The Rise and Decline of Communist Czechoslovakia´s Railway Sector 9789633864777

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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S RAILWAY SECTOR

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S RAILWAY SECTOR

Tomáš Nigrin

Central European University Press Budapest–Vienna–New York

© 2022 Tomáš Nigrin Published in 2022 by Central European University Press Nádor utca 9, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary Tel: +36-1-327-3138 or 327-3000 E-mail: ceupress​@press​.ceu​​.edu Website: www​.ceupress​.com Translated by Robert Kiene ISBN 978-963-386-476-0 (hardback) ISBN 978-963-386-477-7 (ebook) The monography is the output of the project called “New Mobility – High-Speed Transport Systems and Transport-Related Human Behaviour,” Reg. No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_026/000 8430, co-financed by the “Operational Programme Research, Development and Education.” The monograph has been published with the support of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Nigrin, Tomáš, author. Title: The rise and decline of communist Czechoslovakia’s railway sector / Tomáš Nigrin. Other titles: Od nepostradatelnosti ke stagnaci? English Description: Budapest ; New York : Central European University Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022016702 (print) | LCCN 2022016703 (ebook) | ISBN 9789633864760 (hardcover) | ISBN 9789633864777 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Railroads--Czechoslovakia--History--20th century. | Czechoslovakia-History--1968-1989. | Czechoslovakia--Politics and government--1968-1989. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Economy | HISTORY / Modern / 20th Century / General Classification: LCC HE3059.3 .N5413 2022 (print) | LCC HE3059.3 (ebook) | DDC 385.09437/09042--dc23/eng/20220427 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022016702 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022016703

To Monika, Julie, Jakub, and Jonáš



Contents

List of tables List of figures

ix xi

1 Introduction

1

2 Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1970

13

2.1 The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)  14 2.2 The Second Czechoslovak Republic and the Nazi Occupation (1938–1945) 19 2.3 Czechoslovakia after World War II (1945–1970)  22 2.4 Other Transport Sectors in Czechoslovakia (1918–1970)  29 2.5 Chapter Summary 39

3 Actors and Institutions of Policy-Making for the Railway Sector 42 3.1 Actors and Institutions of Transportation Policy  43 3.2 Transportation Policy and the Central Plan  50 3.3 Institutions of the Railway Sector  55 3.4 The Foreign Policy of Railway Transport  60 3.5 Chapter Summary 70

4 The Internal Mechanisms of the Railway Sector

72

4.1 The Transportation Sector in the Central Plan  73 4.2 The “Real” Mechanisms in the Economy  82 4.3 The Economy of the Railway Sector  85 4.4 Political Duties: A Case Study of the Czechoslovak Spartakiads  95 4.5 National Security Tasks in Peace and War  99 4.6 Chapter Summary 107



Contents

viii

5 Conditions in the Railway Sector

109

5.1 Case Study: Operations  110 5.2 Case Study: The Personnel Situation  137 5.3 International Cooperation 158 5.4 Chapter Summary 197

6 Conclusion

201

References 207 Index 235

Tables

1.1 The Dimensions of Policy Concepts 2.1 Increase in Automobile Ownership and Social Product in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1988 3.1 Number of Agenda Items Relating to the Railroads Discussed at Meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ from 1966 to 1989 3.2 Overview of the Number of Meetings of the Collegium and the Council of the Minister of Transportation in the Years 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1987 3.3 Comparison of the Average Growth in National Income, the Performance of Freight Transport by Rail, Road Freight Transport, and Rail and Road Freight Transport in the Five-Year Plans from 1970 to 1989 (in Percent) 3.4 Ministries and Agencies Responsible for Rail Transport 3.5 Changes in the Organization of the Czechoslovak State Railways at the Level of the Individual Railways (Dráha) from 1952 to 1989 4.1 Number of Specifically Verifiable Indicators Related to the Transport Sector (Excluding Communications) in the Laws on the National Economic Plan in the Years 1949 through 1990; Extent of Timely and Full Realization (in Percent) 4.2 Development of the National Income in the Years 1949–1989 4.3 Revenues, Share of Expenses Covered, and Volume for Various Fare Categories of ČSD Passenger Transport in 1968 4.4 Number of Kilometers Traveled by Passengers in Local and Express Passenger Trains Compared to the Average Wage for Years 1968, 1978, and 1987 4.5 Comparison of the Growth in Revenues for Passenger and Freight Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia in the Years 1970, 1980, and 1987 5.1 Basic Statistics on the Development of the Czechoslovak Railways in the Years 1950–1990 5.2 Employment at ČSD in Selected Professions Compared to Positions on Paper in 1971 (in Percent)

9 36 47 47

50 56 57

81 83 88 91 92 112 140



x 5.3

Tables

Comparison of Labor Productivity in Passenger and Freight Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia in the Years 1970, 1980, and 1987 5.4 Basic Statistics on the Development of the West German Railways from 1950 to 1990 5.5 Basic Statistics on the Development of the East German Railways in the Years 1950–1990 5.6 Overview of the Travel Time of Express Trains Linking Prague and Berlin in the Years 1984–1989 (in Hours and Minutes) 5.7 Basic Statistics on the Development of the Polish Railways in the Years 1950–1990 5.8 Overview of the Volume of Rail Transport between the ČSSR and Poland in the Years from 1973 to 1975 (in Tons) 5.9 Basic Statistics on the Development of the Hungarian Railways in the Years 1950–1990 5.10 The Turning Points for Various Quantitative Indicators between 1950 and 1990, When Continuing Growth of the Railways of the ČSSR, FRG, GDR, Poland, and Hungary Ended

156 173 179 184 186 192 196 199

Figures

1.1 2.1

Actors in transportation policy in a democratic society 10 Map of the main lines of the railway network of the First Czechoslovak Republic (1930) 17 2.2 An advertising poster for the prestigious ČSD line from Prague to Bratislava, the Slovak Bullet (diesel locomotive Tatra M 290.0 of the 1930s) 19 2.3 Interior of motor car M290.002, the Slovenská strela20 2.4 Test run of motor car M290.002, the Slovenská strela21 2.5 Beroun station after destruction by an air raid at the end of World War II, May 1945 23 2.6 Freight car delivering goods for Czechoslovakia from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), about 1947 24 2.7 Number of motor vehicles registered on June 30 of the indicated years, by type 33 2.8 Proposal for the main highway network for the Czechoslovak Republic (1938) 35 2.9 Trend in volume of goods transported in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1970, in millions of tons 40 2.10 Trend in performance of freight transport in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1970, in billions of ton-kilometers 41 3.1 Hierarchy of the “Deciding Actors” in Czechoslovak transportation policy in the 1970s and 1980s 45 3.2 Decorated steam locomotive 475.1128 at the head of the Polonia express (Vienna-Warsaw), in the station at Přerov, 30 May 1971 46 3.3 Headquarters of the State Planning Commission in Prague (photo from the 1950s or 1960s) 55 4.1 Festive decorations on the station building at Štramberk, May 1, 1950 74 4.2 Steam locomotive 498.015 at the head of an express train from 75 Prague to Moscow, Pardubice 1951 4.3 Decorated steam locomotive at the head of a passenger train in the Děčín station, May 1, 1952 76 4.4 Electric locomotive E499.022 at the head of a passenger train in the Štrba station, 1955 77 

xii

Figures

4.5 4.6

Festive decorations at the Frýdek-Místek station, 1963 A Kirow crane loads coal onto steam locomotive 534.0384 at the depot in Hradec Králové, May 28, 1978 Train transporting gymnasts to the Second National Spartakiad in 1960 (Úvalno station, Bruntál region) Railroad troops constructing the Polanka connecting line in the railway station at Ostrava-Vítkovice Ceremonial opening of the Polanka connecting line from Ostrava-Kunčice to Ostrava-Vítkovice, 1964 Freight car transporting milk, 1960s Passenger train pulled by steam locomotive 375.0, unknown location, late 1950s Steam locomotive 434.1 at the Hradec Králové depot, about 1965 Railroad employees posing by locomotive E499.043 in the Vsetín station, 1966 Transporting Volga automobiles on a Px flatcar, 1970 Diesel locomotive T458.1125 being moved at the Trnava station, 1970 Freight yards in Ostrava, 1963 Different types of freight cars transporting coal, 1979 Diesel locomotives T478.2033 and T478.2031 at the Opava East station, 1971 Decorated locomotive T679.1421 pulling a freight train on the Brno-Přerov line, 1977 EM475 electrically powered units were employed on suburban passenger trains from the mid-1960s Decorations on motor car M131.1 in the Plešivec station, 1970s Freight Yards at Přerov, 1978 Two-axle motor car M152.0 became an icon of passenger travel on local lines, entering the Dolní Lipová station, 1982 Motor car M152.0030 coupled with another passenger car, near Obrnice station, July 23, 1983 A festively decorated locomotive T478.3379 passing through Karlovy Vary-Dvory station and the Karlex (Berlín-Karlovy Vary) express train, pulled by locomotive 170 of the East German Reichsbahn, September 13, 1981 Another decorated locomotive, T679.1410, in the Karlovy Vary station, September 11, 1982 Motor car M296.1018 at the Skřivany station, July 18, 1983 Electric locomotive E469.1024 in the Most station, at the head of a unit freight train, July 23, 1983 Locomotive T679.1326 nearby the Most station, pulling a freight train, July 23, 1983

4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16

5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20

78 82 98 106 107 113 118 118 119 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 128 133 134

134 135 135 136 136

Figures 5.21 Locomotive T478.1102 in the Klobouky in Bohemia station, at the head of a switching freight train, July 28, 1983 5.22 Uniforms of ČSD railway workers in the first Czechoslovak Republic, 1920s 5.23 Railway workers’ uniforms, 1952–1963 5.24 Engineers at the Sokolov depot in front of steam locomotive 534.0447. Sokolov, late 1950s 5.25 Engineers and firemen of the Sokolov depot in conversation next to steam locomotive 556.0, late 1950s 5.26 Example of spontaneous protest at the Hodslavice railroad station after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968 5.27 An example of spontaneous protest against the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Přerov, August 22, 1968 5.28 ČSD railway workers’ uniforms, 1963–1992 5.29 Locomotive T466.0269 at the head of a passenger train in the Kopřivnice railroad station, 1983 5.30 Engineers talking next to locomotive E466.2016 in the Košice depot, June 23, 1984 5.31 Locomotive T458.1095 moving through the Čaňa station, June 23, 1984 5.32 Three Ikarus and one Karosa articulated buses waiting at the Budovatelů station of the Prague metro in 1981 5.33 Growth of the Average Wage at ČSD and in Czechoslovakia (in Kčs)

xiii

137 138 141 142 143 144 144 146 157 157 158 164 164

1 INTRODUCTION

The political and economic changes after 1989, when central planning was abandoned and the economy transformed in Czechoslovakia, quickly revealed the true state in which the Czechoslovak State Railways (Československé státní dráhy, or ČSD)1 found itself after the fall of communism. The wave of economic transformation fully exposed the sad state of the entire railway sector, its lack of funding, and its low level of competitiveness with other forms of transport. The existing infrastructure did allow for adequate transport, but at low speeds. The sector’s rolling stock was neglected, and the level of service provided on both passenger and freight trains was very low. The “new era” of the 1990s subjected the Czechoslovak railway system to comparison with those in developed Western economies, with disappointing results. In the West, rail transport had become ever more efficient since the 1960s. The stock of equipment there was constantly being modernized. Passenger transport increasingly focused on connecting larger urban areas and fast, high-capacity trains known as “unit trains” were introduced for transporting freight. In the 1970s, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) began to build high-speed tracks connecting their most-populated centers, while trains in Czechoslovakia traveled at no more than 120 km per hour, and that only on some short sections of the main lines. Shortly after 1989, ČSD (then effectively the entire railway sector) lost its preeminent position in the transport of people and goods. In passenger transport, travelers were offered new links, competition from bus lines developed quickly, and people began to give preference to faster, more comfortable, and increasingly affordable automobile transport. Freight transport also experienced a sharp decline after 1989 as well, because economic transformation led to the disappearance of many large state-owned companies, resulting in the loss of traditionally important customers who required transport of the goods they produced. Since the form of transport the customer had to use was no longer 1 The Czechoslovak railways were renamed by Law no. 148/1950 (see Zákon č, 148/1950). The Czechoslovak State Railways were temporarily abolished and incorporated into the Ministry of the Railroads by Government Decree no. 33/1952, “On the Establishment of the Ministry of the Railroads and Reorganization of the Railways” (see Vládní nařízení 33/1952). Throughout this text, the organization will be referred to as the Czechoslovak State Railways or by using the abbreviation ČSD.



2

Introduction

prescribed by an economic plan, more flexible, faster, and oftentimes cheaper truck transport took over an ever more important part of the overall transport sector. Trucks were also more advantageous for small shipments of goods and thus adapted better to changes in economic conditions. The starting point of the Czechoslovak railway sector was nevertheless a good one. In the days of the First Czechoslovak Republic in the 1920s and 1930s (hereinafter the First Republic), ČSD kept pace with the most highly developed railways of the world, but the prize for that was a raising public debt.2 Even at the end of World War II in 1945, the situation of rail transport was not too bad because, in comparison to neighboring countries, the sector had avoided widespread destruction in the war (except in Slovakia). Moreover, Czechoslovakia made massive investments in the sector in the postwar period and introduced new technologies. In fact, a foundation existed for quality development of the entire transport sector. Why then—speaking figuratively—did the ČSD “miss the train,” and why did it fall into the sorry state in which it found itself in 1989? Where can we find the roots of the gradual stagnation and internal exhaustion of the sector? For answers to those questions, we must look at the last two decades of late state socialism in Czechoslovakia, the 1970s and the 1980s. Those decades were preceded by changes in the social position, behavior, and efficiency of the railroads all over Europe, which were noticeable on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In Czechoslovakia there was potential for further development thanks to the massive investments that were undertaken after World War II and which ended at the turn of the decade of the 1960s. We want to analyze the position of the railway sector in the national economy, the role of railroads in Czechoslovak transportation policy, the internal mechanisms of management, and the conditions in the sector in order to show how the railways in the Czechoslovakia of the 1970s and 1980s coped with the new trends in its economy and its society. The degree of willingness and ability in Czechoslovakia to react to changing conditions outside the country, to adapt to them, and to modernize (not only) its transport activities, will reveal the hidden roots of the gradual stagnation of the railway sector through the end of the 1980s. The basic outlines of the railway’s decline can be sketched out in a description of the development of rail transport on the territory of Czechoslovakia. From its rise in the second half of the nineteenth century to the last quarter of the twentieth, the railroads were pivotal to the economy and the largest part of the overall transportation sector. Their development accelerated industrialization. The increased mobility they gave the population contributed to the modernization of society. Bohemia, Moravia, and (Czech) Silesia were the site of one of the densest rail networks in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Highcapacity tracks linked the Czechoslovak network to neighboring regions. They 2 Doležalová, Rašín, Engliš a ti druzí [Rašín, Engliš, and the Others], 425.

Introduction

3

permitted it to meet growing demand for bulky and heavy-weight goods, and to a certain extent the demand for transport of passengers as well. Compared to the Czech lands, the level of development of the railway network in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia reflected the lower level of industrialization and the differing pace of modernization in the Hungarian parts of the Habsburg monarchy. Even there, however, the railroads definitely contributed to the process of modernization. In the time of the First Republic, the railways played a constant, important strategic role in terms of the contemporary political situation and the needs of the state economy. Their importance was observable from the very beginning of the Czechoslovak state. We can point to the example of the Košice-Bohumín rail line: it was the only high-capacity line linking the Czech lands with Slovakia. In 1919 it facilitated military operations against the Hungarian Soviet Republic and its satellite, the Slovak Soviet Republic. The same line ran through the area of Těšín (Silesia), which became the object of conflict in 1919 during the so-called “Seven-Day War” between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Logically, therefore, the modernization and construction of the missing rail links between the eastern and western parts of the newly established Czechoslovak Republic was one of the main objectives in the development of the country’s transport infrastructure in the 1920s and 1930s. World War II placed even more demands on rail transport, along with an increased emphasis on conserving society’s supply of scarce commodities during the war years. There was as well a compelling need to conserve resources for development and maintenance of the sector itself. Shortages of fuel required motor vehicle transport to be halted in 1941 and steam locomotives were used exclusively thereafter. From 1944, the railways became a more frequent target of partisan attacks and were also the favorite objectives of the pilots of Allied dive bombers, popularly called “kotláři” (“boiler-men”) for their attacks directed at the steam engines’ boilers. At the end of World War II the railways still operated, but the impact of heavy wartime traffic, neglected maintenance and improvements, along with the destruction of infrastructure and rolling stock, were obvious. The railways of Czechoslovakia experienced their high point after the war. Their reconstruction and development were a top priority for the government because they supported the development of the entire country. The political and, above all, economic changes launched in 1948 led to the further strengthening of the role played by the railways in the economy. This was due mainly to changes in their structure—central planning and the growing concentration of production into large state-owned enterprises required the development of high-capacity, heavy transport of raw materials and goods by rail. With technological and economic changes beginning in the 1970s, road transport began to compete with the railways and ultimately in some segments completely replaced them. However, the railways retained their unassailable dominance in the transport of passengers.

4

Introduction

This book will attempt to find an answer to the question of why the railways in Czechoslovakia maintained their pre-eminent position for most of the period between 1945 and 1989, including the 1970s and 1980s, with respect to automobile transport at a time when the railway sector in the developed countries experienced exactly the opposite trend. It also will explore the extent to which the steady, long-term, yet artificially supported importance of rail transport was itself the actual cause of the poor conditions in which the railways found themselves after the year 1989. The answers to these questions must be sought in light of the fact that Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989 was a totalitarian state where political power was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa—KSČ). Although the state began to intervene in some sectors of the economy immediately after 1945, justified mainly by a desire to better coordinate postwar reconstruction of the country, the state only took full control of the economy after 1948. Following the example of the Soviet Union, the private sector was completely nationalized soon after the communists seized power. The market economy was restricted and replaced by central planning. The plans set the main priorities and directed the economy down to the smallest detail. Fulfillment of the plan was the main motivation and goal of all economic actors. In the case of the railroads, this meant the achievement of performance indicators that were almost entirely of a quantitative nature. In that context, we can frame a tentative hypothesis: that the continued dominance of the railways was dictated by inflexible, long-term planning, which for certain reasons limited their ability to make changes that would allow the efficient modernization of their structure and open up space for road transport, which developed slowly and belatedly compared to the Western economies. Rail transport played a central role in three key areas: the economy, national security, and society. In the economic sphere, it was essential for high-capacity transport of the coal and other raw materials that propped up the central pillar of the Czechoslovak economy—heavy industry. The proportion of freight transported on the railways (ČSD) and motor transport (represented by the stateowned Czechoslovak State Automobile Transport Company/Československá státní automobilová doprava—ČSAD) gradually began to tip in favor of motor transport in the period, but the overall dominance of rail transport still remained unquestioned. In 1970, the transport performance3 on the railways and on motorized transport was in the proportion 84:16. By 1980 it was 72:28 and in 1989 it was 69:31.4 3 Transport performance is the transport of persons or a quantity of goods over a given distance and is mathematically expressed as the product of the number of kilometers traveled and the volume of transport (the weight of goods or number of persons). A passenger-kilometer (passengerkm) is the transport of one person over the distance of one kilometer. A ton-kilometer (tkm) is the transport of one ton of goods over one kilometer. 4 Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR [Historical Statistical Yearbook of the ČSSR], 438 and 439; Československo. Federální statistický úřad. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 428 and 429.

Introduction

5

Of course, the railways were also ensuring the no less important transport of passengers, although even here over time they gradually lost ground to road transport, even more so than they did in the area of freight transport. In 1970, the performance of the railways and the bus lines was almost the same. Trains logged 18 billion passenger-km compared to 21 billion passenger-km for buses even though the railway network was significantly smaller than that of the buses. In 1980, while the performance of the railways was at the same level as it was 10 years earlier (18 billion passenger-km), the bus system turned in 32 billion passenger-km. By 1989, the performance of the railways had only slightly increased, to 19 billion passenger-km, while bus transport achieved 39 billion passenger-km.5 The growth in passenger transport on the bus lines came mainly over short distances (ca. 12–15 km) and was accompanied by an increase in the number of bus routes. The railways still dominated travel over longer distances (42–47 km). The network of bus routes constantly grew over the time period, while the railroad network began to shrink as less-used tracks were closed down. In the area of national security, the railways played a role in ensuring internal security in peacetime, as well as serving the needs of strategic military planners, including those of the Warsaw Pact. In both cases, its task was to ensure the movement of military (or police) units and their equipment. In that regard, units of specialized railway troops were expected to perform military tasks, including logistics. Finally, the role of ČSD in society must be mentioned. The railroads were an important employer not only in the centers of economic activity but also, due to their very dense network, in peripheral areas. In all, the railways employed more than 200,000 people.6 The parameters of the centrally planned economy that were established immediately after 1948 both confirmed and heightened the importance of the railways. In the 1950s and 1960s investments were made into the development and modernization of the railway sector (for example, building tracks for diesel and electric locomotives and automating signalization). This enabled greater efficiency of transport and steep increases in performance. Such was the state of affairs for the railways through the end of the 1960s. The beginning of the 1970s, however, brought about significant changes in the structure of the economy that were linked to changes in social behavior and satisfaction of social needs. An increase in the purchasing power of the population was fundamental to this. Thanks to technological advances, higher quality (and more affordable) automobiles became available. People were no longer so dependent on inflexible 5 Federal Statistical Office of Czechoslovakia: Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 432 and 437; Statistická ročenka České a slovenské federativní republiky [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic], 442 and 447. 6 In 1970, 220,000 people were employed on the railways and 89,000 in road transport. In 1980, 206,000 were employed on the railways and 102,000 in road transport. The figures for 1987 were 207,000 and 103,000, respectively. In: Výroční zpráva dopravy 1971 [Annual Report on Transportation 1971], 13; Výroční zpráva dopravy 1979/1980 [Annual Report on Transportation 1979/1980], 25; Výroční zpráva dopravy 1987 [Annual Report on Transportation 1987], 27.

6

Introduction

public transportation schedules. This led to a constant strengthening of the trend to motorization that established road transportation as a solid competitor to the railroads in the transport of people. Transport of goods by motor vehicle increased as well thanks to improvements in the road network and in the vehicles themselves. People’s behavior also changed, in that they increasingly preferred individual means of transport. The situation became more and more complicated for the railways as a result, but the changes that they could logically be expected to make in response did not come. This book explores the above-outlined hypothesis in the context of the development of the Czechoslovak railway sector in late state socialism, that is, during the political “normalization” after the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. At that time, the frailty of the centrally planned economy gradually became apparent. An economic crisis at the beginning of the 1960s spurred some attempts at reform. The most well-known of these was the second, or “Šik’s” reform (named for the reform-minded economist Ota Šik), which was implemented from 1965 to 1969. It partially relaxed the mechanisms of central planning of the economy, although it ultimately ended in failure.7 The Czechoslovak economy of the late 1960s was unaffected by classic economic cycles, because the annual growth of Gross National Income had gradually fallen off to nothing (or at least a barely marginal level),8 which remained the case through the 1980s.9 The power apparatus tried to react to the crisis with reforms of a greater or lesser extent that were aimed mainly at the management of central planning. This included the adoption of a number of “reform” programs, which in practice had no significant impact on the economy’s performance at all. Several reforms to the system of pricing and accounting had no greater effect either.10 The opportunities and ability of the railway sector at the time to react to its own needs and the changes in the world around it still remain an unresearched topic. As a result, we know very little about the situation of the railways and the details of their operations and mechanisms within the Czechoslovak economy. Unfortunately, research is hampered by a small base of information resources. Access to some archival collections is limited and their state of organization is poor.  7 Šulc, Z jeviště i zákulisí české politiky a ekonomiky [From the Stage and Behind the Scenes of Czech Politics and Economy], 60.   8 Gross National Income (GNI) is defined as gross domestic product, plus net receipts from abroad of compensation of employees, property income, and net taxes less subsidies on production. Compensation of employees receivable from abroad are those that are earned by residents who essentially live inside the economic territory but work abroad (this happens in border areas on a regular basis), or for people who live and work abroad for short periods (seasonal workers) and whose center of economic interest remains in their home country (see OECD, “Data”).  9 Průcha et  al., Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992 [The Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia 1918–1992], 391. 10 Mlčoch, Chování československé podnikové sféry [The Behavior of the Czechoslovak Corporate Sphere], 9.

Introduction

7

This book relativizes the earlier, automatically respected, and oft-repeated theory found in the literature that there was a turning point in the development of European rail transport at the end of the 1960s. It is a theory which has been applied to Czechoslovakia as well. Rather, we formulate the hypothesis that, on the one hand, a prescribed (and inflexible) central economic plan ensured that in the face of growing competition from road transport, the railways would retain their position in terms of the volume of traffic. On the other hand, due to the exhaustion of resources for investment in the economy, there would be no opportunity for modernization and improving the quality of the services they offered, and for increasing efficiency and lowering the cost of operations. As a result, the railways were trapped in a “vicious circle” they were unable to escape before the end of communism in Czechoslovakia, with worsening efficiency, rising costs of operation, and declining levels of service. The state of the railway sector negatively affected the entire economy. Czechoslovakia can serve as a case study, and in its own way a model, for developments in other countries of the Eastern Bloc with centrally planned economies, which had similar experiences. Looking for an answer to the main question we have posed means that we must deal with a number of subsidiary questions. These include, for example, whether there were explicit political-economic transport policies, whether the situation was influenced by some sort of path dependency (in terms of exhaustion of funds that limited the railways’ ability to modernize transport and logistical systems), and whether the communist government, with awareness of its strategic situation, intentionally maintained the dominance of rail transport and projected it into its concept of transport policy. If all that is true, the question arises, did the government provide the system with sufficient resources to fulfill its strategic objectives? We must then refine our initial hypothesis in two basic respects: 1. The reason for the continuing dominance of the railways was that it was the best way to integrate the strategic, economic, and social roles of transport into the existing political-economic preferences of the regime, which were embodied in the system of central planning of the economy. 2. The idea that the railways were the optimal means of transport was further strengthened by a certain path dependency in the sector, which strongly supported a continued conservative style of operation because of high fixed costs, large sunk historical investments, and important technical limitations.11 The result was the preservation of the role of the railways as the least expensive, and perhaps, because of the state of the economic system, the only realistic solution to transportation needs. This was certainly true in the eyes of the regime, but it effectively dampened the development of automobile transport. 11 Arthur, Increasing Returns, 112.

8

Introduction

This book focuses on the years between 1970 and 1989, which were superficially a relatively homogeneous period of time, both from the economic and from the internal and external political points of view. The weak and strong sides of the railway sector could express themselves under such stable conditions without being influenced by the deeper changes the economy and society were then undergoing. In researching the railway sector, we must first outline its position in the economic and political system. We will describe the relationships among the main decision-makers at each level and the tools available to them. We will also define and evaluate the actual condition of the railways, based on performance indicators of the sector and on case studies. In that regard, the application of approaches based on economic and political history is most appropriate, concretely, a political analysis (1) combined with an approach that is specifically focused on transport policy (2). (1) Our analysis begins with a definition of “transport policy” as a set of government activities (expressions of intentions, decrees, and concrete steps) that relate to transportation, intended to ensure its operations and the fulfillment of its assigned tasks. Our aim is to capture the creation and implementation of railway transportation policy in the dimensions of its (1) structure and organization, (2) procedures, and (3) process. Our approach corresponds to the three traditionally recognized dimensions of policy consisting of form (polity), content (policy), and process (politics).12 If we apply this framework to rail transport, the first concept, polity, includes all regulatory texts, i.e., the laws and regulations that establish general norms and functional legalities. It also includes (in this case) the institutional environment, including the context of the centrally planned economic system. The second concept, policy, relates to the values and goals that can be inferred from relevant political programs and various planning documents. The way in which problems are resolved falls under this rubric. The third concept, politics, relates to processes and power relationships, and is focused on the reasons, motivations, and methods of making decisions and promoting various interests.13​ (2) The contemporary view does not understand transport policy only as a part of the economic policy of a state but recognizes that it is an expression of its autonomy and complexity and has an influence on all elements of human life and the national economy. Transport policy impacts the social sphere, including people’s mobility,14 economic development,15 technology,16 to some extent 12 Palonen, “Four Times of Politics,” 171–186. 13 Schwedes, Verkehrspolitik [Transportation Policy], 18–19. 14 Quality, high-capacity, rapid connections with economic and political centers, and with places offering better chances for employment, have a positive effect on the development of the social structure of a region. Infrastructure is a necessary condition, but so is the provision of transport on it. 15 The structure and quality of transport links is a necessary condition for the economic development of a region. 16 A decision by a state to give preference to certain technology used in transportation has strategic impact on the energy dependence of the country, the development of its industry, and of course on economic opportunities.

Introduction

9

Table 1.1 The Dimensions of Policy Concepts Dimension

Concept

Forms

Attributes

Form

“Polity”

Content

“Policy”

Constitution Laws Institutions Tasks and goals Political programs Programmatic documents

Process

“Politics”

Organization Methodology System Solving problems Fulfilling tasks Values and goals Creating results Power Consensus Self-assertion

Interests Conflicts Struggle

Source: Schwedes, Verkehrspolitik [Transportation Policy], 21.

foreign policy,17 and not least ecology and the environment.18 The state sets priorities in these areas and selects the tools it will use to promote its ends. To understand the functioning of transportation policy in a democratic society (and in a one-party totalitarian system like that of Czechoslovakia), it is essential to identify the main actors, their roles, their tasks, and their mutual relationships. In the majority of countries, the main (and “decisive”) actors in transportation policy are government agencies, responsible ministries, and the people’s representatives (e.g., members of parliament). The state makes the specific decisions in setting transportation policy, but its decisions are influenced by actors who frequently lack professional training, even though their “opinions” constitute an important basis for decision-making. Among the influential actors are citizens and various organizations, associations, and trade unions (fig. 1.1).​ “Supporting” actors play an important auxiliary role in making decisions about transportation policy. They include professional public administrators, advisors, and other officials. The importance of these actors lies in the discussion of proposed policies and the application of their knowledge of specific local data, their experience, and their discussions with “influential” actors. According to the above model, every decision about transport policy should reflect the ideas

17 Foreign policy is influenced by transport policy not only in terms of a country’s approach to its geopolitical energy strategy but also to its national security. One question that transport policy must be able to answer is whether the transportation system will be able to function in the event of a security threat to the state, using only the energy resources located in the country. Infrastructure and the direction of its development are also affected. 18 There are several different modes of transport, which all differ in their energy demands and have different impacts on the environment. Attention is now being paid to the ecological impacts of burning fossil fuels, in which road transport plays the greatest role. Therefore, in developed countries an effort is being made to put more ecological modes of transport into service.

Introduction

10

influence Influential actors (concepts) – Citizens – Political parties – Organizations, trade unions – The business community

Decision-makers – Government agencies – Relevant ministries – Political representatives

discussion

support Supporting Actors (preparation of decisions) – Public administrators – Advisors – Statistics offices

Figure 1.1 Actors in transportation policy in a democratic society. Source: Granjot and Bernecker, Verkehrspolitik [Transportation Policy], 64. Graphic layout by the author. of the “influential” actors and take into account the expertise of the “supporting” actors.19 The state’s main tool for transportation policy is establishing the conditions and the “rules of the game” through legislation and effective law enforcement. States do this in two basic ways. The first is by adopting market-organizing measures, which regulate the market by means of concessions, licenses, bans on activities, price controls, and operational and technical requirements. The second way consists of fiscal measures, which include real steps (rationalization of operations and investments into transport infrastructure) and financial interventions (investment incentives, subsidies, taxes, and fees).20 Regulation of the market is therefore direct action taken by the state, while indirect management involves efforts by the state to convince other actors to take certain actions through taxation of particular activities and financial support for projects that further the interests of the state.21 Our approach to answering the questions posed above requires us to divide our subject matter into several parts and apply individual research criteria to them. In this case, we will continue to follow the previously identified dimensions of policy, defined as polity, policy, and politics. The first area of our research will seek an answer to the question, what position did the railway sector occupy in the system of central planning as a “­polity”? Our research further focuses on the question, how did the hierarchical relationships of the actors in the transport sector in Czechoslovakia differ from those that are “standard” in ordinary democratic systems? We will pay the most attention to analysis and definition of the legal framework for the institutions and actors in the sector, with the aim of showing how it was managed and 19 Grandjot and Bernecker, Verkehrspolitik [Transportation Policy], 64. 20 Canzler et al., Handbuch Verkehrspolitik [Handbook of Transportation Policy], 129. 21 Grandjot and Bernecker, Verkehrspolitik [Transportation Policy], 59.

Introduction

11

how political power was wielded within it. We will examine the extent to which individual actors had responsibility and independence, and the extent to which the organization of the sector was compatible with the overall economic system. Thus we will show which institutions and which actors were the key decision-makers in the rail transport sector in terms of their ability to put their decisions into action. There are a number of political actors at different levels whose roles in the decision-making process must be analyzed. These include the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Ústřední výbor Komunistické strany Československa—ÚV KSČ), the federal government of Czechoslovakia, the Ministry of Transportation (and the diverse institutions that developed within it), and the managers of the various constituent railways of the ČSD.22 Even the organizations at the lowest level of politics, the national and regional committees, were in some cases able to protect their interests, as will be seen, for example, in controversies over the closure of local rail lines or the limiting of traffic thereon. We will also pay attention to ČSD’s relations with its foreign counterparts, because international transport and transit traffic were a significant part of ČSD’s business and major sources of foreign exchange. These foreign relationships included bilateral and multilateral agreements and memberships in international railway organizations, which often addressed issues of technology, traffic-control, and transport policy. The railway sector, in contrast to most other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy, enjoyed a certain amount of independence in its international activities and contacts. This is important to understanding and evaluating its position in the economic system of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR). Our second area of research is focused on railway transport from the standpoint of policy, showing how the central plan managed the transport sector and established its priorities and tasks, as well as giving it a range of instruments to use. As we examine the functioning of the various sectors of the Czechoslovak economy, we refer to the concept of an “economic sector” (in the sense of the organization of a set of economic activities and the utilization of available resources to achieve the maximum possible returns for the least possible cost) and its various mechanisms. The aim of our research is to show the factors, rules, and motivations that determined the key decisions in the railway sector and describe the status and role of rail transport as one of the policy areas of the state economy. The result of our research in this area will be an answer to the question of how and why the regime conceived, formulated, and planned for the needs of the railway sector to maintain the desired extent of its operations, including its relationships with foreign countries.

22 A “railway” is one of the organizational and operational units into which the Czechoslovak railways is divided. See later chapters for more information on the organizational development of the individual railways.

12

Introduction

The third and final part of our research is focused on the railway sector from the standpoint of politics. In particular, we focus on the ČSD as the dominant organization in the sector, and on how ČSD performed the tasks assigned to it within the framework of its relationships with other actors in the national economy. Our research takes the form of case studies of the most significant problems in the railway sector, which we have defined based on archival research in selected reference sources. Specifically, we focus on operational and personnel problems, which impacted the operations of the ČSD and its ability to fulfill the tasks assigned to them in the central plan. Our goal is to show how the central political and economic-planning agencies understood particular problems and needs, how they dealt with them, and how the agencies’ approaches to them changed over time. Our research thus will attempt to show the extent to which the approaches that were chosen addressed the strategic challenges faced by the railway sector that we describe in the first two parts of this book. We will also look at the railways’ connections with foreign countries and whether, in light of their economic (and foreign exchange-earning) potential, they differed from the conditions for domestic rail transport. Based on the foregoing research questions we have defined, this book contains three main chapters focused on the institutions and actors that formulated policy for rail transport, on the railways as an economic sector, and finally on the actual conditions and changes in the railway sector. Before that, however, we present a chapter that focuses on the history of rail transport in Czechoslovakia in the context of the development of other transport sectors, with the goal of elucidating its chief opportunities and limitations.

2 RAIL TRANSPORT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM 1918 TO 1970

From the time it was founded in 1918, the Czechoslovak Republic had a dense, although unevenly distributed, railway infrastructure. The configuration of the railways corresponded to the country’s earlier political allegiance (focused on the political centers of the former Austria-Hungary) and to a certain extent to the level of industrialization of its regions. In the first decades of its existence, the newly established republic lacked reliable rail connections between its eastern and western parts. It was also necessary to connect some of the remoter regions of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the national rail network. Regional levels of industrialization were reflected in the density and capacity of the railway network, which were significantly greater in Bohemia, Moravia, and the Czech part of Silesia. In contrast, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia had not undergone significant industrialization and economic development, and the railway network was much sparser there. After 1918, the trends in transportation showed very strong continuity with the time of Austro-Hungarian rule. That year did not represent as much of a turning point for rail transport as it did in politics. The railways were already the dominant pillar of passenger and freight transport from the beginning of the First Czechoslovak Republic, and they retained their pre-eminent position until after World War II. Over the decades following 1918, automobile transport gradually became the railroads’ greatest competitor for moving people and goods. However, the railways lost their dominant position very slowly. They unequivocally maintained their importance as a key transportation sector, especially for high-capacity transport, until 1989. The geopolitical changes in the region had great influence on the operations of the railway sector. The founding of Czechoslovakia required stabilization of the rail network in the strategic interest of the newly established state. Other important events were the change in the country’s borders as a result of the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the breakup of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 into the independent Slovak Republic and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, occupied by Nazi Germany. Both changes led to temporary organizational and operational disruptions in rail transport. World War II also had enormous impact on rail transport, in that the capacity of rail lines was increased to meet wartime needs, locomotives and other rolling stock deteriorated, and



14

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

railway infrastructure was destroyed toward the end of the war. Prewar conditions began to return after 1945, but more changes soon occurred. The communist coup of 1948 introduced the era of central planning and bound the economy to the Soviet Union. The railroads were assigned new tasks, with an emphasis on high-capacity transport that could support politically favored heavy industries. This chapter presents the history and development of the railway sector from the founding of Czechoslovakia up to the beginning of the 1970s. It is organized chronologically, according to historical and political milestones that had significant impact on rail transport and other sectors of the national economy. We discuss first the period of the First Czechoslovak Republic, when the railway sector and its development were indispensable to the existence and defensibility of the newly established state. We then turn to the period of the Second Republic and the Nazi occupation. The responsibilities and the standing of the railroads changed in relation to the state, as well as in terms of their role in the Central European region. After the Nazi occupation of the Czech lands and the formation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the railways were entirely subordinated to the German Reich’s war effort. Finally, we address the years from 1945 to 1970, a period of postwar reconstruction and rapid development of the railway sector. Every subpart of this chapter analyzes an era with regard to form (institutions and actors), content (the internal mechanisms of the sector), and process (interests, problems, and operations). In order to elaborate on the context and highlight the trends in the relationships between the individual transport sectors, we devote the last part of the chapter to road, water, and air transport as well as rail transport.

2.1 The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938) The railway sector in the newly established Czechoslovakia definitely had an advantageous position from the outset, comparable to that of the sector in the developed regions of foreign countries. The birth of the Czechoslovak Republic affected the railway sector and transportation in general similarly. It was marked by continuation of the institutions and agencies that had functioned in AustriaHungary, although they began to operate in the framework of the Czechoslovak state. The transportation sector was administered by three government ministries: the railroads fell under the Ministry of the Railways, postal services under the Ministry of the Post, and the other transport sectors (road, air, and water transport) under the Ministry of Public Works. A Ministry of Transportation that merged the functions of the Ministry of the Post and the Ministry of the Railroads was established in 1938.1 The rail network in the Czechoslovakia of 1918 was well-developed and had adequate capacity for its time, however it generated huge public debt during the 1 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [The History of Transportation], 47.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

15

period of the First Czechoslovak Republic.2 There were two main problems that interfered with the effective heterogeneity of the state, however: (1) the density of the network was greater in Bohemia and Moravia than it was in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, and (2) there was a lack of capacity on the rail links between the Czech lands and Slovakia. (1) The development of the rail network reflected economic conditions in Austria-Hungary, where industrialization began later than it did in other states of Western Europe. The development of industry proceeded unevenly in the dual Habsburg monarchy. The main reason for the different levels of development of the rail network in the Czech lands and Slovakia was the different forms that industrialization and economic development had taken in the two traditional parts of the country, Cisleithania and Transleithania.3 Bohemia, Moravia, and a small part of Silesia were regions of Cisleithania, that is, the Austrian half of the Habsburg monarchy. They enjoyed an above-average level of development and a correspondingly dense rail network. Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia were both located in Transleithania, the Hungarian part of the monarchy, and represented the economic periphery of the empire. At the time of Czechoslovakia’s founding not quite 13,500 km of railroad tracks existed on its territory, of which somewhat more than 3,000 km were in Slovakia and just a few hundred in Subcarpathian Ruthenia.4 (2) The rail infrastructure corresponded to the legal structures inherited by the newly established Czechoslovakia. The border between Cisleithania and Transleithania ran between the Czech lands and Slovakia. Both regions had been governed from different centers—Vienna for the Czech lands and Budapest for Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The main problem with the railway network was the lack of connections running from east to west. The high-capacity line of the Košice-Bohumín Railway led through the contested area of Těšín (Silesia), where a brief armed conflict broke out between Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1919. A second high-capacity, levelgrade line connected Brno and Bratislava via Břeclav and Kúty, close to the southern border with Austria. Between these two tracks there were only a few connections of a mostly local character, specifically at Holíč, Skalica, and through the Vlára Pass,5 but they were not useful for heavy freight or long-distance transport.

2 Doležalová, Rašín, Engliš a ti druzí [Rašín, Engliš and the Others], 425. 3 Křen, Dvě století [Two Centuries], 248–256. 4 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 739. 5 See, for example, the railway map of the Czechoslovak Republic at “Železniční mapa Republiky československé” [“Railway Map of the Czechoslovak Republic”]; or in Kyncl et  al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 32.

16

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

The most important transport company, which held a near-monopoly, was the Czechoslovak State Railways (ČSD). It was founded in the new state and took over operations from the Austrian State Rail Transport Company, the Imperial and Royal Austrian State Railways (k. k. Österreichische Staatsbahnen) in the Czech lands, and from the Hungarian State Railways (Magyar Királyi Államvasutak) in Slovakia. Two key tasks in the beginning were the standardization of operations and rolling stock and employment of a sufficient number of trained and qualified personnel. The latter was lacking in particular in some areas of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. For many years after the establishment of the Republic, German was spoken in railway operations where German-speaking personnel were predominant. Those employees did not speak Czech at the level required for running a nationwide rail network and ensuring its safe operations.6​ The establishment of Czechoslovakia did not slow the trend already underway in Austria-Hungary at the turn of the twentieth century toward the nationalization of private railway companies. There were a number of private operators of local and less important lines, most of which were nationalized by 1925 (although some private railways still functioned in Slovakia through World War II), and three large and financially viable rail companies: the ÚstíTeplice Railway, Buštěhrad Railway and Košice-Bohumín Railway. The firstmentioned of these was nationalized in 1922 and the second a year later. The Košice-Bohumín Railway remained a formally private entity (a corporation) until the end of World War II, although because of its strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, ČSD took over its operations as early as 1921. It was effectively nationalized in 1924 when the Czechoslovak Republic bought a majority share of its stock. There was no other way for the government to take control of the company because of international participation in the ownership of KošiceBohumín Railways and the threat that an outright seizure would pose to the country’s international reputation. The railway’s independent legal structure had no effect on its actual operations.7 Considering that the railways were a key segment of the transport sector in the newly founded Czechoslovak state, one of the first tasks was renewal of damaged tracks in the troubled border regions of Bohemia and Moravia and in Slovakia as the result of a short-lived civil war. Another task was building strategic connections between the western and eastern parts of the country. Besides the upgrading of many hundreds of kilometers of track (which meant increasing the load rating of tracks for use by modern locomotives, raising permissible speeds, doubling tracks, installing safety equipment, and the like), the 6 See, for example, the reproduction of a memorial book on the Lužná-Lišany railway station at “Reprodukce Pamětní knihy ze stanice Lužná” [“Reproduction of the Memorial Book of the Lužná Station”]. 7 Jakubec, Vývoj československých a německých drah 1929–1937 [The Development of the Czechoslovak and German Railways 1929–1937, 11.

Figure 2.1 Map of the main lines of the railway network of the First Czechoslovak Republic (1930). Source: Archives of the author.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia 17

18

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovak Republic succeeded in building about 360 km of new tracks. In Bohemia and Moravia, the problem was mostly just the technical upgrading of existing tracks, principally by creating double tracks. The most important strategic construction project was a railroad connection between Havlíčkův Brod and Brno, partly by replacing older tracks and partly by building entirely new ones. This construction offered a new high-capacity line joining the east and west, and also provided a reassuring distance between the track and the northern and southern borders of the country. The track was not entirely finished before World War II broke out, similarly to a number of other projects.8 One important construction project was begun on the border between the Czech lands and Slovakia, in which a number of tracks for long-distance transport were built (mainly in the area of Horní Lideč: Vsetín-Horní Lideč-Púchov) and as a strategic alternative in case of a threat to national security (in particular the line over the Vlára Pass: Staré Město u Uherského Hradiště-Bylnice-Trenčín). In Slovakia the capacity of the rail infrastructure was gradually increased and a number of strategic alternate connecting tracks were built, of which about ten were completed on new transversal lines joining east and west (for example, Červená Skala-Margecany, Zvolen-Krupina, Handlová-Horná Štubňa, ZbehyZlaté Moravce, and others). Some projects were abandoned in an advanced state of construction (for example, the Gemer line).9​​​ It was necessary to incorporate Subcarpathian Ruthenia into the Czechoslovak railway network, but given geographic conditions this was a very difficult task. The existing railway network in Ruthenia could not be easily defended; some tracks, especially the one leading to the easternmost town of Jasina, ran right along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian and Czechoslovak-Romanian borders, and in some places even ran in péage10 through Romanian territory. Because of its capacity and efficiency, rail transport clearly dominated the entire transportation system in the time of the First Republic. Until the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1930s, the number of passengers transported remained stable. In 1920 the railways transported 280 million passengers and their number gradually increased to 343 million in 1929. However, at the peak of the economic crisis in 1933, the volume declined to 240 million passengers.11 The volume of freight transported by rail reacted even more strongly to the major economic crisis. While from 1920 to 1929 about 70 to 110 million tons (as used in this book, the term ton refers to a metric ton, or 1,000 kg) of goods were transported by rail, when the depression was at its worst in 1933 the railroads carried only 55 million tons of goods.12 Still, the performance of the other modes of transport did not threaten the railway sector. Historical records show that the number  8 Kyncl, Historie dopravy [The History of Transportation], 41.   9 For more detail on the projects and the development of the railway network in Slovakia in the interwar period, see: Klubal, “The Modernisation of Railways in Slovakia after 1945,” 157–159. 10  Péage means the continuation of the domestic railway transport of one state across the territory of another state. 11 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 767. 12 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 751.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

19

Figure 2.2  An advertising poster for the prestigious ČSD line from Prague to Bratislava, the Slovak Bullet (diesel locomotive Tatra M 290.0 of the 1930s). Note: Text on the poster reads, “Slovenská strela ČSD, Prague-Bratislava.” Collection of Roman Jeschke. of motor vehicles in private hands in Czechoslovakia (mainly passenger cars) increased from 5,300 to 90,900 between 1922 and 1937. The number of vehicles owned by the state and private companies (most of which were trucks and buses) increased from 2,100 to 31,500.13 The volume of passengers and freight transported by road was quite marginal at that time compared to that of the railroads.

2.2 The Second Czechoslovak Republic and the Nazi Occupation (1938–1945) The expansion of Nazi Germany across Central Europe and the outbreak of World War II spelled the end for Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement of 13 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 816.

20

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

Figure 2.3 Interior of motor car M290.002, the Slovenská strela. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. September 30, 1938, meant the dismantling of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the surrendering of the Sudetenland to the German Reich. Slovakia suffered the disintegration of its territory as did Bohemia and Moravia. In the fall of 1938, on the basis of the so-called first Vienna arbitrage, Slovakia had to transfer southern Slovakia and a large part of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to Hungary, which resulted in the disruption of a number of rail lines which had to be connected via péage lines through foreign territory or substituted for by motorbus transport. The newly drawn borders between the Czech lands and Slovakia on the one hand, and Germany and Hungary on the other, broke up what was earlier a tight-knit transport network. The new management imposed on the transport sector had unfortunate effects on rail transport. From the fall of 1938, high-capacity transport between the east and west of the former Czechoslovakia practically ceased to exist, which fundamentally affected the operations of the state. The main rail line Prague-Česká Třebová-Olomouc was interrupted in several places by the newly imposed borders and the southern route through Havlíčkův Brod was still under construction, as mentioned above. Rail transport was further handicapped by the transfer of a number of locomotives and wagons to the Reich’s railways for use in the Sudetenland.14 14 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [The History of Transport], 50–51.14.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

21

Figure 2.4 Test run of motor car M290.002, the Slovenská strela. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. Under the Czechoslovak Republic the institutional structure of the railway sector remained unchanged for the most part and the main transportation institutions were retained in similar form as they had existed under AustriaHungary. The establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the independent Slovak state led to fundamental changes, however. Legally, the Protectorate was an autonomous part of the German Reich, but despite the existence of some independent institutions and offices it was effectively under the control of the political and economic system of the Reich. Eastern Slovakia was the target of Hungarian armed intervention in April and May of 1939, leading to the loss of additional Slovak territory that was home to about 70,000 inhabitants.15 In the spring of 1939, ČSD was dissolved and the Czech-Moravian Railways (Českomoravské dráhy- Böhmisch-Mährische Bahn [ČMD-BMB]) was formed. During the existence of the Protectorate all the projects for further development of the railways that had been planned under the First Republic were halted. Only maintenance of the existing infrastructure and equipment was carried on. The main task of the railroad administration was ensuring operations in the interest of the Reich’s war effort. Only a few construction projects connected with 15 Wandycz, Střední Evropa v dějinách od středověku do současnosti [Central Europe in History from the Middle Ages to the Present], 220–221.

22

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

changes in the volume of traffic were undertaken. Two examples are the expansion of the Vienna-Ústí nad Orlicí-Breslau (Wrocław) line and a few triangle bypass tracks at the junction stations built in the later phases of the war.16 On the territory of the Slovak Republic the railway operator was the Slovak Railways, which was established when the ČSD was broken up. The first tasks of the Slovak Railways were to stabilize its infrastructure and build about 50 km of track to make spare tracks useful in the majority of directions. As in the Protectorate, the war led to a shift of traffic in entirely new directions. This meant a sharp increase in traffic for freight and passenger transportation toward the west into the German Reich and also into the Protectorate in a north-south direction that up to then had not much been used.17

2.3 Czechoslovakia after World War II (1945–1970) Immediately after the end of World War II, the Republic was faced with the enormous task of rebuilding wartime destruction and redressing the exploitation of the country’s resources for purposes of the war. In that connection, economic policy focused in the first months after the war on nationalizing important parts of the economy of the country in order to make resources available for its postwar renewal. The first wave of postwar nationalizations was directed mainly against wartime collaborators, but also on sectors that were important to the national economy. For the moment the transport sector was not affected, since the renewed Czechoslovak State Railways were already a state-owned company at that time. The end of World War II had a significant impact on the condition of transportation infrastructure. The railway network had suffered the greatest damage of any transportation sector, especially in the eastern parts of the Republic. The approach of the eastern battlefront, the retreat of German forces, and the outbreak of the Slovak national uprising caused widespread destruction of rail infrastructure all over Slovakia, northeast Moravia, and in Silesia. The western parts of the renewed Republic, on the territory of the former Protectorate, had experienced a different kind of destruction: the important nodes of the railway network had become more and more frequent targets of Allied bombardment from the beginning of 1945.​ In Slovakia in the last months of the war, German units employed especially destructive methods that liquidated significant portions of the Slovak infrastructure. In the battles at the end of the war more than 73 percent of trackage was 16 Among these tracks was a connection between Náchod and Bad Kudowa (today Kudowa-Zdrój) and “triangles” at important railway stations that provided alternate tracks around the station in case it was damaged by Allied air attacks. An example is the triangle that still exists today around the station at Kladno, permitting transit in the direction Kladno-Dubí–Kamenné Žehrovice. 17 Klubal, “The Modernisation of Railways in Slovakia after 1945,” 159.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

23

Figure 2.5 Beroun station after destruction by an air raid at the end of World War II, May 1945. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke. damaged (out of a total of 3,506 km), 72 percent of bridges longer than 5 meters (out of a total of 1,111), and 31 of 71 tunnels. A great deal of the above-ground structures and the equipment for communications and security of the railroads was damaged. The extent of destruction of the rail network in Slovakia was comparable to that in Poland and the war-ravaged parts of the Soviet Union.18 In Bohemia and Moravia the destruction of infrastructure was not as extensive as it was in Slovakia, but bombing destroyed the most important railway hubs in Cheb, Pilsen, Klatovy, Ústí nad Labem, České Budějovice, and Kralupy nad Vltavou. The rail network in the area of Prague received its most damage in the course of the Prague uprising in the first days of May, 1945.19 Many locomotives were destroyed in addition to infrastructure. Locomotives were attacked at the end of the war by above-mentioned “kotláři,” “boiler-men,” that is Allied dive-bombers that attacked individual targets. Their favorite prey was locomotive steam engines’ boilers and wagons traveling on the network. The course of the war and the fast retreat of Nazi forces from Eastern Europe led to significant confusion in the stock of locomotives and rail cars. In peacetime each railway operator had looked after its own locomotives and cars. In the later stages of the war, when Hitler’s satellite countries came under tighter control by the German Reich, not too much attention was paid to who owned equipment 18 Hons, Dějiny dopravy [The History of Transport], 258. 19 Hons, Dějiny dopravy [The History of Transport], 258.

24

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

Figure 2.6 Freight car delivering goods for Czechoslovakia from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), about 1947. Note: Text on the car reads, “Borrowed from UNRRA” and “This car may not leave the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. and it was used wherever it was needed. Besides the requisitioning of various locomotives, the German Class 52 steam locomotives were mass-produced and distributed to rail operators all over Europe. Some of them served for various purposes in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere through the end of the 1970s.20​ After 1945, the largest state institution with influence on all the elements of the transportation system was the Ministry of Transportation of Czechoslovakia. In Slovakia, a Transport Authority was established, but it early on lost its authority over issues related to rail transport to the Ministry. In 1952 and 1953 the Ministry of Transportation was stripped of its authority over rail transport and for 13 months there existed an independent Ministry of the Railroads. This organizational experiment was not successful because it resulted in the separation of decision-making and management in the area of rail transport from that for other sectors of the transport network, something that proved not to be in accord with the interests of the state. The end result was the consolidation of the entire transportation agenda under the Ministry of Transportation.21 In 1960 the Ministry of Transportation was merged with the Ministry of Communications (called the Ministry of the Post until 1952). This move reflected a general trend 20 More on the Class 52 locomotive is found on the web pages of the German Society for Railroad History (see “Německá společnost pro železniční historii”/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Eisenbahngeschichte/). 21 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 50.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

25

under which the developing telecommunications and informatics sectors were increasingly profiled as elements of the transportation system.22 We can divide the reconstruction of the infrastructure on the territory of postwar Czechoslovakia into two phases. (1) The first phase began even before the end of World War II. Some areas of Czechoslovakia (we here do not count the area of Subcarpathian Ruthenia which was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945), in particular the northeast part of Slovakia, were liberated by the Soviet Army at the end of 1944. From that time, it was necessary to stabilize those territories, including reconstructing the transport infrastructure needed for supplying military operations. The railways had precedence in that regard because of their high capacity. Management of the railroads in the liberated zone began with repairs in the most damaged areas. Some of the repairs were conducted by engineering units of the railway troops of the Red Army.23 (2) From April 1945 in Slovakia, and from May 1945 in Bohemia and Moravia, a second phase of reconstruction began in which the work of rebuilding was coordinated according to the priority of the various track segments. Most important was the reconstruction of connections between Moravia and Slovakia, along with links onward to eastern Slovakia. Reconstruction of the tracks in Slovakia continued until December 1947.24 The importance of the railway sector in the postwar situation is shown by the text of the Košice government program of April 5, 1945, which stated its goal in Article XII: To re-establish postal, telegraphic, telephonic and radio (telecommunications) connections, build up long-distance and local transport, especially for movement of foodstuffs from the villages to the cities, and to mobilize to that end all available means of transportation.25 The stress of the postwar situation in transportation is also shown by contemporary legislation focused on the transport sector. Rail transport was covered by Presidential Decree no. 77 of September 21, 1945, “On Some Measures for Facilitating Loading and Unloading of Goods in Rail Transport,”26 which imposed a fine of up to 100,000 Czech crowns and/or imprisonment for up to 22 Law no. 101/1960, “On the Merger of Some Ministries, Transferring Water Management to the Responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and a Change in the Name of the Ministry of Construction,” (see Zákon č. 101/1960). 23 It is interesting that during World War II, for strategic and logistic reasons, the Soviet Army constructed a section of new track through the Lupkov Pass and Medzilaborce and on to the eastern Slovakian town of Humenné using the Soviet Union’s broad-gauge standard. 24 Hons, Dějiny dopravy na území ČSSR [The History of Transportation on the Territory of the ČSSR], 258–259. 25 Košice Government Program of April 5, 1945. 26 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 77/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 77/1945).

26

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

6 months on anyone who delayed the loading and unloading of goods.27 The railroads were required to load and unload goods within a specified time frame, and were authorized to work on Saturdays, Sundays, and at noontime.28 The result was a noticeable speeding up of the circulation of rail cars and a concomitant increase in the capacity for transporting goods. Over the year 1945, the railroads were able to renew and stabilize their performance very quickly, although some damaged infrastructure was repaired only provisionally. The period of stabilization was rather short and further changes arrived quickly, which entirely transformed existing conditions. The events of 1948 can be considered a milestone not only in Czechoslovak politics, but also in the country’s economic development. The February coup kicked off an extensive wave of nationalizations of the majority of companies and the workplaces of small businesses.29 The nationalizations were a step on the path to centralization of the economic system and its complete subjugation to the will of the state. The transportation sector in general was no exception to this process, but it did not much affect its most important part, the railroads. Except for the ambiguous legal status of the Czech segment of the Košice-Bohumín Railway (whose Slovak segment was nationalized during the war by the independent Slovak state under Law no. 52/1943 of May 13, 1943), the entire system was already under state control and unified under the state company, ČSD. The remaining Czech segment of the Košice-Bohumín Railway was formally nationalized by Law no. 311/1948 of December 22, 1948, “On National Transport Companies.”30 Nationalization affected mainly the road and water transport sectors, as will be discussed later. Along with increasing pressure for nationalization of the economy the postwar economic system showed an ever-greater preference for central planning. The first omen of later developments was the so-called “two-year economic plan,” which was approved in 1947 and 1948. Its clearly stated aim was to exceed the economic level the country had achieved in 1937 by ten percent by the end of the year 1948. Although industry in what had been Czechoslovakia was handicapped during World War II by the deformation of its sectoral structure, by deterioration of its mechanical equipment, and by confiscation of its inputs,31 industrial output grew by 18.2 percent from 1939 to 1944.32

27 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 77/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 77/1945, Para. 4). 28 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 77/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 77/1945). 29 Plíva, Soubor znárodňovacích předpisů vydaných v letech 1945–1951 [Collected Nationalization Decrees Issued in the Years 1945–1951], 3. 30 Law no. 311/1948 of December 22, 1948, “On National Transportation Companies” (see Zákon č. 311/1948). 31 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992 [The Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia 1918–1992], 109. 32 Holubová, Ekonomický vývoj Protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1939–1945 [The Economic Development of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 1939–1945], 43.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

27

The two-year economic plan adopted by Law no. 192/1946, “On the Two-year Economic Plan”33 required the transportation sector to take on some key tasks. It was presumed that by the end of 1948, the “transportation performance of the year 1937” would be equaled.34 Moreover, certain plans for the development of transport that had been prepared in the time of the First Czechoslovak Republic were to be implemented. In the areas of rail, road, river, airline, and postal transport, extensive renewal of infrastructure and equipment was expected to take place. Among the revived development projects planned under the First Republic we can name increasing the capacity of the Košice-Bohumín railway to twice what it was in 1937.35 By looking at the statistical data it is not possible to say whether the transportation sector was able to meet the goals that were set for it by the two-year plan. The overall data does not clarify the nature of the goods that were transported— the heavy industry supported after World War II burdened the transportation system with movement of bulky raw materials (coal, iron ore, and the like) more than did other kinds of industry—nor does it show the quality of services (track speeds, etc.). With regard to the total volume of goods transported on the railroads it can be said that in 1937, 70.1 billion tons were transported, while in 1948 the total was 63.8 billion tons. At the same time, the average length of the freight transportation was increased from 157.9 km to 191.8 km. Similarly, the number of gross ton-kilometers (tkm) transported increased from 24.0 billion tkm to 28.1 billion tkm.36 There was a significant increase in the number of passengers transported by rail—while in 1937, 293 million passengers were 33 Regulation no. 192/1946, “On the Two-year Economic Plan” (see Předpis č. 192/1946). 34 Regulation no. 192/1946, “On the Two-year Economic Plan” (see Předpis č. 192/1946, Part I, Section I, para. 1). 35 “To achieve the transportation performance called for in the two-year plan it will be necessary to: (1) in railway transport: (a) introduce 300 new locomotives, 250 motorized rail cars, 17,090 freight cars and 700 passenger cars, expand the fleet of city transit with 123 motorized and 130 trailer vehicles; prepare for the serial production of special freight rail cars; (b) renew and add to the safety and communication equipment of the railways at the cost of 200 million Kčs; (c) renew and add to the equipment in the railway repair shops at the cost of 100 million Kčs; and (d) add to the transport equipment of the Košice – Bohumín Railway so that its performance is increased by 50 percent compared to the year 1937. (2) In road transport: (a) put 1,950 new motorbuses, 200 trailer vehicles for passenger transport, 2,400 freight tractor trucks, and 700 trailers into service; and prepare for the serial production of special freight trucks; (b) build garages and repair shops for motor vehicles at a cost of 150 million Kčs. (3) In river transport: (a) put 45 new barges and four tugboats into service and renew the river fleet damaged in the events of the war; (b) construct ports at Bratislava and Komárno. (4) in air transport: (a) put another 50 cargo airplanes into service; (b) expand and improve airports, especially at Prague-Ruzyně, Brno-Černovice, Bratislava-Vajnorech and Poprad, add to their equipment and begin construction of airports at Brno-Tuřany and Bratislava-Ivánec. (5) In postal transport: (a) renew the operational equipment of the postal services and expand telecommunication equipment at a total cost of 933 million Kčs; (b) add to the repair shop equipment and improve the condition of the post office’s motor vehicles at a cost of 140 million Kčs.” In: Regulation no. 192/1946, “On the Two-year Economic Plan” (see Předpis č. 192/1946, Section I, para. 5). 36 Federal Statistical Office: Historická statistická ročenka [Historical Statistical Yearbook], 310.

28

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

transported, in 1948 there were 459 million passengers—and the average distance they traveled increased from 27.3 km to 34.7 km.37 The extent of investment into the transport sector is best approximated by statistics on the overall resources made available for investment under the twoyear plan. A total of 78.7 billion Czechoslovak crowns (Kčs) was made available to the public administration, local governments, and to state-owned, nationalized, and private enterprises. Transportation was to receive 15.7 billion Kčs of that, about 20 percent of all the investment resources made available to the economy. Earthworks, water management, transportation, and other public works in the amount of 12.8 billion Kčs were lumped into one column and constituted 16 percent of all investment resources. It is not possible to specify the exact amount of investment to be made available for construction of transportation infrastructure.38 Of the total amount of investment resources (78.7 billion Kčs), Slovakia was to receive 22.1 billion Kčs, and of transportation funds, 4.71 billion Kčs, or 21 percent. The numbers for Slovakia correspond to the nationwide structure of investments envisaged by the two-year plan.39 The amounts of funds to be invested were slightly revised in 1947 to take account of price changes.40 The preference for and accelerated development of heavy industry, and dependence on the Soviet Union for inputs of raw materials, had a very large impact on the structure of transportation. A trend of significantly increasing volume of rail transport was evident through the entire period from 1950 to 1970. The geographic locations of industry and important deposits of mineral resources like coal and iron ore were reasons for the railroads’ growth. Some new industrial centers, electric power plants, and the like were built in areas that lacked their own raw materials, which meant that transporting them in large quantities was necessary. The Eastern Slovakia Steelworks in Košice is an example of a heavy industry that was constructed without regard to the presence of local sources of minerals. All needed raw material inputs, mainly iron ore and coal, were transported by rail from the Soviet Union. Moreover, until a Soviet-standard broad-gauge track was constructed into the steelworks, such materials had to be transferred from the Soviets’ broad-gauge equipment onto rolling stock suitable for the standard European-gauge track. The locations of resources and the places they were consumed in Czechoslovakia led to the identification of two main rail lines, along which the majority of railroad freight was transported. They were referred to as the first and second main lines in official documents. The first of these joined northern Bohemia with northern Moravia, northern Slovakia and the transshipment 37 Federal Statistical Office: Historická statistická ročenka [Historical Statistical Yearbook], 311. 38 Part I, Section III, para. 6, Regulation no. 192/1946, “On the Two-year Economic Plan” (see Předpis č. 192/1946). 39 Regulation no. 192/1946, “On the Two-year Economic Plan,” (see Předpis č. 192/1946, Part I, Section III, para. 6 and also Part I, Section IV, para. 7). 40 Regulation no. 131/1947, which amended measures on the implementation of the two-year economic plan (see Předpis č. 131/1947).

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

29

point in eastern Slovakia, Čierna nad Tisou, where the Czechoslovak and Soviet railway networks intersected and where it was necessary to transfer all goods because of the difference in track widths in the two countries. While ČSD used the standard European gauge of 1,435 mm, the Soviet railway network used a gauge of 1,524 (today 1,520) mm. The so-called second main line ran through the southern parts of the Republic and provided connections into southern Slovakia and onward into Hungary.41 Both main lines together constituted 13 percent of the length of the ČSD network, but in terms of gross ton-kilometers they carried 61 percent of the traffic on the entire network in 1961.42 After several years of strong growth, the traffic on the railroads was lightened somewhat by the construction of pipelines, especially the Družba oil pipeline connecting Czechoslovakia with the oilfields in the Soviet Union. The first oil entered Czechoslovakia by the pipeline in 1962, in the amount of two million tons. By 1970, that had grown to almost ten million tons of oil. The performance of the railroads declined proportionately as they lost the majority of their business of transporting oil products.43

2.4 Other Transport Sectors in Czechoslovakia (1918–1970) Compared to the railways, the other transport sectors (road, waterborne, and air transport) were not well-developed at the beginning of Czechoslovakia’s existence, and thus could not compete with the rapid development of the railways. As in the railway sector, the situation at the outset in those other transport sectors reflected the situation in Austria-Hungary. The Czechoslovak central administration took over responsibility for roads from the former Royal and Imperial road network, which included a large number of non-state-owned roads, divided into provincial, district (Classes I and II), and municipal types. Although traffic on the roads was not very heavy at the time, their importance for short-distance transport constantly increased. The state therefore tried to stabilize and improve the road network. Throughout the 1920s, it tried to bring the maximum possible number of non-state-owned roads under its control. By 1929, it had succeeded with regard to 4,000 previously non-state-owned roads, thanks to which a compact network of state-owned main roads came into existence.44 The constantly increasing pace of development of road transport in the time of the First Republic and the need to establish secure communications with all parts of the new state led the government to plan for the construction of 41 First main line: Třebušice-Ústí nad Labem-Nymburk-Kolín-Česká Třebová-Olomouc-OstravaŽilina-Košice-Čierna nad Tisou. Second main line: Sokolov-Plzeň-Jihlava-/Praha-Kutná Hora-/Havlíčkův Brod-Brno-Bratislava-Štúrovo. 42 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 28. 43 Federal Statistical Office: Historická statistická ročenka [Historical Statistical Yearbook], 313. 44 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy na území České republiky [The History of Transportation in the Territory fo the Czech Republic], 46.

30

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

a network of superhighways. A number of important Czechoslovak businessmen were among the project’s supporters and promoters, of whom the most well-known was the Zlín shoe magnate Tomáš Baťa. The first superhighway was meant to connect Prague with Subcarpathian Ruthenia and thus provide a strategic link along the backbone of the entire country. The decision to begin construction was taken shortly before the First Republic was dismantled in the fall of 1938.45 ČSD was involved in the birth and development of road transport and operated in that sector in the 1920s and 1930s. ČSD operated the first motorbus routes, which were connected to rail passenger routes. A number of key railroad stations offered freight trucks so that goods could be transported from the rail station to their final customers. The development of this kind of service led to the establishment in 1933 of an independent company, ČSD Automobile Transport, which fell under the supervision of the Central Administration for Automobile Transport, a division of the Ministry of Railways. The company took over the fleet of the Administration for Postal Automobile Transport in 1934. The role of the Central Administration for Automobile Transport was at first limited to coordination of transport lines, but it also provided supervision and regulation of private carriers and other transport businesses. From 1933 it was authorized to grant concessions for private operators of automobile transport. Later its competency was extended to supervision of ČSD’s most serious competitor in freight transport during the 1930s: factory transport (transport operated by individual industrial concerns exclusively for their own purposes). About 1938, as a protectionist measure favoring rail transport, a maximum distance that goods were allowed to be transported on the highways was established.46 During World War II, road transport was strictly limited to official concessions and reduced in scope, as mentioned above. Institutionally, it was still considered auxiliary to rail transport, and there were no significant changes compared to before the war. The most fundamental change was in the ownership of the highway network—most of it was nationalized in 1941. During the war, the availability of fuel and high-quality tires was more and more limited. Therefore, road transport was gradually restricted. By 1940, civilian automobile traffic in the territory of the Protectorate was almost entirely brought to a halt.47 Construction of the superhighway network proceeded for a few months under the Protectorate. The construction of a stretch of the highway from Prague to Brno (near Prague in Průhonice), which had been planned earlier, continued and a route between Vienna and Breslau (today Wrocław in Poland), a priority for the German Reich, was begun. About 70 km of that superhighway, which was to 45 See “Historie našich dálnic v první polovině 20. Století” [“The History of Our Highways in the First Half of the Twentieth Century”]. 46 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy na území České republiky [The History of Transportation in the Territory fo the Czech Republic], 45–47. 47 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy na území České republiky [The History of Transportation in the Territory fo the Czech Republic], 51–52.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

31

be given an extra-territorial legal status in Bohemia, was built before construction was halted in 1942. Another planned superhighway, of which today only some basic ground preparations are visible, was to run from Cheb to Liberec.48 The centralization of the economy during the war and shortages of raw materials caused all other superhighway projects to be shelved in 1942. Road transport was traditionally part of the organizational structure of the railroads. Even before World War II, ČSD had a division for automobile transport, both of freight and passengers. The constantly growing private, commercial transport sector was separate. Wartime destruction severely affected the highway network. As with the rail network, many bridges and other structures were destroyed. The approaching armies began to open the most important highways to traffic even before the renewed state administration could do so. Temporary bridges replaced downed structures. After the war, centrally coordinated repairs followed and the highways were categorized into first- and second-class roads, based on their importance to the national transportation network.49 The need to ensure transport at the time of the postwar renewal of the state led to the limiting of ownership rights and private enterprise in road transport in the fall of 1945. According to a decree of the President of the Republic, no. 76 of September 21, 1945 (“On the Requisition of Transport Vehicles in the Time of Extraordinary Economic Conditions”),50 local national committees could “requisition transport vehicles for especially important economic purposes, such as the sugar beet and potato harvests and for coal deliveries.”51 Transport vehicles included “horses and other draft animals, vehicles pulled by animals, motor trucks, and water craft (all with accessory equipment).”52 The decree was aimed directly at private ownership and enterprise in freight transport, because it excepted vehicles “belonging to the state, state-owned companies and institutes, regional administrations, and providers of postal services.”53 The newly established organizational conditions for road transport did not prevent the sector from growing in comparison to the prewar period or the fulfilling the goals set for it by the two-year plan. The increase in traffic and performance in road transport was several times greater than the plan expected. In 1937, 13 million tons of goods were transported. In 1948 it was 24 million tons. The performance of road-based freight transport increased from 121 million

48 See “Historie našich dálnic v první polovině 20. Století” [“The History of Our Highways in the First Half of the Twentieth Century”]. 49 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy na území České republiky [The History of Transportation in the Territory fo the Czech Republic], 58. 50 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 76/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 76/1945). 51 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 76/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 76/1945, para. 1, Section 1). 52 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 76/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 76/1945). 53 Decree of the President of the Republic no. 76/1945 (see Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 76/1945, para 3, Section 3, Subsection (c)).

32

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

tkm to 363 million tkm.54 In passenger transport, the number of persons transported increased from 84 million in 1937 to 292 million in 1948,55 although the latter number was still relatively unimportant compared to rail transport. The average distance traveled was not recorded in the statistics, but at the time road transport of goods and people was mostly limited to short distances in local situations. The events of 1948 led to further centralization of the administration of the road transport sector and to its eventual nationalization. Large firms (as measured by number of employees) in the business of transporting goods and people were nationalized in the first wave under Law no. 311/1948, and the state-owned company Czechoslovak Automobile Transport was founded.56 Still, a number of entrepreneurs and small firms were active in the road transport sector and were not much affected by the law. They were effectively liquidated by Regulation no. 34/1950 of March 27, 1950, the decree of the Minister of Transportation “On Appropriation of Road Motor Vehicles Used for Commercial Transportation.” Based on that regulation, local national committees could decide to seize (or auction off) transportation means owned by commercial firms. This could be done at the request of the affected firm or at the direction of the national committees.57 Thus, at the beginning of the 1950s private companies vanished from the passenger and freight transport sectors. From then on, the majority of transportation services in the national economy was provided by nationalized transport companies. Judging by the statistics on road transport, “factory transport,” that is, transport provided to factories by vehicles owned by factories themselves, was an exception. Communal transport firms provided a very small part of overall transport capacity (Figure 2.7).58 On January 1, 1949, the centralized national enterprise ČSAD was set up, with one head office for the Czech lands and another for Slovakia. ČSAD absorbed the last remnants of private commercial activity in the road transport sector. An attempt at improving the efficiency of its management led in 1952 to the establishment of a subsidiary in each region (kraj) of the country. The Ministry of Transport retained formal oversight and operative control over the regional transport offices. Another step in the direction of decentralization was taken in 1957 when operational control was transferred from the central Ministry to the regional offices in the Czech lands and to the head office for Slovakia. 54 Federal Statistical Office: Historická statistická ročenka [Historical Statistical Yearbook], 311. 55 Federal Statistical Office: Historická statistická ročenka [Historical Statistical Yearbook], 313. 56 Law no. 311/1948 of December 22, 1948, “On National Transportation Companies” (see Zákon č. 311/1948). 57 Regulation no. 34/1950 of March 27, 1950, Directive of the Minister of Transportation on the Seizure of Highway Motor Vehicles Used for Commercial Transportation (see Předpis č. 34/1950). 58 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 22.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

33

1000000 900000 800000 700000 600000 500000 400000 300000 200000 100000 0

Automobiles

Vans 1950

Trucks 1955

1960

Special Trucks 1965

Coaches

Motorcycles

1970

Figure 2.7 Number of motor vehicles registered on June 30 of the indicated years, by type. Source: Federal Statistics Office. Historical Statistical Almanac of the ČSSR (Prague: SNTL, 1985, 313). Decentralization did not stop at the regional level. In 1960, ČSAD subsidiaries were established in each district (okres). This step proved to be very ineffective, because not every district office was capable of the effective operational management of transport (planning routes, furnishing vehicles, and the like). Moreover, the size of the districts was very small. In 1963, the situation was returned to its original state, when one single ČSAD subsidiary was established in every region. After Czechoslovakia was federalized, formal control of ČSAD was given to the Ministry of Transportation of the Czech Socialist Republic (ČSR) and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR).59 The postwar development and modernization of industry resulted in a rapid increase in the number of motor vehicles of all types. Individually owned automobiles became an increasingly important category in transportation statistics, although there was initially a constant shortage of automobiles available for sale in the market. High prices and legal restrictions limited their purchase. For example, in the 1950s, purchase of an automobile required the consent of the buyer’s employer. As time passed, such requirements were gradually lifted. The population’s increasing purchasing power and growing preference for individual means of transport resulted in a massive increase in vehicle ownership, at first for the more affordable motorcycles and mopeds, whose number grew the 59 Ryba, K historii silniční dopravy na území České republiky [On the History of Highway Transport on the Territory of the Czech Republic], 412.

34

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

most in the early 1960s, and then in the late 1960s for automobiles as well.60 The increases were so significant that state transportation policy had to accelerate the construction of roads and highways. The growth in individual ownership of automobiles partly reflected the condition of the public transport network of the time. The development of the market for individual automobiles was the first expression of an improvement in the standard of living of society. The statistics cited below show that the increasing “social product” (a rough communist-era equivalent of GDP) of Czechoslovakia was reflected in the increase in automobile ownership. The greatest advance in the number of individually owned automobiles per capita took place in the 1960s. The following decades only confirmed that trend.​​ Waterborne transportation played a strategic role for Czechoslovakia after 1918, and air transport began to grow in the 1920s. The Elbe River was the country’s most important navigable waterway. It ran through Germany to the port of Hamburg, to which the Versailles Treaty gave Czechoslovakia privileged access via the Elbe. Under that treaty, and other peace treaties concluded after World War I, the country was given access to maritime ports at the mouths of the Elbe, Oder, and Danube Rivers, and to onward marine shipping, which was something entirely new for a landlocked state. Free navigation along the Elbe was ensured by the “Elbe Act” of 1922, enforcement of which was handled by an international commission.61 Transport on the Elbe was carried out by the Czechoslovak Shipping Company, which was formed by a merger of the Czechoslovak Steam Navigation Company and the Austrian Northwest Steam Navigation Company. Despite the treaties’ assurances of free navigation, the volume of goods shipped in the time of the First Republic never measured up to that achieved before World War I. In 1903, the yearly volume of goods handled at the river port at Ústí nad Labem was roughly 2.4 million tons. In the years 1924 to 1937, it ranged from 500,000 to 800,000 tons a year.62 Transport on the Oder River was provided by the Czechoslovak Oder Shipping Company. On the Danube, where there were difficulties with enforcement of the regulations, the operator was the Czechoslovak Shipping Company of the Danube. After 1918, the internal network of waterways developed rather sporadically, mainly because of unfavorable natural conditions and competition from the railways, which were better able to satisfy the demand for high-capacity transport. A long-discussed canal connecting the Danube, the Elbe, and the Oder never got beyond the planning stage.63 Projects for improving the navigability and regulation of the Vltava River went forward successfully. Work on the first dam of the so-called Vltava cascade was begun, and in 60 Federal Statistical Office: Historická statistická ročenka [Historical Statistical Yearbook], 313. 61 Jakubec, Železnice a Labská plavba ve střední Evropě 1918–1938 [The Railroads and Elbe River Traffic in Central Europe], 97. 62 Hons, Dějiny dopravy [The History of Transportation], 250. 63 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 3 and 14.

Figure 2.8 Proposal for the main highway network for the Czechoslovak Republic (1938). Source: Archives of the author.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia 35

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

36

Table 2.1  Increase in Automobile Ownership and Social Product in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1988

1950 1960 1970 1980 1988

Individually Owned Automobiles (Total)

Number of Inhabitants per Individually Owned Automobile

Growth in Social Product per Capita (%)

130,583 247,092 825,755 2,273,931 2,904,000

95 55 17 7 5

0 92 255 507 698

Source: Benešová, Výkonnost železniční dopravy v  Československu [The Performance of Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia], 76.

Slovakia, the Váh cascade project was initiated. However, to this day neither waterway has been fully opened and made navigable. For example, the Vltava cascade even today serves more to produce energy than for navigation.64 Internal waterborne transport was left paralyzed at the end of the war. Besides the many watercraft that were destroyed, the navigation channels were completely blocked. The obstacles were primarily downed bridges and other destroyed infrastructure such as locks. Navigation was disrupted on the Elbe for a long time after 1945 and the river lost its formal international status. Just when its navigability was restored, the Cold War began and tensions increased between the Eastern Bloc and the West. The flow of the Elbe marked the dividing line between them. In the end the status of the Czechoslovak river fleet was clarified and both German states allowed Czechoslovak boats to travel to Hamburg. Only the Czechoslovak navigation corridor established by the Versailles Treaty was maintained, but shipping along the waterways originally identified by the treaty was no longer possible.65 The Danube waterway also maintained its international status, which was renewed in 1948 by the conclusion of the Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube.66

64 Hons, Dejiny dopravy [The History of Transportation], 251–253. 65 Hons, Dejiny dopravy na území ČSSR [The History of Transportation on the Territory of the ČSSR], 258–259. 66 Text of the justification prepared for the National Congress of the Czechoslovak Republic on October 12, 1948, and text of the Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube of August 18, 1948, in the official pages of the Digital Library of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (see “Text důvodové zprávy pro Národní shromáždění republiky Československé [Text of the Explanatory Memorandum for the National Congress of the Czechoslovak Republic]”).

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

37

The impact of the political coup of 1948 was felt in the institutional structures of the shipping companies in the form of Law no. 311/1948,67 under which the shipping companies, river ports, and transshipment points were nationalized and managed by centralized national enterprises: the Czechoslovak Elbe Shipping Company, the Czechoslovak Oder Shipping Company, and the Czechoslovak Danube Shipping Company. In 1952, the Czechoslovak Elbe Shipping Company and the Czechoslovak Oder Shipping Company were merged into the Czechoslovak Elbe-Oder Shipping Company.68 Waterborne transport fell under the aegis of the Ministry of Transport (and its successor organizations) throughout the entire period. From 1945, supervision of shipping was at first done by the Czechoslovak Shipping Office, while after 1950 it was the responsibility of the regional governments. In 1955 two shipping administrations were created with headquarters in Prague and Bratislava. After 1960, they were consolidated into a State Shipping Administration with several offices in the Czech lands and Slovakia. After the federalization of Czechoslovakia, the shipping administrations were again separated into a shipping administration for the ČSR, headquartered in Prague, and a State Shipping Administration for the SSR, with its seat in Bratislava.69 Waterborne transport played only an auxiliary role in domestic transportation. It was mostly used for foreign trade—primarily along the Elbe to Hamburg and the Danube to the Black Sea. River ports were modernized as the sector developed, particularly on the Danube at Komárno. In an effort to ensure advantageous logistics for Czechoslovakia’s foreign trade, the Czechoslovak Maritime Shipping Company was established in 1959 as an international corporation, part of the Čechofracht Company. It began with a flotilla of eleven specialized sea-going ships, and their number increased over time.70 Compared to other landlocked states, Czechoslovakia boasted a large sea-going fleet, which along with its treaty-based rights to the ports of Hamburg and Gdansk helped to support its foreign trade. Air transport developed throughout the existence of the independent Czechoslovak republic. In 1918, no airline company provided long-distance domestic or international air transport in Czechoslovakia. The first such company was founded at the beginning of the 1920s and mainly operated sight-seeing tours. In 1923 a proposal by the Ministry of Public Works for establishment of a state-owned company, Czechoslovak Airlines (ČSA), was approved. The 67 Law no. 311/1948 of December 22, 1948, “On National Transportation Companies” (see Zákon č. 311/1948). 68 Regulation no. 52/1950, Governmental Measure on the Merger of the National Transportation Companies “Czechoslovak Elbe River Transport, National Company” and “Czechoslovak Oder River Transport, National Company”] (see Předpis č. 52/1950). 69 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 9. 70 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 83.

38

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

first domestic airport it used was the military airport in the Prague suburb of Kbely. Its mission was to provide civilian travel links both internally and internationally. Immediately after it was founded in October 1923, the new airline opened its first route linking Prague with Bratislava. The two cities were the only places in Czechoslovakia that had modern airports. As time went on, other domestic routes were established, for example, from Prague to Košice, Liberec, and Mariánské Lázně. The first international route was to France, via Milan to Marseille.71 Important development of the routes of the Czechoslovak airline companies took place in the 1930s. In 1938, before international air traffic from Czechoslovakia was curtailed, ČSA’s route network grew to 11,400 kilometers.72 The success and strong development of air transport was supported by the founding of other airlines that competed with ČSA. Worth mentioning is the Czechoslovak Aviation Company, which was a subsidiary of the Škoda works. It did not own any aircraft itself, but as a member of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), it made it possible for German and Austrian airlines to provide service on the route Vienna-Prague-Dresden-Berlin. The most important milestone in the development of air transport in the time of the First Republic was the construction of the independent civil airport in Prague, in Ruzyně. The development of the first generation of airports lasted from the beginning of the 1930s until 1937. At the same time, the safety of air travel was improved—runway lighting, direction finders, and air traffic control systems were installed.73 Air travel was severely curtailed after 1938. All air traffic was shut down in the fall of 1938, after which one route operated by the German airline Lufthansa on the route Vienna-Prague-Berlin was re-established. A large number of ČSA’s pilots left the country for foreign exile and formed the Czechoslovak air squadrons in Allied air forces.74 After World War II, air links were gradually renewed. The first new ČSA flights began in the spring of 1946. At that time the remnants of the Slovak Airline Company, formed under the independent Slovak state, were folded into ČSA. Political developments after 1948 and the nationalization of the air transport sector did not have much impact because ČSA was effectively the dominant state-owned company already and its only major competitor was the Czechoslovak Aviation Company. The operations and orientation of the airlines were more affected. Routes were redirected to the East, principally to the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, and other friendly states.75 The longest route operated 71 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 37. 72 Kyncl et  al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 48; and Hons, Dějiny dopravy na území ČSSR [History of Transportation on the Territory of the ČSSR], 254 and 255. 73 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 37. 74 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 52–53. 75 Kyncl et al., Historie dopravy [History of Transportation], 70–71.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

39

by ČSA was between Prague and Havana, Cuba.76 Czechoslovak planes were handicapped by a boycott against their refueling promoted by Western aircraft fuel producers who were protesting against the nationalization of the WestGerman-owned ESSO refinery in Czechoslovakia, and also by a prohibition on overflights of West German territory. ČSA began to equip itself with aviation products produced in the East, especially from the Soviet Union, because deliveries from the West were made impossible by an embargo on exports of spare parts and other aviation technology. Because of the ongoing development of aviation and constantly increasing costs, the State Aviation Administration was established in 1958. In 1965, that agency was divided into the State Aviation Inspectorate, which provided professional oversight, and the Airports Administration, which was devoted to construction and operation of airports. After the country was federalized, the latter entity was further divided into the Prague Airports Administration and the Bratislava Airports Administration. The federalization of Czechoslovakia was felt by ČSA itself. The company Slov-air was spun off from it, focusing on aviation chemical spraying services in agriculture and forestry, and also charter flights for personal transport.77

2.5 Chapter Summary The development of the transport sector from 1918 to 1970 shows some very pronounced trends and the impact of political and geopolitical changes on the structure, organization, and operation of individual transport sectors. The turbulent times of World War II resulted in a large number of basic changes in the transport sector in quick succession. The postwar period was a golden age for rail transport, when the railways were completely dominant in the transport of people and freight. That ended in Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the 1950s. The advent of new technologies and economic and social needs hastened the development of other transport sectors, which took over some of the existing tasks of the railroads as well as other tasks that were newly created. The period after the end of World War II brought a number of changes in the political and economic spheres. Central economic planning deemed the provision of the transport links necessary for supporting heavy industry, and also for satisfying the demand for personal transport, primarily as tasks for the railways. At the same time, other transport sectors were developing, among them individual automobiles for personal transportation, which had ever-greater influence on the position and performance of rail transport. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show 76 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 80–82. 77 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 99.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

40

the performance of the several sectors of freight transport in the years from 1950 to 1970, and make it possible to compare trends in all of the sectors. Despite the remarkable increase in volume of freight, the importance of the statistics should not be exaggerated, because they do not reflect the quality of the means of transport. The railroads maintained their importance in heavy transport over long distances, but motorized road transport quickly took over the transport of freight over short distances, showing remarkable growth. About two-thirds of road transport was factory transport, with the rest handled by ČSAD. From 1950 to 1970 road transport mostly played a complementary role, providing local transport and carriage of goods to rail hubs. The economic statistics show that there was strong growth in the economy’s demand for transport because of the growth of heavy industry and the consequent need for transport of coal and iron ore. The gradual development of the various transport sectors and related infrastructure in the years from 1918 to 1945 prefigured what followed after the end of World War II and up until 1970. Economically, the railroads continued to be the most important sector for the transport of goods and people, but other sectors grew in importance—especially road transport. The increasing competition between the rail and road transport sectors, and the gradual diversification of their tasks, foretold developments after 1970 (see figs. 2.9 and 2.10). Even though almost all economic parameters were centrally planned, theoretically allowing the railroads to maintain their economic position and importance, 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

1950

1955 Rail

Water

1960 Air

1965 Road

1970 Pipeline

Figure 2.9 Trend in volume of goods transported in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1970, in millions of tons. Source: Voráček et  al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 22.

Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia

41

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1950

1955 Rail

Water

1960 Air

1965 Road

1970 Pipeline

Figure 2.10  Trend in performance of freight transport in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1970, in billions of ton-kilometers. Source: Voráček et  al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportation in the ČSSR], 22. stiff competition to the railways began to develop nevertheless, mainly from road transport. State transportation policy reacted to this pressure. On the one hand, it tried to eliminate the weak links in rail transport, but on the other, it had to bend to the strong pressure to develop the road and highway infrastructure. Both sectors gradually began to compete for the resources available from the state, which lacked adequate funds for investment. The 1960s were a turning point, when fewer investments were made into rail transport than highway transport and available funds began to be depleted. This situation began to be reflected in the conditions of the rail sector as a whole and in its internal relationships. Nevertheless, the railroads still maintained their strong position. We will discuss the reasons for that in the following chapters.

3 ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS OF POLICY-MAKING FOR THE RAILWAY SECTOR

Generally speaking, transportation policy is the relationship between transport and the hierarchical structures of society. Both concepts, transport and politics, are not constant but gradually change over time. Today, transportation is not understood only as the technology associated with the operation of various means of transport,1 and policy-making is not seen merely as “cabinet discussions,” but rather a wide spectrum of communications tools used for managing human society.2 Transportation policy has been developed and defined in the course of human activity, particularly people’s mobility and communications, and as political mechanisms were organized that are capable of making decisions in the interest of society. In our view, the latter element is the state (or the state administration) in its modern form as it is found in the western hemisphere. We here take notice of the state’s decision-making processes, its setting of priorities, its preferences, and its mechanisms of management and control, which through transportation policy have an impact on all participating entities—mainly freight transporters in the commercial sector and passenger carriers in society at large. At the beginning of the new millennium, a new definition of transport policy has gradually taken hold, which we can use to examine the changes in the transport sector throughout history. The modern definition of transport policy is mainly the establishment of goals for the development of transport and the choice of tools to be used to achieve those goals.3 What goals and tools that are chosen depend on the notions and interests of the actors who set transport policy. Policy changes at the pace of development of transport and the applicable technology. Since the middle of the twentieth century, in the course of a single human lifetime, many changes in the concept of transport policy have been seen. In industrial and post-industrial times, transportation has been (and continues to be) one of the key activities of human society, making continued economic growth possible. Therefore, there has been immense pressure for innovation and

1 Canzler and Schöller-Schwedes, Handbuch Verkehrspolitik [Handbook of Transport Policy], 18–19. 2 Christoph Cornelissen, Geschichtswissenschaften [The Historical Sciences], 134–135. 3 Peltrám et al., Dopravní politika [The Politics of Transportation], 5.



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43

development in the field of transportation, which has required adaptation of decision-making—and political—processes. As one of the elements of economic policy, transportation policy was a subject of central planning in Czechoslovakia after 1948. Central planning determined both the conditions in the railway sector and its specific tasks. In practice, the economic environment that arose in the centrally planned economies was rather protectionist with regard to the railroads. The system “protected” the railroads from competition by other modes of transportation by assigning them an exclusive set of tasks. However, it did not put pressure on them to change and failed to provide them with the resources they needed to modernize or at least improve themselves. Compared to other transportation sectors, the railway sector has a number of specific features, which in their complexity and systemic nature significantly influence its technological conditions. From the beginning of their development, the railroads formed a closed system, a kind of unique railway world. One can mention the benefits given to the sector’s employees: their own special housing, health care facilities, cultural institutions, and recreation areas. Actors and institutions arose which made decisions only for the railway sector. Examples are the existence of an independent Ministry of the Railroads and professional and regulatory agencies that concerned themselves exclusively with rail transport. It is possible to identify a politics of rail transport, which included actors, institutions, and management mechanisms that operated exclusively within the sector. The top leadership of the state ensured coordination of measures in rail transport policy with those in other sectors, a duty that became even more important as road transport developed after World War II. In Czechoslovakia, a Ministry of Transportation was established after the war, which integrated the management structures of all the transportation sectors (with the exception of the post office). Early in the 1950s, the Ministry of the Railways, which had functioned throughout the time of the first Czechoslovak Republic, was briefly re-established. Even after it was abolished, the railroads had a special status in the Ministry of Transportation through the end of the 1980s. The Czechoslovak railways were deeply rooted in the structure of the Ministry, which was their ultimate coordinating and operating agency.

3.1 Actors and Institutions of Transportation Policy By the end of the 1940s, the Czechoslovak economy was centrally managed. This had an impact on all transport sectors. They were assigned new tasks and duties that fit the definitions, arrangements, functions, and goals of transportation policy. In Czechoslovakia the actors in transportation policy and the relationships between them responded to the same power vertical that all other economic sectors and all other social and political spheres were bound to respect. At the top were the decisions taken at the Congresses of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Between congresses, the Presidium of the Central Committee,

44

Policy-Making for the Railway Sector

as the Communist Party’s supreme executive organ, ensured implementation of the decisions taken at the congresses. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ was one of the most important “deciding actors” and no other government agency could take a decision that exceeded the bounds it established. Government agencies and professional ministries existed at a lower level. After the federalization of Czechoslovakia they shared responsibility for individual transportation sectors at the federal and state levels. The circle of “influential actors” in the totalitarian political arrangements of Czechoslovakia was essentially limited to politically engaged persons, that is, members of the KSČ and the parties of the National Front. Their supreme organ was the Congress of the Communist Party, whose dictates were realized by the leadership of the Party’s executive organs and their subservient elements in the National Front. The circle certainly did not include “the people,” but it cannot be said that their opinions were completely disregarded. Many theories of communication claim that even in totalitarian societies, a government cannot exist without some communication with the people. Nevertheless, in questions of transportation, communication consisted mainly of indirect hints and reactions.4 In the model of Czechoslovak transportation policy outlined above, the group of “supporting actors” played a purely auxiliary role in the process of decision-making by the “deciding actors,” mainly by providing expert advice and by implementing the deciders’ will. In practice in Czechoslovakia, communication between “influential actors” and “supporting actors” completely broke down. The reason for this was a strongly technocratic approach to managing the affairs of the state and a preference for making political and professional decisions without regard to public opinion. The hierarchy of the deciding actors in transportation policy in Czechoslovakia during the era of the centrally planned economy resembled a pyramid whose lower levels were split by a vertical axis that represented the border between the Czech lands and Slovakia. This was reflected in the devolution of decisionmaking power and the responsibilities of the actors at the lower levels of the state apparatus. The most important stimulus for change in the organization of the institutions of the transportation sector after 1945 was the federalization of Czechoslovakia and the division of competencies in selected areas between the two parts of the federal republic. This affected mainly road transport, where an even greater diffusion of responsibility was connected to increased local autonomy. The situation can be depicted by a simple chart, Figure 3.1, which illustrates the political organization of Czechoslovakia after federalization in 1969. The supreme organs of the Communist Party occupied the apex of the pyramid. The highest among them was the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met every five years in non-crisis times. In the 1970s and 1980s, congresses were held in 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1986. The congresses 4 Cornelissen, Geschichtswissenschaften [The Historical Sciences], 103.

Policy-Making for the Railway Sector

45

Figure 3.1  Hierarchy of the “Deciding Actors” in Czechoslovak transportation policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Source: The author. laid out the basic political framework. These guidelines were operationalized in decisions taken by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ (A), an executive organ that met on a roughly weekly basis. After the federalization of Czechoslovakia, competencies in the transport sector were divided between the federal government and the two national governments. The federal government and the federal Ministry of Transportation (Federální ministerstvo dopravy— FMD) are at level (B) in Figure 3.1. The two national governments, Czech (C1) and Slovak (C2), and their respective ministries of transport are at a subsidiary level. Levels D1 and D2 represent the regions, of which there were seven in the Czech Socialist Republic, plus the capital city Prague, and three in the Slovak Socialist Republic, plus Bratislava. At the lowest level are the districts of the ČSR (E1) and SSR (E2).5​​ All the fundamental decisions in the transportation sector were made by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ (A). The guidelines for its actions were provided by political precepts approved by the Congress of the Central Committee. Professional reports on the transportation sector were produced by the relevant departments of the Ministry of Transportation, supplemented by the views of the professional departments of the Central Committee. As far as transportation was concerned, the top of the pyramid was not always occupied by the same actors. While the most important decisions about transportation in general continued to be ratified by the Central Committee, the number of items 5 Chovan, “Význam a úlohy dopravy při uspokojovaní potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva” [“The Importance and Role of Transportation in Meeting the Needs of the National Economy and the Population”], 293.

46

Policy-Making for the Railway Sector

Figure 3.2 Decorated steam locomotive 475.1128 at the head of the Polonia express (Vienna-Warsaw), in the station at Přerov, 30 May 1971. Note: Text on the locomotive reads, “We Salute the Fourteenth Congress [of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia].” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. on its agenda relating to the railroads declined in the course of time. The locus of important decision-making with respect to the railways thus gradually shifted from level A to level B. Table 3.2 provides the number of agenda items discussed by the Presidium of the Central Committee in the years 1966 to 1989. There were several reasons for the gradual reduction in the number of agenda items related to rail transport. A look at the themes and programs discussed at the meetings gives the impression that the content of the agenda of the Central Committee changed between the 1960s and the 1980s. The Central Committee gradually abandoned its role as direct manager of the operations of the state and concerned itself with more “strategic” political questions, which were frequently focused on foreign relations.6 It can be assumed that in transportation, as in 6 Overview of archival collections (Aparát fondu) with material on the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ): Aparát fondu Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR; Aparát fondu Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1971–1975, 1261/0/6, NA ČR; Aparát fondu Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR; Aparát fondu Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR; Aparát fondu Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

Policy-Making for the Railway Sector

47

Table 3.1  Number of Agenda Items Relating to the Railroads Discussed at Meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ from 1966 to 1989 Period

Number of Agenda Items

1966–1971 1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1989

13  7  5  3  3

Source: Collection Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, National Archives of the Czech Republic (NA ČR); Collection Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ 1971–1975, 1261/0/6, NA ČR; Collection Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR; Collection Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR; Collection Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

Table 3.2 Overview of the Number of Meetings of the Collegium and the Council of the Minister of Transportation in the Years 1971, 1976, 1981, and 1987 Year

1971

1976

1981

1987

Collegium of the Minister of Transportation Council of the Minister of Transportation

11 56

15 45

8 45

8 36

Source: Overview of Meetings of the Collegium of the Minister of Transportation and the Council of the Minister of Transportation in the Years 1971–1987, NA ČR.

other sectors of the economy, more and more important operational matters were devolved to the responsible ministries. Several detailed memoranda prepared for discussion of the issues, and which characterized the situation of the rail sector, were key source documents for the research presented in the following chapters.7 7 Informace o současné situaci v dopravě [Information on the Present Situation in Transportation], 13. 6. 1968, vol. 73, unit 97/inf 1, Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ÚV KSČ) 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, National Archives of the Czech Republic (NA ČR); Ministry of Transportation: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft of Material for the Plenary Session of the ÚV KSČ on the Main Problems in Transportation], Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR; Výsledky následné kontroly opatření přijatých k prověrce na Federálním ministerstvu dopravy, správě Severozápadní dráhy a železniční stanici Praha-Vršovice [Results of Follow-up on Measures Adopted Pursuant to an Audit of the

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Policy-Making for the Railway Sector

The government and the FMD (level B) were increasingly powerful actors in decision-making for the rail sector. The FMD oversaw rail, waterborne, and air travel. Highway transport, like local mass transport, fell under the decisionmaking authority of the national governments (C1 and C2), and the FMD played only a formal supervisory role in that sector. The regions (D1 and D2) and the districts (E1 and E2) handled other tasks in transportation policy. Here it must be noted that, in practice, federalization meant that the national regulations for specific sectors could differ, and that the districts and regions were bound by the decisions of the supervising national governments and their agencies. Where there were significant differences in the economic sector in Slovakia and the Czech lands, they were primarily attributable to specific legislation at the national level.8 The central agency for transportation policy in the 1970s and 1980s was the FMD, which in all managed 40 economic organizations active in the sector. Other transportation entities fell under the competency of the national (Czech and Slovak) governments. For the most part, these were local mass transit companies, road maintenance departments, and auto repair shops.9 It should not be forgotten that factory transport entities, which were operated by manufacturers supervised by other (mainly economic) agencies, were heavily engaged in transporting freight. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior had many responsibilities Federal Ministry of Transportation, the Administration of the Northwestern Railways and the Praha-Vršovice Railway Station], 21. 12. 1976, vol. 27, unit 29/inf 2, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR; Zpráva o připravenosti dopravy ke zvládnutí podzimní přepravní kampaně a zabezpečení železniční dopravy v zimním období 1980/1981 [Report on the Readiness of Transport for the Fall Transportation Campaign and Safeguarding of Rail Transport in the Winter of 1980/1981, 9. 10. 1980, P151/80, point 3, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR; Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého pětiletého plánu a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationalization of Public Transport During the Seventh Five-Year Plan, 2. 6. 1982, P 42/82, point 4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR; Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation of Rail Transport in 1987], 10. 2. 1988, P 59/88, point for information 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR; Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na Ministerstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], 7. 7. 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 8 Chovan, “Význam a úlohy dopravy při uspokojovaní potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva” [“The Importance and Role of Transportation in Meeting the Needs of the National Economy and Population”], 293. 9 Chovan, “Význam a úlohy dopravy při uspokojovaní potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva” [“The Importance and Role of Transportation in Meeting the Needs of the National Economy and Population”], 293.

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for transportation and the Ministry of Defense oversaw transport matters related to the defense of the state. The FMD had the central management role for the railroads and was organizationally inseparable from the state enterprise ČSD. As will be explained later, ČSD was divided into several independent railroad operations. It had no central headquarters of its own or general directorate. The FMD itself, and its departments, played that role. Although the FMD was beholden to the decisions of the Czechoslovak government and in political questions to those of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ, given the complexity of the subject matter and the lack of detailed understanding at higher levels, the FMD had wide latitude for pursuing its own initiatives within the bounds of the decisions taken by the government and the Presidium. The period that is the subject of this book was marked by the unusually long term in office of federal Minister of Transport Vladimír Blažek, who served from 1975 to 1988. While he was in office no significant internal changes took place in the form of decision-making. Decisions at the FMD were made by the minister’s council and the collegium of the Ministry. Meetings of the former body took place weekly, if not more frequently. They were attended by the minister, his deputies, the director of the FMD’s “Department for Cadres and Personnel,” the chairman of the all-enterprise committee of the KSČ, and selected directors of the departments of the Ministry depending on the agenda to be discussed. For example, in 1971, the seminar met in this constellation about 60 times. In 1987, it met around 40 times. The other body, the collegium, was a broader decisionmaking body. In contrast to the council, it was composed of the heads of the individual railways and other organizations overseen by the FMD. Compared to the council, the Ministry’s collegium met less frequently and dealt with longer term issues rather than everyday operations.10 The statistics in Table 3.3 provide a comparison of the number of meetings of the Ministry’s collegium and the minister’s council during the year. It appears that the frequency with which each body met remained almost unchanged over time. It is also clear that both bodies met less frequently over time. The reason for the change in frequency of meetings is not determinable from the available sources, but it might have been a gradual change in the management of the Ministry, which transferred more responsibility to its subsidiaries, and also that the management of the FMD kept to the “beaten track” while Vladimír Blažek remained at its head. The FMD took an indirect approach to management of factory transport. It laid down specific conditions for each type of factory transport, including economic regulations for distributing profits and common property, and making contributions to the social security system. Tariffs for transport were also established centrally. Factories with their own means of transport were not allowed to 10 Overview of the meetings of the Collegium of the Minister of Transportation and the Advisory Council of the Minister of Transportation in the years 1971–1987, NA ČR.

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Table 3.3  Comparison of the Average Growth in National Income, the Performance of Freight Transport by Rail, Road Freight Transport, and Rail and Road Freight Transport in the Five-Year Plans from 1970 to 1989 (in Percent) Period

National Income

Freight Transport by Rail

Freight Transport by Road

Freight Transport by Rail and Road

1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1989

5.7 3.7 1.8 1.9

9 2.9 1.9 −0.3

36 31 −0.2 6

13 8 1 −0.1

Source: Průcha,  Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992 Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia 1918–1992], 391; Federal Statistical Office.  Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR [Historical Statistical Yearbook of the ČSSR], 311; Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 754.

offer more advantageous terms to others than the state-owned companies. The FMD constantly tried to regulate factory transport, but was able to do so only with great difficulty. Factories that had their own transportation means enjoyed their advantages and were not easily brought under the regulatory control of the Ministry of Transportation.11

3.2 Transportation Policy and the Central Plan The changes in the economic system of Czechoslovakia after 1948 required economic subjects to change the way they had functioned under a market economy (although the Czechoslovak economy from 1945 to 1948 was not entirely free of regulation by the state). They had to adapt to the necessity of fulfilling the criteria set up by the central economic plan. Their primary goal was no longer achieving positive economic results, but fulfilling the tasks assigned by the plan. The contemporary transportation policy reflected the system’s embrace of “scientific” socialist economic theory, which posited that it was possible to create and implement a precise, prescribed mechanism for the functioning of every economic sector. The conviction that it was possible to create an effective, wellfunctioning system using modern technology and planning techniques was behind the main features of the economic plan.12 Only with the passage of time did it become obvious that the real development of the rail sector was at odds with the original intentions. How was the economic plan set up? The decision-making, professional coordinating agency of the state was the State Planning Commission. The 11 Blažek, “Zásady státní dopravní politiky” [“Basics of State Transportation Policy”], 99 and 100. 12 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportion], 17–18.

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Commission worked out the proposals of the five-year economic plan for each sector. The individual enterprises participated in its creation. They proposed a plan to their supervising agency, which was then passed on to the relevant ministry. The plans were fleshed out and contextualized at all levels with reference to the needs and abilities of other actors in the economy. This was not a mere “cutting and pasting” of proposals. The Commission had its own vision for development and the future of the economy that it attempted to realize by amending and integrating the plans submitted to it. The State Planning Commission was established in 195913 as a professional body that would have responsibility for preparing the national five-year economic plan for all sectors of the economy. It de facto had the status of a government ministry with a large number of professional, mainly economically oriented working groups. The Commission was always chaired by a deputy premier of the Czechoslovak government. Its members were nominated (and recalled) by the government and approved by the Czechoslovak president. The Commission achieved its greatest influence in the 1960s when it became the center of the movement for change and reform of the centrally planned economic system.14 In 1965 the Commission’s methodology for preparing the state economic plan for economic development, that is, for future five-year plans, was published in the collected laws of the republic.15 The general scheme for preparation of the plans was set forth in the introduction to the guidelines: By submitting their proposals for the five-year plan, the Ministry, the central organs, the regional national committees, the trade union directorates, enterprises, and organizations will gradually approximate the best solution. In creating their plans, they will rely on the basic proportions contained in the government’s guidelines for preparing the five-year plan. The final proposal for the five-year plan will be a synthesis of the initial guidelines and the proposals for the plan submitted by the central organs, regional national committees, and individual producers, adjusted on the basis of the enterprises’ plans.16

13 The State Planning Commission was created in 1959 as the successor to the State Office for Planning, which was established by the Decree of the President of the Republic of August 25, 1956 (no. 63/1945). 14 Šulc, Z jeviště i zákulisí české politiky a ekonomiky [On-Stage and Behind the Scenes of Czech Politics and Economy], 79. 15 Regulation no. 55/1965, Methodological Guidelines of the State Planning Commission for Preparing the State Plan for Development of the National Economy (see Předpis č. 55/1965). 16 Regulation no. 55/1965, Methodological Guidelines of the State Planning Commission for Preparing the State Plan for Development of the National Economy (see Předpis č. 55/1965, Article 3, para. 2).

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Thus the State Planning Commission gathered up all the proposed plans from the individual ministries and as the supreme coordinating body amended them so that they could best be realized. A planning commission was established for Slovakia after the federalization of the state, which presented a single proposed plan for all of Slovakia to the State Planning Commission. Its proposal was then worked into the plan for the entire Republic. Another high-level central planning office was the Committee for Technical and Investment Development, which was established at the end of the 1960s. In the second half of the 1980s, it was changed into the State Commission for Scientific-Technical and Investment Development. Like the State Planning Commission, its chairman was a member of the federal government with ministerial rank. Its agenda touched on that of the Ministry of Transportation in the area of development and introduction of new technology that was meant to improve the effectiveness of transport. However, with its limited powers, the Commission could not influence the actual implementation of the higher authorities’ regulations or the allocation of resources for desired investments.17 How then was transportation integrated into the central economic plan? Central planning for transportation meant the establishment of volumetric goals for both freight and passenger transport, which were accompanied by other requirements, for example, in the case of rail transport, the percentage of locomotives of a particular kind to be maintained in service. The economic plan of course planned for investments and steps toward modernization. Achieving those goals was shown to be highly problematic in the 1970s and 1980s, which we will explain with concrete examples from the transport sector. The proposals of the State Planning Commission had to respect the approved principles of the state’s transportation policy, which were a subset of the state’s overall economic policy. The starting point for state transportation policy in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen in two documents: Principles of State Policy for 197718 and the voluminous Report of the Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR on the Importance of the Tasks of Transport for Meeting the Needs of the National Economy and the Population for the Year 1985.19 Although the two documents served different purposes, when combined with a wide range of articles in the professional magazine Doprava (Transport), they permit an insight into legal policies and the position of transportation in the national economy. 17 Šulc, Z jeviště i zákulisí české politiky a ekonomiky [On-Stage and Behind the Scenes of Czech Politics and Economy], 79. 18 Principles of State Transportation Policy. Appendix to the Decree of the Government of the ČSSR (see PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978, 13). 19 See “Report of the Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR on the Importance of Transportation in Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population,” 167.

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To begin, we quote the following basic statement of the direction of transport policy: The basic mission of transportation is to ensure with maximum social efficiency the satisfaction of the transport needs of the national economy and the population in accordance with the political-economic guidelines for advancing the national economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the standard of living, the environment, and the defense needs of the state. Transportation also contributes importantly to realization of the integration program of the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. (…) The aim of the state’s transportation policy is the coordinated development of the various kinds of transport within the framework of the transportation system, in order to satisfy the needs of society for transport with the maximum social efficiency and the necessary quality and punctuality. Development of the transport system must effectively contribute to the achievement of the optimal economy for the entire nation, that is, to the achievement of the maximum growth of national income with the minimum expenditure of social effort.20 The above-quoted excerpt describes the state’s transportation policy, the position of transport in the economy, and the basic direction for its development. According to this definition, transportation is a service which should “satisfy the needs of the national economy and the population” to the full extent those needs are defined by the plan. The result of this approach was that the railroads were totally overburdened by the 1970s. They were expected to accomplish their assigned tasks but were not given adequate resources to grow and create reserve capacity. Another interesting point is related to the expectation that the railways would satisfy the needs of society “with maximum social efficiency.” This effectively meant an open door to implementation of the wider theoretical concept of how transportation in Czechoslovakia should be organized and put into practice. According to this concept, the various transport sectors should define their own tasks and areas of operation in the national economy, while only the most efficient sector or mode of transport should be used for any given purpose. Efficiency was measured from both an economic and a “geopolitical” standpoint. Solutions that were cheap, effective, and realistic were preferred. Ideally, they would take advantage of the technology available in the Eastern Bloc without expending scarce reserves of Western foreign exchange. “Social efficiency” also meant taking into account the fuel-efficiency of transport as measured by 20 Principles of State Transportation Policy, Appendix to the Decree of the Government of the ČSSR (see PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978, 5).

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the specific consumption of fuel (or energy) per unit transported. Heavy, highcapacity modes of transport were preferred, including for passenger transport, but they did not always offer the highest possible speeds. This “theoretical” approach often did not bring the expected results.21 In passenger transportation, the railways were expected to focus on highdemand routes over middle and long distances and on mass transit in large cities and urban agglomerations.22 Freight transport by rail was meant to ensure movement of goods over medium and long distances and concentrate on foreign trade. Transport over short distances was to be done by mass transit from point to point,23 which de facto in today’s terminology was running of unit trains.24 Transport of persons and freight over shorter distances, especially in smaller volumes, was to be ensured by road transport. Road transport was expected to operate over longer distances only in cases where speed was essential or the shipper’s needs required it. It could also serve where needed for purposes of international trade.25 The state’s plan involved establishing a rail network that was consistent with the above-mentioned concept of transport and that would improve transportation efficiency in Czechoslovakia. While this was an admirable objective, it never was realized to its full extent in the economic plan. Measures for increasing efficiency were focused mainly on decreasing the distance between the supplier and the consumer of goods. Not too much distance should separate them, because otherwise the already overburdened transportation system would be even more stressed.26 The planners tried to achieve a state in which the overall growth of the economy would not require a proportionate increase in the demand for transportation. They never succeeded, although the annual increases in the performance of the railroads and road transport steadily declined in the 1970s. In the 1980s their performance practically did not increase at all. Nevertheless, the condition of the railroads did not improve—freight transport overwhelmed the network, resulting in its collapse and the obstruction of passenger transport.27​​

21 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportion in the ČSSR], 17–18. 22 Principles of State Transportation Policy, Appendix to the Decree of the Government of the ČSSR (see PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978, 6). 23 Principles of State Transportation Policy, Appendix to the Decree of the Government of the ČSSR (see PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978, 7). 24 A “unit train” is a freight train that carries goods for one customer from a single point of origin to a single destination without being broken up or combined with other trains. 25 Principles of State Transportation Policy, Appendix to the Decree of the Government of the ČSSR (see PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978, 7). 26 Principles of State Transportation Policy, Appendix to the Decree of the Government of the ČSSR (see PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978, 9). 27 See Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992 [The Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia 1918–1992], 391; Federal Statistics Office. Historická statistická ročenka Historical Statistical Yearbook], 311; Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 754.

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Figure 3.3 Headquarters of the State Planning Commission in Prague (photo from the 1950s or 1960s). Note: Author’s archives. The real result of political decisions does not always correspond to stated intent, as proved by the above-mentioned construction of the Eastern Slovakia Steelworks in Košice, where a huge complex for steel production was constructed far from the sources of needed raw materials, which had to be brought in from far away. The state’s schemes were in many respects professionally produced models which were not always successfully implemented or realized down to the last detail. “If only” everything had gone as the theory predicted, a streamlined transportation system could have been created that would have had a positive effect on the functioning of the economy and its cost-effectiveness. Other factors were at play here, however, mainly political decisions that placed greater weight on the particular political interests of regions and people than they did on central principles.

3.3 Institutions of the Railway Sector The organization of the railway sector in Czechoslovakia was set in 1945. After that time, some small changes and reallocations of competences were made at the ministerial level. The table below shows the changes in the bodies of the federal government that oversaw the rail sector. The most significant change after the war was the establishment of a Ministry of Railways in 1952, which was one of many efforts at reorganization in the 1950s. During the year-long existence

56

Policy-Making for the Railway Sector Table 3.4 Ministries and Agencies Responsible for Rail Transport Name of Ministry

Period

Ministry of Transportation Ministry of the Railways Ministry of Transportation Ministry of Transport and Communications Ministry of Transportation Federal Committee for Transportation Central Railways Administration Federal Ministry of Transportation

1945–1952 1952–1953 1953–1960 1960–1963 1963–1968 1968–1971 1969–1971 1971–1992

Source: “Vývoj dopravního archivnictví v Československu se zvláštním zřetelem k  archivům železničním” [Development of the Transportation Archives of Czechoslovakia with Special Emphasis on the Railway Archives].

of that Ministry, the move proved to be unworkable and the previous structure was reinstated. Other changes related mainly to the provision of information, a task that at different times was transferred into the Ministry of Transportation and then again out of the Ministry. The federalization of Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1960s brought changes in many state institutions. However, even after federalization, the railways remained under the supervision of the federal government’s agencies. For a while the Federal Committee for Transportation acted as the supreme body for transport. The Central Railways Administration was established later and placed under the aegis of the Federal Committee for Transportation.28​ ČSD was essentially the only company operating in the railway sector. Organizationally, it fell under the authority of the Central Directorate of the ČSD, which was a part of the Ministry of Transportation, with the exception of the years 1969 to 1971 when it stood outside the Ministry’s structure as the Central Railways Administration. The Ministry of Transportation controlled a number of railroad operation and repair shops, which functioned like independent manufacturing units.29 28 “The Development of the Transportation Archives in Czechoslovakia with Special Attention to the Railway Archives” (see “Vývoj dopravního archivnictví”). 29 See, for example, the list of economic organizations controlled by the FMD as of 1980, other than the individual railways: The Central Clearing House for Rail Cars; International Transport Control; Administration for Reconstruction of the Prague Rail Node; Administration for Railway Construction in the Eastern Slovak Region; ČSKD—INTRANS; Central Computer Technology Prague; Central Computer Technology Bratislava; Railway Telecommunications Administration; Central Institute for Railway Health Services; ČSD—Domestic Property Administration; ČSD—Dining and Sleeping Cars; Technical Fuel Center in Most; General Directorate of Industrial Railroad Repairs; the independent Railway Repair Shops and Machine Works in Martin-Vrútky, Trnava, Ostrava, Šumperk, Nymburk, Česká Lípa, Louny, and Pilsen; Institute for Development and Rationalization of Industrial Railway Repairs; Mechanization

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Table 3.5  Changes in the Organization of the Czechoslovak State Railways at the Level of the Individual Railways (Dráha) from 1952 to 1989 1952–1963

1963–1989

Pražská dráha (Prague) Ústecká dráha (Ústí n. L.) Plzeňská dráha (Plzeň) Ostravská dráha (Ostrava) Bratislavská dráha (Bratislava) Košická dráha (Košice)

Severozápadní dráha (Prague) Jihozápadní dráha (Plzeň) Střední dráha (Olomouc) Východní dráha (Bratislava)

Source: “Vývoj dopravního archivnictví v Československu se zvláštním zřetelem k  archivům železničním” [Development of the Transportation Archives of Czechoslovakia with Special Emphasis on the Railway Archives].

The ČSD was founded (or rather, reborn) in 1945 as a “state company.” From 1945 to 1952, ČSD was divided up, with a division for management and several subsidiary railways that functioned like independent and mostly self-sufficient entities. ČSD was further divided into functional units that ran the railway stations, locomotive sheds, and the like. The original number of six subsidiary railways was reduced in 1963 to four (see Table 3.5).30 The reason for these changes was the introduction of a new management structure and the creation of a new operations department for the subsidiary railways, which was further divided into operational divisions. The new management structure for ČSD was considered reasonably effective, so no further organizational changes were made until the end of the 1980s. Besides the individual railways that maintained the network of tracks and operated the trains that ran on them, ČSD had other units which concentrated on research, engineering plans, construction, as well as repair shops and other services for maintaining railway equipment.31 Some of these units were called manufacturing economic units (výrobně-hospodářské jednotky—VHJ), which represented a middle path of management. The VHJs arose in the context of the major restructuring of state enterprises after 1958. of Track Maintenance; the independent Martin-Vrútky, Praha; Railway Industry Construction Works; Railway Construction, independent in Bratislava, Brno and Prague; Railway Electrification Prague; Center for Development and Rationalization of Railway Construction; Automation of Railway Transport, independent in Prague and Bratislava, Specialized Company; State Institute for Transportation Design; and Transportation and Communications Publishing House. In: FMD, Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1979–1980 [Annual Report on Transportation for the year 1979–1980], 19 and 20. 30 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportion in the ČSSR], 49 and 50. 31 These entities included the Railway Research Institute, the State Institute of Railway Design, the Transportation and Communications Publishing House, and the like.

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The law on the federalization of Czechoslovakia deeply affected the transportation sector as a whole, but less so the railway sector. In the federal framework, management responsibilities were divided between federal authorities and the national republics and their national agencies. Transportation was one area where the line between the competencies of the federal and the national governments was blurred. This was true above all for road transport, specifically the regional branches of the Czechoslovak Automobile Transport company and the local mass transit companies. The railway sector, including ČSD, remained under central administration, although that result was not assured at the beginning of the debate over federalization. It was clear that given the tension between the Czech and Slovak parts of the state, there would be strong conflict within ČSD as well, conflict which loomed large at the end of the 1960s. As we have mentioned, federalization involved the division of the central Ministry of Transportation and Communications into two national institutions: the Ministry of Transportation of the Czech Socialist Republic and the Ministry of Transportation, Posts, and Telecommunications of the Slovak Socialist Republic. In the transition period between 1968 and 1971, at the federal level there existed the Federal Transportation Committee.32 The Central Railroad Administration was spun off from the Ministry of Transportation and became the supreme federal management agency for the railroads in the years from 1969 to 1971.33 Because of uncertainty and growing problems, the state institutions in the transportation sector were reorganized. From January 1, 1971, there was once again a single FMD, which took over the duties of the Central Railroad Administration and became the central management agency for the ČSD along with its previously mentioned subunits and divisions.34 At the time, there was discussion of the possibility of transforming the Central Railroad Administration into a Central Directorate for the ČSD and separating it from the FMD. This did not happen until halfway through 1989 with the enactment of Law no. 68/1989, “On the Organization of the Czechoslovak State Railways.”35 Until that time the Central Railroad Administration was part of the FMD. A new procedure for staffing the highest positions in the railway sector, which gave the Slovaks permanent representation in the central administration, was meant to lead to a mutually acceptable balancing of national interests.36 32 Federal Government of the ČSSR 1969–1989 (see Federální vlády ČSSR 1969–1989). 33 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportion in the ČSSR], 50. 34 Voráček et al., 30 let socialistické dopravy ČSSR [Thirty Years of Socialist Transportion in the ČSSR], 50. 35 Law no. 68/1989 Sb., “On the Organization of the Czechoslovak State Railways” (see Zákon č. 68/1989). 36 Position of the Fifth Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Proposal for Unified Management of Railway Transport presented by the Prime Minister, Ing. O. Černík, June 1969 (see “Návrh na organizační uspořádání řízení železniční dopravy”).

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In the course of discussions of the federalization of Czechoslovakia, the matter of the organization of the railroads was taken up at the highest levels. It was necessary to find a quick resolution, because it was clear that “the extremely unfavorable situation in rail transport urgently requires reconciling divergent points of view.”37 Failure to take necessary steps toward the federalization of the transportation sector and to clarify administrative competencies threatened to destabilize the rail transport sector. Contrary to the desires of the majority of railway employees, the Slovak political representation preferred that ČSD be divided into two national railway companies. The Czech position on the organization of the ČSD supported centralization. The differences of opinion and reluctance to take a decision on an effective solution for rail transport is reflected in a statement prepared by the Fifth Department of the Central Committee of the KSČ for a meeting of the Central Committee’s Presidium: It was not possible to overcome the differences in the evenly composed working groups or in a joint meeting of the Minister-president of the federal Committee on Transportation and the two national Ministers. Up to now both sides have insisted on their demands. The leadership of the federal Committee has taken almost no action and has left it up to the national ministers to resolve the disputes. In this situation, the dispute has grown into a serious political conflict, which even now is having very adverse effects on the administration of the railroads— especially at the level of the interim central railway administration and its board of directors. It can be said that the instability of the managing agencies is one of the main reasons for the serious operational problems that have manifested themselves in the past few weeks and months.38 In view of the inability of the lower levels to agree among themselves, a decision on possible changes in the organizational structure of the ČSD had to be taken at the highest level of the KSČ. The possibility of dividing the ČSD into Czech and Slovak components was examined from many angles, but in the end it was considered unacceptable, mainly because the two parts of the federation were so closely integrated, as is confirmed by transportation statistics. Every day 4,385 railcars traveled from the ČSR to the SSR and 4,369 in the opposite direction. Uniform technologies and management procedures were important 37 Position of the Fifth Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Proposal for Unified Management of Railway Transport presented by the Prime Minister, Ing. O. Černík, June 1969 (see “Návrh na organizační uspořádání řízení železniční dopravy”). 38 Position of the Fifth Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Proposal for Unified Management of Railway Transport presented by the Prime Minister, Ing. O. Černík, June 1969 (see “Návrh na organizační uspořádání řízení železniční dopravy”).

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for maintaining good relations with shippers and foreign railroad administrations. Splitting ČSD would have required dividing up its rolling stock and sharing the revenues from individual tracks, which would have been very difficult and would not have improved the functioning of the rail system—quite the opposite. In the view of the Fifth Department of the Central Committee, the railroads should remain unified in order to better fulfill the interests of society as a whole in the national defense and the development of the other sectors of the national economy.39 The supreme bodies therefore decided that other than setting quotas on the number of managers in the Ministry of Transport and ČSD, there would be no further organizational changes in the railroads. Until the breakup of Czechoslovakia, central federal administration of the railroads was never again questioned.

3.4 The Foreign Policy of Railway Transport In no country with the size and location of Czechoslovakia, and the strong export orientation of its industry, could the domestic railway sector function without the cooperation of foreign countries. From a historical perspective, cooperation with foreign railroads was always necessary for the maximum possible harmonization of technical standards, and ensuring that passenger and freight trains were mutually interoperable, and all aspects of normal rail traffic were well coordinated. Therefore, from the very beginning of the Czechoslovak Republic, the railway sector was the subject of a particular form of diplomacy, which was pursued by the ČSD itself and by the Ministry of Transportation on its behalf. This involved participation in various multilateral organizations and the maintenance of bilateral relationships, mainly with neighboring countries’ railroad administrations. The railway sector’s position was completely unique among Czechoslovakia’s economic and trade institutions. The Czechoslovak railways (and for some matters, the Ministry of Transportation) belonged to a large number of multilateral rail transport organizations that were the most important actors in coordination of the standards and the development of railroads and rail technology in Europe. Despite the division of Europe into two political power blocs, the activities of these organizations continued across the divide. Commercial exchanges between East and West carried on by the railroads did not stop with the rise of the Cold War, and so it was necessary to keep up mutual communication and coordination. As in other areas, the countries of the Eastern Bloc tried to establish parallel (or competing) railroad organizations, but in reality they never succeeded in creating

39 Position of the Fifth Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Proposal for Unified Management of Railway Transport presented by the Prime Minister, Ing. O. Černík, June 1969 (see “Návrh na organizační uspořádání řízení železniční dopravy”).

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platforms that were so strong that their decisions would be followed by Western railroad administrations, whether voluntarily or by coercion.40 The International Union of Railways is the oldest multilateral organization in the rail sector. It was founded in 1922 in Paris with the aim of standardizing international rail traffic to the maximum possible extent. The creation of the UIC was one of the first reactions to the newly established European borders after the end of World War I and to the differing levels of technical development within the countries of Europe. Because of Czechoslovakia’s geographic location and also its political attachments to France, the new country was one of the organization’s founding members. The most important body of the International Union of Railways was its General Assembly. Representatives of all member countries’ railroad administrations participated in it, but each country was entitled to a different number of votes. The number of votes was based on a calculation that was a function of the length of a country’s rail network. If a railroad represented the interests of another railroad, it could add the length of that rail network to its own total. The minimum number of votes was set at 3 and the maximum at 13.41 In 1980 the multilateral unions for international coach regulations (Regolamento Interazionale delle Carrozze—RIC) and for goods wagons (Regolamento Internazionale dei Veicoli—RIV) were merged into the UIC. The RIC was an international agreement on standards for construction of railway passenger wagons and their use in international traffic, created in 1922. Until the merger with the UIC, supervision of this agreement was in the hands of the Swiss Railways. The RIV was an agreement relating to freight wagons, founded on principles similar to the RIC. After World War II, Czechoslovakia’s coordinating body for membership in the UIC was the international department (O5) of the FMD. ČSD was represented at the General Assembly of the UIC by a deputy selected by the Minister of Transportation.42 As time went on, Czechoslovakia’s participation became limited to questions that directly affected its interests. This was mandated by the regulations of the FMD43 in order to conserve its scarce supplies of foreign currency. Here it must be noted that although the UIC was a worldwide organization for the integration of rail transport and its agenda was within the competency of the Ministry of Transportation, Czechoslovakia never deviated from the prescribed lines of the Eastern Bloc’s foreign policy. Czechoslovakia, along 40 Kopecký et al., Železnice v československé dopravní soustavě [The Railroads in the Czechoslovak Transportation Network], 126. 41 B—Voting, Special Provisions, 18, Methodology for Participation and Activity of ČSD in the International Railway Union (UIC) and Associated Organizations, May 21, 1981, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC. 42 Methodology for Participation and Activity of ČSD in the International Railway Union (UIC) and Associated Organizations, May 21, 1981, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC. 43 Methodology for Participation and Activity of ČSD in the International Railway Union (UIC) and Associated Organizations, May 21, 1981, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC.

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with the other countries of the Bloc, tried to promote the needs and the goals for integrated development of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in the UIC. Individual COMECON members’ interests were expressed only in very specific instances, such as the setting of international import duties based on the Montreux principle (about which more below). Also worth mentioning is the organization for international freight train timetables (the Livret indicateur International des Marchandises—LIM), in which Czechoslovakia participated as a founding member from 1923 and which coordinated timetables for long-distance freight trains. The first LIM conference took place in 1924 in České Budějovice with the participation of the Austrian, Yugoslav, and Italian railroads. The creation of a timetable for freight trains led to faster transport between member states of the LIM and coordination of crossborder transit of the trains of individual rail operators. The organization developed quickly and today unites the majority of international railway companies in Europe, operating under the name Forum Train Europe.44 The Organization for Cooperation between Railways (OSJD) was a competitor with the UIC as an international organization for rail transport, originating from within the Eastern Bloc. The ministers of transportation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Vietnam, China, North Korea, and Mongolia agreed to found the OSJD at a meeting in Warsaw on September 1, 1957, where the organization still has its headquarters to this day. Several international agreements setting standards for cross-border passenger and freight transportation formed the basis for the organization. In the area of long-distance transport, the OSJD advocated the establishment of international transit corridors for transport between Eastern Europe and East Asia, and elsewhere.45 The main difference between the two rail sector organizations was found in the nature of the economic relationships between their member railway administrations. In the UIC, all payments between members were settled in Swiss francs, which the countries of the Eastern Bloc had a hard time obtaining. In the OSJD, payments were made in convertible Russian rubles.46 Besides setting up the economic mechanisms used between its member railways, the OSJD considered all the important issues of coordination involved in the development of railroad infrastructure and technology. In the framework of scientific-technical cooperation, the organization tried to establish modern standards for infrastructure such as tracks, safety equipment, and dispatching technology, which its members were then expected to implement. The OSJD functioned outside the framework of COMECON through the end of the 1980s, although it did

44 See Forum Train Europe, official pages of the timetable organization LIM. 45 See Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD), official web pages of the organization. 46 Interview with Peltrám, 29 January 2015.

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closely cooperate with that organization.47 It represented Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European states in negotiations within the UIC on several specific issues. For example, officials of the ČSSR did not themselves take part in the ad hoc working groups on automatic couplings, the introduction of which was a long-time priority of the Eastern European railroads. Their vote was cast for them by the OSJD, which created joint working groups with the UIC on non-political, technical matters: the automatic couplers,48 electro-pneumatic brakes,49 and uniform numerical coding of rolling stock.50 COMECON was the most important coordinating body for economic policy in the Eastern Bloc, and its activities touched upon all sectors of transportation. A standing commission for cooperation in the area of transportation was set up within COMECON, which focused mainly on technical and developmental issues, that is, on scientific-technical cooperation. This was a wide-ranging agenda, which included planning for long-term technological development. Representatives of other transportation organizations met in the framework of COMECON, such as the OSJD, the Common Freight Car Pool (OPW), the Bureau for Joint Use of Containers, the Bureau for Coordination of Ship Freighting, and the Secretariat of the Danube Commission. The founding document of COMECON, to which these commissions made reference and adhered, was the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress.51 COMECON’s Standing Commission for Transportation Cooperation was not concerned only with a discussion of issues affecting member countries. One item on its agenda was communication and cooperation with the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (Conférence Européene des Ministres des Transports—CEMT). Besides developing common agendas and technologies, the Commission also provided a coordinating and negotiating forum for other matters. This included, for example, the upgrading and further development of a network of international express trains, InterExpres, in reaction to the rise of the InterCity network of express trains in the West, and also solving problems in the financial relationships within the OPW system.52 The Commission had a number of other agenda items for which temporary working groups were formed as necessary. 47 “Dvacet let komitétu OSŽD” [“Twenty Years of the OSŽD Commission”], 289–290. 48 The coupler is a device that connects two rail cars and transfers traction, and in some cases pushing, between rail cars. An automatic coupling permits automatic connection and disconnection of rail cars, sometimes along with the train’s brake, electric, and electronic circuits. 49 The electro-pneumatic brake is an automatic brake operating on compressed air, which can be controlled with an electro-pneumatic valve. 50 Methodology for Participation and Activity of ČSD in the International Railway Union (UIC) and Associated Organizations, May 21, 1981, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC. 51 Role of COMECON in the Area of Transportation for the Period 1991–1995, 1989, in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 14 VTS RVHP. 52 Role of COMECON in the Area of Transportation for the Period 1991–1995, 1989, in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 14 VTS RVHP.

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One of the most basic forms of cooperation among the COMECON’s railroad administrations was the above-mentioned OPW.53 This was an agreement for the joint use of freight cars in international traffic, which enabled an increase in efficiency, mainly by reducing the number of cars returning empty to their home country from abroad. The OPW’s goal was creating a common pool of freight cars that could serve in international operations. Both two- and four-axle cars with a minimum top speed of 100 km/h were included in the pool. Each member railway provided OPW with a certain number of its cars, but by no means all of them. The common scheme facilitated operations and allowed higher speeds and better coordination of international freight traffic. Where before freight cars usually returned empty to their country of origin after being unloaded, with the OPW they were placed at the disposal of the railway in the country where they stood. They could be put to work (mostly in international commerce) without traveling about empty. This allowed for greater efficiency in the use of cars and a reduction in the cost of international transport. Every member railway administration was allotted a maximum number of cars in the OPW that could be located on its territory at any one time. If that number was exceeded, it was necessary to pay an extra fee.54 One of the main proponents of the OPW was the Hungarian Minister of Transportation, György Csanádi,55 because Hungary—through whose territory a large part of the exports of the Eastern Bloc passed—was one of those countries that profited the most from the system. An agreement on the creation and circulation of a common pool of freight cars was signed in December 1963. The OPW operated from 1964 to mid-1990, and its members were Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. The central office of the OPW was in Prague. The highest body of the OPW was its Council, on which one representative from each member country sat. The Council met at least once a year and was empowered to negotiate all issues affecting the achievement of the aims of the OPW agreement. It took decisions only with the unanimous consent of all the parties to the agreement. The day-to-day operations of the OPW were handled by the Bureau for the Common Freight Car Pool. Its director and his deputy, who enjoyed the same international status as officials of COMECON, were appointed by the Council. The Bureau supervised the circulation of freight cars, and if a member railway used more cars than it put into the system, it had to pay a mandated fine, payment of which was enforced by the Bureau of the OPW.56 Bilateral relationships in rail transport are impossible to separate from Czechoslovakia’s overall bilateral political relationships with other states. The 53 Kábrt, Společný park nákladních vozů (OPW) [The Common Pool of Freight Cars (OPW)]. 54 Klatt and Willms, Strukturwandel und makroökonomische Steuerung [Structural Change and Macroeconomic Management], 493. 55 Frisnyák, “The Centrally Planned Economy and Railways in Hungary,” 178. 56 Regulation no. 187/1964, Notice from the Minister of Foreign Affairs About the Agreement to Create a Common Pool of Freight Cars of September 8, 1964 (see Předpis č. 187/1964).

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hierarchy and intensity of those relationships were only partially dictated by political factors. For the most part, operational factors were decisive. Relationships reflected the importance of individual neighboring railroad networks to crossborder and transit traffic. The political bloc to which the neighbor state belonged did of course play a role in deciding how it fit into the doctrine of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Transportation relationships with “friendly” countries, including rail transport issues, were guided by a permanent transportation commission at the ministerial level or even a bilateral government-to-government commission. Despite very good transport policy relations with some countries of the Western Bloc, like the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), not a single agreement was concluded at the ministerial or government level with a Western partner before 1989. Although the political approach to individual countries differed, Czechoslovakia’s transport relations with all of its neighbors were on a very good footing. With only minor exceptions the parties took a constructive approach to resolving all issues that arose. We will illustrate the relationships with some examples from both sides of the Iron Curtain. First we will turn to the FRG, which was a member of the Western Bloc, but at the same time a key partner for transportation. Relationships with Germany in the area of transportation had to function smoothly for economic reasons. We will also discuss bilateral relationships with some members of the Eastern Bloc, specifically the GDR, Poland, and Hungary. The general representation offices that the Czechoslovak railways established in the most important partner countries during the 1960s and 1970s were effectively railway embassies. They were opened in Frankfurt am Main (for West Germany), in Berlin (for the GDR), in Warsaw, in Vienna, and in Stockholm. Their main task was to represent the interests of the ČSD and negotiate the most important commercial and tariff issues. The rail transportation agenda was handled by these representatives of the ČSD directly, and not by the commercial sections of the Czechoslovak embassies, as was the case for other industrial enterprises.57 The reader may be asking, why are we not paying much attention to the Austrian railways (Österreichische Bundesbahnen—ÖBB) and the Soviet railways (SŽD)? Unfortunately, source material on those relationships is not available in the archives in separate collections related to international cooperation, and at this time it is not possible to search it out. Relations between the Czechoslovak railways and the Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) reproduced the political relations between the two states, with some delay. After World War II, the usual diplomatic relationships did not exist between Czechoslovakia and the FRG. After West Germany regained full sovereignty in its foreign policy in 1955, the so-called Hallstein Doctrine was introduced, by 57 ČSD—General Representation in Frankfurt am Main, FRG, Appointment of Dr. Antonín Kábrt to a Long-term Posting, Federal Ministry of Transportation, 1968, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1.

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which West Germany would not recognize, and would even break off diplomatic relations with any country that fully recognized the GDR, as Czechoslovakia of course did, along with all the other countries of the Eastern Bloc. Despite long tradition and the relatively high degree of mutual exchange, neither country maintained full official diplomatic relations with the other. Some contacts therefore took place between intermediaries or through the offices of commercial enterprises.58 Relations in the field of rail transport were never opened up at the ministerial or government level with the Deutsche Bundesbahn or for that matter, with the FRG. All questions were resolved in bilateral negotiations, but at a lower level than with the member nations of COMECON. Most of the international transportation agenda was handled by the administration of the Northwest Railways in Czechoslovakia and the district directorate of the DB in Nuremberg. From the end of World War II until 1949, transportation matters were handled in negotiations between the Czechoslovak government and the administration of the American zone of occupation in Germany. This was expensive for Czechoslovakia but could not be avoided until contractual relationships were established between the two national railway operators. The situation also led to difficulties on the ground. Border crossings were blocked by empty rail cars returning from abroad because their use on the return trip was not possible without an appropriate agreement.59 In 1949 DB and ČSD joined in the results of the Montreux conference, which regulated transit commerce and mandated a so-called dollar tariff for mutual settlement of amounts owing for customs duties. We will devote more attention to this in the chapter on conditions in the rail sector. Changes in the contractual basis for cooperation in rail transport between Czechoslovakia and the FRG did not come about until the 1960s, in connection with changes in the direction of the relationship between the two countries, a general relaxation of tensions, and the gradual abandonment of West Germany’s rigorous approach to its foreign policy in the form of the Hallstein doctrine. The “first swallow” of better contractual relations in the area of rail transport was the signing of an “Agreement on Border Crossings” on April 25, 1964. This document was concluded between the two national rail companies and in the absence of diplomatic relations served in place of an international agreement between their governments.60 The opening of official commercial relations between Czechoslovakia and the German Federal Republic and the establishment of commercial representations 58 For more on the development of mutual transport relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG, see: Jakubec, Československo-německé dopravněpolitické vztahy v období studené války [Czechoslovak-German Transportation-Political Relations in the Time of the Cold War], 66–97. 59 Jakubec, Československo-německé dopravněpolitické vztahy v období studené války [Czechoslovak-German Transport Policy Relations in the Time of the Cold War], 88–92. 60 Opening of the Meeting on Contractual Arrangements for Transport Relations between the ČSSR and FRG, November 24, 1971, vol. 24, unit 25/10, Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1971–1976.

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in 1967 and 1968 can be considered the forerunner of fully normalized relations. Room was then made for the relationship to intensify. The policies of Willy Brandt toward the countries of the Eastern Bloc led to new developments. In 1970, bilateral negotiations on the reopening of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the Eastern European states began. Negotiations with Czechoslovakia took longer than with any other country of the Eastern Bloc, continuing on until 1973. The most serious problem in the way was the still unresolved issue of the Munich Agreement of September 1938. From 1968, practical bilateral communications with the Deutsche Bundesbahn were handled by the ČSD’s general representation in Frankfurt am Main. The ČSD office mainly resolved traffic and commercial matters for both freight and passenger transport.61 On the other hand, the Deutsche Bundesbahn did not have a representation office in Prague and never considered establishing one. In negotiations, it was agreed that DB would at least send its representatives to Prague at the time when Czechoslovakia’s five-year plan was in the final stages of preparation. In the end, not even this plan was realized, with the result that small issues in the mutual relationship had to be resolved between the directorate of the railroad in Nuremberg and the administration of the Southwest Railways in Pilsen. More complicated issues were addressed by ČSD’s general representation office in Frankfurt am Main.62 Relations between Czechoslovakia and the GDR were much less complicated than they were with West Germany. The first agreement on rail transport between the two governments was concluded in October 1955 and was intended to improve the flow of traffic at the railroad border crossings. That agreement was replaced by one between the governments of the ČSSR and GDR on cooperation in the area of rail transportation, signed in 1972.63 Based on that agreement, a ČSSR-GDR permanent working group for transportation began to meet regularly, concerned with issues affecting all modes of transport. Because relationships with the Deutsche Reichsbahn (DR) constantly intensified, the ČSD opened a general representation office in East Berlin.64 Besides operational matters, the ČSD maintained very intensive cooperation with the DR in the area of technology. A 1984 agreement on cooperation in the development of specialized equipment for track maintenance (Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and GDR on Cooperation in Research, Development, and Production of Machines and Equipment for the Construction 61 Cooperation between the ČSSR and GDR in the Area of Transportation and Communications, February 17, 1989, in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 SRN 1989. 62 Report on the Meeting of Deputy Federal Minister of Transportation Ing. Miloslav Škárka with a Member of the Board of Directors of the Deutsche Bahn, Ing. Hans Wiedemann, August 1986, in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987. 63 Governmental Agreement between the ČSSR and GDR in the Area of Transport—Proposal of the Minister of Transport of the GDR, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1. 64 ČSD—General Representation in Berlin, GDR, Appointment of Ing. Ladislav Šimovič, Federal Ministry of Transportation.

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and Maintenance of Tracks and for Improving Efficiency)65 is evidence of that. The agreement was similar to others for technological and development cooperation that were agreed to in the framework of COMECON. However, as a report by the FMD states, attempts at coordination of the rail transport sector at the level of COMECON had not succeeded, and so both countries entered into a bilateral agreement.66 The agreement parceled out specializations in the development and production of equipment for controlling and maintaining tracks. It also set goals for the volume of production of such equipment for the years 1986–1990.67 Relationships in the area of rail transport between Czechoslovakia and Poland had to be redefined after 1945 because of the postwar changes in the territory of the Polish Republic. Poland was an important northern neighbor of Czechoslovakia, joined with it by many (originally German) rail lines. The volume of freight traffic between the two countries increased. Their mutual relations were complicated by two things: the short war over the area of Těšín (Silesia) in 1919, in which maintaining supplies of coal and the railroad connections between the Czech lands and Slovakia played a major role, and Polish steps that once again threatened Czechoslovakia’s interests in the area in the fall of 1938. In the new geopolitical conditions after 1945, political cooperation between the two countries developed slowly. They were faced with enormous tasks of postwar reconstruction, and therefore relations normalized first in the economic area. The industrial complex in Upper Silesia was informally cooperating with the Moravian-Silesian region of Czechoslovakia even before the conclusion of a bilateral agreement. The first two years after the war were beset by numerous political uncertainties and also some minor disagreements over borders, which were resolved with an Agreement on Friendship and Mutual Cooperation between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish Republic.68 Parallel to resolution of the political questions, economic cooperation at the highest levels 65 Agreement between the Government of the ČSSR and the Government of the GDR on Cooperation in Research, Development, and Production of Machines and Equipment for Constructing and Maintaining Tracks, and Means for Economizing, 1984. 66 Report of the Federal Ministry of Transportation on the Agreement between the Government of the ČSSR and the Government of the GDR on Cooperation in Research, Development, and Production of Machines and Equipment for Constructing and Maintaining Tracks, and Means for Economizing, 1984. 67 Czechoslovakia was to specialize in the development and construction of various kinds of equipment for cleaning gravel rail beds, including cleaning them while the equipment was moving along the rails, for earthmoving, for replacing sleepers, and other auxiliary equipment. The GDR was to specialize in multi-spindle Archimedes screws and compactors, small and medium size sleeper tampers, and medium track measuring technology. In: Agreement between the Government of the ČSSR and the Government of the GDR on Cooperation in Research, Development, and Production of Machines and Equipment for Construction and Maintenance of Tracks and Means for Economizing, 1984, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1. 68 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Republic of Poland, no. 154/1947 (see “Smlouva o přátelství a vzájemné pomoci”).

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was unblocked. “Normalization” of commercial relations culminated in 1947, when the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, Hubert Ripka, and the Polish Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, signed an Agreement on Ensuring Economic Cooperation.69 The development of transport relationships was a top priority of that agreement, focusing on the “highest development of mutual exchanges of land and services” and the “highest use of bilateral resources in the areas of transport, export, and transit, whether on land, by sea and rivers, or in the air.”70 By mutual agreement, the executive agency for economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Poland was the Council for Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Cooperation, whose auxiliary bodies were known as mixed working groups, including one on transportation. Transport relationships were part of the agenda of mutual economic cooperation for more than a decade. Two specific transport issues predominated in the political agenda. One was the situation on two péage routes, Hrádek nad Nisou-Zittau, from which the line continued on through German territory to Varnsdorf in Czechoslovakia, and Javorník in Silesia-Mikulovice. The first case was resolved in 1949,71 and the second after a short escalation of political tensions immediately after the end of World War II,72 in a mutual agreement reached in 1948.73 A comprehensive arrangement for bilateral political-transportation relations was contained in an international agreement signed in August 1958.74 It referenced the regulation traffic at the border crossings in an ancillary agreement between the Czechoslovak and Polish railway administrations, which was itself part of another agreement that clarified the state borders. The bilateral relationship between the Czechoslovak and Polish railway administrations, and the ministries of transportation as well, was very intense due to the huge importance to both countries of transiting traffic. Czechoslovak goods moving to Baltic seaports passed back and forth through Polish territory. A large part of Polish coal

69 Kořalková, “O zrodu československo-polského spojeneckého svazku” [“On the Birth of the Czechoslovak-Polish Alliance”], 11. 70 Governmental Decree no. 10/48, which brought the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Republic of Poland, signed in Prague on July 4, 1947, into temporary force. 71 Agreement between the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the Republic of Poland on Privileged Transit on the Railways from Czechoslovakia to Czechoslovakia through Poland in the LiberecVarnsdorf Sector, 1949 (see “Ujednání mezi republikou Československou a republikou Polskou [Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish Republic]”). 72 “Zakázaná válka” [“The Forbidden War”]. 73 Agreement between the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the Republic of Poland on Privileged Transit on the Railways from Czechoslovakia to Czechoslovakia through Głuchołazy of November 12, 1948, in: Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 45/2005 (see “Dohoda mezi republikou Československou a republikou Polskou [Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish Republic]”). 74 Regulation no. 59/1958. Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs About the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish People’s Republic on Mutual Railway Transport, August 28, 1958 (see Předpis č. 59/1958).

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exports passed through Czechoslovak territory, mainly to the southern member states of COMECON but also to western countries as well.75 Cooperation by the Czechoslovak railways with their Hungarian partners was also very intense, despite some delicate historical problems connected with the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. A large number of border crossings joined the two countries, through which a great deal of commercial traffic passed—more than with any other of Czechoslovakia’s neighboring countries. Moreover, the strong ties of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia with Hungary meant that there was a great deal of passenger traffic back and forth across the border with that country. Bilateral issues with Hungary were resolved in a similar manner to those with other countries of the Eastern Bloc. A permanent Czechoslovak-Hungarian transport commission was set up, which dealt with a wide range of problems in the transport sector. The main issue in rail transport was increasing capacity and modernizing the border crossings between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which were a bottleneck for bilateral trade and commerce transiting from north to south. The infrastructure could not handle the stress of increasing transport demand.76 Strengthening north-south connections was also in the interest of Poland and its export policies. Cooperation with Hungary was outstanding in other transport-related areas as well. For example, the construction arm of ČSD assisted in the development of the Hungarian railways from the end of the 1960s.77

3.5 Chapter Summary The railway sector had a similar institutional structure and similar decisionmakers as other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy, however, the intensity of the interest in the sector shown by the party organs of the KSČ decreased over time. The reason for this was the gradual consolidation of the agendas of the political leadership and government agencies in Czechoslovakia. In the case of the railway sector, this meant a huge increase in the experts’ agenda and the establishment of a FMD after the federalization of the Republic. One of ČSD’s peculiarities was its close ties with the FMD, which meant that in fact it did not have a fully fledged corporate structure. After state and institutional reforms 75  Protocol of the XXII. Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transportation Commission, which was held on March 25–28, 1975, in Olomouc, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 76 Information on the Proposed Decree of the Government of the ČSSR. Negotiation of the Protocol on Activation of the railway border crossing at Lupkow-Medzilaborce. Office of the Prime Minister of the ČSSR, 1974, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, Z15 Hraniční přechody. 77  Joint Report of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Hungarian Transportation Commission to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Committee for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43, 44 Československo-maďarská dopravní komise.

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in Czechoslovakia that followed federalization at the beginning of the 1970s, the railways retained their centralized management despite numerous efforts by Slovak politicians to change that. From the standpoint of economic policy, the Czechoslovak railways were a sector-wide enterprise. Its success in fulfilling the tasks assigned to it by the state plan was measured by volume indicators. The railroads were certainly one of the most efficient forms of transport. Nevertheless, competitors to it quickly arose in the form of highway transportation of freight and passengers. Moreover, transportation using personal automobiles became more and more important. One particularity of the railway sector compared to other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy was its independent foreign activity, which grew out of the historical need for international coordination in technical and operational matters. The Ministry of Transportation and the ČSD were very active in that regard and participated in a number of international multilateral transportation and railroad-related organizations, as well as maintaining bilateral relationships with neighboring countries and their railway administrations. Their agenda of course conformed to Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy positions, but no more so than did the agendas of entities whose foreign activities were under the full control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In the case of the FRG, the Czechoslovak railways pursued their own kind of autonomous diplomacy irrespective of political doctrines or crises, which mainly dealt with operational and commercial matters. ČSD’s relations with other countries of the Eastern Bloc were not so unusual, but they always maintained their own accent and issues, which were defined by the interests and needs of the railway itself.

4 THE INTERNAL MECHANISMS OF THE RAILWAY SECTOR

The internal mechanisms of the railways were in many respects similar to those of other sectors of the national economy. They differed however in their complexity, and in the tasks that the railways were expected to fulfill. Those tasks were not only the ones assigned by the economic plan, but other political and strategic missions as well. We described the chain of command (the “management vertical”) for the railway sector in the previous chapters.1 At the top stood actors with the power to make high-level decisions about the railways’ affairs and to set strategic goals for the rail sector as a whole. At the bottom was ČSD, which was further divided into various organizational units. The political, economic, and national security organs of government actively participated in defining tasks for the Czechoslovak railways. The political sphere outlined the basic parameters for its operations and assigned it the jobs the political leadership deemed most important, among which was supporting the Spartakiad communist regime mass gymnastics shows. The economic agencies defined their tasks for the railroads as part of the central economic plan, from which all the benchmarks and internal relationships of the transportation sector were derived, and which also set tariffs and the amount of investments to be made. The national security area included matters of both internal security and the national defense, in which the railroads played a key transport role and were expected to always be ready to fulfill their assigned duties if needed. The economic role of the railroads was of particular importance for the functioning of the railways and the scope of the railway network. To illustrate, we will cite some examples of the way the internal mechanisms of the sector functioned. This chapter focuses in the first place on the state’s economic plan and the tasks it established for the railway sector, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. We then turn to the basic economic parameters of the sector, in particular the way tariffs were set. Tariff-setting is an important matter, but it was not all that important in a centralized, planned economy. However, profits and losses were subjects of the plan and their imbalance resulted in the sector’s long-term lack of self-sufficiency, which became apparent in the course of the transition to a market economy after 1989. We will also discuss some of the political and strategic objectives set for the railroads. One of the most extensive logistical tasks of the 1 See the economic definition of “management vertical” found in Mlčoch, Československý ekonomický systém v 70. a 80. Letech [The Czechoslovak Economic System in the 1970s and 1980s], 7.



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ČSD, which the political sphere demanded be fulfilled no matter the cost, was transporting gymnasts and onlookers to the Czechoslovak Spartakiads. In the strategic area, the railways were very important to the military’s plans, both for the defense of the territory of Czechoslovakia and supporting a possible “counterattack” on the West by Warsaw Pact forces.

4.1 The Transportation Sector in the Central Plan The most important objectives for transportation, as they were set forth in the central economic plan, gradually changed over the years from 1949 to 1989. A quantitative analysis shows how transportation policy was reflected in the legal framework establishing the plans and how performance indicators for the sector were chosen. In some cases, mainly for investments, the achievement of planned goals that depended upon the actions of suppliers outside the transportation sector was delayed or not achieved at all. The majority of the laws we examined were amended while they were in force. However, the changes affected transportation only in marginal ways and thus were not necessary to analyze.2 All the central economic plans—one-year, two-year, and five-year—were established by law and were accompanied by very detailed regulations that set precise tasks and plans for the ministries and enterprises. Because of a lack of specificity in the laws, our review of the top-level legislation does not allow us to obtain deep insight into how it functioned or uncover all the complexities of the national economic plan. However, we can see how certain goals were prescribed in the legislation and how they were pursued by the pertinent authorities. The time frame in which the five-year plans were approved is a clue to the worsening of the overall economic situation and the difficulty of preparing economic plans that were often unrealistic and overtaken by events from the very moment they were enacted. The five-year plans at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s were often given final approval well after they were already under way. The first Czechoslovak five-year plan was approved in 1948 and was to run from 1949 to 1953. Part IV of the implementing legislation, entitled “Development of Transportation,” was devoted to the transportation sector. This included “postal transportation,” meaning the telephone and telegraph networks and the “mechanization and motorization of the operations” of the post office. Overall, the plan contained rather extensive mentions of transportation and very clearly defined goals for its planned growth. Only a few paragraphs were devoted to the growth of transportation, setting a goal of significantly increasing the volume of goods and people transported. The plan foresaw strong growth in dieselpowered locomotives and smaller growth in steam propulsion.3​​​

2 Půlpán, Nástin českých a československých hospodářských dějin do roku 1990 [Outline of Czech and Czechoslovak Economic History to the Year 1990], 198. 3 Development of Transportation, para. 11–13, Part II, Section IV, in: Law no. 241/1948 Sb., “On the First Five-year Plan for Development of the Czechoslovak Republic” (see Zákon č. 241/1948).

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Figure 4.1 Festive decorations on the station building at Štramberk, May 1, 1950. Note: Text on the building reads, “Long Live the First of May!,” “Speed up the Circulation of Engines and Wagons,” “Increase the Safety of Transportation,” and “Forward to Accomplishment of the Further Tasks of the Five-Year Plan.” A portrait of Czechoslovak President Klement Gottwald hangs on the building. Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. The first five-year plan did not achieve its expected results. The poor situation of the overall Czechoslovak economy was underlined by the currency reform carried out in 1953.4 For that reason, the economic plans for the years 1954 and 1955 were enacted on a one-year basis. The two laws establishing the plans mentioned transportation more briefly than they did for the previous plan. They devoted only a few lines to it in one paragraph entitled “Transportation and Communications,” which included all kinds of transport, including the post office and telecommunications. In 1954, besides growth in the volume of transportation, changes in technology were called for that would remove the obstacles in the path of increased efficiency.5 These changes included speeding up the 4 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992 [The Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia 1918–1992], 284. 5 Transportation and Communications, para 4, Part II, in: Law no. 2/1954 “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the Year 1954” (see Zákon č. 2/1954).

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Figure 4.2 Steam locomotive 498.015 at the head of an express train from Prague to Moscow, Pardubice 1951. Note: Locomotive emblazoned “PragueMoscow.” Collection of Roman Jeschke. circulation of rail cars and increasing the average weight of the freight trains could carry by introducing unit trains. The 1955 plan more or less repeated the precepts of the previous year. For the first time, it mentioned motorbus transportation and improving its quality. The fleet of buses was to be enlarged and the number of buses waiting for repair reduced.6 The law on the second five-year plan, which began in 1955, was not adopted until October 1958. It marginalized the transport sector. The independent part or paragraph entitled “Transportation and Communications” entirely disappeared and only a brief, if specific, mention of development planned for the sector was retained. The plan called for a 61 percent increase in the ton-kilometers of freight transported on the railroads and a 57 percent increase on the roads. By the end of the five-year plan, the electrification of the Ústí nad LabemNymburk and Prague-Česká, Třebová-Valašské, Meziříčí-Žilina lines was to be completed.7​​ The third five-year plan from 1960 to 1965, adopted in November 1960, meant a return to extensive discussion of the transportation sector. The entire Part IV of the plan, entitled “Development of Transportation and Communications,” was 6 Transportation and Communications, para. 4, Part II, Law no. 12/1955 “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the year 1955” (see Zákon č. 12/1955). 7 Para. 3, Law no. 63/1958 “On the Second Five-year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic” (see Zákon č. 63/1958).

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Figure 4.3 Decorated steam locomotive at the head of a passenger train in the Děčín station, May 1, 1952. Note: Text on the locomotive reads, “May 1, Labor Day.” Portraits (from left): Czechoslovak President Klement Gottwald, Soviet leader Josef Stalin. Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. divided into paragraphs on “Transportation” (§13) and “Communications (§14). The national economic plan again counted on significant growth in transportation by rail, on the highways, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of new technology was also mentioned, such as equipping 790 km of track with automatic block signaling,8 3,100 km of track with automatic train stops,9 and 101 train stations with safety relays.10 As for highway infrastructure, the plan also foresaw the start of construction of the superhighway from Prague to Brno.11 The fourth five-year plan, from 1965 to 1970, did not devote an individual section or paragraph to the transportation sector, which apparently was because the law itself was rather concise. Tasks assigned to the sector were mentioned only twice. Among other things, the plan called for faster modernization of rail   8 Automatic block signaling is equipment that divides a track into sections and ensures that only one train is operating on each section.   9 Automatic train stops are equipment that allows for halting all trains on a particular track in the case of an emergency by means of a special radio signal. 10 Safety relays are electronic equipment for ensuring the safety of railway operations. 11 Transportation, para. 13, Part IV—Development of Transportation and Communications, in: Law no. 165/1960, “On the Five-year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (see Zákon č. 165/1960).

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Figure 4.4 Electric locomotive E499.022 at the head of a passenger train in the Štrba station, 1955. Note: Text on the locomotive reads, “To Socialism via Electrification.” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. transport so that steam-powered locomotives could “essentially” be phased out by the year 1970. There was a reference to reconstruction of the rail network. An attempt at beginning construction of a superhighway was again announced, although its exact path was not specified in the law. Specific goals for the growth of transport were not part of this law. Only a planned increase in investment into the sector was listed.12 The trend to including only a few details in the law (as opposed to the plan for its implementation, which remained quite detailed) applied equally to the law setting forth the fifth five-year plan for the years 1971–1975. That law did not mention transportation at all.13 Things changed in the law on the sixth five-year plan for the years 1976 to 1980. The tasks and objectives for the transportation sector were concentrated in one paragraph (§6), which also talked about telecommunications. The plan called for growth in transportation as always, but it also cited one technological 12 Points 2c and 6, para. 2, Law no. 83/1966, “On the Fourth Five-year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (see Zákon č. 83/1966). 13 Law no. 101/1971, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1971 to 1975” (see Zákon č. 101/1971).

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Figure 4.5  Festive decorations at the Frýdek-Místek station, 1963. Note: Text on the banner reads, “We Salute the Eighteenth Anniversary of the Liberation of Our Country. Thanks to the Soviet People for our Liberation.” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. innovation—the development of a containerized transport system—about which more in other chapters. It is possible to read a host of problems reflected in the statement “increase the safety and improve the travel comfort”—beginning with individual automobile travel and the high death toll on the roads, through the dismal state of the rail sector’s rolling stock, to the overall shoddy conditions of passenger transport on the railroads (for more details on the situation, see below).14 The law on the seventh five-year plan (1981–1985) was successfully approved in December 1981. “Development of transportation and communications” received its own paragraph, which again included telephone communications. Considerably lower growth in the performance of the railways was expected compared to previous economic plans—a 5 percent increase over the entire lifespan of the seventh plan. The document does mention however the need to “reduce the cost of transporting social production, mainly by steps toward economizing on the part of shippers and elimination of ineffective cooperation 14 Point a, para. 6, Part I, Law no. 69/1976 Sb., “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1976 to 1980” (see Zákon č. 69/1976).

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and uneconomic transportation of goods” and also “develop an advanced transportation system and reduce the energy intensity of all modes of transport.” This reflected a key problem of economy of the day—every percentage point increase in the growth of the economy resulted in a further increase in the demand for transport of goods and people. Thus one goal of the state’s plan was to limit the so-called energy intensity of transportation and reduce industry’s demand for it.15 The basics of the eighth five-year plan (1986–1990), the last one to be implemented, were established in a law that once again was not adopted until the end of the first year covered by the plan (in December 1986). In comparison to earlier plans, the eighth plan contained a somewhat more extensive mention of transportation in a comprehensive paragraph devoted to “the development of transportation and communications.” Unlike previous laws on the plans, no specific indicators (volume goals, scope of investment, overall percentage growth, and the like) were established. The law focused on principles for development, which can generally be summarized as an attempt at economical, flexible, and energyefficient freight transport, and a preference for public passenger transport. The railways and urban mass transit were to be further electrified in order to reduce the average consumption of fuel. For urban transit that meant extending trams, trolleybuses, and subway lines. As for infrastructure, the plan called for innovation, reconstruction of rail lines and stations, and the expansion of electrification and automatic safety stations.16 After reviewing the tasks of the transportation sector mentioned in the laws establishing the central economic plans from 1949 to 1990, we can say the following: the frequent mentions of transportation in the laws supporting the regulations and defining the goals of the plans underscore the importance of transportation to their overall success. The fourth through sixth plans (1966– 1985) were something of an exception, when transportation was mentioned only briefly or even not at all, as was the case in the 1971–1975 plan. That situation can be ascribed to the important political and economic changes that took place at that time—the attempt at economic and political reform followed by the period of normalization—and also to a loss of interest in further developing and modernizing the transportation sector, whose performance at the time was reaching its highest level in the country’s history.17 The goals of the plans gradually changed from the clearly defined expected outcomes in the first economic plan to rather declarative statements of needed progress in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Now there were mentions of general 15 Para. 11, Part I, Law no. 122/1981, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1981–1985” (see Zákon č. 122/1981). 16 Development of Transportation and Communications, para. 9, Part II, Law no. 87/1986 “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czech Socialist Republic for the years 1986–1990” (see Zákon č. 87/1986). 17 The author used his own criteria to evaluate how extensively the sector was mentioned in the laws.

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attempts at “conservation” and increasing “economic activity.” Some statements refer to operational problems: excessively long routes run by freight-carrying vehicles, incomplete loading of railroad cars, and a poor travel comfort. From today’s perspective it is surprising that even the plans for which there was a bare minimum of quantitative, verifiable indicators were never fulfilled. A few trends can be observed. It is remarkable that despite the decreasing specificity of the steps called for in the plans, from the 1960s the goals they set were largely unmet or were significantly delayed in being realized, especially the goals for the rail sector and for development of highway infrastructure (see Table 4.1 below). The very ambitious goals of the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s were in fact fulfilled, obviously thanks to the very rapid growth of the economy at that time. One reason was that the plans put an emphasis on heavy industry, which was advantageous for fulfillment of the volume goals set for the transport of freight. The goals for development and expansion of infrastructure were also successfully met, even though economic growth slowed in the years from 1953 to 1955. The growing number of instances over time where the criteria of the plan went unfulfilled was evidence that the central organs of the government were unable to prepare a realistic, rational, and fulfillable plan for the national economy, that the problems and stagnation of the economy were increasing, and that the government could not institute a comprehensive program of investment, not only for the transportation sector but for other sectors as well (about which more below). The goals set by the fifth five-year plan (1966–1970) are examples of this. According to the plan, steam traction on the rail network was to be eliminated (with only some exceptions) by the year 1970. In reality, this could only be accomplished ten years later and steam locomotives were still being used in some places as late as 1982. Deep deficits in investment and infrastructure in the transportation sector resulted in the inefficiency of what investment there was and congestion of the rail lines with unprofitable traffic. ​ The above statistics on the objectives set for the transportation sector and their fulfillment must be viewed in the light of the trend in the national income in the time of the centrally planned economy. Despite all attempts at reform, the performance of the Czechoslovak economy constantly declined, with only small variations. Year-on-year growth at the end of the 1970s was minimal. The statistics showing the (in)ability of the economy to fulfill the plans and make significant investments correlate with this decline.18 If we perform a similar analysis of the laws on economic planning in other important areas, for example in industrial production, we notice something interesting. Although the form and extent of the mentions of industrial production changed, the sector was never entirely marginalized and quantitative goals 18 Jakubec et al., Hospodářský vývoj Českých zemí v období 1948–1992 [The Economic Development of the Czech Lands in the Period 1948–1992].

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Table 4.1 Number of Specifically Verifiable Indicators Related to the Transport Sector (Excluding Communications) in the Laws on the National Economic Plan in the Years 1949 through 1990; Extent of Timely and Full Realization (in Percent) Economic Plan

Number of Specifically Verifiable Indicators for the Transportation Sector (Excluding Communications)

Percent of Goals Fulfilled in the Prescribed Time Frame (%)

First Five-Year Plan (1949–1953) State Plan 1954 State Plan 1955 Second Five-Year Plan (1955–1960) Third Five-Year Plan (1961–1965) Fourth Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) Fifth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) Sixth Five-Year Plan (1976–1980) Seventh Five-Year Plan (1981–1985) Eighth Five-Year Plan (1986–1990)

6 4 2 4 5 2 0 2 0 0

100 50 50 50 0 50 — 0 — —

Sources: Federal Statistics Office. Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR, 310–315; Law no. 69/1976, Part I, Para. 6, Subpara. (a) (see Zákon č. 69/1976); Law no. 241/1948 (see Zákon č. 241/194); Law no. 2/1954 (see Zákon č. 2/1954); Law no. 12/1955 (see Zákon č. 12/1955); Law no. 63/1958 (see Zákon č. 63/1958); Law no. 165/1960 (see Zákon č. 165/1960); Law no. 83/1966 (see Zákon č. 83/1966); Law no. 101/1971 (see Zákon č. 101/1971); Law no. 69/1976 (see Zákon č. 69/1976); Law no. 122/1981 (see Zákon č. 122/1981); Law no. 87/1986 (see Zákon č. 87/1986).

were set for it in the laws on all the five-year plans. The majority of such mentions are stated in terms of the growth forecast for particular industrial sectors. The early economic plans mandated a concrete number of strategic products to be produced. For industry, then, there was no reduction of goals to mere slogans, as was the case for the transportation sector. This reflects the perception on the one hand that transportation was a supportive element in the economy, and on the other that it was a sector where the mandated goals went unmet for a long time.19​ 19 Law no. 241/1948, “On the First Five-year Plan for Development of the Czechoslovak Republic” (Zákon č. 241/1948); Law no. 2/1954, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the year 1954” (Zákon č. 2/1954); Law no. 12/1955, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the year 1955” (Zákon č. 12/1955); Law no. 63/1958, “On the Second Five-year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic” (Zákon č. 63/1958); Law no. 165/1960 Sb., “On the Third Five-year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (Zákon č. 165/1960); Law no. 83/1966 Sb., “On the Fourth Five-year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (Zákon č. 83/1966); Law no. 101/1971, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the years 1971 to 1975” (Zákon č.

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Figure 4.6 A Kirow crane loads coal onto steam locomotive 534.0384 at the depot in Hradec Králové, May 28, 1978. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

4.2 The “Real” Mechanisms in the Economy Every economic system creates unwritten “real” internal mechanisms that cannot be reproduced elsewhere. These include political, social, and economic factors that at the time existed alongside the standardly established rules and procedures. In retrospect, these factors are very difficult to reconstruct and are poorly mapped in historical research, although it is possible to find them in a few studies by contemporary authors20 and some interviews with actors of the time. Therefore, this chapter will be rather brief. It will try to uncover another level of the functioning of the economic mechanisms of the rail transport sector. The central plan, which established the most important economic guidelines, also established the limits within which the economy functioned. Not all the plans could be realized in full. Nor could all inputs and outputs be planned, and when individual parts of the plans began to fail, a special kind of economic 101/1971); Law no. 69/1976 Sb., “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1976 to 1980” (Zákon č. 69/1976); Law no. 122/1981, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1981–1985” (Zákon č. 122/1981); Law no. 87/1986, “On the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czech Socialist Republic for the years 1986–1990 (Zákon č. 87/1986). 20  See, for example, Mlčoch, Chování československé podnikové sféry [The Behavior of the Czechoslovak Corporate Sphere]; Šulc, Stát a ekonomika [The State and the Economy].

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Table 4.2 Development of the National Income in the Years 1949–1989 Period 1st Five-Year Plan Year Plans 2nd Five-Year Plan 3rd Five-Year Plan 4th Five-Year Plan 5th Five-Year Plan 6th Five-Year Plan 7th Five-Year Plan 8th Five-Year Plan

1949–1953 1954–1955 1956–1960 1961–1965 1966–1970 1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1989

Average Growth of National Income (%) 9.3 7.1 7.0 2.0 6.9 5.4 3.4 2.2 1.8

Source: Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992 [Economic and Social History of Czechoslovakia], 391.

environment began to develop. Symptomatic of this was the hypertrophy of ordinary economic relationships and the creation of non-standard conditions under which the relationships and connections among the leadership and the enterprises played an increasingly important role as they began to “game the plan.”21 According to Lubomír Mlčoch, an inverted pyramid was created in the management of the economy, in which the central government lost its dominant position with respect to creating the economic plan. In the event, the plans failed and shortages of goods were experienced at all levels of the economy. Demand was weak throughout the economy, but even so, it was satisfied only with difficulty and usually exceeded available supplies.22 As we examine how this situation was projected into the railway sector, we can distinguish two levels that influenced the “real” as opposed to the theoretical functioning of the rail sector and other parts of the economy. On the one hand, there was a shortfall of goods and services which negatively influenced all activities in the sector. On the other hand, there were the actions of the leaders of the enterprises in the consumer-supplier relationship. (1) The first level was exemplified by the constant lack of spare parts for locomotives and their delayed deliveries. Delays in the delivery of diesel and electric locomotives in the 1970s forced the Czechoslovak railways to keep their inefficient steam locomotives in service. The entire national economy was damaged because potential savings in transport costs were not realized and its actors’ operations were hindered. (2) The second level was non-standard transactions between customers and what were in many cases monopoly suppliers. In the rail sector these transactions 21 Mlčoch, Chování československé podnikové sféry [The Behavior of the Czechoslovak Corporate Sphere], 152–154. 22 Mlčoch, Chování československé podnikové sféry [The Behavior of the Czechoslovak Corporate Sphere], 139.

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could be observed at the level of the individual railways, manufacturers, and others. In a time when monopoly suppliers could not deliver needed inputs, enterprises (customers) had to do what they could to keep their businesses going and deal with shortages that threatened their production and operations. Because of the complexity of the technology it used, the rail sector was extraordinarily vulnerable to interruptions in the supply of the spare parts it needed to ensure safe and fluid operations. Obtaining needed products from alternative suppliers was not an option, nor was procurement from outside the COMECON bloc. Therefore, the leaders of individual enterprises and operational units had to undertake many kinds of personal initiatives on their own. The leaders of customer firms tried to obtain their needed deliveries in two main ways. (1) The first way went through the offices of the secretariat of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, that is, along party lines, by getting the party secretariat to recognize certain deliveries as a political priority. In such cases, the party cadres ensured priority treatment by the supplier company. Much depended on internal party relationships and the rank of the people who represented the customer firm. Interviews with our respondents confirm that when a given task was “politically protected” by a sufficiently powerful organization within the KSČ, it had a greater chance of success and of obtaining faster deliveries of needed items.23 Even the construction of the Prague metro depended on the party’s highest political priorities and its members’ individual relationships with customer firms. The metro was managed by a deputy of the government, Otakar Ferfecký, who wrote about the key relationships in his memoirs.24 (2) The other way was more common, according to interviews we have conducted. This was personal engagement by customer firms with suppliers. The highest representatives of the customer firms set out on “missions” equipped with “gratuities” (hard-to-get items, foods, alcohol, and the like) to give to the managers of the supplier firms.25 Interviews with actors involved in the rail sector at the time produced a number of examples. One of our respondents described in an interview his quest to obtain electronic parts used in safety equipment on the railroad. The VHJ Automatization of Rail Transport (Automatizace železniční dopravy—AŽD) had threatened that it would not be able to deliver new and refurbished safety equipment because it had not received needed component parts. A personal visit by the respondent to the TESLA Lanškroun factory led to the delivery of the needed parts to AŽD, which was then able to fulfill its contract with the railroad.26 It is very difficult to describe and systematize these “real” mechanisms, and to determine the degree of influence they had on the economy as a whole. They clearly did not play a negligible role and it is essential to take them into account 23 See, for example, the interview with Laníček. 24 Ferfecký, Na trasách metra i života [On the Track of the Metro and Life]. 25 See, for example, the interview with Polák. 26 See, for example, the interview with Laníček.

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in any overview of central planning. Non-standard, informal relationships arose when central planning failed. They were used to keep an enterprise’s operations going and were a reaction to immediate problems and shortages of goods. This was true for every sector of the economy; the railways were no exception.27

4.3 The Economy of the Railway Sector The economic mechanisms of the railway sector in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the economic theory behind the centrally planned economy. Not every enterprise in the sector had to behave as if it were making a profit from a marketeconomy point of view. Even incurring losses and transferring and spreading them out over the entire sector could be in line with the plan. The railway sector was one of those sectors of the Czechoslovak economy where for many years there were internal transfers of funds and price regulation that served the ends of the state’s transportation policy. Those practices camouflaged the real problems with the commercial relationships in the economy. As a result, the situation in the sector got worse over time. One measure, keeping prices low in passenger and freight transport, was intended to reduce upward pressure on the prices of goods in the overall economy. Increases in the cost of transporting raw materials and finished products would otherwise have shown up in the price of goods in the stores. The 1960s were a critical time for the economic relationships in the railway sector. That was when the first major changes in the economy and the organization of central planning took place since planning itself was first introduced. One reason for the reforms was the crisis that hit the Czechoslovak economy at the beginning of the decade. The gradually changing structure of the economy was another. Above all, a number of postwar investment programs were completed and the wave of postwar industrialization ended. The economic reforms instituted during the 1960s put greater emphasis on economic rentability in individual sectors. Up to that point, profit was mainly an indicator and played no more than a statistical role. In the framework of the new reforms, enterprises were given greater economic independence, including more authority over their own budgets. Managers and other employees could newly be motivated by participating financially in the economic results of their firms. Sometimes the sum of the reform measures was termed khozraschyot, a Russian neologism that in part meant that a firm had to cover its expenses from its own operations.28 In the Soviet Union, where the reform trends originated, khozraschyot was tested on the Belorussian railway, one of the components of the Soviet railway 27 Handl, KSČ a řízení centrálně plánované ekonomiky [The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Management of the Centrally Planned Economy], 13–56. 28 Půlpán, Nástin českých a československých hospodářských dějin do roku 1990 [Outline of Czech and Czechoslovak Economic History to the Year 1990], 244 and 245.

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network. That experiment produced unexpectedly good results, proving to increase efficiency and activate hidden reserves. The system also introduced material incentives for employees. Employees participated in the economic results of the company in which they worked by receiving a variable portion of them in their salaries. The theory behind these changes was an attempt to link the economic interests of the enterprises, the work units, and individuals. If every individual performed his tasks well, it was good for him or her, as well as for the entire enterprise. Under the reforms, each firm was to prepare its own plan, which was later approved or amended by the central planning offices. The firms had to design their strategies so that performance of clearly defined tasks could be measured by economic indicators. If the goals were achieved, the employees would reap higher financial rewards.29 The Czechoslovak rail sector was entirely unique and presented a difficult case for reform, mainly because of its wide scope. A reform that was meant to affect the core of ČSD’s activities had to take into account all the parts of an extraordinarily expansive organization. That was one reason why reforms were instituted in the railway sector two decades later than they were in other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy. Although the ČSD did not fully implement the concept of khozraschyot management in the 1960s, partial solutions were sought that would allow for at least small improvements in the efficiency of its operations. Our examination of ČSD’s expenditures, in which we looked at all its units, including those for maintenance and development of infrastructure, exposed the economic reality of the enterprise in the mid-1960s. For example, a total of 23.3 billion Kčs flowed into the transportation sector as a whole in the year 1966. Of that, 2.63 billion Kčs was spent on manufacturing and research activities and 20.4 billion Kčs on infrastructure investments. Subsidies for the Czechoslovak railways totaled another 2.3 billion Kčs per year, which reimbursed operational expenses not covered by revenues. One contemporary account about this situation, which was creating constant pressure on the state budget, characterized it as follows: Under current conditions in the transport sector, the introduction of improved management techniques is not creating an independent, fully self-sufficient entity. Even if more resources are being obtained from modernization, rationalization and improved organization of operations, revenues are still not sufficient to cover the expenditures needed for investment.30 29 Stejskal, “Mnoho tváří přestavby [The Many Faces of Perestroika],” 199. 30 Ministry of Transportation: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transportation], Prague, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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This meant that revenues from the economic activities of the railway sector were not sufficient to cover the expense of operations and certainly not other expenses associated with reconstruction, capital investment, and further development. Although in the theory of the central plan there was no relationship between revenues that were actually generated and resources available to cover operations and investments, as a practical matter the two were linked in the official documents. The documents stated that there were not enough funds to “introduce new, efficient technology,” “cover losses in passenger transport,” “increase travel culture,” “ensure growth in the average wage of transport sector employees comparable to that in other socially important sectors of the national economy,” and “provide social benefits (by constructing housing, improving retirement benefits, etc.) in order to increase the security of employees in the transportation sector.” Of all the entities in the transportation sector, the lack of funds was felt most keenly by the Czechoslovak railways.31 One approach to solving some of the important problems was an attempt to increase the tariffs charged in passenger and freight transportation and to rationalize and improve the efficiency of the sector. It was possible to obtain a very precise idea of the expected revenues in freight transport and a fair estimate of revenues in passenger transport for upcoming years by reading the economic plan. From a market-economy perspective, the planners’ task was to estimate expenditures and set an economically acceptable (and sufficient) level of tariffs. But in actuality that did not happen. The level of tariffs in freight transport was more influenced by the expenses faced by the manufacturers and by incomes and the need to preserve social mobility in the case of tariffs for passenger transport. Setting tariffs was thus a highly charged political matter. The debate that arose was evidence of both the intentions and the weaknesses of the centrally planned economic system. The efficiency of transport and the cost-effectiveness of specific tracks were reflected in the structure of expenditures. The Czechoslovak railways could not decide for itself about any of these issues, but had to pass the decision-making to bodies higher up the power vertical. Some issues reached the very highest levels.32 By the second half of the 1960s, the economics and profitability of the railroads required urgent attention. The idea of sharply raising tariffs for passenger travel to bring in much-needed revenue was discussed. The highest bodies in the power vertical thus faced a decision: whether to ensure that rail travel remained accessible to all levels of society, which would keep society mobile, or to take 31 Ministry of Transportation: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transportation], Prague, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 32 Ministry of Transportation: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transportation], Prague, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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Table 4.3 Revenues, Share of Expenses Covered, and Volume for Various Fare Categories of ČSD Passenger Transport in 1968 Fare Type

Revenue per 1000 km (in Kčs)

Percent of ČSD Expenses Covered

Volume (in Percent of Total PassengerKilometers Transported)

Ordinary Workeri Student Employeeii Gratis Discounted Other

158.45 29.76 21.95 18.39 — 79.55 —

69.2 13.1 9.6 8.1 — 34.9 —

39.6 25.2 3.8 9.1 8.1 13.6 0.6

i Fare for employees (of the majority of large firms) for their daily commuting to their place of employment. ii Fare for employees of the Czechoslovak railways and the (federal) Ministry of Transportation, and their family members. Source: Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs for Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

steps to deal with the deep economic crisis within ČSD and thereby ensure the long-term sustainability of the rail sector’s operations. The government met to discuss the need to raise tariffs in passenger and freight transport for the first time in May 1969.33 The revenue from tariffs in passenger transport at the end of the 1960s is shown in Table 4.3. It also shows the types of fares and their revenues in Czechoslovak crowns per 1,000 passenger-kilometers and the volume of passenger traffic in the various categories. Ordinary fares were the category for passengers who did not receive any discount. Worker fares were another category, which were special tariffs for workers traveling to their workplaces. Student fares were for students in elementary and high schools, and employee fares were for employees of ČSD, their families, and people employed in state agencies involved with transportation. There were several other types of discounted fares, including those for soldiers, pensioners, invalids, and others.34 Table 4.3 shows the revenues obtained from fares per 1,000 km transported in each given category. Expenses per 1,000 passenger-km totaled 228 Kčs in 1968. No single tariff category provided that much revenue.35 The top Czechoslovak 33 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 34 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 35 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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political leadership found itself in a difficult situation, because it could not restore economic balance to ČSD even by doubling the price of tickets. Fares for rail travel were extremely low compared to those for travel by bus. The tariffs charged by ČSAD for bus travel brought in about twice as much revenue per passenger-km as did those charged by ČSD.36 In July 1969, the Czechoslovak government debated a proposal to raise fares for passenger rail transportation by at least 100 percent. The aim was to reduce the state funds required to cover ČSD’s operating losses. In the event, there was a difference of opinion between the Ministry of Transportation and the economic department of the Central Committee of the KSČ, which had a say in the matter. The economic department admitted that under the existing circumstances ČSD could not achieve a balance in its economic results, but it did not consider the documents supporting the proposal to be sufficiently well prepared. Discussion about raising fares took into account the impact on various different social classes. One issue was whether or not to preserve the workers’ fares. The Czechoslovak railways did not receive any compensation for the revenue it lost that way. ČSD tried unsuccessfully to obtain compensation from the budgets of the workers’ employing organizations. However, the political representatives were fearful of pushing the cost of fares into the price of goods produced by the manufacturing sector, which would add further upward pressure on prices throughout the economy. There was a similar concern about the negative impact of higher fares on low-income groups among the population. The economic department of the Central Committee considered the issue of fares to be a “matter of wide social-economic importance.” It demanded that the question of raising fares be linked to real improvements in the quality of ČSD’s services, which had for a long time stagnated along with the price of tickets.37 Increasing fares on the railroads would affect almost all of society, and a price-shock in that area was not in the interest of the ruling circles at that time. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had started fundamental changes inside the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, and society at large. The age of political normalization had begun. Any worsening of the living situation of the population was therefore to be avoided, even at the cost of high and rising expenditures out of the state budget. The railway sector thus found itself in a different situation than the bus and highway freight transport sectors. While tariffs in highway transport, for both passengers and freight, sufficed to ensure the renewal of basic equipment,38 revenue from fares in passenger rail transport could not even cover fixed costs and 36 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 37 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 38 Informace o záměrech v tarifní oblasti v souvislosti s řešením naléhavých úkolů čs. národního hospodářství [Information on Objectives in the Area of Tariffs Relating to Fulfilling the Urgent Needs of the Czechoslovak National Economy], Department of Tariffs and Pricing

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no increases in fares (especially for passenger transport) were possible because of opposition in the highest circles of Czechoslovak politics. The following statistics best show the state in which the Czechoslovak railways found themselves in the 1970s and 1980s. The prewar tariffs from 1937, when an ordinary ticket for 100 km of travel cost 24.50 Kčs, were maintained on the Czechoslovak railways until 1953. After the currency reform in 1953, a ticket for the same distance cost 14 Kčs. The price remained at that level until 1989, despite the continual rise of prices and purchasing power in the overall economy. The real price of train travel thus became cheaper for the population as wages gradually increased.39 The purchasing power of the population increased by 4.3 percent annually in the 1970s and by 1.3 percent annually in the following decade.40 Table 4.4 shows the trend in affordability of train tickets in relation to the average monthly income of the population, as train travel became ever cheaper in real terms. Therefore, we believe that the fears of the political organs about the possible destabilization of the society due to increases in the price of passenger travel were unfounded. The mobility of the population constantly increased, but so did the gap between revenues and expenses in passenger rail transport. Between 1970 and 1980, ČSD’s revenues reflected changes in the efficiency of both passenger and freight transport by rail. The number of passengers transported constantly fell, although the average distance they traveled increased. In that ten-year period, ČSD’s total revenues declined by about one percent.41 ČSD found it impossible to economize in its operations, and the fact that the majority of passengers traveled on discounted tickets only made matters worse.42 Tariff revenues clearly indicate how difficult the economic situation of the railway sector was. Because of the problems caused by the conservative approach to tariffs we have described, ČSD remained dependent on financial contributions from the state budget that increased three-fold over two decades, from 2.30 billion Kčs in 1970 to 6.05 billion Kčs in 1987.43 For comparison, Table 4.5 and of the Federal Ministry of Transportation (FMD), 8. 10. 1979, in: Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, 5. 11. 1979, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 39 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 40 Bálek, “Československá ekonomika v 80. letech 20. století” [“The Czechoslovak Economy in the 1980s”], 45. 41 Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1971 [Annual Report on Transportation for 1971], FMD, NADAS 1972, 60; Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1979–1980 [Annual Report on Transportation for 1979–1980], FMD, NADAS, undated, 70. 42  Federal Statistics Office, Statistická ročenka České a slovenské federativní republiky 1992 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1992, 442. 43 Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness

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Table 4.4 Number of Kilometers Traveled by Passengers in Local and Express Passenger Trains Compared to the Average Wage for Years 1968, 1978, and 1987 Year

Average Wage

Number of Km Traveled in Local Trains

Number of Km Traveled in Express Trains

1968 1978 1987

1,750 Kčs 2,517 Kčs 3,168 Kčs

12,500 17,900 22,628

8,925 13,484 16,971

Source: Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky [Statistial Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], 124 and 460; Czechoslovakia. Federal Statistical Office. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 195, 258, 259, and 264; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990] 272.

the text below indicate the increase in revenues for passenger and freight transport. The result was a persistent “gaping scissors.” There was no change in the tariffs for passenger transport in the period, and freight tariffs were increased only marginally. Although the performance of the railroads increased, which increased revenues, the growth in revenue was offset by even greater expenses. The available archival documents do not offer a clear view of the expenditure side of ČSD’s operations, although statistical data for all of Czechoslovakia is available to clarify the overall trends. That data shows rapid change in all categories of expenditure, above all for energy supplies: brown and hard coal, motor fuels, and electrical energy. From the end of the 1960s, producer prices began to rise along with the cost of energy. Energy costs were rising because of increasing difficulties in obtaining coal supplies and because of the two worldwide oil crises. The oil crises affected the entire Eastern Bloc, albeit with a delay compared to the western countries, and led to similar price increases. The first price shock at the beginning of the period resulted in increases in producer prices of about 30  percent between 1966 and 1967.44 The price of hard coal, brown coal, and electricity increased by 66.4 percent, 44.5 percent, and 37.6 percent, respectively, in the same period. Besides the general increases in prices in the economy, any comparison of the prices for energy at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s must take into account the impact of the first oil crisis in 1973. Between 1967 and 1978 the price of motor fuels and lubricants increased by 97  percent, the price of electricity by 45 percent, and the price of hard coal by 5 percent. Only the price of of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], 7. 7. 221 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 44 Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], 464.

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Table 4.5 Comparison of the Growth in Revenues for Passenger and Freight Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia in the Years 1970, 1980, and 1987

Revenues from Passenger Transport (in Billions of Czechoslovak crowns) Revenues from Freight Transport (in Billions of Czechoslovak crowns) Total

1970

1980

1987

Change 1970– 1987 (in %)

1.902

1.890

2.07

8

13.146

16.175

22.03

67

15.048

18.065

24.1

60

Source: Federal Statistical Office of Czechoslovakia. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 444; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské federativní republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 442; Federal Ministry of Transportation (Federalní ministerstvo dopravy (FMD)).Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1971 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1971], NADAS 1972, 13 and 60; Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1979–1980 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1979–1980], FMD, NADAS, undated, 25 and 70; Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1987 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1987], FMD, NADAS, undated, 27 and 66.

brown coal remained approximately the same. The overall increase in the prices of manufactured goods was only 12.1 percent in the same period.45 The comparison of prices in the second decade we are examining, that between 1979 and 1989, must include the impact of the second oil crisis in 1979. Statistics show an extraordinarily rapid rise in prices through the first half of the 1980s, which put further pressure on the expenditure side of the Czechoslovak railways’ operations. The cost of motor fuels and lubricants increased 131.4 percent between 1977 and 1984, then stagnated through the year 1988. A similar rapid increase was experienced in the wholesale price of coal. Between 1977 and 1984 the cost of hard coal increased by 71.7 percent and of brown coal by 70.6 percent. After that, through 1988, prices increased by only another three percent for hard coal and ten  percent for brown coal. A more gradual increase in prices was experienced for electricity, the cost of which increased by 46 percent from 1977 to 1988.46 Revenue from freight transport did not help the economic balance of the operations of the Czechoslovak railways very much even though some freight tariffs were successfully increased. In the 1970s and 1980s revenues increased by 45  Czechoslovakia. Federal Statistics Office. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 195, 258, 259, and 264. 46  Federal Statistics Office, Statistická ročenka České a slovenské federativní republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 207, 267, and 272.

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23 percent,47 but those increases were not enough to offset the operational losses of the railways. Along with negotiations to increase tariffs, ČSD tried to improve its balance on the expenditure side by streamlining its operations. Besides other measures, it identified little-used and unprofitable rail lines that it could shut down. Many of them had lost their original importance and traffic on them was being maintained mostly from inertia. The first major attempt at shutting down about 485 km of track was made in 1965. A list of 26 lines was proposed for closure, representing 3 percent of the rail network. The lines were chosen on the basis of a study of their operational effectiveness and a comparison of the revenue they were expected to generate with the investment they required. The criterion was the return over five years on the investment in maintaining or upgrading them. Some of the lines were pulled off the list because of their strategic importance. This included 17 lines that were needed for national defense, of which the majority served military bases or training grounds (for example the line in the area of Doupov Mountains), 12 other strategic lines in border areas like the Šumava and the Ore Mountains, and some other lines that were important for transporting freight.48 Negotiations went on for many years and the attempt to shut down lines was not very successful. The 14th Congress of the KSČ in 1971 confirmed the need to increase the cost-effectiveness of rail transport by shutting down tracks, but actually implementing that step was difficult. The process was delayed by a piecemeal approach to the task and the failure to include the necessary investment in the five-year plans. There was opposition from the carriers, the traveling public, and the national committees among others because of the difference between rail and road tariffs. ČSAD made disproportionate demands for vehicles and workers as it took over the railroads’ operations. Roads required maintenance and general repairs. Not least of all were obstacles presented by Law no. 51/1956, On Railways, which recognized the wisdom of shutting down rail lines, but in reality left ČSD with only very narrow room for maneuver in that regard.49 One important factor among those mentioned above was the political pressure applied by national committees and the citizenry. An interesting case is found in a document presented to the Presidium of the KSČ’s Central Committee relating to the shutdown of a track from Trhový Štěpánov to Dolní Kralovice district Benešov, middle Bohemia). This section of track was to be closed down because of the construction of a dam at Švihov. The track was located in an area

47 Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1971 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1971], FMD, NADAS 1972, 60; Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1979–1980 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1979–1980], FMD, NADAS, undated, 70. 48 Postup při rušení málo využitých železničních tratí, listopad 1972 [Approach to the Abolishment of Little-used Railroad Tracks, November 1972], in: KSČ ÚV 02/1, vol. 63, unit 61/7, NAČR. 49 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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that would be under water after the reservoir behind the dam was filled. The document describes how absurd the situation was: Discussions with the local authorities were begun during an election period without sufficient consultation and coordination. The result was a campaign by the traveling public, the carriers, and the railway employees to overturn the decision, which had active participation of the local authorities, including the local Party bodies, despite the fact that the need to shut down the track was clearly apparent.50 Deciding to close down a rail line required a great deal of political courage because it usually evoked an explosion of local discontent.51 Therefore, the highest political and government organs became involved in such questions, including the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Czechoslovak government, which produced a detailed analysis of the experience of foreign countries with abolishing rail lines and dealing with the reaction of their populations. Besides the neighboring countries of COMECON, the report examined the situation in two countries of Western Europe, the FRG, and Sweden. This document was unprecedented for its time because it applied an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) to the foreign strategies and their results and costs. The authors of the report provided statistics that compared the proportions of national networks that were transporting less than one million gross ton-kilometers52 per kilometer of track. In Czechoslovakia, 25.7 percent of rail lines hosted that little traffic. The greatest proportions were in France (44.88  percent) and in Sweden (51.04  percent), while the smallest was in Switzerland (6.31  percent). The document stated that the process of shutting down little-used rail lines was ongoing in all the countries of Europe, East and West. Based on the study, the Czechoslovak authorities sought to avoid an approach taken in Hungary because of its results there. The Hungarians had compensated for higher fares on buses in places where local train lines were shut down by offering subsidies to regular travelers. This led to disruptions that were very difficult to manage, to higher expenses, and to political problems when the subsidies had to be terminated.53 50 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 51 See, for example, Pullmann, “Sociální dějiny a totalitněhistorické vyprávění” [“Social History and the Totalitarian Historical Narrative”], 715. 52 A gross ton-kilometer (gtkm) is an indicator of the gross performance of locomotives. It characterizes the volume of transport activity. The calculation takes into account not only the weight of the goods transported, but also the weight of the freight cars without counting the locomotive itself. In: “Český statistický úřad, Doprava a spoje” [“Czech Statistics Office, Transportation and Communications”]. 53 Informace o úpravě osobních dopravních tarifů [Information on Reform of Tariffs in Public Transport], vol. 99, unit 164/7, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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Despite the difficulties, some rail lines in Czechoslovakia were closed in the 1970s, but given the above-described problems the number was smaller than the plans originally called for. The closures did not have a significant impact on the economics of ČSD’s operations. Compared to 1967, when the railroad network in Czechoslovakia was at its maximum and measured 13,332 km, by 1979 the network had been reduced by only 190 km.54 The Czechoslovak railways were in a paradoxical situation in the 1970s and 1980s, in which the level of tariffs was a politically untouchable matter, leading to constantly increasing dependence on operational subsidies from the state. There was no success in rationalizing operations, mainly by closing down unused local tracks. The entire sector required ever-greater subsidies. In contrast to road transportation, the rail sector was unable to cover the cost of replacing equipment along with the cost of its normal operations from its revenues. Together with the stagnation of investment in rail transport, this led to a “gaping scissors” between reality and the railways’ needs of the time. The state was of course responsible for setting things right in the transportation sector, but it systematically deprived the sector of the income stream that could have been available for modernizing and developing it. The result was operational difficulties and a decline in the quality of the railways.

4.4 Political Duties: A Case Study of the Czechoslovak Spartakiads The internal mechanisms of the railway sector were influenced by various political tasks as well as by economic factors in the plans. The political tasks were assigned by the highest rungs of the power vertical and were meant to further the doctrines of communist Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak railways had the duty to “heroically” fulfill those tasks without regard to expense and its other responsibilities. One of the most massive and important of such tasks was the Czechoslovak Spartakiads. Based on political demands, ČSD had to undertake an enormous logistical operation in support of preparations for the spectacles. The first Czechoslovak Spartakiad took place in 1955 and was repeated every five years until 1985, with the exception of the year 1970. The Spartakiads originated in the tradition of the Sokol Festivals and the strong physical culture movement in the Czech lands. They were among the most important sporting and propagandistic events supported by the communist regime. The Spartakiad was not only the central spectacle held in Prague’s Strahov Stadium but also a whole other set of regional, district, and local events. The number of participants and spectators constantly increased; in 1985 more than two million gymnasts participated as about four million spectators looked on. Sporting preparations aside, the Spartakiads, and in particular their culmination in Prague in the Strahov Stadium, were a huge challenge for the entire transportation network. 54 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 742.

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Internal Mechanisms of the Railway Sector

This was especially true for the railways, which had to ensure the majority of the transport for the participants. It was necessary to move a huge number of gymnasts around Prague during the main event, which could fill a chapter of this book on the Prague Transport Company alone. Besides that, however, the delivery of a large number of gymnasts and spectators into the capital city from all corners of Czechoslovakia was a technically difficult task. All the preparations and the actual presentation of the Spartakiads went forward under the strict supervision of the party organs and the Ministry of Transport. Thanks to the gradual increase in the number of gymnasts and spectators over time, it was possible to “practice” the transportation process on the railroads, build up the necessary infrastructure, and improve the technology of locomotives and rail cars so that the smooth flow of a large number of spectators in a very short time was assured.55 For ČSD, the last and the largest Spartakiad in 1985 represented the successful completion of a politically important task. The majority of the movement of gymnasts and spectators took place in less than two weeks in June. The full extent of the event can be sensed from the statistical data. In all, 1.2 million gymnasts were transported to and from all of the various Spartakiad events, which took place from May until the beginning of July. Five hundred and thirty special Spartakiad trains were prepared for half a million gymnasts, while another two hundred thousand individuals were transported on scheduled links. Nine hundred passenger cars for the special trains, about five hundred locomotives and other traction units, and several thousand railroad workers were deployed in the effort.56 Although the railways experienced only a few small problems in servicing the Spartakiad in 1985, this definitely does not imply that the railways were in excellent condition as a whole. The Spartakiad was an event that called for extraordinary measures. An example, as shown by contemporary documents, was the nationwide finale of the Spartakiad and the steps taken by the railway responsible for Prague, which was at that time the Northwest Railway.57 Measures were taken in every area, and the political propaganda sphere was no exception. Besides his operational tasks, the chief operating officer of the Northwest 55 For details see: Anonymous, “Když jezdily autobusy na Strahov” [“When the Autobuses Ran to Strahov”], 7. 56 Informace o zajištění přepravy účastníků Československé spartakiády 1985 [Report on Ensuring Transport for Participants in the Czechoslovak Spartakiad 1985], FMD, Department of Rail Transport and Shipping], 4. 7. 1985, in: NA ČR, FMD, List 3 and 4, Z11 Spartakiády. 57  Politicko-organizační opatření pro zabezpečení přepravy cvičenců a návštěvníků Československé spartakiády 1985 [Political and Organizational Measures for Ensuring Transport of Participants and Visitors to the Czechoslovak Spartakiad 1985], Czechoslovak State Railways– Administration of the Northwestern Railways Prague, 12. 3. 1985, in: Informace o zajištění přepravy účastníků Československé spartakiády 1985 [Report on Ensuring Transport for Participants in the Czechoslovak Spartakiad 1985], FMD, Department of Rail Transport and Shipping, 4. 7. 1985, in: NA ČR, FMD, List 3 and 4, Z11 Spartakiády.

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Railway devised slogans that were used as the theme for political banners decorating railway stations.58 The entire event was a “showcase” for the ČSD. Preparations for the Spartakiads took the railways months to complete. In their course the maximum possible number of traction units and wagons had to be patched up and put into service. They then had to be cleaned up, as did the interiors and exteriors of the railroad stations and stopping points. Special attention had to be given to the tracks on which the Spartakiad trains would travel and to selected stations in the area of Prague. This involved a technical check and de facto special maintenance above and beyond the usual. The state of the equipment and traffic controls along the tracks had to be determined, as did the state of safety equipment, station platforms, radios, and the overall appearance of the stations. Freight trains were generally banned from entering and leaving Prague and its environs for two weeks around the time of the Spartakiad. Only selected freight trains were allowed to pass through Prague, which caused complications for freight transport in the wider region of Central Bohemia. The capacity that was freed up on tracks and in stations was meant to be used by the special Spartakiad trains. To the extent possible, freight trains were diverted from the main lines onto side tracks in order to not complicate the traffic situation in the capital and its environs.59​ The personnel who manned the Spartakiad trains were specially selected, and only the most skilled employees were assigned to accompany them. All of them had to pay greater attention to their tasks. The movement of the Spartakiad trains was controlled by a dedicated dispatching system called the “spardis.”60 58 “ČSS 1985 – mírový pozdrav československého lidu všem národům” [“The Czechoslovak Spartakiad (ČSS) 1985 — A Peaceful Greeting from the Czechoslovak People to All Nations”]; “ČSS 1985 – přehlídka úspěchů naší sjednocené tělovýchovy” [“ČSS 1985 — A Display of the Success of Our United Physical Training”]; “ČSS 1985 – projev jednoty a síly našeho lidu” [“ČSS 1985 — An Expression of the Unity and Strength of Our People”]; “ČSS 1985 – oslava 40. výročí osvobození naší vlasti Sovětskou armádou” [ČSS 1985 — Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Liberation of our Country by the Soviet Army”], all in: Politicko-organizační opatření pro zabezpečení přepravy cvičenců a návštěvníků Československé spartakiády 1985 [Political and Organizational Measures for Ensuring Transport of Participants and Visitors to the Czechoslovak Spartakiad 1985] (see previous note), 11 and 12. 59 “ČSS 1985 – mírový pozdrav československého lidu všem národům” [“Czechoslovak Spartakiad (ČSS) 1985 — A Peaceful Greeting from the Czechoslovak People to All Nations”]; “ČSS 1985 – přehlídka úspěchů naší sjednocené tělovýchovy” [“ČSS 1985 — A Display of the Success of Our United Physical Training”]; “ČSS 1985 – projev jednoty a síly našeho lidu” [“ČSS 1985 — An Expression of the Unity and Strength of Our People”]; “ČSS 1985 – oslava 40. výročí osvobození naší vlasti Sovětskou armádou” [ČSS 1985 — Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Liberation of our Country by the Soviet Army”], all in: Politicko-organizační opatření pro zabezpečení přepravy cvičenců a návštěvníků Československé spartakiády 1985 [Political and Organizational Measures for Ensuring Transport of Participants and Visitors to the Czechoslovak Spartakiad 1985]. 60 “ČSS 1985 – mírový pozdrav československého lidu všem národům” [“Czechoslovak Spartakiad (ČSS) 1985 — A Peaceful Greeting from the Czechoslovak People to All Nations”]; “ČSS 1985 – přehlídka úspěchů naší sjednocené tělovýchovy” [“ČSS 1985 — A Display of the Success of Our United Physical Training”]; “ČSS 1985 – projev jednoty a síly našeho lidu” [“ČSS 1985 — An

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Figure 4.7 Train transporting gymnasts to the Second National Spartakiad in 1960 (Úvalno station, Bruntál region). Note: Archives of the town of Úvalno. The railway leadership did its best to minimize the number of unusual occurrences and accidents on the railroad while the Spartakiads were under way. The slogan was, “During the Spartakiad of 1985 no accidents that would threaten the safety of the Spartakiad trains and the health of the gymnasts and visitors of the 1985 Spartakiad.”61 Some operating regulations were even amended to introduce special rules in order to increase traffic safety for the special Spartakiad trains on sections of track between stations. The entire interstation section62 had to be completely free in front of the Spartakiad trains. It could not be divided into

Expression of the Unity and Strength of Our People”]; “ČSS 1985 – oslava 40. výročí osvobození naší vlasti Sovětskou armádou” [ČSS 1985 — Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Liberation of our Country by the Soviet Army”], all in: Politicko-organizační opatření pro zabezpečení přepravy cvičenců a návštěvníků Československé spartakiády 1985 [Political and Organizational Measures for Ensuring Transport of Participants and Visitors to the Czechoslovak Spartakiad 1985]. 61 ČSS—Czechoslovak Spartakiad. 62 “Interstation section” means the track between two railway stations (or freight stations occupied by a dispatcher). In normal operations the automatic safety system permits operation of more than one train on a given section of track.

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separate sections by traffic lights to allow engineers to proceed on sight.63 This led to a significant reduction in the capacity of the tracks, especially on heavily used sections. In spite of the above-standard measures taken to ensure the safety of rail traffic, which greatly stressed the railroads and their employees, ČSD was able to fulfill its tasks. The successful logistics of the 1985 Czechoslovak Spartakiad show that the railway system could adequately deal with a multitude of tasks in spite of the complexity of its operations and its clear under-financing. We will ignore, however, how much that effort cost and the impact the “concentration” on the Spartakiad had on the railways’ other services, especially freight transport.

4.5 National Security Tasks in Peace and War Ensuring strategic needs and the defense of the state when its security was threatened was one of the basic tasks of the transportation network. The way it was to be used for those purposes obviously changed over time. The railroads played the most important role in ensuring strategic needs from the first half of the nineteenth century to the second half of the twentieth century. It was the first means of transportation that could quickly transport large numbers of soldiers and military materiel overland without sapping the strength of the fighting units. Operating railroads, including constructing strategic sections of track, gradually became a normal and necessary task for every nation-state. World War II signaled a gradual loss of the dominant role that the railroads had played in strategic military plans. The American army introduced the advanced use of road transport technology and its infantry units were fully motorized. They were able to move about freely without regard to the condition and availability of railroad infrastructure. Ensuring security and the availability of transport were tasks for the railways in peacetime and in time of war. This brought the railroads a wide range of benefits besides their responsibilities. Specialized military units known as railroad troops supplied the benefits. They performed many repairs on the Czechoslovak railway network as they practiced their technological capabilities in the course of their training activities. It was typical of the railways that as a widespread, specialized operation they had their own security agencies. Specialized units of the police were providing security and protecting persons and property and persons on the rail lines in Czechoslovakia from the middle of the 1930s. The structure of those units changed many times but finally was standardized in the middle of the 1960s. 63 Simply put, “proceeding on sight” is a way of operating a train that under certain circumstances allows it to enter onto a track that is already occupied by a train proceeding in the same direction. In such a case the locomotive engineer is required to travel at a speed that will allow him to stop the train for any obstacle or other train on the track.

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The first such units were the Armed Guard Units of the Railroads (Ozbrojená stráž ochrany železnic—OSOŽ), whose existence ended with World War II. The Protective Guards (Ochranná stráž) and the Investigative Service (Pátrací služba), which were organizational units of ČSD, also participated in fighting crime on the railroads. At the end of the 1940s there was an attempt by the National Security Corps (Sbor národní bezpečnosti—SNB) to take over protection of the railroads. In 1953 all the protective and investigative units were consolidated into the Seventh Railroad Department of the SNB headquarters. It handled criminal investigations, external affairs, and investigation of railroad accidents. In 1964, the Armed Railroad Security (Ozbrojená ochrana železnic—OOŽ) was formed and security services for the railways were placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Transportation. The OOŽ’s authority was not the same as that of the police and responsibility for investigating criminal acts remained within the competence of the SNB. The situation changed again in 1974 when the Armed Railroad Security Corps (Sbor ozbrojené ochrany železnic—SOOŽ) was organized and given much wider authority than the OOŽ.64 That structure existed until 1992 when SOOŽ was transferred into the organization of the Police of the Czech Republic as the Railroad Police Service (Služba železniční policie), and after a number of further reorganizations was merged into the regular police force. At times when war threatened, authority over the railroads was to be turned over to army command as needed, and the activities of the railroads would be subject to the mobilization plans of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. Although those plans were focused first and foremost on defense, they called for the Czechoslovak People’s Army (Československá lidová armáda—ČSLA) to immediately counterattack after an invasion by NATO troops and advance into the West. With time, the range of planned operations by the ČSLA expanded from a few kilometers to hundreds of kilometers from the border. The Soviet Army was expected to follow right behind the ČSLA in a second wave, which meant it would have to be quickly transported to its starting position in Czechoslovakia, something which placed extremely grave logistical demands on the Czechoslovak transportation sector.65 From the standpoint of logistics, the Czechoslovak Army’s operational plans after 1957 relied mainly on rail transport, which was to be the main method for moving tanks more than 100 km and artillery more than 300 km. In the first three days after an announcement of mobilization (M1 to M3), 70 to 80 percent of the capacity of the railway network was to be used for purposes of mobilizing troops, and in the succeeding days (M4 to M15) “only” 30 to 40 percent. The 64 See amended Sections 9a, 9b and 9c of Law no. 51/1964, “On the Railways,” in: Law no. 104/1974 of October 23, 1974, which amended and added to Law no. 51/1964, “On the Railways” (see Zákon č. 104/1974). 65 Luňák, Plánování nemyslitelného [Planning for the Unthinkable], 138.

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railroads’ main task was to transport the Soviet Army, which was to be the second wave of attack after the Czechoslovak units. The Soviet general staff’s transportation needs were precisely defined as “an inseparable part of the operational and mobilizational movement of the Czechoslovak People’s Army.”66 To give an idea of the enormity of the task, we can cite the number of rail cars that would have to be rounded up in the first four days after a military crisis was announced, and sent to certain areas from which troops and materiel would be deployed to defend the homeland. That number included 816 flatcars to be sent to Poland to the areas of Chyrów and Nowy Zagórz, 1,730 flatcars to the eastern Slovakian areas of Slovenské Nové Město and Čierna nad Tisou, and another 420 heavy freight cars to the area of Bohumín. At the same time, the normally unused border crossings with the GDR at Hraničná and Vejprty were to be activated.67 As the ČSLA modernized its equipment over two decades, the focus of military plans shifted. More and more fighting units were equipped with their own means of transportation, which could be used in the event of a mobilization. This corresponded to the trend in planning, which emphasized strengthening the role of highway transport. The railroads were to serve for transporting reinforcements, including the second wave units of the Soviet Army. The Czechoslovak war plan from 1977 provides details. It calculated that the capacity of the so-called dedicated automobile highways was 4,000–6,000 vehicles a day with a load capacity of 60 tons. Compared to the 1956 plan, that is a four- to six-fold increase. The plan also foresaw a need to rebuild destroyed bridges and other infrastructure along the military highways. Special units of the ČSLA, sometimes called “highway brigades,” were set up that were assigned to cooperate with civilian units from the Ministry of Transportation in that task.68 The size of the transportation network was also influenced by the operational plans of the army in times of peace. The Ministry of Defense mandated key requirements for dedicated military automobile highways, such as the ability to handle heavy traffic, an acceptable gradient profile, the presence of service stations, and the like.69 The military’s plans also had an impact on rail transport. As with the highways, it was necessary to establish “wartime” parameters for railway infrastructure. Some rail lines were maintained and kept in repair exclusively for the use of the army. As mentioned above, there was an attempt to shut down little-used rail lines in the first half of the 1970s. Sixty-nine tracks were identified as unprofitable and unable to provide a return on any investment in them. Of that number, 17 tracks were exempted from closure because they were important for national defense, as were another 12 located in border areas that 66 Luňák, Plánování nemyslitelného [Planning for the Unthinkable], 138. 67 Luňák, Plánování nemyslitelného [Planning for the Unthinkable], 157. 68 Luňák, Plánování nemyslitelného [Planning for the Unthinkable], 278 and 279. 69 Mahdanová and Petrů, “Nadrozměrná přeprava v podmínkách České republiky” [“Oversize Transport in the Conditions of the Czech Republic”], 356.

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would be strategic links in case of an advance into the West and would ensure connections with the Ministry of Interior’s border guard units. Strategic defense considerations influenced the structure of the Czechoslovak railway network and led to the preservation of tracks that represented a long-term burden on the finances of the ČSD.70 At the beginning of the 1970s the State Planning Commission worked out a plan for rail transport in the event of conflict, called the “wartime prognosis.” The prognosis took into account the possibility of a general nuclear war that would strike every part of the ČSSR. It was expected that every important piece of infrastructure would be destroyed, including bridges across larger rivers and canyons, and also tunnels and rail transportation nodes.71 The State Planning Commission’s wartime prognosis was based on the existing peacetime capabilities of the railways. Therefore, it described basic tasks the railways needed to undertake: improving the quality of transport, renewing rolling stock, and electrifying the main lines. In retrospect, these were exactly the tasks that the rail sector needed to undertake in the interest of its future development and modernization. Besides domestic modernization, the higher level of effectiveness called for by war plans was hoped to improve coordination between the member countries of COMECON. In particular, this meant introducing computer technology and standardizing rolling stock and other equipment.72 The main goals set forth for the railroads in the strategic military documents are interesting from today’s point of view: phase out steam-powered traction in the years 1975 to 1980, introduce automatic coupling by 1980, build a central repair base for ČSD in 1978 and 1979, develop joint ventures with other COMECON countries to share rolling stock and servicing facilities, and institute a regional containerized transport system.73 Other than phasing out steampowered locomotives, the Czechoslovak railways were unable to fulfill any of those goals. Among many of the other objectives placed before the railway sector we can mention some important ones relating to infrastructure: rail lines were to be quickly electrified, average axle weight limits increased to 20 tons or 8 tons per running meter,74 switchbacks75 eliminated between important rail lines, and 70  Postup při rušení málo využitých železničních tratí, listopad 1972 [Approach to the Abolishment of Little-used Railroad Tracks, November 1972], KSČ ÚV 02/1, vol. 63, unit 61/7, NAČR. 71 Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR): Správa o plnení úloh operačnej prípravy štátneho územia (OPŠÚ) a osobitej části vykonávacieho štátneho plánu rozvoja národného hospodárstva SSR za rok 1980 a súhrn za roky 1976–1980 [Report on Fulfillment of the Operational Tasks for Preparedness of the State Territory (OPSÚ) and the Special Provisions of the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR) for the Year 1980 and Summary for the Years 1976–1980], undated, from 1981, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4. 72 See: Státní plánovací komise, Lists 3 and 4 [State Planning Commission, pp. 3 and 4]. 73 Státní plánovací komise, Lists 3 and 4 [State Planning Commission, pp. 3 and 4]. 74 A running meter (in Czech, běžný metr) is a unit of length one meter long. 75 The term “switchback” in railway transport is a place on a track where a train has to change its direction of travel in order to continue further on the track.

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detours built around the busiest railway nodes (Brno, Jihlava, Bratislava, Košice, Přerov, Olomouc, Česká Třebová, Kolín, and Prague).76 In the end, only a minimum of the proposed measures was actually realized. The railway troops were a highly specialized army unit that was tasked with ensuring the transportation needs outlined in the military’s plans for mobilization and operations. This unit was to undertake construction projects and the operation of transport in war. It employed a wide range of railroad professionals. The railroad troops were assigned varied activities in the operational plans. Mainly, they were to secure, and as needed repair, the infrastructure located behind the advancing armies and ensure operations on it. In the event of an advance by the ČSLA into West Germany, the railroad troops were tasked with opening rail lines from Cheb to Nuremberg and from Domažlice through Schwandorf and Regensburg to Donauwörth. These lines, along with so-called battlefield highways, were the backbone of the supply line for the advancing armies.77 “Highway battalions” were split off from the railroad troops in the 1960s and given responsibility for the military highways. The army units charged with transportation construction and railroad technology arose gradually as the role of the railroads in military strategy strengthened. They appeared first as specialized units of the armies’ corps of engineers and later were made independent military units. In Austria-Hungary the first railroad and telegraph regiments were formed at the turn of the twentieth century, but it was World War I that proved the importance of this type of unit.78 The usefulness to the army of specialization in rail transport was driven home by the “Siberian adventures” of the Czechoslovak Legions at the end of the war, when they controlled long sections of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. As a result, specialized railroad regiments, or railroad troops, were quickly formed when the First Czechoslovak Republic was established. They were disbanded along with the Czechoslovak Army after the German occupation in 1939. There were no railroad troops in the severely reduced security forces of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, in the so-called Government Army.79 After 1945 a specialized unit of railroad troops was reconstituted as part of the army corps of engineers. It remained with the engineers until 1950, when the railroad troops again became an independent branch of the army. Their training included both the standard basic training and professional education in their specialty. The railway troops were expected to be capable of rebuilding railroad infrastructure, constructing bridges, installing safety equipment, and, finally, directing and operating traffic on the rails. Officers therefore had a technical educational background, usually with an emphasis on transportation, 76 Státní plánovací komise, List 3 and 4 [State Planning Commission, pp. 3 and 4]. 77 Luňák, Plánování nemyslitelného [Planning for the Unthinkable], 199. 78 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 16–17. 79 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 32–34 and 157.

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which they gained either in a university or in the military academy. The troops were schooled in technical theory and in its practical application.80 For the latter, the army created a number of training grounds, one of which was the railroad troops’ base on the Sázava River at Ždár nad Sázavou. There they practiced their skills on an abandoned local track from Havlíčkův Brod to Ždár nad Sázavou, which had been made obsolete in the 1950s by a high-capacity double track. An ever-greater part of their professional training was provided by repairing ordinary rail lines, which had a very positive effect on ČSD’s operations. Thanks to their training and above all their excellent equipment, the units of the railroad troops became productive, sought-after builders for many important and difficult-to-accomplish projects. This was true especially for bridge construction and repair of tracks damaged by natural disasters. From the 1950s to the mid-1960s, the unit had about 5,600–6,000 men. After 1965, troop reductions began to be considered. It can be assumed that this was the result of the tense economic situation in the country. Although the units did a huge amount of work, the expense of utilizing the expertise of the soldier-workers was higher than that of employing civilian construction companies. In an attempt to lower the high cost of the unit’s activities, a plan was put forward to reduce the manpower of the units to 3,500 men. Not surprisingly, because part of the railroad troops’ training was the maintenance and reconstruction of commonly used rail lines, and they provided the Czechoslovak railways with considerable value, the idea did not meet with the approval of the Ministry of Transportation.81 This debate hit the Czechoslovak railways at a very difficult moment. At the beginning of the 1960s, ČSD was experiencing frequent interruptions of traffic, especially during the harsh winter of 1962–1963, and was having difficulty meeting the requirements of the economic plans.82 The railway troops were performing much of the construction activity, upgrading of tracks, and even repairs to rail cars and had become by that time irreplaceable. The troops’ contribution to renewal of railroad infrastructure increased from 2  percent of the total in 1960 to 18 percent in 1969.83 The Ministry of National Defense proposed covering the gaps in manpower by bringing on 1,750 conscripts performing their 19-month alternative service. After completing five months of basic training, a new soldier could move over to assist the activities of the Ministry of Transportation. After signing a “work 80 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 187 and 188 81  Návrh na řešení další výstavby železničního vojska, 3. ledna 1967 [Proposal for Further Construction Works by the Railroad Troops], vol. 22, unit 24/2, Předsednictvo ÚV KSČ 1966– 1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 82 Zpráva pro předsednictvo ÚV KSC o průběhu příprav k zabezpečení dopravy v zimních podmínkách [Report to the Presidium of the ÚV KSC on Preparations for Ensuring Transport under Winter Conditions] , no. 4870/1963, in: FMD, NA ČR. 83 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 207.

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commitment,” he was obligated to work in his assigned workplace until the commitment was fulfilled. It was thus possible to reduce the deficit in manpower on the railroads, although the Ministry of Transportation complained that it needed more individuals with technological expertise and management experience (in this case, officers) for directing construction projects. The attitude of the Ministry of National Defense won out in the end and the strength of the railway units was reduced as of September 1, 1969.84 The State Defense Council decided to increase the number of personnel in 1988. At the beginning of the 1970s, the decision to reduce the number of soldiers in the railway troops went along with a change in the concept of building and maintenance of a battlefront rail network. Now the units of the railroad troops were expected to provide security only in the rear immediately behind the front lines. The remainder of the network, even on territory under the direct control of the army, was to be taken over by “special reconstruction units” of the federal Ministry of Transportation. Because of the specialized expertise required and the type of damage expected to the infrastructure, they were to be backed up by “tunnel reconstruction units,” which were placed under the control of the federal Ministry of Fuels and Energy. In the event of war, the units of the railroad troops were to provide reconstruction services and operation of 350  km of tracks—and for short periods under exceptional circumstances, up to 500 km. The units had to be capable of ensuring movement by 18 train pairs over 24 hours. For that purpose, they had at their disposal 60 diesel locomotives and 1 track crane. In a mobilization, the railway troops’ operations brigade was to immediately take over operations of the rail lines west of a line running through České Budějovice, Písek, Strakonice, Plzeň, Blatno u Jesenice, and Karlovy Vary. As the army advanced, they were to follow the battlefront forward and repair the railway infrastructure behind it. Later, they were to hand their duties over to the above-mentioned special reconstruction units, which besides reconstructing infrastructure were to operate trains as well. In case they found themselves in areas falling under the control of the army in the field, they were to immediately submit to its command. The Northwest Railway, headquartered in Prague, was to take over management of construction works on particular sections of track.85 Despite the reduction in its manpower, the railroad troops maintained their importance to ČSD throughout the 1970s and 1980s because they performed extensive repairs on railroad tracks. Every year they renewed an average of 250  km of track. They also participated in important construction projects (such as the Žďákov bridge across the Orlík reservoir) and other projects of notable importance such as the Prague metro and reconstruction of the 84 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 218. 85 Railroad Troops Command: Usnesení 15. schůze ROS ze dne 7. června 1972—rozpis [Resolution of the Fifteenth ROS on June 7, 1972—Details], October 19, 1972, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4.

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Figure 4.8 Railroad troops constructing the Polanka connecting line in the railway station at Ostrava-Vítkovice. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. railway node at Prague. An attempt at locating the railroad troops in areas that were important for the transportation network and for the national economy was the founding in 1971 of Military Railroad Construction Centers (Vojenská železniční stavební střediska—VŽSS) in Sokolov and in Most, which were to take part in “the construction, transfer and maintenance of the rail lines of the open-pit mines in the area” of the northern Bohemian brown coal district. A new VŽSS in Žíšov built in 1986 increased the capacity and modernized the rail lines in southern Bohemia in connection with the construction of the nuclear power plant at Temelín.86 The political and economic changes after 1989 led to a gradual decline of the railroad troops. They finally were disbanded in 1994 and their duties were taken over by a privatized company, Stavební obnova železnic, a.s.87​​

86 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 218. 87 Jiránek and Soušek, Dějiny československého železničního vojska [History of the Czechoslovak Railroad Troops], 231–233.

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4.6 Chapter Summary The railway sector had a number of characteristics that were different from other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy. We can count among them its essential role in supporting the national economy, as well as its strategic importance to the defense of the republic and the government’s political needs. The country’s highest political organs took decisions that did not promote a rational relationship between tariffs and expenditures, factors which had begun to play a more and more important role in the central planning of the Czechoslovak economy. The main problem was that fares for passenger transport were frozen and did not change at all in nominal terms from the time of the currency reform of 1953. Moreover, tariffs for transport of freight increased only marginally. In other transportation sectors, particularly highway transport, prices were set more rationally and their revenues were better able to cover renewal of their plant and equipment. The need to ensure political and strategic tasks also interfered with rationalization of the operations of the railroads and increasing their efficiency. Because of opposition by the Ministry of Defense in the 1970s it was impossible to shut down many little-used tracks. The railways had to keep infrastructure and a

Figure 4.9 Ceremonial opening of the Polanka connecting line from OstravaKunčice to Ostrava-Vítkovice, 1964. Note: Text on the motor car reads: “We Will Build the ‘Youth Line’ and More Quickly Fulfill our Commitments to It.” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský.

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prescribed number of wagons and locomotives in reserve to ensure fulfillment of political and strategic tasks. We can also mention the need to provide logistics for the Spartakiads and maintain capabilities for mobilizing the ČSLA. The importance of rail transport to the economic, political, and defense spheres was never in doubt, but that did not prevent its gradual decline. As fares and tariffs stagnated, the need to reimburse the annual operating expenses of ČSD from the state budget increased. Subsidies to the railway sector increased from two billion Kčs to six billion Kčs a year in the period from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s. The enormous sums that vanished because of inadequate tariffs charged by ČSD increased the pressure on the state budget, further reducing its ability to allocate sufficient funds for investment into the modernization of the rail sector.

5 CONDITIONS IN THE RAILWAY SECTOR

At the end of World War II, the ČSD was one of the largest and most important state enterprises. They operated under a specific institutional framework and particular internal mechanisms because they constituted the entire railway sector. Almost all actors, institutions, and conceptual documents declared the fundamental importance of the sector to the economic, political, and strategic interests of the country. Despite the general agreement about the importance of rail transport, the uneconomic mechanisms we have discussed above were created. The railways were forced to operate under economically disadvantageous conditions and bend themselves to political and strategic objectives that in many cases stood directly in the path of efficient and economical operations. How did the mechanisms that were created for the operation of the railways impact their situation? This chapter will analyze the situation on the Czechoslovak railroads and in the ČSD in the 1970s and 1980s. Given the size of this state enterprise and the extent of its operations, our overview of ČSD will be divided into three parts, based on time and subject matter. The first parts are case studies of operations and personnel policies, which were key matters affecting ČSD’s business. The third part discusses the main aspects of international cooperation on the multilateral and bilateral levels. This discussion will complement the picture of ČSD’s domestic situation and show whether “privileged” international traffic, under different operational conditions, had problems similar to those of ČSD’s domestic operations. In both case studies we chose to survey three time periods (the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s), which allowed us to observe the changes throughout the course of each decade. The specific dates of our surveys were chosen on the basis of evaluations prepared for the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ, which were our key reference material. Those evaluations were accompanied by a range of other sources, including some in the public media which we will discuss later. We will leave the beginning of the first research period, the 1960s, undefined and focus on the second half of the decade. One of our findings is that the events surrounding the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not have a significant impact on the railways other than some changes in the personnel of its governing structures. The end of the 1970s was a time when the performance



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of the railways definitely began to stagnate and the sector began to lose out in its competition with highway transport. Our selection of the late 1980s as the ending point of our study is significant, and not only from the standpoint of this work. In those years the long-simmering crisis of the socialist economy began to boil over, foreshadowing the political changes in the entire Eastern Bloc. In the railway sector, there was a constantly widening gap between the railway sector’s actual state and the modernization that was not only possible, but was in fact ongoing in the West. It was then that the inadequacies stemming from the longterm underfinancing of the railway sector and its long-neglected maintenance began to express themselves. We provide a view of the situation in ČSD in two areas. The first is an overview of ČSD’s operations and its problems. The second focuses on its personnel situation, an issue that ČSD struggled with for a long time. The blame for the latter problems lies partly in the inadequate compensation that personnel in many key occupations received, and also in a lack of discipline in the labor force, which caused a number of extraordinary traffic accidents. The case studies will be completed by a look at ČSD’s foreign relations and contacts, and at how international issues were resolved within multilateral organizations and in bilateral relations. Although that discussion does not correspond exactly to the case studies we present below, it does explore the most important issues and problems that arose in international transportation. Our study covers some of the specifics of ČSD’s international relationships, which reflected the situation in the domestic railway sector and also compensated in part for its shortcomings. The international relationships offered a number of ways to balance out operations and borrow assets used for construction and other purposes. The significant role of international relations is underscored by its economic returns—ČSD generated a large amount of foreign exchange from its international commerce with the West. In the course of its foreign activities, the Czechoslovak railways actively defended the provisions of the Montreux agreement on the setting of tariffs, which mandated payment of transport costs in the currency of the state into which goods were exported. This led to long-running disputes in the country’s transportation diplomacy, in particular with Poland.

5.1 Case Study: Operations The 1970s and 1980s were a time when the Czechoslovak railways reached a maximum in the transport of people and goods. They had to contend with significant overburdening of the network, mainly by freight trains. They also faced constantly increasing pressure to improve the quality of transport and rationalize operations, which did lead to a certain increase in their economic efficiency. The railroads encountered stiff competition in the period we studied from the development of highway transportation, and on some segments from air transport. Our survey of three time periods provides an overview of the changes in the operations of ČSD in the 1970s and 1980s.

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Table 5.1 presents basic, general statistics and the basic data from our surveys of the Czechoslovak railway sector. It gives the length of the network and the volume of passenger and freight transport. The results can be compared with the statistics of neighboring countries’ railway administrations (see later in this chapter). Together, they reveal common trends in the Eastern Bloc as well as trends that mirrored the situations of Western railway administrations and their modernizing railway networks. Generally, it can be said that the length of ČSD’s network remained unchanged after World War II, although some local tracks were shut down after 1970. Quantitative performance indicators show that the rapid growth in transport performance after World War II slowed down and then nearly halted. For passenger transport, the break point came in the years from 1965 to 1970. Freight transport continued to grow for another decade, but its rate of increase was very low. The reason for this was that the volume of goods transported by rail fell while the average distance that goods traveled rose. It is possible to observe the slowing of the previous trend in the years 1970–1975. Eventually, after 1985 the volume of goods transported declined along with the sector’s efficiency.1 The survey of the three time periods that follows focuses on the railways as the most important transport sector, on its problems, and also on proposed and implemented plans for modernizing it. Our discussion of the problems and shortcomings shows the realities of the situation with which ČSD was dealing. In using the statistics of the time, one must be wary, because the majority of the sector’s leadership was materially interested in positive results, especially in the second half of the 1980s. One must assume, therefore, that some statistics were adjusted in small ways so that they appeared to be positive. Our sources, including some statistical data, will be supplemented by the records of the People’s Audit Committee of the KSČ, the auditors of the Federal Ministry of Transport, and other information, some of which originated in the contemporary media. Although we cannot offer an exhaustive account of the operational situation, we can show its most important contours.​

5.1.1 Survey of the Late 1960s The late 1960s were a critical time for the railroads because the whole transportation sector began to undergo change. For the railways, that meant mainly the consolidation of operations and a revamping of the economic aspects of the sector (for more, see below). From a detailed look at the railway sector, it can be said that “the quality of transportation lagged behind its quantitative growth, in terms of its safety, efficiency, fluidity, speed, and the variety of the services it

1 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781; Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the ČSSR 1980], 428–432; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské federativní republiky [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 428–432.

13168 140 31702 524.0 18.7

13124 96 18634 441.5 15.6

13139 196 47407 580.6 19.3

1960 13301 219 56904 569.1 19.7

1965 13308 236.8 60995 548.9 18.8

1970 13215 271.4 69271 486.4 18.4

1975

13131 287.0 72640 415.6 18.0

1980

13130 293.2 73598 419.5 19.8

1985

13106 283.6 71985 410.9 19.7

1989

Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781; Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the ČSSR 1980], 428–432; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 428–432.

Note: The largest value in each category is outlined in bold.

Length of Network (in km) Freight Transport (mil. of tons) Freight Transport (mil. of ton-km) Passenger Transport (mil. of persons) Passenger Transport (mil. passenger-km)

1955

1950

Table 5.1 Basic Statistics on the Development of the Czechoslovak Railways in the Years 1950–1990

112 Conditions in the Railway Sector

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113

Figure 5.1 Freight car transporting milk, 1960s. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. offered to passengers commuting to their employment, schools, and recreation.”2 This statement highlights the main problem with ČSD’s operations at the time, which was the poor quality of passenger and freight transport. Raising the quality of ČSD’s operations was a constant preoccupation of the leadership and a goal it strived for, but the archives do not show a consistent response from the lower ranks of the company. The unflattering picture quoted above existed despite the fact that, since the end of World War II, the railways had received an inordinate amount of investment compared to the rest of the economy, first for repairing war damage and later to strengthen transport links and strategic communications in Czechoslovakia. The investment also paid for completing certain projects begun under the First Czechoslovak Republic. Little new infrastructure was completed after the second half of the 1950s. From that time on, no new sections of track were constructed, with the exception of a broad-gauge track from the Soviet Union into the town of Haniska, where the ironworks in eastern Slovakia were located. Efforts at modernization were mainly aimed at changing the power source for the traction used on the railway network. This involved the gradual phasing out of steam-powered traction in favor of diesel and electric locomotives. The main rail lines were electrified in the 1960s so that electric locomotives could 2  Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Federal Ministry of Transportation, Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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be used on the first- and second-class lines. However, the universality of electric traction was reduced by the use of two different power systems. After 1959, the southern part of the country was electrified with alternating-current systems of 25 kV, 50 Hz. In the north, mainly on first-class lines, electrification was completed with a 3 kV direct-current system.3 Single-system locomotives had to be swapped out at junction stations, or multi-system locomotives had to be produced and used. Development of such locomotives was delayed until the beginning of the 1970s, with the introduction of ES 499.0 (now 350) locomotives. In the years that followed, the pace of investment slowed significantly, which coincided with the trend in the entire Czechoslovak economy. ČSD was unable to complete many proposed projects, many of which had been a long time in preparation. This led to increased operating costs and large economic losses, as even the completed investment projects could not manage to turn a profit.4 We will first describe conditions in passenger transport and then turn to freight transport. The situation of passenger transport on the ČSD at the end of the 1960s was very favorable and the railways dominated the sector. An approximation of the situation can be derived from basic statistics. Every inhabitant of Czechoslovakia took an average of 45.7 trips a year in passenger trains, which was comparable to the number in Western European countries. The number of train trips per track was however much smaller—about 25.9 movements per kilometer of track. Although the total volume of travel grew, the rate at which seats were occupied on the trains fell, from 57 percent in 1955 to 48.6 percent at the end of the 1960s. Given the very well-quantified results available to us, we can identify three main problems in passenger transport: the low speed of the trains, the high degree of unreliability and delay of connections, and worn out, inadequately maintained rail cars, which hampered the development of travel comfort by rail. The speed of trains at the time is shown by the statistics. From the beginning of the 1960s until 1967, the average speed of travel on express trains increased from 48.8 km/h to 52.9 km/h and on local trains from 28.5 km/h to 30.7 km/h. Still, this was a very low speed that did not suit the needs of the time. In 1967, passenger trains fulfilled the timetables much better than they did in 1956, 92.1 percent of the time compared to 87.5 percent in 1956, but performance plateaued from 1961 to 1963. The improvement that did occur was partly due to the inclusion of “cotton” in the published timetables, meaning that an extra five to seven percent was added to the time of every trip as a reserve in case of traffic problems. The rolling stock of ČSD was very worn out at the end of the 1960s because it had been only partly renewed in the postwar period. Most of the equipment 3 Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústřed¬ního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Federal Ministry of Transportation, Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presdium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR., 13. 4 Půlpán, Nástin českých a československých hospodářských dějin do roku 1990 [Outline of Czech and Czechoslovak Economic History to the Year 1990], 217.

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115

replacements were locomotives, mainly diesel and electric units. Forty-seven percent of the rail cars in passenger service were thirty years old or older and twelve percent were older than forty-five years. In all, 59 percent of ČSD’s rolling stock was outmoded and offered no more than the standard of travel of the First Republic, which illustrates the slow tempo of upgrading equipment.5 Freight transport was the victim of the obsession with quantity even more so than was passenger transport. In terms of speed and reliability, it was in the same critical situation, with one difference: the timetables for freight trains were set up with even more slack than those for passenger trains. Despite some efforts to speed up the flow of traffic, the average speed of freight trains was very low. In 1970, their average speed was 18.14  km/h.6 There were three main reasons for this: the poor state of railroad infrastructure, outmoded rolling stock, and a track network that was overburdened and that required trains to be waiting in stations or on open tracks. As mentioned above, most freight traveled over the first and second main lines, which made up only 14.1 percent of the entire network and thus were heavily congested. From 1955 the concentration of freight traffic on those lines constantly increased. In 1970, it reached 58.2 gross ton-km, that is, 60  percent of the total volume of freight traffic on the ČSD network. Some sections of track were so congested that there was no time for normal track maintenance to be performed.7 Some global trends gradually appeared in Czechoslovakia’s freight transport, mainly palletization8 and containerization9 of goods. Containerization allowed the standardized handling and transfer of commodities and increased flexibility in the use of rolling stock. A system of express freight trains was also developed that linked the main marshaling yards.10 On tracks where such trains did not travel, attempts were made to introduce a system of light-duty trains for collecting goods. All this was done with the goal of speeding up and improving the efficiency of freight transport. ČSD lagged behind in improving the circulation of  5 Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Federal Ministry of Transportation, Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.  6 Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1971 [Annual Report on Transportation for 1971], Federal Ministry of Transportation, 40.  7 Zpráva o koncepčním řešení rozvoje železničních dopravních cest [Report on a Plan for Development of Rail Travel Routes], Planning Department of the FMD, November 1972, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, November 1972, FMD, Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR.   8 “Palletization” is the transport of goods on standard-sized pallets, which facilitates their transport, storage, and above all, handling.   9 “Containerization” is the transport of goods in standardized containers, which facilitates their transport, storage, and above all, handling. 10 Marshalling yards are railway stations where rolling stock is sorted and trains are put together (formed). The stations have the technical equipment for forming trains, for sorting rolling stock, and for the use of workers in the shunting process.

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Conditions in the Railway Sector

rail cars, however, resulting in higher costs. Because freight cars were occupied in use longer than was necessary, more cars were needed in service and there were delays in their loading and unloading.11 The railways encountered a number of extraordinary difficulties, among which were regular blockades of rail traffic due to extreme winter weather. At such times, the whole rail network was thrown into an emergency situation and was only able to perform its tasks in a limited manner. Here it is worth mentioning the record-breaking, freezing winter of 1962–1963, in the course of which the railroads ran into very serious traffic problems that negatively influenced the entire national economy. The operational, and especially the maintenance, units of ČSD were affected by the chronic dysfunction of supplier-consumer relationships in the national economy. A significant number of locomotives and wagons suffered from lowquality maintenance, in part because suppliers were unable to resolve complaints within the time specified by their warranties. The time locomotives spent in repair shops was prolonged by a significant lack of spare parts and producers’ inability to deliver them in the requested quantity and quality.12 The proportion of the rolling stock undergoing repairs at any one time increased from 8.38 percent in 1961 to 12.16 percent in 1971.13 In the second half of the 1960s, the main tasks for ČSD in its relations with its customers, both in passenger and freight transport, can mainly be defined as follows: to improve the completely inadequate travel comfort and to increase the quality of freight transport. In general, the quality of transportation lagged far behind its quantitative growth.14 A report by the People’s Audit Committee of the ČSSR from 1972 summed up the main problems thus: 11  Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Federal Ministry of Transportation, Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 12  Informace o situaci v zásobování náhradními díly pro železniční vozidla, Odbor zásobování odbytu FMD [Information on the Situation in the Supply of Spare Parts for Railroad Cars, Department of Distribution Supply of the Ministry of Transportation], Information for the Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, August 21, 1972, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 13  Zpráva z prověrky úrovně kultury cestování v osobní dopravě na železnici, Výbor lidové kontroly ČSSR [Report of an Audit of the Culture of Travel in Personal Transport on the Railroads, People’s Audit Committee of the ČSSR], in: Informace o situaci v zásobování náhradními díly pro železniční vozidla, Odbor zásobování odbytu FMD [Information on the Situation in the Supply of Spare Parts for Railroad Cars, Department of Distribution Supply of the Ministry of Transportation], Information for the Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, August 21, 1972, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 14  Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Federal Ministry of Transportation, Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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117

The role and the importance of passenger transport on the railways have been underestimated by the Ministry of Transportation. Objectives set for the quality of passenger transport have not been met. The main reasons are a failure in the management and organization of work on the railways, particularly a single-minded focus on fulfilling the goals for volume of freight transport, insubordination and a decline in workplace discipline, disregard of rules in the workplace, and inconsistent and ineffective supervision by the economic leadership and professional audit agencies. The situation is also negatively influenced by personnel changes in all the mentioned functions in the period between 1962 and 1971.15 Because of the congestion on some sections of the main rail lines, plans were drawn up for the construction and activation of parallel tracks, onto which some freight traffic could be diverted.16 The state of the railway sector was briefly outlined in a commentary in Rudé právo from the year 1967: [I]ncreases in the plan every year have led to overburdening of the railway network and to the gradual worsening of the services it provides. This is apparent not only in freight transport, where manufacturers must to a certain extent adapt themselves to the capacities of the railways, but also in the travel comfort.17​​​​​

5.1.2 Survey of the Late 1970s The results of our survey of the late 1970s do not indicate any significant improvement in the situation of the transportation sector. The Czechoslovak railways still had not completed the transition from steam traction, congestion on the freight transport network still continued, maintenance of the tracks was delayed, and the railways had not been able to improve their services in passenger travel, in particular the travel comfort and the speed of the trains. Plans for eliminating worn-out, inefficient, and uneconomic steam locomotives had been on the boards since the beginning of the 1960s. Implementation of those plans had slowed significantly and Czechoslovakia lagged behind Western Europe, although when compared to the rest of the Eastern Bloc, the delay was 15  Zpráva z prověrky úrovně kultury cestování v osobní dopravě na železnici, Výbor lidové kontroly ČSSR [Report of an Audit of the Culture of Travel in Personal Transport on the Railroads, People’s Audit Committee of the ČSSR], in: Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, August 21, 1972, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 16 See, for example: Zpráva o koncepčním řešení rozvoje železničních dopravních cest [Report on a Plan for Development of Rail Travel Routes], Planning Department of the FMD, November 1972, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, November 1972, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 17 Kouřil, “Komentujeme—koleje a silnice” [“We Comment on—Rails and Highways], 2.

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Conditions in the Railway Sector

Figure 5.2 Passenger train pulled by steam locomotive 375.0, unknown location, late 1950s. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský.

Figure 5.3 Steam locomotive 434.1 at the Hradec Králové depot, about 1965. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke.

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119

Figure 5.4 Railroad employees posing by locomotive E499.043 in the Vsetín station, 1966. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke.

Figure 5.5 Transporting Volga automobiles on a Px flatcar, 1970. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke.

120

Conditions in the Railway Sector

Figure 5.6 Diesel locomotive T458.1125 being moved at the Trnava station, 1970. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke. not all that great. It was evident that the economy was unable to support the prescribed tempo of renewal of locomotives and other rolling stock. That meant that ČSD had to keep its inefficient and uneconomic locomotives in operation. As the statistics provided in Table 5.1 show that in the 1970s the volume of freight transport grew and the congestion on the railway network increased. The development of bypasses and alternative routes was unable to prevent this. The main problems were in the north-Bohemian brown coal mining areas and the region around Ostrava. “Resolution” of operational and technical difficulties therefore began to be pushed to the political, propagandistic level more and more often. Attempts to ensure the transport of the necessary volume of coal began to be called the “battle for coal,” and the “battle” became a challenge for every railway employee. Fifty-nine sections of track were the most congested and it was impossible to maintain smooth and regular operations on them due to the heavy traffic.18 Freight trains frequently piled up on the tracks leading into stations and waited long hours (and sometimes days) at the larger stations to enter and their cars to be redistributed. In some cases, especially in northern 18  Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého pětiletého plánu a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationalization of Public Transport in the Time of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Further Outlook], June 2, 1982, P 42/82, point 4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR.

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Figure 5.7 Freight yards in Ostrava, 1963. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. Bohemia, passengers were shunted onto substitute motor bus transport because it was impossible to guarantee timely operation of passenger trains on certain tracks.19 The managing agencies repeatedly excused themselves for the long-term deterioration of the condition of rail infrastructure by pointing to the growing volume of traffic and the need to fulfill the plan. The deterioration was not a fact that was hidden or unrecognized—the “battle for coal” was at that time ČSD’s dominant, publicly declared task. As an example of an explicit admission of the problem and an explanation of an unsatisfactory situation in a public communication, let us quote a critique of constant delays on passenger trains running on the first main line between Všetaty and Lysá and Labem: Preferential transit of trains leaving the coal basin to supply our national economy is our priority task. Because we understand the importance of this political objective, situations can occur where, in an attempt to ensure its fulfilment, there is an impact on the quality of travel on passenger trains.20​​ 19 For example, this happened on the double tracked, electrified Bílina-Úpořiny-Ústí nad Labem line. 20 Práce: Dlouhé jízdy vlaků a zpožďování na trati Lysá-Všetaty, 1981 [Work: Extended Travel of Trains and Delays on the Lysá-Všetaty Line], NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti.

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Figure 5.8 Different types of freight cars transporting coal, 1979. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. A complaint that was registered about the slow speed of travel between Prague and Stochov, where in places the track speed was reduced to a mere 20 km/h instead of the usual 80 km/h, can serve as another example of the response of the railways to complaints by passengers. Long delays were experienced on that section of track. The writer submitting the complaint received back general information about the problems of the railways and their tasks, but he got nothing about any possible improvements in the situation or at least information about the expected time frame for repairs: The district of Kladno, to which the section of track we are discussing belongs, maintains the track with a crew of maintenance workers, the size of which has shrunk sevenfold over the past fifteen years. Besides the transit of passenger trains, the track section transports about 17 million tons of freight a year.21​​

21 Bureš, Autobusová doprava a dále kritika stavu svršku u ČSD [Bus Transport and Criticism of the Condition of Equipment of the Czechoslovak State Railways], NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti.

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123

Figure 5.9 Diesel locomotives T478.2033 and T478.2031 at the Opava East station, 1971. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke. All things considered, travel on passenger trains worsened in the 1970s because of congestion, the deterioration of infrastructure, and a decline in average speeds and in reliability. The average delay increased from 1.91 minutes in 1971 to 3.07 minutes in 1980 for every 100 kilometers of travel in a passenger train.22 As a result, it had to be admitted that “it is not possible to maintain railroad tracks and infrastructure to the extent made necessary by the growing demand for transport.”23 The situation of course expressed itself negatively in ČSD’s operations in more frequent delays and unreliability of the timetables. The poor state of the railroads’ equipment also led to many accidents, mainly derailments at poorly maintained switches. The situation made even worse by a shortage of track workers (see below). “The operational capability of some construction units was practically destroyed because of an ongoing lack of track 22  Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého pětiletého plánu a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationalization of Public Transport in the Time of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Further Outlook], June 2, 1982, P 42/82, point 4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR. 23 Zpráva o současné situaci v technickém stavu elektrických lokomotiv a železničního svršku s provedením vyhodnocení stavu a podmínek výlukových činností na ČSD, odbor lokomotivního hospodářství, odbor traťového hospodářství [Report on the Current Situation of the Technical State of Electric Locomotives and Railroad Equipment, with an Evalution of the State and Conditions of the Exclusive Activities of the ČSD, Section of Locomotive Operations, Section of Track Operations], FMD, May 24, 1979, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, 28. 5. 1979, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR.

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Figure 5.10 Decorated locomotive T679.1421 pulling a freight train on the BrnoPřerov line, 1977. Note: Text on the locomotive: “Workers of the World, Unite!” The flags of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are displayed in the windows of the cab. Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. workers, which resulted in a great many defective places that could not be eliminated by continuous repairs.”24 Many examples from actual practice showed that the mechanisms of central planning could not react flexibly enough, especially for the maintenance of railway infrastructure.25 24 Informace o stavu a údržbě tratí ČSD pro poradu odboru dopravy a spojů VIII. Oddělení ÚV KSČ [Information on the Conditions and Maintenance of ČSD Routes for the Use of the Section for Transportation and Communications of the Eight Department of the ÚV KSČ], January 26, 1981; Zpráva o současné situaci v technickém stavu elektrických lokomotiv a železničního svršku s provedením vyhodnocení stavu a podmínek výlukových činností na ČSD, odbor lokomotivního hospodářství, odbor traťového hospodářství [Report on the Current Situation of the Technical State of Electric Locomotives and Railroad Equipment, with an Evalution of the State and Conditions of the Exclusive Activities of the ČSD, Section of Locomotive Operations, Section of Track Operations], FMD, May 24, 1979, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, 28. 5. 1979, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 25 František Hájek—zpožďování vlaků [František Hájek—Delay of Trains], 1981, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti.

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Statistics show that although the number of passengers on the railroads began to decline in the 1970s, the distances they traveled on the trains increased. This meant increased pressure and demand for long-distance travel and associated services. In the decade of the 1970s, extensive modernization of the fleet of passenger wagons took place, mainly those used for long-distance travel. Many of the cars were produced by the East German wagon factory at Bautzen. As new electric locomotives and rail cars for long-distance travel were introduced, motorized coaches of the M262 type became outmoded. In 1982 their age ranged from 21 to 33 years, depending on their date of manufacture. Replacements for them were constantly delayed.26​​ The poor quality of maintenance performed by ČSD on new long-distance wagons quickly became a problem, leading to the rapid deterioration of their interiors. Exterior washing of the cars was also a problem because ČSD lacked enough functional washing facilities. In the winter, cars could only be washed in Prague and Bratislava.27 This sad state of affairs attracted a large number of complaints about the condition of the rail cars, their inadequate maintenance,

Figure 5.11 EM475 electrically powered units were employed on suburban passenger trains from the mid-1960s. Note: Archives of the author. 26  Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého pětiletého plánu a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationalization of Public Transport in the Time of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Further Outlook], June 2, 1982, P 42/82, point 4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR. 27  Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého pětiletého plánu a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationalization of Public Transport in the Time of

126

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Figure 5.12 Decorations on motor car M131.1  in the Plešivec station, 1970s. Note: Portrait of Czechoslovak president Ludvík Svoboda. Collection of Leštinský. and their cleanliness.28 The services provided by ČSD’s subsidiary, Restaurant and Sleeping Cars (Jídelní a lůžkové vozy—JLV) were also of very poor quality. All inspections performed on sleeper cars, couchettes, and dining cars identified significant shortcomings in cleanliness, quality of service, and staff discipline. They also showed that decisions of the FMD and JLV were not helping the railways’ employees and that some of the proposals for improving the conditions of their employment remained “on paper.”29 At the beginning of the 1970s one of the main challenges for the railway sector was improving the state of its infrastructure. ČSD did all it could to find new track maintenance employees. It employed prisoners, foreign workers, mainly from Vietnam, and of course the railway troops. Even so, it is clear from contemporary documents that the entire sector had arrived at a dead end from which the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Further Outlook], June 2, 1982, P 42/82, point 4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR. 28 Compare: Z11 Stížnosti [Complaints], in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4. 29 Zpráva z provedené kontroly naplňování závěrů porady ministra dopravy ze dne 16. března 1981 ke zlepšení kvality služeb podniku JLV poskytovaných cestující veřejnosti, odbor železniční dopravy a přepravy FMD, odbor vozového hospodářství FMD [Report to the Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation on Audit of Fulfilled Commitments for Improving Services of the JLV Company Provided to the Traveling Public, Section of Rail Transport of the FMD, Section of Railcar Operations of the FMD], February 8, 1982, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, March 15, 1982, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR.

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it could not extricate itself.30 Nevertheless, plans were being made for a massive expansion of bypass routes around the most heavily congested places on the first and second main lines.31 The inadequate quality of passenger transport, travel comfort, and auxiliary services was a topic of discussion at all levels of society, as it had been in previous years. By the 1970s, the situation of ČSD was demonstrating such fundamental problems that it was a topic at the 15th Congress of the Central Committee of the KSČ: The report from the meeting of the Central Committee of the KSČ states that transportation is a limiting factor on the national economy—therefore growth of 4.2 percent in transport must be ensured in the year 1978. That is the average for the entire country. In the Northern Bohemian region, the growth in the transport of coal must be ten percent. The network of tracks and sidings is very dense there, but only a few main lines have the technical capacity to handle intense modern traffic . . . Basically, the material and technical infrastructure of the railroads is 100 years old.32 A journal for railway professionals also wrote unflatteringly about the situation. In his New Year’s message to the employees of ČSD, published in the pages of the magazine Železničář, federal Minister of Transportation Vladimír Blažek spoke surprisingly openly about the problems of the rail sector and the huge deficit in investment in the kind of infrastructure that could improve the state of the railways in Czechoslovakia: By our failure to fulfill the need for critical construction, we are not creating the conditions for technical development, for greater track capacity, or for improvement of our repair facilities. We must quite openly admit that compared to the situation in the Fifth Five-Year Plan, we have not succeeded in speeding up or improving the quality of capital investments. I am thinking mainly about constructing them, putting the new capacity into operation, and limiting the growth of budget expenditures.33​ 30  Plnění opatření ke zprávě o stavu tratí ČSD, odbor traťového hospodářství FMD [Implementation of Measures in the Report on the Condition of ČSD Lines], December 14, 1981, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, December 21, 1981, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 31 For specifics, see: Postup zvyšování propustnosti jižního tahu z Košic do Jihlavy a tratí z České Třebové do Lysé nad Labem a Poříčan, odbor výhledu FMD [Measures for Improving the Flow of Rail Traffic from Košice to Jihlava and on the Line from Česká Třebová to Lysá nad Labem and Poříčany], May 24, 1976, in: Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, 15. 6. 1976, FMD, Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 32 Josef Vašátko, “Železniční stavby v Severních Čechách” [“Rail Construction in Northern Bohemia”] in: Rudé právo, January 17, 1978, 3. 33 Blažek, “Hned po startu plným tempem” [“Full Speed Right from the Start”], 1.

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Figure 5.13 Freight Yards at Přerov, 1978. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský.

5.1.3 Survey: The Late 1980s From an operational point of view, the decade of the 1980s was a period of stabilization for railway transportation. There was no significant increase in the volume of goods and people transported, as was the case in earlier decades after the end of World War II. One reason for this was the massive growth in motor vehicle transport, which was taking over more and more services in both freight and mass passenger transport. Public transport was deeply affected by the rapid growth in individual automobile ownership. At the end of the 1980s, ČSD was still handling an enormous amount of traffic by European standards, but its capacity was “nearly exhausted by the social demands imposed by the plan.”34 Between 1980 and 1989, the total weight of freight transported each year stagnated at the level of about 280 million tons per year. Freight transport performance was about 72 billion ton-km, and passenger performance was 19 million passenger-km.35 A positive development was shown in performance of electric 34  Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation in Rail Transport for the Year 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 35  Statistická ročenka ČSSR 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the ČSSR 1980], 428–432; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské federativní republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 428–432.

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traction, as ČSD succeeded in redirecting the majority of freight transport operations (measured in gross ton-km) onto more energy-efficient electric locomotive-drawn trains. In 1980, the proportion of freight pulled by electric locomotives compared to other forms of power was about 6:4. By 1989, it had reached 7.5:2.5. The statistics on train-kilometers in terms of types of traction developed in a similar direction as steam locomotives were finally retired from service at the beginning of the 1980s.36 The number of passengers transported by rail marginally decreased. Part of the passenger base moved over to other types of public and individual transport, mainly on the highways. At the same time there was a slight increase in the average distance passengers traveled by rail. Between 1980 and 1989 the number of train-km in passenger transport increased from 132 million train-km to 138 million train-km. More travelers opted for highway transport for short trips, while trains were used for longer journeys. The average distance of a rail journey increased from 43.4 km in 1980 to 47.9 km in 1989. Thanks to that, ČSD was able to weather the drop in the number of passengers transported. The performance of passenger transport held steady at about 19 million passenger-km per year.37 Still, the long-term problems of the passenger transport sector remained. The reliability and speed of travel, cleanliness, and the quality of the services offered were frequent targets of criticism. Compared with more developed countries abroad, ČSD’s network was not competitive. Although the average speed of the trains used in long-distance service increased to 62 km/h in 1987, such trains averaged 108 km/h in the GDR, nearly twice as fast. The increase in the average speeds noticeable in the timetables from the last two decades resulted from the introduction of more efficient, electrically powered locomotives. Electric locomotives had better performance specifications than diesel (and, of course, steam) locomotives. They permitted trains to get under way faster, which shortened travel times. However, keeping to the timetables was still a sore point for passenger transport. A standard, almost usual, delay in departures was 10 to 30 minutes. Just in the first quarter of 1987, 40.1 percent of international express trains, 15.9 percent of domestic express trains, and 3.4 percent of local trains experienced delays. The number of delayed departures of express trains in 1987 was twice what it had been in 1984.38 36 Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 438 and 439. 37  Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské republiky 1990 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1990], 442. 38 Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

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Passenger travel and its reliability were affected by the overall condition of rail infrastructure. Stated travel times in many cases remained “on paper.” As the state of railway equipment worsened, passenger trains were allowed socalled “bonuses” over their usual stated travel times. Track repairs were another significant problem. Besides the previously mentioned problems with suppliers and shortages of trained railway workers, it was impossible to withdraw some sections of track from service and perform major repair work on them because of the huge amount of daily traffic they had to carry. For those reasons, there was no significant improvement in the situation. For example, in 1986 the “bonus” in the stated travel time between Prague and Ústí nad Labem was 32 minutes39 and 42.7 minutes between Prague and Zábřeh na Moravě, but even so, there were constant delays.40 This shows that the “everyday reality” of fulfilling ČSD’s timetable was not blessed with great success. The Prague-Zábřeh section was traversed by effectively all trains between Prague, Ostrava, and the northern part of Slovakia, and also those between Prague and Bratislava and the entire southern part of Slovakia.41 The stabilization of passenger transport was regularly discussed in all the agencies involved in transportation and communications, including the Fifth Department of the Central Committee of the KSČ. The Federal Ministry of Transportation presented the Fifth Department with a report, “Measures for Improving Passenger Transportation in the Years 1986 to 1990,” and continuously monitored its implementation. The results were not satisfactory, however, and improvements were noted on only a few sections of track. The main positive development was the introduction of an automated reservation system that offered greater flexibility, and consequently resulted in greater use of the reservation system. Little else improved: The shortcomings are mainly related to the low levels of the fulfillment of the railway timetable, of the information available to the traveling public, of the cleanliness and amenities of the trains and of passenger compartments, of the quality of services provided by ticket offices, and even of the treatment of the traveling public by railway employees, which is the result of poor direction and control of the behavior of some workers.42 39 The distance between the Praha-Holešovice train station and Ústí nad Labem is 103 km. The travel time listed in the grafikon for 2016/2017 for the fastest passenger train was 70 minutes. 40 The distance between the main station in Prague and Zábřeh na Moravě is 204 km. The travel time listed in the grafikon for 2016/2017 for the fastest passenger train stopping in both stations was 115 minutes. 41  ČST—Aktuality: Stížnost cestujících na kvalitu vlaku R529 [ČST—News: Passengers’ Complaints about the Quality of the R529 Train], 7.8.1986, Related Correspondence of the FMD, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti. 42  Kvalita železniční osobní dopravy v roce 1987, postup v roce 1988 a dalších letech 8.5LP, FMD, Odbor železniční dopravy a přepravy, Podklady pro poradu odboru dopravy a spojů XV. oddělení

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The above-mentioned report did not contain any concrete proposals for change and improvement with clear assignments of responsibility and deadlines. It only stated that future developments would be monitored and efforts to improve would “receive heightened attention.”43 Although the situation was bad in passenger transport, some improvements were made, including faster speeds on long-distance routes. However, the increase in average speeds was not achieved through better infrastructure, but by reducing the number of station-stops and making operational changes (reducing the time spent waiting in the stations and swapping out locomotives, manipulating through-traveling wagons, etc.) The 1986–1987 timetables introduced a new category of long-distance passenger train into the Czechoslovak rail network, the InterExpres train, to which those changes were applied. The trains were the result of cooperation of the Czechoslovak, East German, Polish, and Hungarian railway administrations, and were intended to respond to the introduction of high-quality InterCity (and later, EuroCity) trains in Western Europe. InterExpres trains operating on the ČSD network linked Prague with Berlin, Budapest, and Warsaw.44 Freight transport also suffered from detours and delays. There were constant problems with coupling up rail cars and ensuring their arrival at the proper place and time. The average speed of travel for freight cars was only 100 km in 24 hours, that is, about 4.2 km/h. The ever-increasing number of bottlenecks in the infrastructure seriously hampered traffic on the network. Some rail nodes (e.g., Ústí nad Labem, Olomouc, the Ostrava region, and Žilina) were always jammed. They could not accept all the trains that wanted to enter and permit them to pass through without problems. As of 1987, every day about 120 freight trains were stalled on ČSD’s network without locomotives to pull them, many of them standing still for five days or more. The idling of train crews, rail cars, and locomotives led to an enormous increase in costs, to say nothing of damages caused by delays in the delivery of the goods being transported.45 ÚV KSČ [Quality of Passenger Rail Transport in the Year 1987, Approach to 1988 and Later Years, 8.5LP, FMD Section on Rail Transport and Carriage, Material for the Section on Transportation and Communications of the Fifteenth Department of the Central Committee of the KSČ] NA ČR, FMD, List 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti. 43 Kvalita železniční osobní dopravy v roce 1987, postup v roce 1988 a dalších letech 8.5LP, FMD, Odbor železniční dopravy a přepravy, Podklady pro poradu odboru dopravy a spojů XV. oddělení ÚV KSČ [Quality of Passenger Rail Transport in the Year 1987, Approach to 1988 and Later Years, 8.5LP, FMD Section on Rail Transport and Carriage, Material for the Section on Transportation and Communications of the Fifteenth Department of the Central Committee of the KSČ], NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti. 44  “Die ‘InterExpres’-Züge der DR. Das EuroCity/EuroNight-System in Osteuropa“ [“The ‘InterExpres‘ Trains of the German Reichsbahn: The EuroCity/EuroNight System in Eastern Europe“]. 45  Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku

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The blame for the constantly slowing flow of traffic can be placed on the overburdening of first and second main rail line, where traffic was delayed by the above-mentioned lack of maintenance as well as congestion in stations and rail nodes. Up to 70 percent of traffic traveled on 18 percent of the total length of the network. The average yearly transport performance on each kilometer of track was 13.21 gross ton. In the FRG and France the average was half of that number. In some places on the ČSD main lines, each kilometer carried 90 million gross ton.46 In 1987, 376 sections of the network totaling 757 km in length were in bad technical condition. The railway administration did not react flexibly enough to the need to eliminate the defects, and the progress of construction projects was very slow. Track maintenance continued as always, which meant that in the interest of keeping traffic flowing and meeting the plan’s targets for the volume of transport, there was a “significant reduction in repair work on high-traffic rail lines that resulted in the deliberate deterioration of the quality and maintenance of the lines.”47 Rolling stock was also a problem. It was predicted that in 1990, 52 percent of locomotives would be 20 years old or older and 33 percent would still be in service after their economic and technical service lives had expired. About a third of the total of 9,623 rail cars in service were outmoded types. In general, rail cars suffered from permanent defects due to frequent shutdowns of repair facilities, prolongation of the time between inspections, and continuing shortages of spare parts—which were problems for locomotives as well. ČSD ceased doing maintenance on some features of its rail cars, mainly on express trains. An example was the central locking function for the doors on passenger rail cars that were produced in East Germany. ČSD was unable to maintain the system in operation because it could not hook up trains with that type of car exclusively, something that was essential for activation of the locking function. The constant shortage of freight cars was a serious problem, which was solved by the use of cars from the OPW common freight car pool and other foreign freight cars (see below regarding the borrowing of freight cars from the FRG). This meant of course an increase in the cost of operations because ČSD had to při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 46 Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation of Rail Transport in the Year 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 47  Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation of Rail Transport in the Year 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

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reimburse its partners for use of the cars, but it would never have been able to meet the domestic demand for transport otherwise.48 The unsatisfactory state of ČSD’s network led it to devise plans for modernizing its main lines, with work to begin at the end of the 1980s. The idea was to eliminate bottlenecks on the first and second main lines, raise speed limits to 120–140 km/h, and invest in other infrastructure improvements.49 Upgrading of the first section of track was actually achieved in 1988 on a section between Šakvice and Zaječí near Břeclav, and top speeds were raised to 140 km on one track. Further modernization of infrastructure took place after 1993  in the Czech Republic when a comprehensive modernization of four main rail corridors was begun.50​​​​​​​​

Figure 5.14 Two-axle motor car M152.0 became an icon of passenger travel on local lines, entering the Dolní Lipová station, 1982. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke. 48 Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation of Rail Transport in the Year 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point k inf 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 49 Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation of Rail Transport in the Year 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 50 “Ministerstvo dopravy ČR, Tranzitní železniční koridory [Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic, Rail Transit Corridors].”

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Figure 5.15 Motor car M152.0030 coupled with another passenger car, near Obrnice station, July 23, 1983. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

Figure 5.16 A festively decorated locomotive T478.3379 passing through Karlovy Vary-Dvory station and the Karlex (Berlín-Karlovy Vary) express train, pulled by locomotive 170 of the East German Reichsbahn, September 13, 1981. Note: Text on the locomotive reads, “Day of the Czechoslovak Railway Workers.” The Czechoslovak and Soviet flags are seen below. Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

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Figure 5.17 Another decorated locomotive, T679.1410, in the Karlovy Vary station, September 11, 1982. Note: Text on the locomotive reads, “Day of the Czechoslovak Railway Workers.” The Czechoslovak and Soviet flags are seen under the text. Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

Figure 5.18 Motor car M296.1018 at the Skřivany station, July 18, 1983. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

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Figure 5.19 Electric locomotive E469.1024 in the Most station, at the head of a unit freight train, July 23, 1983. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

Figure 5.20 Locomotive T679.1326 nearby the Most station, pulling a freight train, July 23, 1983. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

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Figure 5.21 Locomotive T478.1102 in the Klobouky in Bohemia station, at the head of a switching freight train, July 28, 1983. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

5.2 Case Study: The Personnel Situation The Czechoslovak railways were one of the largest employers in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1966 they employed 207,000 people. Meeting the constantly growing demand for transportation required extraordinary effort from all employees and increased the pressure for greater labor productivity. As did other employers in Czechoslovakia, ČSD was beset by chronic shortages of manpower. By the 1960s, the railways could no longer count on their earlier “personnel pillar” of stable and experienced employees who remembered the time before the war, when being a railway worker had professional cachet and dignity and the railways were one of the country’s most prestigious employers. After 1950 there was a rapid and almost total turnover of ČSD’s personnel. Just between 1950 and 1956, ČSD took on 135,000 new employees. The replacement of employees who remembered the First Czechoslovak Republic was effectively complete as of 1970.51 After 1945, the profession of railway worker quickly gained importance because the extensive damage done during the war required enormous effort 51 Ministerstvo dopravy: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport] , Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR, 57.

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to repair. Ensuring the flow of rail traffic was key for renewing supply lines and for running the economy. In the course of the republic’s postwar reconstruction, the railways began to be militarized, both in their terminology and in their organization. In propaganda, as previously mentioned, transportation became a new “battleground” where the “battle for coal” and other supplies was carried on. Like the railways in other Eastern European nations, ČSD was organized in a very strict hierarchy. Membership in the organization was even denoted by a uniform. In the 1950s, the railway workers’ uniform resembled that of Soviet soldiers, down to insignia of rank. Railway workers were, in the popular jargon of the day, members of the “blue army.” The public perception of employment on the railways changed after two decades of peacetime and the profession lost its social prestige. The worsening of conditions of employment in comparison to other workplaces was mainly responsible for that. ČSD began to encounter significant problems, especially shortages of workers and a decline in their work ethic. An increasing number of employees were hired who approached their work with indifference and did not follow workplace rules. The results were damaging to the operations of the railway sector as a whole.52 The following three surveys will show how the personnel situation at ČSD changed and the problems with which the railways had to deal.​

Figure 5.22  Uniforms of ČSD railway workers in the first Czechoslovak Republic, 1920s. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. 52 Ministerstvo dopravy: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee

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5.2.1 Survey of the Late 1960s The Czechoslovak railways began to encounter problems in the course of the 1960s in the area of personnel. Employees’ pay did not adequately compensate them for the arduousness of work on the railroads, working in shifts, and the frequent absences from home that the profession called for. Nor did employees receive retirement pay, housing subsidies, and other “soft” benefits such as the social prestige that railway workers enjoyed in the time of the First Republic. In response to its employees’ dissatisfaction, ČSD introduced stabilizing measures and premium pay for occupations that were in deficit. It increased the number of jobs that allowed employees to receive higher retirement benefits and allowed retirees to work more than 180 days a year without losing their benefits, as was usual at the time. Not least, it improved the quality of the health care and the spa treatments that employees received. Even so, the railway sector was unable to attract the number of employees it needed, and according to some assessments, the railway’s workforce was excessively “feminized,” given the physical demands of the profession.53 Documents of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ that were discussed in June 1968, at the peak of the Prague Spring, compared the developments in the railway sector with those in the society at large. The dissatisfaction of ČSD’s employees is made plain in the documents: The situation in transport in the past weeks is basically comparable to political developments in society as a whole . . . An attempt to rehabilitate the social standing of the entire transport sector and especially the railway workers has come to the fore. It is characteristic that there is no criticism of the [Communist] Party but mainly of the economic and professional organizations.54 Dissatisfied workers pointedly recalled the contributions of employees in the transportation sector to the rebuilding of the republic after the war: “Transportation workers were the first to turn the wheels after the war, but they are the last to be rewarded.”55 As mentioned above, the below-average wages earned by workers in the railway sector were responsible for the shortfall in their numbers. The situation resulted in a high number of overtime hours being of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR, 57. 53 Ministerstvo dopravy: Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transport], Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR, 13. 54 Informace o současné situaci v dopravě [Information on the Current Situation in Transport], June 13, 1968, vol. 73, unit 97/inf 1, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 55  Informace o současné situaci v dopravě [Information on the Current Situation in Transport], June 13, 1968, vol. 73, unit 97/inf 1, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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Table 5.2  Employment at ČSD in Selected Professions Compared to Positions on Paper in 1971 (in Percent) Profession Train Crew Shunting Crew Locomotive Crew Track Maintenance Railway Construction Workshops

Employment Compared to Positions on Paper (in %) 94.76 92.13 97.97 93.79 92.52 98.87

Source: Rozbor příčin výrazného úbytku pracovních sil dělnických a provozních profesí na železnici v roce 1971 [Discussion of the Reasons for the Marked Decline in Manpower Among Workers and Operators on the Railroads in the Year 1971], Discussion Material for Meeting of the Government of the ČSSR, February 1972, Advisory Board of the Minister of Transportation, August 21, 1972, Collegium of the Federal Ministry of Transportation and Minister’s Advisory Board, NA ČR.

worked. On the railways alone, employees worked 35 million overtime hours per year, which was equivalent to the labor of 10,000 employees. Czechoslovakia’s government unceasingly tried to remedy the situation. At the end of the 1960s it actually did manage to staff ČSD to a satisfactory level. That did not last, however. As conditions in other sectors of the economy improved, those employers improved their offers and workers again began to abandon ČSD. Very soon the shortage of manpower returned.56 Table 5.2 below shows the percentage of filled positions in various job categories on the Czechoslovak railways. All the key areas of the railway sector suffered from a lack of manpower. The most problematic positions were shunting crew, railway construction workers, and track maintenance workers. These positions were essential to the smooth operation of the railway network and maintenance of its infrastructure, as will be shown later. Besides the shortages of employees, their aging became a problem as well. In 1971, 25.8 percent of ČSD’s employees were between 40 and 49 years of age and 28.65 percent were between 50 and 59.57 The 56 Rozbor příčin výrazného úbytku pracovních sil dělnických a provozních profesí na železnici v roce 1971, Podkladový materiál pro schůzi vlády ČSSR, únor 1972 [Discussion of the Reasons for the Marked Decline in Manpower Among Workers and Operators on the Railroads in the Year 1971, Material for Meeting of the Government of the ČSSR, February 1972], in: Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, August 21, 1972, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 57  Rozbor příčin výrazného úbytku pracovních sil dělnických a provozních profesí na železnici v roce 1971, Podkladový materiál pro schůzi vlády ČSSR, únor 1972 [Discussion of the Reasons for the Marked Decline in Manpower Among Workers and Operators on the Railroads in the Year 1971, Material for Meeting of the Government of the ČSSR, February 1972], in: Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, August 21, 1972, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR.

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Figure 5.23  Railway workers’ uniforms, 1952–1963. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. intake of younger employees slowed down; after the wave of hiring in the 1940s and 1950s, employment essentially stagnated.​​​ A look at the statistics on the remuneration of employees of ČSD in 1970 does not give the impression of a significant social imbalance. The average wage at ČSD in 1970 was 2,272 Kčs per month while the average wage in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors of the ČSSR economy was 1,937 Kčs. These figures do not take into account the professional qualifications demanded by the railway sector, which were higher than in other economic sectors because of the complexity of its operations. Fully 338 ton-km of freight transported per year was attributable to each employee of ČSD in 1970.58 Besides the inadequate compensation of professionals, a long-term disregard for and lack of attention to employees’ social and housing problems contributed to the worsening situation. The plan for the year 1964 called for building 58  Federal Statistical Office, Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 265 and 444.

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Figure 5.24  Engineers at the Sokolov depot in front of steam locomotive 534.0447. Sokolov, late 1950s. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke. 12,000 housing units for railway workers, but by 1968 only 3,886 had been delivered to them. Attempts to increase the salaries of some of the job categories that were in deficit caused ill-feeling among the employees and led to distrust of the railway workers’ labor union (Odborový svaz dopravy a spojů). The union had traditionally most actively supported the locomotive engineers, but the engineers founded their own union in 1967, the Federation of Engineers (Federace strojvůdců), which still exists today. They were followed in that step by the train dispatchers, conductors, repairmen, and others.59 Low wages and excessive demands for overtime work reduced the employees’ motivation. Inattention and mistakes by employees led to a number of accidents. Employees were responsible for the majority, 59 percent, of the accidents that occurred in 1966. The remaining 41 percent were caused by technical defects of the rolling stock, tracks, and safety equipment that can at least in part be blamed on slap-dash or negligent maintenance.60 59  Informace o současné situaci v dopravě [Information on the Current Situation in Transport], June 13, 1968, vol. 73, unit 97/inf 1, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 60 Ministry of Transportation, Návrh materiálu pro plenární zasedání Ústředního výboru KSČ k hlavním problémům dopravy [Draft Material for the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSČ on the Main Problems in Transportation] Praha, April 1967, vol. 35, unit 36/8, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR, 13.

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Figure 5.25  Engineers and firemen of the Sokolov depot in conversation next to steam locomotive 556.0, late 1950s. Note: Collection of Roman Jeschke. Another way that dissatisfaction was expressed was through political agitation. The documents mention several threats of strike activity that were made by shunting crew in Hradec Králové and by workers in the area of Žilina, something that was never seen in other professions under the communist regime. The documents also tell of a national conference of 600 dispatchers that was organized during one night shift in the spring of 1968. This was a completely extraordinary political act, which the apparatus of the state was unable to prevent or control. The employees had free access to the railways’ telephones, telegraphs, and teletypes. They were highly mobile as well thanks to their free travel benefits and were willing and able to travel long distances. All of this allowed them to mobilize for political action and protest among their co-workers.61​​

61  Informace o současné situaci v dopravě [Information on the Current Situation in Transport], June 13, 1968, vol. 73, unit 97/inf 1, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR.

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Figure 5.26 Example of spontaneous protest at the Hodslavice railroad station after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968. Note: Text on the building reads, “When the [Soviet] stars go out, Prague will be happy!” Collection of Roman Jeschke.

Figure 5.27 An example of spontaneous protest against the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Přerov, August 22, 1968. Note: Text on the wagon reads, “Death to Traitors—We Support Our [Legitimate Government].” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský.

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5.2.2 Survey of the Late 1970s ČSD’s personnel situation did not improve during the 1970s, rather the opposite. The railways were unable to hire the planned number of employees and the manpower shortage was compensated for by overtime work. Many employees did not meet the standards for their professions. Training and the quality of the work performed were insufficient at all levels.62 Management and controls were inadequate, supervisors expected very little of their subordinates, and the overall discipline of the employees was very low.63 In the course of economic reforms, the FMD tried to introduce material incentives for supervisory employees. The yearly bonus was not insignificant; it was about 25–35 percent of the annual salary and was dependent on fulfillment of the plan.64 Although this was an unprecedented step for management and for motivating employees to take responsibility, it did not bring the expected results. According to reports of the time, ČSD set very low standards for performance. Even if they were fulfilled, it did not lead to any significant improvement in the conditions of the sector. Other problems began to appear that were caused by developments in the past decades, and not only in those job categories where manpower was lacking. The low intake of new employees led to an increase in the average age of employees, which was felt first in those jobs which had demanding physical requirements.65 Other employers in construction and manufacturing often offered better conditions for equally arduous work. Nor was ČSD able to offer competitive salaries.66​ The Federal Ministry of Transportation therefore tried to construct housing for ČSD employees, but it always fell behind. Financial incentives were more effective and quicker to implement—ČSD offered various bonuses, inclusion in 62  See, for example, these reports on inspections: Zpráva z provedené kontroly naplňování závěrů porady ministra dopravy ze dne 16. března 1981 ke zlepšení kvality služeb podniku JLV poskytovaných cestující veřejnosti, odbor železniční dopravy a přepravy FMD, odbor vozového hospodářství FMD [[Report to the Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation on Audit of Fulfilled Commitments for Improving Services of the JLV Company Provided to the Traveling Public, Section of Rail Transport of the FMD, Section of Railcar Operations of the FMD], March 15, 1982, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 63  Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého pětiletého plánu a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationaliztion of Passenger Transport in the Period of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Onward], June 2, 1982, P 42/82, point 4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1981–1985, 1261/0/8, NA ČR. 64 Hmotná zainteresovanost vedoucích organizací řízených FMD pro rok 1982 [Material Interest of Leading Organizations for the Year 1982], March 5, 1982, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, March 15, 1982, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 65 Výsledky následné kontroly plnění opatření přijatých k prověrce na Federálním ministerstvu dopravy, správě severozápadní dráhy a železniční stanice Praha-Vršovice provedené v roce 1975 [Results of Follow-up on Measures Adopted Pursuant to an Audit of the Federal Ministry of Transportation, the Administration of the Northwestern Railways and the Praha-Vršovice Railway Station], December 21, 1976, vol. 27, unit 29/inf 2, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR. 66 Zpráva o stavu tratí ČSD [Report on the Conditions of Lines of the ČSD], December 3, 1980, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, 26. 1. 1981, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR.

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Figure 5.28 ČSD railway workers’ uniforms, 1963–1992. Note: Collection of Mojmír Leštinský. advantageous fare classes, and pension contributions for a range of professions. From the end of the 1970s, it was usual for many railway employees to receive a special old-age pension contribution when they retired.67 However, it was not always possible to fulfill promises, especially in the area of salaries. The high cost of the workers that were employed was the fundamental problem. In that regard, ČSD was paying for its enormous size. The railways gradually introduced a “stabilization supplement” for workers who stayed employed for a certain time in job categories that were physically demanding or in deficit. This was intended to reduce the turnover of employees that plagued ČSD as much as the shortages of manpower.68 For younger employees the duration of military service could be shortened if they signed a long-term employment contract.69 67 Informace o přehledu povolání pro účely poskytování zvláštního příspěvku 200,- Kč měsíčně k důchodu pracovníkům úzkoprofilových profesí železniční dopravy [Information on a List of Occupations for the Purpose of Providing a Special Contribution of 200 Czechoslovak Crowns for the Pensions of Workers of Scarce Specialisations in Rail Transport], Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, May 2, 1979, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 68 Soubor opatření k omezení fluktuace a ke zvýšení náboru a stabilizace pracovních sil v železniční dopravě [Summary of Measures for Limiting Fluctuation and Increasing the Hiring and Stability of Manpower in Rail Transport], Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, March 14, 1978, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 69  Rozbor situace v pracovních silách v obvodu Severozápadní dráhy, jaké důsledky má nedostatek pracovníků v provozu a v kterých lokalitách, jaká opatření k jejich řešení již byla provedena a co se dále navrhuje [Elaboration of the Manpower Situation on the Northwestern Railways

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The deplorable state in which the Czechoslovak railways found itself underlines its inability to attract employees and obtain basic equipment. In October 1980 the problems were brought up in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ. The distribution of winter work clothing for employees had had very poor results: 34,000 of the 140,000 pairs of Vibram-sole boots that were needed were unavailable, 9,500 of the needed 29,000 quilted jackets, 7,500 of the needed 16,000 quilted pants, and 15,000 of the needed 19,000 raincoats.70 A similar unsatisfactory situation existed with the distribution of work uniforms. Because of shortages of certain sizes, some conductors had to go to work in civilian clothing.71 Analyzing the actual conditions in the workplaces and the mood of the workers is rather difficult given that few archival sources are available. However, records of complaints that the Federal Ministry of Transportation processed, often in cooperation with the People’s Audit Committee of the KSČ, can provide some insights. One anonymous letter of complaint sent to Rudé právo, published under the title “Who is Sabotaging Traffic on the Railroads? The Situation of Traffic on ČSD is Not Rosy,” was passed on to the People’s Audit Committee on September 6, 1979. It contained a critique of the internal relationships within ČSD and a complaint about the treatment of its employees: The causes are many: 1) an expanding administrative apparatus, whose management of the work is downright catastrophic; and 2) transferring of responsibilities from one category of worker to other workers who then have a hard time keeping their heads above water, mostly at the cost of large amounts of overtime work . . . 3) minimal care for the workers—many stations do not have any drinkable water and most do not make hot meals available . . . 4) The working environment is miserable—locker rooms are unusable, in some way-stations and sleeping quarters there are dirty sheets. At the station in Dobříš, one has to wash at the pump; there are no sinks in any of the rooms.72 Resulting from the Lack of Workers for Operations and in Some Localities], 20. 5. 1974, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, July 1, 1974, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 70  Zpráva o připravenosti dopravy ke zvládnutí podzimní přepravní kampaně a zabezpečení železniční dopravy v zimním období 1980/1981 [Report on the Preparedness of Transport for the Autumn Transport Campaign and Rail Transport Security in the Winter Period 1980/1981], October 9, 1980, P151/80, point 3, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR. 71  Zpráva z provedené kontroly naplňování závěrů porady ministra dopravy ze dne 16. března 1981 ke zlepšení kvality služeb podniku JLV poskytovaných cestující veřejnosti [Report to the Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation on Audit of Fulfillment of Commitments by the Minister of Transportation of March 16, 1981 for Improving Services of the JLV Company Provided to the Traveling Public] Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, March 15, 1982, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 72 Dopis redakce Rudého práva Výboru lidové kontroly [Letter to the Editor of Rudé právo and the People’s Audit Committee], September 6, 1979, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti.

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The FMD issued an extensive response to the complaint, which mainly explained why it was not possible to make improvements. The ideas put forward in the central plan to improve the situation were quite generous: they included attempts to solve the housing situation, facilitate employee’s travel to their workplaces and back from distant locations, modify working hours for employees who were separated from their families for a whole week, improve conditions in shelter huts along the network,73 deliver free hot meals to all employees, and give stabilization supplements and recruitment bonuses to workers.74 The planning document of course did not discuss the economic implications of these steps; they were basically a recital of possible improvements that were never really implemented. At the end of the 1970s ČSD could not find employees to staff a wide range of its assigned responsibilities. Therefore, it looked for various alternatives to strengthen its employee collectives. In crisis situations, but also at times of the year when there simply was greater demand for transport than usual, ČSD called on the railway troops or brigades of civilian volunteers. In the late 1970s the FMD began to negotiate for the help of workers from Cuba and Vietnam.75 Soldiers in basic training from ordinary army units also assisted when crisis situations arose.76 ČSD began to use prisoners to offset the lack of workers, especially in the area of track maintenance. This was not an ideal solution and entailed extra expense because prisoners had to be transported over long distances to the work site and then closely guarded. It had to be done, however, because of the unsupportable situation with regard to maintaining tracks. The introduction to a document prepared for a discussion between the First Deputy Minister of Transportation and the Chief of the Department of Corrections (Sbor napravné výchovy—SNV) stated: The personnel situation of the track maintenance units, especially with regard to manual laborers in the industrial areas of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic must be dealt with in a non-traditional fashion. One 73 Shelter huts were railway accommodations for workers in case their shifts were interrupted or for resting between shifts. They were mainly used by engineers, guards, and conductors. 74  Situace v traťovém hospodářství [The Situation in Track Operations], Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, May 28, 1979, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 75  Zaměstnávání a odborná příprava vietnamských občanů v organizacích resortu FMD a posouzení návrhu kubánské strany ke zvyšování kvalifikace občanů Kuby v železniční dopravě, odbor pracovních sil FMD [Employment and Professional Training of Vietnamese Citizens in the Organizational Departments of the FMD and Evaluation of the Proposal of the Cuban Side for Improving the Qualifications of Cuban Citizens in Rail Transport, Workforce Section of the FMD], October 19, 1981, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, October 19, 1981, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 76  Zpráva o připravenosti dopravy ke zvládnutí podzimní přepravní kampaně a zabezpečení železniční dopravy v zimním období 1980/1981 [Report on the Preparedness of Transport for the Autumn Transport Campaign and Rail Transport Security in the Winter Period 1980/1981], October 9, 1980, P151/80, point 3, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR.

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way is ensuring track maintenance by using prison labor. At this time, 470 prisoners are maintaining the tracks in the area administered by the Northwest Railways.77 The Department of Corrections wanted to limit the transport of prisoners to the work site to a maximum of 30 km from their prison so that they could be moved on appropriately secure means of transportation. This was met with resistance from ČSD, which shows how indispensable prisoners were for some activities: such a limit would prevent the maintenance of many tracks and therefore contribute to further traffic problems.78 Prisoners worked regularly on other parts of the ČSD network, not just on the Northwest Railways. For example, in 1978 prisoners performed a large number of repairs on the Southwest Railways: they refurbished 36.7 km of track, dismantled 47 km, and installed 5.6 km. Nevertheless, the Southwest Railways did not receive the full number of prisoners it requested: In light of the small number of track workers, the increasing expense of maintaining the equipment of the railways, and the degree of congestion on the lines, the current number of workers from the Corrections Institute79 is totally inadequate.80 Fragmentary documents from the archives show that the use of prisoners was welcomed by the individual railways of ČSD as a means of covering the deficit in the number of employees, especially manual laborers. Some prisoners even worked for ČSD’s manufacturing economic units, fabricating spare parts that were in short supply.81 At the end of the 1970s the personnel department of the FMD tried to increase the number of workers at ČSD, mainly in the area of track maintenance and 77 Podklady pro jednání I. náměstka ministra s náčelníkem Správy nápravné výchovy, 1979 [Materials for the Meeting of the First Deputy Minister with the Chief of the Department of Corrections, 1979], NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, K1 Využití odsouzených [Employment of Convicts]. 78  Informace pro I. náměstka ministra dopravy, Věc: Výpomoc SNV České socialistické republiky [Information for the First Deputy Minister of Transportation, Matter: Assistance by the SNV of the Czech Socialist Republic], September 10, 1971, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, K1 Využití odsouzených [Employment of Convicts]. 79 Ústav nápravné výchovy—ÚNV. 80 ČSD—Southwestern Railway: Zpráva o činnosti pracovníků ÚNV na pracovišti traťového hospodářství v Jihozápadní dráze [Report on the Activities of Workers from the ÚNV at the Track Operations Worksites of the Southwestern Railways], Zajíc, Vladimír, February 22, 1979, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, K1 Využití odsouzených [Employment of Convicts]. 81  See, for example: Informace pro ministra dopravy: Program rozvoje výroby náhradních dílů v letech 1979–1980 a v 7. 5LP [Information for the Minister of Translport: Program for Development of the Production of Spare Parts in the Years 1979–1980], NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, K1 Využití odsouzených [Employment of Convicts].

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repair work, by using foreign workers. This method of filling the need for labor was common in the Eastern Bloc, and most of the workers came from Cuba and Vietnam. Negotiations with Cuba for assistance took place in 1978 without any apparent success. The FMD thus decided to turn to the Vietnamese government. In 1981, contingents of Vietnamese workers began to arrive, mainly to work in the railways’ repair shops. Within a few months there were about a hundred of them working for ČSD.82 Our survey of the decade shows how the political processes of “normalization” after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the accompanying political changes in the KSČ expressed themselves in the personnel area. Communists who did not adapt their views to the situation after 1968 were in most cases forced out of their jobs. This was generally true for all employers in Czechoslovakia. In the transportation sector, the process culminated in 1971 when the “cleansing of the representatives and supporters of rightist opportunism from the political and economic apparatuses” was completed. It was also necessary to ensure that only competent, class conscious, politically mature, and professionally qualified workers work in the state administration and economic sphere, so that they can be examples for all the working people in their political support for the current policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, their work, their personal lives, and the qualities of their character.83 The quotation above shows how wide-ranging the scope of the ongoing inquisition was. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the documentation available today how much of an impact normalization had on the Ministry of Transportation. It can be said generally that, given the strategic role of transportation, the personnel changes that installed “reliable and conscious cadres” were very thorough. For example, in the University of Transportation in Žilina, the only technical school in the country focused exclusively on the field of transportation, the teaching of several courses was threatened because of the changes. Detailed material prepared for the Collegium of the Minster of Transportation shows 82 Zaměstnávání a odborná příprava vietnamských občanů v organizacích resortu FMD a posouzení návrhu kubánské strany ke zvyšování kvalifikace občanů Kuby v železniční dopravě, odbor pracovních sil FMD [Employment and Professional Training of Vietnamese Citizens in the Organizational Departments of the FMD and Evaluation of the Proposal of the Cuban Side for Improving the Qualifications of Cuban Citizens in Rail Transport, Workforce Section of the FMD], October 19, 1981, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, October 19, 1981, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 83 Rozpracování usnesení ÚV KSČ a vlády ČSSR o kádrové a personální práci [Elaboration of a Decree of the ÚV KSČ and the Government of the ČSSR on the Work of Cadres and Personnel], April 15, 1971, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, April 7, 1971, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR.

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how complete the cleansing of the school was. Besides the firing of a number of academics, the dean of the school, Ing. Podstranický, was dismissed and five students were expelled from their studies for anti-Soviet attitudes. The reformist Union of Slovak University Students was broken up as well, and replaced by the newly organized Union of Socialist Youth.84

5.2.3 Survey of the Late 1980s The personnel situation in the operations of ČSD was still tense at the end of the 1980s. Despite various efforts by departments of the Federal Ministry of Transportation, it was not possible to raise salaries and social benefits.85 The intensity and volume of transport significantly increased, but the number of persons employed in some of the important operational job categories rapidly declined from 1971 to 1987: members of train crews by 5,450,86 yardmasters by 925, shunting crew and signalmen by 1,220, and track maintenance workers by 2,728.87 This negatively impacted operations on the ČSD network, and as a result the quality of services in passenger and freight transport continued to get worse.88 A side effect of the reduced number of employees and the continued high volume of traffic was the need to increase the amount of overtime work. At the end of the 1980s, ČSD was under significant pressure and effectively lost its ability to perform its tasks within the legal limits for working hours with the personnel (including their absences due to illness, etc.) that it had. Therefore, the amount of overtime worked regularly increased. A specific example was the government’s Decree no. 49 of February 19, 1986, which set a limit of 500 hours a year on the amount of overtime work that an employee was allowed to perform in the 84 Sprava o súčasných problémech Vysokej školy dopravnej v Žiline, červen 1971 [Report on Current Problems in the High School of Transportation in Žilině, June 1971], Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, July 30, 1971, FMD Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister, NA ČR. 85 Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation in Rail Transport in 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 86 Conductors, guards, etc. 87  Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na Ministerstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986– 1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 88 Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation in Rail Transport in 1987], February 10, 1988, P 59/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

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railway sector. The federal Minister of Transportation was permitted to increase that number with the consent of the Central Committee of the Trade Unions.89 Letters and requests sent to the Ministry from the individual railways show that in some cases the allowable amount of overtime work for some professions (shunting crew, signalmen, wagon masters, and yard masters) was increased to as much as 700 hours a year. This definitely was not an exceptional thing. The limits on overtime work were established on the basis of requests by the individual railways, and so its volume differed depending on where the employees worked.90 Not even increasing overtime was able to cover all of ČSD’s operational needs. This was evident from the plan, which proposed elimination of all services which could be considered better than the norm. JLV, for example, gave up on staffing all its dining cars because of the lack of employees. In 1986, JLV was short an average of 90 key employees every day. A number of orders for special dining cars had to be refused because no employees were available to staff them. However, such cars were provided for trains in cases where it would not be “politically acceptable” if dining services were not offered. These were principally trains that ran in the summer tourist season and were full of workers who were on their way to vacations in foreign countries. At those times, dining cars were taken off of domestic, “everyday” trains.91 ČSD encountered periodic problems in the personnel area for the better part of two decades. In the summer of 1988 the issue once again landed in front of the Presidium of the KSČ Central Committee. The basis of discussion was an exceptionally critical, plainspoken report by the Secretary of the Central Committee, M. Beňo,92 and a member of the Central Audit and Review Commission, J. Hajn.93 Referring to the “conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the Central Committee of the KSČ” the report sharply criticized conditions on the railways at the end of the 1980s. The report was focused in the first place on the leadership of the sector, most of whom were members of the KSČ or candidates for membership in the party. The authors started from the understanding that this group was most responsible for improving conditions and making progress in the

89 FMD: Zvýšený limit práce přesčas v organizacích oboru železniční dopravy v roce 1987 [Increase in the Limit on Overtime Work in Rail Transport Organizations in 1987], NAČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4. 90 Compare with: ČSD—Jihozápadní dráha: Žádost o zvýšení ročního limitu práce přesčas na jednotlivé pracovníky pro rok 1987 [Request to Raise the Annual Limit on Overtime Work for Individual Workers in the Year 1987], July 31, 1987, FMD: Zvýšený limit práce přesčas v organizacích oboru železniční dopravy v roce 1987 [Raise in the Limit on Overtime Work in Rail Transport Organizations in 1987], NAČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4. 91 See, for example: ČST—Aktuality: Stížnost cestujících na kvalitu R529 [ČST—News: Passengers’ Complaints about the Quality of the R529 Train], August 7, 1986, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, Z11 Stížnosti. 92 See “Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů” [“Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes”]. 93 See “Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů” [“Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes”].

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sector. After reviewing the work of the governing bodies, the authors embarked on some very harsh criticism:94 The Party organs and organizations are not working effectively to address the shortcomings in passenger and freight rail transport in a timely manner. Their lack of diligence, inconsistent assertion of their right to audit operations, and frequent ignoring of directives have required the Party committees within the Operations Departments (OD)95 of ČSD, the All-factory Committee96 and the membership of the Factory Organization97 of the KSČ to meet to discuss the matter, mostly in a general way. Reports are rarely provided which evaluate the performance of the responsible managers in fulfilling their duties. The low level of criticism/self-criticism has resulted in the adoption of directives that are not always specific and auditable.98 Besides the low level of competence and the lack of diligence of the management, there was criticism of the inactivity of the party organs and communist “activists.” Some of them never did anything at all, or performed their duties only perfunctorily, without achieving any real results. Another problem was management employees’ lack of education. Only 65  percent of the employees of the Federal Ministry of Transportation had a university-level education. The percentage in some operations departments (the report mentions the OD in Ústí

94 Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. Sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986– 1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 95 In Czech: Provozní oddíl. 96 In Czech: Celozávodní výbor. 97 In Czech: Závodní výbor/organizace. 98  Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. Sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

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nad Labem) was even less. Similar unsatisfactory situations existed in positions that required a high-school education.99 The report called attention to the undemanding standards and limits on material incentives with regard to dispatchers on the ČSD network. They were supposed to receive a financial reward for fulfilling the timetable in a minimum amount of 85  percent of their pay. However, the timetable itself compensated for the worsening technical state of the railroad tracks and the common traffic delays by padding the timetables with the above-mentioned “bonus” time. Keeping to the timetable with its lax parameters did not put much of a burden on those who supervised the dispatch function. According to Mikuláš Beňo’s and Jaroslav Hajn’s report, the constant irregularity of the trains in spite of the slack in the timetables was inexcusable. They demanded significantly stricter indicators of timeliness in the construction of the timetable. Dispatchers would receive payment of a bonus of up to 100 percent of their pay if they met the standards.100 That did not happen, however. The report by Beňo and Hajn described the unsatisfactory situation stemming from lack of discipline and absenteeism of employees at the important station of Čierná nad Tisou, where equipment was transferred from Soviet-gauge tracks: For example, within the area of responsibility of the All-factory Committee of the Slovak Communist Party,101 the border station (to the Soviet Union) at Čierná nad Tisou (number of workers, 2,768, of whom 570 are Communists) in 1986 had unexcused absences from work totaling 18,111 hours. In 1987, that number grew to 20,835 hours, while the  99 Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. Sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 100  Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. Sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR. 101 In Czech/Slovak: Komunistická strana Slovenska.

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number of employees declined by 156. The number of disciplinary measures taken increases every year. As many as 50 percent of them are for the use of alcohol. One-quarter of the cases involved Party members and 48 punitive measures were meted out to them by the Party.102 According to the standard rhetoric, in the future new employees would be attracted by recruitment bonuses and salaries that would be repeatedly increased over time. As in the majority of cases, the plan failed in that regard. A new approach to improving the situation in the repair shops, especially in Moravia and Silesia, was to send some locomotives to Poland to be repaired. Also, workers from Vietnam were working in the repair shops from the beginning of the decade. In conclusion, it can be said that the personnel area was a weakness of the Czechoslovak railways throughout the period we studied. There were never enough employees in difficult jobs and the Federal Ministry of Transportation was never able to improve salaries so much that those jobs would become more financially attractive than those done by other employees. Other factors connected with employment also affected the railways negatively: the very poor condition of the workplaces, inadequate tools and machinery, and the lack of employee housing. The result was significant problems with employees’ work ethic and with performance of employment tasks. The lack of employee discipline caused the majority of serious accidents and negatively influenced the services ČSD was able to offer in passenger and freight transport. How did the salary situation on the railways compare with the average wage and how did the productivity of work there develop? Statistics show that in the years from 1970 to 1987, wages constantly increased on the railways. Over not quite two decades, they increased by 57 percent and always remained slightly above the average wage in Czechoslovakia. The national average wage also increased by roughly 55 percent in the same period and was kept in an almost unchanged proportion to the average wage in ČSD. Despite the relatively large increase in wages at a time with very stable prices—with virtually zero inflation as we understand the term today—the relative pay

102  Výsledky kontroly, jako komunisté—vedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na [m]inisterstvu dopravy ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. Sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti železniční dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists — the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population], July 7, 1988, P 79/88, point 5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1986–1989, 1261/0/9, NA ČR.

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advantage of railway work over other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy did not increase. The wage increases that occurred in the railway sector over the course of the decades we studied had no connection with the productivity of labor or any other economic indicators. Rather, they were set by the state in the context of its salary policies for the entire economy. Although it is very difficult to interpret the statistics on productivity of labor in the railway sector, there are some quantitative comparisons that can be made of the trends in the passenger and freight transport sectors. The statistics on the performance of the sector show that the growth in wages roughly corresponds to the growth of revenues in rail transport (for both passenger and freight transport). Revenues increased by 60 percent from 1970 to 1987. However, the increase lagged behind labor productivity, calculated in terms of transport volume per employee (Figure 5.33). The volume of freight transported, measured in thousands of ton-km increased 30 percent in the time period we studied, but passengers transported increased only 12 percent. This is only a rough overview of the volumes in rail transport, but it clearly shows the trend over the two decades. Revenues in passenger transport did not grow at the same rate as they did in freight transport, which resulted in a widening gap between revenues and expenditures for the Czechoslovak railways.103​​​​ Table 5.3 Comparison of Labor Productivity in Passenger and Freight Rail Transport in Czechoslovakia in the Years 1970, 1980, and 1987

Thousands of ton-km per employee Thousands of passenger-km per employee

1970

1980

1987

Change 1987 over 1970 (in %)

330 85.8

406 87.5

428 96.7

+30 +12

Source: Czechoslovak Federal Statistical Office. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], 444; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské federativní republiky, 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1980], 442; Federal Ministry of Transportation. Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1971, FMD [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1971, FMD], 13 and 60; Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1979–1980, FMD [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1979–1980, FMD], 25 and 70; Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1987, FMD [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1987, FMD], 27 and 66.

103 Federal Statistical Office, Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky, 1980, 444; Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské federativní republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 1980], 442; FMD, Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1971 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1971], 13 and 60; Federal Ministry of Transportation, Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1979–1980 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1979–1980], 25 and 70; FMD, Výroční zpráva dopravy za rok 1987 [Annual Report on Transportation for the Year 1987], 27 and 66.

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Figure 5.29 Locomotive T466.0269 at the head of a passenger train in the Kopřivnice railroad station, 1983. Note: Text on the locomotive reads, “ČSD—Last Trip with the Classic Set of Wagons—1882–1983.” Collection of Mojmír Leštinský.

Figure 5.30 Engineers talking next to locomotive E466.2016  in the Košice depot, June 23, 1984. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

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Figure 5.31 Locomotive T458.1095 moving through the Čaňa station, June 23, 1984. Note: Collection of Ladislav Kroul.

5.3 International Cooperation International relations and contacts were an exceptionally important matter for the Czechoslovak railways. The connections of the Czechoslovak railway network to six neighboring countries’ railways and the large volume of freight transiting the country on the ČSD network explain this. After 1970, and even before, the Federal Ministry of Transport and ČSD conducted a very active and in its own way, autonomous transportation diplomacy, both multilaterally and bilaterally, in order to defend Czechoslovakia’s economic and political interests. The results of this diplomacy affected the economic balance of the rail sector and cross-border operations. International traffic was important to both the overall economy and the export sector from the standpoint of the significant revenues obtained from transiting trains. It operated under the same conditions as domestic rail traffic. A review of Czechoslovakia’s (and ČSD’s) relations with multilateral organizations and neighboring countries in the sphere of transportation and rail traffic shows how important operational and strategic matters were resolved and the priorities they were accorded. All international rail transport relationships should be seen as interconnected and as a “relationship game” that was pursued on several levels in the interest of both Czechoslovakia and ČSD. The goal of international cooperation was to defend the country’s economic interests by facilitating the export and import of goods and securing “dollar” income from the transit of goods. Diplomacy also allowed Czechoslovakia to overcome some

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of its problems through technical cooperation within the COMECON framework. By sending employees to work abroad for a time if the Czechoslovak plan did not foresee an immediate need for them, ČSD maintained its reserve construction capabilities and the necessary number of qualified workers, and also obtained consideration in goods and services in return. Let us first describe activities in the framework of international railway organizations, and then turn to bilateral relations with selected railroad administrations in neighboring countries from both political power blocs. Individual examples from both of these areas cannot give us the full picture of Czechoslovakia’s foreign cooperation in the rail sector, but they do complement our study of operational and personnel matters. We will mention the most important areas of multilateral and bilateral cooperation. To answer part of our main research question, we will examine whether or not international cooperation, which was undoubtedly a strategic activity, and in some areas a high priority, encountered the same limitations and deficiencies that arose in other areas of ČSD’s activities due to the weaknesses of the system. We will provide some historical background on certain neighboring rail systems, the most important developments in their organization and operation, and an overview of quantitative indicators. We will compare the situations of the foreign railways with that of ČSD to learn whether the trends in Czechoslovakia duplicated those in foreign countries. This will help us to contextualize our review of the conditions on the Czechoslovak railways and determine whether they are similar to those that existed in the rail systems of neighboring countries.

5.3.1 Activity in International Railway Organizations Historically, the Czechoslovak railways have always pursued an active transportation diplomacy, participating in the activities of both “Western” and “Eastern” railway organizations. Among the most important of the “Western” organizations is the International Union of Railways. Among the “Eastern” organizations there were the Organization for Cooperation between Railways (OSJD) and cooperative mechanisms within COMECON, as we have mentioned in an earlier chapter. The first, and from the standpoint of prestige and date of founding the most important multilateral organization was the International Union of Railways (UIC). ČSD was one of the railway administrations that actively participated in the activities of the organization from the time it was founded. Representatives of ČSD traditionally headed some of the UIC’s committees and working groups. At the beginning of the 1980s a ČSD official was chairman of the organization’s Technical Committee Documentation (CTD). The peak of ČSD’s influence in the UIC was without question the election of one of its representatives as president of the organization. In the two-year term from 1983 to 1984 the UIC’s president was Deputy Minister of Transportation Stanislav Houska.104 For many years, the 104 Kopecký et  al., Železnice v československé dopravní soustavě [The Railroads and the Czechoslovak Transportation System], 126.

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election to the presidency of a representative from a member railway administration other than France’s was unusual. From its founding in 1922 until 1959, the president of the UIC was always a representative of the French Railways. Later, the railways of the socialist and the non-socialist countries alternated in the presidency. A member of the first of those groups held office for one term, then a member of the second, non-socialist, group held office for two terms in a row. Identity as a “socialist” country was determined by membership in the OSJD.105 As the representative of the OSJD group, the Polish railways held the presidency of the UIC from 1965 to 1966 (represented by Donald Tarantowitz, a Deputy Minister of Transportation). From 1971 to 1972 it was the Hungarian railways (in the person of Károly Rödönyi, General Director of the Hungarian railways, later First Deputy Minister of Transportation). Then in 1977–1978 it was the GDR’s railway’s turn (represented by Volkmar Winkler,106 Minister of Transportation). Representatives of the Romanian and Bulgarian railways stood as candidates for the 1983–1984 presidency. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia’s Stanislav Houska was considered the most suitable candidate. At the time, he had behind him more than four years of membership on the Management Committee of the UIC and its Permanent group. He was very familiar with the environment of the UIC and its principles for making decisions. He knew all the General Directors of the European railways, which is one of the qualifications for election as the UIC’s president. The Federal Ministry of Transportation saw his term as president as an unusual opportunity, because Czechoslovakia could not expect to hold the UIC presidency again for 30 years.107 Houska’s presidency had practical importance as well as carrying prestige. From the end of the 1970s, many issues that could have had bad economic consequences for ČSD had been debated in diplomatic fora. The main issue at stake was setting tariffs in accord with the Montreux Convention, which mandated payment for international transit by rail in the currency of the country to which goods were destined. For Czechoslovakia, an important country for transit of goods from the Eastern Bloc, the Montreux rules protected a not insignificant source of hard Western currency. Under those rules, Czechoslovakia’s Eastern partners’ railway administrations had to pay ČSD for transit to the West in Western currency. Poland complained most loudly, but Czechoslovakia 105  Zpráva o zvolení Československých státních drah předsednickou železnicí v Mezinárodní železniční unii (UIC) na období let 1983–1984 [Report on the Election of the Czechoslovak State Railways to the Presidency of the International Union of Railways for the Period 1983– 1984], Federální ministerstvo dopravy, 1982, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC. 106 Volkmar Winkler (June 15, 1929–January 17, 1980), for more biographic information, see: “Biographische Datenbank.” 107  Zpráva o zvolení Československých státních drah předsednickou železnicí v Mezinárodní železniční unii (UIC) na období let 1983–1984 [Report on the Election of the Czechoslovak State Railways to the Presidency of the International Union of Railways for the Period 1983– 1984], Federální ministerstvo dopravy, 1982, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC.

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continued to insist on respect for the Montreux principles even though the conflict with Poland escalated at the end of the 1970s (more about this below). Having a Czechoslovak as the president of the UIC meant that debate over the Montreux principles could be moderated in a direction beneficial to Czechoslovakia.108 Czechoslovakia’s presidency of the UIC also promised improved procedures for collecting debts from other member railways that had been weighing down the economic balance for ČSD. In 1981, ČSD was owed debts totaling 7.8 billion Kčs by “non-socialist countries and Yugoslavia.” The largest individual debtor was the Turkish railways, who owed almost four million USD.109 At the beginning of the 1980s, the Yugoslav Railway (JŽ) had significant problems with paying its debts and owed money to a number of UIC member railway administrations. A delegation made up of representatives of railway administrations from all over Europe went to Belgrade in 1984 to examine the financial stability of JŽ and find ways for Yugoslavia to pay its debts.110 ČSD took a very active part in the activities of the UIC’s Office of Research and Experiments (Office de Recherches et d’Essais—ORE). A representative of ČSD sat on the board of that office from 1974. The ORE often used the infrastructure of the test track at Velim in Czechoslovakia. Thanks to the hard currency income from tests run by ORE, the unit at Velim was modernized and in its time was a top research facility by international standards. It still today continues an intensive program of research. The organization that integrated the railway administrations of the Eastern Bloc was the Organization for Cooperation between Railways, which competed directly with the UIC. Nevertheless, both organizations cooperated with each other, mainly on technical standards for rolling stock. Otherwise, the interoperability of rail cars, that is, their ability to operate on the networks of the various railways, would be threatened and complications would arise in international trade. The main difference in the organizations was in the economic relations between their member railway administrations. Except for those shipments covered by the Montreux rules, member states of the OSJD settled their debts to

108  Zpráva o zvolení Československých státních drah předsednickou železnicí v Mezinárodní železniční unii (UIC) na období let 1983–1984 [Report on the Election of the Czechoslovak State Railways to the Presidency of the International Union of Railways for the Period 1983– 1984], Federální ministerstvo dopravy, 1982, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC. 109  Zpráva o zvolení Československých státních drah předsednickou železnicí v Mezinárodní železniční unii (UIC) na období let 1983–1984 [Report on the Election of the Czechoslovak State Railways to the Presidency of the International Union of Railways for the Period 1983– 1984], Federální ministerstvo dopravy, 1982, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC. 110  Zpráva Miroslava Chocholouše a Jána Miškoce, odbor finanční a informační soustavy, ze zasedání podvýboru UIC finanční problémy, 6. a 7. února 1985 [Report by Miroslav Chocholouš and Jan Miškoc, Department of Financial and Information Systems, from the Meeting of the Subcommittee of the UIC on Financial Problems, February 6 and 7, 1985], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC.

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each other in convertible rubles and not, as was normal between members of the UIC, in Swiss francs.111 Besides internal economic arrangements, including the accounting system between member railway administrations, the OSJD resolved important issues that arose regarding key infrastructure and technology. In the framework of its scientific-technical cooperation, it tried to modernize the standards for infrastructure such as tracks, safety equipment, and dispatching technology applied by its individual members. Although the OSJD functioned outside the structure of COMECON, it cooperated very closely with it. It also cooperated with the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the UIC, and the Central Office for International Carriage by Rail.112 Notably, the OSJD promoted an international transit corridor between Eastern Europe and East Asia. One interesting thing is that the tensions inside the Eastern Bloc were reflected in the OSJD organization. Its operations were deeply affected by the armed conflict that broke out on the Ussuri River in 1969 between the Soviet Union and China, after which the OSJD was nearly paralyzed by constant obstacles put up by the Chinese side. The situation calmed down the following year.113 One important project that occupied the European railways from the 1920s was the development and introduction of automatic couplings. This equipment allowed the rapid automatic coupling and uncoupling of two rail cars. Until it was introduced, freight transport was slow and dangerous because of the handling of wagons equipped with screw couplings. From 1928, the UIC tried to implement a single standard automatic coupling, which did not require slow, dangerous manual operation. However, it failed to introduce a problem-free, economical solution that would be acceptable to all member states. Widespread adoption of automatic couplers on the European continent did not take place until after their independent introduction by the Soviet Union in the course of reconstruction after World War II. The Soviet coupling was based on technology used in the American Willison coupler. The Soviet Union was able to make the change independently because its railways operated independently from neighboring countries, except Mongolia, on its nonstandard gauge track.114 The OSJD took up the issue of automatic couplers in 1957 and began to cooperate on them with the UIC in 1967. In 1969, an agreement was reached between 111 Interview with Peltrám, January 29, 2015. 112 “Dvacet let komitétu OSŽD” [“Twenty Years of the OSŽD Commission”], 289–290. 113  Informace o vyhodnocení mezinárodních vztahů v dopravě za rok 1970, April 15, 1971, FMD, Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, April 7, 1971. 114  Zpráva o zajištění výroby automatických spřáhel a přípravy přechodu Československých státních drah na provoz s automatickými spřáhly [Report on Ensuring the Production of Automatic Couplers and Preparations for the Transition of the Czechoslovak State Railways to the Use of Automatic Couplers], FMD, Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister of Transportion, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, November 29, 1979.

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the two organizations on the development, testing, financing, and use of automatic couplers, with an emphasis on their development. They had to be compatible with the Soviet automatic coupler and equipped with electric and pneumatic connections. The agreement was in force for 20 years, until November 1989. The desired results could not be achieved and development never surpassed the testing stage. The reason for the very slow progress was the complicated materials used in the models that were developed and the high cost of the program. Moreover, the two blocs took different approaches to the problem. While the Eastern Bloc countries preferred the coupler used in the Soviet Union, which did not allow automatic connection of the cars’ breaking and electronic systems, the Western countries promoted an automatic coupler that linked more systems.115 There was a good chance that the slow progress would complicate and slow rail traffic rather than speed it up. Considering how difficult coordinating the approaches of individual countries was, the interoperability of rail cars would be significantly limited, thereby interfering with trade in goods. As a result, when the prolongation of the cooperation agreement was under negotiation in 1989, the Czechoslovak side was rather reserved with regard to the whole project. It frequently asked whether the extensive investment required made sense economically and pointed out the risk that Czechoslovak rail cars would become incompatible with transit in those European countries that did not introduce the system of automatic couplers.116 The coordinating activities of COMECON had a significant impact on transportation, especially in terms of the manufacture of transportation equipment in the member states. COMECON mandated that its member states specialize in certain types of manufacturing and that other types would be phased out in individual countries. Despite the incontrovertible economic savings of this approach, it did not always succeed. Rather, it became a symbol of the failure of coordination in the Eastern Bloc. There were widespread complaints in East Germany, including by professionals, about the halting of the production of Gotha light trams and the importation of low-quality Romanian diesel locomotives. In Czechoslovakia the import of low-accelerating articulated Hungarian Ikarus autobuses that could not navigate Czechoslovakia’s rugged terrain was highly criticized as well.​​ At the turn of the 1970s, technical and manufacturing coordination began in earnest in rail transport, which was a reaction to the need for revamping and modernizing the rolling stock of the individual COMECON member states’ railways. 115 Interview with Pohl, April 5, 2017. 116  Směrnice pro jednání čs. delegace o textu Dohody mezi zainteresovanými členy OSŽD o dalším vývoji, zkouškách, financování a využití automatického spřáhla v železničním provozu a související dokumentace [Guidance for the Meeting of the Czechoslovak Delegation on the Text of the Agreement of Interested Members of the OSŽD on the Further Development, Testing, Financing, and Use of Automatic Couplers and Related Documentation], 1989, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, 17 Automatické spřáhlo.

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Figure 5.32  Three Ikarus and one Karosa articulated buses waiting at the Budovatelů station of the Prague metro in 1981. Note: Today the station is called Chodov. Source: Archives of the author. 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

1970

1978 ČSD

1987

average wage in Czechoslovakia

Figure 5.33 Growth of the Average Wage at ČSD and in Czechoslovakia (in Kčs) Source: Federal Statistics Office of Czechoslovakia. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 195 and 444; Federal Statistics Office of Czechoslovakia. Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky 1980 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1980], 195 and 444.

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Documentation from the year 1970 sums up the state of the sector as follows: a breakdown of the general data shows the inadequate progress in the member states of COMECON in centralizing the production of freight cars as a result of failing to take advantage of the opportunity to specialize and cooperate in the production of the cars and their spare parts.117 A similar situation existed with regard to production of locomotives.118 A directive from the 48th meeting of the Executive Committee of COMECON in December 1970 tasked COMECON’s Permanent Committee on the Manufacture of Machinery and its secretariat to “prepare proposals for specialization and cooperation in the manufacture of rail cars, locomotives and heavy trucks.”119 This task, which was also included in the comprehensive program for socialist economic integration, included setting up two commissions, one for the railways and another for automobile transport. The ministries of transportation were to participate in both commissions because of the complexity of the relations between producers and consumers and the problems that were arising. The main issues that concerned the commission for rail transportation were the automatizing of loading and unloading operations, increasing the speed of travel of the trains (in part by use of the above-mentioned automatic couplers), and the development of containerized transport.120 Besides these matters, the commission was primarily concerned with harmonizing technologies, standards, and regulations in all member states, so that the national rail car and locomotive fleets would be as compatible as possible. There was an attempt to 117  Vysvětlující zápis o uskutečněných pracích a zjištěných problémech, které je třeba dále rozpracovat. Příloha 7.1 Protokolu 3. zasedání zvláštní pracovní skupiny pro vagony a motorové lokomotivy [Explanatory Material on Performing Work and Determining Problems That Must Be Resolved. Attachment 7.1 to the Protocol of the Third Meeting of the Special Working Group on Railcars and Diesel Locomotives], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M6/165 Komise pro standardizaci vagonů a lokomotiv. 118  Vysvětlující zápis o uskutečněných pracích a zjištěných problémech, které je třeba dále rozpracovat. Příloha 7.1 Protokolu 3. zasedání zvláštní pracovní skupiny pro vagony a motorové lokomotivy [Explanatory Material on Performing Work and Determining Problems That Must Be Resolved. Attachment 7.1 to the Protocol of the Third Meeting of the Special Working Group on Railcars and Diesel Locomotives], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M6/165 Komise pro standardizaci vagonů a lokomotiv. 119  Komentář k úvahám o prognózách technického rozvoje nákladních vozů a motorových lokomotiv, 1970 [Commentary on Considerations in the Prognosis for Technical Development of Freight Cars and Diesel Locomotives, 1970], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M6/165 Komise pro standardizaci vagonů a lokomotiv. 120  Úvahy o prognózách technického rozvoje nákladních vozů a motorových lokomotiv, 1970, Komentář k úvahám o prognózách technického rozvoje nákladních vozů a motorových lokomotiv, 1970 [Considerations in the Prognosis for Technical Development of Freight Cars and Diesel Locomotives, 1970, Commentary on Considerations in the Prognosis for Technical Development of Freight Cars and Diesel Locomotives], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M6/165 Komise pro standardizaci vagonů a lokomotiv.

166

Conditions in the Railway Sector

make diesel locomotive traffic more cost-efficient and improve the locomotives’ performance (reliability, fuel consumption, power, and speed).121 Perestroika, the attempt at economic reform begun in the Soviet Union, had an influence on the operations and organization of COMECON in the 1980s. The many changes in the economic sphere preceded the changes in the political and social spheres. In 1986 the program of the 118th and 119th meetings of the Executive Committee of COMECON included a section entitled “Reorganization of the Activities of the Agencies of COMECON.” The debate on the possible transformation of the bodies working in the field of transport within COMECON makes it possible to assess its activities up to that point. The secretariat was adjudged to be functioning well enough, and no reasons were found for making significant changes to it. It was decided to maintain the division of COMECON into four sections, which had been done in the early 1970s.122 The strength of the commitment of the member states to the organization and the extent to which they were willing to fulfill their agreed responsibilities were criticized.123 The responsibilities of COMECON’s transportation working groups were not limited to fulfilling the joint goals established by the organization. They were also a platform for bilateral cooperation between member states, mainly in the scientific-technical area, that is, the development and application of new technologies that were meant to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of transportation. At this point we must mention some examples of Czechoslovakia’s bilateral cooperation in the area of rail transport, which was not unique for the region. Besides intensive cooperation with the USSR, Czechoslovakia’s cooperation 121  Úvahy o prognózách technického rozvoje a organizace různých druhů spolupráce v oblasti motorových lokomotiv. Překlad, Příloha č. 5.2 k protokolu z porady pracovní skupiny pro nákladní vozy a motorové lokomotivy [Considerations in the Prognosis for Technical Development and Organization of Various Types of Cooperation in the Area of Diesl Locomotives. Translation, Attachment no. 5.2 to the Protocol of the Meeting of the Working Group on Freight Cars and Diesel Locomotives], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M6/165 Komise pro standardizaci vagonů a lokomotiv. 122  Členění SDK RVHP: Sekce č. 1: Komplexní dopravní problémy, sekce č. 2: Železniční doprava, sekce č. 3: Silniční doprava, Sekce č. 4: Vodní doprava [Divisions of COMECON: Section 1, Complex Transportation Problems; Section 2, Rail Transport; Section 3, Highway Transport; Section 4, Water Transport], in: Náměty a doporučení čs. delegace na zlepšení činnosti v působnosti SKD RVHP Rad zmocněnců a mezinárodních organizací čl. států RVHP v dopravě [Considerations and Recommendations of the Czechoslovak Delegation for Improving Activities in the Competence of the SKD RVHP Council of Deputies and International Organizations of the Member States of the RVHP in Transportation], 1986, NA ČR, Mezináro, M5/274—Hospodářská a vědecko-technická spolupráce. 123  Náměty a doporučení čs. delegace na zlepšení činnosti v působnosti SKD RVHP Rad zmocněnců a mezinárodních organizací čl. států RVHP v dopravě [Considerations and Recommendations of the Czechoslovak Delegation for Improving Activities in the Competence of the SKD RVHP Council of Deputies and International Organizations of the Member States of the RVHP in Transportation], 1986 (see Note 122).

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167

with East Germany and Poland was at a high level. Cooperation with the Soviet Union focused in particular on modernizing electric traction systems and their diffusion throughout the Eastern Bloc. Cooperation with East Germany was in the area of maintaining rail cars, the technology of track maintenance equipment, and putting computer systems for directing traffic into use. Poland cooperated in a diagnostic system for track sections, maintenance of rolling stock, preventing voltage drops on track systems, and computerization of stations at border crossings.124 The Czechoslovak railways gained advantages from two aspects of COMECON mutual economic assistance: the Common Freight Car Pool (OPW) and containerization. In Czechoslovakia, the creation of a contingent of freight cars and the functioning of the OPW were approved by a decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “On the Creation and Operation of a Common Pool of Freight Cars,” dated September 8, 1964.125 The initiative for the scheme originated with COMECON and the agreement was signed in the form of a multilateral international treaty, which explains the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the beginning, the OPW had only 10,000 wagons. As it proved itself to be successful, the number of cars increased to 240,000  in 1972, which were able to serve 86  percent of international trade on the rail lines between the member states of COMECON.126 Gradually, however, the cars in the OPW began to show the result of differing levels of maintenance and their technical condition reflected the systemic shortcomings of their “mother” railways. This was one of the main problems that led to the dissolution of the OPW in 1990, independent of the political developments on the international stage. Several operational weaknesses began to show in ČSD’s participation in the OPW. One of the most important was that too many cars remained on the ČSD network, which engendered additional costs. For example, in 1964 the maximum number of OPW cars that ČSD was allowed to keep on its network at any one time was set at 20,000, out of the 90,000 cars it placed into the OPW system by ČSD. ČSD regularly had ten percent more cars than that on its network due to traffic delays. In 1964, according to a decree by the Ministry of Transportation, for each car in excess of the 20,000-car limit, the amount of the “retainer” per “car-day”127 varied from 1.50 rubles to 7.50 rubles,128 which translates to 124  Zhodnocení výsledků mnohostranné vědecko-technické spolupráce s členskými státy RVHP v roce 1987 [Evaluation of the Results of Multilateral Scientific-Technical Cooperation with the Member States of COMECON in 1987], FMD, Mezináro, M5/274 Hospodářská a VT spolupráce, NA ČR. 125  Předpis č. 187/1964 Sb., Dohoda o vytvoření a provozu společného parku nákladních vozů ze dne 8.9.1964 [Agreement on the Creation and Operation of a Common Pool of Freight Cars from September 8. 1964], www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1964​-187, (February 27, 2017). 126  Předpis č. 187/1964 Sb., Dohoda o vytvoření a provozu společného parku nákladních vozů ze dne 8.9.1964, www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1964​-187 [Agreement on the Creation and Operation of a Common Pool of Freight Cars from September 8. 1964], (February 27, 2017). 127 A “car-day” (vozoden) meant the stay of one rail car on the network for one day. 128 “Zelenou pro OPW” [“Green Light for the OPW”], 3.

168

Conditions in the Railway Sector

1.35–6.75 USD at the 1964 exchange rate.129 ČSD therefore from the beginning of the OPW actively resisted counting transiting freight cars against the OPW quota, since there was no handling of the freight in them on Czechoslovak territory. The problem was resolved by amendments to the OPW’s internal system for counting transiting rail cars.130 Participation in the OPW system resulted in clear financial savings in the amounts paid for retention of rail cars on the participating rail networks. Therefore, new technology was rapidly introduced for rtracing the movements of freight cars and for organizing traffic in order to facilitate their loading and unloading. The first automatization and monitoring of the location of freight cars was introduced at the beginning of the 1980s when the maximum time in country and the maximum number of OPW cars on the Czechoslovak network were still being frequently exceeded. The circulation of the cars and their length of stay on the individual railways of ČSD were monitored by computers.131 It was obvious that when rail cars of the OPW stayed too long on the ČSD network, it slowed freight transport throughout the system because it overloaded the rail network and caused operational problems. Containerization of both domestic and international transport was the second important and successful project coordinated by COMECON. The logisticians of freight transport tried to speed up the loading and unloading of goods on and off freight cars and also onto ocean-going ships. The way to speed up the handling of goods was to standardize the way goods were packed for transport. We consider palletization to be the first step toward standardizing the handling of goods.132 The next step in the direction of simplified logistical processes was the use of containers. Among their advantages was that they were multi-purpose, could be handled in a standardized way, and gradually reduced the need for different kinds of rail cars, even though in the beginning there were no containers suitable for shipping bulk cargos.133 The greatest advances in this mode of transport took place after World War II. The main reason for its introduction was to simplify and increase the efficiency of logistical processes. The path to standardization of containers was a long one, however. The early models were based on ones used for military logistics. Development proceeded independently in many parts of the world 129 In 2017 prices, the retainer ranged from 10.55 USD to 52.75 USD. The conversion calculation was made with the help of: www​.dollartimes​.com/, accessed September 27, 2021. 130  Komplexní zpráva o problematice čs. účasti ve Společném parku nákladních vozů a zásadních stanoviscích čs. strany k nevyřešeným otázkám a problémům, Odbor železniční dopravy a přepravy FMD [Detailed Report on the Issue of Czechoslovak Participation in the Common Pool of Freight Cars and the Basic Position of the Czechoslovak Side on Unresolved Questions and Problems, Section of Rail Transport and Carriage], May 5, 1971, FMD, Collegium and Cabinet of the Minister dopravy, Cabinet of the Minister of Transportation, October 4, 1971. 131 Huspek, “Ostře sledované vagony” [“Closely Observed Railcars”], 3. 132 Interview with Kořínková, January 29, 2015. 133 Klatt et  al., Strukturwandel und makroökonomische Steuerung [Structural Change and Macroeconomic Management], 493.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

169

and responded to the specific needs of local transport systems. In the Soviet Union for example, the containers that were gradually put into service in the 1970s and 1980s were different sizes than those used in the rest of the Northern Hemisphere. The Soviet containers were shorter and wider than those in the West, which was made possible by the wider Soviet track gauge. Thanks to their shorter length, they were easy to handle and it was not necessary to equip loading docks with heavy-duty equipment.134 The containers that are now normally used in a large part of the world were based on containers used by the American Army in its logistics chain. At the beginning of the 1970s that size of container was made standard by the International Maritime Organization, and in 1972 it was incorporated into international treaties.135 From that time forward, containerization began to advance and develop in two areas, international combined transport and domestic and factory transport. Although both categories used the same standards and had the same motivation of increasing transport efficiency, the technology used and the applicable laws and regulations developed in different ways. Containers very quickly became common in international transport. Already by the 1970s, practically all goods leaving Czechoslovakia for abroad were shipped in standardized metal containers. The United Nations Convention on Multimodal Transport, also known as the “Hamburg Rules,” was signed in 1978. The convention was meant to contribute to the “resolution of problems stemming from the differing legal regimes valid for individual modes of transportation and differing technical, economic, and responsibility requirements for transfer of goods between two types of transport means.”136

134 Interview with Kořínková, January 29, 2015. 135 Dohoda o zavedení jednotného kontejnerového systému [Agreement on Formation of a Unified Container System] (1971); Dohoda o vědeckotechnické spolupráci na problému “Technické, ekonomické a technologické základny kontejnerového dopravního systému členských států RVHP pro vnitrostátní a mezinárodní přepravy” [Agreement on ScientificTechnical Cooperation on Issues of “The Technical, Economic, and Technological Bases for a Containerized Transport System for the Member States of COMECON for Domestic and International Freight] (1971); Smlouva o společném plánování materiálně-technické základny kontejnerového dopravního systému členských států RVHP [Agreement on Common Planning of the Material and Technical Bases for a Containerized Transport System for the Member States of COMECON] (1972); Dohoda o společném užívání kontejnerů v mezinárodních přepravách [Agreement on Common Usage of Containers in International Transport (1974), in: Zpráva pro vládu ČSSR o sjednání “Programu dalšího rozvoje kontejnerového dopravního systému na léta 1981–1990” [Report for the Government of the ČSSR on N“egotiations for a “Program of Further Development of a Containerized Transport System in the Years 1981–1990], vol. 111, unit 111/10, June 19, 1979, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR. 136  Obeslání Konference OSN o kombinované přepravě zboží, Podklady pro schůzi vlády, Zpráva pro vládu [Issues from the UN Conference on Multimodal Transport of Goods, Materials for a Meeting of the Government, Report for the Government], 3, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, N Progresivní dopravní systémy.

170

Conditions in the Railway Sector

Although containerization and combined transport were first used in ocean cargo ships and in seaports, they very quickly were introduced into other kinds of international transportation. The development of containerization became one area of cooperation among the COMECON member states. At the end of the 1970s, Czechoslovakia was one of the countries whose system showed the most successful development. An agreement for a common container system for COMECON began to take shape at the beginning of the 1970s. Based on the “Comprehensive Program for Further Deepening and Perfecting Cooperation and Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the Member States of COMECON,” adopted in 1969, an agreement was reached two years later on introducing a uniform containerized transportation system. Then in 1974 an Agreement on the Joint Use of Containers was concluded within the COMECON framework. It established standards for use of containers and a system similar to the OPW system used with railway freight cars. The signatories could use a joint fleet of containers for transporting freight and did not have to load goods onto “their” containers only.137 As with the OPW, a Bureau of Joint-Use Containers was set up in Bucharest, whose activities were managed by a Council of Deputies for Joint-Use Containers.138 Another step was the development of routes for container trains throughout COMECON. From 1972 to 1974, the first routes were created for specialized express freight trains transporting containers.139 The first container terminals were established at the same time.140 In 1979, there were 15 such terminals in Czechoslovakia, of which 13 were for rail transport and the rest for river barges. According to a document on planned strategic development, the number of terminals for rail transport was expected to double in the course of the 1980s.

137  Dohoda o společném užívání kontejnerů v mezinárodních přepravách [Agreement for Common Usage of Containers in International Transport] (1974), Zpráva pro vládu ČSSR o sjednání “Programu o přijetí ‘Programu dalšího rozvoje kontejnerového dopravního systému na léta 1981–1990” [Report to the Government of the ČSSR on Negotiations for the “Program for Adoption of the ‘Program for Further Development of a Containerized Transport System for the Years 1981–1990’”], June 19, 1979, vol. 111, unit 111/10, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976– 1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR. 138  Petergáč, “Kontejnerizace v zemích RVHP” [“Containerization in the COMECON Countries”], 156–158. 139  1972: Sofie-Bucharest-Konstanta-Budapest-Komárno / Štúrovo, Bratislava-Prague-DěčínDresden-Berlin-Rostock, Budap​est-B​ratis​lava-​Petro​v ice-​Katow​ice-W​a rsaw​- Gdyn​ě-Poznań; 1973: Plzeň-Prague-Žilina-Čop-Kyiv-Moscow, Štětín-Poznań-Wrocław-Meziměstí-LichkovPrague, in: Kořínková, “K zavádění kontejnerového dopravního systému v ČSSR” [“On Implementation of a Containerized Transport System in the ČSSR”], 141 and 142. 140 The first terminals in Czechoslovakia were: 1971—Děčín, Prague, Čierna nad Tisou; 1972— Ostrava, Bratislava; 1973—Přerov, Plzeň, Košice; 1975—Brno, in: Kořínková, “K zavádění kontejnerového dopravního systému v ČSSR” [“On Implementation of a Containerized Transport System in the ČSSR”], 142.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

171

One specialized transshipment terminal for river transport traffic was also planned.141 That plan was implemented for the most part. During the 1970s, the system of routes for regular express container trains between COMECON members developed. Containers could be transported at much higher speeds than goods loaded on classic freight cars made up into the usual trains. The extent of the container system and its speed and capacity are best exemplified by transport between China and Great Britain. The TransSiberian container route, sometimes known as the TSKP, made it possible to transport containers from Hong Kong through St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) and thence on ships to London in 35 days. It was expected that with modernized infrastructure that time could be shortened to only 25 days.142 The political changes of the years 1989 to 1991 brought about changes in the economic and social systems of the COMECON region, the effect of which was years of economic stagnation and transformation. This was reflected in the volume of freight transported. The eastern system of containerized trains began to gradually fall apart. The destination markets changed and privatization often led to a decline in production and changes in logistics technology, caused by the inability of the railways to adapt. In the 1990s the system of containerized trains inside the (now former) COMECON completely broke down.143

5.3.2 Bilateral Cooperation International transport was an important and economically advantageous activity for ČSD. It required direct communication with neighboring railway administrations and others. Czechoslovakia was located in a very particular position: it had borders with countries of both political power blocs and with a wide-gauge railway network. From the Western Bloc, we will discuss the FRG as our reference country. Of the countries of the Eastern Bloc, we will discuss the GDR, Poland, and Hungary. We will not talk about Austria and the Soviet Union because of a lack of archival resources. We will give a short historical essay on the development of the railways we discuss and provide the most important statistical data on their operations. In that way, it will be possible to see the basic trends and set forth their correlation with developments in Czechoslovakia. Let us turn first to the FRG. The former German railway system, the Deutsche Reichsbahn, was broken up after World War II into individual railways administered by the authorities in each occupation zone. In 1949, the administrations in the FRG were merged under the name Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB). (The East 141  Program dalšího rozvoje jednotného kontejnerového dopravního systému na léta 1981–1990, návrh, 19. 6. 1979 [Program for Further Development of a Unified Containerized Transport System for the Years 1981–1990, Proposal, June 19, 1979], vol. 111, unit 111/10, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR. 142 “Transsibiřská kontejnerová trasa” [“The Trans-Siberian Container Route”], 376 and 377. 143 Interview with Kořínková, January 29, 2015.

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German railways continued to operate under the name Deutsche Reichsbahn until 1993.) A single railway company was definitively established with the passage of the FRG law on railways, the Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz, in 1951.144 The railroad infrastructure of the FRG had suffered enormous damage during World War II. After 1945, the Deutsche Reichsbahn was required to transfer thousands of locomotives and rail cars as reparations to the railway administrations of the victorious powers. The railway network itself was subjected to “demontage,” which most often consisted of pulling up one track of a dualtrack line and the associated overhead wires.145 Renewal of full operations on the DB network continued through the end of the 1940s. Subsequent development had a different path than that in the Eastern European countries, including Czechoslovakia. The reason was the different economic system in the FRG and the faster growth of automobile traffic for both passenger and freight transportation, which was made possible by the rapid advances in technology, the road network, and the purchasing power of the population, the latter of which made motor vehicles ever more affordable. DB was therefore forced to economize and improve the efficiency of its operations earlier than the railway administrations of Eastern Europe. It had the advantage of the growing economic strength of the FRG, which allowed for investment into the development of the railways and introducing new technology onto the network. This occurred even though DB constantly experienced negative financial results—at 1989 prices, DB’s cumulative losses were 44 billion West German marks (22.5 billion euros at the later exchange rate). Rationalization was imposed throughout the network and in operations. From the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, a large number of unprofitable rail lines were eliminated. Tracks were quickly electrified or served by diesel locomotives. Steam traction was completely taken out of operation in the FRG by the year 1976.146 The volume of freight transported reached a peak in the 1960s and 1970s. The number of passengers transported peaked in the mid-1950s, and then more or less stagnated through the following two decades. The situation turned around after high-speed rail lines were constructed in the 1980s.147​ At the beginning of the 1970s, the volume of freight and passenger transport declined. Nevertheless, the fleet of rail cars in freight transport, and especially in passenger transport was modernized. In the 1980s, fast, comfortable InterCity trains linked the most important West German cities. All cars were equipped with air conditioning and their average speed of travel was 108  km/h. At the same time, the average speed of express trains in Czechoslovakia was 70 to 80 km/h and the system-wide maximum speed limit was not raised to 90 km/h

144 Federal Law on Railroads (see Spolkový zákon o železnicích/Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz) . 145 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railroads 1], 252. 146 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railroads 1], 258. 147 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781.

37009 367 52.9 1555 35919

36924 291 43.1 1472 30264

Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781.

Note: The highest value in each category is outlined in bold.

Length of Network (in km) Freight Transport (mil. tons) Freight Transport (mil. tkm) Passenger Transport (mil. passengers) Passenger Transport (mil. passengers)

1955

1950 36019 429 57.1 1399 38402

1960 35229 422 61 1165 38567

1965 33010 392 73.6 1054 38129

1970 31892 329 57.3 1079 37727

1975

Table 5.4 Basic Statistics on the Development of the West German Railways from 1950 to 1990

31497 364 60.8 1165 38862

1980

30578 335 65.5 1134 43451

1985

30129 310 61.2 1134 42023

1990

Conditions in the Railway Sector 173

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Conditions in the Railway Sector

until 1986.148 The speed of traffic on the DB network thus constantly increased. One milestone in the development of rail transport in the FRG was the construction of the first high-speed line and the introduction of high-speed ICE (InterCity Express) trains. Although construction on the majority of planned projects, including the new ICE trains, continued through the 1990s, the first section of high-speed track was already open between Hannover and Würzburg in 1988. The railway networks of Czechoslovakia and West Germany were joined by only three border crossings in the 1950s and 1960s: Pomezí-Schirnding for passenger and freight traffic, and Domažlice-Furth im Wald and Aš-Selb for freight traffic only. Passenger traffic between Domažice and Furth im Wald was reinstated later. Other rail border crossings, including those through Železná Ruda and Nové Údolí, remained out of service. The track at Nové Údolí was dismantled on the West German side and never rebuilt.149 The available archival material indicates that transport links between the ČSSR and FRG intensified during the 1980s. Commercial exchanges between the two states increased, and so did passenger traffic because of the growth of tourism. Rail transport of course was very important for their bilateral trade, but from the overall transportation agenda of the Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Transportation it is clear that it gradually fell into the shade of roadway transportation.150 The links with Hamburg were special, in that they involved both water and rail transport. The port at Hamburg was one of Czechoslovakia’s main historical and geographical gateways to world oceanic trade. Czechoslovakia’s foreign trade flowed through the “Vltava port” (Moldauhafen) in Hamburg. Access to the port was granted in 1929 to Czechoslovakia for 99 years by the Versailles peace treaty. The Vltava port was considered sovereign territory of Czechoslovakia and still is today.151 The majority of the goods transported along the Elbe River went to Hamburg, but still about two million tons of goods traveled by rail from Czechoslovakia every year. Freight charges were calculated on the basis of the “ČSD-DB overseas tariff,” which was agreed to by the ČSD, DB, and the GDR’s Deutsche Reichsbahn administrations.152 148 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railroads 1], 256–257. 149 Jakubec. Československo-německé dopravněpolitické vztahy v období studené války [Czechoslovak-German Transport Policy Relations During the Cold War], 92–97. 150 The main collections are: 19 SRN 1988; 19 SRN 1989; Z16 Generální zastoupení ČSD, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4. 151 For more on the relationship of the ČSSR with Hamburg, see: 19 Hamburg 1986–1992, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4. 152  Vybrané otázky pro jednání ministra dopravy ČSSR Ing. V. Blažka s prvním starostou Svobodného a Hansovního města Hamburk a předsedou hamburského senátu Hansem Ulrichem Klosem, Federální ministerstvo dopravy, 1979 [Selected Issues for the Meeting of the Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR, Ing. V. Blažek, with the First Mayor of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and the President of the Hamburg Senate, Hans Ulrich Kos, Federal Ministry of Transportation, 1979 NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, M1.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

175

The Federal Ministry of Transportation’s agenda in its transport relationships with West Germany mainly focused on conceptual and developmental matters. The rugged terrain of the mountains along the Czechoslovak-German border did not lend itself to development and modernization without large financial outlays. Considering the extent of trade, the issue was not all that pressing. From an operational point of view, the two border crossings at Domažlice-Furth im Wald and Pomezí-Schirnding were most important. The capacity of both the stations at the crossing point sufficed for the amount of mutual trade. As for modernization of infrastructure, there were no significant projects, only some upgrades of safety equipment and signaling technology.153 The border crossing at Aš-Selb played only an auxiliary role and the German side agitated for its closure. The border crossing was relatively unimportant because it was located close by the busy crossing at Pomezí-Schirding and very expensive repairs to the infrastructure on the German side were needed. The Czechoslovak railways insisted on keeping the crossing open and argued that it was needed to provide an alternative route in case one of the two main rail crossings into West Germany was blocked. In reality, however, it was the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defense that opposed closure of the crossing, because it played an important role in the logistics of its war plans.154 In any event, the crossing remained in operation until the mid-1990s, when it was closed down. Negotiations to reopen it for passenger traffic started in 2013, and it finally reopened in 2015. On the other hand, the German side repeatedly called for reopening the border crossings at Cheb-Waldsassen and Železná Ruda-Bayerisher Eisenstein. The first of these was needed to shorten the route for transporting coal from Most in Czechoslovakia to the coal-fired power plant at Schwandorf in the FRG. Although the plan for reopening the crossing was not economically feasible at the end of the 1970s,155 it remained among the priorities for development in the mutual transportation relationship. Internal Bavarian political interests played a role in that, because reopening the crossing at Cheb-Waldsassen strengthened 153  Opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR-NSR v oblasti dopravy [Measures for More Active ČSSR– FRG Relations in the Area of Transportation], Federal Ministry of Transportation, 1978, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987. 154  Zpráva z jednání náměstka federálního ministra dopravy ing. Miloslava Škárka s členem představenstva Deutsche Bahn ing. Hansem Wiedemannem [Report on the Meeting of the Deputy Federal Minister of Transportation, Ing. Miloslav Škárek, with Hans Wiedemann, a Member of the Board of Deutsche Bahn], August 1986, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987. 155  Opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR-NSR v oblasti dopravy [Measures for More Active ČSSR– FRG Relations in the Area of Transportation], Federal Ministry of Transportation, 1978, Zpráva z jednání náměstka federálního ministra dopravy ing. Miloslava Škárka s členem představenstva Deutsche Bahn ing. Hansem Wiedemannem [Report on the Meeting of the Deputy Federal Minister of Transportation, Ing. Miloslav Škárek, with Hans Wiedemann, a Member of the Board of Deutsche Bahn], August 1986, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987.

176

Conditions in the Railway Sector

the argument for keeping the local rail line on the German side open, which was the main goal of the local politicians. Reopening the Železná Ruda-Bayerisher Eisenstein crossing alone would have had only local benefit and would not have significantly lessened the burden of traffic at the main border crossing stations.156 One matter that related to all kinds of transportation, and not just the railways, was customs and immigration inspections at the borders. Discussions between the two sides focused on how to speed up travel. They included the possibility of issuing a one-time entry visa to FRG citizens right at the rail and road border crossings. That effort had the goal of reducing the long waits of international trains in the border stations, which would increase the attractiveness of travel by rail to tourists.157 At the end of the 1980s negotiations were held for reducing the waiting time on trains at the border stations from 45 minutes to 25 minutes. It was even considered to introduce at the Pomezí-Schirnding crossing what were for the time very advanced customs and immigration procedures.158 Relations between the two railroad administrations can be termed correct, and even above average, even though the countries belonged to different political power blocs. Several internal documents of the Federal Ministry of Transportation evaluated relations that way and they provide examples of successful mutual cooperation by both administrations. We can mention the help provided by the Deutsche Bundesbahn to relieve the shortage of freight cars on the ČSD network. In the second half of the 1970s, DB shared (for a fee, of course) 1,320 freight cars with Czechoslovakia.159 The Czechoslovak side also considered

156 For more detail, see: Záznam z přijetí západoněmeckého velvyslance [Notes on a Meeting with the West German Ambassador], Federal Ministry of Transportation; Zpráva z jednání náměstka federálního ministra dopravy ing. Miloslava Škárka s členem představenstva Deutsche Bahn ing. Hansem Wiedemannem [Report on the Meeting of the Deputy Federal Minister of Transportation, Ing. Miloslav Škárek, with Hans Wiedemann, a Member of the Board of Deutsche Bahn], August 1986, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987. 157  Spolupráce mezi ČSSR a SRN v oblasti dopravy a spojů [Cooperation between the ČSSR and the FRG in the Area of Transportation and Communications], February 17, 1989, in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 SRN 1989. 158  Záznam z jednání náměstka ministra dopravy ČSSR pro ekonomiku a stálého představitele ČSD v UIC ing. Ladislava Blažka, CSc., a náměstka ministra dopravy ČSSR pro železniční provoz ing. Miloslava Škárky, CSc., s prezidentem Mezinárodní železniční unie a předsedou představenstva Deutsche Bundesbahn Dr. Ing. Reinerem Gohlkem [Notes on the Meeting of the Deputy Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR for Economics and the Permanent Representative of the ČSD to the UIC, Ing. Ladislav Blažek, CSc., and the Deputy Minister of Transportation of Transportation for Railroad Operations, Ing. Miloslav Škárek, CSc., with the President of the International Union of Railways and Chairman of the Board of the German Bundesbahn, Dr. Ing. Reiner Gohlke], December 1987, NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, M1. 159  Opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR-NSR v oblasti dopravy [Measures for More Active ČSSR– FRG Relations in the Area of Transportation], Federal Ministry of Transportation, 1978, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

177

cooperation on setting tariffs as positive in terms of providing discounts and commercial rates by Deutsche Bundesbahn.160 In the second half of the 1980s, the frequent, friendly dialog between ČSD and DB was evidence of their good relationship. DB even tried to intensify the cooperation across the Iron Curtain. It was looking for a way to speed up passenger traffic as well as freight transport. ČSD tried to introduce faster trains with a higher level of comfort on its long-distance passenger routes. This was constituted of an effort in the late 1980s to bring some of the EuroCity trains, which up to then had not entered the countries of the Eastern Bloc, into Prague. Given the situation on the tracks in Czechoslovakia, consideration was given to introducing high-speed tilting trains of the Talgo or Pendolino type, which can reach higher speeds on tracks with many curves because of their tilting undercarriage.161 Another example of cooperation was the introduction of direct passenger rail cars from Prague to Zurich via Munich with the 1989–1990 timetable.162 Similar conditions existed on the railways in the GDR as in the FRG at the time the GDR was established, due to the damage caused in World War II and the subsequent “demontage.” The GDR railways retained their original name— Deutsche Reichsbahn. The reason for that was the four-power agreement concluded at Potsdam in 1945, according to which DR provided trains throughout the city of Berlin, which had been divided into four occupation zones by Allied agreement. After the division of Germany into two states the western occupation zones were de facto an exclave of the FRG inside the territory of East Germany. The DR operated all passenger and freight trains on the territory of Berlin as well as a system of rapid internal city rail transport, the S-Bahn. This brought DR economic advantages, because it charged for its services in West German marks. Ensuring Berlin’s transport opened up room for the GDR regime to promote itself to the citizenry. At the same time, changing the name of the GDR railways from Deutsche Reichsbahn would have raised questions about the legal succession of the new company and its right to organize transport in all of Berlin.163 One of the main tasks of DR in the Soviet occupation zone was the renewal of infrastructure after World War II that had been the object of the Allies’ “demontage.” Reconstruction took longer than in the FRG and some of the originally dual-track lines were never restored to their earlier state and it took until the 160  Opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR-NSR v oblasti dopravy [Measures for More Active ČSSR– FRG Relations in the Area of Transportation], Federal Ministry of Transportation, 1978, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, 19 NSR 1978–1987. 161  Interní zápis DB o výsledcích setkání předsedy představenstva s náměstky ministra dopravy ČSSR Ladislavem Blažkem a Miloslavem Škárkou ve dnech 10. a 11. 12. 1987 [Internal Report of Deutsche Bahn on the Results of the Meeting of the Chairman of the Board with the Deputy Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR, Ladislav Blažek and Miloslav Škárek on December 10-11, 1987], NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, M1. 162  Spolupráce mezi ČSSR a SRN v oblasti dopravy a spojů [Cooperation between the ČSSR and the FRG in the Area of Transportation and Communications], February 17, 1989, NA ČR, FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, 19 SRN 1989. 163 Nigrin, “Cold War Crisis on the Railway,” , 233–234.

178

Conditions in the Railway Sector

early 1960s to put some less important connecting tracks back into operation. This was due to the severing of most transportation links into West Germany, but also to the East into the territory beyond the Odra and Neisse rivers, which after 1945 became part of Poland. Historically, the railway network of the GDR was very high-quality, as it was in the FRG. Tracks were built very efficiently in terms of their location and the traffic they were planned to handle. There were a number of important constructions, mainly bridges, that could never have been built to the same extent in other Eastern European countries for economic reasons. Before World War II and even during the war, the German rail network had already been modernized. The GDR was an important transit country for the Eastern Bloc, both into western Europe and into northern Europe. The volume and frequency of freight traffic in East Germany constantly grew through the end of the 1980s, not only because of transiting goods but also because of the centrally planned economic system of the country. Passenger travel however experienced a fall in the number of passengers transported in the 1970s, but it began to increase again in the 1980s.164 In the 1970s and 1980s the priority goal for modernization of the Deutsche Reichsbahn was the development of electrified tracks. The goal was to achieve electrification of all important rail lines and admirable progress was made.165 At the beginning of the 1980s, electrification of the main lines was speeded up, and from 1981 to 1985, 730  km of track was electrified.166 The GDR tried to create links with the Soviet Union’s rail network for its freight traffic, as did Czechoslovakia and Poland. In 1986, a rail terminal with wide-gauge capabilities was built in Mukran on the Baltic Sea, from which a ferry for rail cars traveled to Klaipėda. The DR thus gained the ability to transfer goods between widegauge and standard-gauge tracks on its territory, which had a significant positive impact on the quality and timeliness of loading and unloading of goods.167 The majority of rail traffic between Czechoslovakia and the GDR’s Reichsbahn was concentrated on the crossing at Děčín-Bad Schandau. Only two other rail border crossings remained in service: Vojtanov-Bad Brambach and JiříkovEbersbach. A péage rail line was opened from Varnsdorf to Hrádek nad Nisou across East German territory at Zittau. It crossed Polish territory as well. The problem with other border crossings, particularly in the Ore Mountains, was the steep terrain in their vicinity. The enormous amount of fuel required for operating on those lines made them unsuitable for freight traffic.​ Cooperation with the GDR was a strategic priority for ČSD and Czechoslovakia because the shortest connection to Hamburg lay across its 164 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781. 165 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 158–160. 166  Novák, “Elektrizace tratí DR pokračuje” [Electrification of the Lines of the German Reichsbahn Continues”], 298. 167 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 156–157.

13134 208 25.2 1016 22905

12895 129 15.1 954 18576

Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781.

Note: The largest value in each category is outlined in bold.

Length of Network (in km) Freight Transport (mil. tons) Freight Transport (mil. tkm) Passenger Transport (mil. passengers) Passenger Transport (mil. passenger-km)

1955

1950 16174 238 32.9 943 21288

1960 15930 260 38.9 684 17446

1965 14658 263 41.5 626 17666

1970 14298 289 49.7 634 21305

1975

Table 5.5 Basic Statistics on the Development of the East German Railways in the Years 1950–1990

14248 312 56.4 607 22027

1980

14054 348 58.7 623 22451

1985

14024 349 60.4 592 23588

1990

Conditions in the Railway Sector 179

180

Conditions in the Railway Sector

territory. A large part of Czechoslovakia’s overseas trade crossed the GDR (see above).168 The transport relationship between the two countries can be described as intensive in terms of both operations and technology. As part of the effort to provide technical assistance to the GDR and to maintain Czechoslovakia’s technological base at a time when its level of investment was declining, an interesting meeting took place at the Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Transportation. In 1967, the GDR Ministry of Transportation came with a request for assistance in modernizing and electrifying the rail line between Dresden and Schöna. The ČSSR had already promised Hungary all its capacity at that time, but it did not rule out future aid to the GDR. Then, at the beginning of the 1970s, the FMD restarted the discussions about using Czechoslovakia’s equipment for electrifying rail lines in the GDR despite a decree, no. 31/1971, issued by the Czechoslovak government. The federal Minister of Transportation, Štefan Šutka, approved the request for cooperation from the GDR for selfish reasons. The planned level of investment in electrification of the rail network called for by the fifth five-year plan was so low that the Ministry sought to preserve sufficient construction capacity in Czechoslovak firms for future years when, according to the plan, it would again be needed in the ČSSR. In the GDR’s case, the assistance was to be paid for by overhauling 12 sleeping cars a year and delivering 1,000 three-door ISO-IC transcontainers for use in the developing system of container transportation.169 Other projects on which the ČSSR and the GDR cooperated were the electrification of a through route around Berlin and a track from Berlin to Rostock.170 The GDR was an important supplier of passenger rail cars for ČSD. The production capacity for them was not sufficient in Czechoslovakia, and moreover, it was the GDR that was assigned their production under COMECON’s “international division of labor.” From the year 1965, ČSD bought or traded for about 4,000 passenger rail cars for which Czechoslovakia did not have the production capacity. Those cars still form the basis of ČSD’s and the Slovak railways’ rolling stock today, although most of them have been modernized. Although the cars were relatively advanced technologically, able to operate at 140 km/h and exceptionally at 160 km/h, they were subject to frequent breakdowns and unreliability of some of their systems. In the second half of the 1980s, deliveries of rail cars

168 For more on the development of the relationship between Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic in the area of rail transport see: Jakubec. Československo-německé dopravněpolitické vztahy v období studené války [Czechoslovak-German Transport Policy Relations During the Cold War], 97–103. 169  Zpráva k žádosti o povolení vývozu specializovaných kapacit elektrizace a zabezpečovací techniky do NDR [Report on a Request for Permission to Export Specialized Capabilities for Electrification and Safety Technology to the GDR], January 21, 1970, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1971–1976, 1261/0/6, NA ČR. 170 Kopecký et al., Železnice v československé dopravní soustavě [The Railroads in the Czechoslovak Transportation System], 103.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

181

and replacement parts from the GDR began to experience delays, which reduced the number of operational passenger rail cars available to ČSD.171 The concentration of traffic headed into East Germany on the track along the Elbe River caused serious operational problems in northern Bohemia in the 1970s, which were exacerbated by the intensive domestic freight traffic in and out of the northern Bohemian coal basin. The capacity of border crossing was no longer sufficient and some trains had to be rerouted through Děčín, others through Ústí nad Labem and even as far away as Lovosice.172 This had a negative impact on domestic freight transport and the ministers of transportation of both countries made efforts to increase the capacity of their most important rail border crossing. One of the main subjects of their negotiations was the section between Děčín and Bad Schandau, and on to Dresden. Czechoslovakia assisted in the modernization and electrification of the track from Dresden to Pirna, as mentioned above, and the section Pirna-Bad Schandau-Děčín was also scheduled for electrification. The work was completed in 1987, but before then a useable two-system locomotive had to be developed. The Czech and East German tracks operated on different electrical systems (3 kV DC in the ČSSR and 15 kV, 16 2/3 Hz in the GDR). The two systems did not come into contact anywhere else in Czechoslovakia. That meant that a suitable locomotive had to be developed quickly, which Škoda Plzeň proceeded to do.173 The prototype was not delivered until 1988, a year after the electrification work was finished.174 Until then, there were no other locomotives that could operate on that combination of voltages in

171  Pracovní náplň—směrnice pro jednání ministrů ČSSR a NDR—dopravní problematika, 4. Července 1989 [Working Paper—Guidance for the Meeting of the Ministers of the ČSSR and GDR—Transportation Issues, July 4, 1989], in: NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NDR 1987–1989. 172  Stanovisko VIII., VII. A XI. Oddělení ÚV KSČ k předloženému materiálu o problematice výstavby železniční výměnné stanice se společnými službami ČSR-NDR v Děčíně-Boleticích [Position of the Eighth, Seventh, and Eleventh Departments of the ÚV KSČ on Materials Presented Regarding the Issue of Construction of a Railroad Switching Station with Common ČSR-GDR Services at Děčín-Boletice], April 14, 1977, vol. 36, unit 40/4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR. 173  Protokol z XXIV. zasedání Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu Společného výboru pro hospodářskou a vědecko-technickou spolupráci mezi ČSSR a NDR, které se konalo 26. až 28. dubna 1988 ve Valticích, ČSSR [Protocol of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Permanent Working Group on Transportation of the Joint Commission for Economic and ScientificTechnical Cooperation between the ČSSR and the GDR, Held on April 26–28, 1988 at Valtice, ČSSR], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1. 174  Společná zpráva o stavu spolupráce v oblasti dopravy, Stálá pracovní skupina [Joint Report on Cooperation in the Area of Transportation, Permanent Working Group], 1988, Protokol z XXIV. zasedání Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu Společného výboru pro hospodářskou a vědecko-technickou spolupráci mezi ČSSR a NDR, které se konalo 26. až 28. dubna 1988 ve Valticích, ČSSR [Protocol of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Permanent Working Group on Transportation of the Joint Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation between the ČSSR and the GDR, Held on April 26–28, 1988 at Valtice, ČSSR], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1.

182

Conditions in the Railway Sector

either Czechoslovakia or the GDR.175 The Deutsche Bundesbahn showed some interest in the new locomotive in connection with the projected electrification of tracks at the Czechoslovak-West German border. For historical reasons, the voltage of the track system on the West German side was the same as that used in the East Germany.176 The modernization of the tracks alone could not solve all the operational problems of the congested cross-border sections. The stations at the border and in nearby areas were overburdened, which complicated the already-stressed transport facilities in northern Bohemia, particularly in the Ústí region. Therefore, plans were made to build a new transshipment facility at Děčín-Boletice, which was expected to have capacity for 31–50 train-pairs a day. It was a good example of investment cooperation between two countries with centrally planned economies. A bilateral agreement set forth the exact share of investment in money and work that one or the other of the two sides would provide, as well as a system for clearing debts and obligations.177 In the end, this promising project was never realized, in part because of its large cost and also because of strong opposition from the local inhabitants of Děčín and Boletice. The intended railway station was to be located on the site of some high-quality agricultural land in the valley of the Elbe. Only the widening of the track bed in Děčín-Prostřední Žleb at the entrance to the main station was completed. A separate chapter could describe the long-distance passenger trains that linked both capitals with a number of daily direct connections. Traditionally, these were express trains that operated on other lines besides that between Berlin and Prague. In the mid-1980s, three of the trains were upgraded to the 175  Pracovní náplň—směrnice pro jednání ministrů ČSSR a NDR—dopravní problematika, 4. července 1989 [Working Paper—Guidance for the Meeting of the Ministers of the ČSSR and GDR—Transportation Issues, July 4, 1989], NA ČR, FMD, pp. 3 and 4, 19 NDR 1987–1989. 176 See, for example: Zápis z jednání náměstka ministra dopravy ČSSR pro ekonomiku ing. Ladislava Blažka, CSc., a náměstka ministra dopravy pro železniční provoz ing. Miloslava Škárky, CSc., s generálním ředitelem Deutsche Bundesbahn a prezidentem Mezinárodní železniční unie Dr. Ing. Reinerem Gohlkem, které se uskutečnilo ve dnech 10. až 11. prosince 1987 v Praze, Federální ministerstvo dopravy [Notes on the Meeting of the Deputy Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR for Economics, Ing. Ladislav Blažek, CSc., and the Deputy Minister of Transportation of Transportation for Railroad Operations, Ing. Miloslav Škárek, CSc., with the General Director of the German Bundesbahn and President of the International Union of Railways, Dr. Ing. Reiner Gohlke, which took Place on December 10–11, 1987 in Prague, Federal Ministry of Transportation], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, Z15 Hraniční přechody. 177  Zpráva o dosavadních výsledcích jednání o současném stavu přípravy dohody mezi vládou Československé socialistické republiky a vládou Německé demokratické republiky o výstavbě výměnné stanice se společnými službami pro nákladní dopravu v prostoru Děčín-Boletice a o základních otázkách jejího užívání [Report on the Results of Negotiations on the Current Status of Preparation of an Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Reublic and the Government of the German Democratic Republic on Construction of a Switching Station with Common Services for Freight Transport in the Area of Děčín-Boletice and on Basic Issues with Regard to Its Use], April 14, 1977, vol. 36, unit 40/4, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1976–1980, 1261/0/7, NA ČR.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

183

InterExpres class and their speed and quality were closely monitored. Of course, as in many other cases, the links still drew criticism for their speed, frequent delays, and lack of punctuality: The critics said that the level of punctuality and cleanliness the international passenger trains attained was unsatisfactory at the time.178 The behavior of a number of the East German citizens traveling in the trains and the condition in which they left the rail cars was also an issue: The travel comfort in the international passenger trains is disappointing, especially on the Dresden-Děčín section. This is because of the crowds traveling from the GDR, who consume beer all the way from Berlin and leave behind a large number of empty beer bottles. This not only makes a mess but also creates odors and contaminates the cars, but is also responsible for the low level of cleanliness of the cars from the CFR179 and JŽ180 and the bad manners of the travelers themselves.181 Table 5.6 shows the changes in the travel times of certain express trains between Prague and Berlin between 1984 and 1989. The most significant reduction in the travel time happened thanks to better organization of the operation of the long-distance InterCity trains running between Prague, Berlin, and Budapest.182 Changes in the type of traction and other modernizing steps did not yet have an impact on the speed of the trains. The large difference in the travel time in the two directions is interesting. The reason was the “cotton,” about a 30-minute reserve, which DR added into its standard timetable. This points up the

178  Zpráva o činnosti a plnění plánu Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu Hospodářského výboru ČSSR/NDR v období mezi XXIII. a XXIV. zasedáním [Report on Activities and Implementation of the Plans of the Permanent Working Group for Transportation of the ČSSR/GDR Economic Commission in the Period between the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Meetings], in: NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1. 179 Romanian railways. 180 Yugoslav railways. 181  Pracovní náplň—směrnice pro jednání ministrů ČSSR a NDR—dopravní problematika, 4. července 1989 [Working Paper—Guidance for the Meeting of the Ministers of the ČSSR and GDR—Transportation Issues, July 4, 1989], NA ČR, Zpráva z jednání ministrů dopravy ČSSR a NDR dne 13. 10. 1987 [Report on the Meeting of the Ministers of Transportation of the ČSSR and GDR on October 13, 1987], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–47 Jednání MD ČSSR a MD NDR.FMD, Pp. 3 and 4, 19 NDR 1987–1989. 182  Zpráva z jednání ministrů dopravy ČSSR a NDR dne 13. 10. 1987 [Report on the Meeting of the Ministers of Transportation of the ČSSR and GDR on October 13, 1987], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–47 Jednání MD ČSSR a MD NDR.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

184

Table 5.6 Overview of the Travel Time of Express Trains Linking Prague and Berlin in the Years 1984–1989 (in Hours and Minutes)

Timetable 1984/1985 1985/1986 1986/1987 1987/1988 1988/1989

Progres/ Hungaria

Vindobona

Meridian

Panonia

Balt-Orient

B-P 6:56 6:21 5:45 5:45 6:38

B-P 6:35 6:06 6:00 6:12 6:28

B-P 7:56 7:33 6:50 6:44 6:50

B-P 7:32 7:16 6:44 6:42 7:08

B-P 7:39 7:18 6:56 6:48 7:10

P-B 6:57 6:12 5:52 5:52 5:52

P-B 6:32 6:11 6:09 6:15 6:06

P-B 7:26 7:12 6:32 6:00 6:17

P-B 7:53 7:08 6:32 6:48 6:50

P-B 7:50 6:49 6:29 6:35 6:39

Note: B-P: direction Berlin-Prague; P-B direction Prague-Berlin. Source: Zpráva o činnosti a plnění plánu Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu Hospodářského výboru ČSSR/NDR v období mezi XXIII. a XXIV. Zasedáním [Report on Activities and Implementation of the Plans of the Permanent Working Group for Transportation of the ČSSR/GDR in the Period between the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Meetings], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1.

irregularities in rail traffic, especially in East Germany, where the trains were frequently delayed.183 In 1988 only 67.9 percent of the trains were on time.184 Cross-border passenger and freight traffic between Czechoslovakia and the GDR was significantly speeded up by an agreement for joint immigration and customs inspections on the state borders that was signed in 1971. At first the inspections were performed in one place while the trains were stopped, but later they were done while the trains were in motion between two border stations. Customs formalities for freight traffic were taken care of in one or the other of the border stations.185 After World War II, Poland had to cope with conditions that far exceeded those in any other country of the Eastern Bloc. The fighting during the war had damaged infrastructure in Poland’s original eastern territory and in the western 183  Zpráva o činnosti a plnění plánu Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu Hospodářského výboru ČSSR/NDR v období mezi XXIII. a XXIV. zasedáním [Report on Activities and Implementation of the Plans of the Permanent Working Group for Transportation of the ČSSR/GDR Economic Commission in the Period between the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Meetings], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1. 184  Zpráva o činnosti a plnění plánu Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu Hospodářského výboru ČSSR/NDR v období mezi XXIV. a XXV. zasedáním [Report on Activities and Implementation of the Plans of the Permanent Working Group for Transportation of the ČSSR/GDR Economic Commission in the Period between the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Meetings], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1. 185  Sjednání Dohody mezi vládou Československé socialistické republiky a Německé demokratické republiky o společných kontrolách na státních hranicích, Federální ministerstvo dopravy [Negotiations for an Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic on Joint Controls on the State Border, Federal Ministry of Transportation], 1971, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–47 Společné odbavení na hranicích.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

185

parts of the country that Poland acquired in 1945. The shifting of Polish territory to the west, up to the border on the Oder and Neisse Rivers, the subsequent expulsion and resettling of the German population, and the enormous destruction of infrastructure led to a long period of reconstruction, during which the situation of the railways was consolidated. Besides the poor state of the infrastructure and a shortage of rolling stock, the lack of experienced workers exacerbated the situation. Reconstruction of some parts of Poland’s railroad infrastructure, above all the destroyed bridges over the Vistula, took until 1957 to complete.186 A number of structures and tracks with only regional importance were never entirely rebuilt, including some tracks that crossed the border into Czechoslovakia. Actions by the Soviet Union further disadvantaged the Polish rail infrastructure. Immediately after occupying Poland, the Soviets began to dismantle tracks, most often taking up one of the tracks on dual-track lines and removing practically all of the associated electrical power lines in the new territory granted to Poland. The demontage was one form of reparations to which the allies had agreed and which at first all of them carried out. When part of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany became sovereign Polish territory, Poland had to deal with the earlier actions of the Soviet occupation authorities that had worsened the condition and the carrying capacity of war-damaged infrastructure. Paradoxically, Poland did not assert any reparation demands of its own, but sought to indemnify itself from the Soviet quota of reparations. Due to Poland’s political situation from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the Polish rail network was very unevenly developed. When the first railroads were introduced, Poland was divided between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Its rail lines thus filled the economic and strategic aims of the three hegemons on Polish territory. After Poland was revived in 1918, its rail network did not correspond to the country’s needs for effective links between all parts of its territory and its capital, Warsaw. A similar situation arose after Poland was shifted to the west in 1945 and took over formerly German territory. The region was highly industrialized, with a well-developed rail network that far exceeded the density and modernity of the situation in the rest of the country. The network in the newly acquired territory was complemented by a number of narrowgauge tracks in (formerly) densely populated industrial areas. The statistics in Table 5.7 show the conditions and the performance of the Polish railways between 1950 and 1990. In them we can see trends that differ in several respects from those in other Eastern European countries. The reasons for this are the above-mentioned situation of Poland’s railway infrastructure, a long-term economic crisis that affected Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, and unsuccessful attempts at economic reforms. Stagnation of investment in infrastructure—both of the railroads and the roads—and the falling standard of living 186 Przegietka, “1918, 1945 and 1989: Three Turning Points in the History of Polish Railways in the Twentieth Century,” in Roth and Jacolin, eds., Eastern European Railways in Transition, 138.

26985 236 25.2 940 36981

26312 160 15.1 613 27124

Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781.

Note: The largest value in each category is outlined in bold.

Length of Network (in km) Freight Transport (mil. tons) Freight Transport (mil. tkm) Passenger Transport (mil. passengers) Passenger Transport (mil. passenger-km)

1955

1950 26904 287 32.9 817 30942

1960 26862 341 38.9 972 34318

1965 26678 382 41.5 1056 36891

1970 26702 464 49.7 1118 42819

1975

Table 5.7 Basic Statistics on the Development of the Polish Railways in the Years 1950–1990

27185 482 56.4 1101 46324

1980

27095 419 58.7 1005 51978

1985

26228 388 60.4 951 55888

1990

186 Conditions in the Railway Sector

Conditions in the Railway Sector

187

slowed down the kind of economic and social modernization that was occurring in other countries of the Western, but also the Eastern, Blocs. In Poland, for example, the trend toward individual use of automobiles was slower than in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and of course the countries of Western Europe.187 The size of the rail network overall did not shrink, but rather grew, although a few tracks were shut down. Twenty-seven percent of the Polish rail network was composed of lines with low levels of traffic, less than one million gross tonkm per year.188 Such tracks were usually considered unprofitable in most other countries of the world and abandoned. In Poland, about 600 km of tracks were shut down in the 1960s, which was an unusual step in the Eastern Bloc. Plans called for more than 2,000 km of tracks to be taken out of service in the 1970s and 1980s, but those plans were not realized before the 1990s.189 The construction of a new central rail main line linking Cracow and Katowice with Warsaw and the wide-gauge main line track serving Poland’s steel mills was responsible for the increase in the total length of the railway network.190 The volume of freight transport grew significantly and only at the end of the 1980s did the volume of goods transported begin to fall off. Passenger traffic peaked in the years between 1975 and 1980 as it did in other countries, after which it continued to increase. This indicates the irreplaceable role of the railways in long-distance passenger travel, which was not limited by the relatively weak growth of individual automobile travel. It should be noted that the condition of the road infrastructure in Poland did not provide a favorable starting point for the widespread use of automobiles.191 If we focus on the development of the Polish railways in the 1970s and 1980s, we can see a reflection of the country’s economic progress, which at the time was stagnating. The lack of investment was evident in the state of the infrastructure, especially in the 1980s. The last important investments into the railways in Poland were the construction of the central main line, the wide-gauge track into the steel mills, and the main stations in Warsaw and Katowice.192 The central main line was built to connect the main economic centers of the country, particularly the Upper Silesian industrial complex, with Warsaw and the Baltic port at Gdansk. In the end, only part of the project was completed, the track between Katowice and Cracow, which was put into service in 1977.193 187 Vykoukal et  al., Východ: vznik, vývoj a rozpad sovětského bloku 1944–1989 [The East: The Origin, Development and Breakup of the Soviet Bloc 1944–1989], 551–558. 188  Zahraniční zkušenosti z řešení problematiky neefektivních železničních tratí, listopad 1972 [Foreign Experience in Solving the Problem of Uneconomic Lines, November 1972], Presidium of the KSČ ÚV 02/1, vol. 63, unit 61/7, NA ČR. 189  Zahraniční zkušenosti z řešení problematiky neefektivních železničních tratí, listopad 1972 [Foreign Experience in Solving the Problem of Uneconomic Lines, November 1972], Presidium of the KSČ ÚV 02/1, vol. 63, unit 61/7, NA ČR. 190 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 187. 191 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781. 192 Przegietka, “1918, 1945 and 1989,” 141. 193 Przegietka, “1918, 1945 and 1989,” 141.

188

Conditions in the Railway Sector

As in Czechoslovakia, the Polish steel mills, which used iron ore from the Soviet Union, were connected to the source with Soviet-standard wide-gauge track. The Polish railways constructed a nearly 400 km-long track, the “steel mill widegauge main line,” from the border with the Soviet Union (today Ukraine) to Nowa Huta near Cracow.194 Although Poland was able to complete some important projects in the 1970s, the overall state of the Polish railways did not much improve. Modernization of the power sources of locomotives took much more time in Poland than it did in other Eastern European countries, principally the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Steam traction still played an important role in regular train operations into the 1980s and in some places continued in service until the 1990s. The low price of the locally produced coal and the high cost of new locomotives and motorized passenger rail cars was responsible for steam locomotives lingering on in Poland. Electrification of the main freight lines in fact began soon after the end of World War II, but its progress slowed sharply in the 1970s. Things changed after 1978 when 300–500 km of tracks were electrified every year through the end of the 1980s.195 From the end of the 1950s a Permanent Commission for Czechoslovak-Polish Transportation met to resolve bilateral transport issues. However, its discussions did not always proceed without complications. The mutual relationship was disturbed in the mid-1960s by a dispute over the billing process for transport of goods in transit. Poland’s protests against the application of the tariff provisions of the Montreux Convention (details of which are discussed above) were not made to Czechoslovakia directly, but to COMECON and whenever possible to the UIC and OSJD. The Montreux tariff provisions stated that the fees for goods transiting on the railroads would be paid to the railway administration providing the transit in the currency of the receiving country, because transport was understood as a service to the customer. This rule was very advantageous to those countries that were used mainly for transit. It provided a large amount of hard currency to Hungary as it did to Czechoslovakia. Poland demanded that the same system be applied to exports to the West that was applied between member countries of the OSJD, where clearing, computation of delivery costs, and payments were made in convertible rubles. That change would significantly benefit Poland and save it Western hard currency at the expense of the transit countries. Poland, in an attempt to achieve at least a bilateral tariff agreement with Czechoslovakia, and thus relief from the Montreux tariffs, proposed a change in the handling of the cost of transport to Polish ports, which was paid by Czechoslovakia in convertible rubble. Although goods were ultimately destined for capitalist countries by sea, transport to the port was considered a service to Czechoslovakia under the agreements then in force, and the end customer 194 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 187. 195 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 188–189.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

189

paid only the actual costs of ocean transport in hard currency. This was very advantageous for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia reacted negatively to Poland’s diplomatic note, arguing for full application of the Montreux principles and noting that those principles applied to rail transit through Poland, mainly in the north–south direction.196 The matter could not be resolved within the Permanent Commission for Transportation. It therefore reached the level of an exchange of notes between the two Prime Ministers, Józef Cyrankiewicz and Jozef Lenárt.197 There followed a long period of relations between the two countries that were not governed by any agreement, because Poland refused to renew a five-year agreement for cooperation on transit of goods. Czechoslovakia did all it could to keep the Montreux principles in effect because they were better for it financially. If a change were made for Poland, then all other countries would ask for the same treatment, which would have led to significant losses. At the beginning of the 1970s, Czechoslovakia charged Poland 150 million Kčs per year in hard currency at a time when transit, principally to Austria, the FRG, and Sweden, brought in a total of 440 million Kčs.198 Intensive negotiations with Poland were carried on until 1973, when it seemed to be in the mutual interest to end the situation where goods were being transported without an agreement. It was therefore possible to separate the negotiations for an agreement between the ČSSR and Poland on cooperation in transiting traffic through the year 1990 from the Montreux tariff issue. Such an agreement was concluded on February 21, 1974.199 Czechoslovakia helped Poland to obtain a review of the tariffs system for rail transit within COMECON at the end of the 1960s. The Executive Committee 196  Memorandum o plnění IV. zasedání Výkonného výboru o změně způsobu vyúčtování plateb za přepravu zásilek zahraničního obchodu přes území států Rady do kapitalistických států, Dokument s připomínkami československé strany, Překlad dopisu předsedy rady ministrů PLR [Memorandum on the Implementation of the Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee on Changes in Accounting for Payments for Transport of Packages in Foreign Commerce Across the Territory of Council States to Capitalist States, Document with Notes by the Czechoslovak Side, Translation of a Letter from the Chairman of the Council of the Polish People’s Republic (PLR)], February 18, 1966, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 197 See the letter from Cyrankiewicz to Lenárt of February 19, 1966 and the following reply, in: Odpověď na memorandum vlády PLR k plnění usnesení 4. zasedání výkonného výboru RVHP o změně způsobu vyúčtování plateb za železniční tranzitní přepravu zboží přes území členských států Rady do kapitalistických států [Reply to the Memorandum of the PLR on Implementation of a Resolution of the Fourth Meeting of the COMECON Executive Committee on Changes in Accounting for Payments for Transiting Rail Transport of Goods Across the Territory of Member States of the Council to Capitalist States] of , January 12, 1967, vol. 20, unit 21/5, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1966–1970, 1261/0/5, NA ČR. 198  Uzavření dohody mezi ČSSR a PLR o spolupráci při tranzitních přepravách zboží obou zemí do roku 1990 [Conclusion of an Agreement between the ČSSR and PLR on Cooperation in the Transit of Goods of Both Countries Through 1990], 15. 10. 1973, vol. 95, unit 94/3, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1971–1976, 1261/0/6, NA ČR. 199 See Dohoda mezi vládou Československé socialistické republiky [Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic].

190

Conditions in the Railway Sector

of COMECON considered putting into effect a tariff increasing the rents from transiting rail cars by seven percent. Hungary withdrew from the negotiations and demanded an exemption from the proposed change. The Hungarian representative on the Executive Committee said: I ask that the effectiveness of this decision be suspended with regard to the Hungarian People’s Republic, because the way it is worded, naming specific countries, does not provide for mutual advantage. In that way Hungary will not prevent countries which consider it in their interest to mutually implement it from doing so.200 Poland was only able to keep the Czechoslovak representative in the discussions by means of a secret agreement, according to which the preference for Polish goods in transit to Yugoslavia and capitalist countries would be increased by 17.5  percent. The Czechoslovak government’s justification for this was clear: “without this increase the ČSSR would not participate in the coefficient agreement because it would cause losses and therefore could never be signed by the other states of COMECON.”201 Czechoslovakia systematically blocked any discussion of changes to the Montreux tariff inside COMECON and in other multilateral transportation organizations such as the UIC and OSJD. The issue was raised in the early 1980s as one of the reasons that Czechoslovakia should run for the post of president of the UIC (more about which is mentioned in Chapter 5.3.1).202 During the 1970s, the main issues in the bilateral transportation relationship moved on from tariff matters and began to focus on operational questions. At the beginning of that decade the most important matter was transportation of coal, which was shipped south from Poland across Czechoslovak territory and onward to the capitalist countries and member countries of COMECON in the Balkans. There were two bottlenecks in the path of that traffic, namely the 200 Prohlášení MLR učiněné na 22. zasedání Výkonného výboru RVHP, 1971 [Decree of the Hungarian People’s Republic (MLR) Concluded at the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of COMECON], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 201  Návrh stanoviska k požadavku polské strany na změnu způsobu úhrady nákladů za tranzit zboží po železnici z PLR přes území ČSSR do kapitalistických zemí. Materiál pro schůzi vlády ČSSR, 12. 2. 1971 [Position on the Demands of the Polish Side for Changes in Accounting for Payments of Costs for Transit of Goods from the PLR Across the Territory of the ČSSR to Capitialist Countries], Prohlášení MLR učiněné na 22. zasedání Výkonného výboru RVHP [Statement of the MLR at the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Executive Committee], 1971, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 202 Zpráva o zvolení Československých státních drah předsednickou železnicí v Mezinárodní železniční unii (UIC) na období let 1983–1984, Federální ministerstvo dopravy, 1982 [Report on the Election of the Czechoslovak State Railways to the Presidency for Railways of the International Railway Union (UIC) for 1983–1984, Federal Ministry of Transport, 1982], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M9 ČSD v UIC.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

191

border crossing between Czechoslovakia and Poland, and for goods headed into the Balkans the border crossing between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Poland, in an effort to redress the transport difficulties, turned to a relatively unused international route through Maťovce and then via a standard-gauge track through the Soviet Union, passing through Chop and Halmeu and on into Romania. The track was a relic of the earlier Czechoslovak railway network in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This route required the reactivation of the most easterly border crossing between Poland and Czechoslovakia, a track linking Łupków and Medzilaborce. That crossing was closed in 1946, but was kept on a list of “tracks of special interest” that could be reactivated if the need arose.203 Poland’s interest in facilitating transit over that route, and therefore in reactivating the border crossing, was obvious. Poland’s request to reopen it was accompanied by an offer to use Polish equipment to perform the work required on the Czechoslovak side at Medzilaborce and to contribute to the cost of the project. The Polish railways also offered that it would accept an increase in the tariff for transit over the entire Czechoslovak section of the track in light of the greater expense of operations. They expressed a willingness that was unusual at the time to provide its own locomotives for traction anywhere in Czechoslovakia.204 Poland had enormous interest in activating the crossing at ŁupkówMedzilaborce, and the two governments got into a dispute over it that is captured in the protocol of their negotiations: The next to last paragraph of the Polish side’s brief is formulated in a way that calls into doubt the sincerity of the Czechoslovak side’s approach to cooperation in rail transport, including ensuring transit of goods in Poland’s foreign trade.205 Despite the disagreements in the working groups and in the opinions of the experts, according to whom opening the crossings would be bad for the Czechoslovak economy because of the high cost of the investments that would

203  Průvodní zpráva k Protokolu o aktivování železničního hraničního přechodu ŁupkówMedzilaborce [Annexed Report on the Protocol for Activating the Rail Border Crossing at Łupków-Medzilaborce], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, Z 15 Hraniční přechody. 204 Protokol z XXI. Zasedání Stále československo-polské dopravní komise, které se konalo ve dnech 8. Až 11. Dubna 1974 v Gdaňsku [Protocol of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transport Commission, Which Took Place on April 8–11, 1974 in Gdansk], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 205 Protokol z XXI. zasedání Stále československo-polské dopravní komise, které se konalo ve dnech 8. až 11. dubna 1974 v Gdaňsku [Protocol of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transport Commission, Which Took Place on April 8–11, 1974 in Gdansk], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska.

192

Conditions in the Railway Sector

be needed,206 the Czechoslovak side relented, and in 1974 the crossing between Łupków and Medzilaborce was opened, primarily to serve for transit of the growing amount of Polish coal and coke exported to Romania.207 The flow of traffic between the two countries, including transiting traffic, can best be grasped with a statistical overview of transport performance. This overview shows the constant exchange of goods between the ČSSR and Poland, a major part of which was transport of coal and coke. From the table, it is also possible to see the quantitative impact on freight transport of the opening of the Łupków-Medzilaborce crossing. The growth from 1973 to 1975 was about 20 percent.208​ Only a few issues arose in the meetings of the joint transportation commission in later years. The representatives of the two countries mainly tried to Table 5.8 Overview of the Volume of Rail Transport between the ČSSR and Poland in the Years from 1973 to 1975 (in Tons)

Total through border crossings ČSD-PKP North-South South-North Of Which: Trade in Goods Poland-ČSSR ČSSR-Poland Transit of Polish Goods Through ČSSR Transit of Czechoslovak Goods Through Poland

1973

1974

1975

17,962,906 12,395,737 5,567,169

20,336,580 14,468,639 5,867,941

22,897,000 16,011,000 6,886,000

5,342,000 4,211,000 1,131,000 8,104,700 4,436,200

5,332,000 4,178,000 1,154,000 10,290,600 4,713,900

5,239,000 4,011,000 1,028,000 11,800,000 5,858,000

Note: The source obtained data from the protocol of meetings of representatives of the ministries overseeing rail transport at Szczyrk on February 20–28, 1975. Source: Protocol of the XXII. Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transportation Commission, which took place on March 25–28, 1975,  in Olomouc, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 206 Průvodní zpráva k Protokolu o aktivování železničního hraničního přechodu ŁupkówMedzilaborce [Annexed Report on the Protocol for Activating the Rail Border Crossing at Łupków-Medzilaborce], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, Z 15 Hraniční přechody. 207 Protokol z XXII. zasedání Stále československo-polské dopravní komise, které se konalo ve dnech 25. až 28. března 1975 v Olomouci [Protocol of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transport Commission, Which Took Place on March 25–28 in Olomouc], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 208 Protokol z XXII. zasedání Stále československo-polské dopravní komise, které se konalo ve dnech 25. až 28. března 1975 v Olomouci [Protocol of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transport Commission, Which Took Place on March 25–28 in Olomouc], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

193

resolve problems in operations, of which the most important was the chronic shortage of freight cars for transporting the coal and sulfur required by customers in Czechoslovakia. Poland blamed the shortage on the prolonged stay of its freight cars in the OPW system in other countries. No solution was found for the problem in the meetings of the Council of the OPW. There was some improvement after an agreement was reached on “rail car assistance,” which in practice meant that rail cars for transporting raw materials to customers in Czechoslovakia were lent to Poland. This mostly applied to cars meant for transport of coal and sulfur.209 In comparison with other bilateral negotiations in the area of rail transport, in the Czechoslovak-Polish discussions almost no attention was paid to passenger transport, which remained at a relatively low level compared to neighboring countries. In the 1970s, Poland raised only a few issues, focused mainly on making some rail border crossings available to citizens of countries outside COMECON and facilitating regional cross-border transport. At the end of the 1980s the extent, speed, and quality of international long-distance trains between the two countries became an issue. The state of the trains was adjudged unsatisfactory, as in fact were the majority of Czechoslovakia’s links into neighboring countries. The reasons were the extraordinary number of delays, crowding of passenger rail cars despite the introduction of a mandatory reservation system, and lack of cleanliness. One interesting agenda item was first discussed in 1989 and was implemented after the political regimes changed in Czechoslovakia and Poland. That was the inclusion of a long-distance train linking Warsaw with Vienna through Přerov and Břeclav into the EuroCity system, which up to then had operated exclusively on the western side of the Iron Curtain.210 As in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Hungarian transportation system was severely damaged in the battles of World War II. Destruction of rail infrastructure represented about a fifth of all the war damage done in Hungary. The transportation system began to be reconstructed in the latter half of the 1940s and in some places work continued until the mid-1950s. Substantial modernization of the system was delayed through the entire decade of the 1950s211 when only 135 km of track was electrified.212 209 Pracovní skupina pro železniční dopravu, Zpráva o činnosti pracovních skupin stálé československo-polské dopravní komise za období mezi XXV. a XXVI. zasedáním Komise, 1978 [Working Group on Rail Transport, Report on the Activities of the Working Groups of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transport Commission in the Period between the TwentyFifth and Twenty-Sixth meetings of the Commission, 1978], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 210  Jednání ministrů ČSSR a PLR, 11 až 12. dubna 1989, Federální ministerstvo dopravy [Meeting of the Ministers of the ČSSR and PLR, April 11-12, 1989, Federal Ministry of Transportation], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43 Jednání ministerstev dopravy Československa a Polska. 211 Frisnyák, “The Centrally Planned Economy and Railways in Hungary,” 176. 212 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 145.

194

Conditions in the Railway Sector

The whole system was at the time afflicted by widespread collapse. The fault was strict adherence to the poorly conceived criteria of the transportation sections of Hungary’s central economic plan. This led to the overloading of the rail network, and nearly to its complete breakdown at the beginning of the 1950s. Hungarian manufacturers were required to ship out a precisely planned volume of goods. Therefore, they loaded up half-finished products or entirely useless cargo willy-nilly, just so they could report that they had shipped their share of the planned volume of goods on the railroad. The Hungarian transportation system was overwhelmed and its productivity was severely reduced—locomotives and wagons had a minimal daily circulation.213 The appointment of György Csanádi as Minister of Transportation was a turning point for the Hungarian railways. His goal was to modernize the rail system and adapt it to modern life. According to Csanádi, the railways had to face up to the competition from road transport and also to changes in Hungarians’ social behavior. The way forward was modernization and rationalizing operations. In the course of a decade, the Hungarian railways closed down a large part of their unprofitable network—which constituted a greater percentage of the total length of track than in any other Eastern European country, as can be seen from the statistics provided below. Most of the country’s important rail lines were modernized, for example, the line between Budapest and Vienna.214 The slow progress of electrification was speeded up—between 1960 and 1970, 500 km of track was electrified, and from 1970 to 1980 another 650 km.215 Csanádi was aware of Hungary’s unique position as an important transit country for the southernmost countries of the Eastern Bloc. Intensive cooperation with other railway administrations was of the utmost importance for Hungary and its railways. Therefore, a wide range of proposals for improving the operation of international and transit traffic was put forward by Hungary while Csanádi occupied the post of Minister of Transportation. Csanádi was behind the creation of the OPW common pool of freight cars, which allowed Hungary and other countries to compensate for their chronic shortage of rail freight cars.216 The statistics below show the development of the Hungarian railways in some key areas. The volume of freight transported peaked in 1975 and the sector’s productivity five years later. The number of passengers traveling on the railways reached its peak between the years 1965 and 1970, and productivity was greatest around the year 1975. A fall-off in the volume of both freight and passenger transport, which for the most part was due to the rise of road transportation, was compensated for by an increase in the average distance traveled. The result was a significant decline in productivity through the second half of the 1980s, 213 Frisnyák, “The Centrally Planned Economy and Railways in Hungary,” 171–177. 214 Frisnyák, “The Centrally Planned Economy and Railways in Hungary,” 178. 215 Jelen, Světové železnice 1 [World Railways 1], 145. 216 Frisnyák, “The Centrally Planned Economy and Railways in Hungary,” 179–180.

Conditions in the Railway Sector

195

which was a phenomenon that was experienced by all the railways of Europe regardless of the political power bloc to which they belonged.217​ Cooperation between ČSD and the Hungarian railways was extensive. The two countries were connected by a large number of border crossings, across which there was strong demand for passenger travel due to the links of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia with Hungary. This was a situation that was not seen elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and cross-border traffic with no other neighboring company compared to it. Besides the usual railway traffic, cooperation included the provision of Czechoslovak railway construction equipment operated by ČSD on the territory of Hungary, which began in 1967. Czechoslovakia’s assistance modernized a large part of the Hungarian railway system. Specifically, it contributed to the electrification of the Debrecen-Karcag-Miskolc, Nagymaros-Szob, and Budapest-Gyékényes lines in Hungary and the cross-border Štúrovo-Szob and Komárno-Komárom lines. In return, Hungary undertook some construction projects for the Czechoslovak side, mainly in Slovakia.218 Bilateral issues that arose were handled by a Permanent CzechoslovakHungarian Transportation Commission similar to those created with other Czechoslovak neighbors. It dealt with a wide spectrum of matters affecting the transportation sector. The main issue was increasing capacity and modernizing the border crossings between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which were a bottleneck for bilateral transport as well as transiting north-south traffic. The rail border crossings were simply unable to handle the stress at times of increased traffic.219 Poland exerted strong pressure for improving the situation because of the priority it placed on trade with the countries to the south.220 The commission mainly focused on the flow and volume of transport. For example, it looked for ways to detour around the freight transportation nodes in Hungary. Thanks to changes in technology, new unit trains were created for transporting goods from Czechoslovakia into the Balkans, which did away with the necessity of

217 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781. 218  Zpráva k žádosti o povolení vývozu specializovaných kapacit elektrizace a zabezpečovací techniky do NDR [Report on a Request for Permission to Export Specialized Capabilities for Electrification and Safety Technology to the GDR], January 21, 1970, Presidium of the ÚV KSČ 1971–1976, 1261/0/6, NA ČR. 219  Informace k návrhu usnesení vlády ČSSR. Sjednání Protokolu o aktivaci železničního hraničního přechodu Łupków-Medzilaborce [Information on the Proposed Decree of the Government of the ČSSR for Activating the Rail Border Crossing at Łupków-Medzilaborce]. Office of the Chairman of the Government of the ČSSR, 1974, NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, Z15 Hraniční přechody. 220 Společná zpráva Stálé československo-maďarské dopravní komise pro Československomaďarský smíšený výbor pro hospodářskou a vědeckotechnickou spolupráci [Joint Report of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Transport Commission to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Committee for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43, 44 Československo-maďarská dopravní komise.

10298 70.8 8.8 367 10277

8756 41.8 5.4 257 7142

Source: Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 737–781.

Note: The largest value in each category is outlined in bold.

Length of Network (in km) Freight Transport (mil. tons) Freight Transport (mil. ton-km) Passenger Transport (mil. passengers) Passenger Transport (mil. passenger-km)

1955

1950 10307 97.1 13.3 485 14324

1960 10069 115 17.2 536 16347

1965 9514 118 19.8 526 16339

1970 8740 132 23.5 463 15823

1975

Table 5.9 Basic Statistics on the Development of the Hungarian Railways in the Years 1950–1990

8142 130 24.3 389 14475

1980

8024 118 22.3 233 11209

1985

8038 112 21 228 11871

1990

196 Conditions in the Railway Sector

Conditions in the Railway Sector

197

uncoupling trains in Budapest. The trains avoided the transportation node there by using alternative routes. In the area of passenger transport, from the beginning of the 1980s the commission paid attention to intensifying the passenger links and improving their quality. New fast express trains were gradually introduced, mainly to the capitals of other countries in the Central European region. In light of the tense historical relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary over national minorities in the two countries, one proposal by the Hungarian side is interesting. It suggested that the main stations in Prague and Bratislava make loudspeaker announcements about international trains headed into Hungary in the Hungarian language, with the understanding that the station in Budapest would do the same for Czech and Slovak passengers.221 The proposal was never implemented.

5.4 Chapter Summary As with other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy, the state of the railway sector in Czechoslovakia generally corresponded to the state of the economy as a whole and shared its positive and negative systemic characteristics. Our two case studies focusing on the operational and the personnel situations at ČSD analyzed important areas which showed long-term negative trends. Above all, the operational side suffered from systemic inadequacies that interfered with improving its quality. After a wave of reconstruction and modernization in the early postwar period, the pace of modernization and innovation in the railway sector slowed down, which a range of qualitative data shows. In particular, the types of locomotives were not modernized and it took a long time to abandon steam power. The speed and punctuality of passenger and freight trains did not much improve over time. Progress in that regard was very slow, and the quality of the rolling stock and the travel comfort was sub-optimal. The Czechoslovak railways were unable to make systematic, widespread improvement in their services. Instead, only small-scale innovations were introduced that had little or no impact on the overall situation. Among the innovations in passenger travel were the InterExpres long-distance express trains, whose quality and timeliness were closely monitored. Only a handful of such trains were in service, however. Generally, the operational quality of the network declined. ČSD could ensure a 221  Zasedání stálé československo-maďarské dopravní komise—ekonomická informace č. 34. Velvyslanectví ČSSR Budapešť pro Federální ministerstvo zahraničních věcí [Meeting of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Hungarian Transport Commission—Economic Information no. 34. Embassy of the ČSSR Budapest for the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs], October 11, 1985; Společná zpráva Stálé československo-maďarské dopravní komise pro Československomaďarský smíšený výbor pro hospodářskou a vědeckotechnickou spolupráci [Joint Report of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Transport Commission to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Committee for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation], NA ČR, FMD, Mezináro, M1–43, 44 Československo-maďarská dopravní komise.

198

Conditions in the Railway Sector

high volume of transportation for passengers and freight, but only at the cost of constantly decreasing speeds and quality of service. The shortcomings in the personnel and operational areas went together and indirectly had influence on each other. It can generally be said that in the entire period we studied, the Czechoslovak railways suffered from a shortage of personnel in all occupations. The government and the Ministry of Transportation were unable to bring about deep and lasting change in that situation despite numerous attempts. The financial rewards, working conditions, and environment on the railroads just were not competitive with those offered by other employers. The longstanding personnel problems led to reductions and low quality of services. Demands on existing employees increased, including pressure to work overtime. ČSD had no ability to “choose” among the pool of applicants for employment. This had an impact on the quality of the corps of railway workers, chiefly in lower-skilled operational jobs, and resulted in poor discipline and haphazard performance of duties. That obviously was not a good thing for the rail sector, which was strategically important to the entire Czechoslovak economy. Comparison of the basic quantitative indicators of the rail sector in Czechoslovakia with selected neighboring rail systems shows that domestic developments in the country did not differ all that much from the general trends in the Eastern Bloc. The situation in the FRG, where there was significant modernization of the railroads and rationalization of their operations, can be considered as the “gold standard” for development. We can compare to it the reductions in the size of the rail network and in the volume of freight and passenger transport in favor of road transportation. For individual indicators, we can also compare the turning points in the systems—that is, the moment when an indicator stopped growing and began to stagnate or decline. Based on such a comparison, it is clear that all the Eastern European railways we studied lagged behind Germany. With only minor exceptions, the turning points came at about the same time in each country. Only in the case of Czechoslovakia do we observe an earlier decline in passenger transport, because automobile usage and the modernization of the road system happened earlier than in other Eastern European countries. Other trends confirm a great deal of path dependency in the behavior of the railway administrations of the centrally planned economies, which limited their development.​ Our overview of international cooperation shows that the Czechoslovak railways were very active in their relationships with other countries’ railways. ČSD actively promoted its own and Czechoslovakia’s national interests in multilateral organizations such as the UIC, OSJD, and others. It participated in activities that promoted more efficient freight transport. In that regard, we can mention participation in the OPW and development of containerization in the framework of COMECON. ČSD maintained very active relations with its neighboring railway administrations irrespective of their membership in the eastern or western political power blocs. In all the relations with the FRG, Poland, and Hungary

1950

1960 HPR; GDR FRG ČSSR

1955 FRG FRG; GDR

HPR HPR

1965

FRG

ČSSR

1970

PPR

HPR

1975 PPR PPR HPR

1980

GDR DDR; PPR GDR; PPR

FRG; ČSSR

1990 ČSSR ČSSR

1985

Source: The author.

Note: ČSSR—Czechoslovakia; FRG—Federal Republic of Germany; GDR—German Democratic Republic; PPR—Polish People’s Republic; HPR—Hungarian People’s Republic.

Length of Network (in km) Freight Transport (mil. tons) Freight Transport (mil. ton-km) Passenger Transport (mil. passengers) Passenger Transport (mil. passenger-km)

 

Table 5.10 The Turning Points for Various Quantitative Indicators between 1950 and 1990, When Continuing Growth of the Railways of the ČSSR, FRG, GDR, Poland, and Hungary Ended

Conditions in the Railway Sector 199

200

Conditions in the Railway Sector

we have discussed, there was active cooperation in operational and technological matters, which, however, was always limited by the physical condition of the rail sectors in both Czechoslovakia and the neighboring countries. The reality of bilateral relations from the point of view of the Czechoslovak railways was that the systemic deficits in international transport were impossible to overcome fully. They influenced international transport in the same negative way that they affected “ordinary” domestic traffic.

6 CONCLUSION

Crowded, slow, dirty, frequently delayed, outmoded trains; dilapidated stations; and lack of care and respect for passengers on the part of railway employees. These were the typical impressions left on passengers at the end of the 1980s when they traveled by train in Czechoslovakia. The state of freight transport was no better. The railways were undoubtedly able to transport an enormous amount of freight and passengers, but their speed and flexibility were at a very low level. How was it possible that the rail sector sank into such an unsatisfactory state when official documents always identified it as a key sector of the national economy? The answer must be found in the general developments in transportation and competition between its various modes, in the behavior of the institutions and actors charged with fulfillment of state transportation policy, and finally in the actual condition of the railways themselves. The golden age of rail transport in Czechoslovakia was the period just after the end of World War II. In the years of postwar reconstruction, the railways were the dominant and preferred mode of transportation, into which the majority of the funds available to the transport sector were funneled. They maintained their supreme importance until the end of the 1950s, a time when road transport was already well-established in the developed countries of Western Europe. Most of the trends taking hold in the “capitalist countries” arrived in the countries of the Eastern Bloc with a delay, as was the case in Czechoslovakia. There, automobile transportation only began to become serious competition for the railways in the early 1960s. The development of the road network in Czechoslovakia, as well as improvements in the technology of automobiles, laid down the conditions for transportation to move onto the roads. Transport of passengers in buses on mass transport networks in the cities and later on long-distance routes across the country gradually developed to the point where their timetables were competitive with those of the railroads. For freight, road transport was preferred mainly for short distances and where flexibility or especially careful handling of cargo was required. Personal motor vehicles deserve a chapter all to themselves—their development required a better road network, but also more accessible cars, above all in terms of their price. Thanks to the development of the domestic economy and rising income levels in the population, personal motor vehicles became a real



202

Conclusion

option for households. Motorcycles were the first to become popular in the 1950s and early 1960s, followed by automobiles later in the 1960s. This significantly influenced the transportation sector, because in many areas the railways simply could not compete with automobile transportation. Despite the above-described “pressure” on the railways, they remained the most important and essential mode of transport into the 1970s. How then did it happen that by the end of the 1980s they were on the edge of economic failure and complete stagnation? The research method we used allowed us to apply many different filters to the available data on the development of the railway sector in Czechoslovakia, and to structure this book around answering the questions we have raised. Analysis of the developments and the issues surrounding the railway sector writ large led us to identify three main dimensions—polity, policy, and politics—and to define clear objectives: (1) identify and describe the actors in the railway sector and their interests and purposes; (2) bring into focus the role assigned to the railway sector in programmatic documents and the central economic plans, and the sector’s access to the resources available in the economy; and (3) focus on two areas, operations and personnel, that importantly influenced (and reflected) the internal functioning of ČSD. Our approach to these objectives included a description of the development of the railways in neighboring countries and of international cooperation. We situated the development of ČSD and the conditions of its network in the international contexts of both Eastern and Western Europe. The Czechoslovak railways were a highly strategic sector of the Czechoslovak economy, as was repeatedly declared in all official documents. This was reflected in its unique management structure and also in its assigned tasks. Issues that arose in the railway sector were commonly addressed in detail by the highest political organs of the country, the Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and its Presidium. The top management of ČSD was part of the organizational structure of the FMD. Besides demonstrating ČSD’s national importance, centralized control of the sector forced the railways to concentrate on other, mainly political, objectives of the country’s leadership, which did not always correspond to the railways’ own interest in its efficient operation. Besides their usual role as public transportation, the Czechoslovak railways played another role in the national defense, for which it was to ensure the transport of troops in case of mobilization for war. To that end, it was required to maintain many unprofitable tracks and an inordinately high number of wagons and locomotives in operation. Maintaining social contentment and offering affordable transportation “to all” were requirements for the railways’ operations. In that respect, the year 1968 and the subsequent political “normalization” were a critical time when all attempts were made to avoid any significant upset to Czechoslovak society. Therefore, the Central Committee of the KSČ was determined not to increase the fares for passenger rail travel, which remained unchanged in nominal terms from the monetary reform of 1953 (!) and were significantly cheaper than fares for travel by bus. The leadership’s repeated refusals

Conclusion

203

to raise fares resulted in large operating losses for ČSD and the need to provide it with subsidies from the state budget. Although it was no problem for the economy’s central planners to offer subsidies, ČSD’s economic inefficiency, even if not its fault, increased the pressure on the state treasury. A similar problem existed in freight transport. In the eyes of the Presidium of the KSČ, higher tariffs would lead to higher prices in the overall economy that would potentially upset the population. The shortfall of revenue for covering expenses was gradually (somewhat) reduced in a few steps. Still, the regime’s leadership tried as hard as it could to avoid increasing production costs and thus maintain social stability among the population. The Czechoslovak railways reacted to its difficulties with attempts to increase efficiency and rationalize its operations, at least in part. The most important step was ending the use of steam locomotives, which was originally planned for the end of the 1960s, and expanding diesel and electric traction. Delivery of new locomotives was delayed, however, and the electrification of the most important rail lines could not be achieved in the planned timeline. Steam locomotives remained in regular service until the 1980s. One possible economizing move, reducing the extent of the rail network, was unsuccessful—both because of the importance of a number of (operationally ineffective) rail lines to the national defense capabilities of the country and because of insuperable political opposition in the affected regions, which was heightened by concern about local social unrest. A few lines were finally closed down without any significant impact on ČSD’s operational efficiency. Parallel to the unsatisfactory trends in the economic dimension of ČSD’s operations, the approach to the entire transportation sector began to change in the 1970s. Although in the documents setting forth Czechoslovak transportation policy the railways were still considered a strategic mode of transportation, which should be strengthened and further developed, the reality of the times demanded greater attention to road transport. The rise of motor vehicles caused a whole range of problems and associated needs, which had to be addressed without delay. The increasing number of automobiles led to traffic jams and increased emissions, and other problems even when they were standing still, such as adequate parking space. On the other hand, truck transport was able to offset (and even eliminate) some of the weaknesses of domestic rail transport and gradually during the 1970s also of international rail transport. Pressure arose for the development of a system of quality, high-speed roads and highways, which had two advantages over the railroads. Economically, it required much less investment than was required to modernize the railroads to similar standards of efficiency, speed, and capacity. Road infrastructure could also be used for both freight and passenger traffic, and above all for individual personal automobiles. From a political standpoint, the development of roads and superhighways for the burgeoning number of new personal automobiles could be viewed as evidence of rising living standards of the population, and thus as proof of the correctness of the “course” of Czechoslovakia’s political development.

204

Conclusion

With the rise in automobile traffic, the railways were thus de facto shunted onto a side track in terms of the interest of the highest authorities and the actual priorities of the state’s transportation policy. Although they were always and everywhere described as occupying the leading position and playing an irreplaceable role, they were the victim of their own assigned tasks and the extraordinarily high cost of investment in various modernizations. The lack of new investment began to show in Czechoslovakia from the early 1970s and was associated with a cycle of long-term stagnation in the domestic economy which lasted for nearly two decades. Modernization projects and improvements in efficiency required enormous investment. The chronic lack of funds led to long delays in the completion of investment projects such as delivery of new rolling stock (locomotives and wagons) and the modernization of infrastructure. The expected revenue from those projects was therefore not available for use by ČSD, whether for improving services or promoting more efficient operations. Paradoxically, the Czechoslovak railways were able to “fulfill the plan” in terms of their assigned tasks up to the end of the 1980s. Because the highest organs lost interest in the sector and funds for investment were not available, a “dysfunctional management system” arose that was like those in several other sectors of the Czechoslovak economy. The establishment of mainly quantitative indicators as the basis for assigning tasks to the railways led to failures on the qualitative side. Internal mechanisms for evaluation of results relied on very vague indicators of quality for evaluating the performance of managers. This led to a paradoxical situation where the state of the railways got progressively worse while evaluations (based on “objective criteria”) generally showed “good” results on the part of individual workers and ČSD as a whole. Because of the “dysfunction” of ČSD’s management, overall economic reforms, including the introduction of financial incentives for managers who fulfilled their assigned tasks, could not reverse the trend in development. Work requirements were not strictly defined, and no greater effort than usual on the managers’ part was required to fulfill them. The Czechoslovak railways thus got themselves into a downward spiral which was difficult to change, much less stop. Changing this trend, which resulted from a general path dependency, was beyond the will and ability of the management apparatus of the sector (at the level of ČSD and the FMD). In the 1980s, the sector lost all importance in the eyes of the authorities. Therefore, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was relatively little change and not much success in modernizing operations. This situation became fully apparent with the economic changes after 1989, when the railways were faced with even stronger competition from road transport. Because of the historical failings of the previous decades, the volume of freight and passenger rail transport fell to less than half of what it had been before. In comparison with developments in Western Europe at the time, the most important trends in modernization of the railways were observable— mainly the phase-out of steam traction, electrification, and the introduction of

Conclusion

205

containerization—but they were realized a decade or more later than they were in the FRG, to take one example. The trend to “derailroadization” and toward the development of road transport and the individual use of automobiles was felt in Czechoslovakia, although more weakly and later in time than in West Germany. It is interesting that these “outside” pressures did not result in changes in rail transportation similar to those in the West. In the FRG, the volume of rail traffic declined at the beginning of the 1960s, and in reaction the entire concept of passenger and freight transport changed. This meant the development of highspeed rail lines for transporting passengers and a focus on connections between the largest cities and for suburban transport. In freight transport, it meant support for containerization and high-capacity transport using unit trains, both of which were becoming common elsewhere in the world. In Czechoslovakia, however, these trends were with only a few exceptions not seen, and the railways did not abandon their traditional roles until after the fall of the communist regime. The central economic plan, the centerpiece of the Czechoslovak economy, kept the railway sector in its traditional, stable state. The atmosphere was not very innovative, despite the concepts and strategies expressed in the documents of state transportation policy. A key advantage of the railroads in the fulfillment of the central plan was their ability to provide high-capacity transport for (mainly heavy) industry concentrated in large centers, including the export of goods. Regardless of breakdowns and other shortcomings in the quality of their services, the railways always had to cope with the demands of the plan, to say nothing of the demands of national defense. Nevertheless, the modernizations promised in the central plan (for example, the delivery of new locomotives and rail cars) frequently went unfulfilled. Therefore, the pressure for changing the conditions on the railways could not be increased. Without a strong stimulus there could not be a strong reaction that would bring about change. Because of external trends (especially the rise of the automobile), the political decisions of the highest organs of the Czechoslovak government, the chronic lack of investment funds, and the structural failures in the supplier-customer relationship, at the end of the 1960s the Czechoslovak railways were unable to embark on the path toward a modern and efficiently operating railroad. Rather, they concentrated on maintaining the place they were assigned by the central plan: fulfilling quantitative indicators while ignoring the constant decline of quality, to the point that their internal reserves were depleted and the sector began to stagnate. In the end, traffic on the Czechoslovak railways was provided by an outmoded, uneconomical fleet of locomotives and cars operating on deteriorating infrastructure. Neither ČSD’s upper management nor its ordinary workers were able to improve this unfortunate situation. The railways turned in upon themselves and created a system per se. They became resistant to all plans for economic change at the same time they were the target of more and more frequent criticism from society. In their lethargic isolation, which prevailed until the end of the 1980s, they lost interest in the needs of their customers, both passengers and shippers. They only pretended to take an interest in modernizing

206

Conclusion

within the limits of economic conditions and concentrated exclusively on quantitatively measurable tasks. The continuation of these conditions after the year 1990 led to a steep decline in efficiency. The Czechoslovak railways fell to the lowest imaginable level and required large state subsidies to cover operational losses. It took the Czech Republic more than 20 years to change attitudes and stabilize the railway system. Reforms in the rail sector, effected after the year 2000 under intense pressure from the European Union, were what facilitated and accelerated those changes.

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Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 1971–1976 24/25/10 smluvní úprava dopravy mezi ČSSR a NSR [Contractual Arrangements for Transport between the ČSSR and GDR]; 28/30/11 povolení vývozu specializovaných kapacit elektrizace železnic do NDR [Permission to Export Specialized Capacity Electrified Railways to the GDR]; 32/34/6 současný stav a možnost urychlení výstavby dálnic [Current Status and the Possibility of Speeding Up Construction of Highways]; 64/62/9 rušení málo využitých tranzit [Abolishment of Little-Used Transit]; 74/72/45 tranzitní plynovod [Transit of Natural Gas]; 78/75/4 dohoda mezi MD ČSSR a spolkovým ministerstvem dopravy NSR o vnitrozemské vodní dopravě mezi ČSSR a NSR [Agreement between the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and the Federal Ministry of Transportation of the FRG on Domestic Water Transport between the ČSSR and FRG]; 95/94/3 tranzitní přeprava PLR a ČSR [Transit Transport PLR and ČSR; 121/120/inf 1 sjednání dohody o všeobecných podmínkách mezinárodní přepravy nákladů silniční dopravou [Negotiations for an Agreement on General Conditions if International Carriage of Freight in Highway Transport]; 132/133/inf 5 zásoby osobních automobilů výroby 1973 [Supplies for Production of Passenger Cars 1973]; 160/163/2 základní záměry rozvoje ekonomiky ČSSR do r. 1990

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[Basic Considerations for the Development of the Economy of the ČSSR to 1990]; 171/173/24 svolání komise pro VTR [Election of the Comission for VTR]; 185/186/2 výsledky koordinace národohospodářských plánů se státy RVHP 1976–80 [Results of the Coordination of the National Economic Plans of the COMECON States 1976–80]; 188/189/2 hlavní záměry hosp. a soc. vývoje v ČSSR 1976–1980 [Main Considerations in Economic and Social Development of the ČSSR 1976–1980].

Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 1976–1980 27/29/k inf 2 Plnění opatření přijatých k prověrce federálního ministerstva dopravy, správy Severozápadní dráhy a želez. Stanici Praha Vršovice [Implementation of Measures Taken for Audit of the Federal Ministry of Transportation, Report of the Northwestern Railways and the Prague–Vršovice Railway Station]; 36 40 4 Příprava dohody mezi vládami ČSSR a NDR o výstavbě výměnné stanice se společnými službami pro nákladní dopravu v prostorách nádraží Děčín – Boletice [Preparation of the Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and FRG for Construction of a Switching Station with Common Services for Freight Transport in the Area of the Děčín – Boletice Station]; 36 40 17 Sjednání dohod o zajištění tranzitu elektrické energie z Polska do Rakouska přes území ČSSR [Negotiation of an Agreement on Ensuring the Transit of Electrical Energy From Poland to Austria Across the Territory of the ČSSR]; 111/111/9 Sjednání mnohostranné dohody o rekonstrukci a technické přestavbě železničních tratí mezinárodního významu [Negotiation of a Multilateral Agreement for Reconstruction and Technical Transformation of Railway Lines with International Importance]; 111/111/10 Sjednání protokolu o přijetí “Programu dalšího rozvoje kontejnerového dopravního systému na r. 1981–1990” [Negotiation of a Protocol on Adoption of a “Program of Further Development of a Containerized Transport System for in 1981–1990”]; 111/111/11 Sjednání rámcové dohody o vytvoření a zavedení do provozu propojeného komplexu automatizovaných systémů rezervace míst a prodeje letenek na mezinárodních leteckých linkách [Negotiation of a Framework Agreement for Creation and Introducing into Operation a Linked Complex of Automated Systems for Reserving Seats and Sales of Airplane Tickets on International Air Routes]; 113/112/26 Omezení rychlosti jízdy silničních motorových vozidel s cílem snížení spotřeby pohonných hmot [Limitations on the Speed of Travel of Highway Motor Vehicles with the Aim of Reducing Consumption of Fuel]; 116/119/1 Dlouhodobý program racionalizace spotřeby, úspor a využití všech druhů paliv a energie [Long-Term Program for Rationalizing Consumption, Conserving and Using All Types of Fuel and Energy].

Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 1980–1985 P151/80/3 Zpráva o připravenosti dopravy ke zvládnutí podzimní přepravní kampaně a zabezpečení železniční dopravy v zimním období 1980/1981 [Agreement on Preparing Transport for the Autumn Transport Campaign and Ensuring Rail

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Transport in the Winter of 1980/1981]; P151/80/4a Zpráva o racionalizačních opatřeních v silniční nákladní dopravě z hlediska úspor pohonných hmot [Report on Rationalization Measures in Highway Freight Transport in Order to Save Fuel]; P161/81/4 Hlavní směry hospodářského a sociálního rozvoje ČSSR na léta 1981– 1985 [Main Directions of Economic and Social Development for the Years 1981– 1985]; P131/82/3 Zpráva o postavení a dalším rozvoji čs. civilní letecké dopravy v období do roku 1985 [Report on the Establishment and Further Development of Czechoslovak Civil Airline Transport in the Period to 1985]; P35/82/1 Rozvoj vodních cest v ČSSR a jejich propojení do soustavy vodních cest v  Evropě [Development of Waterways in the ČSSR and Their Inclusion into the System of Waterways in Europe]; P42/82/4 Rozvoj, koordinace a racionalizace osobní dopravy v období sedmého 5LP a v dalším výhledu [Development, Coordination, and Rationalization of Personal Transportation in the Period of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Onward]; P49/82/k inf: 2 Protokol o dohodě o mezinárodním železničním tranzitním tarifu a sazbách za používání nákladních vozů v systému PPV [Protocol on the Agreement on International Rail Transit Tariffs and Rates for Use of Freight Cars in the PPV System]; 121/84/2a Návrh prováděcího plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství na rok 1995 [Proposal for an Introductory Plan of Development for the National Economy in the Year 1985].

Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 1986–1989 P3/86/3 Přístup ČSSR k Evropské dohodě o hlavních silnicích s mezinárodních provozem AGR (Ženeva 1975) [Approach of the ČSSR to the European Agreement on Main Highways with International Traffic AGR (Geneva 1975)]; P11/86/3 Uzavření dohody mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou MLR o železniční dopravě [Conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of the ČSSR and the Government of the MLR on Rail Transport]; P12/86/1a Návrh 8 5LP – 1986–1990 [Proposal for the Eighth Five-Year Plan – 1986–1990]; P40/87/k inf 8 Sjednání dohody mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou USA o letecké dopravě [Negotiation of the Agreement between the Government of the ČSSR and the Government of the USA on Airline Transport]; P59/88/k inf 5 Informace o situaci v železniční dopravě v roce 1987 [Information on the Situation in Rail Transport in 1987]; P79/88/5 Výsledky kontroly, jak komunistévedoucí pracovníci a stranické organizace na MD ČSSR a ve vybraných podřízených organizacích plní závěry XVII. Sjezdu KSČ z hlediska plynulosti a hospodárnosti žel. Dopravy, upevňování disciplíny a pořádku při uspokojování potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [Results of a Review of How the Communists—the Leading Workers and Party Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation of the ČSSR and Selected Subsidiary Organizations Are Fulfilling the Conclusions of the Seventeenth Congress of the KSČ in Terms of the Fluidity and Effectiveness of Rail Transportation, Reinforcing Discipline and Order in the Course of Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and the Population]; P115/89/3 Vládní návrh zákona o organizaci Československé státní dráhy [Governmental Proposal for a Law on the Organization of the Czechoslovak State Railways]; P137/89/2 Východiska a cíle soc.-ekon. rozvoje ČSSR pro 9 5LP a další období [Starting Point and Goal for Socio-economic Development of the ČSSR for the Ninth Five-Year Plan and Later Periods].

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Návrh smlouvy PLR mezi ČSSR a PLR [Transportation Protocol between the ČSSR and PLR for 1970. Proposed Agreement between the ČSSR and PLR]; 9774/1989 Zápis z 1. zasedání čs. části čs.-polské SKDS, 19. 4. 1989 [Notes from the First Meeting of the Czechoslovak Part of the Czechoslovak-Polish SKDS]; 12502/1989 Zápis z 2. zasedání čs. části čs.-polské SKDS [Notes from the Second Meeting of the Czechoslovak Part of the Czechoslovak-Polish SKDS], 14. 6. 1989; 13761/1989 Zápis z 3. zasedání čs. části čs.-polské SKDS [Notes from the Third Meeting of the Czechoslovak Part of the Czechoslovak-Polish SKDS], 20. 7. 1989; Zápis z 4. zasedání čs. části čs.-polské SDKS [Notes from the Fourth Meeting of the Czechoslovak Part of the Czechoslovak-Polish SKDS], 19. 9. 1990; 0904/1990 Zápis z 5. zasedání čs. části čs.-polské SDK, 5. 10. 1990 [Notes from the Fifth Meeting of the Czechoslovak Part of the Czechoslovak-Polish SKDS]; Statut čs.-polské dopravní komise [By-Laws of the Czechoslovak-Polish Transportation Commission]; Pracovní skupiny pro tranzitní, námořní a říční přepravy čs.-polské dopravní komise [Working Group on Transit, Maritime, and Riverine Transport of the Czechoslovak-Polish Transportation Commission]; Smlouva mezi ČSSR a MLR o společné kontrole na státních hranicích 1973–1975 [Agreement between the ČSSR and the MLR on Joint Controls at the State Borders 1973–75]; 1. – 16. zasedání Stálé čs.-maďarské dopravní komise 1965–1974 [First to Sixteenth Meetings of the Permanent Czechoslovak-Hungarian Transportation Commission 1965–1974]; 17. – 28. zasedání Stálé čs.-maďarské dopravní komise 1975–1985 [Seventeenth to Twenty-Eigth Meetings of the Permanent CzechoslovakHungarian Transportation Commission 1975–1985; Československo-německá (NDR) dopravní komise [Czechoslovak-German (GDR) Transportation Commis­ sion]; Dohoda mezi ČSSR a NDR o společné kontrole na státních hranicích 1967– 1973 [Agreement between the ČSSR and GDR on Joint Controls at the State Borders 1967–1973]; Zápisy a protokoly Stálé pracovní skupiny pro dopravu v HV ČSSR – NDR 1969–1985 [Notes and Protocols of the Permanent Working Group on Transportation in HV ČSSR-GDR 1969–1985]; 12694/1984 Jednání ministrů dopravy ČSSR a NDR v Berlíně [Meeting of the Ministers of Transportation of the ČSSR and GDR in Berlin], 21. – 22. 5. 1984; 14464/1986 Jednání ministrů dopravy ČSSR a NDR v Berlíně [Meeting of the Ministers of Transportation of the ČSSR and GDR in Berlin], 13. – 14. 7. 1986; 11528/1987 Jednání ministrů dopravy ČSSR a NDR v Berlíně [Meeting of the Ministers of Transportation of the ČSSR and GDR in Berlin] 4. – 5. 5. 1987; 26126/1977 Podklady pro konzultace s NSR [Materials for Consultations with the GDR]; SM 219/1978 Příprava ekonomických podkladů pro jednání s. G. Husáka v NSR [Preparation of Economic Materials for Meeting of G. Husák in the GDR]; 19850/1978 Opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR a NSR v oblasti dopravy [Measures for Activating the Relations between the ČSSR and GDR in the Area of Transportation]; SM 2010/1981 Spolupráce na státních hranicích mezi ČSSR a NSR [Cooperation on the State Borders between the ČSSR and FRG]; Jednání ministerstva dopravy ČSSR a NSR 1987 [Meeting of the Ministers of Transportation of the ČSSR and FRG]; 230/1979-5/192 Návštěva starosty města Hamburk v ČSSR [Visit of the Mayor of the City of Hamburg to the ČSSR]; 13319/1979 Návštěva senátora Steinera v ČSSR [Visit of Senator Steiner to the ČSSR]; 18667/1979 Návštěva starosty města Hamburk v ČSSR [Visit of the Mayor of the City of Hamburg to the ČSSR]; 19595/1979 Vybrané otázky pro jednání se starostou města Hamburk v  ČSSR [Selected Issues for the Meeting with the Mayor of the City of Hamburg to the ČSSR]; 20707/1979 Záznam z jednání s prvním starostou města Hamburk H. U. Klosem [Notes from the Meeting

References

217

with the First Mayor of the City of Hamburg H. U. Klos]; 21953/1979 Záznam z jednání náměstka ministra dopravy J. Dykasta s  hamburským senátorem J. Steinertem [Notes from the Meeting with the Deputy Minister of Transportation J. Dykast with Hamburg Senator J. Steinert]; 201/1972 Sjednání mezivládních dohod v dopravě s NDR [Negotiations for an Intergovernmental Agreement on Trasportation with the GDR]; 17128/1972 Podepsání mezivládních dohod o spolupráci v železniční dopravě a vnitrozemské vodní dopravě mezi ČSSR a NDR – vyslání delegace [Signature of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Rail Transport and Domestic Water Transport between the ČSSR and GDR – Dispatch of the Delegation]; SM 580/1975 Sjednání smlouvy mezi ČSSR a NDR o společných státních hranicích [Negotiation of the Agreement between the ČSSR and GDR on the Common State Borders]; SM 168/1976 Sjednání smlouvy ČSSR/NDR o spolupráci na státních hranicích [Negotiation of the ČSSR/GDR Agreement on Cooperation on the State Borders]; SM 1763/1976 Zpráva pro vládu ČSSR o Smlouvě mezi ČSSR a NDR o spolupráci na státních hranicích [Report to the Government of the ČSSR on the Agreement between the ČSSR and GDR on Cooperation on the State Borders]; 7436/1984 Dohoda mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou NDR o spolupráci při výzkumu, vývoji a výrobě strojů a zařízení pro stavbu a údržbu tratí [Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and GDR on Cooperation in Research, Development and Production of Machines and Equipement for Construction and Maintenance of Tracks] ; 10545/1988 XXIV. zasedání SPS ČSSR/NDR [Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the ČSSR/GDR SPS]; XXV. Zasedání Stálé pracovní skupiny dopravu [Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Permanent Working Group on Transportation]; 8498/1989 Jednání sekretářů Stálé pracovní skupiny [Meeting of the Secretaries of the Permanent Working Group]; 20061/1985-19/192 20. zasedání Podskupiny pro vodní dopravu ČSSR/NDR [Twentieth Meeting of the ČSSR/NDR Subgroup for Water Transport]; Protokol z  XXIV. zasedání Stálé pracovní skupiny ve Valticích [Protocol of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Permanent Working Group in Valtice]; Cestovní zprávy 1985–1987 [Reports on Travel 1986–1987]; GZ ČSD – NSR/Frankfurt n. M. – září 1968; GZ ČSD – NDR/Berlín – 1. 7. 1969 [GZ ČSD – FRG/Frankfurt am Main – September 1968.]

M5 Economic and Scientific Cooperation X. – XVII. zasedání pracovní skupiny pro standardizaci vagónů 1975–1979 [Tenth to Seventeenth Meetings of the Working Group on Standardization of Railcars 1975–1979]; II. – IV. zasedání skupiny pro kooperativu ve výrobě dopravních prostředků 1970–1971 [Second to Fourth Meetings of the Group on Cooperation in the Production of Means of Transportation 1970–1971]; 13808/1986 Návrh programu vědeckotechnického pokroku do r. 2000 (RVHP) [Proposed Program of Scientific-Technical Progress to the Year 2000 (COMECON)]; Zhodnocení výsledků mnohostranné vědeckotechnické spolupráce s  členskými státy RVHP v  roku 1987 [Evaluation of the Results of Multilateral Scientific-Technical Cooperation with the Member States of COMECON in the Year 1987]; Zhodnocení výsledků mnohostranné vědeckotechnické spolupráce s  členskými státy RVHP a SFRJ [Evaluation of the Results of Multilateral Scientific-Technical Cooperation with the Member States of COMECON and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]; 49/1988-05 Služební dopis – Zemní plyn – konzultace v ZSSR [Service Letter – Natural Gas – Consultation

218

References

with the Soviet Union]; 8850/1986 Služební dopis – Zabezpečení usnesení SKD RVHP [Service Letter – Ensuring Resolution of SKD COMECON]; Dohoda “Perspektivní železniční vozidla” [Agreement “Advanced Railcars”], 1972; Dohoda “Stavby a zařízení na mezinárodních silnicích” [Agreement “Construction and Operations on International Highways], 1978; Dohoda “SZT” [Agreement “SZT”]; Dohoda “Specializace & kooperace AŽD Technopol” [Agreement “Specialization and Cooperation AŽD Technopol”; Čs. delegace v  SKD RVHP – 310. Zasedání [Czechoslovak Delegation to the COMECON SKD – 310th Meeting]; 78. zasedání SKD RVHP, 1987 [Seventy-Eighth Meeting of the SKD COMECON, 1987]; Zápis ze 108. zasedání poradního sboru čs. zmocněnce pro SZT RVHP – 1. 11. 1989 na ÚŘ ČSD [Notes from the 108th Meeting of the Advisory Body by the Czechoslovak Delegates to the SZT COMECON – November 1, 1989 at the ÚR ČSD].

M9 8973/1981-05 Metodické pokyny pro účast a činnost ČSD v  UIC a organizacích k  ní přidružených, 1981 [Methodological Instructions for the Participation and Activities of the ČSD at the UIC and Associated Organizations, 1981].

M11 Celní dohoda o náhradních součástkách pro opravu vozů EUROP (Ženeva, 1958) [Customs Agreement on Spare Parts for Repair of EUROP Cars (Geneva, 1958)]; Evropská dohoda o mezinárodních železničních magistrálách (Ženeva, 1985) [European Agreement on International Railway Thoroughfares (Geneva, 1985)]; Dohovor o mezinárodní železniční přepravě COTIF a CIV [Discussion on International Rail Transport COTIF and CIV]; Dohoda mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou SSSR o pohraniční železniční přepravě [Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and Soviet Union on Border Rail Traffic], 1968; Dohoda mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou MLR o železniční dopravě [Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and MLR on Rail Transport], 1986; 8188/1977 Zpráva o dosažených výsledcích jednání o stavu přípravy Dohody mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou NDR o výstavbě výměnné stanice se společnými službami pro nákladní dopravu v prostoru Děčín – Boletice [Report on Results Achieved at the Meeting on the State of Preparations for an Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and GDR on Construction of Switching Stations with Common Services for Freight Transport in the Area of Děčín – Boletice], 1977; 15019/1972 Sjednání nové Dohody mezi vládou ČSSR a vládou NDR o spolupráci v oblasti žel. dopravy [Negotiation of a New Agreement between the Governments of the ČSSR and GDR on Cooperation in the Area of Rail Transport], 1972; N A 10-11SSO1 Rozvoj progresivních přepravních systémů [Development of a Progressive Transportation System], 1989; 11127/1987 Návrh trojstranné dohody mezi podniky Morcontainer, Čechofracht a ČSKD Intrans [Proposal for a Trilateral Agreement between the Companies Morcontainer, Čechofracht, and ČSKD Intrans], 1987; 6244/1979 Sjednání Protokolu o přijetí “Programu dalšího rozvoje kontejnerového dopravního systému na léta 1981–1990” [Negotiation of a Protocol for Adoption of the “Program for Further Development of a Containerized Transportation System in the Years 1981–1990”]; 70/1985-O 5/192 Služební dopis – Zpráva pro PMD ČSSR –

References

219

atestace VK [Service Letter – Report for PMD ČSSR – Attestation of VK]; Evropská dohoda o celním odbavování palet používaných v mezinárodní dopravě – Ženeva, 1960 [European Agreement on Customs Trreatment of Pallets Used in International Transport – Geneva, 1960]; Úmluva OSN o kombinovaných přepravách 1979– 1984 [UN Convention on Multimodal Transport 1979–1984]; Konvence OSN o mezinárodních kombinovaných přepravách – Ženeva, 1980 [UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport – Geneva, 1980]; Celní dohoda o kontejnerech a Protokol o podpisu – Ženeva, 1956 [Customs Agreement on Containers and Protocol of Signature – Geneva 1956].

Z15 9674/1979 Dohoda ČSSR/SSSR o výstavbě nového hraničního přechodu [ČSSR/USSR Agreement for Construction of a New Border Crossing]; 22966/1983 NDR – otázka vstupu do platnosti Dohovoru mezi FMD ČSSR a MD NDR [GDR – Issuses Around the Entry into Force of the Agreement between the FMD of the ČSSR and the Ministry of Transport of the GDR]; 22183/1984 DR – Využívání vlaků privilegované dopravy v úseku Varnsdorf – Zittau [German Reichsbahn – Use of Cars in Priority Transport in the Varnsdorf – Zittau Sector]; Jednání náměstka ministrů dopravy ČSSR s  prezidentem Mezinárodní železniční unie – Praha, 10. – 11. 12. 1987 [Meeting of the Deputy Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR with the President of the International Railway Union – Prague, December 10–11, 1987]; Otevření železničního hraničního přechodu Medzilaborce – Lupków [Opening of the Railway Border Crossing at Medzilaborce – Lupków]; Zprávy ze ZSC 1985–1986 [Reports from the ZSC 1985–1986].

Z 11 Osobní přeprava v  ČSSR – rušení výpravních oprávnění pro spěšniny, stížnosti na kulturu cestování, zpožďování vlaků polohy a rušení vlaků (ukázky), mimotarifní slevy jízdného, problémy vlakových čet (jednotlivé případy, ukázky), tisk jízdenek; u některých stížností přiloženy jízdenky [Personal Transport in the ČSSR – Cancellation of Station Privileges for Express Trains, Complaints About the Culture of Travel, Train Delays and Cancellations (Examples), Non-Tariff Fare Discounts, Problems of Train Crews (Individual Cases, Examples), Printing of Tickets; For Some Complaints Tickets Are Attached.

Z 16 Generální zastoupení ČSD v zahraničí – jmenování zástupců, platy, prostory [General Representation of the ČSD Abroad – Naming of Representatives, Pay, Premises].

FMD – Page 3 3116/1972 Usnesení 15. schůze Rady obrany [Resolution of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Defense Council]; 00409/1972 Usnesení 15. schůze Rady obrany státu [Resolution

220

References

of the Fifteenth Meeting of the National Defense Council]; 0051/1981 Vyhodnocení operační přípravy za 6. 5LP [Evaluation of Operational Preparedness for the Sixth Five-Year Plan]; Zpráva o plnění úkolů operační přípravy státního území [Report on Implementation of the Tasks for Operational Preparedness of the State Territory]; 00308/1981 Protokol z prověrky připravenosti FMD k zabezpečení provozu železnice a plnění vybraných přepravních úkolů v době branné pohotovosti státu [Protocol of the Audit of the Preparedness of the FMD for Ensuring Rail Traffic and Implementing Selected Transport Tasks in a Period of Armed Alert of the State]; 00317/1976 Protokol z jednání FMD ČSSR a MDS MLR – obnova dopravy přes Dunaj [Protocol of the Meeting of the FMD of the ČSSR and the MDS MLR – Renewal of Transport by the Danube]; 0084/1977 Závěry k obnově-náhradě dopravních objektu za branné pohotovosti státu [Conclusions on the Reconstruction/Replacement of Transport Infrastucture for the Defense of the State]; 0090299/1977 Zpráva o ujednání jednání MD ČSSR a MDS MLR [Report on Negotiations of the Ministries of Defense of the ČSSR and MLR]; 0071/1976 Údaje o operační přípravě železnic pro 6. Pětiletku [Information on the Operational Preparedness of the Railways for the Sixth FiveYear Plan]; 015/1981 Zpráva k zabezpečení dopravních objektů za branné pohotovosti státu [Report on the Security of Transportation Infrastructure for the Defense of the State]; 0020004/1973 Státní plánovací – sestavení válečné prognózy [State Planning – Creation of a War Prognosis]; 9814/1979 Využití odsouzených, ÚNV Horní Slavkov (torzo spisu) [Use of Convicts, Central National Committee of Horní Slavkov (Body of the File)], 1979.

FMD – Page 4 SM 1156/88 NSR-zaslanie listov medzi ministrom Blažkom a spolkovým ministrom Warnkem o predbežnom vykonávaní medziváldnej dohody o vnutrozemskej vodnej doprave medzi NSR a ČSSR k uloženiu do ADO FMZV [GDR–Letters Exchanged between Minister Blažek and Federal Minister Warnke on Preliminary Preparation of an Intergovernmental Agreement on Domestic Water Transport between the GDR and ČSSR for Inclusion in the ADO FMZV]; 11534/89 Vytvorenie čs. časti Čs. rakúskej skupiny expertov pre zlepšenie obojstrannej medzištátnej železničnej dopravy [Creation of the Czechoslovak Part of the Czechoslovak Austrian Group of Experts for Improvement of Bilateral International Rail Transport]; 11871/89 Zoznam úloh VTS RVHP v oblasti dopravy na obdobie po 1991 [List of Tasks of the VTS COMECON in the Area of Transportation for the Period After 1991]; 17866/89 Operatívna informacia o priebehu zasadanie Stálej komisie RVHP pre spoluprácu v doprave [Operational Information on the Meeting of the Permanent Commission of COMECON for Cooperation in Transportation]; 16245/89 Dohoda o automatickém spřáhlu – předložené poradě ministra [Agreement on Automatic Couplers – Presented to the Cabinet of the Minister]; 16682/89 Dohoda o automatickém spřáhlu – připomínkové řízení [Agreement on Automatic Couplers – Comments Procedure]; 19850/78 opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR – NSR v oblasti dopravy [Measures for Activating ČSSR–GDR Relations in the Area of Transportation]; 20003/84 záznam z přijetí západoněmeckého poslance [Notes on the Visit of the West German Delegate]; 97975/85 železniční trať Furth im W. – Domažlice [Rail Line Furth im Wald – Domažlice; sine ref. no. čj. záznam z přijetí velvyslance NSR v ČSSR ministrem dopravy ČSSR [Notes from the Visit of the FRG Ambassador in the ČSSR with the

References

221

ČSSR Minister of Transportation], 28. 8. 1985; 6934/86 záznam z přijetí velvyslance NSR [Notes from the Visit of the West German Ambassador], 16. 1. 1986; sine ref. no. návštěva člena předsednictva DB ing. Hanse Wiedmana v ČSSR [Visit of a Member of the Board of Deutsche Bahn, Ing. Hans Weidman to the ČSSR], 1 – 4. 8. 1986; 1764/87 záznam o rozhovoru velvyslance ČSSR v NSR s ministrem dopravy NSR p. Warnkem [Notes on a Conversation of the ČSSR’s Ambassador to the GDR with the Minister of Transportation of the GDR, Mr. Warnke], 21. 4. 1987; sine ref. no informácia pre riaditeľa odboru medzinárodného [Information for the Director of the International Department], 25. 5. 1987; sine ref. no Štrougal – Kohl, ČSSR, Praha, 26. 1. 1988; 156/88 vystoupení spolkového ministra dopravy NSR ve Spolkovém sněmu [Appearance by the Federal Minister of Transport of the FRG Before the Federal Parliament], 5. 5. 1988; 21/88 informace pro MD ČSSR: silniční hraniční přechod Svatý Kříž – Waldsassen [Information for the Ministry of Defense of the ČSSR: Highway Border Crossing Svatý Kříž – Waldsassen], 22. 7. 1988; 249/88 podklady pro jednání s velvyslancem NSR u ministra dopravy a spojů, 5. 9. 1988 [Bases for Negotiations with the Ambassador of the FRG at the Ministry of Transportation and Communications]; 15017/88 záznam z prijatia senátora města Hamburgu Wilhelma Rahlfsa námestníkom ministra dopravy a spojov ing. R. Chovana [Notes from the Visit of Hamburg City Senator Wilhelm Rahlfs with the Minister of Transporation and Communications, R. Chovan], 22. 9. 1988; 15420/88 mezinárodní jednání v ČSSR: schvalovací řízení projektu rekonstrukce silnice a hraničního mostu ve Strážném [International Meeting in the ČSSR: Approval of the Project of Reconstruction of the Highway and Border Bridge at Strážný], 27. 9. 1988; 15927/88 ZSC NSR, Řezno: rekonstrukce hran. mostů ve Folmavě a ve Strážném [Ratibonia: Reconstruction of the Border Bridges in Folmava and Strážný], 8. 11. 1988; sine ref. no záznam z expert. jednání mezi ČSSR a NSR o ulehčení vízové praxe [Notes on the Meeting of Experts of the ČSSR and FRG on Relaxing Visa Procedures], 28. 11. 1988; sine ref. no jednání smíšeného výboru k dohodě o vnitřní plavbě ČSSR – NSR [Meeting of the ČSSR – FRG Mixed Committee on the Agreement on Internal River Traffic], 5. 12. 1988; 18051/88 ZSC NSR, Řezno: rekonstrukce hran. mostů – stavební činnost v 1989 [Ratibonia: Reconstruction of the Border Bridge – Construction Activity in 1989], 13. 12. 1988; 80317/89 FMZV záznam o rozhovoru s předsedou výboru pro dopravu spolkového sněmu [Notes on Conversation with the Chairman of the Committee on Transportation of the Federal Parliament], 18. 1. 1989; sine ref. No záznam z jednání se zástupci firmy Siemens [Notes on Meeting with a Representative of the Siemens Corporation], 14. 2. 1989; 54/4989 záznam z prijatia veľvyslanca NSR MDS p. F. Podlenou [Notes on the Visit of the FRG Ambassador Mr. F. Podlena], 17. 2. 1989; 65/1989 návštěva ministra dopravy ČSSR v NSR [Visit of the Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR in the FRG], 28. 2. 1989; 81892/89 NSR – zřízení dálničního hraničního přechodu Rozvadov a silničního hraničního přechodu Svatý Kříž [FRG – Operation of the Highway Border Crossings at Rozvadov and Svatý Kříž] 1. 3. 1989; 8156/89 ZSC pracovníků FMDS do NSR, Pasov: výstavba hraničního mostu ve Strážném. Závěrečné schvalování projektu a příprava stavby [Workers of the FMDS in the FRG, Passau: Construction of the Border Bridge at Strážný. Final Approval of the Project and Preparations for Construction], 29. 3. 1989; sine ref. no záznam z jednání ministra dopravy a spojů ČSSR se spolkovým ministrem dopravy NSR v Hradci Králové [Notes on the Meeting of the Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR with the Federal Minister of Transportation of the FRG in Hradec Králové], 4. 8. 1989; NSR, 1986–1992 [FRG, 1986–1992].

222

References

Collegium of the Czechoslovak Federal Minister of Transportation KM 27. 4. 71: 41203/1971 Rozpracování usnesení Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa a vlády ČSSR o kádrové a personální práci [Elaboration of a Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslvoakia and the Government of the ČSSR on Cadres and Personnel]. KM 18. 5. 71: 42435/1971, 42436/1971 1. Komplexní zpráva o zajištění vývoje, výroby automatických spřáhel, rekonstrukcí vozidel a o způsobu zajištění přechodu Československých drah na automatické spřáhlo [Detailed Report on Ensuring the Development, Production of Automatic Couplers, Reconstrution of Railcars and Ways for Achieving the Transition of the Czechoslovak Railways to Automatic Couplers]; Návrh informace o zajištění vývoje a výroby automatických spřáhel, rekonstrukcí vozidel a o způsobu přípravy přechodu vozidel Československých drah na automatické spřáhlo [Proposed Report on Ensuring the Development, Production of Automatic Couplers, Reconstrution of Railcars and Ways for Achieving the Transition of the Czechoslovak Railways to Automatic Couplers]. KM 30. 7. 1971: 47663/1971 Zpráva o současných problémech Vysoké školy dopravní v Žilině [Report on Current Problems of the High School of Transportation in Žilina]. KM 29. 11. 71: 55082/1971 Zpráva o komplexní připravenosti železnic, vodní dopravy, civilního letectví a pozemních komunikací na práci v zimních podmínkách v období [Report on Complex Readiness of Railways, Water Transportation, Civil Aviation and Road Commucations on it’s Operation in Winter Period]. PMD 10. 5. 71: sine ref. no Návrh postupu při odstraňování mzdových nedostatků v  železniční dopravě [Detailed Report on an Approach to Removing Shortfalls in Salaries in Rail Transport]; bez čj. “Komplexní zpráva o problematice čs. účasti v OPW [Detailed Report on Issues of Czechoslovak Participation in the OPW]” PMD 18. 10. 71: sine ref. no Zpráva k návrhu na změnu sazeb za používání nákladních železničních vozů v mezinárodní přepravě v režimu PPV [Report on a Proposal for a Change in the Rates for Use of Railroad Freight Cars in International Transport in the PPV Regime]; 52171/1971 Zpráva o vstupu ČSD do společnosti “INTERCONTAINER” [Report on Entry of ČSD into the “INTERCONTAINER” Association]. PMD 2. 11. 71: sine ref. No Zpráva o rozvoji komplexní socialistické racionalizace v resortu dopravy [Report on the Development of a Complex Socialist Rationalization of the Transportation Sector]. KM 15. 8. 72: sine ref. no Zpráva o koncepci rozvoje bytové výstavby v rámci Federálního ministerstva dopravy [Report on a Concept for Development of Apartment Construction in the Framework of the Ministry of Transportation]; 01379/1972 Předběžná zpráva o přehodnocení uvažovaného rozsahu elektrické a motorové trakce do roku 1980 – tajné, vč. Mapy [Preliminary Report on a Reappraisal of the Planned Extent of Electric and Diesel Traction to the Year 1980 – Secret, Including Maps]. KM 24. 10. 72: 21930/1972 Kontrolní zpráva o přestavbě železničního uzlu Praha [Monitoring Report on the Reconstruction of the Prague Rail Node]; 23914/1972 Návrh zásad čs. tarifní politiky v  mezinárodních přepravách [Proposed Principles for Czechoslovak Tariff Policy in International Transportation]. KM 21. 11. 72: 9049/1972 Zpráva o plnění plánu rozvoje dopravy za 3. čtvrtletí 1972 [Report on Implementation of the Plan of Development for Transportation for the Third Quarter of 1972]; Operativní zpráva o plnění plánu rozvoje dopravy za říjen 1972 [Operational Report on Implementation of the Plan for Development of

References

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Transportation for October 1972]; 01791/1972 Koncepce rozvoje dopravy do roku 1990, část A, B, C – tajné [Concept for Development of Transportation to 1990, Parts A, B, C – Secret]. PMD 1. 2. 72: sine ref. no Návrh usnesení vlády ČSSR o příčinách výrazného úbytku pracovníků dělnických a provozních profesí na železnici v  roce 1971 [Proposed Decree of the Government of the ČSSR on the Causes of the Significant Reduction in the Workers and Operational Professions of the Railroads in 1971]; 23/1972 Informativní zpráva o postupu prací na sestavě hospodářských plánů podniků s  návrhy na řešení případně neuzavřených problémů (staré + nové znění) [Informational Report on the Aproach to Work in the Set of Economic Plans of Companies with Proposals for Solving Remaining Problems]; 6867/1972 Zpráva o výsledku plnění opatření ke snížení počtu správkových nákladních vozů a situaci v  zajištění valivých ložisek pro provedení rekonstrukcí vozů v  roce 1972 [Report on the Results of Implementation of Measures Regarding the Reduced Number of Repaired Freight Cars and the Situation in Ensuring Rolling Places for Performing Reconstruction of Railcars in 1972]. PMD 29. 5. 72: 192/1972 Informace o postupu řešení málo využitých železničních tratí [Information on the Approach to Dealing with Little-Used Railway Lines]. PMD 3. 7. 72: 17127/1972 Zhodnocení výsledků čs. účasti ve Společném parku OPW za rok 1971, výsledků konzultací k  návrhu na novelizaci Dohody o vytvoření a vzájemném využívání parku OPW a návrhy na další postup [Evaluation of the Results of Czechoslovak Participation in the Common Pool of Railcars (OPW) and Mutual Use of the OPW Pool and Proposals for Further Action]; sine ref. no Návrh výnosu o poskytování stabilizačních odměn pracovníkům železniční dopravy [Proposal for Providing Stablizing Remuneration for Rail Transport Workers]. PMD 17. 7. 72: 1804/1972 Zpráva o výsledku prověrky úrovně kultury cestování v osobní přepravě na železnici [Report on the Results of an Audit of the Level of the Culture of Traveling in Public Rail Transit]; sine ref. no Informace o situaci v  zásobování náhradními díly pro železniční vozidla [Information on the Situation in the Supply of Spare Parts for Railcars]. PMD 8. 8. 72: 18370/1972 Zpráva o dopravním zabezpečení rozvoje palivo-energetické základny ČSSR [Report on Transport Security and the Development of the Fuel and Energy Base of the ČSSR]. PMD 21. 8. 72: sine ref. no Zpráva o opatřeních ke zlepšení stavu tratí hlavního tahu I a II – další etapa se zvláštním zaměřením na železniční spodek [Report on Measures for Improving the Condition of Tracks on Main Lines I and II – Further Stage with a Special Emphasis on Railroad Track Beds]; 18666/1972 Návrh “Zásad čs. tarifní politiky v  mezinárodních přepravách” [Proposal “Basics of Czechoslovak Tariff Policy in International Transportation”]; 19517/1972 Zpráva o stavu zpracování transkontejnerového tarifu v  rámci Rady vzájemné hospodářské pomoci [Report on the State of Development of the Trans-container Tariff in the Framework of COMECON]. KM 18. 9. 73: 22394/1973 Koncepce rozvoje důležitých přechodových stanic a postup jejich zabezpečení [Concept for Development of Important Border Crossing Stations and the Approach to Securing Them]. PMD 19. 3. 73: sine ref. no Zpráva o zavádění komplexních vlakových mužstev [Report on Introduction of a Comples Railroad Workforce]; sine ref. no Zpráva o zabezpečení úkolů a ukazatelů státního plánu v  hospodářských plánech organizací resortu

224

References

dopravy [Report on Performance of the Tasks and Indicators of the State Plan in the Economic Plan of the Organizations of the Ministry of Transportation]. PMD 18. 7. 73: 18490/1973 Koncepční rozvoj jižního odklonového tahu na síti Československých drah [Concept for Development of the Southern ByPass Rout on the Network of the Czechoslvoak Railways]; sine ref. no Kontrolní zpráva o plnění harmonogramu postupu rušení málo využitých železničních tratí za I. pololetí 1973 [Monitoring Report on Implementation of the Schedule for Abolishing Little-Used Rail Lines in the First Half of 1973]. PMD 12. 11. 73: b sine ref. no Informace o struktuře a organizaci mezinárodní nákladní dopravy na jednotlivých pohraničních přechodech mezi ĆSSR, Německou demokratickou republikou, Polskou lidovou republikou, Maďarskou lidovou republikou + doplněk [Information on the Structure and Organization of International Freight Transport at Individual Border Crossings between the ČSSR, German Democratic Republic, Polish People’s Republic, Hungarian People’s Republic + Annex]. KM 21. 10. 74: 436/1974 Dílčí informativní zpráva o možnostech zvýšení propustné výkonnosti I. hlavního tahu v  úseku Žilina – Česká Třebová a II. hlavního tahu v železničních uzlech Břeclav a Brno [Interim Informatonal Report on the Possibilities for Increasing the Throughput on the First Main Line in the Žilina – Česká Třebová Sector and on the Second Main Line in the Rail Nodes of Břeclav and Brno]. PMD 21. 1. 74: sine ref. no Zásady postupu pro řešení rekreační dopravy na železnici v  létě 1974 [Principles of an Approach to Solving Recreational Transport on the Railways in Summer 1974]. PMD 18. 3. 74: 11234/1974 Návrh opatření a politicko-organizačního zabezpečení k řešení hlavních problémů plánu roku 1974 podle usnesení předsednictva vlády č. 70/74 [Proposed Measures and Political Organizational Provisions for Solving the Main Problems in the 1974 Plan in Accord with Decree no 70/74 of the Government Presidium]. PMD 1. 7. 74: S-1020 Rozbor situace v pracovních silách v obvodu Severozápadní dráhy, jaké důsledky má nedostatek pracovníků v provozu a u kterých lokalit [Elaboration of the Manpower Situation on the Northwestern Railways Resulting from the Lack of Workers for Operations and in Some Localities]. PMD 11. 11. 74: 265/1974 Zpráva o současné situaci v železniční dopravě [Report on the Current Situation in Rail Transport]. PMD 13. 1. 75: 15/1974 Zpráva o plánu a realizaci obnov kolejí za čtyři roky 5. pětiletky a plánu na rok 1975 [Report on the Plan and Realization of Renewal of Tracks in the Four Years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan and the Plan for the Year 1975]. PMD 10. 3. 75: 171/1975 Zpráva o stavu zamourování trati Most – Ústí nad Labem – Kolín a návrh řešení problematiky odstranění uhelného prachu z tratí [Report on the Blackening of the Most – Ústí nad Labem – Kolín Line and a Proposal for Resolving the Problem of Removing Coal Dust from the Tracks]. PMD 28. 4. 75: 13557/1975 Informace pro poradu odboru dopravy a spojů XVII. oddělení Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa o situaci v  železniční tranzitní přepravě [Information for the Meeting of the Transportation and Communications Section of the Seventeenth Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Situation in Transiting Rail Traffic]. PMD 5. 5. 75: 14250/1975 Zpráva o stavu zabezpečení odvozu uhlí ze Severočeského uhelného revíru a problematika traťových přeložek v severočeské a sokolovské oblasti

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225

[Report on Securing the Transport of Coal from the North Bohemian Coal Mines and the Problems of Relocating Tacks in Northern Bohemia and the Sokolov Area]. PMD 13. 10. 75: 294/1975 Návrh ekonomických pravidel pro dráhy a výrobně hospodářské jednotky (VHJ) resortu dopravy [Proposed Economic Rules for Railways nad Productive Economic Entities (VHJ) of the Ministry of Transportation]. KM 16. 3. 75: 10006/1976 Zpráva o stavu a úrovni vyřizování stížností, oznámení a podnětů občanů za rok 1975 [Report on the Situation and the Number of Complaints, Notices and Citizen’s Suggestions Handled in 1975]. KM 20. 4. 76: 11999/1976 Zpráva o stavu kvality železniční přepravy osob [Report on the Quality of Passenger Rail Transport]. KM 15. 6. 75: 145/1976 Postup zvyšování propustnosti jižního tahu z Košic do Jihlavy a tratí z České Třebové do Lysé nad Labem a Poříčan; 174/1976 Ověření účinnosti Ekonomických pravidel pro uplatnění zásad plánovitého řízení v železniční dopravě na 6. pětiletku [Procedure for Increasing Through Traffic on the Southern Route from Košice to Jihlava and the Line from Česká Třebová to Lysá nad Labem and Poříčany]. KR 24. 1. 77: 462/1977 Návrh zásad státní dopravní politiky (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek) [Proposed Principles for State Transportation Policy (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek)]; 6724/1977 Zpráva o současném stavu vývoje a možnostech využití v  podmínkách Československých drah dálkové luxusní rychlé elektrické jednotky [Report on the Current State of Development and Possibilities for Use on the Czechoslovak Railways of Long-Distance Luxury Express Electric Units]. PMD 7. 9. 77: sine ref. No Zabezpečení úkolů XV. Sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa v železniční dopravě [Implementation of the Tasks of the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party for Rail Transport]. PMD 19. 9. 77: 20025/1977 Zhodnocení dosavadní úrovně přepravy a předpoklady dalšího vývoje přepravní spolupráce po železnici mezi ČSSR a SSSR [Evaluation of the Existing Level of Preparedness and Bases for Further Development of Cooperation on Transport on the Railways between the ČSSR and the Soviet Union]; 2116/1977 Zpráva o zabezpečení náhradních dílů a úzkoprofilových materiálů pro železniční dopravu [Report on Ensuring Spart Parts and Low-Profile Material for Rail Transport]; 17717/1977 Zpráva o převodu přepravy kusových zásilek od Československých drah k národnímu podniku Československé automobilové závody [Report on Transferring Transport of Piece Consignments from the Czechoslovak Railways to the Czechoslovak Automobile Works]. PMD 31. 10. 77: 18096/1977 Návrh usnesení vlády ČSSR ke zprávě o postupu přestavby a výstavby železničního uzlu Praha [Proposed Decree of the ČSSR Government on the Report of the Progress of Construction and Reconstruction of the Prague Rail Node]; 345/1977 Postup další elektrizace pro zvýšení ekonomiky železničního provozu [Approach to Further Electrification for Increasing the Efficiency of Rail Traffic]; 340/1977 Zpřesnění koncepce rozvoje seřaďovacích stanic a postup jejich výstavby [Refining the Concept for Development of Switching Stations and the Approach to Their Construction]. KM 26. 4. 78: 13126/1978 Zpráva o stavu a úrovni vyřizování stížností, oznámení a podnětů občanů za rok 1977 (ředitel O 17 s. dr. Boleslav) [Report on the Handling of Complaints, Notices and Suggestions from Citizens for 1977 (Director O 17 dr. Boleslav)]. Společná porada vedení Národního výboru hlavního města Prahy s vedením federálního ministerstva dopravy 7. 2. 78 [Joint Session of the Leadership of the National

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Committee of the Capital City Prague with the Leadership of the Federal Ministry of Transportation]: sine ref. no Zpráva o činnosti Ústřední řídící komise pro řešení výstavby dopravního systému v hlavním městě Praze [Report on the Activities of the Central Direction Commission for Construction of the Transportation Systém of the Capital City Prague]; 23365/1978 Zpráva o postupu přestavby a výstavby železničního uzlu Praha a o opatřeních k urychlení její další realizace [Report on the Approach to Construction and Reconstruction of the Prague Rail Node and Measures for Accelerating Its Further Realization]; sine ref. no Zpráva o zpracování Generelu dopravy hlavního města Prahy [Report on Development Plan for Transportation in the Capital City Prague]; 537/1978 Problematika pracovních sil federálně řízených oborů dopravy, bytová a sociální problematika těchto oborů na území hlavního města Prahy [The Issue of Manpower in Federally Controlled Transport Sectors, Housing and Social Issues of the Sector in the Territory of the Capital City Prague]; 357/1978 Dislokační problematika v  nebytových prostorech organizací federálního ministerstva dopravy na území hlavního města Prahy [Issues of Dislocation in NonResidential Areas of Organizations of the Federal Ministry of Transportation in the Territory of the Capital City Prague]; sine ref. no Zpráva o zabezpečení stavební dopravy na území hlavního města Prahy v letech 1978-1980 a v 7. pětiletce [Report on Ensuring Construction Transport on the Territory of Capital City Prague in 1978– 1980]; 31/1978 Základní komunikační systém hlavního města Prahy a zabezpečování jeho návaznosti na výpadové úseky dálnic a vybrané silniční sítě [The Basic Communication Systém of the Capital City Prague and Ensuring its Connection with Outgoing Sections of Superhighways and Selected Highway Networks]. PMD 14. 3. 78: 8248/1978 Soubor opatření k omezení fluktuace a ke zvýšení náboru a stabilizace pracovních sil v železniční dopravě (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 9) [Summary of Measures for Limiting Fluctuation and Increasing the Hiring and Stability of Manpower in Rail Transport (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 9)]. PMD 17. 4. 78: 121/1978 Souhrnný dokument návrhu řešení úkolů v  oblasti nástrojů přímého a nepřímého řízení podle usnesení vlády ČSSR č. 215/1977 (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 25) [Summary Document of a Proposal for Implementing the Tasks in the Area of Tools for Direct and Indirect Managemenent in Accord with ČSSR Governmental Decree no. 215/1977 (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 25)]. PMD 21. 8. 78: 19850/1978 Opatření pro aktivizaci vztahů ČSSR a Německá spolková republika v  oblasti dopravy (ředitel O 5 s. ing. Šír) [Measures for Activating the Relations of the ČSSR and German Federal Republic in the Area of Transportation (Director O 5 Ing. Šír)]. PMD 2. 5. 79: sine ref. no Informace o přehledu povolání pro účely poskytování zvláštního příspěvku 200,- Kčs měsíčně k  důchodu pracovníkům úzkoprofilových profesí železniční dopravy (ředitel úseku pro kádrovou a personální práci s. ing. Mácha – O 32) [Information on a List of Occupations for the Purpose of Providing a Special Contribution of 200 Czechoslovak Crowns for the Pensions of Workers of Scarce Specialisations in Rail Transport (Director of the Section for Cadres and Personnel Work Ing. Mácha – O 32)]. PMD 28. 5. 79: S/D 92/1979 Zpráva o současné situaci v technickém stavu elektrických lokomotiv a železničního svršku (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška – O 12, O13) [Report on the Current Situation in the Technical State of Electric Locomotives and the Railroad Beds (Deputy Minister Ing. Houšek – O 12, O13)]. PMD 5. 11. 79: 21047/1979 Různé – Informace o záměrech v  tarifní oblasti dopravy v  souvislosti s  řešením naléhavých úkolů čs. národního hospodářství

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227

[Various – Information on Conclusions in the Area of Transport Tariffs in Connection with Completing Urgent Tasks in the Czechoslovak National Economy]. KM 27. 1. 81: 1145/1980 Stav a údržba železničních tratí (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška – O 13) [Condition and Maintenance of Rail Lines (Deputy Minister Ing. Houšek – O 13)]. PMD 26. 1. 81: 1145/1980 Zpráva o stavu tratí Československých drah (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška – O 13) – v kolegiu 27. 1. 1981 [Report on the Condition of the Lines of the Czechoslovak Railways (Deputy Minister ing. Houšek – O 13) – In the Collegium, January 25, 1981]. PMD 16. 2. 81: 0015/1981 Návrh zásad komplexní přestavby tarifů osobní dopravy (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 21) – tajné [Proposed Principles for the Complex Reform of Tariffs in Passenger Transport (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 21)]. PMD 16. 3. 81: 183/1981 Různé – Snížení rozsahu zahajovaných staveb [Various – Reducing the Extent of Construction Begun]. PMD 20. 7. 81: 16445/1981 Koncepce železniční, silniční a letecké dopravy z  hlediska zabezpečení potřeb zahraničního cestovního ruchu včetně opatření k  vytváření předpokladů pro zkvalitnění přepravy turistů v  období 1981-1985 se zvláštním zřetelem na kulturu cestování (náměstek ministra s. Dykast) [The Concept of Rail, Highway and Air Transport from the Standpoint of Ensuring the Needs of Foreign Tourists, Including Measures for Creating a Basis for Improved Transport of Tourists in the Period 1981–1985]. PMD 19. 10. 81: 47/1981 Zaměstnávání a odborná příprava vietnamských občanů v organizacích resortu dopravy a posouzení návrhu kubánské strany ke zvýšení kvalifikace občanů Kuby v  železniční dopravě (ředitel úseku pro kádrovou a personální práci s. ing. Mácha – O 32) [Employment and Professional Training of Vietnamese Citizens in Organizations of the Transportation Sector and Evaluation of a Proposal by the Cuban Side for Improving the Qualifications of Cuban Citizens in Rail Transport (Director of the Section for Cadres and Personnel, Ing. Mácha)]. PMD 21. 12. 81: 1265/1981 Plnění hlavních opatření ke zprávě o stavu tratí Československých drah (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška – O 13) [Implementation of the Main Measures in the Report on Track Conditions on the Czechoslovak Railways (Deputy Minister Ing. Houšek – O 13)]. PMD 15. 3. 82: 9705/1981 Stanovení výše podílů na hospodářských výsledcích za rok 1981 (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 2) [Establishment of the Levels of Participation in the Economic Results for 1981 (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek)] ; 60/1982 Hmotná zainteresovanost vedoucích organizací na rok 1982 (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 3) [Material Interest of Leading Organizations for the Year 1982 (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 3)]; 29/1982 Přehled ukazatelů pro běžné hodnocení plánu, hodnocení organizací, pro tvorbu fondu hmotné stimulace a přepočet mzdových prostředků v  organizacích resortu dopravy za rok 1982 (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 1, O 2, O 3) [Overview of Indicators for Regular Evaluation of the Plan and Organizations, and for Creation of Funds for Stimulating and Accounting for Salary Resources in the Organizations of the Transportation Sector for 1982 (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 1, O 2, O 3)]. MPMD 10. 5. 82: 121/1982 Komplexní soubor opatření k  zabezpečení přepravních potřeb v  7. pětiletce a realizace státní dopravní politiky stanovené XVI. sjezdem Komunistické strany Československa (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek) [Detailed Summary of Measures for Ensuring Transport Needs in the Seventh Five-Year Plan

228

References

and Implementing State Transportation Policy Established by the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek)]. PMD 9. 8. 82: 17258/1982 Zpráva o stavu vyřizování stížností, oznámení a podnětů pracujících, došlých aparátu federálního ministerstva dopravy za I. pololetí 1982 (ředitel O 17 s. ing. Fortuna) [Report on the Handling of Complaints, Notices, and Suggestions Received by the Apparatus of the Federal Ministry of Transportation in the First Half of 1982 (Director O 17 Ing. Fortuna)]. PMD 23. 8. 82: Návrh tarifně-politické koncepce v dopravě a zásad komplexní přestavby tarifů (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 21) – vrácen [Proposed Concept for Tariff Policy in Transportation and Principles for the Complex Reformo of Tariffs (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 21) – Returned]; 17030/1982 Zpráva o výsledcích jednání o zdokonalování základní sazby OPW a metodiky regulování parku OPW (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška – O 11) [Report on the Results of a Meeting on Improvement of the Basic Rates of the OPW and Methods for Regulating the OPW Pool (Deputy Minister Ing. Houška – O 11)]. PMD 30. 8. 82: 18218/1982 Zpráva o plnění a účinnosti přijatých opatření k  prověrce hospodaření s  cizími vozy a vozy OPW, včetně dopadů z  usnesení předsednictva vlády ČSSR, č. 159/82 (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška) [Report on Implementation and Effectiveness of Measures Adopted for Auditing the Management of Foreign Railcars and Railcars of the OPW, Including Impacts of the Decree of the Presidium of the Government of the ČSSR, no. 159/82 (Deputy Minister Ing. Houšek)]; sine ref. no Zpráva o zvolení Československých drah předsednickou železnicí v UIC na období 1983–1984 (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška) [Report on the Election of Czechoslovak Railways to the Chairmanship for Railways in the UIC for the Period 1983–1984 (Deputy Minister Ing. Houšek)]. PMD 20. 9. 82: 6015/1982 Novelizace protokolu o vzájemných přepravách po železnici, vodních cestách, leteckých linkách a silnicích ČSSR pro sovětská vojska, včetně způsobu přeprav přes hranice ČSSR (ředitel O 5 s. ing. Šír) [Amendment of the Protocl on Mutual Transport on the Railroads, Waterways, Airways, and Highways of the ČSSR by the Soviet Army, Including Means of Transport Across the Borders of the ČSSR (Director O 5 Ing. Šír)]. KM 24. 5. 83: 13176/1983 Zpráva o plnění opatření přijatých ke zkvalitnění osobní železniční dopravy a kvality cestování (náměstek ministra s. ing. Houška – O 11) [Report on Implementation of the Measures Adopted for Improving the Qualiity of Passenger Rail Transport and the Quality of Traveling (Deputy Minister Ing. Houšek – O 11)]. PMD 14. 5. 84: sine ref. no Problematika vstupu Československých drah do Interfrigo (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 2) [The Issue of the Entry of Czechoslovak Railways into Interfrigo (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 2)]. PMD 25. 6. 84: 128/1984 Zpráva o použitelnosti nákladních vozů Československých drah v režimu RIV (náměstek ministra s. ing. Škárka, CSc. – O 15) [Report on the Usefulness of Freight Cars of the Czechoslovak Railways in the RIV Regime (Deputy Minister Ing. Škárek, CSc. – O 15)]. PMD 3. 12. 84: 21657/1984 Informace o stavu a vývoji četnosti a věcné problematiky došlých stížností, oznámení a podnětů v  resortu dopravy za období I. – III. čtvrtletí 1984 (hlavní kontrolor federálního ministerstva dopravy s. ing. Fortuna) [Information on the Conditions and Development of the Number and Continuing Problems of Complaints, Notices, and Suggestions Received by the Transportation

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229

Sector in the First Through Third Quarters of 1984 (Chief Controller for the Federal Ministry of Transportation Ing. Fortuna)]. PMD 12. 12. 84: 519/1984 Komplexní vyhodnocení mezinárodních tarifních otázek v  železniční dopravě, včetně problematiky OPW a SUK (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek – O 21) [Detailed Evaluation of International Tariff Issues in Rail Transport, Including the Issues of the OPW and SUK (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek – O 21)]. PMD 15. 7. 85: 14623/1985 Zpráva o zajištění provozu úzkorozchodných tratí Československých státních drah (O 12) [Report on Ensuring Transport on the Narrow-Gauge Lines of the Czechoslovak State Railways (O 12)]. Mimořádná porada ministra dopravy s náčelníky drah a generálními řediteli 9. 10. 1985 [Special Meeting of the Minister of Transportation with the Heads of the Railways and General Directors, October 9, 1985)]: 18860/1985 Návrh na sjednání Protokolu o změnách v  Protokolu o vojenských přepravách po železnicích, vodních tocích, leteckých linkách a silnicích ČSSR pro sovětská vojska dočasně se nacházející na území ČSSR, včetně způsobu přeprav přes hranice ČSSR (O 5, O 21) [Proposals for a Meeting on Changes to the Protocol on Military Transport for the Soviet Army Temporarily Present on the Territory of the ČSSR on the Railroads, Waterways, Airways and Highways of the ČSSR, Including Means of Transport Across the Borders of the ČSSR (O 5, O 21)]. PMD 19. 10. 85: 146/1985 Vyhodnocení části Československých státních drah na činnosti Mezinárodní unie železniční v letech 1983–1984 a návrh na další postup při zajišťování účasti ČSD na této činnosti (O 5) [Evaluation of the Participation of the Czechoslovak State Railways in the Activities of the International Railways Union in 1983–1984 and Proposal for Future Participation of the ČSD in Those Activities (O 5)]. KM 28. 8. 86: 15921/1986 Stanovení kriteriálních ukazatelů charakterizujících úroveň hospodaření organizací resortu dopravy za rok 1986 (S/B – O 2) [Establishment of Indicative Criteria for Evaluating the Level of Operations of Orgainizations of the Trnasport Sector in 1986]; 10660/1986 Koncepce čs. mezinárodní dopravní politiky po XVII. sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa (S/A – O 5) [Concept of Czechoslovak International Transportation Polcy for the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (S/A – O 5)]. PMD 26. 5. 86: Rozbor hlavních poznatků ze stížností, oznámení a podnětů pracujících za resort dopravy za rok 1985 a období 7. pětiletky (hlavní kontrolor FMD s. ing. Fortuna) [Discussion of the Main Points from Complaints, Notices, and Suggestions to the Transportation Sector for 1985 and the Period of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (Head Controller of the FMD Ing. Fortuna)]. PMD 8. 9. 86: sine ref. No Informace o uplatňování zásad státní dopravní politiky v  8. pětiletce (S/C – O 22) [Information on Implementation of the Principles of State Transportation Policy in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (S/C – O 22)]; 17418/1986 Informace o zabezpečení jmenovitých úkolů XVII. sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa v elektrizaci tratí a ve výstavbě autobloků (S/C – O 7) [Information on Ensuring the Tasks Assigned by the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for Electrification of Tracks and Construction of Automatic Blocks (S/C – O 7)]. PMD 11. 5. 87: 10630/1987 Komplexní dokument pro přestavbu hospodářského mechanismu ČSSR v podmínkách dopravy – 1. pracovní verze (náměstek ministra s. ing. Blažek, CSc.) [Detailed Documentation for Reformo of the Management

230

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Mechanism of the ČSSR in Conditions of Transportation – First Working Version (Deputy Minister Ing. Blažek, CSc.)]; 151/1987 Zpráva o postupném zvyšování rychlosti osobní dopravy na železnici (náměstek ministra s. ing. Fukan – O 22) Report on the Approach to Increasing Speeds in Passenger Transport on the Railways (Deputy Minister Ing. Fukan – O 22)]; S/D-855/1987 Zpráva o programu zvyšování rychlosti vlaků pro grafikon vlakové dopravy 1988/1989 a další roky (náměstek ministra s. ing. Škárka, CSc.) [Report on a Program for Increasing Speeds of Trains on the Schedule of Train Transport in 1988/1989 and Later Years (Deputy Minister Ing. Škárka, CSc.)]; sine ref. no Zpráva o postupu zvyšování traťových rychlostí na provozovaných tratích (náměstek ministra s. ing. Škárka, CSc. – O 13) [Report on the Approach to Increasing Speeds in Track Operations (Deputy Minister Ing. Škárka, CSc. – O 13)]. PMD 17. 8. 87: sine ref. no Zpráva o řešení současné tíživé situace v železniční dopravě (pracovní skupina FMD) [Report on Resolving the Current Difficult Situation in Rail Transport (Working Group of the FMD)].

Archives of the Author Federal Ministry of Transportation. Výroční zpráva dopravy 1970–1989 [Annual Reports on Transportation 1970–89]. Praha, 1970–1989 – published annually.

Legislation Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz [Federal Law on Railways]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.gesetze​-im​-internet​.de​/aeg​/BJNR002250951​.html. Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 76/1945 [Decree no. 76/1945 of the President of the Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.psp​.cz​/sqw​/sbirka​.sqw​?cz​=76​& r​=1945. Dekret prezidenta republiky č. 77/1945 [Decree no. 77/1945 of the President of the Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.psp​.cz​/sqw​/sbirka​.sqw​?cz​=76​& r​=1945. Dohoda mezi republikou Československou a republikou Polskou o privilegované průvozní dopravě železniční z Československa do Československa přes Glucholazy ze dne 12. 11. 1948 [Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish Republic on Prioritizing Through Traffic on the Railroad from Czechoslovakia to Czechoslovakia Through Glucholazy of November 12, 1948], in: Sdělení Ministerstva zahraničních věcí č. 45/2005 Sb. [Collected Announcements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 45/2005]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.esipa​.cz​/sbirka​/ sbsrv​.dll​/sb​?DR​=SB​& CP​=2005m045. Předpis č. 131/1947 Sb. Vládní nařízení, kterým se nově upravují některá opatření k provedení dvouletého hospodářského plánu [Regulation no. 131/1947, Government Directive Amending Some Measures for Implementation of the Two-Year Economic Plan]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1947​-131. Předpis č. 187/1964 Sb. Vyhláška ministra zahraničních věcí o Dohodě o vytvoření a provozu společného parku nákladních vozidel ze dne 8. 9. 1964 [Notice no. 197/1084 of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Agreement for Creation and Operation of the Common Pool of Railcars of September 8, 1964]. Accessed September 11, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1964​-187.

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Předpis č. 192/1946 Sbírky jako zákon o dvouletém hospodářském plánu [Regulation no. 192/1946 on the Two-Year Economic Plan]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http:// www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1946​-192. Předpis č. 34/1950 ze dne 27. března 1950, Nařízení ministra dopravy o zcizování silničních motorových vozidel používaných pro živnostenskou dopravu [Regulation no. 34/1950 of March 27, 1950, Directive of the Minister of Transportation on the Seizure of Highway Motor Vehicles used for Commercial Transportation]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1950​-34​/zneni​-19500408. Předpis č. 52/1950 Sb. Vládní nařízení o sloučení národních dopravních podniků “Československá plavba labská, národní podnik” a “Československá plavba oderská, národní podnik” [Regulation no. 52/1950, Government Directive on the Merger of the National Transportation Companies “Czechoslovak Elbe River Transport, National Company” and “Czechoslovak Oder River Transport, National Company”] Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1952​-25. Předpis č. 55/1965 Sb. Metodické pokyny Státní plánovací komise pro vypracování státního plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství [Regulation no. 55/1965, Methodological Guidelines for the State Planning Commission for Creating the State Plan for Development of the National Economy]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http:// www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1965​-55. Předpis č. 59/1958 Sb. Vyhláška ministra zahraničních věcí o Dohodě mezi Československou republikou a Polskou lidovou republikou o vzájemné železniční dopravě, 28. 8. 1958 [Regulation no. 59/1958, Notice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish People’s Republic on Mutual Rail Transport, August 28, 1958]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1958​-56. Smlouva o přátelství a vzájemné pomoci mezi Československou republikou a republikou Polsko, č. 154/1947 Sb. Accessed October 31, 2021 Agreement on Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Republic of Poland, no. 154/1947]. https://www​.slov​-lex​.sk​/pravne​-predpisy​/SK​/ZZ​/1947​/154​/19470901​. html. Text důvodové zprávy pro Národní shromáždění republiky Československé ze dne 12. října 1948 a text Úmluvy o režimu plavby na Dunaji ze dne 18. srpna 1948 na oficiálních stránkách Digitální knihovny Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu České republiky [Text of the Explanatory Memorandum to the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic of October 12, 1948 and Text of the Convention on the Regime of River Traffic on the Danube of August 18, 1948 in the Official Pages of the Digital Library of the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Czech Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.psp​.cz​/eknih​/1948ns​/tisky​/t0111​_ 00​.htm. Ujednání mezi republikou Československou a republikou Polskou o privilegovaném železničním průvozu z  Československa do Československa na úseku Liberec – Varnsdorf přes Polsko, 1949 [Agreement between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish Republic on Priority Rail Transit from Czechoslovakia to Czechoslovakia through Poland in the Liberec – Varnsdorf Sector]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http:// isap​.sejm​.gov​.pl​/Download​?id​=WDU19510480351​& type​=2. Vládní nařízení 33/1952 Sb. o zřízení ministerstva železnic a o reorganisaci železnic [Government Directive 33/1952 on Establishment of the Ministry of Railroads and Reorganization of the Railroads]. Accessed July 30, 2019. https://www​.zakonyprolidi​. cz​/cs​/1952​-33.

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Zákon č. 101/1960 Sb. o sloučení některých ministerstev, o převedení řízení vodního hospodářství do působnosti ministerstva zemědělství a o změněn názvu ministerstva stavebnictví [Law no. 101/1960 on the Merger of Certain Ministries, on Transfer of the Management of Waterways to the Competence of the Ministry of Agriculture, and on a Change in the Name of the Ministry of Construction]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1960​-101. Zákon č. 101/1971 o státním plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství Československé socialistické republiky na léta 1971 až 1975 [Law no. 101/1971 on the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from 1971 to 1975]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1971​-101. Zákon č. 104/1974 ze dne 23. 10. 1974, kterým se mění a doplňuje zákon č. 51/1964 Sb., o drahách [Law no. 104/1974 of October 23, 1974, which amends and supplements Law no. 51/1964, on the Railways]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.psp​.cz​/sqw​/ sbirka​.sqw​?cz​=104​& r​=1974. Zákon č. 12/1955 o státním plánu rozvoje hospodářství republiky Československé na rok 1955 [Law no. 12/1955 on the State Plan for Development of the Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the year 1955]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​. zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1955​-12. Zákon č. 122/1981 o státním plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství Československé socialistické republiky na léta 1981–1985 [Law no. 122/1981 on the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the years 1981–1985]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1981​-122. Zákon č. 148/1950 Sb. doplňující zákon o národních dopravních podnicích na Československé státní dráhy [Law no. 148/1950 supplementing the Law on National Transport Companies in the Czechoslovak State Railways]. Accessed July 30, 2019. https://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1950​-148. Zákon č. 165/1960 Sb., o třetím pětiletém plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství Československé socialistické republiky [Law no. 165/1960, on the Third Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.epravo​.cz/​_dataPublic​/sbirky​/archiv​/sb71​- 60​ .pdf. Zákon č. 2/1954 o státním plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství republiky Československé na rok 1954 [Law no. 2/1954, on the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic for the Year 1954]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1954​-2. Zákon č. 241/1948 Sb., o prvním pětiletém plánu rozvoje Československé republiky [Law no. 241/1948, on the First Five-Year Plan for Development of the Czechoslovak Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. in: http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1948​-241, October 31, 2021. Zákon č. 311/1948 Sb. ze dne 22. prosince 1948, zákon o národních dopravních podnicích [Law no. 311/1948 of December 22, 1948 on National Transportation Companies]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1948​-311. Zákon č. 63/1958 o druhém pětiletém plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství Republiky československé [Law no. 63/1958, on the Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http:// www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1958​- 63. Zákon č. 68/1989 Sb., Zákon o organizaci Československé státní dráhy [Law no. 68/1989, Law on the Organization of the Czechoslovak State Railways]. Accessed October 31, 2021. in: http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1989​- 68.

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Zákon č. 69/1976 Sb., o státním plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství Československé socialistické republiky na léta 1976 až 1980 [Law no. 69/1976, on the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1976 to 1980]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/ 1976​- 69. Zákon č. 83/1966 Sb., o čtvrtém pětiletém plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství Československé socialistické republiky [Law no. 83/19660, on the Fourth FiveYear Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/ 1966 ​- 83. Zákon č. 87/1986 o státním plánu rozvoje národního hospodářství České socialistické republiky na léta 1986–1990 [Law no. 87/1986, on the State Plan for Development of the National Economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the Years 1986– 1990]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/1986​-87. Zákon o archivnictví a spisové službě a změně některých zákonů  (zákon č.  499/2004 Sb.) [Law on Archival and Recording Services and a Change if Some Laws (Law no. 499/2004)]. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.zakonyprolidi​.cz​/cs​/2004​-499.

Periodicals Blažek, Vladimír. “Hned po startu plným tempem [Full Speed from the Very Start].” Železničář 1 (1977). Chovan, Rastislav. “Význam a úlohy dopravy při uspokojovaní potřeb národního hospodářství a obyvatelstva [The Importance and Role of Transportation in Satisfying the Needs of the National Economy and Population].” Doprava 4, no. 27 (1985), 293. Doprava: odborný provozně ekonomický měsíčník pro všechna dopravní odvětví [Transportation: Professional Operational Economic Monthly for All Transportation Sectors]. Praha: Dopravní nakladatelství, 1959–2010, editions in years 1965–1989. “Dvacet let komitétu OSŽD [Twenty years of the OSŽD Commission].” Železničář 19 (1977): 289–90. Huspek, Zdeněk. “Ostře sledované vagony [Closely Observed Railcars].” Pravda, August 20, 1980, 3. “Když jezdily autobusy na Strahov [When the Autobuses Ran to Strahov].” In DP Kontakt, Příloha – 75 let městské autobusové dopravy v  Praze červen 2000, no. 6 (2000), 7. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.dpp​.cz​/download​-file​/181​/06​ -cerven​-2000​-priloha​.pdf. Kouřil, František. “Komentujeme – koleje a silnice [We Comment Upon – Rails and Highways].” Rudé právo, August 11, 1967. Novák, Ivan. “Elektrizace tratí DR pokračuje [Electrification of the Tracks of the German Reichsbahn Continues].” Železničář 19 (1987), 298. Petergáč, Štefan. “Kontejnerizace v zemích RVHP [Containerization in the COMECON Countries].” Doprava 2, no. 19 (1977), 156–58. Rudé právo: orgán Československé sociálně demokratické strany dělnické [Rudé právo: Newspaper of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party of Workers]. Praha, editions in years 1967, 1976 and 1987. Severočeský železničář: týdeník pracujících provozního oddělení v Ústí nad Labem [Northern Bohemian Railway Worker: Weekly of the Workers of the Operations

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Department in Ústí nad Labem]. Ústí nad Labem: KSČ – ROH, editions in years 1967, 1976 and 1987. Stejskal, Petr. “Mnoho tváří přestavby [The Many Faces of Perestroika].” Doprava 3 (1988), 199. “Transsibiřská kontejnerová trasa [Trans-Siberian Container Route].” Doprava Vol. 20 (1978), p. 376, and 377. “Zakázaná války.” Koktejl, May 2005. Accessed October 31, 2021. http://www​.czech​press​.cz​/index​.php​?option​=com​_content​& view​=article​& id​=792​:zakazana​-valka. “Zelenou pro OPW [Green Light for the OPW].” Pravda, August 22, 1964, 3. Železničář: celostátní týdeník čs. Železničářů, cestující veřejnosti a přepravců [Railway Worker: National Weekly of the Czechoslovak Railway Workers, the Traveling Public, and Shippers]. Praha: Nadas, 1967–1991, editions in years 1967, 1976 and 1987.

Interviews Fontana, Josef (1940), November 25, 2015. Kořínková, Květoslava (1940), January 29, 2015. Laníček, Ivo (1938 – 2021), January 5, 2016. Peltrám, Antonín (1930 – 2020), January 29, 2015. Pohl, Jiří (1951), April 5, 2017. Staněk, Karel (1961), September 24, 2015.

Index

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures, bold indicate tables, and references following “n” refer to notes. actors of transportation policy, 43; comparison of average growth, 50; deciding actors, 45; number of agenda items relating to railroads, 47; number of meetings of Collegium and Council of Minister of Transportation, 47; Presidium of the Central Committee, 43–44 Agreement on Border Crossings, 66 All-factory Committee of Slovak Communist Party, 153–54 Allied dive-bombers, 23 Armed Guard Units of the Railroads, 100 Armed Railroad Security Corps, 100 Austrian Northwest Steam Navigation Company, 34 Austrian State Rail Transport Company, 16 automated reservation system, 130 automatic block signaling, 76n8 automatic coupling, 63n48, 102; ad hoc working groups on, 63; single standard, 162 automatic train stops, 76n9 Automatizace železniční dopravy (AŽD), 84 automobile transport, 1, 4, 7, 13; commissions for, 165; ČSD, 30–31 aviation, 39 AŽD. See Automatizace železniční dopravy battlefield highways, 103 battle for coal, 120–21, 138 Belorussian railway, 85 Beňo, M., 152, 154

bilateral cooperation, 65, 171; bilateral transportation relationship, 190; Czechoslovak railways, 175; Deutsche Bundesbahn, 176, 182; Deutsche Reichsbahn, 172, 177; East German railways, basic statistics on development of, 179; EuroCity trains, 177; FMD, 180; GDR, 178; Hungarian railways, basic statistics on development of, 196; InterExpres class, 183; long-distance passenger trains, 182; maintenance, 60, 71; Polish railways, 186, 187; Polish steel mills, 188; rail car assistance, 193; in rail transport, 64; tracks of special interest, 191; travel time of express trains linking Prague and Berlin, 184; Vltava port, 174; volume of rail transport, 192; West German railways, basic statistics on development of, 173 Blažek, V., 49, 127 BMB. See Böhmisch-Mährische Bahn Bohemia, 2, 13, 18, 23, 25; density of network in, 15; extra-territorial legal status in, 31 Böhmisch-Mährische Bahn (BMB), 21 border crossings, 66, 70, 174–75, 191, 195; at Aš-Selb, 175; capacity of, 181; railroad, 67; regulation traffic at, 69 Brandt, W., 67 Bratislava Airports Administration, 39 brigades of civilian volunteers, 148 Bulgarian railways, 160 Bureau for Coordination of Ship Freighting, 63 Bureau for Joint Use of Containers, 63 Buštěhrad Railway, 16 

236

Index

capitalist countries, 188, 190, 201 CEMT. See Conference Europeene des Ministres des Transports central plan(ning), 1, 3–4, 11–12, 14, 43, 50–55, 82, 205; mechanisms, 6, 124; system of, 10 Central Railroad Administration. See Central Railways Administration Central Railways Administration, 56, 58 Česke Budějovice, 23, 62, 105 Československá lidová armáda (ČSLA), 100 Československá státní automobilová doprava (ČSAD), 4, 32–33, 40, 89, 93 Československe státni dráhy (ČSD), 1, 5, 21, 29, 56–57, 67, 72, 93, 99, 109; advertising poster for, 19; Automobile Transport, 30; ČSD-DB overseas tariff, 174; Czech position on organization of, 59; economic dimension of ČSD’s operations, 203; employees, 127; employment at, 140; expenditures, 86; foreign relations and contacts, 110; network, 129, 131, 133, 149, 151; operations, 12, 152–53; participation in OPW, 167; passenger transport on, 114; personnel situation, 145, 151; relations, 11; representatives of, 159; revenues, share of expenses covered, and volume, 88; statistics on remuneration of employees, 141; subsidiary, 126; tasks for, 116; top management, 202; uniforms of ČSD railway workers, 138, 146; workers at, 149–50 Cheb: to Liberec, 31; rail lines from, 103; railway hubs in, 23 Cheb-Waldsassen crossing, 175 Chief of the Department of Corrections, 148 Collegium of Minster of Transportation, 150–51 COMECON. See Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Committee for Technical and Investment Development, 52 Common Freight Car Pool (OPW), 52, 63, 64, 167–68; common pool of freight cars, 194; ČSD participation in, 167 Conference Europeene des Ministres des Transports (CEMT), 63 Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 43–44

containerization, 115, 115n9, 167–70, 198, 205 containerized transport system, 78, 102 containers, 168, 171; Soviet, 169; use, 170 cooperative mechanisms, 159 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 62, 170, 190; bloc, 84; coordinating activities of, 163; framework, 62–63, 159; member nations, 66; mutual economic assistance, 167; neighboring countries, 94; operations and organization, 166; railroad administrations, 64; responsibilities of COMECON’s transportation working groups, 166; southern member states, 70; Standing Commission for Transportation Cooperation, 63; structure, 162 coupler, 63n48; automatic, 63, 162–63 ČSA. See Czechoslovak Airlines ČSAD. See Československá státní automobilová doprava Csanádi, G., 64, 194 ČSD. See Československé státní dráhy ČSLA. See Československá lidová armáda ČSS. See Czechoslovak Spartakiads ČSSR. See Czechoslovak Socialist Republic CTD. See Technical Committee Documentation Cyrankiewicz, J., 189 Czech-Moravian Railways, 21 Czechoslovak Airlines (ČSA), 37–38 Czechoslovak and Polish railway administrations, 69 Czechoslovak Army’s operational plans, 100 Czechoslovak Automobile Transport, 32, 58 Czechoslovak Aviation Company, 38 Czechoslovak central administration, 29 Czechoslovak Danube Shipping Company, 37 Czechoslovak economy, 4, 6, 43, 74, 191–92; performance, 80, 204; sectors, 11, 71, 85–86, 156 Czechoslovak Elbe Shipping Company, 37 Czechoslovak five-year plan, 73–81 Czechoslovak government, 49, 51, 66, 89, 94, 180, 190, 205 Czechoslovakia, 11, 14, 16, 20, 53, 68n67, 96, 163, 170–71, 188–89; average speed of express trains in, 172–73;

Index bilateral cooperation, 166; breakup, 13; changes in economic system, 50; labor productivity and freight rail transport comparison, 156; defense of territory, 73; Eastern partners’ railway administrations, 160; federalization of, 37, 39; growth in revenues for passenger and freight rail transport in, 92; growth of average wage at ČSD and in, 164; hierarchical relationships of actors in transport sector, 10; increase in automobile ownership and social product, 36; individual use of automobiles, 205; presidency of UIC, 161; rail transport on territory of, 1–4, 12, 95; road network in, 201; Soviet invasion, 150; statistical data for, 91; territory of postwar, 25; totalitarian political arrangements, 44; transport sectors in, 29–39; trend in performance of freight transport in, 41; waterborne transportation, 34; after World War II, 22–29 Czechoslovak Maritime Shipping Company, 37 Czechoslovak Oder Shipping Company, 34, 37 Czechoslovak People’s Army, 100–101 Czechoslovak planes, 39 Czechoslovak railways, 2, 60, 65, 87, 90, 95, 102, 104, 110–11, 117, 137, 147, 159, 167, 175, 202–6; basic statistics on development of, 112; connections, 158; defining tasks for, 72; economic balance of operations, 92–93; job categories on, 140; in late state socialism, 6; problems in, 12; railroads, 109; rail sector, 86; subsidies for, 86; system, 1, 1n1 Czechoslovak Shipping Company/Office, 34, 37 Czechoslovak Spartakiads (ČSS), 73, 95, 97n59, 97–98n60; events, 96; logistics, 99; preparations for, 97; train transporting gymnasts, 98 Czechoslovak State Automobile Transport Company, 4 Czechoslovak State Railways, 1, 16, 22; changes in organization of, 57 Czechoslovak Steam Navigation Company, 34 Czechoslovak war plan, 101

237

Danube River, 34, 36 DB. See Deutsche Bundesbahn Děčín-Bad Schandau crossing, 178, 181 Děčín-Boletice, 182 Děčín-Prostřední Žleb, 182 decision-making process, 11, 42 demontage, 172, 177, 185 Department of Corrections, 149 derailroadization, 205 Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB), 65–67, 171–72, 176–77, 182 Deutsche Reichsbahn (DR), 67, 171–72, 177; GDR railways from, 177; relationships with, 67 Development of Transportation and Communications, 73, 78–79 diplomacy, 158–59; active transportation, 159; autonomous transportation, 158; form, 60 dollar tariff, 66 Domažlice-Furth im Wald crossing, 174–75 Doprava (Transport) (magazine), 52 DR. See Deutsche Reichsbahn Družba oil pipeline, 29 dysfunctional management system, 204 Eastern Bloc, 36, 38, 91, 111, 150, 162–63, 187; with centrally planned economies, 7; countries, 60, 62, 66–67, 70–71, 171, 177, 184, 201; economic policy in, 63; exports, 64; foreign policy, 61; members, 65; railway administrations, 161 economic reforms, 85, 145, 185, 204 economic sector, 11–12, 43, 48, 50, 141 economy of railway sector, 4, 85, 92; number of kilometers traveled by passengers, 91; rail lines in Czechoslovakia, 95; revenue from tariffs in passenger transport, 88; revenues, share of expenses covered, and volume, 88; second oil crisis, 92; tariffs, 87, 90 efficiency, 7, 18, 32, 53, 64, 86–87, 111, 172, 203; economic, 110; of freight transport, 115; of logistical processes, 168; of railroads, 2; social, 53–54; of transport and steep, 5; transportation, 54 Elbe Act of 1922, 34 Elbe River, 34, 174, 181

238

Index

electro-pneumatic brake, 63, 63n49 EuroCity: system, 193; trains, 177 European Conference of Ministers of Transport, 63 European railways, 162 Executive Committee of COMECON, 165–66, 189–90 Factory Organization of KSČ, 153 factory transport, 30, 32, 40, 50, 169; entities, 48–49; management, 49 federalization, 37, 39, 44–45, 48, 52, 56, 58–59, 71 Federal Ministry of Transportation, 45, 48–49, 58, 61, 126, 130, 145, 147, 148, 150, 155, 158, 160, 175, 180; departments, 151; employees, 153; internal documents, 176; special reconstruction units of, 105 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 1, 65–66, 171, 176–78, 198, 205; railroad infrastructure of, 172; rail transport in, 174 Federation of Engineers, 142 Ferfecký, O., 84 financial incentives, 145–46, 204 First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–938), 2–3, 13–19, 103, 137; railway network lines of, 17; time of, 27; uniforms of ČSD railway workers in, 138, 146 foreign policy of railway transport, 9n17, 60; COMECON, 63; cooperation with Hungary, 70; FRG, 65; International Union of Railways, 61; normalization of commercial relations, 69; OPW, 64; OSJD, 62; practical bilateral communications, 67; transportation matters, 66; See also transportation policy Forum Train Europe, 62 freight cars, 116, 132; classic, 171; contingent of, 167; in international traffic, 64; movements, 168; OPW common pool of, 194; production, 165; shortage, 132, 176, 193; transporting coal, 122 freight trains, 1, 60, 97, 120, 131, 170, 177; average weight, 75; speed and punctuality, 197; timetable for, 62, 115 freight transport, 1, 5, 30, 52, 79, 85, 111, 120, 131, 162, 201; complications for, 97; Czechoslovakia, 115; expected

revenues in, 87; fleet of rail cars in, 172; logisticians of, 168; network, 117; operations, 129; by rail, 54, 90; sectors, 32, 40, 156; trend in performance, 41; volume, 187; See also passenger transport French Railways, 160 FRG. See Federal Republic of Germany German Democratic Republic (GDR), 62, 65–67, 101, 129, 171, 180–81, 184; cooperation with, 178–79; Ministry of Transportation, 180; railways, 177–78 German units, 22 Government Army, 103 Gross National Income (GNI), 6, 6n8 Hajn, J., 152, 154 Hallstein Doctrine, 65–66 Hamburg Rules. See United Nations Convention on Multimodal Transport Houska, S., 159–60 Hrádek nad Nisou-Zittau route, 69 Hungarian railways, 16, 70, 160, 194–95, 196 Hungarian transportation system, 193–94 IATA. See International Air Transport Association ICE trains. See InterCity trains Imperial and Royal Austrian State Railways in Czech lands, 16 influential actors, 9–10, 44 InterCity trains (ICE trains), 131, 172, 174, 183 InterExpres, 63; class, 183; train, 131 internal mechanisms of railway sector, 72; Czechoslovak Spartakiads, 95–99; economy of railway sector, 85–95; national income development, 83; national security tasks in peace and war, 99–106; real mechanisms in economy, 82–85; transportation sector in central plan, 73–81 International Air Transport Association (IATA), 38 international cooperation, 158; activity in international railway organizations, 159–71 International Maritime Organization, 169 international railway organizations: activity in, 159; commission for rail

Index transportation, 165; containerization, 167–70; containers, 171; coordinating activities of COMECON, 163; Czechoslovak railways, 167; Ikarus and Karosa articulated buses, 164; Montreux principles, 161; OSJD, 162; Perestroika, 166; Polish railways, 160 international traffic, 61, 64, 109, 158 international transport, 11, 110, 169, 170–71; cost of, 64; domestic and, 168 International Union of Railways (UIC), 61, 159; Office of Research and Experiments, 161 Investigative Service, 100 Javorník in Silesia-Mikulovice route, 69 Jídelní a lůžkové vozy (JLV), 126 Jiříkov-Ebersbach crossing, 178 JLV. See Jídelní a lůžkové vozy Joint Use of Containers, 63, 170 JŽ. See Yugoslav Railway khozraschyot (Russian neologism), 85–86 Klatovy, 23 Košice-Bohumín Railway, 3, 15–16; capacity, 27; Czech segment, 26; high-capacity line, 15; ownership, 16 “kotláři” (“boiler-men”), 3, 23 Kralupy nad Vltavou, 23 Lenart, J., 189 Livret indicateur International des Marchandises (LIM), 62 locomotives, 13–14, 23–24, 115, 131–32; diesel, 105, 113–14, 123; electric, 125, 129; requisitioning, 24; single-system, 114; steam, 3, 80, 117, 203; technology, 96; time, 116 long-distance passenger trains, 182 Military Railroad Construction Centers (1971), 106 Ministry of Communications, 24 Ministry of Defense, 49, 101, 107 Ministry of National Defense, 104–5, 175 Ministry of Public Works, 14, 37 Ministry of Railroads/Railways, 14, 30, 43, 55 Ministry of the Post, 14, 24 Ministry of Transportation, 11, 14, 32, 37, 43, 52, 56, 58, 60, 71, 96, 101, 105, 117,

239

150, 167; activities, 104; competency, 61; departments, 45 Mlčoch, L., 83 Montreux conference, 66 Montreux Convention, 160, 188 Montreux rules, 160–61, 189 Moravia, 2, 13, 15, 18, 20, 23, 25, 155; border regions, 16; density of network in, 15 Moravian-Silesian region of Czechoslovakia, 68 Munich Agreement of 1938, 13, 19–20, 67 mutual transport relations, 66n58 nationalization, 26, 38–39; first wave of postwar, 22; of private railway companies, 16 national security, 4; OOŽ’s authority, 100; railway troops, 103–4, 106; Soviet Army, 101; specialized military units, 99; tasks in peace and war, 99; wartime prognosis, 102 National Security Corps, 100 Nazi Occupation (1938–945), 14, 19–22 Neisse river, 178, 185 normalization, 150; of commercial relations, 69; period, 79; political, 6, 150, 202 ÖBB. See Österreichische Bundesbahnen OD. See Operations Departments Oder River, 34, 178, 185 Office de Recherches et d’Essais (ORE), 161 “On the Two-year Economic Plan”, 26–27 OOŽ. See Ozbrojena ochrana železnic Operational Tasks for Preparedness of the State Territory (OPSU), 102n71 Operations Departments (OD), 153 OPSU. See Operational Tasks for Preparedness of the State Territory OPW. See Common Freight Car Pool ordinary fares, 88 ORE. See Office de Recherches et d’Essais Organization for Cooperation between Railways (OSJD), 62–63, 159–62 OSJD. See Organization for Cooperation between Railways OSOŽ. See Ozbrojená stráž ochrany železnic Österreichische Bundesbahnen (ÖBB), 65

240

Index

Ozbrojená ochrana železnic (OOŽ), 100 Ozbrojená stráž ochrany železnic (OSOŽ), 100 palletization, 115n8, 168 passenger-kilometer (passenger-km), 4n3, 88 passenger trains, 114, 130. See also freight trains passenger transport, 1, 52, 193; conditions in, 114; on ČSD, 114; role and importance, 117; stabilization of, 130 Péage, 18n10, 20, 69, 178 Pendolino type trains, 177 Perestroika, 166 Permanent Commission for Czechoslovak-Polish Transportation, 188–89 Permanent Czechoslovak-Hungarian Transportation Commission, 195 Pilsen, 23 Pirna–Bad Schandau–Děčín, 181 Poland, 3, 15, 70, 101, 167, 178, 188, 191, 193; economic cooperation, 69; locomotives to, 155; ministers of transportation, 62 Polish railways, 160, 185, 186, 187–88, 191 Pomezí-Schirnding crossing, 174–76 Prague-Česká Třebová-Olomouc (rail line), 20 Prague: Airports Administration, 39; metro, 84, 105; Strahov Stadium, 95 Principles of State Policy for 1977, 52 Protective Guards, 100 Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 13–14, 21, 103 Railroad Police Service, 100 rail transport, 1–2, 163, 166; Beroun station after destruction, 23; Czechoslovakia after World War II, 22–29; First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–938), 14–19; in FRG, 174; importance of, 4, 109; key areas, 4; ministries and agencies responsible for, 56; status and role, 11; temporary organizational and operational disruptions in, 13; on territory of Czechoslovakia, 2; transport sectors in Czechoslovakia, 29–39 railway sector, 1, 2–5, 11n22, 43, 60, 71, 111, 158, 202; administrations of

Eastern Bloc, 161; density and capacity, 13; employees, 130; of GDR, 178; hubs, 23; in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, 3; Soviet, 29; transport policy, 8; history and development, 14 “real” mechanisms in economy, 82–85 Regolamento Interazionale delle Carrozze (RIC), 61 Regolamento Internazionale dei Veicoli (RIV), 61 Reorganization of Activities of the Agencies of COMECON, 166 Report of the Minister of Transportation of the ČSSR on the Importance of the Tasks of Transport for Meeting the Needs of the National Economy and the Population for the Year 1985, 52 RIC. See Regolamento Interazionale delle Carrozze RIV. See Regolamento Internazionale dei Veicoli road transport, 3–4, 7, 9n18, 30, 40, 54, 194, 204; organizational conditions for, 31; pace of development, 29; See also rail transport Rodonyi, K., 160 Romanian railways, 160 Royal and Imperial road network, 29 running meter, 102n74 safety equipment, 16–17, 62, 84, 97, 103, 142, 162, 175 Sbor nápravné výchovy (SNV), 148 Sbor národní bezpečnosti (SNB), 100 Sbor ozbrojené ochrany železnic (SOOŽ), 100 Second Czechoslovak Republic, 19–22 Secretariat of the Danube Commission, 63 Seven-Day War, 3 shelter huts, 148n73 “Šik’s” reform, 6 Silesia, 2; Czech part of, 13, 15; Upper, 68 single-system locomotives, 114 single standard automatic coupling, 162 Škoda Plzeň, 181 Slovakia, 15–16, 24–25, 70, 130; planning commission, 52; railway network in, 3; remoter regions of, 13 Služba železniční policie, 100 SNB. See Sbor národní bezpečnosti SNV. See Sbor nápravné výchovy

Index social efficiency, 53–54 social product, 34, 36 SOOŽ. See Sbor ozbrojené ochrany železnic Southwest Railways, 67, 149 Soviet railways (SŽD), 65 Soviet Union, 4, 14, 23, 25, 28–29, 39, 62, 64, 85, 113, 124, 162–63, 166–67, 169, 171, 185, 188, 191; automatic coupler, 163; coupling, 162; invasion of Czechoslovakia, 89, 144, 150; occupation of Czechoslovakia, 109; Soviet Army, 25n23, 100, 101 specialized military units, 99 special reconstruction units, 105 stabilization, 128; of passenger transport, 130; period of, 26; of rail network, 13 “stabilization supplement” for workers, 146 State Aviation Administration, 39 State Aviation Inspectorate, 39 State Commission for Scientific-Technical and Investment Development, 52 State Planning Commission, 50–51, 102; in Prague, 55; proposals of, 52 Subcarpathian Ruthenia, 3, 13, 15, 18, 191; railway network in, 3; remoter regions of, 13 superhighway network, 30–31 “supporting” actors, 9–10, 44 Šutka, Š., 180 Swiss Railways, 61 “switchback” in railway transport, 102n75 SŽD. See Soviet railways Talgo type trains, 177 Tarantowitz, D., 160 tariff-setting, 72 Technical Committee Documentation (CTD), 159 Těšín (Silesia), 3, 15, 68 TESLA Lanškroun factory, 84 Trans-Siberian Railroad, 103 Transportation and Communications, 58, 74–75 transportation policy, 42–43; actors and institutions of, 10, 43–50; and

241

Central Plan, 50–55; functioning of, 9; institutions of railway sector, 55–60; railroads in Czechoslovak, 2; state, 52–53, 85, 204; See also actors of transportation policy transportation sector in central plan, 29, 73; aviation, 39; highway network for Czechoslovak Republic, 35; increase in automobile ownership and social product, 36; verifiable indicators, 81 transportation system, 18, 27, 66, 193; elements of, 24; framework, 53; Hungarian, 193–94; streamlined, 55; transport modes, 9n18; transport performance, 4n3, 111, 192; transport policy, 7–9, 11, 42–43, 53 UIC. See International Union of Railways United Nations Convention on Multimodal Transport, 169 University of Transportation in Žilina, 150 Ústí-Teplice Railway, 16 Ústi nad Labem, 23, 34, 75, 130, 181 Váh cascade project, 36 Versailles Treaty, 34, 36 VHJ. See Výrobně-hospodářské jednotky Vienna-Ústí nad Orlicí-Breslau (Wrocław) line, 22 Vienna arbitrage, 20 Vltava cascade, 34–36 Vojtanov-Bad Brambach crossing, 178 Výrobně-hospodářské jednotky (VHJ), 57; Automatization of Rail Transport, 84 Warsaw Pact, 5, 73, 100 Winkler, V., 160 work commitment, 104–5 worker fares, 88 Yugoslav Railway (JŽ), 161 Žďákov bridge, 105 Železná Ruda-Bayerisher Eisenstein crossing, 175–76 Železničář magazine, 127