The Revolution of 1905, Vol. 2 9780804723282, 9780804719728

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
A Note to the Reader (page xi)
Introduction (page 1)
1. The Search for Stability (page 9)
2. Implementing Political Reform (page 42)
3. The First Steps of the Duma (page 81)
4. Stirrings from Below (page 111)
5. The Dissolution of the Duma (page 162)
6. A New Government Takes Command (page 216)
7. Peasants into Citizens (page 264)
8. The Second Duma (page 292)
9. Coup d'État (page 337)
Conclusion (page 369)
Notes (page 379)
Bibliography (page 415)
Index (page 429)

Citation preview

The Revolution of 1905

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Abraham Ascher

THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 Authority Restored

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Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California © 1992 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America Published with the support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency CIP data appear at the end of the book Original printing 1992 Last figure below indicates year of this printing:

03 02 OL 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 Stanford University Press publications are distributed exclusively by Stanford University Press within the United States, Canada, and Mexico; they are distributed exclusively by Cambridge University Press throughout the rest of the world.

To My Mother

FEIGA ASCHER

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~ Acknowledgments | I should like to express my appreciation to various institutions and individuals who helped me bring to a conclusion my study of the Revolution of 1905. Financial support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, the Earhart Foundation, and the Research Foundation of the City University of New York made possible research trips in the United States and Europe and enabled me to take time off from teaching. A number of archives generously gave me access to their holdings in my search for relevant source material: the Archives du Ministére des Affaires Etrangéres in Paris, the Public Record Office in London, the Haus-Hof-und-Staatsarchiv in Vienna, the Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amts in Bonn, the Hoover Institution, and the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. The National Archives in Washington, D.C., promptly sent me microfilms of diplomatic dispatches I requested. Librarians at Columbia University, the New York City Public Library, and the library of the Graduate School of the City University responded graciously to all my requests for books, pamphlets, and newspapers. The six summers I spent at the Slavonic Library of Helsinki University were especially profitable. The holdings of the library on early-twentieth-century Russia are superb, and the entire staff made every effort to provide me with the materials I asked for. I am grateful to all my friends who read the manuscript and gave me the benefit of their thoughtful criticisms: Julian Franklin, Paula Franklin, Guenter Lewy, Allen McConnell, and Marc Raeff. Allan K. Wildman read the manuscript with special care and made numerous suggestions for its improvement, virtually all of which I incorporated into my final draft. Peter J. Kahn of Stanford University Press, the copy editor for the

viii Acknowledgments : first volume, shepherded this volume through to completion. He not only

encouraged me in my work but read the entire manuscript and again pointed out stylistic and substantive weaknesses. The final version owes much to his cogent comments. Ms. Barbara Mnookin was an excellent copy editor who saved me from many infelicities and mistakes. My wife, Anna, again took time off from her own work to improve the style and content of the book; and her support and help greatly facilitated its completion. The shortcomings of the book are, of course, my responsibility. A.A.

Contents

Introduction I 1. The Search for Stability 9

A Note to the Reader xi

2. Implementing Political Reform 42

3. The First Steps of the Duma 81

4. Stirrings from Below III

5. The Dissolution of the Duma 162

6. A New Government Takes Command 216

7. Peasants into Citizens 264

8. The Second Duma 2.92

g. Coup d’Etat 337 Conclusion 369 Notes 379 Bibliography 415 Index 429 Twelve pages of illustrations follow p. 114

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A Note to the Reader

In 1905-7 Russia was still using the Julian calendar, which was then thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar used in the West. I have given all dates in the text according to the Russian calendar; I have also used the Russian date alone in the notes for issues of newspapers and other periodicals, which were often dated in both forms on their covers. Western dates do occasionally occur in dispatches from foreign diplomats stationed in Russia, but I always give the Russian equivalent in parentheses to avoid confusion. The transliteration of Russian names inevitably poses a problem, and | have opted to use the forms most commonly known for the handful of people the reader is likely to be familiar with already: Tsar Nicholas, Count Witte, Kerensky, Trotsky. Otherwise I follow the Library of Congress transliteration system, modified to eliminate soft and hard signs. The list below is designed to define certain terms and offices mentioned in the text.

City Governor the chief authority in larger cities such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, and Sevastopol; his powers were equivalent to those of a Governor. Gendarmes members of a special police force under the direct authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Governor the chief authority in provinces; responsible to the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Governor-_ the chief authority in a few important provinces (noGeneral tably St. Petersburg and Moscow) and in the borderlands; his rank was equivalent to that of a minister and he had direct access to the Tsar.

xii A Note to the Reader

Guberniia a province. Kulak a well-to-do peasant who owned a fairly large farm, (literally, “fist”?) who could afford to hire some laborers, and who often lent money to other peasants.

, Chief Procurator the chief administrator of the Russian Orthodox of the Most Church, with direct access to the Tsar. Holy Synod State Council an appointed body of dignitaries, established in 1810, that advised the Tsar on legislation.

Uezd a county, including a city or town and several rural districts (volosti).

Volost a district in rural regions.

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The authorities, however, had taken measures that told a different story. As early as June 1 the police searched the apartments of several SD

and SR deputies and began a massive roundup of citizens; the arrests were especially widespread at various railway stations. Also on that day, a large number of policemen had been stationed near the Tauride Palace. Whenever a crowd of citizens appeared on a street of the capital, mounted patrols as well as numerous agents from the secret police were sent to the

area. Toward evening, additional policemen were deployed in various parts of St. Petersburg. In a desperate attempt to change Stolypin’s mind, the four Kadets who

348 Coup d’Etat had secretly met with him from time to time (Maklakov, Struve, Chelnokov, and Bulgakov) took it on themselves to visit the Prime Minister again. They had decided that Stolypin must be warned that it would be “sheer madness” to dissolve the Duma now. They arrived at the Elagin Palace at 11:30 P.M. on June 2; Stolypin received them immediately, even though he was then in the midst of a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

The conversation began on a sour note. When the Kadets claimed that the charges against the Social Democrats were unfounded, Stolypin shot back: “TI will not discuss this with you: if the judicial authorities say that there is proof, this must be accepted as the starting point for action, for

us and for you.... While we talk here, Social Democrats are roaming from one factory to another inciting the workers.” After several such exchanges, the four Kadets, bewildered, exchanged glances; they all won-

dered whether they should not simply get up and leave. , , In a final effort to prevent a collapse of the talks, Struve asked Stolypin

why he had changed his attitude toward the Duma so drastically. Why was he making such impossible demands just when the legislature was working more effectively than ever before? Stolypin indicated that now it was his turn to be puzzled: he had not noticed any improvement in the 7 way the Duma was conducting its business. Sadly, he noted that he could

~ not possibly agree with the Duma on the agrarian question. The Kadets were taken aback; Chelnokov reminded Stolypin that he—the Prime Minister—had recently expressed satisfaction with the way the Duma was proceeding on this issue. Chelnokov pointed out that the legislators

were considering the agrarian bill clause by clause, a procedure that would permit the kind of amendments Stolypin favored. Unimpressed, Stolypin reminded his interlocutors that Kadet orators had insisted that the party would never abandon its agrarian program. Bulgakov, a member of the Agrarian Committee, informed Stolypin that the committee did not intend to adopt the plank on the compulsory expropriation of private lands. Now Stolypin perked up and began to show great interest in his visitors’ remarks. It seemed as though an important misunderstanding had been cleared up, and that-agreement might be reached with the Prime

Minister after all. | |

Stolypin’s tone became more conciliatory, but still he would not yield on the demand for the expulsion of the Social Democrats. If the Kadets had abandoned their agrarian program, he asked, why would they not yield to the government’s demands? “Liberate the Duma of [the Social Democrats], and you will see how well we will be able to work together.” The Kadets would command the support of a majority in the legislature and would be able to implement their program. “You will see,” Stolypin continued, “how everything will then go well. Why don’t you

Coup d’Etat 349

want this?” In addition, Stolypin claimed that expelling the SDs was essential to the attainment of a legal order in Russia, a goal that the liberals also cherished. The Kadets were once again taken aback, not having expected this turn in the conversation. Maklakov replied for the four men: “You present your demand in such a sharp and exaggerated form that the Duma cannot accede to it. After this, we would be ashamed

to look each other in the face.” Stolypin asked point blank: “Does this mean that the Duma will refuse [our request]?” “Certainly,” Maklakov said. “I myself am a rightist Kadet and will vote against you.” Stolypin looked straight at the other three Kadets, all of whom indicated agreement with Maklakov. “‘Well,” he announced, “then there is nothing to be done ... only remember what I say to you: now it is you who are dissolving the Duma.” One of the Kadets asked the Prime Minister whether he expected any unrest in response to the dissolution. ‘“‘No. Perhaps purely local [incidents]; but this is not important.” Stolypin could confidently make this prediction. Since mid-May he had received two detailed and cautiously optimistic assessments from the Department of Police on how the people

throughout the country were responding to the deliberations of the Duma. Although there were pockets of strong hostility toward the government, overall the country was calm, and the authors of the reports did not anticipate any major explosions in the near future. The assessments were based on reports submitted by provincial and city governors, who carefully monitored the political mood of the people under their jurisdiction.» The Prime Minister concluded the meeting with a surprisingly cordial statement: “I hope to meet all of you in the Third Duma. My only pleasant memory of the Second Duma is my acquaintance with you. I hope that when you get to know me better, you will not regard me as such a villain as people generally consider me.” Maklakov could not contain his anger: “I will not be in the Third Duma. You have destroyed all our work, and our voters will turn to the left. Now they will ot elect us.” Stolypin grinned enigmatically. Maklakov posed one final question: “Or will you change the electoral law, effecting a coup d’état? This would not be better.” Stolypin did not answer. The Kadets left, having accomplished

nothing. The last-ditch appeal by the four Kadets was bound to fail. Although Stolypin had resisted the intense pressure for dissolution for three months,

he had now concluded that he could never cooperate with the Duma as it was then constituted. The differences over the agrarian issue were no doubt very important in leading him to that conclusion, but the final conversation with the Kadets suggests that political considerations were

350 Coup d’Etat also critical. Even Bulgakov’s revelation that the Kadets had decided to abandon the plank on compulsory expropriation did not prompt Stolypin to change his mind about the Duma. Stolypin may simply not have trusted the Kadets on this issue, but it is also possible that he had become

| convinced at this point that nothing short of a fundamental political change would do. After all, his conflicts with the legislature ever since March 6 had not centered on the agrarian issue alone. He had believed all along that most deputies did not appreciate the necessity of restoring law and order, which to him was a sine qua non for the restructuring of Russian society. Stolypin did not accept the ultraconservative view of the Duma as an institution whose very existence was incompatible with the preservation of the monarchical order. Deep down, however, he too distrusted the Duma because it had never abandoned the demands for radical change in the political system. The Kadets had modified their tactics,

but they had not abandoned their program, which envisioned a far greater role for the Duma. He, on the other hand, was a firm believer in the primacy of the monarchy. In the last analysis, then, the political ques-

agrarian question.

tion of who was to rule was no less important to Stolypin than the In addition, Stolypin probably doubted that the four deputies were authentic spokesmen for the Kadet party. He had met them before on several occasions but always on condition that the meetings be kept secret. This time they also insisted on secrecy, which suggested that at least a large sector of the Kadet party would not approve of their approaches to the Prime Minister. It soon emerged that the four were indeed solitary voices. Apparently, someone in Stolypin’s office leaked information on

the meeting to the press, producing an uproar within the liberal party. According to one article in the left-wing Rus, the four deputies had been authorized by the Kadet party to “bargain” with the Prime Minister about the surrender of the 55 Social Democrats. At first, the Kadet central committee denied that any secret encounter had taken place, but when the committee met a few days later, it learned that the four deputies

had in fact met with Stolypin. A majority of the committee was “extremely distressed” at the revelation, and the Kadets’ ensuing attacks on the four were so intense that Struve withdrew from active politics and Maklakov told Miliukov that he planned to resign from the party. The

four deputies wrote a letter to Rus pointing out that they had gone to Stolypin on their own initiative without authorization from the party, and that their only purpose. was to “clarify the situation.” Separately, Maklakov indicated that while he understood the anger of his colleagues over the visit to Stolypin, he could never have forgiven himself had he not made the last-minute attempt to save the Duma, an attempt that at the

Coup d’Etat 351 time did not seem to be hopeless. These explanations did not put a stop

to the abuse. By the time the four Kadets visited him, Stolypin had already let the Tsar know that he favored dissolution; the pressures from the Court were too strong for him to change his decision even if he had been so inclined. On May 30 he had informed the Tsar that on June 1 he would ask the Duma to expel the 55 SD deputies and to agree to the arrest of the sixteen deputies who were “most guilty” of conspiring against the state. The Council of Ministers, he continued, considered it impossible to demand the arrest of all 55 deputies, for that would smack of political revenge. But if any of the 55 went into hiding, the police would pursue them and take them into custody. Stolypin also notified the Tsar that a new electoral law as well as the manifesto on dissolution had been drafted and would be sent to him the next morning for his signature. Three days later, on June 2, he indicated that while there were some differences among the ministers on details, all of them agreed that it was necessary to dissolve the Duma. “I firmly believe,” Stolypin wrote at the end of the second letter, “that the Lord will lead Russia to its predestined path, and that Your Majesty will have the good fortune of seeing [the country] pacified

and extolled.” Tsar Nicholas himself, by this time determined to disband the legislature, advised Stolypin in no uncertain terms that he would brook no delay. At 11:30 P.M. on June 2, he wrote to the Prime Minister that he had signed the new electoral law, and that “I waited all day long with impa-

tience for notification from you that the dissolution of the accursed Duma had been completed. But at the same time I feel in my heart that things are not moving along smoothly and are being dragged out. This is intolerable-—The Duma must be dissolved tomorrow, on Sunday morning. It is necessary to display decisiveness and firmness to Russia. The dispersal of the Duma is now the right [thing to do] and vitally necessary. There must be no delay, not one minute of hesitation! God favors the bold.” 37 Once again Nicholas demonstrated that on issues about which he felt strongly he had a mind of his own and could be decisive.

Although no deputy could have deceived himself on the fate of the Duma, Stolypin succeeded in keeping the leadership in the dark about his

intentions, just as he had done a year earlier when the First Duma was disbanded. On the morning of June 3, “Golovin was having a late breakfast when he was visited by a foreign correspondent who asked him: ‘Where are you going to live now, Mr. Golovin?’ ‘In Petersburg as long as the Duma lasts.’ ‘But do you not know? The Duma is dissolved.’ For

352 Coup d’Etat the second time, this was the way the President of the Duma learnt of its dissolution.” Golovin rushed to the headquarters of the Kadet fraction,

and to his surprise found the place virtually deserted. Golovin asked someone whether the deputies would again meet in Vyborg or somewhere else; he learned that the Kadet deputies had decided to remain calm and to go home. As he returned to his home in Moscow, he consoled

himself with the thought “that the Duma had not done anything that could be used to accuse it of having violated the constitution and as a justification for a return to the old, pre-constitutional order.” At 6:00 A.M. on Sunday, June 3—the First Duma had also been dissolved on a Sunday—Okhrana agents entered the Tauride Palace as others posted the manifesto disbanding the legislature on the doors. Within an hour all the entrances except the main one were closed. The rooms previously used by Social Democratic, Social Revolutionary, Trudovik, and Muslim deputies were locked. Within the entire building there was “a deathly silence, broken by the occasional loud orders issued by the bosses of the palace.” The city also remained quiet throughout the day.

Although the army was in a state of alert, not a single unit was summoned from the barracks. Only on the streets near the Tauride Palace, on the boulevards, and in the city gardens were the police out in more force than usual.2? In other parts of the city, policemen arrested over 200 people, including the sixteen Social Democratic deputies at the center of the controversy. Other SD deputies received notices to appear in court the next day.* During the night of June 3, the police arrested another 300 citizens. By June 6 the total number in custody had reached 600, and the authorities had moved soldiers out of the Petropavlovsk fortress to make room for the political prisoners. The police conducted similar roundups in many other cities of the Empire.” In the manifesto dissolving the Duma, Tsar Nicholas went into considerable detail to explain his action: “To Our regret, a significant portion of the members of the second Duma did not justify Our expectations. Many of those sent by the people to work [for them] did not go with a pure heart, with a desire to strengthen Russia and to improve its system,

but [went rather] with an explicit intention to increase unrest and to promote the disintegration of the state.” He charged the deputies with having failed to consider many of the projects introduced by the government and with having refused to condemn terror. Moreover, they had * The SD deputies arrested by the government remained in jail until November 22, when they were brought to trial (closed to the public). On December 1 the court sentenced 25 of them to hard labor for four or five years or to exile for an unspecified term, and acquitted nine. The SDs found guilty were also deprived of their civil and political rights. A few SDs were never apprehended, and one died before the trial. Levin, Second Duma, pp. 344-473

M. E. Solovev, “Tsarskie provokatory,” p. 126.

Coup d’Etat 353 resorted to interpellations for the sole purpose of arousing hostility to the

government among large sectors of the population. Finally, the Tsar pointed to an “action unprecedented in the annals of history”: the participation of a group of elected officials in a plot against the state and Tsarist authority. For all these reasons, Nicholas claimed that he had no alternative but to disband the Duma. He announced that a new Duma

would meet on November 1, but he also indicated that he would take appropriate measures to ensure that the new legislature would be devoted

to the strengthening of the Russian state; “the State Duma,” the manifesto declared, “‘must be Russian in spirit.” To achieve that, a new electoral law for the selection of deputies had been sent to the Senate for promulgation. The manifesto spoke in only general terms of the principles underlying the new law. The Tsar simply vowed to remain faithful to the Manifesto of October 17 and to the Fundamental Laws by assuring representation to all segments of the population. But he made one important exception. In those regions of the Empire where the population had not attained the proper level of civic consciousness (grazhdanstvennost), elections would be temporarily suspended.* To secure the widest dissemination of the Tsar’s decision, the Most Holy

Synod sent a telegram to all dioceses directing them to see to it that priests read the manifesto and the new electoral law at the conclusion of church services.”

As already noted, Kryzhanovskii was the architect of the new electoral law. His task was enormously complicated. Stolypin had given him only vague instructions: he was to devise a scheme that would ensure the election of a Duma composed of “the more cultivated strata of the population,” by which the Prime Minister meant, of course, a Duma in which a majority of the deputies would be conservative and loyal to his program. But Stolypin also directed Kryzhanovskii to remain faithful to the general scheme of the previous elections so that the new regulations would not appear to be a total rejection of the concessions the autocracy had made in October 1905. Stolypin indicated that it was his wish and the wish of

the Tsar that no category of the population represented in the first two Dumas be completely deprived of representation in the Third Duma. Although Kryzhanovskii thought that he was being asked to square the circle, as a loyal servant of the Tsar he accepted the assignment.# After reviewing various possibilities, Kryzhanovskii came up with three

options. The first entrusted the election of Duma deputies to country zemstvo assemblies, composed of men with experience in self-government

and a good grasp of practical affairs. Kryzhanovskii was confident that

354 Coup d’Etat these men would not select people with “unrealistic dreams.” But Stolypin and the cabinet, which met in strictest secrecy with several former min-

isters, rejected this approach—which Kryzhanovskii himself favored— because it would violate the Tsar’s wish not to exclude any major segment

of public opinion. The second option was to divide all the voters into several categories according to income and then assign each group a certain number of seats in the legislature. For some reason the cabinet rejected this option as well, which left Kryzhanovskii with his last alternative, to introduce numerous changes in the existing electoral law. Thus, he proceeded to alter the number of seats in the Duma assigned to particular geographical regions, social groups, and ethnic minorities. “Trustworthy” citizens would simply be given the lion’s share. Kryzhanovskii

acknowledged that of the three options he had proposed, this was the most “brazen” scheme.“ Even then, the Senate issued several interpretations of the law to further limit the franchise of various categories of voters. It was all thoroughly arbitrary and transparent, and it made for extraordinary complexity, but it worked in producing a Duma the au-

thorities considered acceptable. |

The essential features of the law can be briefly summarized. The size of the Duma was reduced from 542 to 442, almost entirely at the expense of the outlying regions of the Empire. The Steppe and Turkestan regions, the vast Turgai, Ural, and Iakutsk oblasts, the nomadic peoples of Astrakhan and Stavropol, and the Siberian Cossacks lost their representation completely. The Duma delegations of the Poles, Armenians, and Tatars were sharply reduced. Thus, the Poles, with a population of about eleven million, would elect fourteen deputies, two of whom had to be Russian; in the Second Duma, it will be recalled, the Polish delegation numbered 46. The roughly six million people of Transcaucasia could elect seven deputies, one of whom had to be Russian. (The requirement

that some of the deputies from non-Russian regions must be Russian was designed to satisfy the demands of the local Russian communities and to ensure that the new Duma had a truly Russian cast.) By contrast, the province of Kursk, with a population of two and a half million, the vast majority of them ethnically Russian, was assigned eleven deputies; the three million citizens (also overwhelmingly Russian) of Tambov

would elect twelve. In addition, the law favored the affluent over the masses: the peasants would choose only half as many electors (those who made the final selections of deputies) as they had chosen in 1906, and the landowners a third more. In the 51 provinces of European Russia, landowners would get roughly 49.6 percent of the electors, the urban population 26.2 percent, the peasants 21.7 percent, and industrial workers 2.3 percent. In slightly over half

Coup d’Etat 355 these provinces, landowners by themselves selected a majority of the elec-

tors, and in the remaining provinces, they could obtain a majority by forming alliances with one or another urban group. To reduce the election of liberals in cities, eighteen of 25 urban centers were deprived of the right to choose their own deputies; the eighteen cities were merged with

the provincial constituencies. In the seven cities that still elected their own deputies (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Riga, Warsaw, and Lodz), the enfranchised population was divided into two categories: men of substantial wealth and everyone else. Each category elected the same number of deputies. Women, men under the age of 25, students, soldiers and sailors in active service, and people who had been dismissed from the civil service or convicted of a criminal offense were entirely excluded.

Although the voting was fairly straightforward and direct in the large cities, elsewhere “the system of indirect voting is developed to such an extent as to make elections resemble walking through a labyrinth.” The elections were to proceed in three different stages, and the electors who survived the process would meet in the capital of the province to choose the deputies. As one contemporary observed, “The system is so calculated that, in the end, the big landowners are almost certain to secure a majority, and the peasants returned are usually those who seem to the landowners fairly safe.” +

Did the government’s actions of June 3 amount to a coup d’état? Were they a deliberate violation of the constitution designed to reshape the state’s

political system? Opponents of the regime immediately used the term

coup d’état to describe the Tsar’s dissolution of the Duma and the pro- | mulgation of the new electoral law, two measures that may be said to have marked the final crushing of the revolution initiated almost three years earlier. The opponents of the old order insisted on this terminology not only because it was an effective way to vilify the authorities, but also because they sincerely believed that on June 3 the Tsar had once and for

all subverted the Manifesto of October 17, by far the most significant achievement of the revolution. Although Nicholas had often contended that he still held autocratic power, and his officials had taken many steps that violated the spirit of the manifesto, until June 3 the basic principles embodied in the document had not been officially discarded. Even though

the manifesto did not introduce universal suffrage, the vote had been granted to a large proportion of the population. Moreover, the manifesto stated explicitly that the “further development of the principle of universal suffrage” would be taken up by the “new legislative order.” As long as the authorities did not definitively renounce these principles, the op-

356 Coup d’Etat position could hope that fundamental changes in the political structure might still be attained by legal means. Some defenders of the old order claimed that the events of June 3 could not be considered a coup since the authorities had simply dissolved the

Duma, not eliminated it. The Tsar, according to this interpretation, merely changed the Fundamental Laws, which was his prerogative.“ It is not a convincing argument. To be sure, the Tsar acted legally in dis-

solving the Duma, but the critical question is whether he also acted legally in changing the electoral law. Even conservatives such as the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg, who applauded Stolypin’s move,

acknowledged that “in reality, the decree on the electoral law is in a formal sense a coup d’état, a breach of the constitution.” 4” Kryzhanovski himself conceded that it was “indisputable” that “formally” the promul-

gation of the new electoral law violated the Fundamental Laws. He offered two justifications, one legalistic and the other pragmatic. In his

testimony in 1917 to the committee investigating the causes of the Empire’s collapse, he pointed out that Stolypin did not believe the Tsar had violated the law because he had never taken an oath to uphold the Manifesto of October 1905. Consequently, Nicholas still retained autocratic powers and could deal with the Duma and the electoral system as he wished.** Kryzhanovskii also mentioned this line of reasoning in his memoirs, asserting in addition that the manifesto dissolving the Duma was not issued under article 87 of the Fundamental Laws but enacted by the Tsar himself; an act promulgated by the sovereign did not need the

approval of the Duma. |

Kryzhanovskii’s pragmatic argument seems more plausible. He insisted that in view of the circumstances at the time, the government could not have followed a different course. Had new elections been held under the old procedures, a Duma capable of constructive legislative work could not possibly have been elected. It would then have been necessary either to abolish the representative system altogether and establish a dictatorship or to change the electoral system at a later date. According to Kryzhanovskii, an “influential group” at Court argued vigorously in favor of suspending elections for the next Duma for five to ten years. Stolypin, however, wished to preserve the Duma as an institution and at the same time create conditions for the selection of a legislature that would be capable of “‘reeducating society.” +? Kokovtsov agreed with this interpretation: “In making this change [in the electoral system] without the consent of the Duma [Stolypin] violated the Tsar’s earlier decree, but he did

so solely in the name of preserving the principle of public representation.” °° Gurko in his memoirs made the same point in defending Stoly-

Coup d’Etat 357 pin’s conduct: the Prime Minister “really intended not to violate the constitution but to strengthen and preserve it.” *! Interesting as these arguments are, the simple fact is: the government had indeed staged a coup d’état. A reading of the Fundamental Laws of

1906, enacted by Tsar Nicholas himself, makes that clear. Article 87 stated specifically that this emergency article could not be used to “‘intro-

duce changes either in the Fundamental State Laws or in the Organic Laws of the State Council of the State Duma or in the provisions on elections to the Council or to the Duma.” * Moreover, two senior officials actually acknowledged that Stolypin deliberately violated the constitution with the intention of changing the political structure. In his memoirs A. A. Mosolov, the Director of the Chancellery in 1907, bluntly stated that because the Prime Minister knew that he could not secure passage of the electoral law in the Duma, he effected a “‘coup d’état from above.”

And on the same page as his invocation of the pragmatic argument in favor of dissolution, Kokovtsov noted that Stolypin was fully aware of what he was doing and “had had a great struggle with his own conscience before he had undertaken the task of revising the electoral law.” * Shcheglovitov, Stolypin’s Minister of Justice, gave a different assessment of the Prime Minister’s concern for the niceties of the law. When Shcheglovitov was asked in 1917 whether Stolypin understood that he was conducting a coup d’état, he answered, “I must say that Stolypin was a distinctive person, very talented, a very passionate man, who attached little significance to juridical questions, and if a certain measure seemed

to him to be necessary then he would not countenance any impediments.” Shcheglovitov went on to say that under the circumstances prevailing in 1907, the law was simply irrelevant to the Prime Minister; he considered the actions of June 3 ‘“‘an expression of historical rights that belonged to the monarch.” Shcheglovitov also revealed that he himself had argued against promulgating the new electoral law because it contravened the Fundamental Laws, but his fellow cabinet members had considered his views “quite curious.” How had he, as Minister of Justice, reacted to the government’s decision? “I raised the question of my departure [from office] . . .” (ellipses in the original). He then conceded that he had participated in the illegal action by sending the new electoral law to the Senate for review.*> In short, Stolypin and his government knowingly violated the constitution, not by breaching minor technicalities but by radically transforming the political system. The ultraconservatives were of course delighted with this decisive suppression of the Revolution of 1905, especially since the Tsar went out of his way to reassert his warm regard for them at the very moment the Duma was dissolved. In response

358 Coup d’Etat , to Dubrovin’s message praising the dissolution, Nicholas on June 3 sent the following telegram to the leader of the URP, a telegram that in Witte’s view revealed “all the poverty of political thought and morbidity of soul of the autocratic emperor’’:5* Convey to all the chairmen of the branches and all the members of the Union of the Russian People who have sent me the spirited expression of their feelings My heartfelt gratitude for their devotion and readiness to serve the throne and the welfare of our dear homeland. I am confident that now all the truly faithful and affectionate sons of the Russian homeland will unite still more closely, and as they continually increase their numbers they will assist Me in bringing about a peaceful renewal of our great and holy Russia and in improving the goodly way of life of her people. Certainly for Me the Union of the Russian People will be a trustworthy support, serving everyone and ever an example of legality and order.’’

Overjoyed by the Tsar’s recognition of the importance of his movement, Dubrovin urged his followers to “stand fast in filial unity with the autocratic monarch.”’s* Throughout the country, branches of the URP celebrated the demise of the Duma, and senior officials often attended the Union’s festivities. In Iaroslavl, for example, the governor of the province attended the URP’s celebrations and referred to its “sacred role” in the

country’s political affairs.» a

By all accounts, the people of the Russian Empire reacted apathetically to the news of the Duma’s dissolution. St. Petersburg, Moscow, and all

the other major cities remained calm. In none of them was there any serious incident or large-scale demonstration. At most, workers would meet, adopt a resolution condemning the government, and go home. At one meeting in St. Petersburg, attended by about 1,500, orators sharply criticized the authorities, but after a long discussion of how to pro-

ceed, the workers were unwilling to go even so far as to adopt a resolution. They would, instead, meet again soon. The few attempts that activists made to organize strikes evoked very scant response from workers, in large measure because of a lack of interest; in addition, the heavy presence of police on the streets of major cities served to intimidate people. Ten days after the dissolution, the area in the vicinity of the Tau-

ride Palace, the meeting place of the Duma, still resembled an armed camp. Half a company of soldiers and numerous mounted policemen remained on guard around the clock.*: According to one informed observer, only in Kiev was there any forceful action against the government; a battalion of sappers tried to stage an uprising, but it was a feeble affair

that was quickly quelled.

Coup d’Etat 359 A mood of despair and indifference also prevailed in the countryside. “Professor Harper and I,” Pares noted, “travelled widely in Eastern Russia immediately after the Dissolution. Everywhere we saw complete prostration and disillusionment. ... A peasant of Saratov summed up for us better than anyone else the net result of the last five years: ‘Five years ago there was belief and fear [of the Government]; now the belief is gone, and only the fear remains.’”® In Kaluga province observers noted deep depression among the peasants, a sizable number of whom decided to emigrate to Siberia. Even the liberal press reacted to the events of June 3 “with sullen resignation.” Russkie vedomosti censured the government very mildly and advised the people not to resort to boycotts or other such measures to protest the arbitrary action of the authorities. Tovarishch, the moderately left-wing paper, noted with astonishment that the coup made a stronger impression in Western Europe than in Russia. But perhaps that was not surprising, the editors suggested with obvious irony, because the “rotten West” was no longer used to such conduct by men in

authority. The opposition parties did not undertake any serious protests either. Though stunned by Stolypin’s coup, the Kadets, still smarting from the dismal failure of their protests against the dissolution of the First Duma, confined themselves to feeble criticisms of the authorities.” A meeting of the Kadet central committee and representatives from provincial committees on June 10 and 11 (attended by 50 delegates from 22 provinces) discussed tactics but decided to leave most decisions on policy matters up to a party congress to be held at the beginning of August. The political situation was expected to be clearer then, and the elections would be closer at hand, which would make it necessary for the party to formulate its tactics. The only significant decision of the June meeting, approved by an overwhelming majority, was to participate in the upcoming electoral campaign without changing the party’s program or abandoning the party’s independence. This decision reflected the view, widespread among liberals, that to boycott the election would be a mistake, since it would leave the field wide open to reactionaries.® In truth, the liberal movement had lost heart. Various meetings held by the Kadets in the weeks following the dissolution revealed that the party was fragmented, demoralized, and deeply pessimistic about the likely outcome of the elections.” The Octobrists were visibly troubled by the government’s move against the Duma and especially by the new electoral law, but in public they tended to apologize for and even justify the coup d’état as a “regrettable necessity.” It seemed to them that at a moment of crisis the authorities were right to resort to extraconstitutional measures; the party’s central committee placed most of the blame for the government’s conduct on

360 Coup d’Etat

political activists who were “irreconcilably” hostile to the country’s “young [political] system based on law.” These views marked a decisive shift to the right on the part of the Octobrists. In February 1906 they had declared their opposition to reactionaries as well as revolutionaries. Now they cast their lot with the right, with whom they maintained friendly

movement.”! , }

contact. In effect they ceased to be a genuinely independent political

Even the Social Democrats avoided militant tactics in the wake of the dispersal of the Duma. Lenin was not surprised by the coup, since he had never expected the government to allow the Duma to effect significant reforms. He again insisted that the country’s problems could be solved

only by means of an armed uprising, but he did not advocate such an uprising in the immediate future. He did not even favor boycotting the upcoming Duma elections, a tactic he considered legitimate only if the masses were prepared to launch an armed offensive against the old order.” Similarly, a conference of St. Petersburg Social Democrats in Terioki on the night of June 7 decided that it was too risky to call for a political

future.”3

strike. The proletariat in the capital was simply too disorganized. Consequently, the delegates, among whom the Bolsheviks predominated, urged the party to appeal to the masses to conduct propaganda among the peasants for a general strike and armed uprising at some point in the It took the central committee of the RSDWP about two weeks to formulate guidelines on how to react to the dissolution of the Duma, and these too were distinctly restrained. In a letter to the party organizations, the central committee denounced the government and vowed that the party would not abandon its commitment to revolution. But it conceded that the mood of the working class was not militant, and that the party itself lacked the organizational strength to contemplate concerted action— an “open offensive’”—by the masses. Nonetheless, the central committee expressed support for protests by the workers against the Tsarist regime,

but warned that their form and timing must depend on local conditions and initiatives.” A month later, on July 16, an All-City Conference of the RSDWP in Moscow passed a resolution condemning the dissolution of the Duma and in an accompanying statement declared that political action “would be harmful and would not lead to [fruitful] results.” ” ~ Many rank-and-file radicals became despondent. When V. S. Voitinskii was released from prison in July, he was startled by the demoralization and disintegration of the Social Democratic organization in St. Petersburg. People who had supported the radical movement were stunned to discover that the proletariat was not prepared for militant action in response to the dissolution. Concluding that they had been misled by the

Coup d’Etat 361 leadership about the mood of the workers, many activists who had devoted years to the cause left the party. Even the intelligentsia abandoned the movement in droves. “Party committees,” Voitinskii lamented, “‘became deserted. ... And in the country everything was quiet. No agrarian disturbances, no political strikes, no mass protests.” ”6 The Socialist Revolutionaries, whose deputies had not in any way distinguished themselves in the Duma debates and who in any case never

felt comfortable in a parliamentary setting, did no more than issue a proclamation criticizing the dissolution. They did not organize any demonstrations or strikes and seemed once again to lose interest in legal political activities. Still, they were convinced that the revolution had not yet ended and therefore called for partisan actions against the authorities and for more intense preparations for the next round of the upheaval, which they believed would be an armed uprising. The SR Party officially adopted a policy of “‘active boycott” of the elections to the Third Duma.” In large measure the absence of a vigorous popular reaction to the coup can be explained by a pervasive weariness and loss of self-confidence, and the feeling that participation in political affairs was simply pointless. Virtually every observer noted that the long struggle by the people had taken its toll. “For three years,” the liberal Vestnik Evropy noted, “‘we have spent [a great deal of] nervous energy without results; fatigue could not but be the consequence of the fruitless struggle of ideas against reality.”’ Not a single social group—peasants, socialists, constitutionalists, zemtsy, professors, students—could fend off a mood of deep pessimism.” But, as most observers noted, the “comprehensive precautionary measures” taken by the authorities also weighed heavily on the nation and were an important factor discouraging people from organizing protests.” On June 2 A.D. Zinoviev, the Governor of St. Petersburg province, issued new regulations aimed at muzzling the press. Anyone who published or circulated “articles or other communications arousing a hostile attitude toward the government” or praising criminal actions was subject to a fine of 3,000 rubles or up to three months’ imprisonment. Equally harsh pen-

alties would be imposed on anyone who circulated false information about the actions of any official agency if that information aroused “a hostile attitude in the population.” Similar regulations were promulgated by all the governors of territories under Extraordinary Security, which is to say, most of the Empire. On two separate occasions (June 4 and rr), Stolypin called on senior officials throughout the country to enforce the new rules with full vigor.*° In Moscow alone, the governor-general fined eight newspapers (among them Russkie vedomosti) during the first ten days of the new press regime for having disseminated “‘false information.” Elsewhere—in St. Petersburg, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Penza, and Tiflis, to

rules.21 | , ,

362 Coup d’Etat

mention only a few cities—officials also wasted no time in enforcing the

The crackdown reached into other spheres of public life and lasted for

some time. In St. Petersburg over a period of a year the government closed down 39 of the 76 trade unions that had been established since the beginning of the revolution; total union membership dropped by some 40 percent. In Moscow the decline in the number of unions and union membership was even greater.*2 And the arrest of activists in the Opposition movement—mainly electors, political leaders, intellectuals, and students—continued unabated. On June 13 Gerasimov, the chief of the St. Petersburg Okhrana, reported to the Director of the Department of Police that his agents had conducted three sweeps of Social Democratic

strongholds over the preceding ten days, resulting in the arrest of 130 party members, among them nine members of the St. Petersburg Committee, the entire organization of militiamen (45 people), and several members of the military organization. With satisfaction, he noted that the local SD organization was “completely dejected.” * In the first four weeks some 2,000 political arrests were believed to have taken place in

St. Petersburg alone.* = Similar roundups occurred in various provincial capitals. The police in _

the countryside also made arrests on a massive scale and frequently prevented peasants from holding meetings.* In Poltava province many employees of the railway system were dismissed on suspicion that they belonged to the Union of Railroad Employees. Those who retained their jobs were warned to sever all contacts with the dismissed workers. Re-

ports from Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, and Bobriusk indicated that military courts had become active again; in the three cities seven civilians had been tried and executed, all in one day.*” In mid-June the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, no friend of the opposition, voiced the fear that “the bureaucracy would again commit the old sins of despotism and

thereby sow anew the seeds of revolution.” * | } | — If the dissolution of the Duma did not produce any large-scale protest

movements, there is evidence to suggest that it did give rise to a new outburst of lawlessness, both political and purely criminal. Most people were, in the words of Bernard Pares, “in a mood of extreme prostration,”’ but some gave vent to their anger by resorting to violence. The number

of incidents began to increase sharply in late May, when the political crisis was already in evidence, and then accelerated. “Murders and robberies are reported from all parts of the Empire,” one observer noted in mid-June. “The terrorists have shown themselves particularly active and, as usual, youths between the ages of 17 and 22 have been the instruments _

, used to put into execution their iniquitous plans.” Public opinion showed increasing concern about the government’s inability to restore order, and _

Coup d’Etat 363

in several regions of the country, “the people have taken the law into their own hands and started lynching the robbers when they can catch them.” ®

Commentators were at a loss to explain the rise in terrorism and crimi-

nality. Some ascribed it to the expiration of the law on field courtsmartial, others to the Duma’s failure to condemn violence, and still others to deep popular hostility to the prevailing order of things. It is impossible to determine the precise importance of these factors, but one of the observations Pares made as he traveled around the country in the ensuing weeks suggests that personal despair was critical. He noted not only a rise in various forms of crimes but “also a great outbreak of sexual license as well. Russia was indeed, as Gorky said, ‘at the bottom.’”” Pares offered no details; the only explanation that can be proposed is that people enduring great crises often abandon traditional mores.*! Be that as it may, for at least two months after the Duma’s dissolution, there was no letup in lawlessness. One of the most dramatic incidents occurred in Tiflis in mid-June. In an attack on a military escort transporting some 340,000 rubles, Bolshevik terrorists killed two soldiers, wounded about 50, and made off with the money.*2 Another especially daring incident took place on a pleasure boat, the Sofia, which was cruising in the Black Sea some eighteen miles from Odessa. Three young men

boarded ship during a dinner party and “proceeded to hold up the assembled company.” At the same time two of their fellows overpowered the crew and forced them to take the ship to Odessa, where the five men seized funds worth more than 5,000 British pounds from an employee of the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade and smaller sums from various other passengers. After destroying the machinery of the vessel, the thieves disappeared on two small boats. Many other, less dramatic incidents were reported from other parts of the country.” The problem of lawlessness was so serious that on July 7 Stolypin sent a circular to the chiefs of provincial gendarmes and the heads of provincial departments of the Okhrana ordering them to take stronger measures against people involved in any form of unrest. To obtain speedy punishment, officials were urged to bring the accused before military district courts. Ten days earlier the authorities had issued a decree amending the military judicial code. Preliminary investigations could now be completed in one day rather than in three days; on August ro the government directed military commanders to appoint older officers as judges because they were more likely than younger ones to be firm in meting out punishments. In effect the government was moving toward giving to the military district courts functions similar to those of the lapsed field courts-

martial.

Not until early August did observers in Russia detect a decline in ter-

364 Coup d’Etat rorism and criminality, which, interestingly, was accompanied by a significant loss of interest in domestic politics. Newspapers no longer dwelt on internal affairs and devoted an increasing number of articles to foreign affairs. A year earlier the press had almost completely ignored that subject. “The Russian people, generally speaking,” the British Ambassador concluded, “is at present tired of the ceaseless internal troubles of the past two, or nearly three years.” But he also warned that “it remains... to be seen how far this new feeling of apathy and ‘peace at any price’ will

be a durable one.” Stolypin had to be content with his handiwork, for the result was the kind of legislature that he believed was needed to restore stable and effective rule. Not only did the new, restrictive electoral law by itself work to his advantage. Within days after the dissolution of the Duma, local election committees began to apply a variety of dubious measures to reduce the number of eligible voters even further. A few statistics will suffice to tell the tale. Only about 19 percent of the eligible voters in 67 cities of European Russia (roughly ro percent of all the cities) participated in the elections for the Third Duma, compared with about 55 percent in 1906.

The total number of voters in these cities dropped from 307,930 to 195,000. In some cities—Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Samara, Sevas-

topol, Stavropol, and Viatka—the decline was at least 50 percent; in Jaroslavl, Vologda, and Kremenchug it amounted to 40 percent. In several cities—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Nizhnii-Novgorod, Saratov, and Riazan—the decline was even greater, ranging from 65 per-

cent to 84 percent.” |

Often, local committees disqualified would-be voters on thoroughly specious grounds. An applicant would be turned away on the pretext that the authorities had not received instructions from the provincial governor; another would simply be arbitrarily excluded as politically untrustworthy. In Kremenchug the authorities eliminated some 3,000 voters by these ploys. Elsewhere, officials deliberately made registration difficult by

giving the public only a few days notice before beginning to consider applications. In some areas officials never informed citizens of the dates on which they could submit their applications. Not-surprisingly, many eligible voters were so dispirited that they did not even attempt to register. In late June the Statistical Department in Moscow, which supervised the procedures, reported that non-tax-paying apartment renters showed “extremely weak interest” in the elections: only 150 people out of a pool of 30,000 eligible voters had registered. In St. Petersburg, where the potential pool was roughly the same, only 166 had registered. The decline

Coup d’Etat 365 in the number of voters in this category was even more dramatic in Vilna, Tula, Mogilev, Kamenets-Podolsk, and Sevastopol.” Even in some rural areas with sizable numbers of large landowners, the registration lists declined by 30 to 40 percent. The reason for these declines was again the exclusion of voters considered politically unreliable. Local committees would arbitrarily exclude peasants with fairly substan-

tial landholdings from the classification of landowner. In addition, an interpretation of the electoral law handed down by the Senate in 1906 for the specific purpose of preventing small landowners from voting was now rigorously applied. The result was a decrease ranging from 25 to 73 percent in the number of smallholders who participated in the election. In Poltava province 16,000 small landowners voted in the election of the First Duma; after the Senate’s ruling, the number dwindled to 3,000 in

the election of the Second Duma; in 1907 only 575 voted.** National minorities were also subjected to various exclusionary practices by the authorities, again in keeping with the government’s overall plan to reduce to a minimum the number of deputies hostile to its program.” After the first stages of the elections had been completed, officials and various right-wing groups made concerted efforts to disqualify opposition candidates either on the charge that they lacked residence qualification or on the grounds that they held unacceptable political views. The most frequent targets were prominent activists and former Duma deputies. Thus, officials contended that V. M. Gessen and F. A. Golovin had lost their residence qualification by dint of their stay in St. Petersburg as members of the Second Duma. The claim was so patently absurd that the local election committees refused to disqualify the two men. But other committees did sustain similar charges and thereby eliminated a number of candidates from the race. In St. Petersburg, for example, the authorities disqualified the leaders of the Popular Socialists shortly before the final voting. On the other hand, officials tended to rule in favor of right-wing candidates who legally did not qualify. A case in point was G. K. Shmid, a captain in the navy who in 1891 had been found guilty of selling military secrets to a foreign power. The Tsar had subsequently pardoned him, but under the electoral law of 1907, no one deprived of his rank and status was allowed to vote or hold office. Nevertheless, Shmid, who had been active in right-wing causes in Minsk since his pardon, decided to run for the Third Duma. After the revelation of his previous conviction, the local election committee decided that he was ineligible to vote. Shmid appealed the decision to the provincial election committee, which on September 27 was informed by Kryzhanovskii that, according to the Prime Minister, Shmid had been restored to all his rights and consequently could partici-

366 Coup a’Etat pate in the election and run for office. Kryzhanovskii said that he was merely providing the committee with “information and guidance”; the committee reinstated Shmid, who went on to win his race. Subsequently, the Duma itself reviewed his qualifications and voted not to seat him.1™ Although the new legislature was much more to Stolypin’s liking than the first two, it was not as compliant as he had hoped. This turn of events, however, became evident only later.‘ In 1907 no one could dispute that basically Kryzhanovskii’s electoral law had served the government well. The composition of the Third Duma was as follows: '~

Grouping No. Grouping No. Grouping No. Rightists 51 Progressives 28 Polish Kolo 11 Moderate Kadets 54 Polish-Lithuanianrightists 96 Trudoviks 14 Belorussian Group 7

Octobrists 154 Social Democrats 18 Muslim Group 8 Since the Octobrists had by now swung decisively to the right, the government could generally count on the support of about 300 deputies out of a total of 441. Furthermore, 32 of the deputies on the right had clearly identified themselves as candidates of the Union of the Russian People, which meant that slightly over 10 percent of the legislators in the conservative camp were not simply pro-government but extremists who favored the restoration of Tsarist autocracy.’ On some issues several Progressives also supported the government, giving it an even

more decisive majority. Put differently, if all the national groups are counted as part of the opposition, which was true only to a degree, the combined strength of the parties that favored a fundamental reordering of the country’s political system amounted to no more than a third of the

Duma. One need only compare these figures with those for the First and Second Dumas (see above, pp. 51, 284) to note how fundamentally the Empire’s structure of politics had been transformed The opposition, the dominant force in the first two legislatures, had been reduced to vir-

tual impotence. , |

The social group that now emerged as the dominant political force was the landowning nobility, which was represented by 173 deputies, almost

40 percent of the membership. These gentry deputies were elected by some 30,000 families, a fairly homogeneous group economically, socially, and politically. Although not all the gentry deputies voted consistently with the right, most did so; a mere handful of men thus exerted a powerful influence on the affairs of state in a country whose population numbered about 130 million. The rightists could also count on the support of the 53 deputies who were Orthodox clergymen—a much larger

Coup d’Etat 367 contingent than in the two preceding legislatures—and of the one deputy who was a Roman Catholic priest. Another twelve who could be relied on to side with the authorities were government officials. Significantly, only 38 legislators came from the professions, and only seven were businessmen. Of the remaining deputies whose social origins are known, 68

were peasants, 27 workers, and 17 Cossacks. The reassertion of the conservative gentry’s predominance in the country’s political life had been presaged at a zemstvo congress in Moscow, which met on June 10, only one week after the dissolution of the Duma.

Of the 158 representatives from 32 provinces at the congress, 33 belonged to rightist movements, 33 were members of moderate rightist (or

nationalistic) organizations, and 44 were Octobrists. The Kadets and their allies, who predominated in previous zemstvo congresses, were represented by fewer than 20 delegates, most of whom had not been prominent in the liberal movement. Except for M. A. Stakhovich, none of the leaders of Russian liberalism was in attendance.’ Not surprisingly, the congress expressed support for Stolypin, whom it greeted as “a loyal servant of our Sovereign, who did not lose faith in this difficult time in the vital forces of the Russian land.” In making this point, the delegates were voicing their approval not only of the political changes introduced by the Prime Minister but also of his successful resistance to the men at Court and in the State Council who had favored the abolition of the Duma. For the landed gentry, the new political settlement was ideal, since it assured

them a preeminent place of influence. At the same time the congress avoided any reference to the Tsar as autocrat, preferring instead the appellations ‘“‘all-merciful Sovereign” or merely “Sovereign.” Thus, the dele-

gates left unresolved the question of the relative powers of the monarch and the representative institution. Nicholas felt free to claim that he re-

tained his autocratic powers without fear of a challenge on this score from the Duma, which was dominated by men with views similar to those who attended the zemstvo congress. '°

The drift to the right also manifested itself on the local level in the zemstvo elections that took place in various localities in the four weeks following the dissolution of the Duma. In the provinces of Poltava and Samara, only rightists won seats; in Tambov 20 Octobrists, six members of the Union of the Russian People, and only one Kadet were elected.” These results marked a continuation of trends that had emerged in late 1906 and early 1907. A comparison of the political allegiance of chairmen of zemstvo assemblies in 1905 and 1907 graphically demonstrates the changes that had occurred. In 1905 the Kadets occupied fifteen chairmanships, the Progressives six, the Octobrists thirteen, and the rightists

368 Coup d’Etat none. Two years later the figures were Kadets, one; Progressives, three; Octobrists, nineteen; rightists, eleven.1° Thus, at all levels of the political arena the opposition suffered devas-

tating defeats. To most activists it seemed as though the country had come almost full circle in the three years since the revolution began. The autocracy that in 1905 and 1906 had been forced to concede a constitution was strong enough in 1907 to violate the constitution with impunity and to reassert its authority so effectively that all the struggles and suffering appeared to have been in vain. In the months following the dissolution of the Second Duma, such a conclusion was not implausible, but in fact the outcome of the revolution was not quite that clear-cut or bleak. As will become evident in the concluding chapter, Russia in 1907 was not the Russia of 1904.

Conclusion

‘“‘T ASKED A MAN the other day, who is employed in

the ‘Zemstva,’ what party he belonged to. ‘I belong to the party of common sense,’ he answered; ‘unfortunately it does not exist.’ This exactly sums up, I think, the impression that any impartial observer must necessarily derive from the present situation in Russia. Common sense has gone. Hysteria and undisciplined rant have taken its place.” ! This comment by Maurice Baring, made shortly after he arrived in St. Petersburg from Moscow in late December 1905, does not by itself adequately explain the outcome of the Revolution of 1905. But it does point to one critical factor: both the opposition and the authorities were thoroughly unrealistic throughout the upheaval. The opposition wanted to change the entire system overnight; the authorities clung to the belief that they could rule as they had for centuries, arbitrarily and without regard to the interests of the vast majority of the people. The lack of political maturity among all social groups undermined every endeavor to reach a reasonable solution to the crisis. In none of the negotiations over a coalition government—four in all during the three-year period—did either the authorities or the opposition bend sufficiently to bring about an agreement. More important, the Duma, cherished by most citizens as the greatest achievement of the revolution, as the institution that would fulfill their deepest aspirations, met with such fierce hostility from the Court and the government that its very existence seemed constantly at risk. Few within society rejected the suspicion that their rulers had agreed to the Duma not as an authentic concession to the opposition, but as a sop to the people to surmount a serious crisis. At the same time few within that body showed any inclination for compromise, or even for civil discourse either with the authorities or with each other. Russia’s first encounter with constitutionalism was not an edifying experience.

370 Conclusion This universal intransigence, as I suggested in the first volume of my study, was basically a legacy of Russia’s autocratic structure of rule, which did not allow for the emergence of leaders with political acumen and independent judgment. Even Stolypin, who recognized the need for fundamental reform, failed to understand that the changes he wished to introduce would not succeed if they were enacted arbitrarily and without broadly based support. Nor was Stolypin a truly independent leader. A firm believer in autocracy, he abandoned reforms that he considered essential when they were opposed by the autocrat: witness the fate of his plan to lighten the burden on the Jews. Ultimately, the failure of political leadership must be placed on the shoulders of the Tsar himself. Despite his weak personality, he held fast to certain principles. He wished to retain the autocracy even while permitting certain institutional changes, and he would not accord equal rights to ethnic and religious minorities. None of the basic changes that Russia had undergone over the preceding decades—industrialization, the emergence of social groups demanding a say in state policy, the growth of radical movements, the decline in power resulting from the disastrous war with Japan—induced him to alter his view of the world. Every time an opportunity for accommodation with the opposition presented itself, _ he insisted on maintaining his prerogatives and thus prevented the only kind of change that could have produced stability. Most of his closest advisers, and by 1906 much of the landed nobility, had neither the foresight nor the strength of character to resist him. They deluded themselves into believing that the old order could be maintained indefinitely, and

with it their long-standing privileges. a

In many ways the conduct of the opposition’s leadership mirrored that of the authorities. Without experience in the give-and-take of parliamentary government, without training in genuine political work, the opposi-

tion, too, demonstrated astonishing intransigence. The leaders of the various protest movements refused to be satisfied with the proverbial half a loaf and insisted on the rapid and total transformation of society, some-

thing that probably could not have succeeded even under more auspicious circumstances. A more conciliatory attitude during the Days of Lib-

erty in late 1905 or during the deliberations of the two Dumas might _ have left the authorities no alternative but the adoption of a more reasonable stance. Certainly, the liberals’ refusal to repudiate and denounce terror from below played into the hands of those who wished to continue

to rule with a mailed fist. | | The intransigence of the opposition leaders also weakened the liberation movement itself. For most of the revolutionary period, the opposition was split into warring groups incapable of a united effort against the

Conclusion 371

autocracy. These splits, as this study has shown, greatly hampered the forces for change and were critical in helping the old order to survive. For Russia, it was a misfortune that modernization did not occur gradually, so that the demands of various social groups might have been met sequentially. History is rarely that tidy. As it was, modernization came relatively late and produced at one and the same time a whole array of parties and factions with irreconcilable demands. Though united in their hatred of Tsarism, the liberals, Socialist Revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, and

Mensheviks differed on too many fundamentals to collaborate for any length of time. Only those in power benefited from these divisions. In fact, throughout 1905 the social groups represented by these political movements tended to act separately and in large measure spontaneously in protesting against the old order. When the liberals launched their campaign against the autocracy in late 1904, the workers, peasants, and minorities either remained aloof or participated only minimally. Worker unrest in early 1905 was viewed sympathetically by liberals but did not

lead to a coordinated protest movement. Meanwhile, peasant unrest, though influenced by the turbulence in the cities, assumed a rhythm all its own. Disturbances began in the countryside during the summer of 1905, when workers were relatively quiescent, and reached a crescendo in late 1905, after the new outburst of unrest in the cities had subsided. Similarly, the ethnic minorities followed their own calendar in demanding change. Nor, finally, did the major breaches of discipline in the military forces coincide with the most dramatic periods of political activism by other social groups. The bulk of the mutinies in 1905 broke out after the workers had ended their most spectacular strike movement in the fall of that year. In 1906, too, the absence of a coordinated effort by the protest movements had a strong bearing on the course of the revolution. The industrial workers, though by no means reconciled to the prevailing order, were not nearly so active in their opposition as they had been in 1905. Fear of unemployment, exhaustion, and despair had taken their toll. The peasants unleashed a new wave of unrest in the spring of 1906, but as long as their efforts were not coordinated with major activity elsewhere, the autocracy could not be brought to its knees. Also, as was shown in Chapter 6, the military unrest in the summer of 1906 caught the revolutionary parties by surprise; without their assistance, the mutinies inevitably petered out rather quickly. It bears repeating that despite the gravity of the disorders in the army, whenever the government needed troops to repress the most threatening challenges to its authority, it always found them. The reasons that the government could root out rebellion by calling on the army—which, after all, was composed largely of peasants who might

372 Conclusion have been expected to sympathize with the demands of the villagers—are diverse and complicated. But for the outcome of the revolution, the essential point is that enough troops followed orders to humble the opposition,

often by the most ruthless means. , ,

Only once, during the general strike of October 1905, was there any significant degree of cooperation between opposition groups with divergent long-range goals. Even on this occasion, the antigovernment move-

ment was not planned. Still, once the strike had gained momentum, workers and liberals cooperated to such a remarkable extent that their combined efforts came close to toppling the old regime. As it was, the concession the government made to bring the crippling strike to an end, the October Manifesto, marked the most momentous achievement of the Revolution of 1905. One can only speculate on what might have been achieved by a protest movement embracing all the discontented social

groups acting in unison. —

Considering the political conditions in Russia in the early twentieth century, such an effort was too much to expect. Normal political activity was out of the question; as a result, the political movements that emerged in the years immediately before the revolution had only the most rudimentary organizations and means of communication at their command. In any case, in 1904 neither the liberal nor the radical leaders could fore-

see the outbreak of an upheaval that might threaten the Tsarist regime. Essentially, the major protests that erupted in 1905 and 1906 were spontaneous affairs. In most instances the leaders followed the masses and

groups. , 7

provided guidance only after the masses had taken matters into their own hands. By that time, it was too late to mesh the efforts of the aggrieved To be sure, senior officials were often at a loss as to how to respond to the unrest, and at times even the most talented among their number suc-

cumbed to despair. A confidential conversation between the Russian Ambassador in London, Count A. K. Benkendorf, and his German coun-

terpart in mid-May 1906 is instructive in this regard. Benkendorf was thoroughly pessimistic about Russia’s future because he considered all the ministers mediocrities. Moreover, he was convinced that the Duma would accomplish nothing and would soon be dissolved, which in turn would set off a “general revolution.” In Benkendorf’s view, Witte was the

one man who could save Russia, but only if he embarked “on a thoroughly radical transformation of the Russian state organism.” But having said that, Benkendorf related the substance of a conversation he had had with Witte two years earlier, which suggested that even the future Prime

Minister was too bewildered to cope with the crisis. Benkendorf had posed several questions to Witte. Should the war with Japan be continued

Conclusion 373 or should it be ended? Should Russia be granted a constitution or should the autocracy be retained? “To all these questions, Witte responded that it was impossible. When [Benkendorf] finally asked what in his view should actually happen, [Witte] answered: Everyone in Russia is radical and I am the most radical of all.’’2 Although Benkendorf’s account of Witte’s mood reveals the despair and paralysis that often beset the political leadership from 1904 to 1907, the government was not quite as helpless as Witte had claimed. Most notably, the bureaucracy, a pillar of the old order, remained essentially intact and continued its faithful service to the monarch. The social structure also did not break down. In fact, in 1906 substantial sectors of the

landowning gentry that had favored moderate liberalism, alarmed by peasant unrest and the breakdown of civil order, increasingly turned toward the right and supported the Tsar on key issues. Moreover, Witte himself took initiatives that helped the autocracy withstand the crisis. During the general strike he engineered the granting of the October Manifesto, a concession that not only curtailed the work stoppage and gave the authorities a new lease on life, but also caused fatal splits within the opposition. Six months later Witte succeeded in negotiating a huge foreign loan, which greatly strengthened the regime at a critical moment. No less important, he helped fashion the draconian policies that in late 1905 and early 1906 suppressed rebellious peasants and workers. The repression continued at various levels of intensity for a year and a

half. Shortly after Stolypin’s coup d’état, in June 1907, it seemed as though Russia in the course of three years had come full circle. Most of the opposition’s aspirations—for a sovereign parliament, democratic suf-

frage, and land reform, not to mention the additional demands of the socialists—remained unfulfilled, and the most sweeping concession, the establishment of an elected national assembly, had been severely undermined. The Tsar, the bureaucracy, and the gentry landowners were in the saddle once again. Nonetheless, the Empire’s political system had been changed in important ways. True, the Tsar still claimed to rule as an autocrat, but so long as the Duma continued to function, as it did till the end of the old regime, the claim was not convincing. Neither he nor the bureaucracy could operate as arbitrarily as they had before. On many vital questions the Tsar and his officials needed the support of the legislature. Although the electoral law of June 3, 1907, deprived the masses of much of their representation, the Duma did not become a mere rubber stamp for the government. That the Duma was a vibrant institution was demonstrated with

special force during the crisis of the old regime in 1916 and 1917. A significant majority in the legislature fiercely criticized the autocracy and

374 Conclusion in doing so spoke for large sectors of the nation. The Provisional Govern-

ment that took control after the Tsar’s abdication in February 1917 was the Duma’s creation. Without the reforms introduced during the Revolution of 1905, such developments would have been inconceivable. Moreover, from 1907 until 1917 Russia lived under a multiparty system, another legacy of the revolution. There was still much repression of the left, and the Kadets were never recognized as a legal party, but various parties (including the Kadets, Social Democrats, and Popular Socialists) were represented in the Dumas, and radical as well as liberal deputies frequently spoke out against official abuses. This is not the place to

take up the vexing question of whether Russia was moving toward a Western form of constitutionalism, but there can be no doubt that political questions were discussed far more freely and more extensively than they had been before 1904. Despite the restrictions imposed by the government, newspapers and journals could deal with sensitive political and social issues in a way that was unimaginable before the revolution. The trade union movement suffered some heavy blows at Stolypin’s hands, and from 1907 to 1912 the number of organized workers declined sharply. “Nevertheless,” the leading authority on the subject has concluded, “the preceding two and a half years had left an imprint on the workers’ movement that could not be entirely erased, even during the period of Prime Minister Stolypin’s harsh regime. Trade unions declined, but they did not vanish. Some organized workers turned their attention to other legal opportunities for collective association, such as clubs, cultural societies, consumer cooperatives, and production artels. Among a small but influential group of workers, the aspiration for organization remained intact during these years of repression and disappointment.”’¢ After Stolypin’s assassination in 1911 and the massacre of a peaceful assembly of workers in the Lena gold fields in 1912, the government relaxed its policies, and the labor movement experienced a modest revival

of trade unionism.‘ | 7 |

Slowly, painfully, against all odds, the Russian people were creating associations free from government control, and thus they continued a process that had received its greatest impetus during the Revolution of 1905. Russia in the years from 1907 to 1914 was not yet a civil society in the Western sense. But the country had taken the first steps on the road toward such a society, a prerequisite for a genuine constitutional order. True, the men and women who had initiated the struggle against the old

order in 1904 had hoped for much more; but in view of the obstacles they encountered, their achievement was not negligible. As a revolution, 1905 was a failure, but it was a failure that nonetheless brought about important institutional changes in Russia. Though considerably modified, the changes remained in place until the Empire collapsed in 1917.

Conclusion 375

The events from 1904 to 1907 were not a “dress rehearsal’ for the Revolution of 1917; the one did not make the other inevitable. During the three years examined in this study, there were several occasions on which Russian history might well have taken a different turn. Only the most rigid determinist would claim that the outcome of every conflict was

preordained, that all the missed opportunities were really not opportunities at all. Those who take this position necessarily regard the October Manifesto, the Days of Liberty, and the First and Second Dumas’ struggle for reform as worthy of study merely because they were the prelude to the great upheaval of 1917. My own reading of the three-year period of struggle has led me to conclude that although neither the liberals nor the radicals had any chance of achieving all their goals, the changes in the country’s political and social structure could have been greater and more

lasting than they turned out to be. Many thoughtful contemporaries in Russia held this view, which is why they devoted themselves to the political struggle in the first place. If r905 did not inexorably lead to 1917, it did leave a troubled nation in its wake. The revolution having failed, the chasm between state and

society, one of the root causes of the convulsion, remained as wide as ever. But conditions were sufficiently fluid for Russia to have followed any one of several paths. To be sure, events in the decade from 1907 to 1917 persuaded many activists and political analysts that the country faced only two choices, autocracy or radical revolution. But in sowing the seeds of parliamentarism, the Revolution of 1905 created the possibility of another path, Western constitutionalism. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 suppressed that option. Seventy-four years later, however, the country found itself in the throes of yet another upheaval, inspired to a large extent by the same ideals that had animated much of the opposition in 1905: the rule of law, government by the people, and respect for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. Though aborted, the Revolution

of 1905 left an enduring legacy: it initiated a process of political, economic, and social change that, as we now know, has still not run its full course.

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Reference Matter

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Notes

The following abbreviations are used in the Notes. Complete authors’ names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography, pp. 415—28.

AMAE Archives du Ministére des Affairs Etrangéres. Russie:

: Direction Politique, nouvelle série, Paris. BDFA British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Public Record

Office, London. Dokumenty i materialy Revoliutstia 1905—7 gg. v Rossii: dokumenty i materialy. Eds. A. Pankratova et al. 8 vols. in 17 parts. Moscow, 1955-65.

HHSA Haus-Hof-und-Staatsarchiv. Russland, Berichte. Vienna.

PAAA Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amts. Abteilung A, Russland. Bonn.

USDMR U.S. Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Russia, 1808— 1906, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Introduction 1. Derenkovskii et al., Revoliutsiia 1905-1907 godov.

Chapter 1 1. U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg to Washington, Dec. 13, 1905, USDMR. 2. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 449. 3. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 16, 1906, FO/181, BDFA. 4. Healy, Russian Autocracy, pp. 106—7; see Witte’s report of Jan. 10, 1906, in Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, pp. 77-83. 5. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, pp. 83-86. 6. Astrov, Vospominaniia, p. 338. 7. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 1, 1906, p. 3. 8. L. Aehrenthal to Vienna, Jan. 14/27, 1906, HHSA.

380 =©Notes to Pages 11-19

9. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 16, 1906, FO 181/866,

BDFA. | : BDFA.

10. Moskovskie vedomosti, Jan. 21, 1906, p. 2. 11. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 16, 1906, FO 181/866,

12. Moskovskie vedomosti, Feb. 19, 1906, p. 2. 13. Bogdanovich, Dneunik, p. 367. 14. Moskovskie vedomosti, Jan. 17, 1906, p. 2.

15. Ibid., Jan. 18, 1906, pp. 1-2.

16. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 215; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 16, 1906, BDFA. 17. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 25, 1906, FO 181/869, BDFA.

18. Ibid., Jan. 15, 1906, FO 181/866, BDFA. 19. Moskovskie vedomosti, Feb. 20, 1906, p. 2. 20. Pravo, March 12, 1906, col. 952. 21. Pares, Wandering Student, pp. 132—33. 22. Russkie vedomosti, March 2, 1906, p. I.

23. Witte, Vospominaniia, Ill, pp. 199-204; Petrunkevich, “Iz zapisok,” P. 442. 24. Austro-Hungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg to Vienna, Jan. 14/27, 1906, HHSA. 25. Witte, Vospominaniza, Ill, pp. 210-13. 26. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, March 28, 1906, FO 181/ 869, BDFA. 27. Russkie vedomosti, March 13, 1906, p. I.

28. Ibid., March 16, 1906, pp. 2-3. 29. Ibid., March 17, 1906, p. 2.

30. Ibid.

31. Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 86. 32. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, April 5, 1906, PAAA. 33. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, March 14, 1906, FO 181/ 869, BDFA. 34. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, p. 148. 35. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 13.

36. Ibid. 37. Okhrana Archive, Box 213, Folder XIIId(1), item 9, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif. 38. Hildermeier, Sozialrevolutiondre Partei, p. 156; Dokumenty i materialy,

V, part I, p. XI. , 39. Zenzinov, Perezhitoe, pp. 271-72. 40. Pravo, April 1, 1906, col. 1262.

41. Nasha zhizn, April 25, 1906, pp. 2—3. , , 42. Russkie vedomosti, April 25, 1906, p. 2. 43. Pravo, March 25, 1906, col. 1157.

44. Pravo, March 12, 1906, col. 965, March 19, cols. 1085, 1086, 1906,

March 25, col. 1168, April 1, cols. 1262, 1263.

45. Pravo, Feb. 19, 1906, col. 634. ,

46. U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg to Washington, April 3, 1906, USDMR; German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, March 21, 1906, PAAA. |

Notes to Pages 19-25 381 47. Pravo, March 5, 1906, col. 839, March 12, col. 966, March 25, col. 1169. 48. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, pp. 154-56. 49. Hildermeier, Sozialrevolutiondre Partei, p. 387.

50. On the partisan actions, see Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, pp. 373ff. Not all Social Democratic organizations rejected terror in principle. On March 2, 1906, the Moscow Committee of the RSDWP adopted the following position: “Taking into account the fact that the mass annihilation of the most harmful agents of the government and representatives of reaction at the moment of aggressive offensives must introduce the greatest disorganization into the ranks of the reactionary forces and thus improve the chances of success for an uprising, the M[oscow] C[ommittee] considers it necessary to form special organizations of fighting groups that will assume the task of preparing a series of terrorist acts at the moment of an aggressive offensive [uprising].” At the same time the Moscow Committee averred its support for the official Social Democratic position on terror by warning that individual violence not timed for the moment of a mass uprising would be diversionary for the masses and should therefore be avoided. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, p. 297. 51. Maklakov, Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, p. 18. 52. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 2, p. 181. 53. Ibid., part 1, pp. 111-13; part 2, p. 90. 54. Ibid., part 1, pp. 676-77. 55. Santoni, “P. N. Durnovo,” pp. 316—17; Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, p. 89. 56. On these measures, see Ascher, Revolution, 1, pp. 110-11. 57. Pravo, March 12, 1906, cols. 968—69. 58. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 209. 59. Pravo, Feb. 5, 1906, col. 459. 60. Ibid., col. 458. 61. Pravo, April 1, 1906, col. 1258. 62. Pravo, March 25, 1906, col. 1164, April 13, col. 1258. 63. Pravo, Feb. 26, 1906, col. 744. 64. Pravo, March 5, 1906, col. 833. 65. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, March 14, 1906, FO 181/ 869, BDFA.

66. Pravo, March 12, 1906, cols. 963—64, April 9, col. 1309.

67. Pravo, March 25, 1906, col. 1166, April 1, cols. 1257-58, April 16, cols. 1411-12; Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 2, p. 419. 68. Nevinson, Dawn in Russia, p. 300. 69. Pravo, March 25, 1906, col. 1169. 70. Pravo, April 1, 1906, col. 1264. 71. Pravo, March 12, 1906, col. 967, April 9, cols. 1312-13. 72. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 2, p. 419. 73. Baring, A Year in Russia, pp. 131-32. 74. British Consul in Odessa to London, April 4, 1906, FO 181/878, BDFA. 75. Ibid., March 2, 1906, FO 181/878, BDFA. 76. Ibid. 77. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 6, 1906, p. 2; British Consul in Odessa to London, April 4, 1906, FO 181/878, BDFA. 78. On the government’s efforts to reinforce the police, see British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 11, 1906, FO 181/869, BDFA; Russkie vedo-

382 Notes to Pages 25-31 mosti, Feb. 1, Feb. 4, 1906, both p. 3; and Pravo, March 25, 1906, col. 1156,

April 1, col. 1250, April 9, col. 1306, April 16, col. 1398. |

79. Naumov, Iz utselevshikh vospominanii, Il, pp. 65-66. Oo

80. Pravo, March 19,-1906, col. 1084.

81. Pravo, April 23, 1906, col. 1494.

82. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, pp. 790-91.

Military Conflict, pp.145-46. 84. Pravo, March 12, 1906, col. 953. , 83. Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” pp. 94—95. See also the discussion in Fuller, Civil-

85. Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, p. 245.

86. Pravo, March 19, 1906, col. 1073.

87. Pravo, April 23, 1906, cols. 1492—93. 88. Pravo, Feb. 26, 1906, col. 741. 89. Pravo, March 5, 1906, col. 824.

93. Ibid.

90. Pravo, March 19, 1906, col. 1078. On the Schmidt affair, see Ascher,

Revolution, |, pp. 270-72. |

91. Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools, pp. 546-47.

92. Pravo, March 12, 1906, col. 957. 94. Pravo, April 9, 1906, col. 1304, April 23, col. 1492. 95. Pravo, March 5, 1906, cols. 1492—93. 96. Pravo, April 1, 1906, col. 1251. :

97. Shipov, Vospominaniia, pp. 488—90.

Order, pp. 177-202. , ,

98. For a discussion of the “zemstvo reaction,” see Manning, Crisis of the Old

99. Walkin, “Government Controls,” pp. 203-4.

100. H. Williams, Russia of the Russians, pp. 117-18. _

Russia, pp. 135-36. , 101. Baring, A Year in Russia, p. 119. 102. For a description of the complicated rules, see Balmuth, Censorship in

103. See Pravo, passim, for the early months of 1906.

104. Pravo, March 5, 1906, col. 831. | 7

105. Pravo, April 23, 1906, col. 1495. Emphasis in original.

Words, p. 305. | - oo

106. Voznesenskii et al., Deistuuiushchaia chast, pp. 103-4; Ruud, Fighting

107. Hagen, Entfaltung politischer Offentlichkeit, p. 103. For information on

the government’s actions against the press, see Pravo, passim. ,

108. Pravo, April 1, 1906, cols. 1255—56. ,

trols,” p. 207. | }

109. H. Williams, Russia of the Russians, p. 104; Walkin, “Government Con-

110. Walkin, “Government Controls,” p. 205. ,

869, BDFA. -

111. Hagen, Entfaltung politischer Offentlichkeit, p. 104. 112. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 26, 1906, FO 181/

113. See, in particular, the lead articles in Moskovskie vedomosti.

114. Naumov, Iz utseleushikh vospominanii, Il, p. 65. The congress’s resolutions were reprinted in Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 13, 1906, p. 5. For an English translation of the resolutions, see Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution,

Pp. 200-203. , | -

115. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 13, 1906, p. 5; Hosking and Manning, “What

Notes to Pages 32-43 383 Was the United Nobility?,” pp. 150-51; Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, Pp. 47.

116. “Soiuz 17 Oktiabria v 1906 g.,” pp. 158—60.

117. Ibid., pp. 159, 160-61. See the detailed discussion on the meeting in Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 116—20. 118. For a discussion of the differences between Shipov and Guchkov at the meeting, see Brainerd, “The Octobrists and the Gentry,” pp. 73-76. 119. Ibid., p. 77. 120. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 122 (see also p. 222). 121. For details on these groups, see ibid., pp. 126-28.

122. For an excellent discussion of the Octobrists’ first congress, see ibid., pp. 120—25; see also Rainey, “Union of 17 October,” pp. 138-41. For the debates, see “Soiuz 17 Oktiabria v 1906 g.,” pp. 84-121. An English translation of documents on the first Octobrist program, adopted in November 1905, may be found in Menashe, “Alexander Guchkov,” pp. 213-28. 123. Shipov, Vospominaniia, p. 421. 124. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 353-54. 125. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, pp. 409-11. 126. Ibid., p. 407. 127. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 49-50. 128. Pipes, Liberal on the Right, p. 7. 129. Pravo, Jan. 29, 1906, cols. 15—20. 130. Vestnik partii narodnoi svobody, Feb. 22, 1906, p. 8.

131. On the Kadets’ “split personality,” see Pipes, Liberal on the Right, pp. 28—33. See also Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 218. 132. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 219; Emmons, Formation of Political Parti€s, p. 55. 133. Pravo, Jan. 29, 1906, cols. 333-34. 134. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 215. 135. Kautsky, ed., Rosa Luxemburg Briefe, pp. 95-96. 136. Keep “Russian Social Democracy,” pp. 183-84. 137. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, XI, p. 159, quoted in Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 214. 138. F. I. Dan to Karl Kautsky, St. Petersburg, Jan. 19 (Feb. 1), 1906, Kautsky Archive, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam. 139. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 216. 140. Keep, “Russian Social Democracy,” p. 184. 141. The discussion of the SRs is based on Hildermeier, Sozialrevolutiondre Partet, p. 176. 142. Pravo, April 16, cols. 1398-99. 143. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Feb. 14, 1906, FO 181/866.

Chapter 2 1. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Feb. 14, 1906, FO 181/866.

2. Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 356-57, 365-66. 3. Baring, A Year in Russia, p. 154.

4. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 237-39; Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 371-73; Mehlinger and Thompson,

384 Notes to Pages 43-51 Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, pp. 242—43; Haimson, ed., Politics of Rural Russia, pp. 9-15. Both Emmons (p. 240) and Haimson (p. 12) have charts indicating the complexity of the electoral system; for more details on the procedures, see those two works. 5. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 185. 6. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 314; Mehlinger and Thompson,

pp. 248-49. , ,

Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, pp. 246-49. , 7. Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government,

8. Witte, Vospominaniza, Ill, p. 357. 9. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 224. 10. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, p. 397. 11. Naumov, Iz utselevshikh vospominanii, Il, pp. 80-81. 12. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 140, 142. 13. Pravo, March 19, 1906, col. 1090. 14. For reports on how officials placed constraints on Kadet organizations in various parts of the country, see Pravo, Feb. 26, 1906, col. 736. For a-thorough discussion of the interference by officials in the electoral process, see Emmons,

Formation of Political Parties, pp. 185-93. ,

15. Pravo, April 16, 1906, col. 1400, April 23, cols. 1493-94; Sidelnikov,

Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 129. ,

16. Pravo, April 16, 1906, col. 1398, April 23, col. 1495. 17. Russkie vedomosti, March 7, 1906, p. I.

18. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, p. 419. |

19. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 130-31; Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, p. 2.73. 20. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 120—22; Riha, Russian European, p. 104; Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 145-47.

21. Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, p. 269. 22. Quoted in Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 120. The quotation is from two different appeals Sidelnikov found in the archives in Moscow. 23. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 208—9; Sidelnikov, Obrazo-

vanie i deiatelnost, pp. 123-25. , 24. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 206—9; Sidelnikov, Obrazo-

vanie i deiatelnost, p. 126. oe 25. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 117. | ne

26. Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” pp. 199-200; Sidelnikov,

Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 127. |

pp. 88—89. , a

27. Lenin, Sochineniia, X, pp. 108—11; Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, 28. Voitinskii, Gody, II, pp. 22-24.

Democracy,” p. 185. |

29. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 15 1—52; Keep, “Russian Social

30. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 220-21. 31. U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg to Washington, April 3, 1906, USDMR. 32. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 454. 33. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 358. 34. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 277, 280, 282.

35. Ibid., p. 178.

Notes to Pages 51-58 385 36. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 454.

37. For the statistics on the votes of the monarchist alliance, see Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” p. 203.

38. Quoted in ibid. ,

39. Brainerd, “The Octobrists and the Gentry,” p. 81. 40. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 11, 1906, FO 181/869, BDFA.

41. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 366 42. Ibid., pp. 353—54; Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 190; AustroHungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg to Vienna, June 13, 1906, HHSA. 43. Miliukov, God borby, p. 269; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 11, 1906, FO 181/869, BDFA. 44. Quoted in Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 197. 45. Russkie vedomosti, March 22, 1906, p. 2.

46. Vlad. Nabokov, “Pered Dumoi,” Vestnik partii narodnoi svobody, April 11, 1906, pp. 353—58. 47. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 371. 48. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 455. 49. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 343; Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 553-55. 50. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 377. 51. Dnevnik Imperatora, p. 240. 52. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, pp. 374-75. 53. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, p. 710. 54. Witte, Vospominaniza, Ill, pp. 217, 250. 55- Crisp, “Russian Liberals,” p. 500; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, IV, part 1, p. 155. 56. Long, “Economics of the Franco-Russian Alliance,” pp. 128—29; Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, pp. 211—12; Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 21, 1906, p. 2. 57. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Feb. 14, 1906, FO 181/866. 58. Long, “Economics of the Franco-Russian Alliance,” p. 125.

59. Ibid., pp. 81-82. 60. Ibid., pp. 110-16. 61. See Ascher, Revolution, I, pp. 300-301. 62. For more details on the Algeciras conference and its aftermath, see Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 439-41. 63. Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 453-54. Maklakov’s radicalism at this time is noteworthy because some years later he became a strong critic of Miliukov’s radicalism, which he blamed for the Duma’s failure to cooperate with the government. 64. On the final negotiations, the most detailed study is Long, ‘Economics of the Franco-Russian Alliance.” See also Crisp, “Russian Liberals’; Mehlinger and

Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, pp. 239—40; and Witte, Vospominaniia, Ill, p. 241. 65. Witte, Vospominaniia, Ill, p. 341. 66. Tsarskoselskiia soveshchantia, p. 312. 67. Witte, Vospominaniia, Ill, p. 219. 68. Long, “Economics of the Franco-Russian Alliance,” pp. 215-21; Riha, Russian European, p. 115.

386 Notes to Pages 59-72 . 69. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 224—25.

70. The quotation is from an archival source cited in Ananich et al., Krizis

samoderzhavie, p. 278. | , 71. Tsarskoselsktia soveshchaniia, pp. 293-95. |

72. Ibid., p. 307.

73. Ibid., p. 308; Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 443-44. For more details on the Crown Council, see Doctorow’s work,

which is the most thorough and reliable on the subject. 74. Tsarskoselskiia soveshchantia, pp. 303—4. I have used the translation of Witte’s statement in Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,”

Pp. 448-49. a oep. 104. ; 75. Kokovtsov, Out — of My| Past,

76. Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 445—47. 77. Ibid., pp. 459-61. For other discussions of the Crown Council’s deliberations, see Healy, Russian Autocracy, pp. 109—22; and Mehlinger and Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government, pp. 291-98, 302—7.

78. Moskovskie vedomosti, Feb. 24, 1906, p. 2. -

79. Menashe, “Alexander Guchkov,” p. 196; Harrison, “Octobrists and the Russian Revolution,” p. 55; Shipov, Vospominaniia, p. 423; Emmons, Forma-

tion of Political Parties, pp. 125-26. a

80. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 232; Pipes, Liberal on the Right, p. 38.

81. Miliukov, God borby, p. 87. a

82. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 23, 1906, pp. I—2, quoted in Doctorow, “Intro-

duction of Parliamentary Institutions,” p. 463. |

83. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 24, 1906, p. 3, quoted in ibid., p. 464. 84. Witte, Vospominaniia, Ill, pp. 295—96; Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 494—505. On the background to the Fundamental

Laws, see Szeftel, Russian Constitution, pp. 31-78. , |

pp. 296-97. 88. Ibid., pp. 204—5.

85. Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 506—7. 86. Tsarskoselskiia soveshchaniia, pp. 194, 202; Witte, Vospominaniia, III,

87. Tsarskoselskiia soveshchaniia, pp. 193-97.

tions,” pp. 525-26. Oo 90. Tsarskoselskiia soveshchaniia, pp. 206—9. ,

89. Ibid., pp. 205-6; Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institu-

91. Ibid., pp.p. 225-28. , ,| oe 92. Ibid., 233. ,| 93. Ibid., pp. 233-36. , ;

94. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, pp. 215—16, 224. , so

95. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 257-59. 96. Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 536—39;

Witte, Vospominaniza, Ill, pp. 304—5. |

stitution, pp. 84-109. , |

97. For an English version of the Fundamental Laws, see Szeftel, Russian Con-

98. French Embassy in St. Petersburg to Paris, May 16, 1906, AMAE.

99. Witte, Vospominaniia, Ill, p. 336. : a

100. French Embassy in St. Petersburg to Paris, May 16, 1906, AMAE. © ror. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, May 9, 1906, PAAA. 102. For the exchange of letters, see Witte, Vospominaniia, III, pp. 338—43.

Notes to Pages 72-85 387 103. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 124. 104. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 25, 1906, FO 181/ 869, BDFA.

105. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, Il, p. 339. 106. Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” p. 109. 107. Nasha zhizn, April 25, 1906, p. 3. 108. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 379. 109. Russkie vedomosti, April 24, 1906, p. I. 110. Nasha zhizn, April 25, 1906. 111. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 25, 1906, FO 181/ 869, BDFA.

112. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, March 21, 1906, PAAA. The German Ambassador mentioned three possible candidates (A. P. Izvolskii, Count N. V. Muraviev, and Count A. K. Benkendorf) then being discussed in political circles. 113. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 123-29. 114. Miliukov, God borby, pp. 308-9. 115. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, Il, pp. 339-40. 116. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, p. 110. 117. Witte, Vospominaniia, Il, p. 348. 118. Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 21-22. 119. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, May 9, 1906, PAAA. 120. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 264; Pravo, April 23, 1906, col. 1435. 121. Protokoly III Sezda, p. 38.

122. Ibid., pp. 41-42. 123. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, p. 420; Protokoly III Sezda, p. 25. 124. See, for example, Protokoly III Sezda, pp. 162-63. 125. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, p. 226. 126. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 259. 127. Ibid., p. 361. 128. Protokoly III Sezda, pp. 4-20.

129. Ibid., pp. 160-63. 130. Ibid., pp. 56—60.

Chapter 3 1. U.S. Ambassador in Petersburg to Washington, May 1, 1906, USDMR. The part of the dispatch dealing with Trepov’s comments was marked “confidential.” 2. Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” p. 109.

3. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part I, p. 157, part 2, p. 398. Pravo, May 21, 1906, col. 1867. 4. Russkie vedomosti, April 28, 1906, p. 2. 5. Izvolskii, Recollections, p. 74. 6. U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg to Washington, May 10, 1906, USDMR. 7. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 379.

8. The translation, with some emendations, is from Maklakov, First State Duma, pp. 44-45. 9. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 104; Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 75-76; Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” p. 470; Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 470. 10. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 470.

388 Notes to Pages 86—98

6, 1906, col. 1706. ,

11. Russkie vedomosti, April 28, 1906, pp. 3—4, April 29, p. 3; Pravo, May

12. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, pp. 233, 237; Shuster, Peterburgskie

rabochie, pp. 229—30; Voitinskii, Gody, II, pp. 44-45. , 13. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 224. —_

14. Vinaver, Konflikty v Pervoi Dume, pp. 17—18; Garvi, Vospominaniia, II,

pp. 20—21; Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 45. ,

15. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 207—8. The oath may be found in Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, p. 2.

16. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, p. 3.

17. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 202-3. 18. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 201. On the origins of the Tru-

20. Ibid. | |

dovik fraction, see Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, pp. 356—57. , 19. Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 357.

21. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 193-94; Sidelni-

kov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 196.

22. For details, see Ascher, Revolution, I, pp. 299-300.

23. For a brief biographical sketch of Miliukov, see ibid., pp. 33-34. 24. Riha, Russian European, pp. 113, 119; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 199, 201; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 366. 25. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, p. 227. 26. Golovin, “Iz zapisok,” p. 143.

pp. 468—69. 27. Ibid., p. 148. |

28. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 371-72; Gurko, Features and Figures, 29. Christian, “Alexis Aladin,” pp. 132-36. 30. Maklakov, First State Duma, p. 38. 31. See Christian, “Alexis Aladin,” pp. 140—52, which covers Aladin’s life to

1920.

32. Vinaver, Konflikty v Pervoi Dume, p. 66. :

33. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 367—68. , 34. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, |, pp. 74—76.

35. Ibid., pp. 154-55. 36. Ibid., p. 228. 37. Ibid., pp. 155, 228, 230, 237; Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 294-95. 38. Quoted in Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 107. 39. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, 1, p. 243; Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia,

PP. 56-57. 40. Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” pp. 111-12. 41. Miliukov, God borby, p. 407; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 372-73; Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 108.

42. Baring, A Year in Russia, pp. 208-9. ,

azua, pp. 57-58. , -

43. Vinaver, Konflikty v Pervoi Dume, pp. 61-66; Startsev, Russkaia burzhu-

44. Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, p. 60.

45. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 136. ,

46. Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, pp. 60-61; Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 140. 47. Austrian Embassy in St. Petersburg to Vienna, May 25, 1906, HHSA.

48. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, pp. 321-24. |

Notes to Pages 98-113 389 49. Zimmerman, “Between Reaction and Revolution,” p. 230. 50. For Nabokov’s speech, see Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, |, pp. 324-26. 51. Ibid., p. 327. 52. Ibid., Dp. 357:

53. Ibid., pp. 331-32. 54. Ibid., p. 336. 55. Ibid., pp. 349-50. 56. Letter quoted in Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 272. 57. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, pp. 342-43. 58. Ibid., p. 343. 59. Ibid., p. 348. 60. Ibid., p. 353. 61. Ibid., p. 35.4; Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, pp. 62-63. 62. Russkie vedomosti, May 17, 1906, p. I. 63. Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, p. 63; Zimmerman, “Between Reaction and Revolution,” pp. 217-19. 64. U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg to Washington, May 27, 1906, USDMR. 65. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, p. 90; Izvolskii, Recollections, p. 173. 66. Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 173-74.

67. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 123-24; Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 452-53; Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” p. 111; Witte, Vospominaniia, IU,

P a Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, 1, pp. 389-90, 639—40; Sidelnikov, | Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 264—66. 69. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 468. 70. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 13, 1906, PAAA.

71. Mossolov, At the Court, pp. 139-40. 72. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominantiia, pp. 83, 85-86; Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, Pp. 390, 392. 73. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, pp. 427, 430, 429. ’ 74. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 245-49. 75. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 472.

76. Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 180-81; Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” p. 116; Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 472. 77. Russkie vedomosti, June 6, 1906, p. I. 78. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 141-42. 79. Nasha zhizn, June 3, 1906, p. 2, June 10, p. 4. 80. See, for example, Russkie vedomosti, June 7, 1906, pp. I, 2. 81. Russkie vedomosti, May 14, 1906, p. 2, May 27, p. 2, May 30, p. 4, June 6, p. 3, June 8, p. 4. 82. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, pp. 566—69; Vinaver, Konflikty v Pervot Dume, pp. 84-85.

83. Quoted in Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” Pp. 559-60. 84. Ibid., pp. 559-63.

Chapter 4 1. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 42. 2. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, pp. 394—95, 455. For a good summary in English on the information in the two volumes, see Perrie, “Russian Peasant Movement.”

390 «6. Notes to Pages 113-21 3. Some of the difficulties in seeking to generalize about the peasant movement in the years from 1905 to 1907 are discussed in Simonova, “Krestianskoe dvizhenie 1905—1907 gg.” 4. Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, p. 99. 5. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 84. 6. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, p. 392.

7. Ibid., p. 414. 8. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 60. 9. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, I, pp. 48, 77; Il, p. 290. See also Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, pp. 1oo—101 on the link between pogroms and peasant “acts of violence.” 10. Robbins, Tsar’s Viceroys, p. 228. For Durnovo’s report to the Tsar on the governors’ assessment of the agrarian unrest, see Dokumenty i materialy, V, part I, pp. 96—98.

11. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, pp. 144-47. 12. Perrie, Agrarian Policy, p. 139; Shanin, Roots of Otherness, pp. 145, 169, 170; Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, II, p. 243; Robinson, Rural Russia, p. 155; Agrar-

noe dvizhenie, Il, pp. 417-18. , 13. Shanin, Roots of Otherness, Il, pp. 114-19. For more details on the

Union, see Kiriukhina, “Vserossiiskii krestianskii soiuz v 1905 g.”’ 14. Shanin, Roots of Otherness, Il, p. 109. 15. On the relative weakness of peasant organizations at this time, see Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, Il, pp. 243—46; and Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, p. 103.

16. Seregny, “Different Type of Peasant Movement”; Shanin, Roots of Oth-

erness, Il, pp. 107-14. ,

131, 183-85. , , 17. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, p. 10. 7

18. On the events in Olshanits, see ibid., pp. 95-96, 100-122 passim, 129,

19. For more details on the agrarian unrest in the autumn and winter of 1905—6 and its suppression, see Ascher, Revolution, I, pp. 161-67, 267-69. ,

20. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 243-44.

21. Levin; Second Duma, pp. 364-65. 22. See, for example, Agrarnoe dvizhenie, 1, pp. 62, 175; and Il, pp. 306, 314.

23. Ibid., 1, p. 93. The role of returning soldiers is mentioned in ibid., pp. 174-75; and Il, pp. 61, 212. 24. Ibid.,1, p. 71.

25. Ibid., p. 49; Il, p. 61. 26. Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, Il, p. 307; Seregny, Russian Teachers, p. 33.

27. Kovalev, ed., ““Tsarizm v borbe,” pp. 150-51. | ,

28. Trekhbratov, “O statisticheskom izuchenii,” pp. 134, 135-36. 29. Ibid., p. 134. For an analysis of another batch of petitions, from Samara

province, see Bukhovets, “K metodike izucheniia.”

pp. 281-84.

30. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part I, vol. 3, pp. 92—93. For other, similarly moving resolutions, see Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution,

31. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, |, p. 131. 32. Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, pp. 277-78, 283—85. For details on the lists of demands, see Trekhbratov, “O statisticheskom izuchenii”’; Bukhovets, ‘“‘K metodike izucheniia”; and Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, Il, pp. 280— 89. See also the discussion in Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 244.

Notes to Pages 121~30 391 33. Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, pp. 278-80. For other peasant resolutions voicing right-wing extremist demands, see Pravo, June 4, 1906, col. 2013. 34. See the document reprinted in Ascher, Revolution, I, p. 165, and the surrounding discussion. 35. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, pp. 259—60. 36. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 324. 37. Quoted in ibid., p. 324. See also Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Il, part 2, p. 267. 38. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 3, pp. 239~42. 39. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 329-31. 40. Such sentiments were expressed in Kaluga and Moscow provinces. See Agrarnoe dvizhenie, I, pp. 13, 17.

41. On the changed tactics of the peasants of Saratov in 1906, see Mixter, “Peasant Collective Action,” p. 224.

42. Drezen, ed., Tsarizm, pp. 121-27; Veselovskii, Krestianskii vopros, pp. 117-18. 43. Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, Il, p. 316. 44. Ibid., p. 317. 45. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 242. 46. Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 4, 1906, p. I. 47. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, pp. 206-10; Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, Pp. 243.

48. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, pp. 12-13. 49. Bushnell, “Mutineers and Revolutionaries,” p. 338. On July 30, to cite but one example, the Governor of Kostroma, A. A. Vatatsi, complained to the Department of Police that he did not have enough troops to maintain order. Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 1, vol. 2, pp. 38-39. 50. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, pp. 129, 144. 51. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 57. 52. Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, p. 106; Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, p. 327. 53. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 254. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, I, p. 86; Veselovskui, Krestianskii vopros, p. 111. 54. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 13, 1906, PAAA. 55. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 3, pp. 363—65. 56. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, |, pp. 53—55, Il, pp. 451, 461; Obshchestvennoe dvi-

zhenie, IV, part 1, p. 7. For additional evidence of the wide variations in the economic consequences of the unrest, see Agrarnoe dvizhenie, I, pp. 84, 132, 149. See also Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, p. 112. 57. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, Il, p. 320. 58. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 42. Ihave rounded the numbers to the nearest thousand.

59. Balabanov, Ot 1905 k 1917, p. 71. 60. See Ascher, Revolution, I, pp. 136—37. 61. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, pp. 311-12. 62. See Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, pp. 287—96, for these and other workers’ resolutions. 63. Ascher, Pavel Axelrod, p. 250. 64. Voitinskii, Gody, Il, pp. 54—55; Garvi, Vospominaniia, Il, p. 23; Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 1, pp. 217-18.

392 Notes to Pages 130-41 65. Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 1, vol. I, p. 23. 66. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 67. 67. Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 1, vol. 1, pp. 3-4; Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. IX, pp. 326-29. 68. Dokumenty i materialy, IV, part 1, vol. 1, pp. 222, 421-22.

69. Ibid., p. 424. ,

70. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 77. 71. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, vol. 1, pp. 226, 244-45. 72. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 226-27. 73. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, May 22, 1906, PAAA. 74. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 3, pp. 149, 184, 186, 310, 494;

Nasha zhizn, May 2, 1906, p. 2. | 75. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 14; Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, pp. 195-97.

76. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, p. 199. 77. Ibid., p. 200. 78. For details and a careful analysis of these statistics, see ibid., pp. 201-5.

79. Ibid., pp. 260—62, 280, 288—89. 80. Ibid., pp. 281-87. On the employers’ associations, see also Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Il, part 2, pp. 74-83. ,

81. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, p. 317. 82. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 239-40. 83. Russkie vedomosti, June 6, 1906, pp. 2, 3. 84. German Consul in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 5, 1906, PAAA; Russkie

vedomosti, June 6, 1906, p. 4. | 85. Nasha zhizn, June 14, 1906, p. 4.

86. Russkie vedomosti, June 6, 1906, p. 3. ,

87. Ibid., June 13, 1906, p. 4, June 7, p. 2; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Il, part 1, pp. 277-78. 88. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 206; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Ul, part 1, pp. 274, 302; Dokumenty i materialy, IV, part 1, vol. 1, p. 619; German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, June 5, 1906, PAAA; Bovykin et al., eds., Rabochii

klass, pp. 292-94. 89. Levin, Second Duma, p. 365; Shanin, Roots of Otherness, p. 196. go. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 207. 91. Ibid., p. 210; Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 193. 92. Pravo, May 28, 1906, col. 1954.

93. Pravo, March 19, 1906, col. 1081. | 94. Voitinskii, Gody, Il, p. 193. 95. Ibid., p. 194.

96. Ibid., pp. 195-96. ,

97. Voitinskii, Peterburgskii Sovet, pp. 8-9. 98. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 222-23. 99. Voitinskii, Peterburgskii Sovet, pp. 7—11. 100. Ibid., pp. 15-17. 1o1. Ibid., pp. 12—19; Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 224. 102. Voitinskii, Peterburgskii Sovet, pp. 27-28.

103. Ibid., Ibid., pp. pp. 54-55. 49-54. : | 104. 105. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

106. Ibid., pp. 32, 65; Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 224.

Notes to Pages 142-49 3:93 107. Voitinskii, Peterburgskii Sovet, pp. 93-96. 108. Ibid., p. 136; Bovykin et al., eds., Rabochii klass, p. 294; Russkie vedomosti, July 13, 1906, p. 3. 109. Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutiondre Partei, p. 372. t10. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, p. 129. 111. For more on the Maximalists, see the thorough discussion in Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutionadre Partei, pp. 126—40. See also Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Ill, pp. 511-16. 112. Pravo, May 21, 1906, cols. 1874-75. 113. Ibid., cols. 1875—76. For similar listings of attacks on officials and policemen at this time, see Pravo, May 28, cols. 1958—59. 114. Russkie vedomosti, June 14, 1906, p. 4. 115. Pravo, July 2, 1906, cols. 2301—2. 116. Pravo, May 6, 1906, col. 1707. 117. Pravo, July 9, 1906, cols. 2346—47. 118. Pravo, July 30, 1906, col. 2501. 119. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, May 22, 1906, PAAA; Pravo, June 18, 1906, col. 2191. 120. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, pp. 126-27. 121. Pravo, July 2, 1906, col. 2300. 122. Pravo, July 9, 1906, col. 2338. 123. British Consulate General in Odessa to London, May 4, 1906, FO 181/ 878, BDFA.

124. The Standard (London), July 25, 1906, p. 7. 125. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, July 6, 1906, PAAA. 126. Moskovskie vedomosti, Sept. 12, 1906, p. 3. 127. Pravo, June 4, 1906, col. 2013. 128. Pravo, May 21, 1906, cols. 1867—68. 129. Pravo, June 4, 1906, col. 2013. 130. Pravo, May 21, 1906, cols. 1868, 1869, 1872. 131. Pravo, March 12, 1906, col. 953. 132. Pravo, May 28, 1906, col. 1958.

133. Pravo, March 12, 1906, cols. 954-55. 134. Pravo, June 25, 1906, col. 2261. 135. Rech, June 4, 1906, p. 3. 136. U.S. Embassy in St. Petersburg to Washington, June 16, June 23, 1906, USDMR; German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 18, 19, 20, 1906, PAAA; French Foreign Ministry to French Embassy in St. Petersburg, June 21, 1906, AMAE.

137. Austro-Hungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg to Vienna, June 12(25), HHSA. For an excellent discussion of Aehrenthal’s anti-Semitism, see Wank, “Case of Aristocratic Anti-Semitism.” 138. Nasha zhizn, June 4, 1906, p. 4. 139. Rech, June 6, 1906, p. 3; Nasha zhizn, June 6, 1906, p. 2. 140. Russkie vedomosti, June 6, 1906, p. 2. 141. American Jewish Year Book, pp. 64-65; Russkie vedomosti, June 6, 1906, p. 3, June 14, p. 2; Rech, June 6, 1906, pp. 2, 3, June 13, p. 2, June 15, p. 3; Nasha zhizn, June 15, 1906, p. 3. There are different estimates of the number of victims; according to some sources, 200 Jews were killed. 142. Rech, June 7, 1906, p. 3.

394 Notes to Pages 149-57 143. Rech, June 6, 1906, p. 3. 144. Nasha zhizn, June 15, 1906, p. 3; Rech, June 6, 1906, pp. 2, 3, June 13, p. 2; Russkie vedomosti, June 14, 1906, p. 2. 145. Rech, June 6, 1906, p. 3.

146. Russkie vedomosti, June 10, 1906, p. 4. ,

147. Rech, June 10, 1906, p. 2. 148. Pravo, June 25, 1906, col. 2250. 149. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, pp. 1128—29; German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 25, 1906, PAAA. 150. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 119. 151. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, pp. 1129—32. I have used (with some minor emendations) the translation of the speech in Baring, A Year in Russia,

Pp. 250-57. , 152. Russkie vedomosti, June 9, 1906, p. I. 153. Rech, June 10, 1906, p. 3.

154. Rech, June 7, 1906, pp. 3, 4, June 11, p. 2.

156. Ibid., p. 1596. _ 157. Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” p. 114. a 155. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, p. 1141.

158. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, p. 1825. 159. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 272—73. 160. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, p. 1775; Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 273; German Consul in Kovno to Berlin, June 27, 1908, PAAA. 161. Rech, June 18, 1906, p. 4; Nasha zhizn, June 7, 1906, p. 4, June 20, p. 4. 162. Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, pp. 141, 173. For details on the conditions in the army and the reforms of December, see Ascher, Revolution, I,

Pp. 167-74, 269-73.

163. Bushnell, ‘““Mutineers and Revolutionaries,” pp. 272—73.

164. Russkie vedomosti, May 11, 1906, p. 1. 165. Bushnell, “Mutineers and Revolutionaries,” p. 244. For more details on these organizations and their attempts to form a unified movement capable of a

pp. 198-201. , pp. 117-18. | : “nationwide armed uprising,” see ibid., pp. 244—50.

166. For details on the newspaper, see Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, 167. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 1, pp. 119—20.

168. Ibid., p. 121. For earlier reports on unrest in Kronstadt, see ibid.,

169. Russkie vedomosti, June 9, 1906, p. I. 170. See Bushnell, “Mutineers and Revolutionaries,” pp. 270—71, for details

on this effort at indoctrination. ©

: 171. Pravo, June 11, 1906, col. 2077. 172. Dokumenty i materialy, V, part 1, vol. 1, pp. 318—19. I have used the translation in Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, pp. 222-23. 173. Quoted in Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, p. 178. For more details on the messages to the Duma, see ibid., pp. 178-80.

174. Ibid., p. 190. 175. Russkie vedomosti, June 14, 1906, p. 4. 176. Pravo, June 25, 1906, col. 2258. :

177. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 3, pp. 412—14. 178. Bushnell, ““Mutineers and Revolutionaries,” p. 294. _

Notes to Pages 157-71 395 179. See, for example, Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 1, vol. 1, pp. 320-21, and vol. 3, pp. 412—14. 180. Bushnell, ‘““Mutineers and Revolutionaries,” pp. 292-95. 181. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 2, p. 61.

182. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 320; Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, pp. 193-94 (the quotation is from p. 194). 183. Konovalov, “Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie,” pp. too—101. 184. Pravo, July 2, 1906, cols. 2290—91; Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, p. 196; Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, p. 157. 185. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, p. 168. 186. Konovalov, “‘Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie,” p. 103.

Chapter 5 1. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, p. 431. 2. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, p. 232. 3. Austro-Hungarian Embassy in St. Petersburg to Vienna, May 20/June 2, 1906, HHSA. 4. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 25, July 1, 1906, PAAA. 5. German Embassy in Rome to Berlin, June 25, 1906, PAAA.

6. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 214; Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 258. 7. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 212—13. 8. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 274; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 205, 219.

9. Healy, Russian Autocracy, pp. 199-202; Maklakov, First State Duma, pp. 157-71. _

10. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, pp. 294-95, 389. 11. Vinaver, Konflikty v Pervoi Dume, pp. 75-77. 12. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, p. 430. 13. Ibid., p. 432. 14. Vinaver, Konflikty v Pervoi Dume, p. 107; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 236—37. 15. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, I, p. 902. 16. Ibid., Il, p. 1469. 17. Ibid., pp. 1478-81. 18. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 239. 19. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, pp. 1481-83. 20. Ibid., p. 1483. 21. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 251; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 239-40. 22. Nasha zhizn, June 3, 1906, p. 4. 23. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, p. 1252. 24. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 255-57; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 261-63. 25. Izvolskii, Recollections, p. 182. 26. Roberta Manning contends that “the complicated legal rhetoric of Duma and cabinet alike about human rights and the rights of the national assembly and/ or the autocrat merely concealed an underlying dispute over property rights, a

396 Notes to Pages 172-86 life-and-death struggle between the gentry and the peasantry over the gentry’s lands.” Crisis of the Old Order, p. 205. 27. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, 1, pp. 248—51. For an English translation of the Kadet project, see Rhyne, “Constitutional Democratic Party,” pp. 478—81. 28. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 216. 29. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, 1, pp. 560-62; Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 217; Owen, Russian Peasant Movement, pp. 31-34; Sidelnikov,

Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 297, 299; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Ill, Pp. 144-46. 30. See Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, pp. 1152—5§6, for the Project of 33.

31. Ibid., p. 1142, quoted in Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 2.17. 32. Moskovskie vedomosti, June 1, 1906, p. 2. 33. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 218-23; the Trepov quotation is

from p. 218. |

34. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, 1, pp. §17~—23. For Stishinskii’s speech,

see ibid., pp. 509-17. 35. Baring, A Year in Russia, p. 180.

p- 480. , ,

36. Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation, pp. 85—86. , 37. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, 1, p. 567. 38. Moskovskie vedomosti, June 17, 1906, p. 2; Gurko, Features and Figures,

173. |

39. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 315-16. 40. Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, June 20, 1906, p. I. 41. Moskovskie vedomosti, June 6, 1906, pp. 1, 2, July 5, p. 1, July 9, p. 1. 42. Heilbronner, “Piotr Khristianovich von Schwanebach,” pp. 31-36. 43. Hosking and Manning, “What Was the United Nobility?,” pp. 160, 161,

44. Ibid., p. 155. 45. Korros, “Landed Nobility,” p. 126. 46. Hosking and Manning, “What Was the United Nobility?,” pp. 151-59. 47. Ibid., p. 159. 48. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 386. 49. Vinaver, Istoriia, p. 6; Rech, June 2, 1906, p. 3, June 6, p. 1; Miliukov,

Vospominaniia, p. 389. 50. Rech, June 16, 1906, reprinted in Miliukov, God borby, pp. 490-92. 51. Russkie vedomosti, June 16, 1906, p. 2. 52. Ibid., June 22, 1906, p. 2. 53. Moskovskie vedomosti, July 1, 1906, p. 1. 54. Tuck, “Paul Miljukov,” pp. 119—20.

55. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 377. 56. Ibid., pp. 377-79. 57. Ibid., p. 379.

58. Chermenskii, Burzhuaztia, p. 287. , 59. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 147-49.

60. Riha, Russian European, p. 124. , 61. Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 216-17, 219. 62. The Daily Telegraph (London), July 7, 1906 (June 24 by the Russian calendar), p. 12. The quotations in this and the following few paragraphs are from this article. 63. Rech, June 27, 1906, reprinted in Miliukov, God borby, p. 497.

Notes to Pages 187-99 397

64. The full text of the memorandum is in Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 184-89. 65. Ibid., pp. 189-92. 66. Ibid., p. 193; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 380. 67. Ibid., p. 385. 68. Miliukov, Tri popytki, p. 34. 69. Russkie vedomosti, July 1, 1905, p. 2. 70. Tuck, “Paul Miljukov,” p. 124. 71. Izvolskii, Recollections, p. 212. Izvolskii says the ride took place in midJuly, but that is clearly incorrect, since the Duma would have been dissolved by then. 72. Shipov, Vospominaniia, p. 450. 73. Miliukov, Tri popytki, pp. 40—41. 74. Shipov, Vospominaniia, pp. 445-46. 75. Ibid., pp. 446—48. 76. Ibid., p. 449.

77. Ibid., pp. 449-51. 78. Ibid., pp. 451-57. 79. Ibid., pp. 457-58. 80. Ibid., p. 460. 81. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, p. 1956. 82. Ibid., p. 1974. 83. Ibid., p. 1989. 84. Ibid., p. 1958. 85. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 308; Miliukov, Vospominantiia, pp. 39798. On the fate of the Appeal, see also Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, p. 103. 86. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 397-98. 87. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 268—69. 88. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906, Il, p. 2034, quoted in Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 274; Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 358.

89. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 486; Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, p. 105; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 254; Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, p. 116; Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 123. 90. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 261. 91. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 484. 92. Ibid., p. 482. 93. Ibid., p. 488; Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 153; Izvolskii, Recollections, p. 203. 94. Heilbronner, “Piotr Khristianovich von Schwanebach,” p. 37. 95. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 152. 96. Ibid., p. 155; Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, pp. 104-5. 97. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, pp. 230-31. 98. Russkie vedomosti, July 7, 1906, p. 1, July 8, p. 4, July 9, pp. 2, 4; Moskovskie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 2; Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, p. 207. 99. Vinaver, Istoriia, p. 7; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 396. 100. Rech, July 6, 1906, reprinted in Miliukov, God borby, p. 380. See also Riha, Russian European, p. 132, whose translation I have used with some emendations. 101. Rech, July 6, 1906, in Miliukov, God borby, p. 381. 102. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 2.

398 Notes to Pages 199-209

Features and Figures, p. 484. ,

103. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, p. 400; Rech, July 12, 1906, p. 2; Gurko,

104. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, pp. 118-19. 105. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, pp. 400—401; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 401; Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, p. 106; Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 486.

106. Healy, Russian Autocracy, p. 243. :

107. Ibid., p. 247; Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. I. 108. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 2; Moskovuskie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, pp. 2, 3; Rech, July 10, 1906, pp. 1, 2; Pravo, July 23, 1906, col. 2422. 109. The Standard (London), July.25, 1906, p. 7.

110. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 402.

111. The Hungarian precedent was not relevant to the situation in Russia. The dissolution of the Diet had clearly been a violation of the constitution. See Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 290-91. 112. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 402—4; Vinaver, Istoriia, pp. 9—10. 113. Russkie vedomosti, July 19, 1906, p. 2.

114. Ibid., July 12, 1906,|p. 2. , 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid.; Riha, Russian European, p. 134.

117. Sergeev, ed., “Pervaia gosudarstvennaia duma,” p. 86. | 118. Ibid., pp. 87—88.

119. Ibid., p. 89. 120. Vinaver, Istoriia, p. 22; Riha, Russian European, p. 134. 121. Sergeev, ed., ““Pervaia gosudarstvennaia duma,” pp. 89—91.122. Russkie vedomosti, July 12, 1906, p. 2. 123. Sergeev, ed., ““Pervaia gosudarstvennaia duma,” pp. 96—97; Russkie ve-

domosti, July 12, 1906, p. 2; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 406. 124. I have used the translation, with some minor changes, in Zimmerman,

125. Ibid., pp. 285—86.

“Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 282—83.

126. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, p. 435; Miliukov, Tri popytki, pp. 62—63. 127. Rech, July 16, 1906, reprinted in Miliukov, God borby, p. 532.

128. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 3. 129. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 124. 130. Moskovskie vedomosti, July 12, 1906, p. 2.

131. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 406—7. 132. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, p. 120. 133. Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, pp. 372—73; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 285. 134. Pravo, Aug. 6, 1906, cols. 2553—54. 135. Russkie vedomosti, July 28, 1906, p. 4. 136. Pravo, July 30, 1906, col. 2491; Russkie vedomosti, July 21, 1906, p. 2. 137. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 2, July 12, p. 2. 138. Rech, July 12, 1906, p. 1. 139. On the Social Democrats’ leaflets, see Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 1,

vol. 2, pp. 164-65, 306=7.

140. Rech, July 14, 1906. 141. Moskovskie vedomosti, July 12, 1906, p. 2, July 14, p. 2.

142. Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, Il, pp. 318—20, 323—24.

Notes to Pages 209-21 399 143. Pares, Russia and Reform, pp. 561-62. 144. Riha, Russian European, p. 135. 145. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 417; Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, p. 235. 146. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 327-29. 147. Harrison, “Octobrists,” p. 58. 148. Trubetskoi, “Iz zapisnoi knizhki arkhivista.” 149. Moskovskie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. I. 150. Ibid., p. 3. 151. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 1. For similarly pessimistic predictions, see Rech, July 10, 1906, p. 1, and July 16, p. 1. 152. Rech, Sept. 8, 1906, p. 3. 153. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 493; Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, pp. 121—223; Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 218-19. 154. Tovarishch, Sept. 8, 1906, p. 2.

Chapter 6 1. Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 463—64.

2. Ibid., p. 461. 3. Shanin, Roots of Otherness, Il, pp. 245—46; Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 250. 4. Strakhovsky, “Statesmanship of Peter Stolypin,” p. 349. 5. Solzhenitsyn, August 1914, p. $30.

6. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 2, 1907, FO 181/899, BDFA.

7. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, July 24, 1906, PAAA. 8. Tverskoi, “K istoricheskim materialam,” p. 186. 9. Von Bock, Reminiscences of My Father, pp. 65—66, 178.

10. Conroy, Peter Arkad’evich Stolypin, p. 26; Witte, Vospominaniia, IU, p. 351; Levin, “P. A. Stolypin,” pp. 458—59; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 2, 1907, FO 181/899, BDFA.

11. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, |, pp. 160—61; Rediger, “Iz zapisok,” pp. 116, 127; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 2, 1907, FO 181/ 899, BDFA. 12. On Stolypin’s commitment to strengthening the state, see Hosking, “P. A. Stolypin,” especially pp. 141-42. 13. Shipov, Vospominaniia, pp. 480, 484, 511. 14. Tverskoi, “K istoricheskim materialam,” pp. 194, 197. 15. See the analysis of Stolypin as a leader in Hosking, Russian Constitutional

Experiment, pp. 25-26. 16. Izgoev, P. A. Stolypin, p. 12. 17. Von Bock, Reminiscences of My Father, p. 22. 18. Levin, “P. A. Stolypin,” p. 446. 19. Von Bock, Reminiscences of My Father, p. 88. 20. For a good description of Saratov, see Raleigh, Revolution on the Volga,

pp. 17-74. 21. For a detailed study of Stolypin in Saratov, see Fallows, ‘““Governor Stolypin,” in Wade and Seregny, eds., Politics and Society, pp. 160—90. 22. Robbins, Tsar’s Viceroys, p. 232; Strakhovsky, “Statesmanship of Peter

400 Notes to Pages 221-32 Stolypin,” p. 350. Stolypin’s 1904 report is reproduced in “K istorii agrarnoi

reformy Stolypina.” , |

23. Quoted in Levin, “P. A. Stolypin,” p. 447. 24. Pares, A Wandering Student, p. 156. 25. Izvolskii, Recollections, pp. 88-89. 26. Von Bock, Reminiscences of My Father, p. 128. 27. Pares, A Wandering Student, pp. 156-57. 28. Raleigh, Revolution on the Volga, pp. 56-57. 29. Russkie vedomosti, July 15, 1906, p. 2. 30. Ibid., July 14, 1906, p. 1. |

31. Pares, A Wandering Student, p. 142; Pares, My Russian Memoirs, pp. 125-26. a 32. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 126.

33. Ibid.; Russkie vedomosti, July 15, 1906, p. 2. | 34. Russkie vedomosti, July 16, 1906, p. I. 35. Ibid., July 11, 1906, p. 2, July 19, p. 3; Rech, July 12, 1906, p. 1.

36. Shipov, Vospominaniia, pp. 464—66.

38. Ibid., p. 473. ,

37. Ibid., pp. 466—72.

39. Startsev, Russkaia burzhuaziia, pp. 116-18. 40. For a detailed discussion of the negotiations, see ibid., pp. 118-22.

41. Guchkov, “Iz vospominanii A. I. Guchkova,” p. 2. 42. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” pp. 102-3.

43. Guchkov, “Iz vospominanii A. I. Guchkova,” p. 2. | 44. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, Aug. 10, 1906, PAAA. 45. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 151.

BDFA. ,

46. Russkie vedomosti, July 21, 1906, p. 2. |

47. Ibid., July 23, 1906, p. I. 48. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 2, 1907, FO 181/899,

49. Ibid.

50. Voitinskii, Gody, Il, p. 121.

51. Ibid., p. 105. ,

52. Garvi, Vospominaniza, Il, p. 76. 53. The Standard (London), July 25, 1906, p. 7, July 26, p. 7. 54. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 39—40.

55. Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutiondare Partei, p. 158. , 56. Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 37—38.

57. Ibid., pp. 42-47. For the appeal of July 10, see ibid., pp. 34-36. 58. Lenin, “Rospusk Dumy i zadachi proletariata,” in Sochineniia, X, pp. 5—

19; Derenkovskii, ““Vseobshchaia stachka,” pp. 113-15.

59. Liadov, Vospominaniia, p. 171. i

60. Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, pp. 209-10. 61. See, for example, the leaflet issued by the Kiev committee of the RSDWP on July 10, in Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 2, vol. 3, pp. 84—86. 62. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, July 23, 1906, PAAA. ~ 63. Garvi, Vospominaniia, Il, p. 77; Pravo, July 30, 1906, col. 2496; Bush-

nell, Mutiny and Repression, p. 217. ,

64. Pravo, July 30, 1906, cols. 2500-2501. This account does not indicate

why the sailor was arrested.

Notes to Pages 232-39 401 65. On the Sveaborg, Kronstadt, and Pamiat Azova mutinies, see Pravo, July 30, 1906, cols. 2496-2500; Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 92-93, 121-31, 177—79; and Bushnell, Mutiny and Repression, pp. 216— 20. There were two other mutinies at this time—in Poltava on July 15 and in Deshlagar (Azerbaijan) on July 17—but both were quickly crushed. See Bushnell,

Mutiny and Repression, pp. 213-14. 66. Derenkovski, “Vseobshchaia stachka,” pp. 128—29; Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, p. 609. 67. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 271-72. 68. Ibid., pp. 5o—51; Derenkovskii, ““Vseobshchaia stachka,” p. 130. The five other groups were the Committee of the Social Democratic Fraction of the State Duma, the Committee of the Trudovik Group of the State Duma, the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and the Central Committee of the General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia (Bund). 69. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 245. 70. Ibid., p. 244; Russkie vedomosti, July 23, 1906, p. 3; Dokumenty 1 materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 278, 279. 71. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 272, 275; Derenkovskii, “Vseobshchaia stachka,” p. 130. 72. Derenkovskii, ““Vseobshchaia stachka,” pp. 139-40; Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, p. 471. 73. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 475-76. 74. See, for example, Derenkovskii, “Vseobshchaia stachka,” p. 145; and Dokumenty i materialy, V1, part 2, vol. 1, p. 623. 75. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 475, 623. 76. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, Aug. 10, 1906, PAAA; Russkie vedomosti, July 28, 1906, pp. 4-5. 77. Derenkovskii, ““Vseobshchaia stachka,” pp. 149, 152; Russkie vedomosti, July 28, 1906, p. 4; Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 482-83. 78. Dubrovskii, Krestianskoe dvizhenie, p. 42; Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 141. 79. Riha, Russian European, p. 133. 80. See Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutiondre Partei, pp. 159—61, for a discussion of the SR view that a revolution was imminent. 81. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 2, vol. 1, pp. 126-29. 82. Voitinskii, Gody, Il, pp. 106-7.

83. Schapiro, Communist Party, pp. 86-98; Ascher, Pavel Axelrod, pp. 265-66. 84. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, Aug. 5, 1906, PAAA. 85. Pravo, Aug. 13, 1906, col. 2610. 86. Pravo, Sept. 24, 1906, cols. 2972-73. 87. Pravo, Aug. 20, 1906, cols. 2664-65. 88. Russkie vedomosti, July 30, 1906, p. 4.

89. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, p. 312; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Il, part I, pp. 294-96. 90. Moskovskie vedomosti, July 20, 1906, p. 2. 91. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, Aug. 7, 1906, PAAA. On Bauman’s funeral, see Ascher, Revolution, I, pp. 262-65. 92. Russkie vedomosti, July 22, 1906, p. 3.

402 ~#=Notes to Pages 239-46

93. Ibid., July 28, 1906, p. 3. oO |

lin, Aug. 5, 1906, PAAA.

94. Ibid., July 23, 1906, pp. 2—3; German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Ber-

95. For an excellent account of Herzenstein’s murder and the trial, see Raw-

son, “Union of the Russian People,” pp. 165-76.

96. Pravo, Aug. 13, 1906, cols. 2602—6; Aug. 20, cols. 2660—62. a

97. Rech, Sept. 9, 1906, p. 3. , ,

98. Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 15, 1906, p. 3. a 99. Ibid., Aug. 9, 1906, p. 3, Aug. 17, p. 3, Oct. 1, p. 4, Nov. 14, p. 3; Pravo, Aug. 13, 1906, col. 2602. See these sources for the names of additional cities in

which large stores of arms were found. 100. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Sept. 24, 1906, FO 181/

865, BDFA. a

865, BDFA. . | 865, BDFA. , a

101. German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, Sept. 19, 1906, PAAA. 102. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Sept. 24, 1906, FO 181/

, 103. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 94. , 104. Rech, Oct. 18, 1906, p. 3. 105. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Oct. 11, 1906, FO 181/

865. ,

106. Simonova, “Krestianskoe dvizhenie 1905-1907 gg.,” p. 224. 107. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Oct. 11, 1906, FO 181/ 108. Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 3, 1906, p. 4. 10g. See, for example, ibid., Aug. 4, 1906, p. 2, Aug. 5, p. 3, Aug. 10, p. 2,

p. 360. , . Aug. 30, p. 3, and Nov. 14, p.3. | , 110. German Consul in Baku to Berlin, Nov. 15, 1906, PAAA.

111. For additional details on the violence in the Caucasus, see Dokumenty i materialy, VI, part 1, vol. 3, p. 360; and Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 11, 1906, 112. Vestnik Evropy, no. 9, Sept. 1906, p. 422.

113. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, pp. 134-35.

114. Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 13, 1906, pp. 2, 3; Pravo, Aug. 20, 1906, cols. 2659—60; Von Bock, Reminiscences of My Father, pp. 150—57; Gerassi-

moff, Der Kampf, pp. 134-35. oe

115. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 164-65. Oo 116. Moskovskie vedomosti, Aug. 17, 1906, pp. I—2.

117. Tovarishch, Aug. 16, 1906, p. 3; German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, Aug. 27, 1906, PAAA. , 118. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” pp. 103—4. :

119. Conroy, Peter Arkad’evich Stolypin, pp. 94-95; Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 268, 281—82; Levin, “P. A. Stolypin,” p. 449; Fuller, Civil-

Military Conflict, p. 174; Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 388. | 120. Rech, Sept. 7, 1906, p. 3; Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 449. -

121. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 449. Kokovtsov claimed that every min- , ister, including the most liberal, Izvolskii, agreed on the need to institute field

courts-martial. Out of My Past, pp. 159-60. 7

122. The law was. widely publicized. See, for example, Moskovskie vedomosti, Aug. 29, 1906, p. I. For a fine discussion of the law, see Fuller, Civil-

Military Conflict, pp.174-76. | .

Notes to Pages 246-52 403 123. Moskovskie vedomosti, Oct. 12, 1906, p. 2. 124. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, p. 174. 125. Ibid., pp. 169—73. See ibid., p. 171 for statistics on the number of civilian trials in Military District Courts in the years from 1902 to 1912. 126. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Sept. 12, 1906, FO 181/ 865, BDFA.

127. Shipov, Vospominaniia, p. 492. ,

128. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, p. 174. 129. Harrison, “British Press,” p. 92. 130. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 332-33. 131. Tovarishch, Sept. 5, 1906, p. 4, Sept. 13, p. 3. 132. Ibid., Sept. 16, 1906, p. 3. 133. Rech, Sept. 2, 1906, p. 2. 134. Russkie vedomosti, Jan 24, 1907, Pp. 3. 135. Ibid., Nov. 19, 1906, p. 4; Tovarishch, Feb. 20, 1907, p. 5. 136. Strakhovsky, “Statesmanship of Peter Stolypin,” p. 357. 137. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 175; Riha, Russian European, p. 160. 138. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, VII, p. 4. 139. Strakhovsky, “Statesmanship of Peter Stolypin,” p. 357. 140. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Oct. 26, Nov. 7, 1906, FO 181/863, BDFA; German Consul in Moscow to Berlin, Oct. 8, 1906, PAAA. 141. Russkie vedomosti, July 20, 1906, p. 2; Sidelnikov, Obrazovanie i deiatelnost, p. 370. 142. Pravo, Sept. 17, 1906, col. 2899. 143. Pravo, Aug. 13, 1906, col. 2597. 144. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 2, July 12, pp. 2, 3, Oct. 17, p. 4; Moskovskie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 3, July 12, p. 2; Pravo, July 23, 1906, cols. 2424-26, Sept. 17, cols. 2899—2900, Oct. 15, col. 3184. 145. Russkie vedomosti, July 11, 1906, p. 2, July 14, p. 2, Aug. 11, p. 4, Sept. 30, p. 3; Moskovskie vedomosti, July 16, 1906, p. 2; Rech, Aug. 30, 1906, p. 2, Oct. 3, p. 3; Pravo, Aug. 13, 1906, cols. 2599-2600, Sept. 10, col. 2827, Sept. 17, col. 2903. 146. Pravo, Aug. 27, 1906, col. 2736. 147. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh, p. 23.4; Russkie vedomosti, July 12, 1906, p. 2; Pravo, July 23, 1906, cols. 2423-24. 148. Russkie vedomosti, Oct. 12, 1906, p. 3. 149. Ibid., Aug. 31, 1906, p. 3; Pravo, Sept. 10, 1906, col. 2823. 150. Russkie vedomosti, Nov. 7, 1906, p. 3. 151. Ibid., Aug. 1, 1906, p. 2; Pravo, Sept. 24, 1906, col. 2958; Zimmerman, “Between Reaction and Revolution,” pp. 293-94.

152. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 292—93; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, IV, part 2, p. 67; Pravo, Aug. 6, 1906, col. 2552, Aug. 13, col. 2599, Aug. 27, cols. 2740, 2777, Sept. 10, col. 2825, Sept. 24, col. 2959, Oct. 1, col. 3027; Rech, Sept. 5, 1906, p. 2; Russkie vedomosti, Oct. 13, 1906, p. 3, Oct. 18, p. 3.

153. Curtiss, Church and State, p. 231. The one distinction that remained was that only the Orthodox Church was permitted to proselytize among other faiths. 154. Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 9, 1906, p. 2; Rogger, Jewish Policies, pp. 95— 96; British Embassy in St. Petersburg, Oct. 22, 1906, FO 181/906, BDFA.

404 Notes to Pages 253-64 ,

PP. 94-95. .

155. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 106; Rogger, Jewish Policies,

156. See Rogger, Jewish Policies, p. 250, for more details on Stolypin’s proposal; and Conroy, Peter Arkad’evich Stolypin, p. 49.

157. Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 504-6.

158. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 167-68. 159. ‘“Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 105. The translation is from Rogger, Jewish Policies, p. 93. I have relied heavily on Rogger’s excellent account of the cabinet’s deliberations, ibid., pp. 90-97. 160. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 167-68. 161. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” pp. 106-7. 162. Russkie vedomosti, Nov. 9, 1906, p. 3. 163. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, Jan. 28, 1907, PAAA. On

Gorky’s stay in the United States, see Kaun, Maxim Gorky, p. 386. , 164. Kassow, “Russian University,” pp. 478—79; Ivanov, ““Demokraticheskoe studenchestvo,” p. 199. 165. Tovarishch, Aug. 27, 1906, p. I. 166. Russkie vedomosti, Sept. 2, 1906, p. 3. 167. Ibid., Sept. 3, 1906, p. 3; Rech, Sept. 9, 1906, p. 3.

168. Rech, Sept. 3, 1906, p. 2, Sept. 16, p. 4, Sept. 21, p. 4; Russkie vedo-

mosti, Sept. 3, 1906, p. 3, Nov. 19, p. 3. : 169. Kassow, “Russian University,” pp. 487, 489—90.

170. Ibid., pp. 209, 5o1—2. , 171. Russkie vedomosti, Aug. 25, 1906, p. 3; Rech, Sept. 6, 1906, p. 3.

172. Ivanov, “Demokraticheskoe studenchestvo,” p. 202.

173. Kassow, “Russian University,” p. 486; Rech, Sept. 26, 1906, p. 4; Russkie vedomosti, Oct. 18, 1906, p. 2. 174. Kassow, “Russian University,” pp. 494—96; Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 31, 1907, p. 4, Feb. 4, p. 5; Rech, Feb. 2, 1907, p. 2. 175. Quoted in Kassow, “Russian University,” p. 522. The information on Stolypin is from ibid., pp. 520-22. 176. Rech, Sept. 23, 1906, p. 3. 177. Moskovskie vedomosti, Sept. 20, 1906, p. 3, Oct. 7, pp. 2-3. 178. Rech, Oct. 14, 1906, p. 3; Russkie vedomosti, Oct. 3, 1906, pp. 3—4. 179. Rech, Oct. 1, 1906, p. 3, Oct. 3, p. 3, Oct. 5, p. 2, Oct. 7, p. 3, Oct. 10,

p- 4.

p. 3; Russkie vedomosti, Oct. 4, 1906, p. 2, Oct. 5, p. 3, Oct. 6, p. 1, Oct. 7,

906, BDFA.

180. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Oct. 22, 1906, FO 181/ 181. Russkie vedomosti, Oct. 19, 1906, p. 4, Oct. 21, p. 2. 182. Rech, Feb. 8, 1907, p. 3; Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 8, 1907, p. 3. 183. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 28, 1907, p. 4, Feb. 7, p. 3; Pravo, Feb. 18,

1907, col. 556.

Chapter 7 |

BDFA. ,

1. French Embassy in St. Petersburg to Paris, Sept. 22, 1906, AMAE. 2. Tovarishch, Sept. 23, 1906, p. 2. , 3. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Oct. 22, 1906, FO 181/906,

Notes to Pages 264-74 405 4. French Embassy in St. Petersburg to Paris, Oct. 6, 1906, AMAE. 5. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 129. 6. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, Nov. 9, Nov. 30, 1906, PAAA. 7. Ibid., Feb. 18, 1907, PAAA. 8. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 403; Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,”

pp. 103-4. 9. Harrison, “British Press,” pp. 89—90; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Oct. 11, 1906, FO 181/865, BDFA; Rech, Sept. 29, 1906, p. 2. 10. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 402. 11. Gurko, Features and Figures, pp. 506—8; Novyi Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, XV, p. 298; British Embassy in St. Petersburg, Dec. 5, 1906, FO 181/863, BDFA.

12. This is one of the central themes of Macey’s Government and Peasant in Russia.

13. Ibid., p. 44. 14. Ibid., p. 234; Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 501. 15. Quoted in Mosse, “‘Stolypin’s Villages,” p. 259. 16. Tverskoi, “K istoricheskim materialam,” p. 191. 17. Wortman, “Property Rights,” p. 29. 18. Quoted in Treadgold, “Was Stolypin in Favor of the Kulaks?,” pp. 5-6.

19. Quoted in ibid., p. 3. 20. Quoted in ibid., p. 3. , 21. On these points, see ibid., p. 7; and Macey, Government and Peasant in

Russia, pp. 239-40. 22. Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, p. 162. 23. On Stolypin’s encouragement of settlement in Siberia, see Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, pp. 160-71. 24. Preyer, Die russische Agrarreform, pp. 159—60; Macey, Government and

Peasant in Russia, pp. 226, 233-34; Robinson, Rural Russia Under the Old Regime, pp. 209-11. 25. Robinson, Rural Russia, pp. 212-22; Mosse, “Stolypin’s Villages,” pp. 261-62; Macey, Government and Peasant in Russia, pp. 235—36. 26. Quoted in Treadgold, “Was Stolypin in Favor of the Kulaks?,”’ p. ro. 27. Perrie, Agrarian Policy, p. 184. 28. Wortman, “Property Rights,” p. 29; Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 316; Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution, p. 19. 29. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 286—87; Macey, Government and Peasant in Russia, p. 220. 30. Maklakov, First State Duma, p. 141. 31. Mosse, “Stolypin’s Villages,” p. 274. 32. For more details on the peasants’ reluctance to take advantage of Stolypin’s reforms, see ibid., pp. 268—71; and Owen, Russian Peasant Movement,

pp. 51-53. 33. Owen, Russian Peasant Movement, p. 82. 34. Alekseev, “Ocherki novoi agronomicheskoi politiki,” Sovremennyi mir, Sept. 1909, pp. 236—39, quoted in ibid., p. 83. 35. Tokmakoff, “Stolypin’s Agrarian Reform,” p. 124. 36. Mosse, “Stolypin’s Villages,” p. 263; Owen, Russian Peasant Movement, p. 63. See also Atkinson’s thoughtful study “The Statistics on the Russian Land Commune.”

406 Notes to Pages 274-83

Order, p. 292. ,

37. Kurlov, Gibel imperatorskoi Rossii, p. 73; Manning, Crisis of the Old

38. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, Nov. 9, 1906, PAAA. 39. Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” pp. 80—83; Tovarishch, Jan. 12, 1907, p. 4; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Sept. 12, 1906, FO 181/

865, BDFA. , 40. Russkie vedomosti, Nov. 30, 1906, p. 2.

41. Pravo, Sept. 10, 1906, col. 2823. ,

42. Pravo, Jan. 21, 1907, col. 241. 43. Pravo, Oct. 29, 1906, col. 3339. 44. Pravo, Nov. 19, 1906, col. 3609.

45. Pravo, Jan. 6, 1907, col. 61. ,

46. Pravo, Jan. 6, 1907, col. 61. 47. Pravo, Jan. 14, 1907, col. 141. 48. Pravo, Jan. 14, 1907, col. 141. 49. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, pp. 100-104; Shchegolev, ed., Padenie,

V, PP. 405-9. |

50. Kurlov, Gibel imperatorskoi Rossii, pp. 73-74.

51. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, VI, pp. 184-205. _ 52. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, p. 421; Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, p. 445.

53. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 13, 1907, p. 3.

54. Pravo, Dec. 10, 1906, col. 3884, Jan. 28, cols. 316—19. 55. Pravo, Feb. 4, 1907, col. 397. 56. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 25, 1907, p. 3.

57. Pravo, Feb. 4, 1907, col. 395. ,

58. Pravo, Jan. 14, 1907, col. 141. 59. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Feb. 13, 1907, FO 181/899, BDFA.

60. Rech, Jan. 13, 1907, p. 3. 61. Tovarishch, Feb. 4, 1907, p. 5, Feb. 6, p. 4. 62. Novoe vremia, Jan. 6, 1907, p. 2. 63. Rech, Jan. 7, 1907, Pp. 3.

64. Ibid. 65. Rech, Jan. 9, 1907, p. 3, Jan. 13, p. 3. 66. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 304—10; Cher-

menskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 339—40. 67. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, p. 443. :

69. Ibid., p. 446. -

68. Ibid., pp. 445-46.

70. Voitinskii, Gody, Il, p. 146. 71. Ibid., pp. 115—17; Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 258-59.

Party, p. 93. | 72. Voitinskii, Gody, II, pp. 133-34.

73. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 262-63; Schapiro, Communist 74. On the SR strategy during the second electoral campaign, see the analysis

in Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutiondre Partei, pp. 177-81.

75. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, pp. 263-64. 76. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, 1, pp. 104—5. For other evidence of peasant support of the upcoming Duma, see ibid., pp. 16, 179-80.

Notes to Pages 283-93 407 77. Ibid., pp. 46—47, 112; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, part 2, p. 278. 78. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, |, p. 251. 79. Ibid., p. 112. 80. Pares, “Second Duma,” p. 42. 81. These figures are taken from Levin, Second Duma, p. 67. The statistics are necessarily inexact because there was some movement of deputies from one party to another, as there had been in the First Duma. But whichever figures are used, the basic point remains: the substantial increase in the number of deputies of the extreme parties on the right and left. 82. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 17, 1907, p. 3.

83. Levin, Second Duma, p. 68.

84. See the table in Emmons, Formation of Political Parties, p. 367, for additional details on election results. See also his careful analysis (pp. 365—71) of the significance of the shift in votes between the two elections. 85. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 6, 1907, p. 3. 86. Rech, Jan. 30, 1907, p. 4. 87. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 8, 1907, pp. 2, 3, Feb. 10, p. 2, Feb. 13, p. 3. 88. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1907, p. 2. 89. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 314-15. 90. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 105. 91. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Dec. 19, 1906, FO 181/863, BDFA.

92. Pravo, Dec. 31, 1906, col. 4172; Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, p. 396. 93. Tovarishch, Jan. 30, 1907. 94. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 31, 1907, Pp. 2. 95. Ibid., Jan. 4, 1907, p. 2. 96. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, pp. 152—60. 97. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, pp. 430-32; Riha, Russian European, p. 141;

Pipes, Liberal on the Right, pp. 55-56. For an analysis of the Kadet attitude toward revolutionary terror, see Geifman, ‘““The Kadets and Terrorism.” At times,

leading Kadets portrayed terrorists as “innocent victims of the regime” and as “martyrs and near-saints.” Ibid., p. 260. 98. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 24, 1907, Pp. 3. 99. Lenin, Sochinentia (3d ed.), X, pp. 299, 323, quoted in Riha, Russian European, p. 141. too. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, XIV, pp. 380-85. 101. Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, pp. 408-9.

Chapter 8 1. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, March 14, 1907, FO 181/ 893, BDFA.

2. Rech, Feb. 21, 1907, p. I. 3. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 21, 1907, pp. 3, 4, Feb. 23, p. 3; Novoe vremia, Feb. 21, 1907, p. 4, Feb. 23, p. 3; Rech, Feb. 21, 1907, p. 3. 4. See, for example, the Governor of Mogilev’s order prohibiting such meetings. Pravo, April 15, 1907, col. 1166. 5. Nilve, “Prigovory i nakazy,” pp. 99—I00.

408 Notes to Pages 294-304 6. Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, p. 276; Nilve, “‘Prigovory 1 nakazy,” pp. 100-104; Nilve, “K metodike izucheniia prigovorov,” p. 177. 7. Pares, My Russtan Memotrs, p. 132. 8. Nilve, “Prigovory i nakazy,” pp. 108—10. See also the peasant petitions

, reproduced in Dokumenty i materialy, VII, part 1, pp. 362—64, 376-77.

g. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 266. 10. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 17, 1907, p. 3. 11. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, part 1, pp. 293, 463-64.

12. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 21, 1907, pp. I, 3, 4, Feb. 23, p. 3; Novoe vremia, Feb. 21, 1907, p. 4, Feb. 23, p. 3; Rech, Feb. 21, 1907, p. 2. For details on worker interest in the Duma in Ekaterinoslav and Penza, see these sources. __

13. Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” p. 146.

14. French Embassy in St. Petersburg to Paris, March 9, 1907, AMAE;; Pares,

“Second Duma,” p. 45. .

1907, Pp. 3. , | 15. Gessen, V duukh vekakh, p. 241.

16. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 367-68; Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 20,

BDFA..- , , 17. Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 20, 1907, p. 3.

18. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, p. 1; Levin, Second Duma, p. 92; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, March 14, 1907, FO 181/893,

19. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, p. 8. ,

20. Golovin, ““Vospominaniia,” pp. 146—47; “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 108.

21. Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 117-19. Oo

Pp. 295-96. SO

22. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 108; Manning, Crisis of the Old Order,

23. Novoe vremia, Feb. 21, 1907, p. 4.

24. Russkie vedomosti, March 22, 1907, p. 4. 25. Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” pp. 130-31. , 26. Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 132-35; Russkie vedomosti, March 30, 1907, p. 4, March 31, p. 2, April 1, p. 4, April 4, p. 2; Levin, Second Duma, pp. 134-37.

27. Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 135-36.

28. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 133. ,

29. Russkie vedomosti, March 2, 1907, p. 3.

30. Ibid., March 3, 1907, p. 2, March 22, p. 4, April 19, p. 3. For other incidents of government harassment of deputies, see ibid., March 3, p. 4, March 4, p. 3, April 19, p. 3; and Rech, Feb. 18, 1907, p. 3.

31. Pravo, April 8, 1907, col. 1090. ,

P- 4432. Russkie vedomosti, April 27, 1907, p. 2, April 29, pp. 2, 3. 33. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 109. 34. German Embassy in St. Petersburg, March 16, 1907, to Berlin, PAAA.

35. Golovin, “Zapiski,” p. 121. , .

36. Bing, ed., The Secret Letters, p. 229. 37. The Daily News (London), March 13, 1907, p. 7. 38. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, 1, p. 57, quoted in Roobol, Tsereteli, 39. Quoted in Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 333.

40. Ibid., p. 332; Pipes, Liberal on the Right, pp. 57—59.

41. Brainerd, “The Octobrists and the Gentry,” pp. 82—83; Obshchestvennoe

Notes to Pages 304-18 409 dvizhenie, Ill, pp. 211-13, 216—17; Tovarishch, March 30, 1907, p. 3; Russkie vedomosti, April 13, 1907, p. 2. 42. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 332; Levin, Second Duma, p. 193. 43. Pares, My Russian Memotrs, p. 142. 44. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, 1, pp. 106—20; Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” p. 153. For a discussion of the reforms Stolypin had in mind, see Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 302-3.

45. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, 1, pp. 120—29. , 46. Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” pp. 220-21. 47. Ibid., pp. 60-64. 48. H. Williams, Russia of the Russians, p. 83. 49. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, pp. 130—69. 50. Maklakov, Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, p. 96. 51. Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” p. 154. 52. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, |, pp. 445-46.

53. Ibid., pp. 445-50. 54. Ibid., pp. 1275-77; Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” pp. 139—41. 55. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, pp. 954-55, 981—84. 56. Ibid., p. 1027; Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” p. 137. 57. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, p. 565.

58. Ibid., Il, pp. 178-92. 59. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 24, 1907, FO 181/893, BDFA.

60. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 300; Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, pp. 414-16. 61. Russkie vedomosti, March 29, 1907, p. 2, March 30, p. 1, April 10, pp. 4,

5; Bogdanovich, Dnevnik, pp. 414-16; Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, Pp. 300, 302—3.

62. Russkie vedomosti, April 4, 1907, p. 4, April 5, p. 2, April 10, p. 4, April 11, pp. 2, 4, April 12, p. 2; Novoe vremia, April 11, p. 2. 63. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 180. 64. Quoted in Levin, Second Duma, p. 295 (I have made some emendations in the translation); Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 139—40. 65. Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 140-41.

66. Ibid., pp. 141-42. 67. Ibid., pp. 143-45; Levin, Second Duma, pp. 294-306. 68. Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 145—46; “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” p. 112. 69. Levin, Second Duma, pp. 303—4.

70. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, pp. 180-81; Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” pp. 10-51; Levin, Second Duma, p. 303. 71. Golovin, “Zapiski,” p. 147; Russkie vedomosti, April 21, 1907, p. 3. 72. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 193-99. 73. The Duma voted funds for the military and, as will be seen below, for famine relief. The bill the State Council rejected dealt with the abolition of the field courts-martial. 74. For details on how the Duma dealt with these issues, and also with unemployment, see Levin, Second Duma. 75. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 296-97, 298—300; Russkie vedomosti, Feb. 10, p. 3.

410 ©Notes to Pages 319-27 76. Russkie vedomosti, Jan. 10, 1907, p. 3, Jan. 21, p. 4, Jan. 28, pp. 4, 7, Feb. 8, p. 3, March 10, p. 2, March 30, p. 2, April 4, p. 5, April 10, p. 5, April 27,

p. 3; Dokumenty i materialy, VII, part 1, pp. 332—33; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Jan. 31, 1907, FO 181/899, BDFA. 77. Golovin, “Vospominaniia,” pp. 155-56.

78. Levin, Second Duma, pp. 134-41. _

79. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 389—90.

80. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 310-11; Dokumenty i materialy, VII, part 1, p. 6. For a list of peasant disturbances and the types of unrest in the province of Orlov in the period from January 7 to July 23, 1907, see Dokumenty i materialy, VII, part 1, pp. 350—51. See also Agrarnoe dvizhenie, 1, pp. 23-24;

and Russkie vedomosti, May 27, 1907, p. 2. 7 | |

81. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, pp. 384—85. For more details on the agrarian bills, see Levin, Second Duma, pp. 166—73. In late May the Kadets did come up with a plan to allow separation from the commune, but it was so restrictive that it would most probably not have led many peasants to withdraw from the mir. For details, see Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” p. 383. 82. Maklakov, Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, pp. 232-33.

83. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 317. 84. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 433-45.

85. Russkie vedomosti, May 16, 1907, Pp. 2. | 86. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 631-33. 87. Ibid., p. 1246; Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 398; Zimmerman, “Between

p- 378. , ,

Revolution and Reaction,” p. 350. : 88. Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 378; Geifman, “The Kadets and Terrorism.” , 89. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, p. 516; Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia,

90. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, p. 527.

pominanila,” pp. 159-60. , 7 92. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, pp. 1554, 1564. 93. Ibid., Il, p. 608. 94. 95. Ibid., Ibid.,pp. p. 685—700. 733. oo | , ,

91. Ibid., pp. 529-30; Levin, Second Duma, pp. 272—73; Golovin, ‘“‘Vos-

96. Ibid., pp. 765-68; Pares, “Second Duma,” p. 51. -

97. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 777-78. , 98. See Levin, Second Duma, pp. 260—78, for more details on the Duma’s

deliberations on political terror. 99. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, p. 514. , 100. Levin, Second Duma, p. 232. | ,

101. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, April 24, 1907, FO 181/

893; May 23, FO 181/906.

102. Russkie vedomosti, March 15, 1907, p. 2.

103. Ibid., March 20, 1907, p. 5. 104. Ibid., March 18, 1907, p. 3.

105. Ibid., March 17, 1907, p. 2.

106. Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” pp. 179—85. According to one account of the incident, Kazantsev persuaded Fedorov that Iollos was a police agent. When Fedorov discovered that he had been misled, he “lured Kazantsev into a forest and murdered him.” Pipes, Russian Revolution, p.170. —

Notes to Pages 327-39 A411

107. Russkie vedomosti, May 16, 1907, p. 4; Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, Pp. 456-57. 108. Russkie vedomosti, March 24, 1907, p. 2, April 5, p. 2, April 7, p. 2; British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, May 8, 1907, FO 181/906, BDFA. 109. Pravo, March 25, 1907, col. 935. 110. Pravo, May 6, 1907, col. 1326. 111. Russkie vedomosti, June 2, 1907, p. 4. 112. Ibid., March 25, 1907, p. 4. 113. Pravo, April 29, 1907, col. 1251. 114. Russkie vedomosti, March 6, 1907, p. 3. 115. Pravo, April 15, 1907, col. 1166. 116. Levin, Second Duma, p. 23. 117. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie, p. 268. 118. Russkie vedomosti, May 26, 1907, p. 4. 119. Dokumenty i materialy, VIl, vol. 1, pp. 77-79. 120. Freeze, ““Handmaiden of the State?,” pp. 86—89. 121. Ibid., p. 94.

122. Curtiss, Church and State, pp. 275-78. 123. Ibid., pp. 211-27; Cunningham, A Vanquished Hope. For some interesting documents on church developments, see Freeze, ed., From Supplication to Revolution, pp. 228—38 (the longer quotation is from p. 236). 124. Curtiss, Church and State, pp. 196—202, 236-67. 125. See Ascher, Revolution, 1, pp. 205-6.

126. Curtiss, Church and State, pp. 203-5. 127. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, 1, pp. 430-32. 128. Pares, My Russian Memorrs, p. 135. 129. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, I, pp. 785—89; Curtiss, Church and State, pp. 204—5. My translation is based on Curtiss’s. 130. Tovarishch, May 13, 1907, Pp. 2. 131. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 594-96. 132. Tovarishch, May 15, 1907, p. 2; Russkie vedomosti, May 15, 1907, p. 3.

133. Tovarishch, May 19, 1907, p. 7, May 23, p. 2, May 24, pp. 4-5; Russkie vedomosti, May 20, 1907, p. 4; Pravo, May 27, 1907, cols. 1526—28. 134. Tovarishch, Feb. 17, 1907, p. 4; Rech, Feb. 22, 1907, p. 1, Feb. 24, p. 4. 135. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 135. 136. Tovarishch, Feb. 21, 1907, p. 4, March 1, p. 3, March 2, p. 5, March 16, p. 2. 137. Ibid., May 16, 1907, p. 2, May 18, p. 2, May 29, p. 2. 138. Pismo Sviashchennika Grigoriia.

Chapter 9 1. Golovin, “Zapiski,” pp. 122—24. See also Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, pp. 366-67. 2. Russkie vedomosti, May 22, 1907, Pp. 2. 3. Golovin, “Zapiski,” p. 125. 4. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 179. 5. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, p. 418. 6. Zimmerman, “Between Revolution and Reaction,” pp. 378—84; Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, pp. 107—8; Chermenskii, Burzhuaziia, p. 403.

412 Notes to Pages 339-55 7. Heilbronner, “Piotr Khristianovich von Schwanebach,” pp. 40—43.

8. Ibid., pp. 46-47. , 9. Ibid., pp. 47, 51-53. | ,

10. Russkie vedomosti, May 8, 1907, p. 2, May 9, p. 1; Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 203-7; Levin, Second Duma, pp. 314-17.

11. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, pp. 207-8. -

12. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 209. _ ,

13. Ibid., pp. 199-202. 14. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, pp. 152-55. oe

15. M. E. Solovev, “Tsarskie provokatory,” p. 127. See this article for Shornikova’s later career. The SDs did not learn of her role as an Okhrana agent until

1911. See also Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, VII, pp. 109-10; Gerassimoff, Der

Kampf, pp. 161—66; and Voitinskii, Gody, Il, p. 202. 7 ,

16. Voitinskii, Gody, II, pp. 203—4; Levin, Second Duma, p. 313. 17. Voitinskii, Gody, II, p. 205. , 18. Ibid., pp. 206—7; Levin, Second Duma, p. 315.

19. Gerassimoff, Der Kampf, pp. 163-64. 20. Ibid., p. 166. oO 21. Russkie vedomosti, May 9, 1907, Pp. I. 7 22. Stenograficheskie otchety, 1907, Il, p. 218.

| 23. Russkie vedomosti, May 27,1907, p.2. _ | , 24. Golovin, “Razgon II,” pp. 60—61. 25. Ibid., p. 61; Levin, Second Duma, p. 323. ,

PP- 324-25. ,

26. For the names of the two groups of 16 deputies, see Levin, Second Duma, 27. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, pp. 82—83. 28. Tokmakoff, “P. A. Stolypin,” p. 59; Levin, Second Duma, pp. 325-31.

29. Golovin, “Razgon II,” pp. 63—65. |

30. Kizevetter, Na rubezhe, pp. 464-65; Golovin, “Razgon II,” p. 62.

31. Pares, My Russian Memotrs, p. 145.

32. Russkie vedomosti, June 2, 1907, pp. 2, 3; Tovarishch, June 5, 1907, Pp. 3.

33. Dokumenty i materialy, VI, vol. 1, pp. 33—46. , 34. Maklakov, Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, pp. 245-47; Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, p. 312. :

35. Pipes, Liberal on the Right, pp. 61-65; Tovarishch, June 8, 1907, p. 2, June 10, p. 5; Maklakov, Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, p. 248. 36. “Perepiska N. A. Romanova,” pp. 113-14.

37. Hagen, “Nikolaj Il an Stolypin,” p. 68. , /

38. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 145. , a

39. Russkie vedomosti, June 5, 1907, pp. 2, 6. 40. Russkie vedomosti, June 5, 1907, p. 2, June 6, p. 2, June 7, p. 2; Tovarishch, June 7, 1907, p. 3; Pravo, June 10, 1907, cols. 1718—19.

41. Pravo, June 10, 1907, cols. 1635-38.

42. Tovarishch, June 5, 1907, p.3. ,

43. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, pp. 107-8. Oo

44. Ibid., pp. 107-8, 111.

45. H. Williams, Russia of the Russians, pp. 78—80. The most comprehensive description of the new electoral law can be found in Harper, New Electoral Law;

for other analyses on which I have relied, see Haimson, ed., Politics of Rural Russia, pp. 16—23; Levin, “Russian Voter”; Doctorow, “The Introduction of

Notes to Pages 356-62 413 Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 598—603; and Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 147. 46. Testimony of M. I. Trusevich, the Director of Police from 1906 to 1909, at the Commission of Inquiry in 1917, in Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, III, pp. 209-10. 47. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 19, 1907, PAAA. 48. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, p. 418. 49. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia, pp. 114—15; Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, V, p. 418. 50. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 178. 51. Gurko, Features and Figures, p. 510. 52. Szeftel, Russian Constitution, p. 99. 53. Mossolov, At the Court, p. 141. 54. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 178.

55. Shchegolev, ed., Padenie, Il, pp. 345-46, 439. 56. Witte, Vospominaniia, I, p. 245, quoted in Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” p. 224. See also Brock, “Theory and Practice of the Union of Russian People,” p. 299. 57. Russkoe znamia, June 4, 1907, pp. 1-2, quoted in Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” p. 224. 58. Ibid., p. 225. 59. Pravo, June 24, 1907, col. 1821. 60. Russkie vedomosti, June 5, 1907, p. 2. 61. Ibid., June 6, p. 2; Tovarishch, June 13, 1907, p. 3; Dokumenty i materialy, VII, part 1, pp. 249-50; Levin, Second Duma, p. 342. 62. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 27, 1907, PAAA. 63. Pares, “Second Duma,” p. 55. 64. Agrarnoe dvizhenie, I, p. 13. 65. Doctorow, “Introduction of Parliamentary Institutions,” pp. 603—4. 66. Tovarishch, June 8, 1907, p. I. 67. Levin, “June 3, 1907,” pp. 239-40. 68. Russkie vedomosti, June 13, 1907, p. I. 69. Ibid., June 12, 1907, p. I. 70. Hosking, “P. A. Stolypin,” p. 144.

71. Levin, “June 3, 1907,” p. 238; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Il,

pp. 221-23. 72. Levin, “June 3, 1907,” pp. 243—44. See also Lenin’s report to a conference of SDs in early July, in Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniia, XVI, pp. 46-48. 73. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, p. 160; Russkie vedomosti, June 7, 1907, Pp. 2.

74. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, pp. 51-53.

75. Ibid., pp. 236-37. 76. Voitinskii, Gody, Il, pp. 222-23. 77. Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutiondre Partei, pp. 182—83; Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Ill, pp. 125, 129. 78. Vestnik Evropy, Sept. 1907, p. 423. 79. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 27, 1907, PAAA. 80. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, pp. 85-87, 155-56, 518. 81. Pravo, June 17, 1907, col. 1773; Russkie vedomosti, June 7, 1907, p. 2, June 14, p. 2, June 17, p. 2. 82. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, p. 321.

414 Notes to Pages 362-74 7

BDFA. , ,

83. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, p. 161. , Oo 84. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, July 18, 1907, FO 181/906,

85. Levin, “June 3, 1907,” p. 247.

BDFA. |

86. Russkie vedomosti, June 9, 1907, p. 2. ,

87. Ibid., June 10, 1907, p. 2. —_

88. German Embassy in St. Petersburg to Berlin, June 27, 1907, PAAA. 89. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, June 20, 1907, FO 181/906,

90. Pares, My Russian Memoirs, p. 163. , 91. Hentig, Crime, p. 325. | oe 92. For details on the Tiflis robbery, see Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolu-

tion, pp. 393-94. | |

BDFA. | oe Pp. 176-77. oe

93. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, July 18, 1907, FO 181/906,

94. Dokumenty i materialy, VII, vol. 1, p. 89; Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict,

95. British Embassy in St. Petersburg to London, Aug. 15, 1907, FO 181/906. 96. These statistics are from Levin, “Russian Voter,” p. 666. See this article, based on a careful survey of newspaper reports at the time, for more details.

97. Ibid., pp. 667—68. | , 98. Ibid., p. 671. 99. Ibid., pp. 672-73. , |

100. Ibid., pp. 674—76. For an analysis of the “foundations of the 3rd June system,” see Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 14—55.— 101. See Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, for details.

102. I have relied on the following sources for information on the Duma’s makeup: Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, p. 327; Walsh, “Political Parties,” | p. 148; and C. J. Smith, “Third State Duma,” p. 202. For slightly different figures,

see Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, p. 46. ,

103. Rawson, “Union of the Russian People,” p. 226.

104. C. J. Smith, “Third State Duma,” pp. 202—3. See also Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 47—48, for an analysis of the “social and occu-

pational composition” of the Duma. , ,

105. Manning, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 326-27. 106. The information and quotation in this paragraph are from ibid., p.328. 107. Manning, “The Zemstvo and Politics,” p. 143; British Embassy in

St. Petersburg to London, July 18, 1907, FO 181/906, BDFA; Veselovskii, Istoriia

Zemstva, \V, pp. 49-52, 58. , oe 108. Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, pp. 29-30.

, Conclusion a 1. Baring, A Year in Russia, p. 75. ,

2. German Embassy in London to Berlin, May 19, 1906, PAAA. 3. On this theme, see Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment.

5. Ibid., p. 355. , ,

- 4. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, pp. 320-21. ,

Bibliography

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Nasha zhizn. St. Petersburg. Left-liberal daily; sympathetic to the Socialist

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Rus. St. Petersburg. Liberal daily newspaper. Russkie vedomosti. Moscow. Liberal newspaper; after 1905, close to the moderate Kadets. Russkoe znamia. St. Petersburg. Official organ of the right-wing Union of the Russian People. Syn otechestva. St. Petersburg. Initially a liberal paper; came under the influence of the Socialist Revolutionaries. Tovarishch. St. Petersburg. Left-wing paper. Vestnik Evropy. Moscow. Moderate-liberal historical and political journal. Vestnik partii narodnoi svobody. St. Petersburg. Kadet paper.

Memoirs and Published Documents Astrov, N. I. Vospominaniia. Paris, 1941. Baring, Maurice. A Year in Russia. London, 1917 (original ed., 1907). Bing, Edward J., ed. The Secret Letters of the Last Tsar. New York, 1938.

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Buchanan, George. My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories. 2 vols. London, 1923. Chernov, V. M. Pered burei, Vospominaniia. New York, 1953. Dillon, Edward J. The Eclipse of Russia. New York, 1918. Dnevnik Imperatora Nikolaia II. Berlin, 1923. Drezen, A. K., ed. Tsarizm v borbe s revoliutsiei 1905-1907 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov. Moscow, 1936. Freeze, Gregory L., ed. From Supplication to Revolution: A Documentary Social History of Imperial Russia. New York, 1988. Garvi, P. A. Vospominantia: Peterburg—1906 g.; Peterburg—Odessa—Vena— 1912 g. 2 vols. New York, 1961. ———. Vospominaniia sotsialdemokrata: stati o zbhizni i deiatelnosti P. A. Garvi. New York, 1946. Gerassimoff, Alexander. Der Kampf gegen die erste Russische Revolution. Erinnerungen. Ir. Ernst Thalmann. Frauenfeld and Leipzig, 1934. Gessen, I. V. V duukh vekakh: zhiznennyi otchet. Berlin, 1937. (Golovin, F. A.]. “Iz zapisok F. A. Golovina,” Krasnyi arkhiv, no. 58 (1933), pp.

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Index

In this index an “f” after a number indicates a separate reference on the next page, and an “ff” indicates separate references on the next two pages. A continuous discussion over two or more pages is indicated by a span of page numbers, e.g., “pp. 57-58.” Passim is used for a cluster of references in close but not consecutive sequence.

Academy of Sciences, 60, 82 Aleksandrovsk (Ekaterinoslav province),

Active boycott, 38f, 49, 361 I4§

Address by the British Public to the Presi- Aleksinskii, G. A., 302, 310-11

dent of the Duma, 266 Alexander I, Tsar, 59, 66

Address from the Throne, 82—85, 87 Alexander Mikhailovich, Grand Duke, 2, Aehrenthal, Count Aloys Lexa von (Austro- 2.28 Hungarian Ambassador to St. Peters- Algeciras Conference, 56—57 burg), 10O—-I1, 15, 106, 147, 178 All-City Conference of the RSDWPR in

Afanaseev, K. I., 252 Moscow, 360

Agrarian Committee (of Duma), 348 Alliance Israelite Universelle, 147 Agrarian question, 5, 182, 186,371; Mar- _— All-Russian Congress of Marshals of the

shals of the Nobility and, 31; Octobrists Nobility, 30—31 on, 34; discussed at Crown Council, All-Russian Congress of Teachers, 37 67—68; Goremykin on, 68, 97, 173; All-Russian Peasants’ Union, 37, 47, 115—

and First Duma, 94, 97f, 119-23, I7I- 16, 117, 125, 206, 229, 332 77, 192-95; peasant unrest and, 111— Altai region (West Siberia), 270 28; United Nobility on, 179; Stolypin American Embassy, see U.S. Ambassador and, 221, 267—74, 321—22, 348, 350; to St. Petersburg and Second Duma, 292-94, 319-22, Amnesty, for political prisoners, 86f, 94,

348, 350 98, 182, 186

Agrarian strikes, 123-25, 127 Anarchists, 19, 24 Agrarian unrest, 5, 111-28, 174,319-20 Anarkhiia, 243 Agrarnoe dvizhenie v Rosstiv 1905-1906 — Anikin, S. V., 92, 93

gg., [12—13, 116 Answer to the Throne, 93—96, 97-98, Akimov, M. G., 13, 27, 61, 66f, 73-74 IOI, 155, 194, 211 | Aladin, A. F., 3, 91-93, 99, 169, 173, 284 Antonii, Metropolitan, 333-34 Aleksandriisk district (Steppe region), 114 Appeal to the People, 192—95, 198-99

430 Index Aptekarskii Island, 188, 244 Black Sea, 363 Arakantsev, M. P., 148 Bloody Sunday, 2, 55, 112

Archangel, 19, 23, 137, 174 Bobrinskii, A. A., Count, 15, 304, 306,

Argunov, A. A., 234 3009 ff

Arkhipov, A. V., 333-34 Bobriusk, 362

Armenians, 2.43, 354 Bogdanovich, A. V., General, 54

Arseni, Abbot, 331 Bogorodits (Pskov province), 283 Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, 70, Bolotov, A. V., 25 245, 255, 268, 272, 320, 322f, 346, Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, 375

356f Bolsheviks, 19, 130—31, 132, 227, 291,

Article 129 of the Criminal Code, 29, 251 302, 341, 360, 363, 371; and Duma,

Astrakhan, 137, 236, 354 38—39, 48—50, 129; and the unem-

Astrov, N. I., 10 ployed, 140; and dissolution of the First Atamanskii Regiment, 3 42 Duma, 229-30; and July 1906 unrest, August 1914 (Solzhenitsyn), 217 2.33, 237; and elections for Second Autocracy, I, 11—12, 6§f, 255, 370 Duma, 280—81; and hostility toward

Autonomists, 88 Kadets, 295

Azef, E. F., 17, 202, 288 Bompard, Maurice (French Ambassador to St. Petersburg), 71

Bakhchisai (Crimea), 208 Bondarev, S. I., 203. , Bakhmut, 136, 208 Bonnell, Victoria E., 134 Bakhmut district (Steppe region), 114. Brandlavsk district (Podolia province), 125

Baku, 22, 136f, 243 Braudo, A. I., 68

Balakhin district (Nizhnii-Novgorod prov- _ Brest-Litovsk, 149, 236

ince), 283 Brezhkovskaia, E. K., 281-82

Balashov district (Saratov province), 118 Briansk, 18, 146

Baltic provinces, 10, 113, 242, 325 Brilliantov, A. I., 333-34 Baring, Maurice, 28, 43, 95, 175, 369 Brisson, Eugene Henri, 90

Barzinashvili, Dmitrii, 127 British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 9— _

Bauman, N. E., 239 10, 15, 22, 30, 40, §5, 246, 249, 266,

Bazhanov factory, 128 364

Belorussia, 124 7 British Consul General in Odessa, 144 Belsk district (Smolensk province), 122 British Consul in Moscow, 16

Benkendorf, A. K., Count, 372-73 British Consul in Riga, 242

Benkendorf, P. K., Count, 2 . Brodskii, B. B., 342

Berezin, M. E., 296 Bryan, William Jennings, 169—70 Berlin, 147, 152, 326 _ Bulgakov, S. N., 303, 348-51 Bersenev (F. I. Dan), 129 Bulgarians, 306 Bessarabia, 144, 297, 306 : Bulygin Duma, 42, 59 | Bialystok pogrom, 18, 146—54, 163,170, | Bund (General Union of Jewish Workers in

208 Russia and Poland), 20, 146, 154

Birilev, A. A., Vice Admiral, 13, 20, 76, Bushnell, John, 154

106 Byltsino (Vladimir province), 294

Birzhevie vedomosti, 92

Bismarck, Otto von, 103, 218 Cahiers (peasant petitions), 5, 48, 119-22,

Bjorko Treaty, 56 293-94 , Black-earth provinces, 114, 124 Capital punishment, 34, 94, 105—6, 124, Black Hundred Kadets, 303 128, 166—69, 186, 247-48 Black Hundreds, 39, 45, 132, 136, 145— Catherine the Great, 86

46, 156, 207, 266, 276, 327f, 331 Caucasus, 9, 126, 129, 208, 318

Index 431 Central Agricultural region, 179 185—91; and Appeal to the People, Central All-Russian Patriotic Committee, 193—95; and dissolution of First Duma,

145 198—211 passim; and Moscow Univer-

Chelnokov, M. V., 296, 303, 320, 348—51 sity, 259-60; and elections for Second

Chelnokova, Mme, 299 Duma, 279-82, 284-85; policies and

Cherkassk district (Ukraine), 122, 241 tactics in Second Duma, 286—87, 292,

Cherkassy (central Ukraine), 208 295—98, 302—4, 314; and terrorism, Chermenetskii Monastery, 335 289—91, 323—26; peasants’ attitude to-

Chernigov province, 23, 114, 123, 251, ward, 294; and Zurabov affair, 316; |

320 Orthodox priests as, 332; and dissolu-

Chernov, V. M., 39, 234, 282 tion of Second Duma, 345-46, 348—

Chief Military Procurator, 168—69 52, 359; and Third Duma, 366-67; Chief Procurator of the Navy, 168 and zemstvo congress (June 1907), 367; Chigirin district (Kiev province), 122 loss of zemstvo seats of, 367—68

Chita, 17, 22, 29 Coriolanus, 72

Chukhnin, G. P., Admiral, 143, 192 Cossacks, 20, 22, 25, 38, 44, §2, 145, 157,

City Councils, 137—42, 292—93 231, 234, 284, 366 Civil disorder, 7, 9, 24-26, 142, 144-46, Council of Ministers, 50, 63 ff, 95, 106f,

148—50, 241-43, 362-63 109, 124, 145

Civil society, 135, 374 Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

Civil War (1917-21), 92 54, 276

Code of Criminal Procedure, 246 Coup d’état of June 3, 1907, 355—58 Commission of Inquiry on the Collapse of Court of Arbitration at the Hague, 57

the Old Regime, 44, 73, 276-77 Court or Court camarilla, 2, 4, 8, 96, 110,

Committee of State Defense, 25 112, 162, 214; attitude toward Duma Committee on Military Education, 156 of, 6, 82, 104f, 108, 369; views of Witte

Committee to Help Workers, 140 of, 11, 72, 73, 265; influence of DurCommune, 31, 102, 174, 221, 267, 270— novo at, 14; Muromtsev and, 90, 95;

74, 304-5, 320 Muraviev’s criticism of, 164; and agrarCommunism, 217 lan question, 173—74; On negotiations

Constantine, Grand Duke, 334 with liberals, 177, 179, 181—82; views

Constantinople, 76 of Stolypin of, 226, 244, 264-65, 313; Constituent Assembly, 36, 120 and Second Duma, 285-86, 293—97,

Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), 319, 338, 339; on election in 1907, 356 6, III, 130, 145, 223, 239, 279, 3743 Criminal Code, 29, 251 repression of, 22, 44, 250—51; differ- Crown Councils: Feb. 1906, §9—63; April ences with Octobrists, 33; second con- 1906, 64—68, 76 gress (Jan. 1906) of, 35-37; misjudg-

ment of country’s mood by, 40; and Daily Telegraph, 184—86 elections for First Duma, 46—47, 5of, Dan, F. I., 38, 129-30, 227, 281 52—53; and French loans, 57—58; on Days of Liberty, 28, 370, 375 reformed State Council, 62—63; third Dediulin, V. A., General, 214, 288 congress (April 1906) of, 77—80; poli- Department of Police, 349, 362 cies and tactics in First Duma of, 86— Dillon, E. J., 14 TIO, 129, 165~—69, 171—72; Lenin on, Dmitrievka (Taganrog), 129 131; and the unemployed, 140; and Bia- Dmowski, Roman, 325 lystok pogrom, 148, 150, 153; German Dolgorukov, P. D., Prince, 27, 57, 88, 204,

Ambassador on, 164; on agrarian ques- 210, 295—96, 306, 346 tion, I71—73, 175, 273, 320—21; and Dolzhenkov, V. I., 198, 318 negotiations with Court, 180, 183, Don Cossacks, 158

432 Index Don Military District, 148 of, 297-302, 304-25, 332-33, 344—

Don oblast, 308 47; Tsar’s attitude toward, 301—2,

Dreyfus Affair, 266 339-40, 351—53; collapse of its ceiling, Dubasov, F. V., Admiral, 18, 31, 78, 137, 302; Trudovik conduct in, 304, 312,

145, 173, 287, 313 316, 319; on plot to assassinate Tsar,

Dubrovin, A. I., 276, 358 , 317-18; and famine relief, 318—19;

Duma (State), 3, 6f, 10, 22, 26, 68—70, and revolutionary terrorism, 322—25; 73, 3733 peasant support for, 5; Tsar’s Orthodox priests in, 332—36; dissoluattitude toward, 11; Marshals of the tion of, 337—53; compared to First Nobility on, 31; Octobrists’ attitude to- Duma, 366 ward, 34; Kadets’ views of, 36, 40,77— —Third: 248, 277, 278, 349, 353, 364-67

78; Mensheviks’ atitude toward, 38— —Fourth: 277, 279 39, 129, 131; Socialist Revolutionaries’ | Duma Committee of 33 (on Bialystok po-

attitude toward, 38—39; Bolsheviks’ at- grom), 1§2—53 | titude toward, 38—39, 129, 131; Witte Durnovo, P. N., 3, 10, 26, 32, 44, 64, 66,

and, 42, 44-45, 50, $3, 57-59, 61— 74, 82, 313; and Witte, 13, 71; influ62, 64; Lenin and, 49, 129; and French ence at Court, 14f; repressive policies loans, 58; discussed at Crown Councils, of, 17, 21, 28, 39, 67; and elections for

59—60, 64; and peasant petitions, 119— First Duma, 53 22; workers’ attitude toward, 128 Durnovo, P. P., 11 —First: 6, 162, 182, 292, 375; elections Dvinsk (Latvia), 23,207 | for, 42—53, 129; Tsar and, 82-85, 95, Dvorianstvo (nobility, gentry), 4, 51, 60,

181; deliberations of, 86—106, 164-77, 366—67, 370 |

192—95; social composition of, 88; and §Dzhaparidze, S. D., 153, 311 agrarian question, 94, 97, 98, 119-23,

I7I—77, 192—95; Stolypin and, 102, Economist, 310 107, 190-201, 207; interpellations in, Ekaterinburg, 29, 143 102-3, 153, 165-68, 197, 317-18, Ekaterinoslav, 18, 49, 100, 127, 129, 136, 340-41; dissolution of, 106-7, 109— 145, 277, 328, 361f, 364 10, 177-79, 195-215; and peasants, Ekaterinoslav University, 258 123; and workers, 125; and Social Elagin Palace, 348 Democrats, 130; Workers’ Group in, Elections: for First Duma, 42—53, 129; for 130; and labor unrest, 135; and Bialy- Second Duma, 274-87; for Third Duma,

stok pogrom, 146, 147, I50—53; and 364-67 mutinies in military services, 154-55; Electoral law of 1907, 353-54, 364—67,

soldiers’ interest in, 157; procedures of, 373 165; United Nobility on, 179; dissolu- Elenskii, V. I., Lieutentant-Colonel, 3 42 tion of, 195-215; Orthodox priests in, Elets (Orel province), 279 332; compared to Second Duma, 366 Elizavetgrad, 133, 278f —Second: 3, 5, 6, 264, 332, 365, 368, Emancipation of serfs (1861), 113, 267 375; election for, 274—87; peasants’ in- | Emergency regulations of 1881, 21f, 94,

terest in, 283-84, 293—94; Court’s atti- 121 | | tude toward, 285-86, 296-97; and Emmons, Terence, 33—34, 5of Stolypin, 286—87, 297—301, 304-8, Employers’ associations, 13 5 318—20; Kadet policies and tactics in, England, 91f 286—87, 292, 295f, 297-98, 302—4, Enisei Regiment, 232 314; popular support for, 292-93; and _ Eniseisk (Siberia), 129 agrarian question, 292—94, 302—4, Eremin, A. M., 20

314; workers’ interest in, 294-95; elec- | Ermolov, A. S., 188

tion of officers, 295—96; deliberations Evlogii, Bishop, 337

Index 433 Executive Committee of the Petrograd German Consul in Moscow, 16, 249

Soviet, 305 Germany, 56, 57, 76, 256

Expropriations, see Partisan actions Gershau-Flotov, B. B., 119

Extraordinary Security, 200, 246, 341,361 | Gershuni, G. A., 282 Gertsenshtein, see Herzenstein, M. Ia.

Factory Inspectorate, 233, 235 Gerus, L. G., 341-43 Famine, 170-71, 318—19 Gessen, I. V., 68, 197-98, 296, 327, 347 Famine Relief Committee, 299, 318 Gessen, V. M., 29—30, 327, 365

Fedorov, assassin, 327 Gluskin printing plant, 207

Field courts-martial, 245—49, 308, 326 Golovin, F. A., 68, 335, 365; on MuromFifth Congress of the RSDWP (1907), 3.43 tsev, 90; career and personal traits of,

Filosofov, D. A., 13, 227 295—96; conduct as Duma President, Financial Manifesto, 89, 206 297-99, 306, 309-12, 323-24, 346— Finland, 9, 204, 231, 256, 288, 313 47; and Tsar, 298, 301-2, 313-14, First Zakaspiiskii Railway Battalion, 157 337-39; and Stolypin, 299-300, 323Fourth All-Russian Congress of the Union 2.4; criticism of Second Duma by, 308;

of Unions, 37 and Zurabov affair, 314—17; and disso-

Fourth (Unification) Congress of the RSD WP lution of Second Duma, 345, 347-48,

(1906), 129-30 351-52

France, 56, 196, 256 Golubev, I. Ia., 65, 296-97 Frederiks, V. B., Count, 2, 104, 195-96, Gomel, 208, 277

199, 286 Gorchakov, S. D., 250

Freeze, Gregory, 329 Goremykin, I. L., 3, 76, 90, 95, Lor, 107— French Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 57, 8, 124, 176, 179, 216, 226; concept of

295 autocracy of, 66; on agrarian question,

French loans to Russia, 54—58, 373 68, 97, 1733; appointed Prime Minister,

Frish, E. V., 62, 65, 68, 87, 150 73—74; career and personal traits of, Fuller, William C., 160, 246 75; response to Duma’s Answer to the Fundamental Laws, 73, 87, 94, 168, 222, Throne, 97—98; Guchkov’s denuncia245, 353, 356f; revision of, 63—71; Ka- tion of, 100; attitude toward Duma of, dets’ opposition to revision, 77, 183; LOI—2, 106; Gurko’s criticism of, 103;

and First Duma, 96—97, 99 conduct as Prime Minister, 109, 318; and dissolution of First Duma, 109—10,

Gaisinsk district (Podolia province), 125 196, 199; and famine relief, 170-71; Gapon, Father Georgii Apollonovich, 3 rumors of dismissal of, 177; and nego-

Garin, N. P., 13 tiations with liberals, 181, 183-84; Garvi, P. A., 227 Trubetskoi’s criticism of, 211 Geiden, P. A., Count, 32, 95, 99—I00, Gorky, Maxim, 256-57, 363

205, 211, 223-25 Gorodiansk district (Chernigov province),

General Staff, 155 . 114 General strike (October 1905), 1, 112, Government Communiqué on the agrarian 372, 273 question, 176—77, 192 Gentry or nobility, see Dvorianstvo Gradizhsk (Poltava province), 146

Gerashenko, Stefan, 328 Grazhdanin, 2

Gerasimov, A. V., 75, 143-44, 199, 288— | Grazhdanstvennost (civic spirit), 268

89, 339, 342-44, 362 Great Britain, 196, 228, 246, 256

German Ambassador to Rome, 164 Great Russians, 220 German Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 71, | Gredeskul, N. A., 88, 204

76, 103, 147,150, 163, 217, 256, 274, Grinevich, A. I., 333-34

301, 356, 362 Gringmut, V. A., 54, 265, 278

434 Index Grodno, 143,146—54, 220 Izvolskii, A. P., 146, 162, 171; appointed Group for Peaceful Renewal, 51, 94, 284, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 76; moder-

323 ate in Goremykin’s cabinet, 96-97,

7 Guchkov, A. I., 33, 61, 100, 211, 223, 106, 109, 196; and negotiations with

225f, 247, 261 , liberals, 181, 184, 186—90, 192

Guriia, 116 , , Gudovich, V. V., Count, 32 , Izvolskii, P. P., Procurator of the Most

Gurev, Ia. I., 20 Holy Synod, 227, 334

Gurko, V. L., 9, sof, 57, 85, 97, 103, 106, Janitors, 136, 200 108, 179; on agrarian question, 173— Japan, 55, 72, 114 76, 267—68; on dissolution of First Jews, 6, 12, 17, 121, 220, 239, 276, 306, Duma, 196—97; on Stolypin as adminis- 331; and agrarian unrest, 114-15, 117;

trator, 216; on law on field courts- right-wing attacks on, 145—46, 156, martial, 245; and the Jewish question, 173, 277, 327-28; and Bialystok 2§3—54; involved in financial scandal, pogrom, 146—54; Irepov’s charges 266—67; and dissolution of Second. against, 185; Stolypin and, 221, 252—

Duma, 356-57 55; Tsar Nicholas and, 225, 255—57; at

Hamburg, 241 , Guzhkovskii, Ia. A., 251-52 _ universities, 258 Jus abutendi, 322

Heidelberg University, 326 oo Kadets, see Constitutional Democratic.

Heine, Heinrich, 52 | Party

Helsingfors (Helsinki), 18, 203, 210, 227, Kaluga, 25, 136, 359

230f, 233 Kamenetsk-Podolsk (Ukraine), 365

Herzenstein, M. Ia. (Gertsenshtein), 173, Kamensk (Ekaterinburg province), 143

175-76, 204f, 238-40, 327, Kamyshanskii, P. D., 345, 347 Historical-Philological Institute (St. Peters- | Kapustin, M. Ia., 325

burg), 307 - Kauffmann, P. M., 109, 227, 260-61

Holy Synod, 2, 45, 61, 70, 74, 76, 227, Kaulbars, A. V., 262—63

252, 278, 329-36, 353 Kautsky, Karl, 37

Hungary, 201 _ Kautsky, Luise, 37 Kazan, 118, 137, 209, 318, 331, 342

Iakubson, V. R., 148 Kazantsev, Aleksandr, 240, 327

Jakutsk, 23, 354 Kazan University, 258 Jamburg (St. Petersburg province), 334 Kelts, 207 | Jaroslavl, 23, 24, 85, 358, 364 Kerch (Crimea), 241

Imperial Free Economic Society, 112 Kerensky, Alexander, 91 ,

Ingush, 122, 126 Kharitonov, P. A., 63

Insevich, B. M., 275 , . Kharkov, 23, 25, 49, 85, 114, 127-28,

Institute of Experimental Medicine, 288 137, 208, 278 Interpellations, 102—3, 153, 165-68, 197, Khasanov, K.G.,312

317-18, 340-41 Kherson, 85, 312

Iollos, G. G., 162, 205, 309, 326—27 Kholshchevnikov, General, 21

Irkutsk, 23, 230 Khomiakov, N. A., 338

Iskul, Iu. A., Baron, 62, 63 | Kiev, 20, 133, 160, 208, 328, 331, 358,

Italy, 256, 288 362; terrorism in, 22, 143, 145; represIuskevich-Kraskovskii, N. M:, 240 sion in, 23, 29; Duma elections in, 49,

Iuzovka (Donbass), 208, 241 276—77, 364; agrarian unrest in, 116,

Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 49, 137 122, 125

Ivashkov (Chernigov province), 114 Kiev University, 258, 326

Index 435

Kirienko, I. I., 300 Labor unrest, see Workers

Kishinev, 275 Lamark, 181

Kislovodsk (Stavropol province), 208-9 Lamsdorff, V. N., Count, 13, 50

Kiuba Restaurant, 182-83 Land Captain, 209, 271

Kizevetter, A. A., 36, 45, 77, 162, 262, Land Organization Commissions, 272

323-24, 346-47 Land Socialization Bill (or “Project of

Kokoshkin, F. F., 89, 93, 99, 201 104”), 172

Kokovtsov, V. N., 15, 56, 72, 97, 1o7ff, Landtag, 103 226, 244; assessment of Goremykin, Larichkin (URP operative), 240 74-75, 102; and negotiations with lib- Latvia, 242 erals, 183—84; and the Jewish question, | Law of December 11, 1905, 42-44 253—55; and agrarian reform, 268; ru- = Law of February 20, 1906, 119

mored as successor to Stolypin, 285; Law of March 4, 1906, 133-35 and Second Duma, 299, 339—40; on Law on field courts-martial, 245-49, 308,

dissolution of Second Duma, 356—57 326 Kolo, 51, 88, 205, 284, 298, 304, 325,366 Lazarevskii, N. I., 68

Kolokolnikov, K. A., 333-34 Lena gold fields, 374 Kommisarov, M. S., Captain, 151 Lenin, V. I. (Ulyanov), 91, 227, 258; and

Koni, A. F., 223-25 Duma, 38, 48—49, 129-31, 229-30, Konovalev, V. I., 160 360; and July 1906 unrest, 233; and

Konovitsyn, S. N., Count, 18 Stolypin’s agrarian reforms, 272; denun- | Konstantin Fortress, 232, 238 ciation of Miliukov, 291 Kosich, A. V., General, 180 Liadov, M.N., 233

Kostroma, 29, 137, 295 Libava, 18 Kovalevskii, V. I, 68 286—87, 371, 373

Kovalevskii, M. M., 68, 180 Liberals, 1, 6, §7, 101, 181, 221, 272, Kovno, 23, 143, 219f, 268, 344 Lidval Company, 267 Kozlov, A. A., Major-General, 143, 192 Lithuania, 219f

Krasikov, P. A., 281 Lodz, 355

Krasnoe Selo, 159, 198 London, 76, 152, 266 Kremenchug (Poltava province), 30, 364 Lopatkin, I. A., 3.43

Krivoshein, A. V., 313 Lukhachev, I. A., 32 Kronstadt, 155-56, 228, 231-33, 237 Luxemburg, Rosa, 37 Kronstadt Military and Workers’ Organi- Luzhenovskii, G. N., 18

zation of the RSDWP, 236-37 Lvov, G. E., 172, 299 Krupenskii, P. N., 297, 308, 310 Lvov, N. N., 95, 172, 180, 187, 223-24 Kryzhanovskii, D. F., General, 26

Kryzhanovsku, S. E., 44, 59, IOI, 104—5, Maiak, 240

276, 339, 353-545 356, 365-66 Maikov, A. A., 345

Kurlov, P. G., 276 Makarov, A. A., 169, 324-25 Kursk, 23, 27, 114, 157, 210, 320, 354 Makharadze, G. F., 300

Kutais, 153, 300, 318 Maklakov, V. A., 46, 57, 91, 280, 308, Kutler, N. N., 13-15, 31, 180, 251, 273, 330, 347, 348-51

335 Mandelberg, V. E., 3.46

Kuzmich, K., 143 Manifesto dissolving First Duma, 200 Kuzmin-Karavaev, V. D., 180, 187, 347 Manifesto dissolving Second Duma, 352-—

Kuznetsov, A. A., 325 53

Manuilov, A. A., 258, 260-61, 327

Labor unions or trade unions, 134-35, Mariupol (Ukraine), 136, 208

362, 374 Markov, N. A., 277 -

436 Index , Markovo Republic, 116 | 170; and United Nobility, 179; and

Marseillaise, 54, 133, 158, 209 URP, 275; and Zurabov affair, 314; atMarshals of the Nobility, 31, 179 tempt to prevent pogroms by, 327-28

Martens, F. F., 57 , Ministry of Justice, 27, 73, 75, 97, 100,

Matvenko, Procurator of the Navy, 168 164, 168, 250, 325, 329, 340, 345—46

Maximalists, 142-43, 243-44 Ministry of Post and Telegraph, 305

Mazurin, Vladimir, 247 Ministry of the Navy, 76, 168

Melitopol (Ukraine), 277 : Ministry of Trade and Commerce, 227 Mensheviks, 132, 195, 227, 291, 305, Ministry of Transportation, 74 340f, 371; and Duma, 38-39, 129-31; Ministry of War, 76, 106, 153, 156, 159— and the unemployed, 140; and dissolu- 60, 166, 168—69, 199

tion of First Duma, 229; and July 1906 Minor, O. S., 39

unrest, 233, 237; and elections for Sec- Minsk, 29, 136, 320, 364 |

ond Duma, 280-81 Mitava (Latvia), 23 ,

Meshcherskii, V. P., Prince, 2 Moderate rightists, 366

Meyer, George L. (U.S. Ambassador to St. Mogilev, 136, 278, 312, 365

Petersburg), 9 Moisenko (URP activist), 328 , Miasoedov, N. A., 202, 204 Moldavians, 306° . Michael Aleksandrovich, Grand Duke, 2 Monarchist Party, 213, 265,275

Mikhailichenko, M. I., 100, 105 | Morocco, 56, 76 Mikhailovskii Artillery School, 334 Morshansk district (Tambov province),

Military Justice Administration, 155 1§9 Military services, see Mutinies in military Moscow, 25, 28, 77, 116, 118, 129; politi-

services cal unrest in, 16, 18, 20, 144—45, 241;

Militia units, 131 repression in, 23—24, 27, 29, 250, 362; Miliukov, P. N., 3, 35, 52, 63, 92£, 95, and Duma elections, 45, 49f, 355, 364; 350; and Third Congress of Kadets, 78— labor unrest in, 133, 136; labor unions

79; and First Duma, 89; negotiations in, 134-36; unemployment in, 137, with Court, 180—86, 188—90, 194; and 142; terrorism in, 143; and dissolution | Appeal to the People, 194—95; and dis- of First Duma, 208; July 1906 unrest in, solution of First Duma, 197—210 pas- 234—36, 238; and Second Duma, 293,

sim; and July 1906 unrest, 236; and 358; advocates of Church reform in,

Stolypin, 289-91 331

Miliutin, Iu. N., 32 Moscow Society for Mutual Aid, 142 Min, G. A., Colonel, 214,240 Moscow University, 89, 258—62, 296, Ministry of Agriculture, 31, 74, 108, 173, 305, 327

2.27 } Moscow uprising (December 1905), 3, 5,

Ministry of Education, 74, 108, 227, 258, II, 31, 37-38, 49, I12, 133, 214

260—61 oe Moskovskie vedomosti, 12, 145, 173,

Ministry of Finance, 55, 57, 74-75 177-78, 180, 213, 239, 244-45, 265,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 50, 76, 146, 278

162 , | Mosolov, A. A., 1, 104, 184, 357

Ministry of Internal Affairs, 10, 13, 39,44, | Mukhanov, A. A., 192 66, 75, 82, I1§, 119, 195, 307; On iIn- Muraviev, N. V., 164 creasing police force, 25; and repres- Muromtsev, S. A., 68, 108—9, 152, 168,

sion, 39, 40, 200-201; and relief for 180, 266, 296, 298; elected President of unemployed, 141; and terrorism, 144; First Duma, 87; career and personal and Bialystok pogrom, 150, 151, 153; traits of, 89—90; relations with Court, as target of interpellations, 153, 166, 95—96, 183, 188—92, 194; and dissolu325, 340—41; and unrest in military tion of First Duma, 197, 202, 204, services, 15 5—56, 158; and famine, 206—7

Index 437 Muslim deputies, 284, 352, 366 and Shmid, 365; and zemstvo congress

Muslims, 2.43 of 1907, 367

Mutinies in military services, 154-61, Nikolaev (Ukraine), 20

227-28, 230-33, 371-72 Nikolaevskii, N. F., 193 Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke, 2, 25,

Nabokov, V. D., 89, 98—99, 106, 167, 198 66, 108, 153, 289, 318

Nadel (allotment land), 271 Nikolskii, A. P., 74, 291

Nakaz (instruction), 341-44 Nizhegorod, 118 Narodnaia svoboda, 89 Nizhnee (Ekaterinoslav province), 29 Nasha zhizn, 108, 207 Nizhnii-Novgorod, 136, 156, 158, 209, Nationaleigentum (national property), 68 318, 364

Naumov, A. N., 25, 44 Nogutsk (Stavropol province), 121 Naumov, Vladimir, 288—89 Nolde, E. Iu., Baron, 64

Nelepovskii, S. I., 312 Nonpartisans, 51, 88, 284-85, 320, 332

Nelidov, D. A., 76 Novgorod province, 27

Nemeshaev, K. S., 13, 74 Novgorodtsev, P. I., 96, 194 Nepliuev, General, 143 Novoe vremia, 12, 92, 247, 291, 298, 303,

Neva River, 198, 244 314

Nevinson, H. W., 266 Novoradomsk, 136 New Russia, 179 Novorossiisk University, 306—7 Nezhin district (Chernigov province), 123 Novosilsk district (Tual province), 27 Nicholas II, Tsar, 2f, 6f, ro, 12, 18, 28, 31, 42, §6, 60—62, 86, 90, 115, 156, Obolenskii, A. D., Prince, 13, 45, 50, 61—

214; and October Manifesto, 1, 12, 39; 62, 74, 180, 268 inconsistent conduct of, 11-12, 16, October Manifesto, 4, 57f, 65, 69, 73, 163—64; and dismissal of Kutler, 14— 100, I12, 192, 372f, 375; [sar and, 1, 15; and Witte, 15, 58, 71-72; conser- 12, 39; Opposition to, 6, 30, 178; police vative critics of, 53-54, 265—66; as attitude toward, 29; Octobrists’ support chairman of Crown Councils, 59; and for, 31-34, 47, 210; Witte on, 60; KaFundamental Laws, 63—70; committed dets on, 62—63, 79; Goremykin on, 66; to autocratic rule, 65, 370; and Kokov- and peasant unrest, 114, 118, 121; Shitsov, 74—75; and Goremykin, 74-75, pov on, 191; Stolypin and, 223-24, 109; and First Duma, 82—85, 95-97, 253, 304; Golovin on, 297 IOI, 104, 153, 195—99; and peasant Octobrists, see Union of October 17 petitions to, 121—22, 294; attitude of Odessa, 148, 208, 363; terrorism in, 19; peasants toward, 121-22, 283, 294; repression in, 22, 23; civil disorder in, and mutinies in army, 159—60; and 24—25, 328; Duma elections in, 49-50, agrarian question, 176; Schwanebach’s 277, 355, 364; labor unrest in, 157; influence on, 178; and United Nobility, field courts-martial in, 247; URP activi178-80; and negotiations with liberals, ties in, 262—63 181-91, 225; E. N. Trubetskoi’s appeal § Odessa University, 258, 262—63

to, 211—13; urges harsh measures Ognev, N. V., 252 against terrorism, 245; and Jewish ques- | Okhrana, 75, 141, 143, 288, 352, 362f; on tion, 253—57; planned assassination of, significance of terror, 17; and unrest in

288—89, 317—18; and Second Duma, army, 20; and Duma deputies, 300, 292, 301f, 313, 339—40, 351-56 pas- 340-41; and the coup d’état, 342-44 sim; and Golovin, 298, 301-2, 313— Old Believers, 252 14, 337—39; and Zurabov affair, 315— Olonets province, 174 17, 337—38; and Church reform, 330- Olovennikov, V. V., 240 31, 336; Father Tikhvinskii’s appeal to, Olshanits (Kiev province), 116—17

333; and ultraconservatives, 357—58; Onipko, F. M., 91

438 Index

Oranienbaum, 198 Petrovskii, A. I., 308—9

Orel, 23, 85, 136 Oo Petrunkevich, I. I., 14, 79, 89, 181, 183, —

Orenburg, 136, 318 194f; on amnesty for political prisoners, Orenburg Regiment, 25 87, 105; on Trudovik agrarian program, Orlov, 25, 114, 126, 320 173; and dissolution of First Duma, Orlov, A. A., General, 214 198, 201—2, 204—5; on Miliukov’s Orthodox Church, 252, 329-36 contacts with Stolypin, 290—91; on

Orthodox clergy, 60, 366 | Zurabov affair, 316

Osten-Sacken, Baron, 299—300 Pirogov Medical Society, 26~—27

Ozol, I. P., 340-47 passim Platon, Bishop, 277, 337 Plehve, V. K., 224

Palen, K. I., Count, 60, 62, 66, 68 Plekhanov, G. V., 258, 280 , Pale of Settlement, 22, 253 , Plotsk, 136 Palitsyn, F. F., General, 26, 199 . | Pobedonostsev, K. P., 2, 61, 108, 199, 335

Pamiat Azova, 232, 238 | Podolia province, 125, 167 :

Pares, Bernard, 16, 151, 207, 209, 223, Pogroms, 114-15, 117, 145-54, 327—28

284, 294, 295—96, 300, 304, 359, Poiarkov, A. V., 167 |

362-63 , Poincaré, Raymond, 57

Paris, 55f, 76, 91, 152 Poland or Poles, 9, 145f, 191, 220, 318,

Parish priests, 330 354 Partisan actions, 17, 19, 138 Poliakov, A. G., 309

Party of Democratic Reform, 68 Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian Group, 366

Party of Legal Order, 279 . Polish National Democrats, 51 Party of National Order, 277 Polish Socialist Party (PSP), 51

Paul Aleksandrovich, Grand Duke, 2 | Polovnev (URP activist), 240 Pavlov, V. P., General, 168—69, 246 Poltava, 25, 114, 126, 146, 208, 275, 279,

Peasants, 1, §, 182, 241, 319—20, 371; 320, 362, 364, 367 Marshals of the Nobility on, 31; unrest Polytechnical Institute in St. Petersburg,

among, 111—28; and First Duma, 47— 2.59, 342-43 , 48, 50-51, 171-77, 192—95; Gurko Polytechnical Museum in Moscow, 280 on, 174; United Nobility on, 179; Stoly- | Ponomarev, Captain, 299 pin and, 221, 267—74, 321; resistance Popular Socialists, 284, 291, 295, 311, to Stolypin’s agrarian reforms, 273; and 316—18, 320, 365, 374 Second Duma, 283-84, 292—94; and Poshekonskii district (Iaroslavl province),

Third Duma, 367. See also Agrarian 44 question; Agrarian unrest; Commune Potemkin, Gregory, Prince, 86 Peasants’ Land Bank, 98, 127, 177, 270, Poznanskii, N. N., 296

313 | Pravda Bozhiia, 334

Peasants’ Union, see All-Russian Peasants’ Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, 102f, 107, 176

Union Pravo, 18, 21, 29, 46, 77, 143, 240, 250,

Penza, 20, 118, 219, 283, 294, 361 275,278 People’s Will, 219 ! Preobrazhenskii Regiment, 158 Pergament, O. Ia., 327 , Pre-Sobor conference, 330-31

Perm, 25, 143, 174, 295 Progressives, 51, 284, 366-68 Peterhof, 159, 190,196, 198f “Project of 33,” 173

Petrazhitskii, L. I., 172 “Project of 42,” 171-72

Petropavlovsk, 23 , “Project of 104,” 172.

Petropavlovsk fortress, 3 52 Provincial Electoral Assemblies, 43 Petrov, Father G. S., 334-36 Provisional Government (1917), 305, 374

Petrovka (Tambov province), 159 Prussia, 219 an

Index 439

Pskov, 23, 118, 198 374; and terrorism, 19; propaganda in Public works, 139—42 military services by, 20, 155; and First Purishkevich, V. M., 4, 306—7, 309-12, Duma, 38—39, 47—49, 85, 88, 129ff,

337> 345 193, 195, 203, 208, 229—30; factional

Pushkin, Lieutenant, 127 disputes within, 38—39, 130—31, 227,

Put, 47 371; Fourth (Unification) Congress of,

Pzhendovskii printing plant, 207 129, 237; and armed struggle, 131-32; and labor unions, 134; and the unem-

Radom, 136 ployed, 139—40; and July 1906 unrest, Ramishvili, I. 1., 193 230-37; Fifth Party Congress (1907) Rasputin, 307 of, 237; and St. Petersburg University, Ratimov, 288—89 2.59; Stolypin’s criticism of, 270; and

Rech, 46, 52, 68f, 77, 89, 183, 198, 201, Second Duma, 280-82, 296, 302, 310—

240f, 247, 289 II, 314-17, 341-48, 350-52, 360—

Red Cross, 118, 141 61; conference of Jan. 6, 1907, 281; on Red Guards, 231 plot to assassinate Tsar, 317—18; and

Red Hundreds, 126-27 Third Duma, 366

Rediger, A. F., General, 13, 20f, 26, 73, Russkie vedomosti, 10, 45, 47, 52, 63, 76, 81, 95, 106, 153, 1§ §-—§6, 160, 314 101, 107f, 179, 188-89, 262, 326—27, Regulations Against Strikes by Agricultural 361; and Bialystok pogrom, 152; on

Workers, 124 dissolution of First Duma, 198, 213; at-

Regulations of 1892, 26 titude toward Stolypin, 223, 275; on

Reinbot, A. A., 132, 260-261, 275 Court rumors, 226, 286, 313; on Kadet Rennenkampf, P. K., General, 21f tactics in Second Duma, 287; and Sec-

Rennert, Frederick, 14 ond Duma, 295, 317, 344—45; on dis- Renovationist movement, 330—31 solution of Second Duma, 359

Reuters, 222 Russkoe Gosudarstvo, 15 Revel (Tallinn), 128, 137, 228, 232 Russkoe znamia, 2.76, 306

Revolution of 1917, 272f Russo-Japanese War, 118 Riazan, 23, 114, 364

Riga, 17ff, 166-67, 236, 242, 340, 355 Saburov, A. A., 65, 67

Rightists, 366—68 St. Petersburg, 23f, 37, 54, 77, 109, 131, Robbins, Richard G., 115 153, 203, 207; unrest in, 9, 133, 135, Rodichev, F. I., 77-79, 89, 94, 99, 239, 136, 233-34, 238, 241; terrorism in,

310, 318, 335 18, 143; repression in, 22, 27, 29, 250, Romanevko, 328 281-83, 355, 364f; appearance of,

Rodzevich, N., 12 328—29, 361f; Duma elections in, 49f,

Rostov, 19 when First Duma met, 82; public meetRostov-on-Don, 44, 149, 230 ings in, 129, 294; labor unions in, 134;

Rouvier, Maurice, 55 unemployment in, 137—38, 139—42;

RSDWP, see Russian Social Democratic Bryan’s visit to, 169—70; URP’s activi-

Workers Party ties in, 146, 275; and dissolution of

Rukhlov, S. V., 180 First Duma, 197f, 200, 208; and disso-

Rus, 350 lution of Second Duma, 352, 358, 361— Russian Ambassador to London, 372 62

Russian Ambassador to Paris, 55, 57 St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDWP,

Russian Assembly, 275, 279 86, 130, 131f, 140, 342

Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, 363 St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, 286 Russian Social Democratic Workers Party St. Petersburg University, 257, 259-60, (SDs), 51, 58, 119, 122, 125, 203, 279, 293

440 Index Samara, 23, 25, 40, 118, 143, 311, 318— Skatuden peninsula, 231 ,

19, 364, 367 Smolensk, 18, 122, 209, 278, 320

Samarin, F. D., 268 | Smolevich, 145 ,

Sapotnitskii, A. B., 341-43 Smychin (Chernigov province), 114 Saratov, 25, 143, 149, 203, 208, 219,220, Sobor, 330 , 268, 359; repression in, 23; support for | Social Democrats (SDs), see Russian Social

Duma in, 54; conditions of peasants in, Democratic Workers Party 113; agrarian unrest in, 118, 121, 126; Socialist Revolutionary Battle Organizalabor unrest in, 136; unemployment in, tion, 144 137, 142; Duma elections in, 283, 364; Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs), 58,

famine in, 318 125, 198, 295, 327, 332, 371; and terSariansk district (Vitebsk province), 293 rorism, 17-19, 132, 142; and propa-

Saslovo (Tambov province), 25 ganda in military services, 20, 155; and

Schmidt, P. P., 27, 143 First Duma, 38—39, 47, 51, 208, 228— Schwanebach, P. Kh., 4, 71-72, 106, 178, 29; and labor unions, 134; agrarian

196—97, 227, 315, 339-40 program of, 173, 175; and dissolution

Sedelnikov, I. I., 100 of First Duma, 208, 228—29; and July

Sedlets, 18 1906 unrest, 230—37; and Moscow

Senate, 43, 69, 200, 277, 353f, 365 University, 259; and Stolypin’s agrarian

Serebriakov, I. D., 295 reforms, 272; and Second Duma, 281Sergei Aleksandrovich, Grand Duke, 2 82, 316, 320, 361; on plot to assassiSergei Mikhailovich, Grand Duke, 73 nate Tsar, 317—18; arrests of in June

Sestroretsk, 197 1906, 347 292, 364 Sofia, 363 7th Cavalry Reserve Regiment, 159 Sokolov, N.N.,142 |

Sevastopol, 20, 23, 143, 207, 236, 279, Society of Military Science Enthusiasts, 15 5

Shakhovskoi, D.L, 88 | Solovetskii Monastery, 331

Shaposhnikov, G. N., 91 Solskii, D. M., Count, 59, 62—64, 66f Shcheglovitov, I. G., 73, 75, 97, 100, 168, Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 217

227, 245, 324, 327, 357 Sormovo (Nizhnii-Novgorod province), 158 Shchepkin, E. N., 87, 99, 148, 150 Southwest Russia, 125

Shchepkin, N. N., 206 Soviet of the Unemployed, 139—42 Sheremetev, 149—50, 153 Soviets, 3, 89, 132, 206, 233ff Shingarev, A. I., 248 : Soviets of Peasant Deputies, 12.5 Shipov, D. N., 32f, 34-35, 61f, 190-92, Soviet Union, 116, 217 |

211, 223—24, 247, 264, 327 Sozonovich, I. P., 312 , ,

Shipov, I. P., 13 Spaniards, 256

Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, A. A., Prince, 76, Spiridovich, A. I., 288-89

106, 196-97, 227 Stakhovich, M. A., 34, 94-95, 205, 223,

Shlikhter, A. G., 233 2.98, 335, 367 Shmid, G. K., 365-66 Standard, 228 Shornikova, E. N., 342, 344 Star Chamber, 13f

Shulgin, V. V., 324 Staroselts (Grodno province), 149

Siberia, 21, 272, 320, 359 Stashinskii, V. A., 344 ,

Siberian Cossacks, 354 State Council, 14f, 54, 59-63, 69f, 79,

Silberberg group, 288 96f, 121, 165, 167, 169, 171, 183, 188, Simbirsk, 25, 85, 91, 118, 133, 137, 284, 190, 197, 291, 357

325 , Statutes for Militia Units of the RSDWP,

Simferopol (Crimea), 22, 29, 85, 277, 278 I3I-32

Sipiagin, D. S., 224 Stavropol, 120, 121, 354, 364

Index 441 Steppe Predvakaz region, 119 Tambov, 25, 114, 118, 136, 159, 208, Steppe region (New Russia), 114, 354 354, 367 Stishinksii, A. S., 60, 66, 76, 106, 108, Tambusoy, S. Ia., 252

173—74, 176, 179, 196, 227 Tatars, 208, 354

Stockholm congress, 129ff Tauride, 25

Stolypin, P. A., 3, 54, 144, 211, 214-15, Tauride Palace, 82, 86, 89, 123, 200, 202, 2.63, 266, 329, 374; career and personal 2.92, 298, 299—300, 304, 314, 347;

traits of, 4, 7, 75, 216—21, 370; and 352, 358 First Duma, 102, 107, 190, 196—201, Telav (Tiflis province), 126-27, 136 207; and agrarian strikes, 124; and Bia- Tennison, Ia. Ia., 204 lystok pogrom, 149, 150—52; and un- Terioki, 209f, 238—39, 360 rest in military services, 155—56, 158— Terner, F. G., 61 59; and famine, 170; and Gurko, 176; Terrorism 17-21, 94-95, 142-45, 238—

negotiations with liberals by, 181, 183, 42, 282, 287-91, 322-29, 362-64 188—91, 223-27; and Appeal to the Teslenko, N. V., 296, 346f People, 193-94; agrarian policy of, Theological Academy, St. Petersburg, 334 221, 267-74, 304—5, 320—22, 348, Theological Consistory of Novocherkassk,

350; his program as Prime minister, 252 222—23; and his government, 226-27; Theological Seminary, St. Petersburg, 334 and July 1906 unrest, 234, 238; andter- _ Tiflis, 17f, 22, 29, 126, 136, 142f, 361,

rorism, 238, 287—91, 322—23, 363; as- 363 sassination attempt on, 244; Court’s Tikhvin (Novgorod province), 27 view of, 244, 264—65; and law on field Tikhvinskii, Father F. V., 332—34

courts-martial, 245-49, 326; crack- Timiriazev, V. L., 13, 180 down on opposition by, 249-52; and Timofeev, Major General, 29, 143 legal reforms, 252; and the Jewish ques- _—‘Tiraspol (Moldavia), 144

tion, 252—55; and universities, 260— Tobolsk, 23 62; assessment of political situation by, Tolstoi, D. A., 224 264; and Second Duma, 274-77, 286-— _Tolstoi, J. 1., Count, 13, 74

87, 297-301, 304-8, 318—20, 339— Tolstoy, Lev, 334 51, 356-57, 361; rumors of his dis- Tomsk, 22, 208 missal, 285-86; and Golovin, 299-— Tovarishch, 2.47, 359 300, 323-24; and Zurabov affair, 315— Trans-Baikal, 21 17; on plot to assassinate Tsar, 318; 0n Transcaucasia, 354 Iollos’s assassination, 327; and unrest Trepov, D. F., General, 2, 3, 81, 143; influwithin Church, 336; and elections for ence at Court, 13, 214; and revision of

Third Duma, 353—54, 364; and Fundamental Laws, 63, 68—69; and zemstvo congress of 1907, 367 Duma, 108, 195, 199; and agrarian Strukov, A. P., General-Adjutant, 173-74 question, 173—74; and negotiations Struve, P. B., 62, 258, 303, 320, 348—51 with liberals, 181-86, 194

Student movement, 257—63 Trepov, A. F., 183-84

Sudzha, 136 Trubetskoi, E. N., Prince, 37, 211-13 Sukhomlin, N. N., General, 180 Trubetskoi, P. N., Prince, 30—31

Sumy district (Kharkov province), 116 Trubetskoi, S. N., Prince, 260, 322, 333

Sveaborg, 227—28, 230-33, 236 Trudoviks, 3, 5, 116, 122, 128, 129-30, Sviatii Krest (Stavropol province), 120 148, 186; and First Duma, 51, 86, 88,

Sviatopolk-Mirsky, P. D., Prince, 3 91, 105f, 108, 167-69, 176, 203, 228; program of, 92; and agrarian question,

Taganrog, 18 172—73, 175; on Appeal to the People, Tagantsev, N. S., 61 193, 195; and Second Duma, 281-82,

442 Index Trudoviks (continued) | Union of Russian Army Officers, 156—57 295f, 304, 312, 316, 319, 352; on plot | Union of Secondary School Teachers, 27 to assassinate Tsar, 317-18; Orthodox Union of the Russian People (URP), 48, 51, priests as, 332; and Third Duma, 366 86, 136, 145—47, 255, 262—63, 277,

Truger brothers, 247 306, 367; and Herzenstein’s assassinaTrysov, Bolshevik activist, 233 tion, 240; legalized by Stolypin, 274; Tsar or Tsarism, see Autocracy; Nicholas II and elections for Second Duma, 275—

Tsaritsyn, 45, 137 , 76, 278f; funded by government, 276; Tsarskoe Selo, 64, 275, 285—86, 316 and IJollos’s assassination, 327; and par-

Tsereteli, I. G., 305-6, 346-47 | ish clergy, 331, 336; and dissolution of

Tserkounyi vestnik, 331 Second Duma, 358; and Third Duma,

Tsion, S. A., Captain, 231 366

Tugan-Baranovskii, M. I., 258 Union of True Russians, 328 Tula, 25, 27, 49, 114, 118, 126, 136, 320, | Union of Unions, 37

365 United Nobility, 4, 178-80, 196, 272

Turi, 125-26 Sif Tupichev (Chernigov province), 114 United States, 169, 254

Turgai oblast, 354 U. S. Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 9, 50, Turkestan region, 354 United Zemstvo Organization, 118

Turks, 306 : Universities, 60, 257—63 Tver, 18, 49, 209, 292 University of Iuriev, 102 Tverskoi, P. A., 218 University of Kazan, 258

Tyrkova, A. V., 194 Ural oblast, 354

Urusov, S. D., Prince, 151-52, 162

Udel (crown domain), 172 Usman (Tambov province), 208

Ufa, 118, 295, 312 Uspenskii Sobor, 293 |

Ukase dissolving First Duma, 199-200 | Ukase of November 9, 1906, 268, 269—72, Vasilchikov, B. A., Prince, 15, 227, 268

274, 304 , Vasilii Island, 136 , , Ukraine or Ukranians, 236, 306 Vasilkov (Kiev province), 145 Uman, 29 Veisman, 77 Undol (Vladimir province), 128 Verner, Andrew, M., 2

Unemployment, 137-42 , Verneuil, Maurice de, 55

Union of Engineers, 140 Vestnik Evropy, 361

Union of Liberation, 296 Vestnik partii narodnoi svobody, 46 — Union of October 17 (Octobrists), 4,31-— - Viatka, 177, 252, 332, 364 355 37, 44, 51, 61, 181, 325; and elec- Vilna, 23, 136, 219, 220, 278, 365.

tions for First Duma, 46—47; on re- Vinaver, M. M., 89, 92ff, 203 formed State Council, 62; and Vyborg Vitebsk or Vitebsk province, 23, 119, 143 Manifesto, 210-11; divisions within, Vladikavkaz garrison, 157

264, 303—4; and Stolypin’s agrarian re- Vladimir, 128 , forms, 272; legalized by Stolypin, 274; | Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Grand-Duke, 66

and elections for Second Duma,-275; Vnorovskii, B., 18

funded by government, 276; and links | Voennyi golos,155— oo to ultraconservatives, 278—79; and Sec- _Voitinskii, V. S., 17, 48-49, 132, 138,

ond Duma, 298, 359—60; on terrorism, 227, 241, 341-44, 360-61 323; and Third Duma, 366-67; and Volga region, 113, 179, 236, 283 gains in zemstvo elections in 1907, | Volga River, 220

367-68 Volkonskii, N. S., Prince, 32

Union of Railroad Employees, 362 Volkov, T. O., 122

Index 443

Vologda, 174, 364 compared to Stolypin, 222, 224; plans Volokolamsk district (Moscow province), return to government service, 265; at-

116 tempted assassination of, 288; bewil-

Von der Launits, V. F., 156, 288 dered by revolutionary turmoil, 372—73 Vonliarliarskii, A. V., General, 240 Workers, 1, 5, 128—37, 371; unrest Voronezh, 25, 50, 114, 126, 145, 167, 320 among, 128, 132—33, 136—37; and

Voznesenskii, K. F., 311-12 Second Duma, 292—95; and Third

Vpered, 30, 131 Duma, 367

Vtory Birki (Kiev province), 120 Workers’ Conspiracy, 138 Vyborg district (St. Petersburg), 137, 208 Workers’ Group in Duma, 119, 130

Vyborg (Finland), 202-7, 2o9f, 352 World War I, 273 Vyborg Manifesto, 205-9, 250f, 310

Vykhvostov (Chernigov province), 114 Zabludov (Grodno province), 150 Zabolotnyi, I. K., 167 Warsaw, 17f, 29, 37, 49, 143f, 208, 242— Zamiatin, General, 244

43, 250, 275, 355 Zemliachka, R. S., 233

Warsaw Station, 335 Zemstvo congress (June 10, 1907), 367 Westinghouse Company, 139 Zemstvo or zemstvo employees, 17, 27—

White Guards, 328 28, 30, 60, 118, 137, 292, 367—68, 369

White Sea, 331 Zhilkin, I. V., 92, 93, 193 William II, Kaiser of Germany, 56 Zhitekskii, priest, 275

Winter Palace, 82, 86, 104, 244, 292, 313 Zhitomir, 136, 149, 250, 278 Witte, S. Iu., 3f, 10-16, 26, 39—40, 42, Zholmanovskii, Governor-General of Eka-

50, §9—-62, 115, 145, 173-74, 214, terinoslav, 18 217; illness of, 15-16; Octobrists’ atti- Zinoviev, A. D., 361 tude toward, 31—32; and elections for Zionism, 147 First Duma, 44-45, 53, 75; and French = Zionist Socialist Party, 22 loans, 54—58; and Fundamental Laws, Zurabov, A. G., 314-17, 337-38, 339 63—69; departure from office, 71-77; Zvenigorodsk district (Kiev province), 122

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data (Revised for volume 2) Ascher, Abraham, 1928-—

The Revolution of 1905.

Bibliography: v. 1, p. 383-397. Includes index.

restored. |

Contents: [1] Russia in disarray. [2] Authority

1. Soviet Union—History—Revolution of 1905. I. Title.

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