The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy

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The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Nature of the Problem
2. The Content and Evolution of Congressional Isolationism
3. The Isolationist Congressman: Social Background Characteristics
4. The Isolationist Congressman: Political Characteristics
5. The Isolationist Congressman: Constituency Characteristics
6. Ideology and Foreign Policy Voting
7. Isolationism, the Legislative System, and Presidential Leadership
Postscript: The 88th Congress

Citation preview

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM congressional voting and presidential leadership in foreign policy

A n A dvanced Study in Political Science

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM congressional voting and presidential leadership in foreign policy

LEROY N . RIESELBACH Indiana University

T he Bobbs-M errill Company, Inc. A Subsidiary of H ow ard W . Sams & Co., Inc. Publishers • Indianapolis • New York • Kansas City

James A . Robinson The Ohio State University C o n s u l t in g E d it o r

Designed by Lester Glassner

Copyright © 1966 by T h e Bobbs-M errill Com pany, I n c L ibrary of Congress C atalog C ard N um ber 67-18661 P rinted in the U nited States o f A m erica First P rin tin g

T o Helen

Contents LIST OF TABLES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1.

2.

X XV

INTRODUCTION

3

TH E NATURE OF T H E PROBLEM

7

A Brief History of American Isolationism, 1796-1938

9

Congressional Isolationism, 1939-1958

13

The Literature of Isolationism

16

T H E CONTENT AND EVOLUTION OF CONGRESSIONAL ISOLATIONISM

33

Foreign and Domestic Policy: Is There a Difference?

35

The Content of Congressional Isolationism

38

The Evolution of Congressional Isolationism •• vtt

47

• ••

Vttt

CONTENTS

3.

4.

5.

T H E ISOLATIONIST CONGRESSMAN: SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

61

Religious Affiliation

62

Educational Attainm ent

67

Prior M ilitary Service

69

Prior Occupation

73

TH E ISOLATIONIST CONGRESSMAN: POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

83

Length of Service

84

Electoral Margin

88

Prior Elective Office

94

Committee Assignment

96

TH E ISOLATIONIST CONGRESSMAN: CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS

105

R egon

106

Urban-Rural Division

114

Ethnicity

120

Educational Level

127

Socioeconomic Status

132

6. IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

VOTING

141

The Extent of Ideological Orientation

143

The Composition of the Extreme Ideological Groups: Party Affiliation

146

The Composition of the Extreme Ideological Groups: Demographic Characteristics

148

The Moderate Ideological Types

153

The M ixed Ideological Types

160

CONTENTS

7.

ISOLATIONISM. T H E LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM, AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP Isolationism: What It Is and What I t Is N ot

SX

165 165

A Paradigm of Congressional Voting Decisions

170

Strategies and Techniques of Presidential Leadership

181

Conclusion

192

p o s t s c r ip t : t h e

8 8 t h c o n g r ess

195

APPENDIXES

A. The Foreign and Domestic Policy Guttman Scales

201

B. The Sources of the Demographic Data

219

BIBLIOGRAPHY

223

INDEX

235

TABLES 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2- 5

Correlations Between Basic Scales, by Congress Correlations Between Basic and O ther Scales, by Congress Correlations of Civil Rights and Basic Scales, by Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Party and Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Party and Congress

3- 1 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Party, Reli­ gion, and Congress 3-2 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid Among Urban Congressmen, by Religion and Party, 83rd Congress 3-3 Distribution of Votes of Democrats on Foreign Trade, by Education and Congress 3-4 D istribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Military Service, Party, and Congress 3-5 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Occupa­ tion, Party, and Congress

x

37 40 44 49 51

64 65 68 71 74

LIST O P TABLES

3- 6

4 -1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5

4 -6

5 -1 5—2 5—3 5—4 5-5 5-6

5-7

D istribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Occupa* tion, Party, and Congress Correlation Coefficients: Length of Service and For­ eign Policy Scale Scores, by Congress D istribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Electoral Margin, Party, and Congress Correlation Coefficients: Electoral Margin and For­ eign Policy Scale Scores, by Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Prior Elective Office, Party, and Congress Comparison of Voting on Foreign Aid, Foreign Af­ fairs Committee and Rest of the House, by Party and Congress Distribution of Republican Votes on Foreign Trade, by Committee Assignment and Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Region, Party, and Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Region, Party, and Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Ruralism, Party, and Congress Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Rural­ ism, Party, and Congress Correlation Coefficients: Ruralism and Foreign Pol­ icy Voting, by Congress Distribution of Votes of Midwestern Representatives on Foreign Aid, 85th Congress, by Ruralism and Party Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Ethnicity, Party, and Congress

XI

75

86 89 90 95

98 99

108 109 115 116 117

118 122

XI*

U ST O P TABLES

5-8

Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Eth­ nicity, Party, and Congress 5-9 Correlation Coefficients: Ethnicity and Foreign Pol­ icy Voting, by Congress 5-10 D istribution of Votes of Urban Representatives on Foreign Aid, 83rd Congress, by Ethnicity and Party 5-11 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Educa­ tional Level, Party, and Congress 5-12 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Educa­ tional Level, Party, and Congress 5-13 Correlation Coefficients: Educational Level and For­ eign Policy Voting, by Congress 5-14 Distribution of Votes of Republican Representatives on Foreign Policy, 85th Congress, by Education and Region 5-15 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Socio­ economic Status, Party, and Congress 5-16 Distribution of Votes on Foreign Trade, by Socio­ economic Status, Party, and Congress 5-17 Correlation Coefficients: Socioeconomic Status and Foreign Policy Voting, by Congress 5-18 Distribution of Votes of Midwestern Representatives on Foreign Aid, 85th Congress, by Party and Status 5- 19 Distribution of Votes of Urban Representatives on Foreign Aid, 85th Congress, by Party and Status 6- 1 6-2 6-3

123 123 124 128 128 129

130 133 134 134 135 136

D istribution of Foreign Policy Ideological Types, by Congress Distribution of Representatives, by Ideological

143

Inclination and Congress

145

Distribution of Extreme Ideological Types, by Party and Congress

146

LIST OF TABLES

X III

6-4

Significant Differences: Isolationists and Internation­ alists, by Congress 6-5 Significant Differences: Isolationists and Internation­ alists, by Party and Congress 6-6 Significant Differences: Moderate Ideological Types and Isolationists, by Congress 6-7 Significant Differences: Moderate Ideological Types and Internationalists, by Congress 6-8 Significant Differences: Democratic Moderate Inter* nationalists and Internationalists, by Congress 6-9 Significant Differences: Mixed and Extreme Ideolog­ ical Types, by Congress 6- 10 Significant Differences: Democratic Mixed and Inter­ nationalist Ideologies, by Congress

162

7- 1 A Paradigm of Congressional Voting Decisions

171

P-1

150 151 154 156 158 161

D istribution of Votes on Foreign Aid, by Party, 88th Congress

197

A -l

Sample Scalogram

202

A -2

Scalogram of Foreign Aid Votes, Wisconsin Delega­ tion, 85th Congress Frequency D istribution of Scale Types A ttitude Toward Foreign Aid by Party Affiliation, Wisconsin Delegation, 85th Congress

A -3 A-4

206 207 207

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In w riting this book, I incurred a number of obligations, both personal and institutional, which I acknowledge with gratitude here. A number of people have been generous with their time and com­ ments. Robert E. Lane was a constant source of guidance and en­ couragement. James D. Barber, Robert A. Dahl, Karl W . Deutsch, Charles H. McCall, Jr., James A. Robinson, and Robert C. W ood gave excellent critical readings of die manuscript, or portions of it, a t various stages in its writing. Duncan MacRae, Jr., made available material which spared me many hours of toil mapping congressional districts and calculating their demographic attributes. T o many oth­ ers, too numerous to mention, I owe thanks for suggestions on particular problems relating to this project. W hile I have benefited greatly from their suggestions, they are, of course, absolved from responsibility for any sins of commission or omission which I may have committed. I am grateful to the Political Science Department of Yale Univer­ sity on two counts: first, for the training which enabled me to undertake the w riting of this study and, second, for its support (with funds from the Falk Foundation) during the years when the project was designed and the data collected. The Mental Health Research Institute of the University of Michigan provided, through a post-doctoral fellowship, the peaceful but also stimulating envi­

xv

xvi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ronment in which the final draft of this book was completed as well as the secretarial assistance which made it legible. For permission to incorporate portions of my earlier articles on congressional isolationism, I am grateful to the editors of Interna­ tional Organization and The American Political Science Review. Finally, I cannot begin to express adequate thanks to my family— my wife, Helen, and our children—for aid, comfort, and encour­ agement over the years during which this book was written.

LEROY N . RIESELBACH September 196S

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM congressional voting and presidential leadership in foreign policy

Introduction

Isolationism has been a force in American politics since the found­ ing of the nation. Although the number of isolationists has declined, and the concept of isolationism has changed, substantial opposition remains to American participation in foreign affairs. Despite a seem­ ingly irrevocable commitment to world leadership, Congress and the people have shown a persistent reluctance to provide the tools for the exercise of this leadership. The isolationist phenomenon is of more than historical interest, even though internationalism is predominant now. It is possible (and to some degree has occurred) that the present extent of involvement in international affairs will come under closer scrutiny, and perhaps even attack, in Congress. The possibility of a dramatic upswing in popular and congressional support for a policy much less firmly committed to foreign involvement does exist. N or is it entirely in­ conceivable that the “conservative renaissance," which some ob­ servers see on campus and in Congress, might lead to control of key policy-making positions by men who question the usefulness of for­ eign aid, reciprocal trade, and continued membership in the United Nations.

3

4

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

This book is w ritten on the assumption, however, that the United States will continue to participate actively in foreign affairs and that the president will continue to propose internationalist programs to Congress. The foreign policy-making process has involved interac­ tion between the executive and legislative branches, with the initia­ tive in the hands of the former. Robert Dahl’s formulation—"in foreign policy the president proposes, the Congress disposes”— remains, and we assume will remain, an accurate description of the policy-making process.1 The president is dependent on Congress to provide the authority and the funds to put his programs into opera­ tion, but James A. Robinson in his recent summary of tw enty-tw o case studies of foreign affairs decisions found that despite high con­ gressional involvement in sixteen of these decisions, the legislature initiated only three of them and exercised "predominant influence” in only six.2 Since the president with his powerful constitutional position and his vastly superior sources of information provides, and in fact is expected to provide, leadership in foreign affairs, his ability to se­ cure congressional acceptance of, and support for, his proposals will be crucial if he is to be an effective leader.8 T o mobilize support effectively, he must know what his most probable bases of congres­ sional support are, what kinds of resistance he is likely to encounter, and what kind of congressmen will resist him. Specifically, will it be worthwhile for the president, who must search for additional votes to carry his program through Congress, to appeal to Catholic legisla­ tors, to members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to the repre­ sentatives of eastern constituencies, or to rural legislators? Should he expect to be opposed by congressmen who were lawyers before election or by those from electorally marginal districts? Briefly, the central question of this study is: W hich members of 1 R oben A. Dahl, congress and foreign policy (New York: H arcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 58. 2 For details, see James A. Robinson, congress and foreign policy - making (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1962), chap. 2, pp. 23-69, w ith a summary table at p. 65. 8 The intrusion of such issues as American “prestige” abroad and the state of the Atlantic alliance into recent political campaigns in the form of charges of failure on the pan of the administration in office suggests the force of the expectation of presidential leadership.

INTRODUCTION

5

Congress, specifically of the House of Representatives, are likely to support and which to oppose the internationalist policies the presi­ dent will continue to suggest? Our findings in the first six chapters will attempt to answer this question by determining the specific attributes of the isolationist congressman—that is, his social back­ ground, his political attributes, and the attributes of die consti­ tuency he represents. The data are explicated in terms of the congres­ sional response to internationalist programs on the assumption that the legislature will receive such programs from the president. The findings do, however, indicate the possible sources erf votes for isola­ tionist policy proposals should such be sent to Congress. In answering the first question, this study can shed some light on tw o other questions: what is the general nature of the voting process in Congress, and what are the implications of our study for the leadership obligation of the president? A paradigm of the factors relevant to congressional vote choice, integrating the findings from the first six chapters with the findings of other works which focus on the determinants of legislative voting, is presented in Chapter Seven. The paradigm suggests that the vote of the individual repre­ sentative may be influenced by a variety of factors. Some of these factors are external to the legislature—events at home and abroad, constituency opinion, and the demographic make-up of the district. Some of the factors are internal to the legislative system—the formal organizational structure of the chamber, and the “rules of the legisla­ tive game.” Personal attributes of the congressman may affect his voting behavior. His own preferences are important; he may feel so strongly about some matter that he will ignore the views of his constituents, the legislative leadership, and the president to vote his convictions. However, no lawmaker can ignore the views of his constituents with impunity for long periods, and, thus, the repre­ sentative’s perceptions of the opinions held by the residents of his district become important. Vote choice emerges from this welter of external, internal, and personal factors. The vote position taken by any representative is, in a sense, the resultant of events, constituency attitudes and character­ istics, and the shape of the legislative system, all mediated by the personal characteristics of individual congressmen. Some of these relationships are explored in the following pages.

6

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

The paradigm of congressional voting decisions leads, in turn, to a discussion of where, and in what ways, the president can intervene in the legislative process to mobilize support for his program. In our discussion of the president as engaged in mobilizing votes in Con­ gress, he is, of course, used to symbolize all the agencies, bureaus, and individuals in the executive branch concerned with foreign pol­ icy. By establishing correlations between the social, political, and constituency attributes of congressmen and vote choice, our find­ ings may suggest which representatives are more likely to be amenable to suggestions (or “pressures”) from the president. Some of the many strategic and tactical weapons available to the president to win congressional backing for his policy initiatives are also discussed. The exclusive concern of the present volume is with the imple­ mentation, not the formulation, of foreign policy. The process of policy-making and the wisdom of the policies lie beyond our con­ cerns here. As might be expected in establishing the characteristics of the isolationist congressman, some common assumptions about him are dispelled. But, of even more importance, it is hoped that this examination of the patterns of congressional voting on foreign aid and trade legislation may provide some insight into the ways in which the president can deal more effectively with the problems of foreign policy leadership.

1.

The N ature o f the Problem

Many discussions of foreign affairs assume the existence of an isolationist-internationalist continuum without explicitly defining either of these terms. Definitions are, however, implicit in this litera­ ture. In the broadest sense, isolationism is an attitude of opposition to binding commitments by the United States government that would create new, or expand existing, obligations to foreign nations. This definition embraces those who merely want no new policy departures and those who desire substantial cutbacks in our overseas commitments. The latter group has not been large, and questions of reduction in the scope of foreign policy activity have seldom reached the roll-call stage in Congress. More often, particularly in recent years, controversy has centered on the extent of the commit­ ment, for example, the size of the foreign aid appropriation. Thus we shall mainly be concerned with those representatives who would adhere rather closely to the status quo. This general definition should not blind us to the probability that isolationism is a multidimensional phenomenon, of which a number of different species may exist. Isolationists may have different geo­ 7

8

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

graphical foci: one clearly definable group may reject all foreign involvements; another may oppose all activity outside the W estern Hemisphere; and a third may wish to avoid contact with Europe, while participating actively in Asian affairs ( ‘‘Asia-Firsters’’). Isola­ tionists may also differ along subject matter lines. For instance, a military isolationist may oppose the commitment of troops to de­ fend foreign areas; an economic isolationist may object to the use of nonmilitary resources to assist other nations; a political isolationist may reject participation in international organizations; or a “gen­ eral” isolationist may decry any overseas commitments which might impose restraints on future American activity, or which might have undesirable domestic effects. Numerous permutations and combina­ tions of the above may exist. For example, economic isolationists, while condemning foreign aid, may be quite willing to spend enor­ mous sums for American national defense as a means of purchasing freedom from foreign commitments. The problem lies in determin­ ing whether a particular instance of isolationism stems from a single attribute, a cluster of different but highly correlated variables, or a series of distinct factors which are unrelated to one another. W ith the continuing involvement of this country in world politics and the seeming finality of such participation, the word isolationism has come to have unfavorable connotations to many Americans. In this study no such connotation is implied by its use. Isolationism, here, refers only to a reluctance to extend American overseas com­ mitments with respect to all or to some particular segment of foreign affairs. W hether this reluctance is justified or unjustified is an entirely independent matter. But what subjects do individuals, in Congress and out, perceive as falling under the designation “foreign affairs”? Common sense would assign some matters to either foreign or domestic affairs, but it is difficult to make intuitive judgments on all matters before Con­ gress. Is, for instance, the question of the admission of displaced persons to this country a foreign policy issue? O r is it seen as more closely related to matters of civil rights? Has civil rights itself be­ come associated with foreign policy because of the emergence of the new African nations as an important international force? Is a proposed appropriation for overseas propaganda activities a foreign

9

CHAPTER ONE

policy or a government spending issue? Chapter Tw o will distin­ guish by means of vote correlations the subjects most closely related to foreign affairs.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM, 1796-1938 A cursory look at the history and impact of isolationist behavior on the conduct of American foreign relations will aid in understand­ ing die staying power of this idea in the face of harsh world reali­ ties, as well as aid in setting up a standard against which to measure changes in the nature of isolationism occurring since 1939. Unquestionably, the most famous utterance on the subject of American foreign political relations is George W ashington’s Fare­ well Address, delivered in September 1796: The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have as litde political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us snip. It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, / mean, as we are now at liberty to do it. . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establish­ ments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. . . This rather moderate speech, w ith references to “extending” commerce and safely trusting “temporary alliances,” has been taken by the opponents of all foreign contacts to be an absolute injunc­ tion. The pages of the Congressional Record are replete with quota­ tions from the speech, usually excluding the final paragraph. Staying clear of European entanglements, generalized to an aver­ sion to all contact with foreign nations, was a guiding tenet of1 1T ext from Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., the recoud o r American York: Knopf, 1954), pp. 86, 87. Italics added.

diplomacy

(New

10

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

American policy for 140 years. Except for one brief interlude—the Spanish-American W ar, which pointed toward Asia, not Europe, and which did not involve this country in European politics or entangling alliances—this policy remained inviolate until W orld W ar I, and after that conflict isolationism regained its dominant position. In the years between 1797 and 1917, the idea of isolation was reaffirmed on many occasions, the most widely known being the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in December, 1823. W hile warning the European powers to keep clear of the W estern Hemi­ sphere, President Monroe reiterated that “our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.” 2 The Civil W ar gave further impetus in this direction. The efforts of the Union were bent to prevent recognition of, or alliance with, the Confederacy by any European power. Tow ard this end, the government noted American abstention from European affairs and the Monroe Doctrine to persuade the nations of the Old W orld to refrain from intervention in the New. Historical evidence sug­ gests that the weakness of the southern position, not the persuasive­ ness of northern arguments, prevented any European alliances. In any event, no ties between Europe and the Confederacy emerged, and the American isolationist tradition survived the Civil W ar unscathed.8 Even direct participation in W orld W ar I failed to loosen the hold of the isolationist idea on the American people and on Ameri­ can policy. Several factors may account for the reaffirmation of faith in isolationism as an ideal which followed the Armistice. The w ar was described as a crusade to restore the old order, “to make the world safe for democracy.” 4 If the status quo ante was the 2 Bartlett, the record of American diplomacy , p . 182. 8 Sqe Samuel Flagg Bemis, a diplomatic history of the American people (4th edn., New York: H olt, 1955), pp. 364-383, for a full discussion of die events of this period. * See Selig Adler, the isolationist im pu lse : its tw entieth century reaction (N ew York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957), pp. 34, 35.

CHAPTER ONE

11

goal, w hy was a League of Nations required to keep the peace? W hy should the United States surrender its sovereignty to such an organization? These questions were asked frequently by those who had opposed the war, and by those who had profited little from it. They were also asked often by Republicans w ith an eye on the 1920 elections; the League, identified w ith a Democratic president, had become a prime target for partisan attack.5 O ther factors were unquestionably related to the outright rejec­ tion by Congress, and seemingly by popular opinion, of the collec­ tive security idea. But, for whatever reasons, during the “return to normalcy” of the 1920’s, America turned inward and away from the world political arena. The “red scare” of 1919-1920, the confidence in tiie nation's ability to take care of itself fostered by successful prosecution of the war, the war debt problem—all may have con­ tributed to the decline of interest in the nations of the Old W orld. W ith the defeat of the plan for United States adherence to the W orld Court, isolationism became the accepted policy of both major political parties and, apparently, of a great majority of the general population. The onset of the depression and the bloodshed of the early thirties only intensified isolationist determination to keep America out of any future war. Events in Manchuria, Ethio­ pia, and Spain hardened the dedication of the isolationists. Scholars sought to demonstrate that American participation in W orld W ar I had been unwarranted and unnecessary.5 The N ye Committee sug­ gested that an unwilling America had been beguiled and led into w ar through the evil designs of the “munitions lobby.” The result of this fervor was codification of the existing isolation­ ist policy in a series of acts, known as the N eutrality Laws, passed between 1935 and 1937.7 These laws forbade, when a state of war existed, the export of arms to any or all belligerents. They prohib­ ited direct loans to warring nations and indirect loans through the *lbid^ pp. 45-49. T he discussion which follows relies heavily on chaps. 4-8 of this volume. • W alter Millis, the road to war (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1935); Charles C. Tansell, America goes to war (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938). TR obert A. Divine in the illusion of neutrality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) gives a detailed account of the passage of these bills.

12

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

purchase of foreign securities. They also made it impossible, by including them as belligerents, for nations acting under a mandate from the League of Nations to obtain armaments in this country. These laws prohibited Americans from taking passage on ships sail­ ing under the flags of belligerent countries. Finally, the N eutrality Laws empowered the president, at his own discretion, to prohibit the export of some nonmilitary commodities to belligerents, except on a cash and carry basis. This last provision was aimed at averting the maritime incidents that had compromised American neutrality in the years before 1917. W ith the passage of these acts, an isolationism more extensive than that suggested by the Farewell Address became the law of the land. Franklin Roosevelt, fresh from his landslide victory over Alf Landon, signed these measures without an audible murmur of pro­ test. The President seemed unwilling to confront a strongly isola­ tionist nation—both in Congress and out—with the possibility that isolationism was not the way to avoid future conflicts.8 Up to the end of 1937 internal, not foreign, affairs dominated the American political scene.- It should be remembered, however, that throughout this period the United States was able to remain aloof from “entanglements” only so long as the international political situation remained favorable to such abstention. It is trite, but true, to say with Halle that “our real shield [from the Old W orld] was not the Atlantic Ocean but the English navy.” 8 A fter 1937 the isolationist tide slowly receded, and by 1939 the isolationists were clearly on the defensive. The outbreak of the war in Europe made clear to many Americans that this country could not remain indifferent to the outcome of the European conflict. During this period, the Roosevelt administration was able to per­ suade Congress that some preparations for war were essential. It is at this point that the present study will begin. ®Adler, the isolationist im pulse , p. 262; W illiam L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, the challenge to isolationism 1937-1940 (New York: H arper, 1952), pp. 38-39, 46-47, 81, 335-336, et passim. • Louis J. Halle, dream and reality : aspects of American foreign policy (New York: H arper & Row, 1959), p. 32.

CHAPTER ONE

13

CONGRESSIONAL ISOLATIONISM, 1939-1958 Tw o important criteria dictated the selection of the 76th, 80th, 83rd, and 85th Congresses for examination here: their consideration of important foreign policy questions, and their relationship with the presidency. In the 76th Congress, elected in 1938, the first halting steps were taken to increase the ability of the United States to resist aggression. A fter an early failure, a second effort succeeded in repealing the arms embargo provisions of the N eutrality Laws. The selective serv­ ice system was enacted. Congress appropriated increased expendi­ tures for national defense; empowered the president to call the Na­ tional Guard, Reserve units, and retired personnel to active duty; and renewed the president’s authority to make reciprocal trade agreements. The legislation was not enacted without desperate opposition. The first attempt to repeal the arms embargo of the N eutrality Laws ended in defeat; repeal came only in the final days of the second session of the Congress. The House version of the Selective Service A ct contained provisions, deleted in the Senate bill, requir­ ing the president to withhold induction of draftees for 60 days after he had issued a draft call, and then permitting him to induct only enough men to make up the difference between the number sought by the call and the number who had volunteered during the 60-day period. These provisions passed the House, by a 207-200 vote, on September 7, 1940. The 76th Congress in its early days illustrates the domination of the isolationist idea over a clear majority of congressmen. The pres­ sure of world events in the later days of the Congress produced the first breaks in the isolationist ranks. In the 76th Congress, both the high point of congressional isolationist strength and its slow erosion can be examined. The second Congress singled out for study, the 80th, encompasses the period 1947-1948, in which postwar American foreign policy

14

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

began to take form. The idea of foreign aid developed. A d hoc grants to devastated countries gave way to more systematic, longer range programs, such as aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan. The selective service system was extended into what were ostensibly peacetime years. The United Nations had been accepted and negotiations had been begun which were soon to link the United States inextricably in a far-flung network of “entangling alliances.” During these years, the reciprocal trade program was re­ enacted, and foreign contacts were extended by the admission of a large number of displaced persons, above and beyond the quotas imposed by immigration legislation.10 W hile much of this legislation was passed by comfortable margins, the opponents of these bills were able to pare down the size and scope of a number of them. For example, aid to devastated countries was trimmed by $150 million. The 80th Congress had a majority committed to an internationalist course, but within it there were substantial differences of opinion as to the proper extent of such activity. By 1952, when the 83rd Congress was elected, the “Cold W ar” had become a reality. The satellites and China had come under secure communist domination; the Berlin blockade and the Korean W ar made clear that force would continue to be an essential inter­ national political weapon. Charges of communist infiltration through­ out American society heightened concern with international affairs. All of these factors contributed to the success of the Republican party, traditionally the party of isolation. Although the time may have been ripe for a reconsideration of America’s role in world affairs, no major changes in policy were introduced or seriously considered. The policy of containment, de­ vised under previous Democratic administrations, remained in force during the Eisenhower years. If anything, opposition to interna­ tional commitments was reduced by the Eisenhower administra­ tion’s acceptance of existing programs. Foreign aid and reciprocal trade were continued. Larger sums were authorized and appropriated 10 For a full discussion of American policy during this period, see Adler, pp. 360-470; and H . Bradford W esterfield, foreign policy and party politics : pearl harbor to Korea (New H aven: Yale U ni­ versity Press, 1955), especially P art Three, pp. 129-382. the isolationist im pulse ,

CHAPTER ONE

25

for national defense. The 83rd Congress was notable rather for the decisions it failed to make than for the course of action it actually followed.11 T he Democratic party won control of Congress in 1956, in the face of a G.O.P. presidential sweep. Again Congress resisted whatever temptation may have existed to alter the basic outlines of American policy. Old programs were once again extended. Foreign aid and reciprocal trade had become established policy. The isolationist efforts were aimed not at repeal but at modification. The size and scope of these programs was the target of the opposition. The exigencies of the international situation were presumably responsible for the enactment of the “Eisenhower Mideast Doc­ trine”—the one departure taken by the 85th Congress. The Doc­ trine permitted the dispatch of American troops to foreign soil if requested by the government of the country involved. Less than sixty votes were cast against this idea in the House of Representa­ tives, indicating the extent to which activist, “entangling” policy had become accepted in the mid-fifties. T he second criterion for the selection of these particular Con­ gresses is the relation of the presidency and Congress. A number of studies of congressional roll calls have suggested that the voting configurations in Congress may be influenced by the status that a party enjoys as majority or minority, with or without a president in the W hite House.18 The four Congresses enumerated above have been selected to take this into account, thereby giving greater con­ fidence in findings that withstand changes in the party balance and control of the presidency. Each of the four represents one possible relationship between the W hite House and Congress. Thus the 76th Congress saw a Democratic president with a Democratic majority;*21 11 See Norman A. Graebner, the n ew isolationism (New York: Ronald Press, 1956), for a not unbiased view of American foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration. 12 See Duncan MacRae, dimensions of congressional voting (L os Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 298-312; David B. Trum an, the congressional party (New York: W iley, 1959), pp. viii, 11-12, 289-316; Malcolm E. Jewell, “Evaluating the Decline of Southern Internation­ alism Through Senatorial Roll Call Votes,” journal of politics, XXI (1959), 624-646.

16

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

the 80th Congress, a Democratic president confronted by a Repub­ lican congressional majority; the 83rd and 85th Congresses found a G.O.P. chief executive with his party first in the majority and then reduced to minority status. The voting records of the members of the House of Representa­ tives, rather than of the Senate, will be studied. The House seemed better suited to testing some of the relevant hypotheses because one important class of variables possibly related to isolationist behavior is demographic; the congressional constituency is much more likely to be demographically homogeneous than is an entire state.

T H E LITERATURE OF ISOLATIONISM Numerous variables have been suggested by others as relevant to isolationist behavior. Each hypothesis derived from the literature is relevant to the problems posed in the Introduction, for each, if valid at the congressional level, will specify a potential source of opposi­ tion to, or support for, presidential leadership on foreign policy matters. Four broad classes of variables appear to merit discussion: demographic, political, attitudinal, and psychological. Of the demographic factors, the most important, or at least the most common, hypothesis is that isolationism is geographically de­ termined.18 Adler suggests that:

f

The First World W ar crystallized the phenomenon called Midwestern isolationism. . . . Geography played an important part in nurturing this sentiment. A certain inner security came from having thousands of miles of land, in addition to the oceans, act as a buffer to the outside world. In western com­ munities, there were fewer people who had become aware of an Atlantic world, united by trade, travel, and cultural contacts.14

18 See Alfred O. H ero, Americans in world affairs (Boston: W orld Peace Foundation, 1959), for a compilation of much literature on demography and foreign policy attitudes. 14 Adler, the isolationist im pulse , p. 43. For other statements of the hypo­ thesis, see Halle, dream and reality, p. 52; Alexander DeConde, “On Tw enti­ eth Century Isolationism,” in DeConde, ed., isolation and security (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 3. Some doubt has been expressed

CHAPTER ONE

17

Unable to conceive of American interests as including an active role in international politics because of their physical insularity, the midwestem isolationists resist any efforts to expand the scope of such activity abroad. Smuckler has suggested a variation of this hypothesis. He con­ cludes that, while there is a discernable region of isolationism, “rural areas are more frequently represented by isolationists than urban areas in the same state.” 1(1 Presumably, lack of contact with inter­ national problems leads to failure to perceive a need for overseas commitments. The South poses special problems for analysis. During the late 1930's and early 1940's, this predominantly rural area was a staunch supporter of the internationalist policies of the New and Fair Deals, but it now appears to be moving toward a more isolationist position at a time when the remainder of the country is becoming more internationalist. This contrary development has been attributed to such factors as the industrialization and urbanization trends in the region, the weakening of the traditional southern alliance with the Democratic party, the ascent to power of the opposition Republi­ cans, and a general growth of conservatism in the area.19 Another widely held explanation of isolationism, of more recent vintage, is best stated by Samuel Lubell: The hard core of isolationism in the United States has been ethnic and emotional, not geographical.61*3 about the adequacy of this explanation by W illiam G. Carlton, “Isolationism and the Middle W est," Mississippi valley historical review , XXXIII (1946), 377-390; Ralph H . Smuckler, “The Region of Isolationism,” American poli­ tical science review , XLVII (1953), 386-401; and Leroy N . Rieselbach, “The Basis of Isolationist Behavior,” public opinion quarterly, XXIV (1960), 645657. For evidence that the relation of this factor to isolationism may be dif­ ferent among the general population from what it is in Congress, see Bruce M. Russen, “Demography, Salience, and Isolationist Behavior,” public opinion quarterly, XXIV (1960), 658-664. 13 Smuckler, “The Region of Isolationism,” p. 398. Also Bernard Fenster­ wald, Jr., “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansionism,” the journal of conflict resolution , II (June and December, 1958), 111-138, 280309, at p. 129. 16 Jewell, “Evaluating the Decline of Southern Internationalism”; and Charles O. Lerche, Jr., “Southern Congressmen and the ‘New Isolationism,*” political science quarterly, LXXV (1960), 321-337.

18

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

By far the strongest characteristic of the isolationist-voting counties is the residence there of ethnic groups with a proGerman or anti-English bias. Far from being indifferent to Europe’s wars the evidence argues that the isolationists ac­ tually were oversensitive to them.17 These pro-German, anti-English attitudes are, according to this explanation, residues of American participation in the great wars of the twentieth century. During these conflicts, Americans of G er­ man and Irish descent found themselves with divided loyalties. The German-American felt that his new nation should not be at war with his native land. The Irish, on the other hand, resented United States assistance to, and cooperation with, their traditional foe, G reat Britain. Both groups hope to avoid emotional conflict between an­ cestral ties and the national interest of their new land by keeping American foreign policy clear of situations producing such tensions. Therefore, these groups tend to oppose any policy that proposes Anglo-American cooperation, or that might produce some differ­ ence between Germany and the United States.18*Such sentiment is true not only for agricultural areas, but holds as well for GermanAmerican precincts in the cities.18 However, proponents of this ethnic-emotional theory deal almost exclusively with the midwestem regions, although there are coun­ ties elsewhere in the country with large ethnic groups. This would indicate that there may be some validity to the claims of the re­ gional theory. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that the ethnic view, while it may explain individual attitudes, is not a cru­ cial factor in congressional behavior.20 17 Samuel Lubell,

(Garden City, N . Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), pp. 137-150, at p. 140. Others offering similar, explanations are Louis H arris, is there a republican m ajority ? (New York: H arper, 1954), pp. 11-14, 82-94; and Louis Bean, how to predict elections (New York: Knopf, 1948), pp. 90-98. 18 For a general discussion of the impact of minority groups on foreign affairs decisions, see Lawrence H . Fuchs, "M inority Groups and Foreign Policy,” political science quarterly, LXXIV (1959), 161-175. 18 Lubell, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, p . 134. 20 Compare Julius Turner, party and constituency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), chap. 5, pp. 98-127; Rieselbach, “The Basis of Isolationist Behavior,” pp. 649, 652-656. For a suggestion that foreign the future of

American

politics

CHAPTER ONE

19

Another variable possibly related to isolationist sentiment is edu­ cation.* 21 The more education an individual has, so this hypothesis goes, the more likely he is to see the importance of overseas con­ nections to American welfare and security. There is ample evidence for the common assertion that education is related to interest and activity in, and information about, politics generally.22 By exten­ sion, this means that the educated are more likely to expect benefits from dealings with foreign nations. Fensterwald suggests the relevance of another factor, religious affiliation, for views on foreign policy. W hat is known is that American Catholics are greatly in­ fluenced in their attitudes by the position of the Vatican and, that during the crucial 1930’s, this influence was strongly in the direction of American aloofness from the affairs of Europe. American Catholics were in the front ranks of the “isolationists.” 2* H e also states that “the Episcopal church in America was generally ‘interventionist’ in the periods prior to America’s entry into both world wars,” while “several branches of the Lutheran Church were violently ‘isolationist’ in the same periods.” There is substantial data suggesting that American Jew ry is more internationalist in outlook than other religious groups.24 W hether religion has a similar impact on communicant congressmen remains to be seen. Tw o additional variables, military service and occupation, deserve brief mention. M ilitary service may affect foreign policy views in affairs are not especially salient to Americans of German and Irish ancestry, see Russett, “Demography, Salience, and Isolationist Behavior.” 21 Fensterwald, “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansion­ ism,” p. 137; Halle, dream and reality, pp. 59-67; and Smuckler, “The Region of Isolationism,” p. 399. 22 For example, Angus Campbell, et al., the American voter (New York: W iley, 1960), pp. 475-481; W illiam A. Scott and Stephen B. W ithey, the UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS, THE PUBLIC VIEW, 1954-1955 (New York: M anhattan Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 113-116, 126-127. 22 Fensterwald, “T he Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansion­ ism,” pp. 136, 137. 24 Fensterwald, “The Anatomy of American Isolationism’ and Expansion­ ism,” p. 136; Lawrence E. Fuchs, the political behavior of American je w s (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 100-103, 171-203.

20

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

two possible ways. It may cause those who have been members of the armed forces to become more aware of the connections of this country with foreign nations, or service may be a disagreeable expe­ rience, imparting a rejection of all activity that might lead to service for future generations. Some occupations, such as teaching and gov­ ernment service, may lead to views more sympathetic to interna­ tionalism than do other occupations, such as farming and business. Finally, socioeconomic status appears to influence foreign affairs attitudes.25 In a sense, status is a summary measure combining edu­ cation, religion, and occupation; These three variables are often the defining criteria of status; those who have a high degree of educa­ tional accomplishment, belong to certain churches, pursue pres­ tigious occupations, and possess the financial resources which go with these attributes are the individuals who are accorded high status positions in society. The high status group in America appears to be more internationalist than those lower on the socioeconomic ladder. As suggested by the literature of isolationism, the following eight demographic variables merit investigation of their relationship to congressional isolationist behavior: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Geography (sectionalism) Place of residence (urban-rural) National origin (ethnicity) Educational achievement Religious affiliation Military service Occupation Socioeconomic status

Education, religion, military service, and occupation will be dis­ cussed in Chapter Three, which relates the social background char­ acteristics of congressmen to their votes on foreign policy. Chapter Five will explore the relation between constituency characteristics— geography, residence, ethnicity, education, and status—and the con­ gressional vote. 25 See H ero, Americans in world status and w orld affairs behavior.

affairs,

pp. 43-68, for a discussion o f

CHAPTER ONE

21

It must be noted that demographic characteristics of the congres­ sional district are relevant only if the representative is conscious of, and responsive to, these constituency interests. It is a central assump­ tion of this study that this is the case. There is a good deal of evi­ dence both practical and scholarly, that constituency “pressures” must be carefully considered by the congressman.2* The second group of variables possibly related to isolationist be­ havior, we will call political factors. A number of studies have suggested that political affiliation is a crucial determinant of vote in Congress on most major issues, over­ riding the impact of pressure groups, constituency, and even per­ sonal conviction.27 W ith regard to foreign policy, the traditional division between the parties is well known. Yet this is undoubtedly an oversimplification, for clearly all Republicans are not isolationist and all Democrats are not supporters of an interventionist policy. There may be ideological differences within the parties; the alleged differences between “modem” and “Old Guard” Republicans in the 92 29 O n the practical side, see Joe M artin, as told to R obert J. Donovan,

my

(New York: M cGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 246-247. A recent academic statement of this point is Lewis A. Froman, Jr., congress­ m en and their constituencies (Chicago: Rand M cNally, 1963), pp. 1-15. V. O. Key, Jr., argues that there is “persuasive circumstantial evidence that constituency opinion affects a legislator’s position” ( public opinion and American . democracy [New York: Knopf, 1961], pp. 490-491). MacRae (dimensions of congressional voting, p. 278) puts it this way: “. . . the consistency with which congressmen place themselves on scales is related to the existence of audiences o r groups that are potential sources of social control.” For suggestions that the impact of constituency varies from issue to issue, see Lewis A. Dexter, “The Representative and His District,” hum an organization, XVI (1947), 2-13; and W arren £ . Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” American political science review , LVII (1963), 45-56. W e should note, however, that the salience, as well as the direction, of constituency opinion may be im portant. A repre­ sentative may ignore the views of a m ajority of his constituents, if he feels that the issue at stake means little to them, to support the desires of a smaller group for whom the issue has greater intensity. See Robert A. Dahl, a preface to democratic theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956 ), pp. 90119, for a discussion of the intensity problem. 27 Cf. George Grassmuck, sectional biases in congress on foreign policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), p. 14; Turner, party and constituency , pp. 29-33, 164-179. first fifty years in politics

22

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

foreign affairs area come readily to mind. The regional factor may be a source of intra-party cleavage (the declining strength of south­ ern internationalism has been mentioned). Finally, the consistency of the party stands can be examined. Grassmuck, for example, found that in the 1920’s and 1930’s neither party took a consistent position on foreign affairs. The “in” party tended to favor a larger military establishment, while the “outs” resisted enlargement of the armed forces.28 A second, and related, political factor is the competitiveness of the congressional district. It has generally been assumed that to win the crucial votes in highly competitive areas, the parties try to ap­ peal to all groups in society, with the result that their programs tend to resemble one another.29 If this is true, congressmen from the marginal districts will be more cautious in their activity and adopt more moderate positions for they cannot afford to offend any group of constituents. A congressman from a safe constituency, on the other hand, freed from concern about the next election, can adopt a more extreme stand.80 ^ .Huntington has proposed a contrary hypothesis. His data indicate that the parties are least similar in competitive districts. The argu­ aient here is that in marginal areas the parties do not seek to expand their appeal but rather seek to mobilize their traditional bases of support. Thus they tend to take« extreme positions, and to move apart ideologically. In either case, electoral margin should be re­ lated to congressional voting behavior on international affairs. Length of service in Congress is a third political variable to con­ sider. The longer the period of service, the more likely is the repre­ sentative to feel freer of constituency pressures, and able to take stands “on the merits.” Again, if security comes with continuing reelection, the long-time congressman should be on the extremes of attitude continua on foreign policy issues. Presumably a representa28 Grassmuck, sectional biases, p. 54. 20 See S. P. H untington, UA Revised Theory of American Party Politics,” American political science review , XLIV (1950), 669-677, for a presentation

and critique of this view. 80 MacRae finds that this relation holds for Republicans, but not for Demo­ crats (dimensions of congressional voting, pp. 284-289).

CHAPTER ONE

23

tive of long service from a safe seat will be able to express himself more independently than a colleague of equal service from a more competitive area. A fourth political factor deserves mention here: the committee assignments of the legislator. Recent analysis has shown a specializa­ tion of function in deliberative bodies.81 It has been pointed out that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee exerts an “interna­ tionalizing” influence on its members. Briefed by the executive branch, the Committee comes to reflect the point of view of the State Department, and thus to be more internationalist in outlook than their fellow senators. New members joining the Committee tend to adopt these internationalist norms.83 In the House there may appear a contrast in voting between the members of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees and the remaining members of Congress, if exposure in committee to foreign policy issues has any impact. There is an additional variable which may be related to foreign policy attitudes, namely, prior service in elective office. Shouldering the burdens of responsibility to the public, it may be argued, in­ creases the officeholder’s awareness of the problems involved in clinging to strong ideological positions. This recognition that com­ promise is the essence of politics may lead to less obdurate opposi­ tion to some American involvement in world affairs. If this is so, we would expect to find differences in foreign policy behavior between those with prior service as elected officials and those without such experience. There are, then, five political variables which may be associated with isolationist voting patterns in the House of Representatives.21 1 Party affiliation 2 Electoral margin 31 Donald Matthews, u.s. senators and their world (Chapel H ill: Univer­ sity of N orth Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 95-97; W illiam Buchanan, et "The Legislator as Specialist,” western political quarterly, XIII (1960), 636-651. 32 See David N . Farnsworth, “A Comparison of the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee on Selected Roll Call Votes,” western political quar­ terly , XIV (1961), 168-175.

24

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

3 Length of service 4 Committee assignment 5 Prior elective office Chapter Four will examine the relationship between these factors and foreign policy voting behavior. Although we will be less concerned with atdtudinal and psycho­ logical variables in the chapters to follow—some cannot even be measured by roll-call votes—we will review briefly these categories in order to give a complete picture of the elements possibly associ­ ated with isolationism. Several attitudinal variables appear to have a possible relationship to isolationism. Paciflsdc and nationalistic attitudes, hyperpatriot­ ism, philosophical distrust of Europe and Europeans, “Asia-First*’ orientation, and conservative ideology are possibilities for investiga­ tion. W hile these may merely be surface manifestations of underly­ ing psychological factors, nevertheless, we will spell out briefly their possible association with isolationist behavior. The connection of pacifism with isolationism is obvious, for no activity is more “entangling" than war. Opposition to collective security and selective service may be indications of pacificism. Similarly, nationalistic attitudes may lead to rejection of treaty arrangements and international organizations,88 for the ardent na­ tionalist believes that the United States needs no allies, no help to get along in the world. Thus the nationalist will support measures to build up American military power, but reject those which require international cooperation. A third possible source of isolationist attitudes is the hyperpatriot­ ism of the socially mobile.84 This patriotism is seen among groups moving in both directions on the status ladder. Upper-class individ­ uals are most disposed to this view when they are declining in status. They tend to see themselves as threatened by “foreigners" who are 88 DeConde, “On Tw entieth Century Isolationism” p. 22 ; Fensterwald, “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansionism,” pp. 300-307. 84 For an elaboration of these views, see Daniel Bell, ed., the n ew American right (New York: Criterion Books, 1955); and especially Richard Hofstadter’s essay, “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt.”

CHAPTER ONE

25

moving into their neighborhoods, and with whom they must com­ pete in the marketplace. This hostility is generalized to a dislike of all things foreign, including political contacts. On the other hand, lower-class citizens, mainly immigrants, who are rising in status, feel compelled to prove themselves Americans. This demonstration takes the form of rejecting all things “un-American,” including for­ eign contacts and those who foster such contacts—“easterners,” “liberals,” and “Ivy Leaguers.” Halle has proposed a variation on the class-mobility hypothesis. He finds recent immigrants to be supporters of isolationism, but w ith different reasons for different generations. The new arrival retains roots and relatives in Europe and therefore is reluctant to see the United States engage in actions that might lead to war with the land of his birth. The children of these immigrants, caught up in the process of assimilation and status-seeking, renounce these for­ eign ties and demonstrate the “hundred-percent Americanism” of the upwardly mobile. Finally, the third generation, having become part of American society, is able to look back on its ancestral land with some detachment and nostalgia. This sense of national origin leads this group to be isolationist, again to avoid conflict with die land from which their forebears emigrated.*8 An additional factor cited to account for isolationist behavior is a traditional or philosophical distrust of Europe and Europeans. Ac­ cording to this view, this country was founded by people who rejected the ways of the Old W orld, and whose design was to create a Utopia, a way of life free from the evils they had left behind. This “sense of escape” continued to motivate immigrants, and an aversion to Europe became part of the American political tradition. Pro­ jected into the sphere of international politics, this meant avoiding contacts with European nations.88 A paternalistic attitude toward the Far East, especially toward China, often accompanied this rejection of Europe. Americans with an “Asia-First” political bias felt that the United States should avoid the corruptions of Europe, and carry its own enlightened ways to 88 Halle, DREAM AND BEAUTY, p p . 34-46.

*9 Ibid., pp. 13-22; Adler,

t h e iso la tio n ist im p u l s e ,

pp. 9-12.

26

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Asia. They, of course, favored United States intervention in Asian affairs.87 A t the level of opinion and attitude, this w riter has hypothesized that isolationism may also be a basic element of the political ideol­ ogy known as conservatism.88 If this is true, an internationalist foreign policy requiring high taxes and large bureaucratic organiza­ tions will be seen to be part of the general tendency, unleashed by the New Deal, to centralize more and more control of American life in the hands of the national government. The isolationists, then, ought to oppose “Big Government” on the domestic scene with equal vigor.88 There could, of course, be any number of “ideologies,” if we mean by that term a set of consistent attitudes on a given set of subjects. Another ideology possibly connected with isolationism stems from the tradition of the Populist-Progressive era, whose dis­ sidents felt domestic reform was the major need of the country, and intervention in foreign affairs could only lead to a dilution of this effort.40 The heirs of this tradition might be expected to be liberal in domestic matters, but isolationist in the foreign policy sphere. Finally, two contrary hypotheses may be advanced concerning the relation of substantive knowledge to foreign affairs behavior. One suggests that knowledge leads to understanding and to friendli­ ness and, consequently, to a desire to increase contacts with other nations. The other, that it results in insecurity and hostility, resulting in a desire to avoid such contacts. This should be true whether the 07 Halle, dream and reality , p. 259; Adler, THE isolationist im pulse , pp. 20- 22 ; Fensterwald, “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism* and Expan­

sionism,” pp. 280-281. 88 As with isolationism, conservatism raises a definitional problem. W e shall use the word to mean a reluctance to enlarge the scope of governmental ac­ tivity, whether this is in terms of more power to regulate private enterprise, to intervene direcdy in the economy in competition with business, or to tax more heavily. In short, conservatism will be defined as opposition to the grow th of government’s role in American society. Conversely, liberalism w ill be employed to mean support of the grow th of the scope of government activity. 89 Rieselbach, “The Basis of Isolationist Behavior,” pp. 649-650. 40 Adler, the isolationist im pulse , pp. 51, 54-70; Eric F. Goldman, rendez­ vous w ith destiny (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 180-195, 290-297.

CHAPTER ONE

27

knowledge was acquired directly through personal contacts or indi­ rectly by means of impersonal communication media. From our discussion the following atdtudinal dimensions seem relevant to isolationism: 1 Pacifism 2 Nationalism 3 Hyperpatriotism caused by: a Social mobility b Generational conflicts 4 Philosophical distrust of Europe and Europeans, which may or may not be coupled with a willingness to participate in Asian affairs 5 Ideology, whether conservative, progressive, or some other type T he degree of substantive knowledge about foreign nations and foreign affairs generally may affect the ways in which these atti­ tudes are held. Turning to the purely psychological determinants of isolationist behavior, the problem, particularly at the congressional level, be­ comes difficult. It is almost impossible to measure basic personality factors by roll-call votes. However, since the attitudes discussed above probably reflect basic personality dynamics, it seems worth­ while to sketch briefly some possible psychological bases of isola­ tionist behavior. Aversion to commitments to foreign nations may stem from a variety of deeply hidden psychological sources.41 One such factor is the process of generalization, where reactions from the per­ sonal sphere are generalized and applied to other contexts. For in­ stance, an individual may perceive a member of some ethnic group as the source of his personal problems, and then generalize this 41 Three works have attempted to synthesize some of the material on per­ sonality and foreign policy. See Fensterwald, “The Anatomy of American Isolationism’ and Expansionism,” pp. 280-307; H ero, Americans in world affairs, pp. 30-42; and Bjorn Christiansen, attitudes toward foreign affairs as a function of personality (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959), pp. 23-75, and die sources cited therein. The paragraphs which follow rely heavily on these works.

28

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

hostility to include all its members, as well as the country of his “enemy’s” origin. In this way, he may come to oppose aid, treaties, or other contacts w ith a particular nation or set of nations. Another hypothesis, purporting to explain the genesis of foreign policy views, the latency hypothesis,42 holds that nonmanifest layers of the personality influence attitudes toward international politics. Childhood experiences and the process of socialization may lead to a personality structure containing latent aggressive, destructive, and sadistic impulses that have no outlet in ordinary personal relations but can be expressed through attitudes toward more distant subjects, politics in general and international politics in particular. The authoritarian personality has frequently been used in recent years as an example of this type of analysis.48 The distinctive traits of this personality type—the tendency to stereotype, to think in terms of ingroup and outgroup, to identify w ith strong leaders, and to disapprove of the weak and helpless—are fixed in childhood and color the view of the individual on a wide range of topics, interna­ tional politics among them. There is also evidence to suggest that such personality attributes as anomie, misanthropy, and cynicism are related to foreign policy views.44 Frustration and personal insecurity may also be factors influenc­ ing foreign affairs attitudes, for frustration often leads to aggression, and, if the frustrating object is one against which aggression cannot 42 Christiansen, p. 25. 48 T . W . Adorno, et al.,

the authoritarian personality (New York: H arper, 1950). For a critique, see Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF “ the AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY” (G len­ coe, 111.: Free Press, 1954). For specific applications to foreign affairs, see D. J. Levinson, “Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy,” the journal of conflict resolution , I (1957), 37-47; W illiam J. MacKinnan and Richard Centers, “Authoritarianism and Internationalism,” public opinion quarterly, XX (1956-1957), 621-630; Howard P. Smith and Ellen W eber Rosen, “Some Psychological Correlates of W orldmindedness and Authoritarianism,” journal of personality , XXVI (1958), 170-183. 44 Charles D. Farris, “Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie,” journal of politics, XXII (1960), 50-67; Morris Rosenberg, “M isanthropy and Attitudes Tow ard International Affairs,” journal of conflict resolution, I (1957), 340-345; and Yasamasa Kuroda, “Correlates of Attitudes Tow ard Peace” (unpublished ms., n.d.).

CHAPTER ONE

29

be expressed, the aggression may be directed toward other objects, foreign countries, “internationalists," etc. Personal fear of some fu­ ture frustrations can have much the same result, and may lead to uncritical action to end the feeling of insecurity, or it may induce hyper-caution, which in turn may result in an inability to trust either individuals or allied nations.45 An interesting effort to dis­ cover some personality correlates of congressional voting behavior on foreign affairs has been made by Margaret G. Hermann. A sam­ ple of proponents of foreign aid in the 81st Congress (elected in 1948) was compared with a group of opponents with respect to sense of security-insecurity, tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity, and positive-negative orientation toward people. Content analysis of foreign aid speeches in the Congressional Record was used to assess the personality attributes of the congressmen. The isolationist repre­ sentatives—those who voted against foreign aid—were significantly more insecure, intolerant of ambiguity, and negatively oriented tow ard people than the internationalist supporters of the program. T his pioneering study demonstrates both the relevance of person­ ality for an understanding of legislative voting patterns and the difficulty in obtaining reliable data on the personality characteristics of individual legislators.45 There are four psychological factors that may be related, posi­ tively or negatively, to isolationist behavior: 1 Generalization 2 Latent personality characteristics, e.g., the authoritarian personality 3 Frustration 4 Personal insecurity A ll of these involve, to some extent, aggression, here treated as a derivative rather than a primary drive, which is directed to, or 45 For evidence supporting die first of these hypotheses, see Maurice L. Färber, “The Armagedden Complex: Dynamics of Opinion,” public opinion quarterly , XV (1951-1952), 217-224. 45 M argaret G. Hermann, some personal characteristics related to foreign aid voting op congressmen (unpublished master’s diesis, N orthw estern Uni­ versity, 1963).

30

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

displaced upon, foreign nations, “foreigners,” or those sympathetic to “foreigners.” In the following chapters, we will focus primarily on the demo­ graphic and political variables. For obvious reasons, mainly difficul­ ties in measurement, the attitudinaî dimension will be ignored almost entirely and the psychological variables completely. In addition, tw o other potentially important sources of influence on the policy deci­ sions rendered by Congress have been ignored: the pressure groups and the formal, institutional arrangements of the House. Recent studies have suggested that the impact of the interest group is less that of compelling decisions to be taken than that of providing support for legislators favoring the group’s desired policy out­ come.47 Thus pressure groups appear to function as channels of communication rather than shapers of policy. And what power they do exercise over 435 representatives is too nebulous to allow reliable assessment.48 Similarly, the formal organizational structure of the chamber may preclude discovery of the positions of individual con­ gressmen—a bill may be blocked in committee or passed by a non­ record vote. The “rules of the legislative game”—the informal norms and values held by members of Congress as well as the formal procedural rules—may shape the choice which confronts the indi­ vidual representative. For instance, the deference shown the appro­ priations committees of Congress means that it is virtually impossi­ ble to amend appropriation measures from the floor, and that the lawmaker must, in effect, take or leave the recommendations of the committee. By testing the diverse hypotheses presented in this Chapter, this 47 Harmon Zeigler, interest groups in American society (Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Lester W . M ilbrath, the Washington lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); and Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American business and public policy (New York: A therton Press, 1963), pp. 321-399. 48 See Bernard C. Cohen, the influence of non -governmental groups on foreign policy - making (Boston: W orld Peace Foundation, 1959). Cohen’s effort to assess pressure group influence runs to a total of 23 pages. H e con­ cludes that “the available literature . . . does not seem to promise very much in the way of pertinent findings. But, in extenuation, it should be emphasized that there are some persistent analytical or conceptual difficulties that tend to hinder the accumulation of directly relevant data” (p. 8).

CHAPTER ONE

}1

study will attem pt to draw the broad contours of congressional isolationism—who holds diese views, what kinds of constituencies they represent, how they vote on non-foreign questions. However, we must first establish if there are clear distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs. If there are, then we must determine which issues are related to foreign policy problems before we can test the relation­ ship of the variables to congressional isolationist behavior, Roll-call votes provide the best data for answering these questions, and we will rely on them.

2.

The Content a n d Evolution o f Congressional Isolationism

The foregoing review of the literature suggests that the problem of assessing the roots of isolationism is one which has concerned writers on politics for some time. Here it is hoped that the applica­ tion of newer and more precise quantitative methods may shed new light on an old issue. The well-known cumulative scaling methods, developed by Louis Guttman and others, have been used to order roll-call data from the House of Representatives.1 Guttman scale techniques permit each legislator to be assigned a numerical scale score on a variety of subject-matter continua (scales). Thus, for each topic of concern, we can see precisely where each representa­ tive stands in relatioii to his fellow legislators. Then, correlation coefficients between each pair of scales were calculated. A correla­ tion coefficient gives a quantitative indication of the strength of die relationship between two variables and can vary from + 1.0 to -1 .0 . A high positive coefficient indicates that there is substantial agree1 For a discussion of the mechanics of Guttman scaling, see Appendix A and the sources cited therein. Appendix A also lists the items which comprise the four basic scales described twlow.

n

34

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

ment in the way a set of items, or individuals, is distributed on two variables. For example, a high positive correlation between scales measuring foreign aid and reciprocal trade voting indicates that the same individuals who voted for aid also tended to vote for trade legislation; a strong negative correlation would suggest the opposite —those who voted for aid would tend to vote against trade. Using these methods, we can ascertain more accurately the extent to which congressional voting on different issues is similarly patterned, and in later analyses, the degree to which other factors—social background, political and constituency characteristics of individual congressmen—are related to voting alignments in the House. In this chapter, these methods have been used to establish the extent of association between the voting patterns on such apparent foreign policy subjects as foreign aid and foreign trade, and to see what, if any, relationships exist between these scales and others deal­ ing with affairs generally considered domestic in nature. If the analysis confirms that there exist clearly differentiable clusters of issues which can be labeled foreign and domestic, then other issues more difficult to classify can be related to one or the other. Since the four Congresses studied here were selected, in part, because each dealt with foreign aid and foreign trade issues, in each we have foreign aid and foreign trade scales. The former include roll calls on such things as aid to Greece and Turkey and the Mutual Security Program, while items on extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements A ct comprise the latter scales. Issues dealing with the scope of federal government activity and with the level of federal government expenditures formed the domestic scales (hereafter re­ ferred to as the government activity and government spending scales). Government activity includes proposals concerning the scope of the federal government (for example, a bill designed to limit the Federal Power Commission’s authority to regulate the natural gas industry). Government spending implies that the issue is how much federal money to spend, not what to spend it on (for example, an amendment to the Department of Health, Education, and W elfare Appropriation providing more federal money for hospital construction). Scales measuring other subjects of interest were found in some of the Congresses studied. In the areas which, by intuition, might be

CHAPTER TWO

35

related to foreign policy considerations, scales were obtained from roll calls dealing with civil rights (76th, 80th, and 85th Congresses), the selective service system (76th and 80th), admission of displaced persons (80th and 83rd), overseas propaganda activity (80th and 83rd), and the loyalty-security program (80th, 83rd and 85th). In all cases where no scales on these items appear, no roll-call votes were taken by the House on these matters. In no instance did a set of items fail to meet the criteria for an acceptable Guttman scale.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY: IS TH ERE A DIFFERENCE? This analysis has tentatively assumed that there exists a body of foreign policy matters, specifically foreign aid and foreign trade, which can be clearly distinguished from other issues falling within the area of domestic politics, specifically scales relating to govern­ ment activity and government spending. Decisions in the areas of foreign aid and trade cannot help but affect the political, military, and economic relations of the United States and foreign govern­ ments. Repercussions abroad from decisions relating to die size and scope of federal government activity at home and to the size of the federal budget are less obvious. If there is a distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, policy-makers will probably apply different criteria for evaluation and decision in the two areas. Therefore, it appears reasonable to expect that patterns of voting on foreign affairs subjects will resemble one another more closely than they approximate patterns on domestic policy matters. On the other hand, the decision-makers may apply the same standards to all decisions whether or not they deal with foreign countries. For example, cost might be the criterion; where the money is to be spent, at home or abroad, may be an irrelevant consideration. If this were the case, we would expect to find no distinctions in congressional voting between foreign and domestic issues. The president’s approach to his leadership task may depend on his knowledge of which of these alternatives is accurate. Since the chief

36

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

executive will attempt to persuade Congress to support his policy initiatives, it will help if he knows what evaluative criteria the legis­ lators apply and, thus, can make his appeals for support in appropri­ ate terms. The data support the assumption that there do, in fact, exist differentiable clusters of issues, that is, foreign and domestic. How­ ever, with respect to the major scales—foreign aid, foreign trade, government activity, and government spending—there are some ex­ ceptions to the expectation of easily distinguished clusters of foreign and domestic issues. The intercorrelations of these four scales ap­ pear in Table 2-1.2 Only government activity fits the predicted pattern perfectly; it is most closely correlated with the other domestic scale, government spending, in each of the four Congresses. Government spending, however, during the 76th and 80th Congresses, was most closely related to foreign trade, suggesting that opposition to large federal government expenditures coincided at times with the resistance to the reciprocal trade program. By the 83rd Congress and thereafter, the relationship took on the expected dimension, that is, government spending was more closely related to government activity than to either of the foreign policy scales. W ith respect to foreign aid and foreign trade, the tendency is in the hypothesized direction, but there are exceptions. Scales on for­ eign aid legislation correlated most closely with foreign trade scales in each Congress with the exception of the 85th; there the relation­ ship between foreign aid and government activity was closer than that between foreign aid and foreign trade. Reversing the perspec­ tive, we find that foreign trade was also most closely associated with foreign aid in three of the four Congresses. The exception here was the 80th Congress, where the extent of association between the for­ eign trade and foreign aid scales was exceeded by that between 2 The correlation coefficients in Table 2 -1 are product-moment correlations, calculated by an IBM 650 electronic computer. Using correlations of this type imposes certain limitations on the analysis. All that we can note are broad, general movements in congressional vote patterns; such shifts may, of course, conceal contrary movements by various subgroupings of legislators. In addi­ tion, no information is provided about the behavior of individual congressmen, and the possible influences affecting changes in voting alignment suggested in subsequent paragraphs must, necessarily, rest on speculation.

CHAPTER TWO

37

TAB LE 2-1 CORRELATIONS BETW EEN BASIC SCALES, BY CONGRESS 76th (1939-40)

80th (1947-48)

83rd (1953-54)

85th (1957-58)

Foreign Aid and Foreign Trade

.90

.58

.39

.45

Foreign Aid and Govern­ ment Activity

.77

.42

.33

.56

Foreign Aid and Govern­ ment Spending

.76

.56

.37

.40

Foreign Trade and Govern­ ment Activity

.77

.66

.20

.36

Foreign Trade and Govern­ ment Spending

.80

.91

.30

.24

Government Activity and Government Spending

.77

.72

.76

.68

foreign trade and by both the scales dealing with domestic affairs. It is interesting to note that four of the five departures from the expected pattern occurred in Congresses where the presidency and Congress were controlled by different political parties. W e may surmise that factors accompanying this situation account for devia­ tions from our prediction.* In some way a “loosening'* of party discipline may weaken the linkage between similar subjects ordi­ narily imposed by existing party loyalties. In addition, three of the * See David B. Trum an, the congressional party, pp. 149-150, 185-186, 192, fo r a discussion of some of the factors influencing behavior of the m inority party in the House of Representatives.

38

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

deviations came in the 80th Congress, which, as we will see later in this chapter, marked a transition from pre- to postwar voting align­ ments in the House. Nevertheless, approximately 85 per cent (27 of 32) of the possible comparisons show that the correlation coefficients relating the for­ eign policy scales to one another are larger than those relating the foreign scales to the domestic issue scales. W hile keeping in mind the departures from the expected pattern, the foreign aid and reciprocal trade scales will be considered as distinguishable from the domestic policy scales. W e will accept the following proposition: Proposition 2-1. There exist in Congress clusters of issues, foreign and domestic, which are sufficiently distinguish­ able to be considered as distinct segments of congressional activity. The bearing of this finding on the foreign affairs leadership po­ tential of the president is readily apparent. Since the voting con­ figurations on international and domestic matters are distinctive, different criteria are probably employed by lawmakers to evaluate the two spheres of congressional activity, and if this is so, the presi­ dent should be able to exert his leadership more effectively by couching his. appeals in terms appropriate to the foreign policy area.

T H E CO N TEN T OF CONGRESSIONAL ISOLATIONISM There are some issues, however, that are not so clearly definable as foreign or domestic issues, but which, as we mentioned earlier, might be considered by congressmen as related to international affairs. Again, it would be useful for the president to know in what terms—as foreign or domestic policy—a representative views a par­ ticular subject. Selective Service W ith the selective service's intimate connection w ith national defense, it seems likely that the draft will be more

CHAPTER TWO

39

closely related to foreign than domestic policy matters. However, a congressman who felt that the draft was unnecessary in what was ostensibly peacetime might conceivably view continuation of the conscription apparatus as a needless burden on the federal government. The data in Table 2-2 confirm that selective service is most closely linked with foreign policy matters: members of Congress most likely to support an active, interventionist foreign policy were also more willing to require substantial numbers of Americans to serve in the armed forces. The draft, then, may be considered to be a part of the congressional international relations sphere of activity. Foreign Information The problem of analysis becomes more difficult in the area of overseas propaganda activity. From one point of view, conducting information activities overseas may make a valuable contribution to foreign policy. By presenting the United States in the most favorable light, our policy-makers could hope both to strengthen support for this country in allied and uncommitted nations and to undermine support for regimes in hostile states. From another perspective, information programs might appear to be of little use. If propaganda activities seem to produce no tangible benefits for the country, then such activities may look costly— in terms of actual cash outlay for propaganda and in terms of the needless swelling of the federal bureaucracy. • The data in Table 2-2 yield no clear answer. In the 80th Congress, the first in which a scale of foreign information roll calls was ob­ tained, foreign information was most closely related to foreign pol­ icy concerns. Six years later the degree of association was reversed and overseas informational activity was associated more closely with the domestic rather than the foreign scales. The reason for this shift may simply be in the nature of the legislation involved—the issue was framed differently. In the 80th Congress, the issue was the creation in the State Department of an agency to carry on propaganda activity, while in the 83rd Congress the question involved die appropriation of funds to sustain an al­ ready functioning operation. The United States’ position in the world arena also may account

40

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 2-2 CORRELATIONS BETW EEN BASIC AND O TH ER SCALES, BY CONGRESS 76th (1939-40)

80th (1947-48)

.74 .66

.55 .24

.48

.02

.56

.18

Selective Service and Foreign Aid Foreign Trade Government Activity Government Spending

Foreign Information and Foreign Aid Foreign Trade Government Activity Government Spending Displaced Persons and Foreign Aid Foreign Trade Government Activity Government Spending Loyalty-Security and Foreign Aid Foreign Trade Government Activity Government Spending

83rd (1953-54)

85th (1957-58)

.69 .46

.42 .30

.26

.68

.40

.66

.37 .20

.46 .14

.44

.19

.27

.02

.42 .52

.26 .35

.48 .22

.67

.80

.59

.59

.76

.67

CHAPTER TWO

41

for this change. In the earlier congressional sessions, the Cold W ar was in its initial phase and foreign policy problems dominated con­ gressional activity. This was the era of the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and the first stirrings leading to the creation of an anticommu­ nist “entangling” alliance. W ith concerns of this nature in the fore­ front, the creation of an agency of the federal government to deal in propaganda may have been seen by Congress as an essential element in our postwar policy of containment. By 1953, the cold war had given no signs of ending, and Congress may have viewed overseas informational activity in a new light. In an era which gave rise to McCarthyism, it may not be unreasonable to suggest that the House was in a mood to react strongly to proposals to further enlarge the scope and cost of overseas programs. W ith the Republicans in office and committed to carrying out foreign policies similar to those of the Trum an administration, it may be that international propaganda was seen as an area in which program cutbacks could be made. It may also be that conservative Democrats, mainly southern, free from the obligation of supporting a president of their party, opposed the foreign information program. In any event, the voting alignments on propaganda matters came, by 1953-1954, to resemble the patterns on domestic, not foreign, policy legislation. Displaced Persons The third issue which might be either a for­ eign or domestic problem is the admission of displaced persons to the country. Here again, there are at least two approaches to the question. Opening the door to substantial numbers of displaced per­ sons may be a way to project the image of the United States as a country which respects the dignity of the individual, or it may be an ineffective foreign policy tool which produces no results for a heavy investment of staff and money. As with overseas information programs, we encounter difficulty in assigning the subject to either the foreign or domestic spheres. In the 80th Congress the displaced person scale is most closely associ­ ated w ith a domestic scale—government activity. The entrance of displaced persons into the country may have been seen as a new government program, favored or opposed on grounds similar to those used in evaluating other domestic expansions of government

42

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

operations. This explanation must be advanced cautiously for the correlation coefficients are low and there is only a slight variation among them. The second highest correlation of the displaced person scale is with the foreign aid scale, indicating that some representa­ tives may have seen the question as one of assisting our allies, real or potential. By the 83rd Congress, the relationship between the displaced per­ sons scale and the scales measuring government activity and foreign aid had reversed. Table 2-2 shows that the displaced persons and foreign aid scales were clearly the most closely associated. The pas­ sage of time may have led to an increased sensitivity on the part of the American government to “world opinion,” and one explanation for the increase in the extent of the association between foreign aid and the acceptance of displaced persons might be that Congress recognized that a liberal policy toward refugees would support the democratic image our policy was seeking to project.4 The foreign information and the displaced persons scales point to unstable relationships between some issues and foreign and domestic policy. There are a number of possible reasons for this instability. In die first place, from a rational point of view, percep­ tions of issues may change with the passage of time. A t one stage, a policy proposal may seem to be a much needed addition to Ameri­ can foreign policy, while at another time the same proposal may appear as nothing more than needless expenditure. The changing nature of the times, both domestically and internationally, may ac­ count for this alteration in perception. For instance, a congressman may have supported overseas propaganda as a short-term adjunct to foreign policy. W hen the time perspective within which he views the policy begins to lengthen, he may employ a different set of criteria to evaluate the program. Thus, in the case of foreign infor­ mation services it is possible that representatives willing to support such a program as a temporary measure to supplement the adminis­ tration’s foreign policy came, with the passage of time, to oppose the program as an unneeded and expensive federal government ac* In any case, we must be careful in assuming that immigration policy is a foreign policy question purely and simply. For works which seem to make such an assumption, see H olbert N . Carroll, the house op representatives and foreign policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 77-79; and James A. Robinson, congress and foreign policy- making , pp. 12 , 15.

CHAPTER TWO

43

tivity. The same sort of logic, in reverse, could be applied to the admission of displaced persons. A second factor, domestic political developments, may account for changes in behavior quite apart from any shifts in the perception of issues. A change in administration or an alteration of a party's status in the House from minority to majority may lead to a change in the kinds of political pressures that can be brought to bear on party members and thus to a shift in the political necessities con­ fronting individual representatives. For example, political changes between 1947 and 1953 may have freed some Democrats from an obligation to vote contrary to their convictions in order to support a president of their party and imposed a similar duty on a number of Republicans.8 Finally, changes in personnel in the House may produce shifts in voting patterns. In part, this may be related to alterations in the domestic political situation. A shift in party majorities will, of course, replace some representatives with others of the opposite party who may bring with them a different viewpoint on the issue in question. In part, the changes in behavior may result from the changing nature of the times; an alteration in the state of the world may lead voters to elect a new political generation which reacts quite differently from those who preceded them in office. Also, the random operation of factors such as death and retirement may re­ move supporters and opponents of a particular policy in unequal proportions. A statistical study can, of course, only chart the gross shifts in voting alignment. It cannot provide answers to the question of why these shifts occurred. In all probability, some combination of the above elements is responsible for the behavior changes. The Loyalty-Security Program As in the case of other issues, representatives may view the federal loyalty-security program from differing perspectives. From one vantage point, the elimination of the unreliable and untrustworthy from federal service may enhance the wisdom of American policy and increase the determination with 6 On this point, see Mark Kesselman, “Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy,” m idw est journal o r political science, V (1961), 284289.

44

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

which it is carried out. From another angle, the program may ap­ pear to be merely an additional distraction of decision-makers from their primary task of making policy. Finally, the program may seem just another extension, and an expensive one, of the federal bureauc­ racy which can produce no useful foreign policy results. The data in Table 2-2 indicate the federal loyalty-security pro­ gram has remained constantly more closely related to the domestic issues than to the foreign policy scales. This may result from the fact that the program does not foster contacts with foreign nations and operates in this country. The program does have important impacts on foreign policy, but these effects are less visible as foreign policy than other expenditures and activities which are carried out beyond the borders of the United States. Civil Rights The relation of civil rights questions—anti-lynch­ ing, outlawing of the poll tax, and the protection of voting rights afforded by the Civil Rights Act of 1957—to foreign policy matters poses the most puzzling problems. W hile civil liberties are tradi­ tionally considered domestic in nature, in recent civil rights battles in the legislature congressmen have argued that we must improve the status of minority groups in the United States in order not to weaken our position in the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. Thus even this question may appear to some representatives as a foreign policy matter. The correlation coefficients relating the civil rights scales to the four major scales appear in Table 2-3.

TABLE 2-3 CORRELATIONS OF CIVIL RIG H TS AND BASIC SCALES, BY CONGRESS

SCALE

Foreign Aid Foreign Trade Government Activity Government Spending

76th (1939-40) - .60 -.47 -.21 -.39

80th (1947-48) - .19 -.57 -.01 -.45

85th (1957-58) + .46 +.17 +.38 +.18

CHAPTER TWO

45

Only in the most recent Congress were foreign policy and civil rights even positively related, and then, although the closest associa­ tion was between civil rights and foreign aid, the weakest relation­ ship existed between civil rights and foreign trade. In the earlier years the correlation coefficients were negative, suggesting that those representatives favoring legislation designed to promote the welfare of minority groups opposed increasing American inter­ national commitments, and conversely.* W e may mention two factors to account for the finding of nega­ tive correlations. Unquestionably the major element is geography. Southern congressmen, long supporters of liberal aid and trade policies, were, of course, violently antagonistic to legislation aimed at undercutting the traditional patterns of southern society. Second, though less important in terms of numbers, is the existence during these years of a congressional bloc of “liberal-isolationists.” These men, in the tradition of midwestem agrarian radicalism, were con­ cerned almost exclusively with domestic reform. They argued for prom pt and effective participation of the national government in the economic order and in the defense of minority group interests. Given this preoccupation with the domestic, the liberal-isolationists saw overseas adventures as merely distractions from the chief task, reform at home. Thus, they tended to vote for civil rights legisla­ tion and against enlargement of foreign commitments. T o summarize, examination of five subjects with more or less obvious implications for foreign policy leads to the following conclusion: Proposition 2-2. Beyond foreign aid and foreign trade, there can be no constant definition of the content of con- j gressional isolationism. •T h u s only in the 85th Congress do the data support Lipset’s hypothesis that there exist two species of the liberal-conservative cleavage, economic and noneconomic. T he “liberal” groups in the tw o areas do iloc-coincide; the poorer, less educated segments of society are economic liberals, but non­ economic conservatives. Both foreign policy and civil rights are noneconomic matters, and, therefore, we should expect them to be more closely associated than civil rights and domestic (economic) issues. It should be remembered, however, that Lipset’s formulation derives from studies of the general popu­ lation, not of Congress. See Seymour M artin Lipset, political m an (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 101 - 102, 298-301.

46

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

a Some issues (e.g., selective service) are consistently more closely related to foreign affairs and others (e.g., loyalty-security programs) are constantly closer to domestic affairs. b Some issues (e.g., displaced persons and foreign in­ formation programs) are more closely related to foreign affairs at one point in time and to domestic affairs at another. c Some issues (e.g., civil rights) are not consistently related to either foreign or domestic affairs at any single point in time. The content of the foreign affairs segment of congres­ sional activity fluctuates with the passage of time. This proposition suggests that the exercise of presidential leader­ ship will not be easy, for the chief executive cannot simply pigeon­ hole issues as foreign or domestic policy matters. Rather, in attempt­ ing to exercise his persuasive powers, he is likely to be confronted w ith shifting issue perceptions in Congress, and he will have to find out as best he can whether, at any particular point in time, his appeals should be couched in terms of international or domestic affairs. This kind of difficulty will be particularly acute with respect to such issues as foreign information programs and the admission of displaced persons which lawmakers seem to view differently as time passes. These findings suggest what is to be demonstrated more clearly in subsequent analyses, namely, that isolationism is a highly compli­ cated phenomenon. Its substantive content may differ from time to time, and additional evidence of the relevance of situational factors will be introduced later. Marked differences will appear between die voting alignments on aid and trade, and the correlates—social background, political, and constituency—of the tw o scales will shift with the passage of time. Such variations make difficult our explana­ tory problem as well as complicating the problems of presidential leadership.

CHAPTER TWO

47

T H E EV O LU TIO N OF CONGRESSIONAL ISOLATIONISM Before turning to direct discussion of the variables singled out for study in Chapter One, it would be well to look at the general trends in the evolution of isolationism. As will be recalled, the four Con­ gresses under study were selected to control for certain political factors including the status of the parties as majority or minority in the House and the relation of the House to the presidency. Since the relationships which show up in the historical pattern can be at­ tributed to the operation of these political factors, relationships in­ volving the demographic variables to be studied will take on signifi­ cance only insofar as they depart from the pattern established by the political factors. For example, if the data indicate an overall increase in the amount of isolationism between the 76th and 80th Congresses, then an increase of similar proportions among Catholic congressmen merely reflects general trends and is of little impor­ tance. If, on the other hand, isolationism among Catholics decreases, then we may suggest that religion is associated with isolationism in a way independent of the political factors. These primary political factors, in other words, provide a standard against which we can measure the importance of the demographic variables to be considered. This type of time-series analysis assumes, of course, that the scales measuring foreign aid and foreign trade in each Congress are similar enough to allow conclusions about the changes in the amount of isolationism and internationalism over time. Ideally, it would be desirable to use the same instruments to measure voting behavior at each point in time, but given the nature of congressional roll calls this is obviously impossible. However, for a number of reasons, the scales are sufficiently similar to permit general statements about shifts across a period of years. First, the content of the roll calls comprising the scales is relatively constant; the votes on foreign trade, for instance, all require the congressman to make a general judgment on the entire reciprocal trade program. The individual items com­

48

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

prising the scales involve, almost exclusively,, attempts to recommit, passage of a complete bill, acceptance of a conference report, or other broad considerations. There are almost no narrower questions such as tariff protection for single commodities. The same is true of the votes dealing with the foreign aid program, with the exception of the roll calls in the 76th Congress.7 Second, a number of congressmen of known opinion were ac­ curately “scored” by these scales, suggesting that the scales do place representatives consistently at the appropriate issue position. For example, the well-publicized isolationist Representatives Daniel A. Reed (Republican, New York) and Noah Mason (Republican, Illi­ nois) fell at the isolationist end of the scales in each Congress. Also such recognized internationalists as Emanuel Celler (Democrat, N ew York) and Chet Holifield (Democrat, California) appear as strong supporters of aid and trade on the scales in successive Con­ gresses. Parts of the following analysis, then, assume that the scales at each period are sufficiently similar to allow us to use theip as equivalents and to note general trends in the extent to which con­ gressmen vote for isolationist and internationalist positions. Table 2-4 presents the distribution of votes on foreign aid. The dam show that the relative stability in the amount of isolationist sentiment masks contrary trends in the two political parties. Republican representatives adhered to the general pattem , display­ ing a sharp decrease in isolationism between the 76th and 80th Con­ gresses and a slight rise thereafter. Democrats, on the other hand, became more isolationist as time passed. Although there were no Democratic isolationists in the earliest Congress, by 1957-1958 more than a fourth opposed foreign aid legislation. 7T he issue in the 76th Congress, the repeal of the arms embargo provisions 0

of the N eutrality Laws, is not quite the same as the postwar foreign aid bills, but did require Congress to decide whether or not to commit American eco­ nomic resources to those nations which were potential allies. And given the near unanimity of the party positions during this period, it does not seem unfair to use the earliest foreign aid scale as a base against which to note the subsequent breakdown of party solidarity on the issue. For evidence that the voting pattern on the arms embargo repeal is not very different from that on the 1941 (77th Congress) passage of the Lend-Lease bill, an act quite similar to postwar foreign aid legislation, see Leroy N . Rieselbach, “T he Demography of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958,” American POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, LVIII (1964), 577-588.

CHAPTER TWO

49

T A B L E 2-4 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS 76th

80th

83rd

85th

Isolationists # Republican Democratic

33.0% 81.9 0.0

15.0% 24.4 3.1

25.1% 36.7 13.4

33.1% 36.8 29.8

Moderates Republican Democratic

5.7 1.7 8.4

38.2 52.4 20.0

7.8 4.5 11.1

13.6 5.4 20.6

Internationalists Republican Democratic

47.7 0.0 79.8

36.7 14.4 65.6

63.6 55.2 72.2

50.6 54.9 47.1

Not Ascertained Republican Democratic

13.6 16.4 11.8

9.8 8.8 11.3

3.4 3.6 3.2

2.8 2.9 2.5

#The Gunman scale types were collapsed into the following categories, in the way described in Appendix A: Isolationists, Moderates, Internationalists, and N ot Ascertained (Le., those who did not fit into any scale pattern).

On the internationalist side, the fluctuations of the general level conceal a great increase in Republican internationalism and a mod­ erate decline in internationalism among Democratic representatives. In the 76th Congress, no Republican fell in the internationalist group; by the 85th Congress, a clear majority were supporters of an activist foreign policy. Only in the most recent period did less than a majority of Democrats support the foreign aid program. Relating party to voting on foreign aid indicates that Republican congressmen have been more isolationist than their Democratic col­ leagues in each of the four Congresses. But the extent of isolationism within the party has become markedly less than it was at the time of the 76th Congress. On the other hand, among Democrats isolation­ ism had reached a high point by the most recent Congress under study, and was only slightly less than it was among Republicans. Similar findings appear if we look at the relation of the parties to internationalism. In the first three Congresses, the Republicans were

50

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

less internationalist than the Democrats, but by increasingly narrow margins. By 1957-1958, however, the Republicans provided propor­ tionally greater support for foreign aid than did the Democrats. W ith foreign trade, also, general trends hide differential move­ ments by the tw o parties (see Table 2-5). Republican opposition to the reciprocal trade program fell to less than half of what it had been; at the same time G.O.P. support for expanded foreign trade programs reached the point, by the 85th Congress, where more than half of the party members supported the Trade Agreements Act. W hile the movements were not as wide, the Democrats moved in opposite directions. Their support of reciprocal trade programs was at its low point, and their opposition to them was highest, in the 85th Congress. Looking at the absolute differences between the parties, we discover that the Republicans in each instance are more isolationist and less internationalist than the Democrats. Here again, however, the passage of time has substantially reduced the size of the difference.8 A comparison of the two scales in order to delineate the general developments in attitude toward foreign policy yields a number of points. First, although the general trend in both cases was toward a breakdown of clear-cut party divisions, these occurred at different times.9 In the 80th Congress isolationism on foreign aid had declined sharply while on foreign trade it had actually increased somewhat. In the interval between the 80th and 83rd Congresses, the foreign trade isolationists decreased considerably, bringing that scale closer to foreign aid. 8For evidence that on some issues—specifically farm price-support legisla­ tion—partisanship increased during the postwar period, see J. Roland Pennoclc, “Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," journal of politics, XVIII (1956), 167-210. 8 It is interesting to note that the breakdown in party unanimity was ac­ companied by a sharp rise in the extent of moderation. It is almost as if the supporters of both isolationism and internationalism took time to reassess their positions. On foreign aid the increase in the number of moderates is particu­ larly marked (Table 2-4)—between the 76th and 80th Congresses both isola­ tionism and internationalism declined. By the 83rd Congress, the moderate group had resolved its problem. W hile a few moderates remained, the bulk adopted other positions, the m ajority moving toward the internationalist end of the scale. A similar, though less dear-cut, set of developments occurred on foreign trade between the 80th and 85th Congresses (Table 2-5).

CHAPTER TWO

51

TABLE 2-5 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES O N FOREIGN TRADE, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS 76th

80th

83rd

85th

Isolationists Republican Democratic

35.9% 87.6 1.1

47.6% 84.4 0.5

12.3% 19.0 5.6

22.9% 30.9 16.0

Moderates Republican Democratic

4.1 2.3 5.3

9.2 9.6 8.7

21.7 26.7 16.7

12.7 12.7 12.6

Internationalists Republican Democratic

51.9 1.1 85.9

39.4 0.0 82.1

56.1 45.2 67.1

60.4 53.4 66.4

Not Ascertained Republican Democratic

8.1 9.0 7.6

7.2 6.0 8.7

9.9 9.0 10.6

4.1 2.9 5.0

Second, the data reveal that in 44 per cent of the cases members of the same party moved in opposite directions on the two scales. T hat is, if Democratic representatives over a given period of time gave greater support to foreign aid legislation, the likelihood was great that the group would decrease in its support of the foreign trade program. It becomes clear, then, that factors other than party are at work here, or that the impact of party differs from issue to issue. It is against this background, attributable to political factors, that we will examine the relevance of variables describing congressmen as individuals to the voting on foreign policy. Summarizing these historical trends, we find that the following pattern emerges from the data: W ith respect to foreign aid 1 Isolationism among Republicans dropped sharply between the 76th and 80th Congresses; thereafter it rose slightly.

52

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Among Democrats, isolationism rose in each successive Con­ gress. Internationalism among Republicans increased to the point where it commanded the support of a majority, while among Democrats it rose and fell, ending at its lowest level. 2 The composition of die isolationist and internationalist groups altered over time from exclusively one-party aggre­ gates to combinations of both parties in roughly equal proportions. 3 Republicans have been more isolationist and less interna­ tionalist than Democrats in each of the Congresses w ith the single exception of the 85th, where they were slightly more internationalist. The quantitative difference between the parties declined steadily. W ith respect to foreign trade 4 Isolationism among Republicans broke sharply between the 80th and 83rd Congresses and increased slightly thereafter. Among Democrats, isolationism reached its highest point in the 85th Congress. Internationalism generally rose among Republicans and declined among Democrats. 5 Between the 76th and 85th Congresses, the polarization of the parties vanished and substantial proportions of each party came to be found at each end of the scale. 6 Republicans were more isolationist and less internationalist than Democrats but the quantitative differences between the parties lessened in each Congress. W ith respect to foreign aid and foreign trade 7 The breakdown of clear-cut divisions between the parties came at different points in time; it came between the 76th and 80th Congresses for foreign aid and between the 80th and 83rd for foreign trade. 8 The tw o foreign policy areas were affected by different factors, or the same factors in different proportions, for in a

CHAPTER TWO

53

substantial number of cases the same political party moved in one direction on one scale and the other direction on the second scale. Together with some of the data presented earlier, these summary statements highlight two points which are w orthy of special atten­ tion. The most prominent feature of the historical pattern is the extent to which the lines of division in the House have altered over time. The change in sign, from negative to positive, in the correla­ tion coefficients relating civil rights to the foreign and domestic scales (Table 2-3) indicates that the opponents of foreign involve­ ments have come to be the same group which fights legislation aimed at effecting changes in the area of civil rights. The extent of association between scales is small but nonetheless the change in sign does give rise to speculation that a cleavage between liberals and conservatives (in the sense these terms were defined in Chapter One) has begun to emerge. Thus it may be that the same congress­ men now oppose government intervention and activity in the areas designated as foreign policy, domestic affairs, and civil rights. Developments since W orld W ar II seem to be primarily responsi­ ble for the shift toward correspondence of the lines of division on these matters. In the first place, the attitude of southern representa­ tives has changed. The widely noted increase in southern industriali­ zation, stimulated by the war, has led many southerners to adopt issue positions similar to those held by business interests in other regions. Second, a shift in the center of gravity within the Demo­ cratic party, accompanying the end of the Roosevelt era, appears to have greatly reduced the amount of support given by southern members of the House to policies proposed by the party leadership. Third, the more vigorous attack on segregation since 1954, at­ tributed in the South to northern liberals, may have led some south­ erners to espouse conservatism generally. W hatever the cause, southerners have begun to have serious questions about the advisa­ bility of the foreign aid and foreign trade programs. Leading to the same result among another group has been the demise of the liberal-isolationist groups, in Congress and outside. The leadership of the Progressive and Farmer-Labor parties found it necessary to lead their followers into an alliance with the major

54

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

parties with the result that the liberal-isolationist ideas became di­ luted. Unable, in most instances, to influence major party nomi­ nations, these views were no longer represented in the House. The result, again, has been to increase the consistency of congressional voting on foreign, domestic, and civil rights matters. The same conclusion emerges from other evidence. Table 2-1 indicates the declining degree of association between the major scales from the high levels found in the 76th Congress. As Tables 2-4 and 2-5 suggest, the cause of the strong relationships in the earliest Congress is the high degree of partisanship that existed on all of the major scales. Party feelings ran high during this period as a result of the controversies swirling around the New Deal, the Court-packing light, and the developing European war. There was almost complete polarization of the parties; in no case were there more than four members of either party voting with the extremists—the committed isolationists and internationalists—of the opposition. W ith the pas­ sage of time, however, the distinction between the internationalists and isolationists, with respect to party affiliation, has become blurred. On the foreign aid scale, for instance, by the 80th Congress the supporters of international aid had breached the heretofore solid ranks of the Republicans. The majority of G.O.P. Congressmen were tolerant enough of foreign aid proposals to fall within the moderate range on the scale (Table 2-4). By the 83rd Congress, two additional developments had taken place. First, a majority within each party now supported foreign aid for the first time. Second, Democratic support for the program had begun to deteriorate, for where there were no Democratic isolation­ ists in the 76th Congress and only six in the 80th, now the number had climbed to twenty-nine. The trend toward the breakdown of partisan division on the foreign aid question was complete by 1957; there had emerged a voting alignment which cut cleanly across party lines, where almost equal numbers within each party sup­ ported and objected to long-term commitments to assistance of for­ eign nations. The influence of domestic political factors can be inferred. The breakdown in Republican opposition to foreign aid came in a Con­ gress when the G.O.P. was the majority party in the House for the first time since the Hoover administration. The party leadership, in

CHAPTER TWO

55

a position requiring more than simple opposition to the president, was successful in moderating the views toward foreign aid which had characterized the Republicans in the prewar period. W hen the party captured the presidency as well as control of the House in 1952, responsibility for the conduct of American international rela­ tions seems to have led a majority of Republicans in the House to support the foreign aid activities proposed by the president. On the other hand, the increase in Democratic opposition to foreign aid suggests a continual growth among party members of disenchant­ ment with long-term foreign aid. A similar set of developments can be seen in the voting on the reciprocal trade issue, but the reaction on die part of the Republi­ cans occurred later in time. The partisan nature of the political alignments on foreign trade were not influenced by W orld W ar II. Even control of the 80th Congress by the Republicans failed to convince members of that party that relaxation of trade barriers was in the national interest, and they continued to oppose extension of presidential authority to make tariff concessions to other nations10— 1 perhaps because the legislation would give additional power to a Democratic president. In any event, when a Republican was safely in the W hite House, the party dramatically altered its stand on the sub­ ject. In the 83rd Congress, almost half of the Republicans fell at the internationalist extreme of the foreign trade scale, but it was not until the 85th Congress that a clear majority of Republican representatives were proponents of foreign trade. It may be that not until the foreign aid program, specifically the Marshall Plan, had brought about European recovery did they fully appreciate the value of freer trade policies.11 Such a delay in recognition would account for the time lag in the development of Republican backing for the trade program. During this same period, most Democrats continued to support the reciprocal trade program, but the extent of this backing declined somewhat, although not to the same degree that Democratic support of foreign aid had fallen off. T he net result of the evident trends, 10 For an attem pt to relate the activities of pressure group» to these de­ velopments, see Richard A. W atson, “The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes," journal of politics, XVIII (1956), 678-701. 11 Ibid^ p. 699.

56

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

here as w ith foreign aid, is that at the most recent period in time, the clear-cut party cleavage on reciprocal trade had vanished and had been replaced by bipartisan groups of supporters and foes of the program. These groups, it can be argued, reflect the beginnings of a true liberal-conservative cleavage cutting across party lines. A glance at Table 2-1 seems to corroborate this. W ith the excep­ tion of the relationship between the domestic policy scales which fluctuated erratically but within narrow limits and at a relatively high level, the remaining correlations showed a drop through the 80th and 83rd Congresses and an upturn in the 85th. This increase in the size of the coefficients indicates that some factor, or set of factors, operated to enlarge the extent of intercorrelation among the scales. Tables 2-4 and 2-5 suggest that party affiliation is not responsible for the changes, leading us to accept the following proposition: Proposition 2-3. Analysis of historical trends reveals that the nature of the opposition to foreign aid and foreign trade evolved from a partisan to an ideological base. In the 76th Congress the opponents of these programs were exclu­ sively Republicans; by the mid-1950’s they were composed of a conservative coalition cutting across party lines. The time differential in reaching the state of affairs described in Proposition 2-3 suggests one additional point. Key has outlined the process by which issues move across the political scene, designating it “dualism in a moving consensus.” 12 In early periods of discussion of particular questions, while there may be some agitation for the policy, neither of the major parties is willing to seriously consider proposing a new departure. Such was clearly the case in the mid1930’s, when the N eutrality Laws appear to have had the full sup­ port of both parties and the public.18 A t the next stage of the 12 V. O. Key, Jr., politics, parties and pressure groups (4th edn., New York: Crowell, 1958), pp. 243-249. For a different formulation of this notion, see Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and W illiam N . McPhee, voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 206-212. 18 On this point, see Adler, the isolationist im pulse , chap. 11, pp. 239-273; and the polls collected in H adley Cantril, ed., public opinion , 1935-1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 966-967.

CHAPTER TWO

57

process, one of die parties suggests that a new step be taken, the proposal is rejected by the opposition party, and the matter becomes a subject of partisan controversy. Both foreign policy scales under consideration here seem to have reached this stage by the time of the 76th Congress. Eventually the new policy is enacted by one of the parties, usu­ ally over the objections of the other, and becomes operative. If it proves acceptable, gradually support for it spreads until such time as both parties tend to accept the idea, at least in principle, and the debate is reduced to one over scope and method. By the 80th Con­ gress, there were visible signs that the Republicans had begun to have second thoughts about the opposition to foreign aid, but they held firm in their resistance to more liberal international trade poli­ cies. In the 83rd Congress, foreign aid commanded the support of majorities of both parties, while Republican opposition to reciprocal trade had begun to disintegrate. Foreign trade “caught up” with foreign aid, in the sense that it entered that zone of consensus where it was supported by the bulk of each party in the most recent Congress considered. Proposition 2-4. Historical developments in the nature of die opposition to, and support for, particular policies do not occur uniformly for the entire policy area, but rather differentially with respect to individual issues such as foreign aid and foreign trade. By way of a general summary, we will note the conclusions advanced in this chapter. W ith respect to the content of con­ gressional isolationism, we may make two points.1 1 Foreign aid and foreign trade seem to belong to a foreign policy sphere of activity which is distinguishable from domestic policy. 2 O ther issues, particularly overseas information and dis­ placed persons policy, cannot be so easily assigned to the foreign or domestic categories. The voting patterns on such issues are not consistently more closely related to the align-

58

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

ments on either foreign or domestic matters, but rather shift with the passage of time. These facts shape the nature of the president's tasks if he is to fulfill his obligation as the chief American foreign policy maker. Since part of this leadership obligation requires him to win legisla­ tive backing for his proposals, he must provide the individual con­ gressmen with persuasive arguments, or at least acceptable justifica­ tions, in order to secure their support. The president will be helped in this to the extent that his position is couched in the most appro­ priate terms. Knowledge of the frame of reference within which, at any given time, legislators consider policy initiatives should help him make the most effective bid for support. This is more clearly the case if, as some have argued, the con­ gressman is in reality a free agent who can make many of his policy choices as he sees fit. In contrast to the picture of the legislator mercilessly buffeted by incompatible pressures, this view portrays the lawmaker as able to define the nature of his job, to allocate his time and resources as he wishes, to listen to what and to whom he chooses, and thus to play competing interests off against one another in order to obtain for himself a wide range of behavioral discre­ tion.14 If the representative is not a prisoner of the interests, then a persuasive president, approaching him w ith the appropriate argu­ ments, may have a real chance to win his support. Finally, with respect to the evolution of congressional isolation­ ism, we may note two additional conclusions. 3 The base of opposition to the foreign aid and trade pro­ grams has altered over time; a bipartisan coalition replaced the Republican party as the major foe of the programs. 4 This development took place at different rates of speed w ith respect to the two subjects, coming later on reciprocal trade than on foreign aid legislation. These points, too, are relevant to the problem of mobilization of support for the president's policy initiatives, for they suggest an 14For a description of congressmen in these terms, see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter,

amemcan business and public policy ,

pp. 401-458.

CHAPTER TWO

59

additional complicating factor. Successful techniques for winning legislative support may cease to work as time passes and the shape of the divisions within the legislature alters. W hat is effective in gain­ ing adherents in an era of high partisanship may be totally unsuc­ cessful when the basic pattern is one of a liberal-conservative cleavage superimposed on party lines. It is, thus, highly probable that there is no fixed formula for effective foreign policy leadership; the president must be ever alert to situational changes which have outmoded earlier methods for winning congressional backing for his proposals and which require new lines of approach to the Congress.

3.

The Isolationist Congressman: Social Background Characteristics

Having determined that foreign aid and foreign trade can be dis­ tinguished from domestic policy matters, we can now begin to ex­ plore the relationship between the demographic variables and con­ gressional voting on foreign policy issues. In order to discover which of these factors are significantly associated with the distribu­ tion of congressional votes on the foreign aid and foreign trade issues, we will note whether a variable is related to each of the scales in the same way, or whether it has a particular relationship to one, but not the other, scale. Also, using all four sessions of Congress, we will observe what, if any, changes in the nature of the relationships between these variables and foreign affairs views have occurred with the passage of time. The relevance of the findings to the president's foreign policy leadership task should be clear. Each factor to be examined specifies a potential source of support for, or hostility to, the chief execu­ tive’s program; each may, thus, provide a clue to some possible action by the president which might enhance his ability to mobilize maximum legislative support for his policy proposals. The literature, 61

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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

62

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

summarized in Chapter One, displays a lack of agreement as to the relationship of many variables and the congressional vote. The present research may clarify some of these relationships. Several of the demographic variables will be considered in this chapter—specifically, religious affiliation, educational achievement, prior military service, and occupation prior to election. A t each stage of the analysis we will control for party affiliation, since much evidence, cited earlier, suggests the importance of party as a deter­ minant of congressional voting behavior. In examining these demo­ graphic variables, we will point out any departures from the general historical pattern of development, for these variables can be mean­ ingfully associated with the vote on foreign policy questions only if they are independent of the operation of political factors. (See pp. 51-53.)

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION A president seeking to rally legislative support for an interna­ tionalist program would receive little consistent counsel on how to approach the religious groups in Congress from an examination of what has been w ritten on the topic (see p. 19). Some have argued that Catholics, if they have responded favorably to the pronounce­ ments of Church spokesmen, have been in the forefront of isola­ tionist ranks while some Protestant groups have been actively internationalist. The isolationism of the Catholic hierarchy is under­ standable in light of the supranational character of the Church. It is certainly logical for the Vatican to look for ways to prevent the slaughter of Catholic by Catholic, and thus, isolationism—which would reduce the possibility of such a conflict—might well appear attractive to the Church.1 In addition, individual Catholics may pos­ sess characteristics which incline them in the isolationist direction. For example, many Catholics are of Irish and German ancestry, 1 John H . Fenton finds that the political behavior of Catholics strongly reflects the teaching of the Church, though this is less true of Catholic con­ gressmen. See his the catholic vote (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1960), pp. 109-110.

CHAPTER THREE

63

especially the former, and may hold views which reflect their na­ tional backgrounds.2 Also, a larger number of Catholics than of other religious groups fall into the low income and low education groups and may share with these classes a hostility to an expansion of internationalism. Protestants are less likely to put international religious considerations above attachment to their particular nations; they may be willing, therefore, to run whatever risks of interna­ tional political conflict may be involved in greater activity in world affairs. On the other hand, in the years after W orld W ar II the Catholic Church adopted a strong anticommunist posture; foreign aid and expanded international commerce may be considered as a means of halting expansion of the communist empire. This may give Catholic congressmen greater incentive to support liberal foreign policies than the Protestants, who are motivated by no such violent anti­ communism. Also Catholics, more likely to be first- or secondgeneration Americans, may see tangible benefits resulting from international programs for their friends and relatives in the old homeland. For the purpose of explicating the data, we will accept this second viewpoint and adopt, as a tentative hypothesis, the view that Catho­ lics as a group are less isolationist and more internationalist than Protestants. The data do not entirely confirm this proposition.* W ith party controls added (Table 3-1) the hypothesis applies to foreign aid but not to foreign trade. On the foreign aid scales, in twelve of fourteen possible comparisons, Catholics were more inclined than Protestants of the same party to support a broad foreign aid program and less likely to oppose it.4 The two instances where this was not so oc2 On the ethnic approach to isolationism, see chap. 1, pp. 17-18, and Lubell, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS.

8 Tables 3-1 and 3-2 include only those congressmen for whom information on religious affiliation was obtainable. Such data are more difficult to find as one goes farther back historically. The earlier Congresses include a relatively small number for whom religious data was available; the more recent period utilizes much fuller data. For a discussion of the collection of this information, see Appendix B. 4 The probability that Catholics will be more internationalist or less iso­ lationist than Protestants in twelve of fourteen cases is .006 as measured by

64

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 3-1 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY, RELIGION, AND CONGRESS* 76th ISOLATIONIST

Republican Catholic Protestant Democratic Catholic Protestant

INTERNATION­ ALIST

(50.0%)t (0.0%) 86.8 0.0 0.0 0.0

68.6 89.5

80th NUM ­ BER

ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

2 68

28.6% 23.4

21.4% 15.6

14 128

35 76

2.8 4.1

NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

83rd

86.1 61.2

36 98

85th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

Republican Catholic Protestant

17.4% 36.8

78.3% 56.4

23 163

Democratic Catholic Protestant

3.9 15.7

94.1 66.4

51 134

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

19.2% 39.2

69.2% 52.9

26 176

6.6 39.8

80.3 31.9

61 166

• Because the discussion focuses on isolationism and internationalism, the Moderate and N ot Ascertainable categories have been omitted. t Percentages based on a number of less than ten are indicated by paren­ theses.

curred in the earliest Congresses. In the case of foreign trade, there is no consistent relationship. This evidence suggests that on foreign aid the tentative hypothesis is accurate; Catholic legislators are more likely than their Protestant colleagues to support an internationalist the Sign Test. For a discussion of the test and the calculation procedures, see Sidney Siegel, nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences (New York: M cGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 68-75.

CHAPTER THREE

65

president. But with respect to foreign trade, no regularities appear and we must reject the tentative hypothesis. N or is the foreign aid finding an artifact of the urban-rural divi­ sion, for in urban areas the relationship holds true.5 A sample of the data appears in Table 3-2. Eleven comparisons are possible (seven in addition to those in the table) and in each urban area Catholics are more internationalist and less isolationist than urban Protestants. The association is independent of place of residence.5

TABLE 3-2 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID AMONG URBAN CO N G RESSM EN , BY R E L IG IO N AND PARTY, 83rd CONGRESS

Republican Catholic Protestant Democratic Catholic Protestant

ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

6.7% 12.8

93.3% 80.9

0 .0

100.0

4.3

82.6

NUM BER

15 47 45 23

Examination of developments over time strengthens the assertion that Catholicism is related to support of internationalism. Summary 5W e have limited ourselves in applying controls to those instances where there are a minimum of ten congressmen in a party-religious category (e.g., there must be at least ten Republicans of each religious conviction before we will use controls). There were too few Catholic congressmen from rural areas and from the South for additional controls to be used. The urban-rural divi­ sion was established on the basis of occupation distributions which determined the percentage of die population engaged in farm-related occupations. For a full discussion, see below, chap. 5, n. 7, p. 166, and Appendix B, pp. 221-222. •T h is corroborates and strengthens Fenton’s assertion that Catholic con­ gressmen, controlled for party and region, were more ardent supporters of foreign aid than were non-Catholics, for it indicates that urban-rural controls, which Fenton omits, do not destroy the reladonship. See Fenton, the catholic vote, pp. 105-108.

66

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

statements 1-3 (see pp. 51-52) describe the historical trends w ith respect to foreign aid. Statement 1 shows that over time the parties moved in opposite directions: among Republicans opposition to for­ eign aid declined while support for it rose; among Democrats isola­ tionism grew while internationalism decreased. All five (out of a possible thirty-six) departures from this pattern involved Catholic representatives and four of them were consistent with the tentative hypothesis; that is, in four instances Catholic deviation from the general pattern displayed a shift toward greater internationalism. T o cite one case, between the 76th and 80th Congresses internationalism among Democrats as a whole declined, but among Catholic Demo­ crats it increased. This finding testifies to the pull of affiliation with the Catholic Church in the direction of international involvement. However, the small number of deviations together with the high degree of accuracy of summary statements 2 and 3 suggest, as a qualification, that the pull of religion, while producing regularities, is not sufficient to produce many variations in the historical pattern which we have attributed to the operation of political factors. On the basis of this data, the relationship of religious affiliation to voting behavior can be summarized with the following proposition: Proposition 3-1. On foreign aid, but not foreign trade, matters, Catholic congressmen are more internationalist and less isolationist than Protestant representatives. A number of reasons may be cited to explain this proposition. First, it may simply be that individual churchgoers do not follow the advice of their formal leadership. Other factors—class, status, party affilia­ tion, etc.—may outweigh the counsel of Church elders, leading indi­ viduals to adopt a stand contrary to that advocated by the Church hierarchy. Second, congressmen may not be typical Church mem­ bers; institutional factors peculiar to the House, or the responsibili­ ties of public life, may create a different set of pressures to which the legislator must respond. In fact, it would be surprising if this were not so. Third, since the Catholic Church does not announce a position on most issues before Congress, it is quite possible that the Church favors foreign aid as a bulwark against communist expan­

CHAPTER THREE

57

sion. Since the exceptions to the proposition came in the earliest Congresses, this suggests that the Church may have reversed its position as it re-evaluated its stand in the light of the developing Cold W ar. Finally, as indicated earlier, since foreign aid goes in large amounts to countries from which many Catholics emigrated to the United States, such programs may be viewed by Catholics as a means to assist their homelands. No such clear-cut benefits appear to stem from expanded foreign trade and this may account for our finding that no relationship exists between religious affiliation and voting on trade. Nevertheless, legislators of the Catholic faith do provide one potential source of support on which a president may draw for pro-foreign aid votes.

EDUCATIONAL A TTA IN M EN T A second potential source of legislative backing for an interna­ tionalist president is the highly educated members of the House. Studies of individuals in the general population strongly suggest that those with greater amounts of education tend to be more interested in, more informed and more sophisticated about, international rela­ tions—and more likely to support an expansion of American partici­ pation in the world political arena (see p. 19, and nn. 21, 22). Those who continue their schooling have a greater opportunity to develop their intellectual powers and to expose themselves to a wider range of information on a broader range of subjects. The educated are more likely to perceive bonds linking the United States and foreign peoples, to look to the long-term benefits as contrasted to the short-term costs of an internationalist foreign policy, and to eschew simplified solutions to complex international problems. The empirical evidence, at least, seems to support such conclusions, and on the basis of such studies we will accept, as a tentative hypothesis, the view that there exists a positive correlation between educational attainment and favorable attitudes toward expanded foreign aid and foreign trade programs. W hatever the case with regard to the average citizen, the presi­ dent will not profit from knowledge of the educational accom­

68

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

plishments of members of Congress. Our data reveal no clear associ­ ation between the amount of schooling and voting behavior. N or does an examination of the historical trends shed much light; the departures from that pattern do support the tentative hypothesis, but they are so few that it is clear that other factors are more significantly connected with the vote on foreign policy—both aid and trade—than is the educational attainment of the individual con­ gressman. Thus, we must reject the tentative hypothesis.7 7Adding party controls does produce regularities among Democrats, but these are difficult to explain and, in any case, negate the tentative hypothesis. TABLE 3-3 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES OF DEMOCRATS ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY EDUCATION AND CONGRESS 76th

80th

ISOLA- INTERNA-

ISOLA- INTERNA­

TIONIST TIONALIST NUMBER TIONIST TIONALIST NUMBER

Educational Level High School College Graduate

0.0% 1.5 U

88.4% 85.7 84.7

43 133 85

0.0% 1.1 0.0

84.6% 77.4 86.7

26 93 75

85th

83rd

ISOLA- INTERNA-

ISOLA- INTERNA-

TIONIST TIONALIST NUMBER TIONIST TIONALIST NUMBER

Educational Level High School College Graduate

0.0% 8.4

1.1

76.9% 71.1 66.3

26 83 92

9.7% 16.3 14.7

67.7% 67.4

68.6

Tw o propositions can be derived from these data:

Proposition 3-2a. Among Democratic representatives, in each Congress, those with a high-school education are more inter­ nationalist than legislators with college experience on matters of foreign trade but not foreign aid. N o such relationship ex­ ists between the high-school educated and those with graduate training.

31 92

102

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69

It is highly probable that congressmen, regardless of the extent of their formal education, get their political cues from party leaders or from the particular institutional position, a committee chairman­ ship for instance, which they hold in the House. Such influences are more immediate and probably more persuasive than the indirect influence of past schooling.

PRIOR MILITARY SERVICE Earlier we suggested that the experience of serving in the armed forces might affect a legislator’s point of view on foreign policy decisions (see pp. 19-20). On the one hand, service in the armed forces, with its inevitable disruption of family and occupational routines, may prove so unhappy an experience that a man who has endured it becomes impressed with the necessity of making certain that others do not have to undergo similar hardships unnecessarily. On the other hand, military service may prove highly educational; contacts with foreign peoples, and a sense of understanding of their problems may lead to a belief in the utility of international coopera­ tion. Military experience, therefore, may incline an individual either toward withdrawal from, or more active participation in, interna­ tional affairs. Let us, giving the military the benefit of the doubt, adopt, as a tentative hypothesis, the notion that service in the mili­ tary serves to increase the soldier's appreciation of international Proposition 3-2b. Among Democrats, in each Congress, the college educated are more isolationist than either of the other educational groups on the foreign trade but not the foreign aid scale. W hy these relationships should occur raises ticklish problems of explanation. If those lawmakers with a high-school background are less likely to do independent thinking and more apt to vote with the party leadership, why do we not get similar findings on foreign aid? Perhaps these are only chance relationships or perhaps some third factor is responsible. If this last is the case, why should it affect Democrats and not Republicans? In any event, these regularities, which must remain unexplained, appear at best to provide a slender reed on which to base presidential appeals for legislative support.

70

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

problems. W e would expect that representatives who haw been exposed to military life would be less isolationist and more internationalist than their colleagues who have not had a similar experi­ ence. If this is so, an internationalist president could expect to find veterans rallying behind his policy proposals. The data (Table 3-4) show that, with respect to foreign aid, clear differences between the parties occur. In each of the three most recent Congresses, the tentative hypothesis applies consistently to Republicans, but not to Democrats. That is, military service inclines G.O.P. representatives to be more sympathetic toward foreign aid, and thus less isolationist, than those Republicans without experience in the armed forces. Conversely, Democrats who served in the mili­ tary are more disposed to limit American commitments in the for­ eign aid area than those who did not. By the 80th Congress, when party solidarity on the foreign aid question collapsed, those repre­ sentatives with military service broke most quickly with the past position of their party. It appears that military experience is differ­ entially related to party affiliation. An examination of the general historical pattern indicates that the association between military service and foreign policy voting is not strong enough to produce many deviations from that pattern. As in the case of the other variables treated in this chapter, military service introduces consistencies which exist within the broad movements defined by historical developments. All eight of the sum­ mary statements (see pp. 51-53) are highly accurate and the few departures from them do not point consistently in any direction, suggesting that the political forces previously discussed are of sub­ stantially greater importance as determinants of the vote than is an individual congressman’s prior military experience. W hile at the most general level, there is no relationship between military service and congressional voting on foreign affairs, a look at the parties separately suggests some relevance for the military serv­ ice variable. Proposition 3-3. F o r R epublicans, in th e th ree m ost recent Congresses, p rio r m ilitary service has been related to greater internationalism and lesser isolationism on foreign

71

CHAPTER T H U S

aid. Among Democrats during the same period the con­ verse was true; those with prior military service were less internationalist and more isolationist. Thus, in the period since W orld W ar II, the tentative hypothesis is borne out among Republicans but not Democrats. One possible cause of this finding is that service in the armed forces may be an unsettling experience and shake the faith of individuals in their views no matter what those views had been previously.8 Those TABLE $-4 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY MILITARY SERVICE, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 80th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

83rd

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

NUM ­ BER

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

Republican No Service 27.6% Some Service 21.3

9.8% 18.9

123 127

40.2% 34.1

44.6% 62.8

92 129

Democratic No Service Some Service

67.3 63.5

110 85

11.2 15.6

76.6 67.9

107 109

1.8 4.7

85th ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

NUM BER

Republican No Service Some Service

40.7% 34.1

46.9% 60.2

81 123

Democratic No Service Some Service

26.6 32.6

48.1 46.2

106 132

8A study of the impact of foreign travel on American businessmen found, in a similar vein, that experience abroad "counteracts self-interest thus lead-

72

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Republicans who had served became more ready than their col­ leagues who had remained civilians to see possible gains from for­ eign aid programs. On the other hand, military experiences may have inclined those Democrats exposed to them to be less optimistic about the hopes of accomplishing much through a policy of over­ seas assistance than fellow Democrats who had not served. Since the relationship between military service and vote on foreign aid appeared only after the breakdown of party unity on the issue, this suggests, as a second point, that social background characteristics of congressmen may be important only where they complement pressure from the political sphere. Thus, since Republi­ cans have moved from isolationism toward internationalism over time, it appears that those representatives who have been predisposed to move in this direction by their personal experiences are likely to respond more quickly to political pressures. In the 83rd and 85th Congresses, the greatest Republican support for the reciprocal trade program came from legislators with prior military service. If we accept the idea outlined above that military service is differ­ entially related to the two parties, the notion of the complementary nature of personal characteristics will explain the behavior of the Democratic representatives as well. As party solidarity declined, those Democrats with military backgrounds, perhaps disillusioned by service in the armed forces, responded most quickly. N o longer compelled to support the foreign aid program for reasons of party loyalty, they moved more rapidly than their fellow party members without service toward isolationism and away from internation­ alism. On the other hand, if we reject the idea of differing associa­ tion between each party and prior military service, we are left with the conclusion that where the forces generated by party and per­ sonal characteristics are in conflict, the political force is stronger. However, prior military service cannot be entirely disregarded as a factor in congressional voting patterns. ing to a convergence among different points of view. . . . protectionists become less protectionist while the liberal traders become less extreme in their view too.” Ithiel de Sola Pool, Suzanne Keller and Raymond A. Bauer, “The Influence of Foreign Travel on Political Attitudes of American Businessmen,” PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, XX (1956), p. 165.

CHAPTER THREE

73

PRIOR OCCUPATION A final social background characteristic which may influence the vote decisions of congressmen is the occupation pursued prior to election to the House. Possibly the experiences of individuals in some pursuits provide a broader perspective on world problems and thus a greater willingness to see the United States become entangled in world affairs, à perspective lacking in men engaged in other ways of earning a livelihood.* For example, there is some evidence that businessmen, partly because of their higher socioeconomic status and partly because their occupational interests are broader, are more prone to see advantages in expanded international activity. This, of course, does not apply equally to all segments of the business com­ munity.10 Lawyers, too, may have a greater appreciation of the possible gains from international political contacts, for their work may lead them to perceive connections which transcend national boundaries. A third category, which we will call other professionals —the medical professions (medicine and dentistry), teaching, and writing—is also worth examining in this connection.11 Farmers comprise a fourth group. Primarily concerned with local issues, especially economic questions, we might expect the farm group to be less sympathetic toward efforts to enlarge the scope of American commitments to other countries. W e will adopt as our tentative hypothesis that buńnessmen, lawyers, other professionals, and farmers will fall in this order on the internationalist-isolationist continuum. The data in Tables 3-5 and 3-6 suggest that, while there are no consistencies which persist throughout the entire period under • Occupation is, of course, related to socioeconomic status. For a summary of the literature relating status to political behavior which pays some attention to occupation, see H ero, Americans in world affairs, pp. 57-58. 10 On the division within the business community, see David S. McClellan and Charles E. W oodhouse, “The Business Elite and Foreign Policy,” western political quarterly, XIII (M arch 1960), 172-190. 11This group, created because of an insufficient number of cases in any one occupation, may be too diverse in composition to be politically meaningful.

74

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 3-Ü DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY OCCUPATION. PARTY. AND CONGRESS 76th

Republican Business Law Other Professions Farm Democratic Business Law Other Professions Farm

80th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

73.0% 85.7

0.0% 0.0

37 77

86.5 83.0

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

29.2% 23.7

6.3% 18.0

48 118

37 12

28.6 23.1

14.3 7.7

49 13

80.5 81.2

41 154

7.7 2.4

73.0 64.0

26 125

82.5 62.5

40 16

4.0 (0.0)

72.0 (25.0)

25 8

NUM ­ BER

85th

83rd

Republican Business Law Other Professions Farm Democratic Business Law Other Professions Farm

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

34.6% 36.0

63.5% 52.0

52 100

33 13

44.8 33.3

44.8 66.7

29 12

89.4 66.9

45 124

20.8 32.6

55.8 43.5

48 138

78.3 (50.0)

23 8

20.0 (44.4)

48.0 (22.2)

25 9

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

31.3% 36.2

60.4% 56.0

42.4 38.5

48.5 46.2

4.4 16.1 8.7 (50.0)

NUM ­ BER

48 116

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

CHATTER THREE

75

TABLE 3-6 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY OCCUPATION, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 76th

Republican Business Lawyers Other Professions Farm

80th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

78.4% 90.9

2.7% 0.0

37 77

89.2 91.7

0.0 0.0

37 12

77.6 100.0

0.0 0.0

49 13

85.4 87.0

41 154

0.0 0.8

84.6 80.0

26 125

85.0 75.0

40 16

0.0 (0.0)

88.0 (62.5)

25 8

Democratic 0.0 Business Lawyers 0.6 Other Professions 0.0 Farm 12.5

NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

87.5% 82.2

83rd ISOLA­ TION­ IST

Republican Business Lawyers Other Professions Farm

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

18.8% 45.8% 16.4 49.1 24.2 23.1

Democratic 2.2 Business Lawyers 0.8 Other Professions 21.7 Farm (25.0)

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

0.0% 0.0

NUM ­ BER

48 118

85th NUM ­ BER

48 116

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

23.1% 37.0

65.4% 48.0

52 100

39.4 30.8

33 13

31.0 16.7

55.2 58.3

29 12

71.1 68.5

45 124

6.3 16.7

75.0 62.3

48 138

60.9 (50.0)

23 8

20.0 (22.2)

72.0 (77.8)

25 9

76

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

analysis, the trend is in the direction of the tentative hypothesis. Legislators with business careers are more internationalist on foreign aid than each of the other occupational groups in a significant pro­ portion of cases.13 Similarly, representatives with prior experience in farming were less internationalist than each of the other cate­ gories to a significant degree. On the foreign trade scale, representatives of both parties with experience in farming were significantly more isolationist and less internationalist than those with each of the other occupational backgrounds. W ithin Democratic ranks, finally, farmers were signifi­ cantly more opposed to and less in favor of aid and trade programs than lawmakers in each of the other categories. Thus, we may con­ clude that the tentative hypothesis correctly predicts the general relationships among the occupational groups—businessmen tend to be more internationalist and farmers less so than the remaining oc­ cupational types. The law and other professional groups fall within these extremes but in no consistent pattern. Examination of the departures from the historical pattern indi­ cates that the gap between the farm congressmen and the other groups is lessening over time. Summary statement 1 notes that with the passage of time isolationism among Republicans declined and internationalism increased while among Democrats isolationism rose and internationalism fell. In nine (of a possible seventy-two) instances, there were departures from the statement. Four of these involved representatives with farm backgrounds and in each case this group became less isolationist or more internationalist, con­ trary to more general trends. Three deviations involved businessmen and, again, in each of them the group moved, in opposition to the historical pattern, away from isolationism or toward greater support of an extensive foreign aid program. The implication of these de­ partures from expectation seems to be that there is an overall trend toward greater tolerance of large foreign aid programs among busi­ nessmen and farmers, though the latter remain, among Democrats, the least internationalist of all occupational groups and are merely closing the gap. The change in the composition of the isolationist and internation­ alist groups described in statement 2 is accurate. Representatives of 12 As measured by the Sign Test. See above, n. 4, pp. 63-64.

CHATTER THREE

77

all occupational categories were, by 1957-1958, at both ends of the scale. There were, however, some changes in the rate of movement. Congressmen with business training moved more sharply away from isolationism and toward internationalism than did the other occupa­ tional groups. On the internationalist side, farmers also made a sub­ stantial gain. Summary statement 4 describes rising international­ ism on foreign trade coupled with generally falling isolationism among Republicans and, conversely, slipping internationalism and increasing isolationism on the Democratic side. The fourteen de­ partures from this pattern include five which relate to the farmlegislator groups; of these, four show movement away from isola­ tionism or toward internationalism. Similarly, the two deviations from statement 6 (describing the relative extent of pro- and antiforeign trade sentiments in the two parties) are consistent with the trends already noted. These exceptions to the general pattern of development again suggest that the trends toward broadened for­ eign aid support and away from resistance to the program have been more rapid among business and farm groups in the House. Tw o points can be mentioned to account for the failure of the data to support the tentative hypothesis completely. In the first place, the occupational categories used may simply be too broad. The nature of the biographical data on congressmen is such that it is impossible to make any determination of the individuals whose busi­ ness ventures involved international contacts. If such information were available, we might find that those representatives whose prior business experience was in export-import activity behaved quite differ­ ently from those lawmakers whose previous business ventures were in the nature of the small-town country store. Such a finding would hardly be surprising. A similar argument can be made with regard to lawyers; a man who had served as counsel to a million-dollar corporation might well come to have a different set of foreign pol­ icy perspectives than an attorney engaged in private practice at the county seat. In the second place, as the study of historical trends indicates, the political factors—control of the House and/or the presidency—seem to outweigh the social background characteristics of the congressmen. If this is so, then it is likely that party and other political pressures are more influential than occupational experience in determining the legislators’ votes.

78

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

If we look to the total number of possible comparisons between groups rather than perfect consistency, we can modify this essen­ tially negative judgment. Tw o propositions can be derived from our discussion of the association of occupational background and for­ eign affairs voting behavior. Proposition 3-4a. In a significant num ber o f cases, on both scales and in both parties, representatives w ith business backgrounds are m ore internationalist, and farm represent­ atives less so, than congressm en o f each o f the o th er oc­ cupational backgrounds. Proposition 3-4b. In a significant num ber o f cases, rep re­ sentatives o f both parties w ith farm backgrounds w ere m ore isolationist than each o f the o th er occupational groups on foreign trade only.

These propositions support, in part at least, the tentative hypothesis set out at the start of this section. Several possible explanations present themselves. First, it may be true that business occupations do foster greater international contacts and, thus, broader recogni­ tion of the advantages of international political activity. On the other hand, farmers, with their predominantly local interests, are perhaps less able to see benefits deriving from such activity. Second, the extent of actual overseas contacts aside, the differ­ ences between the business and farm groups and the other occupa­ tional categories may stem from changes in the economic positions of the two groups. It may be that in recent years, the expanding concern of American business with world markets has led to a greater understanding of, or a new perception of advantage in, American aid to and trade with the economically less affluent na­ tions of the world. The farm group, on the contrary, has been perhaps less willing to compete with nations abroad than the other occupations. Remember, however, that the departures from the general trends indicate that the gap between farmers and other oc­ cupational groups has been lessening with the passage of time. Third, as the data in Table 3-6 indicate, in each instance on foreign trade Republican businessmen were more internationalist

CHATTE* THREE

79

than G.O.P. farmers. This finding lends some support to die notion, set out in the discussion of military service, that the pull of demo­ graphic factors is most visible when it supports pressures from other sources. Thus it may be, given the tendency for the Republican party to reduce its enmity for international entanglements over time, that G.O.P. lawmakers with business experience, predisposed in this direction by occupational background, were quicker to re­ spond to suggestions of the party leadership.1* W hile it is impossible to make a firm generalization linking occu­ pation and voting behavior, the evidence is such that we cannot ignore the possibility that occupation is a relevant factor in the determination of votes on the floor of the House of Representatives. If relevant, however, occupation is hardly determinative, for it is not responsible for a great number of departures from the general historical pattern. This affirms our earlier judgment that personal characteristics take on importance within a context defined by polit­ ical events. A brief discussion of the answers our data provide to the prob­ lems raised at the outset of this chapter may clarify the relation­ ship between social background attributes of congressmen and their voting behavior. 1 Although not all the variables examined in this chapter yielded strong, positive relationships, the propositions pre­ sented here establish the relevance of social background characteristics for an understanding of the vote decisions in Congress. Religious affiliation was continually associated with voting alignments on foreign aid, though not on for­ eign trade, throughout the period under consideration. Generally, the data on occupational background reflect pos­ itive relationships between business careers and internation­ alism; prior experience in farming and isolationism. In addi18This conclusion is buttressed by the further finding (see Table 3-5) that Republican lawyers are consistently more internationalist on foreign aid than those in the other professional group. Thus, it is possible to suggest that within the Republican party there may be some validity in the tentative hypothesis.

80

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

tion, social background characteristics, at least in the case of prior military service and prior occupation, take on impor­ tance when they complement political forces. Those repre­ sentatives pushed in a given direction by political pressures and social attributes have responded more than those im­ pelled by one of these forces. 2 Yet, political forces seem to be stronger than social forces, when they push in opposite directions. This suggests a second point: social background characteristics take on importance within a context defined by the play of poli­ tical pressures. The relations of the parties to one an­ other as majority and minority, the reaction of both to external events, the relationship of Congress to the W hite House, and the changes in legislative personnel establish a political environment within which the House of Repre­ sentatives hammers out foreign affairs decisions. Back­ ground attributes introduce regularities shaped by these political forces.14 The scarcity of departures from the broad historical pattern of development testifies to the primacy of political pressures. 3 The foregoing has clear implications for the ability of the president to win legislative backing for his policy designs, insofar as support can be won through discussion of the substance of foreign policy problems. Votes secured through the judicious use of patronage or similar persuasive tools are obviously another matter. W here appeals “on the 14But the fact that regularities do exist, that social background character­ istics do exert some influence over and above that of party and constituency, allows us to modify, to a degree at least, Turner’s negative judgment that the social attributes of a congressman “unless they happen to coincide with the attitudes of his party and district, were not usually found in his voting be­ havior” (Turner, party and constituency, pp. 172-173). There is some lack of clarity here, for T urner uses “attitude” and “characteristic” as synonyms, where it seems that personal attitudes may or may not be directly related to personal characteristics. In what follows we will assume that T urner uses both these terms as we have used characteristic in this chapter, namely to describe certain attributes (for example, religious affiliation) of individual congressmen. In fairness, we should note that Turner’s study covers the period before 1950, a period during which our data indicate party played a much more crucial role than it did after that time.

CHAPTER THREE

81

merits” can be effective, however, the president should, according to our interpretation, make his requests primarily in terms of those forces which shape the political context of legislative activity. His arguments should take account of the events of the times, the party balance, and individual lawmakers who command die key institutional centers of influence. Over and above requests for votes in these terms, however, other things being equal, there may be some gain from focusing attention on congressmen with certain social background characteristics, particularly affiliation with die Catholic Church and prior experience in the business world.

Social background characteristics interact with factors of party and subject matter to produce a complicated picture of congressional isolationism; both political and social background forces are relevant and important to an understanding of the congressional vote. As we have seen, there are consistent relationships which apply to (Hie party and not the other, and some findings apply to one subject m atter scale and not the other. W hether “political” variables and constituency characteristics will create additional complications is a question to which we will turn in the following chapters.

4.

The Isolationist Congressman: Political Characteristics

Shifting our attention from the social background characteristics of the congressmen to the political environment in which they make foreign policy decisions, we will analyze four variables: length of service in Congress, electoral margin (that is, the percentage of the vote the representative received in the most recent election), prior service in an elective office, and service on a House committee which deals with foreign affairs activity. In connection with these political factors, we will first examine the extent of association between the variables and the vote on foreign policy issues, and also the possibility that the variables are related in different ways to the individual scales. Second, employing time-series data, we will attempt to discover what, if any, trends are visible in the relationship between each variable and foreign policy voting behavior. Again, the general historical pattern of development set out in Chapter Tw o will be referred to (see pp. 51-53), and deviations from it will be noted. Here, as in the last chapter, our findings may shed some light on the problems of presidential leadership in foreign affairs. The varia­ bles to be examined may point to possible sources of congressional

83

84

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

backing for proposals to extend the foreign aid and reciprocal trade programs, or to potential resistance to such policy initiatives. T he president, then, to the extent that he is aware of the political cor­ relates of isolationist-internationalist voting, may be able to exert his energies more effectively in an effort to maximize the legislative response to his policy desires.

LEN G TH OF SERVICE One of the most frequent targets of the critics of the congres­ sional machinery is the seniority system which rewards those best able to survive die vicissitudes of electoral politics with a dispropor­ tionate share of legislative influence. Power derived from committee chairmanships and from informal relationships developed over long years of service enables those legislators with seniority to resist pres­ idential requests with impunity. The impact of Congressman O tto Passman (Democrat, Louisiana) on the foreign aid appropriation over the past half-dozen years is but one example. It is widely be­ lieved that the senior members of the House bring a different point of view to bear on policy matters that come before Congress; their opinions were shaped in an earlier period, they are older, they tend to come from “safe" districts, and they are often conservative. Thus it is assumed that they are more reluctant to see any value in departing from traditional political patterns and that they see little or no advantage in increasing the extent of American participation in world politics even when requests to do so come from the W hite House.1 Following this line of reasoning, let us accept, as a tentative hypothesiSj the view that greater length of service leads to more 1 On the seniority system, see George B. Galloway, the legislative process congress (New York: Crowell, 1955), pp. 366-369; Ernest S. Griffith, congress: its contemporary role (3rd edn., New York: New York University Press, 1961), pp. 28-32; and George Goodwin, “T he Seniority System in Congress,” American political science review , LIU (1959), 412-436. Critical assessments of the system are provided by James M acGregor Burns, the deadlock of democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and the R eport of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, toward a more responsible tw o -party system (New York: Rinehart, 1950). in

CHAPTER POUR

85

isolationism and less internationalism on foreign aid and foreign trade matters. The data, however, suggest that the president need not fear op­ position from the most senior group of legislators. In fact, what little meaningful evidence can be gathered contradicts the tentative hypothesis. Various methods of breaking down the data yield no consistent relationships, and in only one instance are there any meaningful departures from the historical trends. The three devia­ tions from summary statement 1, which describes the shift among Republicans away from isolationism and toward internationalism and the contrary movement toward more opposition to, and less support for, foreign aid among Democrats, tend to disprove the tentative hypothesis. For example, between the 80th and 83rd Congresses, Republicans with long service (more than ten terms) became less isolationist in a situation where the party as a whole became more so. These departures from the historical pattern indicate that the association, however slight it is, between length of service and isolationism is negative, not positive. Correlating length of service and the foreign policy scale scores provides another shred of evidence on this point. The coefficients (Table 4-1) reach statistical significance 8 in three of four instances relating to foreign trade, and, being positive, they suggest that tenure is related, though only slightly, to an inclination to vote for, not against as the tentative hypothesis predicts, an expanded reciprocal trade program. On the other hand, since the largest of the coefficients (.17) can explain very little of the variation on the trade scale, this should provide ample warning against taking this relationship too seriously. In attempting to explain the finding that length of service is un­ related to vote position, the obvious point to make is that other things such as party pressures are more important as explanatory factors. Seniority introduces relatively few deviations from the general pattern of development and supports the notion of the primacy of other variables.8*2 2 The test is an F test. See H ubert M. Blalock, Jr., social statistics (New York: M cGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 302-305, for the procedure. * In any given instance, of course, a particular senior member may utilize his institutional position to frustrate the desires of the president. All we can

86

TH E ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 4-1 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: LEN G TH OF SERVICE AND FOREIGN POLICY SCALE SCORES, BY CONGRESS* 76th

80th

83rd

Foreign Aid

.171

.01

.00

Foreign Trade

.121

.14 f

.03

85th -.01 .15 f

* Scores on the foreign policy scales run from isolationism (low) to inter­ nationalism (high), t Significant at .01 level $ Significant at j05 level

A second possible explanation relates congressional attitudes to public opinion. If there exists some relationship between legislative actions and popular sentiment, then it may be that as public senti­ ment alters, the pressures on the legislature also shift.4 It also may be the case that those of short tenure, less secure in their jobs, are more sensitive to pressure stemming from public opinion. The availa­ ble poll data, and they are sketchy at best, indicate that public attitudes toward foreign aid were hostile in the 1930’s, became more friendly in the years following W orld W ar II, only to level off when no immediate and apparent results were forthcoming from the aid programs.5 W hile acknowledging that public opinion may affect legislators with similar political attributes in quite different ways, this shift in public sentiment may have influenced the least senior (one to three terms) representatives. They were the most isolationist group on foreign aid in the 76th Congress, the least isolationist in the next two Congresses, and most opposed to the program by the 85th Congress. say here is that taken as a whole those with long service are no more likely than other seniority groups to oppose the president. 4 The validity of this assumption was discussed in chap. 1, p. 21, and n. 26. 5 See the poU data collected in Cantrell, public opinion , pp. 120-130; Hazel Gaudet Erskine, ‘T h e Cold W ar: Report from the Polls,” public opinion quabteily , XXV (1961), 300-303.

CHAPTER FOUR

87

One final explanation remains: it may be that length of service is not positively related to isolationism or internationalism but rather to moderation. If short tenure breeds insecurity, the congressman may be cautious and tend to avoid extreme positions in order to prevent alienation of any group of constituents. Or, as Truman's study of the 81st Congress suggests, the most junior members of the House may take their cues from the floor leader who, in turn, as dictated by his role, tended to take a centerist position within his own party. Thus the reference point for “insecure," short-term representatives was a position of moderation. Whichever of these explanations is accurate, our data confirm the tendency of those with short tenure to fall in the moderate range, for in twenty of twenty-four possible comparisons the legislators with short tenure were more moderate than representatives of long service.9 The lat­ ter, presumably more secure, seem to have been more willing to take extreme positions, either isolationist or internationalist. All this seems to suggest a relevance for length of service in any effort to assess congressional voting alignments on foreign policy matters. As we noted, two pieces of evidence—the departures from the historical pattern and the correlation coefficients relation in seniority to the vote, especially on foreign trade—give faint indica­ tion that length of service may be positively related to international­ ism. W e have also pointed out the possibility that short tenure may lead to moderation rather than extremism. The critics of Congress may have overestimated the effects of seniority on the ability of the president to provide leadership. On international relations issues, at least, the president need not fear disproportionate opposition from the “elder Statesmen" in the House. This discussion reinforces two points made in the previous chap­ ter. First, the scarcity of departures from the historical trends indi­ cates that length of service, like the social background attributes, is less important than the forces—events, the party balance, etc.— 6 Truman, the congressional party, pp. 202-227. Trum an finds this ten­ dency to moderation among junior representatives only on the Democratic side of the aisle. By the 83rd Congress, according to our data, it characterized short-term members of both parties. Trum an attributes the party difference to the performance of the two floor leaders; our data imply that the Republi­ can leader, Joseph M artin of Massachusetts, had changed his tactics by 1953.

88

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

which shape the political context within which the legislature oper­ ates. Second, since the deviations from summary statement 1 noted above indicate that among Republicans on foreign aid long service pulls in the direction of internationalism, political attributes, again like social background characteristics, may take on importance when they complement already existing pressures. Thus when Republican opposition began to crumble, the senior members of the party voted for foreign aid to the greatest extent.

ELECTORAL MARGIN Electoral margin, like length of service, and in similar ways, may be associated with subsequent voting behavior, and with response to presidential policy requests.7 Electoral margin may be related to vote choice in three distinct ways. If public opinion is more influ­ ential among legislators who are insecure because of narrow election victories, the representatives of competitive areas8 will alter their vote positions in response to fluctuations in public sentiment. There­ fore we should expect to find no consistent relationship between electoral margin and foreign policy behavior in the House. From another perspective, the congressmen who represent com­ petitive districts may, like those of short tenure, be cautious in their behavior and eschew extreme positions. Moderation in voting will protect them from driving any group “back home” from the fold, 7 Some literature on this topic is cited in nn. 29, 30, p. 22. * Using the percentage of the total vote secured by the winner as the cri­ terion, we have classified the districts as follows: Competitive seats 54S% or less of the vote Interm ediate seats SSjO-S9S% of the vote Safe seats 60X>% or more of the vote . For a suggestion that this customary classificatory scheme oversimplifies re­ ality, that what is “safe” in one sute or for one office may, in fact, be “com­ petitive” in another su te or for a different office, see Joseph A. Schlesinger, ‘T h e Structure of Competition for Office in the American Sûtes,” behavioral science, V (1960), 197-210, and “Stability in the Vote for Governor,” public OPINION QUARTERLY, XXIV (1960), 85-91.

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89

which in a close election might spell the difference between victory and defeat. Those from safe constituencies, following this line of reasoning, should be more willing to take stands at the extremes of the foreign policy continua. The most common assumption, however, is that those lawmakers who hold safe seats can afford to be less concerned with their con­ stituents' wishes and can pursue a more independent course of ac­ tion. Since legislators without substantial electoral competition tend to be conservatives, or at least to represent supposedly conservative areas, they may be expected to be more isolationist than their col­ leagues from competitive districts.* A s a tentative hypothecs, we have opted for this third alternative; we will treat the data in light of the expectation that congressmen from safe districts will be more isolationist and less internationalist than legislators w ith less comfortable pluralities. The data (Table 4-2) disclose that in the two most recent Con-

TABLE 4-2 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES O N FOREIGN AID, BY ELECTORAL MARGIN, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

85th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

Republican Competitive Safe

19.5% 41.9

70.7% 52.4

41 124

Democratic Competitive Safe

2 0 .0

89.1 64.0

46 145

0 .0

NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

27.9% 39.4

62.8% 52.5

43 99

25.0 34.8

50.0 41.3

52 155

gresses the tentative hypothesis receives confirmation with respect to foreign aid. In the years after 1953, legislators in each party with 8 See Bums,

and the APSA Report, system , on these points.

the deadlock of democracy,

a more responsible tw o -party

toward

90

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

competitive constituencies were less isolationist and more interna­ tionalist than those with safe seats. On foreign trade no regularities whatsoever appear in the voting patterns, indicating that the tw o foreign policy areas are related to outside forces in different ways. The correlation coefficients relating percentage of vote to scale score (Table 4-3) suggest that the verification of the tentative TABLE 4-3 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: ELECTORAL MARGIN AND FOREIGN POLICY SCALE SCORES, BY CONGRESS 76th

80th

Foreign Aid

.49*

.15 *

-.23*

Foreign Trade

.40*

.38*

.18 •

83rd

85th -.24* -.07

* Significant at the .01 level

hypothesis has come about as the result of a reversal of the nature of the association. In the 76th Congress lawmakers receiving a high pro­ portion of the vote were strong backers of the foreign aid and trade programs. This probably stems from the high level of sup­ port given the Roosevelt administration by southerners from safe constituencies. Popular sentiment on the eve of W orld W ar II was, at best, hesitant about American participation in that conflict, and there were very vocal groups advocating neutrality.10 There­ fore, if congressmen are affected by public opinion, it is probable that representatives of competitive districts were reluctant to as­ sume strong internationalist positions. By the 85th Congress, as the negative correlations indicate, those from safe seats had become opponents of foreign aid and also, to a lesser extent, of foreign trade. These changes coincided with the breakdown of party soli­ darity on these issues, suggesting that political characteristics may take on importance as the impact of party declines.11 10 See Divine, the illusion of neutrality. 11 Further evidence in support of this conclusion derives from an examina­ tion of foreign trade. W e noted earlier (pp. 48-51) that the end to party

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91

The deviations from the historical pattern of development set out in the summary statements lend further weight to the argument that representing a competitive constituency pushes the congressman in the direction of internationalism. Statement 1 notes the general changes over time on foreign aid: among Republicans isolationism has fallen while internationalism has risen; among Democrats the changes have been precisely the reverse. Of the five departures from the statement, four support the tentative hypothesis, showing legis* lators from competitive districts moving away from isolationism or toward internationalism. T o cite a single instance, between the 80th and 83rd Congresses, Republicans from closely contested consti­ tuencies became less isolationist while the G.O.P. as a whole be­ came more so. The demise of party solidarity on foreign aid, which statement 2 describes, had taken place within each electoral margin group by the 85th Congress, but the breakdown came more quickly among the safe-seat congressmen. As late as 1953-1954, the only Democrats opposed to the aid program were from safe districts, and one-fifth of them fell in isolationist ranks. Only in the most recent (85th) Congress did the isolationist cause attract votes from Demo­ crats from competitive districts. These departures from the general pattern indicate that those representatives who face greater electoral competition are drawn toward internationalism. Over time some meaningful relationships have emerged, but no con­ sistencies appear which cover the entire period since 1939-1940. A number of factors have been discussed in attempting to explain other essentially negative findings and these are relevant here as well. However, in particular historical periods, presumably those where there is widespread popular approval of foreign aid, the president solidarity on reciprocal trade came after the parties had ceased to vote as units on foreign aid. In the 85th Congress, representatives of competitive districts were, in each party, less isolationist and more internationalist than those from safe constituencies. Also, in the 85th Congress, the correlation re­ lating electoral margin and the trade vote (Table 4-3) became negative, indi­ cating that the pro-trade votes tended to come from those with narrow elec­ toral pluralities. In sum, electoral margin seems to be becoming related to foreign trade voting in the same way it became related to foreign aid, but the change is taking place later in time because party unity persisted longer on trade than on aid.

92

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

may find support forthcoming from congressmen from closely con­ tested areas. The importance of electoral margin is suggested by the data for the most recent years, the coefficients of correlation, and the departures from the historical pattern. Proposition 4-1. In the 83rd and 85th Congresses, on for­ eign aid, representatives of both parties from competi­ tive districts have been more internationalist and less isolationist than those from safe districts. If the poll data noted earlier are accurate,12 it is possible that con­ gressmen from competitive districts, presumably more sensitive to public whim, shifted their positions to reflect the change, or their perception of the change, in popular sentiment. Thus the proposi­ tion may reflect the upward curve of popular support for participa­ tion in world affairs. The finding may also mean that there now exists agreement be­ tween the leaders of the parties as to the desirability of the aid program, and that those lawmakers who are more insecure by rea­ son of their slender pluralities are also more susceptible to party pressure. Finally, the proposition may mean that public opinion and political party have come to push in the same direction. If both parties and the attentive portion of the electorate agree that an internationalist policy is most desirable, then it should not be sur­ prising that the congressmen impelled by both forces (those from competitive districts) respond most to the combined pressures.12 12 See the sources cited in n. 5, p. 85, above. 18 W hatever the most appropriate explanation, Proposition 4-1 allows us to support and to amend MacRae’s findings, based on a study of the 81st Congress, on the relation of electoral margin to voting record (MacRae, dimensions of congressional voting). MacRae concludes that Republicans “showed some indication of heightened responsiveness to constituency char­ acteristics when they had narrow election margins, but that the Democrats did not” (p. 286). O ur data show that at a later point in time the relationship holds for both parties. This permits rejection of two of MacRae’s tentative explanations for his finding (p. 289). The differential relation of electoral margin to the two parties is not a permanent characteristic, reflecting struc­ tural differences with them. N or is the status of the parties as m ajority and

CHAPTER FOUR

93

One other point should be made here. W e suggested earlier that, as appears to be the case with length of service, the thrust of low security resulting from narrow election victories might be a ten­ dency to avoid taking extreme positions. There is, however, no evidence to support this notion; legislators from competitive areas show no indication of being more moderate than those holding safe seats.* 14 Thus it may be that the insecurity produced by thin elec­ toral margins differs from that stemming from short service, the for­ mer leading to a heightened sensitivity to constituency opinion (in recent years greater internationalism and reduced isolationism) while the latter leads to the avoidance of extreme position (moderation).15 W e must repeat an earlier caution: the scarcity of departures from the historical pattern suggests that political forces cannot be ignored. However, within the context defined by the operation of these forces, it seems that insecurity, particularly that generated by electoral margin, must be considered in any attempt to discover the determinants of congressional voting behavior. minority determinative, for our finding holds for both the 83rd Congress, with its Republican majority, and the 85th, dominated by the Democrats. In fair­ ness, we must note that MacRae’s findings included controls for region. Since these are not included here, it may be that regional variations have contamin­ ated our data. W e are left with the possibility that these findings, MacRae’s and those presented here, reflect the situations of particular periods. Electoral margin may have had one effect under a Democratic president (in the 81st Congress) and another in a Republican administration (83rd and 85th Congresses). O r as MacRae suggests (p. 289), the composition of the parties may be the de­ termining factor. 14 This is in contrast to Truman’s finding (the congressional party, p. 216) that lawmakers from competitive seats, like those with short service, tend to fall in the moderate range. 18 In an attempt to test the idea that insecurity produces an increased sus­ ceptibility to public and/or party pressures, we combined length of service and electoral margin in a single measure, contrasting the insecure (low tenure, low electoral margin) with the secure (long service, high plurality) congress­ men. These data produce the same results as electoral margin taken alone: in the tw o most recent (83rd and 85th) Congresses, the insecure were less isolationist and more internationalist than the secure legislators. The discus­ sion of possible explanations for the electoral margin findings is also relevant here.

94

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

PRIOR ELECTIVE OFFICE Service as an elective official prior to winning a seat in Congress may also relate to a representative's reaction to the policy initiatives of the president. Aid and trade decisions, like most policy moves, involve uncertainty, for there is no absolute guarantee that these programs will produce the precise results anticipated and desired. Thus the congressman who brings the elected public servant's experience in making policy decisions with him to Washington may approach his decision-making task from a distinctive perspective. Prior responsibility to an electorate may create in the officeholder a recognition of the necessity, despite die risks involved, to act in response to larger forces beyond his immediate control. If the people demand soludons to problems, then the elected leader will have to act as best he can to meet these popular demands. Experi­ ence of this sort, when brought to Congress, may make the legis­ lator recognize that the United States cannot avoid international activity on a large scale. The demands of security, and resistance to aggression, may appear to require an internationalist policy, even one which involves grave uncertainties. If this line of reasoning is correct, we should expect that representatives with prior service in elective office will be more internationalist and less isolationist than lawmakers without such experience. They should also be more re­ sponsive to appeals for support from the president. W e will adopt this view as a tentative hypothesis. The data do not corroborate this notion. N o relationships exist throughout the period since 1939; departures from the historical pattern set out in the summary statements display no regularities. Over time, however, one consistency has emerged, and it con­ tradicts the tentative hypothesis (Table 4-4). In the 83rd and 85th Congresses, on foreign trade, lawmakers of both parties without prior service were more internationalist than those who had been elected to public office other than Congress. The most likely explanation for the failure of the tentative hy­ pothesis is that there is, in fact, no common core of experience

95

CHAPTER FOUR

TABLE 4-A DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY PRIOR ELECTIVE OFFICE, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

85th

INTERNA­ TIONALIST

NUM BER

INTERNA­ TIONALIST

Republican Prior office No office

44.2% 46.2

104 117

47.8% 58.0

112

Democratic Prior office No office

66.7 67.6

111

105

63.2 69.9

125 113

NUM BER

92

shared by those who are elected to office. The outlook of the public prosecutor probably differs considerably from that of the state legis­ lator, which job, in turn, may well impart a different set of views than does election to a statewide executive post. A second possibil­ ity, of course, is that other forces, in particular party affiliation, are determinative here. The scarcity of deviations from the historical pattern of the party groups indicates that whatever pull prior expe­ rience in an elective job may have it is far outweighed by the influ­ ence which political forces exert. One proposition does emerge from looking at developments over the years: Proposition 4-2. In the 83rd and 85th Congresses, repre­ sentatives of both parties without previous service in an elective office were more internationalist on foreign trade only than those who had such service. Perhaps those without the experience in the art of political com­ promise which an elective post provides were more willing to take an extreme position, which in an era of general approval of foreign trade tended to be the internationalist extreme. The impact of prior elective service may be to make the representative cautious in the

96

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

face of contradictory pressures rather than encouraging him to go ahead regardless of the risks involved. It should be noted, of course, that this finding may be accidental, for the quantitative differences between the two groups are small.

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT There is evidence to suggest that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by virtue of their assignment to that commit­ tee, have greater contact with foreign affairs and, as a result, are more inclined to support internationalist programs than those who lack such an intimate view of foreign problems.16 The committee is entrusted with the crucial foreign policy bills; in order to facilitate the passage of this legislation, the executive agencies involved, and particularly the State Department, often brief the committee mem­ bers on the latest foreign developments. The expectation is that such briefing (or lobbying) will make the senators more sympathetic to the position of the administration, that is, more aware of the neces­ sities of active participation in world politics. In addition, congres­ sional committees often develop behavioral norms to which most of the members become socialized after a period of service. Given the information which the executive supplies, some of which is not readily available to nonmembers, the prospect is that the committees dealing with foreign affairs will come to have internationalist norms, that they will impress these on new members of the committee, and that they will respond more readily than nonmembers to presiden­ tial initiatives. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services deal directly and exclu­ sively with matters involving international relations. They, too, are the recipients of much attention from the executive branch and, as a consequence, might be expected to back internationalist policy pro­ posals. At least we will follow this line of reasoning and start from a ten ta tive h yp o th esis w h ich asserts th a t m em bers o f th e A rm e d S e rv 16 Farnsworth, “A Comparison of the Senate and Its Foreign Relations Committee,” pp. 168-175. See also p. 25, above, and the sources cited there.

CHAPTER FOUR

97

ices an d F oreign A ffa irs C om m ittees w ill be m ore intern ation alist and less isolation ist than th e rem ain der o f th e H ouse.

This hypothesis is accurate for the Committee on Foreign Affairs« but not the Committee on Armed Services« on foreign aid legislation« and for the Republican members of Foreign Affairs on foreign trade. W ith respect to overseas aid, in thirteen of fourteen possible comparisons representatives on Foreign Affairs were more interna­ tionalist or less isolationist than the remainder of the House (Table 4-5). N o such consistency appears with respect to membership on the Armed Services Committee. On foreign trade, the tentative hypothesis applies only to Republican legislators on Foreign Affairs in the period beginning with the 80th Congress (Table 4-6); since then they have been less isolationist and more internationalist than their colleagues in the House. On the other hand, the G.O.P. contingent on Armed Serv­ ices has been more isolationist and less internationalist than the re­ mainder of the House. On the Democratic side of the aisle, there is no clear association between membership on one of the foreign policy committees and voting behavior on international trade. Examination of the departures from the historical pattern pro­ vides additional evidence to bolster the idea that the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee constitute a reservoir of internationalism on which the president can draw. Summary statement 1 indicates that Republican isolationism declined and internationalism rose over time while changes in the opposite direction occurred among Democrats. There were only six deviations from this pattem, but five of them are consistent with the tentative hypothesis. In each of these instances, members of the committee became more favorable or less opposed to foreign aid over an interval when the rest of the House was moving in the contrary direction. Summary statement 7 describes a time differential in the collapse of party unity on the aid and trade scales, the diffusion to the opposite end beginning earlier on foreign aid. Some Democratic support for the isolationist position appeared in the 80th Congress, but no member of Foreign Affairs cast such a vote until the 85th (Table 4-5). On the Republican side, die shift toward internationalism was much more rapid among committee members.

98

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 4-5 COMPARISON OF V O TIN G ON FOREIGN AID, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND REST OF T H E HOUSE, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS 8 0th

76th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

R epublican Foreign A ffairs 80.0% R est o f H ouse 80.5 D em ocratic Foreign A ffairs R est o f H ouse

0 .0 0 .0

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

o.o%

NUM ­ BER

10

0 .0

149

80.0 81.2

15 218

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

7.7% 25.7

0 .0

3.5

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

46.1% 11.5

13 218

81.8 64.9

171

11

8 5 th

8 3rd ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

R epublican Foreign A ffairs 26.7% R est o f H ouse 36.9

73.3% 53.5

15 187

33.3% 38.4

66.7% 51.7

15 172

D em ocratic Foreign A ffairs 0 .0 R est o f H ouse 13.4

84.6 71.5

13 186

17.6 30.8

76.4 44.8

201

17

Deviations from the historical pattern also tend to confirm the finding, noted above, that on foreign trade Republican members of the Armed Services Committee were more isolationist than G.O.P. nonmembers. The four departures from statement 4 (describing a shift in Republican voting toward internationalism and a change in the distribution of Democratic votes favorable on the balance to

CHAPTER FOUR

99

TABLE 4-6 DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT AND CONGRESS 80th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

A rm ed Services 94.7% Foreign A ffairs 38.5 R est o f H ouse 86.2

83rd

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

0.0% 0.0 0.0

19 13 218

42.1% 6.7 17.6

42.1% 86.7 42.2

19 15 187

85th ISOLATIONIST

A rm ed Services Foreign A ffairs R est o f H ouse

47.1% 6.7 31.4

INTERNATIONALIST

35.3% 80.0 52.9

NUM BER

17 15 172

isolationism) all show that members of Armed Services deviated in the direction of lesser internationalism or increased isolationism. Contrary to our expectation, the two committees under considera­ tion are related in different ways to the voting alignments on aid and trade. The conclusion which follows from the data on committee as­ signment can now be put in propositional form: Proposition 4-3 a. M em bers o f die H ouse C om m ittee on Foreign A ffairs o f both parties have been m ore in ter­ nationalist and less isolationist than nonm em bers on fo r­ eign aid. R epublican m em bers o f the com m ittee have been m ore internationalist and less isolationist on foreign trade.

It appears, then, that contact with foreign policy problems in com­ mittee, the Foreign Affairs Committee at least, does create among

100

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

the members an increased amount of support for international activ­ ity. Carroll’s conclusion that “chance, modified occasionally by purposeful intrusions by the formal party leaders . . 17 determines the composition of House committees indicates that the inter­ nationalism of Foreign Affairs stems from more than a self-selection process by which internationalists ask for and get seats on the com­ mittee.18 It is possible that the committee develops a set of norms, in this case leading to greater internationalism, to which members continue to conform regardless of changes in committee personnel. In his study of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Farnsworth states this view clearly: “The most effective way to destroy the AntiInternationalist sentiment in the Senate, other than defeat at the polls, is to make those Senators holding such attitudes members of the Com mittee."19 There is reason to suppose that some similar mechanism operates within the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House.20 This raises the additional question of why the proposition should hold only for the Foreign Affairs Committee. One reason may be 17 Carroll, the house of representatives and foreign affairs, pp . 29-30. 18 It would be desirable to test this by examining behavioral changes which occur when a representative becomes a member of Foreign Affairs. U nfor­ tunately, apparently because of the low prestige of the committee, congress­ men have been assigned to Foreign Affairs early in their careers. Thus there are very few cases available to the present study of more senior legislators with clearly defined voting records transferring to the committee, where their subsequent voting behavior can be compared to that prior to membership. Fifteen instances did occur; in seven of these the legislator was more inter­ nationalist while a member of the committee, in four the lawmaker’s position remained unchanged, and in four the shift was toward isolationism. Further­ more, it is difficult to untangle changes stemming from assumption of com­ mittee membership and those which are simply the product of the historical pattern of development. 18 Farnsworth, “A Comparison of the Senate and Its Foreign Relations Committee,” p. 175. For an example of a similar mechanism, see Richard F. Fenno, Jr., 'T h e House Appropriations Committee,” American political science review , LVI (1962), 310-324. 20 For evidence that working at the United Nations has similar kinds o f effects, see Chadwick F. Alger, "United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience,” pubuc opinion quarterly, XXVII (1963), 411-426.

CHAPTER FOUR

101

that handling of foreign affairs matters alone is not enough to influence the behavior of committee members. O ther kinds of con­ tact may be required before any such impact is felt. If this is so, then it is possible that Foreign Affairs members receive these addi­ tional contacts which reinforce the impetus toward internationalism that their specialization in foreign policy matters gives them. The additional forces which may foster increasing concern for interna­ tional relations include formal and informal briefings of legislators by the relevant executive agencies, direct contacts by the president or the Secretary of State, the experience of foreign travel, and the opportunity to serve as delegates to international conferences.21 To the extent that these elements impinge differently on members of different committees, these groups may take on varying attitudes on foreign affairs despite a shared concern with the business of foreign policy legislation. It follows from this, as a second point, that the committees may develop differing sets of behavioral norms. That is, Foreign Affairs may impose internationalist standards on those who become mem­ bers while Armed Services may require adherence to a quite differ­ ent set of precepts. Finally, such a set of contrasting expectations may stem from differences in the nature of the subjects considered by the two committees. Neither aid nor trade is in the province of Armed Services; this committee is concerned with purely military opera­ tions, the nature> of reserve forces, the selective service program, and weapons development as well as the size, organization, and composition of each branch of the armed forces. Such concerns may lead to a depreciation of the value of nonmilitary programs such as aid and trade, which in turn may produce a reluctance to see American resources expended in these areas. It may be that high levels of support will be forthcoming only for bills which fall within the jurisdiction of the committee. W e should also remember that Proposition 4-3a applies to Repub­ lican members of Foreign Affairs on foreign trade as well as foreign aid. This may mean, as suggested earlier, that political characteristics become more important when they tend to support pressures from 21 Carroll, the house of representatives and foreign affairs, pp. 320-350, provides an elaboration on these executive-legislative relations.

102

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

party. Thus over a period when the Republican Party was shifting toward acceptance of international involvement, those serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee, pushed by party and experience, moved more rapidly to support internationalist legislation than did Republicans in general By reviewing the data on trends and the parties separately, we find an additional proposition: Proposition 4-3b. On foreign trade only, Republican members of the Armed Services Committee were more isolationist and less internationalist than nonmembers in each Congress. The most probable explanations for this finding lie in the possibility of different amounts of contact with foreign relations or of con­ trasting committee norms discussed above. The proposition should, however, remind us that the relationship between committee assign­ ment and voting performance is not a simple one, and that while membership on a foreign policy committee may be relevant to the vote decision it is by no means determinative of that choice. T o close this examination of the relation of selected political characteristics of congressmen to the voting patterns in the House, it might be useful to recapitulate some of our general conclusions. 1

The present chapter established some relevance for a con­ gressman's political characteristics as a determinant of his vote. Service on the Foreign Affairs Committee has been related to roll-call behavior on foreign aid over the entire period under study and electoral margin has been similarly associated for a shorter time. Thus political attributes seem to have predictive power over and above that provided by party and constituency.23

aa This assertion is contradictory to Turner’s dismissal of “personal char­ acteristics” (which seem to include what we have called political attributes) as meaningful influences on the shape of the congressional vote ( party and constituency , pp. 172-173). See also n. 14, p. 80, above.

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103

2 The findings presented here also serve to reinforce some of die conclusions reached earlier. O ur data do not detract from the accuracy of the proposidons set forth in Chapter Tw o concerning the time differential between the shift from party division to bipartisan cleavage on the two scales and the narrowing of the quantitative gap between Repub­ licans and Democrats on both aid and trade matters. The exceptions which do occur, and there are few of them, suggest that political characteristics are too important to be ignored and that they are probably less important than such broad political alterations as a change in the major­ ity party in the House or a shift in the occupancy of the W hite House. The political variables appear to take on sig­ nificance only within the context of broader historical trends. In addition, in Chapter Three we suggested that social background factors may take on importance when they complement political pressures; our discussion of length of service and committee assignment suggest that this may be true of political characteristics as well. W here the party pattern or historical trends push in a given direction, it may be that the representatives predisposed by political attributes respond most readily. 3 All this has meaning for the strategy of presidential foreign policy leadership as well. The chief executive can, under certain circumstances, derive benefit from focusing on the political characteristics of representatives and appealing in the appropriate terms. However, if it is necessary to allocate scarce resources, our findings indicate that priority should be given to approaches in terms of situational factors. The fact that departures from the historical pattern occurred infrequently suggests that the political context—events, personalities, the party balance, nonforeign policy issues— determines the basic configuration of congressional voting and that political characteristics produce regularities within this context A satisfactory interpretation of some new de­ velopment and the policy requirements which flow from it are more likely to generate support for the president than appeals in terms of political attributes.

104

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Yet the political attributes of congressmen are not 'with­ out significance. Attention to the Foreign Affairs Committee should provide the chief executive w ith valuable support for the foreign aid program. The value of the backing of the committee, moreover, may extend well beyond the votes of the members, for in an era of specialization of function within the legislature, there is a tendency for the nonspecialists to take their cues from the recognized experts.28 In the case of foreign aid, these experts are the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Thus, through a “multiplier” effect, die president’s backing may be enlarged by his success in rally­ ing the committee to his cause. Similarly, while the relation­ ships are weak, in close legislative contests, where extra leadership effort is required or where the president’s resources are virtually unlimited, attention to representatives with low electoral margins or w ithout prior service in elected office may make the difference between passage and rejection.

W e noted in the last chapter that the social background character­ istics interacted with situational, party, and subject matter factors to produce shifting legislative voting patterns. Now we can suggest that political attributes must also be considered. In addition, the time factor must be taken into account, for new relationships may come into existence, or cease to operate, as time passes. For example, electoral margin has been associated with internationalism in the 83rd and 85th Congresses only. These factors delineate an abstract, complex image of voting alignments in the House. Examination of constituency characteristics may require us to retouch our portrait of congressional isolationism again. 38 Matthews,

v js.

senators and their world,

pp. 95-97.

5.

The Isolationist Congressman: Constituency Characteristics

One of the most persistently invoked explanations of the presi­ dent’s success (or failure) in gaining congressional support for his policies is the nature of the legislative constituencies. The chief executive's ability to prevent defections by southern Democrats or to retain the loyalty of rural representatives is often cited to ac­ count for particular legislative outcomes. The relationship between the characteristics of the constituency a congressman represents and his vote preferences in the foreign policy field may be asso­ ciated with voting alignments in the House and, thus, have implica­ tions for the strategy of presidential foreign affairs leadership. W e will look at five constituency variables: region, urban-rural division, ethnic composition, educational level, and socioeconomic status. As in the previous chapters, we will be concerned with the degree of association between each variable and foreign policy voting, and we will explore the possibility that these factors may be related in different ways to aid and trade matters. W e will also repeat the analysis of time-series data in an effort to discover what develop­ ments in the relationships between constituency characteristics and 105

106

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

roll-call behavior have occurred with the passage of time. Finally, we will again note deviations from the general historical pattern of change (see pp. 51-53) in order to discover in what direction vari­ ables seem to push the representatives in those situations where there appear to be no consistent relationships. W e should note here, as we did in Chapter One, that this analysis of district attributes is predicated on the belief that constituency is a source of voting cues for the members of the House (see p. 21, and n. 26). W hether or not lawmakers from similar districts display similar voting records on international issues is the empirical question that is the chief concern of this chapter.

REGION It is a common assumption that different regions of the country have characteristic attitudes toward the proper American posture in world affairs and that, as a consequence, there are regional variations in the congressional response to presidential proposals to expand the nation’s overseas commitments. Tw o views, in particular, are wide­ spread.1 First, the Midwest is considered the traditional home of isolationism.2 The area is physically remote in the sense that the 1 For references to the literature on geography and foreign policy attitudes, see chap. 1, nn. 13-16, pp. 16-17. 2 W e have made the following regional breakdown for the purposes of this section: east: south : m idw est : w est :

Conn., Del., Maine, Mass., NJ1., N.J., N.Y., Pa., RJ ., Vt. (10 states) Ala^ Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Md., Miss., N.C^ Okla, S.C., Term., Tex., Va., W . Va. (15 states) III., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mick., Minn., Mo., Nebr , N . Dak., Ohio, S. Dak., Wis. ( 12 states) Ariz., Calif., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N . Mex., Ore., Utah, Wash., Wyo. (11 states)

O ther studies have chosen to divide what we have labeled the W est into tw o regions, the Pacific Coast states (Calif., Ore., and W ash.) and the Rocky Mountain sûtes (the remaining eight in our W est category). See, for example,

CHAPTER FIVE

107

coastal regions have more international contacts; its inhabitants are more parochial and, thus, less able to perceive the advantages which accrue from an internationalist foreign policy. The central regions are also the place of residence of substantial numbers of particular ethnic groups which, as we shall see in a later section of this chapter, are asserted to be strong isolationists. The second view concerns the change in international attitudes which has occurred in the South. Southerners were among the most determined supporters of the liberal international policies pushed by Democratic presidents prior to W orld W ar II. In the period since then a number of developments have taken place which have reduced the appeal of internationalism for residents of the South, and, as a result, support for internationalist programs has declined (see pp. 16-17). Accepting these arguments provides two tentative hypotheses to guide our investigation of regional variations in foreign policy voting: 1 Congressmen from the Midwest should be more isolationist and less internationalist than those representing coastal areas; 2 Over time, there should appear a steady decline in inter­ nationalism in the South accompanied by an increase in isolationism. The data (Tables 5-1 and 5-2) suggest that the true significance of region can be seen only with the addition of controls for party. Midwestern isolationism, to the extent that it does exist, is peculiar to the Republican party. On foreign aid, G.O.P. congressmen from the central regions were most isolationist in each Congress and the least internationalist in the two most recent (83rd and 85th) Con­ gresses. Similarly on foreign trade, midwestem Republicans, along with their southern colleagues, have, in the 83rd and 85th Con­ gresses, provided more opposition to, and less support for, recip­ rocal trade than G.O.P. lawmakers from the East and W est coasts. W esterfield, foreign policy and party politics. Analysis of the present data in terms of five rather than four regions showed clear differences between the voting behavior of Pacific and Mountain states representatives, the former being strongly internationalist, the latter heavily isolationist. See Rieselbach, “The Demography of the Congressional Vote,” pp. 577-588. The small number of congressmen from these parts of the country, however, meant that regional controls were difficult to apply. T o avoid this problem, the present chapter will deal w ith four regions only.

108

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-1 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY REGION, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 76th ISOLATIONIST

R epublican E ast South M idw est W est

76.7% (60.0) 88.4 83.3

D em ocratic E ast South M idw est W est

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

INTERNATION­ ALIST

0.0% (0.0) 0.0 0.0 70.0 90.0 68.5 73.3

80th NUM ­ BER

ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

73 5 86 12

5.5% 28.6 45.1 3.1

31.9% 7.1 4.4 3.1

91 14 113 32

50 130 54 30

6.7 3.2 0.0 0.0

86.7 58.7 86.4 52.9

30 126 22 17

85th

8 3rd ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

R epublican East South M idw est W est

12.0% 21.4 64.9 21.1

84.0% 71.4 25.5 65.8

D em ocratic E ast South M idw est W est

0.0 21.7 5.7 5.9

97.6 55.0 91.4 89.5

NUM ­ BER

75 14 94 38 42 120 35 19

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

10.8% 40.0 60.7 32.3

85.1% 46.7 29.8 54.8

74 15 84 31

0.0 53.3 10.9 32.3

93.5 18.3 67.4 61.5

46 120 46 26

CHAPTER FIVE

109

TABLE 5-2 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY REGION, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 76th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

Republican East South Midwest West

89.0% (100.0) 88.4 66.7

Democratic East South Midwest West

0.0 0.8 1.9 3.3

80th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

1.4% (0.0) 0.0 8.3

73 5 86 12

83.0% 85.7 85.0 84.4

50 130 54 30

0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9

88.0 89.2 88.9 63.3

0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.7 80.2 90.9 76.5

NUM ­ BER

91 14 113 32 30 126 22 17

85th

83rd ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

Republican East South Midwest West

8.0% 28.6 26.6 18.4

66.7% 35.7 33.0 39.5

75 14 94 38

Democratic East South Midwest West

2.4 6.7 8.6 0.0

81.0 64.2 68.6 52.6

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

42 120 35 19

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

31.1% 33.3 35.7 16.1

56.8% 46.7 47.6 64.5

74 15 84 31

15.2 24.2 2.2 3.8

78.3 49.2 93.5 76.9

46 120 46 26

110

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Thus, tentative hypothesis 1, suggesting a regional basis for non­ entanglement sentiments, has come to hold for Republicans in the period since 1953. An entirely different picture appears on the Democratic side of the aisle. W ith respect to both aid and trade, midwestem Democrats have been, in the 83rd and 85th Congresses, more internationalist than the party’s representatives from the South and West. In short, the legislators from the East and Midwest have been the leading Democratic proponents of internationalism in recent years. One clear relationship does transcend party lines: in the two latest Congresses, eastern legislators have been more internationalist and less isolationist on foreign aid than any other regional group; during this same period, they have been more internationalist and less isolationist on foreign trade than southern representatives. There is evidence that the forces postulated by tentative hypoth­ esis 1 are at work, particularly within the Republican party where Midwesterners are the leading isolationists. And, conversely, eastern representatives of both parties tend to be in the forefront of the internationalists, especially on the foreign aid scale. However, the behavior of midwestem Democrats seriously qualifies the hypothesis and suggests that party must be considered before meaningful gen­ eralizations about region can be made. A look at tentative hypothesis 2, noting the decline in southern internationalism, again makes clear the necessity of considering party along with region. The fall iii support for internationalist programs among southern representatives appears among Democrats only; southern Republicans have been consistently more isolationist than legislators from the East and W est on both aid and trade bills. Among Democrats, on both scales, the southerners moved from most internationalist in the 76th Congress to most isolationist in the 85th. Again, it is clear that regional groups within the two parties have behaved quite differently. This may only reflect that a region gets its political reputation from its dominant party. Thus the Midwest, the center of Republi­ can strength, becomes known as the isolationist capital of America because the G.O.P. has consistently been more opposed to extended international activity. If we examine midwestem Democrats, we find that, by and large, they have been stronger advocates of both for-

CHAPTER FIVE

111

dgn aid and trade than have Democrats from the South and W est. Southern Republicans on both scales have been consistently more isolationist dian Republicans from the coastal regions; whereas the region has been popularly identified with internationalism. Thus, it seems that such regional generalizations as the tentative hypoth­ eses do not apply to both political parties. An «am ination of the departures from the historical pattern lends support to the notion that eastern representatives are strong backers of internationalist programs. Summary statement 1 notes the shifts in the distribution of party votes on foreign aid—toward increased internationalism among Republicans and toward more isolationism among Democrats. Only the deviations involving eastern legislators point consistently in a given direction; all six in­ dicate that where these congressmen move contrary to broad trends, the shift is toward greater internationalism and reduced isolation­ ism. Although, in general, Republicans were less internationalist on foreign trade than Democrats (statement 6), considering region reveals that in the 83rd Congress eastern Republicans were more inclined to support reciprocal trade than Democrats from that area. Finally, examination of regional differences displays an important exception to statement 7 (stating that party solidarity collapsed at different points in time on the two issues). Though party cohesion on foreign aid ended in the 80th Congress, as late as the 85th Con­ gress there were no eastern isolationists. W hile the tendency of the data is in the predicted direction, the tentative hypothesis must be rejected, primarily because of die behavior of die minority party in both the South and the Midwest. Southern Republicans did not shift sharply toward isolationism; they had always been more isolationist than coastal Republicans. Midwestern Democrats were not more isolationist than representa­ tives of the coastal areas; in fact they were consistently less isola­ tionist than their colleagues from the far West.* The views ex• The extent of midwestem Democratic internationalism revealed here has not been stressed by the literature on isolationism. A number of writers find persistent support for foreign programs among eastern representatives of both parties and opposition to them from midwestem Republicans. See Grassmuck, sectional biases, pp. 141-174; MacRae, dimensions of congressional voting, pp. 276-278; Turner, party and constituency, pp. 144-163; and Smuckler, ‘T h e Region of Isolationism,” pp. 386-401. Comparison is made difficult by

112

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

pressed by the tentative hypotheses oversimplify the problem of region by assigning to a geographical area the characteristic of its dominant party and ignoring the possibility, which our data demon­ strate to be fact, that the minority party in the region may behave quite differently. Looking at developments over time will allow some meaningful statements to be made: Proposition 5-la. Representatives of both parties from the East have, in the 83rd and 85th Congresses, been more internationalist and less isolationist than the other regional groupings on foreign aid. A fter the breakdown of party solidarity representatives from the East supported the foreign aid program to a greater extent, pri­ marily because that region has greater economic and cultural con­ tacts overseas than the interior regions. Party controls produce other relationships which buttress this point. Proposition 5-lb. Eastern and midwestem Democrats were more internationalist than Democrats from the South and West on both scales in the three most recent Congresses. This supports Proposition 5-la, but it is w orth nothing that mid­ westem Democrats exceeded western representatives in internation­ alism, for it indicates that there have been differences between the coasts. Perhaps the emphasis of the aid program on Europe served to attract eastern Democrats while western lawmakers found it less attractive and supported it less ardently. In any case, the East, ori­ ented both culturally and economically toward Europe, has come to be the major backer of a foreign aid program which began as a primarily European operation. differing definitions of regions employed in these studies. Grassmuck (pp. 159160) and Smuckler (pp. 395-396), however, find that midwestem isolationism transcends party lines. In contradiction to this, our data show midwestem Democrats to have been more consistent backers of the aid program than either southern or western congressmen.

CHAPTER FIVE

113

On the Republican side, another proposition emerges: Proportion 5-lc. Midwestern Republicans were more isolationist than coastal representatives in each Congress on foreign aid and in the 83rd and 85th Congresses on foreign trade. Again, the extent of contacts—cultural and business—may be im­ portant; since the Midwest has less of these contacts, its legislators may be less able to see benefits stemming from enlarged aid and trade programs. But it is more likely that party forces are chiefly responsible, since Democrats from the Midwest do not display this isolationism. The conservative wing of the Republican party, with its center of gravity in the Midwest, remains the group most reluc­ tant to accept the new G.O.P. moderate internationalism, adopted by other geographical groups with the election of a Republican president. In short, both party and regional factors must be taken into account in determining the sources of House voting patterns. The findings concerning shifts in southern internationalism again demonstrate the interrelationship of party and regional factors as sources of the voting patterns on foreign policy. Proposition 5-ld. Southern Democrats have shifted stead­ ily toward greater isolationism and lesser internationalism relative to legislators from other regions on both aid and trade. A number of factors may be cited by way of explanation.4 First, the increase in industrialization in the South has been widely noted. The presence of large numbers of people who see potential disadvantage stemming from a low tariff policy may have led to greater antipathy toward die reciprocal trade program. Next, an upsurge of southern conservatism, which rejects the increasing activity of the federal government, may account for enlarged opposition to an expensive foreign aid program and an expanded reciprocal agreements power* * On these explanations, see Jewell, “Evaluating the Decline of Southern Internationalism,” pp. 624-646.

114

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

in the hands of the president. Finally, political changes—a Demo­ cratic loss of control first of the House and then of the presidencymay have freed southern representatives of the obligation to support policies, already growing substantively less attractive, for partisan reasons.5 In sum, we are left with a complex relationship between party, region, and foreign policy voting. The important relationships— midwestern Republican isolationism and southern Democratic shifts toward isolationism—appear only when party controls are added. Yet over time eastern lawmakers of both parties have become the leading supporters of internationalism, and developments since the 85th Congress suggest that changes in southern voting are more than a response to a Republican president. Thus we can safely con­ clude that both political and regional forces help to define the for­ eign policy voting alignments in the House. In addition, changes over time suggest that the relationship between political and re­ gional factors is not fixed; as partisan loyalties decline, other varia­ bles, including constituency characteristics, take on increased im­ portance as determinants of congressional vote choices.

URBAN-RURAL DIVISION The representatives of rural constituencies comprise a second widely noted source of opposition to internationalist policies. The countryside, it is argued, lacks the heterogeneity which character­ izes urban populations; inhabitants of rural areas are less likely to 8 The present data, extending as they do the time period of other studies, illustrate the value of continued longitudinal studies, for they show further developments in southern voting patterns. For example, MacRae ( dimensions of congressional voting, pp. 276-277), examining the 81st Congress, finds southern Democrats at both ends of his foreign aid scale; our study brings us eight years nearer the present and shows Democrats from the South clus­ tered at the isolationist end of the spectrum. W hile this may be the result, as Grassmuck ( sectional biases, pp. 152-154) argues, of a characteristic party orientation of southern democrats, the fact that the South continued to be the most isolationist section after the 1960 election restored the Democrats to the W hite House suggests that regional factors exert a pull over and above that of party.

115

CHAPTER FIVE

have that cosmopolitan outlook which will be most tolerant of in­ ternational involvement. This may stem from the type of people residing in the country, from the absence of international contacts which urban-based business and industry provide, or from a re­ duced access, through the media of mass communication, to infor­ mation about the rest of the world.6 According to this view, the president is likely to face more opposition from rural congressmen than from those representing urban districts. Let us, then, adopt as a tentative hypothesis the view that a representative of an urban dis­ trict will be more internationalist and less isolationist than a con­ gressman from a rural area. The data in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 indicate that there is a strong TABLE 5-3 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY RURALISM, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

80th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

Republican Urban Rural

10.0% 42.4

27.8% 0.0

90 59

Democratic Urban Rural

2.9 4.8

82.6 52.4

69 84

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

14.7% 70.2

78.7% 23.4

75 47

2.4 23.3

92.9 59.3

83 86

85th ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

NUM BER

Republican Urban Rural

26.4% 65.7

70.8% 25.7

72 35

Democratic Urban Rural

3.3 52.5

80.2 24.2

91 97

0 The literature on this problem is cited in chap. 1 , n. 14, p. 16.

116

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-4 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY RURALISM, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

85th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

Republican Urban Rural

8.0% 34.0

68.0% 17.0

75 47

Democratic Urban Rural

4.7

78.8 64.0

85 86

1.2

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

15.3% 37.1

69.4% 48.6

72 35

8.8 19.2

85.7 54.5

91 97

tendency in the direction of the hypothesis. On the foreign aid scale, in each Congress since the 80th, legislators of both parties from urban districts have been more internationalist than those representing rural areas.7 The same thing is true on foreign trade in the two most recent Congresses. It appears, then, that when party unity dissolved, representatives of city constituencies, regardless of party, were attracted to the internationalist view on both aid and trade while their colleagues from the countryside were more apt to have reservations about the wisdom of extended international commitments. The correlation coefficients relating the percentage of the district population engaged in fanning to the representatives' voting behav­ ior (Table 5-5) strongly support this view. Only after the pure 7 W e have used the percentage of the male working force employed in farm occupations as a measure of ruralism in the following way:

24.0% or more 6.0-23.9% 5.9% or less

rural district mixed district urban, or more accurately nonfarm, district.

For clarity in presentation the mixed district figures have been omitted from Tables 5-3 and 5-4. See Appendix B for a discussion of the computation of this measure.

CHAPTER FIVE

117

TABLE 5-5 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: RURALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY V O TIN G , BY CONGRESS 76th

80th

83rd

85th

Foreign Aid

-.05

-.23 •

- .43 •

-.45*

Foreign Trade

-.02

.05

-.26*

-.22*

* Significant at the .01 level

partisan cleavage came to an end—in the 80th Congress on foreign aid and in the 83rd with regard to foreign trade—did any statisti­ cally significant relationship appear between ruralism and attitude toward foreign policy. The negative correlations demonstrate that the more rural a district the more likely is its representative to vote against the aid and trade programs. Thus only with a change in the political situation did ruralism come to have a relevance to roll-call behavior, suggesting again the primacy of the broader political forces in the determination of voting alignments. Although the distribution of urban and rural districts precludes most controls, those which can be applied indicate that the effect of place of residence on voting behavior is independent of region. Only the Midwest provides a sufficient number of cases to permit regional controls, but within that area the positive association be­ tween rural residence and isolationism persists. A sample of the data appear in Table 5-6. The relationship holds in seventeen out of twenty cases where there are a minimum of ten representatives in each category. The implication, then, is that the urban-rural dimen­ sion exerts influence on voting alignments independent of the pulls of regional factors. An examination of the departures from the historical trends pro­ vides additional evidence to support the finding that representing an urban community leads to increased sympathy for internationalist programs. Summary statement 1 describes a change over time to­ ward internationalism among Republicans and a shift among Demo­ crats toward isolationism. Five of the six deviations from this pat-

118

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-6 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES OF MIDW ESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, 85th CONGRESS, BY RURALISM AND PARTY ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

Republican Urban Rural

47.1% 70.4

52.9% 22.2

17 27

Democratic Urban Rural

0.0 28.6

92.3 42.9

26 14

N UM BER

tern show urban congressmen moving toward, or rural lawmakers moving away from, internationalism at a time when the legislature as a whole was shifting in a contrary direction. Statement 4 de­ scribes similar party shifts with respect to foreign trade, and both the exceptions to it show urban representatives pulled toward inter­ nationalism. The breakdown of party solidarity on the two scales did come at different times (statement 7), but considering rural repre­ sentatives introduces an alteration in the pattern. On the Republi­ can side, support for foreign aid first appeared in the 80th Congress, but there were no rural internationalists until the 83rd Con­ gress. These movements contrary to broad developmental trends indicate that there exist positive associations between ruralism and isolationism, and urbanism and internationalism. However, place of residence does not cause a great number of deviations from the historical pattern which we have attributed to the working of broad political factors. Thus, it appears that in re­ cent years the urban and rural groups have been moved along in the same direction by nonlegislative forces while at the same time sus­ taining the relationship between themselves. The data presented above require rejection of the tentative hy­ pothesis for the full twenty-year period. In the earlier Congresses loyalty to party was such that it cut across residential differences; Republicans opposed foreign aid to a man in the 76th Congress and were virtually unanimous in their unwillingness to back die recip­

CHAPTER FIVE

119

rocal trade program in the 80th as well as the 76th Congress. Simi­ larly, Democrats gave little help to the foes of these programs.8 As the hold of party on its members crumbled, place of residence came to play an important part in the establishment of voting alignments: Proposition 5-2. On foreign aid, representatives of both parties from urban districts have been, since the 80th Congress, more internationalist and less isolationist than those representing rural areas. The same has been true on foreign trade since the 83rd Congress. A fter the times noted in the proposition, the factors discussed at the beginning of the section came to be highly relevant. The impact of W orld W ar II and the passing of Franklin Roosevelt from the polit­ ical scene, with all the partisan emotion which surrounded him, appear, in retrospect, to have loosened party discipline in the House. W hen this occurred, and the Republican prospects for office first visibly improved and then became reality, it was the urban Republi­ cans who gave the most support to internationalist programs. On the other hand, it was the city Democrats who drifted least from the 8 The present w riter, using pre-1950 data, has argued elsewhere that ruralism within a congressional district is a less important determinant of a represent­ ative’s vote than party affiliation. See Rieselbach, “The Basis of Isolationist Behavior,” pp. 645-657. In the later period, this seems no longer to be the case, but the earlier data together with our findings on the relationship of prior occupation and the vote (see pp. 73-79) suggest an interesting paradox: before 1950, the representatives who themselves were engaged in farming prior to election were less internationalist than their colleagues, while legislators from farm districts were not. One explanation of this apparent contradiction is that in some historical periods isolationism in Congress differs from the anti­ entanglement feelings held by the general population. Farmers as a group of citizens may be more isolationist than other groups, but may be incapable of effectively transmitting their views to W ashington. Perhaps foreign policy questions are not salient enough or are subordinated to domestic farm issues. O r perhaps the legislator feels less need to respond positively to constituent views in the foreign affairs area, preferring to place greater stress on party as a source of voting cues. W hatever the reasons, it appears that early in the period covered by this study there may have existed different “isolationisms” in Congress and die electorate.

120

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

traditional internationalist position of their party. It may be that the greater contacts with, and information about, foreign nations led to this greater receptivity of urban representatives to appeals for sup­ port of international aid and trade programs.9 This again argues for the notion of the complementarity of demographic and political variables, for where party and demographic characteristic seem to push in the same direction, it is the legislators with the characteristic who respond most rapidly. In general, demographic factors may become relevant only when they tend to support the thrust of political party.

ETHNICITY

“An Anglo-Saxon, Hinnissy, is a German that’s forgot who was his parents.” Despite Mr. Dooley’s admonition, writers on the for­ eign policy process have pointed to the residence in congressional districts of particular ethnic groups as an indicator of constituency sentiment opposed to wider American participation in world affairs (see pp. 17-18). In particular, Americans of German and Irish de­ scent are held to be susceptible to the appeals of isolationism because of the emotional tensions which beset them. Each group hopes that isolationism will provide the means by which these ethnic-emotional 8 The findings of this section allow us to refine and embellish some of the

notions about the relationship of place of residence and the congressional vote presented in other studies. T urner ( party and constituency, pp. 72-97) finds clear differences in behavior between urban and rural representatives; our data show that these differences apply specifically to the foreign policy area. Smuckler (“The Region of Isolationism,” pp. 398-399) has shown that there is a positive association between urbanism and internationalism; we may now suggest that introduction of party controls does not alter the relationship. And MacRae’s study of the 81st Congress, with controls for party and region, discovers die relationship applies to Republicans only ( dimensions of con­ gressional voting, pp. 276-278). The present analysis indicates that, with the passage of time, and applying the same controls, this relationship characterized both parties. In sum, with controls for party and region, urbanism has been positively related to internationalism on foreign aid and reciprocal trade in the period after 1953.

CHAPTER FIVE

121

problems can be avoided. The German-American seeks to prevent American conflict with Germany, while those of Irish ancestry de­ sire to keep the United States clear of entangling alliances with her traditional enemy, England. By abjuring international activity, these ethnic groups seek to avert the emotional discomfort resulting from American conflict with, or support for, nations about which the ethnic groups have mixed feelings. If this argument is valid, and if the sentiments of the groups are transmitted to their representatives, then we may assume, as a tenta­ tive hypothesis, that congressmen from districts with large numbers of Americans of German and Irish extraction within them will be more isolationist and less internationalist than lawmakers from con­ stituencies w ith smaller populations of these ethnic groups. The data (Tables 5-7 and 5-8) show that this hypothesis is valid only on foreign aid in the 76th Congress. In the years after W orld W ar II the reverse came to be true; by the 80th Congress on foreign aid and the 83rd on foreign trade, representatives of high ethnic districts were more, not less, internationalist than those from dis­ tricts with a smaller number of Americans of German and Irish extraction.10 The correlation coefficients relating the percentage of ethnic popu­ lation to voting underscore the same point (Table 5-9). Here we 10 In this section, ethnicity is used to note the amount of the population of German and Irish ancestry. The districts have been categorized as follows:

Low Ethnic Moderate Ethnic H igh Ethnic

OJO-O.4% of the population 0J-0S% of the population 1j0% or more of the population bom m Germany or Ireland.

These are quite small percentages of the total population, but the census provides only the number of foreign bom for counties and census tracts. W e have employed these data on the assumption that those who immigrate to the U S. tend to settle in parts of the country where others from the “old country” have settled. If this is so, then the relative number of foreign bom may be an index to die number of people of ethnic ancestry—first, second generations e tc —within a district. W e have, in what follows, accepted this assumption as sufficiently valid to allow the categorizadon of the districts noted above. Since the census does not present the data, even on foreign bom, in southern states, these have been omitted from the tabulations. Only those southern districts composed entirely of census tracts are included.

122

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-1 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY ETHNICITY. PARTY. AND CONGRESS 80th

76th

Republican Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity Democratic Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

77.8%

0.0%

83.8

0 .0

111

18.3

23.1

104

0 .0

8 8 .8

80

8.3

41.7

12

0 .0

63.8

94

2 .6

8 6 .8

38

NUM ­ BER

18

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

46.3%

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

1.9%

NUM ­ BER

54

85th

83rd ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

Republican Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity

64.5%

39.5%

43

34.5

62.2

Democratic Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity

18.8 0 .0

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

52.9%

29.4%

34

19

33.0

61.4

88

6 8 .8

16

28.0

44.0

25

1 0 0 .0

54

0.0

95.0

60

CHAPTER FIVE

123

TABLE 5-8 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY ETHNICITY, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 85th

83rd

Republican Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity Democratic Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

30.2%

18.6%

43

12.2

60.0

18.8 0.0

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

41.2%

32.4%

34

19

25.0

61.4

88

12.5

16

12.0

56.0

25

81.5

54

5.0

91.7

60

TABLE 5-9 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: ETHNICITY AND FOREIGN POLICY V O TIN G , BY CONGRESS 80th

83rd

85 th

- .09

.25*

.2 1 *

.19"

Foreign T rad e - .03

.15 f

.36 #

.1 7 "

76th Foreign A id

# Significant at the .01 level t Significant at the .05 level

see that in the first Congress (76th) the coefficients, though small and nonsignificant, were negative, indicating that those from low ethnic districts tended to fall at the internationalist (high) end of the foreign policy scales. In the three subsequent Congresses, how­ ever, the coefficients were positive, suggesting that during these years congressmen from low ethnic districts generally fell at the isolationist (low) end of the scales. This indicates a reversal from

124

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

support of the tentative hypothesis in the 76th Congress to support of the converse in the period thereafter.11 Over dmę, then, repre­ sentatives of high ethnic constituencies came to be more interna­ tionalist and less isolationist than those from areas with fewer citi­ zens of German and Irish ancestry. The available controls suggest, furthermore, that the association between high ethnicity and internationalism which has characterized the most recent Congresses persists in urban areas.13 A sample of the data appears in Table 5-10. Only eight comparisons are possible, but in seven of them urban representatives from high ethnic dis­ tricts were more internationalist or less isolationist than city legis­ lators from areas with fewer ethnic groups. TABLE 5-10 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES OF URBAN REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, 83rd CONGRESS, BY ETHN ICITY AND PARTY ISOLATIONIST

Republican Low Ethnicity 20.0% High Ethnicity 15.1 Democratic Low Ethnicity High Ethnicity

4.8 0.0

INTERNATIONALIST

70.0% 81.1 90.5 100.0

NUM BER

20 53 21 50

11 It is interesting to note that Samuel Lubell, the chief proponent of die tentative hypothesis, presents as evidence of its truth data collected prior to W orld W ar II. The data involve the behavior of German-Americans in the 1940 presidential election. See his future of American politics, pp. 135-167, and THE revolt of the moderates (New York: H arper, 1956), pp. 64-74, 100102. 13 W e have used controls only where there are at least ten cases in each category involved. Breaking the attitude scales and the distributions of con­ stituency characteristics into three parts rather than dichotomies creates prob­ lems of sufficient numbers of cases. Thus, with respect to ethnicity, the heavy concentration of foreign bom in the East leaves too few low ethnic districts there and too few high ethnic districts in the other regions to allow us to apply controls for region.

CHAPTER FIVE

125

The departures from the historical pattern highlight the finding that ethnicity is positively associated with internationalism. Sum­ mary statement 1 indicates that over time Republicans have be­ come more favorable to foreign aid while Democrats have become more opposed. Six of the seven deviations from this pattern con­ tradict the tentative hypothesis—that is, the representatives of high ethnic areas moved, contrary to the more general shifts, tow ard involvement or away from isolationism. The end of party polariza­ tion did, as statement 7 describes, come at different times on the two scales, but introducing ethnicity points up some group deviations. On foreign aid, Democratic isolationists first appeared in the 80th Congress, but there were none among the legislators from high ethnic districts in either the 83rd or 85th Congresses. Similarly, on foreign trade, while the 83rd Congress found the Democrats oppos­ ing the program for the first time, none of them were from high ethnic areas. The departures from the historical pattern indicate that lawmakers from high ethnic constituencies are attracted to the internationalist cause. Obviously, the tentative hypothesis cannot be accepted. This is so probably because legislators ignored, at least in the earliest Con­ gresses, ethnic considerations in making their vote decisions. It may be that party lines were sufficiently tight before W orld W ar II so that ethnic forces did not come into play; or it may be that the impact of the ethnic variable has altered under the stimulus of the events of recent international political history. This last point suggests that it may be instructive to look at de­ velopments over time. As we have noted, the converse of the tenta­ tive hypothesis has come to be the case. Proposition 5-3. Since the 80th Congress on foreign aid and the 83rd on foreign trade, representatives of both parties from urban, high ethnic districts have been more internationalist and less isolationist than those from low ethnic districts. The changing nature of the association of ethnicity and voting choice provides one possible explanation of the proposition. It is

126

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

conceivable that in the earliest Congress, that is, prior to W orld W ar II, the ethnic-emotional conflict was intensely felt in the dis­ tricts and this concern transmitted to Washington. The changed character of the international balance of power which confronted the postwar world may have rendered ethnicity much less impor­ tant. Challenged by world communism, Germany and the United States became allies, thus greatly reducing the possibility of GermanAmerican conflict and the emotional problems of Americans of German ancestry. The Soviet threat, which linked the destinies of England and Ireland in great measure, may also have been sufficient to diminish Anglo-Irish hostility or to subordinate it to a more serious peril, thus allowing Irish-Americans to see benefits in con­ tinuing the friendship between Great Britain and the United States. The development of the cold war has created a situation in which these nations are allies and in which American participation in world affairs provides gains for each nation. If this is so, isolationist views are no longer functional for the ethnic groups being considered.18 13 W e should note that while there are only four cases involving rural areas,

each of them shows rural lawmakers from high ethnic districts more isola­ tionist than those from low ethnic areas. Thus the tentative hypothesis may, in fact, be true for rural areas. The ethnic populations, mainly Germans, living in the country may be more isolationist than other farm residents; they may be plagued by the emotional tensions which Lubell posits, while in the cities other forces, such as church and labor union, cut across ethnic barriers and exert the predominant influence on voting behavior. For further evidence on this point see Rieselbach, “The Basis of Isolationist Behavior." The consistencies which do exist suggest some modifications in propo­ sitions set forth in other studies. First, our data, at least as they relate to urban areas, contradict Smuckler’s assertion (“The Region of Isolationism," p. 400) that “some correlation existed between isolationism in the 1933-1950 period in a particular community and the strength of certain foreign bom elements . . . in that community." Since Smuckler does not use controls for ruralism and does note exceptions to his statement, it may be that his exceptions are urban areas and that his data and those presented here are consistent in sug­ gesting that ethnicity and isolationism are related positively in rural areas and negatively in the cities. Second, the positive association between high ethnicity and internationalism also runs counter to the present author's finding (“The Basis of Isolationist Behavior," p. 649) that there was a statistically in­ significant correlation between these factors. Both this and the Smuckler study used roll calls from the period ending in 1950; thus the findings presented here may simply show that the relationship has changed in the years after 1950. Finally, we can refine Turner’s conclusion ( party and constituency,

CHAPTER FIVE

127

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL The argument for expecting the educational level of a congres­ sional district to have an impact on its representative’s voting be­ havior parallels the logic relating an individual’s school experience to his political preferences. W e hypothesized earlier (see p. 67) that the added information, interest, and sophistication which education presumably brings lead the highly schooled groups to support in­ ternationalist policies. If this is so, and if the constituency has large numbers of well-educated voters, then we may expect that the con­ gressmen from such districts will be more inclined to support inter­ nationalist policies than those from less highly educated areas. In this section, then, we will take as a tentative hypothesis that the level of education within a congressional district will be positively related to the amount of intematiomlism of its representative. As with other constituency attributes, the data (Tables 5-11 and 5-12) show that the tentative hypothesis holds in the most recent (83rd and 85th) Congresses. In the period since 1953 representatives of both parties from highly educated districts* 14 have been more ardent recruits to the internationalist cause than legislators from less well-educated areas. In short, in the recent period, the president has pp. 98-127) that “foreign-native pressures are important determinants of the congressional vote. W e can now assert that representatives of both parties from urban, high ethnic districts were, in the 83rd and 85th Congresses, in­ clined to vote for internationalist positions on aid and trade. At the same time, so far as most limited controls can reveal, congressmen from rural and high ethnic districts tend to be more isolationist. W e should note that meth­ odological differences in the calculation of ethnicity may account for the noncongruence of these findings. 14 The measure of education employed here is the percentage of district pop­ ulation who had attended college at some time. The U.S. Census makes this data easily available. The following categories were used: Low Education 0.0-99% of the population college trained Moderate Education 10-14S% of the population college trained H igh Education ' 15% or more of the population college trained The moderate education districts have been omitted from the tables.

128

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-11 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

Republican Low Education High Education Democratic Low Education High Education

85th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

52.5%

37.5%

40

20.3

72.2

16.5 8.1

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

54.3%

34.3%

35

79

28.9

65.8

76

69.9

103

33.6

46.3

110

75.7

37

17.5

50.0

40

TABLE 5-12 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES O N FOREIGN TRADE, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

85th

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

Republican Low Education High Education

35.0%

25.0%

40

8.7

59.5

Democratic Low Education High Education

9.7 0.0

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

60.0%

22.9%

35

79

11.8

71.1

76

68.0

103

19.1

60.9

no

62.2

37

10.0

77.5

40

CHAPTER FIVE

129

received a major portion of his legislative support for aid and trade from the representatives of well-educated districts. The correlation coefficients relating educational level and scale scores on the aid and trade scales underscore this point. In the years when party discipline was strong (the 76th Congress on both issues and the 80th on foreign trade), the coefficients were negative (Table 5-13), suggesting that those whose districts contained larger

TABLE 5-13 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND FOREIGN POLICY V O TIN G , BY CONGRESS 76th Foreign Aid

-.16*

Foreign Trade -.11 +

80th

83rd

85th

.08

.15 f

.161

.03

.20*

-.22*

* Significant at the .01 level t Significant at the X>5 level

numbers of college-educated citizens tended to fall at the isolationist (low) end of the attitude scales. In later years, when party una­ nimity declined, the correlations became positive; lawmakers from high education areas tended to fall at the internationalist (high) end of the scales. Thus, when party discipline was relaxed, or collapsed, legislators from areas of the greatest education came to be the most consistent supporters of internationalist policies. W hile the size of the coefficients indicates that the relationship is not a strong one, nonetheless, six of the correlations are statistically significant, and the association cannot be ignored. The available controls for region suggest that the positive associa­ tion between high education and internationalism is independent of regional factors. Though the sixteen possible comparisons are lim­ ited to Republican lawmakers and the midwestem and eastern re­ gions, all sixteen show that the representatives from highly educated districts exceed those from less well-educated constituencies in sup­ port of the foreign aid and trade programs (Table 5-14).

130

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-14 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES OF REPUBLICAN REPRESENTATIVES O N FOREIGN POLICY, 85th CONGRESS, BY EDUCATION AND REGION Foreign Aid

Foreign Trade

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

East Low Education High Education

30.0%

70.0%

10

70.0%

10.0%

10

5.0

90.0

20

15.0

75.0

20

Midwest Low Education High Education

57.1

33.0

21

52.4

28.6

21

45.5

50.0

22

9.1

77.3

22

NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

Although there are fewer cases and the evidence is less clear, the positive relationship between high education and support for inter­ nationalist programs seem to survive the introduction of controls for ruralism. Eight comparisons are possible, all involving urban districts, and in six of the eight urban representatives from high education districts were more internationalist or less isolationist than urban representatives of the same party from low education dis­ tricts. Thus, within the limits imposed by imperfect controls, the tentative hypothesis appears to be accurate in recent Congresses. The few consistent departures from the historical pattern of de­ velopment support our finding that the pull of education is in the direction of internationalism. Four of the five deviations from sum­ mary statement 4 (describing a rise in Republican internationalism accompanied by a general decline in Democratic support for foreign trade) show the lawmakers from high education areas shifting, con­ trary to the more general movements, toward involvement and away from isolationism. The exceptions to the time differential in

CHAPTER FIVE

131

the breakdown of party cohesion on the two scales (statement 7) also point in the same direction. On both aid and trade bills, when isolationist votes appeared among Democrats, they were cast by representatives of low education constituencies. Those from high education areas delayed in breaking with the traditional party position until the 83rd Congress on aid and until the 85th on trade legislation. In short, these departures from historical trends indicate that a high level of education among a lawmaker’s constituents is associated with a tendency on his part to vote for the internation­ alist aid and trade policies requested by the president. In sum, although there appears a movement in the direction of the predicted positive relationship between the degree of international­ ism of a congressman and the extent of education among his consti­ tuents, we must reject the tentative hypothesis when we look at both scales and a period of two decades. Evidently, other factors, in particular situational factors, are more important sources of voting decisions than the educational level of a representative’s district. This appears to have been true in the earli­ est Congresses. W hile party unity remained firm, legislators from all types of districts adhered to the party line; only when party disci­ pline dissolved did other factors come into play as shapers of the voting alignments. Educational level seems to be one of these fac­ tors, for in the years when party cohesion was declining, representa­ tives from high education constituencies came to be the leading supporters of internationalist policies. Proposition 5-4. In the 83rd and 85th Congresses, repre­ sentatives of both parties from highly educated districts have been more internationalist than those from less welleducated districts on both foreign aid and trade. As noted earlier, this relationship is not a strong one, but the general trend of the data is in the predicted direction. Thus it is possible to conclude that education does lead to more concern about, and more information on, foreign policy issues, which, coupled with greater analytical powers, leads the well-educated to perceive greater bene­ fits to be derived from enlarged international political activity. A t

132

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

any rate, when released from the obligation to back his political party, the representative of such people has been a major source of support for the aid and trade policies of an internationally inclined president.1® SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS The general well-being of a community may also be related to die response its congressman makes to the foreign policy proposals of the executive branch. Individuals who are relatively well off usually have the time and personal resources to concern themselves with politics; they often have the educational background to understand more fully the complexities of international affairs; they are fre­ quently motivated to participate in affairs of the community, some of which may relate to foreign policy matters. If this is so, we should find that congressional districts which contain the greatest numbers of voters with a high socioeconomic status are more internationlist in their outlook on world politics, and in turn, the repre­ sentatives of these constituencies should be more inclined to cast their votes for expanded aid and trade programs. Following this line of reasoning, we will adopt, as a tentative bypotheńsf that con­ gressmen from high status districts will be more internationalist and less isolationist than representatives of less well-off constituencies. The data (Tables 5-15 and 5-16) show that, while there was again a time lag between the two scales, the hypothesis is verified only in the later years of the period since 1939. It is confirmed on foreign aid in the 80th Congress and thereafter; on foreign trade it is ac­ curate for the 83rd and 85th Congresses. The hypothesis fits Repub­ licans on both scales in each of the four Congresses, but came to apply to Democrats only after the relaxation of party unity. So long as the party whips were able to hold the southern Democrats in line, constituency variables were of little importance, but when discipline51 15 This finding is in direct contrast to that of Smuckler (“The Region of Isolationism," pp. 399-400), who found a negative relationship between high education and internationalist voting. O ur data tend to support the findings of much survey research that education and internationalism are positively correlated. Again, we should note the possibility that the difference in the findings results from different procedures in measuring educational levels.

133

CHAPTER FIVE

TAB LE S-15 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN AID, BY SOCIO­ ECONOMIC STATUS, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 80th ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

Republican Low Status High Status

37.2% 13.2

2.6% 26.3

Democratic Low Status High Status

4.9 0.0

83rd

62.8 75.0

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

66.0% 13.8

24.5% 80.0

53 80

19.1 22

64.8 86.7

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

NUM ­ BER

78 76 102 36

105 45

85th ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

NUM BER

Republican Low Status High Status

68.9% 26.0

24.4% 68.8

45 77

Democratic Low Status High Status

40.5 8.3

37.7 66.7

116 48

could no longer be maintained—in the 80th Congress on foreign aid and in the 83rd on foreign trade—Democrats from high status dis­ tricts became more inclined to support “entangling” aid and trade programs than those from lower status areas.16 16 W e have used the percentage of employed males engaged in managerial, technical, and professional occupations as die measure of status—education is usually a concomitant of such activities; they are often rewarded by high income. For a discussion of the method, see Appendix B. The districts were categorized as follows according to the percentage in the managerial, profes­ sional, technical occupational group:

Low status Moderate status H igh status

0J0-14S% 15j0-19S% 20j0% or more

134

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-16 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON FOREIGN TRADE, BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, PARTY, AND CONGRESS 83rd

R epublican Low Status H igh Status D em ocratic Low Status H igh Status

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

39.6% 3.8

13.2% 72.5

10.5

64.8 77.8

0.0

85 th NUM ­ BER

ISOLA­ TION­ IST

INTER­ NATION­ ALIST

NUM ­ BER

53 80

51.1% 11.7

31.1% 70.1

45 77

25.0 6.3

52.6 89.6

105 45

116 48

The correlation coefficients relating the percentage of managerial, technical, and professional occupations in the population to the voting record of the representative support this finding. The data in Table 5-17 show that in the early years when the party influence TABLE 5-17 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND FOREIGN POLICY V O TIN G , BY CONGRESS 76th

80th

-.24*

.I lf

Foreign Trade -.1 9 *

- .19 *

Foreign Aid

83rd .26 #

85th .27*

.19*

.26*

* Significant at the .01 level t Significant at the .05 level

was dominant the relation between status and voting for interna­ tionalist policies was negative. That is, representatives of districts with more high status citizens tended to fall at the isolationist (low) end of the scales. But in the more recent period, with the collapse of

CHAPTER FIVE

135

party unanimity, the correlations became positive, indicating that congressmen from high status areas tended to move to the interna­ tionalist (high) end of the scales. This change of sign may well result from alterations in the amount and effectiveness of pressure from the political parties. Furthermore, the available controls indicate the positive associa­ tion between high status and internationalism is independent of re­ gional and urban-rural factors. Regional controls are available for all except the W est and within each party; in twenty-seven of thirtytwo cases the predicted result was found (that is, representatives of high status districts were m ore internationalist or less isolationist than those from low status areas). Although all the comparisons involve urban areas, the same result is found in nine of twelve cases when controls for ruralism are added. Samples of the data are given in Tables 5-18 and 5-19. TABLE 5-18 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES OF MIDWESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, 85th CONGRESS, BY PARTY AND STATUS

Republican Low Status High Status Democratic Low Status High Status

NUM BER

ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

73.0% 58.0

18.9% 41.2

37 17

13.6

63.6 90.0

22

0 .0

10

The evidence of the departures from the historical pattern is con­ sistent with these findings. The two exceptions to summary state­ ment 1, which describes a decline over time in Republican isolation­ ism accompanied by an increase in Democratic opposition to foreign aid, show lawmakers from high status constituencies shifting toward internationalism at a time when the general trend was toward re­ duced support for overseas assistance. The single deviation from the

136

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 5-19 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES OF URBAN REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, 85th CONGRESS, BY PARTY AND STATUS

Republican Low Status High Status Democratic Low Status High Status

ISOLATIONIST

INTERNATIONALIST

28.1% 16.7

70.2% 75.0

57 12

74.4 83.9

39 31

5.1 0 .0

NU M BER

decreasing quantitative difference between the parties on foreign aid (statement 3) finds that, in the 85th Congress, Republicans from low status districts, unlike their colleagues from high status areas, had not surpassed low status Democrats in internationalism. State­ ment 7 describes the time differential in the collapse of party unanimity on two scales; Tables 5-15 and 5-16 show that Democrats from high status districts broke with the internationalist position of the party later than those from low status constituencies. In sum, the departures testify to the pull that high status exerts in the direction of involvement. Nevertheless, we cannot accept the tentative hypothesis, because in the early period pressure from the Democratic party apparently far outweighed the forces generated by constituency interests. Democrats representing constituencies of all status levels followed the party line. Only when the party could no longer exercise such control over the rank-and-file did these other forces come to be relevant. As we have seen, once free of party control, Democrats from high status districts joined Republicans from similar areas as the strongest proponents of internationalist policies. Proposition 5-5a. Since the 80th Congress, representatives of both parties from high status districts have been more internationalist and less isolationist than those from low status areas on foreign aid. On foreign trade, the same is true since the 83rd Congress.

CHAPTER FIVS

131

It is possible to argue that once die hold of the parties had been reduced the forces which high status generates came into play. The existence in these high status districts of relatively large numbers of voters of high education, prestige occupations, large income, and high visibility in the community may well mean that there is in the constituency a substantial pool of interested and articulate citizens who hold pro-internationalist attitudes on foreign policy issues. If such views do influence congressional voting, then high status may contribute to decisions to support aid and trade measures in the House.17 If we look at the parties separately, we find a final proposition: Proposition 5-5b. Among Republicans, representatives from high status districts have been more internationalist and less isolationist than those from low status areas in each Congress and on both scales. The most likely explanation for the finding that the predicted rela­ tionship has been true consistendy for Republicans but not for Democrats lies in the behavior of southern Democrats. If it is true, as we have suggested, that the tentative hypothesis is accurate only after the collapse of party discipline, and since it is also true that Democrats from the South reside mainly in low status districts, then it stands to reason that loyalty to party among this numerous group tends to inflate the internationalism among the low status category. T hat is, southern Democrats from low status areas supporting inter­ nationalist aid and trade policies out of loyalty to, or duress from, party possibly prevented the hypothesis from accurately describing the state of affairs among Democrats. Our study of the relationship of constituency characteristics and congressional voting behavior has made it possible to establish some general conclusions. 17 The relationship described here does point up the value of longitudinal studies. Smuckler, examining the period prior to 1950, found no correlation between economic level and foreign policy views (“The Region of Isola­ tionism,” p. 399) ; in this study the evidence indicates that after 1950, as party discipline collapsed, high socioeconomic status came to be positively associated with internationalism on both aid and trade issues.

m

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

1 Constituency attributes are clearly associated w ith legisla­ tive voting records, more so, in fact, than factors examined in the previous chapters. Each of the five variables consid­ ered in this chapter has come to be related to the congres­ sional vote. W ith the passage of time, eastern, high ethnic, high education, urban, and high socioeconomic status districts have been more likely to send to W ashington men of both parties who support internationalist aid and trade programs. On the other hand, southern, low ethnic, low education, rural, and low socioeconomic constituencies have supplied the greatest share of the opposition to these programs. The available controls suggest that each of these factors exerts an influence independent of the others. 2 The evidence emphasizes that the importance of particular factors as determinants of voting alignments varies with the passage of time. In one era a variable may have high pre­ dictive power (for example, party affiliation in the late 1930’s); later a different set of factors (for example, con­ stituency characteristics in the 1950’s) may take on impor­ tance. Thus the explanatory “weight” to be attached to specific elements will alter as time passes. 3 The implications of these findings for the president’s task of providing foreign policy leadership are clear. First, the time factor must be considered, for a strategy that success­ fully mobilizes legislative support at one time may fail later on when political conditions have altered. Second, this sug­ gests, and the scarcity of the departures from the historical pattern confirms, that events of various kinds, often beyond the control of the president, create a political environment within which Congress acts and which shapes congressional action to a great extent. The president, then, must calculate the impact of events on particular groups of legislators and search for votes in terms dictated by this assessment and in terms appropriate to each group. The data of this chapter reveal that, in the period after 1950, lawmakers from a par­ ticular set of congressional districts responded to the politi­ cal situation by voting for internationalist programs. How­ ever, if the political context should change in the direction

CHAPTER FIVE

139

of greater polarization of the parties, the president would find that appropriate appeals to members of his own party would produce more support than approaches to members representing specific types of constituencies. For instance, we can speculate that the events and personalities of the period of the Kennedy presidency were beginning to harden party lines. If he had lived, President Kennedy might have had to employ quite different leadership techniques than his successor, Lyndon Johnson, has used. The findings of this chapter reinforce the concept of the multi­ variate character of congressional isolationism set out earlier. W e have added constituency characteristics to the social background and political attributes of individual legislators as factors which give shape to voting alignments. Previous discussion has stressed the importance of the time dimension and situational forces. The con­ sistent relationship of socioeconomic status and internationalism among Republicans but not Democrats (Proposition 5-5b) suggests that while party affiliation has lost some predictive value, it cannot be overlooked as a determinant of the vote. A t any given time a cluster of demographic variables interacts with the political situation to define the configuration of congressional isolationism.

6.

Ideology a n d Foreign Policy Voting

Our findings in the previous chapters suggest that subject matter must also be considered in attempting to explain the congressional vote. Some of the factors related to voting on aid and trade legisla­ tion applied to one issue but not to the other. Since the tactics that are successful in winning support for foreign aid may not work with regard to reciprocal trade, it is important for die president to know what appeals will be effective for eliciting support for aid or trade measures or for both types of legislation. In this chapter we will assess the degree to which congressional voting records reveal aid and trade to be linked as a part of a general foreign affairs “ideology.” The greater the ideological orientation on these matters, the more use the president will be able to get from proven tech­ niques of leadership, for he will be able to use these methods to recruit backing for both content areas. Ideology may be defined as a set of integrated beliefs about the nature of man, his place in the universe, and the requisite actions which flow from these things.1 However, “ideology” will be used 1 For a useful discussion of the nature of ideology, see Robert E. Lane, (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 13-16.

political ideology

141

142

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

here for very limited purposes. W e will deal with only a small segment of ideological concern, namely, “foreign policy” ideology. W e will be interested in congressional beliefs about the nature of American foreign policy and what specific steps are entailed by this policy. As used here, ideology is operationally defined in terms of the positions taken on foreign policy matters by individual representa­ tives on roll-call votes. W e will discuss three types of ideology. First, the “extreme” ideologies, that is, those which describe indi­ viduals who consistently support either the isolationist or the inter­ nationalist alternative on aid and trade issues. Those legislators who by the objective evidence of their votes (scale scores) have opposed extension of American international activity on both aid and trade will be termed “isolationists,” while those who have supported exten­ sions in both areas will be called “internationalists.” Second, we will deal with “moderate” ideologies, those which describe individuals who take an extreme position on one issue and a moderate stand on the other. Here we also encounter two subtypes, the “moderateinternationalists” and the “moderate-isolationists.” The former is composed of legislators who fell in the moderate range on one scale and at the internationalist end of the other, while the latter type in­ cludes those whose scale scores show them to be moderates on one topic and isolationists on the other. Finally, we will examine a “mixed” ideology—one which leads a congressman to take positions at the opposite extremes of the two scales (for example, inter­ nationalist on one and isolationist on the other).2 The distribution of representatives will be examined with respect to these ideological types, the demographic characteristics of the groups, and the differences in demographic terms between the vari­ ous types. From this we may be able to draw some general conclu2 W e must note what should be obvious: we do not assert that the congress­ men who fall into what we have labeled ideological types are consciously ad­ hering to a clearly defined ideology or that they are motivated by any par­ ticular set of factors. It is only suggested that these three patterns of voting on aid and trade issues are found and that each may have a rationale (ide­ ology) underlying it. For an application of this type of procedure to the House of Representatives, see Charles D. Farris, “A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress,” jouknal of politics, XX (1958), 308-339, especially pp. 327-328.

CHAPTER SIX

143

sions about the strategic requirements for successful foreign policy leadership by the president. T H E EX TEN T OF IDEOLOGICAL O RIEN TA TIO N From the logical starting point—an examination of the amount of ideological orientation that exists in the House (Table 6-1) *—we TABLE 6-1 DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGICAL TYPES, BY CONGRESS •

E xtrem e Ideologies Isolationists Internationalists

76th

80th

83rd

8 5th

37.2% 51.3

15.0% 30.0

8 .8 %

50.0

16.2% 41.9

M oderate Ideologies M oderate Isolationists M oderate Internationalists

2.2

32.7

9.1

7.3

8.6

12.4

19.2

15.0

M ixed Ideologies

0.2

6.6

10.9

17.5

(N = 361)

(N = 380)

(N = 386)

(N = 413)

* Only those congressmen who were assigned scale scores on both the foreign aid and foreign trade scales are included in the table. A small number of congressmen who were moderates on both subjects have also been omitted. The actual percentage of moderates in each Congress is as follows: 76th, 0.4; 80th, 3.4; 83rd, 2.1; and 85th, 2.2. The numbers here were too small to permit further analysis of the moderate group.

see that the foreign policy extremists, both isolationists and inter­ nationalists, comprised a significant proportion of the House mem­ bership in each Congress. The actual percentages are as follows: 8 The method for “cross-tabulating” the two scales to get the distribution of ideological types is that of Farris, “A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings.”

144

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

76th 80th 83rd 85th

Congress Congress Congress Congress

88.5% 45.0 58.8 58.1

There existed, then, a solid and numerically substantial group of legislators, the larger number being internationalists, who made up the hard-core supporters and opponents of international involvement. In each Congress there was a group, never smaller than 30.0 per cent, that consistently supported the internationalist requests of the president. The degree of ideological orientation becomes more impressive if the moderate ideologies are taken into account, that is, those who supported an extreme position on one issue and took a moderate stance on the other. The extent of moderate ideology in each Con­ gress was: 76th 80th 83rd 85th

Congress Congress Congress Congress

10.8% 45.1 28.3 22.3

Thus, in addition to those who were consistent backers of one or the other extreme policy, there were also large numbers who in­ clined in the direction of one of the extreme positions. Adding up these two sets of figures may give some idea of the general level of ideological extremism: 76th 80th 83rd 85th

Congress Congress Congress Congress

99.3% 90.1 87.1 80.4

Taking the extreme and moderate ideological types together, the implication is clear that in each Congress there was a considerable though declining degree of ideological orientation. In three of four instances, the 80th Congress being the exception, a clear majority of the legislators was internationalist or inclined in that direction (see Table 6-2). This suggests that the president has been able to mobil­ ize adequate support to pass foreign aid and reciprocal trade pro­ grams acceptable to the administration.

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TA B LE 6-2 DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES, BY IDEOLOGICAL INCLINATION AND CONGRESS ISOLATIONIST OR MODERATEISOLATIONIST

76th 80th 83rd 85th

39.4% 47.7 17.9 23.5

INTERNATIONALIST OR MODERATEINTERNATIONALIST

59.9% 42.4 69.2 56.9

On the other hand, the data in Table 6-1 show a growth in the number of congressmen who assumed what we have called a mixed ideological posture, that is, isolationists on one issue and internation­ alists on the other. The size of this mixed group grew from 0.2 per cent in the 76th Congress to 17.5 per cent twenty years later. Thus, while there appeared to be a continuing body of ideological orienta­ tion in the House, there was also an increase in the number of congressmen whose votes showed a mixed ideological stand. The argument to this point can be summarized in a paradoxical proposition: 4 Proposition 6-1. While there continued to be a substantial degree of ideological orientation in foreign policy voting in the House, at the same time the number of congress­ men taking ideologically mixed stands increased in each succeeding Congress. Any attempt to explain this proposition leads to a discussion of party affiliation. 4 This proposition may be merely an artifact of method, for it is possible that the scales used in different years are not strictly comparable and that this may account for the variations discussed. However, the reasons for believing that the scales in the four Congresses can be treated as equivalents were dis­ cussed earlier (see above, chap. 2, pp. 47-48), and, while the proposition should be viewed with caution, it can, in the opinion of the present w riter, justifiably be considered as tentative, not merely an artifact of procedure.

146

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

T H E COMPOSITION OF T H E EXTREME IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS: PARTY AFFILIATION Table 6-3 presents the party affiliation of the extreme ideological groups, isolationists and internationalists, in each of the four Congresses.

TABLE 6-3 DISTRIBUTION OF EXTREME IDEOLOGICAL TYPES, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS REPUBLICAN

DEMOCRATIC

NUM BER

76th Isolationists Internationalists

100.0%

80th Isolationists Internationalists

100.0

0 .0

0 .0

1 00.0

56 114

83rd Isolationists Internationalists

94.1 43.0

5.9 57.0

34 193

85th Isolationists Internationalists

59.7 46.8

40.3 53.2

67 173

0 .0

0.0% 1 0 0 .0

131 184

The data disclose the declining importance of party affiliation as a distinguishing feature of the extreme ideological groups. In the two earliest Congresses, the isolationists and the internationalists were exclusively one party aggregates; this ceased to be the case in the 83rd Congress, and by the 85th there was, for the first time, no statistically significant (as measured by the Chi Square test) party difference between the two groups. Over a period of twenty years a voting alignment emerged that cut cleanly across party lines, where relatively equal numbers within each party supported and objected to long-term commitments to foreign nations.

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This makes clear a second proposition: Proposition 6-2. W ith the passage o f tim e, p arty declined as a distinguishing facto r o f the isolationist and interna­ tionalist groups.

In explanation of this finding, we should recall the previous dis­ cussion of the factors leading to a relaxation of party loyalty and/or discipline. T o recapitulate, it was suggested that such things as W orld W ar II, the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the assumption by the Republican party in 1953 of responsibility for the conduct of American foreign affairs coincident with the shift of the Democrats into opposition, and the changing character of the South seem to have left the parties unable to attract near unanimous support from their rank and file. W hatever the cause, party declined in impor­ tance as a determinant of foreign policy voting. The data in Tables 6-1 and 6-3 suggest that as party became less important, some other factor, or set of factors, replaced it as the basis of the distinction between the isolationist and international­ ist groups. Our earlier speculation led to the possibility that an ideological division along liberal-conservative lines began to operate in the 1950’s.0 Prior to that time party affiliation distinguished be­ tween the pro- and and-involvement forces. In the period after 1950 foreign policy issues may have become part of the more encompass­ ing question of the proper size and scope of federal government activity. Thus the isolationists may have been those who wanted to hold down the growth of the national governmental apparatus while those who were willing to see more functions carried on in Wash­ ington may have been the lawmakers who voted for enlarged inter­ national commitments. If the isolationists became conservatives and not simply Repub­ licans, while a bipartisan coalition of liberals, not Democrats alone, made up the internationalists, then the findings summarized in Proposition 6-1 (the continued existence of a high degree of ideo­ logical orientation simultaneously with an increase in the amount of mixed ideological voting) can be explained. It may be that the 8 See above, pp. 51-56.

148

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

liberal-conservative cleavage incompletely replaced the partisan division as the factor which differentiated the isolationists from the internationalists. These liberal and conservative groups lack even the limited institutional sanctions which are available to the political party to hold the support of their members. They must rely entirely on die intellectual convictions of their adherents; they have few if any means of compulsion. Thus, while the liberal and conservative positions may have been becoming more attractive in general, for some congressmen, free from outside sanctions, non-ideological fac­ tors may have taken on substantial importance. Such forces may have led lawmakers to adopt what we have called mixed ideological positions on foreign policy matters. For example, constituency characteristics may have taken on added significance for some legis­ lators. Those with a business or industry at home particularly en­ dangered by foreign competition may have opposed foreign trade but continued to vote for foreign aid bills. O r a representative may have seen foreign aid as an extravagance but perceived advantages in freer trade. A set of developments such as these may account for the persistence of a considerable degree of ideological extremism along with a growing amount of mixed ideological voting. For an internationalist president attempting to enlist support for his policy proposals, this means that while at any point in time there seems to tie a nucleus of internationalist strength around which to construct majorities in favor of aid and trade programs, its composi­ tion is not constant. A strategy which secures passage of a program in one Congress may become outmoded in a subsequent session. For instance, the tactics required to mobilize the democratic majority of the House in support of internationalist policies may well be ineffec­ tive for inducing members of a liberal coalition which includes lawmakers of both parties to back extended aid and trade programs.

T H E COMPOSITION OF T H E EXTREME IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS If political party is no longer a useful tool for separating the isolationists from the internationalists, on what grounds can the tw o

CHAPTER SIX

149

groups be distinguished? Table 6-4 lists the significant differences between die isolationist and internationalist groups.* It is apparent from Table 6-4 that the demographic base of the extreme blocs was not a stable one, but radier shifted w ith the passage of time. The most consistent difference between the groups was die regional one; the isolationists tended to be more from southern and midwestem areas while the proponents of international activity included more eastern congressmen. O ther constituency characteristics allow us to distinguish be­ tween the ideological groups in the most recent Congresses. In the 80th Congress and thereafter, the isolationists were more from rural, low ethnic districts, and in the two latest Congresses, they were also the representatives of low status constituencies. Conversely, in this same period the internationalists came from urban, high ethnic, high status districts in higher proportion. Turning from the demographic to the domestic behavioral side, the data in Table 6-4 indicate that the two foreign policy groups differed significantly on domestic policy matters as well. In each Congress those who tended to favor a minimal role in world politics for the United States also were more inclined to take a conservative position with regard to government activity and government spending.7 It is possible, of course, that these differences reflect no more than party contrasts, for the parties tend to have their centers of gravity in differing types of constituencies.* As already noted, in the earlier Congresses the ideological groups were single party entities and therefore no controls for party are possible. In fact, only in the two most recent Congresses among Republicans and the latest among Democrats were there sufficient numbers of isolationists and inter­ nationalists in the party to allow the use of party controls. The significant differences among the party groups appear in Table 6-5. • “Significant” is used here in a statistical sense. The Chi Square and the Fisher Exact Probability tests have been used where appropriate. See Segel, NONPABAMETEic STATisncs, pp. 95-111, for a discussion of the procedures. All the differences reported in this and the following sections are significant at the .05 level of confidence or less. 7 See above, p. 34, for a discussion of the government activity and govern­ ment spending scales. * Lewis A. Froman, J r , “Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Con­ gressional Voting Behavior,” am ebkan political science eeview , LVII (1963), 57-62.

150

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE 6—4

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: ISOLATIONISTS AND INTERNATIONALISTS, BY CONGRESS ISOLATIONISTS DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM INTERNA­ TIONALISTS W ITH RESPECT

76th 80th Party Republican * Republican Region Midwest Midwest Ethnicity High Low UrbanRural Ruralism Status Religion Protestant Elective None Office Education (constit­ uency) Electoral Margin Govern­ ment Activity Conservative Conservative Govern­ ment Spending Conservative Conservative

83rd Republican Midwest Low Rural Low

85th South Low Rural Low Protestant

Low Safe Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative

• The cell entry is the direction of the statistically significant difference (e.g., in the 76th Congress, the isolationists were significantly more Republican than the internationalists).

CHAPTER SIX

151

These data, however, indicate that the differences outlined above characterize, in the recent period, the extreme ideological groups of both parties. Republican isolationists were significantly more midwestern than G.O.P. supporters of aid and trade legislation.

TAB LE 6-5 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: ISOLATIONISTS AND INTERNATIONALISTS, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS REPUBLICAN ISOLATIONISTS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM REPUBLICAN INTERNATIONALISTS W ITH r e spe c t t o :

Region Ethnicity Urban-Ruralism Status Education (constituency) Government Activity Government Spending DEMOCRATIC ISOLATIONISTS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISTS W ITH r e spe c t t o :

Region Ethnicity Urban-Ruralism Status Religion Government Activity Government Spending

83rd

85th Midwest Low Rural Low

Midwest Low Rural Low Low

Conservative Conservative

85th South Low Rural Low Protestant Conservative Conservative

On the Democratic side the isolationists were from southern dis­ tricts to a greater extent than the internationalists. In both parties

152

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

the internationalists included a larger number of eastern congressmen than did the isolationists.9 Similarly, Republican and Democratic isolationists were, at each point where party controls were applicable, more often the repre­ sentatives of low ethnic, rural, and low socioeconomic status dis­ tricts and more conservative with respect to domestic matters than the internationalists of their respective parties. The internationalists of both parties, conversely, tended to be from high ethnic, urban, and high socioeconomic status constituencies and more liberal in the areas of government activity and spending. Thus there emerged at least the basic outlines of a liberal-conserv­ ative ideological cleavage in the House that cut across party lines. A core of internationalists, distinguishable from the isolationists with respect to a few demographic attributes and a more liberal position on domestic affairs, came into existence. In opposition, there came to be a body of representatives of conservative orienta­ tion who tended to reject increasing involvement by the federal government in foreign and domestic policy concerns. T o summar­ ize, we may reduce the foregoing to propositional form: Proposition 6-3. W ith the passage o f tim e, a liberal-con­ servative dim ension replaced p arty affiliation as the facto r w hich distinguished betw een the extrem e ideological groups. T h e isolationists tended to be m ore southern and m idw estem and less eastern; m ore the representatives o f low ethnic, ru ral, and low status districts; and m ore con­ servative on dom estic m atters than the internationalists in the m ost recent Congresses.

The explanatory factors which may account for the proposition have been noted elsewhere. By way of summary, we may note the greater concern for foreign policy which may stem from particular ethnic backgrounds; the increased contacts with international affairs which eastern and urban residence may foster; and the greater un• These findings support the conclusion reached in chap. 5 that only the East can justifiably be given a regional label, in this case die region of inter­ nationalism, and that, contrary to popular usage, neither the South nor the Midwest but only their majority parties can be characterized as isolationist.

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153

demanding of, and sensitivity to, foreign political activity which the high levels of income and education associated with high status may produce.10 In addition, in recent years the same representatives who have supported internationalist policy alternatives have also been inclined to vote for enlarged federal government activity and expenditure. W e have referred to this as a liberal-conservative cleavage. W hatever name is given to it, its existence suggests that there is in the House of Representatives an evaluative dimension which applies for some congressmen to both domestic and foreign policy issues. The president, then, in some instances may be able to gain sup­ port by making appeals in ideological terms; for example, if indeed there is some common rationale underlying similar vote choices, casting international policies in terms of liberalism may elicit needed support. But since foreign policy can be conceived as a part of a broader liberal-conservative ideological split only within a limited time period, this should remind us that a presidential strategy based on ideological appeals is, in a sense, “time bound,” and its utility must be reassessed as the political environment changes in response to international and domestic political events.

T H E MODERATE IDEOLOGICAL TYPES Since the president must build internationalist majorities from those who lean in the direction of involvement as well as from those who provide more consistent support, it is worthwhile to see if the char­ acteristics that distinguish the moderate (that is, those who fell in the moderate range on one subject and in an extreme category on another) from the extreme groups can be identified. The differences which appear may be important for the strategic and tactical plan­ ning of die president. The data are arrayed in Tables 6-6 and 6-7. 10 These factors tend to be present in the same districts (Le, eastern con­ stituencies are more likely to be high ethnic, high status, urban areas than districts in other regions); thus making it difficult to establish whether the isolationist phenomenon is the product of one, or of a combination, of these forces.

154

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TAB LE 6—6

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: MODERATE IDEOLOGICAL TYPES AND ISOLATIONISTS, BY CONGRESS MODERATE ISOLATIONISTS DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM ISOLATIONISTS w it h r e s p e c t t o :

Region UrbanRuralism Status Education (constit­ uency) Education (congress­ man) MODERATE INTERNA­ TIONALISTS DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM ISOLATIONISTS W ITH r e spe c t t o :

80th East, West

83rd

85th

Urban High Low High School

76th 80th Democratic Democratic South, West South, East

Party Region UrbanRuralism Status Ethnicity Religion Catholic Govern­ ment Activity Liberal Govern­ ment Spending Liberal

Urban

83rd Democratic East

85th

Urban High

High

Liberal Liberal

Liberal

CHAPTER SIX

155

These data reveal a number of points. First, they indicate that the moderate ideological types, as might be expected, tended to resem­ ble most closely that extreme type to which the group was nearest on the ideological continuum. For example, those legislators who departed from isolationism on either foreign aid or trade were demographically and w ith respect to position on domestic affairs more like the isolationists than the internationalists. Thus the moderate isolationist group was significantly different from the iso­ lationists on a few dimensions while differing from the international­ ists on a larger number of items. Second, turning from the number to the nature of the differences, the Tables show that the moderate ideological types had signifi­ cantly less of the characteristics which typify the extreme types. Thus, where differences occurred, the moderates tended to be more Democratic, urban, eastern, liberal on domestic matters, etc., than the isolationists and more Republican, midwestem and southern, rural, conservative, etc., than the internationalists. This is precisely what we would expect if the moderates can be placed between the extremes on an ideological continuum. Third, it is important to note the consistency of the differences between moderate and extreme types. In general, there were rela­ tively few differences which held up over time. Only the moderate isolationist group differed consistently from one of die polar types, the internationalists, on the same variables over time. And these differences came into existence simultaneously with the decline in importance of party. W hat the data show, then, is that for the most part the moderate ideological groups differed from the extreme types in the predicted directions, but that these differences did not persist over time.11 There is, then, a kind of shifting factionalism 11 The major exceptions to this finding occur in the 76th Congress where the moderate internationalist group differed from the pure internationalists in the direction of greater, not lesser, eastern residence, Catholicism, ethnicity, and urbanism. These apparent contradictions may be explained by the earlier discussion (pp. 120-126) of the change in the nature of the relationship between ethnicity and internationalism. In the period prior to W orld W ar II, Ameri­ cans of German and Irish origins, many of them Catholics living in urban areas of the East, seem to have been isolationists. In the postwar era, we have argued, differing circumstances led these citizens to become leading backers of involvement. This shift accounts for the change in the direction of the significant differences between the moderate internationalist and international­ ist types between the 76th and 80th Congresses.

156

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

TAB LE 6-7 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: MODERATE IDEOLOGICAL TYPES AND INTERNATIONALISTS, BY CONGRESS MODERATE ISOLATIONISTS DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM INTERNATION­ ALISTS W ITH RESPECT TO:

Party Region UrbanRuralism Status Ethnicity Education (constit­ uency) Religion Education (congress­ man) Percentage of Vote

80th Republican Midwest Low

Low Protestant

85th

83rd Republican Midwest

South

Rural Low Low

Rural Low Low

Protestant

Protestant

High School High School 60% +

within the isolationist and internationalist camps; at one point in time, some legislators characterized by one set of factors shifted into the moderate range while during another period a different group sharing another set of characteristics adopted a moderate stance on foreign policy questions. Adding controls for party in large measure confirms the general conclusions advanced in the preceding paragraphs. Among Repub­ licans, the moderate ideological types resemble the extreme type at the nearest end of the policy continuum and have significantly fewer of the attributes which characterize the extreme groups. T he only consistent differences between a moderate and an extreme

CHAPTER SIX

157

TABLE 6-7 (Continued) Govern­ ment Activity Conservative Conservative Conservative Govern­ ment Spending Conservative Conservative Conservative MODERATE INTERNA­ TIONALISTS DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM INTERNA­ TIONALISTS W ITH RESPECT TO:

Region UrbanRuralism Status Ethnicity Religion Govern­ ment Activity Govern­ ment Spending

76th East Urban

80th

83rd South

85th South

Rural Low

Rural Low Protestant

High Catholic Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative

ideological group show the moderate internationalist Republicans distinguishable in each case from the isolationists, the moderates coming from more urban, high status districts. On the Democratic side, w ith a single exception, the same findings are apparent. T he interesting exception (Table 6-8) shows that the moderate internationalists differed from the extreme international­ ists w ith some consistency on a number of variables.* 12 The mod­ erate group was characterized to a significantly smaller degree by 12 This was true in the 80th Congress and thereafter. T he table clearly il­ lustrates the reversal of some relationships between the 76th and 80th Con­ gresses discussed in n. 11, p. 155.

158

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

TAB LE 6-8 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: DEMOCRATIC M ODERATE INTERNATIONALISTS AND INTERNATIONALISTS, BY CONGRESS MODERATE INTERNA­ TIONALISTS DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM INTERNATIONALISTS W ITH RESPECT TO:

76th

80th

Region Midwest, West South UrbanRuralism Urban Rural Ethnicity High Low Religion Catholic Percentage of Vote 60% + Elective Office None Govern­ ment Conservative Activity Govern­ ment Spending

South

85th South

Rural Low Protestant

Rural Low Protestant

83rd

Conservative Conservative Conservative

the attributes most closely associated with extreme internationalism and was more southern, rural, low ethnic, and conservative on gov­ ernment activity than the interventionist group. The emergence of this pattern coincided with the diminishing of southern Democratic enthusiasm for internationalist policies, suggesting that, in contrast to the G.O.P., there is a relatively permanent split within the ranks of pro-internationalist Democrats between the consistent supporters of aid and trade who reside mainly in the urban N orth and a group of southern representatives largely from rural, low ethnic areas who

CHAPTER SIX

159

have some reservations about American overseas involvement A Democratic president, of course, must design his legislative strategy to retain as much support as possible from both these groups. T o summarize the discussion of the moderate ideological types, we may set forth two additional propositions: Proposition 6-4. T h e m oderate ideologicial groups resem ­ bled m ost closely th e ideological type a t th e nearest end o f th e isolationist-internationalist continuum . T h e m oder­ ate groups, w here differences did occur, had significantly less o f th e characteristics w hich w ere positively associated w ith th e extrem e ideological types.

This is hardly a surprising finding, for we should expect that if a certain set of factors were related to isolationism, for example, then those who departed slightly from isolationist voting should have been characterized by most of the variables which were associated w ith that position. If extreme stands were, in some sense, the result­ ant of the operation of a number of forces, then those representa­ tives who were impelled by fewer of those forces should have been less likely to stand on extreme ground. The earlier analysis of the factors mentioned in this section has suggested some ways in which they may be related to foreign policy vote decisions. Proposition 6-5. T h e significant differences betw een p ar­ ticu lar m oderate and extrem e ideological types w ere n o t consistent over tim e.

Perhaps this conclusion ought not be dignified by a proposition, for we have noted some exceptions to it. But it seems worthwhile to emphasize again that voting configurations in the House reflect a complex interaction of situational and demographic factors. As the environmental context alters, the ideological groupings dissolve and reform along new lines. The tactics employed by the president to mobilize support for his international policies will also have to shift to meet these changes in circumstance.

160

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

The findings of this and the preceding section, taken together, pose problems of strategy for the chief executive. W hile appeals for support in terms of a liberal ideology may, in some eras, secure the backing of some legislators, such an approach is not likely to be effective with the shifting cluster of moderates whose votes may have to be added to those of the extreme internationalists if the desired policy alternatives are to be enacted. In fact, ideological appeals may repel some of the moderates; if so, the president will be required to find tactics which will attract both groups. T o do so, he may be compelled to forego approaches which might be highly successful w ith particular groups of representatives.

THE MIXED IDEOLOGICAL TYPES Looking briefly at those congressmen who fell into w hat we have labeled the mixed ideological category (those who were isolationists on one foreign affairs issue and internationalists on the other), we will see which, if any, of the variables under consideration in this study will permit us to distinguish between the mixed and extreme types and to estimate, if possible, the president’s chances of drawing support from the representatives with mixed voting records. The data (Table 6-9) indicate that the mixed types differed from the extreme types in the same manner as the moderate ideological groups. They were likely, where there were differences, to have had significantly less of the characteristics which were associated with isolationism and internationalism. Thus, the mixed group tended to be less characterized by Republican party affiliation, ruralism, high status, high ethnicity, and conservatism on domestic matters than the isolationists, and to have been less Democratic, urban, low status, Catholic, and liberal than the internationalists. From one perspective, this is in accord with our earlier findings, for it is logical that those less characterized by attributes associated with an extreme position on the foreign policy continuum will be less likely to occupy posi­ tions at the extremes. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the present study does not permit us to explain why some con­ gressmen assumed moderate issue positions while others adopted mixed postures.

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CHAPTER SIX

TA B LE 6-9 SIG N IFICA NT DIFFERENCES: MIXED AND EXTREME IDEOLOGICAL TYPES, BY CONGRESS M IXED IDEOLOGIES DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM ISOLATIONISTS w it h r e sp e c t t o :

Party Region Urban-Ruralism Status Ethnicity Government Activity Government Spending M IXED IDEOLOGIES DIFFER SIGNIFI­ CANTLY FROM INTERNATIONALISTS [TH RESPECT TO:

Party Region Urban-Ruralism Status Education (constituency) Government Activity Government Spending

80th East Urban High High

80th Republican East High

83rd

85th

Democratic South Urban High High Liberal

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal

83rd

85th

South Rural

South Rural

Low

Low

Low

Low

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative

Here, too, we should note that there was little consistency in the differences over time; in no instance did the mixed ideological group differ from an extreme group on the same dimension in each Con­ gress. Again, this suggests that there may have been a shifting pat­ tern; at one point one group of legislators found it advisable to

162

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

adopt a mixed ideological posture while at a later date a different set of lawmakers selected mixed issue positions.18 W ith a single exception, examining the parties individually dem­ onstrates that these findings apply to both Republicans and Demo­ crats. The exception (Table 6-10) requires modification of the T A B L E 6-10

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: DEMOCRATIC MIXED AND INTERN A TIO N A LIST IDEOLOGIES, BY CONGRESS M IXED IDEOLOGIES DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE INTERNATIONALISTS W ITH RESPECT TO:

R egion U rban-R uralism Status E thnicity R eligion G overnm ent A ctiv ity

83rd South R ural L ow Low P rotestant

85th South R u ral L ow L ow P ro testan t C onservative

statement that there was little consistency over time in the differ­ ences between the mixed and extreme ideological types, for among Democrats the mixed ideological group differed from the interna­ tionalists on the same five variables in both the 83rd and 85th Con­ gresses. This lends support to our earlier suggestion that within the Democratic party there developed a clear split, in demographic terms at least, between the internationalists and remaining groups within the party. One conclusion emerges clearly from this discussion. Proposition 6-6. W h ere differences occurred, m ixed ideo­ logical types had significantly less o f th e characteristics th at w ere positively associated w ith th e extrem e ideologi­ cal groups.

is It is possible to argue that extreme positions result from the operation of a number of forces no one of which is both necessary and sufficient. It may be the number of forces exerting pressure, not which specific ones, that is important.

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One thing is clear regarding this proposition’s relevance for presi­ dential leadership: appeals based on a liberal ideology are not likely to attract the mixed ideological group. Beyond this there appear to be no strategic imperatives; on each issue, the president will be required to determine the reasons why an individual representative has supported the program of the administration. Since the law­ maker opposed the second foreign policy program, these reasons are likely to be idiosyncratic ones—things about the man himself or his district shared by few, if any, others in the legislature—and the president may have to take account of these on an individual basis. T o conclude this examination of the ideological groupings on foreign policy matters, we may note a few general points. 1 The data presented in this chapter suggest that, in large part, voting positions on foreign affairs issues fell along an isolationist-internationalist continuum; clearly distinguishable extreme and intermediate groups appeared and could be placed on the continuum. There was, at each point in time, a good deal of ideological orientation in the House on inter­ national relations questions. 2 The criteria by which these group distinctions can be made support the findings of the previous chapters. The extreme ideological types, the isolationists and the internationalists, differ from the moderate and mixed ideological groups with respect to the variables considered in the present study; they are characterized by more of those attributes which our analysis has shown to be associated with extreme positions. 3 W ith the passage of dmę the basis of this ideological cleavage has shifted; in the earlier period party affiliadon distinguished between the isolationist and internationalist groups; later a set of demographic characteristics divided the tw o voting blocs. Presidential leadership strategy must take these factors into ac­ count. W hile there has been a fairly large group of internationalists supporting the president, he has had to add the votes of representa­ tives less ideologically inclined to those of the extremists in order to secure passage of the legislation he desired. The kind of appeal

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necessary to win one of these groups may not enlist the other; thus the president will have to pursue a “mixed strategy” of some sort. In addition, because the character of the cleavage in Congress alters over the years, the tactical components of this strategy will have to be changed to meet changes in the political situation. There simply have not been a sufficient number of legislators who evidence an ideological approach to foreign policy to permit application of a single strategy. Rather, it seems that there must be different ap­ proaches to different segments of the House membership, and the task of the president is to find the combination of approaches which will win the support of both the more and the less ideologically oriented groups of congressmen. Along these same lines, the present w riter has used some of the data presented here to argue that there appears little hope for re­ form of the party system in the direction of a “responsible twoparty system” which would provide the president with a disciplined majority in Congress to enact his policy proposals.14 The evidence leads to the conclusion that there does not exist in Congress the raw material (in the form of an enduring ideological cleavage) from which to construct a realigned, responsible tw o-party system. The president, therefore, in all likelihood, will have to lead without the assistance of disciplined parties. His strategy must be to elicit suffi­ cient support from a variety of legislative subgroups to put across his program. The specific tactical moves available to him will be a major concern of the following chapter. 14 See Leroy N . Rieselbach, “Congressional Ideology, the Vote on Foreign Policy, and the Prospects for Party Realignment,” in John D. M ontgomery and A rthur Smithies, eds., public policy , XIV ( yearbook of the graduate school of public administration , Cambridge: H arvard University Press, 1965), pp. 49-70.

7.

Isolationism, the Legislative System, a n d Presidential Leadership

In this final chapter the threads of the argument concerning each of the three major topics dealt with in this study must be pulled together. First, we will look at the broad outlines of congressional isolationism as they have emerged from the data of the present work. Second, we will make an effort to extract from the findings of the previous chapters some general conclusions about the nature of the legislative system, proposing a modest paradigm of the pro­ cess by which individual congressmen make their voting decisions. And, finally, we will explore the implications of the propositions presented here for the strategy of presidential foreign policy leadership.

ISOLATIONISM: W H A T IT IS, AND W H A T IT IS N O T In the substantive portions of this study, we have delineated trends in the extent of isolationism, the degree of association be­ tween three types of demographic variables and congressional roll165

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call behavior, and the amount of similarity in the relationships between these factors and the two foreign policy issues taken indi­ vidually. Relying on quantitative methods, we have sought to provide answers to the questions posed in the introduction concerning the nature of the isolationist phenomenon. A t the most general level, the data make it quite clear that no single-factor explanation of isolationism will suffice. Opposition to involvement in world politics cannot be attributed solely to the operation of an ethnic, party, or regional factor; rather our evidence compels the conclusion that a wide variety of forces are relevant to foreign policy vote choices in Congress. A general examination of the factors that seem important in identifying the sources of support for, and opposition to, expanded American activity in the affairs of the world may make clear the complexity of the phenomenon as well as the difficulty in predicting future developments. In the first place, congressional roll-call voting goes on in a politi­ cal context defined by events outside the legislative halls. T he ebb and flow of world tensions, the development of more immediate crisis situations, the degree to which existing policies resolve such crises, the changing personnel of foreign regimes, the state of dip­ lomatic relations between the United States and our allies, these and many others like them provide the international background against which American legislators make their foreign policy choices. As such events occur the congressman’s perceptions and evaluations of the available policy alternatives may change. His position also may shift in response to the passage of time; what appears to be a valid activity in the short run may lose much of its appeal when set in a longer time perspective. Domestic events, political, social, and economic, also may influ­ ence the vote decision of the representative. A recession which swells the ranks of the unemployed and creates competing demands for available funds, federal intervention in a violent racial situation, or evidence (or charges) of conflict of interest or actual misconduct within the administration may cause a lawmaker to hesitate before he votes to expend huge sums in distant lands or to expand the size and authority of the federal bureaucracy. A presidential election which changes the control of the presidency may alter the frame­ work within which a representative views particular policies. In

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addition, a legislator may be unwilling, in the months immediately preceding a general election, to back policies which he would sup­ port after the votes have been counted. There are examples in the data of this study which support the claim of relevance for these broad-gauge factors. T he linear growth of isolationism among southern Democrats testifies to the operation of long-term trends which are apparently independent of changes in the immediate legislative environment However, it is possible to argue that this development was a response to international events, domestic economic and political changes in the South, and/or a change in the time perspective within which the aid and trade pro­ gram are viewed. The shift toward internationalism among Republi­ can representatives during the 83rd and 85th Congresses suggests the impact of the presidency on the legislative system, for these voting changes seem to have been influenced directly by the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, which put in office a Republican president committed to internationalist aid and trade policies. Thus it seems plausible to suggest that international and domestic events create forces which exert pressures on the legislature and which may affect the voting alignments within the chamber. It is within a shifting context of such events that the House considers foreign policy measures. Moreover, although we have no data to substantiate the assertion w ith respect to foreign affairs, it seems clear that the environment within which the legislator functions is affected by the shape of the legislative system itself. W hich party has a congressional majority is important because pressures to “make a record” accompany major­ ity status. T he presidency is relevant here as well, for a majority in the House may function one way if it must deal with a president of its own party and quite differently in the absence of cues and pres­ sures emanating from the W hite House. Also, the identities of the individual legislators who man the key committee and leadership posts may be crucial to whether or not a bill ever reaches the floor and, if it does, to the form in which the issue is presented to the rank-and-file members of Congress.1 1 A recent example of the importance of the committee chairman is pro­ vided by the change in the behavior of the House Committee on Education and Labor which followed the replacement, as chairman, of Graham A.

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Second, within the context defined by events and the legislative system, a large number of variables of different kinds appear to be relevant to foreign affairs voting in the House. In the tw o most recent (83rd and 85th) Congresses nine variables were associated in some way with foreign policy voting in both parties. W hen the parties were treated separately, other factors were related to Demo­ cratic or Republican vote decisions.3 In addition to the large num­ ber of variables, we should point out that different kinds of factors appear to be associated with foreign affairs behavior. This study has singled out three types of characteristics—social background, politi­ cal, and constituency—and each has pointed to elements which, at one time or another, were related to isolationist voting. As a second general conclusion, it is apparent that the correlates of isolationism are not stable, but rather shift with the passage of time. The evidence collected here makes it clear that at different points in time different clusters of factors are positively associated with voting behavior. Only a few factors—for example, religious affiliation and committee assignment—were consistently related to foreign policy vote decisions over the entire period covered in this study. Even here, the findings held for the foreign aid scales only. If relationships within the parties, taken individually, are considered, then some additional consistencies appear. Length of service, prior military service, and occupation prior to election to Congress were consistently associated with one pole of the isolationist-internation­ alist continuum, in one or the other of the political parties, over the years from 1939 to 1958. This indicates that the variables selected for study have differential relationships with the tw o parties. O ther factors were related to isolationism for periods of time shorter than the entire tw enty years examined here. In the earliest Congresses political party affiliation was a crucial determinant of Barden (Denk, N.C.) by Adam Clayton Powell. On Barden as chairman, see Gus T yler, a legislative campaign for a federal m in im u m wage (1955) (New York: H olt, 1959); Alan K. McAdams, power and politics in labor legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 128-133, et passim. 2 These totals are based on the propositions set forth in the previous chap­ ters. Thus, they include only those relationships w hich hold for both parties in tw o or more successive Congresses or in one party for each of the four Congresses. If single or nonconsecutive sessions are taken into account die number of relevant factors would be even higher.

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vote choice; as party declined in importance, a set of constituency attributes became related to isolationist voting. In short, in different historical periods dissimilar clusters of variables were associated pos­ itively with foreign aid and trade voting in the House. The demo­ graphic base of isolationism changes as time passes. A third point that should be made is that there are differences in the relationships between the factors studied here and the two facets of foreign relations which we have examined. The time-series data indicate that contrary movements often appeared with respect to aid and trade; over the same interval isolationism increased on one subject and declined on the other. This means that events and the shape of the legislative system have had differing effects on the two subject matter areas. Also, the propositions of the earlier chapters suggest that relationships frequently apply to one or the other of the tw o topics but not to both of them. For example, the findings relat­ ing affiliation w ith the Catholic Church and membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee to reduced isolationism describe reality with respect to foreign aid but are inaccurate w ith regard to the reciprocal trade program. On the whole the data of this study show that isolationism cannot be explained in terms of any one factor, that its correlates are not fixed but rather change in response to alterations in the political and legislative situations, and that at any given time the shape of isolationism may differ with respect to different issues. There are different “isolationisms” at different times and on differ­ ent subjects. On the positive side, however, at any point in time a cluster of variables definitely appears to be related to the vote patterns within the House of Representatives. Specifically, in the 76th Congress, when the issue was the arms embargo repeal, political party seemed to be the crucial factor in vote decisions. Six years later, after W orld W ar II, party discipline cracked and regional, urban-rural, and ethnic factors took on importance, and in the 1950’s, after a more marked decline in party cohesion, coastal, high ethnic, high education, urban, and high socioeconomic districts tended to send to W ashington men more likely to support foreign aid and trade legislation while southern, low ethnic, low education, rural, and low socioeconomic constituencies supplied the greatest share of the opposition to these programs. And the available controls suggest

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that each of these factors exerted an influence independent of the others. W hether or not this pattern was peculiar to the Eisenhower presidency and the international and domestic events of the 1950’s or whether it will persist during the present decade remains for further research to determine. These shifts occurred simultaneously with changes in the political context within which the legislative process operates. The control of the presidency passed from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1952, and with the change came alterations in the kinds of pressures brought to bear on individual representatives. For instance, southern Democrats, representing a rapidly industrializing area and w ithout an obligation to support an incumbent president, began to oppose the aid and trade programs in larger numbers while Republicans began to rally around their internationalist president. Thus, a new set of political circumstances produced a situation in which forces other than party came to contribute to the pattern of congressional voting. Isolationist behavior in the House is the result of the interaction of situational factors, reflecting the changing nature of the times; party and other political factors, defining the legislative context; and different types of demographic variables, specifying the attributes of the individual congressmen.

A PARADIGM OF CONGRESSIONAL V O TIN G DECISIONS W e have described the behavior (the votes) of the individual members of the House of Representatives and we have speculated about some of the factors (events, the political situation domesti­ cally, the effects of the legislator’s prior experience, and the charac­ teristics of the constituency he represents) which may influence him to adopt the stand he announces when the roll is called. Here the elements discussed in the previous chapters will be combined with some variables which other studies have specified as relevant to vote choice in a paradigm of the process by which the representa­ tive decides how to vote on measures before Congress.

FIGURE 1-1 A PARADIGM OF CONGRESSIONAL V O TIN G DECISIONS

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Figure 7-1 presents the paradigm, but a caution is in order before discussing it. The arrows in the figure do not necessarily represent the same magnitude; some may be more important than others, some may be irrelevant in particular instances. Even if values could be assigned to any of these linkages, there is no certainty that the pattern would remain meaningful as time passed. In fact, our data suggest that as circumstances altered, the forces impinging on con­ gressional vote choice would also change in intensity. N or do we assert that we can predict in advance the outcome of any legislative contest or explain the vote of any single lawmaker. All that we are suggesting is that the factors enumerated in Figure 7-1 should be able to account for much of the variation in voting alignments and that each of the arrows linking two factors point to a relationship which can be investigated with a manageable research design.8 In the paradigm we have grafted the factors emphasized in this study on to those which Miller and Stokes examined in their study of constituency influence in Congress.4 Four classes of factors— events, constituency opinion, the demographic attributes or charac­ teristics of the constituency, and the legislative system—may im­ pinge on the preferences and/or perceptions of the congressman and have an impact on his ultimate vote choice. The vote of any single representative, then, may be influenced by one or a combination of these factors. The most straightforward source of vote choice, of course, is for the representative to follow the dictates of his own conscience, that is, after weighing the alter­ natives, he will support the proposal which he himself prefers. This is representation in the Burkean style; the legislator should vote for what is good for his constituents but not in response to their current demands. A second relatively clear-cut influence on the voting decision is the representative's perceptions of his constituency. One of the cen­ tral elements of the American democratic ethos is that the elected * Some of these research projects would, of course, require the interviewing of congressmen. For a discussion of this problem, citation of the literature, and suggestions concerning possible foci around which survey research m ight be organized, see Leroy N . Rieselbach, congressional isolationist behavior, 19391958 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1963), chap. 8. 4 Miller and Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” pp. 45-56.

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official is to m irror the desires of those who put him in office. Thus, the lawmaker should act as a mandated delegate, seeking to enact that which the “folks back home” wish to see become law, regard­ less of his own views on the matter. The role of mandated delegate is not always easy to play, for what the legislator perceives may not be in accord with reality. The papers he reads, the constituents with whom he talks, and the mail he gets may not, indeed probably do not, accurately reflect the sentiments of those who reside in his constituency.5 In short, the individual representative may be acting on the basis of misperceptions of constituency opinion.6 In reality, it seems that the congressman is less likely to assume the role of Burkean representative or mandated delegate than to take on what Eulau et al., have labeled the role of “politico.” T hat is, he will take into account both his own attitudes and his views of dis­ trict sentiment; on some occasions his vote will reflect one or the other of these two forces; on others he will attempt to strike a balance between the forces. In general, the politico will be “more sensitive to conflicting alternatives. . . , more flexible in the way he resolves the conflict of alternatives, and less dogmatic in his repre­ sentational style” than the Burkean legislator or the mandated dele­ gate.7 He may shift his own attitudes to bring them into line with the perceived state of constituency feeling or he may alter his view of constituent opinion to conform to his personal preference in an effort to minimize the conflict which he may experience in trying to satisfy himself and those whom he represents. 5 For a discussion of the communications received by congressmen con­ cerning reciprocal trade legislation, see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, American business and public policy , pp. 433-443. For some general considerations on the relationship of representative and constituency, see Lewis Anthony Dexter, “The Representative and His District,” in Theodore J. Lowi, ed., legislative politics U.S.A. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 159-168. • See M iller and Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” for correla­ tion coefficients relating the preferences and perceptions of congressmen to actual constituency opinion on social welfare, foreign involvement, and civil rights legislation. 7 Heinz Eulau, John C. W ahlke, W illiam Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, “The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of E d m u n d Burke,” American political science review , LIII (1959), 742-756, at p. 750.

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Preferences and perceptions of the representative are, in turn, influenced by external stimuli. First of all, the lawmaker is himself a part of the legislative system; he belongs to a political party; he is a member of one or more committees; he is linked to other legislators by a network of formal and informal communications; and he is engaged in a set of social relationships, containing formal and in­ formal elements and involving status differentiations, with his legis­ lative colleagues. The data of the present study indicate that the legislative system impinges on individual behavior. Throughout the period under consideration here, members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs were more internationalist than nonmembers. In the earlier years there was a clear difference in party response to proposals to involve the United States more deeply in world affairs. In addition, the informal norms of the chamber may generate more subtle pressures of a social or a psychological nature. The man who does not conform to the “folkways” may find his legislative task made more difficult.8 A legislator who desires acceptance by the “inner club” may be required to behave in certain ways to acquire membership in the elite group.9 Also, the way the issue is presented, as for example under a closed (or “gag”) rule from the Rules Com­ mittee, may mean that the congressman cannot express his own views accurately. In such circumstances, he may vote against a bill the principle behind which he supports.10 Finally, the rules of pro­ cedure may be manipulated to affect the way an issue is framed and 8 See Matthews, u.s. senators and their world, pp. 92-117. • W illiam S. W hite discusses the nature of the Senate’s “inner club,” citadel (New York: H arper, 1956), pp. 81-94. W hile the role of “outsider” is functional from the point of view of the legislative system, the representa­ tive who chooses it is likely to be required to sacrifice influence in order to gain freedom of action or the opportunity to voice unpopular views. T o maximize legislative effectiveness, a lawmaker may be required to conform. See Ralph K. H uitt, “The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role,” AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, LV (1961), 566-575. 10It seems likely that there has existed a m ajority in the House favorable to the principle of federal aid to education. But such issues as the inclusion of parochial schools as recipients of aid have made it impossible to get a voting m ajority on specific aid to education bills. See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., “The House of Representatives and Federal Aid to Education” in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W . Polsby, eds., n ew perspectives on the house of representatives (Chicago: Rand M cNally, 1963), pp. 195-235.

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the pressures brought to bear on the legislators.11 In short, the preferences of the representative may reflect his position in the legislative system. It is also worthwhile to note that the legislative process is itself deeply embedded in the larger political system, and the representa­ tive’s behavior, including his vote, may be influenced by what the other branches of government, the executive and the judicial, do or by what the representative expects them to do. From the legisla­ tive point of view, it may not be worthwhile to incur the displeas­ ure of others, from whom favors may be needed at another time, by voting for legislation which will not be enforced by the adminis­ trative branch, which may be held unconstitutional, or which will be ignored by the president. The representative may also be the recipient of pressures generated by political considerations outside the legislative arena. The need to make a record, or at least to pass some particular piece of legislation, may stir the executive to action, either in the form of direct contact with individual lawmakers or indirectly through the party leadership in Congress.1 12 1 *The prefer­ ences and sanctions of the larger political system, in short, may generate pressures which, directly or indirectly through the legisla­ tive system, affect the preferences and perceptions of the member of the House. A congressman’s preferences may also be influenced by events occurring outside the legislature. Certain policy requisites may be seen as flowing from the failure of present policy, a revolution overseas, or a military confrontation between two nations.18 Do­ 11 In the one instance when the House and Senate passed aid to education bills, the House Rules Committee refused to clear the bill for conference. Fenno, “The House of Representatives and Federal Aid to Education,” p. 228. For another example, see Howard E. Shuman, “Senate Rules and the Civil Rights Bill: A Case Study,” American political science review , LI (1957), 955-975. 18 McAdams makes clear that the congressional leadership felt that there had to be labor reform legislation in 1959; it was a “political necessity” ( power AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION, p . 8 ).

18 Events may be classed as being of tw o types: spectacular, single occur­ rences and cumulative happenings. The fiasco at the Bay of Pigs is an example of the form er, while the erosion of the N A TO alliance may fall into the latter category. Each kind, however, may affect the congressman’s preferences.

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mestic events may have similar consequences. The data of this study show that following the 1952 presidential election the degree of Republican support for the aid and trade programs greatly enlarged; some of this increment may well have stemmed from an alteration of attitudes in keeping with the elevation of General Eisenhower to the presidency. Similarly, the steady decline in southern Democratic support for internationalism reflects, in part at least, the cumulative impact of the economic changes occurring in the South. Further­ more, events may have an indirect influence on individual vote choice by way of the legislative system. An event may convince the leadership of one or both parties that some response is necessary and the leaders, in turn, may make demands upon the rank-and-file representatives.14 In addition to the legislative system and events, constituency opin­ ion may be related to the preferences and perceptions, and thus the vote, of the individual legislator. His mail and his face-to-face con­ tacts with his constituents, both at home and in W ashington, may persuade the congressman that a particular course of action is the most desirable one. W e can meaningfully distinguish between mass and elite opinions in this connection. One congressman may take his cues from the general population, or at least that segment of it with which he communicates; another may be influenced by the “opinionmakers” of his constituency.16 The views and arguments presented81* For an elaboration of these points and a detailed discussion of the impact of events on images and attitudes, see Karl W . Deutsch and Richard L. M erritt, MThe Effects of National and International Events Upon Image Formation and Change" (New Haven: Yale Political Data Program Preprint N o. 7, 1964). w The McClellan (“Labor Rackets”) Committee’s revelations of alleged labor union corruption and misuse of funds are pertinent here. In addition to affecting the preferences of some legislators, these disclosures, though for different reasons, persuaded the leaders of both parties that reform legislation was essential (McAdams, power and politics in labor legislation pp. 11-13, 36-40, 268-269). 18 Rosenau defines “opinion-makers” as those “who occupy positions which enable them to transmit, with some regularity, opinions about . . . issues to unknown persons” (James N . Rosenau, national leadership and foreign policy : a case in mobilization of public support [Princeton: Princeton Uni­ versity Press, 1963], p. 6).

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by the opinion-leading elite may be quite different from those ad­ vanced by the average citizen, and thus these tw o sources of infor­ mation may be incompatible, perhaps compelling the lawmaker to choose one or the other of the recommended courses of action.16 There may be different geographical conceptions of constituency. For some, perhaps most, legislators constituency will be the specific areas which they represent, their state or congressional district; others, however, may look to a larger entity, the region or the nation. These latter will refer to national rather than local mass public opinion and will read W alter Lippmann or A rthur Krock instead of the local editor or columnist. Again, the local and national perspectives may conflict and require a choice by the representative.17 Again, events may affect legislative preferences indirectly by way of constituency opinion or the legislative system. A national or international occurrence may go virtually unnoticed until the con­ gressman is alerted to it, and its consequences, by constituency opinion—mass, elite, or both—or by pressures originating in Con­ gress. In all these ways, constituency opinion may exert an influence on a representative’s attitude and thus his vote. As a last potential influence on vote decisions, we should mention the gross (demographic) characteristics of the constituency. The representative’s attitudes may be influenced by the kind of people who reside in his district; for example, the presence there of many members of a particular ethnic group may lead the lawmaker to assume that their interests require the support of a policy, such as large amounts of aid for, or high levels of trade with, the native land of this group. O r the congressman, particularly the one from a relatively homogeneous constituency, may share the basic attributes of those whom he represents. If so, his preferences may reflect the characteristics of the district, and may do so without any knowl16 Identification of these subtypes of constituency opinion may perm it us to assert a relevance for constituency opinion despite the finding of Miller and Stokes that “on the question of foreign involvement there is no discernible agreement between legislator and district whatever” (p. 49). They dealt w ith mass opinions; it may be that some congressmen chose to listen instead to the views of the elite. 17 Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, American business and policy , pp. 444-450.

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edge of, or concern for, the actual distribution of constituency opinion.18 District characteristics may also affect congressional preferences indirectly, exerting influence through constituency opinion. The existence in the district of a given ethnic group may, in fact, generate a widespread community viewpoint on some policy matter, which when communicated to Washington, may influence the attitudes of the representative on that issue. In any case, some such mechanism as these may explain the finding that during the Eisenhower administration congressmen of both parties represent­ ing districts w ith a specified set of demographic attributes w ere more internationalist than those from constituencies lacking these characteristics. The legislative system, events, constituency opinion, and constitu­ ency characteristics may also have similar effects on the perceptions of the individual representative. All these may provide him w ith an indication of the possible response of his constituents to action he contemplates taking. For example, the functioning of the legislative system may shed light on the state of public opinion. The testim ony he hears presented to his committee may affect the congressman's view of mass opinion. If he reads articles or speeches inserted in the Congressional Record, his conception of elite opinion may alter. O r he may accept, as reflecting the feelings of his own constituents, the interpretation of the state of public sentiment presented by the legislative leadership. W hile admittedly there is no data on these points, it is at least plausible to argue that the representative's per­ ception of constituency opinion may be shaped in part by such cues coming from the legislative system. Likewise, events may have an impact on the perceptions of the lawmakers, who may estimate the reaction of their constituents to a particular happening, and the probable consequences, electoral and otherwise, for themselves which may flow from this response. A foreign aid “scandal” may lead the congressman to believe that op­ position to the program will be aroused in his district.19 In fact, a 18 Here is another way in which constituency may be im portant despite the absence of any correlation between the actual state of constituency opinion and the roll-call behavior of the representative. 19 For a discussion of such a “scandal” in V iet Nam, see John D. Mont­ gomery, the politics of foreign aid (N ew York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 224-23$.

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reaction of this sort may take place and be communicated to the legislator. Thus, the expectation or the fact of constituency disap­ proval of international developments can have an effect on the rep­ resentative’s perceptions of his district. Also, election results may permit the congressman to gauge the views of those he represents.90 The linkage between constituency opinion and perceptions is ob­ vious. Those representatives who adopt the role of mandated dele­ gate or politico will take local sentiment into account, and consider the possible electoral consequences of their actions. Some of them may even vote contrary to their own preferences if their percep­ tions of district opinion suggest that difficulties will follow from a vote in keeping with their own attitudes. These perceptions may or may not be correct; the point is that congressional behavior may be determined in part by the lawmaker’s expectation of constituent response to his actions.21 In much the same fashion, constituency characteristics may influ­ ence the perceptions and the vote of a legislator. For example, be­ cause those engaged in farming reside in large numbers in his dis­ trict, the representative may believe that the farm population will react in a particular way to some step he considers taking. He may behave in a way designed to avert any adverse reaction on the part of the farm group, and he may do so even in the absence of any evidence that it is concerned about the issue involved. Here, too, legislative action may be affected by expectation, or the reality, that the opinions of those who live there reflect a district’s demographic characteristics. As a final point, we should note that some of the arrows in the paradigm point in both directions, suggesting that “feedback” proc20 T he view, frequently voiced following the 1960 presidential election, that the slim Democratic margin of victory indicated a desire on the part of most Americans to see the Kennedy administration move slowly may have de­ creased the willingness of some congressmen to push ahead vigorously w ith a variety of new programs. 21 It is here that the interest group, which we have ignored in this book, becomes relevant, for it is in its ability to punish at the polls in the local district that the pressure group may possess a sanction to employ against the lawmaker who refuses to heed the group’s argument. T o the extent that the group can mobilize public support, which can be translated into votes on election day, it can assert its claim against the legislator more effectively.

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esses are involved. Once a legislator has gone on record in favor of reciprocal trade, for example, his pro-trade preferences may harden, for to vote “nay” at a later time would be to display his inconsist­ ency. Once his preferences become set, his perceptions of constitu­ ency opinion may shift to lend support to his attitudes. And wheq his votes and preferences become known to his constituents, those who respect his judgment or expertise may alter their opinions. O r those who disagree with his position may cease to communicate with him, thus introducing an additional bias into his perceptions of constituency opinion. In short, his actions help to shape the repre­ sentative’s preferences and perceptions. “Congressmen, indeed, do respond to pressures, but they generate the pressures they feel” 22 It is apparent from looking at the paradigm that the vote deci­ sions of individual congressmen grow out of their own preferences and their perceptions of constituency opinion, or a combination of these two factors.28 These preferences and perceptions, in turn, are shaped by the lawmaker’s position in the legislative system, by events, by the opinions and demographic characteristics of his con­ stituency, or by some combination of these elements. W e must repeat that we do not assert that we know which of the many paths leading to vote choice displayed in the paradigm any single congressman follows in making his decision; we do argue that the relative importance of the arrows in Figure 7-1 can be determined. It may be that no two representatives will decide in the same way. On the other hand, it seems likely that those who hold similar values and represent like districts may make their vote decisions in similar ways. T o the extent that the president can identify those groups of legislators who do respond in a similar fashion, he may have a start­ ing place for his efforts to enlist support for his foreign policy programs. It is to this question of presidential leadership that we now turn. 22 Bauer, Pool, Dexter, American business and public policy , p . 420. 22 It must be admitted that it is often difficult to distinguish between pref­ erences and perceptions. The essence of the distinction lies in the extent to which the legislator acts on the basis of his own values. If he works fo r w hat he believes to be “good” or “desirable,” we may say he is following his preferences. If he takes a course dictated by his view of w hat constituent response will be, then perceptions are im portant. As noted earlier, a repre­ sentative may adjust his behavior to take account of his preferences and per­ ceptions.

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STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP Many difficulties inevitably confront the president as he tries to exert the policy leadership expected of him. Using the paradigm discussed in the previous pages as a point of departure, we will examine some of these difficulties as well as some of the tactical weapons available to him in any effort to mobilize legislative support for his programs. Before turning to analysis of these problems, how­ ever, we must enter a few caveats. In the first place, to exert leadership is not to compel congressmen to vote the president’s way against their wishes. The president does not try to bludgeon representatives into submission; rather the effort is to develop a consensus, among those people outside of the government as well as those within, on the basic goals of American policy and on the appropriate means of attaining those goals.24 Con­ gress, of course, will be a vital part of such national consensuses, and our focus here is on the requirement that the president must elicit backing from Congress on policies such as foreign aid and reciprocal trade.25 This is not to say that in some instances the president does not apply pressure to individual congressmen but rather to suggest that he cannot command the entire legislature to follow his lead. His success, then, depends on his ability to put together-a majority in support of a program and, in turn, on his skill in convincing legisla­ tors to vote for the policy. Second, it would also be a mistake to visualize the consensus­ building process as an effort by the whole executive branch to enlist48 84 On this point, see Roger Hilsman, “Congressional-Executive Relations and political science review , LII (1958), 725-744; Rosenau, national leadership and foreign policy , pp. 16-42, 331-360. M Aid and trade seem to stand in sharp contrast to policies which have direct m ilitary implications. Congress has shown almost complete deference to presidential requests for hardware for the armed forces—on occasion, the legislature has tried to give the executive more than it requested. The president, then, need not engage in consensus building activities with respect to m ilitary matters. d ie Foreign Policy Consensus,” Am erican

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the support of the entire legislature, for seldom does the president request congressional backing with the united support of his entire administration. Policy struggles tend to be fought between oppos­ ing coalitions, each containing elements from the executive, the leg­ islature, and the “attentive” segments of the public. For example, the 1957 foreign aid program was adversely affected by the split within the Eisenhower administration between the “moderate” and “economy” blocs. The attack on the president’s budget by Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, on the ground that the high tax bur­ den of the country would cause “a depression that will curl your hair,” may have encouraged the opponents of foreign aid to try to cut the authorization and certainly a letter, issued by Budget Direc­ tor Percival F. Brundage while the House was considering the aid authorization bill, instructing all agencies to restrict expenditures for fiscal 1958 to 1957 levels provided an excuse to cut back the aid program. The task of the president, therefore, is to shape his policy proposals in a way to win sufficient support to carry the day. If he can do so, then we may say that a consensus has been created on a particular policy matter.29 In seeking to encompass a sufficient number of lawmakers in a developing consensus, the president may have to intervene in the legislative process.2 27 6 There are, however, clear limitations on his ability to influence congressional decisions. N ot all of the available techniques can be employed by the presi­ dent in the same instance—some of them may be mutually exclusive. For example, it is unlikely that any policy issue can simultaneously be made a partisan and a nonpartisan question. The president must 26 See Richard £ . N eustadt, presidential power (New York: W iley, 1960), pp. 64-70; H . Field Haviland, Jr., “Foreign Aid and the Policy Process: 1957,” AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, LII (1958), 689-724. 27 N ote that we are not concerned here with bow the president makes his decisions or what the content of the policy request is, though it is clear that the desire to head off congressional opposition may affect both the means of decision-making and the content of the decisions. On these issues, see Neu­ stadt, presidential pow er ; Theodore C. Sorenson, decision- making in the w hite house (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1963). W hat w ill con­ cern us is the facet of implementation of decisions which requires the presi­ dent to seek to influence legislative behavior.

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calculate in which of these two guises his desired policy is most likely to pass. Then, the president cannot intervene too frequently, for his credit w ith members of Congress is not inexhaustible. Con­ gressional sensitivity to accusations of domination by the executive branch is likely to inhibit legislative response to unlimited presiden­ tial appeals. The chief executive, therefore, will have to assign prior­ ities to the bills which comprise his program. He must decide what bills are w orth intervention in congressional affairs and which are not; he may wish to preserve enough credit to permit him to deal effectively w ith any emergency which might arise. Just how much “credit” a president actually has is difficult to assess. Critics of the late President Kennedy accused him of being too reluctant to use his influence to advance his legislative program, while some have argued that Lyndon Johnson has overextended himself. Thus, the particular issue involved and the importance which the president attaches to it will influence the extent to which he throws his weight into a struggle with Congress. The paradigm of the congressional voting process suggests some additional limitations on presidential leadership possibilities. Some of the classes of factors noted there must be taken as “givens,” beyond the power of the president to alter. For instance, the shape of the legislative system is set and the president must deal with Congress as he finds it. The rules of procedure and the structural elements are established and the previous election has determined the identities of the particular representatives who will fill the roles created by these rules and structures. The effectiveness of the available leadership techniques may depend, then, on the personalities of the individuals involved. One president may be a more effective leader than an­ other; one legislator may be more easily influenced than another.38 Moreover, events—both foreign and domestic—are often outside 28 On the basis of his first year in office, it seems that Lyndon Johnson’s quiet, undogmatic, non-ideological approach to Congress has been more ef­ fective than the more exhortatory method of his predecessor. A fter taking a beating in 1963, Johnson turned the tables on Congressman O tto Passman of the House Appropriations Committee a year later. For the details, which illustrate the use of a number of the techniques discussed in this section, see Elizabeth Brenner Drew, “Mr. Passman Meets His Match,” the iepokteb, V oL XXXI, N o. 9 (November 19, 1964), pp. 40-43.

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of presidential control. The collapse of a regime which was the recipient of vast sums in American aid, the loss of a U.S. reconnais­ sance plane over foreign soil, or strains within one of the alliances will tax the leadership skills of the president. He may attem pt to interpret such occurrences to suit his purposes, but he will have to take account of the fact that these events did take place. Finally, the characteristics of the constituencies which the lawmakers represent are also fixed; at any point in time, a given proportion of the con­ gressmen will come from urban, rural, high status, high ethnic, high education districts, etc. This means, since the data of this study suggest that constituency attributes are relevant to vote choice, the president must confront a legislature where his potential allies, in demographic terms, may be limited. Thus, the president will have to contend with forces which the legislative system, events, and the demographic distribution of congressional districts generate and which lie outside his power to shape to any great degree. On the other hand, constituency opinion and the perceptions and preferences of individual representatives, while they have distinct distributions, are more amenable to presidential intervention and influence. In trying to shape these elements, the president has cer­ tain basic advantages. The initiative is his; he possesses vast staff and information resources; he can, as the central figure in American politics, pre-empt the stage whenever he chooses; his status automat­ ically commands respect for his proposals. These things belong to any president and can be used in an effort to win congressional support. In addition, the state of his “professional reputation” and “public prestige” will enhance the persuasive powers of the presi­ dent.*9 By reputation is meant the feeling on the part of those whom the president seeks to influence that he has the ability and die determination to employ the advantages he possesses. Prestige im­ plies that the president will be able to rally public sentiment behind his cause. The greater the president’s reputation and prestige, the more difficult it will be for the individual representative to resist requests from the W hite House, for to engage in open combat with a determined and popular president is to court disaster. In simple terms, the leadership task of the president is, using all his advantages, 29 This discussion relies heavily on N eustadt, p *esidential pp. 33-107.

fowek ,

especially

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to “persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do” (or w hat he thinks they ought to do) w ithout per­ suasion.*0 The most direct method of persuasion is to try to alter the prefer­ ences and die perceptions of constituency opinion held by the indi­ vidual lawmaker—in Dahl's phrase, to change his “view of reality.” 01 T he president can argue in terms of substantive considerations o r potential political repercussions, trying to influence the leg­ islator's views of (preferences concerning) policy moves required to deal w ith any situation or to change the evaluation (perception) of possible constituency response to the actions considered by the representative. T o the extent that these efforts succeed, the presi­ dent may rally voting support in Congress. He can direct his argu­ ments, first of all, to the entire legislature. He can use speeches, special messages to Congress, press conference utterances, letters to die legislative leadership which are released for publication, and the reports of presidential “task forces” to interpret events and argue for a desired policy.08 The effort here is to provide a persuasive argument, or at least an acceptable rationale, for backing his requests. The president may also direct his attention to specific subgroups of congressmen. He may appeal to his party colleagues in terms of party loyalty or the need to establish party positions to use in a forthcoming electoral campaign. He may focus attention on the most important committee by means of letters to the members or through the testimony of high-ranking executive personnel at the committee’s hearings. Secretary of State Dulles, the outgoing and incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of die International Cooperation Administration all appeared before die Senate Appropriations Committee to plead for the appropriation of die full amount authorized for the 1957 foreign aid bill. In addi­ tion, committee or subcommittee members may be briefed by the relevant executive agency; in fact, such briefings have been institu-180 80 H arry S Trum an, quoted in N eustadt, pp. 9-10. 81 Dahl, GONGBESS AMD FOREIGN POLICY, p . 22. 88 President Eisenhower employed many of these techniques in his efforts to rescue the 1957 foreign aid bill. See Haviland, “Foreign Aid and the Policy Process.”

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tionalized by the establishment of permanent “consultative’* sub­ committees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.88 T he data of the present study suggest that the attention paid to the Foreign Affairs Committee has led to high levels of internationalist voting on the part of the committee members. Furthermore, the managers of a bill may be willing to make legislative concessions in order to win backing from those favored by accepted amendments.84 Such tac­ tics may serve both to win votes and to divide the opposition. Special mention must be made of efforts to enlist the support of the opposition party, tactics commonly referred to as bipartisanship. There has been little agreement as to the precise meaning of the term ; here we shall use it to mean the attem pt by the president, through consultation w ith the leaders of the party out of power, to win enough opposition votes to enact the desired policies. Biparti­ sanship may also entail some form of commitment to keep the issue out of subsequent election campaigns or to refrain from trying in other ways to gain partisan advantage from the agreement, but the essence of bipartisanship is the effort to win votes through consulta­ tion.88 Bipartisanship can operate only when there is time for con­ sultation, when the opposition has acknowledged foreign policy leaders, and when these leaders are willing to work with the admin­ istration.86 Collaboration of this sort is likely to require the presi88 See Carroll, the house of representatives and foreign affairs, pp. 336-338. *4 For example, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate headed off potential opposition to the Japanese Peace T reaty by accepting in advance a "reservation” declaring that the treaty should in no way be read to give Senate approval to the Yalta agreement. The reservation did not affect the substance of the treaty and served to disarm a potentially explosive issue. See Bernard C. Cohen, the political process and foreign policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 23-24, 166-168. as On bipartisanship, see W esterfield, foreign policy and party politics; Cecil V. Crabb, bipartisan foreign policy : m yth or reality? (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1957). a* T he classic example of successful bipartisanship is the cooperation which developed in the late 1940’s between the Trum an administration and the Re­ publican minority led by Senator A rthur H . Vandenberg. See W esterfield, FOREIGN POLICY AND PARTY POLITICS; Crabb, BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY; and Malcolm E. Jewell, senatorial politics and foreign policy (Lexington: Uni­ versity of Kentucky Press, 1962). For Vandenberg’s own view of bipartisan-

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dent to permit the opposition to get its “trademark” on die bill through participation in its drafting or by insisting on specific amendments, thus permitting them to display their impact on the shape of policy. Thus, the Trum an Administration let Senator Vandenberg, in guiding the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948 through the Senate, tie American participation in “collective security arrange­ ments—the major purpose of the resolution—to the popular con­ cept of strengthening die United Nations.” 87 W hile there have been many problems involved, bipartisanship has proven to be an effec­ tive device for building consensus and recruiting legislative allies for the president’s foreign policy program. A third method of altering the preferences and perceptions of congressmen is to deal directly with them as individuals. The presi­ dent can do this himself; he can call congressmen to the W hite House for private conferences or he can personally phone them to ask for support; or he can make favorable references to a particular representative in his public statements in order to win the “good will” and hopefully the vote of the lawmaker. The press widely noted the efforts of President Kennedy using these methods to “woo” W ilbur Mills of Arkansas, Chairman of the powerful House W ays and Means Committee, to back the 1962 reciprocal trade bill. Conversations with individual legislators can be used to persuade them, in terms of the national or local interest, of the wisdom of the president’s policy, or to suggest to them that their political futures necessitate backing the president. O r such meetings may serve as negotiating sessions where an “arrangement” between the chief ex­ ecutive and the lawmaker is consummated. In such situations, the bases of the president’s bargaining power include his veto power, his control over federal patronage, his ability to provide election help, and his influence on pending legislation, each of which can be used, as the president chooses, to assist the representative.88 ship, see A rthur H . Vandenberg, Jr., the private papers of senator vandenrerg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952). For a more recent example involving the House of Representatives, see Haviland, “Foreign Aid and the Policy Process.” 97 See Jewell, senatorial politics and foreign policy , pp. 119-123. 88 It is not clear to what extent these bases of power are used since the bargain may not be explicit and certainly will not be widely publicized. For

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The president may also contact the congressman indirectly; on foreign policy matters this is usually done through the W hite House staff or the Department of State. It is customary for the presidential staff to include people w ith congressional experience, often prior service on a committee staff or as the legislative assistant to a senator or representative.8* State Department contact with Congress be­ came formalized in 1949 with the creation of an Office of Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations designed to promote commu­ nication between the Department and the legislature. T he Office, through its Legislative Management Officers, makes contact with the congressional leaders, rank-and-file lawmakers, and the staffs of individuals and committees. These liaison men seek to represent the position of the Department to the legislators and to inform the policy-makers of congressional opinion.* 40 Finally, the president may seek to exploit the influence of other members of the executive branch by assigning them to “lobby” for a particular policy.41 Through the use of these methods, the president may seek to shape the preferences and perceptions of the congressmen by ap­ peals aimed at the legislature as a whole, at specific subgroups within the chambers, and at the individual members themselves. But he cannot use all of these approaches simultaneously; he must pick and choose from among them those techniques which will enable him to example, it was rumored that a prim ary election defeat led Senator J. H ow ard Edmondson (D., Olda.) to change his mind and support the president, by voting to end the filibuster against the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, in the expectation of receiving a federal appointment when he left office. 89 Central figures in the W hite House liaison with Capitol H ill on the 1957 foreign aid bill were I. Jack M artin, a form er legislative assistant to Senator R obert A. T aft, and Bryce Harlow, form er Chief of Staff of the House Armed Services Committee (Haviland, “Foreign Aid and the Policy Process,” p. 711). 40 For a full discussion of the Office, its techniques and effectiveness, see Robinson, congress and foreign policy - m a k in g , pp. 141-167. The evidence suggests that those, in the Senate at least, who are satisfied with the State Department’s information services are more likely to approve its policies. 41 President Trum an formalized this procedure by establishing a Cabinet Committee, headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, Fred Vinson, to exert pressure on Congress to pass the Employment A ct of 1946 (Stephen K. Bailey, congress m akes a la w [New York: Columbia University Press, 1950], pp. 162, 169, 237).

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assemble a legislative majority in the short run and to build consen­ sus on goals and means over the long haul. The tactics selected must be used carefully; they should be effective w ithout smacking of the heavy-handed pressure which is likely to arouse congressional hostility and to cost the president support.42 The president can also employ many of these same techniques to operate through the legislative system. He or others from the execu­ tive branch can seek to influence party leaders and committee chair­ men, and in turn, through them win support from the rank-and-file congressmen. The party leadership—the Speaker of the House and the floor leaders and whips in both House and Senate—possesses a variety of weapons which it can use for the benefit, or to the detri­ ment, of members of Congress. The leaders control the scheduling of legislation for consideration; they are in a strategic position to affect the course of that consideration; they play a role in the trans­ fer of old, and the assignment of new, members to committees—in short, they have rewards and sanctions with which they can attempt to win votes for the policy positions they favor.48 If the president can win the wholehearted support of the party leaders, he may also be able to secure backing from others who can be persuaded by the leaders. Similarly, the committee chairman has perquisites—control over subcommittee structure, the agenda and time of full committee meetings, and the hearings held by the committee—which he can employ to facilitate or hinder passage of any bill.44 The chairman 42 Haviland reports that President Eisenhower’s “threat” that a special session might be necessary if Congress did not appropriate the full amount of of the 1957 foreign aid authorization antagonized the Democrats in Congress (“Foreign Aid and the Policy Process,” p. 709). 48 For a description of how Lyndon B. Johnson, as Democratic Leader of the Senate, combined these institutional rewards and sanctions w ith persuasive powers to provide effective leadership, see Ralph K. H uitt, “Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," American political science review , LV (1961), 333-344. Nicholas A. Masters concludes: “Party Leaders . . . use assignments to major committees to bargain with the leaders of party groups or factions, in order to preserve and fortify their leadership positions and conciliate po­ tential rivals, as well as to reward members who have cooperated” ( “Com ­ mittee Assignments in the House of Representatives,” American political science review , LV [1961], 345-357, at p. 357). 44 George Goodwin, Jr., “Subcommittees: The M iniature Legislatures of Congress,” American political science review , LVI (1962), 596-604; Galloway, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, p . 289.

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can, if he chooses, use these bases of influence to bargain w ith the members of his committee for support for legislation he favors. Thus, if the president can enlist the chairman in his cause, he may also win backing from the committee members. The legislative sys­ tem, then, provides the president with potential methods of influ­ encing Congress. T o the extent that he can win the support of those who control the levers of power within Congress, he may also be able to win the votes of those subject to the operation of that power. W e have suggested that the president can seek to shape the pref­ erences and perceptions of representatives directly or indirectly through the legislative system. In addition, he can try to affect them by mobilizing constituency opinion; he can attem pt to arouse mass opinion, elite opinion, or the former through the latter. Some of the devices mentioned earlier, such as radio and television speeches, re­ marks at press conferences, and public appearances in general—in short, his ability to “make news”—will permit the chief executive to appeal directly to the people to communicate w ith their representa­ tives in support of his position. If such requests arouse a large re­ sponse, the pressure on some legislators may be the decisive influence on their vote decisions. President Eisenhower’s speech to the nation on behalf of the Landrum-Griflm Labor Reform Bill provides an example of the potential effectiveness of an appeal “over the heads of Congress.” McAdams concludes that the president’s speech was “the deciding factor for a number of congressmen. . . . ” 45 The president may also try to shape congressional preferences and perceptions by enlisting the support of elite opinion. If newspapers in a state or district editorialize with near unanimity for a particular policy, the representative who takes his cues from the press rather than public opinion in general may be led to back the president. He may do so because he finds the editors’ arguments persuasive or because he believes these views typical of the electorate, but either interpretation may convince him that a vote for the president’s proposal is his wisest course of action. President Kennedy’s meetings in the W hite House with editors from the individual states seem to have been designed to win newspaper support for the policies of his 46 POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION, p . 198.

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administration. The president may also try to operate in similar fashion through other segments of elite opinion. Finally, the president may try to use elite opinion to arouse the average citizen. The executive branch may try to coordinate the activity of interest groups in order to generate the maximum amount of public pressure on Congress.40*O r a special conference of “opinion-makers” may be convened to accomplish the same pur­ pose. If the national opinion leaders can be won to the administra­ tion's position, they may carry the message to the general popula­ tion which, in turn, may bring pressure to bear on Congress.47 Presidential strategy aims at winning votes for and, in the long run, agreement on policy by the most economic use of the tactical moves noted above. The president may try to enlist the support of a majority in a variety of ways. He may, for example, start w ith the bulk of his own party and try to add to them enough opposition votes to enact the legislation he desires. He may make legislative concessions, attempt to rally public opinion, or if he finds votes difficult to obtain, make use of his techniques of personal persuasion. Or, the chief executive, as is so often the case with respect to civil rights, may cast the issue in nonpartisan terms and attem pt to win backing from both parties by appeals based on the merits, the national interest, or the moral necessity involved. The president will employ the methods which, in each legislative sit­ uation, he believes are most likely to produce victory. W hile the president is confronted by factors—the legislative sys­ tem, events, and the demographic characteristics of constituencies— which lie largely beyond his control, he still has a variety of advan­ tages and leadership techniques which he can use, directly or indi­ rectly, to influence the preferences and the perceptions of constitu­ 40 McAdams describes the role of the W hite House “as the coordinator of effort and clearinghouse of ideas and planning in the attempts (of the manage­ ment groups) to generate public support for labor reform legislation” ( power and politics in labor lecislation , pp. 68-75, 176-178, at p. 74). 47 On the basis of his study of the 1958 Conference on Foreign Aspects of U.S. National Security, convened in W ashington to develop popular support for foreign aid, James N . Rosenau argues that “The mobilization of the nation’s opinion-makers now seems to be a distinct possibility” ( national LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY, p . 334).

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ency opinion held by individual members of Congress. His success in dealing with the legislature is likely to determine, in large part, his ability to have his policies enacted and to build a national consensus on the wisdom of these programs.

CONCLUSION In the early pages of this book we set down two basic assumptions which underlie what we have written. First, it was assumed that the United States would neither be willing nor able to reduce the extent of its participation in world politics. This being so, we assumed, secondly, that the American president would continue to be the chief architect of, and spokesman for, this internationalist policy. Acceptance of these assumptions raised directly the questions which have been our chief concern: l Since it is neither possible nor desirable for the president to make and implement policy without legislative cołlabpration, where in Congress has he been able to find the required support for his internationalist programs? 2 W hat do our findings about the roots of isolationist behavior tell us about the nature of the legislative process? 3 W hat are the implications of these findings for the successful meeting by the president of his obligation to provide foreign policy leadership? The answer to the first of the above questions encompasses the first six chapters. These findings, concerning the complexity of the isolationist phenomenon, have been summarized in the first section of the present chapter. These propositions were combined with those which other studies of Congress have developed in a simple paradigm of the process by which legislative vote decisions are made (section tw o), and in the third section we noted where and with what techniques the president might try to mobilize legislative sup­ port for his internationalism. W hat remains, then, is to discuss the potential for successful and effective presidential guidance of Amer­ ican foreign policy. The presidency, as the office is presently constituted, provides the incumbent with sufficient powers to be an effective foreign policy leader within the letter and the spirit of the American constitutional

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system. The leadership task, however, will not be easy, for the president's policies will no doubt continue to come under fire from those who think they do not go far enough as well as from the isolationists who feel they go too far. Moreover, the character of the opposition will in all likelihood continue to change in response to altered circumstances. N or will the president be able to command support; rather he will have to depend on his ability to persuade Congress and the interested public that his policies are wise ones. He may also have to overcome a good deal of bureaucratic opposition and inertia. Nevertheless, the president can provide adequate leadership. His constitutional position enables him to command attention and re­ spect for his policy proposals. He possesses the resources neces­ sary to educate and influence the public and the government in favor of his policies. The president, however, cannot simply mobi­ lize backing for whatever policies he feels are most desirable; on the contrary, he can go only so far in departing from existing programs as he can convince the concerned segments of the public and Con­ gress is required. Congress can simply refuse to appropriate funds for a foreign aid program of which it does not approve; it can withdraw from the president the power which it has delegated to him to enter into reciprocal trade agreements if the agreements he negotiates displease the congressmen. The voters can turn out of office a president who puts into operation unacceptable policies. T o recognize this, one need only imagine the effect on the ensuing election of a presidential decision to effectuate unilateral disarma­ ment. The president's goal is to use the powers available to him to enlarge the area of his discretion, that is, to secure widespread agreement on the direction in which the nation should move and on the means which are acceptable to facilitate achievement of defined policy goals. The president, then, can help to shape the broad limits which constrain his policy choices. W ithin these limits, he has a good deal of latitude. A large portion of the public will respond only in crisis situations, and on minor matters presidential decisions will receive only scant attention. But even here, he cannot go his-ow n way entirely but must try to win the support of the legislature and of the "attentive’' public. W e have seen that the president has a number of

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levers with which to raise votes in Congress, but he must be pre­ pared to make concessions in order to develop majorities. By and large, the weapons available to the president have been adequate with respect to the aid and trade programs. For example, the presi­ dent has retained the power to grant, at his discretion, foreign aid to communist Poland and Yugoslavia. Also, his power to enter into trade agreements has been enlarged despite the growth of foreign economic competition. In fact, the Kennedy administration success­ fully persuaded Congress to provide retraining opportunities for workers who lose their jobs because of increased imports instead of trying to protect these jobs by erecting higher tariff barriers. T he office of the president does provide the occupant with suffi­ cient resources to shape popular and legislative attitudes and, thus, to build consensuses on policies within the very broad limits im­ posed by congressional and public opinion. However, we do not contend that any president will be a successful leader. A president may fail because he is unable or unwilling to make use of the leader­ ship resources available to him; he may try to introduce policy departures, the wisdom of which he has not made clear to those whose support he requests; or he may push too far, too fast, and thus alienate those whose backing he needs. Possession of adequate powers is no guarantee that the president will use them to create areas of agreement on policy. The elements for successful policy leadership inhere in the presidency; how well they are employed depends, in the last analysis, on the extent to which men are elevated to the presidency who possess both the sound judgment needed to formulate and implement viable policies and the ability and deter­ mination to use the available leadership resources to secure the ac­ ceptance by the people and their representatives of these policies.

Postscript The 88th Congress

Eight years have passed since the end of the 85th Congress, the most recent treated in this book. In these intervening years the Democratic party recaptured the W hite House and retained its majority in the House of Representatives. From the point of view of this study, this, in a sense, brings us full circle; the 76th Congress, with which we began the analysis, was also a period during which the Democrats controlled the presidency and die legislature. These developments raise the quesdon of what, if any, changes in the relationships described in the text have taken place. Do the proposi­ tions advanced continue to hold in a period of Democratic domina­ tion? How, if at all, can we characterize the changes which have occurred over the nearly three decades since 1939? An analysis of the foreign aid voting in the 88th Congress (1963-1964) provides partial answers to these questions.1 The methods employed for this 1 This analysis was made possible by funds granted by the Carnegie Cor­ poration of New York to the American Political Science Association for the study of Congress. T he statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

195

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study are described elsewhere;8 here it should suffice to say that in all major particulars the findings pertaining to the 88th Con­ gress are comparable to the ones reported here for four earlier Congresses. W ith a single exception, to be discussed below, the propositions describing correlates of foreign aid voting presented in Chapters Three, Four, and Five characterize the 88th Congress. Specifically, thisjneans that Catholics of both parties continued to be more inter­ nationalist than Protestants. Similarly, both Republican and Demorcranc members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs supported the foreign aid program to a greater degree than did their colleagues who did not serve on the committee. Finally, the representatives of eastern, urban, high ethnic, high socioeconomic status districts who had emerged during the Eisenhower era as the leading propo­ nents of foreign aid continued as the major backers of the program. In short, the major relationships between social background, politi­ cal and constituency characteristics and the congressional vote which held for the 85th Congress still were applicable in the mid1960’s. The major change which the Democratic electoral victory of 1960 seems to have brought about is the re-emergence of political party affiliation as a distinguishing feature of the isolationist and internationalist groups. The data for the 88th Congress are pre­ sented in Table P-1; comparable data for the earlier Congresses are in Table 2-4 (see above, p. 49). By the 85th Congress (19571958), party had ceased to differentiate between the opponents and proponents of foreign aid. Six years later, however, while there remained a sizeable degree of isolationism in the House (38.5 per cent), the Republican party offered a significantly greater portion of the opposition to the aid program. More than 60 per cent of the Republican legislators were isolationists, while only 11.7 per cent 2 See Leroy N . Rieselbach, “Foreign Policy Ideology in the 88th Congress: Constituency and O ther Correlates,” paper presented at the Annual M eeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, A pril 28-30, 1966, for a listing of the roll calls comprising the foreign aid scale and a description of the demographic measures employed. It should be noted that different in­ dices of some variables were used in order to take advantage of the Census Bureau’s congressional district data book (W ashington: Government Print­ ing Office, 1964).

p o s t s c r ip t : t h e

88t h

c o n g r ess

197

TA B LE ¥-1 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES O N FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY, 88th CONGRESS NUM BER

Isolationist Republican Democratic Moderate Republican Democratic

38.5% 60.9 232 12.0 25.7 2.7

170 Internationalist 45.3% (109) Republican 11.7 Democratic 68.0 ( 61) 53 Not Ascertained 4.3 Republican 1.7 ( 46) Democratic 6.1 ( 7)

NUM BER

200 ( 21) (179) 19 ( 3) ( 16) 442

were internationalists. The corresponding figures in the 85th Con­ gress were 36.8 and 54.9 per cent, respectively. On the Democratic side, there were similar, if less dramatic, de­ velopments. There continued to exist a hard-core opposition to for­ eign aid; 23.2 p ercen t of the Democrats fell in the isolationist cate­ gory as opposed to 29.8 per cent in 1957-1958. The proportion of internationalists, however, climbed to 68.0 per cent in 1963-1964, up from 47.1 per cent in the 85th Congress. Thus, the 1960 presidential election seems to have led to the greatest polarization of the parties since pre-W orld W ar II days. The behavior of the moderate groups is interesting in this connec­ tion. In the 85th Congress there was a large group of Democratic moderates; the bulk of the moderates in the 88th Congress, on the other hand, were Republicans. It is almost as if those Democrats who had drifted away from internationalism to moderation during the Eisenhower administration were drawn back to support the aid program once a member of their party occupied the W hite House. Similarly, Republican representatives who supported foreign aid in the 1950’s appear to have shifted back in the direction of isolationism once their party was no longer in control of the executive branch. In the absence of data on individual preferences, this sort of analysis must, of course, remain sheer speculation. In any case, these findings underscore the importance of situational factors for an understand­ ing of congressional voting.

198

TH E BOOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

A number of reasons may be adduced to account for this revival of a partisan cleavage in die House. The contrast in the political styles of the presidents involved is relevant here. Dwight Eisen­ hower’s preference for a nonpartisan, “above-politics” presidential posture is well known. John F. Kennedy, on the other hand, seem­ ingly intent on mobilizing the basic Democratic majority which exists in the electorate, waged a hard-hitting, highly partisan 1960 campaign, vigorously attacking the Eisenhower record if not the President himself.* Once safely, if barely, over the electoral hurdle, the policies of the Kennedy administration were scarcely the sort to minimize partisan conflict. W here the Eisenhower era had seen a consolidation of New Deal actions, the New Frontier proposed to move boldly forward. A reciprocal trade act which proposed to retrain workers whose jobs were lost because of imports rather than to protect those jobs through tariffs, a nuclear test ban treaty, medi­ care, a powerful civil rights bill—these and a variety of other legis­ lative proposals contrasted starkly with what had come from the president to Capitol Hill during the previous administration, and it is not surprising that this legislative program so ceminiscent of the New Deal provoked partisanship not unlike that which character­ ized that earlier era. A period of increased partisanship has implications for presiden­ tial leadership as well. In such times, the president can rely on appeals to party loyalty to provide the bulk of the support for his foreign policy program. By use of the techniques described earlier (see above, Chapter 7), he will seek to add sufficient votes from the moderates of both parties and the internationalists among the oppo­ sition. He will, in all likelihood, have to deal w ith these latter groups on a pragmatic, individual basis. Examination of the 88th Congress, in light of the findings of the period from 1938-1958, reinforces many of the conclusions reached in this book. A set of personal factors—social background, political, 8 Richard Nixon, the nominee of the minority party, repeatedly stressed the personal qualities of the candidates rather than their party affiliations. On these points, see Theodore H . W hite, the making of the president 1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1961) and the texts of the Kennedy-Nixon television debates, reprinted in Sidney Kraus, ed., the great debates (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962).

p o s t s c r ip t : t h e

88t h

c o n g r ess

199

and constituency—continues to be related to individual congres­ sional vote choices. The situational context—events such as a presi­ dential election and the personalities of those holding major offices —continues to impinge on legislative activity. And in response to such things, the importance of political party in the congressional arena fluctuates. It is w ith these factors in mind that the president will continue to shape the foreign policy of the nation.

APPENDIXES A. Tim foreign aMi Domestic Policy Guttman Sco/ot This appendix presents the rationale and basic methods of G utt­ man scaling techniques and lists the roll-call votes which comprise the scales employed in this study. W hile other techniques are avail­ able, Guttman scale analysis qiited to exam ine the be­ havior of legislators on single subjects such as aid and trade bills.1 The distinguishing characteristic of the Guttman scale is its cum­ ulative property.2 A set of responses to a series of related questions designed to measure a single attitude (or variable) is a scale if one can tell from a given response how a respondent will answer items more or less extreme than the given one. T hat is, a respondent who has given a positive response to the third item on a scale is likely to have given positive responses to the first tw o scale items. Thus, in 1 For a discussion of some of the other available methods and a comparison of diem with Guttm an scaling, see Rieselbach, congressional isolationist behavior. 1939-1958, pp. 39-63. 2 The definitive work on scale analysis is Samuel Stouffer, et al., m easure ­ m e n t AND PREDICTION, Vol. IV of STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD war ii (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), see especially pp. 60-90. For a more concise explanation, see Bert F. Green, “A ttitude Measurement,” in G ardner Lindzey, edn handbook of social psychology (Reading, Mass.: Addison-W esley, 1954), pp. 335-369. The discussion of scale analysis which follows draws heavily from these tw o sources.

201

202

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TABLE A - l SAMPLE SCALOGRAM ITEMS 1 2

Respondents (scale types)

I II III IV

+

+ + —

3

+ +

+

-

-





-

+ indicates a positive response - indicates a negative response Question 1. Question 2. Question 3.

Are you taller than 5'0"? Are you taller than 5'3"? Are you taller than 5'6"?

the sample scalogram (Table A -l), the positive response of re­ spondent I to question 3 precludes negative responses to questions 1 and 2. Similarly knowledge of respondent IV ’s negative response to the first question would tell immediately the response given items 2 and 3. The basic idea of scale analysis is that "the items can be arranged in an order so that an individual who agrees with, or responds ^positively to, any particular item also responds positively to all items of lower rank order. The rank order of items is the scale of items; the scale of persons is very similar, people being arranged in order according to the highest rank order of items checked, which is equivalent to the number of positive responses in a perfect scale." * The scale in Table A -l is a "perfect" scale, that is, there can be no errors. Each set of responses will match one of the four scale types. In practice, perfect scales do not occur, and there are often some “non-scale" responses which do not "fit" the scale pattern. For instance, a commonly used measure is the "social distance" scale. This scale is composed of a series of questions asking the respond­ ent, for example, whether or not he would accept a member of some 8 Green, "A ttitude Measurement,” p. 353.

APPENDIX A

203

minority group as (1) a business associate, (2) a close personal friend, and (3) his son-in-law. The assumption is that, if the ques­ tions have been properly phrased, a respondent who would not have a minority group member as a business associate would not accept him in the other statuses suggested. However, it is conceivable that a respondent might accept the member of the group as his son-in-law, but not as a business associate or friend, perhaps on the ground that the decision was his daughter's and not his. In any case, a positive response to the question (item 3) would be a non-scale response, or error, if coupled with negative responses to the other scale items. This pattern of response (— +) would be ranked w ith scale type IV in Table A -l (— - ) , w ith an error on item 3. Minimization of errors is the criterion used to obtain the rank orders of both items and respondents in a scalogram. T he first criterion for creating a scale is unidhnensionality. Thus, if a group of responses forms a scale, there can be only a maximum number of errors tolerated. This criterion indicates that the items in the scale relate to one another or measure related attitudes on a particular topic. Unidimensionality is measured by a Coefficient of Reproducibility, which is calculated by the formula: Number of errors * ~ Number of Item responses A coefficient of .90 or above indicates an acceptable scale, that is, there must not be more than one response in ten that does not fit the scale pattern. There are other criteria that an acceptable scale must meet. The distribution of responses must not be too one-sided, for, if there is a sm all number of one kind of response, the Coefficient of Reproduc­ ibility will be artificially increased. If there are less than ten per cent negative responses, for example, to a given question, there will be less than ten per cent error, although the question may be measuring different attitudes in the positive and negative respondents. For this reason, the distribution of responses on any item should be greater than an 80-20 split and should include some items which approach a 50-50 division of response. A random pattern of errors is a second requirement for an acceptable scale, for, if a large number of errors occurs on a particular item, it may be that this item is tapping an

204

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

attitude other than the one under study. Finally, a useful scale will include as many items as possible, usually ten or more. This require­ ment seems to be the least important, and many users of scale analy­ sis often ignore it, but the greater the number of items, the greater die assurance that die scale actually does measure die attitude (vari­ able) that it in fact seeks to measure. In summary, then, a set of responses to a series of related ques­ tions forms a scale if one respondent higher in the rank order than another responds favorably on at least one more item than that other. Knowledge of a respondent’s scale type will permit us to predict his responses to the individual items w ith a minimum accu­ racy of ninety per cent. T he Guttman scale also ranks both the individuals and die items with respect to positive responses; thus in Table A -l, respondent (scale type) I and item 1 received the most positive responses. Finally, the selection of the items from a single content area and attention to the criterion of unidimensionality in­ dicate that the scale is measuring a single variable. Scale analysis has advantages for problems of description, inter­ pretation, and prediction. It is an aid in describing behavior* because it lists the responses to all the questions. By assigning to each scale pattern (+ + + ;+ + - ; + — ; ------) a score (4; 3; 2;1), other aids in description are made available. For instance, the respondents with the same score can be said to have the same or similar characteris­ tics. A person with a higher score is “favorable” on all questions that a person with a lower score answers favorably and at least one more. In addition, the whole concept of a single continuum, each item of which is a simple function of the scale scores, permits a clear state­ ment of the meaning of a rank order based on a single variable. Scale analysis aids in the interpretation of data. O ften it is difficult to determine whether or not tw o variables are related, especially as cross-tabulations may obscure the relationship between them. If tw o variables are not associated, the responses to the questions concern­ ing them will not scale; if, on the other hand, they are closely related, the responses will scale, and the researcher will avoid the error of finding more variables than actually exist. Prediction is simplified by using scale methods. Less tabulation is necessary, for the scale scores will have the same relationship as the responses to the individual items that comprise the scale. Statistical correlation

APPENDIX A

20$

procedures are thus greatly simplified as well. However, this topic lies outside the scope of this appendix. Recently, social scientists have been using these procedures to analyze legislative behavior.4 The justification for this use of scale analysis is that a legislative body is a social system involving struc­ tural uniformities of behavior similar to those of a larger system. These patterns of action are traceable and the behavior of the legis­ lators on particular issues (labor, civil rights, etc.) can be measured much as die scales previously discussed measure attitudes and vari­ ables in other areas. Thus, roll calls on a particular issue form a scale if a representative, whose votes on the issue are more “favorable” than those of a second legislator, is as favorable as or more favorable than the second representative on each individual roll-call vote. The same criteria of acceptability discussed above, of course, apply to this use of scale analysis. Scale analysis can serve both to determine the existence of voting blocs and to test the cohesion of preconceived regional or party groups. W e have applied these methods of scale analysis to the Wisconsin congressmen with respect to foreign aid legislation in the 85th Congress. The results appear in Table A-2. The responses to ten roll-call votes on foreign aid legislation meet all the criteria for an acceptable scale. However, in many cases, there are not ten roll calls on a given subject, and often it is necessary to make scales of less than ten items. It would be well, at this point, to suggest some of the limitations inherent in using scale analysis. In the first place, scales are relevant to time and population. A population may be scalable at one point in time but not at another. Changes in attitude on the part of individ­ ual congressmen may make a scale on foreign aid issues impossible at some future time; in addition, the rank order established by the scale may alter over time. Second, a universe of attributes may be scal­ able for one population and not for another, or for a total popula­ tion but not for some particular subgroup. In our example, however, foreign aid items do scale for the rep-* * See MacRae, dimensions of congressional voting; George M. Belknap, “A M ethod for Analyzing Legislative Behavior,” midw est journal of poli­ tical science, II (1958), 377-402; and Farris, “A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress,” pp. 306-338.

206

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

TAB LE A -2 SCALOGRAM OF FOREIGN AID VOTES, W ISCONSIN DELEGATION, 85th CONGRESS* IT E M

CONGRESSMAN

1

O’Konski Smith Van Pelt Withrow Laird Byrnes Johnson Zabłocki Reuss Tewes

+ + + + + + + + -

CR= 1 - %e = 1 - .03 = .97

2

3

4

5

+

+ + + + +

+ + + +

(-)

+ + + + + +

-

-

-

A + + + + + -

-

6

7

8 + + + +

9

10

+

+ + + +

+

+

A

A

+ + +

+ + +

-

-

(+)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(+)

A + +

+ = “isolationist” vote - = “internationalist” vote A = Absent or not voting ( )= Error

* Tw o points about this illustrative table should be made. First, the order of items was determined by applying scale procedures to the entire House, not merely to the W isconsin delegation. It is obvious that if the techniques had been used on the W isconsin congressmen only, a different order of items would have appeared. Second, we should note that absences are excluded from the calculation of the Coefficient of Reproducibility. T o include them would artificially increase the size of the coefficient.

resentatives from Wisconsin (Table A -2). The ten congressmen fall into six of th&elevcn possible scale types^Table A -3), ranging from strong isolationists (type 1) to strong internationalists (type 10). The first group—from O’Konski through W ithrow —are solidly opposed to foreign aid legislation. These are the only Wisconsin congressmen who did not cast at least one pro-foreign aid vote, and thus form the voting bloc least favorably disposed toward aid to overseas nations. Four representatives—Johnson through Tewes— are to a great extent supporters of foreign aid, casting a total of

APPENDIX A

207

TA B LE A -3 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SCALE TYPES SCALE TYPE 0

NUM BER

PERCENTAGE

4

40

1

0

2

0

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1

10

10

0 0

1

10

0 1

10

1

10

2

20

three votes in opposition to foreign aid. Finally, two congressmen— Laird and Byrnes—roughly divide their votes between support of and opposition to overseas aid. In this manner, groupings can be found in Congress on specific related issues. For purposes of analysis, the scale types can be collapsed into three groups, calling types 0-2, isolationist; types 3-7, moderate; and 8-10, internationalist, and correlated w ith some outside variable. A simple example of this process appears in Table A-4.

TA B LE A -4 A TTITU D E TOW ARD FOREIGN AID BY PARTY AFFILIATION, W ISCONSIN DELEGATION, 85th CONGRESS

Isolationists (scale types 0-2) Moderates (types 3-7) Internationalists (types 8-10)

REPUBLICAN

DEMOCRATIC

4

0

2

0

1

3

208

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Although there is a difference between the two parties, it is not a clear-cut one. All of the Republican representatives did not oppose the three Democrats; tw o were moderates and one joined the Demo­ crats in support of foreign aid. Similar, and more complicated, com­ parisons can be made between the isolationism-internationalism con­ tinuum and a wide variety of demographic and behavioral variables. Another advantage of the use of scale analysis is the singling out of deviant cases for special study—for instance, the circumstances that surround the positive (anti-foreign aid) votes of Representative Reuss on item 6 and Representative Byrnes on item 10,* Scale techniques also permit speculation about the behavior of absent members. If an absence occurs to the left of the breaking point of the scale, the assumption is that if these votes had been cast they would have been anti-foreign aid. Thus we may predict that had Representative Smith been present on items 2, 6, 7, and 9, he would have cast positive votes. Conversely, we would predict nega­ tive responses where absences occur to the right of the breaking point O f course, we can make no guesses about absences that ob­ scure the breaking point in the scale and fall between the positive and negative responses. An additional benefit from employing the Guttman scale is that it provides a single continuum for rating the performance of individ­ ual legislators. W ere we to assign scale scores to the different pat­ terns, we could rank the ten Wisconsin Congressmen on a pro- to anti-foreign aid spectrum. Table A-2 gives an approximation of rank order. Assigning scale scores would also transform the variable of behavior on foreign aid legislation from a qualitative to a quanti­ tative one, thus allowing more elaborate statistical procedures. W e may also rank the votes themselves on a similar continuum. #In the case of Representative Byrnes, the error could be on item 4 rather than on item 3. W here a non-scale response pattern can be assigned to more than one scale type, the rule of “middleweighting” has been followed, that is, the pattern is assigned to the scale type nearest the middle of scale. If the non-scale pattern can be assigned to two types, each equidistant from the middle type, then it is assigned to that type which has the greatest frequency of occurrence. See Andrew F. H enry, “A M ethod of Classifying Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale,” pu blic o pin io n quarterly , XVI (1952), 94-106.

APPENDIX A

209

Item 1 has the most appealing anti-foreign aid position, and item 10 the least, in terms of amount of support drawn. The rank order is reversed from the point of view of support for foreign aid. Finally, the concept of unidimensionality ensures that we are deal­ ing w ith a single or related group of attitudes. Thus, although we can never be certain what basic feelings are responsible for the votes cast by the different Congressmen on foreign aid issues, we can be reasonably sure that these votes were regarded as foreign aid issues. In this way, we are able to clarify the use of variables under accu­ rate terminology. W e need add only a few points relating to the specific procedures used in the present study. In the first place, the original universe of roll calls included all those which on an a priori inspection seemed to fall w ithin a given policy context, that is, within the foreign on domestic spheres. Those roll calls on which the minority consisted of less than ten per cent of the total votes cast were excluded on the grounds that their inclusion might artificially enlarge the coefficient of reproducibility. A second problem requiring clarification is the question of ab­ sences. If excessive nonvoting is fouiid it will be difficult to assign individual congressmen to the appropriate scale type. T o mitigate this assignment problem, this study has included, in addition to the recorded votes cast on the floor of the House, all available declara­ tions of vote intention. Thus the calculations presented include pairs, vote announcements, and responses to Congressional Quar­ terly polls wherever such information was available. Since no attem pt was made to weight roll calls or various types of response, a pair or an announcement, even one made after the rollcall vote had been taken, will have the same impact on the scales as a vote actually cast on the floor of the House. This procedure was adopted with full knowledge that some distortions might be intro­ duced, but on the assumption that these would, in fact, be slight. Finally, we should note that our coding procedures listed “isola­ tionist” and “conservative” votes as “positive.” Thus, in the tables which follow, the positive vote column should be read to mean the particular response to a roll-call vote that was coded as isolationist or conservative, and die “percentage positive” column gives the distribution of the responses to each item.

210

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Having made these decisions about die roll calls to be included, the responses to be used, and the coding procedures to be employed, the Guttman techniques described above were applied, and the scales obtained. N o attem pt was made to enlarge the number of items comprising the scales by cross-checking rolls not included in the initial universe against the scales which were found. The justifi­ cation for this is that while such additions would elaborate die scales, given our intention to collapse the scale types for purposes of analysis, more refined scales would provide no analytic gain. Also, since the focus of the study is foreign policy decisions, there is no need to discover all the scales that might have been constructed for a given Congress. Collapsing the scale types into Isolationist, Moderate, and Interna­ tionalist, or Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal categories not only simplifies the task of analysis, but also contributes to the goal of making the scales as inclusive as possible. W here the types are col­ lapsed, some of the absences become irrelevant. If, for example, scale types 0, 1, and 2 are combined into the Isolationist group, an absence of the extreme scale item would be inconsequential, for whether the response, had it been made, was “positive” or “nega­ tive” the respondent would fall into either type 0 or type 1, both of which are within the range of the isolationist category. Only where an absence obscures the line between tw o collapsed categories must a congressman be excluded from the analysis. The procedure for collapsing consisted of examining the frequency distribution of the pure scale types and collapsing at natural breaks in the distribution. In addition to the representatives who are excluded from the analysis because of absences which blurred the line between col­ lapsed categories, those whose voting records contained too many “errors” are also excluded. W hile there is no precedent, we have assigned to the appropriate scale type and included in the study those whose votes displayed “errors” of 20 per cent or less. For example, in a ten item scale, a legislator who made three or more inconsistent responses was not assigned to any scale type. W hile this procedure may be too liberal, the aim, again, was to make the scales as inclusive as possible.

APPENDIX A

211

ITE M COM POSITION OF SCALES

ITEM

DATE

Foreign Aid Scales a 76th c o n g r e s s 6-30-39 Neutrality Act: Vorys amend­ ment (adding arms embargo) Neutrality Act: instruct House 11-2-39 conferees Neutrality Act: recommit 6-30-39 Neutrality Act: passage 6-30-39 Neutrality Act: instruct House 11-2-39 conferees 11-2-39 Neutrality Act: instruct House conferees Neutrality Act: send to conference 10-31-39 11-3-39 Neutrality Act: Conference Report

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

Y

.55

Y Y N

.46 .49 .48

Y

.43

Y N

.42 .43

N

.42

Y

.81

Y

.58

Y

.44

N

.27

N

.22

N N N

.21

N

.16

N

.17

1

b 80th 4-30-47 4-30-47 5-21-47 5-9-47 5-21-47 12-15-47 4-2-48 3-31-48 6-20-48 4-30-47

CONGRESS

Aid to Devastated Countries: Amendment (no aid to “Russiandominated” countries) Post-UNNRA W ar Relief: Amendment (cut funds) Aid to Devastated Countries: Recommit Conference Report Aid to Greece and Turkey: passage Aid to Devastated Countries: Conference Report Foreign Aid Act: Conference Report ERP: Conference Report ERP: passage Foreign Aid Appropriation: Conference Report Aid to Devastated Countries: passage

.19 .19

212

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

ITEM

DATE

c 83rd 7-31-53 7-31-53 7-28-53 6-30-54 7-22-53 7-13-53 6-19-53 7-9-54 6-18-53 d 85th 8-15-57 7-2-58 7-19-57 8-14-57 7-19-57 6-27-58 5-14-58 8-15-57 7-2-58

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

Y

.49

N

.40

N

.33

N

.33

N

.29

N

.33

N

.28

Y

.26

N

.10

N

.66

N

.56

Y

.44

N

.42

N

.38

Y

.36

N

.34

N

.34

N

.3 4

CONGRESS

Mutual Security Appropriation: recommit Conference Report Mutual Security Appropriation: Conference Report Mutual Security Appropriation: passage Mutual Security Authorization: passage Mutual Security Appropriation: passage Mutual Security Authorization: Conference Report Mutual Security Authorization: passage Mutual Security Authorization: recommit Mutual Security Authorization: motion to consider CONGRESS

Mutual Security Appropriation: recommit (adding funds) Mutual Security Appropriations: recommit (adding funds) Mutual Security Authorization: recommit Mutual Security Authorization: Conference Report Mutual Security Authorization: passage Mutual Security Authorization: recommit Conference Report Mutual Security Authorization: passage Mutual Security Appropriation: passage Mutual Security Appropriation: passage

APPENDIX A

ITEM

DATE

8-30-57

Mutual Security Appropriation: Conference Report

213

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

N

.39

N Y

.44 .42

Y

.42

N

.44

Y

.43

N

.39

N

.22

Y

.61

Y N

.58 .56

Y

.54

Y N N

.54 .59 .16

Y N

.35 .24

2 Foreign Trade Scales a 76th 2-23-40 2-23-40 2-21-39 8-21-40 8-21-40 9-14-40 2-21-39 b 80th 5-26-48 5-26-48 5-26-48 5-26-48 c 83rd 7-23-53 7-23-53 6-11-54 d 85th 6-11-58 6-11-58

CONGRESS

Reciprocal Trade Act: passage Reciprocal Trade Act: recommit Export-Import Bank Extension: recommit Export-Import Bank Extension: passage Export-Import Bank Extension: recommit Export-Import Bank Extension: Conference Report Export-Import Bank Extension: passage CONGRESS

Trade Agreements Act: passage (with new limits on President) Trade Agreements Act: Rule for Consideration (end debate) Trade Agreements Act: recommit Trade Agreements Act: Rule for Consideration (adoption) CONGRESS

Trade Agreements Act: Rule for Consideration (adoption) (a stricter bill) Trade Agreements Act: recommit Trade Agreements Act: passage CONGRESS

Trade Agreements Act: recommit Trade Agreements Act: passage

214

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

DATE

ITEM

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

Y Y N Y

.73 .75 .70 .65

Y

.33

Y

.34

N

.36

N

.34

Y

.80

Y

.84

N Y

.80 .66

Y Y

.62 .58

N N

.84 .79

N

.76

N

.71

3 Government Activity Scales a 76th 6-4-40 4-18-40 4-18-40 7-20-39 5-3-39 2-9-40 2-8-40 2-9-40 b 80th 6-14-48 2-27-48 7-11-47 1-22-48 1-22-48 1-22-48 c 83rd 6-25-53 2-25-53 7-8-53 4-15-53

c o n g r ess

NLRA Amendments: Rule for Consideration Logan-Walter Bill: passage Logan-Walter Bill: recommit NLRB Investigation: passage Rejection of Reorganization Plan No. 1 Civil Service Act Amendments: recommital Civil Service Act Amendments: Rule for Consideration Civil Service Act Amendments: passage c o n g r ess

Social Security Act Amendments: overriding of veto Social Security Act Amendments: passage Amendments to FPC powers: recommit Reclamation Bill: passage Reclamation Bill: Elliot Amendment (requiring Congressional approval of all new projects) Reclamation Bill: recommit CONGRESS

Sell Government-owned rubber plants: recommital Housing Loan Insurance: recommit Unemployment Compensation Tax: Forand Amendment (delaying repayment to states) National Bank Stockholders: recommit

APPENDIX A

ITEM

DATE

7-8-54 7-24-54 7-13-54 d 85th 7-25-57 8-8-58 8-7-58 8-23-58

215

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

N

.69

Y N

.56 .36

Y Y N N

.51 .38 .29 .29

Y

.53

N

.54

N

.53

N

.45

N

.42

Y

.33

N

.32

N

.30

N

.28

Unemployment Compensation Revisions: recommit Atomic Energy Act Amendments: Cole Amendment (granting normal patent rights) Health Reinsurance: recommit CONGRESS

School Construction: Smith motion (to strike enacting clause) NDEA: recommit NDEA: Rule for Consideration NDEA: Conference Report

4 Government Spending Scales a 76th 6-13-39 8-1-39 8-3-39 3-28-40 3-28-40 5-15-39 5-27-40 7-1-40 3-20-39

c o n g r ess

TVA Act Amendment: passage (called for TVA to pay certain taxes) RFC, REA, Public Works Appropriation: Rule for Consideration Housing Authority Appropriation: passage Labor-Security Appropriation: Leavy Amendment (increasing funds for CCC) Labor-Security Appropriations: Collins Amendment (increasing funds) W ar Department Civil Functions Appropriations: recommit Interior Department Appropriation: Conference Report Increase resources of Commodity Credit Corporation: passage Interior Department Appropriation: passage

216

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM POSITIVE ITEM

DATE

3-20-39

b 80th 3-24-48 4-2-48 6-2-47 7-8-47 7-18-48 2-2-48 3-27-47 6-17-47 7-8-47 2-2-48 3-27-47 4-25-47 7-18-47 7-18-47 7-18-47 7-18-47 7-18-47 6-16-47

Interior Department Appropriation: White Amendment limiting expenditures

VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

Y

.27

Y Y

.81 .78

Y Y

.69 .73

Y Y Y Y N N N

.73 .71 .67 .66 .63 .62 .57

N

.58

Y

.55

N

.51

N

.52

N

.48

N

.49

N

.15

CONGRESS

Tax Reduction Bill: passage Tax Reduction Bill: override veto Income Tax Reduction: Conference Report Income Tax Reduction: passage Income Tax Reduction: override veto Tax Reduction Bill: passage Income Tax Reduction: passage Income Tax Reduction: recommit Income Tax Reduction: recommit Tax Reduction Bill: recommit Income Tax Reduction: recommit Interior Department Appropriation: recommit Department of Agriculture Appropriation: Case Amendment (cutting funds) Department of Agriculture Appropriation: Rankin Amendment (increasing funds) Department of Agriculture Appropriation: Cannon Amendment (increasing funds) Department of Agriculture Appropriation: Case Amendment (adding funds) Department of Agriculture Appropriation: Cannon Amendment (adding funds) Pay Increase for USMA Cadets: passage

APPENDIX A

ITEM

DATE

6-15-48 c 83rd 7-21-53

4-26-53 5-5-53 7-31-53 4-26-53 7-31-53 7-10-53 7-29-54 d 85th 4-4-57 5-1-58 4-4-57 2-5-57

217

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

N

.10

N

.59

N

.51

Y

.49

Y

.43

N

.40

N

.40

N

.19

N

.15

Y

.60

Y

.58

Y

.52

Y

.55

Aid to “impacted” area schools: passage co n g r ess

Sute, Justice, Commerce Departments Appropriation: Preston Amendment (adding funds) Labor and HEW Departments Appropriations: recommit Agriculture Department Appropriation: King Amendment (cutting funds) Increase National Debt Ceiling: recommit Labor and HEW Departments Appropriation: Fogarty Amendment (adding funds) Increase National Debt Ceiling: passage Excess Profits tax extension: passage Increase borrowing authority of Commodity Credit Corp.: passage CONGRESS

Labor and HEW Departments Appropriation: Flynt Amendment (cutting funds) Temporary Unemployment Compensation: Herlong Amendment (cutting funds) Labor and HEW Departments Appropriation: Bymes Amendment (cutting funds) Deficiency Appropriation: Lanham Amendment (cutting funds)

218

DATE

8-1-58 8-18-58 8-7-57 1-23-58 7-23-57

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

ITEM

Loans for Municipalities: Rule for consideration Housing Act: passage Supplemental Appropriations: passage Raise National Debt Ceiling: passage Postal Pay Increase: passage

POSITIVE VOTE

PERCENTAGE POSITIVE

N N

.52 .35

N

.19

N N

.18 .10

B.

The Sources of the Demographic Data

The data on the congressmen and their constituencies employed in Chapters Three to Five were gathered from the following sources: Personal Characteristics Information on the religious affiliation of the members of the House of Representatives came primarily from the biographies supplied by the congressmen themselves to the Congressional Directory (annual volumes, Washington, Govern­ ment Printing Office). In most cases, only a direct statement of religious preference was accepted and used; in a few cases, however, where the biography revealed sufficient information to permit a seemingly reliable inference to be drawn (for example, a representa­ tive listing membership in the Catholic W ar Veterans and the An­ cient O rder of Hibernians could safely be assumed to be of the Catholic faith) or where the religious preference was common knowledge (for example, the membership of New York representa­ tive Sol Bloom in a Jewish congregation) religious affiliation was taken to be sufficiently established to allow inclusion in the analysis. In all other cases, where no direct statement appeared in the bio­ graphy or no reliable inference could be drawn, no religious affilia­ tion was assumed and the individual representatives were excluded from the analysis. This problem was eliminated in the 85th Con­ gress; the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress supplied the author w ith a listing of the church preferences of 430 of the 435 members of that House. The Congressional Directory also provided the bulk of the data on the occupations of the congressmen prior to election to the House. The biographies in that source were supplemented for the 76th and 80th Congresses by examination of the Biographical Direc­ tory of the American Congress, 1114-1949 (House Document 607, Eighty-First Congress, Second Session, W ashington, Government Printing Office, 1950). W here doubts remained, for the most recent Congresses, the occupational listings of the Congresńonal Quarterly Almanac (annual volumes, W ashington, Congressional Quarterly, 219

220

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Inc.) were consulted. In those instances where a congressman had pursued more than one occupation, a reading of all the above men­ tioned sources was used to make the best possible estimate of the major occupation of the representative. In most cases, the major occupation could be clearly established, but it must be noted that in a few instances there remains some doubt about the chief source of income of the individual prior to election to Congress. These same biographical sources allowed determination of the educational attainment of the individual legislators. It appears that congressmen take some pride in their educational accomplishments or their success in the absence of a great deal of formal schooling; thus almost all biographies contained a reference to schools attended and/or degrees received. The representatives were assumed to have had no formal education over and above the highest level of training mentioned in the biographies, and it was this level that was used in the analysis. Information concerning prior military service was obtained from these same sources, the Congressional Directory, the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, and the Congressional Quar­ terly Almanac. Again, it appears that a veteran’s status is prized by congressmen, and thus safe to assume that those who had served in the armed forces would include this fact in their biographies. Those legislators who made no reference to military service were assumed not to have been in uniform. Political Characteristics The Congressional Directory includes full information on the seniority and tenure of all members of the House, making calculations of length of service relatively simple. The data presented in Chapter Four include the term currently being served; that is, a representative’s length of service includes the incomplete term which was in process at the time the individual roll calls were taken. The authoritative source for electoral margin is the America Votes series, Richard M. Scammon, editor, issued biennially under the auspices of the Governmental Affairs Institute. These volumes contain the percentage division of the vote for each congressional district for the period since 1946. The percentages for the 76th Congress are based on calculations from the official returns for con-

APPENDIX B

221

gressional elections presented in the Congressional Directory for that Congress. W here a representative was elected in a special elec­ tion, the data on his margin of victory were obtained from stories in local newspapers or the Congressional Quarterly W eekly Report (weekly, Washington, Congressional Quarterly, Inc.). The biographical sources previously cited yielded the data on the representatives' prior service in elective offices. Failure to list such services was taken as indicative of a lack of such service. State constitutions and statutes provided the information on whether such offices as county prosecutor and district attorney were elective or appointive. Data on the committee assignments of the lawmakers are, of course, readily available in the Congressional Directory. From this source the membership of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees was established. Constituency Characteristics The real problems in the collection of data for this study were encountered attempting to obtain reliable measures of the characteristics of the congressional districts. Districts composed entirely of whole counties posed no difficulty, for the calculations involved only simple addition of the appropriate county totals of the U S. Census. Districts comprised of parts of counties created more difficulty. T he procedure for dealing w ith these non-whole-county districts follows that employed by Duncan MacRae, Jr., in his Dimentions o f Congressional Voting (pp. 334-335). The boundaries of the non-whole-county dis­ tricts were determined by relying on the Congressional Directory, state statutes, or maps supplied by local election commissions; these boundaries were, in effect, superimposed on the census tract maps in the U S. Census reports, and those census tracts lying wholly within each district listed. On the basis of these tracts, the desired distribu­ tions were compiled. Census tracts divided by district lines were not included in the calculations. A few districts contained untracted suburban areas bordering on metropolitan areas; the characteristics of these areas were calculated by approximation. The appropriate totals for all subunits given by the Census were assembled, these were subtracted from the county totals to get a “residual" figure, and the residual was apportioned to the districts in proportion to the

222

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

corresponding total population. These methods were employed to obtain the indices of ethnicity, education, status, and ruralism de­ scribed specifically in the footnotes to Chapter Five. T he division of the country into four regions—East, South, Mid­ west, and W est—made in Chapter Four follows general usage. T he decision was arbitrarily made to include the border states and Okla­ homa in the southern region.

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THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

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A dler, Selig, 16 Aggression, isolationism and, 29-30 Anglo-Irish hostility. See IrishAm ericans Arm ed forces. See M ilitary service Arm ed Services Com m ittee, 96-99, 101, 102 “A ttentive" public, 193 A ttitu d in al variables, isolationism and, 24-27 A uthoritarian personality, isola­ tionism and, 25 B ipartisanship, 186-187 B rundage, Percival F., 182 Business contacts, isolationism and, 113 Businessmen, isolationism and, 7379, 81 C atholics, isolationism and, 19, 6267. 81, 196 C eller, Em anuel, 48 C ivil rights, foreign policy and, 8, 35, 44-45 C ivil W ar, 10

C om m ittee assignments, isolation­ ism and, 23, 83, 96-104 C om m ittee on Arm ed Services, 9699, 101, 102 C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs, 96102, 104, 174, 186, 196 Congress 76th, IS 80th, 13-14 83rd, 14-15 85th, 15 88th, 195-99 com m ittee assignm ents in, 23, 83, 96-104 "folkways" of, 174 length of service in, 23, 83, 84-88 presidential leadership of. See Presidential leadership See also specific topics for discus­ sion of each Congress in study Congressional districts. See Con­ stituency characteristics; Con­ stituency opinion Congressional Record, 29, 178 Congressional voting paradigm of, 5-6, 170-180

235

236

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

situational factors of, 197 See also specific factors related to voting behavior Congressmen perceptions of, 166, 172—173, 174— 180 personal attrib u tes of, 5, 61-82 political characteristics of, 83-104 preferences of, 5, 174-180 See also C onstituency characteris­ tics; specific personal characteristics Consensus, presidential leadership and, 56, 181-182, 189, 192, 194 Conservatism ideological groups and, 152, 155, 160 isolationism and, 26 party affiliation and, 152 in South, 113 C onstituency characteristics, 105139 com petitiveness and electoral m argin, 22, 83, 84, 88-93 ideological groups and, 148, 149 presidential leadership and, 105, 138-139, 184 vote decisions and, 177-180 See also specific characteristics C onstituency opinion congressional preferences and, 176-177, 179 presidential leadership and, 190 representative’s perceptions of, 172-173, 176-177 C ultural contacts, isolationism and, 113 D ahl, R obert, 4, 185 Democrats. See Political parties D epartm ent of State, Office o f A ssistant Secretary for Con­ gressional R elations, 188 D isplaced persons, im m igration of, 14, 35, 41-43

D istricts. See C onstituency charac­ teristics; C onstituency o p in io n Domestic events, influence on con­ gressional voting of, 166-167, 183-184 Domestic policy difference betw een foreign policy and, 35—38 foreign aid and, 54-55 ideological groups and, 149 “Dualism in a m oving consensus,” 56 D ulles, Jo h n Foster, 185 East definition in this study of, 106n. isolationism and, 106-114. Edm ondson, J. H ow ard, 188n. E ducational level, 19 of congressmen, 67-69 of constituents, 105, 127-132 Eisenhower, Dw ight D., 14, 178, 182, 189n., 198 speech on Landrum -G riffin B ill by, 190 “Eisenhow er M ideast D octrine,” 15 Elections, presidential, isolationism and, 167 Elective office, p rio r service in , 23, 83, 94-96 Electoral m argin, 22, 83, 84, 88-93 E lite opinion effect on congressmen of, 176-177 presidential leadership and, 190191 England, Irish-Am ericans and, 18, 120-121, 124, 126 Episcopal church, isolationism and, 19 E thnic groups generalization and, 27-28 ideological groups and, 152, 160 isolationism and, 17-18, 105, 120126, 196 vote decisions and, 177

INDEX

E ulau, H einz, 17S Europe, philosophical distrust of, 25 E xternal stim uli, congressmen and, 174 Extrem e ideological groups, 143145, 146-153 Far

East, paternalistic attitu d e tow ard, 25-26 Farm er-Labor party, 53-54 Farm ers, isolationism and, 73-78 “Feedback” processes, 179-180 Fensterw ald, B ernard, Jr., 19 “Folkways” of Congress, 174 Foreign affairs. See Foreign policy Foreign Affairs Com m ittee, 96-102, 104, 174, 186, 196 Foreign aid C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs and, 97-98, 1% developm ent of idea of, 14 education and, 128, 129, 131 electoral m argin and, 89-90 ethnic groups and, 122, 125, 196 m ilitary service and, 70-72 occupation and, 74, 76-78 parties and, 48-50, 51-53, 54-55, 196 presidential leadership and, 181 region and, 108, 110, 196 relationship betw een foreign trade and, 36-37 religion and, 63-67, 196 socioeconomic status and, 132, 196 urban-rural division and, 115, 116-119, 196 Foreign inform ation. See Overseas propaganda activity Foreign policy difference betw een dom estic policy and, 35-38 education and, 129-130 ideology and, 141-144

237

length of service and, 85-86 variables relevant to, 168 See also Foreign aid; Foreign trade Foreign trade com m ittee assignm ent and, 99 education and, 128, 129, 141 ethnic groups and, 123, 125 occupation and, 75-78 parties and, 50-53, 55-56 presidential leadership and, 181 region and, 109, 110 relationship betw een foreign aid and, 36-37 religion and, 63-67 socioeconomic status and, 132134 urban-rural division and, 116-119 See also R eciprocal trade F rustration, isolationism and, 2829 Generalization» isolationism and, 27-28 Geography, isolationism and, 16-18, 105, 106-120, 196 German-Americans, isolationism and, 18, 120-121, 124, 126 G overnm ent activity definition of, 34 foreign policy and, 36-37 G overnm ent spending definition of, 34 foreign policy and, 36-37 G reat B ritain, Irish-Am ericans and, 18, 120-121, 124, 126 G uttm an scaling, 33, 201-218 H alle, Louis J., 12, 25 H arlow , Bryce, 188n. H erm ann, M argaret G., 29 H olifield, C het, 48 H um phrey, George, 182 H yperpatriotism , 24-25

238

THE ROOTS OF ISOLATIONISM

Ideological groups extrem e, 145-145, 146-155 m ixed, 14S-145, 160-164 m oderate. 142-145, 15S-160, 197 political parties and, 146-148, 149, 155, 156-158 Ideology, 24-27, 141-164 definition of, 141-142 ex tent of, 143-148 Im m igrants, isolationism and, 25 Im m igration of displaced persons, 14, 35, 41-43 Institutional position in Congress, influence on members of, 69 I nternationalists definition of, 142 ideology and, 143-163 Irish-Am ericans, isolationism and, 18, 120-121, 124, 126 Isolationism a ttitu d in al variables arid, 24-27 constituency characteristics and. See C onstituency characteristics content of congressional, 38-46 definition of, 7-8 education and, 19, 67-69, 105, 127-132 ethnic groups and, 17-18, 105, 120-126 evolution in Congress of, 47-59, 168 geography and, 16-18, 105, 106120, 196 history of, 3, 9-16 hypotheses for, 16-31 length of sendee and. See L ength of service m ilitary service and, 19-20, 69-72 occupation and, 19-20, 73-79 pacifism and, 24 political factors and, 21-24, 51, 77, 83-104, 166-70 political parties and, 21-22, 54 presidential leadership and. See P residential leadership

psychological determ inants 27-30 religious affiliation and, 19, 67, 196 single-factor explanation of, socioeconomic status and, 20, 25, 105, 132-137, 196 See also other specific topics

of, 62166 24-

Jews, isolationism and, 19 Johnson, Lyndon B., 139, 183, 189n. Kennedy, Jo h n F., 139, 183 persuasions used by, 187, 190, 194 policies of, 198 Key, V. O., Jr., 56 Krock, A rthur, 177 Landon, Alf, 12 Landrum -G riffin L abor R eform B ill, 190 Latency hypothesis, isolationism and, 28 Lawyers, isolationism and, 73-77 League of N ations, 11, 12 Length of service isolationism and, 23-24, 83, 84-88 related to m oderation, 87 “Liberal-isolationists,” 45 L ippm ann, W alter, 177 Loyalty-security program , 35, 43-44 Lubell, Samuel, 17 L utheran C hurch, isolationism and, 19 M arshall Plan, 14, 41 M artin, I. Jade, 188n. M ason, N oah, 48 Mass opinion effect on congressmen of, 176-177 presidential leadership and, 190 See also C onstituency o p inion M idwest definition in this study of, 106n. ideological groups and, 155

INDEX

isolationism and, 16-17, 106-114, 117, 118, 135 M ilitary service foreign aid and, 70-72 isolationism and, 19-20, 69-72 M ills, W ilbur, 187 M ixed ideological groups, 143-145, 160-164 M oderate ideological groups, 142145, 153-160, 197 definitions of, 142 M oderation electoral m argin and, 88-89, 93 length of service and, 87 M onroe D octrine, 10 N ationalistic attitudes, isolationism and, 24 N eutrality Laws, 11-12, 13, 56 N ixon, R ichard, 198n. Nye Com m ittee, 11 O ccupation, isolationism and, 1920, 73-79 Office of A ssistant Secretary for Congressional R elations (State D epartm ent), 188 Overseas propaganda activity, 35, 39-41, 42 Pacifism, isolationism and, 24 Paradigm of congressional voting, 5-6, 170-180 Parties. See Political parties Party leaders, influence of, 69 Passman, O tto, 84, 18Sn. Perceptions of congressmen, 166, 172-173, 174-180 Personal insecurity, isolationism and, 28-29 Persuasion, presidential, 185 Place of residence. See U rban-rural division Political affiliation. See Political parties

239

Political changes, 42-43 southern congressmen and, 114 Political factors isolationism and, 21-24, 51, 77, 83-104, 166-170 See also Political parties; specific factors Political ideology. See Ideology P olitical parties bipartisanship, 186-187 education and, 129, 131 extrem e ideological groups and, 146-148, 149 foreign aid and, 48-50, 51-53, 54-55, 196-197 foreign trade and, 50-53, 55-56 isolationism and, 21-22, 54 m ilitary service and, 70-72 m ixed ideological groups and, 160 m oderate ideological groups and, 155, 156-158 presidency and Congress con­ trolled by different, 37 pressures of, 85 p rio r elective service and, 95 region and, 110-114 See also P olitical factors “Politico,” role of, 173 P opular sentim ent (public opinion) pressures of, 86, 92 See also C onstituency opinion; E lectoral m argin; E lite opinion Populist-Progressive era, ideology of, 26 Preferences of congressmen, 5, 174— 180 P residential elections, isolationism and, 167 P residential leadership, 4, 6, 15-16, 61, 198 constituency characteristics and, 105, 138-139, 184 foreign vs. dom estic policy and, 35-36, 38, 46

240

THE ROOTS O F ISOLATIONISM

ideology and, 141, 15S, 160, 163164 political characteristics and, 8081, 83. 84, 91-92, 103 strategies and techniques of, 5859. 181-194 P rior elective office, isolationism and, 23, 83, 94-96 P rior m ilitary service. See M ilitary service P rior occupation. See O ccupation Progressive party, 53-54 Propaganda activity, overseas, 35, 39-41, 42 Psychological determ inants of iso­ lationism , 27-30 Public, “attentive,” 193 Public opinion (popular sentim ent) pressures of, 86, 92 See also C onstituency opinion; Electoral m argin; E lite opinion R eciprocal trade, 14, 55-56 Reed, D aniel A., 48 Regions definition in this study of, 106n. isolationism and, 16-18, 105, 106114, 196 R eligious affiliation, isolationism and, 19, 62-67, 196 R epublicans. See Political parties R obinson, Jam es A., 4 Roosevelt, Franklin, 12, 119, 147 R ural-urban division ideological groups and, 152, 155, 157, 160 isolationism and, 17, 105, 114120, 196 "Safe" districts, 22, 84, 89 Selective service, 13 isolationism and, 35, 38-39

Seniority system, 84 Situational factors, education and, 131 Socioeconomic status ideological groups and, 149, 152, 157, 160 isolationism and, 20, 24-25, 105, 132-137, 196 South definition in this study of, 106n. ideological groups and, 149, 152, 157, 160 isolationism and, 17, 53, 106-114, 137, 167 State D epartm ent Office of Assistant Secretary for C ongressional Re­ lations, 188 Status. See Socioeconomic status T aft, R obert A., 188n. T rade. See Foreign trade T rum an, H arry S, 185n., 187 U rban-rural division ideological groups and, 152, 153, 157, 160 isolationism and, 105, 114-120, 196 V andenberg, A rth u r H ., 186nv 187 Vote behavior. See C ongressional voting; specific topics W ashington, George, Farew ell Address of, 9, 12 W est definition in this study of, 106n. isolationism and, 106-114 W orld W ar I, 10-11, 16 W orld W ar II, 119, 147