituality of power as focused in relationships. This moves beyond leadership responsibility focused in setting out general principles. There has to be some means of engaging the context, and this demands involvement in the ongoing dialogue around key issues and with all stakeholders inside and outside the Movement. The logic of Gülen’s writings actually suggests the need for greater involvement in such dialogue from leadership. This also suggests that key to such leadership is the application of values and the development of virtues, the virtues focused in the practice of responsibility. This provides a dynamic view of accountability for Gülen and the Movement as a whole. All this points to leadership accountability which is focused in plural dialogue and to a model of leadership which far from encouraging denial of responsibility seeks to disperse and share responsibility, a strong sense of dispersed leadership. Whilst this approach to leadership responsibility shares several elements with servant leadership as developed recently in the West, including the focus on practice of holistic virtues (Greenleaf 1977; Ciulla 2004; Alimo-Metcalfe 2005), it does not share a primary focus of service to the workforce. The argument behind that focus is based in care and respect for the workforce and the eventual consequence of success for the organization (Robinson & Smith 2014). Gülen’s view of leadership involves, rather, a teleological and transcendent perspective. The focus is on service of God and his purposes, leading both to care for all stakeholders and with that the sharing of responsibility for such service. This is anchor for dispersed leadership. All this raises huge questions about leadership responsibility in the wider Muslim world, and how dialogic leadership can be developed there.

Conclusions In this final chapter I have argued there are several weaknesses in Gülen’s view of responsibility and practice of responsibility in Gülen and the Hizmet Movement. These are focused on agency, universal responsibility

Conclusions

183

and social responsibility. At worst, however, these are limitations to view of responsibility which contributes to religious and spiritual perspectives but also directly to the practice of responsibility in business and civil society. What makes this view of responsibility so important is that it connects personal, professional and political responsibility and that these are focused in teleology and the practice of dialogue. Dialogue is the authentic vehicle of agency, accountability and creative responsibility, always pushing against denial of responsibility or dissociation. Dialogue is key to the argument against the view of Gülen as a proto-cultic leader, and a unique contribution to thinking and practice about responsibility and leadership. Some examples of leadership have suggested that this leadership responsibility is something which is evolving. In particular the example of the Mavi Marmara incident suggests accountability had not been thoroughly worked through in terms of governance or leadership. Other examples, such as the Netherlands and the more recent New York Times, show leadership evolving, partly through responsibility being taken for interpretation and partly through opening interpretation to dialogue. This provides an example of responsibility in practice which moves beyond any narrow view of the Movement or Gülen’s thinking, engaging the ‘other’ in the Movement and beyond, and thus enabling the practice of personal, professional, organizational and public responsibility. Each of these is anchored and integrated in personal and social identity. In this light, leadership can be viewed as owning responsibility for responding to all the different relationships which inform the self, and for Gülen this is centred in the relationship with God. There is evidence then that leadership is evolving and that accountability moves us beyond simply giving an account, but actually giving an account of core values, including justice, and identity, focused in prophetic dialogue and demanding leadership across the board, inside and outside the Movement. We should not be surprised then that Gülen and the Hizmet Movement provide us both with an opacity, largely because the Movement is not organized in a way which easily fits traditional models of accountability, based in formalized institutions, but at the same time with some extraordinary developments in the meaning and practice of responsibility.

184

The Spirituality of Responsibility

The ongoing debate in the Netherlands extends beyond the rights of religious groups to dialogic accountability, and with that to the very nature of accountability. Far from defending groups this moves out into a positive and rigorous exploration of how groups should relate in civil society. For Gülen then the practice of responsibility has the hallmark of a journey, and, No one who consciously walks upon such a road will doubt for a moment that they are a servant, and that their sole duty is to give the bestowed honor of vicegerency its due value. Such people will try to live and let the fleeting life of this world be lived to the full; they will try to inscribe their names in the ink of effort and sincerity wherever they go. They will try to inspire similar feelings in all the places where their hands and their name reach. They will try to reach such a depth that it will fill all the worlds, while inscribing their thoughts on every bit of time and space – thoughts that are bound to Him. And if such people can reflect this duty of service and responsibility … they will carry out all deeds of service with a joy of worship and be aware of the gratitude of having reached the apex of true believers, an apex which is considered to be the highest level of existence (Gülen 2004, 126–127).

Notes

Introduction 1

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2016/03/erdogan-gulen -turkey-media-crackdown-160313115624084.html

Chapter 1 1

www.ihh.org.tr/en

2 Ibid. 3

http://www.freegaza.org/

4

BBC (2011).

5

There is some debate about the exact date of birth, due to recording practices at that time.

6

See, for instance, http://turkishinvitations.weebly.com/repression-in-the-name -of-tolerance.html

7

http://www.gyv.org.tr

8

http://www.tukson.org

9

http://www.bankasia-bd.com/annual_reports/Annual%20Report%202014.pdf

10 http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/ 11 Noted in an interview in 2014 with Kerim Balci in Istanbul, see Chapter 4. 12 See the example of avoiding drinking alcohol in order to avoid the loss of judgement (Robinson & Kenyon 2009).

Chapter 2 1

A key virtue related to intentionality for Gülen is ikhlas, purity of heart, avoiding motivation based in individual reward, derived from Nursi’s writings (Michel 2005).

2

There is a strong parallel with the concept of ‘the singing self ’, developed by Christian theologian David Ford (1999).

Notes

186

Chapter 3 1

Suggesting something broader than the narrow Western view of lust both as a

2

Solomon (2007) picks up on this tension in his critique of Goleman’s (1998)

vice and as related primarily to sexual activity. emotional intelligence, arguing that he is too focused on control of the emotions. 3

Precisely what Gülen was testing out in the Mavi Marmara case.

4

This is can be contrasted with examples of rhetoric which build on Aristotle and are focused in communication of the truth focused in dialogic relationships (cf. Robinson & Smith 2014).

5

See Parry et al. (2007). Living purely ‘in the moment’ could, however, be seen as a form of psychopathy, excluding the past, future and present social environments.

6

İffet can also be understood as ‘purity’. ‘Chastity’ is the common translation preferred in Essays-Perspectives and Opinions (Gülen 2006, 70).

7

Scherkoske argues for integrity as an epistemic virtue.

Chapter 4 1

In which Milgram (2005) tested participant’s responses to commands which might harm others, cf. Shanks (2012), Pesqueux (2012), Robinson and Smith (2014).

2

Carried out by the author in 2015–2016.

3

This has been confirmed by research commissioned by the World Bank (Pink 2011).

4

http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/about-interest-free-banking.aspx

5

In an interview given to the author in June, 2014 in Istanbul.

6 Hence, Zaman Daily was closed and taken over by Turkish government appointees in 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35739547, precisely the opposite of open dialogue.

Chapter 5 1

Walpole coined the term in a letter of 1754, based in the story of the journeys of the three Princes of Serendib.

2

See also Shakespeare’s use of contradiction and disguise, as in Twelfth Night.

Notes

187

3

Partly involving genuine openness to and engagement with the past, memoria.

4

Focusing on time as Kairos, associated with significant existential events, or moments of judgement, and the arrangement of space as mediating the significance of such events and relationships.

Chapter 6 1

http://gyv.org.tr/Hakkimizda/Detay/19/About%20the%20Foundation

2

http://www.dialoguesociety.org/

3

http://www.abantplatform.org/Haberler/Detay/2398/

4

It might be argued that just as Bauman argues for aporia at the centre of ethics, Gülen sets up a parallel series of values and principles which cannot be simplistically assimilated. The only way to work through tradition and universal principles is precisely through dialogue and action.

5

Several Turkish businessmen focused on Gülen’s idea of concentric circles of responsibility (derived from Nursi). These noted different levels of obligation, from that owed to God to that owed to the world. Importantly, though all had to be recognized and responded to in appropriate action.

6

Hence Gülen’s capacity to relate to an existentialist position such as Sartre, whilst

7

The application of this thinking to the credit crisis is apposite (see Robinson &

also critiquing the underlying philosophy. Dowson 2012).

Conclusions 1

Echoing the contrast in MacIntyre (1981) between institutional goods and wider

2

Hendricks dismisses the research of Esposito, Ebaugh and others.

3

Here prophecy is defined as speaking out for justice rather than predicting the

goods.

future. 4

http://www.peacebuilding2013.org/

Bibliography

Akyol, H. (2008), An Alternative Approach to Preventing Ethnic Conflict: The Role of the Gülen Schools in Strengthening the Delicate Relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds with Particular Reference to the ‘Kirkuk Crisis’, http://medya.zaman .com.tr/2008/11/17/akyol_harun.pdf [Accessed 20 February 2015]. Akyol, H. (2011), ‘How to Solve the Kirkuk Problem’, http://www.todayszaman.com/ news-241508-how-to-solve-the-kirkuk-problem-by-harun-akyol*.html [Accessed 20 February 2015]. Alimo-Metcalfe, B. and Alban-Metcalfe, J. (2005), ‘Leadership, Time for a New Direction’, Leadership 1, 51. Aquinas, T. (1981), Summa Theologica, New York: Resources for Christian Living. Arendt, H. (1991), ‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility’, in May, L. and H. Hoffman (eds), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, 273–283, Savage: Rowbottom and Littlefield. Aristotle. (2009), Nicomachean Ethics, London: Penguin. Arslan, M. (2001), ‘Work Ethic Values of Protestant British, Irish Catholic and Turkish Muslim Managers’, Journal of Business Ethics 31 (4), 321–339. Augustine. (2003), City of God, London: Penguin. Austen, J. (2003), Pride and Prejudice, London: Penguin. Bakhtin, M. (1981), The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Austin: University of Texas. Barker, E. (1989), New Religious Movements: A Practical Introduction, London: HMSO. Barton, G., Weller, P. and Yilmaz, Y. (eds) (2013), The Muslim World and Politics in Transition: Creative Contributions of the Gülen Movement, London: Bloomsbury. Bauman, Z. (1989), Modernity and the Holocaust, London: Polity. Bauman, Z. (1994), Postmodern Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon. BBC News. (2011), Turkey Suspends Israel Defence Ties over Gaza Aid Raid, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14800305 [Accessed 12 December 2014]. BBC News. (2012), Israeli Report Criticises PM Netanyahu over Gaza Flotilla, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18428785 [Accessed 28 August 2014]. BBC News. (2013), Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/10203726 [Accessed 2 July 2014].

Bibliography

189

Berghout, A. (2008), ‘Said Nursi’s Vision for a New Universal Culture of Dialogue’, in Abu-Rabi, I. (ed.), Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Risale-i-Nur, 231–258, Albany: SUNY Press. Berlin, I. (1969), ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Quinton, A. (ed.), Political Philosophy, 141–153, London: Penguin. Bilici, A. (2010), O röportajı bir de böyle okuyun! Zaman yazarı Gülen’i yorumladı! – Güncel – Medyafaresi, http://www.medyafaresi.com/haber/41524/guncel-o -roportaji-bir-de-boyle-okuyun-zaman-yazari-guleni-yorumladi.html [Accessed 3 November 2013]. Bohm, D. (1996), On Dialogue, London: Routledge. Bonhoeffer, D. (1995), Ethics, New York: MacMillan. Boutros-Ghalis, B. (1992), An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml [Accessed 18 January 2015]. Brown, M. (2005), Corporate Integrity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bruininks, P. and Malle, B. (2005), ‘Distinguishing Hope from Optimism and Related Affective States’, Motivation and Emotion 29 (4), 327–355. Buber, M. (1942), I and Thou, Edinburgh: T&T Clarke. Butler, D. (2014), ‘Turkey’s Erdogan Signals Fresh Moves against Gulen Supporters’, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/12/12/us-turkey-erdogan-cleric -idUSKBN0JQ1LJ20141212 [Accessed 12 December 2015]. Callender, J. (2010), Free Will and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Campbell, A. (1986), The Gospel of Anger, London: SPCK. Carroll, B. (2007), A Dialogue of Civilizations, Istanbul: The Gülen Institute. Carroll, A.B. and Buchholtz, A.K. (2000), Business & Society, Ethics and Stakeholder Management, Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing. Çelik, G. (2009), Gülen’s Islamic Ethic of the Middle Way’, Muslims between Tradition and Modernity – The Gülen Movement as a Bridge between Cultures, Conference paper, May 26–27, Potsdam, Germany. Çelik, G. and Alan, Y. (2006), Fethullah Gülen as a Servant Leader, http://www .fethullahgulenconference.org/dallas/read.php?p=fethullah-gulen-as-servant -leader [Accessed 21 November 2015]. Çetin, M. (2007), ‘The Gulen Movement: Its Nature and Identity’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement, 377–390, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Ciulla, J. (2004), Ethics, the Heart of Leadership, London: Praeger. Colby, A. and Kohlberg, L. (2011), The Measurement of Moral Judgment: Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cooper-White, P. (2009), Many Voices: Pastoral Psychotherapy in Relational and Theological Perspective, Philadelphia: Augsburg.

190

Bibliography

Curzer, H. (2014), Aristotle and the Virtues, Oxford: Oxford University Press. de Beauvoir, S. (2000), The Ethics of Ambiguity, New York: Citadel. De Bolt, D. (2005), ‘Dialogue: Greek Foundations and the Thought of Fethullah Gülen and Jürgen Habermas’, Conference Proceedings of Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice, 12–13 November, Rice University, Houston. Diyanet Vakfi, T. (ed.) (2004), İlmihal – 1 Iman ve Ibadetler, 10th ed. Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı. Dostoevsky, F. (1993), The Grand Inquisitor, Indianapolis: Hackett. Ebaugh, H.R. (2009), The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam, London: Springer. Edel, P. (2013), BFP Exclusive: Fetullah Gulen’s New Controversy in the Netherlands, http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/04/09/bfp-exclusive-fethullah-gulens -new-controversy-in-the-netherlands/ [Accessed 15 August 2015]. Eisenberg, E.M. (1984), ‘Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication’, Communication Monographs, 51, 227–242, London: Taylor and Francis. Eisenberg, E.M. and Witten, M.G. (1987), ‘Reconsidering Openness in Organizational Communication’, Academy of Management Review 12, 418–426. Eldridge, B. (2007), ‘The Place of the Gülen Movement in the Intellectual History of Islam, Particularly in Relation to Islam’s Confrontation with Postmodernism’, in Yılmaz, I. (ed.), Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, 526–538, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Eliot, T.S. (2009), Four Quartets, London: Faber. Elkington, J. (2001), ‘The “Triple Bottom Line” for 21st-Century Business’, in Starkey, R. and R. Welford (eds), Business and Sustainable Development, 20–43, London: Earthscan Publication. Entine, J. (2002), ‘Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar: The Politics of Dialogue’, in Megone, C. and S. Robinson (eds), Case Histories in Business Ethics, 59–95, London: Routledge. Epley, N. (2014), Mindwise, London: Allen Lane. Ergil, D. (2010), Neşe Düzel – ‘Doğu Ergil: “Washington‘a acil heyet gitti”’ başlıklı köşe yazısı – Taraf Gazetesi, http://www.taraf.com.tr/nese-duzel/makale-dogu -ergil-washington-a-acil-heyet-gitti.htm [Accessed 12 September 2013]. Eris, S. (2006), Islam: Belief and Practice - A Brief Guide, New Jersey: Tughra Books. Esposito, J. and Yilmaz, I. (eds) (2010), Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives, New York: Blue Dome. Farrar, M., Robinson, S. and Sener, O. (eds) (2012), Debating Multiculturalism 1, London: Dialogue Society.

Bibliography

191

Finch, J. and Mason, J. (1993), Negotiating Family Responsibilities, Routledge: London. Florman, S. (1976), The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, New York: St Martins. Foot, P. (1979), Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ford, D. (1999), Self and Salvation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fowler, J. (1997), Faithful Change, Nashville: Abingdon. Francis Report. (2013), The Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust Public Enquiry, http:// www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/ [Accessed 18 August 2015]. Freeman, R. E. (1984) Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. (2003), ‘Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, in Wideker, D. and M. Mckenna (eds), Moral Responsibilities and Alternative Possibilities, Aldershot: Ashgate. Friedman, M. (1983), ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’, in Donaldson, T. and P. Weherne (eds), Ethical Issues in Business, 239–243, New York: Prentice Hall. Friere, P. (1972), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, London: Penguin. Gadamar, H.-G. (1975), Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. New York: Crossroads. Geuss, R. (1981), The Idea of a Critical Theory. Habermas & the Frankfurt School, New York: Cambridge University Press. Gizelis, T. (2009), ‘Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding’, Journal of Peace Research 46 (4), 505–523. Goleman, D. (1998), Working with Emotional Intelligence, London: Bantam. Goodpaster, K. (2007), Conscience and Corporate Culture, London: Blackwell. Goshen-Gottstein, A. (2013), ‘Arguing For/Over the Dignity of Difference The Elijah Interfaith Institute’, http://faith.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Goshen-Gottstein .pdf [Accessed 23 December 2014]. Goss, B. and Williams, M.L. (1973), ‘The Effects of Equivocation on Perceived Source Credibility’, Central States Speech Journal 24, 162–167. Graskemper, M. (2007), ‘A Bridge to Interreligious Cooperation: The Gulen-Jesuits Educational Nexus’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, 622–631, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Greenleaf, R. (1977), The Servant as Leader: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness, New York: Paulist Press. Griffiths, P. and Stotz, K. (2000), ‘How the Mind Grows. A Developmental Perspective on the Biology of Cognition’, Synthese 122, 29–51. Grinell, K. (2010), ‘Boarder Thinking: Fethullah Gulen and the East West Divide’, in Esposito, J. and I. Yilmaz (eds), Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives, 65–84, New York: Blue Dome.

192

Bibliography

Gulay, E. (2007), ‘The Gulen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey’s Rival Elite?’ Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16 (1), 37–61. Gülen, F. (1990a), ‘Murakabe ve Muhasebe. Süleymaniye Mosque’, http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=XJ6rIMuRIxQ&feature=youtube_gdata_player [Accessed 12 August 2014]. Gülen, F. (1990b), Fethullah Gülen ANNE BABA HAKKI 110 dk. Izmir. http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=2MJZMihUuAk&feature=youtube_gdata_player [Accessed 23 March 2013]. Gülen, F. (1995a), ‘Sorumluluk Suuru’, Yeni Ümit Magazine, July–September, Vol. 29. Gülen, F. (1995b), Prophet Muhammad: Aspects of His Life, Vol. 1, Fairfax: The Fountain. Gülen, F. (1996), Prophet Muhammad: Aspects of His Life, Vol. 2, Fairfax: The Fountain. Gülen, F. (1998), ‘Claims and Answers’, Aksiyon, 06.06 Claim # 19. Gülen, F. (1999), Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism, Vol. 1, Fairfax: The Fountain. Gülen, F. (2000a), Essentials of Islamic Faith, Fairfax: The Fountain. Gülen, F. (2000b), Questions and Answers about Faith, Fairfax: The Fountain. Gülen, F. (2002), Essays, Perspectives, Opinions, Rutherford, NJ: The Light. Gülen, F. (2004a), Towards a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, Rutherford, NJ: The Light. Gülen, F. (2004b), A Brief Overview of Islam, Fairfax: The Fountain. Gülen, F. (2005), The Statue of Our Souls, Rutherford, NJ: The Light. Gülen, F. (2006a), Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism, Vol. 1 rev., Rutherford, NJ: The Light. Gülen, F. (2006b), True Muslims Cannot Be Terrorists, http://en.fgulen.com/content/ view/1052/14 [Accessed 25 October 2015]. Gülen, F. (2007), Kendi İklimimiz, Izmir: Nil Yayinlari. Gülen, F. (2008), İrşad Ekseni, Izmir: Nil Yayinlari. Gülen, F. (2009a), Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism, Vol. 3, Istanbul: Tughra Books. Gülen, F. (2009b), Kitap ve Sünnet Perspektifinde Kader, Istanbul: Nil Yalinyari. Gülen, F. (2009c), ‘The Spirit and What Follows’, http://en.fgulen.com/key-concepts -in-the-practice-of-sufism/3183-the-spirit-and-what-follows [Accessed 4 April 2014]. Gülen, F. (2010), Kur’ânî Akıl ve Fonksiyonları (Qur’anic Reason and Its Functions), Herkul, http://www.herkul.org/kirik-testi/kur-ani-akil-ve-fonksiyonlari/ [Accessed 12 August 2014]. Translated by Fatih Isik. Gülen, F. (2011), ‘The Truth, Rights and More’, Fountain Magazine 82, 3–5. Gülen, F. (2013), ‘Mechanisms of Soul and Conscience’, The Fountain 3 (95), 10. September–October.

Bibliography

193

Gülen, F. (2015), Turkey’s Eroding Democracy, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/ opinion/fethullah-gulen-turkeys-eroding-democracy.html? [Accessed 3 June 2015]. Gürbüz, M. (2007), ‘Performing Moral Opposition: Musings on the Strategy and Identity in the Gülen Movement’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, 104–117, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Guthrie, C. and Quinlan, M. (2010), Just War, London: Bloomsbury. Harle, T. (2005), ‘Serenity, Courage and Wisdom: Changing Competencies for Leadership’, Business Ethics: A European Review 14 (4), 348–357. Harrington, J. (2011), Wrestling with Free Speech, Religious Freedom and Democracy in Turkey, Lanham: University Press America. Hauerwas, S. (1984), The Peaceable Kingdom, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press. Hauerwas, S. and Wells, S. (eds) (2004), The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. Heath, J. and Norman, W. (2004), ‘Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance and Public Management’, Journal of Business Ethics 53 (3): 247–265. Hefner, R. (2005), ‘Introduction: Modernity and the Remaking of Muslim Politics’, in Hefner, R. (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, 1–37, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hendricks, J. (2013), Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World, New York: New York University Press. Huntington, S. (1998), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Touchstone. Isik, F. (2015), A Contemporary Turkish Islamic Contribution to Moral Character Education: A Critical Synthesis and Analysis, Unpublished PhD thesis, Leeds Becket University. Jonas, H. (1984), The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Jonas, H. (2001), The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, Evanstone, IL: Northwestern University Press. Kaldor, M. (2003), ‘Civil Society and Accountability’, Journal of Human Development 4 (1), 5–27. Kalyoncu, M. (2008), ‘Gülen-Inspired Schools in the East Africa: Secular Alternative in Kenya and Pragmatist Approach to Development in Uganda’, in Islam in the Age of Global Challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gülen Movement Conference Proceedings, 350–373, Georgetown University, Washington, 14th and 15th November, Washington, DC: Rumi Forum.

194

Bibliography

Kalyoncu, M. (2010), ‘Building Civil Society un Ethno-religiously Fractured Communities’, in Yilmaz, I. and J. Esposito (eds), Islam and Peacebuilding, 273–290, New York: Blue Dome Press. Kay, J. (2011), Obliquity, London: Profile. Kayaoglu, T. (2007), ‘Preachers of Dialogue: International Relations and Interfaith Theology’, Paper presented in the Conference, Muslim World in TransitionContributions of the Gulen Movement, 25–27 October, London. http:// gulenconference.org.uk/userfiles/file/Proceedings.pdf. Keles, O. (2007), ‘Promoting Human Rights Values in the Muslim World: The Case of the Gülen Movement’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds.), The Muslim World in Transition, 683–708, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Keles, O. (2013), ‘The Gulen Movement and Promoting Human Rights Values’, in Barton, G., P. Weller, and I. Yilmaz (eds), The Muslim World and Politics in Transition, 192–208, London: Bloomsbury. Keles, O. (2014), The Pigeon, The Finger, and Hizmet’s ‘Inevitable Ambiguity, http:// www.todayszaman.com/blog/ozcan-keles/the-pigeon-the-finger-and-hizmets -inevitable-ambiguity_349022.html [Accessed 27 July 2015]. Keles, O. and Sezgin, I. (2016), Hizmet’s Core Teachings to Undermine and Negate Extremism, http://www.gulenmovement.us/hizmets-core-teachings-to -undermine-and-negate-extremism.html [Accessed 12 April 2016]. Ketchum, S. and Pierce, C. (1981), ‘Rights and Responsibilities’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (3), 271–280. Khurana, R. and Nohria, N. (2008), ‘It’s Time to Make Management a True Profession’, Harvard Business Review 86 (10), 70–77. King III. (2009), Report on Corporate Governance, Johannesburg: IOD South Africa. Koehn, D. (1998), Rethinking Feminist Ethics, London: Routledge. Krause, W. (2012), ‘Civility in Islamic Activism’, in Weller, P. and I. Yilmaz (eds), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, 55–64, London: Continuum. Kucukcan, T. (2007), ‘Social and Spiritual Capital of the Gülen Movement’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, 187–197, London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Kuru, A. (2003), ‘Fethullah Gülen’s Search for a Middle Way between Modernity and Muslim Tradition’, in Yavuz, M.H. and J.L. Esposito (eds), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, 115–130, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Kurucan, A. and Erol, M. (2012), Dialogue in Islam, London: Dialogue Society. Lacey, J. (2013), ‘An Exploration of the Strategic Dimensions of Dialogue in a Gulen Movement Organization in Northern Ireland’, in Weller, P. and I. Yilmaz (eds), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, 127–144, London: Continuum.

Bibliography

195

Ladd, J. (1991), ‘Bhopal: An Essay on Moral Responsibility and Civic Virtue’, Journal of Social Philosophy 22, 73–91. Lanchester, J. (2010), Whoops!, London: Penguin. Lauria, J. (2010), ‘Reclusive Turkish Imam Criticizes Gaza Flotilla’, Wall Street Journal, 4 June, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040253045752847212802 74694 [Accessed 21 July 2015]. Lederach, J.P. (2005), The Moral Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lederach, J.P. (2010), The Art of Peace (interview with K. Tippett), http://www .onbeing.org/program/art-peace/182#sthash.yNYQrYrw.dpuf [Accessed 23 January 2015]. Lester, A. (1995), Hope in Pastoral Care and Counselling, Louisville: John Knox Press. Levinas, E. (1989), Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, New York: Columbia University Press. Lovelock, J. (1979), Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maak, T. (2007), ‘Responsible Leadership, Stakeholder Engagement, and the Emergence of Social Capital’, Journal of Business Ethics, 74 (4), 329–343. MacIntyre, A. (1981), After Virtue, London: Duckworth. Mandeville, B. (2003), The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits, London: Penguin. Markham, I. (2003), A Theology of Engagement, Oxford: Blackwell. Markham, I. (2008), ‘Grounded Spirituality: The Challenge of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’, in Abu-Rabi, I. (ed.), Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Risale-i-Nur, 24–52, Albany: SUNY Press. May, L. (1992), Sharing Responsibility, Chicago: Chicago University Press. May, W. (1989), ‘Code and Covenant or Philanthropy?’, in Lammers, S. and A. Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, 83–96, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. McKennny, P. (2005), ‘Responsibility’, in Meilander, G. and W. Werpehowski (eds), Theological Ethics, 237–253, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meijer, A. (2013), ‘The History of Transparency, Analyzing the Long-Term SocioPolitical Construction of Transparency in the Netherlands’, Paper for International Conference on Transparency Research HEC Paris at Jouy-en-Josas October 24th– 26th. Mercan, F. (2012), Fethullah Gülen, 3rd ed. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap. Metcalfe, J. and Shimamura, A.P. (1994), Metacognition: Knowing about Knowing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Michel, T. (2003), ‘Fethullah Gülen as Educator’, in Yavuz, M. and J. Esposito (eds), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, 69–84, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

196

Bibliography

Michel, T. (2008), ‘Fighting Poverty with Kimse Yok Mu?’, in Islam in the Age of Global Challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gülen Movement Conference Proceedings, 350–373, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 14th and 15th November, Washington DC: Rumi Forum. Michel, T. (2010), ‘The Theological Dimension of the Thought of M. Fethullah Gülen’, Conference Paper, 7 October, Felix Meritis, Amsterdam http:// fethullahgulenforum.nl/files/Mapping_the_Gulen_Movement.pdf#page=58 [Accessed 15 September 2015]. Michels, A. and Meijer, A. (2008), ‘Safeguarding Public Accountability in Horizontal Government’, Public Management Review, Online Publication Date: 1 January 2008. Milgram, S. (2005), Obedience to Authority, New York: Pinter and Martin. Mitchell, G. (1999), Making Peace: The Inside Story of the Making of the Good Friday Agreement, London: Heinemann. Mohamed, Y. (2007), ‘The Ethical Theory of Fetullah Gülen and Its Practice in South Africa’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), The Muslim World in Transition, 552–572, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Moosa, E. (2003), ‘The Debts and Burdens of Critical Islam’, in Safi, O. (ed.), Progressive Muslims: On Justice. Gender and Pluralism, 108–123, Oxford: Oneworld. Musser, D. and Sunderland, D. (2005), War or Words: Interreligious Dialogue as an Instrument of Peace, Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press. Mustakova-Possardt, E. (2004), ‘Education for Critical Moral Consciousness’, Journal of Moral Education 33 (September), 245–270. Nasr, S.H. (2006), ‘Standing before God: Human Responsibilities and Human Rights’, in Schweiker, W., K. Johnson, and M. Jung (eds), Humanity before God, 209–237, Minneapolis: Augsburg. Niebuhr, H.R. (1963), The Responsible Self, New York: Harper and Row. Novak, M. (1990), Morality, Capitalism and Democracy, London: IEA. Nursi, B.S. (1995), Isarat-ul Icaz, Istanbul: Envar Nesryat. Nursi, B.S. (1996), ‘Divan-i Harb-i orfi’, Rasle-I Nursi, Istanbul: Nesil. Nursi, B.S. (2000), The Flashes Collection, Istanbul: Sösler Neṣriyat. Nursi, B.S. (2002), Risale-i Nur Kulliyati 2, Istanbul: Nesil Yayinlari. Nussbaum, M. (1992), Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, New York: Oxford University Press. Oakeshott, M. (1989), ‘The Universities, the Voice of Liberal Learning’, in Fuller, T. (ed.), Michael Oakeshott on Education, 118–158, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. O’Neill, O. (2002), A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bibliography

197

Osman, M. (2007), ‘Gülen’s Contribution to a Moderate Islam in South East Asia’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), The Muslim World in Transition, 334–346, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Ou, L. (2009), Keats and Negative Capability, London: Continuum, 2009. Outka, E. (1972), Agape: An Ethical Analysis, New Haven: Yale University Press. Palmer, G., Uribe, A. and Itzhar, J. (2011), Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31st May Flotilla Incident, New York: United Nations. Park, W. (2008), ‘The Fethullah Gulen Movement’, The Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs 12 (3), 1–11. Parry, J., Robinson, S., Watson, N. and Nesti, M. (2007), Spirituality and Sport: An Introduction, London: Routledge. Pelz, P. and Reeves, D. (2008), The White House: From Fear to a Handshake, London: O Publications. Penaskovic, R. (2010), ‘Gulen on Healing the Rift between Islam and the West’, in Esposito, J. and I. Yilmaz (eds.), Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives, 123–146, New York: Blue Dome. Pesqueux, Y. (2012), ‘On the Topic of Responsibility’, Journal of Global Responsibility 3 (1), 19–31. Pink, D. (2011), Drive, London: Canongate. Pratt, D. (2010), ‘Islamic Prospects of Interreligious Dialogue’, in Yilmaz, I. and J. Esposito (eds) Islam and Peacebuilding, 189–206, New York: Blue Dome Press. Press Association. (2014), ‘UK Suffers Wettest Winter Rainfall’, The Guardian, http:// www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/feb/20/uk-suffers-wettest-winter -rainfall-record-floods [Accessed 14 October 2014]. Randerson, J. (2009), ‘Obama Hails New Age of Responsibility’, The Guardian, http:// www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2009/jan/20/obama-inauguration -climatechange [Accessed 14 October 2014]. Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reid, H. (2002), ‘Taking Responsibility of Life and Death’ in Reid, H. (ed.), The Philosophical Athlete, 97–117, Durham NC: Carolina Academic Press. Ricoeur, P. (1992), Oneself as Another, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Robinson, S. (2001), Agape, Moral Meaning and Pastoral Counselling, Cardiff: Aureus. Robinson, S. (2007), ‘The Spiritual Journey’, in Parry, J. et al. (eds), Sport and Spirituality: An Introduction, 38–57, London: Routledge. Robinson, S. (2008), Spirituality, Ethics and Care, London: Jessica Kingsley. Robinson, S. (2009), ‘The Nature of Responsibility in a Professional Setting’, Journal of Business Ethics 88, 11–19. Robinson, S. (2011), Leadership Responsibility, Oxford: Peter Lang.

198

Bibliography

Robinson, S. (2012), ‘Islam Responsibility and Business’, in Farrar, M., S. Robinson, Y. Valli, and P. Wetherly (eds), Islam in the West, 154–168, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Robinson, S. (2014), ‘Can the Marketplace Be Ethical?’ in Wetherly, P. and D. Otter (eds), 3rd ed. The Business Environment, 187–212, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robinson, S. and Dixon, R. (2007), Engineering, Business, and Professional Ethics, London: Heinemann Butterworth. Robinson, S. and Dowson, P. (2012), Business Ethics in Practice, London: CIPD. Robinson, S. and Kenyon, A. (2009), Ethics in the Alcohol Industry, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Robinson, S. and Smith, J. (2012), ‘Exploring Responsibility’, Journal of Global Responsibility 3 (1), 151–167. Robinson, S. and Smith, J. (2014), Co-charismatic Leadership, Oxford: Peter Lang. Rogers, C. (1980), Way of Being, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Sacks, J. (2002), The Dignity of Difference, London: Bloomsbury. Sacks, J. (2005a), The Dignity of Difference Rev., London: Bloomsbury. Sacks, J. (2005b), To Heal a Fractured World: The Ethics of Responsibility, London: Continuum. Saritoprak, Z. (2007), ‘Gulen and His Global Contributions to Peacebuilding’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), The Muslim World in Transition, 632–642, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Saritoprak, Z. (2010a), ‘How Do Gülen’s Educational Efforts Contribute to Global Peace?’ http//en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/323-gulen-conference-in -indonesia/3717-how-do-gulens-educational-efforts-contribute-to-global-peace [Accessed 14 June 2014]. Sarıtoprak, Z. (2010b), ‘Fethullah Gülen’s Theology of Peacebuilding’, in Esposito, J.L. and I. Yilmaz (eds), Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives, 169–188, New York: Blue Dome. Sartre, J.-P. (2004), ‘Existentialism’, in Marino, G. (ed.), Basic Writings in Existentialism, 46–59, New York: The Modern Library. Sartre, J.-P. (2007), Existentialism Is a Humanism, New Haven: Yale University Press. Schact, J. (1964), An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scherkoske. G. (2013), Integrity and the Virtues of Reason: Leading a Convincing Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schweiker, W. (1995), Responsibility and Christian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scruton, R. (2014), The Soul of the World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sezgin, I. (2015), Moral Responsibility in Contemporary Islam: A Critical Examination of Fethullah Gülen’s Contribution, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Leeds Beckett University. Shanks, M. (2012), ‘Milgram Revisited’, Journal of Global Responsibility 3 (1), 66–83.

Bibliography

199

Sidorkin, A. (1999), Beyond Discourse: Education, the Self and Dialogue, Albany: State University of New York Press. Sleap, F., Senner, O., and Weller, P. (2012), Dialogue Theories, London; Dialogue Society. Snyder, C. (2000), ‘The Past and Possible Futures of Hope’, Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 19 (1) Spring, 11–28. Solomon, R. (2007), True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steinvorth, D. (2014), ‘Erdogan and the Traitors: Scandal and Protests Threaten Turkey’s AKP’, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/turkish-prime -minister-erdogan-facing-corruption-scandal-protests-a-959453.html [Accessed 20 December 2014]. Sternberg, E. (2000), Just Business, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, P. (2003), ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Watson, G. (ed.), Free Will, 72–93, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strohm, P. (2011), Conscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sunier, T. and Landman, N. (2014), Transnational Turkish Islam, London: Palgrave Pivot. Sykiainen, L. (2013), ‘The Relevance of Fethullah Gülen’s Thought for Democratic Reforms in the Muslim World’, in Weller, P. and I. Yilmaz (eds), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, 129–142, London: Continuum. Tanner, K. (1993), ‘A Theological Case for Human Responsibility in Moral Choice’, Journal of Religion 73, 592–612. Tawney, R.H. (1930), Equality, London: Allen and Unwin. Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, M. and Bevan, D. (eds) (2013), Wise Management in Organizational Complexity, London: Palgrave. Timmins, N. (2001), The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, London: Harper Collins. Titmuss, R. (1973), The Gift Relationship, London: Penguin. Toguslu, E. (2007), ‘Gülen’s Theory of Adab and Ethical Values of the Movement’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), The Muslim World in Transition, 445–458, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Togoslu, E. (2008), Hizmet: From Futuwwa Tradition to the Emergence of Movement in Public Space, http://www.rumiforum.org/academic-papers/hizmet-from -futuwwa-tradition-to-the-emergence-of-movement-in-public-space.html [Accessed 15 February 2015]. Troeltsche, E. (1981), The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

200

Bibliography

Turner, C. (2008), ‘The Six-Sided Vision of Said Nursi: Towards a Spiritual Architecture of Risale-I Nur’, in Abu-Rabi, I. (ed.), Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Risale-i-Nur, 23–52, Albany: SUNY Press. Tyler, A. (2008), ‘Tolerance as a Source of Peace’, in Yurtsveer, A. (ed.), Islam in the Age of Global Challenges, 732–753, Washington: Rumi Forum. Ugur, E. (2013), ‘Organizing Civil Society: The Gulen Movement’s Abant Platform’, in Barton, G., P. Weller, and I. Yilmaz (eds), The Muslim World and Politics in Transition, 47–66, London: Bloomsbury. Ünal, A. and Williams, A. (eds) (2000), Fetullah Gulen Advocate of Dialogue, Fairfax, VA: The Fountain. Ünal, A. and Williams, A. (2009), Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gulen, Fairfax, VI: Fountain. Uygur, S. (2007), ‘Islamic Puritanism as a Source of Economic Development: The Case of the Gülen Movement’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), The Muslim World in Transition, 445–458, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Vahdat, F. (2002), God and the Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Vainovski-Mihai, I. (2010), ‘The Limits of Otherness in Fethullah Gülen’s Dialogic Methodology for Interfaith Encounters’, in Esposito, J. and I. Yilmaz (eds), Islam and Peacebuilding: Gülen Movement Initiatives, 85–102, New York: Blue Dome. van Bruinessen, M. (2013), ‘The Netherlands and the Gülen Movement’, Sociology of Islam 1 (3–4), 165–168. Vicini, F. (2007), ‘Gülen’s Rethinking of Islamic Pattern and Its Socio-Political Effects’, in Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), The Muslim World in Transition, 430–444, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Vogel, L. (2006), ‘Natural Law Judaism? The Genesis of Bioethics in Hans Jonas, Leo Strauss, and Leon Kass’, in Schweiker, W., M. Johnson, and K. Jung (eds), Humanity before God, 209–237, Minneapolis: Augsburg. Voltaire. (2006), Candide, London: Penguin. Watt, N. (2013), ‘Boris Johnson Invokes Thatcher Spirit with Greed Is Good Speech’, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/27/boris-johnson-thatcher-greed -good [Accessed 20 November 2015]. Weber, M. (1919), ‘Politik als Beruf ’, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, pp. 396–450, Munich: Duncker & Humblodt. Wegerif, R. (2008), ‘Dialogic or Dialectic? The Significance of Ontological Assumptions in Research on Educational Dialogue’, British Educational Research Journal 34 (3), 347–361.

Bibliography

201

Weller, P. (2012a), ‘Dialogical and Transformative Resources: Perspectives from Fethullah Gülen on Religion and Public Life’, in Weller, P. and I. Yilmaz (eds), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, 3–20, London: Continuum. Weller, P. (2012b), ‘Robustness and Civility: Themes from Fethullah Gülen as Resource and Challenge for Government, Muslims and Civil Society in the United Kingdom’, in Weller, P. and I. Yilmaz, European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, 143–160, London: Continuum. Weller, P. and Yilmaz, I. (2012), ‘Conclusion: Fethullah Gülen and the Hizmet: Towards and Evaluation’, in Weller, P. and I. Yilmaz (eds), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, 199–210, London: Continuum. Weller, P. and Yilmaz, I. (eds) (2013), European Muslims, Civility and Public Life, London: Continuum. Werner, M. (2010), ‘The Immediacy of Encounter and the Dangers of Dichotomy’, in Tirosh-Samuelson, H. and C. Wiese (eds), The Legacy of Hans Jonas, 203–230, Brill: Leiden. Western, S. (2009), Leadership, A Critical Text, London: Sage. Wettstein, H. (2007), ‘Rational Religion: Gülen’s Middle Way’, in Yilmaz, I. (ed.), Peaceful Coexistence, London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. White, L. (1967), ‘The Historic Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’, Science 155 (10 March), 1201–1210. Williams, G. (2008), ‘Responsibility as a Virtue’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4): 455–470. Williams, R. (2010), Dostoevsky: Language, Faith and Fiction, London: Continuum. Wolpe, D. (2006), ‘Strong Medicine for an ailing world’, http://www.beliefnet.com/ faiths/judaism/2006/05/strong-medicine-for-an-ailing-world.aspx23/3/2016 [Accessed 23 March 2016]. Yavuz, H. (2013), Towards an Islamic Enlightenment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yilmaz, I. (2002), ‘Dynamic Legal Pluralism in England: The Challenge of Postmodern Muslim Legality to Legal Modernity’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28 (2) Spring, 343–354. Yilmaz, I. (2003), ‘Ijtihad and Tajdid by Conduct: The Gülen Movement’, in Yavuz, I. and J. Esposito (eds), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement, 208–237, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Yilmaz, I. et al. (eds), (2007), The Muslim World in Transition, Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.

Author Index

Akyol, H. 118, 188 Alan, Y. 178, 188 Alimo- Metcalfe, B. 182 Aquinas 48, 51, 188 Arendt, Hannah 95, 96, 188 Aristotle 73, 77, 188 Arslan, Mahmut 170, 188 Augustine 151, 188 Austen, J. 188 Bakhtin, Mikhel 129, 154, 155, 188 dialogue 154–5 Barker, Eileen 16, 188 Barton, Greg 181, 188 Bauman, Zygmunt 39, 94, 95, 96, 137, 174, 188 Berghout, A. 150, 189 Berlin, Isaiah 46, 56, 57, 189 Bevan, David 162, 189 Beveridge, William 117, 189 Bilici, A. 24, 189 Bohm, D. 154, 189 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 81, 189 Boutros-Ghalis, B. 114, 189 Brown, M. 4, 189 Bruininks, P. 115, 189 Buber, Martin 153, 189 Bucholtze, A. 38, 189 Butler, D. 173, 189 Callender, John 9, 45, 49, 189 Campbell, Alastair 64, 189 Carroll, Archie 38, 189 Carroll, B. 69, 92, 95, 189 Çelik, G. 63, 67, 72, 77, 78, 178, 189 Çetin, M. 13, 15, 16, 17, 189 Chomsky, Noam 11, 189 Ciulla, Joanna 182, 189 Colby, Anne 52, 189

Cooper-White, Pamela 54, 72, 126, 189 Curzer, Howard 163, 190 De Beauvoir, Simone 173, 190 De Bolt, D. 155, 190 Dixon, R. 98, 198 Dostoevsky, Fyodor 95, 190 Dowson, Paul 31, 190 Ebaugh, Rose 18, 190 Edel, P. 176, 190 Eisenberg, E.M. 169, 170, 190 Eldridge, B. 149, 190 Eliot, Thomas, S. 130, 190 Elkington, John 30, 190 Entine, Jon 30, 148, 190 Epley, Nicholas 146, 190 Ergil, D. 24, 178, 190 Erhard, Werner 23, 190 Eris, S. 61, 190 Erol, Mustafa 139, 140, 141, 195 Esposito, J. 115, 120, 135, 190 Farrar, Max 158, 190 Finch, Janet 102, 147, 191 Florman, Samuel 65, 191 Foot, Phillipa 59, 191 Ford, D. 2; 18, 191 Fowler, James 52, 191 Frankfurt, Harry 45, 191 Freeman, Mark 38, 191 Friedman, Milton 45, 101, 191 Gadamar, H.-G. 144, 191 Geuss, R. 53, 191 Gizelis, T. 120, 191 Goleman, D. 186 Goodpaster, Kenneth 29, 191 Goshen-Gottstein, A. 137, 138

Author Index Goss, B. 169, 191 Graskemper, M. 18, 26, 79, 80, 82, 121, 147, 151, 191 Greenleaf, R. 182, 191 Griffiths, P. 45, 191 Grinnell, K. 154, 191 Gulay, E. 15, 16, 31, 192 Gulen, Fethullah, passim. See subject index Gürbuz, M. 5, 116 Guthrie 140, 192 Harle, T. 78, 192 Harrington, J. 14, 192 Hauerwas, Stanley 83–4, 134, 192 Heath, J. 101, 192 Hefner, R. 120 Hendricks, Joshua 18, 168–73, 192 Hermans, Hubert 2: 24, 192 Huntington, S. 144, 192 Isik, Fatih 119, 192 Johnson, Boris 105, 192 Jonas, Hans 83, 99, 192 Kaldor, M. 30, 192 Kalyoncou, M. 120, 192 Kay, J. 128, 193 Kayaoglu, T. 137, 193 Keats, John 129 and negative capability 129 Kekes, John 31, 194 Keles, Ozcan 81, 125, 126, 141, 142, 150, 173, 174, 175, 179, 194 Kenyon, Alexandra 3: 21–2, 198 Ketchum, S. 5; 11, 25, 194 Khurana, Rakesh 89, 101, 194 Koehn, Daryl 38, 194 Kohlberg, Lawrence 52, 194 Krause, W. 5; 11, 24, 194 Küçükcan, T. 120, 194 Kurcuran, Ahmet 139, 140, 141, 194 Kuru, A. 71, 72, 77, 194 Lacey, J. 121, 194 Ladd, J. 42, 195 Lanchester, John 7, 8, 36, 195 Landman, M. 176, 195 Lauria, Joe 18, 19, 195

203

Lederach, John Paul 114, 126–33, 143, 195 Lester, A. 120, 195 Levinas, Emmanuel 39, 94, 99, 153, 195 Lovelock, James 99, 195 Maak, Thomas 104, 195 MacIntyre, Alasdair 82–3, 195 Malle, B. 115, 195 Mandeville, Bernard 66, 105, 195 Markham, Ian 138, 161, 195 Mason, J. 102, 147, 195 May, Larry 93, 162, 195 May, W. 89, 195 McKenny, Gerald 34, 35, 195 Meijer, A. 177, 196 Mercan, F. 22, 195 Metcalfe, J. 66, 195 Michel, Thomas 82, 114, 118, 121, 195 Michels, A. 177, 196 Milgram, Stanley 94, 196 Mitchell, George 121, 196 Mohamed, Y. 42, 196 Moosa, E. 149, 196 Musser, D. 126, 136, 196 Mustakova-Possardt, Elena 36, 196 Nasr, S.H. 43, 96, 196 Neibhur, H. R. 42, 84, 162, 196 Nesti, M. 3: 17, 196 Nieman, S. 3 Nohria, Nitin 89, 101, 195 Norman, Wayne 101, 193 Novak, Michael 46, 102, 121, 196 Nursi, Said 20, 116, 150, 196 Nussbaum, Martha 131, 144, 145, 196 O’Neill, Onora 89, 145, 146, 196 Oakshott, Michael 144, 145, 196 Osman, M. 44 Ou, Li 129, 197 Outka, Gene 76, 197 Palmer, G. 25, 28, 197 Park, William 15, 18, 146, 197 Parry, Jim 78, 197 Pelz, P. 131, 197 Penascovic 122, 197 Pesqueux, Y. 186, 197 Pierce 123, 194

204

Author Index

Pratt, D. 88, 135, 143, 151, 154, 197 Press Association 7, 197 Quinlan 140, 193 Randerson, J. 7, 197 Rawls, John 79, 197 Reeves, Donald 131, 197 Reid, H. 78, 197 Ricoeour, Paul 34, 39, 126, 155, 162, 197 Robinson, Simon 17, 28, 31, 34, 64, 65, 71, 76, 80, 89, 101, 110, 128, 145, 148, 158, 177, 197, 198 Rogers, Carl 152, 199 Sacks, Jonathan 137, 138, 156–7, 199 Saritoprak, Z. 118, 120, 121, 149, 199 Sartre, Jean Paul 92, 93, 199 Schact, J. 139, 199 Scherkoske, Greg 84, 199 Schweiker, William 34, 199 Scruton, R. 158, 199 Sener, O. 6; 2, 16, 24, 199 Sezgin, Ismail 20, 22, 54, 150, 199 Shakespeare, William 57, 199 Shanks, Michael 186, 198 Shimamura, A.P. 66, 195 Sidorkin, Alexander 158, 199 Sleap, F 136, 199 Smith, Jonathan 67, 101, 148, 158, 177, 199 Snyder, C. Richard 115, 116, 149, 199 Solomon, Robert 57, 199 Steinvorth, D. 173, 199 Sternberg, Elaine 101, 199 Stotz, K. 45, 191 Strawson, Peter 44, 199 Strohm, P. 54, 199 Sunderland, D 126, 136, 199 Sunier, T 176, 199 Sykiainen, L. 165, 199 Tanner, K. 44 Tawney, Richard W., 41, 43, 56, 117, 199 Taylor, Charles 34, 35, 36, 199 Thompson, M. 163, 199

Timmins, N 117, 199 Titmuss, Richard 89, 199 Toguslu, E. 41, 85, 199 Trimble, David 25, 199 Troeltsche, E. 15, 199 Turner, C. 60, 100, 107, 109, 200 Tyler, A. 75, 200 Ugur, E. 135, 200 Ǘnal, A 9, 13, 49, 64, 65, 71, 72, 120, 200 Uygur, S. 103, 104, 121, 200 Vahdat, F. 40, 200 Vainovski- Mihai, I. 136, 143, 147, 200 van Bruinessen, M 176, 200 Vicini, F. 40, 97, 134, 148, 149, 200 Vogel, L. 24, 99, 200 Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), 92, 200 Walpole, Horace 128, 200 Watson, N. 78, 197 Watt, N. 105, 200 Weber, M. 69, 200 Wegerif, R. 152, 200 Weller, Paul 117, 135, 149, 158, 164, 165, 181, 188, 201 Wells, Sam 83, 201 Werner, M. 153, 201 Western, Simon 178, 201 Wettstein, H., 72, 201 White, Lyn 91, 201 Williams, A. 9, 13, 49, 64, 65, 71, 72, 120, 201 Williams, Gareth 43, 69, 74, 201 Williams, M.L. 169, 201 Williams, Rowan 95, 201 Witten, M.G. 169, 201 Wolpe, David 138, 201 Yavuz, H. 72, 117, 136, 138, 144, 145, 151, 201 Yeats, William Butler 157, 201 Yilmaz, Ishan 15, 115, 120, 135, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 149, 158, 165, 181, 188, 201

Subject Index

Abant Platform 136 accountability 37–8, 107–10 and complexity 175 and dialogue 109 mutual 37, 98, 99, 106, 107–10 plural 110, 111 aesthetics 131–2 and sharpening the senses 131 agape 75–7 and mutuality 76 agency 66–75, 143, 156, 165–6 and action 42–3 and agreement 147 autonomy 41 corporate 167 moral 66–81, 142–3, 156–7 and relationality 43, 163–4 and structure 165 and telos 40–1 and vicegerent 40–1 and virtues 41–2 A.K. Party 170, 170 alcohol 185 alētheia. See truthfulness altruism 128 ambiguity 113, 128–9, 180 and cults 7 and ethics 174 moral 128 and nafs 59 strategic 168–75 anekantavada 129 anger 59–62 areté 80 austerity 68 authorship 37 autonomy 119, 151 Balci, Kerim 107

Bank Asya 18, 106–7 Barker, Eileen 16 benevolence 79 eunoia 79 beneficence 79 Beveridge 117 board 178 corporate 178 Brent Spar 148 British Petroleum (BP) 30 character 66–7 chastity 78–9 Chomsky, Noam 11 CIA 14 civic accountability 177 civic duty 173 civil society 117, 120, 123, 134, 136, 168, 180 citizenship 134, 158 and responsibility 158 clash of civilizations hypothesis 122, 143 collateralized debt obligation (CDO) 35 compatibilism 44 compassion 77, 132 complexity 68–9 Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUKSON) 15 conflict 113–14, 126–9 as endemic 113–14 conscience. See moral psychology contemplation 67 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 1, 101–2 and liberal arguments 101 as dialogic 102 King III 102 as mutual 102 and stakeholder responsibility 102–3

206 corruption 180 courage 77–9 and Plato 78 cowardice 78 creativity 59 credit crisis 7 cult 16–18 and dependency 17 and Hizmet Movement 18 and leadership 17 and polarization 17 democracy 124–6, 180–1 and Islam 125 and freedom 125–6 and responsibility 126 denial 139 destiny 45 determinism. See free will dialogue 30, chapter 6 passim and accountability 145 and attributes of God 137 and complexity 75 and data 148 distinguished from debate 144–5 distinguished from dialectic 152 and diversity 136 engaging 75–6 interfaith 135–6 intra-faith 136 and jihad 139–41 multiple 142 mutual 144 non directive 152–4 and renewal 142 and responsibility 144 and self 144 A theology of 136–9 Dialogue Society 135, 175 dignity 151 Dignity of Difference, The 137 disunity 116, 117, 147 diversity 157–8 docilitas 74 dreams 157 and responsibility 157 education 116–19 and autonomy 119 and family 119, 120

Subject Index and moral development 119 and reconciliation 119 and renewal 119 and women 120 emotional intelligence 186 empathy 145, 147, 153 ene 60 Enlightenment 80 ensoulment 49 environment 97–100 episteme 73 Erdogan, President 170 eros 65–6 existentialism 92–3 faith 76 fidelity 76, 114 Francis Report (2013) 8 Frankfurt School 53 Free Gaza Movement 10–11 free will 33–4, 43–7 and alternative possibilities 44, 45 and compatibilism 44 destiny 44 and determining factors 44 and determinism 44–7 as gift from God 45 tensions in Gulen’s view of 33 freedom 4 and autonomy 45 and dignity 45 disinterested 45 and human rights 45 negative 45 positive 45 moral 45 and responsibility 45 and self awareness 58 and servanthood 45 Gaza 10–13, 20, 29–30 freedom flotilla 10–11 Gülen’s response 19–23 and justice 28–9 governance 4, 178–82 greed 65–6 Greenpeace 30 Gülen, Fethullah passim biography 13–19 and democracy 124–6, 180–1

Subject Index and environment 97–100 and moral psychology chapter 3 passim leadership 18, chapter 7 passim response to Gaza flotilla 19–23, 165–6 response to the Turkish government 178–81 universal responsibility 93–5 Gülen, limitations of his theology 165–8 in agency 166 in social responsibility 167–8 in universal responsibility 166–7 halal 78–9 Hamas 11, 29 haram 78–9 heroes 21 and heroic acts (kahramanlik) 21 and challenge 21 hizmet 42–3, 170 Hizmet Movement 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 114, 116, 117–18, 120, 136, 146, 168–78 Hizmet schools 117–18 as part of peace building 117–19 in Northern Iraq 118 in Philippines 118 Holocaust 94–5, 156 hope 115–19, 132, 157 and agency 116 goals 115 ground, of 117 pathways 115 realistic 117 hopefulness 117 human rights 123–4, 179 and Islam 124 and peacebuilding 123–4 Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief Fund (IHH) 10, 23–4 humility 81–2, 149–51 identity 126–9, 150 and agency, chapter two passim constructed 126 and creation 165 and dialogue 126–7 moral 61–6 and narrative 126–8 personal 183

207

and the self 60, 61 and dialogue 62 responsive 69 social 183 and struggle 60–1 ignorance 116, 147, 148 ikhlas 79, 80, 185 imputability 34–7 and ideas 35 and practice 36–7 and values 35–6 integration 72 integrity 81–2, 148, 169, 172 and ambiguity 169 intelligentia 75 interdependency 166 and mutual need 166 International Criminal Court (ICC) 12, 13 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 10 Israeli government 2, 11–12, 21 and relations with Turkey 21 Jainism 129 jihad 65, 135, 166 a complex concept 140 and holistic dialogue 141 greater 65, 140 lesser 65, 140 journalism 87, 107–9 Journalists and Writers Foundation 11, 15, 135 justice 78–82, 178–80 as fairness 79 distributive 79 environmental 81 as fairness 79 and the Gaza flotilla 20–1 global, chapter 4 passim and interpretation 179–80 and leadership 178 and merit 79 organizational 80 procedural 80 and religious duty 180 and responsibility 28–9 retributive 79 restitutive 79 restorative 80 social 79 as a virtue 79–82

208

Subject Index

kairos 187 khalifa 39 Kimse Yok Mu? 106 leadership 16 and accountability 178–9 charismatic 178 and dialogue 81 distributed 16 dispersed 182 formal leadership integrity 28 guardian leadership 178 and justice 178 personal leadership integrity 28 and responsibility 120, 178–82 and stakeholders 129 Sufi servant 178 substantive leadership integrity 28 and trust 178 learning 74, 128 circle 74, 130 organization 130 platforms 128 Lederach, John Paul chapter 5 passim and the moral imagination 5: 14–21 and paradoxical thinking 7; 17–18 and soul 5;18 and ‘voice walkers’ 5; 18 and web watching 7: 16 liability 38 Lindenstrauss, Micha 26 Lindemstrauss Commission 26–7 lust 64–5 Macbeth 57 Mavi Marmara 10–13, 30, 178, 180 meditative capacity 132 memoria 74 Mennonite Church 114 metacognition 66–7 middle way 72 Mid Staffs Hospital Trust 1, 8 mindfulness 71 modernity 157 modesty 70 moral agency. See agency moral imagination 126–33 and cycles of conflict 126 and deliberation 126

and dialogue 126 and heuristic journey 128 and learning platforms 128 and perception 126–7 radical 127 and worth 127 moral psychology 47–57 and action 42–3 and moral agency 53 and conscience (wijdan) 53–4 and experiential reason 51 and evidential reason 51 and reason (aql) 49–51 mind (zihin) 56–7 and natural reason 50–1 and personhood 48 and sensation (his) 55–6 spiritual intellect (fuad) 54–5 and spirit (ruh) 48–9 and virtues 41–2 Willpower (irade) 54–5 mujaddid 141–3 multiculturalism 157–8 Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) 29 mutuality 128 nafs 59–62 actualizing human potentiality 60 narrative 54–5, 127–9 authorship 54 and dialogue 181 and ethical responsibility 54–5 identity 54 interpretation 127–9 and prophecy 181 and restorying 127–9 negative capability 129 Netherlands 176–7 and debate about civic responsibility New Testament 70, 94 New Religious Movements (NRMs) 16, 17 New York Times 173, 179–81 Noahide Laws 137 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 20, 27, 28, 30 and advocacy 28–9 and care 28 and justice 28 and politicization 29

Subject Index Nous 73, 5: 19 Nursi 149, 167

Palestinian Authority 29 Palmer, Geoffrey 25 Palmer Commission 25–6 paradox 113 and curiosity 113, 129 patience 79 peace 19 responsibility for 19 peacebuilding, chapter 5 passim culture of 126–7 perception 122, 7:12 pessimism 129 as gift 129 as systematic 129 phronesis 11, 22, 73–4 dialogic 108 in professions 107–9 politics 167–8, 179–82 positive action 150 Post-Holocaust ethics 94–5 post modernity 159 poverty 116, 147, 148 power 152–3, 154, 164 and truth 165 practical Wisdom. See phronesis and prudentia practical theology 70, 163 Press Association 7 prophecy 173, 187 and civic responsibility 173 Prometheus 44 Prospect Magazine 14 providentia 74 prudentia 74

reconciliation 7: 23, 8: 18 regulation 61 self 61 respect 76, 77 responsibility chapter 2 passim and accountability 37–8 agency 34–41 as the basis of ethics 94–7 and concentric circles 187 consciousness of 69 debates 2–3 and dialogue, Chapter three passim 105 environmental 97–100 the ethics of 137 and the Gaza flotilla incident 12–13 and identity 51–3, 108 as imputabiity 34–7 and intention 44–5 and justice 28–30 negotiated 104–6 and perception 104 personal 121–2 plural 102–3 positive 38–9 and power 107–8 proactive 103 professional 107–10 proximity 107–8 restless 106–7 and self-interpretation 36 shared 104 and spirituality 161 and teleology 88–9 spheres of 165 universal 90–1, 166–7 undetermined 103 as a virtue 69 Ricoeur, Paul 34 positive responsibility Chapter four passim negative responsibility 34–5 Rumi Forum 175

Rachel Corrie 31 radicalisation 176 ratio 74 reason 41. See also moral psychology recognition 152

sagacity 128. See also phronesis science 91 and stewardship 91–2 and teleology 91–2 sect 15–16

Obama, Barak 7 Olympism 5: 12 optimism 115 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 8: 27

209

210 sensuous perception 130–1 serendipity 128–9 service 118–20 and responsibility 121 social capital 104 social justice 71 social responsibility 121. See CSR solertia 74 spirit. See moral psychology spiritual development 60–3 stages of 60–2 spiritual journey 128–9 as heuristic 128 spiritual techniques 67–8 and austerity 67 and contemplation 67 sophia 73 spirituality 47–53 grounded 161–5 stillness 128, 130 stewardship 88–90 and relational accountability 89 and vicegerent 88 subsidiarity 117, 167 Sufism 16 master 16 order 16–17 sustainability chapter 4 passim tajdid 141–3 by conduct 141 collectively constructed 142 techne 73 teleology 40–1 teleopathy 66–7 theology 114 and creation 114 temperance 71 terrorism 176 Three Princes of Serendib 186 time 129–31 as circular 131 tolerance 75–6, 121–2, 132, 151 transcendence 131 transformation 129 transparency 145–6, 177

Subject Index and civil society 177 Trimble, David 24 trust 114 trustworthiness 62 truth 59, 84 true to others 59–60 true to self 60–1 and paradox 113, 129 and power 165 truthfulness 22–3 Turkel Commission 24–5 Tutu, Desmond 11 Twelfth Night 186 unintended consequences 166–7 United Nations 12, 25–6, 27 universities 120, 144–5 in Kenya 110 in post conflict areas 110 in Uganda 110 in Kyrgyzstan 110 vicegerent 40–2, 69–70 virtue ethics theory 70, 82–3 and chaos 157 virtues 68–77, 178–80 based in spirituality 70 cardinal 75 and education 80 intellectual 73, 5: 19 and the mean 70–2 moral, chapter 5 passim relation to responsibility 5: 9 vocation 129–33, 155–6 Wall street journal 19 Watkin, Ken 24 web watching 128 wisdom 22, 72–5 worth 52–3, 151 Yeats, W.B. 157 Zaman Daily 15, 23–4, 107 principles 100, 108–9, 146 Zaman Vandaag 175