Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign Policy: Presidential Decision-Making in a Post-Cold War World 9781529215922

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign Policy: Presidential Decision- Making in a Post- Cold War World
Copyright information
Dedication
Table of contents
List of abbreviations
Acknowledgments
Preface
Part I Disaggregating Ideas in American Foreign Policy
1 Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign Policy
Introduction
Why ideas?
The debate so far …
Rationalist limitations
Constructivism
Ontological security
Discursive institutionalism
Theoretical framework: uncertainty, weaponization and interpretation
Ideas reduce uncertainty: principled and cognitive interpretations
Ideas as weapons: mechanisms
Normative displacement
Cognitive repression
Interpretive leadership
Method
Plan of the book
Part II US Foreign Policy and Mass Atrocities in the Balkans
2 ‘We Don’t Have a Dog in the Fight’: Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia
Introduction
Cognitive repression in Bosnia: ‘We do deserts, not mountains or jungles’
Bosnia
The Bush administration’s response
Renewed cognitive repression: early optimism to repression in the Clinton administration
Conclusion
3 ‘What Should I Tell My Daughter?’: The Massacre at Srebrenica
Introduction
Normative displacement: principled reinterpretations of Srebrenica
The fall of Srebrenica
Operation Deliberate Force
Conclusion
Part III US Foreign Policy and Terrorism
4 ‘Wag the Dog’: Terrorism in the 1990s
Introduction
Cognitive repression: terrorism as a second-tier threat
Bombing of the World Trade Centre (1993)
1998 Embassy bombings and the Iraqi threat
USS Cole and the 2000 presidential election
Early Bush repression: promises of campaign restraint
Conclusion
5 ‘America Is Under Attack’: From the War on Terror to Iraq
Introduction
Normative displacement: 11 September 2001
Constructing the War on Terror
Constructing the war in Iraq
Conclusion
Part IV Obama and Mass Atrocities in the Middle East
6 ‘This Is Like Rwanda’: How the Road to Libya Ran Through Rwanda
Introduction
Early cognitive repression: a call for restraint
Normative displacement: principled intervention in Libya
Obama’s principled response
Conclusion
7 Syria: ‘There Was No Benghazi To Be Saved’
Introduction
Seeds of intervention and the promise of ‘red lines’
Obama’s response and the promise of intervention
Cognitive repression, chemical weapons and shifting ‘red lines’
Conclusion
Part V ‘America First’ and the Use of Force
8 From ‘America First’ to Saving ‘Beautiful Babies’ in Syria
Introduction
Early cognitive repression: a turn to ‘America First’
Obama, Syria and ISIS
Cognitive repression and Trump’s ‘America First’
Normative displacement: saving the ‘beautiful babies’ in Syria
Back to repression
Conclusion
Part VI Conclusions
10 Ideas and Foreign Policy Variation
Introduction
Taking ideas seriously: theoretical summary and scope for future dialogues
The cases
Findings
References
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

IDEAS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY Presidential Decision-​Making in a Post-​Cold War World Morgan T. Rees

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1590-​8 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1591-​5 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1592-​2 ePdf The right of Morgan T. Rees to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc, Bristol Image credit: Alamy/Mykhailo Polenok Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by TJ Books, Padstow

For Sarah and Layla, my world …

Contents List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Preface

vi vii ix

PART I:  Disaggregating Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1 Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign Policy

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PART II:  US Foreign Policy and Mass Atrocities in the Balkans 2 ‘We Don’t Have a Dog in the Fight’: Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia 33 3 ‘What Should I Tell My Daughter?’: The Massacre at Srebrenica 52 PART III:  US Foreign Policy and Terrorism 4 ‘Wag the Dog’: Terrorism in the 1990s 5 ‘America Is Under Attack’: From the War on Terror to Iraq  PART IV:  Obama and Mass Atrocities in the Middle East 6 ‘This Is Like Rwanda’: How the Road to Libya Ran Through Rwanda 7 Syria: ‘There Was No Benghazi To Be Saved’ 

67 81

103 117

PART V:  ‘America First’ and the Use of Force 8 From ‘America First’ to Saving ‘Beautiful Babies’ in Syria 9 The 2020 Iranian Crisis: De-​escalating from the Use of Force

135 149

PART VI: Conclusions 10 Ideas and Foreign Policy Variation

167

Notes References Index

177 191 218

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List of Abbreviations 9/​11 BW CIA FAA FBI G20 GFC IR ISIS JCPOA JPOA JNA NATO NSC NTC PC PEOC PKK PNAC R2P SAA SDF UN UNSC WMDs WTC

11 September, terrorist attacks Biological Weapon Central Intelligence Agency Federal Aviation Authority Federal Bureau of Investigation Group of Twenty Global Financial Crisis International Relations Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Plan of Action Yugoslav National Army North Atlantic Treaty Alliance National Security Council National Transitional Council Principals Committee Presidential Emergency Operations Centre Kurdistan Workers’ Party Project for the New American Century Responsibility to Protect Syrian Arab Army Syrian Democratic Forces United Nations United Nations Security Council Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Center

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Acknowledgements This book was predominantly written from my home office in Brisbane, Australia, during the COVID-​19 pandemic in 2020. When I completed my PhD in November 2019, I had no idea what the next year would bring. But when things got tough, I drew great comfort from the words of the contemporary philosopher (of sorts), Eric Idle –​‘Always look on the bright side of life’. I have been incredibly lucky and privileged to have had the capacity to continue developing this project post-​PhD despite all that has occurred. As much as the process has been a solitary task with many hours spent alone in my home study researching, writing and occasionally swearing to myself, it was by no means a solo project. Over the last six years, this project has challenged me in ways I did not expect. I would not have made it this far without the support of a group of fantastic people. First and foremost, I would like to thank PhD advisors, Sara Davies, Wesley Widmaier and Luis Cabrera, for their role in helping me to shape and develop this work. Thank you for your patience and taking the time to read over numerous ‘bad drafts’ of the project right from its conception. I am particularly grateful to Wes who, despite moving to Canberra 12 months prior to the end of my PhD, offered without hesitation to continue providing assistance and advice. He also, very kindly, indulged my need to talk (sometimes ramble!) at length about theory. I am also incredibly grateful to Sara who kept me focussed and composed toward the end of my PhD, then drove me to develop the book. Without their guidance and support, this would be little more than a pile of brain droppings. During my candidature, I had the good fortune of belonging to a tight-​ knit cohort who provided not only support but a sense of community and friendship. I would especially like to thank my PhD colleagues Caitlin Mollica and Jacob Deem. Both provided a much-​needed distraction from the daily grind that is PhD life and continued to provide much-​needed moral support in the aftermath. I owe a number of additional intellectual debts to colleagues and mentors that have provided key insights in the development of this project along the way. These include Ian Hall, Susan Park, Will Clapton, Jason Sharman,

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John Kane, and Brent Steele. I would also like to thank Andy Hom, who reached out after my manuscript was accepted, revealing himself as a reviewer. Thank you for your meticulous reading of the draft, and constructive and encouraging feedback. Thank you to the academic community in Griffith’s Centre for Governance and Public Policy, the School of Government and International Relations (SGIR), and the Griffith Asia Institute. In particular, I would like to thank Caitlin Byrne, Cosmo Howard, Robyn Hollander, Andrew O’Neil and Tom Conley for their support. I would also like to extend my thanks to SGIR’s administrative staff Julie Howe, Angela MacDonald and Tracee McPate. Thank you to Stephen Wenham, Caroline Astley, Lorna Blackmore and the rest of team at Bristol University Press for their support, and guidance as I transformed this project from a PhD dissertation to a book manuscript. On a personal note, completing this book has been one of my proudest achievements. I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude and thanks to my family for making it possible. To my parents, Sue and Steve, thank you for always supporting me. When COVID-​19 hit, you made it possible for me to continue working on the manuscript. This project would not have been completed without your help. I cannot imagine having more loving and supportive parents. To my partner Sarah, and daughter Layla –​I owe you everything. In many ways, writing this book has been a selfish and long endeavour. Thank you for your patience during my many instances of ‘mental absence’ over the years. You kept me grounded during the most stressful of periods. Your love and support has meant the world to me. Thank you for the sacrifices you have made so that this book could be completed. This book is as much your achievement as it is mine.

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Preface A president’s decision to use military force is among the most consequential that they can take. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has remained a great power and has enjoyed relative stability in coalitional alignments. Yet, these highly consequential decisions to use force in foreign military interventions in American foreign policy have been inconsistent. This is especially true across a range of key foreign policy issues, including humanitarian interventions and responses to acts of terrorism. When conflict erupted in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, and allegations of ethnic cleansing emerged, President George H.W. Bush cast the conflict as one based on ‘ancient, ethnic animosities’ as his administration argued the US didn’t ‘have a dog in the fight’ (Baker quoted in Power, 2003: 267). While initially adopting a similar position, Clinton would decide to intervene following the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 as Holocaust-​like images emerged, prompting Al Gore’s impassioned plea: ‘What should I tell my daughter?’ Similarly, even as Barack Obama called for restraint over the use of force in US foreign policy, he would succumb to calls for intervention in Libya in 2011 even though the US had ‘no interests in Libya’ (Baker quoted in Power, 2003: 267) as aides warned ‘this is like Rwanda’. Then, despite drawing a ‘red line’ (Obama, 2012), he would revert to restraint following the use of chemical weapons in Syria amid humanitarian conditions and powerful calls for intervention from international partners and domestic coalitions because ‘there was no Benghazi to be saved’. These puzzling variations in presidential positions on the use of force, sometimes under the same administration, poses an important question: what explains variation in foreign policy decisions when the material and social conditions of state interests remain formally the same? This work offers an original theoretical perspective to help better understand variations in foreign policy decision-​making. While there have been numerous efforts to explain foreign policy decision-​making, rationalist approaches have typically pointed to moments of crisis, and exogenous shocks to explain shifts in foreign policy interests. Even as constructivist and ontological security perspectives offer a greater capacity to recognize

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how the competing material and identity needs of states influence foreign policy, their explanations remain incomplete. To develop a more comprehensive understanding of how and when agent interpretations of foreign policy interests vary leading to policy inconsistencies, I integrate discursive institutionalist and constructivist insights to show how agents come to ‘repress’ and ‘displace’ information pertinent to decision-​making, as ideas come in different ‘types’ and ‘forms’ leading to varied interpretations of US foreign policy interests. In doing so, I develop a model to show; first, how different types of ideas reduce uncertainty in principled and cognitive (Schmidt, 2008: 306–​09) ways providing foreign policy agents with a sense of ‘what’s right’ and ‘what works’. Second, I argue that agents use these different types of ideas as ‘weapons’ (Blyth, 2002: 39) as they contest the meaning of events with respect to US interests. In doing so, I show how the forms that ideas come in influence their significance in agent interpretations leading to either a ‘repression’ or ‘displacement’ of particular sources of information. Finally, I stress the role of presidents as ‘interpretive leaders’ in their responsibility to shape and lend legitimacy to foreign policy ideas. To demonstrate this repression and displacement, I trace key decisions pertaining to the use of force in US foreign policy from the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s, to the 2020 Iranian crisis. First, George H.W. Bush’s decision not to intervene in Bosnia followed by Bill Clinton’s similar approach to the crisis until the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995. Second, I contrast Clinton’s cognitive restraint in response to al-​Qaeda-​perpetrated terrorist attacks against US Embassies in Africa, and USS Cole, with George W. Bush’s principled construction of the War on Terror following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Third, I examine policy variation within the Obama administration: Obama succumbed to principled arguments for intervention in Libya in 2011 yet, despite drawing a ‘red line’, ‘repressed’ similar principled arguments as President Assad’s Syrian regime used chemical weapons against civilians. Then, I examine how Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy doctrine was ‘displaced’ as he committed to air strikes to save the ‘beautiful babies’ following the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in 2017. Finally, I show how despite building towards conflict with Iran, Trump reneged following Iran’s retaliation for the assassination of General Soleimani in January 2020, instead, ‘repressing’ initial principled impulses to fight back in the hope of avoiding entanglement.

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PART I

Disaggregating Ideas in American Foreign Policy

1

Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign Policy Introduction The decision to mount an armed intervention is one of the most consequential decisions a president can make. Over the decades following the end of the Cold War, the US has remained a great power and has enjoyed relative stability in coalitional alignments. Yet, since this time, decisions to use force in American foreign policy have varied significantly. Notably, inconsistency has been prevalent not just between administrations, but also within the same one across key cases of humanitarian crises, and responses to the threat of terrorism. Yet, explanations for this variation remain murky, leaving persistent questions regarding how and why decisions to use force, given the enormity of the decision, could vary so significantly. Explaining this remains a key challenge for scholars of foreign policy decision-​making and International Relations theorists. When conflict erupted in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, allegations of ethnic cleansing spurred calls for the US to intervene (Chicago Tribune (Pre-​1997 Fulltext), 1992; The New Republic, 1992; The New York Times, 1992). President George H.W. Bush declared that the conflict was fuelled by ‘ancient, ethnic rivalries and hatreds’ (Bush, 1992c) concluding that the US did not ‘have a dog in the fight’ (Baker quoted in Power, 2003: 267). Despite early optimism, President Clinton initially adopted a similar position with regards to Bosnia. Yet, following the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, which saw the systematic slaughter of 8,000 men and boys, Clinton’s position shifted as he demanded new policy ideas, stating, ‘This has got to stop. We’ve got to find some kind of policy and move ahead’ (Clinton quoted in Halberstam, 2001: 317). Following sustained aggression from Serbian forces, Clinton, in conjunction with the US’s NATO allies, initiated Operation Deliberate Force on 30 August

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1995. This bombing campaign would lead to peace talks at Dayton, Ohio, and a negotiated end to the Bosnia war. But why did intervention occur at this time when acts of ethnic cleansing had taken place in Bosnia for several years? What was it about the massacre at Srebrenica that motivated this reinterpretation? Similarly, when Obama assumed the presidency in January 2009, he was averse to foreign interventions following drawn-​out conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the presidential campaign he advanced the argument that any decision to enter foreign conflicts should be based on ‘pragmatic judgements to keep our country safe’ (Obama, 2008). This culminated in his view that one of the president’s key roles was ‘don’t do stupid shit’ (Obama quoted in Goldberg, 2016). Despite this general aversion to foreign intervention, Obama would intervene in Libya following a rising threat of mass atrocity as Colonel Gaddafi threatened to exterminate the ‘cockroaches’ (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2011) even though intervention in Libya ‘was not a vital security interest of the United States’ (Gates, 2014: 511). Later, as Syria descended into civil war, he declared a ‘red line’ on the regime’s use of chemical weapons, stating that their use would ‘change my equation’ on the use of force (Obama, 2012). Yet, following the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta in 2013, Obama retreated from this threat, framing the issue not as a humanitarian issue but on the need to eliminate and prevent the further use of chemical weapons. In this way, he made the case for diplomacy arguing that using force might ‘inflict damage on Assad’ but it would not ‘eliminate the chemical weapons themselves’ (Obama quoted in Goldberg, 2016). Even President Trump, despite his transactional worldview and vehement disdain for foreign interventions, would succumb to similar variations in his decisions to use military force. Notably, when Obama considered military strikes in Syria 2013, Trump tweeted: ‘Do not attack Syria’ (Coll, 2017), arguing that there was no upside. Yet in 2017, following another round of chemical weapons attacks, despite asserting a strictly ‘America First’ foreign policy, Trump deviated professing a need to save ‘beautiful babies’ in Syria (Trump, 2017d). Such deviations continued to plague his foreign policy throughout his tenure, particularly in dealing with Iran. Such policy variations are prevalent across US foreign policy decisions to use force since the end of the Cold War. In this book, I build on constructivist and discursive institutionalist insights to show how different types and forms of ideas shape and influence interpretations of foreign policy interests, and more importantly, how it leads to variation in decisions around when and how to use force. In doing so, I attempt to provide a theoretical explanation and provide clarity with regard to how key decisions around the use of force were reached across the post-​Cold War presidencies of George H.W. Bush, to Donald Trump. Whether it is Clinton’s shift on Bosnia, the US’s shift from

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restraint regarding terrorism through the 1990s to a War on Terror, Obama’s intervention in Libya followed by a reversion to restraint in Syria, or Trump’s sporadic application of his ‘America First’ foreign policy doctrine, these are important policy deviations that warrant a deeper examination into the ideas at play. Oftentimes, cases that are similar between presidencies have seen significantly different responses. To answer why this occurs and provide a theoretical explanation, I ask the question: what explains variation in foreign policy decisions to use force when the material and social conditions of state interests remain formally the same?

Why ideas? In the absence of large-​scale shifts in the material or ideational bases of state interests, I argue that agents come to rely on cognitive or principled ‘beliefs about how to meet needs’ (Wendt, 1999: 130) to varying degrees as they interpret and reinterpret foreign policy interests. But what does this mean? In simple terms, it means that people, and more importantly, decision-​makers, react differently to information and ideas based on how they are presented. That is to say, ideas come in different forms. Conflicts can be presented as ‘atrocities’ or ‘civil wars’. Depending on the framing, they can spark very different assessments about how they should or can be managed.1 Take for instance, the current global refugee crisis. On a near weekly basis, we see headlines telling us that, somewhere in the world, an asylum-​ seeker boat has sunk leaving dozens, if not hundreds, who were on-​board to perish. Despite the ongoing tragedy, these stories have become so common they almost disappear into the overwhelming noise of international politics. Yet, when an asylum-​seeker boat capsized in the Mediterranean Sea near Bodrum, Turkey in September 2015, it captured the attention of the international community. Why? Because as the news of the tragedy broke it was accompanied by the photograph of a motionless three-​year-​old lying face down on the beach. The boy, Aylan (Alan) Kurdi, had drowned as his family, along with many others, attempted to flee the Syrian civil war. Whether it is just another headline or an image such as the one of Aylan, the same idea is being conveyed –​innocent lives are being lost amid a global crisis. But the image of Aylan conveyed the message in a far more emotive, and powerful way. Same idea, presented in a new way and interpreted differently. The challenge undertaken in this book is to demonstrate how different types and forms of ideas shape the process of foreign policy decision-​making and actually result in policy variation. To do this, I develop a theoretical framework utilizing Vivien Schmidt’s discursive institutionalist notion of different types and forms of ideas (Schmidt, 2008: 306–​09). In doing so,

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I show how agents use different types of ideas as weapons, resulting in either repression or displacement information pertinent to decision-​making (Blyth, 2002: 39–​40) as they contest the meaning of events. By taking a ‘nuts and bolts’ approach to examine the interplay between different types and forms of ideas it is possible to identify the sources of interpretive difference which lead to variation in decisions to use force. Interests are (re)interpreted and negotiated through principled and cognitive types of ideas as they are presented in different forms. This approach provides a means of examining the endogenous dynamics within presidential administrations by which events are interpreted to explain how and why variation and inconsistencies plague foreign policy decision-​making. If we are to truly understand the process of foreign policy decision-​making, we cannot attempt to reduce our analysis to simple cost-​benefit equations, nor interest-​based logics. Foreign policy decision-​making is an iterative process. A given set of conditions does not necessarily mean that agents will pursue preconceived interests they have formulated. In an effort to redress the shortcomings in existing approaches to foreign policy decision-​making and understand how agents come to interpret interests in principled or cognitive ways, I construct a three-​part model. In doing so, I show how agents’ interpretations of interests vary as a result of the interplay between different types of ideas in what Schmidt (2002) refers to as the ‘coordinative discourse of policy construction’. This approach highlights how agents repress and displace interpretations of interests in response to shifting types of information. First, where crises2 bring about a sense of uncertainty,3 state interests –​ broadly defined as ‘beliefs about how to meet needs’ (Wendt, 1999: 130) –​ ‘become something to be explained’ (Blyth, 2002: 9). Building on Vivien Schmidt’s (2008) discursive institutionalist disaggregation between different types of socially constructed ideas, I argue that ‘ideas reduce uncertainty’ (Blyth, 2002: 35–​6) in both principled and cognitive ways.4 Principled ideas5 offer value-​laden interpretations which speak to agents’ sense of ‘what’s right’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15) based on how they think the world should be. Cognitive ideas offer interpretations based on agents’ sense of the world as it is, providing a guide to ‘what works’. Second, to the extent that principled and cognitive ideas reduce uncertainty, setting agents up with a roadmap for political action, these ideas are used as weapons (Blyth, 2002) as agents contest the meaning of events with respect to foreign policy interests. Offering two mechanisms to explain variation in foreign policy decision-​making, I argue that where principled types of ideas dominate coordinative policy deliberations, ‘normative displacement’ results in a principled reinterpretation of interests as existing interpretations are cast aside so that agents can do ‘what’s right’.6 On the other hand, where cognitive

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ideas are upheld, ‘cognitive repression’ sees more principled interpretations repressed as agents instead look to do ‘what works’. Finally, I stress the role of interpretive leaders –​in this case, predominantly the president –​in defining and interpreting the national interest. As ‘interpretive leaders, presidents have been expected to define specific threats and crises in order to guide societal discussions of events in ways that affirm some set of understandings’ (Widmaier, 2007: 785).7 Given this role, presidents advance principled or cognitively laden communicative appeals8 as they seek to legitimize and shape foreign policy interests to both the Congress and the broader public. To the extent that presidential rhetoric is shaped to varying degrees by cognitive and principled types of ideas, constructions of foreign policy interests regarding the use of force will continually be subject to variation. Having developed this framework, I then trace the interplay between different types and forms of ideas within the ‘coordinative discourse of policy construction’ (Schmidt, 2002) of five post-​Cold War presidential administrations. First, I address policy variation toward the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia across the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Second, I show how Clinton’s repression of principled calls for a ‘forward-​ leaning’ foreign policy as he responded to al-​Qaeda perpetuated attacks throughout the 1990s, yet such restraint was displaced by a kind of principled overreaction towards the threat of terrorism in the Bush administration’s response to 9/​11. Third, I address variation in decisions to use force by the Obama administration in response to humanitarian atrocities as he deviated from his self-​proclaimed mantra, ‘don’t do stupid shit’, to intervene in Libya, but refused to enforce his own ‘red line’ as chemical weapons were used in Syria. Finally, I address variation in President Trump’s foreign policy as he deviated from his ‘America First’ platform in principled fashion to save ‘beautiful babies’ in Syria. By contrast, having withdrawn from the Iran nuclear deal and threatening Iran’s ‘obliteration’ in the event of war, Trump worked to de-​escalate tensions with Iran following the assassination of General Soleimani, repressing the injuries to US servicemembers in subsequent retaliatory strikes by the regime.

The debate so far … It is the job of a president and their administration to interpret everyday events and respond to them in line with the national interest. It is reasonable to assume that any rational state leader would work to pursue national security interests. After all, it is the leader’s responsibility to do what is best for their state. In reality, however, this pursuit of the national interest is much more complicated. Even as national interests may not change profoundly, interpretations concerning how best to achieve them do. While

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it is reasonable to assume that no two presidents will interpret interests in the same way, presidents have regularly made decisions that seem counter-​ intuitive to their own stated positions and worldviews. For the most part, these decisions go unnoticed or are not particularly consequential. But when it comes to highly consequential decisions such as those concerning the use of military force in US foreign policy, variations in decision-​making, and thus, variations in interpretations about how and when to use force, stand out and warrant explanation. Yet, albeit for different reasons, in prevailing paradigmatic debates variation in foreign policy decision-​making has been difficult to explain. In this section, I outline the limitations of existing approaches while highlighting the value of incorporating discursive institutionalist insights into constructivist and ontological security approaches. By developing a framework to understand how different types and forms of ideas influence foreign policy decision-​ making, it is possible to more deeply theorize how ideas shape foreign policy and lead to variation. In doing so, I show how the incorporation of discursive institutionalist insights into the constructivist and ontological security research agenda allows for a more holistic examination of the endogenous institutional dynamics that gives rise to varied interpretations of the national interest, and inconsistencies in foreign policy decision-​making. It is these competing tensions which make interpretive variations so significant to understanding change in foreign policy decision-​making, especially when the material or ideational bases on state interests remain relatively stable.

Rationalist limitations Consider first the realist9 perspective. Realists, broadly defined, stress systemic factors as the drivers of state interests. Given the anarchic nature of the international system, states define their interests in terms of ‘power’ (Morgenthau, 1985: 5). This is because in a system in which there is no higher authority, realists argue that states must act in a ‘self-​help’ manner to ensure their security and, ultimately, their survival (Waltz, 1979). Given the view that interests are systemically derived, realists see little room for variation in state interests given the constraining condition of anarchy.10 Major shifts in interests only occur when there is a change in the material distribution of capabilities, and the distribution of power in the international system. Such shifts redefine the possibilities for cooperation and conflict between states. But once set, they remain relatively stable. Even as realists differ on the extent to which systemic pressures push states to act defensively to secure interests, or offensively to maximize power (Mearsheimer, 2001)11 they broadly agree that interests remain stable absent systemic alternations in the balance of power. As Gilpin (1981: 48) argues, variations in the distribution

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of capabilities occur when there are war or other exogenous crises in the international system. While these realist positions are not without merit, their utility for understanding foreign policy decisions is, ultimately, limited. Such views are narrow, leaving little to no scope for agency in the formation and development of state interests. By assigning only a limited role to agency, realists tend to overrate the clarity of these so-​called systemically derived interests. In simple terms, they assume that things like the ‘balance of power’ are self-​evident and that agents will know how to interpret it in ways that maximize the security of the state. Yet, such approaches cannot explain prolonged strategic missteps such as overextensions in the War on Terror, failure to address rising security concerns in Syria, or the decision to intervene in Bosnia or Libya. Instead, these perspectives emphasize major systemic events, which change the balance of power, as the drivers of change and variation in US foreign policy, such as the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, and the rise of China. Neoclassical realists (Rose, 1998; Schweller, 1998; 2004; Dueck, 2006) have come to recognize the limits systemic pressures have in determining state interests. Offering a partial corrective, they have attempted to integrate both realist and constructivist insights to explain foreign policy decision-​making. They maintain the core assumption that ‘relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy’ while acknowledging that ‘[f]‌oreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being’ (Rose, 1998: 146–​7). Randall Schweller (2004: 166), for instance, suggests that ‘whether states balance against threats is not primarily determined by systematic factors but rather, like all national security decisions, by the domestic political process’. Similarly, Colin Dueck professes the existence of cultural forces or as he put it ‘four distinct strategic subcultures within the US’ which act to mediate systemic pressures (Dueck, 2006). Yet, causal relations in the neoclassical realist research agenda have, at best, been left murky, meaning that the dominance of one particular ‘strategic subculture’ or set of social forces at any given point in time has been left under-​explained. Neoclassical realists have often applied unit-​level variables in an ‘ad hoc’ manner leading to accusations that they ‘smuggle in’ social forces, including perceptions, domestic political arrangements and international norms, to explain variations in interpretations (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 34–​9). More recent efforts by Ripsman et al (2016) have attempted to rectify these oversights by clarifying the use of unit-​level intervening variables12 and how they can influence and shape the formation of foreign policy. However, causal relations remain opaque, leading to only a limited understanding of

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when, how and to what extent unit-​level variables matter at various points in time. In simple terms, the insights of neoclassical realists are important, but need to be taken much further in order to provide a generalizable causal account of when intervening variables, such as leader perceptions and strategic subcultures, matter. In a similar fashion, liberals13 concede that systemic pressures are not wholly determining. While different liberal approaches place emphasis on a wide array of variables, they provide greater scope to acknowledge competing domestic and systemic forces. Most notably, domestic neoliberals, including Peter Gourevitch (1978, 1996), suggest that preferences are derived to a greater extent by domestic coalitions in which domestic struggles act as an intervening variable, leading to a degree of variation in foreign policy. Similarly, Andrew Moravcsik (1997: 517) suggests, ‘Political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society’. In simple terms, domestic constituencies play an important role in determining state preferences because ‘policy requires politics’ (Gourevitch, 1986: 3). Such views mediate the emphasis placed by realists on balance of power incentives. While shifting focus to the domestic realm provides a more descriptive analysis, theoretically, the inability to explain variation in foreign policy decision-​making remains. Even coalitional preferences need to be interpreted, and this can be done in a range of fashions. Foreign policy agents need to not only interpret between potentially conflicting coalitional preferences, but they also need to interpret how best to pursue those interests. Much like their realist counterparts, liberal perspectives have overrated the interpretive efficiency of agents, assuming that agents can ‘know’ what their interests really are, thereby underrating the role of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Constructivism Beyond the rationalist focus on systemic and domestic coalitional pressures, constructivists emphasize the role of ideas in shaping state interests. In saying this, constructivists do not discount the importance of material incentives or the balance of power. But, as Widmaier (2016) summarizes, incentives do not ‘speak for themselves’. They must be interpreted in all social contexts. Importantly, constructivists have acknowledged that agents’ ability to make efficient use of information is impeded by uncertainty. In the constructivist view, ‘[i]‌dentities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a “portfolio” of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations’ (Wendt, 1992: 398). That is to say, identities and interests are mutually constitutive.14 They are not systemically given, rather, they are ‘constructed through a process of social interaction’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 2;

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see also Wendt, 1992). As Alexander Wendt (1999: 130) argues, ideas are interests defined as ‘beliefs about how to meet needs’. From such perspectives, what matters most in the construction of foreign policy is not so much the material distribution of power, though this is not insignificant –​but the ideas that give it meaning. Indeed, constructivist analyses on foreign policy have provided important insights into the ways in which ideas shape the national interest over time. In US foreign policy settings, Michael Roskin (1974: 567) has pointed to ‘generational paradigms’, seen as the succession of ‘conventional wisdoms’, where foreign policy preferences shift between ‘interventionism’ and ‘non-​ interventionism’ between generations ‘usually after some foreign policy catastrophe’.15 Jutta Weldes (1999: 10) shows how national interests are social constructions produced through ‘intersubjective and culturally established meanings within which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood’.16 Highlighting these dynamics, Weldes demonstrates how exogenous events, such as the Soviets’ installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962, are constructed as a ‘crisis’ through the internal deliberations of foreign policy agents operating within a pre-​existing ‘security imaginary’. This sees agents drawing on ‘quasi-​casual arguments’ such as the Munich analogy or domino theory to inform their actions in response to a perceived threat. Similarly, in his book, Analogies at War, Yuen Khong shows how such ‘analogical reasoning’ ‘help policy-​makers arrive at inferences’ (1992: 252) when facing uncertainty in the form of new foreign policy challenges. While constructivists have a greater appreciation of the impact of uncertainty and how socially constructed identities shape and influence state interests, second-​generation constructivists17 (see McCourt and Steele, 2017: 1), in particular, could be accused of underrating the inherent ‘ambiguity’ (Best, 2008; 2012) in social conventions, obscuring the ways in which agents can interpret shared ideas in a variety of ways.18 For instance, to provide better insights into the conditions under which ideas emerge, stabilize and take on self-​reinforcing momentum, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) developed the ‘norm life-​cycle theory’. Such theories emphasize ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘epistemic communities’19 who seek to clarify exactly what the idea is and educate leaders resulting in the internalization of these ideas. Once norms have reached ‘Stage 3’ of the ‘norm life-​cycle’, there is an assumption that states ‘know’ how to pursue a given norm and will do so out of habit. Similarly, Mark Blyth (2002: 37) argues that social conventions ‘promote stability’ and ideas act to ‘reduce uncertainty’. Yet, the notion that institutions ‘promote stability’ and that social conventions take on ‘self-​reinforcing’ qualities suggests that these second-​generation constructivists have fallen into the same

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assumptions as their rationalist counterparts regarding the capacity of agents to maintain institutional stability, limiting their ability to explain change absent exogenous crisis.20 Offering a partial corrective, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999) have worked to show how ‘pathologies’ emerge as agents work to stabilize institutional interests, leading them to become ‘insulated’ from ‘information that is essential to the accomplishment of goals’ (1999: 722–​3). In doing so, they show how institutions can become overly rigid over time, slowly ceasing, or even undermining, the goals they were established to pursue. In US foreign policy settings, Widmaier (2015) has shown how such pathologies can ‘impede flexibility and consensus’, leading agents to ‘waste’ information pertinent to stabilizing interests. To an extent, Graham Allison (1971) does acknowledge that bureaucratic politics within institutions allows some scope for variation given that an agent’s position within bureaucratic settings will shape their perceptions. He (1971: 144–​5) recognizes that the nature of foreign policy ‘permits fundamental disagreement among reasonable men’ who have different conceptions of ‘national goals’. However, Allison underrates the ways in which bureaucratic perspectives may themselves endogenously vary in compressed periods. In short, constructivists have tended to underrate the ambiguity inherent in social conventions, often overlooking the variety of ways in which such social conventions may be interpreted. More context, outlining the interplay of competing ideas and conceptions of ‘national goals’ is required to provide a more complete account of when and how varied interpretations of interests shape foreign policy decisions. Indeed, other theoretical traditions –​ most notably, histor ical institutionalism21 –​have recognized scope for agents to ‘incrementally’ adjust institutional arrangements. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen have identified a number of mechanisms whereby incremental adjustment is possible given that rules ‘can never be precise enough to cover the complexities of all possible real-​world situations’ (2010: 11). However, in recognizing scope for adjustment they assume that incremental changes to policy are effective in stabilizing institutions. In doing so, they obscure the variety of ways in which agents may use or ignore information pertinent to decision-​making. Thus, their capacity to explain change and variation in interests is limited.

Ontological security More recently, ontological security has emerged as an important and insightful line of inquiry in the field of International Relations. Building on constructivist insights, scholars of ontological security studies (Mitzen,

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2006; Steele, 2008; 2010: 2019; Zarakol, 2010; Subotić, 2016) have shown the important role that identity and state autobiographies play in understanding state behaviour and the development state interests. In doing so, ontological security has served as a bridge in the material versus ideas debate, demonstrating that states action is motivated by both material and identity needs. The basic notion here is that states pursue self-​identity needs, sometimes, even at the expense of physical security. States construct ‘autobiographical identity narratives’ (Innes and Steele, 2014) to help them make sense of their own behaviour in the international system and give their actions meaning (Subotić, 2016: 614). In such a view, threats to ontological security emerge as state agents interpret events as ‘critical situations’22 (Steele, 2008: 12), leading to a sense of ‘anxiety’ where narratives of the ‘Self ’ are challenged. This sense of insecurity regarding matters of self-​identity can emerge even where no physical threat to state security exists. Instead, these insecurities come about as a result of ‘shame’23 which translates into ‘state anxiety over the ability to reconcile past actions with the biographical narrative states use to justify their behaviour’ (Steele, 2008: 13). Ontological security perspectives, therefore, provide a more comprehensive explanation to account for identity-​based deviations from materially derived state interests recognizing that state action can be explained by efforts to maintain narratives of the ‘Self ’.24 While ontological security perspectives have taken vital steps in demonstrating how conditions of insecurity for state identities influence state behaviour, they would benefit from a more thorough analysis of how ideas behind narratives of the ‘Self ’ are cultivated and maintained. These approaches are ‘macro’ in their analysis concerning how conceptions of ‘shame’, ‘anxiety’ and conceptions of the ‘Self ’ are reproduced in ways that shape foreign policy choices. With the exception of Jelena Subotić (2016), scholars of ontological security have been parsimonious in their analysis of when and how narratives of states’ self-​identity shapes foreign policy. Narratives must be purposefully constructed by intentional agents in ways that demonstrate that a threat to ontological security is or is not present. Significantly, Delehanty and Steele (2009: 526) have noted that ontological security theorists are at risk of ‘[homogenizing] the national Self ’. In doing so, they risk overlooking the ways in which agents contest and interpret between multiple identity narratives in the construction of threats to ontological security. This is by no means a fatal flaw in the ontological security research agenda. Rather, it highlights the scope for further, deeper analysis of the interaction of ideas and narratives in shaping foreign policy decisions. This is especially necessary given that shameful historical memories, such as US inaction towards the Rwandan genocide, can be invoked in different cases by the same agents but yield vastly different decisions.

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Discursive institutionalism While ontological security perspectives offer important insights regarding the role that (self)biographical narratives play in shaping their behaviour, there remains scope for deeper analysis. This is because there remains variation in the foreign policy behaviour of states despite similar narratives which present potential threats to their sense of ‘Self ’. This requires a more in-​depth analysis of the endogenous ideational contestations that take place among foreign policy agents as they debate key decisions. Discursive institutionalism (see Schmidt, 2002; 2008; 2011; Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; 2018) has the tools to provide a more fine-​g rained approach to examine how ideas emerge and shape agents’ perceptions and interpretations in ways that can explain policy variations and deviations. Discursive institutionalism, sometimes referred to as the ‘new institutionalism’, is an umbrella term which encompasses a wide range of ‘interpretive’ approaches to the social sciences which take ‘ideas and discourse seriously’ (Schmidt, 2011: 107). Discursive institutionalists have attempted to provide greater scope for understanding variation in policy by examining the different types and forms of ideas at play. Moving beyond the basic premise that ‘ideas matter’, discursive institutionalists ask questions concerning when, where, why and how they matter (Schmidt, 2008: 305). In doing so, they provide important insights into the ways in which agents use and waste information. Such insights provide scope for deeper analysis into the endogenous dynamics which lead decision-​makers to interpret exogenous events in different ways. Discursive institutionalism not only has the potential to explain how ideas are used in policy deliberations, thereby providing insights into variation that is otherwise unexplained in security studies, it also promises to add substantial explanatory power to both constructivist and ontological security studies by showing when, how and why different types and forms of ideas matter. Discursive institutionalists attempt to understand the intersubjective contexts which make possible the rise of ideational tensions and inefficiencies. Such a view enables scholars to adopt a ‘value-​distributional’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15) approach, which distinguishes between two types of socially constructed ideas, rather than a power distributional one in which agents seek to maximize the utility of existing institutional designs.25 To be clear, discursive institutionalism is not an approach which suggests that agents can construct the world however they wish. Rather, it works to show how ideas and discursive abilities can maintain or bring change to institutions. Schmidt (2008: 306–​08) distinguishes between two types of socially constructed ideas: principled and cognitive. First, principled ideas outline ‘what one ought to do’. These ideas ‘resonate with a deeper core of …

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norms and values’, speaking to the ideals and aspirations of society.26 As Schmidt argues: ‘Normative ideas … attach values to political action and serve to legitimate the policies in a program through reference to their appropriateness’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306).27 By contrast, cognitive ideas28 provide the recipes or instructions on ‘what is and what to do’. They offer solutions to problems at hand by examining how institutional ideas define the problem to be solved. In this way: ‘Cognitive ideas –​also sometimes called causal ideas –​provide the recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and programs by speaking to their interest-​based logic and necessity’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306). Such cognitive ideas tend to be more refined in their application as they are determined by cost-​benefit calculations interpreted through agents’ understanding of how the world actually is. This distinction between different types of ideas provides an opening into understanding how agents interpret events in different ways. In simple terms, discursive institutionalism recognizes the need for agents to interpret between powerful, and potentially competing ideational forces which cannot always be reconciled. On the one hand, agents are committed to pursue principled types of ideas because they reflect the ‘aspirations and ideals’ of the world they wish we could have but can only aspire to. We may wish to eliminate evil from the world but remain unable to do so. At the same time, agents find themselves constrained by cognitive ideas which set out what is possible (or what they believe to be possible) within a particular set of institutional constraints. Carstensen and Schmidt (2016: 324) have highlighted a so-​called ‘power through ideas’ outlining agents’ capacity to persuade other actors to accept their views. In doing so, they recognize that the acceptance of a view may not represent the ‘best’ argument, rather the ‘persuasiveness of an idea depends on both the cognitive and normative (principled) arguments that can be mustered in its support’ (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016: 323–​4). Notably, Andrew Ross (2006: 199) has shown how principled beliefs tend to prefigure cognitive ones, arguing that shared values are ‘inspired and absorbed before being chosen’ acting to ‘tinge our intellectual beliefs’ in ways that we may not be fully aware. From this perspective, value-​laden judgements can yield ‘inarticulable dimensions of identity’ which ‘exceeds the conscious awareness of intentional agents’ (Ross, 2006: 211) given that ‘people regularly perceive, feel and act before they think’29 (Hopf, 2010: 539) given the presence of unthinking ‘habits’30 which ‘permit rapid, not necessarily accurate, categorizations of people and events’.31 Given tensions between these different interpretations, there is scope for policy variations outside of shifts to ideational or material structures. This is particularly likely when agents face uncertainty about their situations.

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In addition to different types of ideas, discursive institutionalists emphasize the different forms that ideas come in. These include, but are not limited to, narratives, frames, stories, collective memories, myths scripts, scenarios and images (Schmidt, 2008: 309).32 Referred to as the ‘terms’ of discourse by Connolly (1983), the different forms that ideas take pattern how arguments are made, as well as which ideas are represented. In simple terms, ideas that come in different forms can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Certain forms will be more persuasive than others. Additionally, discursive institutionalists highlight how ideas can be sustained in different rhetorical forms (Schmidt, 2006; 2008; 2010). Schmidt distinguishes between ‘communicative’ and ‘coordinative’ discourse as forms of communicating ideas. Communicative discourse refers to the ways in which ideas are communicated to the general public, specifically highlighting ‘the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas’. Coordinative discourse, on the other hand, refers to the discourse where ideas are deliberated by a narrow group of elites ‘at the centre of policy construction’ whose appeals often seek to limit principled influences in debate (2008: 310). In his highly innovate analyses of the construction of foreign policy (2015) and economic (2016) orders, Wesley Widmaier (2015; 2016) shows how different types of ideas are used over time to create stability, followed by increasing instability within institutions. These analyses examine how crises provide scope for the principled (re)construction of new policy which are ‘intellectually refined’, becoming increasingly inefficient over time (2016: 20–2). This approach provides important insights concerning the influence of different types and forms of ideas in the rise and fall of political orders. But there is room for greater analysis. For instance, Widmaier suggests that Clinton ‘lacked a principled foundation for humanitarian interventions and shifted back and forth from retrenchment to advancement’ (Widmaier, 2015: 18). Given this lack of principled foundation for humanitarian interventions, the question becomes: how did Clinton come to instigate interventions on some occasions and not others? More fundamentally, what are the underlying factors that led agents to respond to some crises in one way, yet when similar crises emerge, they respond differently? It is clear that there is scope for a more fine-​g rained analysis of the ideas around key events that motivated specific foreign policy decisions. To date, discursive institutionalist approaches have not provided much in the way of causal mechanisms through which preferences are interpreted in principled or cognitive ways. While discursive institutionalists provide valuable insights into the potential for agents to waste information the process through which this happens has been unclear. Examining this issue in greater detail promises to provide valuable insights into the ways

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in which agents use and absorb information as they interpret interests through these different types of ideas. This, in turn, may lead to a greater capacity to explain policy choice that seems to deviate from the pursuit of incentive-​driven preferences. Most importantly, discursive institutionalism can provide additional theoretical rigour to existing constructivist and ontological security approaches given its emphasis on disaggregating between the different types and forms of ideas. Notably, it acts as a useful framework for understanding how states maintain ontological security because it helps to disaggregate how multiple narratives of the ‘Self ’ are developed and maintained by examining the ideas behind it. The notion of these different types of ideas is not far removed from ontological security perspectives which seek to explain state behaviour with reference to their internally derived identities and sense of ‘Self ’. Indeed, the discursive institutionalist categorization of normative or principled types of ideas closely link into states’ identity. This is because such principled ideas, which outline ‘what’s right’ and ‘what ought to be done’, are products of social construction within the state over time. These can, though not always, be quite separate to material security needs, just like ontological security’s emphasis on narratives of the ‘Self ’. Establishing a connection between this discursive institutionalist distinction with ontological security may provide added value by establishing a greater understanding of how agents successfully link principled ideals and aspirations to events and establish a potential threat to the state’s self-​identity in situations where material interests are not at stake. It provides a framework with which to understand how grievances are cultivated into narratives of ontological security. This is not to suggest that a state’s sense of ‘Self ’ is not always a factor to some extent in foreign policy decisions, but the addition of discursive institutionalism will help to establish when it becomes a dominant factor in foreign policy decision-​making by providing context to the ideas being debated.

Theoretical framework: uncertainty, weaponization and interpretation In developing my theoretical framework, I highlight the ways in which agents come to interpret interests through different types of ideas. As such, this framework is capable of explaining variation in agent interpretations. It should be noted that I do not discount realist claims regarding the importance of the balance of power. Material factors such as the distribution of power are always important, but they need to be interpreted. Rationalist approaches overrate interpretive efficiency, providing little capacity to explain varied interpretations of state interests. Deviations are typically cast as errors by

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otherwise rational agents that will ‘cancel out’ over time. I do not suggest that my theoretical approach can explain everything nor correct all preceding theoretical oversights. But it does provide greater clarity in understanding how and when different types of ideas become influential and come to dominate foreign policy deliberations. The question I seek to answer is how, in foreign policy decision-​making, individual agents influence –​or are influenced –​by the types and forms of ideas they are presented with. As mentioned earlier, such an analysis builds on constructivist and ontological security perspectives by enabling a more in-​depth analysis of the forces which shape foreign policy decision-​making. The three-​staged framework that follows enables a ‘nuts and bolts’ analysis of the differences in how and why presidential administrations do, or do not, come to decisions to use force.

Ideas reduce uncertainty: principled and cognitive interpretations During crises or events which bring about uncertainty, agents’ interests –​ defined as ‘beliefs about how to meet needs’ (Wendt, 1999: 130) –​become ‘something to be explained, rather than something with which to do the explaining’ (Blyth, 2002: 9). In this context, ideas act as ‘interpretive frameworks’ providing agents with ‘both a scientific and normative critiques’ which act as ‘blueprints’ for the construction of policy (Blyth, 2002: 37). In this way, ideas can help reduce the scope of interpretation. Concerning the interpretation of national interests, I first stress that ideas reduce uncertainty in different ways. Incorporating Schmidt’s (2008) distinction between principled and cognitive types of ideas with Mark Blyth’s notion that ideas reduce uncertainty provides insight into the categories of ideas we may expect to observe in the foreign policy process. Principled types of ideas tend to play to the ‘aspirations and ideals’ of agents and serve to ‘legitimate policies by reference to their appropriateness’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306–​07). Agents may not be fully unaware that they hold such values until confronted with crises or situations of uncertainty, as such principled ideas tend to prefigure cognitive ones given that they are ‘inspired … before being chosen’ (Ross, 2006: 199). Principled ideas act as a means of providing agents with an understanding of ‘what’s right’ and how they wish they could respond based on how they feel. This has links to ontological security given that understanding ‘what’s right’ is intrinsically linked to how agents and states identify the ‘Self ’. By contrast, cognitive types of ideas are grounded in institutionalized, ‘interest-​based logics’. These set the parameters of what agents believe to be possible within existing institutional constraints. They provide agents with ‘recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action’ (Blyth, 2002: 39). Agents

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interpret information with reference to ‘what works’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15) given their understanding of what can be done with the resources they have based on past success and failures. Such ideas are grounded in institutionalized types of frameworks including, for instance, the Powell Doctrine, which sets forth very specific criteria concerning the deployment of US military assets in conflict. Cognitive types of ideas also act to reduce uncertainty by outlining what agents believe can be done. Yet, these interpretations are limited because they are based on what has worked in the past. This may not necessarily be an accurate reflection of existing circumstances. Simply put, agents professing such ideas could be accused of ‘fighting the last war’ or solving yesterday’s crisis. Taken together, different types of ideas reduce uncertainty in cognitive and principled ways setting out both what we ‘wish’ we could do to pursue and maintain our ideals and aspirations, as well as setting out what is believed ‘can’ be done. Where the two cannot be reconciled, tensions emerge providing scope for variation. This is particularly prevalent given that principled ideas tend to prefigure cognitive ones. Such tensions can be seen within presidential speeches and are acknowledged explicitly by President Obama. He claimed that he held an ‘impulse to save innocent people from tyrants’ while being ‘profoundly wary of ordering any kind of military action’ (Obama, 2020: 654). During the construction of his Nobel Acceptance speech in 2009, for instance, Samantha Power argued for the inclusion of an explicit argument for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).33 While being sympathetic to the principled nature of this plea, Obama declined the suggestion adopting the more cognitively based position that even well-​intentioned action in pursuit of righteous causes can have unintended consequences.34 For Obama, explicitly stating support for the R2P ran the risk of producing excessive expectations on the US to intervene in places outside of their vital security interests, even if there was a desire to intervene and ‘do the right thing’.

Ideas as weapons: mechanisms Having reduced uncertainty by providing agents with a sense of ‘what works’ and ‘what’s right’, ideas act as weapons. That is to say, agents contest the significance of these principled and cognitive interpretations as they try to determine the best way to pursue state interests in a given situation. In US foreign policy settings, major decisions, particularly on the use of force, are made within presidential administrations. Presidential administrations include a variety of individuals, each with their own set of values and beliefs. As such, these different interpretations hold varying levels of significance between agents. Importantly, ideas present in different forms which significantly affect

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the way in which agents come to interpret interests.35 Furthermore, the forms that ideas take will have different influences on agents depending on their own experiences, values and beliefs. Some will adopt more principled interpretations, such as Madeline Albright towards mass atrocities in Bosnia; others, like Powell held more cognitive ideas, with reference to ‘what works’ by drawing comparisons with Vietnam. These different types of ideas become the basis for institutional debates as agents contest the best way to pursue and realize state interests.36 Blyth (2001: 4) argues, ‘In deploying … ideas as weapons, agents can restructure existing institutional arrangements by defining not only the causes of a perceived … problem but also the solutions for dealing with it’. Building on this notion, I show how this is an ongoing process within US presidential administrations when decision-​makers are presented with competing interpretations concerning how best to pursue state security interests. Principled ideas work to displace (Rees, 2020: 231) interests where existing institutional preferences conflict with agents’ sense of ‘what’s right’ in a given situation. On the other hand, cognitive ideas are weapons because they highlight the world as it is, or more colloquially ‘what works’. Yet, in doing so, they act to repress37 principled sources of information, and refine interests by advancing notions of ‘what works’. Institutionalized policies serve to limit the scope and agency of policy-​making to what is only possible using certain ‘embedded’ ideas (Blyth, 2001: 4).38 In this way, both principled and cognitive types of ideas can act as weapons as agents seek to change or maintain institutional preferences. But this leads to the question: how do agents first come to implement principled or cognitive interpretations? Further on I develop two mechanisms through which interests are first interpreted: normative displacement and cognitive repression. I explain how these mechanisms advance certain types of ideas giving them more weight at particular moments in time. In doing so, I show how varying reliance on different types of ideas in foreign policy decision-​making can lead to policy variation even within the same administration. I am not suggesting that one type of idea is better suited to the pursuit of the national interest. I am working to show that the national interest can be interpreted in vastly different ways depending on the dominant types and forms of ideas present at the moment when decisions are made. Normative displacement The first mechanism I have termed ‘normative displacement’ (Rees, 2020: 231; 2021). Normative displacement sees institutional preferences yield as events are interpreted in more principled ways based on agents’ beliefs regarding ‘what’s right’. Moments of crisis, which give rise to uncertainty,

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lend themselves to principled interpretations as agents ‘feel before they think’ (Hopf, 2010: 539) bringing forth value-​laden interpretations which agents may have been unaware that they had (Ross, 2006). These interpretations become particularly powerful when they can be linked to past events or call into question narratives of the ‘Self ’ creating a sense of insecurity that can only be rectified by doing ‘something’.39 These powerful forms spur value-​laden interpretations as agents react to incoming information based on how they feel. In US foreign policy terms, the threat of mass atrocities in Libya in 2011 served to challenge Obama’s preference for avoiding military entanglement despite his restraint through early crises in the Arab Spring. During National Security Council (NSC) debates on Libya, Susan Rice and Samantha Power were able to draw parallels between the mass atrocity-​style rhetoric spouted by Colonel Gaddafi, and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Rice, 2019: 282).40 Given the uncertainty of the situation, this parallel made the threats to the rebel-​stronghold in Benghazi difficult to overcome as principled narratives reshaped and framed debate within the administration. Given the potential for agents to draw such parallels, they may feel that existing interpretations of interests –​such as Obama’s ‘don’t do stupid shit’ mantra –​do not accord with their conceptions of ‘what’s right’ resulting in a displacement of existing interpretations of interests. While such narrative links may be ‘associatively coherent’,41 they do not necessarily provide an accurate representation of the similarities between the past event and the current crisis. Significantly, interpretations are not necessarily the same between different agents. Therefore, principled ideas may not emerge in the same way across events –​ such as situations of mass atrocity, despite similar conditions being present. Where such principled interpretations do come to dominate deliberations, interests are redefined per agents’ beliefs about what ‘ought’ to be done or ‘what’s right’. This results in normative displacement where more refined cognitive interpretations are cast aside. This results in policy variations and inconsistency, such as Obama’s decision to use force in Libya. For the most part, deviations brought about by the displacement of cognitive interpretations are temporary as the principled ideas, and the narratives that support them, are unique to the specific event in question. However, normative displacement can see a permanent change in the way interests are interpreted. For instance, President Bill Clinton’s response to the massacre at Srebrenica demonstrated that the US could utilize limited military force to pursue their humanitarian goals without jeopardizing core security interests. In circumstances in which the level of uncertainty is more extreme, the lack of cognitive guideposts may see a more sustained principled overreaction. Events such as the 9/​11 terrorist attacks may produce conditions under which uncertainty becomes so overwhelming, agents are forced to reinterpret

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interests in ways that may lead to principled overreaction. Such uncertainty allowed President George W. Bush’s reinterpretation of US interests to be sustained, laying the principled foundation for the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq. Cognitive repression The second mechanism I advance is ‘cognitive repression’. By contrast with normative displacement which sees principled interpretations define interests with reference to ‘what’s right’, cognitive repression tends to see such principled influences ‘repressed’. Cognitive repression occurs where cognitive types of ideas dominate arguments around how to respond to crises. Such cognitive types of ideas represent existing institutional preferences and are based on agents’ understandings of what has previously worked, or not worked, in a given situation. They are the instructions held within institutional frameworks on how to respond to crises. In simple terms, cognitive repression sees agents attempt to reduce uncertainty by adapting existing institutional solutions to fit new and emerging challenges. In this way, institutional constraints and conventional wisdoms lead agents to make more cognitive judgements by providing ‘recipes’ (Schmidt, 2008: 306) which guide agents’ understanding of what is likely to ‘work’ in advancing state interests. Using existing frameworks is likely to result in more consistent implementations of interests as the repression of principled sources of information from decision-​making limits the scope for variation. For instance, the Powell Doctrine served to remove principled influences from the decision-​making process by setting specific criteria concerning when and how military force could be used. These criteria asked how the national interest would be served through the use of force, and whether the mission in question was achievable. Emotion, and how decision-​makers ‘felt’ was not a reason to deploy US forces. I am not suggesting that consistency necessarily means that cognitive ideas yield decisions which are more correct or effective in the pursuit or maintenance of state interests. Given that all events and crises are different, efforts to conform to existing conventional wisdoms may result in attempts to fit old solutions to new or evolving problems.42 This type of intellectual refinement has the potential to be constraining –​leading to a kind of ‘intellectual path dependency in policy making’ (Blyth, 2001: 4) as agents fail to adjust policy in light of new information that renders conventional wisdoms insufficient for dealing with the issue.43 In other words, it may see the repression of principled sources of information that is necessary for adjusting preferences. For instance, strict adherence to the Powell Doctrine limited the scope of response to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, leading to inaction. In a similar

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way, Obama’s desire to avoid entanglement in prolonged foreign conflicts would see him repress principled arguments for intervention in the Syrian crisis. In spite of his so-​called ‘red line’ refining the issue from preventing humanitarian atrocities to maintaining international norms against the use of chemical weapons in order to justify a legalistic, diplomatic approach.

Interpretive leadership Finally, following the presentation and debate of these different types of ideas, I stress the role of interpretive leaders.44 As interpretive leaders, presidents have been expected to define specific threats and crises in order to guide ‘societal discussions of events in ways that affirm some set of understandings’ (Widmaier, 2007: 785).45 As such, interpretive leaders justify foreign policy decisions by explaining and defining how decisions fit with the national interests. Similarly, Ronald Krebs (2015: 136) describes the president as the ‘story-​teller-​in-​chief ’. Given this role, presidents advance principled or cognitively laden communicative appeals (Schmidt, 2008: 310; 2014) as they seek to legitimize and shape foreign policy interests. These communicative appeals are important because, as Jeffrey Tulis (1987) argues, ‘Rhetorical practice is not merely a variable; it is also an amplification or vulgarization of the ideas that produce it.’ To the extent that presidential rhetoric is shaped by cognitive or principled types of ideas, constructions of foreign policy interests will continually be subject to variation. Such variation emerges as presidents issue communicative appeals justifying foreign policy decisions to either the use of force or adopt a position of restraint.46 For instance, following initial deliberations in the aftermath of the 9/​11 attacks, President Bush issued principled appeals to the Congress and the public. In his address, he would justify the declaration of a War on Terror by comparing the terrorist ideology to ‘all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century’, declaring, ‘Every nation, in every region of the world, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001c). In doing so, Bush was able to utilize the principled interpretations formed within the administration, laying the foundation for the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, in justifying the decision to exercise restraint in the aftermath of chemical weapons attacks in Syria, Obama argued: ‘The United States of America is prepared to use all elements of our power, including military force, to secure our core interests in the region … But I also believe that we can rarely achieve these objectives through unilateral American action, particularly through military action’ (Obama, 2013b). In doing so, Obama sought to justify more cognitive arguments for restraint in the face of ongoing humanitarian atrocities. The role of interpretive

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leaders is an important one as they need to justify foreign policy decisions demonstrating how they fit with the national interest.

Method This study takes a ‘nuts and bolts’ approach to show how and why presidents do, or do not, resort to the use of force in foreign policy by examining the types and forms that ideas take. This requires an in-​depth analysis of ‘in the room’, ‘experience near’ (Geertz, 1987: 134) accounts of presidential administrations in order to examine the ideas being contested in the lead-​ up to decisions on the use of force. While it is impossible to know exactly what agents are thinking, it is possible to infer how they view an event or crisis based on the ideas that they express. This requires a ‘structured, focussed’ (George and Bennett, 2005: 67) approach to analyze the interplay of different types and forms of ideas. In order to get a sense of the in-​the-​room debates, I utilize biographies from senior foreign policy agents within these presidential administrations, as well as journalistic accounts to determine the types of ideas being debated through the recollections of these agents. I also draw extensively on the speeches47 made by presidents and senior administration officials to examine how such ideas were communicated. The two case studies on the Trump administration have been the most challenging to attain information on. At the time of writing, President Trump has just recently left office. As such, the public record is very young. Much information regarding some of the meetings of the NSC remains classified. Furthermore, only a handful of administration officials have released memoirs and biographies.48 Because of this, material on Trump has a slightly greater reliance on journalistic accounts. In conjunction with the speeches and biographies that are available it is still possible to draw inferences with regards to the internal deliberations taking place during this period. In order to distinguish between the different types of ideas, I make interpretive judgements based on the rhetoric used by agents. While I acknowledge that this is itself a subjective process and reasonable people could disagree as to exactly what constitutes a cognitive or principled idea, it is important to recognize that these types of ideas exist and affect agents’ decision-​making in different ways, resulting in policy variation. Where agents’ interpretations of events are deemed to be consistent with past positions or statements of the administration, I have determined that such ideas are cognitive rather than principled. This is not to suggest that there were no principled considerations when, for instance, Colin Powell advocated restraint rather than intervention in Bosnia. However, such ideas were consistent with the administration’s stance on the use of force in foreign policy and was built around conceptions of what was likely to work.

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Interpretations that differ from existing policy frameworks, or that promote deviation from stated policy have been designated as principled ideas.49 In terms of issue area and case selection, these represent ‘least likely’ (Odell, 2001; Eckstein, 1975) contexts for significant policy variations. This is because instances in which the use of force is considered are highly consequential and made by decision-​makers who have relatively clear preferences and access to information and intelligence. Thus, the argument that different types and forms of ideas lead to policy variation can be comprehensively tested. ‘Least likely’ cases are important as they provide strong, though not unqualified, evidence that a theory will be valid in most other cases. Interventions in Bosnia and Libya serve as important cases in this regard. Senior administration officials said in relation to conflict in the Balkans that the US has ‘no dog in the fight’. Similarly, there were no ‘strategic interests’ in Libya. This means that subsequent interventions cannot be explained with reference to existing, rationalist frameworks. This suggests that the explanation could, therefore, rest in the types and forms of ideas asserted during deliberations. The one exception is George W. Bush’s response to the 9/​11 attacks. Given the uncertainty cast as a result of the attacks, this serves as a ‘most-​likely’ case (Odell, 2001: 166).

Plan of the book Having developed this framework, I apply it to explain variation in foreign policy decisions to use force across the five post-​Cold War presidencies in key cases of humanitarian atrocity and terrorism. In doing so, I trace the interplay between principled and cognitive types of arguments from ‘in the room’ debates as presidents work to make key foreign policy decisions. By tracing these tensions, I show how different types of ideas are used in debate leading presidents to either repress or displace information resulting in variation in decisions to use force. The cases and mechanisms are summarized in Table 1.1. Previewing these substantive arguments, the book is divided into four empirical sections, each with two chapters. Each chapter unpacks a case in which the use of force was considered by the president. In the first part, I trace over two chapters the shift from repression to displacement in US interests in decisions to use force to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In Chapter 2, I highlight the reluctance within the Bush administration to use force in foreign interventions in the post-​Cold War world to avoid Vietnam-​style quagmire. I show how cognitive ideas were employed to repress principled sources of information as humanitarian atrocities and ethnic cleansing ravaged Bosnia. As such, Bosnia would be cast as a civil war driven by ‘ancient, ethnic tensions’ (Bush, 1992b) in a ‘tough and nasty neighbourhood’ (Scowcroft in Halberstam, 2001: 42). Similarly, despite

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Table 1.1: Mechanisms in the cases President

Crisis

Type –​ form of ideas

Mechanism

Intervention/​use of force?

George H.W. Bush

Bosnia I

Cognitive –​ narratives

Cognitive repression

None

Bill Clinton

Bosnia II (Srebrenica)

Principled –​ images, collective memories, narratives

Normative displacement

Yes –​no-​fly zone and Operation Deliberate Force, including the deployment of 20,000 troops

Bill Clinton

US Embassy Cognitive –​ bombings and narratives USS Cole

Cognitive repression

Limited –​Operation Infinite Reach –​cruise missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan

George W. Bush

9/​11 and Iraq Principled –​ Normative narratives and displacement collective memories

Yes –​War on Terror and decision to invade Iraq

Barack Obama

Libya

Principled –​ narratives, collective memories

Normative displacement

Yes –​no-​fly zone and Operation Unified Protector

Barack Obama

Syria

Cognitive –​ collective memories, images

Cognitive repression

No –​but renewed diplomatic efforts to eliminate chemical weapons

Donald Trump

Syria

Principled –​ images

Normative displacement

Limited –​2017 Shayrat missile strike

Donald Trump

Iran

Cognitive –​ collective memories, narratives

Cognitive repression

Limited –​principled escalation –​ assassination of General Soleimani –​but immediate de-e​ scalation

fierce contestation between National Security Advisor Madeleine Albright who likened the atrocities to the Holocaust, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell in the Clinton administration, Albright’s more principled, pro-​intervention ideas were unable to displace Powell’s more refined cognitive interpretations regarding ‘what works’. In Chapter 3, I show how these cognitive interpretations came to be ‘displaced’ following the massacre of 8,000 men and boys in Srebrenica. The atrocities came to be reinterpreted in more humanitarian, rather than strategic terms, succinctly

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outlined when Vice President Al Gore asked the question, ‘What should I tell my daughter?’. This reinterpretation resulted in a limited intervention and the cessation of hostilities as the conflict was interpreted with respect to ‘what’s right’. In the second part, I trace the repression and displacement of US interests concerning the use of force in response to terrorism through the 1990s to the War on Terror. In Chapter 4, I show how Clinton, despite numerous efforts by al-​Qaeda to attack US targets,50 ‘repressed’ principled calls from domestic groups, including the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), to assert a more aggressive campaign against the emerging terrorist threat. Notably, even limited efforts by Clinton to respond to the 1998 US Embassy bombings were met with accusations that the administration was deploying a ‘Wag the Dog’ style foreign policy. Similarly, President George W. Bush would adopt a position of restraint, ‘repressing’ the emerging threat, even as confirmation that the attack on USS Cole in late 2000 was yet another effort made by al-​Qaeda. In Chapter 5, I show how the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 saw a fundamental, and principled reinterpretation of state interests as the more restrained approach adopted by Bush was displaced. Specifically, I show how the displacement of interests under such uncertainty enabled a sustained and ongoing construction of the War on Terror and a foundation for the war in Iraq as Bush developed an ‘us against them’ narrative, vowing to go after state sponsors of terror, and those who ‘harbor them’ (Bush, 2001b). In the third section, I address variation in decisions to use force within the Obama administration. In Chapter 6, I trace the types of ideas which led Obama to displace his self-​professed mantra, ‘don’t do stupid shit’. Upon assuming the presidency, Obama professed a foreign policy based on a kind of realist restraint. He had been a fierce critic of the War on Terror, oftentimes stating during the campaign that he was not against wars, just ‘dumb wars’ (Obama, 2007b). While maintaining this restraint through democratic revolutions during the Arab Spring, Libya would serve to challenge this approach. In 2011, Libya rapidly descended into violence sparking concerns that mass atrocities would ensue. Such concerns were exacerbated as Libya’s leader Colonel Gaddafi referred to members of the Libyan rebellion as ‘cockroaches’ (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2011). This genocidal rhetoric caused members of Obama’s administration to assert, ‘This is like Rwanda’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 113). Despite having ‘no strategic interest’ (Gates, 2014: 511) in Libya, these powerful, principled ideas served to effectively displace Obama’s restraint as he pushed for a decisive Security Council resolution to allow the protection of civilians by ‘any means necessary’ (UNSC, 2011b). In Chapter 7, I trace the types of ideas which led Obama to repress principled arguments for intervention in Syria. Following the intervention in Libya

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and the presence of equally strong narratives on the mass atrocities occurring in Syria under his watch, Obama’s aversion to foreign intervention would re-​emerge. Despite initial suggestions of a ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons and having his ‘finger on the trigger’ after chemical weapons attacks in 2013, Obama would repress principled calls for intervention, even as they broadly came from the same advocates who pushed for intervention in Libya (Obama, 2012). I argue that Obama ultimately came to frame the crisis in legalistic terms regarding the international taboo on the use of chemical weapons, rather than as a humanitarian atrocity given the lack of a ‘Benghazi to be saved’. This enabled a repression of more principled sources of information and, thus, a different outcome despite very similar circumstances in the build-​up. In the fourth and final empirical section, I trace decisions to use force by the Trump administration. In Chapter 8, I trace Trump’s decision-​making with reference to the crisis in Syria, highlighting variations around his ‘America First’ doctrine (Trump, 2017a). Specifically, I examine the decision to bomb Syrian airfields following the chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime in April 2017. I argue that images of the attack –​in which children were seen foaming at the mouth –​temporarily caused a displacement of Trump’s ‘America First’ vision in order to defend the ‘beautiful babies’ (Trump, 2017d; Wolff, 2018: 192–​4) as Trump interpreted US interests in Syria in more principled terms.51 Yet, despite this momentary departure, Trump would return to his foreign policy doctrine, subsequently ordering the withdrawal of US troops from Northern Syria in October 2019, abandoning Kurdish allies in the process (Wright, 2019). Finally, in Chapter 9, I trace Trump’s handling of the Iranian crisis. Beginning early in his presidency, Trump asserted principled appeals in order to justify withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) which eventually occurred in May 2018. Following the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, relations with Iran quickly deteriorated as Trump reconstructed the principled threat posed by the Iranian regime. These tensions culminated in the critical moment in which Trump authorized the assassination of the Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani. Iran quickly retaliated with a missile strike against an Iraqi air base leaving over 100 US soldiers injured. Rather than continuing escalation and becoming entrapped in a wider regional conflict, Trump ‘repressed’ the impact of these strikes in an effort to de-​escalate the crisis and avoid war. In the concluding chapter, I address five theoretical and scholarly implications. First, variations in foreign policy decision-​making within presidential administrations are common. When presidents come into office, they do so with a certain set of preferences which shape the way in which they see the world. In all situations, agents are pursuing what they believe

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to be a rationalist logic in terms of their interpretations of interests. The foreign policy decision-​making process is not made on the basis of clear-​cut interest-​driven logics. Preferences are reshaped as events pose challenges to their beliefs about ‘what works’. As such, presidents’ interpretations of foreign policy interests are subject to variation by the natural passage of events. Second, agents within presidential administrations hold power at different times. For instance, Susan Rice and Samantha Power had decisive influence in the Obama administration as conditions in Libya indicated the potential for mass atrocities. Yet, both were virtually silenced in debates following mass atrocities and the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This highlights the fact that interests are interpreted in different ways, even given the rise of a similar set of conditions, that is, humanitarian crises. Third, agent interpretations of interests are heavily influenced by the forms in which information is provided or made available. Fourth, in addition to providing an explanation of how agent interpretations vary given the presence of principled or cognitive ideas, this study highlights the capacity of both types of ideas to yield ineffective policy. Fifth, the president, ultimately, makes the final decision. While other agents in the administration may possess varying levels of power from one crisis to another where the types of information may be subject to ongoing variation, it is up to the president to make the final decision. Given that the president makes the final decision and interpretations of foreign policy interests vary even as the material and social conditions of state interests remain formally the same, the sources of variation must come from endogenous tensions between these different types of ideas. These dynamic sources of information explain why presidents’ interpretations vary. Taken as a whole, this study highlights the need for scholars to be more aware of the interplay between principled and cognitive interpretations that arise endogenously in institutional deliberations. These insights reinforce the large claim of this study that tensions between different types and forms of ideas lead to different interpretations of interests resulting in variations in foreign policy decision-​making.

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PART II

US Foreign Policy and Mass Atrocities in the Balkans

2

‘We Don’t Have a Dog in the Fight’: Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia Introduction Throughout the early 1990s, US policy towards the conflict in Bosnia varied significantly despite relative stability in material and coalitional alignments. In Part II, I trace the variations in America’s policy towards ethnic cleansing in Bosnia across the presidencies of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Specifically, I ask: why did both administrations seek to avoid military engagement in Bosnia, only for Clinton to have a change of heart in 1995? This is a significant case in US foreign policy decision-​ making regarding decisions to use military force abroad for the purpose of preventing mass atrocities. It spans two presidential administrations and given that national security arguments against the use of force remained fundamentally unchanged, it represents a ‘least likely’ case. In this chapter, I examine the Bush and Clinton administrations’ early management of the crisis in Bosnia. I highlight the way in which cognitive repression saw more cognitive interpretations of US interests regarding the balance of power advanced as US interests were intellectually refined to avoid affective influences. In this way –​even as the Vietnam-​era hangover eased following early successes in the Persian Gulf war –​the Powell Doctrine1 would become entrenched in the Bush administration’s foreign policy. In the second section, I show that even as Clinton appealed for greater US involvement in Bosnia, citing the need to exercise American leadership and a responsibility to our fellow human beings, the risks presented by taking action soon became overwhelming. When Clinton came to office, he would conform to a policy similar to that of the Bush administration. In doing so, he ‘repressed’ principled efforts by members of the administration –​including Vice President Al Gore, and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright –​and his initial impulses to implement a ‘lift and strike’

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policy. Instead, Clinton found himself siding with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell’s more cognitive efforts to avoid a quagmire, just as his predecessor had done.

Cognitive repression in Bosnia: ‘We do deserts, not mountains or jungles’ Even as success in the Persian Gulf  2 saw the Bush administration begin to move beyond post-​Vietnam-​era restraint, the administration remained cautious when it came to the use of military force in foreign interventions. Military force was not to be used unless there was a clear and present danger to the vital national security interests of the US. Bosnia would be cast as being just too risky for the US to engage militarily, risking a quagmire. Given the successes in the Persian Gulf and resistance to action in the Balkans, military officials would advance strong institutional preferences asserting the notion: ‘We do deserts, not mountains or jungles’ (Dunnigan and Macedonia, 2001: 13).3 Throughout this section, I highlight the Bush administration’s efforts to repress principled calls for intervention in Bosnia. In doing so, I show how Bush’s Bosnia policy was formulated through more cognitive interpretations entrenched in institutional, technocratic preferences of risk minimization in an effort to avoid a quagmire. In doing so, Bush would play down the seriousness of the conflict, casting it as a ‘European problem’ (Albright, 2003: 180), warning of Vietnam-​era overstretch (Bush, 1992f) in a conflict fuelled by ‘ancient, ethnic tensions’. In this way, Bush relied on both a lack of ample criteria to warrant intervention and the difficulty of measuring success in an intervention in what was deemed a civil war.

Bosnia Prior to 1991, Yugoslavia had been composed of six republics and two autonomous regions.4 Throughout the 1980s, Yugoslavia had experienced rising ethnic and nationalist tensions following the end of central rule in 1980. These growing tensions led Croatia to commence legal steps to secede in February 1991. In March 1991, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic sought to extend his influence, declaring a ‘Serbian autonomous region’ within Croatia. President Milosevic was a fierce nationalist. Formerly a Yugoslav businessman, he had risen through the ranks of the Yugoslav Communist Party before being elected President by the Serb Parliament in 1989. Up until his election as President of Serbia, Milosevic presented himself as a centrist, adhering to party lines, ‘favouring a Yugoslavia of “brotherhood and unity” ’ (Albright and Woodward, 2018: 98). Yet, his ability to appeal to ethnic fears and resentments made him particularly popular in Serbia.

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In southern Croatia, there were around 200,000 ethnic Serbians (Binder, 1991). Given the high number of Serbians in Croatia, Milosevic was able to reinvigorate nationalist tensions leaving Croatia unable to secede without bloodshed. Over the following seven months, more than 12,000 Croatians died in a war against the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), including 4,500 civilians (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2006). An additional 700,000 people were displaced. In March 1992, having consulted with European and Western diplomats, several members of the Bosnian presidency chose to hold a referendum on whether Bosnia should secede from Yugoslavia. The vote to secede won with an overwhelming, albeit, contentious 99.4 per cent in favour.5 However, a large proportion of Bosnian Serbs either boycotted the vote or were prevented from participating by Bosnian Serb authorities (Walling, 2013: 93). Soon, two Serbian members of the presidency6 resigned, and with the backing of Milosevic, declared a separate Bosnian Serb state within the borders of Bosnia. Supporting their claim were members of the Serb-​ majority JNA, along with local Bosnian Serb forces which constituted a force of around 80,000. This complicated matters for those who still believed in the idea of a multiethnic Bosnia. Soon after, Serb forces began destroying cultural and religious sites and compiled lists of Muslim and Croat intellectuals and professionals. Many were savagely beaten; others were executed (Power, 2003: 248–​9). Recognizing the likelihood of violence, the UN Security Council had put in place an arms embargo banning the delivery of any further arms to the region. Unanimously adopted on 25 September 1991, Security Council Resolution 713 established that: ‘States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment’ (UNSC, 1991b). However, the resolution would have the unintended consequence of leaving Bosnians with no capacity to acquire weapons. The result was a significant imbalance between the resources of the Serbian forces, and Bosnian Muslims as tensions escalated. Facing the threat of conflict against the well-​armed JNA-​backed forces of Milosevic, Bosnia was left defenceless. This set the stage for violence to spread. Violence emerged rapidly, quickly developing into one of the most horrific instances of ethnic cleansing of the 20th century.

The Bush administration’s response Prior to the emergence of violence, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger travelled to the region in February 1991 to warn Milosevic against the use of violence. Like many in the administration, Eagleburger

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had been of the belief that early warnings of impending bloodshed were symptomatic of typical bureaucratic exaggeration. Yet, on his return, having been shocked by the Serbs’ willingness to use force, he remarked: ‘It is going to be bloody as hell’ (Power, 2003: 252–​3). Despite this knowledge of Serbian aggression and their willingness to use force, there was little dissent within the administration that direct US engagement –​especially putting boots on the ground –​was not an option.7 Samantha Power (2003: 252) noted in her book, A Problem from Hell: ‘The war’s viciousness had been forecast so regularly and so vividly as to desensitize US officials. By the time the bloodshed began, US officials were almost too prepared: They had been reading warning cables for so long that nothing could surprise them’. Significantly, one classified memorandum dated 14 April 1992 to Lawrence Eagleburger stated that there was a: Clear pattern of use of force, intimidation, and provocation to violence aimed at forcibly partitioning [Bosnia] and effecting large forced transfers of population … The clear intent of Serbian force is to displace non-​Serbs from mixed areas (including areas where Serbs are a minority) to consolidate Bosnian Serb claims to some 60% of Bosnian territory … in a manner which would create a ‘Serbian Bosnia’.8 Indeed, the violent turn of events in Bosnia hardly caught the Bush administration by surprise. Tensions had been brewing in Yugoslavia for a number of years. Yet, given the complexities of the conflict and problems faced by Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet Republics fought for independence –​Bosnia was not a key strategic concern for the administration. Issues arising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union far outranked signals of trouble brewing in the former Yugoslavia (Halberstam, 2001: 33). More importantly, there was little enthusiasm or motivation among President Bush’s senior administration officials to become engaged with the plight of Bosnian Muslims. Colin Powell, Bush’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was one of the most influential in discouraging US involvement. Powell was particularly averse to the prospect of any US intervention in which vital security interests could not be established, or which lacked a clearly defined objective. Powell’s military background and experience played into his cautious approach. He had served two tours of duty during the US’s unsuccessful campaign in the Vietnam War during which he had witnessed at first hand the ‘ferocious military forces the civilians and his military superiors have casualty underestimated’ (Halberstam, 2001: 35). As such, his experience in Vietnam would prove to be a defining moment in his life and would hold significant sway over his worldview and decision-​making in foreign policy.

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He had taken the lesson from Vietnam that ‘events often outran everyone’s preconceptions’ and was, therefore ‘mistrustful of people with strong views or ideologies’ as it would likely cloud their objectivity (Mann, 2004: 121). He was particularly concerned that any American deaths would create further doubt as to America’s purpose in the new world order.9 In simple terms, Powell strongly believed that ‘lives must not be risked until we can face a parent or a spouse or a child with a clear answer to the question of why a member of the family had died. To provide a “symbol” or a “presence” is not good enough’ (Powell and Persico, 1995: 291). Following US successes in the Persian Gulf conflict, the Powell Doctrine held great legitimacy in assessing the viability of the use of force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. As such, Powell had a decisive influence on the foreign policy decision-​making of the Bush administration, spurring cognitive interpretations of interests. Specifically, the doctrine acted to repress principled sources of information during deliberations of armed conflict. This repression enabled agents to slow down the decision-​making process by answering a series of questions relating to the feasibility of a mission, its relevance to US interests, and whether the proposed mission was supported by the American people. In simple terms, it worked to remove emotion from decision-​making. Evil things may occur in parts of the world, but the cognitive ideas enshrined in the Powell Doctrine emphasized the need to be brutally honest in assessing both the capacity of the US to effect change, and the relevance of events to US national interests. Few senior administration officials viewed the conflict differently to Powell. Scowcroft (quoted in Halberstam, 2001: 42), for instance, was aware of the potential for violence between ethnic groups, noting it was: ‘A very tough, nasty neighbourhood’.10 Secretary of State James Baker argued that the US did not ‘have a dog in this fight’ emphasizing that US involvement in the conflict was not in their vital security interests (quoted in Power, 2001: 267). Seeking to avoid engagement in the conflict, Bush announced in April 1992 that the US would formally recognize the former Yugoslav Republics. Further, Bush stated that the US ‘will begin immediate consultations to establish full diplomatic relations’ (Bush, 1992a). In doing so, Bush sought to send a signal that the US –​and the international community more broadly –​ recognized Bosnia and other Republics as legitimate states. Yet, Bush’s rhetoric, and the act of formally recognizing the old Yugoslav Republics failed to stop Milosevic’s siege upon the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, in April 1992. Sarajevo was soon surrounded by Serbian forces, who began an all-​out onslaught on the defenceless city. By one account –​for every shot fired by the virtually unarmed Bosnians, Serbian forces fired nearly 180 shots. Given Sarajevo’s geography, occupants of the town were unable to escape. Soon Sarajevo had no power, gas or water to the city. Bosnians were

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outnumbered and outgunned. Meanwhile, throughout the countryside, a systematic campaign was underway to ‘cleanse’ the population (Halberstam, 2001: 122–​3). Outside the vision of the international media, Bosnians throughout the countryside were driven from their homes. Men were taken to camps and never heard from again, and their property was seized by Serbian forces. Despite the general ambivalence of the Bush administration toward conflict in Bosnia, there was significant push back against this preference for inaction. Notably, Senator Bob Dole, a long-​time Republican Senator for Kansas, was the Senate minority leader and a veteran of the Second World War with a keen interest in the Balkan region. Senator Dole had been critical of Yugoslavia’s human rights record since 1986 when Serbian forces had systematically stepped up violence and the persecution of ethnic Albanians in Serbia’s Kosovo.11 During this time, he introduced Senate resolutions highlighting specific concerns about Yugoslavia’s persecution of Albanians. By 1990, Dole had become increasingly critical of Serbian forces’ growing propensity for violence, stating that the Yugoslav government was a ‘symbol of tyranny and repression’ and that it was ‘murdering, maiming and imprisoning’ its citizens (Power, 2001: 253). As the Balkans descended into violence, Dole was an early and strong advocate for action. Dole made principled appeals to Bush, then Clinton, to lift the UN-​imposed arms embargo on the newly separated Bosnian territory (Power, 2001: 253–​ 4). In doing so, Dole made the emotionally laden argument that the US had a moral obligation to bring an end to human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing. However, key members of the Bush administration, including Powell and Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, both of whom had been instrumental in the Gulf War, felt that military engagement in Bosnia was not worth the potential risks. Given this view, Cheney, Powell and Bush would advance cognitive interpretations of the conflict in an effort to quell principled calls to action. Cheney would insist during an interview with The New York Times that: ‘This is an internal civil war … Much as I’m appalled by the loss of life we see in Yugoslavia, that does not automatically mean that United States forces ought to be involved on the ground in Yugoslavia, trying to end that conflict’ (quoted in Schmitt, 1992).12 Similarly, Powell was convinced that despite impassioned calls by many in Washington for the US to intervene, public support would not endure the required level of commitment necessary to make a difference (Halberstam, 2001: 141). Responding to these principled calls for intervention, Bush stated, ‘[W]‌e want to help with the assistance, on a humanitarian basis … We are not in a forward-​leaning role as terms of saying our objectives is to bring lasting peace to this troubled land’ (Bush, 1992b).

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By July 1992, reports of Serbian-​run concentration camps began to emerge. One particularly revealing article, a piece by Newsday journalist Roy Gutman, broke the story of a Muslim aid worker who reported that six to ten people were dying daily in a camp near the Serbian-​held town of Prijedor. Gutman suggested that since May, more than 1,000 Bosnian Muslims had been murdered. Many had their throats slit, others were killed by firing squad (Gutman, 1992). The next day in a State Department press briefing with the deputy spokesperson, Richard Boucher (quoted in Power, 2001: 272), the State Department confirmed that they possessed evidence that ‘detention camps’ did in fact exist and that there had been some reports of torture and killing. Yet, while acknowledging the existence of detention camps, Boucher suggested that the Bosnians also maintained detention centres. In doing so, Boucher re-​emphasized the inherent complexities of the civil war brought about by ancient ethnic tensions. By 5 August, Boucher had acquired additional information which assisted in downplaying the degree of terror that was unfolding. A number of Red Cross officials visited several of these camps suggesting that conditions were difficult, but that they were unable to find evidence that they were ‘death camps’ (Power, 2001: 273). As such, the situation did not come close to being in the same realm as the Holocaust. However, Gutman’s story challenged the administration’s narrative that what was happening in Bosnia was civil war. Yet, Bush too, downplayed the significance of these camps arguing that there was not yet ‘hard evidence’ to confirm some of the charges being put forward. For the Bush administration, these findings by the Red Cross officials provided greater scope to justify their position of restraint. Once again, Bush framed the conflict as ‘complex, convoluted conflict that grows out of age-​old animosities’ and that it was ‘without doubt, a true humanitarian nightmare’ (Bush, 1992d). When questioned as to whether he had plans to mobilize US troops Bush simply answered, ‘[N]‌o … I am confident that we have what assets it takes to get the job done without any excessive moves on mobilization’ (1992d). This lack of certainty around the conditions within the camps allowed for continued cognitive repression of more principled calls for action by the likes of Bob Dole. The mere presence of detention camps, even if there were deaths, was not enough to warrant a change in US policy. Yet, within days of downplaying the extent of violence within these camps, proof began to emerge that conditions were dire. More concerningly, proof of Holocaust-​style atrocities was coming to the surface. A British film crew managed to obtain graphic footage of the death camps near Omarska. One of the journalists, Ed Vulliamy, later recounted what he had seen. Speaking of the prisoners within the camp Vulliamy (1994: 101–​02) wrote:

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Nothing could have prepared us for what we see when we come through the back gates of what was the Omarska iron mine and ore-​processing works … The men are at various stages of human decay and affliction; the bones of their elbows and wrists protrude like pieces of jagged stone from the pencil-​thin stalks to which their arms have reduced. Their skin is putrefied, the complexions of their faces debased, degraded, and utterly subservient, and yet they fix their huge hollow eyes on us with looks like the blades of knives. There is nothing quite like the sight of the prisoner desperate to talk and to convey some terrible truth that is so near yet so far, but who dares not. As footage of Serbian death camps was broadcast around the world, narratives likening events in Bosnia to the Holocaust began to emerge. News outlets within the US soon picked up on the narrative. Among the papers to draw parallels to the Holocaust, the Chicago Tribune stated: ‘The ghost of WWII genocide is abroad in Bosnia’ (Chicago Tribune (Pre-​1997 Fulltext) (1992)). Similarly, in The New York Times editorial: ‘The chilling reports from Bosnia evoke this century’s greatest nightmare, Hitler’s genocide’ (The New York Times, 1992). Going further, the editorial drew parallels of the West’s push for a political solution to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler. Even The New Republic –​usually a conservative publication –​published an editorial critical of the Bush administration’s response to the reported atrocities. It stated: ‘There have been too many platitudes about the responsibility of “all factions” for the war. This lazy language is an escape hatch through which outside powers flee their responsibilities’ (The New Republic, 1992). This vision added fuel to principled calls by members of Congress for more decisive action. Likewise, Richard Holbrooke, a former US diplomat, made powerful principled calls for action.13 In August 1992, Holbrooke travelled to the region on two occasions during which he saw at first hand the scale of the atrocities taking place. His experience prompted him to appeal to former colleagues in Congress for action, arguing: ‘Bosnia will be a key test for American policy in Europe. We must therefore succeed in whatever we attempt’ (Holbrooke, 1998: 50). In an op-​ed on Bosnia for Newsweek Holbrooke argued: ‘By its inadequate reaction so far, the United States and, to an even greater extent, the European Community may be undermining not only the dreams of a post-​Cold War “common European House” but also laying the seeds for another era of tragedy’ (1998: 39). Increasingly, there was a widening gap between President Bush’s cognitive interpretations of foreign policy interests in Bosnia and the more principled interpretations asserted by the press and some current and former government officials.

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Over the following months, the press continued to run stories outlining the horrors being faced by those in Bosnia. Some even began running opinion pieces critical of the administration’s meagre response. In particular, a piece ran in The New York Times on 4 October 1992, which criticized many in the Bush administration, including Powell for their ‘no can do’ attitude towards Bosnia. The article cited the US’s $280 billion-​dollar military budget and suggested that Bush could take a leaf out of Lincoln’s book when he told General McClellan: ‘If you don’t want to use the Army, I should like to borrow it for a while’ (Powell and Persico, 1995: 558). Yet, even in the face of sustained criticism in August 1992, Bush –​fearing the costs of miscalculation –​would double down on the Powell Doctrine approach, likening Bosnia to Vietnam, arguing: ‘Before I’d commit forces to battle, I want to know what’s the beginning, what’s the objective, how’s the objective going to be achieved and what’s the end’ (Bush, 1992e). Seeking to strengthen this position, Colin Powell penned an op-​ed in The New York Times in October 1992 which vehemently argued against deploying troops in harm’s way when the goals were ‘unclear’ in a conflict ‘with deep ethnic and religious roots that go back a thousand years’ (Powell, 1992). Similarly, acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger argued that the conflict in Bosnia is ‘a civil war based in 500 to 1000 years of history’ (Eagleburger quoted in Financial Times, 1992). Across these statements, it was clear that those within the administration increasingly saw Bosnia as a complex, irreconcilable conflict that would only lead US forces into a quagmire should they become involved. These cognitive types of ideas served as powerful weapons in advancing the case for restraint as the administration sought to avoid entanglement. Bush himself had serious issues trying to understand the complexities of the Bosnian conflict. Brent Scowcroft recalled that on a number of occasions, briefings on the situation would begin with Bush saying, ‘Now, tell me again what this is all about’ (Halberstam, 2001: 44). As Scowcroft elaborated on the details, Bush would become confused by the intricacies of the conflict. If Bush could barely understand the complexities of deep ethnic rivalries and divisions driving the conflict, there was little chance that the American public would understand them, let alone accept any justification that saw American troops coming home in body bags. Furthermore, Bosnia was significantly different from Iraq. For Bush, Iraq was a clear case of one country invading another in an obvious breach of international law. More importantly, there were clear US national security interests in containing Saddam Hussein’s power in the region. Bosnia was far more complicated. But one thing was clear: as terrible as the Serbian atrocities appeared to be, Milosevic did not pose a threat to US influence in the region. The Bush administration held little concern for the regional

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balance of power. And as Powell would make very clear, there were no viable military options that fell within the restrictive criteria of the Powell Doctrine. On this basis, the administration saw the prospect of intervention as posing a high risk with no strategic benefit. Bosnia was viewed as a complicated civil war that was tragic –​but did not fall within the domain of US national security interests. To an extent, the conflict in Bosnia did feature during the 1992 presidential election. During the first presidential debate on 11 October 1992, Bush re-​emphasized the need for restraint stating that he ‘learned something from Vietnam: I am not going to commit US forces until I know what the mission is, until the military tell me that it can be completed, until I know how they can come out’ (Bush, 1992f). Such analogies were repeated through much of the presidential campaign as justification for the need for measured responses to humanitarian crises.14 Committing troops without a clear objective, or a guarantee that they can be pulled out was a clear violation of institutional preferences after Vietnam. In this way, Bush advanced a cognitive interpretation of US interests in Bosnia –​highlighting the threat of entrapment. Unlike Bush who resisted calls for American involvement beyond that of a peripheral humanitarian assistance role, Clinton suggested that he would be more willing to use America’s forces. While he recognized that the risks of using ground forces where too great, Clinton argued that there were plenty of lesser options, including ‘no-​fly zones’ (Bush, 1992f). Notably, he asserted that the US did ‘have interests there’, adopting the principled position by pointing to the fact there were 2 million refugees, and maybe hundreds of thousands who might starve and freeze to death. With images of Nazi-​style concentration camps floating around the media, this position was generally popular with a public otherwise suffering from a Cold War hangover. However, Bosnia proved too risky for Bush to utilize military assets beyond the mere provision of basic humanitarian aid. Furthermore, a number of key administration officials voiced concern that the US held no vital interests in the former Yugoslav states, and the situation was simply too dangerous to risk US forces where the existence of US vital interests was questionable. In the end, according to Scowcroft, military intervention in Bosnia was simply not in the US’s vital national interest: ‘We could never satisfy ourselves that the amount of involvement we thought it would take was justified in terms of US interests involved … Bosnia was of national interest concern only if the war broke out into Kosovo, risking the involvement of our allies in a wider war’ (quoted in Power, 2001: 288). The Bush administration remained aloof from the Bosnian conflict –​ casting the violence as the product of irreconcilable differences as a result of ancient ethnic tensions between groups. In short, Bush came to view

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the situation as a civil war with violence and atrocities on both sides. US intervention would carry a lot of uncertainties regarding specific, measurable goals, and there was little belief that meaningful peace could be achieved. Yet it was the fear that US involvement would result in Vietnam-​style overstretch, accompanied by American soldiers returning home in body bags, that served as a major constraint on action. US lives would not be risked merely to provide a ‘symbol’ or ‘presence’ (Powell and Persico, 1995: 292). Adopting the criteria of the Powell Doctrine, the administration came to believe that US involvement would serve little purpose, except to put the lives of US personnel at risk in order to provide symbolic support. Emotional and principled interpretations were ‘repressed’, leading Bosnia to be cast as a ‘European problem’ which needed a European solution as the US had ‘no dog in the fight’ (Baker quoted in Power, 2001: 267).

Renewed cognitive repression: early optimism to repression in the Clinton administration ‘I don’t suppose you’d want anybody to keep a campaign promise if it was a very unsound policy’. Warren Christopher, February 1993 (quoted in Drew, 1995: 139). Throughout the 1992 presidential election campaign, Clinton had outlined a more principled case in support of intervention in Bosnia. During the first presidential debate, Clinton had argued that while there was no room to commit troops to Bosnia, the US did ‘have interests there’ (quoted in Bush, 1992f). He advocated lifting the arms embargo and enforcing the UN-​ imposed no-​fly zone. Specifically, he argued that he would do ‘whatever it takes to stop the slaughter of civilians’ and that: ‘History has shown us that you can’t allow the mass extermination of people and just sit by and watch it happen’ (quoted in Harris, 2006: 45). There was a need for the US to ‘be a force for freedom and democracy’ (Clinton quoted in, Bush, 1992h). Powell noted that during a transition briefing with the President-​elect in December 1992, Clinton had pushed the issue of air strikes as a form of intervention in Bosnia (Powell and Persico, 1995: 562). However, when Clinton took office in January 1993, his focus quickly turned to domestic issues with a focus on revitalizing a stagnant American economy. For Clinton, foreign policy, in general, was not a priority.15 As a former small-​state Governor, Clinton had relatively little experience when it came to matters of foreign policy. Some even accused him of holding a level of naïve idealism on foreign policy matters. Colin Powell remarked that his experience in Clinton’s foreign policy meetings were reminiscent of ‘graduate-​student bull sessions’ in which discussions were unstructured and had a tendency to meander (Powell and Persico, 1995: 576). Soon,

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the realities of office would soon see Clinton’s position on Bosnia shift in line with the more established foreign policy thinking of his predecessor. In simple terms, the Powell Doctrine would shape Clinton’s thinking, acting as a powerful weapon in advancing the case for restraint in the face of increasingly strong and principled opposition. Given his success in the Persian Gulf campaign, Powell would command significant influence in the administration. He would use this influence to repress emotion from the decision-​making process, in an effort to focus the debate on the strategic implications of intervention. Many within the administration –​including Vice President Al Gore, UN Ambassador Madeline Albright, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake –​advanced principled interpretations, urging Clinton to take up a more comprehensive role in Bosnia. Lake recognized the scale of atrocities in Bosnia and saw a need for US involvement. However, he remained wary of becoming entangled in a prolonged ‘Vietnam-​style’ conflict. Lake stated in an interview with Elizabeth Drew (1995: 142): ‘There’s tremendous comfort in not being emotional and numbing yourself –​blinding yourself –​to the human consequences of your decisions.’ Despite Lake’s acknowledgement of the potential risks of intervention in Bosnia, he sided with Albright and Gore. The excuse that warring factions had been killing each other for hundreds of years was not a good reason to justify doing nothing in Bosnia. It would not take long for tensions to emerge within the new administration over the appropriate course of action in Bosnia. Many in the middle and lower levels of the State Department, including one outgoing foreign service officer, James Hooper, had been in favour of intervention during the Bush administration, complaining that their concerns rarely made it through to the Secretary of State, let alone to the President. Hooper (quoted in Power, 2001: 295–​6), speaking at an open forum likened what he referred to as America’s ‘self-​indulging’ faith in the peace process as being similar to their faith in the Allied forces before the Second World War. Many mid-​level State Department officials were surprised with this new sense of possibility amid Clinton’s early optimism concerning the US’s capacity to bring about a positive change in Bosnia. Among these officials was Bosnia desk officer, Marcus Harris (1997: 241) who reflected: ‘Career officers, who had become conditioned to temerity through two years of Bush administration inaction … did not seem to realize that they could now speak openly and even favourably of military solutions.’ The administration’s first big foreign policy decision on Bosnia would come on 5 February 1993 following a meeting of the Principals Committee (PC).16 During the meeting, Clinton argued: ‘If the United States doesn’t act in situations like this, nothing will happen … A failure to do so (act) would be to give up American leadership’ (quoted in Drew, 1995: 146–​7).

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However, many of the early decisions made by the administration were often more symbolic. For instance, the decisions that came out of the PC meeting on 5 February included: agreement to participate in humanitarian assistance by way of providing food drops into Muslim-​held areas in Bosnia, tightening economic sanctions and appointing an envoy to the negotiation being conducted by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen17 in an effort to find a territorial settlement more acceptable to Bosnian Muslims. On 10 February, Secretary of State Warren Christopher delivered a stern, principled statement outlining the administration’s position: This conflict may be far from our shores, but it is certainly not distant from our concerns. We cannot afford to ignore it … Bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether ethnic cleansing is a policy the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of freedom, if we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful ethnic democracies, our answer must be a resounding no. (Quoted in Harris, 2006: 241) While Christopher’s response was far more direct than any statement delivered under the Bush administration, it would prove to be little more than a message of disapproval. There would be no quick fix without putting American troops in harm’s way, potentially making a broken Bosnia an American problem. Significant resistance to any major policy change came from top Congressional Democrats who, relieved to finally have a Democrat in the Oval Office after more than a decade, were concerned that a focus on Bosnia and foreign policy more generally, would hinder their ability to initiate domestic reforms. Bolstering such concerns, Dick Morris (1997: 253), one of Clinton’s long-​time pollsters, made his view clear: ‘You don’t want to be Lyndon Johnson, sacrificing your potential for doing well on the domestic front by a destructive, never-​ending foreign involvement’.18 Given the emphasis on rebuilding the US economy during the presidential campaign and the fact that the existential threat posed by the Cold War no longer loomed over US national security, calls to maintain a domestic focus served as powerful, cognitive weapons. Despite these issues, Clinton pushed ahead with efforts to carry out food drops over areas that had been particularly affected by the conflict. Yet, even this proved difficult to get approval from military leaders as Colin Powell continued to resist any US involvement. In the space of a few short months, Clinton’s enthusiasm had been reeled in by Powell’s more cognitive arguments to avoid risking entanglement. Justifying the more restrained approach, Clinton argued that the US had a limited ability to bring the conflict to an end but the administration had ‘done an awful lot to alleviate severe

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human suffering and to meet profound needs’ through the use of airdrops, and support for the Vance-​Owen plan (Clinton, 1993b).19 Clinton continued to argue that ‘the United States should always seek an opportunity to stand up against –​at least speak out against inhumanity’ (Clinton, 1993b), leaving the door open for a change in Bosnia should an opportunity present. During the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, Clinton stated that the US had ‘unique responsibilities’ to ‘redeem in some small measure the deaths of millions whom our nations did not, or would not, or could not save’ (1993d).20 In doing so, he acknowledged that such hatreds had not yet disappeared, referring to ‘contemporary horrors like the slaughter of innocents in Bosnia’. During the address, Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel made an impassioned plea to the President, likening the violence to that of the Holocaust. ‘Mr President, I cannot not tell you something, I have been in the former Yugoslavia last fall. I cannot sleep since what I have seen. As a Jew I am saying that. We must do something to stop the bloodshed in that country’ (quoted in Power 2001: 297). While Clinton acknowledged that the crisis in Bosnia was dire, efforts to draw comparisons with the Holocaust remained unsuccessful. Outside of principled appeals that the US should do something, there was little understanding within the administration as to how to balance US interests in Europe with humanitarian concerns in Bosnia. Yet, Wiesel’s plea was not unheard by Clinton’s administration, and it underscored the risk of ignoring Bosnia. Throughout April and early May, Albright in collaboration with Anthony (Tony) Lake –​the National Security Advisor –​and Vice President Al Gore pushed for what they termed ‘lift and strike’ action. ‘Lift and strike’ sought to lift the arms embargo on arms shipments to Sarajevo and threaten Serb forces with air strikes to keep them at bay (Albright, 2003: 181). It was not just Holocaust survivors that came out as advocates of US action. In both the Congress and the Senate, there were a growing number of forceful advocates outside of the leadership. One particularly strong proponent was Congressman Frank McCloskey, a Democrat from Indiana. McCloskey made several trips to Bosnia and would often pester colleagues on the Hill to support a more comprehensive role for the US in the Balkans. Yet, McCloskey was often faced with resistance from his fellow Congressman as they responded, ‘My constituency isn’t interested in that’.21 Support for military action was mixed. Powell’s resistance remained steadfast. Justifying his position in an interview with The New York Times, he re-​emphasized the need for a clear, attainable ‘end goal’ before utilizing military force: ‘As soon as they tell me it is limited; it means they do not care if we achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me “surgical”, I head for the bunker’ (Powell quoted in Power, 2001: 285).

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Clinton’s administration remained divided with regards to the US’s role in Bosnia throughout debates in the PC in May 1993. Perhaps the most forceful difference of opinion was between Colin Powell and Madeline Albright. Powell had attained a great level of credibility for his handling of the Gulf War crisis, and when asked about military options in Bosnia, in line with his doctrine of overwhelming force, would argue that the costs of any form of military action far outweighed the benefits to America’s vital security interest. In simple terms, Powell argued: ‘No American President could defend to the American people the heavy sacrifice of lives it would cost to resolve this baffling conflict’ (Powell and Persico, 1995: 577–​8). ‘Symbols’ –​even moral ones –​were pointless in his eyes unless there was a clear set of objectives and a reasonable chance of success. Bosnia was not a place to be sending US troops. Powell’s military prowess continued to be difficult for the new administration to overcome. On the other end of the spectrum, Madeline Albright sympathized with the suffering of Bosnian Muslims. Having been born in 1937 in Czechoslovakia into a family forced to repress their Jewish background made her especially sympathetic in her push for action. Of the various foreign policy challenges faced by the Clinton administration, Bosnia was the most captivating for Albright. Indeed, she had an affinity for the region having lived there, her brother being born there, and her father having served there on two occasions (Albright, 2003: 179). As such, Albright would serve as a powerful, principled voice pushing the ‘Never Again’22 analogy. Albright’s presence never allowed it to be forgotten. These significant interpretive tensions between Powell and Albright led them to butt heads on numerous occasions over Bosnia. Where Powell would continue to advance cognitive interpretations in calling for restraint, Albright would advance principled interpretations emphasizing the ‘parallels’ between Bosnia and the Holocaust. Following one meeting of the National Security Council, Powell re-​emphasized his case for restraint presenting his usual in-​depth analysis as to why military action in Bosnia was an impossibility. Asked what it would take to remove Serbian artillery units from Sarajevo airport, Powell argued in line with his doctrine that it would take: tens of thousands of men, billions of dollars, numerous casualties and an open-​ ended commitment. Such logic made the prospect of intervention a non-​ starter. Following the briefing, Albright remarked, ‘What are you saving this superb military for, Colin, if we cannot use it?’ (Albright, 2003: 183). Powell remarked in his memoirs that Albright’s comment nearly gave him an ‘aneurysm’ and he felt compelled to explain to her the role of America’s military (Powell and Persico, 1995: 576–​7). Despite fierce opposition from Powell, Albright remained steadfast in her belief that limited military operations could be conducted, and that

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Powell’s opposition was a product of overlearning the lessons of Vietnam (Albright, 2003: 182–​3). Yet, Powell commanded enormous respect and was rarely challenged on military matters (Blumenthal, 2003: 63). As such, his pragmatic, cognitive ideas were held in high regard as he continued to slow down the decision-​making process. What is significant here is that Powell’s presentation of restrained, cognitive-​based arguments caused a shift in Clinton’s thinking. While initially favouring military action, Powell’s warnings of potential quagmire saw Clinton lean more in a conservative direction. In this way, Clinton went against the principled preferences of his own team –​specifically, Albright, Lake, and Gore –​siding with Powell on the matter of potential risks of intervention. However, Clinton had argued on numerous occasions that something ‘had to be done’ in Bosnia. In doing so, he had backed himself into a corner. In what seemed to be a ‘Hail Mary’ shot at ‘doing something’, Clinton met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the potential of the ‘lift and strike’ pushed for by Gore and Albright. In general, the assessments suggested that ‘lift and strike’ was feasible, but concerns remained that the US could be drawn further into the conflict. Powell emphasized the risks of using air power, suggesting that there may be early victories against Serbian positions, but Serbs would likely move their weapons to churches and mosques, raising the risk of civilian casualties. After much debate, Clinton decided to push ahead with ‘lift and strike’, albeit amid serious reservations. Following a meeting of the NSC on 1 May, Clinton tasked Secretary of State Warren Christopher with the job of pitching the ‘lift and strike’ policy to the Europeans and Russians. However, Christopher faced significant resistance as most of the US’s European allies, particularly those with ground troops in Bosnia, were vehemently against the policy. They worried that allowing air strikes against Serbian positions would put their own troops at risk. They also raised concerns that lifting the arms embargo would exacerbate the situation by potentially allowing more weaponry to make its way into the wrong hands. The French were explicitly against lifting the arms embargo but suggested that they would be open to air strikes if the US were willing to send in ground troops. But thanks to Powell, this was a line Clinton was not willing to cross. While Christopher was away, Powell and Secretary of Defence Les Aspin went to the Capitol to test support for the policy. Support was sketchy at best (Drew, 1995: 154–​7). Soon, Clinton became consumed by doubt. He was concerned that efforts to push ahead with ‘lift and strike’ would only serve to make Bosnia an American problem. Before Christopher arrived back from Europe, Clinton called Aspin and Powell into the Oval Office. While Clinton felt that inaction was immoral, he was unable to reconcile the potential use of force against Powell’s warnings of overextension. This became especially prevalent against

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the backdrop of European resistance to ‘lift and strike’. Upon arriving, Clinton informed the pair that –​on Powell’s recommendation –​he had been reading Robert Kaplan’s book Balkan Ghosts.23 Hearing this, Aspin reacted, ‘Holy shit! He’s going south on “lift and strike” ’. Following the meeting, Aspin phoned Anthony Lake stating, ‘We have a serious problem. We’re out there pushing a policy the President’s not comfortable with. He’s not on board’ (quoted in Drew, 1995: 157). ‘Lift and strike’ was dead. Explaining the administration’s position, Secretary of State Warren Christopher would revert to similar justifications used by the Bush administration, framing the conflict as one stemming from deep ethnic tensions, stating: ‘The hatred between all three groups … is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old. That really is a problem from hell. And I think that the United States is doing all we can to try to deal with that problem’ (quoted in Power, 2001: 306). He would cast the situation as ‘a humanitarian crisis a long way from home, in the middle of another continent’ (Christopher, 1993). Simply, Bosnia would be cast aside into the ‘too hard’ basket. On occasion, questions emerged as to whether the atrocities occurring in Bosnia constituted genocide, sometimes even from Congressional leaders. Whenever questions of genocide emerged, the administration’s position was that there were egregious acts of violence but cast the question of whether genocide was taking place as being legally ambiguous. These sentiments were echoed by Aspin during testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee, in which he suggested that Bosnian Muslims were guilty of atrocities too: ‘It’s easy to analogize the Holocaust, but I never heard of any genocide by the Jews against the German people’ (quoted in Power, 2001: 308). Clinton recalled feeling that the situation was too complex when other factors were against him having any real impact on policy. In his biography, Clinton (2004: 513) noted: My own options were constrained by the dug-​in positions I found when I took office … I was reluctant to go along with Senator Dole in unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, for fear of weakening the United Nations … I also didn’t want to divide the NATO alliance by unilaterally bombing Serb military positions, especially since there were Europeans … soldiers on the ground with the UN mission. The success of the Powell Doctrine in framing the debate in terms of cognitive ideas, emphasizing the lack of strategic interests and high risks of entanglement, made the thought of using of military force to end the conflict seem unfeasible. Given the ‘Vietnam-​era’ analogies that permeated deliberations, there was no significant change to the US policy on Bosnia

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during Clinton’s first months in office. Under these assessments, when utilized in foreign policy, US forces needed to be virtually invincible, and there had to be a clear exit strategy. These criteria could not be met in Bosnia. Instead, emotionally laden, principled calls to ‘do something’ advanced by Albright, Gore and Lake were ‘repressed’ in favour of Powell’s more cognitive, restrained interpretations. Inaction was justified on the basis that other interests superseded Bosnia. Emphasizing the power of these cognitive interpretations, when the city of Sarajevo came under heavy artillery fire in June 1993, and looked almost certain to fall, the administration maintained its position. When asked about the crisis, Christopher argued: ‘That’s a tragic, tragic situation in Bosnia, make no mistake about that. It’s the world’s most difficult diplomatic problem I believe. It defies any simple solution. The United States is doing all that it can consistent with our national interest’ (Williams, 1993). This preference for restraint would be further cemented following the downing of two US Army Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia24 at the start of October 1993.25 From the campaign primaries to the election, Clinton had advanced a principled interpretation of US foreign policy, which saw it in America’s interests to stand up for American values abroad. Yet, the realities of office soon set in as principled notions of ‘what’s right’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15) would yield to cognitive efforts to shut out interventionist voices in an effort to avoid entrenchment in a foreign conflict.

Conclusion Given the early successes of the Powell Doctrine in the Persian Gulf conflict, the Bush administration would adopt a similar set of criteria in assessing the potential for the use of military force in Bosnia. The administration soon determined that the conflict was fuelled by ‘ancient, ethnic animosities’, and that the US ‘did not have a dog in the fight’. As Bosnia continued to come under Serbian assault, Bush would play down principled calls for action by invoking the Powell Doctrine as a means of slowing down the decision-​ making process, thus, intellectually refining interests to ‘we do deserts, not mountains and jungles’ (see Dunnigan and Macedonia, 2001: 13). In this way, cognitive repression saw principled calls for action cast aside as more cognitive ones focussed on avoiding Vietnam-​style overstretch. Even as Clinton came to office promising to change America’s policy towards Bosnia, he too would struggle to move beyond Vietnam-​era memories embodied in the Powell Doctrine’s cognitive interpretations. While he had entered office believing the US had ‘unique responsibilities’ to help prevent future humanitarian failings such as those seen during the Holocaust, his position shifted as the risks of military engagement were

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laid bare. While efforts were made by the likes of Albright, Gore and Lake to advance a principled case for intervention, drawing parallels with the Holocaust, Powell’s emphasis on the potential costs of intervening served as a powerful weapon in advancing the more cognitive interpretations for restraint. Given that no solution could match the strict, institutionalized criteria of the Powell Doctrine, Clinton would come to repress principled calls for intervention. Notably, Clinton concluded that any public and Congressional support for intervention would not survive American casualties. While acknowledging the horrific nature of the crisis, he recognized that any attempt at decisive action in Bosnia might lead America into a Vietnam-​like quagmire. The Holocaust analogy disappeared as cognitive repression ensured the conflict was viewed as one based on an irreconcilable ancient ethnic hatred. As such, US foreign policy towards Bosnia would remain fundamentally unchanged. Colin Powell left the administration in September 1993. Yet, even from afar, Powell continued to be a vocal opponent of intervention in Bosnia. He would describe the conflict as ‘baffling’ and not worth the risk. Sidney Blumenthal –​a former advisor to President Clinton –​stated: ‘At no other previous time in his career did Powell have as much influence as he had in 1993’ (Blumenthal, 2003: 64). The Powell Doctrine had a decisive influence on the Clinton administration’s capacity to develop a policy towards Bosnia. However, if there were any chance of a genuine change in the US’s Bosnia policy, those chances were dashed by the deaths of 18 US soldiers during humanitarian operations in Somalia. This would simply reinforce Clinton’s fear of entanglement at the risk of further deaths of US personnel. It is important to recognize how these competing interpretations of US interests towards the crisis in Bosnia played out. Across two presidential administrations, the fear of overstretch came to dominate deliberations despite Clinton’s wish to be more proactive. In the next chapter, I show how these cognitive style ideas were ‘displaced’ in favour of more principled interpretations. Specifically, I work to show that after two years of policy stagnation the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995 would serve to revitalize analogies drawn by Albright to the Holocaust, acting as a powerful weapon for principled interpretations of US interests. In this way, I show how different types of ideas can be presented in ways that result in policy variation and inconsistency –​even as other factors remain formally the same.

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‘What Should I Tell My Daughter?’: The Massacre at Srebrenica Introduction For the first two and a half years of Clinton’s presidency, conflict raged in the Balkans. Atrocities continued to mount. Despite growing increasingly frustrated by his administration’s inability to come up with a palatable solution to the crisis, the notion of using military force continued to be cast as intangible. However, following the massacre of 8,700 Bosniak men and boys in Srebrenica in June in 1995, the administration’s Bosnia policy underwent a major shift. In this chapter, I examine Clinton’s shift from restraint towards limited intervention through Operation Deliberate Force. In doing so, I show how the massacre at Srebrenica rekindled narratives likening the atrocities to the Holocaust. In this way, I argue that the massacre changed the way in which the conflict was viewed. Images of the atrocity, along with vision of dead and dying Bosnians gave these narratives tremendous power. I argue that the revived power of these narratives enabled a normative displacement leading Clinton towards a more principled interpretation of the conflict as he interpreted US interests in a new light. Such principled ideas were driven by Madeline Albright, Anthony Lake and in particular Al Gore’s powerful, symbolic appeal: ‘What am I supposed to tell [my daughter]?’ if the US were to maintain a position of indifference (Gore quoted in Harris, 2006: 196). This encapsulated these principled interpretations in a powerful form, acting to displace the entrenched notion advocated by Colin Powell that the use of force in Bosnia was neither in the US strategic security interests, nor feasible. The massacre made it clear that US policy towards Bosnia had not only become ineffective but was doing significant damage to the administration’s credibility, undermining their capacity to manage other foreign policy issues. Such normative displacement would see the administration’s policy

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shift towards a more interventionist approach, yielding early successes and eventually, the cessation of hostilities culminating in the signing of the Dayton Accords in Dayton, Ohio. While demonstrating the power of the different forms that ideas take in shaping interpretations, this case also serves to highlight that the repression of principled influences from the policy-​making process prior to the massacre at Srebrenica had resulted in a stagnant policy which ultimately served to limit the US’s capacity to pursue their interests, even in issues beyond Bosnia. This emphasizes that while emotional influences need to be restrained, they cannot be excluded from the policy-​making process.

Normative displacement: principled reinterpretations of Srebrenica Despite resisting intervention for two and a half years, 1995 would prove to be a turning point. Bosnia continued to frustrate Clinton. The crisis sapped much of the administration’s time and energy on foreign policy throughout the early 1990s. Significantly, the crisis continued to highlight tensions between the US’s vital security interests (cognitive ideas concerning ‘what works’) and values (principled ideas concerning ‘what’s right’). Clinton acknowledged that continuing loss of life and ethnic cleansing were detrimental to US interests and that it was important to prevent the conflict from spreading. However, he continued to repress principled sources of information, remaining cautious of becoming overly entangled in Bosnia. As such, he would continue to push back on those arguing for greater US involvement. On 5 June 1995, he argued: I know it’s frustrating to everyone, as it is to me, that we can’t completely solve all of the world’s problems and that more progress toward peace hasn’t been made in Bosnia. Sometimes we have to do what is appropriate to minimize disasters that we confront, while we work over the long run on resolving them through diplomacy. (Clinton, 1995a) Throughout the course of the Bosnian conflict, both the Bush and Clinton administrations were bombarded with stories of civil war and murder. While both administrations spoke out against the violence, calling for peace, neither would be willing for the US to take an active role in ending the violence as the hangover of the Powell Doctrine lingered. Yet, as I will show, when faced with images of suffering following the fall of Srebrenica –​one of the last remaining Muslim enclaves in Bosnia –​Clinton came to accept the need to take risks of failure and significantly change their policy on Bosnia.

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The fall of Srebrenica would serve to reframe the debate on Bosnia by providing a moment of crisis, and spurring principled interpretations yielding normative displacement which would override more refined cognitive interpretations. No longer was conflict in the Balkans simply viewed as ancient ethnic rivalries, irreconcilable by Western influence. Instead, it would be framed in terms of Holocaust-​style atrocities, reshaping debate in more principled terms.

The fall of Srebrenica The pivotal moment came in July 1995 when Srebrenica, one of eastern Bosnia’s last remaining Muslim enclaves, came under siege. As one of the only designated ‘safe areas’ remaining, Srebrenica had seen an influx of refugees trying to escape the violence. Around 40,000 Muslim men, women and children had made Srebrenica their home. Yet, the increased number of occupants in the city made Srebrenica an easy and coveted target for Serbian forces. These ‘safe areas’1 were lightly guarded by the minimal forces the UN could muster for their Security Council sanctioned peacekeeping operation (UNSC, 1993a; 1993b). Throughout much of the conflict in Bosnia, these enclaves had been left alone by Serbian forces. However, as the conflict dragged on Serb forces became increasingly aggressive. Sensing the West’s rising skittishness following disastrous peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda2 –​in which peacekeepers had been deliberately killed –​Serbian forces turned their sniper rifles at UN soldiers with greater frequency. Following a series of NATO air strikes around Sarajevo in May 1995, Serbian forces took 400 peacekeepers hostage, using them as human shields in an effort to prevent any further bombing attempts (Power, 2001: 393). This was yet another humiliating setback for the international community as vision emerged of peacekeepers chained to television poles (Woodward, 1996: 254). By June 1995, there were calls to withdraw UN troops from Bosnia, and it became increasingly clear that they were there for little more than to provide a presence.3 Clinton had grown increasingly frustrated with the administration’s inability to develop a cohesive Bosnia policy. Through the first years of his presidency, proposals for increased US engagement surfaced only to be quashed as the risks of potential entanglement were spelled out. National security meetings on Bosnia policy had become little more than therapy sessions in which tempers flared and officials professed a need to do ‘something’ without yielding any substantive policy options. In early 1995, recognizing that ineffective policy towards Bosnia was damaging the US’s global standing, Lake sent a confidential memo to Clinton describing Bosnia as ‘a cancer’ on the administration’s foreign

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policy, ‘spreading and eating away at its credibility’ (Woodward, 1996: 253). Gore described it as ‘the issue from hell … It’s driving us into a brick wall’ (Woodward, 1996: 255). Clinton was aware by this stage that his policy towards Bosnia had been largely ineffective and reactionary. He had come to realize the US’s flaccid response in Bosnia was adversely affecting other aspects of US foreign policy. It was not possible to hold such a lacklustre approach to Bosnia, one of the world’s key international crises, and still be seen as a competent world leader with the capacity to lead effectively on other global issues (Harris, 2006: 192). Rubbing salt on these concerns, French President Chirac argued amid the US’s indecisive response that ‘the position of leader of the Free World is vacant’ (quoted in Albright, 2003: 187). Clinton had become furious with his inability to control the crisis. In his fury, he privately directed rage alternatively between the Serbs, the UN, allies and the situation in general. Yet, this fury provided what Lake saw as an opening.4 On 14 June, prior to phoning the new French president, Jacques Chirac, to discuss Bosnia, Clinton demanded of his senior foreign policy advisors: ‘We need to get [our] policy straight or we’re just kicking the can down the road again. Right now we’ve got a situation, we’ve got no clear mission, no one’s in control of events’ (quoted in Woodward, 1996: 254). In his time working for Clinton, Lake came to realize that when Clinton became ‘livid’, policy could change (Woodward, 1996: 254).5 In an effort to overcome the reactionary responses to the crisis, Lake had begun to develop what he termed the ‘Endgame Strategy’. Its purpose was to move away from the day-​to-​day improvisation that had represented the administration’s Bosnia policy, and determine what would constitute a positive outcome. The questions Lake sought to answer were: how we get there (to a positive outcome)? And, what risks could be taken to get there? (Harris, 2006: 199). The ‘Endgame Strategy’ sought to work towards a diplomatic settlement but would first require additional pressure on Serbian ground forces. There was still no way that this could be achieved without the use of US air power or, at very least, the credible threat. As such, it faced the same cognitive barriers to effective action as previous policy offerings. The notion of the use of force in Bosnia had remained taboo given that, in particular, Defence Secretary Bill Perry,6 Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili were all explicitly against it (Halberstam, 2001: 313). Due to the general lack of will among these senior administration officials to contemplate the use of force, Lake took the ‘Endgame Strategy’ directly to Clinton in June 1995. Lake’s plan presented a significant risk for Clinton who was already getting ready to fight for his re-​election campaign. As Lake outlined the core tenets of the plan, he emphasized that such a strategy

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would require a willingness to use force in a far more decisive way. He made it clear that it could go wrong, stating: ‘Mr President, tell me if you don’t want to do this, stop me now because the risks are very clear’ (Woodward, 1996: 258). Clinton gave Lake permission to go ahead and develop the strategy further. Then in July, Serbian forces took a decisive step that would push an already frustrated Clinton over the edge. On 6 July, General Ratko Mladic’s7 forces began shelling the UN ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica in an all-​out offensive. Five days later, Srebrenica fell. Soon, Albright received word from Shashi Tharoor, Under Secretary-​General of the UN: ‘[W]‌e’re facing a humanitarian disaster of historic proportions. There are reports of mass killings in Srebrenica’ (quoted in Albright, 2003: 187). On 13 July 1995, Clinton addressed the emerging crisis in Srebrenica, voicing concern at the humanitarian emergency. Significantly, he stated, ‘[T]‌he United Nations should go back in there and re-​establish the safe area, and the people should be able to go home. But we have to deal with the humanitarian crisis’ (Clinton, 1995b). On 14 July, additional details about the Serb takeover of Srebrenica began to emerge. Significantly, some 15,000 people –​most of whom were women, children and elderly –​ were taken from their homes and forced to leave (Woodward, 1996: 260). Further reports soon emerged that men and boys were being removed from their families and taken to unknown locations. Between 11 and 22 July more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were slaughtered in a horrific act of ethnic cleansing (Albright, 2003: 187–​9). The massacre would be the worst single act of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia since Clinton took office. More importantly, it would be a critical turning point in the administration’s Bosnia policy. As evidence of atrocities began to emerge, Clinton argued before his national security team on 17 July that the administration’s current position on Bosnia was doing ‘enormous damage to the United States and to our standing in the world. We look weak … The only time we’ve made progress is when we geared up NATO to pose a real threat to the Serbs’ (quoted in Harris, 2006: 200). While he remained aware that involving America in any armed military intervention posed a high risk, the situation in Bosnia was rapidly deteriorating leading Clinton to realize that continued restraint was going to solve nothing. Something had to change, and Lake’s ‘Endgame strategy’ appeared to be the best option to mitigate the perpetual violence. Prior to approving Lake’s proposal, he stated: ‘I’m risking my presidency’ (quoted in Harris, 2006: 201). Following the slaughter, images of Bosnian Muslim victims made their way onto the front page of major newspapers throughout the United States. These images would prove particularly powerful, renewing calls for a review

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of the administration’s policy on Bosnia as normative displacement saw more principled interpretations of interests begin to emerge. One story in particular ran in The Washington Post which described a photo of a young Bosnian woman who had committed suicide. The story read: The young woman died with no shoes on. Sometime Thursday night she climbed a high tree near the muddy ditch where she had camped for 36 hours. Knotting a shabby floral shawl together with her belt, she secured it to a branch, ran her head of black hair through the makeshift noose and jumped … She had no relatives with her and sobbed by herself until the moment she scaled the tree. (Pomfret, 1995) The sight of Eastern Europeans dying and pleading for their lives served as a powerful narrative reigniting parallels with the Holocaust. Notably, the Republican House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, among a host of others, described the atrocities as ‘the worst humiliation for Western democracies since the 1930s’ (quoted in Power, 2001: 433). A particularly symbolic moment in the development of this more principled debate occurred when Al Gore spoke of his 21-​year-​old daughter who –​having seen the devastating photo of the young Bosnian woman –​questioned her father as to how the administration could justify doing nothing. Gore spoke to Clinton of his daughter’s shock at the horrors faced by everyday people in the conflict. He urged Clinton that the policy of ‘acquiescence’ could no longer stand (Halberstam, 2001: 331). Two days after Srebrenica fell, the foreign policy principals met in the Oval Office. Gore spoke candidly before the other principals: ‘My 21-​year-​old daughter asked about that picture … What am I supposed to tell her? Why is this happening, and we’re not doing anything?’ (quoted in Harris, 2006: 196). The presentation of this principled narrative against the backdrop of the Srebrenica atrocity proved to be a pivotal moment in transforming the administration’s Bosnia policy. As these principled ideas emerged, the fear of Vietnam-​style overstretch had less traction on Clinton’s consideration of the conflict as the focus began to shift towards preventing further bloodshed. While opinion polls demonstrated that Americans were against putting troops on the ground, the photos of horrific bloodshed had affirmed the support for a robust use of air power (Harris, 2006: 196). For the first time during the Bosnian conflict, both Gore and Clinton were on the same page. Srebrenica was not just about genocide; it was about the very fabric of the West (Halberstam, 2001: 326).8 Lake summed up the feeling in the room, ‘Bosnia has become, and is the symbol of US foreign policy’ (quoted in Woodward, 1996: 261). Adding urgency to the issue was the concern that now that Serbian forces had taken the step of attacking Srebrenica, they

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may strike other safe areas, particularly if the current atrocities were left unpunished. Žepa and Goražde were also in danger, and there was little to suggest that they would be spared. The administration would not tolerate another massacre. Clinton’s mindset was shifting. The Bosnian crisis stood in a new light. The goal of US policy was no longer to contain the conflict to prevent destabilization of the region. Responding to the massacre in Srebrenica and doing the ‘right’ thing had become a necessity. US policy was no longer about balance of power considerations –​it had become a question of values and leadership. Bosnia was no longer viewed in terms of cold calculated strategic interests. It had become a test of American values. The massacre served as a powerful change to the form in which the crisis was interpreted by Clinton and his senior advisors. Even members of the administration who had been sceptical about any intervention by American forces, including Secretary of Defence Bill Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, were shocked by what they saw coming out of Srebrenica. Marking a significant shift, Perry became an advocate of robust air power, ‘not a bomb or two, not a pinprick, but a massive air campaign’ (quoted in Harris, 2006: 197). Shalikashvili shared a common approach to matters of military engagement with his predecessor, Colin Powell. When Shalikashvili commenced his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the spring of 1993, he, like Powell before him, was not enthusiastic about US involvement in Bosnia. Significantly, he had been disdainful of the non-​military ‘experts’ in the administration who believed that the use of air power alone would make a decisive difference. He had been against the ‘lift and strike’ proposal because air strikes needed to be coordinated with tactical units on the ground. It was ‘foreign policy on the cheap’ (Halberstam, 2001: 326). Yet, the images coming out of Srebrenica changed his view on Bosnia. For Shalikashvili, Srebrenica could not be ignored. It changed everything. Shalikashvili shifted positions, joining fellow senior members of the administration in advocating for a massive air campaign aimed at crippling Serb forces should they attempt further assaults against defenceless targets. On top of the general change of heart from former intervention sceptics in the administration, Clinton came under pressure following renewed calls from the Senate and the Congress to lift the arms embargo. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole managed to pass legislation demanding that the US lift the arms embargo so that Bosnian Muslims could receive weapons and have a chance to defend themselves. The bill received bipartisan support as 21 Senate Democrats broke ranks with Clinton, siding with 48 Republicans. The 69 votes received in the Senate represented two votes more than necessary to override the presidential veto (Harris, 2006: 196–​7).9

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Notably, Californian Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein stated: ‘For me the turning point was the attack on Srebrenica, that weekend with all the missing people … One image punched through to me: that young woman hanging from a tree. That to me said it all’ (Sciolino, 1995). Upon passage of the bill, Dole argued, ‘We did … the right thing … This is not about politics –​it is about life or death for a little country’ (quoted in Hosler and Matthews, 1995). Some of the votes represented a significant switch in position, including Georgia Democrat Senator Sam Nunn, and Virginia Republican Senator John Warner, both of whom had previously supported presidential prerogatives on matters of foreign policy. In response to the Senate’s vote Clinton warned, ‘[I]‌f we unilaterally lift the arms embargo, that means that the rest of the world will consider that we are responsible for what happens from then on …’ (Clinton, 1995c). Clinton opposed the idea that the US should act unilaterally in opposition to mandates put forth by the UN. But while he retained the view that America should not act unilaterally, the atrocities in Srebrenica had emphasized to Clinton that the US needed to adopt a far more decisive role. Under increasing pressure to act, Clinton argued: I do not believe it is right to impose peace on people, I don’t think in the end you get a lasting peace … But we’re exploring some different ideas. We don’t have a set map; we don’t have a set position. We have some ideas that the new events may make possible, and we’re discussing it with our allies. (Clinton, 1995d) August would prove to be a decisive month. Reeling from the reports of violence making their way out of Srebrenica, Lake’s ‘Endgame Strategy’ emerged as the path forward. Clinton instructed Lake to go to Europe to sell the policy, highlighting all necessary measures the US would be willing to take to get the parties into peace talks. He emphasized to Lake that the allied parties should be aware that Clinton was willing to veto Dole’s bill, but that a veto override may be imminent given the Senate’s earlier vote, and growing support in the House. This would be an important stick with which the administration could motivate allies into more decisive action. Prior to Lake’s departure, Clinton gathered his foreign policy team to go over the ‘Endgame Strategy’ one last time. Viewing this as the best path forward, he argued, ‘We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few months … We should negotiate from a position of real strength, or otherwise, if we let the moment slip away … we’re history’ (quoted in Woodward, 1996: 265–​6). Albright had been in favour of taking decisive action from the moment Clinton took office. The images flowing from Srebrenica compelled her

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to push even harder. Albright made her position clear. She echoed Lake’s sentiment, that America’s reluctance to assume a leadership role in the conflict was damaging to their claim to be global leaders. She argued that if the Serbs refused to agree to reasonable terms, the UN mission should be withdrawn while arming the Bosnian military and backing them with NATO air power (Albright, 2003: 190). Lake flew out to Europe where he had great success convincing the Europeans to agree to the ‘Endgame Strategy’. Even the Russians –​whom Clinton felt would be more resistant to the threat of more coercive measures by NATO –​supported Lake’s proposals (Clinton, 2004: 667). Albright took the case to the Security Council. On the morning of 10 August, the Security Council gathered for a closed-​door session. At the meeting, Albright distributed photos gathered by US intelligence agencies. The photos taken by US spy satellites showed approximately six hundred people standing together on a soccer field in the town of Nova Kasaba on 13 July. The next photo taken on 27 July showed areas down the road where the ground had been upturned along with numerous sets of vehicle tracks. These were mass graves concealing the bodies of the hundreds of people seen weeks earlier. Albright declared, ‘The Bosnian Serbs have executed, beaten, and raped people who were defenceless. They have carried out a calculated plan of atrocities far from a battlefield and with the direct involvement of high-​level Bosnian Serb Army officials’ (Albright, 2003: 189). Albright’s photographic evidence was supported by the stories of two Bosnian refugees who had survived the massacre by hiding under the bodies of their fallen friends. Other eyewitnesses recounted similar stories: They took us off a truck and led us out into some kind of meadow. People started taking off blindfolds and yelling in fear because the meadow was littered with corpses. I was put in the front row, but I fell over to the left before the first shots were fired so that bodies fell on top of me … After a bulldozer driver walked away, I crawled over the dead bodies and into the forest. (Power, 2001: 415–​16) Following Lake’s successful effort to negotiate with European allies, Clinton sent a team led by Richard Holbrooke to Bosnia in order to make a final attempt to negotiate with the Bosnians and Milosevic.10 These negotiations were interrupted when three members of the negotiating teams were killed when their car rolled down the side of a steep mountain. Holbrooke returned to the US with their bodies.11 Following a funeral service for the three men, Holbrooke gave Clinton an hour-​long briefing outlining the initial negotiations. He made it clear that the negotiations with the Serbians had gone nowhere (Woodward, 1996: 269). Yet, with the Europeans on board

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with Lake’s plan, the door had opened for the use of more decisive military force, and this time, Clinton was prepared to take the plunge. normative displacement had made a direct, decisive response the only acceptable course of action in the aftermath of Srebrenica. This is significant because the national security arguments that had been put forth by Colin Powell remained formally unchanged.

Operation Deliberate Force Holbrooke’s team returned to Europe for the second time on 28 August. On this day, however, Serb forces chose once again to bomb civilian targets. The strikes killed 37 civilians and left dozens more wounded in Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo (Albright, 2003: 191). This would prove to be a decisive test of the administration’s new Bosnia policy. Holbrooke was adamant stating, ‘We’ve got to bomb’ (quoted in Woodward, 1996: 269). Two days later on 30 August 1995, Operation Deliberate Force commenced. Sixty aircraft from bases in Italy and USS Theodore conducted comprehensive air strikes on Serb positions around Sarajevo, amounting to the largest NATO military operation to date (Albright, 2003: 191). After years of restraint, the administration was finally seeking to exercise a greater degree of leadership as Clinton came to realize that the integrity, not only of the administration but of the US as global leader, came into question. Aggressors, such as Milosevic, had to be held accountable for their actions. The bombing proved to be effective, crippling General Mladic’s communications centre, neutralizing the Serbs’ ability to move forces quickly. Overnight the Serbs had become blind and deaf on the battlefield (Halberstam, 2001: 348–​9). Within weeks Serb forces had largely lost control of territory they had formerly controlled. Following NATO’s extensive bombing campaign, Bosnians, Croatians and Yugoslavs agreed to a ceasefire (Albright, 2003: 192). On 4 November, talks began at Dayton, Ohio in an effort to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities (Clinton, 2004: 678). After weeks of negotiating, Christopher called Clinton from Dayton to inform him that an agreement had been reached. On 21 November, the Bosnian war had come to an end.12 The Dayton Agreement came into force on 14 December. Getting the parties to the table proved to vindicate several principles obscured by early successes of the Powell Doctrine. First, American leadership was critical in leading ‘the forces of peace and freedom’ which was not only necessary in ending the Bosnian war but would also serve to advance the US’s ‘strategic interests’ and ‘fundamental values’ (Clinton, 2004: 685). Additionally, it proved that limited force –​even just the use of air strikes –​could make a decisive difference.

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In the days after the agreement was reached, Clinton would advance a principled justification for intervention following the massacre at Srebrenica, stating: The violence done to those innocent civilians does violence to the principles on which America stands … Now our conscience demands that we act … I ask my fellow Americans to think about who we are as a people, what we are as a nation. All around the world others look to us not just because of our economic and military might, because of what we stand for and what we’re willing to stand against. In Bosnia, our Nation has led the way from horror to hope, hope for no more Srebrenicas, no more shelling of children’s playgrounds, no more desperate winters, no more shattered lives. Now we have a responsibility to see this achievement for peace through. Our values, our interests, and our leadership are at stake. (Clinton, 1995e) Significantly, Clinton authorized the deployment of 20,000 US troops to the region to take part in operations on the ground. This was a momentous departure from the formerly entrenched Powell Doctrine lens through which the crisis had been viewed. Clinton worked closely with Republican Senators Dole13 and John McCain to get authorization for the deployment through the Senate. In an address to the nation, Clinton justified the need to commit US troops to oversee the implementation of the peace process in the region. He argued: Generations of Americans have understood that Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability is vital to our own national security … When America’s partnerships are weak and our leadership is in doubt, it undermines our ability to secure our interests and to convince others to work with us … America has always been freedom’s greatest champion … In Bosnia, this terrible war has challenged our interests and troubled our souls. (Clinton, 1995f) He emphasized that American troops were not going to fight a war. But if hostilities did emerge, American forces would be authorized to use ‘overwhelming force’ in response. ‘By making an overwhelming show of force, they will lessen the need to use force’ (Clinton, 1995f). Clinton’s shift in position can largely be put down to a reframing of the conflict as the form of ideas changed, becoming more focussed on America’s core values as a pinnacle of human rights. While Clinton knew that the upside of the troop deployment was limited and there was potentially a tremendous downside, particularly to his re-​election chances if the US suffered casualties, the

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massacre had shown that it was not only the ‘right’ thing to do, but it was also a necessary step towards maintaining US interests. Clinton later explained the decision to take the risk and deploy troops, stating, ‘You have to ask yourself which decision would you rather defend ten years from now when you’re not in office. I would rather explain why we tried’ than why ‘NATO’s alliance was destroyed, and the influence of the United States was compromised for ten years’ (cited in Power, 2001: 441). The massacre at Srebrenica proved pivotal in shifting the narrative by giving interventionists in the administration the ammunition to displace existing technocratic narratives. Images of mass graves, dead and dying Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo and Srebrenica acted as powerful forms of ideas for advocates of intervention to advance their principled interpretations and displace the long-​entrenched view that intervention in Bosnia would lead the US into a Vietnam-​style conflict. Furthermore, it re-​emphasized to Clinton the dangers of complacency with regard to genocide. These images, along with fear of further atrocities saw principled interpretations supersede more cognitive deliberations and herald a fundamental shift in the Clinton administration’s policy towards Bosnia.

Conclusion Across the Clinton and Bush administrations, policy towards Bosnia shifted dramatically. Having examined both the Bush and Clinton administrations’ responses to the conflict in Bosnia, I have highlighted how shifts between cognitive and principled interpretations assist in explaining the variation between their policies even as balance of power considerations remained formally the same. While the early success of the Powell Doctrine served as a powerful, cognitive weapon to repress principled arguments which emphasized parallels with the Holocaust, this analogy persisted in the background of debates within the Clinton administration. Following the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995, images of the ruthless slaughter of 8,000 Bosniak men and boys acted to revitalize the formerly ‘repressed’ principled interpretations advanced by Albright, Lake and Gore. This enabled the crisis to be reframed as a mass atrocity, not simply civil war. Significantly, the conflict was seen in a different light as the administration came to realize that ‘Bosnia [had] become a symbol of US foreign policy’ (Lake quoted in Woodward, 1996: 261), and that it was doing ‘enormous damage to the US’s standing in the world’ (Clinton quoted in Harris, 2006: 200). Images of the slaughter ‘displaced’ existing cognitive interpretations towards the more symbolic principled narrative summed up by Al Gore’s appeal, ‘What should I tell my daughter?’ (Gore quoted in Harris, 2006: 196). Significantly, such images altered the

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interpretations of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, and Bill Perry, both of whom had been adamantly against intervention. These powerful forms of ideas led to normative displacement thanks to a principled reinterpretation of US interests. The key change here was not structural or ideational. Therefore, rationalist arguments, that there must be a change to the material or ideational basis of state interests for there to be a change in preferences, do not demonstrate how preferences can be interpreted in different ways leading to different approaches. Similarly, ontological security perspectives struggle to provide a clear assessment of what accounts for this shift in position. Indeed, such perspectives show why Clinton felt the need to justify restraint when the crisis was framed as an ancient ethnic conflict. But it is only through examining the interplay between the different types of ideas that a comprehensive understanding can be formed as to how states’ ‘Self ’ narratives are interpreted by purposeful foreign policy agents in the construction of threats to ontological security. The analogical connection with Holocaust was always there in the Bosnian conflict but it took the massacre at Srebrenica to put weight behind this interpretation and change US policy. In essence, the analysis of this case gives analytic context that is missing from ontological security. Discursive institutionalists provide substantial added value to the examination of such crises by emphasizing the ways in which interests can be interpreted to varying degrees through principled and cognitive types of ideas. This chapter has highlighted how different types of ideas saw interpretations of the Bosnian conflict vary. Importantly, the adaptation of discursive institutionalism used here highlights the ways in which efforts to adapt tried and tested approaches to foreign policy decision-​making, such as the Powell Doctrine, can blind leaders to principled types of information necessary to adapt policy and advance their interests.

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PART III

US Foreign Policy and Terrorism

4

‘Wag the Dog’: Terrorism in the 1990s Introduction In Part II, I trace variations in decisions to use force in response to acts of terrorism across the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. While the 9/​11 attacks serve as a ‘most likely’ (Odell, 2001: 166) case, they clearly show the shift between principled interpretations and the more refined cognitive interpretations as the forms of ideas changed. Unlike attacks on foreign embassies or military vessels, an attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in the middle of Manhattan using passenger aircraft as flying bombs was bound to spark a more principled response. In this chapter, I first examine the responses to the rising threat of terrorism across the Clinton administration. I show how the Clinton administration adopted cognitive types of responses to acts of terrorism from the bombing of the WTC in 1993, to the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the bombing of USS Cole. During this time, the potential threat posed by al-​Qaeda largely went unnoticed by the public. This lack of public attention limited the administration’s scope, and perceived need for action despite vocal principled appeals by the PNAC, a neo-​conservative think tank, calling for a more ‘forward-​leaning’ foreign policy, particularly in relation to Iraq, a leading state sponsor of terror.1 Where Clinton did respond to the Embassy bombings, he was accused by some members in Congress of ‘bombing sand’ as a ‘diversionary tactic’ (Gugliotta and Eilperin, 1998) in a ploy to distract from his impeachment woes. Overall, the administration responded to the attacks with regard to utilitarian styled concerns for ‘what works’, taking action only in a limited way upon the acquisition of ‘actionable intelligence’. As such, the fight against terrorism was broadly cast as a second-​tier threat and not a global problem that the US was, or should be, responsible for fixing. In this way, the administration largely ‘repressed’ any call for a more expansive foreign policy

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to target potential threats including going after state sponsors of terrorism, specifically, Iraq, instead favouring more restrained approaches to global challenges. As such, the attacks against the WTC in 1993, US Embassies in Africa in 1998 and the bombing of USS Cole in 2000 failed to gain traction with the American public as they were, for the most part, in ‘faraway lands’. In the second section, I provide a brief overview of the Bush administration’s early perceptions of the threat posed by terrorism. A number of members of the Bush administration had been active members of the PNAC. As such, these members advocated for a more aggressive approach to defending US interests than the Clinton administration had taken. Yet, the threat posed by al-​Qaeda remained a secondary issue compared to the potential future threat of Iraq. Bush, himself, preferred a more restrained approach to foreign policy. As a result, the threat of terrorism and al-​Qaeda, and terrorism in general, would continue to be viewed as a second-​tier threat as more principled interpretations continued to be ‘repressed’.2

Cognitive repression: terrorism as a second-​tier threat Prior to the 1990s, the Cold War had focussed US foreign policy on maintaining its influence and managing geopolitically significant crises that might otherwise devolve into superpower conflict. However, in a post-​Cold War world, foreign policy decision-​makers were forced to rethink how best to pursue US interests. As the Cold War came to an end, President George H.W. Bush warned, ‘The Soviet bear may be gone, but there are still some wolves in the woods’ (Bush, 1992g). Yet, for the first time since the Second World War, military spending began to fall. Just as the issue of atrocity prevention had been unclear as demonstrated in the previous chapters, the threat posed by terrorism would be just as difficult to interpret. Terrorism was generally viewed as more of a nuisance to be managed over the long term rather than something which posed an existential threat to US security. Prior to the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the public and bureaucratic imagination was incapable of perceiving a major terrorist attack against the US. Terrorism was prominently cast as a domestic law enforcement issue. It was not seen as the top-​level threat facing the US national security interests. This is not to suggest that terrorism was not an issue of concern. While efforts were made to mitigate threats and punish perpetrators of terror, there was neither appetite nor perceived need to go to war against a faceless enemy. Instead, US policy tended to target individuals for specific acts of terror or punish hostile governments. When Clinton assumed the presidency, terrorism was not high on the list of priorities. Clinton was poll sensitive and keen to avoid any situation which might see his approval rating diminished (Blumenthal, 2003: 63). For

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Clinton, the big foreign policy challenges were continuing to encourage the democratization of former Soviet territories, dealing with the ongoing conflict in Bosnia, as well as managing the continued hostile behaviour from Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Gulf War (9/​11 Commission Report, 2004: 348–​9). Yet, terrorism would prove to be a significant and rising threat on the back of three al-​Qaeda-​directed attacks against the US during Clinton’s presidency. Even as it became clear that al-​Qaeda was becoming a more significant threat after declaring war on America in 1998, the Clinton administration would maintain restrained efforts in their pursuit of the terrorist network. Further on I detail the three attacks perpetuated by al-​ Qaeda across the Clinton presidency. I show how, in each instance, they either failed to garner attention, or responses were limited and restrained based on ‘actionable intelligence’.

Bombing of the World Trade Centre (1993) The first attack came on 26 February 1993, when a truck bomb was detonated in the basement of the WTC. The blast destroyed several floors, killing six people, and injuring over a thousand others. The attack was carried out by Ramzi Yousef, an attendee at al-​Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan (Wright, 2006: 177). The intention had been for the bomb to destroy the foundations of one of the towers causing it to topple into the other. In doing so, the perpetrators hoped to kill in excess of 250,000 people in the towers and surrounding area. Despite being described by the FBI as ‘the largest improvised explosive device the bureau had ever encountered’ (Wright, 2006: 177), the attack was not treated as one of a significant, faceless foreign enemy. Instead, it was viewed as a tragic explosion, failing to draw comment from President Clinton until the next day. During a radio broadcast, Clinton briefly addressed the ‘explosion’ that had hit the WTC the day before, stating: Just this morning, I spoke with FBI Director Sessions, who assured me that the FBI and the Treasury Department are working closely with the New York City Police and fire departments. Working together we’ll find out who was involved and why this happened. Americans should know we’ll do everything in our power to keep them safe in their streets, their office and their homes. Feeling safe is an essential part of being secure. And that’s important to all of us. (Clinton, 1993a) Clinton said little to convey any sense of urgency after the attacks and urged the public not to overreact, suggesting that local law enforcement, aided

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by federal agencies, would have the capacity to take the necessary actions in response to the bombing. In doing so, Clinton would later be accused of treating the bombing not as an attack, but more like a disaster, ‘Like a twister in Arkansas’ (Weinberger, 2003). However, at the time, there was little contention around Clinton’s response. Newt Gingrich, then the minority-​ whip of the House, did cite the bombing as an example as to why US military funding should not be cut. In doing so, Gingrich argued, ‘[T]‌here’s a very real requirement for human intelligence and military strength. Every time we have any display of weakness, any display of timidity … There are people on the planet eager to take advantage of us’ (cited in Miniter, 2003). Yet such assertions gained little traction with the administration, focussed on its domestic agenda. Following the attack, it became apparent to the administration that this was the work of an international terrorist group. But while Clinton was concerned that free societies might be susceptible to more of these types of threats, he took a restrained approach, preferring not to chase threats without clear evidence. The response to the bombing of the WTC in 1993 demonstrates the rather placid nature by which the administration, and the US broadly, viewed the threat of terrorism. While attacks may occur from time to time, it was not believed that a catastrophic attack might occur.

1998 Embassy bombings and the Iraqi threat Throughout the early to mid-​1990s, the US had been gathering intelligence on Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-​Qaeda. Bin Laden was a wealthy Saudi Arabian who had been expelled from his country in 1991, and had his citizenship stripped in 1994 (Clinton, 2004: 797). In 1996, bin Laden declared war on America, arguing that the US had remained in Saudi Arabia for years after the end of the Gulf War. He argued, ‘Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms in our land, is a legitimate right and a moral obligation’ (quoted in Wright, 2006: 4). In February 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a ‘fatwa’3 calling for attacks against the US military, and civilian targets throughout the world (Clinton, 2004: 797). As a result, the US issued a global warning of the growing threat posed by bin Laden (Albright, 2003: 365). Significantly, towards the end of 1998, bin Laden’s attacks against the US began to escalate. On 7 August 1998 US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were attacked when two truck bombs exploded. The attacks killed 257 people and injured in excess of 5,000 (Clinton, 2004: 797). Among the fatalities were 12 Americans. Clinton’s response to the attacks was immediate but still restrained. The day of the attacks, Clinton addressed the nation, stating:

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I hope you will understand why I feel the need to comment on the fact that early this morning bombs exploded outside two of our American Embassies in Africa … These acts of terrorist violence are abhorrent; they are inhuman. We will use all the means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it takes. (Clinton, 1998c) The following week, CIA Director George Tenet confirmed that Osama bin Laden and al-​Qaeda was responsible (Clinton, 2004: 798). On 20 August, 79 cruise missiles launched, hitting an al-​Qaeda training base in Khost, Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory outside of Khartoum, Sudan, suspected of manufacturing a chemical used in the development of VX Nerve Gas. Operation Infinite Reach inflicted significant damage to al-​Qaeda training camps and killed a number of al-​Qaeda operatives. Announcing the strikes Clinton stated: Our target was terror; our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Usama bin Ladin … A few months ago, and again this week, bin Ladin publicly vowed to wage a terrorist war against America, saying, and I quote, ‘We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They’re all targets’ … our battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our Embassies in Africa, nor will it end with today’s strike … The risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact. In this case, we knew before our attack that these groups already had planned further actions against us and others. (Clinton, 1998d) A major part of Clinton’s response was to seek assistance and support of other states. This was emphasized by Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger on 20 August during a press briefing on the day of the strikes. During the briefing, Albright stated, ‘[T]‌he United States is asking every nation to stand publicly against those who perpetrate, finance or otherwise support terrorism … we recognize that this is a long-​term struggle … but we recognize as well that it is a struggle we must win’ (Clinton, 1998e). Even though bin Laden had departed from the Afghani camp hours before the missile strikes, the response demonstrated that the Clinton administration would not stand for such attacks against US outposts, nor its citizens. However, Africa was a long way from US home soil. Public interest was limited. As such, the response did little to draw focus from the political circus around the impeachment hearings. Significantly, the strike was limited and

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targeted. At no stage was there any consideration that the US should become engaged in a comprehensive, drawn-​out military campaign in pursuit of bin Laden. Instead, the administration sought to engage states in a multilateral way to condemn and prevent terrorism from flourishing. Such efforts reflect cognitive interpretations as Clinton ‘repressed’ the emotional significance of the bombings, focussing specifically on what could be done to mitigate the threat of terrorism without overextending. Albright recalled, ‘Most members of Congress applauded the mission, but public reaction was generally muted’ (Albright, 2003: 468). The attacks did little to inspire fear within the public or the administration that the threat of terrorism might be about to escalate. The attacks were simply too far away to make most Americans imagine a risk to their safety. What is equally significant, however, is that some critics viewed the action as a Wag the Dog4 style ploy to distract the Congress and public from Clinton’s ongoing impeachment proceedings. In particular, Pennsylvanian Senate Republican Arlen Specter stated: ‘There’s an obvious issue that will be raised internationally as to whether there is any diversionary motivation’ (quoted in Gugliotta and Eilperin, 1998). Republican Senator of Montana Dan Coates added to the critical response stating, ‘[T]‌here is a cloud over this presidency’ (quoted in Gugliotta and Eilperin, 1998). This scepticism was born of the facts that the mid-​term elections were due, and that Clinton had confessed that he had misled the public about the nature of his relationship with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, just three days earlier.5 Despite a minority within Congress displaying scepticism of the authenticity of the threat, the strikes had overwhelming support. House Speaker, Newt Gingrich stated, ‘I think the President did exactly the right thing … By doing this we’re sending the signal that there are no sanctuaries for terrorists’ (quoted in Gugliotta and Eilperin, 1998). Others, including Senate Majority Leader and Mississippi Republican Trent Lott called the strikes ‘appropriate and just’ (quoted in Gugliotta and Eilperin, 1998). Indeed, many in Congress believed that al-​Qaeda may pose a threat to the national security of the United States, but attacks in faraway lands would not stir public support for any sort of a sustained campaign. In the months that followed, George Tenet petitioned the Clinton administration to ‘aggressively increase’ the level of resources from the government to fight terrorism (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 107–​08). On two occasions, Tenet wrote to Clinton in an effort to acquire an additional $2 billion per year for their intelligence budget. Justifying the request, Tenet argued that the intelligence community needed a ‘massive infusion of funds’ to enable them to position themselves for what he characterized as ‘the fight of our lifetime’. ‘The signs were everywhere that al-​Qaeda had plans for bigger, more spectacular attacks on US interests’ (Tenet with Harlow,

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2007: 117). However, he was never able to convince the decision-​makers to provide the sustained, comprehensive funding to combat the rising threat. While the bombing on the US Embassies was an attack against US interests, there was little public interest or appetite for military action. In summary, the Embassy attacks failed to resonate in a way that would displace Clinton’s existing preference for restrained, limited responses to attacks as they materialized. While most members of the Congress, as well as the Clinton administration, had begun to view al-​Qaeda as a rising threat, there was no case for decisive action without actionable intelligence. The CIA did initiate an operation in 1999, which included training 60 Pakistani commandos to undertake an operation to enter Afghanistan to capture bin Laden. The plan was ultimately quashed on account of the military coup taking place in Pakistan (Woodward, 2002: 4–​5). Though operations to infiltrate al-​Qaeda, and improve intelligence capabilities were substantially increased, there was no sense of impending crisis that would lead the administration to overcome existing institutional preferences to limit the use of force, given the absence of clear targets and objectives.6 Specifically, there was no inclination within the Clinton administration to shift towards a more preventive type of foreign policy by pursuing alleged state sponsors of terrorism. While the administration was generally content with these restrained efforts to advance and protect US national security interests, some groups called for more decisive responses. In particular, members of the PNAC7 –​ including Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz8 –​had been pushing for a more assertive approach in order to secure US interests, especially against states they believed to be a threat to US interests.9 The PNAC was formed in 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan following growing discontent among conservatives with both the Clinton administration’s foreign policy and the Republican Party’s lack of direction on foreign affairs. Specifically, members of the PNAC were critical of Clinton’s resistance to topple Slobodan Milosevic in the Balkans, fearing that such muted responses might suggest to the rest of the world that the US was unwilling to uphold and defend their interests (Rumsfeld, 2011: 347). Simply put, the PNAC pushed for a more aggressive, ‘forward-​leaning’ foreign policy in defence of American values that would see efforts to ‘rally support for American global leadership’ and pursue ‘preventive efforts’ to protect US interests (Ryan, 2010: 71–​90). In this light, the PNAC had been particularly vocal with regards to Iraq’s continued provocation, aggression and general disregard of UN mandates. In January 1998, after repeated failures to comply with UN mandates to disarm, the PNAC wrote a letter to President Clinton arguing: ‘The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass

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destruction’ (Rumsfeld, 2011: 417). Saddam’s ongoing disregard for the UN and endless abuses of human rights had not been unnoticed by members of the former security community. Iraq had been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1990 (Rumsfeld, 2011: 347). Wolfowitz, in particular, had been concerned about the developing relationships between terrorist groups and regimes that had been openly hostile to the US. In this context, he had questioned intelligence officials about possible links between the 1993 bombing of the WTC and Iraq. Despite available intelligence suggesting that the attack likely occurred without the backing of a state sponsor, Wolfowitz was sceptical. Iraq had been an ongoing source of antagonism for the US since Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Besides a history of aggression towards their regional neighbours and his own people, Saddam’s pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) was viewed as a consistent threat to US foreign policy interests. Despite numerous UN resolutions10 since 1991 demanding cooperation and proof of disarmament, Saddam refused to comply. Furthermore, there were concerns that in his pursuit of WMDs, Saddam may provide access to such technologies to terrorist organizations. It wasn’t just the PNAC who viewed Iraq as a major threat. The Congress, for the most part, endorsed the policy recommendations outlined in the letter by former national security staffers in January. By October 1998, regime change had become the official US policy towards Iraq when Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. The act passed the House with 360 votes in favour and 38 against. It went on to be passed by the Senate without dissent (Rumsfeld, 2011: 347). That December, in response to growing domestic pressures and continued threat and provocation by the Iraqi regime, Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox.11 This four-​day air campaign had the specific purpose of degrading Saddam’s weapons capability. Justifying the strikes, Clinton stated: The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-​being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi Government, a Government ready to live in peace with its neighbours, a Government that respects the rights of its people … If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbours. He will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them. Because we are acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future. (Clinton, 1998b)

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Then, in 1999, the US Intelligence Community made an assessment that Saddam may have reconstituted a number of his biological weapons programs. Critically, in 2000, a judgement by a National Intelligence Estimate on threats posed by biological weapons stated: ‘Iraq has BW (Biological Weapon) delivery systems available that could be used to threaten the US and Allied forces in the Persian Gulf region’ (cited in Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 366). Saddam was viewed as a significant threat not only to the US but also to international peace and security as evident by the numerous UN resolutions against him and his regime. Yet, despite the risks posed by Saddam’s Iraqi regime as a serious threat to international peace and security, and claims of Saddam’s potential ties with al-​Qaeda, Clinton maintained a restrained approach to dealing with the regime, repressing the more principled desires of the PNAC and members of Congress to see him removed. However, the US’s position on Iraq was particularly susceptible to change given the widespread principled discontent for Saddam. This would become evident in the aftermath of 9/​11.

USS Cole and the 2000 presidential election The final significant al-​Qaeda-​perpetuated attack during the Clinton administration occurred on 12 October 2000, less than one month before the presidential election. USS Cole –​a US Navy operated guided-​missile destroyer –​was attacked by a small boat manned by two suicide bombers during a refuelling stop in the port of Aden, Yemen. The attack killed 17 US sailors and injured another 39 (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 128). Yet, it was unclear who the perpetrators were despite there being a strong suspicion that al-​Qaeda, and bin Laden were responsible. Following the attacks, Clinton stated, ‘If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. If their intention was to deter us from our mission of promoting peace and security in the Middle East, they will fail utterly’ (Clinton, 2000). However, it was not until several weeks after Clinton left office that the link to al-​Qaeda was confirmed (Harris, 2006: 414–​15). Clinton recalled that he was close to launching another missile strike in an effort to target bin Laden. Yet, due to a lack of consistent intelligence regarding his whereabouts, and without complete certainty that al-​Qaeda had indeed perpetrated the attack, Clinton withheld action (Clinton, 2004: 925; Wright, 2006: 331). Clinton held little interest in launching any type of military campaign in the closing days of the presidential campaign. More importantly, he had no interest in handing over a military campaign to the new administration. In summary, the threat was not viewed to be of a level of significance that would warrant distraction from the presidential election –​ and Clinton was concerned about securing his legacy and trying to prevent

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further deterioration between Israel and Palestine (Harris, 2006: 414–​15). Similar to previous attacks, the bombing of USS Cole did little to capture the public’s attention. In what was shaping up to be the closest presidential election in decades, the attack on a Navy vessel in a volatile region failed to spur a sense of urgency and was largely put down as a cost of being a superpower (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 128). Terrorism continued to be a threat to be managed, not pursued. On the campaign trail, mention of the attack was limited. Both candidates, Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George Bush used various issues in the Middle East to frame certain issues of foreign policy, but the bombing of USS Cole did not become a talking point (Allen and Connolly, 2000). During the final presidential debate on 17 October, the attack was mentioned on one occasion as both candidates extended their sympathies to the families of the victims (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000). However, terrorism never featured as a significant issue in the election, and no major polling organization conducted any survey on the issue (9/​ 11 Commission Report, 2004: 341). Terrorism remained too far outside of the public and bureaucratic imagination. This highlights how the attack was not viewed with any real urgency given that, like the Embassy attacks, it was in a faraway place against a military target. As such, the attack did little to displace existing interpretations of the terrorist threat. If a close presidential election wasn’t enough to throw cold water on any ideas of using military force, George Tenet noted that there were no ‘inviting targets’, and ‘simply firing more cruise missiles into the desert wasn’t going to accomplish anything’ (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 128). George Tenet noted that the Clinton administration recognized the nature of the threat posed by bin Laden, and the issue of terrorism ‘fully engaged the highest levels’ of government (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 130). Yet, the attacks took place in faraway lands and failed to resonate more broadly. As such, principled appeals advanced by the PNAC calling for a more forward-​leaning approach to rising foreign policy threats simply had no bearing given the lack of imminent danger to the American people.12 Across the three major terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-​Qaeda, the Clinton administration offered more cognitive interpretations in its responses. While each attack drew a response from the Clinton administration, there was a lack of resonance –​certainly in the public sphere –​to suggest that the US should go after terrorism in a more crusading manner. Terrorism was recognized as a challenge that would require vigilance and ongoing commitment. As a result, the administration would not seek a comprehensive campaign against terrorism. Instead, they would adopt the use of covert operations in order to track and trace specific threats and work to neutralize them on a case-​by-​case basis (see Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 107–​31). This

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was evident by Clinton’s push to infiltrate the al-​Qaeda network and enhance their ability to gather intelligence. But in simple terms, the attacks that took place failed to displace existing ideas around how best to respond to the ongoing threat of terrorism.

Early Bush repression: promises of campaign restraint Throughout the 2000 presidential campaign, Governor Bush pledged to lead the country with ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ at home, and advance strong American values in foreign policy. During his candidacy he stated: ‘I will have a foreign policy with a touch of iron –​driven by American values and American interests’ (Bush, 1999a). He argued in contrast to the Clinton administration that China was a ‘competitor’, not a ‘strategic partner’ (Bush, 1999b), keeping a check on the ever-​hostile Iraqi regime. Such language flowed into his inaugural address: We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge. We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors. The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world, by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. (Bush, 2001a) However, a disparity soon emerged between his campaign rhetoric and the reality of being in office. As a former Governor, Bush had relatively little foreign policy experience. This became blatantly obvious to advisors in his first week as one aide recalled listening in on calls with foreign heads of state, remarking that he could not believe how naïve Bush was on foreign policy (Baker, 2013: 90). Besides this general inexperience, defence spending had reached its lowest level since Pearl Harbor. And despite Rumsfeld’s request for an increase in military expenditure to combat an ageing naval and air force fleet, Bush made it clear that increased federal aid to education and tax relief were his priorities (Rumsfeld, 2011: 331–​3). Much like Clinton, Bush was wary about any fundamental change to US policy on terrorism. Moreover, Bush held little interest in foreign policy generally, let alone engaging in the complex task of seeking out threats far from the shores of the US. Even members of Congress were sceptical as to the extent to which the US should pursue various international terrorist groups let alone state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iraq. As a result, while managing the potential threat posed by the Iraqi regime and monitoring their links to terror organizations was top priority, the administration’s early policy towards Iraq remained fairly stable as the administration focussed

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on tightening sanctions in an effort to keep ‘Saddam in his box’ (Bush, 2010: 228). During the first months of his presidency, Bush maintained Clinton’s restraint. The investigation into the bombing of USS Cole the previous year had confirmed that al-​Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden, were, in fact, responsible for perpetrating the attacks. Yet the administration took no action. Rice later suggested that the reason the administration had not responded militarily was that their only options included firing more cruise missiles from offshore locations in the hope that they kill bin Laden. Failure to do so would just give bin Laden a chance to brag that he had survived another attack by the US (Rice, 2011: 65). Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism said of a meeting with Condoleezza Rice, who, at the time was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, that when they first met in January 2001, he got the impression that she did not know of al-​Qaeda. Significantly, Rice downgraded Clarke’s position of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism so that they reported to the deputies, not to the Principals (Wright, 2006: 334–​5). As a holdover from the Clinton administration, Clarke was immersed in ‘what ifs’ and had petitioned Rice during the early weeks of the administration arguing that ‘we urgently need’ a cabinet-​level review of the threat posed by al-​Qaeda. He wrote in his memo to Rice: ‘al Qida [sic] is not some narrow, little terrorist issue that needs to be included in broader regional policy … We would make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al Qida [sic] poses’ (Clarke quoted in Baker, 2013: 90). However, vision and reports of attacks in distance lands –​even against American targets –​failed to spark fear that US vital security interests might be at risk leading the administration to maintain its existing approach to terrorism. Similarly, the public was virtually ignorant of the threat, leaving the administration with no direction from the public. George Tenet noted that the incoming administration did not possess the same sense of vigilance towards the issue of terrorism that the Clinton administration had developed. Even with the bombing of USS Cole etched in recent memory, Tenet noted that within the top tier of decision-​makers there was a loss of urgency. He noted: [U]‌nless you have been on the receiving end of a 4:00 A.M. phone call telling you that one of your embassies or one of your ships has just been attacked, it is hard to fully fathom the impact of such a loss … there is nothing like being there when the bomb goes off to get your undivided attention. (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 139)

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Such a view advanced the notion that terrorism needed to be significantly reframed in order to alter interpretations in a shift away from existing institutionalized interpretations. However, when Bush came to office, because he had not been responsible for decisions during previous attacks it was difficult to maintain the sense of danger perceived in the Clinton administration. This is not to suggest that the Bush administration ignored the rising threat of terrorism. But it was complicated, and the threat posed was ambiguous. It was not as simple as just going out and getting the ‘bad guys’. Policy had to be developed and diplomacy factored in. This would take time for the new administration to do (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 139). While the administration did not possess the same level of urgency as their predecessors, Bush had requested that Tenet develop a strategy for dismantling the al-​Qaeda network in March 2001. While recognized as an important issue, terrorism was not the primary concern of the incoming administration preferring to focus their foreign policy priorities elsewhere (Herring, 2008: 941).13 Over the early months of the administration, Rice worked with Steve Hadley, the Deputy National Security Advisor, on a plan to develop greater regional support for the US’s counterterrorism efforts, particularly from Pakistan. Pakistan had been a close supporter of the neighbouring Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Any success in developing greater capabilities against the Taliban would rely entirely on getting Pakistan (Rice, 2011: 65). Furthermore, the administration began efforts to increase pressure on the Taliban regime to turn over bin Laden. As part of this strategy, the CIA also began developing plans to provide large-​scale programmes to provide aid to the Taliban’s adversaries. But in a briefing with Bush, Rice suggested that the programmes would take between three and five years to seriously damage al-​Qaeda. Immediate threats would have to be dealt with on a case-​by-​case basis through existing ‘strategy and operational structures’ (Rice, 2011: 66). Towards the end of May, Tenet reported that the CIA had detected an increase in ‘chatter’ between terrorists suggesting there was a coming attack. However, the administration immediately assumed that the attack would be overseas. As such, efforts were made to secure US Embassies in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other locations throughout the region. Reports even emerged suggesting that some of the plots involved airplanes (Rice, 2011: 66). However, bureaucratic rivalries had emerged among the institutions responsible for counterterrorism, which resulted in a diminished capacity to effectively piece together information required to defend against a potential attack (9/​11 Commission Report, 2004: 339–​60). Rice recalled that these institutional weaknesses left gaps in the sharing of information gathered between the domestic and foreign spheres (Rice, 2011: 68). Essentially, there was no way to corroborate information transmitted between operatives based

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in the US and foreign terrorist cells. And there was no sense of urgency within the administration to see this corrected. Up until the attacks of 9/​11, the Bush administration saw terrorism in the same terms as the Clinton administration. That is to say, while terrorism was recognized as a threat, there was a general belief that the way to manage the threat was to wait until actionable intelligence surfaced about the location of terrorist cells and their intentions. Significantly, Tenet noted that for the most part, the public did not recognize the growing threat terrorism posed to the country, suggesting, ‘It will take some “seminal event” … to awaken the public’ (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 163).

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that early responses to terrorism across the Clinton and Bush administrations were relatively restrained. While not ignored, the threat of terrorism was very much viewed as a ‘second-​tier’ threat by both administrations. One contributing reason for this is that al-​Qaeda’s attacks throughout the 1990s largely took place in ‘faraway lands’. As such, the rising threat of terrorism struggled to capture the imagination of the US public, leaving foreign policy agents a limited range of responses. Even when Clinton did respond in a more comprehensive way to the bombings at the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the response faced contestation from some within Congress who classed the strikes ‘diversionary’. As a result, the majority of Clinton’s responses to terrorism took place in a more covert manner, outside of the public view. While some groups, including the PNAC, advanced principled calls for a more ‘forward-​leaning’ foreign policy in which the US would confront threats before they reached its shores, including taking more decisive action against Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime, such calls were ‘repressed’. Threats were responded to only upon the acquisition of ‘actionable intelligence’. This approach remained relatively steady during the early months of the Bush administration, highlighted by Bush’s relatively ambivalent response to affirmation of al-​Qaeda’s responsibility for the bombing of USS Cole. In the next chapter, I work to show how the attacks of 9/​11 would set in motion a series of events that would see principled interpretations displace more refined, cognitive ideas. More formally, the attacks would serve to bring the threat of terrorism to the centre of public attention and see foreign policy agents view terrorism as the number-​one threat to the national security of the US. For the Bush administration, images of the attacks made the costs of insufficient action clear. This prefigured a dramatic shift in interpretations of interests, lowering the acceptable threshold of risk prior to utilizing military force.

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‘America Is Under Attack’: From the War on Terror to Iraq Introduction When Bush took office in January 2001, he was generally restrained in his approach to the outside world. There was little interest in becoming embroiled in foreign conflicts. While promising to bolster America’s defences during the campaign, military expenditure, which had fallen significantly during Clinton’s presidency, remained at its lowest level since Pearl Harbor. However, the events of 11 September 2001 would fundamentally change the course of Bush’s presidency. In this chapter, I show how the failure of existing risk assessment frameworks led to a principled reinterpretation of US foreign policy interests following the attacks of 11 September resulting in normative displacement. This reinterpretation would lay the principled foundations for the construction of the War on Terror and the subsequent decision to invade Iraq in 2003. First, I show how uncertainty consumed the administration following the attacks. Coupled with vision of the Pentagon surrounded by burning wreckage and the smouldering remains of the WTC in downtown Manhattan, such uncertainty lent itself to emotional, principled reactions as Bush cast the terrorists as the ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century’. He declared a ‘War on Terror’ which would be a ‘lengthy campaign’ that would leave the terrorists ‘in the unmarked grave of discarded lies’ (Bush, 2001c). Where early consensus saw intervention in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime, Colin Powell argued against more principled impulses of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to expand the war into Iraq. Initially, Powell’s approach would be successful in advancing more cognitive interpretations. Second, I work to show how ongoing uncertainty led Bush to justify an expansion of the War on Terror to include Iraq. Even as the initial emotion from the 9/​11 attacks had subsided, the long-​running suspicion

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regarding Saddam Hussein’s state sponsorship of terrorism, and the regime’s ongoing defiance of multiple UN Security Council resolutions to provide proof of disarmament would lay the foundations for further principled justifications for the use of force. While the decision to intervene was not clear-​cut, with Colin Powell advancing clear warnings –​‘if you break it, you own it’ –​Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz’s principled warnings of Hussein’s potential aggression would prove too powerful in the context of post-​9/​11 uncertainty. Given the administration’s heightened sensitivity to threats, traditional risk assessment frameworks were cast aside. Cognitive interpretations were ‘displaced’, there were no ‘roadmaps’ to guide action. There was only the principled and urgent need to prevent another attack and secure American interest in a post-​9/​11 world. In terms of significance, this serves as a ‘most likely’ case to bring about a displacement in agent interpretations of US interests, given the direct nature of the attack on US soil. However, analyzing this case sheds light on the way in which ideas are contested during periods of extreme uncertainty. Similarly, it demonstrates how such displacement of interests can be more than just a momentary slip, rather, it can be sustained by uncertainty and act to shape foreign policy in consequential and ongoing ways.

Normative displacement: 11 September 2001 ‘America is under attack.’ –​Andrew Card (quoted in Bush, 2010: 127) On the morning of 11 September Cheney was sitting in his office in the West Wing when his secretaries rushed in urgently, telling him to turn on his TV. A plane had just flown into the north tower of the WTC. As he turned on the TV and saw vision of the smouldering building. Cheney muttered to himself, ‘Boy, it’s going to be a bad day at the FAA [Federal Aviation Authority] today … this is a tragedy’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 121).1 Similarly, Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, recalled that around 9 am her assistant informed her that a plane had hit the WTC. Rice, like others in the administration, believed that this was little more than an unusual accident, not terrorism.2 ‘Not too long before, golfer Payne Stewart had died in a crash when the cabin depressurised and knocked the pilot unconscious. That was the kind of scenario that immediately came to mind’ (Rice, 2011: 71).3 Bush had flown down to Florida for a day trip during which he made a visit to Emma E. Booker Elementary School to promote his ‘No Child Left Behind’ education policy. On his way into the school, Bush was informed that a plane had hit the WTC. Even Bush himself recalled thinking: ‘That plane must have had the worst pilot in the world’ (Bush, 2010: 126). What is perhaps most significant from these memoirs of the

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day is the fact that the gut reaction when the first news of the attacks broke was not to call them terrorism as the prospect of an attack on US soil seemed so distant. However, when the second plane hit, all doubt was removed: it was an act of terror. Shortly after the south tower was hit, Andrew Card, Bush’s Chief of Staff, whispered to Bush in front of the class: ‘A second plane has hit the second tower, America is under attack’ (quoted in Bush, 2010: 127). It was not just the administration that, at first, could not conceive of the images they saw as being terrorism. News stations around the country were running stories about the ‘explosion’ at the top of the WTC (ABC 7, 2001). There was some sporadic, unconfirmed reporting of a plane that had hit the tower. Yet, as reporters scrambled to confirm reports live on air, United Airlines Flight 175 hit the second tower. Shortly after, reports emerged of a third plane heading for Washington. Cheney was rushed out of his office to the Presidential Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) amid fears it was heading for the White House (Baker, 2013: 123). The White House was evacuated. Meanwhile, President Bush was rushed to the airport and on to Air Force One without a destination in mind. Soon after take-​off Bush received a threat that ‘Angel is the next target’ (Baker, 2013: 124).4 Amid the growing uncertainty, Bush told Cheney to give the air force the order to shoot down any plane that failed to respond to air traffic control for fear that they too, could be used as weapons (Bush, 2010: 129). Shortly after the order was given, reports emerged of a flight that had crashed in Pennsylvania.5 Upon hearing news of the crash, Bush asked Cheney, ‘Did we shoot it down, or did it crash?’ (Bush, 2010: 131). There was no immediate answer. Bush and Cheney were left questioning whether they just had a commercial plane full of civilians shot down. In the period that followed, images of the attacks would be replayed over and over. The horror and uncertainty spurred by the attacks would yield normative displacement as Bush, and his administration, became consumed by the need to protect the American people, and their country now at war with an unknown enemy. These images would see terrorism viewed in a new light as existing approaches to managing the threat in faraway lands, clearly, no longer worked. Cheney recalled: We were in a new era and needed an entirely new strategy to keep America secure. The first war of the twenty-​first century wouldn’t be a conflict of nation against nation, army against army. It would be first and foremost a war against terrorists who operated in the shadows, feared no deterrent, and would use any weapon they could get their hands on to destroy us. (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 10)

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After hours of flying over the American countryside, stopping only to refuel and establish contact with his administration from highly secure military bases, Bush ordered Air Force One to return to Washington. Upon arrival, the smouldering remains of the Pentagon came into view, prompting Bush to feel that he was viewing the aftermath of a ‘modern-​day Pearl Harbor’ (Bush, 2010: 137). He recalled: ‘We had suffered the most devastating surprise attack since Pearl Harbor. An enemy had struck our capital for the first time since the War of 1812’ (Bush, 2010: 129).6 Back at the White House, Bush addressed the nation from the Oval Office, laying the initial foundations for what would be a monumental change in American foreign policy, stating: ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them’ (Bush, 2001b). Such an approach would see a departure from the existing case-​by-​case management of terrorism and have the US confront the terrorist threat overseas before it could manifest on US soil, even if this meant punishing state sponsors directly. Given the ‘modern-​day Pearl Harbor’ analogy, the attacks would serve to undermine the long-​held belief that the US was ‘protected by oceans’ (Bush, 2001d). Prior to 9/​11, al-​Qaeda was viewed by the American people –​at least, those who had heard of them –​as a second-​tier threat. But the magnitude of the 9/​11 attacks were unconscionable leading the Bush administration to feel as though they were surrounded by the ‘fog of war’.7 Al-​Qaeda was a faceless enemy. They were an unaccountable non-​ state actor with a capacity to project power and fear the likes of which had not been faced by US foreign policy. Such threats were vastly different from the challenges posed by hostile state actors during the Cold War. The administration’s sense of ‘what works’ was immediately ‘displaced’ as they fell into an almost perpetual reactionary mode. The primary goal was to take all necessary measures to prevent another attack and hunt down the perpetrators. Vision of the attacks served as a powerful set of images that provided the basis on which principled types of reinterpretations of interests were possible.

Constructing the War on Terror 9/​11 would have a similar impact on US foreign policy as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had in 1941.8 Notably, the Bush administration would shift from a restrained, realist-​style foreign policy towards principled crusading as he declared a ‘War on Terror’ (Bush, 2001c). In particular, Bush would be persuaded by principled ideas advanced by his Vice President Richard (Dick) Cheney, and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld had been critical of Clinton’s foreign policy through the 1990s. During Bush’s presidential transition when Rumsfeld was still under consideration

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for Secretary of Defence, he commented that Clinton’s natural reaction to global events was a ‘reflexive pullback’ when challenged or attacked. This could not be the standard of the Bush administration (Woodward, 2002: 20). Both Rumsfeld and Cheney believed that the US needed a new approach to dealing with this heightened threat of terrorism, one that recognized that what had happened was an act of war. Cheney described the view: ‘We were embarking on a fundamentally new policy … We were going to bring down their networks and go after the organizations, nations, and people who lent them support’ (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 332). In the days that followed the attacks, a series of events transpired that would all but ensure a continuation of this principled transformation of US foreign policy interests as Bush attempted to regain control of national security. First, in the days that followed, during a meeting with Congressional leaders, Bush declared, ‘This is the beginning of war in the twenty-​first century. It will require a new strategy … We will answer the bloodlust of the American people that is rightly at boil’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 134). While there was some concern at the prospect of going to war with an unknown enemy, Congressional leaders were generally supportive of Bush’s desire to go after the attackers. Bush was offered bipartisan support as many Democrats, including House Minority Leader, Richard Gephardt, agreed that this was not a political issue. The country’s safety was at stake (Baker, 2013: 135). Second, on 14 September, Bush travelled to New York to visit the WTC site to give thanks to first responders. While there, he was faced with a highly emotional public demanding action. Onlookers yelled, ‘Make ‘em pay, George … Whatever it takes’. As Bush was about to address the crowd, a retired fireman, Rocco Chierichella said to him: ‘Mr President, look what they have done to us. You can’t let them get away with this’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 141). The public was in shock and demanded action. There was a national demand for revenge, spurring a broad domestic push for action.9 This reinforced Bush’s belief that his administration must stop at nothing in order to prevent another attack.10 Throughout mid-​September, Bush convened the NSC at Camp David for a series of strategy meetings. During the first meeting on 15 September, Afghanistan was the focus of deliberations for what would be the beginning of the War on Terror (Woodward, 2002: 75). The ruling Taliban regime appeared to be an obvious target as they had given safe haven to al-​Qaeda. Their particularly oppressive record on matters of human rights provided extra motivation (Woodward, 2002: 79–​80). Al-​Qaeda had used Afghanistan as a base to plan the attacks between 1996 and 2001. Significantly, around ten thousand terrorists had been trained in camps throughout Afghanistan (Bush, 2010: 187). As an expert on Soviet politics, Condoleezza Rice was cautious, recognizing that Afghanistan was ‘the place where great powers

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go to die’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 144). However, she ultimately agreed that al-​Qaeda must be pursued, and Afghanistan was the place with the best chance of confronting the threat. Colin Powell, Bush’s Secretary of State, shared Rice’s reservations but worked in the days immediately after the attack, to put together a coalition for the war to come. Knowing that Afghanistan’s Taliban regime would be the focus, Powell contacted President Musharraf of Pakistan with a set of non-​negotiable demands (Bush, 2010: 188). Pakistan needed to support the US primarily by not allowing Pakistan to become a safe haven for al-​Qaeda, and immediately cutting diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. Pakistan’s cooperation was critical and was seen as vital if the US’s venture into Afghanistan were to be successful. Both Powell and Rice believed that sending US troops into Afghanistan was possible but required careful and meticulous planning. But there was division in the administration as to how broad a scope the impending War on Terror should have. Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld believed the attacks provided an opportunity for the US to pursue a more ‘forward-​leaning’ foreign policy, taking the fight to potential threats. As members of the PNAC during the 1990s, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld had been vocal critics of Clinton’s ‘timid’ foreign policy, which they believed left US interests vulnerable (Rumsfeld, 2011: 347). The 9/​11 attacks only exacerbated their fear. They quickly pushed for a more expansive War on Terror. In this case, Iraq was their primary goal. Wolfowitz was particularly forceful.11 Given Iraq’s history as a state sponsor of terrorism, Wolfowitz asserted that there was a 10 to 50 per cent chance that Saddam Hussein’s regime was involved in the attack (Baker, 2013: 144). Notably, as countries around the world offered their support and sympathy in the aftermath of the attack, Iraq was one exception as Hussein’s Iraqi government put out a statement: ‘The American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity’ (CNN.com/​World (2001)). Iraq was generally viewed by the US as the most dangerous country in the world for their constant evasion of UN resolutions, and their routine assault on US and British pilots patrolling UN-​mandated no-​fly zones. Rumsfeld argued, ‘Dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to antiterrorism’ (quoted in Bush, 2010: 189). However, they provided no evidence that Iraq had been involved in the attack. Yet, this suspicion of Iraq was not unusual. Days earlier, on 12 September, Bush had asked Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, to see if there was any link between Iraq and the attacks (Baker, 2013: 135). Powell and Rice immediately pushed back on the idea, asserting more cognitive interpretations to limit the scope of the war. Powell cautioned

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that targeting Iraq would be viewed as a ‘bait and switch’. Having taken the lead on building an international coalition, he feared that: ‘No one will understand or support us doing anything but going after those who attacked us’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 144). For Powell, having allies in the War on Terror would be vital. Invading Iraq would only serve to undermine their confidence. He elaborated, ‘If we want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it now, because we don’t have linkage to this event’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 189). These more cognitive ideas sought to ensure that any action taken would be achievable, and the US maintained support of its allies. Furthermore, it served to reel in the principled reaction felt within the administration of the need to combat all threats to national security all at once. Rumsfeld rebutted, arguing that if the coalition would not hold together in a fight against Iraq, ‘maybe it is not a coalition worth having’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 144). These tensions were significant and would ultimately set the groundwork for the principled invasion of Iraq 18 months later. By 16 September, Cheney was on the offensive to justify Bush’s new foreign policy proposal: ‘If you provide sanctuary to terrorists, you will face the full wrath of the United States of America’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 146).12 Given time to consider the path forward after meeting with his security team at Camp David, Bush reconvened the NSC on 17 September in Washington. As Bush sat down, he announced, ‘The purpose of this meeting is to assign tasks for the first wave of the war against terrorism. It starts today’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 148). He directed Powell to issue Afghanistan’s Taliban regime an ultimatum. End support for al-​Qaeda, hand over their senior operatives and close down their training facilities, or face an attack from the US (Baker, 2013: 148). Afghanistan was the target; Iraq, much to the dismay of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, would have to wait. Having consulted with Richard Clarke,13 Bush agreed with Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld that Hussein was likely involved but determined that there was not compelling evidence to go on (Baker, 2013: 148). Siding with Powell’s cognitive assessment, Bush concluded that pursuing Saddam would only alienate allies who had already signed onto the coalition to target al-​Qaeda specifically. Yet, the administration remained suspicious of Saddam, and Bush asked George Tenet to report on any links between Iraq and al-​Qaeda going forward. On 18 September, the US Congress voted overwhelmingly to give Bush permission to use all ‘necessary and appropriate force’ against those he deemed to be the perpetrators who ‘planned, authorised, committed, or aided’ the attacks (Authorization for Use of Military Force, 2001). The resolution was passed with bipartisan support; 420–​1 in the House, and 98–​0 in the Senate (Rumsfeld, 2011: 350).

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In his first major address to the nation since the attacks, Bush declared before a joint sitting of Congress on 20 September that the US, along with ‘the civilised world’ was at war with terrorism. In Truman-​esque fashion, Bush’s rhetoric was definitive, leaving no middle ground.14 There was now ‘clear and present danger’ to American interests that had otherwise been absent in a post-​Cold War world. As such, the battle to follow would seek out terrorism, and terrorist-​sympathizing regimes in an effort to extinguish the threat. Rallying the nation, Bush articulated powerful, principled ideas, likening the new threat they faced to ‘all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’, declaring ‘they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies’ (Bush, 2001c). Outlining what the War on Terror would look like, he declared: This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion … Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen … We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region of the world, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime … This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. (Bush, 2001c) Importantly, he identified al-​Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attacks, pointing to Afghanistan as the place in which they found safe haven. In keeping with his statement on 11 September, that the US would not distinguish between terrorists and the states who provided them safe haven, Bush issued the Taliban regime with an ultimatum: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.

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These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. (Bush, 2001c) On 7 October, the US commenced operations in Afghanistan in an effort to overthrow the Taliban regime, and weaken and ultimately defeat al-​Qaeda. Yet, while the War on Terror had commenced, the shock of the 9/​11 attacks had left the US in a state of perpetual uncertainty and fear that another attack was on the way. CIA and FBI headquarters were flooded with tip-​ offs and reports on a daily basis that new threats were imminent. Given the heightened level of uncertainty, all threats were treated as serious. Cheney, in particular, became fixated by the prospect of a biological attack, which had appeared numerous times in his intelligence briefings (Baker, 2013: 150). He consulted a number of experts, including retired air force Colonel, Randall Larsen.15 During a meeting with Larsen, Cheney asked what a chemical attack might look like. Larsen proceeded to pull a test tube containing what he described as a weaponized powder from his pocket, stating, ‘[I]‌t looks like this … And by the way, I did just carry this into your office’ (Baker, 2013: 151). Such a demonstration served to justify the principled, emotional interpretations within the administration as it became clear they had been ill-​equipped to deal with this newfound threat. The fear of a major biological attack was soon justified in early October when a number of letters containing the lethal anthrax bacteria were mailed to several news outlets, as well as the Office of Senator Tom Daschle. At least 17 people were infected. Five died (Bush, 2010: 157). This was the ‘second wave’ of attacks that the administration had feared. The attacks caused widespread panic. This was not helped by a series of copycat pranksters mailing flour and talcum powder, exacerbating the public’s fears. Then, on 17 October, during Bush’s first post-​9/​11 overseas trip, Cheney informed him that one of the White House bio-​detectors had detected traces of botulinum toxin (Bush, 2010: 153). According to early reports, the estimated timeline suggested that there was a good chance both Bush and Cheney had been exposed. For nearly 24 hours, Bush and Cheney awaited the results of a lab test, which ultimately came back negative. However, given the uncertain state of security, the exposure scare did little to quell the nerves of an already anxious administration. Among the most concerning intelligence was the suggestion that al-​Qaeda was in pursuit of black-​market fissile material in an effort to produce their own crude nuclear device. In October, Tenet briefed Bush, Cheney and Rice on an investigation into two Pakistani scientists with whom bin Laden had been in contact. Cheney responded to the briefing stating, ‘If there’s a one per cent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or

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develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response’ (Cheney quoted in Baker, 2013: 178). By this point, the CIA had substantially altered the way in which it assessed threats. Tenet noted that, in order to get ‘real-​time reporting from the field … we threw out the book’ (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 182). Former frameworks, which would otherwise constitute the cognitive types of ideas and provide the administration with a ‘roadmap’ for political action, had been undermined. In mid-​September Tenet sent a memo throughout the intelligence community reading: ‘There can be no bureaucratic impediments to success. All the rules have changed. There must be an absolute and full sharing of information, ideas, and capabilities’ (Baker, 2013: 178–​9). Capping off the year’s paranoia, on 22 December, Richard Reid, a follower of al-​Qaeda, attempted to ignite explosives hidden in his shoes while on a flight to Miami. Bush recounted, ‘The foiled attack had a big impact on me. Three months after 9/​11, it was a vivid reminder that the threats were frighteningly real’ (Bush, 2010: 165). Coupled with the hundreds of threats the intelligence services continued to receive, this attempted attack was a startling reminder of the potential consequences. Between the attacks of 11 September and mid-​2003, the CIA was reporting an average of 400 ‘specific threats’ every month (Bush, 2010: 153). Condoleezza Rice recalled that the constant flow of threats ‘had a huge impact on our psyches’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 157). Tenet likewise admitted that he could not read anything that came across his desk ‘and be anything other than scared to death’ (Baker, 2013: 157). By the end of 2001, the US had entered a new era of uncertainty, the shape of which would be dictated by fear and the search for ‘imperfect solutions for new problems’ for which there was ‘no guidebook or roadmap’ to follow (Rumsfeld, 2011: 352). Their challenge was to deal with a faceless enemy with no sovereignty to lose, and no accountability. Bush provided a stark assessment, recounting, ‘To stop the enemy, we had to be right 100 per cent of the time. To harm us, they had to succeed only once’ (Bush, 2010: 155). The result would be the casting aside of traditional risk assessment frameworks as incoming intelligence viewed all threats as serious, and genuine. The shock of the attacks, coupled with ongoing threats and a new form of enemy resulted in normative displacement, backed by a frightened Congress and public, as Bush attempted to reinterpret how best to keep the country safe. Such displacement saw revitalized approaches to existing challenges, including declarations of ‘we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts, and those who harbor them’, and ‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001b; 2001c). This principled transformation saw a drastic change to the way that Bush made foreign policy decisions, giving rise to what would become known

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as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine comprised of four prongs; first, make no distinction between terrorists and any nation that provides support to them; second, take the fight to the enemy overseas; third, confront threats before they fully materialize; fourth, advance liberty and hope as alternatives to oppression (Bush, 2010: 396–​7). In short, this doctrine would become the basis for lowering the acceptable threshold of risk when it came to interpreting risks highlighted by intelligence, emphasizing a strategy of pre-​emption. This theme carried through Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address (2002a) as he doubled down on these principled, crusading impulses. He argued that shutting down terrorist training camps and preventing terrorists and regimes who sought WMDs was imperative not only to the security of the US but to the world. In doing so, he lay the groundwork for a more expansive campaign as he outlined the ‘axis of evil’; the states that sponsored terrorism and threatened the US and its allies, including Iraq, Iran and North Korea: America will do what is necessary to ensure our Nation’s security … I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons … We have known freedom’s price. We have shown freedom’s power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom’s victory. (Bush, 2002a)

Constructing the war in Iraq In this section, I turn to debates within the administration concerning the decision to invade Iraq. I examine the ideas advanced by the foreign policy principals to demonstrate that in a post-​9/​11 context, intelligence that suggested Saddam was in possession of WMDs and had been in contact with al-​Qaeda allowed for continued principled impulses to dominate debate. As such, cognitive efforts by Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice to pursue restraint would be overshadowed by the principled push by foreign policy hawks, including Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, in the battle of ideas. Such principled interpretations would see the administration cast the Iraqi regime as an ‘imminent threat’ to the US’s national security and fundamental values, citing links to al-​Qaeda, as well as the use of torture and chemical weapons against his own population. In doing so, Bush argued of Saddam’s behaviour, ‘If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning’ (Bush, 2003a). Efforts to contain Iraq’s aggression had crumbled throughout the 1990s. Saddam had sought to increase the country’s air defence and radar capabilities,

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a direct violation of the UN’s no-​fly zones (see UNSC, 1991a). The no-​fly zones had been put in place in order to provide protection for the Kurds in the north, and the Shia in the south. Both groups had been subjected to brutal repression by the regime (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 366). Coupled with over 2,000 attempts to shoot down US military aircraft between January 2000 and September 2002, Iraq posed a major concern for the US, even more so in a post-​9/​11 world (Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, 2002). Moreover, US allies in the region had lambasted the US’s timid response to Saddam’s ongoing taunts and threats. The regime’s hostility towards the US was clear, and their violation of US values in the form of ongoing human rights abuses added to calls for decisive action to be taken against the regime. Yet, prior to 9/​11, there was little to spur the belief that more decisive action was needed. However, the 9/​11 attacks had changed Bush’s calculation. The world had just witnessed what 19 fanatics were capable of doing on an airplane using box cutters. The threat of a hostile regime with WMDs, potentially providing these weapons to groups such as al-​Qaeda, seemed unfathomable by contrast. As such, Bush would increasingly pay attention to Saddam’s breaches of Security Council resolutions –​especially given his historical links to terrorism. Bush recalled in the aftermath of the 9/​11 attacks, ‘The focus of my presidency, which I had expected to be domestic policy, was now war’ (Bush, 2010: 139). Iraq drew a great deal of attention as a result of previous attempts to attain WMDs but it was difficult to decide on the best course of action. While the issue of Iraq first resurfaced in the immediate aftermath of 9/​11, Bush –​prompted by more cognitive arguments advanced by Powell and Rice –​decided that launching an expansive campaign against terrorism would see the US’s legitimacy questioned. Yet, Iraq continued to concern Bush. At the end of 2001, he asked Rumsfeld to review battle plans for Iraq, arguing that they needed to pursue a more effective ‘coercive diplomacy’ to bring Saddam into line (Bush, 2010: 234). By July 2002, the administration was receiving intelligence that Saddam had ‘[m]‌anaged to preserve and in some cases enhance the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production’ (Bush, 2010: 236). Further intelligence suggested that the Sunni-​extremist, Abu Musab al-​Zarqawi, an al-​Qaeda-​affiliated terrorist, had set up a chemical weapons laboratory in the mountainous terrain of north-​eastern Iraq (Baker, 2013: 205). Intelligence suggested that al-​Zarqawi had spent two months in Baghdad receiving medical treatment. During this time, the CIA had requested assistance from a major Arab intelligence service to assist in extraditing al-​Zarqawi. Saddam refused to cooperate (Bush, 2010: 236). Serious debate of military action against Iraq recommenced following what Tenet described as ‘solid evidence’ that al-​Qaeda-​affiliated terrorists were not

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only in Iraq but were in Baghdad seeking Iraqi assistance in the development of WMDs (Tenet quoted in Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 368). These reports saw Cheney and Rumsfeld push a plan to bomb a camp in northern Iraq believed to be al-​Zarqawi’s base for developing biological weapons (Bush, 2010: 236–​7). Cheney had grown increasingly cautious of the Iraqi regime. While he had adopted a more restrained view in the immediate aftermath of 9/​11 towards Iraq, Cheney’s view had shifted: ‘We could not ignore the threat or wish it away, hoping naively that the crumbling sanctions regime would contain Saddam’ (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 369). For Cheney, having established these ‘credible’ links, downplaying the threat posed by the Iraqi regime would undercut the doctrine of pursuing terrorism wherever it was found (Baker, 2013: 205). Powell and Rice again advised against the use of military force, reiterating their concerns that such actions might disrupt efforts to lock down a coalition to isolate Saddam’s regime. Instead of being helpful, they warned such action may create ‘an international firestorm’ and would be viewed as the US starting a war with Iraq unilaterally (Bush, 2010: 237). The notion of dividing the international coalition served as a powerful weapon to repress Cheney and Rumsfeld’s principled push to assert the Bush Doctrine in Iraq. Bush ultimately agreed with Powell and Rice that diplomatic efforts through the UN should take their course. The use of force should only be contemplated once diplomatic options were exhausted. In August, Powell reasserted his cognitive arguments regarding the risks of using military force against Iraq. He was among the most sceptical in the administration of military intervention in Iraq and would often voice his concerns to Rice, asking her to convey his concerns to the President (Woodward, 2004: 148–​51). During a meeting in the White House residence, Powell made the case for diplomacy over force. He pointed out that fighting against the regime would not be difficult. The regime was relatively weak, and the war in 1991 had demonstrated that the Iraqi military was no match for US forces. Getting into Baghdad was not an issue: ‘I know how to do that’ (Powell quoted in Breslow, 2016). Instead, he warned that an invasion would make the US ‘the proud owner of 28 million people’, arguing the US ‘will own all their hopes, aspirations and problems’ (Powell quoted in Woodward, 2004: 150). Furthermore, Powell warned that war with Iraq ran the risk of destabilizing friendly regimes in the region including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. Putting it in more political terms, Powell stated, ‘This will become the first term … this is not going to be a walk in the woods’. He argued that going through the UN and assembling a coalition to isolate the regime may not result in an outcome ‘as clean as just going in and taking the guy out’ but it may avoid war (Woodward, 2004: 148–​51). Powell’s efforts stemmed from more refined cognitive types of ideas similar

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to those that informed his argument to avoid military force in Bosnia given the likelihood of unintended consequences in an invasion that lacked a clear end strategy. However, the forces were against Powell and Rice as Cheney and Rumsfeld played on insecurities and uncertainty surrounding the War on Terror. Initially, after the meeting with Rice and Powell, Bush was persuaded by Powell’s cognitive calls for restraint. He agreed that diplomacy had to be the first course of action. While he despised Saddam, he would regretfully accept that Saddam would have to stay if a diplomatic solution could be reached (Bush, 2010: 237). However, while Powell warned of the dangers of an invasion, citing the costs of instigating a war with Iraq, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld had their own assessment of the consequences of inaction. They warned that continuing on a diplomatic path would just give Saddam more time to become an even greater threat. Going through the UN would only lead to a never-​ending process of debate and delay (Woodward, 2004: 157). Cheney made his concerns clear regarding the threat Saddam posed in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 26 August, arguing that Saddam had ‘made a science out of deceiving the international community’ (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 389). Aware of Bush’s reservations regarding using force, Cheney and Rumsfeld cited previous instances where force had been used without UN consent, including the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, to make the case for unilateral action in Iraq. Clinton had done it to remove President Milosevic from power without UN authorization, and there were already 16 resolutions calling for Iraq to comply (Bush, 2010: 237). Saddam had continued to defy them. In particular, UN Resolution 689, adopted in 1991, specified that Iraq must not commit or support terrorism (UNSC, 1991a). Following 9/​11, Tenet stated before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘We have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad’ (quoted in Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 368). On top of this, Saddam had been providing $25,000 payments to relatives of Palestinian suicide bombers, leading the intelligence community to believe that ‘Baghdad’s links to terrorists will increase’ (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 368). In Cheney and Rumsfeld’s view, Saddam had been given a chance to disarm and comply with the Security Council’s demands, and he had failed to do so. Saddam’s continued failure to comply was exacerbated in the post-​9/​11 context in which the Bush administration found themselves. Normative displacement had seen a dramatic reinterpretation of state interests, culminating in a lowering of the acceptable threshold of risk. As the case against Saddam grew, the principled ideas advanced by Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz became increasingly powerful weapons. However,

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Powell and Rice, along with many international allies, including British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, attempted to mitigate these principled impulses to take immediate action. They argued that a specific UN resolution would help garner public and international support (Bush, 2010: 237). Notably, Brent Scowcroft, President George H.W. Bush’s former National Security Advisor, soon joined the debate, writing in The Wall Street Journal that war should be avoided at the risk of ‘Armageddon in the Middle East’ (Scowcroft, 2002). Like Powell, Scowcroft carried significant weight in matters of foreign policy. But Cheney and Rumsfeld argued that decisive action to protect and advance US interests was not only necessary, but it was also legitimate. Bush was conflicted; risk the reputation of the US by acting unilaterally, or do nothing knowing that potential future attacks might have been stopped? Given the sustained uncertainty around Iraq’s intentions and capabilities, Rumsfeld and Cheney’s principled types of ideas, emphasizing the US’s need to defend itself, gained more and more legitimacy. In September, Bush was preparing to deliver an address to the UN General Assembly. In the weeks leading up to the speech, there was a great deal of deliberation in the administration regarding how to bring up the issue of Iraq. Bush listened to the arguments one last time, deciding that the US would pursue a resolution. Bush stated, ‘There’s ambiguity in the international community’s view of Saddam and we need to clear it up. Either he will come clean about his weapons, or there will be war’ (Bush, 2010: 239). Cheney fiercely petitioned Bush to use the opportunity to challenge the UN to enforce its resolutions and hold Saddam accountable. Given Saddam’s track record, Bush wanted to muster broad international support to pressure Saddam into compliance. During his speech at the UN, Bush argued that the continued brutality of the regime towards its own people demonstrated that Saddam had lost legitimacy, stating: The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. They’ve suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. (Bush, 2002b) Pushing further, he made the case that if the Security Council’s resolutions were not upheld, the danger posed by Iraq would grow as Saddam would move closer and closer to acquiring WMDs. Finally, he adopted Cheney’s logic, warning that failure to hold Iraq accountable would undermine the

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Security Council, stating: ‘We want the resolutions of the world’s most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now, those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime’ (Bush, 2002b). On 7 October 2002, the US Congress passed a bipartisan resolution giving Bush authorization to use military force against the regime if necessary.16 The resolution cited concerns about Hussein’s continued disregard of UN Security Council resolutions. It pointed to the lack of cooperation in efforts to demonstrate disarmament and the dismantling of WMD production capabilities. The resolution also highlighted concerns regarding Hussein’s record of human rights abuses: Neither the people and Government of the United States nor the world community will be satisfied with a cosmetic change at the top of the regime resulting in the replacement of Saddam Hussein by a similarly bloody-​minded relative or general. The people and Government of the United States hope that the Iraqi people will achieve in the near future a full measure of human rights and that Iraq will take its rightful place in the world. The Committee believes that Saddam should be held to account for his many horrific crimes. (United States House of Representatives, 2002) Notably, John Kerry stated at the time: ‘When I vote to give the president of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat’ (Kerry quoted in Bush, 2010: 240). Normative displacement brought about by the 11 September attacks had not only changed the way that the administration viewed the threat of terrorism but had also altered the way in which the Congress and public viewed threats to national security. In this way, the administration’s more principled interpretations faced little opposition as the cognitive interpretations advanced by Powell and Rice could no longer address the administration’s view of ‘what’s right’ in terms of defending US interests. Under consistent pressure from Cheney and Rumsfeld, Bush had grown tired of waiting on the UN for permission to protect America’s vital interests. While at the insistence of members of Powell, Rice and America’s closest allies, Bush agreed to follow through with the UN’s process. He had come to the conclusion that the only long-​term solution was for Saddam to be removed from power. Failure by the UN to reach this determination would prove the institution to be impotent, leaving Bush with no choice but to act unilaterally (Woodward, 2004: 307–​08). By November, the UN agreed to work with the US to enforce their resolutions against Iraq. The US delegation to the Security Council tabled what would become Resolution

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1441. Resolution 1441 provided Saddam’s regime with a ‘final opportunity to comply’ and prove that he had disarmed, or face ‘serious consequences’ (UNSC, 2002). For the US, ‘serious consequences’ provided enough cover to use force. To the administration’s surprise, the resolution passed with a unanimous 15 to 0 vote.17 On 7 December, Saddam submitted over 12,000 pages in an effort to appease the UN’s demands for proof of disarmament. The submission was deemed little more than ‘irrelevant paperwork’ as Hans Blix, leader of the UN inspections team, called the submission ‘rich in volume but poor in information’ (United Nations, 2003). Senator Joe Lieberman referred to it as a ‘twelve-​thousand page, one-​hundred-​pound lie’ (Lieberman quoted in Bush, 2010: 242). Bush was convinced, based on the intelligence his team had gathered that the regime must possess WMDs. He recalled thinking, ‘If Saddam doesn’t actually have WMDs, why on earth would he subject himself to a war he will almost certainly lose?’ (Bush, 2010: 242). Saddam’s submission perpetuated the view that he was continuing his deception and deceit to disguise nefarious activities. Bush was hurtling towards war with Iraq. On 21 December, during a meeting to discuss Saddam’s ongoing defiance, Bush asked that the intelligence pointing to Saddam’s possession of WMDs be laid out one last time. Tenet responded, ‘It’s a slam dunk’ (quoted in Baker, 2013: 240). By this stage, Bush was increasingly of the opinion that military invasion of Iraq would be the only way to ensure that no WMDs fell into the hands of al-​Qaeda, or any other terrorist group. Amid a growing sense of uncertainty, more of his advisors came to view military action as the only way to ensure US interests did not come under threat. Even Condoleezza Rice, who had consistently argued for restraint, argued that if Saddam refused to comply there was no choice (Baker, 2013: 240). In January 2003, the Bush administration declared that Saddam was in ‘material breach’ of Security Council Resolution 1441 (Rumsfeld, 2011: 442). Yet, while the administration was convinced that Saddam would only succumb to the use of force, they were facing staunch resistance from abroad. In particular, France and Germany were against military action in Iraq. The French Foreign Minister, for instance, argued that there was no existing justification to go to war in Iraq (Baker, 2013: 242). Likewise, Powell remained sceptical that war was the right path. Though he found much of the evidence murky, the lowered threshold of risk gave his cognitive ideas little to stand on, especially given Saddam’s past behaviour. Conventional ways of confronting threats in their foreign policy had catastrophically failed. As such, it was nearly impossible to subdue the principled calls to quench America’s ‘bloodlust’. Eventually, Powell came to accept Cheney’s interpretation: ‘Why in the world would he

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[Saddam] subject himself for all those years to UN sanctions and forgo an estimated $100 billion in oil revenue? It makes no sense!’ (Cheney quoted in Woodward, 2004: 298). Powell’s shift was important for a number of reasons. Most importantly was the fact that he carried great credibility throughout the international community. Given France and Germany’s continued resistance to war, Bush asked Powell to present the administration’s case to the Security Council in order to win broader support for a second, conclusive Security Council resolution. After several days sifting through raw intelligence at CIA headquarters, Powell delivered his findings to the UN Security Council. Spurred by principled interpretations of partial and inconclusive pieces of intelligence, Powell constructed the best case he could to legitimize war with Iraq: ‘The facts on Iraq’s behaviour demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime made no effort –​no effort –​to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behaviour show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction’ (Powell, 2003). He highlighted the apparent link between Iraq and al-​Qaeda was ‘potentially much more sinister’, suggesting that while these two may seem like unlikely allies, ‘Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al Qaeda together’ (Powell, 2003). Two weeks later, on 24 February 2003, the Bush administration tabled a second resolution. None of the senior members of the Bush administration believed that they needed a second UN resolution to justify intervention, especially given the broad language within Resolution 1441. Despite efforts to provide a clear rationale for war, the administration failed to persuade key members of the Security Council to support their proposed resolution. The draft resolution was subsequently pulled on 17 March –​just prior to the beginning of the invasion. By early March, amid ongoing defiance by Saddam Hussein’s regime, Bush argued that the US was ready and willing to ensure that American security was upheld, arguing, ‘when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s permission’. Bush would advance principled appeals stating, ‘there’s a lot more at stake than just American security and the security of people close to Saddam Hussein. Freedom is at stake as well’ (Bush, 2003b) Saddam was issued with an ultimatum: disarm, or the US would seek regime change by force, with or without the support of the Security Council. By the middle of March 2003, war appeared inevitable. In one final effort to avoid war, Bush gave Saddam and his family 48 hours to leave Iraq and allow a transition of power. As the deadline on Bush’s ultimatum passed, Bush pushed forward with military operations (Bush, 2003c). On 19 March, Bush announced to the American people that military operations against the Iraqi regime had commenced. He stated, ‘America faces an enemy who

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has no regard for conventions of war or the rules of morality … We have no ambition in Iraq except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people’ (Bush, 2003d). The mission to Iraq was painted with two broad justifications: removing WMDs from Saddam to ensure America’s ongoing security, and liberating the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime. Based on Saddam’s history of aggression, his ongoing defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, and the heightened perception of threat post-​9/​11, Bush interpreted interests in principled terms. Saddam’s Iraqi regime was an imminent threat to US interests. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq was based on the construction of threat grounded in principled interpretations of foreign policy interests. From the restrained, cognitive types of ideas applied to foreign policy decision-​making in the later years of the Clinton administration, the uncertainty spurred by the attacks of 11 September ‘displaced’ existing interpretations of interests leading the administration to the belief that potential threats needed to be confronted before they emerged. This displacement gave rise to a sense of urgency within the administration, pushing the idea that all necessary measures should be taken to eliminate threats to US interests. In this way, more refined cognitive ideas, which had been built on the need for caution given the risks of overextension –​such as in Vietnam –​no longer restrained the administration as fears emerged that continued restraint might lead to another attack.

Conclusion The shift in interpretations of US foreign policy interests towards terrorism across the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations represents a ‘most likely’ case. Yet, this case has highlighted with the greatest clarity how interpretations shift from more refined, cognitive types of ideas –​to more principled ones as normative displacement saw interests reinterpreted in light of uncertainty and crisis. In the space of a day, US foreign policymakers’ interpretations of terrorism shifted from viewing it as a second-​tier threat, to becoming the defining national security issue of the new century. Even as the threat of terrorism emerged through numerous attacks during Clinton’s presidency, including the 1993 bombing of the WTC, the US Embassies in Uganda and Tanzania, and the attack on USS Cole, Clinton maintained a restrained approach in efforts to capture al-​Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. This approach carried into Bush’s early presidency as Tenet noted that the new administration ‘lacked the urgency’ needed to deal with the rising threat. Yet, as the WTC collapsed, normative displacement would see a fundamental reinterpretation of the way the US assessed risks around terrorism. The attacks represented the largest assault on US soil since Pearl

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Harbor and left the administration in perpetual uncertainty, concerned that further attacks could come at any time. From that point on, Bush’s primary focus turned to preventing another attack in an effort to preserve American lives. The catastrophic failure to prevent 9/​11 left the administration unsure as to how to interpret threats, resulting in all risk assessment frameworks being thrown out. Ideas about ‘what worked’ no longer worked. This displacement of these now failed cognitive types of frameworks left the administration with no ‘roadmap’. Instead, principled ideas around the  need to secure the national interests by all necessary means would lay the foundations for the War on Terror. Bush would declare that ‘you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2002b), creating a principled, black and white distinction between right and wrong. Such principled interpretations made way for the value-​laden decision to enter a pre-​emptive war with Iraq and oust the terrorist-​sympathizing Saddam Hussein. Even as Powell and Rice warned that overthrowing the Iraqi regime would make them the proud owners of the hopes and aspirations of ‘28 million Iraqis’, these cognitive arguments failed to repress principled reactions given the powerful backdrop of 9/​11. Such principled interpretations saw the administration overstate the threat of WMDs and Iraq’s links to terrorism given the lack of more refined, cognitive frameworks to assess risk. Significantly, it would see them overlook sectarian tensions which would fuel domestic instability, complicating efforts to install democratic institutions. The result would be a drawn-​out conflict in which US forces would become entrenched. Speaking on the issue years later, Donald Rumsfeld noted, ‘If it were a fact, it wouldn’t be called intelligence’.18 The lowered threshold of risk that followed 9/​11 allowed foreign policy decisions to be made based largely on principled reactions to vision of the WTC. Without such emotional forms of ideas dominating decision-​making, intelligence on Saddam’s possession of WMDs may have been viewed in more critical terms.

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PART IV

Obama and Mass Atrocities in the Middle East

6

‘This Is Like Rwanda’: How the Road to Libya Ran Through Rwanda Introduction Upon assuming the presidency in 2009, President Obama outlined a foreign policy encompassed by restraint. The US was in the midst of an economic recession and struggling to exit two costly wars in the Middle East. Throughout the campaign, Obama had emphasized the need to reel in the crusading overstretch of the Bush administration. This theme of restraint carried through the early years of his presidency, highlighted at major international addresses at Cairo University, as well as his Nobel Prize Acceptance speech in 2009. During these engagements, Obama would stress the need for humility, multilateralism and burden-​sharing in efforts to rid the world of evil (Obama, 2009a; 2009b). In this way, Obama sought to advance a foreign policy grounded in the premise that one of the jobs of the President is simply to ‘don’t do stupid shit’ (Obama quoted in Goldberg, 2016). Despite these efforts, Obama’s position on the use of force would vary through his presidency. Across the next two chapters, I examine the Obama’s decisions concerning the use of force in Libya and Syria. These are important cases as they represent significant variation in decisions to use force in response to similar types of mass atrocities within the same administration. In this chapter, I first outline the professed foreign policy set forth by the incoming Obama administration. Indeed, throughout the campaign of 2008, Obama made a concerted effort to distinguish his foreign policy from that of the outgoing Bush administration. Through continued appeals, Obama would argue that America was a force for good. However, there was a need to recognize the limits of US power, and that it was in the US’s

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vital interests not to overstretch, but a reversion to isolationism was not the answer to America’s security challenges. Furthermore, when democratic uprisings began in the Middle East in 2010, the administration would adopt this same restrained, cognitive approach. Second, I show that despite attempts to reel in crusading impulses of the previous administration, when faced with the prospect of mass atrocity, Obama would succumb to principled types of ideas, becoming drawn into the conflict in Libya in 2011. Despite efforts to avoid entering another Middle Eastern conflict, the belief that Libya was on the verge of mass atrocity would see normative displacement allow more principled interpretations of the US’s role to emerge. Even as Secretary of Defence Robert Gates advanced more cognitive ideas, arguing that Libya was of ‘no strategic interest’ (Gates, 2014: 511), the belief that Libya was on the verge of mass atrocity would see these cognitive ideas yield to principled interpretations advanced by Samantha Power, Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton. Each advanced principled arguments regarding failed or non-​existent humanitarian interventions of the 1990s with a particular focus on the failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda.1 Given this heightened sense of urgency, Obama would pursue decisive action in the Security Council, pushing for a resolution for the protection of Libyan civilians ‘by all necessary measures’ (UNSC, 2011b).

Early cognitive repression: a call for restraint Throughout the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama had been a fierce critic of President Bush’s declaration of a War on Terror. For Obama, Bush’s War on Terror represented a significant overstretch in America’s capabilities. He had been an early critic of the war, criticizing the effort in 2002, while still a State Senator in Illinois, arguing that while he was not against all wars (Wolffe, 2009: 241),2 he was ‘against dumb wars’ (Obama, 2007b). These sentiments were reiterated in 2007, shortly after announcing his candidacy for President. He was especially critical of the Bush administration for essentially writing a blank cheque for a war of undetermined length and undetermined cost. This was something many in Congress had come to resent. More significantly, it represented a critical overstretch in American power and excessive hubris in the belief that America alone could bring an end to terrorism and evil in the world. On the fifth anniversary of the declaration of the war on Iraq on 19 March 2008, Obama used the occasion to emphasize his belief that any decision to go to war should not be ideologically based. Instead, he argued that it is necessary for such decisions as grave as this to be rooted in fact. Thus, decisions to enter wars are based on ‘pragmatic judgements to keep our country safe’ (Obama, 2008). Obama emphasized the need to recognize

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the limits of America’s power, stating, ‘[U]‌nderstand that there’s a lot of cruelty around the world. We’re not going to be able to be everywhere all the time’ (Presidential Candidates Debate, 2008). He was clear that he was not a pacifist, and that war would sometimes be necessary for the cause of peace. Specifically, he would point to the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust, arguing that no one could suggest that there was not a moral obligation to act. Importantly, of the three Democratic contenders remaining after January 2008, Obama was the only one to have opposed the Iraq war from the beginning (Wolffe, 2009: 241–​2). Obama recognized the foreign policy overstretch of the Bush administration. As such, he would present himself as recognizing that sometimes, the use of force was necessary, but so too was restraint. In this way, he advocated for the exercise of restraint with a specific focus of drawing down the seemingly unresolvable conflicts already underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Notably, Obama sought to pursue a foreign policy in which adversaries could be managed through diplomacy, not force. In this light, Obama proposed that under his administration, he would adopt the seemingly unconventional approach of engaging and negotiating with Iran –​one of the US’s most prominent adversaries. This was something his presidential primary contenders had not dared to suggest. Yet, this push for greater diplomacy was a major part of Obama’s professed approach to foreign policy. Justifying his position, Obama argued: the notion that somehow not talking to the countries is punishment to them –​which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration –​is ridiculous. Now, Ronald Reagan and Democratic presidents like JFK constantly spoke to the Soviet Union at a time when Ronald Reagan called them an evil empire. And the reason is because they understood that we may not trust them and they pose an extraordinary danger to this country, but we had the obligation to find areas where we could potentially move forward. (Quoted in Wolffe, 2009: 242–​3)3 In this way, Obama advanced a path for a foreign policy that involved reeling in the threat of the use of force in an effort to promote foreign policy interests. Despite facing significant pushback on the idea of negotiating with America’s enemies –​in particular from Democratic rival Hillary Clinton –​Obama tooled a vehement defence. Drawing on President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address (Kennedy, 1961), Obama argued, ‘Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate’ (Obama, 2007a). After being sworn into office in 2009, Obama continued on this diplomatic push, sending signals to the Iranian regime in an effort to gauge their

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willingness to open a dialogue with the US. In early June, a cable was sent to US Embassies and consulates urging them to invite Iranian diplomats to the upcoming Fourth of July celebrations (Landler, 2009). These early assertions would set the tone for Obama’s approach to foreign policy to avoid the use of military force in favour of the use of diplomacy. Given the backdrop of ongoing recovery from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the worst economic recession since the Great Depression, and drawn-​out efforts to exit costly wars in the Middle East, Obama was even more motivated to maintain his preferred, restrained approach to foreign policy. One major aspect of the administration’s foreign policy platform was acknowledging the need to rebuild relations with the Muslim world. In an effort to repair relations after the damage done by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama emphasized the need for restraint and a ‘new beginning’ during his speech at Cairo University in June 2009. On the issue of Iraq, Obama suggested that there were lessons the US could draw from their experience. He stated: events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible. Indeed, we can recall the words of Thomas Jefferson, who said: ‘I hope that our wisdom will grow with our power, and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be’. (Obama, 2009a) Obama acknowledged that America, along with the international community, had a duty to respond where they could to prevent acts of violence against innocent peoples. At the same time, he argued, ‘you can’t just promise to “end tyranny” in the world’ (Obama quoted in Rhodes, 2018a: 59). Summing up his view of the president’s role in foreign policy, Obama suggested that his job was to avoid doing ‘stupid shit’ (Goldberg, 2016). While he would remain rhetorically supportive of continuing the spread of democracy, the pursuit of democracy and human rights would be less of a feature of his early foreign policy. In key addresses during his first year in office, Obama had sent a clear message that America could not right every injustice in the world. Obama would maintain this view throughout much of the Arab Spring.4 During this time, he called for ‘reform’ rather than ‘revolution’ or ‘regime change’ as democratic movements emerged in Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen (Mann, 2012: 273). Significantly, Obama sought stability, particularly in countries in which the US had diplomatic and military ties. By encouraging ‘reform’, he was making the argument that it was in the US’s interests to remain allies with these countries; however, it was in these countries’ interests to undertake democratic reforms. Yet, the administration’s

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strategy drew criticism for being inconsistent between countries as they sought to stabilize and maintain relationships with key allies. At one point, Deputy National Security Advisor Dennis McDonough stated that the administration was not making decisions ‘based on consistency or precedent. We make them based on how we can best advance our interests in the region’ (Warrick and Birnbaum, 2011). The one thing that was relatively consistent throughout these early uprisings was the restraint by Obama to avoid the use of force. In the following section, I show how the impending threat of mass atrocities in the Libyan crisis of 2011 saw cognitive ideas yield to principled ones. I show how the impending threat of mass atrocities would revitalize memories of US inaction in Rwanda. This would serve as a powerful narrative on which to make the case for intervention, despite cognitive calls for restraint. In this instance, principled beliefs about ‘what’s right’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15) came to inform policy options resulting in a normative displacement as the Obama administration’s interpretations were shaped by principled ideas.

Normative displacement: principled intervention in Libya Muammar Gaddafi came to power in September 1969 following a coup d’état which saw the overthrow of King Idris (Clapper with Brown, 2018: 162). A political revolutionary, Gaddafi consolidated power, settling into a reign spanning more than four decades. During his reign, Gaddafi antagonized the West through his sponsorship of terrorism and pursuit of nuclear weapons, causing President Reagan to refer to Gaddafi as the ‘mad dog of the Middle East’ (Reagan, 1988). Most notably, Gaddafi had been linked to the 1988 Lockerbie bombing (Mann, 2012: 281). Yet, following President George W. Bush’s declaration of the War on Terror, Gaddafi voluntarily surrendered materials that could be used in the production of WMDs in May 2003. Bush hailed Libya’s voluntary handover of these materials as a ‘wise and responsible choice’ (quoted in Coman and Brown, 2003). From that point, Libya made efforts to normalize relations with the West, largely flying under the radar. As a result, Libya would go relatively unnoticed until 2011. In early February, Libya appeared on none of the world’s various risk assessment frameworks, including ‘CrisisWatch’, as being on the brink of conflict (Bellamy, 2011: 266). However, in mid-​February pro-​democratic protests began and were immediately met with violent oppression from government forces on 18 February.5 The outbreak of violence was startling. The international community was quick to respond with condemnation of

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the Gaddafi regime as the death toll –​according to Human Rights Watch (2011) –​passed 200. One Libyan resident, Adel Mohammed Saleh, described the unfolding chaos stating: ‘What we are witnessing today is unimaginable … Warplanes and helicopters are indiscriminately bombing one area after another. There are many, many dead … Our people are dying. It is the policy of scorched earth’ (quoted in Spencer, 2011). The UN Security Council and Human Rights Council immediately issued statements of condemnation, calling for ‘an immediate end to the violence and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population’ (UNSC, 2011a). Significantly, both the Arab League and the African Union joined calls for Gaddafi to cease acts of violence against his people, with the Arab League suspending Libya’s membership on 22 February (BBC, 2011). These early reactions from international and regional institutions provided an indication of the potential threat Gaddafi posed to opposition forces. More importantly, it suggested how far Colonel Gaddafi had gone in terms of losing legitimacy within the regional and international communities. Yet, the most concerning warnings that an atrocity was imminent would come from Gaddafi himself. In a rare televised appearance, Gaddafi spouted genocidal rhetoric, vowing to purify Libya ‘inch by inch, house by house, home by home, street by street, person by person, until the country is clean of the dirt and impurities’ (quoted in Rhodes, 2018a: 110) and the ‘cockroaches’ and ‘rats’ had been eliminated (Barker, 2011). Such language, coupled with worsening violence, would advance principled interpretations perpetuated by Samantha Power, Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton as they drew parallels between Libya and Rwanda.6 Memories of failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 would permeate debate in the NSC, spurring fears of further humanitarian catastrophes should the world fail to stop Gaddafi. These parallels would come to challenge Obama’s preference to keep out of further conflicts in the region acting as powerful weapons to displace his more restrained, cognitive approach to foreign policy. The belief that bloodshed was imminent resulted in a displacement of interests, which were interpreted with greater reliance on principled narratives and memories of past failures.

Obama’s principled response Initially, Obama showed the same level of restraint in Libya as he had towards earlier crises in the Arab Spring. He responded by condemning violence against peaceful protesters without committing to decisive action, stating: ‘[T]‌he Libyan Government has a responsibility to refrain from violence’ and ‘to allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need and to respect the rights of its people’ (Obama, 2011a). On 25

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February, the US supported UN Security Council Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions and travel bans on Libyan officials (UNSC, 2011a). As part of these efforts, the US froze over $30 billion worth of Libyan government assets, closed the US Embassy and moved warships into the Mediterranean Sea as a show of force and warning to the regime (Rice, 2019: 280). But the measures failed to stop Gaddafi. The killings and violence continued to escalate. Soon, calls emerged from the rebels fighting against Gaddafi, and from within the US from leading members of Congress for greater action to be taken to quell the violence. Robert Gates was quick to push back on these calls, issuing a warning that even using modest military power to implement a no-​fly zone was a difficult task. Testifying before Congress in early March, Gates argued: ‘A no-​fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences. That’s the way you do a no-​fly zone’ and it would require ‘a big operation in a big country’ (Sanger and Shanker, 2011). Critically, Gates warned that deploying a large number of aircraft would see US resources in the region spread too thin. In this way, Gates sought to advance a cognitive interpretation of US interests in Libya, emphasising that involvement would likely work against US interests in the region as he attempted to mediate the emergence of principled expectations that the US should ‘do something’.7 Despite these warnings, a number of Senators, including John McCain, John Kerry and Joe Lieberman, all argued for a no-​fly zone, and for the US to be ready for further contributions if necessary (Sanger and Shanker, 2011). McCain even went as far to suggest that Gaddafi would never change his mind and leave Libya peacefully because ‘he’s insane’ (Berger, 2011). At this stage of the conflict, Obama remained unconvinced that US engagement was either necessary or wanted. One senior administration official stated: There’s a great temptation to stand up and say, ‘We’ll help you rid the country of a dictator’ … But the president has been clear that what’s sweeping across the Middle East is organic to the region, and as soon as we become a military player, we’re at risk of falling into the old trap that Americans are stage-​managing events for their own benefit. (Quoted in Berger, 2011) However, pressure for some kind of action continued to build. Even Anne-​Marie Slaughter, who had served as the State Department’s director for policy planning, criticized Obama’s restraint. She tweeted: ‘The international community cannot stand by and watch the massacre of Libyan protesters. In Rwanda we watched. In Kosovo, we acted’ (Landler,

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2011). Even some within the White House could not hide their disgust at Gaddafi’s action. William Daley,8 the White House Chief of Staff, supported Gates’ assessment of the complexity of the conflict. While he refused to state that intervening and removing Gaddafi was vital to the US’s national interests, he would suggest that it ‘was in our interest as human beings’ (quoted in Berger, 2011). Even Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, recognizing that intervention in Libya was not in the vital security interests of the US, argued that the US ‘ought to look for ways of being helpful to those seeking to overthrow dictators’ (quoted in Berger, 2011). With US Senators already calling for action and Gates pushing against it, there was a very early contestation between different types of ideas. While many outside the administration attempted to weaponize (Blyth, 2001: 39) principled types of ideas, referring to the ‘human interest’ of intervention, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates advanced cognitive interpretations in an effort to avoid involvement in a conflict he believed to be outside of the US’s vital foreign policy interests. By early March, reports began to emerge that Gaddafi had launched a counter-​offensive on government opposition forces, which renewed calls for action. As the days passed, Gaddafi’s forces advanced toward the rebel-​ held city of Benghazi, Libya’s second-​largest city, located 1,000km to the east. On 5 March, Benghazi had become the de facto capital following the National Transitional Council’s (NTC) declaration that they were the legitimate voice of Libya (Reuters, 2011). As Gaddafi’s forces got closer, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, leader of Libya’s revolutionary council, argued that if they reached Benghazi ‘this would mean the death of half a million … People know if he comes back they will all die’ (McGreal, 2011). The fate of those residing in Benghazi appeared increasingly bleak. Obama’s concern grew as he perceived the situation to be rapidly deteriorating. He would continue to condemn the regime as early efforts by the international community failed to quell Gaddafi’s oppression. As perceptions of the Libyan crisis worsened, Obama became increasingly vocal as he recognized that the US and the international community ‘has an obligation to do what it can to prevent a repeat of something like what happened in the Balkans in the nineties, what occurred in Rwanda’ (Obama, 2011b). Yet, even as he recognized the threat Gaddafi posed to the people of Libya, Obama remained cautious of taking military action. However, all of the readily available options –​including travel bans, arms embargos, asset freezes, and referral to the International Criminal Court –​had been exhausted (Rhodes, 2018a: 111). Adding further pressure, French President Nicolas Sarkozy had become particularly active in pushing the international community to respond. In early March, Sarkozy indicated that he would bring a draft resolution to the

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UNSC calling for a no-​fly zone (Rhodes, 2018a: 112). Then, on 9 March, Sarkozy officially recognized the NTC –​at the time based in Benghazi –​as Libya’s legitimate government.9 At this point, the Obama administration had not taken this step, despite arguing that Colonel Gaddafi had lost legitimacy to rule (Clapper with Brown, 2018: 164). Obama’s administration was heavily divided. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan, and Vice President Joe Biden were highly sceptical towards any notion of US intervention. Gates had been brought into the Bush administration in 2006 as they sought new ways of managing the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a foreign policy realist, Gates had a reputation for advocating caution and restraint. In many ways, he shared a similar view of the criteria for the use of military force as Colin Powell. In particular, Gates was of the opinion that lives should not be risked unless vital security interests were at stake.10 For Gates, Libya held little strategic value. Recalling the Libya debates in his memoir, Gates’s argument was clear: I opposed the United States attacking a third Muslim country within a decade to bring about regime change, no matter how odious the regime. I worried about how overstretched and tired the military was, and the possibility of a protracted conflict in Libya. I reminded my colleagues that when you start a war, you never know how it will go. (Gates, 2014: 511) Similarly, Hillary Clinton was equally cautious, recognizing America’s overstretch in previous Middle Eastern ventures (Clinton, 2014: 366). Biden was adamant that the notion of intervention was ‘madness’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 113). Rounding out the sceptics’ camp, John Brennan, Obama’s Homeland Security Advisor, emphasized the risks of siding with a largely unknown group of rebels who may have al-​Qaeda links. Other advisors mentioned that intervening in Libya could undermine US interests in nuclear non-​proliferation (Power, 2019: 299).11 Together, they advanced strong, cognitively laden arguments in favour of restraint. Initially, Obama would side with the realists of the administration, placing vital security concerns ahead of values in an effort to avoid overstretch and maintain balance in the region. Yet, others in the administration would vehemently support intervention. This internal support for intervention would spur normative displacement, giving rise to narratives of failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda as more principled interpretations of interests consumed debate. These principled ideas would act as powerful weapons and ultimately sway Obama’s thinking in favour of intervention.

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Advocates of intervention, including Samantha Power and Susan Rice, argued that the US had a moral obligation to do ‘what’s right’ and prevent mass atrocities (Power, 2019: 300–​01; Rice, 2019: 281). They argued that if there was a chance that the US could stop an atrocity and prevent innocent people from dying, there was a duty to do so. Samantha Power had been a key foreign policy advisor to Obama dating back to his days as a Senator (Stolberg, 2011). Obama had read Power’s (2003) Pulitzer Prize-​winning book, A Problem from Hell. He subsequently offered her a position as a foreign policy advisor on his Senate staff. Power had been an outspoken critic of the US’s perceived indifference to genocide and acted as a kind of institutional memory bank of failed efforts to respond to mass atrocity crimes during the 1990s. Along with Power, Obama’s then-​ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, was a strong advocate of intervention in Libya. Rice held significant influence after Obama elevated the position to cabinet-​level status, giving Rice direct reporting access to the President (Rice, 2019: 246). Rice’s advocacy of intervention would stem, in no small way, from her time serving in various capacities on the NSC in the Clinton administration during the Rwanda genocide. In the years that followed, Rice had repeatedly apologized for not pushing harder for intervention. In an interview with Samantha Power in 2001, Rice stated: ‘I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required’ (Rice quoted in Power, 2001). Notably, President Clinton had recognized his failure to respond to the genocide as one of the greatest regrets of his presidency (Clinton, 1998a).12 As such, links to the Rwandan genocide would serve as an important foil on which principled arguments for intervention would be based. Both Power and Rice would act as powerful institutional memory banks of failure to stop genocide, voicing concerns that inaction risked mass atrocity, and the administration falling on the wrong side of history. By mid-​March, pro-​Gaddafi forces were moving quickly toward Benghazi. On 15 March, Obama held a crisis meeting with the NSC to decide on the best path forward to prevent an atrocity. During the meeting, these different types of ideas came to a head. As Gates, Mullen, Panetta, Clapper and Biden advanced more cognitive ideas, emphasizing the need for restraint, when it was Rice’s turn to speak, she said clearly, ‘This is like Rwanda’. In doing so, she likened Gaddafi’s use of violence and rhetoric to that of someone preparing to commit genocide (Rice, 2019: 282; see also Rhodes, 2018a: 113). Obama not only had the opportunity to assist an oppressed people calling for a democratic revolution, but there was also a duty to uphold basic human rights from a brutal dictator. The final push towards intervention came following Hillary Clinton’s change of heart on the issue. Initially, she had been highly sceptical of

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sending US forces into another Middle Eastern conflict. However, in mid-​ March, Hillary Clinton met with Mohamad Jibril, a leader of Libya’s NTC, in Paris. Jibril was adamant that Gaddafi was on the verge of committing mass murder on a grand scale. Already during a counter-​offensive, pro-​ Gaddafi forces had successfully pushed rebels eastward and were quickly advancing on the rebels’ last remaining stronghold in Benghazi (Clinton, 2014: 366–​71). Just days before meeting Jibril, Clinton had testified before Congress arguing that any unilateral action in Libya would be unwise, warning that the situation was highly volatile. Concerns of overstretching the military in another operation in the Middle East rang clear in Clinton’s testimony. However, upon hearing Jibril’s argument, she became convinced that ‘hundreds of thousands of civilians in Benghazi were in imminent danger’ (Clinton, 2014: 370–​1). The prospect of mass civilian casualties confirmed for Clinton the parallels with other mass atrocities. For Clinton, inaction was no longer an acceptable course of action; an intervention was vital. Unlike earlier uprisings in the Arab Spring, where violence was more sporadic, violence in Libya appeared coordinated and mass atrocities seemed imminent. Indeed, Gaddafi had done little to mitigate the perception of impending bloodshed by spewing genocidal rhetoric as he called the opposition ‘cockroaches’ that would be hunted down ‘until the country is cleansed of dirt and scum’ (Obama, 2020: 656). For Obama, Libya now had developed all of the markers of an atrocity about to take place. This context added great weight to the principled interpretation being pushed by Rice and Power, contributing to normative displacement. As such, Obama was coming to the conclusion that action was not only necessary, but a duty. Narratives of failure in Rwanda had spurred this sense of duty, acting to displace Obama’s preference for restraint. Coupled with advocacy within the administration, Obama also had support from the Congress who, just weeks earlier, had unanimously passed a resolution calling for a no-​fly zone over Libya. Furthermore, the Arab League had been calling for a no-​fly zone, even offering to help enforce it; and France and Britain were fiercely advocating for action (Clinton, 2014: 363–​8). Sympathetic to the humanitarian calls for action, Obama asked what impact a no-​fly zone, such as the one Sarkozy was suggesting, would have. The response from military leaders was ‘none’. At this point, Obama grew frustrated: All right, I’m not ready to make a decision yet. But based on what I’m hearing, here’s the one thing we’re not going to do –​we’re not going to participate in some half-​assed no-​fly zone that won’t achieve our objective … Either we do this right, or we stop pretending that

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we’re serious about saving Benghazi just to make ourselves feel better. (Obama, 2020: 657–​8) Following a short intermission, the NSC reconvened with a series of more decisive measures capable of halting Gaddafi’s advance. As the meeting drew to an end, Obama stated that he had made a decision. Obama wanted to pursue a far tougher resolution from the Security Council than merely a no-​ fly zone. He wanted a decisive resolution providing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians from Gaddafi’s forces (Rhodes, 2018a: 115). This represented a significant departure from his foreign policy platform of restraint. Obama rejected the draft resolution proposed by the French government, concluding that a no-​fly zone would be ineffective without a credible threat of force (Obama, 2020: 657–​8). Instead, he tasked Susan Rice with selling the American version which would go on to become Security Council Resolution 1973. He stated: ‘I want to call everyone’s bluff up in New York. Go in tomorrow morning and say that we’re not going to support this resolution for a no-​fly zone, we’re going to redo it to authorise the use of “all necessary measures” ’ (Mann, 2012: xiii). Not only was Resolution 1973 developed by the administration, but Obama was also willing for the US to take a leading role in having NATO enforce it. The humanitarian arguments posed by Rice and Power, in the context of broader support for intervention by the Arab League, allies and the UN, were compelling. After this final NSC meeting before the Security Council vote, Obama took Gates aside, stating privately that the decision to intervene in Libya was a 51 to 49 call (Gates, 2014: 518–​19). Such an admission emphasizes the significance that the different types and forms of ideas have in making critical decisions, particularly in situations where values and strategic interests do not align. In this case, principled ideas served to displace existing preferences from restraint. Despite imperfect information (see Power, 2019: 300–​01),13 Obama had come to the belief that an atrocity was imminent and concluded that potentially thousands of innocent civilians could be murdered. This was the first time during Obama’s presidency that the use of military force was authorized in a new conflict. More importantly, the use of force was explicitly for the protection of human lives. Ben Rhodes would argue in an interview that inherent in the administration’s decision to intervene in Libya: There is a realist component, which is that a lot of what we have been trying to do is to essentially put forward a model of US leadership … if we are against mass atrocities and we are for collective action on behalf of global security issues, and then we don’t step up to the plate

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in Libya, it would have sent a signal that the US isn’t really a leader. (Rhodes quoted in Mann, 2012: 293) On 18 March 2011, Obama justified the decision to participate in intervention on the basis that America would utilize its ‘unique capabilities’ to enforce a no-​fly zone, arguing: ‘Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that [sic] Qadhafi would commit atrocities against his people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis would ensue. The entire region could be destabilized, endangering many of our allies and partners’ (Obama, 2011c). While advancing this principled case for intervention in Libya, Obama argued: ‘[T]‌he burden of action should not be America’s alone’, however, the US ‘should not be afraid to act’ (Obama, 2011d). Obama would refer back to the US invasion of Iraq stating that ‘we went down that road before … regime change there took 8 years … That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya’ (Obama, 2011d). He went on to argue: As I said when the United States joined an international coalition to intervene, we cannot prevent every injustice perpetrated by a regime against its people, and we have learned from our experience in Iraq just how costly and difficult it is to try to impose regime change by force –​no matter how well-​intentioned it may be. But in Libya, we saw the prospect of imminent massacre, we had a mandate for action, and heard the Libyan people’s call for help … And when [sic] Qaddafi inevitably leaves or is forced from power, decades of provocation will come to an end, and the transition to a democratic Libya can proceed. (Obama, 2011e) Obama had become convinced of the need for not only decisive action but was consumed by memories of failure in Rwanda, which would push not only the intervention but also the eventual advocation of regime change (Obama et al, 2011).14 In the aftermath of the intervention and subsequent fall of the Gaddafi regime, Obama admitted that the intervention ‘didn’t work’, and that the coalition did not achieve what it had set out to do (Goldberg, 2016). While successfully avoiding the imminent atrocity in Benghazi, the rush to do the ‘right thing’ led Obama to assume that the US would not be responsible for rebuilding Libya’s institutions, but that European allies would take up the bulk of the role. The lack of leadership in the aftermath of Gaddafi left Libya, in Obama’s words, in a ‘mess’15 (quoted in Goldberg, 2016).

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Conclusion This chapter has provided an explanation for Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya in 2011, and to actively suggest that there could be no future for Libya with Gaddafi in power. This decision represented a significant shift from Obama’s self-​professed, restrained doctrine of ‘don’t do stupid shit’ (Goldberg, 2016). Libya threatened to be a widespread massacre as the Gaddafi regime sought to repress rebel forces and protesters with military force within days of the uprising. Given the belief that mass atrocities were imminent, memories of the international community’s failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide would permeate debate within Obama’s administration. In this way, I showed how normative displacement saw more cognitive interpretations of the crisis yield to more principled ones. Specifically, the voices of Susan Rice and Samantha Power, as institutional memory banks of genocide, became particularly prevalent as they highlighted America’s failure to prevent mass atrocities during the 1990s, playing on America’s sense of ‘shame’. Rationalist approaches struggle to account for this variation –​especially given Obama’s early restraint during the Arab Spring and the Green Revolution. While support from the British and French governments cannot be disregarded in the decision to intervene in Libya, it provides only part of the story.16 Such coalitional support cannot explain Obama’s push to develop a resolution more decisive than the ‘no-​fly zone’. Instead, he sought a resolution that would allow ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians. This was a particularly significant shift given his early reluctance to entertain military options, and general preference for restraint. In this case, it is important to identify the types of ideas at play during the decision-​making process, and how these came to shape Obama’s decision to do something counter to his stated position. Senior members of the administration had labelled Libya as strategically unimportant and ‘not a vital national security interest of the United States’, and therefore, not worth putting American troops in harm’s way (Gates, 2014: 511). Yet, as principled ideas consumed debate, Obama could not escape the parallels drawn between Libya and Rwanda (Rice, 2019: 282). Gaddafi’s genocidal rhetoric and systematic attacks on civilian targets convinced Obama that Benghazi would likely be the scene of a bloodbath and that the US needed to ‘take the lead at the UN and in organizing the military campaign’ (Gates, 2014: 518). In doing so, he came to rely heavily on the will of European powers to maintain a force and rebuild the country following the initial strikes. In this way, principled types of ideas undermined Obama’s realist restraint leading to his participation in a conflict that he might have otherwise avoided.

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Syria: ‘There Was No Benghazi To Be Saved’ Introduction As commitments in Libya wound down, Obama would revert to his initial preference of restraint in matters of foreign policy. However, he would be faced by another, much more complex situation as Syria, too, entered into civil war in March 2011. By 2012, the civil war was in full swing. Casualties began to mount as did the number of civilians seeking to flee the violence. Within a matter of months, the Syrian civil war became one of the most pressing threats to peace and stability within the region. As the war escalated, concerns emerged over the growing humanitarian crisis and fears that the Assad regime might resort to using chemical weapons against rebel forces and civilians began to grow. The potential threat of the use of chemical weapons would prompt Obama to declare a ‘red line’, stating that if Assad used such weapons, this would change his equation of the use of force (Obama, 2012). Nearly one year after making this declaration, the world witnessed the deadliest chemical weapons attack since in the Iran-​Iraq war. The attack took place in Ghouta, in the eastern suburbs of Damascus on 21 August 2013. Early estimates suggested that over 1,400 people were killed (White House, 2013).1 Many of the victims were women and children. Images and videos of the dead, dying and maimed spread around the world, sparking both horror and outrage. Despite the horrific nature of the attack, Obama backed down from the threat of military force, fearing entanglement. What makes this stand-​down particularly puzzling is that there was broad support from both Republicans and Democrats, as well as from military leaders advising the administration, for the use of force. In this chapter, I work to explain this stand-​down, arguing that in contrast to Libya, Obama ‘repressed’ principled sources of information following the

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chemical weapons attack in Ghouta. In the first section, I provide a brief background of the Syrian conflict as well as the Obama administration’s early response. In doing so, I highlight some of the early debates that emerged concerning the potential use of force in Syria. Importantly, I show how early concerns surrounding the potential use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime prompted a principled response from Obama during which he declared a ‘red line’ that would ‘change his equation’ on intervention, laying the groundwork for a second departure from his more cognitive position on the use of force. In the second section, I show how Obama came to the decision not to use force following the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. Unlike Libya, in which normative displacement saw principled interpretations alter Obama’s perceptions of interests, I show that cognitive repression would see responses to the Syrian crisis calculated in more cognitive terms. As such, the crisis would be framed in legal, normative terms concerning the use of chemical weapons leading the administration to claim success following the destruction of much of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, despite ongoing humanitarian atrocities. In this way, while President Assad no longer utilized chemical weapons, Obama would repress the use of barrel bombs against civilian targets, as well as the broader humanitarian and refugee crisis, as he backed away from the idea of military intervention. In simple terms, in Syria ‘There was no Benghazi to be saved’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 157).

Seeds of intervention and the promise of ‘red lines’ Syria’s civil war began in a similar way to many of the conflicts during the Arab Spring. Discontent had been growing with the Assad regime as high unemployment, corruption and a general decline in political freedom persisted throughout the country. These tensions culminated in March 2011 as pro-​democratic protests, inspired by similar protests against repressive regimes in the region, erupted in the southern city of Daraa (Clinton, 2014: 447). However, the regime responded with violence, and conflict soon emerged following the arrest of a group of 13-​year-​old boys in the city of Daraa (Fahim and Saad, 2013). The boys had been arrested for placing graffiti on a wall spelling the words: ‘The people want the regime to fall’, a slogan which had been popular in other revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia (Sinjab, 2011). A number of the boys were beaten and tortured. One boy, Hamza al-​Khateeb, was beaten to death in custody. His mutilated remains were returned to his family on 24 May (Macleod and Flamand, 2011). In the weeks that followed, the Assad regime employed increasingly violent tactics in an effort to quell the uprising. By the end of May 2011, reports

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from within the UN estimated that at least 850 protesters had been killed by government and pro-​government forces while another 8,000 had been arbitrarily detained (Ali, 2011).

Obama’s response and the promise of intervention Obama was relatively quick to respond to the rising violence. Even before the worst of the fighting had begun, the administration placed sanctions on Assad’s regime in May 2011 (Myers and Shadid, 2011). The sanctions were imposed following President Assad’s stubborn refusal to seek a peaceful resolution to the popular uprising, despite mounting international condemnation.2 Following the announcement of the sanctions, Obama, in an address to the State Department, announced: ‘The Syrian people have shown their courage in demanding a transition to democracy. President Asad [sic] now has a choice: He can lead that transition or get out of the way’ (Obama, 2011e). As he had done previously, Obama provided rhetorical support for democratic movements, condemning Assad’s oppression. However, during this early phase of the conflict, Obama showed no intention of becoming militarily involved between the competing factions. By June 2011, significant armed insurgency had gotten underway despite UN efforts to implement a ceasefire. In August, Obama, along with key European allies, began calling for Assad to stand down (Panetta with Newton, 2014: 449–​50). In a written statement, Obama announced, ‘The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-​Assad is standing in their way … For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside’ (Wilson and Warrick, 2011). This rhetorical escalation was backed by additional financial sanctions, aimed at crippling the Assad regime’s capacity to finance further conflict. As the crisis continued to unfold, the US supported draft resolutions before the UN Security Council on 4 October 2011 and 4 February 2012.3 Both of these draft resolutions called for ‘an inclusive Syrian-​led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s population’ (UN News, 2011). Furthermore, just as they had done to Libya earlier in the year, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership in November. Significantly, the League called for opposition groups to meet at the Arab League’s headquarters in Cairo to discuss the path forward for Syria (Batty and Shenker, 2011). It was quickly becoming clear that Assad had lost legitimacy, not only with his people who increasingly rose up against him, but with the international community. By the end of 2011, at least 5,000 Syrians had been killed in the conflict which showed no signs of subsiding (Batty and Shenker, 2011).

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As Assad continued to show that he had no intention of surrendering power and refused to cease hostilities against protesters and rebel groups, the case for intervention grew stronger. However, Obama would maintain restraint. While he continued to rhetorically condemn the Assad regime, he was cautious of taking more decisive action. Just as had been the case in deliberations regarding Libya, debate within the administration over what to do in Syria was divided between principled ideas to do ‘what’s right’, and more cognitive ideas concerning what was likely to work. Samantha Power, Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton urged for early action against Assad. Power went as far as to argue the US should arm the rebels so that they had a means of defending themselves (Clinton, 2014: 462–​3; Goldberg, 2016). In Power’s appeal, she argued that Syrian rebels were citizens; farmers, doctors and carpenters who deserved America’s enthusiastic support. As she had done towards the crisis in Libya, Power was not shy about pushing her point about mass atrocities. She would make her views known to the other Principals during meetings of the NSC. On several occasions, in an effort to assert her point, Power would argue with Obama during meetings of the NSC. At one point, Obama snapped back stating: ‘Samantha, enough, I’ve already read your book’ (Goldberg, 2016). Obama, weary that US involvement in Syria could quickly turn into a quagmire, held a different view: When you have a professional army, that is well armed and sponsored by two large states who have huge stakes in this, and they are fighting against a farmer, a carpenter, an engineer who started out as protesters and suddenly now see themselves in the midst of a civil conflict … The notion that we could have –​in a clean way that didn’t commit US military forces –​hanged the equation on the ground there was never true. (Obama quoted in Goldberg, 2016) Others in the administration, including Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, were starker in their assessment regarding the prospect for success in an intervention. They both noted that intervention in Syria posed a number of significantly greater obstacles than Libya had. Unlike, Libya, Syria had a formidable air force and air defence capabilities, meaning that any effort to implement a ‘no-​fly zone’ would be significantly more complicated, costly and require a greater use of force. Syria posed a significant geopolitical challenge given that it had the backing of the Iranian regime and fell under Russia’s sphere of influence (Panetta with Newton, 2014: 448). Access to the country was also more difficult than it had been in Libya. Furthermore, there were large stocks of chemical weapons ready to be utilized which posed a risk not just to people

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on the ground should intervention cause an escalation in the fighting, but also presented a major risk to any ground troops that might be deployed. Finally, Syria had no obvious opposition to back. While civilians had risen up en masse, they were not unified. Some of the groups allegedly had ‘unsavoury ties’ to terrorist organizations (Panetta with Newton, 2014: 450). James Clapper, for instance, suggested that some of these groups were ‘affiliated or allied with Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq’ (Clapper with Brown, 2018: 168). On this basis, it was difficult to know whom to support as there was little to no cohesion between the various factions. These cognitive types of ideas served as a powerful means of repressing Power’s principled pleas for military action. Despite these challenges, Panetta discussed a range of options with military planners to see what kind of a force might be required to capture Syria’s various known chemical weapons stockpiles. Their assessments came back estimating that it would require 75,000–​90,000 troops to achieve this objective. This constituted roughly the same number of troops committed to fighting in Afghanistan at the time. Panetta considered this to be an impossible task. Indeed, when the notion was presented to Obama and his senior advisors, few saw the benefit of such direct military action. Despite Assad’s brutal violence, many within the administration, including Obama himself, believed that intervention was not a feasible option. Hillary Clinton summed up the challenges faced by the US in Syria as a ‘wicked problem’ for which there was no viable option to help bring the conflict to an end: ‘Do nothing, and a humanitarian disaster envelops the region. Intervene militarily, and risk opening Pandora’s box and wading into another quagmire, like Iraq. Send aid to rebels, and watch it end up in the hands of extremists. Continue with diplomacy, and run head-​first into a Russian veto’ (Clinton, 2014: 461). While Obama sought to avoid entanglement, Assad’s ongoing refusal to comply with international demands to cease acts of violence against the civilian population began to frustrate many within the administration. Adding further complexity was the persistent uncertainty surrounding the scope and capacity of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities. Prior to the civil war, little was known about Syria’s chemical weapons program (Holland, 2020: 28). Despite uncertainty surrounding the types and quantities of these weapons, there was little doubt about the regime’s possession. Syria’s deliberate failure to sign onto the Chemical Weapons Convention in the 1990s served as the primary clue that these weapons were present in the country. As the civil war carried on and Assad’s attacks on the civilian population became increasingly blatant, fears emerged both inside and outside of Syria that he may turn to his chemical weapons stockpiles. As speculation peaked, Obama, in a rare moment that caught many of his own senior advisors by surprise, let his guard down, asserting what could be cast as a principled case for intervention during a press conference on 20 August

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2012. When asked about the possible use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, Obama stated: We cannot have a situation in which chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. We have been very clear with the Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilised … That would change my calculus. That would change my equation. (Obama, 2012) This notion that the use of chemical weapons would ‘change his equation’, and that this would constitute a ‘red-​line’ (Obama, 2012), came about as a result of pent-​up frustration with the administration’s inability to influence events in Syria. Yet, these words would be enormously consequential, and set a seemingly unimpeachable standard for the use of force (Baker et al, 2013). Rhodes stated: ‘In the course of a presidency, a US president says millions of words in public. You never know which of those words will end up cementing a certain opinion’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 224). Despite this initial principled response to the notion of chemical weapons attacks, Obama would return to more cognitive interpretations regarding the strain on US resources and the likelihood of success in future assessments of involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Cognitive repression, chemical weapons and shifting ‘red lines’ Towards the end of 2012, the administration received reports of small-​scale chemical weapons attacks. However, given the volatile situation, these reports were hard to verify with any certainty (Rhodes, 2018a: 224). Significantly, US intelligence was wary of making any grand statements that might overstate the case against the Assad regime. Hoping to avoid any major missteps, Clapper was careful not to assert certainty where ambiguity existed. Yet, this cautious approach fuelled criticism that the administration’s slow response was costing innocent Syrians their lives. Anne-​Marie Slaughter, who served in the State Department as the Director of Planning and Policy until 2011, advanced emotionally laden, principled ideas in an opinion piece in The Washington Post, suggesting that the administration should remember the horrors of Rwanda in their dealing with the Syrian crisis. She argued, ‘Obama must realize the tremendous damage he will do to the United States and to his legacy if he fails to act’ (Slaughter, 2013). Indeed, Slaughter’s piece was not the only one to compare inaction in Syria to President Clinton’s inaction in Rwanda. In February 2013, Foreign Policy ran an article entitled: ‘Has

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Syria Become Obama’s Rwanda?’, in which Obama was accused of ‘wilfully’ disregarding the ‘systematic and appalling bloodshed in a faraway land’. In it, Inboden suggested that Obama had misapplied the ‘lessons of history into paralysis and inaction’ in an effort to avoid his own version of Iraq (Inboden, 2013). This highlighted a growing domestic concern that the situation in Syria was fast deteriorating. Yet, given the difficulty of verifying the reports along with resistance from the intelligence community to make assumptions, it took until April 2013 to determine that chemical weapons had actually been used (Rhodes, 2018a: 230). Following confirmation that chemical weapons had indeed been used, Obama announced a plan to provide military support to the Syrian opposition.4 In June 2013, the White House announced its plan to increase aid to the Free Syria Army.5 For the first time, the US would be supplying arms and ammunition to factions of the Syrian opposition (Clinton, 2014: 465). These actions demonstrate Obama’s continued preference for caution and restraint, as he adopted cognitive types of ideas based on conceptions of ‘what works’ to manage the unfolding crisis, while repressing emotionally charged principled ideas calling for the administration to do more. At this stage, there was no indication that chemical weapons were being used in a systematic way against the civilian population. Attacks until this point had been limited, and there was little suggestion as to whether these weapons would be used again. Given this limited sense of impending atrocity,6 coupled with uncertainty regarding whom to support, there was little ammunition with which advocates of intervention could displace the more refined institutional interpretations of state interests. As such, Obama would avoid engagement this time ‘repressing’ more principally laden sources of information coming out of Syria. While avoiding a military response following the attacks in December 2012, Obama was again confronted with the prospect of using force to enforce his ‘red line’ when chemical weapons were once again utilized by Assad’s forces. On 21 August 2013, stories emerged of a large-​scale chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Ghouta region.7 The attacks killed over 1,4008 people, many of whom were non-​combatants (Panetta with Newton, 2014: 450). Vision of the aftermath showed streets filled with bodies and walking wounded. Many photos included images of young children foaming at the mouth, a common effect of the nerve agent, sarin. Early reports confirmed with a ‘high confidence assessment’ that the substance used in the attack was indeed sarin gas, and that the Assad regime was responsible (Rhodes, 2018a: 226). This time, there was little ambiguity. Obama’s ‘red line’ had been crossed. Having confirmed that Assad-​backed militants were behind the attacks, Obama began to lean in the direction of limited military strikes. The graphic

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vision that was emerging had a profound impact as even some of the more conservative members of the administration were affected by these images. Most notably, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey began to favour military strikes (Rhodes, 2018a: 226–​7). This was an unusual position for Dempsey, especially as up until this point, he had argued that intervening in Syria was a ‘slippery slope where there was little chance of success’ (Dempsey, quoted in Rhodes, 2018a: 226). However, his view on the use of force shifted drastically. During an NSC meeting in the days that followed, Dempsey stated, ‘Normally, I would want to know what comes next. But this is not one of those times’ (quoted in Power, 2019: 365). Indeed, most military action was taken only after the utmost consideration, especially following Vietnam, and reinforced by the ongoing quagmire in Iraq. However, vision of innocent children dying of asphyxiation as clouds of sarin gas surrounded them proved to be a powerful catalyst for more principled interpretations to emerge, even among the most conservative military voices. Prior to the chemical weapons attack, the military leadership had been reluctant to entertain thoughts of military force, but for the first time, there was broad agreement that a military response was appropriate and necessary (Kerry, 2018: 527). The toll of the Syrian crisis had moved beyond an acceptable level. Inaction was no longer a legitimate course of action, and there was a sense the US could not ignore what was going on, nor could they continue to stand by as the Security Council remained gridlocked by Russia and China’s veto. To this end, both Britain and France had indicated that they would be willing to act in lockstep with the US in retaliation for the attacks (Kerry 2018: 531). Given the emotional impact of the images coming out of Syria, Obama was moving closer to a strike while still exercising caution that military strikes might incur further involvement in the conflict. While not enthusiastic about risking escalation and possibly a new war, Obama emphasized, ‘When I say that using chemical weapons was a red line, this is what I meant’, stating that he knew of no other way than a decisive use of force to communicate to Assad: ‘Don’t do this again’ (quoted in Power, 2019: 366). Significantly, Obama directed Power to inform the UN to withdraw their weapons inspectors immediately while confirming with the military that US forces were at the ready to immediately launch an attack upon his orders. The use of force, at this point, appeared inevitable. Yet, John Kerry9 noted that inherent in Obama’s decision-​making was a demand for ‘comprehensive analysis of potential unintended consequences’ (Kerry, 2018: 528). Denis McDonough,10 Obama’s Chief of Staff, was the most cautious in the administration when it came to the question of using force in response to the attacks. Given Obama’s ‘red line’ comment the year before, McDonough

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knew that the issue of military strikes would emerge. During meetings of the NSC in the aftermath of the attack, Clapper noted that McDonough would ‘keep raising the evidentiary bar we needed to meet before he believed our reports’ (Clapper with Brown, 2018: 239). Even as Clapper met McDonough’s demands for greater assurances of the integrity of the intelligence, Clapper again refused to make any claim with absolute certainty (Rhodes, 2018a: 228). In one meeting of the NSC, Clapper stated clearly that catching Assad with chemical weapons was not ‘slam dunk’, despite the comprehensive amount of compiled evidence. Obama responded, ‘Jim, no one asked you if it was a slam dunk’ (Obama quoted in Rhodes, 2018a: 229). But McDonough’s doubts were significant, and soon Obama’s thoughts turned to potential ‘unintended consequences’ following a letter from the Speaker of the House, Republican John Boehner. Boehner wrote: Our nation’s response to the deterioration and atrocities in Syria has implications not just in Syria, but also for America’s credibility across the globe, especially in places like Iran. Even as the United States grapples with the alarming scale of the human suffering, we are immediately confronted with contemplating the potential scenarios our response might trigger or accelerate. These considerations include the Assad regime potentially losing command and control of its stock of chemical weapons or terrorist organisations –​especially those tied to al Qaeda –​gaining greater control of and maintaining territory. (Fuller, 2013) Boehner’s letter reflected the apprehension in Congress regarding the potential implications of the use of force. The letter contained 14 questions relating to any implementation of the use of force. Boehner requested additional information in relation to what would happens should the regime lose control of chemical weapons stockpiles. At its core were questions regarding ‘what happens next?’. Boehner emphasized the need to gain Congressional approval before engaging in military operations. ‘It is essential you address on what basis any use of force would be legally justified and how the justification comports with the exclusive authority of congressional authorization under Article I of the constitution’ (quoted in Rhodes, 2018b).11 These cognitive types of ideas formed a base for repressing emotional sources of information. These questions would prove difficult to overcome. While Syria was broadly viewed as a humanitarian tragedy –​ principled concerns for the humanitarian crisis did not command the same authority as they had in Libya. As such, emotionally laden interpretations, which called for decisive action, struggled to convey the level of urgency required to displace more institutionalized concerns to avoid entanglement.

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Yet, in an effort to confront these concerns and make the case for a limited response, the administration reached out to members of Congress on 29 August. While generally supportive of the plan to use force, a number of Congressional members pushed the administration over the legality of striking Syria. Representative Hal Rogers, chairman of the House Appropriations committee, questioned the administration on the issue of Congressional approval, arguing, ‘If Russia’s not with you, and the UN isn’t with you, aren’t you better off if the Congress is?’ (quoted in Kerry, 2018: 531).12 However, during the meeting with Congressional members, the administration was dealt a major blow. Word came through that the British Parliament had voted against authorizing British military participation in strikes against the Syria regime, fearing a repeat of Iraq. Following his phone call with British Prime Minister David Cameron, Obama’s confidence in the use of force was severely undermined (Rhodes, 2018a: 233).13 The memory of past ventures into the Middle East was a serious impediment. Intervention and the potential removal of Assad risked destabilizing the region further and expanding the territory in which terrorist groups could thrive. Amid the backdown by the British government, the inevitable impasse at the UN due to Russia’s obstruction, and the potential to be drawn into another prolonged conflict, Obama’s doubts grew, and he began to repress the more emotionally laden principled interpretations emphasizing a duty to respond to the humanitarian crisis. Kerry noted that debate within the administration had shifted, focussing less on the legitimacy of military strikes and more on the legality of doing so without UN authorization.14 Broadly speaking, there are three ways in which the use of force can be authorized: self-​defence; acting pursuant to the request of a legitimate government of the nation; or with UN Security Council resolution (Kerry, 2018: 529). At this stage, none of these criteria were filled. Without Congressional authorization, the legality of any military force was tenuous at best. On the evening of 30 August, Obama met with his NSC following a discussion with his Chief of Staff and intervention sceptic, Dennis McDonough. He informed them that they would not be initiating a strike without Congressional authorization. Domestically, there was no way to justify that any action would be in self-​defence, there was no UN resolution on the back of sustained Russian and Chinese vetos, and Britain had voted against participation meaning the US would be left without a key ally. The decision caught many of his aides by surprise given how hard the early push for action had been. Obama laid out his thinking: ‘It’s too easy for a president to go to war’, but if Congress were on board, there would be more credibility politically, legally, and internationally (Obama quoted in Rhodes, 2018a: 235). While surprised by this sudden slowdown in momentum,

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the foreign policy principals basically agreed that seeking authorization for strikes was logical. Susan Rice stood out as the lone dissenter, arguing, ‘We need to hold Assad accountable … Congress is never going to give you this authority’ (quoted in Rhodes, 2018a: 236). However, by shifting the terms of the debate towards a more legal focus, Obama began to remove the emotional impact of the chemical weapons strikes. In a meeting with Congressional leadership the next day, John Boehner said that he was supportive of action, but would not act to rally votes in the Republican caucus. Senator Mitch McConnell would neither offer support, nor offer to push for Republican votes in the Senate (Rhodes, 2018b). However, all leaders agreed that Congressional approval was the preferable course of action. Following the meeting, Obama addressed the nation on the situation in Syria, stating that he was ready to take out military strikes against the Assad regime but that he would seek Congressional approval (Obama, 2013a). However, in making the case for action, Obama shifted the justification for strikes further, grounding the case for action not so much on the humanitarian atrocity, instead, focussing on the need to respond to the use of chemical weapons: Make no mistake, this has implications beyond chemical warfare. If we won’t enforce accountability in the face of this heinous act, what does it say about our resolve to stand up to others who flout fundamental international rules? To governments who would choose to build nuclear arms? To terrorists who would spread biological weapons? To armies who carry out genocide? We cannot raise our children in a world where we will not follow through on the things we say, the accords we sign, the values that define us. (Obama, 2013a) Obama noted that the atrocity risked ‘making a mockery’ of the global prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.15 This emphasis on global prohibition norms around the use of chemical weapons would serve as an important reference point as Obama began to draw focus away from atrocity prevention towards ridding Syria of chemical weapons. Despite early enthusiasm immediately following Assad’s attack, Obama began to question the benefits of a potential strike, instead, considering the potential costs of engagement. Importantly, Obama’s framing of the event in terms of the consequences of ignoring an act of ‘chemical warfare’ would prefigure the repression of principled concerns for the humanitarian conditions in Syria. Adding to concerns of the potential implications of military action, some members of Congress questioned the coherence of engagement. Notably, public opinion was generally against the use of force (Rhodes, 2018a: 237). One Republican Congressman from California, Devin Nunes, argued: ‘The

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apparent chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime is an appalling, unconscionable act by a bloodthirsty tyrant. The ‘limited’ military response supported by President Obama, however, shows no clear goal, strategy, or any coherence whatsoever, and is supported neither by myself nor the American people’ (Nunes quoted in Singer, 2013). These concerns were not limited to the Republicans, though their opposition seemed to be the loudest. Expressing similar sentiments, Democratic Congresswoman from Minnesota, Betty McCollum, argued: ‘Unilateral US military action against the Syrian regime at this time would do nothing to advance American interests, but would certainly fuel extremist groups on both sides of the conflict that are determined to expand the bloodshed beyond Syria’s borders’ (McCollum quoted in Singer, 2013). Providing a much-​needed boost for the case for intervention, Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham released a statement in support of military force, arguing that it ‘would help change the momentum on the battlefield [in Syria]’ (McCain and Salter, 2018: 188). On 2 September, Obama invited them both to the White House to review the intended plans should Congress approve the use of force. McCain recalled that the plan they laid out was ‘surprisingly substantial’ and that it would have a significant impact on the momentum of the conflict (McCain and Salter, 2018: 189). They went on to argue that failure by Congress to authorize the plan would be ‘catastrophic’. On 4 September, the administration’s plan was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 10 to 7. Votes both for and against were bipartisan. However, fearing his own version of Iraq, Obama remained unconvinced that military action was the correct path. By early September, emotions from the chemical attacks had begun to wane and it was not clear that another attack was on the horizon. As Ben Rhodes noted, ‘There was no Benghazi to be saved from an advancing army’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 157) and thus, there was little sense of urgency surrounding deliberations. The delay caused by pursuing Congressional approval would provide Obama with time to pursue more diplomatic measures. While attending the G20 Conference in St Petersburg, Obama spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin, hoping to achieve some form of cooperation from his Russian counterpart in dealing with Assad. During their discussions, Obama sought to convince Putin to pressure Assad into giving up his chemical weapons and opening his borders to UN weapons inspectors. He argued that if Russia could convince Assad to get rid of his chemical weapons, the US would be under no pressure to instigate a military strike (Rhodes, 2018a: 240). This represented a significant diplomatic step that might have represented the last ploy to avoid a military strike. Putin agreed to continue the discussion through John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov.

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On 9 September, Lavrov met with his Syrian counterpart, Walid al-​ Moallem, to make the case that Syria should hand over its chemical weapons as a way to avoid punitive action by the US (Borger and Wintour, 2013). Walid al-​Moallem agreed, moving the diplomatic process forward and averting military action. On 10 September, Obama requested that the Congress hold off on their vote while negotiations took place for international weapons inspectors to oversee the handover and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. Within the White House, Obama remarked, ‘[D]‌ropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason to use force’ (Obama quoted in Goldberg, 2016). He had become focussed on the numerous factors that were aligning against intervention (Rhodes, 2018a: 234). Institutional realities mounted which saw Obama repress the emotional impact of the chemical weapons attack and focus more on what might happen if the use of force went wrong for one reason or another. Notably, Syria’s agreement to surrender their chemical weapons stockpiles nullified the risk of further attacks.16 News of the stand-​down angered Senators McCain and Graham, having been promised action in a face-​to-​face meeting with the President. Yet, by slowing down the decision-​making process and framing it in legalistic chemical weapons taboo terms, Obama overcame emotional arguments for military strikes, in an effort to focus on ridding the country of chemical weapons. Even former Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta remarked, ‘Assad’s action clearly defied President Obama’s warning; by failing to respond, it sent the wrong message to the world’ (Panetta with Newton, 2014: 450). On 24 September 2013, having received confirmation from Putin that Syria would agree to turn over its chemical weapons, Obama outlined the US’s position before the UN General Assembly. He stated: The United States of America is prepared to use all elements of our power, including military force, to secure our core interests in the region … But I also believe that we can rarely achieve these objectives through unilateral American action, particularly through military action. Iraq shows us that democracy cannot simply be imposed by force. Rather, these objectives are best achieved when we partner with the international community and with the countries and peoples of the region. (Obama, 2013b) By 27 September, the UNSC voted unanimously to mandate the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles and disclose the locations of their weapons to the UN. Syria was given until mid-​2014 to have the last of the chemical weapons decommissioned (UNSC, 2013). A year later in August

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2014, the Cape Ray completed the destruction of some of Syria’s most lethal chemical weapons materials (Obama, 2014). Given the chemical weapons framing of the crisis, the destruction of these weapons provided the administration with a degree of success. Moreover, it would serve to mitigate emotional calls for action as the impending threat of mass civilian casualties subsided, despite ongoing government-​sponsored bloodshed. Due to its relatively slow development and the lack of urgency in the narrative given that there was no imminent atrocity to be stopped, Obama resisted emotional, principled influences emphasizing the need to prevent humanitarian atrocity, formulating a narrative based on weapons taboo and thereby reasserting cognitive types of ideas in response to ongoing violations. Speaking about the decision to hold off on a military strike, Obama stated: I’m very proud of this moment … The overwhelming weight of conventional wisdom and the machinery of our national-​security apparatus had gone fairly far. The perception was that my credibility was at stake, that America’s credibility was at stake. And so for me to press the pause button at that moment, I knew, would cost me politically. And the fact that I was able to pull back from the immediate pressures and think through in my own mind what was in America’s interest, not only with respect to Syria but also with respect to our democracy, was as tough a decision as I’ve made –​and I believe ultimately it was the right decision to make. (Obama quoted in Goldberg, 2016) In his approach, Obama returned to more cognitive interpretations of US interests, stating that America’s interests related to ‘the stability of its [Syria’s] neighbours, the elimination of chemical weapons, and ensuring that it does not become a safe haven for terrorists’ (Obama, 2013b). Keen to keep other powers on side, and avoid his own quagmire, he sought procedural actions through the UN. In this way, it is clear that by slowing down the process of decision-​making, Obama would be able to resist efforts to tie principled narratives to the crisis in Syria, instead, focussing on legalistic, reflective approaches to crisis management. These conscious efforts to slow the decision-​making process would see preferences shift from preventing bloodshed –​as they had been in Libya –​towards maintaining the international norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Conclusion Across humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria, Obama struggled to grapple with the issue of whether or not to use force. In responding to these events, Obama relied to varying degrees on principled and cognitive interpretations

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of foreign policy interests. By understanding this variation in interpretations, it is possible to better understand the decisions made by Obama in response to similar types of crises. Unlike in Bosnia and the War on Terror, these case studies highlight variation between reliance on different types of ideas within the same administration across two different cases. In a similar situation but with a markedly different outcome, despite ongoing bloodshed and perpetual atrocities in Syria, Obama ultimately advanced a restrained response following chemical weapons attacks in Syria in 2013. Obama would threaten military action during remarks on 20 August 2012, suggesting that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would constitute a ‘red line’ and that it would ‘change the equation’ on intervention (Obama, 2012). Yet, when Assad did use chemical weapons the following year, Obama ‘repressed’ principled calls for intervention, instead choosing a more restrained, cognitive response. Given that ‘there was no Benghazi to be saved’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 157) and little sense that a mass atrocity was imminent with sporadic acts of violence throughout the country, Obama sought a diplomatic path. Unlike the crisis in Libya, advocates of intervention were silenced in their pursuit of more aggressive action to prevent human rights abuses by the Assad regime. Given the belief that strikes against Assad would likely draw the US into greater commitment, and possibly quagmire, Obama slowed down the decision-​making process. In doing so, he based his response on ‘what works’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15), negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin to cooperate in seeking the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. The issue was thus framed in terms of getting rid of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, as cognitive repression saw interpretations of interests focus less on the scope of mass atrocities, and more on preventing further attacks with chemical weapons. Understanding how interests can be interpreted in different ways when ideas come in different forms provides invaluable insights into explaining decisions to use force in foreign policy. This understanding helps to explain why in Libya, for instance, Obama chose to intervene despite there being ‘no strategic interests’. By contrast, the decision not to intervene following chemical weapons attacks in Syria is equally significant, especially given the early principled construction of the ‘red line’, and the initial readiness to launch a military strike in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Notably, these cases demonstrate how the same agents, Susan Rice and Samantha Power, had varying levels of influence across the two cases despite similar conditions and levels of human suffering. This emphasizes that the forms that ideas come in influence not only how interests are interpreted, but it also impacts whose interpretations are listened to.

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PART V

‘America First’ and the Use of Force

8

From ‘America First’ to Saving ‘Beautiful Babies’ in Syria Introduction In Part V, I examine variations in decisions to use force in the Trump administration across the crisis in Syria and the escalating 2020 Iranian crisis. The foreign policy goals outlined by President Donald Trump have been markedly different to the post-​Cold War presidents that came before him. Throughout the campaign, he had professed an ‘America First’1 foreign policy promising to regain American dominance in the world. As a part of this vision, he sought to ‘rebuild’ America’s military, renegotiate what he viewed as ‘unfair’ or ‘one-​sided’ trade deals, and reassert a unilateral foreign policy, free from multilateral constraints. Yet, upon entering office in January 2017, an actual guide as to how such an ‘America First’ foreign policy might manifest remained unclear. To be fair, this lack of clarity surrounding Trump’s foreign policy platform can be attributed, in no small way, to Trump’s tendency to self-​contradiction. Broadly speaking, however, ‘America First’ could be viewed as a revival of a Jacksonian foreign policy –​a renewed yearning for an isolationist-​style turn and a revival of American ‘greatness’. Despite President Trump’s somewhat unconventional, 2 almost ‘kaleidoscopic’3 statements around his foreign policy (Goldberg, 2017; Kagan, 2018), it is still possible to identify certain variations which do not neatly conform to his ‘America First’ worldview. In fact, there have been instances in which Trump has used force in ways very much counter to this doctrine. In some ways, this variation is more explicit. In this chapter I show how Trump’s decision to bomb Syrian airfields following the chemical weapons attack in Al Shayrat on 4 April 2017 marked a significant departure from his professed ‘America First’ foreign policy. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief background of the developments in the Syrian crisis after the 2013 attack and provide an

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overview of Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy. In particular, I show that he would emphasize the need to put America’s interests before that of other states, ignoring other states and multilateral treaties if they impeded the US’s ability to realize its goals. In this vein, he would argue for the withdrawal of US troops from the Middle East, and, more broadly, from around the globe and focus on specific threats eradicating ISIS. Second, I show that while Trump fiercely advocated his ‘America First’ foreign policy platform, he succumbed to the same inconsistencies as his predecessors. To demonstrate this, I show how emotional images of dead and dying Syrian children, following a chemical weapons attack in Northern Syria, led to a more principled interpretation of foreign policy interests, ‘displacing’ his ‘America First’ doctrine. In this case, Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, would emphasize the significance of using specific images to influence Trump’s thinking, and show these images to her father. These images represented emotional, principally laden ideas which would act to temporarily displace the ‘America First’ doctrine, as well as the voices of some of its most ardent supporters within the administration. Even as certain members, including Steve Bannon, would push back vehemently in an effort to prevent any military response, their influence was heavily diminished in light of these images. What is interesting about this case is that it is remarkably similar to the way in which the decision to not intervene in Syria was made by Obama. Thus, it emphasizes that similar situations can ultimately be interpreted in different ways by different agents, even in very similar circumstances. What emerges most clearly in this case is just how powerful different forms of ideas can be in leading to a temporary displacement of even the most set-​ in-​stone foreign policy. The importance of the forms of ideas is emphasized especially in the final section given Trump’s quick return to the ‘America First’ platform –​which culminated in a decision to abandon Kurdish allies in Northern Syria in 2019 despite an almost certain humanitarian tragedy in light of a Turkish offensive.

Early cognitive repression: a turn to ‘America First’ Obama, Syria and ISIS Obama’s foreign policy had often been heavily criticized by both Republicans and Democrats for, among other reasons, his inconsistency in responding to humanitarian atrocities, and his dealing with the rising threat of terrorism throughout the various crises associated with the Arab Spring. But Syria was a persistent problem, complicated immensely by the rise of ISIS4 in 2014. In the aftermath of the 2013 chemical weapons attack, continued cognitive

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repression saw the administration’s focus shift from the humanitarian crisis to the containment and destruction of ISIS. During a particularly aggressive period, ISIS captured the Iraqi cities of Falujah, Ramadi and Mosul, and made significant territorial advances in Northern Syria prompting the Obama administration to take action in conjunction with an international coalition. The focus was to bomb known ISIS sites and to provide arms to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (McCain and Salter, 2018: 190–​1). Deepening these efforts, Obama deployed US special forces to Syria in November 2015 in order to assist local fighters, particularly Kurdish fighters, in their battle against ISIS. This represented the first open-​ended mission utilizing ground troops in Syria by the US. However, these troops were not stationed in Syria to participate in the civil war.5 The humanitarian crisis would continue to escalate unabated. By the end of Obama’s presidency, the Syrian civil war had entered its sixth year. More than 400,000 Syrians had been killed, nearly a quarter of Syria’s pre-​war population had either fled the country or become internally displaced and there was no discernible opposition for the US to back for regime change. As John Kerry put it in 2015: ‘One Syrian in twenty has been killed or wounded; one in five is a refugee; one in two has been displaced; the average life expectancy in Syria has dropped twenty years’ (Kerry, 2015).6 Yet even these troubling statistics could not overcome the inherent fear of overextension that prevented the US from undertaking a decisive role. Furthermore, the diplomatic push to remove chemical weapons in 2013 had given Obama the opportunity to claim success in their approach. John Kerry, in an interview with Meet the Press, stated, ‘We struck a deal where we got 100 percent of the chemical weapons out’ (Kerry quoted in Gilsinan, 2018). In 2016, however, James Clapper disputed this, suggesting that ‘Syria has not declared all the elements of its chemical weapons program’ (Woodward, 2018: 147). While Obama had suggested that Assad had no future as leader of Syria, little had been done to enforce this position. Instead, his efforts focussed on targeting ISIS, specifically through arming moderate rebel groups to minimize the risks to US troops. As much as this restraint was driven by efforts to avoid the missteps of his predecessor, critics argued: ‘The Obama presidency’s relentless focus on avoiding entanglements came alongside a failure to reckon with the risks –​ especially those risks that grow from inaction’ (Wittes, 2016). For Syria, there was no end in sight. It had emerged as one of the great foreign policy challenges of the 21st century and has generally been viewed as one of the Obama administration’s major foreign policy failures, one which served to weaken the US’s position in the conflict and, more broadly, their capacity to pursue their interests in the region.

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Cognitive repression and Trump’s ‘America First’ Many of Obama’s critics asserted the need for a more consistent foreign policy and clearer grand strategy, particularly in relation to Syria. Colin Dueck (2015), for instance, argued that there would be great scope for the new president to make their mark on US foreign policy, and put US strategy on a new course. Yet, the 2016 Presidential Election was anything but conventional. Obama’s foreign policy record was a key issue among prospective Republican nominees. But Donald Trump stood out as having one of the more drastic approaches to fixing what he saw as the weaknesses in American foreign policy. Despite persistent inconsistencies, thanks in no small part to a seemingly habitual tendency towards self-​contradiction, ‘America First’ stood at the core of his campaign message.7 This encompassed what Trump claimed to be necessary to restore American dominance in foreign policy, trade and immigration. More formally, Trump pushed the idea that US dominance in the world began at home, arguing that all nations should be concerned, first and foremost, with their own interests. Such ideas were not new to American foreign policy. Rather, these ideas represented a re-​emergence of a deeply entrenched Jacksonian worldview and foreign policy, most prominently endorsed by Patrick Buchanan throughout the 1990s (Chung, 2017). This ‘America First’ approach is one which works to ‘reduce the costs and risks of foreign policy’ by advancing foreign policy interests ‘in the safest and most economical way’. In doing so, it centres US foreign policy on the ‘physical security and the economic well-​being of the American people’ (Mead, 2017: 2). Best encapsulated by Buchanan, ‘We must not trade in our sovereignty for a cushioned seat at the head table of anybody’s new world order’ (quoted in Chung, 2017). This ‘new nationalism’ aimed to serve the ‘forgotten Americans’ left behind as a result of bad trade deals, immigration and foreign ‘adventurism’. In foreign policy terms, America has: ‘No friends. No enemies’. Rather, the US has a series of shifting alliances and needed to apologize for nothing. Put simply, the Trump’s reinvigorated foreign policy doctrine could be summed up as: ‘We’re America, bitch’ (Goldberg, 2018). During the campaign, Trump used these ideas to attack not just Obama’s foreign policy but also the records of his Republican counterparts, particularly those who supported the war in Iraq. In a heated exchange with Republican candidates during a debate on 13 February, Trump argued: ‘I’m the only one on this stage that said: “Do not go into Iraq. Do not attack Iraq.” Nobody else on this stage said that. And I said it loud and strong’ (Trump, 2016a). He even went as far to suggest that given their involvement in the Middle East, the US should ‘keep the oil’. While highly unconventional, this idea drew back to the central premise that the US had spent $5 trillion in the

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region over the preceding 15 years, won nothing and done little to secure the national interest, at a time when the standard of living within the US was in decline. Put simply, Trump argued, ‘[W]‌e have to rebuild our own country’ (Trump, 2016a). As far as US interests in Syria were concerned, the extent of Trump’s interest manifested in his desire to exert strength by ‘bomb[ing] the shit out of ISIS’ to push them out of Syrian territory while avoiding entrenchment in the ongoing civil war (Coll, 2017). In a rebuke to the Obama administration’s approach, he declared on the campaign trail that within 30 days of taking office, he would develop a new strategy in the fight against ISIS and fire the generals who had headed up the effort under Obama because they didn’t know how to ‘win’8 (Berger, 2019: 115–​16). In terms of the broader conflict, Trump believed it to be unwise for the US to risk becoming mired in another foreign conflict for an unspecified period of time at huge expense. This was a consistent position for Trump. In 2013, he warned Obama, ‘Do not attack Syria. There is no upside and tremendous downside’ (Coll, 2017). Given this position, it seemed unlikely that Trump would intervene. Furthermore, Trump held little interest at the prospect of pursuing regime change in Syria because Assad had been tough on ISIS (Coll, 2017). Through this worldview, Assad could be seen just as any other state leader. He was there to be negotiated with in an effort to gain as good of a deal for the US as possible (Holland, 2020: 220–​1). By adopting this view, Trump ‘repressed’ emotionally laden ideas around the ongoing humanitarian and refugee crises, intent on focussing on eradicating ISIS and keeping US troops at home. The US was not going to be the world’s policeman. This ‘America First’ message was cemented in his inaugural address: We will seek friendship and good will with nations of the world, but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first. We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an ­example –​we will shine –​for everyone to follow. (Trump, 2017a) While the content of these ideas were not new, they represented a decisive reversion towards an isolationist-​ish, Jacksonian-​styled foreign policy. During the first few months of his presidency, Trump displayed a disdain for the foreign policy establishment. He would regularly criticize America’s allies, including key strategic relationships with NATO, accusing members of not paying ‘their fair share’ (Trump, 2017b). He suggested that South Korea should be paying for the $10 billion missile defence system which was built by the US to protect the South from missile attacks from the North and argued that South Korea should compensate the US with ‘rent’

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for the soldiers stationed there (Rucker and Leonnig, 2020: 133). Trump’s worldview was very transactional in nature. There would need to be direct incentive for the US to become involved in Syria. Notably, on 30 March, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the future of both Syria, and Assad, would ultimately be ‘decided by the Syrian people’ (quoted in Coll, 2017). Yet, even this rigid worldview would be subject to significant variation as emotional images of dead and dying children surfaced in 2017 in the aftermath of a chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime. In the following section, I show how these images acted as powerful weapons to displace Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine.

Normative displacement: saving the ‘beautiful babies’ in Syria On 4 April 2017, just 74 days into Trump’s presidency, Syrian President Bashar al-​Assad’s forces conducted a series of chemical weapons attacks in the rebel-​held town of Khan Sheikhoun located in the country’s north-​west (Wolff, 2018: 183). The attack was horrific, leaving close to 100 civilians, including women and children, dead (BBC News, 2017).9 Hundreds more were injured. Almost as the attacks were happening, graphic images started to emerge showing victims of the attacks, once again, including young children, foaming at the mouth. Given the ongoing significance of the crisis in Syria, members of the Trump administration jumped into action immediately, quickly assigning blame for the attack to the regime. As had been the case in the Obama administration, the use of chemical weapons was viewed as a serious line to cross. Many of Trump’s advisors and cabinet members saw the attack as an opportunity to get more heavily involved in the conflict and help to bring the ground war under control. Since the attacks in 2013, however, the situation in Syria had become more dire given the rise of ISIS and the assertion of Russian influence in the country. For senior members of the Trump administration, these attacks represented a unique opportunity to undertake a decisive and carefully planned response. For National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and National Security Council staffer Derek Harvey,10 US interests in the Middle East had suffered from persistent inconsistency (McMaster, 2020: 268–​71). They believed that there was now an opportunity to correct the strategic missteps of the past few years and provide an opening to reassert America’s vital security interests in the region. While McMaster was eminently qualified to be the National Security Advisor, he was a particularly strange addition to the Trump administration given Trump’s disdain for establishment foreign policy thinking. McMaster had come to the position after Michael Flynn had resigned in disgrace, just

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22 days into his tenure. But from the outset, McMaster struggled to connect with Trump (Woodward, 2018: 145–​6). McMaster was an intellectual with an eye for detail. He was also a war hero, having served in the military for over 30 years. He had been critical of past military leaders in his ground-​ breaking work, Dereliction of Duty (1998), in which he indicted military leaders for not confronting their civilian leaders during the Vietnam war. In a similar way to Brent Scowcroft, McMaster viewed the duty of the National Security Advisor as acting as an honest broker between the Defence and State Department, giving the president a good range of policy options (Berger, 2019: 89). Despite his credentials, McMaster was not widely respected among Trump’s other advisors. Steve Bannon, most notably, referred to him as ‘a fucking liberal’ for not sharing the worldview of Trump and his closest advisors (Bannon quoted in Woodward, 2018: 89). Following the attacks, McMaster and Harvey began developing plans for a series of comprehensive air strikes which would involve incapacitating Assad’s air force, which was viewed as a ‘force multiplier for the regime’ (Harvey quoted in Woodward, 2018: 148). This would, in essence, act to force the Assad regime to negotiate with the US and its international allies in a way that would begin to shape an ‘endgame’ to the conflict. In a fiery exchange, Bannon confronted Harvey upon receiving news of the plan: ‘We don’t want you fucking neocons starting a war’ (quoted in Bergen, 2019: 113). Despite McMaster’s and Harvey’s optimism, James Mattis, the Secretary of Defence, was cautious of supporting any air strikes or attacks on Syrian military positions. Given the absence of a US military presence during the earlier phases of the conflict, Assad had formally requested that Russia intervene on their behalf in the civil war (Clapper with Brown, 2018: 304). As a result, Russian military personnel were stationed, or working at many of Syria’s airfields. Mattis feared that an attack on these bases could put Russian lives in danger and risk seriously escalating and widening the scope of the conflict (Woodward, 2018: 149). Initially, Trump was unmoved by the reports coming out of Syria. Following a briefing with McMaster, Jarod Kushner observed that Trump appeared more annoyed that he had to hear about the attack than he was by the attack itself (Wolff, 2018: 192).11 The mere presentation of facts and potential strategy did little to motivate a response from Trump. McMaster’s presentation was simply unconvincing. Yet, the greatest obstacle faced by the proponents of military force was the deep affinity Trump had developed with Steve Bannon’s hyper-​nationalist worldview.12 Bannon was highly sceptical of foreign interventions, arguing that the US should not become embroiled in conflicts where vital interests were not at stake. He had long professed a Jacksonian-​style approach to foreign policy. From this perspective, the US should not get involved unless there were

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specific gains to be made or pressing national security interests. Morals and emotion had no place in decision-​making. Given such a view, foreign policy was considered in almost a ‘transactional’, cost-​benefit manner. In essence, ‘[W]‌hat’s in it for us’ (Wolff, 2018: 191). These ideas would serve as powerful weapons in the effort to repress and tame any push for the use of military force. For Bannon, while a chemical weapons attack in Syria that killed children was tragic, it was no different to kids starving in Africa or any other part of the world. The world is a terrible and evil place where ‘shit happens’. Bannon had moulded this near apocalyptic view into Trump’s outlook. Much of the world would burn and there was nothing to be done about it. In an effort to circumnavigate Trump’s affinity for Bannon’s ‘fuck ’em’ attitude and overcome the stonewall faced by McMaster and Harvey, Ivanka –​ Trump’s eldest daughter –​and Dina Powell believed that the matter had to be approached from a different perspective. Ivanka knew that the types of information received by Trump had a resounding impact on the way he responded. Literal ‘big pictures’ tended to capture Trump’s attention. Together, Ivanka and Powell put together a slideshow of images that had poured across the media showing the impact of the chemical weapons on their victims. This presentation was shown during a meeting in the afternoon of 4 April in the Oval Office. As their presentation rolled on, Bannon sensed Trump becoming mesmerized by the images. By the end of the presentation ‘Trumpism melted away’ (Wolff, 2018: 192–​3). Vision of the attacks gave incredible power to the notion that intervention was the ‘right thing to do’. More importantly, it clearly affected Trump. Following the meeting with his daughter, Ivanka, and Senior Counsellor, Dina Powell, Trump became infuriated (Wolff, 2018: 192–​4; Woodward, 2018: 146–​7). Over the following hours, the battle of ideas emerged within the White House as his advisors were split on what to do. In one camp, Steve Bannon and Secretary of Defence James Mattis tried to reel in Trump’s more emotional impulses, albeit for different reasons. In the other camp, Ivanka, McMaster and Harvey worked to convince Trump that some form of formal response was required –​preferably the use of force. During a phone call with Mattis on the day of the attack, Trump burst out, ‘Let’s fucking kill him (Assad)! Let’s go in. Let’s kill the fucking lot of them’ (Trump quoted in Woodward, 2018: 146). This reaction on its own represented a significant departure from the core, transactional tenets of his ‘America First’ worldview. Both McMaster and Ivanka presented Trump with the same information, yet it was the forms presented by Ivanka which gave these principled ideas greater foundation to act as weapons and promote interpretations surrounding ‘what’s right’. Doing so enabled a fundamental displacement of Trump’s ‘America First’ interpretation of

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US national security interests. The content of the idea was the same, the form was different. In a public statement on 4 April, Trump denounced the attacks stating, ‘These heinous actions by the Bashar al-​Assad regime are a consequence of the past administration’s weakness and irresolution. President Obama said in 2012 that he would establish a “red-​line” against the use of chemical weapons and then did nothing’ (Trump, 2017c). This was a clear sign that Trump’s thinking in the aftermath was deviating from the approach Obama took in 2013. For Trump, Syria had gone from being ‘not our problem’, to becoming the primary focus. Obama’s restrained, diplomatic effort to remove chemical weapons was not the path forward. During a an NSC meeting in the Oval Office on 5 April, Trump’s advisors laid out three broad responses. First, launch a large-​scale bombing campaign utilizing 200 cruise missiles to disable most of Syria’s airfields, thereby crippling their air power. The second option was a smaller-​scale operation hitting key airfields as a warning shot to the regime. The final option was not to strike at all. McMaster made the consequences of inaction painfully clear: ‘This isn’t just about Syria. We’re on the hundredth anniversary of World War I. This [chemical weapons] hasn’t been used since then and if this becomes normalised, what happens? It’s a threat to the civilised world’ (McMaster quoted in Berger, 2019: 112). For Bannon, the prospect of any action would be pointless. Bannon made these views clear. After the military options were presented, Bannon interjected: ‘If that’s the standard, let me go get some pictures of sub-​ Saharan Africa … If that’s the standard for a fucking missile strike, let’s go everywhere. Let’s do everything’ (Bannon quoted in Woodward, 2018: 149). Such a view cast the notion of cruise missile strikes in Clinton-​esque terms, bombing the hell out of a lot of sand. Yet, amid the emotionally laden vision of dying children, Bannon’s objections held little persuasive power, and attracted little support.13 Prior to formally authorizing action, Trump pulled together the NSC for one final meeting at his Mara Largo Resort. The middle option was on the table which called for 60 cruise missiles to be launched targeting Syrian aircraft on the ground, air defence systems and aircraft shelters. Trump was unusually focussed on the details, asking questions concerning the accuracy of the strikes along with a series of ‘what if ’ questions. Despite Mattis’s emphasis on the need for caution, there was no objection to the strikes going ahead.14 On 6 April, just 76 days into his presidency, Trump’s ‘America First’ outlook took a backseat as 59 Tomahawk missiles were launched at an airfield in Al Shayrat, destroying Syrian fighter jets, aircraft bunkers, radar equipment and air defence systems (Gordon et al, 2017). Flanked by his advisors, Trump announced to the nation that US forces had undertaken

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a targeted strike on the airbase from which the chemical attack of 4 April had been launched. Trump argued that previous attempts to change Assad’s behaviour had ‘failed very dramatically’ and, as a result, the refugee crisis had continued to deepen, seeing the region fall into greater instability. Justifying the strikes, Trump employed emotional, principally laden communicative appeals as he described the chemical attacks: ‘Even beautiful babies were cruelly murdered in this very barbaric attack … Tonight I call on all civilised nations to join us in seeking to end the slaughter and bloodshed in Syria’ (Trump, 2017d). While representing a significant departure from his professed ‘America First’ doctrine, the strikes were widely supported on both sides of the aisle and represented a return to the widely held consensus regarding the US’s role in the Syrian conflict. Most significantly, the strikes emphasized that the US could no longer ‘turn a blind eye’ (Tillerson quoted in Gordon et al, 2017). By making these appeals, Trump was suggesting that ignoring the suffering caused by the attacks was not something the US could abide.15 This shift has added significance given the fact that Trump had downplayed the significance of chemical weapons when asked about them during the campaign (Vitali, 2016). Senators Lindsay Graham and John McCain, both of whom had been frustrated by Obama’s inaction, praised Trump for the strikes. McCain had similarly been critical of Trump’s non-​interventionist approach to Syria calling it ‘another disgraceful episode in American history’ (quoted in Scott, 2017). But the day following the strikes, he appeared on Morning Joe, stating, ‘The signal that was sent last night … was a very, very important one’ (quoted in Woodward, 2018: 153). He continued, ‘This is a beginning, and a lot of hard things have to be done, but without this [air strike], those other things couldn’t have been done either’ (quoted in Sutton, 2017). Perhaps most surprisingly, praise came from Anne-​Marie Slaughter who had been the director of the Policy Planning staff within the State Department during Hillary Clinton’s first two years as Secretary of State. Slaughter had been critical of the Obama administration’s lack of action in 2013. She argued that ‘Donald Trump has done the right thing on Syria … After years of useless handwringing in the face of heinous crimes’ (quoted in Woodward, 2018: 153). The strikes also brought praise from critics in the press, including Fareed Zakaria who stated: I think Donald Trump became president of the United States … For the first time really as president, he talked about international norms, international rules, about America’s role in enforcing justice in the world. It was the kind of rhetoric that we have come to expect from American presidents since Harry Truman. (Quoted in Bergen, 2019: 115)

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The strikes appeared to provide an opening for Trump to reassert US interests in the Syria conflict. Trump called Lindsay Graham on the night of the strikes. During the call, Graham commended Trump on taking decisive action, suggesting that Obama’s failure to take such action in 2013 ‘cost about 400,000 people their lives’ (quoted in Woodward, 2018: 152). While offering his congratulations, Graham challenged Trump by asking what would happen if the base was rebuilt and Assad began dropping barrel bombs. For many public intellectuals and Congresspeople, Assad’s use of chemical weapons was only a part of the issue. The relentless bombing of civilians and growing refugee crisis was the primary concern. Pushing for greater involvement in the Syrian crisis had long been the goal of many in Congress. Obama had been targeted by a lot of criticism for his unwillingness to act decisively. McCain had called Obama’s decision not to strike ‘the worst decision of his presidency’, resulting in ongoing consequences for the US and the region (McCain and Salter, 2018: 189). Even many who had served in Obama’s administration had been critical of Obama’s reluctance to strike. These included Leon Panetta who argued: ‘Once the commander in chief draws that red line, then I think the credibility of the commander in chief and this nation is at stake if he doesn’t enforce it’ (quoted in Goldberg, 2016). Similarly, Hillary Clinton stated, ‘If you say you’re going to strike, you have to strike. There’s no choice’ (quoted in Goldberg, 2016). The overwhelming consensus was that Trump had made the correct call. But this displacement of Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine would be short-​lived and there would be no significant, lasting policy change towards Syria. In the months that followed, emotions subsided and Trump moved on. The humanitarian crisis continued. It became clear that the strikes did not represent a change in strategy and were not part of a broader, coherent policy. The US would not be drawn any further into the conflict. Speaking in June 2017, Mattis, who had been cautious right from the beginning, albeit for different reasons to Trump, re-​emphasized the position: ‘We just refuse to get drawn into the Syrian civil war’ (quoted in Gibbons-​Neff, 2017). However, the fact that Trump deviated, even momentarily, from his doctrine by responding to a humanitarian crisis in a limited way is theoretically significant in emphasizing the importance of how different types of ideas influence and shape decision-​making. On 7 April 2018, the Assad regime launched another chemical weapons attack. This time, the attack occurred in the city of Douma. The attacks left an estimated 40 people dead, most of whom were women and children (BBC News, 2018a). Again, the attacks targeted innocent civilians in a rebel-​held city. In response to the attacks, Trump again deviated from his professed ‘America First’ doctrine, this time in collaboration with British and French

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allies. The strikes targeted Syria’s chemical weapons development facilities with the key objective to eradicate their potential to produce additional weapons. Justifying the attack, Trump again highlighted the brutal nature of the attack stating, ‘[T]‌hese are not the actions of a man; they are the crimes of a monster’ (Trump, 2018b). Yet, this deviation was similarly short-​lived.

Back to repression Across these instances it becomes clear how significant the types and forms of ideas were in shaping Trump’s interpretations, leading him to diverge from his foreign policy platform. These principled forms of ideas, showing the destructive, indiscriminate nature of chemical weapons, served as powerful weapons to displace Trump’s preference to avoid using military force against the regime. The power of the principled forms of these ideas is emphasized by the fact that in the absence of chemical weapons attacks, Trump quickly reverted to his ‘America First’ outlook, narrowing his focus once again to eliminating ISIS from Syrian territory. Emphasizing this point, in early January 2018, Trump agreed to maintain the commitment made by the Obama administration and continue to provide troops to assist in the fight against ISIS and al-​Qaeda in Syria’s north (Borger et al, 2018), which would serve a secondary role of keeping Iranian influence in the region in check.16 Yet, by the end of 2018, ISIS had effectively been geographically defeated as they struggled to maintain a grip on their last remaining strongholds. Trump quickly became frustrated with the ongoing American commitment and began to push for withdrawal, arguing: ‘We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there’ (cited in Borger and Chulov, 2018). By October 2019, Trump announced his intention to withdraw US troops from north-​eastern Syria. American troops had been aiding Kurdish fighters in the struggle against ISIS. However, amid the rising threat of a Turkish offensive in Syria’s north, Trump wanted to avoid getting entangled in any conflict between the Kurds and Turkish fighters (Barnes and Schmitt, 2019).17 This would put the Kurdish people in the region in grave danger. Both Turkey and the US had long considered the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) a terrorist organization within Turkey’s borders. However, Kurds in Syria had been an indispensable ally of the US in their effort to overthrow ISIS from their seat of power in the city of Raqqa. But for Turkey, Kurds living outside of Turkey were largely viewed as indistinguishable from the PKK (Borger and Chulov, 2018). In simple terms, Trump’s plan to withdraw troops meant abandoning the US’s Kurdish allies as they faced a grave threat from the invading Turkish army. But Trump sought to justify the move by rekindling his ‘America First’

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ideals: ‘The Kurds and Turkey have been fighting for many years. Turkey considers the PKK the worst terrorists of all. Others may want to come in and fight for one side or the other. Let them! Endless wars!’ (Trump, 2019b). The planned withdrawal was grounded in two key lines of thinking. First, the ISIS caliphate operating in the region had essentially been disbanded.18 Trump, in turn, asserted that ISIS had been defeated. As a key goal of Trump’s was to weaken and ultimately defeat ISIS, the US had, in his view, fulfilled its role and no longer needed to play a role in Syria. Second, a core competent of his doctrine sought to avoid ‘endless wars’. With the US job done, there would be no benefit to keeping US troops on the ground. The US needed to withdraw from the region, not become further entangled.19 The fact that Kurdish allies may be in the firing line of Turkish forces coming in from the north was irrelevant as the goal had been accomplished. Such a view stemmed back to the central ‘America First’ notion that the US had only ‘interests’, not ‘friends’. The unwaivering support of allies might see the US dragged into, or obligated to remain in, prolonged, foreign conflicts. In this way, Trump spoke to the isolationist ‘America First’ view that American would be better served by staying at home. Thus, the fact that Kurdish allies may be exposed to executions would be simply ‘repressed’ in favour of his preferred worldview. This emphasizes the importance of types and forms of ideas in shaping foreign policy decisions by showing that it is not enough to simply say that human lives are on the line to inspire action or displace preferences.

Conclusion Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency was largely aided by a promise to protect the ‘forgotten Americans’, push back on globalization, which had been blamed for job losses, and to put American interests first, historical alliances be damned. In foreign policy terms, he demonstrated a disdain for multilateralism and what he viewed as an inability to ‘win’ wars. He accused George W. Bush of getting the US into dumb wars, and Obama of weak leadership. Indeed, Trump’s approach to foreign policy was unusual, sometimes kaleidoscopic. Yet, even throughout the sometimes-​conflicting ideas contained in Trump’s worldview there was a certain coherence to his foreign policy, ‘America First’. America has no friends, only interests. Despite Trump’s vehement push for an ‘America First’ foreign policy, this too was subject to the same variations as the foreign policy of his predecessors as he succumbed to emotional, principled ideas in response to chemical weapons attacks in Syria in April 2017. This led to limited strikes against the Assad regime in an effort to save the ‘beautiful babies’. Specifically, Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, and Dina Powell served as powerful, principled voices,

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giving enormous ideational power to the strategy put forth by McMaster and Harvey. Their utilization of emotional images depicting dead and dying children served as a powerful weapon to not only spark a response from Trump, but they acted to fundamentally displace his ‘America First’ worldview. Steve Bannon, despite his best efforts, could no longer sell the idea that these images were just a few among many. Trumpism, and this Jacksonian-​style foreign policy temporarily dissipated as Trump changed his foreign policy approach, initiating limited, targeted strikes. One important observation that emerges from this case study is that different presidents respond to similar situations in very different ways. In both the Obama and Trump administrations, the presidents were presented with similar information and were subjected to the same deluge of requests from policymakers and public intellectuals to intervene through the use of force in the conflict. Yet, these principled calls played a more significant role in influencing Trump to use force, albeit temporarily.20 Furthermore, this case reinforces the importance on the forms that ideas take given it was not enough to simply argue that lives were at risk. This was not an issue for Trump prior to the strikes, and quickly ceased to be a factor in his policy shortly after. Notably, Trump acknowledged that in his effort to avoid quagmire in a civil conflict, he was unmoved by the notion that their Kurdish allies would be left to fight for themselves in the face of potential ethnic cleansing.

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The 2020 Iranian Crisis: De-​escalating from the Use of Force Introduction Outside of the crisis in Syria, Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy has also seen some interesting and comprehensive deviations concerning Iran. Iran posed a unique challenge for Trump given his well-​established disdain for the Iran nuclear agreement and his renewed framing of Iran as the ‘leading state sponsor of terrorism’, coupled with his caution at the prospect of escalation. As a result, Trump was almost consistently on the cusp of conflict with Iran following the decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) in 2018. These tensions would culminate in the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani and increase the presence of US troops in the region, following an Iranian missile attack against the K-​1Air Base in Iraq which left an American contractor dead on 27 December 2019. While there is a clear distinction between the different types of ideas presented, the manner in which they present is slightly different compared to previous cases, yet the impact on foreign policy remains formally the same. Variation is still present and persistent despite relative stability in the material and ideational bases of state interests. In this chapter, I work to show how tensions between principled and cognitive interpretations of US interests towards Iran saw the Trump administration on the brink of conflict as Trump struggled to reconcile his desire to re-​establish US dominance, while at the same time avoiding war. I begin by providing a brief overview of the tensions that surrounded the construction of the JCPOA. I argue that Trump constructed a principled justification, drawing on existing domestic anxieties, to withdraw from the agreement, as he worked to displace the interest-​based logic enshrined in the

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JCPOA. Trump would do this by issuing principled, communicative appeals characterizing Iran as the ‘leading state sponsor of terrorism’ and speaking to domestic concerns that Iran was violating the terms of the agreement, despite evidence to the contrary.1 In this way, Trump was able to weaponize principled arguments that Iran continued to be an irrational actor pursuing nuclear weapons to the detriment of US security interests. Second, I show how the withdrawal from the JCPOA prefigured escalating tensions leading to prolonged contestation between different types of ideas as to whether or not to use force against Iran. I show how National Security Advisor John Bolton, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo advanced a continuation of principled interpretations, pushing for the reinstatement of crippling sanctions and the use of decisive military force in order to change Iran’s behaviour. On the other hand, such ideas were ‘repressed’ by more cognitive interpretations pushed by members of Congress, and, to an extent, Trump himself, in an effort to avoid a broader regional conflict. Such tensions were exacerbated on the back of a number of tit-​for-​tat skirmishes throughout 2018 and 2019, culminating in the assassination of Soleimani and the subsequent Iranian retaliation resulting in traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) to more than 100 US service personnel. As tensions escalated and full-​blown conflict seemed imminent, Trump, faced with significant domestic opposition, reneged on the further use of force. In doing so, Trump ‘repressed’ the urge to respond in a more decisive fashion to Iran’s retaliation against US bases in Iraq for fear of getting dragged into a broader regional conflict, adopting a more cognitive interpretation of US interests towards Iran.

Trump’s principled withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the escalation of the Iranian crisis The US and Iran have had a contentious relationship since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Between the 1979–​81 hostage crisis, to their ongoing funding and support of regional terrorist organizations including Hezbollah and Hamas,2 Iran came to be viewed by the US as an ‘axis of evil’ power, and characterized as the ‘leading state sponsor of terrorism’. For the US, Iran represented a persistent threat to US national security interests. During the early 2000s, particularly in the aftermath of 9/​11, concerns began to rise over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Despite efforts to engage with the regime in that time, Iran remained diplomatically isolated for three decades.3 In an effort to change the course of the relationship, the Obama administration began reaching out to Iran in 2009 with the goal of beginning negotiations around Iran’s nuclear programme. As a gesture of goodwill, Obama sent a memo asking US Embassies to invite Iranian diplomats to

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attend Fourth of July celebrations (Landler, 2009).4 In September 2013, Obama met informally with Iranian President Rouhani on the sidelines of a meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2013. During this meeting, both presidents indicated a willingness to work to improve the relationship between the two states and de-​escalate tensions. Progress was relatively quick. By November 2013, the US and Iran had developed an interim agreement –​ the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) –​to cease development of their nuclear programme in exchange for ‘modest’ sanctions relief (Rice, 2019: 413). Negotiations continued and in 2015, Obama signed the JCPOA. 5 The agreement represented the culmination of over two years of intense negotiations between the Obama administration and the Iranian regime. This represented the most significant step forward in US-​Iran relations since their deterioration following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The purpose of the agreement was to provide Iran with sanctions relief in exchange for their surrendering materials used in the development of nuclear weapons. Continued relief from sanctions would be dependent on Iran’s compliance with the terms of the agreement, which included allowing independent weapons inspectors to certify compliance. The agreement aimed to fulfil the long-​held goal of both Republicans and Democrats of halting the Iranian nuclear programme and furthering US interests in nuclear non-​proliferation while assisting to develop a more cooperative relationship between the US and Iran. However, the agreement was domestically contentious. Support was largely split along party lines, though a number of Democrats held significant reservations.6 During Senate debates in September 2015, Senator Chuck Grassley described the JCPOA as ‘a bad deal that will not increase our national security’, arguing that it ‘will only exacerbate Iran’s support for terror and tradition of terror, with Iran having access to tens of billions of frozen assets to bolster its conventional military and further support global terrorism’ (Grassley, S6561). Others cast the Obama administration as ‘irresponsible’ (Barrasso, S6549), accusing them of viewing the world ‘through rose-​coloured glasses’ (Menendez, S6575).7 Significantly, the deal only had marginal public support with only 21 per cent of Americans agreeing that the deal would make the US more secure (Pew Research Centre, 2015). Within the domestic population, fear and anxiety remained prevalent as most Americans remained sceptical that Iran would conform to the deal, let alone change their behaviour. The notion of cooperating with Iran, a state that had for so long been viewed in the domestic political sphere as being unreliable and untrustworthy, was too much for many to comprehend. This remaining fear would serve as a powerful catalyst on which Trump could later weaponize principled ideas to justify withdrawal from the agreement and re-​escalate tensions.

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Trump’s principled opposition and withdrawal Prior to announcing his candidacy for President, Trump was, at least rhetorically, against any notion of having a nuclear agreement with Iran. Joining the chorus of lawmakers and public intellectual critics, Trump tweeted his disapproval of the nuclear negotiations on multiple occasions. Significantly, Trump condemned the JCPOA during the presidential campaign stating: ‘Iran is emboldened like never before’ (Trump, 2016c; see also Trump, 2016a; 2016b). This view was widely held among Republican candidates with Senator Lindsay Graham, for instance, suggesting in 2015 that the JCPOA was ‘a death sentence for the state of Israel’ (Hanchett, 2015). During a debate with fellow Republican candidates, Trump stated: just so you understand, as far as Iran, I would have never made that deal. I think it’s maybe the world deal I’ve ever seen. I think it’s the worst deal I’ve ever seen negotiated. I will be so tough on them and ultimately that deal will be broken unless they behave better than they’ve ever behaved in their lives, which is probably unlikely. That deal will be broken. (Trump, 2016b) This would become a central theme of Trump’s campaign and a cornerstone of his ‘American First’ foreign policy platform as he stated, ‘My number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran’ (Trump quoted in Woodward, 2018: 129). Despite this claim, however, Trump renewed the agreement on several occasions after taking office as it came up for its mandated review every 90 days. In early March 2017, the Iran deal came up for its first review under the Trump administration.8 Rex Tillerson, Trump’s Secretary of State, pushed Trump to renew the agreement out of principle as ‘Iran was in compliance with the deal as Obama had negotiated it’ (Woodward, 2018: 129). After some resistance, Trump reluctantly agreed to sign the renewal, arguing: This is one of my core principles … I’m not in favour of this deal. This is the worst deal ever made, and here we are renewing this deal … This is the last time. Don’t come back to me and try to renew this thing again. There’s not going to be more renewals. It’s a shitty deal. (Trump quoted in Woodward, 2018: 130) In a letter to inform the House Speaker, Paul Ryan, of the decision to renew the agreement, Trump ordered Tillerson to include a reference to Iran as ‘a

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leading state sponsor of terrorism’ (Tillerson, 2017a) and emphasize that the NSC would be reviewing the suspension of economic sanctions (Woodward, 2018: 130). At Trump’s direction, Tillerson held a press conference to justify a reappraisal of the US’s Iran policy, arguing that ‘Iran’s provocative actions threaten the United States and the rest of the world’ (Tillerson, 2017b). These communicative appeals drew on pre-​existing anxieties over the potential threat posed by Iran. There was little resistance from most Republicans to the planned policy review. Senator Bob Corker from Tennessee stated, ‘[R]‌egardless of Iran’s technical compliance with the nuclear deal, the administration is under no illusion about the continued threat from Tehran and is prepared to work closely with Congress to push back’ (Corker quoted in Harris, 2017). Such rhetoric played into existing principled concerns of Iran’s status as an untrustworthy actor. Tillerson was not alone in trying to restrain Trump’s impulse to withdraw. Others in the administration, including James Mattis, and H.R. McMaster had actively worked to discourage Trump from withdrawing from the agreement (Bolton, 2020: 20). Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in October 2017, Mattis confirmed that Iran was adhering to the terms of the nuclear deal, contrary to assertions made by Trump. He went on to emphasize that it was in America’s national security interests to remain party to the agreement (Bergen, 2019: 185). In consultations with Trump, Tillerson, Mattis and McMaster advanced more cognitive types of ideas in an effort to repress Trump’s more principled impulses. Indeed, they recognized that withdrawing from the agreement when Iran was in compliance would severely cripple the US’s capacity to negotiate and enter similar agreements in future. They also made the argument that if Trump wanted to rebuild relationships with key Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, to counteract Iranian influence in the future, it would be easier to do if nuclear weapons were off the table (Bergen, 2019: 185). Trump never agreed with this more cognitive assessment. He was determined to withdraw and fulfil his campaign promise. In the months prior to formally withdrawing, Trump fired Tillerson and McMaster, with whom he had developed irreconcilable policy differences. They were replaced with John Bolton, as National Security Advisor, and Mike Pompeo, as Secretary of State, both of whom were much more willing to see the US withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. Mattis was left as an isolated voice working to mediate Trump’s black and white, principled interpretation of the Iranian threat. The incoming National Security Advisor, John Bolton, was particularly hawkish in his approach to foreign policy. As Ambassador to the UN in the Bush administration, Bolton was a key advocate of the US war in Iraq. Prior to joining the Trump administration in 2018, he had written a number

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of opinion pieces pushing for pre-​emptive strikes, not just against Iran, but also to quash what he viewed as the imminent threat posed by Pyongyang (Bolton, 2017). One administration official, describing the difference in approaches between McMaster and Bolton, suggested that with Bolton ‘there’s an underlying bias. He’s selling when he’s talking’ rather than advising (Rucker and Leonnig, 2020: 265). Trump liked Bolton’s strongman approach to foreign policy and his contempt for the constraints imposed on the US by international institutions such as the UN, and commitments to multilateralism. Given Iran’s history of aggressive behaviour, Bolton had been a long-​time advocate for regime change (Bergen, 2019: 192). As such, Bolton would prove to be a powerful voice in the administration in the push towards withdrawal. Yet, public opinion had swung considerably since the 2015 Congressional debates. For instance, in October 2017, approximately 56 per cent of Americans either ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ supported the agreement. This included 51 per cent of self-​identified Republicans (McCarthy, 2017). This increased significantly over the coming months, according to a CNN poll taken on 8 May 2018: 46 per cent of Americans disapproved of Trump’s handling of Iran, with 63 per cent of respondents saying the US should not withdraw from the agreement (Sparks, 2018). At the same time, however, 62 per cent of respondents believed that Iran had violated the terms of the agreement, with 75 per cent of respondents believing that Iran posed a moderate to very serious threat to the US (Sparks, 2018). Despite the growth in public support for the deal, anxiety remained high. Trump continued to make the case for withdrawal. To do so, Trump asserted three broad justifications. First, despite evidence to the contrary, Trump asserted on multiple occasions, and in multiple settings, that Iran had breached the terms of the agreement. Second, he made principled appeals highlighting the Iranian government’s human rights abuses and reiterated their ongoing sponsorship of terrorism, suggesting that such behaviour continued to contribute to regional instability (Trump, 2017e; 2018a). Finally, he emphasized the alleged danger posed by the deal to Israel, a theme which had been touched on during early deliberations concerning the agreement. These efforts allowed him to connect with deeply held anxieties which acted as a source of power for principled concerns held by the American public towards Iran.9 On 8 May 2018, Trump announced that he would not be renewing the JCPOA, and the US would be withdrawing. In a press conference announcing the US’s withdrawal from the agreement, Trump issued powerful, principled communicative appeals, once again classifying the Iranian regime as the ‘leading state sponsor of terror’, suggesting that the US had acquired ‘definitive proof ’ from Israeli intelligence authorities that Iran’s nuclear

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programme was for malice intent (Trump, 2018c). He went on to revive the fear that the existing agreement would see American cities ‘threatened with destruction’ stating he ‘will not allow that to happen’ (Trump, 2018c). In place of the agreement, the administration would reinstate crippling economic sanctions, linking sanctions relief to behavioural change. Trump simply had to appeal to pre-​existing principled beliefs which spoke to the emotional, irrational fears held by Americans towards Iran. These had never been overcome and provided an easy foundation on which Trump could assert a principled justification for his action.10 Internationally, news of the withdrawal drew worried responses. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Theresa May issued a joint statement saying that they had ‘regret and concern’ over Trump’s decision to withdraw, insisting that they would continue to honour the agreement if Iran continued to comply (Holmes, 2018). Congressional members were split, predominantly along party lines. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and House Speaker Paul Ryan reiterated their view that the JCPOA was ‘deeply flawed’ (The New York Times, 2018). Senator Marco Rubio stated: ‘I’m glad that President Trump decided today to withdraw from the flawed Iran nuclear deal … This agreement was so bad that bipartisan majorities in both chambers of Congress voted against it after the last administration refused to submit it as a legally binding treaty under the Constitution’ (The New York Times, 2018). McConnell stated: ‘I share the objective and commitment made by the president that Iran should never be able to acquire or develop a nuclear weapon’ (The New York Times, 2018). Significantly, while there were a number of Democrats who opposed the implementation of the Iran deal, many of them condemned Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement. Chuck Schumer, for instance, who had been a vehement critic of the decision to enter the agreement initially, condemned the decision to withdraw, on the basis that it would undermine the US’s capacity to deal with Hezbollah and come to an agreement with North Korea (McPherson, 2018; Shabad, 2018). Yet, such cognitive interpretations failed to repress principled impulses of Trump and his new advisors, Bolton and Pompeo. Despite its growing approval, the Trump administration advanced principled types of ideas in an effort to justify their withdrawal from the JCPOA. While Americans were largely split along party lines as to whether withdrawal was the correct action, anxiety over the potential revitalization of Iran’s nuclear programme remained. Trump’s principled displacement of the JCOPA would prefigure increasingly hostile interactions between the two states.

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Cognitive repression: escalation, assassination and stand-​down in the Iranian crisis Given this principled construction of the Iranian threat and the withdrawal from the JCOPA, relations with Iran quickly deteriorated as the administration began to reapply sanctions. Compounding these effects, Trump’s purge of moderate, establishment voices from his administration suggested a shift towards a more aggressive ‘America First’ foreign policy. In this section, I show how these tensions manifest in an aggressive war of words as Iran was increasingly cast as the ‘leading state sponsor of terrorism’. This soon escalated towards a series of tit-​for-​tat military exchanges, culminating in the assassination of General Soleimani. Yet, after reaching the brink of a full-​blown military conflict, Trump quickly returned to more cognitive types of ideas in an effort to de-​escalate the conflict. Having withdrawn from the agreement and reinstated sanctions against Iran, Trump took the unprecedented step of labelling the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization in April 2019 (Williams et al, 2019). This was the first time the US had designated a part of another state’s government in such a way (Ibsen, 2019). However, it represented a re-​emphasis of the principled, ‘visceral disdain’ (Pillar, 2015) held towards Iran. In July 2018, Major General Soleimani declared that if the US started a conflict with Iran, Iran would finish it, stating, ‘[T]‌his war will destroy all your capabilities’ (Soleimani quoted in BBC, 2018b). This drew an immediate response from Trump on 23 July, as he tweeted: ‘NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE’ (cited in BBC News, 2018b). However, there were significant tensions within the administration concerning how to manage Iran. During a Principals meeting on 26 July, Mattis continued to advance a more cognitive interpretation in an effort to downplay the significance of the threat posed by Iran. Seeking to refocus the administration’s attention on what he viewed to be more pressing issues, Mattis made the argument that China, Russia and North Korea were far greater threats to US national security interests (Bolton, 2020: 74–​5). Yet, Mattis struggled to convince the other Principals, and more importantly, Trump, that Iran was not the number-​one national security threat.11 By contrast, John Bolton was adamant that Iran was a primary threat to US interests in the region. He held the hawkish view that regime change would be the only way to bring about a change in Iran’s behaviour, and worked to keep Iran the focus of national security discussions. Tensions continued to escalate over the coming months.

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Then, in September 2018, Iran-​backed militias attacked the US Embassy in Baghdad (Bolton, 2020: 190–​1). In a statement from the White House, the Trump administration declared that it would ‘hold the regime in Tehran accountable for any attack that results in injury to our personnel or damage to United States Government facilities’, stating that it would respond swiftly and decisively to any defend American lives (Calamur, 2018). Yet, the response to the attack was muted as key members of the departments of State and Defence resisted any form of forceful response (Bolton, 2020: 75). Significantly, Trump, despite his rhetoric and tweets, was wary at the prospect of escalating the crisis which would lead the US to be drawn into a prolonged conflict with Iran. Serious consideration of the use of force began in June 2019 after Iranian forces shot down a US Navy Global Hawk in contested airspace.12 The likelihood of conflict rose drastically after Trump declared via a tweet, ‘Iran made a very big mistake’ (quoted in Bolton, 2020: 399). Tensions appeared to have reached a high point. Soon after, senior administration officials began to explore a range of options to strike targets inside of Iran and implement a new round of economic sanctions. Both the new Secretary of Defence, Mark Esper, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford felt that the attack on the drone was ‘qualitatively different’ from Iran’s previous indiscretions and required a decisive but ‘proportional’ response (Bolton, 2020: 398). They tentatively suggested hitting three strategic sites along the Iranian coast which they believed could result in as many as 150 deaths. Bolton and Pompeo, on the other hand, saw the attack as an opportunity to ramp up deterrence and even push their ‘hard line’, principled preference for ‘comprehensive’ retaliation (Baker et al, 2019). One option they wished to pursue was the extraordinary step of authorizing the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani (Lee and Kube, 2020). General Soleimani was the leader of Iran’s secretive Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The Quds Force is a specific unit in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard which specializes in unconventional warfare intelligence. Under Soleimani, the Quds Force had played a pivotal role in advancing Iran’s foreign policy goals. In this role, General Soleimani’s forces assassinated rivals, armed allies –​including Hezbollah and President Bashar al-​Assad’s Syrian regime –​and provided direction to a network of groups responsible for killing Americans in Iraq for more than a decade (Filkins, 2013). In fact, Soleimani had been so effective in this role that both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations had previously explored the option of targeting Soleimani. However, both Bush and Obama had specifically avoided this option on the basis that killing Soleimani would likely lead to a prolonged armed conflict (McCrystal, 2019). Given the Obama

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administration’s effort to develop the JCPOA, there was no sense in targeting one of Iran’s top military officials (Panetta, 2020). Despite Soleimani’s continued role in supporting terrorism and covertly bolstering Iran’s position in the region, both administrations took the cognitive position of restraint, leaving him untouched for fear of escalation. While Trump never ruled out targeting Soleimani, he set the bar at the death of Americans. If the US lost lives to Soleimani’s attacks, assassination was on the table (Lee and Kube, 2020). With the lack of American deaths, Trump looked to pursue a series of target strikes as suggested by Esper and Dunford. But Trump found it difficult to sell the idea during a Congressional briefing on 20 June. Democrats, in particular, displayed concern over possible escalation and urged Trump to de-​escalate the situation, suggesting that conflict could actually play into Iran’s hands (Shear et al, 2019). Even Senator Mitch McConnell questioned the validity of strikes, asking how the downing of the Global Hawk was different to previous outbursts by the regime (Berger, 2019: 280). The idea wasn’t sticking. If anything, the briefing re-​emphasized Trump’s earlier concerns of the risk of escalation. Following the briefing, Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, stated, ‘[T]‌he impression I got was that the president was genuinely worried about stumbling into a broader conflict’ (quoted in Baker et al, 2019). Further complicating matters was the fact that support from international allies would be difficult to muster, especially because European allies were still holding out for a continuation of the nuclear agreement. A strike on Iranian territory would do little to convince Iran that continued adherence to the agreement would be beneficial. These concerns over the potential for escalation acted as a powerful, institutionalized weapon, acting to repress calls to use force. As the ‘planes were in the air’ Trump backed down, adopting this more cognitive view. Justifying the stand-​down, he argued that 150 deaths was ‘[t]‌oo many body bags’ and that it was ‘[n]ot proportionate’ to the downing of a drone (quoted in Bolton, 2020: 403). Instead, Trump signed an Executive Order authorizing additional economic sanctions, targeting top Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader. Trump argued, ‘I think a lot of restraint has been shown by us. A lot of restraint. And that doesn’t mean we’re going to show it in the future’ (Trump, 2019a). Reiterating the dangers posed by Iran, he continued: These measures represent a strong and proportionate response to Iran’s increasingly provocative actions. We will continue to increase pressure on Tehran until the regime abandons its dangerous activities and its aspirations, including the pursuit of nuclear weapons, increased

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enrichment of uranium, development of ballistic missiles, engagement in and support for terrorism, fuelling of foreign conflicts, and belligerent acts directed against the United States and its allies. (Trump, 2019a) Iran responded by announcing a ‘permanent closure’ of diplomatic relations, effectively ending all negotiations between the US and Iran until the sanctions were lifted (Ma, 2019).

The assassination of General Soleimani The Trump administration had been on the cusp of taking military action against the Iranian regime several times throughout early 2019. Imposing additional sanctions did little to quell these simmering tensions. Over the months that followed, Iran’s threats became increasingly bold. Between October 2019 and January 2020, bases housing Americans in Iraq were targeted more than a dozen times by Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi militia backed by Iran’s Quds Force (Lee and Kube, 2020). The deadliest of these attacks occurred on 27 December after 30 rockets were fired at an Iraqi base in the city of Kirkuk in the country’s north. The attack killed a US contractor and injured several service members (Lee and Kube, 2020). The Trump administration responded to the attack by launching strikes against five known Kataib Hezbollah sites in Iraq and Syria, killing 25 members of the militia (BBC News, 2019). However, the death of the US contractor was critical as it represented Trump’s self-​imposed ‘red line’. General Soleimani’s assassination was now an option. During a round of golf on 30 December 2020, Trump spoke with Senator Lindsay Graham about the possibility of targeting Soleimani. The idea caught Graham by surprise. Echoing the cognitively laden concerns raised during the Congressional briefing in June, Graham reminded Trump of the risks associated with this action. In an effort to repress this principled impulse, Graham stated, ‘Oh, boy, that’s a giant step … this is over the top … You kill him, new game. You go from playing $10 blackjack to $10,000-​a-​hand blackjack’ (quoted in Woodward, 2020: 195–​6). Graham was not the only one taken aback by Trump’s thinking to assassinate Soleimani. The prospect had made a number of Trump’s administration officials uneasy. So much so, that Mick Mulvaney,13 Trump’s Chief of Staff, asked Graham to find a way to convince Trump not to go ahead with the plan following their conversation on the golf course (Woodward, 2020: 197). In what may have served as the tipping point, supporters of the Iran-​ backed militia, Kataib Hezbollah, stormed the US Embassy in Baghdad on 31 December in retaliation for the US’s counterstrikes (CNBC, 2019). Given the invasion of the US Embassy, the death of the US contractor and

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the ongoing provocation of Soleimani’s Quds Forces, Trump was no longer convinced by cognitive arguments for restraint. In the days that followed, Trump gave the order to assassinate Soleimani. On 3 January 2020,14 the US conducted an operation which killed General Soleimani as he departed Baghdad International Airport. Justifying the strike, Trump asserted: Soleimani was plotting imminent15 and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel, but we caught him in the act and terminated him … Soleimani made the death of innocent people his sick passion, contributing to terrorist plots as far away as New Delhi and London … The future belongs to the people of Iran –​those who seek peaceful coexistence and cooperation –​not the terrorist warlords who plunder their nation to finance bloodshed abroad. (Trump, 2020a) Shortly after, Trump announced that an additional 3,500 troops would be sent to the region in response to the growing threat levels. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, ‘Trump’s decision to remove Qassem Soleimani from the battlefield saved American lives … the risk of doing nothing was enormous’ (Pompeo quoted in Pickrell, 2020). Domestically, reactions to the strike were split along party lines with many Republicans suggesting that the assassination saw the elimination of a major threat to US national security interests. Most notably, Lindsay Graham had a considerable change of heart,16 stating during a Fox News interview: ‘I’m glad he’s dead and I’m glad we finally got a president who understands Iran is the cancer of the Middle East and they must change the status quo’ (Graham quoted in Coleman, 2020). Democrats, on the other hand, particularly presidential candidates, were particularly critical of the strikes’ potential to drag the US into another costly conflict. Joe Biden said Trump ‘just tossed a stick of dynamite into a tinderbox … stakes could not be higher’ (quoted in Stewart, 2020). Similarly, Senator Bernie Sanders drew parallels with Vietnam and Iraq overstretch, tweeting: ‘Trump promised to end endless wars, but this action puts us on a path to another one’ (Sanders, 2020). Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi declared in a statement, ‘Tonight’s airstrike risks provoking further dangerous escalation of violence. America –​ and the world –​cannot afford to have tensions escalate to the point of no return’ (Pelosi, 2020). Even with broad consensus among Republicans that Soleimani’s death was justified, there were serious concerns that there was no plan for what was to come. Senator Mitt Romney highlighted the need for a ‘coherent strategy for protecting our [US] security interests in the region’, and more information from the administration would be required as to what would

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happen next (Romney quoted in Stewart, 2020). In doing so, Biden, Sanders and Romney questioned the principled foundations of the administration’s justification by weaponizing cognitive types of ideas by emphasizing the potential for the crisis to devolve into a drawn-​out conflict.

Standing down In the days that followed Soleimani’s assassination Iran vowed ‘harsh retaliation’ (Stewart, 2020), solidifying the belief that the US was on the brink of a major conflict. These fears were exacerbated by Trump’s initial suggestion that any retaliation would be met ‘perhaps in a disproportionate manner’ (quoted in BBC News, 2020a), implying a willingness to hit targets inside Iran’s borders. On 7 January, the Iranian Parliament passed legislation which designated all branches of the US armed forces and Pentagon officials as terrorists (Al Jazeera, 2020). The next day Iran launched a missile attack on an Iraqi air base which housed a number of US soldiers. While there were no US deaths associated with Iran’s strikes, tensions had reached a high point. Fearing the potential for a protracted conflict, Congress had started to raise questions as to why they had not been consulted prior to the assassination. On top of this, news of the retaliation and subsequent injuries sparked renewed backlash against the administration. On 8 January, the Trump administration briefed Congressional members on details and justifications for the strike. Reactions to the briefing were mixed, however, the briefing failed to convince many members that Soleimani posed an imminent threat that would warrant his immediate assassination. For instance, Republican Senator of Utah Mike Lee described it as ‘the worst briefing, at least on a military issue, I’ve seen in the nine years I’ve been here’ (Lee quoted in Pickrell, 2020). Similarly, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer argued that Trump’s decision to strike was impulsive, and only acted to harm the US’s capacity to pursue its interests in the region, and unnecessarily risked the lives of American military personnel (Forgey, 2020). Criticism of the strikes became overwhelming. It had become clear that Trump’s principled framing of the crisis could not overcome cognitive ideas calling for restraint. Given the depth of bipartisan criticism and the growing potential that the US would be dragged into a sustained conflict, Trump began to backtrack, ‘repressing’ his more principled impulses to avoid further military engagements. During a press conference following the briefing with Congressional members, Trump shifted position, beginning to lay the foundation for de-​escalation. He announced that his administration would be imposing additional sanctions and stated that he intended to request that NATO ‘become much more involved in the Middle East process’, but the

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US would not be escalating militarily (Trump quoted in Forgey, 2020).17 In closing, Trump reiterated the position of previous administrations, stating: ‘to the people and leaders of Iran: We want you to have a future and a great future –​one that you deserve –​one of prosperity at home and harmony with the nations of the world. The United States is ready to embrace peace with all who seek it’ (Trump, 2020b). On 10 January, Trump signed an Executive Order imposing wider-​ranging sanctions against the Iranian economy. The sanctions would hit construction, manufacturing, textiles, as well as the financial sector, acting to severely cripple Iran. In a statement, Trump declared: ‘These punishing economic sanctions will remain until the Iranian regime changes its behaviour’, again, re-​emphasizing his will to embrace peace (Trump, 2020c). However, as the days went by more than 100 US soldiers showed signs of TBI18 following Iran’s missile attack on 8 January (Zaveri, 2020). Trump worked to downplay the TBIs suffered after Iran’s retaliation, stating: ‘I heard that they had headaches, and a couple of other things … it’s not very serious … I don’t consider them very serious injuries relative to other injuries I have seen’ (Trump quoted in BBC News, 2020b). Instead of engaging Iran further, Trump made the decision to de-​escalate and impose further economic sanctions rather than risking entanglement in a broader regional conflict (Forgey, 2020). Trump’s justification for de-​escalation was largely grounded in the fact that there had been no US deaths or serious injuries as a result of the strikes. In this way, Trump reverted to more cognitive types of ideas, attempting to justify de-​escalation.

Conclusion This chapter has highlighted how different types of ideas were used in relation to the US’s relationship with Iran in a way that saw a principled escalation towards crisis, and a cognitive stand-​down. Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCOPA marked a significant deviation in US foreign policy towards Iran. Yet, this deviation was not unexpected and largely fit into his ‘America First’ worldview. Domestically, anxiety over Iran’s past behaviour spurred concerns as to whether the regime was actually complying with the JCOPA. These anxieties provided Trump an opening to assert emotionally laden, principled types of ideas, reviving the narrative that Iran was the ‘leading state sponsor of terrorism’ and posed an ongoing threat to US interests, and its people. In doing so, Trump was able to displace interest-​based logics surrounding the JCPOA on the back of growing concerns that Iran was breaching the terms of the deal. The withdrawal prefigured increasingly aggressive behaviour by both the US and Iran as rising tensions threatened to devolve into a broader regional

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conflict. These growing tensions saw the administration on the cusp of using military force as Trump, himself, struggled to maintain either a consistent principled or cognitive interpretation of US interests towards Iran. On the one hand, he wanted to punish Iran for sponsoring terrorism, and pursue a more ‘hard line’ version of the nuclear agreement. However, he sought to avoid war. As a result, Trump, pressed by principled arguments made by John Bolton, Mike Pompeo and Mark Esper, consistently tittered on the edge of using military force as tensions deepened. Tensions between these different types of ideas culminated in the principled decision to assassinate General Qassem Soleimani, leader of the Iranian Quds Forces, in January 2020. This was followed by a spat of retaliatory strikes on US airbases in Iraq by the Iranians. The assassination was a decisive move that previous administrations had avoided for fear of becoming overextended in conflict against Iran. In the aftermath of the attack, Trump quickly reneged on the use of force, ‘repressing’ the urge to escalate and pursue regime change amid significant backlash. It became clear that any further escalation would likely lead to sustained US involvement in yet another Middle Eastern conflict. In an effort to avoid this, Trump returned to more cognitive types of ideas, playing down the significance of Iran’s retaliation which left more than 100 US soldiers with TBIs. Justifying de-​escalation, Trump echoed previous administrations, that the US had no ill-​will towards the people of Iran and that any measures taken against Iran served to target what they described as a corrupt regime. Trump consistently advocated an ‘America First’ foreign policy which saw a shift in interpretations of US interests. Yet, what resulted was an inconsistent pattern of variation with respect to the use of force. Tracing these variations has important implications for understanding Trump’s foreign policy. Reasonable people can debate which of his ideas fall into the cognitive or principled categories. What is clear between the cases examined here is the extent to which different types and forms of ideas have shaped foreign policy decisions to use force by either altering Trump’s interpretation of US interests or allowing Trump to weaponize a particular set of ideas to shift US policy.

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PART VI

Conclusions

10

Ideas and Foreign Policy Variation Introduction Every president has a foreign policy doctrine, until they don’t. In this book, I have argued that in order to better understand foreign policy decision-​ making, we need to look beyond the material and ideational structures emphasized in conventional approaches to International Relations (IR) and zoom in on the discursive interactions that take place among foreign policy agents as they contest ideas in the construction of policy. This volume sought to answer the question: what explains variation in foreign policy decisions when the material and social conditions of state interests remain formally the same? The purpose was to show how different types of ideas see agents interpret interests in principled or cognitive ways. Specifically, I have sought to understand the seemingly confounding variation in decisions to use force in American foreign policy. In doing so, I turned to constructivist and discursive institutionalist insights to highlight the interplay between different types and forms of ideas within presidential administrations. Developing these insights, I have offered a theoretical framework in an effort to provide a means for understanding how agents can interpret ‘interests’ –​defined as ‘beliefs about how to meet needs’ (Wendt, 1999: 130) –​ in different ways. The basic notion that interests are interpreted in different ways is not a new claim, yet it is a claim that has been under-​examined. The process by which foreign policy agents interpret state interests in varying ways has remained causally ambiguous. Understanding variation in foreign policy has been a challenging task for scholars of IR. In IR theory, in particular, scholars employing rationalist assumptions posit that agents can interpret information efficiently. More formally, these scholars assume that state interests remain formally the same in the absence of ‘exogenous shocks’ to the material and ideational bases of state interest. As such, while

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these approaches have provided important insights, there is scope for further understanding of the endogenous institutional dynamics by which different types of ideas are interpreted and deliberated among decision-​makers. In the next section, I highlight the theoretical implications and briefly speak to how this study lays the framework for potential future works. I then summarize the case studies and set out five key findings. First, in addressing the theoretical implications, I stress the need to incorporate discursive institutionalist frameworks into security studies to better show how the interplay between different types of ideas in policy debates provides scope for variation and inconsistency. Second, I summarize the cases re-​ emphasizing how ideas were ‘repressed’ and ‘displaced’ through the eight empirical cases. Third, I outline five key findings of this study and stress the value of incorporating and extending the use of discursive institutionalist analysis beyond US foreign policy decision-​making into other, broader areas of inquiry within the field of security studies.

Taking ideas seriously: theoretical summary and scope for future dialogues This study speaks to the general need for a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between different types and forms of ideas in the construction and interpretation of state interests. Focussing on key decisions to use force in US foreign policy, I have worked to show how different types of ideas come to dominate discursive interactions between foreign policy agents leading to variations and inconsistency in the application of force across key cases of humanitarian atrocities and terrorism. Addressing the theoretical implications of this study, I first examined the rationalist limitations in explaining change and variation in state interests. While such approaches are important, they tend to overrate agents’ capacity to interpret the balance of power and effectively pursue state interests given their overarching assumption that interests are systemically derived. To the extent that neoclassical realists have sought to mediate this emphasis on systemic pressures in explaining foreign policy choices, their intervening variables have largely been ‘smuggled in’ and applied in an ad hoc manner. While constructivist analyses provide wider scope for addressing the importance of a range of different ideas and show how both material and identity needs inform the formation of state interests, they tend to assume that social conventions that ‘reduce uncertainty’ take on ‘self-​reinforcing’ qualities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Making tremendous progress, ontological security analyses have shown how state efforts to secure and stabilize ‘Self-​narratives’ in ‘critical situations’ lead them to act in ways which may undermine their physical security. Yet, such analyses have not fully

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accounted for how multiple possible narratives of the ‘Self ’ are cultivated in the lead-​up to major foreign policy decisions. Indeed, ontological security analyses could be accused of ‘homogenising’ the national self (Delehanty and Steele, 2009: 526). Simply put, there is room for a more complete understanding of how states’ ‘Self-​narratives’ are cultivated and reproduced by purposeful agents in ways that shape foreign policy. The analytical context by which ‘Self-​narratives’ are reproduce has not been fully explored in such perspectives. To redress some of these theoretical shortcomings, I have proposed a turn towards discursive institutionalism as a means of providing a more in-​depth analysis of how different types and forms of ideas are used in foreign policy decision-​making. To do this, I developed a three-​part model to show how agents come to rely on principled or cognitive interpretations. First, building on Vivien Schmidt’s (2008) distinction between principled and cognitive types of ideas, I have argued that ideas reduce uncertainty (Blyth, 2002: 35) in principled and cognitive ways. In such a view, principled ideas reduce uncertainty by drawing on our ‘aspirations and ideals’ providing agents with a sense of what is the ‘right’ thing to do. By contrast, cognitive types of ideas tend to provide more mediated interpretations outlining what can be done, or ‘what works’ in a particular situation. Where these different types of ideas conflict with regards to what the appropriate action is, tensions emerge providing scope for variation and inconsistency in decision-​making. In this case, ideas such as the Powell Doctrine were designated as cognitive ideas given that such approaches to the use of force had become standard practice. This was evident by the fact that agents had emphasized these ideas, in statements before crises emerged, as being the best way to pursue foreign policy interests. By contrast, principled ideas were those ideas judged to be a deviation from previous stated positions. Second, having shown the how information can be interpreted through two broad types of ideas, I demonstrated how agents used these different ideas as weapons (Blyth, 2002: 39) as they contested the meaning of events in terms of US interests. I offered two mechanisms to show how decision-​ makers interpret different forms of ideas in either principled or cognitive ways. Normative displacement, where principled types of ideas lead agents to interpret events based on ‘how they feel’ (Hopf, 2010: 539), resulting in decisions being made with reference to what is deemed as ‘appropriate’ or, put in colloquial terms, ‘what’s right’ (Widmaier, 2016: 15). By contrast, cognitive repression provides a means of understanding how agents repress more value-​laden interpretations with an eye to pursuing interpretations. Such institutionalized preferences provide ‘guidelines’ and ‘blueprints’ to inform political action (Blyth, 2001; 2002; Schmidt, 2008: 306). For example, Powell sought to limit the influence of principled sources of

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information by requiring a comprehensive assessment of goals, interests and viability in decisions regarding whether the use of military force in a given situation was warranted. Finally, presidents act as interpretive leaders as they seek to define interests in a given situation –​whether justifying non-​intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s or constructing the War on Terror and the war in Iraq. In this way, presidents have issued either principled or cognitively laden communicative appeals in an effort to justify and legitimate their interpretations of interests. Discursive institutionalism provides a comprehensive but nuanced way to understand and analyze the factors that influence how foreign policy agents interpret information in ways that can lead to variation in decision-​ making. By demonstrating that information is not received in the same form from one crisis to the next, it is possible to more holistically analyze how tensions between different types of ideas lead to varied interpretations of interests between crises. As a result, there is greater flexibility to analyze and understand variation in foreign policy decisions specifically, and decision-​ making in IR broadly. Importantly, this study has highlighted that where agents come to rely too heavily on one type of interpretation over another, there is potential to repress or displace important sources of information. Scholars need to pay more attention to the types of information which contribute to interest formation. Furthermore, they should take note of the agents involved in the debate as they try to understand foreign policy decision-​making. I concede that this attempt to incorporate discursive institutionalism does not fully articulate what I believe to be a wide-​ranging versatility in the field of security studies. As Schmidt herself recognizes, discursive institutionalism is a broad ‘umbrella phrase’ which covers a huge range of analysis into the ways in which discourse shapes and influences institutions, emphasizing how, where, when and why ideas matter (Schmidt, 2008: 305). However, taking these initial steps has demonstrated how discursive institutionalism can enable a greater disaggregation and analysis of the influence of different types and forms of ideas in policy construction. In doing so, it provides a means of explaining policy variation and deviations in a comprehensive way by examining the ideas at play in the lead-​up to key decisions. Given its broad capacity to analyze the use and communication of ideas, further development and refinement of discursive institutionalism in the field of security studies has the potential to yield significant insights. As such, there is scope for a broad, rich theoretical dialogue to further unpack how agents utilize different types of ideas in policy construction. There are two key theoretical dialogues which I believe could be particularly significant, as well as a capacity for a much broader empirical application beyond the confines of US foreign policy settings. First, developing a more comprehensive dialogue

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between discursive institutionalism and the burgeoning field of ontological security (Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; 2019; Zarakol, 2010; Subotić, 2016). Discursive institutionalism could help to provide more analytical context to ontological security. Specifically, it provides the tools to help unpack the ways in which potentially multiple conceptions of the ‘Self ’ are cultivated and reproduced in ways that lead to variation in foreign policy decision-​making. Second, there is additional opportunity to engage with the literature on psychology and foreign policy analysis which examines individual political leaders and leadership, and specific leadership traits (Renshon, 2006; Saunders, 2011; Horowitz et al, 2015). Of specific interest here is whether individual leaders’ different psychological backgrounds and leadership traits influence their propensity to displace or repress information. From the cases examined in this study, it is clear that not all presidents interpret information in the same way. This was made evident by the different responses between Obama and Trump to chemical weapons attacks in Syria. A dialogue between the two fields of literature could provide deeper theoretical insights into the individual factors that increase the propensity of specific leaders to be more sensitive to principled forms of information, leading to a higher tendency to pursue policy based on gut reactions as opposed to restraint, and vice versa. In addition to expanding into broader theoretical discussions, there is a rich potential for more empirical analysis to further understanding the role of different types and forms of ideas on foreign policy decision-​making. While this study has focussed on US foreign policy, future studies could take the same cases to conduct a comparative study of decision-​making between different states. It may be that as the world’s most powerful state, the US has more prominent variations in its decisions to use force. Even so, tracing the interplay of different types of ideas in foreign policy decision-​ making may help to explain variation in foreign policy decisions of smaller states. Such studies could examine how the foreign policy decision-​makers of other states reached their decisions to intervene or to not intervene in specific instances. Or, in broader terms, there is the capacity to study how states see their responsibilities in terms of providing forces for military or humanitarian missions abroad within other states.1

The cases Across eight empirical chapters, I have worked to demonstrate how the reliance on different types of ideas has resulted in variations in decisions to use force in American foreign policy. In Part II, I analyzed US Bosnia policy across the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. As noted in Chapter 2, it would be impossible to properly understand the Bush administration’s Bosnia policy without understanding the position of

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restraint which held legitimacy following the success of the Powell Doctrine during the war in the Persian Gulf. I showed how cognitive repression saw principled arguments for intervention repressed as the administration’s focus was to avoid quagmire, leading to the position characterized as ‘we don’t have a dog in the fight’ (Baker quoted in Power, 2003: 267). Yet, the Bush administration’s efforts to avoid a quagmire would lead them to ignore effort to draw parallels between the violence in Bosnia with the Holocaust. Similarly, Clinton would find himself unable to overcome Powell’s more cognitive interpretation, rejecting principled efforts by senior administration officials to intervene despite initially being supportive of US involvement. In Chapter 3, I showed how despite material and coalitional arguments remaining formally the same, the decision to avoid military engagement in Bosnia changed in 1995, following the massacre in Srebrenica. The massacre saw principled reactions spur normative displacement as the administration reinterpreted the crisis in Bosnia based on how they felt. The reaction could largely be summarized by the belief that Bosnia had become a ‘cancer’ on US foreign policy which was ‘spreading and eating away at its credibility’ (Lake quoted in Woodward, 1996: 253). This could be symbolically summed up by Al Gore’s principled plea to Clinton: ‘What should I tell my daughter?’ (quoted in Harris, 2006: 196), following the emerging images of the atrocity, reigniting the analogical links to the Holocaust. This resulted in Operation Deliberate Force and the deployment of 20,000 US troops to the region. Significantly, as Albright would point out, success following Srebrenica demonstrated that broad stroke approaches to foreign policy –​such as the Powell Doctrine which advanced conceptions of ‘what works’ –​do not adequately allow for the effective promotion of US interests. This emphasizes a need for both cognitive and principled sources of information to be utilized in effective policy-​making. In Part III, I examined the US’s response to terrorism under the Clinton administration during the 1990s, and the Bush administration following the attacks of September. In Chapter 4, I showed how terrorism was largely viewed as a second-​tier threat through the bombing of the WTC in 1993, the US Embassy attacks in 1998 and the attack on USS Cole in 2000. Even as Clinton came to recognize the rising threat of terrorism in the aftermath of the US Embassy attacks, he ‘repressed’ calls from groups such as PNAC for a more ‘forward-​leaning’ foreign policy, responding to al-​Qaeda’s attacks only where actionable intelligence was available. Significantly, where Clinton did pursue bin Laden in the immediate aftermath of the Embassy bombings, he would be accused of a constructing a ‘Wag the Dog’ style scenario in which some political adversaries characterized the effort as a distraction from the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

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In Chapter 5, I showed how the almost perpetual state of uncertainty following the attacks of 11 September, 2001, resulted in normative displacement as state interests underwent a principled reinterpretation. Given the fear of further attacks, Bush adopted a unilateral approach to foreign policy, stating in black and white terms, ‘Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001b). He declared a War on Terror, laying the principled foundations on which he would subsequently launch the war in Iraq. In doing so, he ignored arguments for restraint put forward by Powell and Condoleezza Rice as they warned of Iraq, ‘If you break it, you own it’. Yet, such arguments failed to overcome the more emotional, intuitive principled interpretations brought on by 9/​11. As such, Bush overlooked the complexity of eradicating terrorist networks in his War on Terror and subsequent war in Iraq amid the need to quench ‘the bloodlust of the American people’ (Bush quoted in Baker, 2013: 134). In Part IV, I analyzed two key intervention decisions made by the Obama administration which, together, represent significant variation in the administration’s interpretations concerning the use of force. In Chapter 5, I analyzed Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya. Even as Obama avoided entering the US into further conflicts during the Arab Spring, the threat of mass atrocity in Libya would prove too great a risk to not intervene. Genocidal rhetoric from Libya’s leader, Colonel Gaddafi, implying he would ‘cleanse’ Libya, and the rebels would be ‘hunted door to door’ (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2011) would see memories of Rwanda spur normative displacement. Such interpretation would lead to reliance on principled interpretations based on how they felt, even if what was happening in Libya ‘was not a vital security interest of the United States’ (Gates, 2014: 511). Spurred by the threat of imminent mass atrocity, Obama sought a decisive resolution from the UN Security Council to authorize ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians (UNSC, 2011b). In Libya, Obama’s typically restrained decision-​making yielded to more principled concerns to prevent a mass atrocity. In Chapter 6, I show how under the same administration interpretations concerning the use of force can shift by analyzing the decision not to intervene in Syria. While Obama initially declared that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would constitute a ‘red line’ and ‘change my equation’ (Obama, 2012) on intervention, he would ultimately pursue more diplomatic means, avoiding the use of force. When confirmation emerged that the Assad regime utilized chemical weapons against the civilian population, Obama initially geared up for a military strike. Yet, as initial principled reactions subsided as no further attacks appeared imminent, Obama began to question the value of military action given that, as Ben

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Rhodes put it, ‘[T]‌here was no Benghazi to be saved’ (Rhodes, 2018a: 157). Instead, Obama pursued diplomatic efforts, seeking the help of Russian President Vladimir Putin to assist in negotiations to remove chemical weapons stockpiles from the Assad regime. In this way, Obama’s cognitive efforts would see cognitive repression shift the administration’s policy away from humanitarian intervention –​instead, he sought to adapt existing frameworks to manage the issue in Syria. In Syria, the motive to intervene was simply not as strong. Yet, while successfully preventing further chemical weapons attacks during his time in office, Obama never came close to threatening intervention again despite continued humanitarian atrocities by the regime. In Part V, I showed how variations in decisions to use force have continued, even under the Trump administration’s more isolationist, ‘America First’ worldview. In Chapter 8, I traced Trump’s decision-​making with reference to the crisis in Syria, highlighting variations around his ‘America First’ doctrine (Trump, 2017a). Specifically, I examined the decision to bomb Syrian airfields following the chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime in April 2017. I argue that images of the attack –​in which children were seen foaming at the mouth –​temporarily ‘displaced’ Trump’s ‘America First’ vision in order to defend the ‘beautiful babies’ (Trump, 2017d; Wolff, 2018: 192–​4) as Trump interpreted US interests in Syria in more principled terms. Yet, despite this momentary departure, Trump would return to his foreign policy doctrine, subsequently ordering the withdrawal of US troops from Northern Syria in October 2019, abandoning Kurdish allies in the process (Wright, 2019). Finally, in Chapter 9, I traced Trump’s handling of the Iranian crisis. Beginning early in his presidency, Trump asserted principled appeals in order to justify withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear deal (JCPOA) which eventually occurred in May 2018. Following the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, relations with Iran quickly deteriorated as Trump reconstructed the principled threat posed by the Iranian regime. These tensions culminated in the critical moment in which the US authorized the assassination of the Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani. Iran quickly retaliated with a missile strike against an Iraqi air base, leaving over 100 US soldiers injured. Rather than continuing to escalate and risk becoming entrapped in a wider regional conflict, Trump heeded the more cognitive interpretations pushed by Congressional members, likening conflict to Iraq and Vietnam, as he ‘repressed’ the impact of these strikes in an effort to de-​escalate the crisis and avoid war.

Findings This study contains five primary findings regarding the way in which foreign policy decisions vary as agents come to rely on principled or cognitive

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types of ideas. First, variations in foreign policy decision-​making within presidential administrations are common. When presidents come into office, they do so with a certain set of preferences which shape the way in which they see the world. However, these preferences are reshaped as events pose challenges to their beliefs about ‘what works’. As such, presidents’ interpretations of foreign policy interests are subject to variation by the natural passage of events. In this way, technocratic, cognitive analyses are not enough to understand the ways in which agents interpret foreign policy interests as these interpretations cannot be reduced to a simple ‘interest-​based logic’ as interests are not static. Second, agents within presidential administrations can have power at different times. Significantly, there is not necessarily consistency in the times in which particular agents have power. For instance, Susan Rice and Samantha Power had decisive influence in the Obama administration as conditions in Libya indicated the potential for mass atrocities. Yet, both were virtually silenced in debates following mass atrocities and the use of chemical weapons in Syria. This highlights that interests are interpreted in different ways, even given the rise of a similar set of conditions. Again, this is not to discount rationalist explanations which point to the geostrategic implications of intervention in Syria. These are still important –​however, they are not wholly determining. Understanding the endogenous tensions which give rise to varying interpretations is important because it enables an analysis of the types of information being presented. Third, agent interpretations of interests are heavily influenced by the forms (that is, images, analogies, narratives and so on) in which information emerges. For instance, where ideas are presented in narrative forms (that is, parallels between Libya and Rwanda), or images (that is, the massacre at Srebrenica, and vision of children dying from chemical weapons in Syria) they may possess more emotional impact. Notably, the forms that ideas come in have a significant impact on the types of ideas which are adopted in interpretation. For Obama, Libya was ‘like Rwanda’ but in Syria, ‘there was no Benghazi to be saved’ leaving interests to be interpreted a principled way in Libya and a cognitive way in Syria despite similar humanitarian conditions. Fourth, in addition to providing an explanation of how agent interpretations vary given the presence of principled or cognitive ideas, this study has also highlighted the capacity of both types of ideas to lead to policy missteps. Where principled interpretations can see agents respond with regards to ‘how they feel’, there may be a failure to fully consider consequences of action. For instance, principled reinterpretations of interests after 9/​11 would see President George W. Bush invade Iraq. Yet in doing so, he overlooked the advice on the scale and duration of the intervention required to secure a stable post-​Hussein Iraq. Similarly, in an effort to do the ‘right thing’ and prevent

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mass atrocity in Benghazi, President Obama miscalculated the willingness of European powers to assist in efforts to rebuild post-​intervention Libya. This would see Libya succumb to further civil unrest and civil war in the years that followed. On the other hand, cognitive interpretations are prone to inefficiency as agents repress and refine institutional preferences.2 In this way, President George H.W. Bush would repress the extent of the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia as his administration sought to avoid a quagmire, emphasizing that Bosnia constituted a ‘European problem’ (Albright, 2003: 180) requiring a ‘European solution’. Yet, in the process, the administration would overlook the Holocaust-​style atrocities perpetuated against Bosnian Muslims. Finally, the president, ultimately, makes the decision. While other agents in the administration may possess differing levels of power from one crisis to another where the emphasis on different types of information varies, it is up to the president to make the final decision. Given that the president is the ultimate decision-​maker yet decisions to use force vary even as the material and social conditions of state interests remain formally the same, variation must come from endogenous tensions between these different types of ideas. No theory can explain everything. As noted by Charles Taylor (1979), theories can only be falsified against other theories. Importantly, this study has avoided making claims that only principled ideas lead policymakers to acts involving the use of military force, or that cognitive, institutionalized ideas result in restraint. Rather, the distinctions serve to highlight variation in agent interpretations of foreign policy interests as they come to view interests in principled or cognitive ways. Turing towards discursive institutionalism in security studies opens avenues to explore the ‘nuts and bolts’ of policy debates by demonstrating the significance of different types and forms of ideas in shaping policy and bringing about variation in decision-​making.

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Jack Holland (2020: 12–​13) emphasizes the importance of language given that it helps to create meaning in our world. He highlights how context and framing impact the way events are interpreted and the significance we assign to them. Blyth (2002: 9) also makes the observation that what constitutes a ‘crisis as a crisis is not a self-​apparent phenomenon’. Similarly, Colin Hay (1996: 254–​5) sees crises as ‘a moment of decisive intervention … perceived by agents capable of making a decisive intervention’ as such, a crisis is ‘a moment and process of transformation’. Uncertainty refers to the limits in available information ‘about the environment, other actors, and possible outcomes’ (Best, 2012: 677). I distinguish between principled and cognitive ideas by interpreting statements made by agents. While I expand on these distinctions in the theoretical framework, I call something a cognitive idea if there is an established use of such an approach by an agent or administration. Principled ideas, on the other hand, are ideas which counter stated or established positions as agents respond to events more emotionally in line with how they feel. I use ‘normative ideas’ and ‘principled ideas’ interchangeably. Andrew Ross (2006: 199) has noted that people’s values can be subconsciously held acting to influence intellectual beliefs. Similarly, Ted Hopf (2010: 541) points to the role of unthinking, precognitive ‘habits’ which ‘permit rapid, not necessarily accurate, categorisation of people and events’. In a similar way, Jeffrey Tulis (1987) notes, ‘Rhetorical practice is not merely a variable; it is also an amplification or vulgarization of the ideas that produce it’. Similarly, Ronald Krebs (2015: 136) states that the presidency ‘calls upon and empowers its holder to serve as the nation’s storyteller-​in-​chief ’. On ‘coordinative discourse’ see Vivien Schmidt (2008: 310; 2014). Unless otherwise stated, any reference to realism refers specifically to structural realism. Waltz does address the issue of socialization, but in a very restrictive way. Where he suggests that norms might encourage conformity, socialization ‘limits variety’ and ‘limits and moulds variety’ (1979: 76). This is because socialization is unable to overcome the competitive structure of the anarchic international system. That is to say, whatever norms develop between states through interaction exist only so long as there is the capability to enforce them. Once a norm no longer possesses the capability to be enforced, its authority ceases to exist. Emphasizing this point Waltz (1979: 91) argues, ‘No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained’. On ‘offensive’ realism see Mearsheimer (2001). On ‘defensive’ realism, see Robert Jervis (1978).

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They focus on four broad categories of intervening variables: perceptions of the state leader, strategic subcultures, state-​society relations and domestic institutional arrangements. There are numerous variations of liberal international relations theory. Domestic neoliberals, including Peter Gourevitch (1978), John Odell (1982), Jack Snyder (1991) are the focus here given their emphasis on domestic coalitions as primary sources of influence in foreign policy decision-​making. Systemic neoliberals include Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972), Robert Keohane (1984), and Robert Axelrod and Keohane (1985). For a detailed discussion of the agent-​structure problem see Wendt (1987). Building on Roskin’s work, Steele and Heinze (2014) provide a more recent account of generational shifts in US foreign policy, specifically concerning humanitarian intervention and the R2P. In this analysis, Weldes pushes beyond Wendt’s structuralism, demonstrating that state identities are not the sole product of interaction between system-​level units. Rather, she observes that states must hold some sense of identity prior to interaction based on the ‘intersubjective and culturally established meanings’ held by agents within the state. David Campbell (1992) shows how states ‘script’ themselves, noting that the ‘source of danger’ faced by the US throughout its history has never been fixed, nor has the ‘identity’ the source of danger was said to threaten. His analysis shows that the contours of state identities are consistently being written and rewritten. Second-​generation constructivists have attempted to bring more methodological rigour to the constructivist research paradigm through the development of more ‘testable’ metrics for their knowledge claims (McCourt and Steele, 2017: 1). On the ‘rationalist’ aspects of Constructivism, see James Fearon and Alexander Wendt (2002). On ‘epistemic communities’ see Adler (1992). This has likely occurred as a result of efforts to pursue great methodological rigour. On historical institutionalism see Paul Pierson (2000; 2004), Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Keleman (2007), and Orfeo Fioretos (2011). ‘Critical situations’ are similar to moments of crisis highlighted by historical institutionalist and rationalist scholars, in that they represent a period in which the ‘institutionalised routines’ of the state are disrupted. However, ‘critical situations’ are the product of endogenous interpretations by agents within institutions. That is, events have to be constructed as posing a threat to ontological security and the state’s self-​identity narratives. ‘Shame’ is defined by Giddens, (1991: 65) as ‘anxiety about the adequacy of the narrative by means of which the individual sustains a coherent biography’. Steele (2019) notes that ontological security can be maintained so long as states can retain the image that they are doing the right thing. As such, relatively limited action can be enough to release states from their anxiety and sense of ‘shame’. Steele refers to a kind of ‘psychic energy’ that primes domestic audiences for a ‘climatic’ release that only comes when anticipated actions are taken that maintain these ‘Self-narratives’. He contrasts Obama’s ‘red line’ that wasn’t enforced with Trump’s limited air strikes in Syria in 2017 to highlight how the release of anticipatory energy –​in this case, in the form of air strikes –​can free states from anxiety even though neither effort did much to change the course of the conflict. Yet, in the latter case, the sense of threat to ontological security was mitigated –​at least, temporarily. Schmidt (2008: 307) emphasizes the point that there is a ‘built-​in bias that seems to assume that “good” ideas –​meaning those that appear more relevant to the problem at hand, more adequate to the task, and more appropriate to the needs of society –​succeed while “bad” ideas fail’.

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I interchange the term ‘normative ideas’ with ‘principled ideas’. Such distinctions align closely with March and Olsen’s (1998) ‘logic of consequences’ and ‘logics of appropriateness’. I use ‘cognitive ideas’ and ‘causal ideas’ interchangeably. Marcus Holmes similarly has argued that ‘we should think about elites making decisions based not only what they think about a particular issue or object, but what they feel about it’ (2015: 712). Daniel Kahneman (2012) makes a distinction between ‘fast and slow thinking’ in which ‘fast thinking’ constitutes unthinking, unreflective gut reactions pushing forth values, of which the agent may have been previously unaware. Habits, broadly defined, are ‘automatic cognitive processes’. On habits as automatic processes, see Daniel M. Wegner and John A. Bargh (1998). Similarly, Bially Mattern (2014: 589–​94) suggests that we can become convinced of an idea ‘even in the face of its questionable integrity, because we are literally physiologically moved by it’. For further elaboration on the different forms that ideas take, see Schmidt (2011; 2014). ‘Responsibility to protect’ refers to the international recognition that there is a duty to work to prevent, end and punish certain mass atrocity crimes including genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Obama specifically mentions the 1993 operation in Somalia, emphasizing that, even when using force against relatively weak adversaries, the unintended consequences can be dire (Obama, 2020: 655). Schmidt (2008: 306–​09) notes that ideas can be principled or cognitive in types and can come in the form of ‘narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scripts, scenarios, images, and more’. On ideas as weapons see Mark Blyth (2002: 39–​40). Daniel Simmons provides a good demonstration of the way by which agents repress information which they would otherwise recognize when they are trying to focus on a particular issue. In the demonstration, the participant is required to observe six people –​ three in white shirts, three in black shirts –​passing a basketball. The participant is then told to count the number of passes made by the white team. At the end of the video, it is revealed that while the participant was undertaking the task of counting passes, a woman in a gorilla suit walked into view, stood centre screen for a moment, then walked off. Yet, given the cognitive capacity required to keep track of the number of passes as the people moved about, most participants fail to notice the gorilla. For further details, see Christopher Chabris et al (2010) The Invisible Gorilla. In US foreign policy terms, efforts to try and avoid overstretch in humanitarian ventures may lead to decision-​makers ignoring important information that would normally shape policy towards such matters, that is, acts of ethnic cleansing, or the barrel bombing of civilians in civil conflict. This view holds similarities to historical institutionalist assumptions regarding path dependency providing increasing returns. See Pierson (2000). Jenny Edkins (2003) has shown how events can be viewed as traumatic as time goes by, leading past events to be reinterpreted or reframed in ways that shape and influence how agents act in similar situations. These reinterpreted memories come to make up part of the states ‘Self-​narrative’ (see Steele, 2008) and could be viewed as the principled types of ideas which bring forth normative displacement in that they push agents to interpret situations based not on a material security need, but with respect to ‘what’s right’. This was particularly powerful given that both the US and the international community failed to respond to the atrocities in Rwanda, which left over 800,000 dead. On ‘associative coherence’ see Kahneman (2012: 51).

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This is similar to Widmaier’s (2016: 20–​2) conception of intellectual conversion whereby agents ignore principled debates in the development of policy resulting in diminishing efficiency and effectiveness. Kahneman (2012: 7) notes, ‘Intense focusing on a task can make people effectively blind to stimuli that normally attract attention’. In other words, it is possible to overlook humanitarian atrocities that occur in conflict while focussing on avoiding entanglement in civil wars. On interpretive leaders see Widmaier (2007: 785). Also see Tulis (1987) and Krebs (2015) on the president’s role as a rhetorical leader, and ‘storyteller-​in-​chief ’. I do not make any claims as to whether such appeals and justifications are well received by Congress or the public. However, the presidents’ justifications serve as important references in terms of guiding broader societal interpretations of interests. On rhetoric as being constitutive of interests, see Michael T. Gibbons (1987) and Charles Taylor (1987). Such an expressivist articulation of interpretive theory differs from other understandings of interpretations of ideas. For instance, hermeneutics of recovery sees the goal of interpretation as ‘the recovery of the original meaning of a political or social practice’ and to ‘uncover the internal coherence … to show how the understanding of the participants makes sense in terms of the institutions and relationships within which they are located’ (Gibbons, 1987: 8–​9). Similarly, the hermeneutics of suspicion sees ‘the self-​understanding available to political and social actors is fundamentally flawed’ (Gibbons, 1987: 9). On hermeneutics of suspicion, see Paul Ricoeur (1970). However, it is still possible to infer how ideas were being utilized within the administration thanks, in part, to the relatively high turnover of officials in senior positions within the Trump administration. Reasonable people may contest the way in which I have designated certain ideas to be principled or cognitive. This is a subjective process. However, the categorization serves mainly to demonstrate how the interplay between different types and forms of ideas lead to policy variation. These attacks include the 1993 bombing of the WTC –​which killed six people and injured a thousand more –​the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya which killed over 200 people, including 12 Americans, and the bombing of USS Cole in October 2000 –​killing 19 sailors. What is significant here is that Trump and Obama were presented with very similar sets of ideas and images following separate chemical weapons attacks in Syria, but they responded differently. This serves to emphasize the point that ideas affect individuals in different ways. Importantly, the parallels between these cases suggest that there is scope for further theoretical dialogue between discursive institutionalist approaches with psychological foreign policy analysis (see Renshon, 2006; Saunders, 2011; Horowitz, et al, 2015). Such analysis could examine whether different leaders’ psychological profiles impact how they interpret between different types of ideas.

Chapter 2 1

The Powell Doctrine was a post-​Vietnam approach to the use of force in American foreign policy, specifically, designed to help avoid further missteps in decisions to send American troops into battle. Articulated by Colin Powell in 1990s, the Powell Doctrine specified eight specific criteria that had to be met prior to using military force. In short, military force should only be used if national security interests were threatened and peaceful means

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had been exhausted; there was a clear, attainable objective; and a plausible exit strategy. For further details, see Stephen Walt (2013). In 1991, the US engaged in Operation Desert Storm in an effort to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The operation required a significant build-​up of US forces in the region culminating in a decisive, quick victory. The success had a significant influence on the way in which foreign policy decision-​makers thought about the use of force in foreign interventions. See Powell and Persico (1995), and Bush and Scowcroft (1999). This quote is attributed to a senior military official as the Bush administration showed an unwillingness to engage militarily in Bosnia. The six republics which made up the former Yugoslavia were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (this included the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia. (United Nations, 2019). While the voters overwhelmingly supported the creation of a separate Bosnian state, the results were contested given that only 64 per cent of Bosnia’s population voted in the referendum which required two thirds to be constitutionally binding. See Halpern (2000: 107). After Josip Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia operated under a collective federal presidency consisting of eight members (one from each of the republics and autonomous regions). Milosevic gained decisive command over four of the seats in the federal presidency (Halpern, 2000: 327). In ontological security terms, foreign policy agents across both the Bush and Clinton administrations had a greater capacity to control the narrative during the early crisis in Bosnia given that conflict and violence was anticipated. As such, it did not constitute a ‘critical situation’, at least during its early phases. This was noted in a confidential memorandum. See Niles, TM.T. (1992) ‘Bosnia-​ Herzegovina: Stabilization’. This could be viewed as restraint based on concern that engagement might impact the US’s capacity to maintain balance of power. In simple terms, tying up troops in peacekeeping missions where there are no material interests would restrict the administration’s ability to send troops in matters directly involving vital material interests. Eagleburger suggested in an interview with David Halberstam that one of the principled complaints from junior administration officials was that those in the senior administration ‘knew too much about Yugoslavia’ and that their resistance to more decisive action may be driven by their views of what the Serbs ‘might’ do if confronted with military force. Albanians made up approximately 90 per cent of the population in Kosovo. It is somewhat telling that the Bosnian crisis does not even get a mention in Cheney’s biography (2011) despite being the Secretary of Defence at the time. While not explanatory in and of itself, it does suggest that among some of the more senior Bush administration officials, Bosnia registered only as a sideshow. Richard Holbrooke was an American diplomat who acted as an advisor to Al Gore during his 1988 presidential run, and then to Bill Clinton in 1992. Bush drew parallels between Bosnia and Vietnam on three occasions during the 1992 Presidential campaign: at two of the three presidential debates, as well as during a Question-​ and-​Answer session. See Bush (1992i; 1992j). Clinton was the first US President since Harry Truman not to have a regularly scheduled meeting with his foreign policy team. See Drew (1995: 144). The PC is composed of the administration’s senior foreign policy advisors, in this case: UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of

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Defence Les Aspin, National Security Advisor Tony Lake, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Vice President Al Gore. Cyrus Vance (representing the UN) and Lord Owen (representing the European Community) were appointed as a Special Envoy to the UN Secretary-​General. They were tasked with developing a peace plan which became known as the ‘Vance-​Owen Peace Plan’, in which Bosnia’s various territories would be divided among the warring factions. See Clinton (2004: 511). This linked concerns of foreign involvement with Lydon Johnson’s overstretch in Vietnam. In justifying the reversion to a more restrained approach, one could argue that Clinton was controlling the US’s ‘Self-​narrative’ by fulfilling the ontological security need to do ‘something’ –​limited as it may be. During remarks for the opening of the Holocaust Museum, Clinton suggested that the memory of the Holocaust was particularly sharp for the US who held a pivotal role in leading the new world order. McCloskey would recount his experiences from the Balkans often arguing to colleagues that the ‘lucky ones’ who survived were scarred not just by the loss of loved ones, but by the fact that their final memories of them were of the way that they died, rather than loving memoires. See Power (2001: 299). ‘Never Again’ is a slogan or analogy generally associated with the Holocaust and other acts of genocide. Balkan Ghosts provides a detailed history of ethnic conflict in the Balkan region. In December 1992, in an effort to provide humanitarian assistance to famine-​stricken Somalia, the Bush administration sent 25,000 troops to Operation Restore Hope. The purpose was to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid took place, but it was not intended to be a mission in which the use of force would be required. However, the mission became drawn out. See Powell and Persico (1995: 264–​6). On 3 October 1993, two US Army Blackhawk helicopters were shot down over Mogadishu, killing 18 US Army Rangers. Their deaths sparked immediate calls for withdrawal from Somalia. See Clinton (2004: 551; Harris, 2006: 122).

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In April 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 819 declaring Srebrenica a ‘safe area’ that was to be free of ‘armed attack or any other hostile act’. In May 1993, the towns of Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde and Bihac were also declared ‘safe areas’ in Resolution 824 (UNSC, 1993a). See Chapter 2, n25 on Somalia. In Rwanda, as the genocide began in 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers were captured and killed. Bernard Janvier was the UN Force Commander. He argued that UN forces were too lightly armed to protect the three eastern enclaves. As such, the ‘safe areas’ would only be safe if Serb forces chose to leave them alone (Power, 2001: 393). Lake had been in the Carter administration when Iran held around 50 American citizens hostage. Carter’s failure to solve the hostage crisis had become symbolic of ineffective presidential decision-​making. Lake knew that Clinton was well aware that failure to address the crisis in Bosnia could well be viewed the same way as Carter’s failure in Iran. This observation by Lake highlights the potential for change when Clinton was faced with powerful images. Specifically, this highlights a recognition of the forms of ideas affecting the way in which interests are interpreted. This opening for more principled types of ideas has parallels with ontological security referents to ‘shame’ and ‘anxiety’

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(Steele, 2008). What is particularly significant here in terms of ontological security is the fact that the massacre at Srebrenica was constructed as a ‘critical situation’ even though similar acts of ethnic cleansing had been occurring for years but had ultimately been ignored. This construction of a ‘critical situation’ can be more clearly understood if we fully appreciate the influence of different types and forms of ideas in shaping interpretations of the massacre. Bill Perry replaced Les Aspin as Secretary of Defence in February 1994. General Ratko Mladic was one of the key commanders responsible for ordering Serb forces to overrun Srebrenica in 1995. He was also a key figure during earlier peace negotiations in 1993. This notion ties closely with the West’s sense of self-identity and self-​narrative proposed by ontological security theorists. The president can veto legislation passed by the US Congress if it receives less than a two-​thirds majority in separate votes in the House and Senate. Milosevic continued to deny that he had any control over the actions of Bosnian Serbs, thus denying knowledge of the massacre (Clinton, 2004: 667). Members of the negotiating team who were killed are: Robert C. Francis from the State Department, Dr Joseph J. Kruzel from the Department of Defence, and Air Force Colonel S. Nelson Drew from Lake’s National Security staff. For details of the ceasefire cessation of hostilities agreement, see the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (United Nations General Assembly, 1995). While Dole had consistently been an advocate of increasing US involvement in Bosnia, his support for the deployment of US ground troops was significant. At the time, Dole was the front-​runner for the Republican nomination to contest the 1996 presidential election against Clinton. This emphasizes that early calls to intervene in Bosnia were not political –​but were viewed as the right thing to do.

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While the PNAC did not directly specify the need to defend against terrorism, they did advocate for a significant increase in military and national security spending and much more aggressive response to potential threats to the national interest. I am not trying to suggest that terrorism was an unimportant issue for the Clinton administration. However, even as Clinton would come to recognize the threat of terrorism, his pursuit of terrorists would remain restrained given a lack of more principled foundations on which to pursue terrorists. A ‘fatwa’ is a nonbinding legal opinion on a point of Islamic law –​usually issued by a qualified jurist. Wag the Dog is a film in which the White House fakes a war in the Balkans in order to distract voters from a Presidential sex scandal in the lead-​up to an election. The film came out in 1997. George Tenet, Director of the CIA, suggested as much, highlighting that he believed the Lewinsky scandal constrained the range of potential actions that Clinton could take (Tenet with Harlow, 2007: 116). For details of the increased efforts to gather intelligence, see Tenet and Harlow (2007: 116–​26). The Project for the New American Century was a neoconservative think tank based in Washington, D.C. For a detailed discussion on the PNAC, see Abelson, 2006.

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Vice President Dick Cheney was also a key member of the PNAC but was less vocal than Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz before coming into office. This included Iraq for continued defiance of UN Security Council resolutions regarding their possession of WMDs –​and their history of sponsoring terrorism (UNSC, 1991a; Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 364–​7). There were a number of resolutions which had set out Iraq’s disarmament obligations. These included Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715 and 986. Prior to authorizing Operation Desert Storm, Clinton had authorized Operation Desert Thunder but stood forces down at the last moment as Saddam agreed to comply with scheduled weapons inspections. Despite his efforts to capture and kill Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, Clinton remarked, in an interview on The Late Show with David Letterman on 11 September 2002, that prior to 9/​11 the American people did not have a sense of the threat terrorism presented. He pointed to the fact that prior to 9/​11, the biggest terrorist attack on US soil was the Oklahoma City bombing on 19 April 1995 (Letterman, 2002). The administration’s top foreign policy priorities tended to focus on the potential threat of Iraq, and missile defence systems.

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The initial reaction to the first plane hitting the WTC by Cheney and others in the administration demonstrates how ‘out of the ordinary’ and unexpected the attacks were. Terrorism, or the notion that America was under attack was not the first thing that came to mind. This suggests that under existing foreign policy frameworks, such an attack was not anticipated or viewed as a genuine threat facing the US. Many of the news networks following the story, including the hosts of ABC News’ morning show, Charles Gibson and Dianne Sewyer suggested shortly after the first tower was hit that ‘there’s been some sort of explosion at the World Trade Center … one report suggests, and we cannot confirm any of this, that a plane has hit the World Trade Center’ (ABC 7, 2001). Others in the administration, including Rumsfeld and Cheney, believed that, initially, the first plane was an accident. ‘Angel’ is the code name for Air Force One. United Flight 93 was the flight which did not make it to its target. It crashed in a field in Pennsylvania when passengers on-​board attempt to retake the cockpit. The war of 1812 was fought against the British, in which the White House was burned down. Cheney used this terminology regarding the WTC collapse to emphasize the radical uncertainty faced by the US (Cheney with Cheney, 2011: 3). The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had the impact of convincing an otherwise hesitant Congress to authorize the use of force in the Second World War. Prior to 1941, the US had adopted an isolationist stance towards European wars. This could be viewed as what Schmidt (2008) refers to as ‘communicative’ political discourse where actors in the broader political community contribute to the development of policy through statements and sentiment. In ontological security terms, such an event constitutes a ‘critical situation’ bringing forth a sense of intense ‘anxiety’ because the notion that the US was ‘protected by oceans’ had been undermined.

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Wolfowitz had even been called on the George H.W. Bush administration to take up a greater role in Bosnia in 1992. In a meeting with Colin Powell, he argued that there were forces at play that could have a significant impact on the US’s vital security interests if the situation got out of hand (Halberstam, 2001: 141). These remarks were given during a television interview on Meet the Press on 16 September. Richard Clarke was the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-​terrorism between 1998 and 2003. In his construction of the Cold War, Truman defined a clear choice between two ways of life, either under democracy or communism. Parallels can be drawn between the ‘black and white’ principled choices put forth by both Truman and Bush as they lay the groundwork of their respective crusading imperatives. For comparison, refer to President Harry Truman’s 1947 ‘Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine’. Randall Larsen was a retired air force colonel with a background in biological warfare. The resolution passed in the House by a comprehensive margin of 296 to 133. Shortly after, the Senate passed the resolution 77 to 23. Members from both sides of the aisle agreed that the time had come for decisive action to be taken. The Bush administration had been sceptical as to whether France would support the resolution given their preference that the War on Terror focus on al-​Qaeda in Afghanistan. Syria, Russia and China supported the resolution despite concerns that they may abstain, or that Russia or China might veto the resolution. This quote was given during an interview in 2016 on The Late Show with Stephen Colbert in reference to challenges on gathering intel on WMDs in Iraq (Colbert, 2016).

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Rwanda is a particularly significant parallel to draw in US foreign policy debates. This is because the inaction which contributed to the scale of death in the Rwandan genocide has been seen as one of the great failures of US foreign policy. Brent Steele (2008: 131–​5) shows how failure to intervene in Rwanda is a source of great ‘shame’ and ontological insecurity for the US. As such, its memory has served to shape US policy in instances such as Kosovo in 1999. He made clear that he was not a pacifist. Obama noted that sometimes violence is a necessity to achieve to what is ultimately the best goal for humanity. For example, the American Civil War, the Second World War, or the War in Afghanistan. This answer was given at a Democratic primary debate in Charleston, South Carolina on 23 July 2007. The ‘Arab Spring’ comprised of a series of democratic and grassroot uprisings and revolutions throughout the Middle East in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, among others. The results of the uprisings were mixed, leading to, at best, changes in government and constitutional reforms, and, at worst, civil wars. The term has historical reference to the democratic European Revolutions of 1848, sometimes called the ‘Springtime of Nations’. On ‘Day of Rage’ see James Clapper’s book Facts and Fears (2018: 162). I am not suggesting here that without intervention Libya would have experienced a widespread mass atrocity perpetrated by the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, there are many who claim the mass atrocity narrative was overstated. Such a claim would require a counterfactual analysis which is not the purpose of this study. The purpose is simply to highlight what agents saw and debated at the time. At the time, in the midst of uncertainty with limited information, there was a belief that Libya was at risk of mass atrocity.

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Alan Kuperman (2013) challenges the notion the Libya was destined to experience a mass atrocity. Just days before his warning to Congress over the complexity of pushing for military action in Libya, Gates delivered a speech at West Point specifically warning that the US should avoid another major land war such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Stars and Stripes (2011). William Daley replaced Rahm Emanuel as the White House Chief of Staff in January 2011. France was the first government to formally recognize the NTC. This closely aligns with Colin Powell’s position that providing a ‘presence’ or a ‘symbol’ is not a good enough justification for the deployment of troops. See Powell and Persico (1995), My American Journey. This was mentioned in the debate as Gaddafi had recently given up his nuclear aspirations. The concern was that by working against Libya in this context might spur other powers, specifically, Iran, to accelerate their programs. In an apology speech at Kigali airport, in 1998, President Bill Clinton (1998) would highlight the need to never again let such an atrocity happen, stating, ‘We owe it to those who died … our every effort to increase our vigilance and strengthen our stand against those who would commit such atrocities in the future, here or elsewhere’ (Clinton, 1998a). Such a display of ‘shame’ emphasizes the degree to which failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda generated ontological insecurity (see Steele, 2008). Power acknowledged the information the administration had about the scale and types of atrocities being committed by Gaddafi’s forces was imperfect. While falling short of calling directly for regime change, it was expressed that ‘it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power’. Goldberg noted that the term ‘mess’ was Obama’s diplomatic language for what he privately described as a ‘shit show’. The push from both the British and French governments cannot be underemphasized as an important factor contributing to the eventual decision by the Obama administration to support intervention. However, while French and British support was important, it does not explain the decision on its own. While their support for action is not insignificant, coalitional support was also available early in the crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s, yet this yielded only limited support. Similarly, the French and Germans were against President George W. Bush’s pre-​emptive strikes in Iraq. As such, coalitional support, while important, only provides a partial explanation. Likewise, realist assumptions regarding the material incentives, necessary for state action, struggle to account for the apparent altruism in the decision to participate in intervention in Libya. Libya, after all, fell outside the realm of vital security interests.

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This estimate is contested, with some suggesting the total number of deaths was around 300. These sanctions were imposed on President Assad and six of his aides within the administration. These draft resolutions were not adopted as a result of vetoes by both the Russian and Chinese delegations. Around 150 people had been killed in this particular instance via the use of chemical weapons.

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The Free Syrian Army was founded by a former faction of the Syrian Armed Forces whose stated intention was to bring down Assad’s regime. This is not to suggest that what was happening in Syria constituted less of a humanitarian crisis than Libya or Bosnia. Nor am I suggesting that violence was not occurring in a systematic way. However, it highlights how the way in which an atrocity is presented can have a significant effect on the way in which agents respond. Ghouta is a suburban area that surrounds the east and south regions of Damascus. This number is contested but was assumed by the US government to be accurate at the time that deliberations over the use of force were underway. John Kerry served as Secretary of State from 2013 to 2017 following Hillary Clinton’s resignation. Denis McDonough served as White House Chief of Staff to Obama between 2013 and 2017. Article I of the US constitution affords Congress with the sole right to declare war. While the president has the power to deploy US forces abroad, this power is limited by the War Powers Resolution which requires Congress to be informed within 48 hours of the deployment of US forces and stipulates that US forces cannot be deployed for more than 60 days without Congressional approval. The resolution served to limit presidential power to unilaterally deploy US forces without a formal declaration of war following the prolonged participation in Vietnam. Russia and Syria have a strong bi-​lateral relationship. In the aftermath of the chemical weapons attack, Russia worked to cast doubt over the responsibility of the Assad regime. Instead, they had suggested that perhaps the rebels had gained control of the weapons and used them to garner international support against Assad (Kerry, 2018: 530). The British Parliament voted 285 to 272 against joining the US in the fear that doing so would lead them down the same path that Tony Blair had taken when he joined President Bush in the Iraq war. In doing so, the framing of the crisis began to shift from a humanitarian issue towards a debate over the legality of using force and upholding international norms against the use of chemical weapons. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction came into effect in April 1997. The agreement outlaws the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their precursors. See: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2018. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Available at: https://​www.opcw.org/​chemical-​weapons-​convention/​. Accessed 16 August 2018. This assumption would later prove false as Assad would launch further chemical attacks in the years that followed. However, the 2013 concession was critical in convincing Obama to back away from the use of force.

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Broadly speaking, the ‘America First’ doctrine advocated by Trump encompassed nationalist, anti-​interventionist policies; see (White House, 2020). Trump’s approach to foreign policy was unconventional, at least since the Second World War, and certainly in a post-​Cold War sense because it neither worked towards defending the international order, and nor was it specifically isolationist. Jeffrey Goldberg (2017) described Trump as an ‘isolationist interventionist’.

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ISIS is a branch of al-​Qaeda made up of former Iraqi military officers and militant jihadists. By 2014, ISIS had formed a kind of ‘quasi state’ in territory covering Iraq and Syria. In an effort to avoid ‘mission creep’, the administration put in place strict limits on the number of US military personnel that would be in Syria and restricted the tasks they could undertake. The number of Syrians killed and wounded at the time of writing has risen significantly. Given this self-​contradictory tendency and limited formal policy, the distinction between the different types of ideas articulated by Trump are sometimes challenging to decipher. The distinction made through Chapters 8 and 9 rely more heavily on my subjective interpretations of the types of ideas being contested. While this is a subjective exercise, it is important is to show how the various ideas were contested at the key moments of decision to highlight deviation and inconsistency in Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy doctrine. Trump was similarly critical of the military leadership during a briefing in the ‘Tank’ –​a specialized, secure conference room in the Pentagon –​on 20 July. It is worth noting that the scale of the attack was significantly smaller than the attacks in 2013 which had prompted a diplomatic effort by the Obama administration. This speaks to the way in which agents interpret the same information in different ways. Harvey was a retired colonel responsible for overseeing the Middle East in the NSC. Given McMaster’s background, he had a style of briefing that was very methodical, covering all details and possible consequences. Following his interview with Trump for the NSA position, Trump announced privately, ‘That guy bores the shit out of me’ (Wolff, 2018: 189). Steve Bannon served as a Senior Councillor to the president between January and August 2017. Bannon was removed from the NSC shortly after the strikes in Syria though he remained in the White House until August 2017, albeit with significantly less influence. Mattis had been instrumental in reeling in Trump’s emotional reaction, limiting the scope of the intended strike to targeting specific areas of a single airfield. A similar justification for the strikes might be developed by scholars of ontological security. Indeed, it is reasonable to accept that the attacks created a sense of ‘insecurity’ and ‘anxiety’ within the US, especially given the frustration at Obama’s unwillingness to enforce his ‘red line’ (See Steele, 2019: 186–​9). However, what is more clearly demonstrated here is the way in which the president came to view the attacks in such a way that action was necessary to save the ‘beautiful babies’. When contrasted with Obama’s 2013 response, the need to explain how, when and by whom ideas are used in a purposeful manner in the construction of threats to ontological security becomes clear. Iran had been supporting a number of rebel groups in the region including Hezbollah, which had a prominent role as an Iranian proxy in the Syrian civil war. Turkish forces commenced an offensive in the north of Syria in mid-​October against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). However, there were widespread concerns the offensive would result in ethnic cleansing of the Kurd-​ dominated territory. There is broad consensus that ISIS remained a threat, with thousands of fighters still in and around the region. This meant that the ideas that perpetuated the caliphate had not been defeated. However, ISIS had no territorial strongholds remaining. For Trump, this constituted their defeat. While it is generally accepted that US withdrawal worked counter to vital national security interests, the effort was an important aspect in upholding Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine.

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This could serve a significant avenue for future research into how specific leadership traits and individuals psychological factors influence their propensity to repress or displace information pertinent to decision-​making.

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Trump consistently asserted that Iran was violating the agreement but was unable to provide evidence. However, these assertions acted to spur the long-​held domestic concerns that Iran could not be trusted. Both of these groups have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US government since 1997. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations made efforts to reach out to Iran and improve relations at different points in time. However, few efforts to cooperation saw success. In an effort to curb their nuclear ambitions, a series of crippling economic sanctions were placed on the regime. See UNSC Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1835. These invitations were subsequently rescinded following the Iranian government’s violent response to protesters after the 2009 Iranian Presidential election. These uprisings are commonly referred to as the ‘Green Revolution’. In 2015, Obama signed into law the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. The act enabled Congress to review the terms of any agreement over a 60-​day period and vote to prevent Obama from implementing the deal. However, this would require a two-​thirds majority in both houses to override the veto. The act also required that the president recertify the agreement every 90 days. Most notably, Democratic Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer made his opposition to the agreement very clear. See John Kerry (2018: 501). For readability and space, reference to congressional quotes is in the following format: page number in the Congressional Record, and last name of the speaker. For example: (s6561, Grassley). Full text of the debates can be found on Congressional Record (2015) Proceedings and Debates of the 114th Congress, First Session, Vol. 161, No. 130. The terms of the agreement meant that it had to be reviewed and renewed every 90 days. Trump’s use of such principled narratives could be viewed as constructing a threat to the ontological security of the US. Given the debate over the JCPOA, there is scope for further study into the way in which ideas are used to contest multiple narratives of the ‘Self ’ in ways that cultivate and maintain threats to ontological security. This is not to suggest that Trump’s withdrawal was not contested; indeed many Democrats and some senior members of Trump’s cabinet had pushed back on the decision. Mattis subsequently resigned from his role as Secretary of Defence in January 2019. He was replaced by Mark Esper. Iran claimed that the drone was shot down after breaching Iranian airspace. The US Navy contested this claim, arguing that it was targeted while in international airspace. Iran had previously argued that its airspace extends over part of the Persian Gulf. However, this claim is not recognized outside of Iran (Bolton, 2020: 398). Mulvaney became the White House Chief of Staff on 2 January 2019. His tenure ended on 31 March 2020. The strikes took place at 1 am local time on 3 January. In Washington, D.C. it was 2 January. The decision to assassinate Soleimani was highly controversial, and the Trump administration’s justification for the strike has changed a number of times. The ‘imminence’ of the threat posed by Soleimani appears to be conflated. There was some speculation

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that the assassination was simply an effort by a president with a highly inconsistent foreign policy agenda to distract from his impending impeachment trial (Ward, 2020). Such accusations are similar to those made of Clinton following his response to the US Embassy bombings in 1998. While there is always contestation over the best way to pursue national interests, the degree to which Republicans shifted from before the strikes to after them is significant, especially on a matter so significant to national security. This could be explained, in part, by a concerted effort to show solidarity with a Republican president facing an impeachment trial in the Senate. Given the protracted tensions between the US and Iran, the assassination of Soleimani could be seen as the metaphorical ‘climatic release’ proposed by Steele (2019), despite doing little to alter Iran’s behaviour. In such a view, the assassination may have provided the opportunity to reassess the administration’s commitment to further action with greater clarity. TBIs are common injuries associated with explosive blasts. They are caused by a blast’s ‘atmospheric over-​pressure followed by under-​pressure or vacuum’. Such injuries are similar to concussions.

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For instance, Eglantine Staunton (2018) has alluded to such variations in France’s understandings of its role in the promotion of the R2P norm between French administrations. Widmaier (2016) emphasized this point with respect to agents’ preferences to refine and stabilize existing institutional designs. Similarly, Chabris et al (2010) and Kahneman (2012) have emphasized that where people focus intensely on a task, they become blind to new information that might otherwise draw their attention. In foreign policy terms, where presidents work to avoid military entanglement in foreign conflicts, they may overlook humanitarian atrocities. Becoming blinded to such events can impact state interests, potentially in detrimental ways.

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References 9/​11 Commission Report (2004) The 9/​11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. ABC 7 (2001) ABC September 11, 2001, 8:31–​9:12am. Available at: https://​ archive.org/​details/​abc200109110831-​0912. [Accessed 5 July 2018]. Abelson, D. (2006) A Capital Idea: Think Tanks in US Foreign Policy, Montreal: McGill-​Queen’s Publishing. Adler, E. (1992) ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, 46(1): 101–​45. Albright, M. 2003 (2013) Madam Secretary: A Memoir, New York: Harper Perennial. Albr ight, M. and Woodward, B. (2018) Fascism: A War ning, London: William Collins. Ali, K. (2011) ‘Women and Children Among up to 26 Bodies “Found in Mass Graves”, The Independent (London), 18 May 2011, pp 24–​5. Al Jazeera (2020) ‘Iran’s Parliament Designates All US Forces as “Terrorists” ’, Al Jazeera (online), 7 January. Available at: www.aljazeera.com/​news/​2020/​ 1/​7/​irans-​parliament-​designates-​all-​us-​forces-​as-​terrorists. [Accessed 16 July 2020]. Allen, M. and Connolly, C. (2000) ‘Candidates Use Mideast to Frame Issues’, The Washington Post, 14 October. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/​ archive/​politics/​2000/​10/​14/​candidates-​use-​mideast-​to-​frame-​issues/​ b91c3822-​bd0c-​4640-​9b67-​a693be75303b/​?utm_​term=.d6063ff54c8d. [Accessed 20 October 2018]. Allison, G.T. (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little Brown. Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–​40), 107th Congress, 1st Session, 18 September 2001, Sec. 2(a). Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R.O. (1985) ‘Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, World Politics, 38(1): 226–​54. Baker, P. (2013) Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House, New York: Random House.

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217

Index References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (187n1). 9/​11  7, 21, 23, 25, 26, 67, 75, 80–​2, 84, 86, 89–​94, 99, 100, 150, 173, 175, 184n12 A African Union  108 Air Force One  83, 84, 184n4 Al-​Assad, Bashar  4, 28, 117, 118–​19, 120, 122, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 139, 140, 141 attack on civilians  121 and chemical weapons  122, 123, 124, 125, 131 Al-​Khateeb, Hamza  118 Al-​Moallem, Walid  129 Al-​Qaeda  7, 27, 67, 68, 69, 70–​3, 75–​9, 80, 84–​90, 91, 92, 94, 97–​9, 111, 125, 146, 172, 185n17, 188n4 Al Shayrat  135, 143 Al-​Zarqawi, Abu Musab  92, 93 Albright, Madeleine  20, 26, 33, 34, 44, 46, 47–​8, 50, 51, 52, 56, 59–​60, 63, 71, 72, 172, 181n16 ‘America First’  4–​5, 7, 28, 136–​40, 142–​6, 149, 152, 156, 162, 163, 174, 187n1, 188n7 Anthrax  89 Arab League  and Libya  108, 113, 114 and Syria  119 Arab Spring  21, 27, 106, 108, 113, 116, 118, 136, 173, 185n4 Aspin, Les  48–​9, 182n16, 183n6 B Baker, James  37 Balkan Ghosts  49, 182n23 Bannon, Steve  136, 141–​2, 143, 148, 188n12, 188n13 Berger, Sandy  71 Biden, Joe  111, 112, 160, 161

bin Laden, Osama  70–​3, 75–​6, 78, 79, 89, 99, 172, 184n12 Blair, Tony  95, 187n13 Blix, Hans  97 Boehner, John  125, 127 Bolton, John  150, 153–​4, 155, 156, 157, 163 Bosnia  3, 4, 7, 9, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 33–​51, 52–​64, 69, 94, 131, 170, 171, 172, 176, 181n3, 181n4, 181n5, 181n7, 181n12, 181n14, 182n17, 182n4, 183n10, 183n12, 183n13, 185n11, 186n16, 187n6 Bosnian Muslims  35, 35, 39, 45, 47, 49, 52, 58, 63, 176 Boucher, Richard  39 Brennan, John  111 Buchanan, Patrick  138 bureaucratic rivalries 79  Bush Doctrine  91, 93 C Cairo University  103, 106 Cameron, David  126 Camp David  85, 87 Cape Ray  130 Card, Andrew (Andy)  82, 83 Central Intelligence Agency  see CIA Chamberlain, Neville  40  Chemical Weapons Convention  121, 187n15 Cheney, Richard (Dick)  82–​3, 84–​5, 87, 89, 91, 93–​6, 97–​98, 181n12, 184n8, 184n9 Chirac, Jacques  55 Christopher, Warren  43, 45, 48, 49, 50, 55, 61, 181n16 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)  73, 79, 89, 90, 92 Clapper, James  112, 120, 121, 122, 125, 137, 185n5 Clarke, Richard  78, 86, 87, 185n13

218

Index

Clinton, Bill  3, 4, 7, 16, 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 42, 43–​51, 52–​64, 67–​80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 94, 99, 104–​5, 122, 171, 172, 181n7, 181n13, 181n15, 182n19, 182n20, 182n4, 182n5, 183n13, 183n2, 183n5, 184n11, 184n12, 186n12, 189n3, 189–​90n15 Clinton, Hillary  108, 111, 112, 113, 118, 120, 121, 144, 145, 187n9 Coates, Dan  72 cognitive repression  6, 7, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37–​9, 43, 50, 51, 53, 63, 67, 68, 72, 75, 77, 80, 92, 93, 100, 104, 116, 117, 118, 121–​3, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 136, 138, 139, 142, 146–​7, 150, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 168, 169, 170–​4, 176, 178, 189n20 concentration camps  39, 40 Constructivism  4, 8, 9, 10–​12, 14, 17, 18, 167, 168, 178n17, 178n18 Corker, Bob  153 CrisisWatch  107 Croatia  34, 35, 61, 181n4 D Daley, William  110, 186n8 Daraa  118 Daschle, Tom  89 Dayton Accord  53 Dempsey, Martin  124 discursive institutionalism  4, 5, 6, 8, 14–​17, 64, 167, 168, 169, 170–​1, 176, 180n51 Dole, Bob  38, 39, 49, 58–​9, 62, 183n13 Dunford, Joseph  157, 158 E Eagleburger, Lawrence  35, 36, 41, 181n10 Eastern Europeans  57 ‘Endgame Strategy’  55–​6, 59, 60 Esper, Mark  157, 158, 163, 189n11 Ethnic cleansing  in Balkans  3–​4, 22, 25, 33, 35, 38, 45, 53, 56, 179n33, 182–​3n5 threat to Kurds  148, 188n17 F FBI (Federal Bureau of Intelligence)  69, 89 Feinstein, Dianne  59 Flynn, Michael  140 Free Syrian Army  137, 187n5 G G20  128 Gaddaffi, Muammar  108–​10, 111, 113, 116, 186n14 genocidal rhetoric  4, 21, 27, 108, 116, 173 pro-​Gaddafi forces  110, 112, 186n13 regime  108, 115, 185n6 rise to power  107 WMDs  107, 186n11

Gates, Robert  104, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 186n7 genocide  49, 59, 63, 104, 112, 137, 179n33 Gephardt, Richard  85 GFC (Global Financial Crisis)  106 Ghouta  4, 117–​18, 123, 187n7 Gingrich, Newt  57, 70, 72 Global Financial Crisis  see GFC Global Hawk  157, 158 Gorbachev, Mikhail  36 Gore, Al  27, 33, 44, 46, 48, 50–​1, 52, 55, 57, 63, 76, 172, 181n13, 181–​2n16 Bosnia  27, 33, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 63, 176, 182n16 presidential candidate  76, 181n13 Graham, Lindsay  128, 129, 144, 145, 152, 159, 160 Grassley, Chuck  151 Gutman, Roy  39 H Hadley, Steve  79 Hamas 150  Harvey, Derek  140, 141, 142, 148, 188n10 Hezbollah  150, 155, 157, 159 historical institutionalism  12, 178n21 Holbrooke, Richard  40, 60, 61, 181n13 Holocaust  26, 39, 40, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 63, 64, 105, 172, 176, 182n22 Memorial Museum  182n20 Hooper, James  44 Howard, John  95 Hussein, Saddam  41, 69, 74, 75, 78, 80, 91–​3, 94, 95, 96–​8, 99, 175, 184n11 sponsor of terrorism  82, 86–​7, 100 I isolationism  104, 147 Iran  26, 28, 91, 105, 105–​6, 117, 120, 125, 135, 146, 149–​63 hostage crisis  150, 182n4 Iraq  4, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 41, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73–​5, 77, 80, 81, 86–​9, 91–​100, 104, 105, 106, 111, 115, 117, 121, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 137, 138, 149, 150, 153, 157, 159, 160, 161, 163, 170, 173, 174, 175, 181n2, 184n9, 184, n10, 184n13, 185n18, 186n7, 186n16, 187n13, 188n4. ISIS  121, 136–​7, 139–​40, 146–​7, 188n4, 188n18 J Jacksonian foreign policy  135, 138, 139, 141, 148 Jalil, Mustafa Abdel  110 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)  28, 149–​50, 151, 152, 154, 155, 15, 162, 174, 189n9

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IDEAS AND USE OF FORCE IN US FOREIGN POLICY

Jibril, Mohamad  113 JNA (Yugoslav National Army)  35 JPOA (Joint Plan of Action)  151

N narrative displacement  6, 7, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 36, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 61, 63, 64, 73, 76, 77, 80, 81–​4, 90, 94, 96, 99, 100, 104, 107–​8, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118, 123, 125, 136, 137, 140, 142, 145–​9, 155, 162, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 179, 189n20 National Transitional Council  see NTC NATO  3, 49, 56, 60, 61, 94, 114, 139, 139, 161 air strikes in Bosnia  54 ‘Never Again’  47, 182n22 186n12 Nobel Peace Prize  19, 103 North Korea  91, 155, 156 NTC (National Transitional Council)  110, 111, 113, 186n9 Nunes, Devin  127–​8 Nunn, Sam  59

K K-​1 Air Base  149 Kataib Hezbollah  159 Kennedy, John F.  105 Kerry, John  96, 109, 124, 126, 128, 137, 187n9 King Idris  107 Kosovo  38, 42, 94, 109, 181n4, 181n11, 185n1 Kurdistan Workers Party  see PKK Kurds  28, 92, 136, 174 allied against ISIS  137, 146 threat of atrocities  146–​7, 188n17 Kushner, Jared  141 Kuwait  74, 181n2 L Lake, Anthony  44, 46, 48, 49, 50–​1, 52, 54, 55–​6, 57, 59–​61, 63, 181–​2n16, 182n4, 182n5, 183n11 Larsen, Randall  89, 185n15 Lavrov, Sergey  128–​9 Lee, Mike  161 Lewinsky, Monica  72, 172, 183n5 liberalism  10, 178n13 Libya  4, 5, 7, 9, 21, 25, 26, 27–​8, 29, 103–​4, 107–​16, 117–​18, 119, 120, 125, 130, 131, 173, 175, 176, 185n4, 185–​6n6, 186n7, 186n11, 186n14, 186n16, 187n6 Benghazi  21, 28, 110–​11, 112, 113–​14, 115, 116, 118, 128, 131, 174, 175–​6 UN Security Council Resolution 1970  109 UN Security Council Resolution 1973  114 Lieberman, Joe  97, 109 ‘lift and strike’  33, 46, 48–​9, 58 Lockerbie bombing  107 M Macron, Emmanuel  155 Mattis, James  141, 142, 143, 145, 153, 156, 188n14, 189n11 McCain, John  62, 109, 128, 129, 144, 145 McCloskey, Frank  46, 182n21 McCollum, Betty  128 McConnell, Mitch  110, 127, 155, 158 McDonough, Dennis  107, 124–​5, 126, 187n10 McMaster, H.R.  140–​1, 142, 143, 148, 153, 154, 188n11 Merkel, Angela  155 Milosevic, Slobodan 34-​5, 37, 41, 60, 61, 73, 94, 181n6, 183n10  Mladic, Ratko  56, 61, 183n7 Morris, Dick  45 Mullen, Mike  112

O Obama, Barack  4, 5, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 101–​16, 117–​36, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 150–​1, 152, 157, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178n24, 179n34, 180n51, 185n2, 186n15, 187n16, 188n15, 189n5 ontological security  8, 12–​13, 14, 17, 18, 64, 168, 169, 171, 178n22, 178n24, 181n7, 182n19, 182–​3n5, 183n8, 184n10, 188n15, 189n9 Operation Deliberate Force  3, 26, 52, 61–​3, 172 P Pakistan  73 need for support from  79, 86 Panetta, Leon  112, 120, 121, 129, 145 PC (Principals Committee)  44, 45, 47, 57, 78, 120, 127, 156, 181n16 Pearl Harbor  77, 81, 84, 184n8 Perry, Bill  55, 58, 64, 183n6 Persian Gulf  33, 34, 37, 44, 50, 75, 172, 189n12 PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party)  146, 147 PNAC (Project for the New American Century)  27, 67, 68, 73–​4, 75, 76, 80, 86, 172, 183n1, 183n7, 184n8 Pompeo, Mike  150, 153, 155, 157, 160, 163 Powell, Colin  20, 22, 24, 26, 33–​4, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44–​8, 49, 51, 52, 58, 61, 81, 82, 86–​7, 91–​4, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 111, 169, 173, 180n1, 181–​2n16, 185n11, 186n10 Powell, Dina  142, 147 Power, Samantha  19, 21, 29, 36, 104, 108, 112, 113, 114, 116, 120, 121, 124, 131, 175, 186n13 Principals Committee  see PC

220

Index

Project for the New American Century  see PNAC

chemical weapons  4, 7, 23, 26, 28, 29, 91, 92, 117, 118, 120–​5, 127, 128–​31, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142–​7, 171, 173, 174, 175, 180n51, 186n4, 187n12, 187n14, 187n15 Douma  145 Raqqa  146 ‘red line’  4, 7, 23, 28, 117, 118, 122, 123, 124, 131, 143, 145, 159, 173, 178n24, 188n15

Q Quds Forces  157, 159, 160, 163 R Reagan, Ronald  105 realism  8–​9, 17, 27, 84, 111, 114, 116, 177n9, 177n11, 186n16 neoclassical realism  9–​10, 168 Reid, Richard  90 Rhodes, Ben  114, 122, 128, 174 Rice, Condoleezza  78, 79, 82, 85–​7, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93–​5, 96, 97, 100, 173 Rice, Susan  104, 108, 112–​13, 114, 116, 120, 127, 131, 175 Rogers, Hal  126 Romney, Mitt  160, 161 Rouhani, Hassan  151 Rumsfeld, Donald  73, 77, 81–​2, 84–​5, 86, 87, 91, 92, 93–​5, 96, 100, 184n8, 184n2 Rwanda  genocide in  13, 21, 105, 108, 111, 112, 116, 182n2, 185n1, 186n12 Ryan, Paul  152, 155 S Sanders, Bernie  160–​1 Sarajevo  37, 46, 47, 50, 54, 61, 63 Sarkozy, Nicolas  110–​11, 113 Schumer, Chuck  155, 161, 189n6 Scowcroft, Brent  37, 41, 42, 95, 141 Second World War  38, 44, 68, 184n8, 185n2, 187n2 Senate Foreign Relations Committee  128 Serbia Forces  3, 35, 36, 38, 47–​8, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60 Sessions, William  69 Shalikashvili, John  55, 58, 64 shame  13, 116, 178n23, 178n24, 182–​3n5, 185n1, 186n12 Slaughter, Anne-​Marie  109, 122, 144 Soleimani, Qassem  7, 26, 28, 149, 150, 156–​61, 163, 174, 189n15, 190n17 Somalia  50, 51, 54, 179n34, 182n24, 182n25, 182n2 South Korea  139 Specter, Arlen  72 Srebrenica  3, 4, 21, 26, 51, 52–​4, 56, 57–​9, 61–​3, 64, 172, 175, 182n1, 182–​3n5, 183n7 mass graves  60, 63 Nova Kasaba  60 Syria  4, 5, 7, 9, 23, 26, 27–​8, 29, 103, 117–​18, 120–​33, 135–​47, 149, 157, 159, 171, 173, 174, 175, 178n24, 180n51, 185n17, 185n4, 187n5, 187n12, 188n4, 188n5, 188n6, 188n13, 188n16, 188n17

T Taliban  79, 81 TBIs (traumatic brain injuries)  150, 162, 163, 190n18 Tenet, George  71, 72, 76, 78, 79, 80, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 97, 99, 183n5, 183n6 terrorism 3, 5, 7, 25, 27, 67-​80, 82-​8, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 100, 104, 107, 136, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 162-​3, 168, 172, 183n1, 183n2, 184n9, 184n12, 185n13  Tillerson, Rex  140, 152–​3 transactional foreign policy  4, 140, 142 traumatic brain injuries  see TBIs Truman, Harry  88, 144, 181n15, 185n14 Trump, Donald  4, 5, 7, 24, 26, 28, 135–​48, 149–​63, 171, 174, 178n24, 180n48, 180n51, 187n1, 187n2, 187n3, 188n7, 188n8, 188n11, 188n14, 188n18, 189n1, 189n9, 189n10, 189n15 Trump, Ivanka  136, 142, 147 Turkey  5, 146–​7, 185n14 U UN General Assembly  95, 129, 151 UN Human Rights Council  108 UN Security Council  21, 27, 35, 54, 60, 82, 92, 94, 95–​6, 97, 98, 99, 104, 108, 109, 114, 119, 124, 126, 140, 173, 182n1, 184n9, 184n10 UN Security Council Resolution 144, 96-​7  USS Cole  26, 27, 67, 68, 75–​7, 78, 80, 99, 172, 180n50 V Vance-​Owen Plan  46, 182n17 Vietnam  25, 34, 36–​7, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 51, 57, 63, 99, 141, 180n1, 182n18, 187n11 memories of  20, 33, 48, 49, 124, 160, 174, 181n14 Vulliamy, Ed  39 W Wag the Dog  27, 72, 172, 183n4 War on Terror  5, 9, 22, 23, 26, 27, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 94, 100, 104, 107, 131, 170, 173, 185n17 Warner, John  59 Weapons of Mass Destruction  see WMDs

221

IDEAS AND USE OF FORCE IN US FOREIGN POLICY

White House  72, 83, 84, 89, 93, 110, 123, 128, 129, 142, 157, 183n4, 184n6, 188n13 Wiesel, Elie  46 WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction)  74, 91, 92–​3, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 107, 184n8, 185n18 Wolfowitz, Paul  73, 74, 81, 82, 86, 87, 94, 184n8, 185n11 WTC (World Trade Centre)  67, 68, 69, 70, 74, 81, 82, 83, 85, 99, 100, 172, 180n50, 184n1, 184n7

Y Yousef, Ramzi  69 Yugoslav National Army  see JNA Yugoslavia  3, 34, 35, 36, 38, 46, 181n4, 181n6, 181n10 Z Zakaria, Fareed  144

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