The Soviet Position on Prohibition of Atomic Weapons and International Control of Atomic Energy

Table of contents :
Concerning Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon and International Control - Speech of November 10 before the Special Political Committee
On the Question of Atomic Energy - Speech of November 23 at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly

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THE SOVIET POSITION PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC W PONS D INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ATOMIC ENERGY

PEECH ES BY A. Y. VYSH INSKY rHE FOURT H SESSI ON OF THE rED NATIO NS GENE RAL ASSEM BLY, EMBER , 1949

Conce rning Prohib ition of the Atomic Weapo n and Interna tional Contro l ----- ----- ----- ----- -

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Speech of November 10 before the Special Political Committee

On the Questi on of Atomic Energy _____ _____ ___ 31 Speech of November 23 at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly

All quotations in the following: speeches have been retranslat ed from Ruulan.

Published by the Informatio n Bulletin of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2112 Massachu setts Ave., N. W ., Washingt on 8, D. C.

Speech of No ve mb er 10, 1949 be for e the Special Po liti ca l Co mm itte e Unit ed Stat es and Britain Sab otag e the Deci sion s of the Gen eral Asse mbl y

our agenda is the Atom ic Energy Commission's repo rt deal . . ing with one of the mos t imp orta nt issues attra ctin g the Unit ed Nati ons' atten tion . This ques tion is alrea d.y thre e years old. This leng th of time was enou gh to have decided it, but never· it is theless it still rema ... ins undecided. And even mor e than that at pres ent no closer to solu tion than it was two or thre e years ago. And_this, desp ite the num ber of resolutions adop ted by the Gen eral Assembly duri ng this peri od expressing in a clear-cut and precise man ner the . who lehe arted aspi ratio n of our orga niza tion that this qµestion be deci ded by proh ibiti ng the use of atom ic ener gy for war purp oses and by rem ovin g the atom ic wea pon from natio nal armaments. One has to state that all these reso lutio ns have turn ed out to be holl ow declarations, that they are all void of prac tical importance, that they have been turn ed by the. com man ding bloc in the Unit ed Nati ons into emp ty scraps of pape r. The year that has elapsed since the third session of the Gen eral Assembly has not mad e any new cont ribu tion to the solu tion of the atomic prob lem. As we poin ted out as long ago as the Pari s session, the reso lutio n of Nov emb er 4, 1948 did not, nor coul d it, yield any results. In this sense, it may be said that the past year is a lost year as far as the issue in ques tion is concerned. It may be presumed that this resolution had one object, that of covering up the· refusal to carry out the prin cipa l resolutions of the Gen eral Assembly adop ted on Janu ary 24 and Dec emb er 14, 1946, resolution s whose histo ric significance mus t. not of course be unde restimated. To prove• this it will be sufficient to refer to poin t six of the D~cember 14, 1946 reso lutio n conc ernin g the insti tutio n with in the fram ewo rk of the Security Council whic h bears the main responsibility for the main tena nce of inter natio nal peac e and N



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security· of an international agency to ensure the adoptiop of measures on prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes~ and the establishment of control over atom~c energy to the extent necessary for ensuring its exclusive use for peaceful • aims. The. General Assembly resolution of November 4 evades this, question, or, to be more exact, buries this question. Moreover, ., it is not even a first-class, but a third-class burial. As foreseen by the Soviet delegation some time ago, the recqmmendations contained in the General Assembly resolution of November 4, 1948, consultations among the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of establishing whe:her there was a basis for agreement on international control over atomic energy to ensure its exclusive use for peaceful purposes, proved to be unreal ana incapable of lifting this important issue out of deadlock. The reason for this should be clear: of" the six perman,ent members of this Commission, five, by voting for the resolution of November 4, 1948, had in advance recogni~ed the ·necessity of suspending altogether the ''work -of the Commission, ascribing this to •tthere being no way out'' and to the Commission's impot~nc~ in rec9nciling contradictions and differences that had appeared . during its work. This decision of the Atomic Energy Commission signified in essence the renunciation of all attempts to bring .about the prohibition of the atomic weapon. This decision is directly and j obviously contradictory to the resolutions of January 24 and December 14, 1946. This i.n fact was also indirectly recognized by the General Assembly which directed the commission to resume its meetings and to make a study of the remaining questions in i~ts program, which the commission itself would deem practicable and useful. By the time ihis resolution was adopted, no one could entertain•• , any doubt that the consideration of secondary questions still pend. ing in" the program of the (Ommission could not be of any essential significance, not to say of no significance at all. However, the real facts surpassed the most pessimi~tic expectations, since the majority ot this commission immediately returned to its former irreconcil~ble standpoint, showing once again the ...... desire of the Anglo-American camp to frustrate the preparations ..... . 4

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of a convent ion on the prohibit ion of the atomic weapon and on cqntrol over the impleme ntation of this prohibit ion. The so-called ttresumption'' of work of the Atomic Energy Com1nission consisted of a ,reiterati on by the majority of this commission of tpe same theses in favor of the American plan for so-called internat ional .. control. All the proceedings at the meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission furnished further proof o·f the complet e relucta~ce of the majority of this commission to take any step forward, proved that "quite the contrary was the case, that its sole desire was to a mere formality, without reduce the work of the commission even a hint of real readiness to give serious consideration to measures for the prohibit ion of the atomic weapon, to measures for the establishment of really ~ffective internat ional control. This m·a nner of behavior of the Commission -majority fully corresponded to the policy of th~ United Stafes Govern·ment on the atomic question a~ expressed in the well-known speech delivered by the Presiden t of the United States on April-~ 6, 1949, when he said that he·; would not hesitate in deciding to use the atomic bomb if the United States' welfare or the world democracies were at stake. The significance of -the second part of this statemen t, mention ing the reasons for which atom bombs would be dropped on some people's heads, is of course conditional, inasmuc h as it is always possible to find a ··plausible excuse for the most imprope r action. Nevertheless, a •·fact is a fact, -a nd it-· is a fact· that high-placed persons in the USA were least of all· inclined to consider -the idea of prohibit ing the use of the atom bomb, but, on the contrary, they· were consider ing the idea of using the atom bomb at tqe appropr iate moment without hesitation. General Bradley, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: ''In the military respect the North Atlantic · Pact may become just as importa nt .for America n security as the possession of atom bombs.'' With such a stand there could not, naturally, be any hope that , success ~ould attend_ the work of the Commission called upon, to . work out !measures for prohibit ing the atomic weapo~. Nor was the· "i 948 session of the General Assembly able to advance this question. Moreover, taking an entirely uncritical view of the ;eport submitte d. by the Atomic Energy Commission and confining ..itself r·o a-simple endorse ment Ot the general deduc-

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tions and recommendations of this report the object wor_ked for and achieved by the Anglo-American bloc at the third sessionthe third ·session of the General Assembly thus relinquished all attempts to continue the work the question of prohibition of the atomic weapon and establishment of international control. Reluctance to bring about the prohibition of the atomic weapon is the principal reason which prompts the Government of the United States of America to hinder in every way the preparation of· recommendations on the _prohibition of the atomic weapon; true this reluctance is covered up by false phras~s about anxiety -at the impasse reached in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission; it is covered up by hypocritical wishes for consultations between the sir permanent members of the commission for establishing whether there is a basis for agreement on international control over atomic energy, for ensuring its exclusive use for peaceful purposes, and for the r~moval of the atomic weapon from the national armaments. • The Anglo-American bloc, which forced this resolution upon the Assembly a year ago, was, of course, aware beforehand of the fact that the existing standpoints,- very eloquently illustrated by the statements of very high-placea leaders of American politics, give no grounds whatever for the hope that this commission of six · would succeed in finding such a basis as a result of its so-called -consultations. Nevertheless, this resolution helped to mislead public opinipn by creating the ,erroneous impression that the USA, Brit().in, and their followers. are really anxious over the situation which developed on this question. ~· Now it is officially stated that the six permanent members of tQe Commission have failed to find a basis on which to solve the task facing them.

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How the Anglo-American Bloc Distorts Facts

Cflnnot help noting. that simultaneously with the present~­ tion to the General Assembly of this Commission's. preliminary report concerning consultations among the six permanent metnbers