The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored 9781503621978

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The Revolution of 1905

Abraham Ascher

THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 Authority Restored

* *

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1992 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America Published with the support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency CIP data appear at the end of the book Original printing 1992

To My Mother FEIGA ASCHER

Acknowledgments

I should like to express my appreciation to various institutions and individuals who helped me bring to a conclusion my study of the Revolution of 1905. Financial support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, the Earhart Foundation, and the Research Foundation of the City University of New York made possible research trips in the United States and Europe and enabled me to take time off from teaching. A number of archives generously gave me access to their holdings in my search for relevant source material: the Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres in Paris, the Public Record Office in London, the Haus-Hof-und-Staatsarchiv in Vienna, the Politisches Archiv des Auswiirtigen Amts in Bonn, the Hoover Institution, and the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. The National Archives in Washington, D.C., promptly sent me microfilms of diplomatic dispatches I requested. Librarians at Columbia University, the New York City Public Library, and the library of the Graduate School of the City University responded graciously to all my requests for books, pamphlets, and newspapers. The six summers I spent at the Slavonic Library of Helsinki University were especially profitable. The holdings of the library on early-twentieth-century Russia are superb, and the entire staff made every effort to provide me with the materials I asked for. I am grateful to all my friends who read the manuscript and gave me the benefit of their thoughtful criticisms: Julian Franklin, Paula Franklin, Guenter Lewy, Allen McConnell, and Marc Raeff. Allan K. Wildman read the manuscript with special care and made numerous suggestions for its improvement, virtually all of which I incorporated into my final draft. Peter J. Kahn of Stanford University Press, the copy editor for the

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Acknowledgments

first volume, shepherded this volume through to completion. He not only encouraged me in my work but read the entire manuscript and again pointed out stylistic and substantive weaknesses. The final version owes much to his cogent comments. Ms. Barbara Mnookin was an excellent copy editor who saved me from many infelicities and mistakes. My wife, Anna, again took time off from her own work to improve the style and content of the book; and her support and help greatly facilitated its completion. The shortcomings of the book are, of course, my responsibility. A.A.

........................... Contents

A Note to the Reader xi

Introduction I. The Search for Stability 2. Implementing Political Reform

I

9

3. The First Steps of the Duma 4· Stirrings from Below 5. The Dissolution of the Duma 6. A New Government Takes Command 7. Peasants into Citizens 8. The Second Duma 9· Coup d'Etat Conclusion Notes

379

Bibliography 4IJ

Index 429

Twelve pages of illustrations follow p. II4

42 8I III I62 2I6

264 292

337 369

A Note to the Reader

In 1905-7 Russia was still using the Julian calendar, which was then thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar used in the West. I have given all dates in the text according to the Russian calendar; I have also used the Russian date alone in the notes for issues of newspapers and other periodicals, which were often dated in both forms on their covers. Western dates do occasionally occur in dispatches from foreign diplomats stationed in Russia, but I always give the Russian equivalent in parentheses to avoid confusion. The transliteration of Russian names inevitably poses a problem, and I have opted to use the forms most commonly known for the handful of people the reader is likely to be familiar with already: Tsar Nicholas, Count Witte, Kerensky, Trotsky. Otherwise I follow the Library of Congress transliteration system, modified to eliminate soft and hard signs. The list below is designed to define certain terms and offices mentioned in the text. City Governor the chief authority in larger cities such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, and Sevastopol; his powers were equivalent to those of a Governor. Gendarmes members of a special police force under the direct authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Governor the chief authority in provinces; responsible to the Minister of Internal Affairs. Governor- the chief authority in a few important provinces (noGeneral tably St. Petersburg and Moscow) and in the borderlands; his rank was equivalent to that of a minister and he had direct access to the Tsar.

xii

A Note to the Reader

a provmce. a well-to-do peasant who owned a fairly large farm, who could afford to hire some laborers, and who often lent money to other peasants. Chief Procurator the chief administrator of the Russian Orthodox of the Most Church, with direct access to the Tsar. Holy Synod State Council an appointed body of dignitaries, established in r8ro, that advised the Tsar on legislation. Uezd a county, including a city or town and several rural districts (volosti). Volost a district in rural regions. Guberniia Kulak (literally, "fist")

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The Revolution of 1905

........................... Introduction

MY AIM in this volume is to conclude my account of the Revolution of 1905 by describing developments from early 1906 until June 3, 1907, the day on which the autocracy inflicted the fatal blow on the opposition that reduced it to virtual impotence. In the initial period of the revolution, the subject of my first volume, the opposition was on the offensive and forced the old order into a series of retreats. Battered by attacks from liberals, workers, peasants, and national minorities, and weakened by a loss of authority in the armed forces, the autocracy yielded-halfheartedly, to be sure-one position after another. The high point of the opposition's triumphs was reached during the general strike of October 1905, when Tsar Nicholas promised not to enact any law without the approval of an elected parliament, a concession that amounted to a commitment to cease ruling as an absolute monarch. Yet within weeks of that concession, the old order began to reassert its authority. In part, the success of the authorities in reclaiming their prerogatives derived from the fragmentation and excesses of the opposition, but it also resulted from the new resolve by the men in power to stem the tide of revolution by repression and, ultimately, by a breach of the constitution. The clock, however, could not be turned back completely. The social and political ferment throughout the country was too deep for that, and the authorities did not feel strong enough even to attempt to undo all the gains of the opposition. In fact, for about a year and a half, the two sides in the conflict found themselves in an uneasy stalemate. Both knew that the struggle had not yet ended, and both still hoped to prevail. In some respects, the social and political turbulence in 1906 and 1907 was similar to that in the first fifteen months of the revolution. There was unrest in the cities and in the countryside; liberals pressed the govern-

2

Introduction

ment to make fundamental changes; the resentments of ethnic minorities in some of the outlying regions of the Empire influenced the course of the upheaval; and the army for a time was beset by indiscipline. The two periods of the revolution were also similar in that the outcome in both was not foreordained. On several occasions in late 1904 and throughout 1905, timely reform by the authorities could have brought the upheaval to an end. In 1906 and the first half of 1907, a cooperative effort by the government and the liberal movement to steer Russia along a new path did not seem to be out of the question. Twice, representatives of the Court and society, which comprised the educated strata of the population, engaged in detailed discussions on the formation of a coalition government committed to broad reform.* True, nothing came of the discussions, but if thoughtful people at the time believed that an agreement was possible, that it was worthwhile for them to enter into negotiations, on what basis can the student of history claim that failure was inevitable? Certainly, individuals in the radical camp viewed the negotiations with alarm. Lenin, for one, raged against the liberals who contemplated accommodation with the old order because he believed that a rapprochement between those groups would undermine his political position and that of all other radicals. As in 1905, so in 1906 and 1907 the two sides in the conflict did not constitute monoliths. Some individuals in both camps feared the abyss and therefore favored flexibility and compromise. Their inability to prevail deserves to be explored and analyzed just as much as the endeavors of the revolutionaries, who wished to transform the entire social and political order. Only by probing the conduct of both the extremists and the moderates in the opposition and in the government can one understand why the upheaval ended as it did, in a victory for • Whenever I refer to the "Court" in this study I have in mind the members of the Tsar's entourage (as distinguished from the heads of various ministries) who supplied him with information on developments in the Empire as well as with advice on policy. The entourage was not a fixed group. Tsar Nicholas did not confine himself to palace officials in considering issues and policies. Often he consulted dose relatives or prominent citizens. General A. A. Mosolov, the Director of the Chancellery, claimed in his memoirs that many people "grossly exaggerated" the entourage's influence on the Tsar. It is true that at times Nicholas reached critical decisions on his own, rather impetuously, but there is little doubt that the Court played a key role in shaping his thinking on most issues of national importance. The most prominent members of the entourage in 1906-7 were Count V. B. Frederiks, the Minister of the Court; General Mosolov; General D. F. Trepov, the Commandant of the Court; Count P. K. Benkendorf, the Palace Marshal; the Grand Dukes Nikolai Nikolaevich, Sergei Aleksandrovich, Alexander Mikhailovich, Michael Aleksandrovich, and Paul Aleksandrovich; Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, editor of the ulttaconservative Grazhdanin; and K. P. Pobedonostsev, former Procurator of the Most Holy Synod. For more details on the entourage, see Mossolov, At the Court, passim; and Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, pp. 67-69.

Introduction

the old order that did not totally abrogate the concessions the autocracy had made. The last phase of the Revolution of I905 has received short shrift from political activists who lived at the time and from scholars. Most have ignored the period altogether or treated it in very broad strokes. Not atypical is a Soviet work published in I 97 5: it devotes 286 pages to the year I905, and only 77 to I906 and I907. 1 The outstanding statesman of the period, indeed, one of the most important statesmen of Late Imperial Russia, P. A. Stolypin, has yet to be the subject of a full-scale biography in any language. Soviet historians have neglected the last year and a half of the revolution because they do not consider that period very interesting or significant. They see it as a "period of decline," when large sectors of the population succumbed to "constitutional illusions" in trusting the new parliament, the Duma, to devise solutions for Russia's economic and political problems. Western scholars have paid somewhat more attention to the period and have written some important studies of various developments, most notably the Second Duma, the politics of the gentry, the unrest in the army, and the emergence of political parties. But the secondary literature is not nearly as rich as that on I 90 5. The number of doctoral dissertations and scholarly articles pales in comparison to the vast outpouring on the first fifteen months of the upheaval. At first glance, the scholarly neglect seems justified. The events and personalities of I905-Bloody Sunday, the massive strikes, the Moscow uprising in December, the emergence of soviets, Father Gapon, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky-present themselves to the casual observer as more interesting and much more exciting than what came after. During the final phase of the revolution, there were no eruptions of mass fury that shook the foundations of the Empire or forced the autocracy to make sweeping concessions. And the political leaders, such as I. L. Goremykin, who succeeded Witte as Prime Minister, as well as most of the members of his cabinet, were uninspiring if not downright incompetent. The two Dumas, the scene of many clashes between the government and the opposition, were more notable for bombastic phrasemaking than for solid achievements. On closer examination, however, such judgments turn out to be superficial. For one thing, some of those who dominated the scene in I905Witte, Durnovo, Trepov, Tsar Nicholas, Miliukov-continued to play a critical role in the later period. For another, several of the new players who came to the fore were powerful personalities. A. F. Aladin, the leader of a new political group, the Trudoviks, was a colorful and dynamic figure in the opposition who deserves more attention than he has so far

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Introduction

received from scholars. On the extreme right, V. M. Purishkevich and P. Kh. Schwanebach emerged as effective spokesmen for a political tendency that steadily increased its influence. Finally, Stolypin, a fairly obscure but by no means unimportant governor in 1905, was a fascinating personage with a vision for Russia's future development at least as penetrating as Witte's. Indeed, in recent years Soviet dissidents and reformers have exalted him as a leader who might have steered Russia along a reformist path that would have avoided the pain of another revolution. Without doubt, he was less erratic and abrasive than Witte, and consequently he accomplished more in delivering the country from the turbulence that had become endemic in 1905. Whatever the final assessment of the agrarian reforms he introduced in November 1906, they were surely the most ambitious and thorough attempt to restructure the social order since the emancipation of the peasants in 1861; in many ways they were a logical complement to the October Manifesto of 1905, which only addressed political reform. The last phase of the revolution also merits dose study because the final struggles between the old order and the opposition evolved in a setting that in only a few months had undergone some basic changes. Although the conflicts remained essentially the same, the political landscape was now remarkably fluid and complex, in many ways more so than it had been in 1904 and 1905. Because of the concessions gained by the opposition during the first fifteen months of the revolution, political parties could now organize their followers and could publish, more or less freely, newspapers as well as journals and pamphlets. To a degree unprecedented in Russia, workers and peasants could set up various movements to promote their interests. The defenders of the old order also took advantage of the new freedoms and created a myriad of organizations to advance the cause of the autocracy. In a real sense, the Russian people became politicized, and as a result the focus of the struggle between the opposition and the government shifted from demonstrations, strikes, and street battles to a new arena, the arena of electoral politics. Although many issues were contested, there was one overriding question: whether the manifesto of October 1905 would be implemented, replacing the autocratic system of rule with a constitutional order. At the same time, the political orientation of several social groups changed in ways that, paradoxically, both weakened and strengthened the opposition. The liberal gentry, aghast at the peasant unrest in late 1905, turned sharply to the right, and some members of the landed nobility formed a powerful right-wing organization, the United Nobility, which enjoyed easy entree to the Tsarist Court. The Octobrist movement, created to uphold the principles of the October Manifesto, also veered to

Introduction

the right, in part because of the agrarian issue and in part because of a growing concern for the restoration of law and order. On the other hand, the peasants became politically active and for the first time made their mark on the national scene as an organized force. To everyone's surprise, the peasants showed remarkable enthusiasm for the Duma, confident that it would meet their most pressing demand, the redistribution of public and private lands. Many of the Duma deputies they elected formed a parliamentary party, the Trudoviks, who exerted significant influence in the legislature. In 190 5, it will be recalled, the peasants engaged in extensive, but basically uncoordinated, disturbances in the countryside. Acting essentially on their own without much contact with other social groups and without full awareness of the issues that animated the opposition movement in the cities, the peasants achieved relatively little beyond disquieting the authorities and did not decisively affect the course of the revolution. Within three months the government, resorting to brute force, restored order. Nevertheless, some important lessons had been learned, with the result that in 1906 and 1907 many peasants turned to different tactics. They emphasized political action, though incidents of unrest by no means came to a halt. More than ever before, peasants now read newspapers, eagerly sought information about the proceedings in the Duma, and composed numerous cahiers, frequently with the assistance of the intelligentsia, that spelled out their grievances and yearnings and were sent to Duma deputies in St. Petersburg. At long last, the political and cultural isolation of the peasants came to an end. As a result, the agrarian question preoccupied both Dumas and was critical in determining the fate of the parliamentary experiment. Industrial workers did not assume nearly as prominent a role in the opposition movement as they had in 1905. Embittered by the defeat of the armed uprising in Moscow in December 1905, they had cooled toward the revolutionaries and .were far less willing to answer calls for new offensives against the old order. Initially, they even showed little interest in electoral politics, a stance that coincided with the stance of the revolutionary parties. But by late 1906 workers, as well as most radicals, concluded that their rejection of the Duma had been a mistake, and they participated vigorously in the electoral campaign for the Second Duma. Thus, the Duma, the single most notable achievement of the opposition's efforts in 1905, became the vortex of the many political storms in 1906 and 1907. For some thirteen months, it was primarily in that institution, composed overwhelmingly of opposition deputies, that the final conflicts of the revolution were played out. The major issues remained the same as they had been since the beginning of the upheaval: democ-

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Introduction

ratization of the political process and social and economic reform. Even an issue that appeared to have been settled continued to agitate the body politic. The very idea of an elected legislature with sharply curtailed powers-a concession by the authorities late in I905 that many in the opposition regarded as sacrosanct-provoked the most heated controversy. The Tsar, most members of the Court, as well as many senior officials and conservatives remained unreconciled to a popular assembly that exercised any voice at all in national affairs. Time and again, individuals and groups on the right campaigned ardently for the elimination of the Duma. By the same token, the revolutionary left dismissed as futile any constitutional arrangement that kept vestiges of the old order intact. Only the Kadets and some moderates on the right and left favored a parliamentary system in principle, and even they rejected the existing system for reasons that will become clear in Chapter 2. Given the absence of consensus not only on specific reforms but on the procedures for determining public policy, it is not surprising that the Duma turned into a battleground on which competing forces engaged in relentless and uncompromising struggles that almost invariably ended in deadlock. Neither the First nor the Second Duma succeeded in enacting much legislation on pressing issues. In fact, only a handful of measures considered by the two legislatures ever became law. With each passing month in I 906 and I 907, it became increasingly doubtful that the October Manifesto, which had engendered so much hope in I905 and early I906, would produce a political settlement of the revolutionary crisis. Under the circumstances, the political atmosphere in I906 and I907 continued to be dangerously volatile, and many activists and government leaders expected a new explosion from below. The clearest symptom of this turbulence was the frequency with which rumors were taken seriously. With amazing regularity, rumors about the dissolution of one or another Duma, the dismissal or resignation of prominent ministers, the establishment of a dictatorship, and the outbreak of pogroms against Jews and liberals spread quickly and caused great anxiety, if not panic. Although the rumors were often groundless, that they so easily gained credibility was a sign of the fluidity of the state of affairs and the despair that had gripped the nation. The country had undergone so many traumas and the distrust of the Court and political leaders was so deep-seated that no tale of horror or willfulness could be dismissed out of hand. The prevalence of distrust also helps to explain the degree of vituperation that characterized political discourse, not only in the debates in the Dumas, which often descended to plain nastiness, but also in the exchanges within parties and between members of various political movements. It would be simple-minded to attribute the politicians' failure to solve the revolu-

Introduction

tionary crisis to this pervasive mudslinging, but it would be a mistake to discount it altogether. Finally, although in I 906 and I 907 mass protest movements and mass violence were not as prominent as they had been in I905, lawlessness and political terror were more widespread. These phenomena demanded a fair amount of space in the first volume, but I devote much more to them here. The spread of lawlessness surely reflected the government's inability fully to reassert its authority and the continuing, deep hostility that many people felt toward the existing order. Seen in this light, lawlessness may be said to have been political protest by other means, though there is little doubt that many criminals claimed to be acting out of political motives merely as a pretext. In describing the critical events of the last period of the Revolution of I 90 5, I have again relied wherever possible on secondary literature, but because of its relative paucity I have had to pay closer attention to primary materials. The Stenographic Reports of the two Dumas provide valuable insights into the mood of both the authorities and the opposition and into the profound hostility between them. Stolypin's speecheseloquent, detailed, and precise-not only yield important information on his policies but also help us to understand his personality. His selfassurance and determination to press forward with his program manifest themselves clearly and forcefully. By the same token, Duma deputies of all persuasions spoke with such candor that their formal and informal speeches reveal clearly the fervor and intransigence with which they held their political positions. As will become evident, the debates in the Dumas and the two legislatures' failure to evolve into effective institutions strongly influenced the outcome of the revolution. Several major participants in the events of I906-7left memoirs, which proved to be invaluable guides on the complicated political maneuvers of the government and leaders of the opposition. The press, still free to publish almost anything the editors considered newsworthy, provided useful information on developments throughout the Empire and evidence on the mood of the nation during the many crises. The voluminous collections published by Soviet scholars contain an enormous amount of material from Soviet archives. Finally, I made extensive use, as I did for my first volume, of the dispatches of American, German, French, English, and Austrian diplomats in various cities of the Russian Empire. Again, I found these dispatches extremely informative: many of the diplomats were knowledgeable observers and reported on developments that other contemporaries tended to slight. The various embassies established close contacts with senior officials in different governmental departments and offices; consequently, the dispatches shed light on the thinking of a fairly

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Introduction

wide range of ministers and Court officials. In a few private audiences with foreign ambassadors, Tsar Nicholas expressed his views with a directness and forcefulness not often found in other sources, including his own diary, which is quite dull and uninformative. As I indicated in the Introduction to the first volume, I could not possibly treat every aspect of the Revolution of 1905 in detail without writing a much larger work than the one I had contemplated. My intention throughout has been to delineate the contours of the upheaval and to focus on the central issues that determined the fate of the Revolution of 1905. Above all, I hope that I have shown why the revolution was a critical event whose failure marked a turning point in modern Russian history.

Chapter One

The Search for Stability

ON THE LAST day of November 1905, the U.S. Ambassador to St. Petersburg, George L. Meyer, painted a bleak picture of conditions in Russia. The "Russian nation," he declared in a telegram to the State Department, "appears to have gone temporarily insane; government practically helpless to restore order throughout the country; departments at sixes and sevens; also crippled by postal and telegraph strike. Only socialists appear to be well organized to establish strikes when and wherever they like. Danger appears to me in a reaction which may bring about [Prime Minister] Witte's resignation before the national assembly meets and military dictatorship resulting in former methods [of rule] and great loss of life throughout the land." In St. Petersburg, the Ambassador continued, "everybody is armed and no one goes without a pistol, it being considered dangerous to walk in any of the side streets and advisable to take a droshky when traveling at night." Meyer urged the Department of State to set up special funds for American consuls operating in various Russian cities "in case they are compelled to shelter and feed American citizens."' V. I. Gurko, a senior official in the Russian government, was equally pessimistic in late r 90 5; it seemed to him that "the existing regime, and even the state itself," might soon collapse. 2 Given the turbulence at the time, these assessments were not unduly alarmist. Within about five weeks, however, conditions changed dramatically. On January 9, 1906, the British Ambassador reported that since the suppression of the Moscow uprising in mid-December the "country has gradually become quieter." Although the Caucasus remained in a "condition of complicated chaos," the agrarian unrest in southern Russia had been put down, martial law in Poland had restored calm, and Finland was "quietly preparing for its new constitution." The "stern measures"

ro

The Search for Stability

applied by the authorities in the Baltic provinces appeared to be effective in quashing local rebellions. Moreover, service on the railroad, widely disrupted by strikes in 1905, had been restored in most parts of European Russia.' The government itself felt more confident than it had in some time. On January ro Witte informed the Tsar that the revolutionary forces had been greatly weakened by the government's recent crackdown in the cities and countryside, though he warned that the country remained tense and that some unrest could still be expected. • A day later P. N. Durnovo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, reported to the Tsar that although revolutionaries were still trying to foment violence, the "revolutionary energy of the masses" had undergone a distinct decline.' N. I. Astrov, a liberal activist in Moscow, detected a note of optimism even among some groups of the opposition, who sensed that a new era had begun, an era in which government arbitrariness would be replaced by respect for law and justice. 6 On January r the editors of the liberal Russkie vedomosti expressed confidence that the sacrifices of the past year would prove not to have been in vain. After all the conflict and bloodshed of 1905, a return to the old order seemed to them to be out of the question. The new year would not be easy, but nonetheless the editors envisioned a "new, free Russia, [the country] having acquired all the blessings of a constitutional order." 7 The emergence of political parties, the greater opportunities for the free expression of political views, and, above all, the impending elections of the State Duma gave hope to numerous leaders of the opposition that the methods of struggle in 1906 would be different from those of 1905, a year widely regarded as "l'annee terrible." Direct action by the masses and violence would be replaced by debate and legislative enactments to realize fundamental reform of the state and society. Not all observers of conditions in Russia in early 1906 shared this optimistic assessment of the state of affairs, and events would soon bear out their apprehensions. Although the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Count Aloys Lexa von Aehrenthal, acknowledged that conditions were somewhat better, he still considered the situation in the country "precarious." Among other things, he pointed to the vacillations of Tsar Nicholas. To be sure, during a long audience with the ambassador in mid-January 1906, Nicholas boasted that his popularity among the people would enable him to take firm measures against the Duma, should that prove necessary. The Tsar summoned as evidence the numerous petitions and telegrams that arrived daily at the Court from all over the Empire. Though his subjects urged him to take the wishes of Duma deputies seriously, they also assured him of their loyalty and advised him to send the deputies packing if they did not "correctly interpret" the peo-

The Search for Stability

pie's wishes. Aehrenthal, however, lacked confidence in the Tsar's ability to pursue a consistent policy on the Duma or, for that matter, on any major issue, since he allowed himself to be influenced by advisers who disagreed among themselves on how to deal with the country's problems. • Even the British Ambassador, who was generally more optimistic than his colleague from Austria, wondered whether Russia was enjoying "a permanent improvement or only a temporary lull." He noted, perceptively, that the country's various social groups harbored deep hostilities toward each other, a situation that boded ill for the future. The ambassador was especially troubled by the "profound distrust which seems to fill all minds as to the policy of the Minister President [Witte]. It is openly stated that his objectives are purely selfish." Many sectors of the population were seized with a "permanent feeling of resentment" over the government's fierce repression, a feeling that the ambassador feared would eventually spill over to the army. 9 And conservatives, including highly placed officials at Court, despised Witte because they blamed him and his policy of concessions for the "dismal events" of the recent past. At a meeting of the State Council on January I 6, the former GovernorGeneral of Moscow P. P. Durnovo went so far as to accuse Witte of having been responsible for the outbreak of the Moscow uprising. Witte rejected the charge as groundless, but a majority of the Council listened to Durnovo's charge with "great interest." 10 Moreover, many in the liberal camp suspected that the Prime Minister was deliberately delaying the elections to the Duma, having calculated that so long as the political situation remained unsettled, he would be irreplaceable. "Disorder," he was thought to believe, "makes his continuance in office indispensable." 11 Witte's conduct of affairs at this time more likely resulted from his own confusion, shared by the Tsar, over how to create a stable political system after the chaos of I 90 5. Given the ambiguity of the political situation, the authorities faced a dilemma. Should they pursue the conciliatory policies initiated in the fall of I 90 5, or should they take advantage of the opposition's weakness and repudiate the earlier concessions? The first course was unpalatable because it ran counter to the deepest convictions of the men in power; the second risked reigniting the revolution. Incapable of resolving the dilemma, Witte and the Tsar in the first months of I 906 made so many contradictory statements on major public issues and adopted so many conflicting policies that the government's direction was not discernible. In truth, the highest authorities in St. Petersburg remained in disarray; they could not even settle on a consistent definition of the Tsar's powers, the most fundamental political question confronting the country. A case in point was the Tsar's duplicitous response to a delegation from

I I

12

The Search for Stability

the "Autocratic-Monarchist Party of the City of Ivanovo-Voznesensk," which on February r 6 expressed its loyalty to him. After voicing his appreciation, Nicholas indicated his intention to uphold the October Manifesto of 1905, in which he had vowed not to enact any law without the approval of an elected legislature. But he immediately undermined this statement by declaring: "The autocracy will remain as it was formerly. Thank you for your devotion to me." 12 According to a different account of the meeting, the Tsar also promised that he would serve as an autocrat with "unlimited" authority. 13 Right-wing extremists lost no time in devising ingenious rationalizations for the claim that the manifesto did not in fact amount to a permanent change in the country's political system. A writer for the ultraconservative Moskovskie vedomosti, N. Rodzevich, offered a line of reasoning that, in one form or another, was frequently cited by supporters of the principle of autocracy. "Let us assume," Rodzevich wrote, "that the Tsar is not knowledgeable on military affairs. Well, he selects an experienced general and declares that without the agreement of this general no military question may be decided. A time comes and the Tsar realizes that the general selected by him gives bad advice; can he really not change his previous order and dismiss the general? Of course he may do so. Similarly, if the Duma does not warrant the Tsar's confidence, would he not be justified in dissolving the Duma and then creating a new one or refusing to convoke one at all? This depends on the Autocrat's will." Rodzevich considered it quite likely that "evil people" would be elected to the Duma by deceiving voters with unrealistic promises or by bribing them.'• Rodzevich also contended that the principle of autocracy was deeply embedded in Russian history and traditions, and that the people strongly favored it. Only seditious troublemakers, most notably the intelligentsia and the Jews, wanted to limit the autocrat's authority." To add to the confusion, even Prime Minister Witte, the author of the October Manifesto, interpreted it in contradictory ways. On December 29, 1905, Novoe vremia revealed that Witte had said in an interview that the manifesto had been promulgated by the Tsar "on his free will," and that what the ruler promised, he could annul with a stroke of the pen. Consequently, Nicholas continued to exercise power as an autocrat with unlimited authority. When a storm of protest erupted, Witte denied having made the remark, but the denial was neither forceful nor convincing.'• Actually, Witte's own authority as Prime Minister was so shaky that many questioned whether he could be accepted as the authentic spokesman of the government. The Tsar, who neither trusted nor liked him, had appointed him only because he could not find anyone else capable of running the government. But Witte was never allowed to take charge.

The Search for Stability

P. N. Durnovo, who headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and General D. F. Trepov, the Commandant of the Court, were enormously influential and regularly undermined Witte's authority. Their hostility toward the Prime Minister, dating back to 1905, seems to have been rooted in personal rivalries. Trepov, a fervent defender of autocracy, had sought to dominate domestic policy ever since he became a commanding presence at Court early in the revolution. Witte's reference to him as the "dictator" of Russia was somewhat overdrawn, but that Tsar Nicholas relied heavily on his advice cannot be doubted. Durnovo, who owed his appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs to Witte, wasted no time in undermining the Prime Minister by hinting to the Tsar that Witte was too liberal, which is precisely what Nicholas suspected. At this time, early 1906, both Durnovo and Trepov were advocates of repression pure and simple and succeeded in persuading the Tsar not to support Witte's program of pacification and reform. "No secret is made of the fact," a foreign observer noted, "that the Prime Minister gives orders and makes promises which his subordinate [Durnovo] refuses to carry into effect." Nor was it a secret that Witte opposed Durnovo's policy of unbridled repression.' 7 Yet in early January Durnovo, who had been Acting Minister of Internal Affairs, was given the post permanently; the same observer commented that "he has for some time been the best hated man in Russia and his present advancement is not likely to enhance his popularity." 18 It also did not enhance the reputation of Witte's government, which increasingly came under criticism for lack of clear direction. Durnovo's promotion exacerbated the rifts within the cabinet, which was split into three groups or "parties": the rightists, who included Ournovo, A. A. Birilev (Minister of the Navy), M. G. Akimov (Minister of Justice), and A. F. Rediger (Minister of War, who took little part in cabinet discussions); the center, consisting of Prince A. D. Obolenskii (Chief Procurator of the Most Holy Synod of the Russian Church), K. S. Nemeshaev (Minister of Transportation), I. P. Shipov (Minister of Finance), and D. A. Filosofov (State Comptroller); and the left, represented by N. N. Kuder (Minister of Agriculture), V.I. Timiriazev (Minister of Commerce), and Count I. I. Tolstoi (Minister of Education). Count V. N. Lamsdorff (Minister of Foreign Affairs) rarely attended cabinet meetings. In the discussions of government policy, which invariably provoked sharp differences, Witte constantly changed positions, moving from one group to another.'• Much of the time the Tsar and his senior advisers ignored the cabinet altogether and relied on the advice of a "Star Chamber," which met regularly under the chairmanship of Trepov. N. P. Garin, formerly Director

r3

14

The Search for Stability

of the Department of Police, supervised the day-to-day work of the Star Chamber, which apparently did not even bother to coordinate its recommendations with those of the Prime Minister. 20 In a desperate attempt to shore up his authority, Witte was said to have bribed a British journalist, E. J. Dillon, to write favorable articles about him in the Daily Telegraph. Dillon's dispatches abounded in inaccuracies and were so obsequious to Witte that a British correspondent, Frederick Rennert, was moved to exclaim: "The man has no right to write that unless he's paid for it." The evidence strongly suggests that Dillon was paid handsomely: "Already possessed of a Panhard, he suddenly appeared in a Rolls Royce." 21 Favorable articles in Great Britain did not help Witte in Russia. In late February he confessed to a highly placed denizen of St. Petersburg society that Durnovo enjoyed "unlimited confidence" at Court. In fact, Witte was certain that if Durnovo wanted to have the Prime Minister hanged, he could easily get his way. Durnovo for his part made no effort to conceal his great power. He told the same person that he alone determined domestic policy, and that he believed the government (that is, Witte) had been too lenient in dealing with the opposition. His goal, Durnovo averred, was to inspire such terror in the country and among the revolutionaries that even the grandchildren of the present generation would never forget it. 22 A striking example of Witte's lack of authority was the way that Kuder, the Minister of Agriculture, was summarily dismissed at the insistence of the Tsar. At an executive cabinet meeting in early February, Kuder had introduced a report calling for the compulsory expropriation of some private lands with compensation and their distribution to needy peasants. Witte had indicated that he considered the proposal "inopportune" in view of Russia's precarious financial condition and agreed to submit it to the cabinet for discussion only because Kuder wanted to hear the other ministers' views on the agrarian question. Witte insisted that the discussion be kept in the strictest confidence. Every minister spoke out against the proposal, and that seemed to end the affair. But somehow the proposal fell into the hands of officials at Court, who immediately pressed for Kuder's dismissal. The Tsar agreed that the minister must go, and Witte made no effort to save Kuder beyond asking Nicholas to appoint him to the State Council or to the Senate, as was customary whenever a minister left office. To this, the Tsar responded that he would follow the practice of Western states, where ministers were not appointed to high positions after completing their service. As I. I. Petrunkevich noted, at no other time did the Tsar express admiration for Western European political practices. Witte himself suggested to the Tsar that there were basic differences between the constitutional systems of government in the West

The Search for Stability

and the autocratic form of rule in Russia. Nicholas was not persuaded, but he did agree to grant Kuder an annual pension of 7 ,ooo rubles.>' Almost from the very day of Witte's appointment as Prime Minister, October 18, 1905, rumors circulated in St. Petersburg about his imminent dismissal or resignation. In early 1906 the rumors became even more frequent, and speculation about the identity of his successor turned into something of a sport. In mid-January the most likely candidate for the post seemed to be Durnovo, a prospect that alarmed even people on the right. Aehrenthal reported to his superiors in Vienna that many of his Russian acquaintances who were thoroughly conservative in their politics "would consider it a great mistake if this man of repression [Durnovo] were placed at the head of the cabinet." It would be much better, according to the conservatives, to appoint a young person with moderate views. They favored either Prince B. A. Vasilchikov or Count Andrei A. Bobrinskii.24 Another person frequently mentioned was V. N. Kokovtsov (formerly Minister of Finance). In early February Witte was on the verge of giving up his post because the Tsar was pressuring him to appoint to ministerial positions men he considered incompetent. Only pleas from the rest of the cabinet persuaded Witte not to submit his resignation. 25 But four weeks later the British Ambassador reported that Witte had in fact tendered his resignation, and that the Tsar was prepared to accept it, but only if Witte "could recommend a person competent to take over the duties of Prime Minister. This he was unable to do." 26 By mid-March there were indications that Witte was no longer capable of coping with the burdens of office. A man of sharp swings in mood, he again seemed to be in a deep depression. For several days he worked sluggishly and paid no attention at all to many items that came to his desk. He tended to remain silent at cabinet meetings, and at two meetings of the State Council he said virtually nothing at allY According to a newspaper report of March 16, Witte's physicians had informed him that he was suffering from heart trouble and had advised him to resign. He was said to have told an acquaintance that "no kind of human energy suffices to enable [me] to bear up under the present situation. Nowhere is there any support for me, everyone criticizes me, no one wants to do any work. Moreover, [all] classes of society are hostile to me, and I can count on no one for support. It is impossible that people will not at last heed the wishes of a sick man who is worn out and whose nerves are frayed to the point of causing heart trouble." Witte insisted that he had to quit because he needed a rest. 28 His performance in office became more lax than ever. For several days he did not even attend meetings of the State Council and undertook no initiatives at all in governmental affairs. 29 When Russkoe Gosudarstvo, a government paper, failed to issue the

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The Search for Stability

usual denials about Witte's departure from office, it was widely assumed that he really was about to be replaced. 30 Somehow, Witte mustered up enough energy to remain at his post for a few more weeks, mainly because he wanted to conclude negotiations with foreign governments for a desperately needed loan for Russia. In large measure the personal failings and predilections of the Tsar and Witte account for their inability to chart a steady political course and to reestablish political stability. Nicholas, as has already been noted, was often incapable of resisting the importunities of advisers who differed among themselves on strategy and tactics. The Tsar's overriding concern was to maintain autocratic rule, but he lacked the talent to devise an effective strategy to defend what he regarded as his sacred prerogatives. Witte, on the other hand, was extraordinarily clever and resourceful, but he was also unscrupulous and arrogant to the point of antagonizing virtually everyone with whom he worked for any length of time. He, too, preferred autocracy over any other form of government; he had drafted the October Manifesto only because he saw no other way out of the crisis into which the general strike had thrust the country. The British historian Bernard Pares recalled that when he asked Witte his view on the desirability of establishing a constitutional order in Russia, the Prime Minister replied: "I have a constitution in my head, but as to my heart-and he spat on the floor." 31 Thus, both the monarch and the leader of the government were in the position of having to create institutions for a new form of government that neither one of them really wanted. By the same token, neither of them considered it wise or feasible to retract the concessions they had made, to undo what they had done. Although the most serious challenges to governmental authority had been beaten back and workers in the cities were too demoralized to launch new, massive offensives, the country was still seething with discontent. By the spring of 1906, only about ten weeks after the period of unrest appeared to have come to an end, most observers of conditions in Russia believed that the outward calm of the population was deceptive. The German Consul in Moscow, for example, warned that "there was enough inflammable material" in the city in late March that the revolutionary movement could "flare up again" in the near future. The fear of a renewal of violence was so intense that an increasing number of families were emigrating. 32 His British counterpart noted that there "seems to be a great deal of wild talk as to 'waiting for the peasants to rise' or 'till the ground is soft enough to dig trenches' and there is much anxiety." 33 The government had been aware for some time that the country might

The Search for Stability

be on the verge of a new outbreak of violence. On February I 2 Durnovo had sent a circular to all governors warning them that revolutionary activists were devoting a "great deal of energy to underground work" in preparation for a general strike and armed uprising in the spring. Claiming that the agitation had been especially intense among peasants, Ournovo directed the governors to increase the surveillance of radical groups in the countryside. They must make every effort to arrest the agitators and to rid the villages of "all the Jews, zemstvo employees, and students who are loafing about unnecessarily." "Visiting orators" should not be permitted into the villages, for their purpose was to hold meetings, "one of the main methods of disseminating revolutionary ideas." 34 Of more immediate concern to the government was a rash of terrorist acts in early I9o6. Assassinations of officials were not a new phenomenon in Russian history, dating back at least until the I 87o's, but in both scope and form they now assumed a new character. For one thing, they were far more extensive. "From Chita to Warsaw, from Riga to Tiflis," wrote V. S. Voitinskii, a Bolshevik activist then living in St. Petersburg, "revolver shots resounded [and] bombs exploded." For another, the targets were not only high officials but ordinary policemen, government offices, banks, and armored cars and railway trains transporting money. For still another, it was not uncommon now for political activists facing arrest to offer armed resistance; in the ensuing shootouts, both sides frequently suffered casualties. 35 Voitinskii and many of his comrades were puzzled by the scattered outbursts of violence. At first the radicals thought that the terror signaled the imminence of a new revolutionary upsurge, but they soon concluded that it was "the last spark of a bonfire that was burning low." This was also the conclusion of the Okhrana, which speculated that workers frustrated by the government's success in suppressing the revolutionary movement had decided that individual acts of terror were now the only effective means of continuing the struggle against the authorities.J? In fact, much of the terror was promoted by the Socialist Revolutionary Party. At their first party congress, held in late I905 and early I906, the SRs voted to initiate a "partisan war," defined as peasant attacks on policemen, government officials, and jails holding political prisoners, backed up by the destruction of government institutions, official documents, and military barracks. 38 The party had at its disposal a sizable group of men and women who were idealists with an "almost reverential" attitude toward terror. Led by E. F. Azef (exposed in I909 as a police provocateur), the terrorists embarked on their missions in a "state of intoxication," fully aware that they would probably not survive. They claimed to be motivated not by a desire for revenge on their selected tar3•

I

7

I

8

The Search for Stability

gets but by the hope and expectation that their example of self-sacrifice would stimulate the masses to rebel. 39 That hope was unrealized, but the terrorists did succeed in frightening the authorities with their brazen acts of violence, which began early in the year. In mid-January M. A. Spiridonova, some ten years later one of the more militant leaders of the Left SRs, killed the Vice-Governor of Tambov, G. N. Luzhenovskii, who had led several punitive expeditions in the province. On March 25 a bomb was thrown at the Governor of Tver, Sleptsov, as he was leaving a meeting of nobles, tearing his body to shreds. 40 On April 23 a young SR, B. Vnorovskii, hurled a bomb at Admiral F. V. Dubasov, Governor-General of Moscow, on one of the major streets of the city. Dubasov was only slightly wounded, but CountS. N. Konovitsyn, standing next to the governor, was killed by the blast, as was the assassin. 41 On the same day in Ekaterinoslav, six people entered a railway carriage transporting the governor-general, Zholmanovskii, and killed him with a round of revolver shots. 42 Most probably, a larger number of high-ranking officials would have been killed had it not been for the extensive precautions taken by the authorities to protect them. In Moscow, for example, the number of soldiers guarding the home of the governor-general was increased fivefold. 43 But the daring attacks by terrorists on lower-ranking officials proved to be remarkably successful. According to Pravo, a highly respected news weekly, the following incidents occurred within a few weeks during the month of March: in Bialystok an armed group of assassins killed a policeman and wounded another; in Warsaw two policemen were shot and killed; in Smolensk terrorists murdered an Assistant Chief of Gendarmes; in Tiflis a group of assassins killed a police officer; in Briansk a bomb exploded in the local technical school. Assassination attempts also took place in St. Petersburg, Taganrog, Libava, and the small town of Bel (near Sedlets). In a town a few miles from Riga, eight people brandishing Braunings entered the office of the local government, disarmed the village constable, and proceeded to burn a portrait of the Tsar as well as official records and property. 44 The terrorists' success in seizing large sums of money made it possible for them to step up their activities. On the evening of February 13, several men entered the State Bank in Helsingfors (Helsinki) and announced: "In the name of the battle organization we are seizing and confiscating the cash. Hands up." The men fired several shots, killing one employee and wounding another, and then made off with more than 175,ooo rubles. 45 In late March a band of twenty armed revolutionaries executed a successful bank robbery in Moscow, which netted them 875,ooo rubles, money that the police were sure would be used to obtain weapons. The five

The Search for Stability

detectives guarding the bank offered no resistance at all; they were helpless because they had left their revolvers in their coats in the wardrobe. 46 Police searches revealed that even before this latest robbery, revolutionaries throughout the country had already managed to procure substantial caches of weapons of various kinds. In Riga a large quantity of guns was found in a private apartment; in Berdichev the police uncovered a laboratory where bombs were being produced, and nine explosives were actually seized; in Rostov a young girl's luggage was found to contain many revolvers; at the railway station in Odessa, policemen opened two large pieces of suspicious-looking luggage and found nineteen hand guns, twenty-five bayonets, and twenty other weapons.47 Archangel was the port of entry for many of these weapons, and on April 17 the government ordered local officials to set up stringent controls: they were to put all foreign boats under surveillance, inspect them carefully when they docked, and keep a watchful eye on individuals at the Archangel railway station. A handsome financial reward was promised to anyone providing accurate information on the illegal transport of weapons.•s In many regions of the Empire, the authorities now placed troops with loaded rifles outside banks, post offices, and government buildings, at railway stations, and near most large factories. Reliable statistics on the number of assassinations carried out during the first four months of 1906, the focus of this chapter, are hard to come by. All the available statistics are for the entire year, but even these must be treated with caution. Nonetheless, it is instructive to review them because they provide an overall picture of the scope of the violence. The Socialist Revolutionaries claimed that throughout the year they assassinated 82 officials. Even though that figure is substantially larger than the number the SRs claimed to have killed in 1905 (54), it still seems much too low. 49 In any case the SRs were not the only ones to engage in terror at this point. Numerous small groups of terrorists of various political persuasions, most notably anarchists, had emerged, and they acted on their own. Some individuals who engaged in terror did so not because of any defined political convictions but because they were enraged by the government's policies. Moreover, a few groups of Marxists now entered the fray. To be sure, the Social Democrats officially rejected individual terror as ineffective and a diversion from the all-important task of preparing the masses for the revolutionary struggle. But the Bolsheviks did sponsor "partisan actions" or "expropriations" -armed robberies of banks or government institutions for the purpose of procuring funds for the revolution. 5° The official statistics on revolutionary violence passed out by the government are much larger than those issued by the revolutionaries. The

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The Search for Stability

government claimed that in all of I906, I,588 people were killed by terrorists.51 This number included civilians who were accidentally killed when bombs were hurled at officials or during gun battles between terrorists and policemen. Judging from the many reports in the press and by foreign observers, the safest conclusion would seem to be that dozens were killed during the first four months of I 906 and hundreds during the entire year. Another source of anxiety for the government was the continuing agitation of radicals among soldiers and sailors. In the early months of I 906, there was no recurrence of the unrest that had shaken the army the previous October and November, but senior officers and civilian authorities did fear new outbreaks of disorder in the foreseeable future. On February I3, I906, Durnovo warned Vice Admiral A. A. Birilev, the Minister of the Navy, that the crews of a number of the ships that would soon be arriving in Nikolaev from Sevastopol were in a revolutionary mood; the men were only waiting for a suitable opportunity to initiate a rebellion. 52 Two weeks later Durnovo sent an even more alarming warning to General Rediger, the Minister of War: the political agitation among troops organized by Social Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Bundists in sixteen cities all over the Empire had reached "serious dimensions." In Moscow "the agitation among troops of the local garrison was proceeding so successfully that a significant part of the infantry and especially of the artillery was ready to join the agitators in the event of a revival of mutinies." On March I4 the Chief of the Okhrana in Kiev, A.M. Eremin, complained that he did not have enough agents to sift through all the material on revolutionary propaganda among local troops, which was increasing day by day. By the end of March the situation was so inflammatory that Durnovo directed governors in all the provinces affected by the radicals' agitation to undertake the "most energetic investigations to track down the agitators and the membership of the military organizations and then take decisive measures to eradicate this evil." 53 Even Cossacks, generally regarded as reliable, were not immune. In Penza province small units of Cossacks had been stationed in a number of villages to maintain order, but in February the Commander of the I 3th Orenburg Cossack Regiment, Ia. I. Gurev ,• discovered to his shock that agitation by radicals had exerted a "harmful influence" on his men. Gurev attributed this to the fact that there were not enough officers to lead all the small units operating in the countryside and to protect their men against the influence of propagandists. Gurev requested permission to reestablish larger companies of Cossacks that would be stationed in one locale and would thus be under the constant supervision of officers. 54 In the midst of all these alarming reports of unrest in the military ser-

The Search for Stability

vices, the government was stunned by news of an extraordinary action taken by General P. K. Rennenkampf, commander of a large punitive expedition in Siberia, against another general. On March 5 Rennenkampf filed formal charges against General Kholshchevnikov for dereliction of duty while military governor and commandant of troops in the Trans-Baikal region in late I905, at a time when rebels had succeeded in seizing control of the local government. Kholshchevnikov had already been discharged, but now he was accused not only of having permitted rebels in his area of command to arm themselves but of actually having helped them to procure weapons and of having attended revolutionary meetings. In addition, he was said to have released political prisoners and to have handed the Post and Telegraph office over to the rebels. It is not clear whether Kholshchevnikov acted out of sympathy for the radical cause or simply gave in to the rebels' demands because he lacked adequate troops to put down the insurrection. Nonetheless, Rediger decided to court-martial Kholshchevnikov, who was found guilty of all charges. The court ordered his imprisonment for sixteen months and deprived him of his civil rights but did not strip him of his rank. 55 The Minister of Internal Affairs defended his repression as a necessary weapon against unrest, but there is little doubt that Durnovo was in fact committed to much more than the eradication of disorder. He was determined to take the sting out of the entire opposition, revolutionary as well as liberal. His directives were simply too sweeping to permit any other conclusion. At his encouragement, the authorities in all parts of the country initiated a campaign of repression that was astonishing in its range and brutality. It included indiscriminate searches of private homes and offices, the imprisonment or exile of individuals suspected of sedition, the dismissal of "untrustworthy" public employees, the prohibition of public meetings, the suppression of newspapers, and the execution of political prisoners. Pravo is again an excellent source. Each weekly edition carried a section entitled "Chronicle" with accounts from newspapers throughout the Empire on what may justly be called the "terror from above." The Chronicle in one issue of Pravo (March 12, I9o6), chosen at random, ran to 22 long columns and contained I 3 2 separate items, the vast majority of them detailing one or another act of government repression. There was little to check Durnovo in prosecuting such a campaign, for in the spring of I 906 over two-thirds of all provinces and regions of the country fell, either entirely or partially, under one or another of the three emergency regulations of I88I, which had given local officials wide latitude to carry out repressive measures. 56 The most dramatic measure of

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repression was, of course, the execution of suspected troublemakers. The government claimed that executions were carried out only in accordance with legal procedures, but it is known that military commanders often executed people summarily. In Tomsk, where General Rennenkampf led a punitive expedition, 6o people were reported to have been shot within a few days. On one day, March 1, nine people were sentenced to death in Chita. The month of January saw a total of 397 people executed in various parts of the EmpireY Officials also made extensive use of the emergency regulations to arrest people or to exile them, often, though not always, on flimsy grounds. In St. Petersburg, for example, a large number of citizens were arrested for having participated in strikes, others for attending political meetings, and still others because the police found weapons in their homes. According to one estimate, in the course of one month, from late December 1905, until the end of January 1906, 1,716 people were taken into custody in the capital. 58 In Kiev during the period from November 19, 1905, until January 28, 1906, one policeman alone arrested on his own initiative 310 citizens "to prevent unrest." 59 In Tiflis police officers seized fifteen people in one day for having engaged in political activities. 60 In Simferopol the authorities incarcerated a priest for distributing food to peasants on strike. 61 In Odessa the police arrested the secretary of the local Kadet committee because he had distributed leaflets urging people to vote for Kadets in the upcoming elections for the Duma. On another occasion in Odessa, a detachment of gendarmes accompanied by several Cossacks and policemen entered a Sunday school for adult workers and, after finding some literature that had been published without prior approval by the censor, took into custody the entire administration of the school, all the teachers, and about 70 students. 62 In Baku more than 50 people suspected of political activities were arbitrarily imprisoned on one day. 63 In two villages in the Pale of Settlement, the police arrested seventeen citizens because they belonged to the Zionist Socialist Party. 64 This recital of arrests could be continued for many pages, but that would make for tedious reading. The point is that the authorities throughout the Empire conducted wholesale seizures of citizens, most of whom had committed no crime more serious than opposing the government. The total number cannot be definitively established. In March 1906 the British Ambassador reported to London that "the number of persons incarcerated for political reasons, mostly without trial, is variously estimated at 17,ooo and 7o,ooo." 65 Judging from the endless complaints of authorities in many regions of the country of their inability to handle the vast increase in prisoners, one suspects that even the upper figure is too low. One solution to the problem was to exile prisoners, a practice that had

The Search for Stability

the added advantage of removing troublemakers from major urban centers. Day after day "politicals," as they were called, were sent to outlying regions of the Empire, generally under the most distressing circumstances. During the month of March groups of 25 to so people arrived daily in Archangel, to be dispatched from there to isolated northern districts of the province. No one was allowed to meet the prisoners to give them provisions or money. As a result, the exiles were forced to live in conditions described as "truly horrible." From Moscow and Kiev groups of prisoners were exiled to Iakutsk oblast; from Orel to Tobolsk province; and so on.•• But only a relatively few of those swept up in the authorities' net were sent into exile. Most remained in jail, creating a horrendous problem of overcrowding in a great many cities. A district prison in the city of Moscow housed 2 5o prisoners in a building designed to accommodate only r 20. Since there were not enough beds, 90 inmates had to sleep in a nearby field. In Irkutsk a jail built for 500 had to house r,2r2 people; some cells that used to be occupied by one person were now occupied by eighteen. In the city of Dvinsk, Vitebsk province, 6o8 prisoners lived in a jail built for 216. In the small town of Krapivin, Tula province, 70 people occupied a jail intended for 30. Similar reports on overcrowding were issued by officials in Kovno, Vilna, Kharkov, Mitava, Pskov, Riazan, Odessa, Petropavlovsk, Kursk, Sevastopol, Chernigov, Samara, Saratov, and Iaroslavl, to mention only a few. 67 Not surprisingly, conditions in the prisons, never exactly comfortable, deteriorated to such an extent that the lives of the inmates were at risk. According to one observer, "all the prisons were so overcrowded that the prisoners were dying of filth and disease."•• In the jails of St. Petersburg, many inmates were infected with scurvy.•• Frequently, sadistic wardens would not allow inmates to receive mail or visitors. It was not uncommon for prisoners, in utter despair over their treatment, to lose their sanity or commit suicide. 70 In numerous jails inmates staged hunger strikes or went on rampages, destroying anything that came to hand. A particularly nasty incident took place at a jail in St. Petersburg on March 25. It was a Saturday, when relatives normally visited inmates, but that day officials refused to allow outsiders into the prison because several gendarmes were off duty. In protest, the prisoners staged a "noisy obstruction," and by the time the warden arrived on the scene, the place was a madhouse. The warden ordered his men to blast the cells with fire hoses, and within a few minutes three inches of water covered all the floors. The men quickly calmed down. 71 In some cities the authorities began to build additional prisons, but this could not really solve the problem of overcrowding. The government

2

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24

The Search for Stability

in St. Petersburg provided funds for only a few new facilities and, in any case, it took months to construct a new prison. Occasionally, officials moved by the agonies of the prisoners acknowledged that overcrowding was intolerable and suggested that the "less guilty" be set free and the "more guilty" be exiled. 72 In a number of cities a few prisoners were released, but the process was so capricious that wags in Moscow circulated the following imaginary account of a conversation between a cabinet minister and his subordinate: The Subordinate: There are so many people in prison that there is no possibility of getting in another man. The prisons are packed, yet arrests are still being made. What are we to do? Where are these people to be put? The Minister: We must let out some of the prisoners. The Subordinate: How many? The Minister: Say five thousand. The Subordinate: Why five thousand? The Minister: A nice even number. The Subordinate: But how? Which? How shall we choose them? The Minister: Let out any five thousand. What does it matter to them? Any five thousand will be as pleased as any other to be let out. 73 The overcrowding of prisons was only one of the problems the authorities encountered in their endeavor to root out the opposition. It became evident once again, as it did in I 90 5, that officials at all levels of government lacked the wherewithal to enforce directives from St. Petersburg to maintain order. For one thing, the police force was too small, poorly trained, inadequately paid, and badly equipped to handle the increasing lawlessness. Not only did the police have to cope with the assassinations and political robberies; they also faced a rise in plain and simple criminality. In fact, it was now very difficult to differentiate between acts of political violence and acts of sheer thuggery. Gangs of ruffians, claiming to be motivated by the highest political motives, would rob offices, shops, and private homes. Odessa, the scene of much violence in I905, became a major center of such disorder in I 906. According to one account, the "robberies are most usually committed by daylight-two or more men enter, pull out revolvers and demand money for the 'Anarchist' cause. In some cases the robbers fire without apparent provocation; in other cases they are open to bargaining, and sometimes go away on being refused money." In the month of March alone, 34 cases of armed robbery were reported in the Odessa press, which was known to exercise a certain amount of self-censorship on this subject. 74 In Kiev there were many more robberies than a year earlier/5 In one city after another, unemployed workers would "personate the more dangerous class [of criminals]" and

The Search for Stability

obtain money by stealing from the better-off. 76 In Odessa and Poltava and elsewhere, a large number of wealthy citizens received anonymous threatening letters demanding specific sums of money; some refused to make any payments but quite a few intimidated citizens gave in to the requests. 77 Senior officials in various provinces-in Moscow, Tula, Orlov, Tauride, and Kaluga, for example-appealed to St. Petersburg for financial help to strengthen police forces, but the government itself was short of funds and provided assistance to only a few localities where the problem of lawlessness was especially acute. In addition, the Ministry of Internal Affairs rejected as too expensive a proposal to arm policemen with rifles and to establish a special corps of mounted gendarmes to aid local constables. For the most part, local authorities and citizens were left to their own devices, and in quite a few regions they took initiatives to reinforce the police. Thus, in Saratov, Voronezh, Kharkov, Simbirsk, and Poltava provinces, conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that landlords hired their own guards to protect their estates. 78 Sometimes local noblemen made personal appeals for help to St. Petersburg that yielded results. In early January 1906 A. N. Naumov, Marshal of the Nobility in Samara province, paid a visit to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the chairman of the Committee of State Defense, to urge that additional troops and funds for more policemen be sent to the province, which was "extremely insecure." The Grand Duke responded favorably to Naumov's request and arranged for special help for Samara. 79 But most provinces did not have such effective lobbyists. Even the arrival of more soldiers and Cossacks in a troubled region did not necessarily result in a restoration of order. To be sure, some military units carried out their mission with the brutal efficiency that had characterized the punitive expeditions of late 1905 and early 1906. In midMarch a corps of Cossacks suddenly appeared in the village of Saslovo, Tambov province, and began questioning frightened peasants in the streets: "Do you have a cross? Do you believe in God? Do you revere the Tsar?" Even though the peasants answered affirmatively to all the questions and displayed a cross, they were beaten mercilessly and some had to be taken to the local hospital. The Assistant Chief of the Saslovo railway station was flogged to death. 80 But in some parts of the country, Cossacks proved to be unreliable as repressors. In Poltava province, for example, a group of Cossacks warned the governor that if their demands for improvements in their material conditions and for a lightening of the burdens of service were not met, they would ask to be relieved from service and to be sent home. 81 At about the same time, early April, A. V. Bolotov, the Governor of Perm, complained that the Cossacks in the 17th Orenburg Regiment in his province were undisciplined and unreliable;

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The Search for Stability

the men were fraternizing with local workers, drinking with them, and establishing close personal relations with them. The governor expected new outbursts of unrest as soon as the weather improved and therefore pleaded with Durnovo to send him new contingents of reliable troops. 82 Also troubling to the government was the occasional resistance of senior army officers to the use of troops for the suppression of unrest. On December 21, 1905, General D. F. Kryzhanovskii, commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division, drafted a memorandum in which he argued that disorders could be ended swiftly if the army acted more energetically, not stopping at burning down entire villages. After reviewing the memorandum, General F. F. Palitsyn, Chief of the General Staff, passed it on to Durnovo and Witte, who presented it to the cabinet on January 10. Durnovo then formulated instructions for the army based on the memorandum, which he sent to Rediger, the Minister of War. Durnovo's orders were simple: the army was not to be deterred from any measures in seeking to reestablish order. Rediger expressed the strongest reservations: brutal conduct by the army would turn the soldiers into "executioners" and "plunderers"; moreover, the people would come to hate the army and would refuse to support it. The minister was no doubt thinking of the upcoming Duma, which would vote on military budgets. Rediger was overruled, but he continued to raise objections to the use of brutal methods of suppression. 83 Both Kryzhanovskii and Rediger were motivated by the same concern, to maintain the integrity of the army. But whereas Kryzhanovskii believed that quick, severe suppression of unrest would protect the army by minimizing contact with the people and thus shielding it against revolutionary influences, Rediger was convinced that sharply reducing the army's involvement in these matters was a far wiser policy. In Durnovo's arsenal of weapons against the opposition, brute force ranked high. But to prevent future outbreaks of antigovernment activity he also considered it necessary to purge the civil service, many of whose employees did in fact sympathize with liberal or radical causes. In February 1906 he sent a circular to governors, chiefs of regions, and city governors pointing out that, according to the Regulations of 1892, it was the obligation of local officials to dismiss civil servants who "by their actions disturb state and public order." 84 It was a sweeping directive, and most officials were only too eager to comply. What followed was an orgy of dismissals that led to an alarming decline in some critical services. One major target was the medical profession, a sizable portion of whose members were zemstvo employees. As early as February 25, the Pirogov Medical Society, a highly respected organization, denounced the arrest, beatings, and discharge of physicians as arbitrary and unlawful.

The Search for Stability

"Several doctors," the society's spokesman noted, "have been arrested and put in prison for refusing to attend when a death sentence is carried out, or for protesting the arrest of sick people currently under medical care in a hospital." 85 The campaign against the physicians was national in scope, but it will suffice to give two examples of its impact. In the Novosilsk district, Tula province, medical services were completely disrupted because physicians refused to honor the local zemstvo assembly's request that they formally renounce all political activities and promise not to join any union or other professional organization. 86 In the zemstvo hospital in Tikhvin, Novgorod province, doctors' assistants looked after patients because all the doctors had either resigned or been dismissed. The people in the city were in despair over the "abnormal situation" at the hospital. 87 Teachers in elementary and secondary schools, suspected of having exerted a pernicious influence on their students, were another major target of the purge. Again, the reasons given for drastic action were often quite trivial or very general. In late February eighteen teachers were dismissed in Moscow for having joined the Union of Secondary School Teachers. 88 In Kursk school officials received a circular requesting them to dismiss teachers "who were harmful in a political sense." 89 A religious teacher in St. Petersburg was dismissed for having conducted a requiem for Lieutenant P. P. Schmidt, who was executed for his role in a mutiny in November 1905.90 By best estimate, somewhere between 7,ooo and 15,000 teachers out of a total of about 14o,ooo were dismissed "in the aftermath of the revolution." 91 Since the purge was not applied with the same ferocity everywhere, some districts suffered losses that devastated the schools. In the Peterhof district, Petersburg province, 20 schools had to be closed for lack of teachers. 92 "Complete chaos" reigned in the educational system in Moscow and the surrounding districts, since the majority of school principals had been discharged for political reasons. 93 Extensive purges were also conducted in the postal and national railway systems, though apparently in neither of these was service seriously disrupted. In addition, the Minister of Justice, M. G. Akimov, zealously pursued employees in his department who had in any way participated in the activities of the "social movement," another term for the opposition.94 Pleas to officials not to proceed with the arbitrary dismissals went unheeded. When Prince P. D. Dolgorukov asked the Governor-General of Moscow not to take action against physicians or other zemstvo employees without due process, he was tersely told: "At the present time, the administration does not find it possible to take into account the verdicts of judicial authorities." 95 A few zemstvo assemblies discussed the mass dismissals, and some even registered protests. Thus, after intense

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The Search for Stability

debate, the zemstvo assembly of Kharkov province denounced the arrest of citizens without due process. "We see in this an infringement of the [principle of the] inviolability of the person, the upholding of which was to be the government's first task."•• The zemstvo assembly of Moscow province also took up the issue, but with a different outcome. The assembly debated a motion to request the lifting of the emergency regulations, which permitted officials to conduct the dismissals. The motion also stipulated that anyone dismissed against the wishes of the zemstvo board was to receive severance pay equal to three months' wages. After prolonged discussion, the assembly defeated the motion by a vote of 3 3 to 27. 97 By and large the zemstvo assemblies, in the midst of a swing to the right politically, remained docile.•• As part of his campaign to quash the opposition, Durnovo went to great lengths to muzzle the press. It will be recalled that the lifting of most restrictions on the press was one of the more notable consequences of the political turbulence in 1904 and 1905. In the weeks following the October general strike, the period known as "The Days of Liberty," Russians enjoyed a remarkable degree of freedom to express their opinions. Preliminary censorship of newspapers, periodicals, and books had been abolished, and the authorities could no longer punish editors or writers by administrative fiat for expressing their views. Nor could the Ministry of Internal Affairs arbitrarily forbid the press from discussing "any problem of state importance." The government could limit freedom of expression only by following prescribed judicial procedures.•• As a result, in November and December of 1905 many new journals and newspapers sprang up, and the number of journalists or professed journalists grew enormously. One humorist noted "that the bulk of the so-called journalists were dentists, chemists' assistants, and retired tailors." Also, quite a few Jews, previously unable to find employment in the field, assumed positions as editors, writers of editorials, and feuilletonists. 100 The new publications, as well as many of the old ones, showed few inhibitions in reporting the darker side of Russian life and in criticizing the authorities. "One has only to buy the Radical newspapers," wrote Maurice Baring, visiting Russia at the time, "to be convinced that [the Press] is certainly more explicit and more unrestrained in its violence than the Press of any other European country, and some of the comic satirical newspapers might have Marat for editor." 101 The campaign against the press assumed various forms. On March 18 and April26 the Tsar approved new, complicated rules on freedom of the press, which tightened government control over periodicals by requiring

The Search for Stability

that publications 8o pages or longer be presented to committees on Press Affairs or to government censors. 102 But in fact the authorities cracked down on the press even before the rules were made public. The police conducted searches of bookstores, schools, and private homes and confiscated illegalliterature. 103 Frequently the police, not the most sophisticated or knowledgeable members of society, made some rather amusing decisions. In Nizhnee, Ekaterinoslav province, they removed the October Manifesto from the shelves of a bookstore because it had been published without a censor's approval. 104 In some localities officials acted with special zeal. In Tiflis, for example, Major General Timofeev not only prohibited the press from reprinting any item from foreign newspapers that touched on orders issued by military commanders, but went so far as to "completely forbid the publication of news about the activities of administrative personnel so long as that news has not appeared in official organs." Publications violating this rule would be shut down immediately, and the editors would be sent into exile. 10' At the behest.of the government in St. Petersburg, officials throughout the country also stepped up the search for secret presses, which were often located in private apartments. The authorities' main weapon against the press was article 129 of the Criminal Code. Formulated in sweeping language, the article stated that anyone guilty of publicly inciting people, either by word of mouth or in print, to rebel, to commit treason, or to overthrow the existing system of government was to be punished by exile; anyone guilty of inciting people to disobey or oppose the law or to commit a serious crime was subject to imprisonment for up to three years; anyone guilty of publicly encouraging men in military service to disregard their obligations would be exiled or imprisoned; and, anyone guilty of fomenting discord between classes, estates (soslovie), or employers and workers would be imprisoned. 106 Since a very large proportion of the newspapers published in Russia at the time were to some degree opposed to the autocracy, it was relatively easy for officials to take action against editors and writers on the basis of this vague article in the Criminal Code. Few areas of the country escaped the crackdown against the press. Sometimes only specific issues of a newspaper or journal would be confiscated, sometimes a publication would be closed down completely, and very often editors would be jailed. Closings were reported in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kostroma, Minsk, Simferopol, Warsaw, Ekaterinburg, Uman, and Chita, to mention only a few of the larger cities. All told, during the first four months of 1906, officials throughout the Empire initiated over 450 actions of one kind or another against the press. 107 Even the prestigious Pravo was not immune. In March the authorities preferred charges (on the basis of article 129) against V. M.

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The Search for Stability

Gessen, one of the editors, for having published a series of articles on unrest in the army and on meetings held by the zemstvo board of Kremenchug with peasants in attendance. 10" This kind of harassment worked a hardship on newspapers and journals, but if the government thought that it could silence the opposition, it was soon disappointed. Many newspapers hired "responsible" or "sitting" editors, whose only job was to answer the call of the police. One liberal paper employed as "responsible editor a long-bearded, impecunious peasant at a salary of five pounds a month while at liberty, and half as much again while in gaol." 109 Very often, publications that were shut down reappeared within a few days under a new name. Confiscating a specific issue of a newspaper did not do much good either. Since editors generally put their publications into circulation while the censorship committees were still reading them, by the time the censors decided to confiscate an issue, 8o percent of the copies were already in the hands of vendors. 110 And then there was the usual incompetence of bureaucrats, who appear not to have paid attention to some of the most revolutionary journals: the Bolshevik paper Vpered continued until March 1907 to publish appeals to the people to prepare for an armed uprising.U' The British Ambassador to St. Petersburg was right in pointing out in midApril I 906 that, despite the government's attempt to control the flow of information, "There [was] in the Russian press a certain spontaneity which in some ways [made] it a useful index of public opinion." 112 Newspapers and journals continued to articulate the discontents of a wide range of opposition groups. For most of the political parties and political associations that could now operate more or less freely, the government's ambivalent policy of reform and repression posed a serious challenge. Only the ultraconservatives, embracing a variety of small monarchist parties, seemed to be free of any doubts whatsoever about the proper direction for the Russian polity: they unequivocally urged the renunciation of the October Manifesto and the restoration of unlimited autocracy so as to put an end to the unrest that had been endemic in Russia for the preceding year and a hal£. 113 By contrast, the landed gentry, which during the winter of 1905-6 turned sharply to the right in reaction to the violence in the countryside and elsewhere, assumed a political posture that can best be characterized as ambiguous. This emerged at the All-Russian Congress of Marshals of the Nobility, convened in early January 1906 by Prince P. N. Trubetskoi for the purpose of formulating a program that would represent the thinking of a unified gentry.

The Search for Stability

The decisions reached by the roughly 120 nobles from all over the country were partly liberal and partly conservative. On the one hand, the congress voiced strong support for a reorganization of the political system as promised in the October Manifesto. The delegates looked forward to the meetings of the Duma and urged the government to hold fair elections and to guarantee civil liberties. On the other hand, the congress called for stern measures by the government to restore order. Essentially, then, the landed gentry favored the government's stated program; but at the same time they expressed some doubts about its conduct of affairs. They were distressed by the authorities' oscillations both on the question of political reform and on the suppression of disorder; the officials' inconsistencies, they contended, were undermining confidence in the government and were paving the way for anarchy. The kind of measures for the restoration of order the marshals had in mind is suggested by the message their elected delegation passed on to Admiral F. V. Dubasov, who had brutally put down the Moscow uprising: "The Sovereign entrusted you, Admiral, with the pacification of the heart of RussiaMoscow. . . . In your courageous arms [Moscow] began to beat again and then the entire Russian organism began to come to life again. . .. For this, we extend to you our heartfelt gratitude." 114 The agrarian issue was uppermost in the minds of the Marshals of the Nobility. They were in a state of shock over the recent wave of unrest in the countryside, and deeply troubled by Trubetskoi's disclosure that the Minister of Agriculture, Kuder, had proposed the compulsory alienation (with compensation) of some privately owned lands. In their view the agrarian question should be solved by abolishing the peasant commune and by facilitating loans to peasants to buy land. The delegates avowed their loyalty to the Tsar and their support for the principle that "Russia is a single, indivisible whole .... No separatist demands whatsoever are acceptable." Trubetskoi ended his last speech with the words: "Let us have faith in the power and greatness of Russia." His toast to the "Sovereign Emperor" was greeted with loud shouts of "Hurrah." 115 The leaders of the Octobrists, who can be regarded as the most moderate wing within liberalism or the most liberal wing within conservatism, were also distressed by the drift of Witte's government, but unlike the Marshals of the Nobility, they were not yet prepared to take a sharp turn to the right. Although they were strong believers in law and order, they nonetheless viewed with misgivings the harsh measures Witte's government was taking to pacify the country. Moreover, the Octobrists were shocked by Witte's declaration that the Manifesto of October 17 had not changed the political system of Russia, and that the Tsar remained an autocrat with unlimited authority. The dismay was so profound that on

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January 8 and 9 the central committees of the Union of October r7's St. Petersburg and Moscow branches met to discuss whether the movement should continue to support the government. It immediately became clear that within three months Witte had lost the confidence of the leadership of a political movement created for the specific purpose of supporting the program he himself had proclaimed. Not a single speaker at the meeting came to Witte's defense. I. A. Lukhachev (St. Petersburg) suspected that Witte was no longer committed to the Duma; he feared that if it contained a majority of deputies unsympathetic to the government, the Prime Minister would postpone its convocation with the intention of changing the electoral law to produce a more pliant Duma. Prince N. S. Volkonskii (Moscow) shared these suspicions and warned of dire consequences. He was convinced that the peasants looked to the Duma for solutions to the agrarian issue, and that if it did not meet by April, there would be a new wave of violent unrest. Count P. A. Geiden (Moscow) accused the government of having been thoroughly insincere over the past few months: "it is impossible to believe in Count Witte's policies." lu. N. Miliutin (St. Petersburg) thought the government was impotent because it was divided on major issues. He had learned that Witte would probably leave office shortly. Finally, Count V. V. Gudovich (St. Petersburg) reported on a recent conversation with Durnovo, who had refused to take a clear-cut position on any important issue. Although the Minister of Internal Affairs had indicated to Gudovich that he did not want to delay the elections to the Duma, he also declared that because so many parts of the Empire were under emergency regulations, which could not be lifted, the obstacles to holding elections were very great."• Only insistent pleas from D. N. Shipov (Moscow), the co-chairman of the meeting and for some time the most respected spokesman of the moderate opposition, persuaded the delegates not to press for Witte's dismissal. But Shipov's reasoning hardly amounted to a vote of confidence in Witte. Shipov argued that there was little likelihood of Witte's being replaced by someone with progressive views; such people simply could not be found within bureaucratic circles, and until the Duma met, no one from society, which is to say, the educated, articulate strata of the population, would join the government. If Witte left office, he would probably be replaced by Durnovo, who would be much worse. "For this reason it is necessary, grudgingly, to support the cabinet, but we must try to influence it not to postpone the convocation of the Duma." Shipov suggested that the Octobrists form a group to lobby the government, and insert a notice in newspapers putting them clearly on record in support of two propositions: that the October Manifesto imposed limitations on the au-

The Search for Stability

thority of the Tsar in legislative matters, and that the political system had been transformed into a "constitutional monarchy." The Octobrists should also make it clear in their notice that they would support Witte only so long as he implemented the freedoms granted in the manifesto.' 17 The central committee adopted Shipov's recommendations, but this did not induce the government to change course. On other issues the Octobrists were sharply divided. They agreed to convoke a congress representing the entire movement within a few weeks, but they could not reach a consensus on its composition and agenda. Shipov wanted to appeal to as broad a coalition of moderates as possible and therefore wished to avoid discussing the specifics of a program. It would be enough, he thought, to focus on the demand that the Duma be convoked without further delay and on a strategy to secure the election of the largest possible number of moderates. He accordingly proposed that not only Octobrists but anyone generally sympathetic with their goals be invited. However, A. I. Guchkov, who was emerging as an increasingly influential voice of Octobrism, wanted to define the Union's "physiognomy" more sharply and counterproposed that only committed Octobrists be invited. A substantial majority supported Guchkov. Guchkov also secured a majority for his proposal that the congress discuss certain specific points of the movement's program. He wanted the Octobrists to come out unambiguously for a constitutional monarchy, which would clearly separate them from the conservatives. He also favored discussing the question of Polish autonomy, on which he took a distinctly nationalistic stand; this would separate the Octobrists from the left, in particular the Kadets. But when a majority at the meeting also advocated taking up the agrarian issue, Guchkov did a volte-face. Quite correctly, he sensed that this issue would prove to be divisive and embarrassing to the Octobrists. He therefore proposed that the congress's agenda be limited to consideration of such broad questions as "organization, government policies, and tactics." This proposal was adopted. The outcome of the meeting pleased neither Guchkov nor Shipov."" In truth, the membership and potential supporters of the Union of October r 7 were far too divided on fundamental issues to reach agreement on a program. In early 1906 the Union was made up of 78 organizations in 36 provinces, about one-third of them in the two capitals. The total membership is not known, but some notion of its size can be gleaned from the enrollment figure for 21 of the provinces-about 24,000 people. 119 The principal division was between the rank-and-file members, especially those in the provinces, and the leaders in St. Petersburg and Moscow: the former tended to favor positions considerably to the right of those advocated by the Union's spokesmen in the two capitals. As Terence Emmons

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has noted, the rift was so deep that if the views of the rank and file had been adopted, the movement would have "risked losing its character as a moderate but decisively constitutionalist organization." 120 Moreover, there were five very small groups that shared many of the views of the Octobrists but continued to maintain separate organizations. The Octobrist leaders wanted to adopt policies that would enable them to form electoral alliances with these groups, and this inevitably disposed them to water down the movement's program even further. 121 The discord within the Octobrist movement flared up soon after the almost 400 delegates to the congress began their deliberations on February 8. So long as the discussion focused on general themes, such as support for the October Manifesto and the need to convoke the Duma quickly (no later than April 25), there was little disagreement. But when the congress took up more specific issues, deep divisions surfaced, just as the delegates at the conference four weeks earlier had feared. A resolution introduced by M. A. Stakhovich outlining the Union's position on the government's conduct of affairs passed by a vote of 142 to 140, which meant that only a little over a third of all the delegates supported the views of the leadership (basically as formulated at the January conference). It also turned out that a very sizable minority opposed the leadership's call for a repeal of the 1881 emergency regulations, for limitations on the imposition of martial law, and for the use of due process (that is, a court trial) in all cases involving capital punishment. Furthermore, because many delegates demanded a consideration of the Union's program, the central committee was forced to abandon its decision not to have this matter taken up. Again, the congress was deeply divided, and as a consequence it accomplished virtually nothing. It adopted a very general resolution on the nationalities question and voted for two articles that addressed only minor aspects of the critical agrarian question. It was obvious that the Octobrists could not settle on a program that would provide them with a dear "physiognomy." The Union thus embarked on the electoral campaign without an unmistakable message to potential supporters.' 22 Shipov, who chaired the meeting, tried to put a good face on the congress's proceedings in his dosing speech. In fact, he knew that the Union was hopelessly fragmented into two broad factions, one that emphasized the need for strong measures to prevent the country from slipping into anarchy and one that stressed the need to consolidate the settlement produced by the October Manifesto. In his memoirs Shipov attributed the split to the fact that in the winter of 1905 the party had been penetrated by a large number of people who cared much more about their narrow economic interests than about the goals of the liberation movement. 123

The Search for Stability

Shipov's explanation for the party's travail was perhaps a bit too simplistic, but he was correct in pointing out that in early I 906 the Union of October I 7 was on its way to transforming itself into a far more conservative movement than it had been at its inception. The Kadets, the principal spokesmen of Russian liberalism, fared only slightly better than the Octobrists in forging a unified movement with a program acceptable to the bulk of the party membership and clearly defined tactics. Those goals had eluded the party at its first congress, held in October I905, but P. N. Miliukov, the unchallenged leader of the movement, insisted that the Kadets could not delay any longer. At the second congress, in early January I906, Miliukov bent every effort "to draw both extreme wings of the party to the center, so that the party could acquire its own physiognomy." Without it, Miliukov argued, the party could not enter the electoral campaign as an effective force. With a membership of about Ioo,ooo people, the party was the largest and bestorganized movement in the democratic camp, but it lacked the unity necessary for victory at the polls. Miliukov attributed the divisions not so much to differences of views as to differences in mood, the consequence of a lack of political experience. In addition, he noted that a large number of intelligentsia sympathetic to Kadet goals were individualists, who formed small political clubs that by themselves would be impotent during an electoral campaign. The task, a daunting one, was to combine all these groups into one disciplined party. 124 In fact, the divisions within the Kadet party were more profound than Miliukov suggested. The right wing considered the monarchy virtually the "sacred foundation" of the Russian polity, whereas it was an article of faith for the left wing that Russia must be transformed into a republic. The militants were especially strong in the provinces, where the government's repression was most acutely felt. Participation in elections under conditions of martial law or other emergency regulations did not seem to them to be promising or worthwhile. Nor did many of the provincial militants consider it wise to take part in the elections so long as universal suffrage had not been introduced. The party was also split over the agrarian issue, some members favoring a complete nationalization of the land and others advocating the retention of private ownership. 125 Finally, the Kadets faced a hard question about strategy that inevitably caused dissension in party ranks: should they now fully sever their ties with the revolutionary left and support the government in its endeavors to restore order, or should they maintain the alliance in order to impel the authorities to make further concessions? At the second congress, the party decided on a two-pronged approach. It moved to the right on substantive questions but continued to support militant tactics if it came to

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that. As A. A. Kizevetter, a thoughtful historian and member of the Kadet Central Committee, put it, the party did "not deny the necessity and inevitability of revolutionary methods of struggle in exceptional moments of political life," but it "always much preferred the path of legal evolution." 126 In pursuing this approach, the Kadets invariably engaged in careful balancing acts. Thus, in early r 906 they opposed new general strikes (advocated by the revolutionaries), but placed most of the blame for the unrest and even for the Moscow uprising on the inflexibility of the government. 127 Miliukov, the architect of the overall strategy, described it as "liberal tactics with the threat of revolution"; he was, in the words of one historian, an "inherently cautious and moderate man, who much of the time followed his constituency rather than led it." 128 The Kadet party's swing to the right manifested itself in various ways. In the first place, the delegates at the congress followed Miliukov's advice and voted almost unanimously to participate in the elections. In his report on the current situation, Miliukov conceded that with its repressive policies the government had made it very difficult for the Kadets to decide in favor of participation, but he nevertheless urged such a course. Participation would provide the Kadets with invaluable practical experience in political organization and agitation. He also warned that a boycott would give the government an easy political victory, for it would not have to compete with the opposition. Although Miliukov was not prepared to commit to participation in the Duma itself at this point-a decision on that question, he argued, would depend on the party's performance; if it gained only two or three seats, the temptation would be strong to remain aloof- 129 the clear implication was that a strong showing in the elections would leave the Kadets no alternative but to take part in the work of the legislature. Still, the delegates could not overcome their penchant for militancy. Although they dropped the demand for a constituent assembly, they now spoke of a "Duma with constituent functions." At the same time, they could not quite bring themselves to come out unequivocally in favor of constructive legislative work in the Duma ("organic work," as it was then called) in the event that they decided to attend its sessions. They therefore passed contradictory resolutions, one rejecting such work and another stating that the Duma must seek to pacify the country by dealing with the agrarian question and by attempting to extend and guarantee political freedom. The Kadets even claimed that the list of projects on which their deputies in the Duma would work could not be specified in advance; all that could be said now was that the deputies would attempt to realize "the immediate goals of the party-the destruction of bureaucratic despotism and the establishment of a democratic constitutional Russian Em-

The Search for Stability

pire on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage." 130 Of course, this meant nothing less than that the Kadets should engage in "organic work." Prince E. N. Trubetskoi, a strong supporter of such a positive approach, denounced the contradictory resolutions as mere "trickery" designed to curry favor with the left. 131 In a second move to the right, the delegates replaced the demand for a "democratic republic" with the demand for a "constitutional and parliamentary monarchy." This change, designed to separate the Kadets politically from the revolutionary parties, was justified on the ground that the people were devoted to the Tsar. As democrats, the Kadets argued, they must respect the wishes of the people. 132 Although the Kadets had thus taken some modest steps toward the center, not until I9I7 was their party registered by the government as a legal association. The authorities were never convinced that the Kadets had broken fully with the revolutionary left, and in several important respects they had not. Just as the Octobrists could not break all ties and sympathies with the right, the Kadets for tactical and emotional reasons could not forswear common action with or residual sympathy for the left. Organizations to the left of the Kadets tended to gravitate toward boycotting the Duma elections. Since their basic premise was that the revolution was temporarily stalled and would soon erupt again, any action that suggested satisfaction with the government's meager concessions was seen as a serious mistake, if not a betrayal of the masses. On January I6, I9o6, the Fourth All-Russian Congress of the Union of Unions, one of the more militant associations of professionals in I905, adopted a resolution rejecting participation in the elections and calling for a renewal of agitation for a democratically elected constituent assembly. The congress clearly misjudged the mood of its members, who reacted so strongly against the decision that the Union ceased to be an effective organization in St. Petersburg. 133 The Peasants' Union, the All-Russian Congress of Teachers, and various smaller groups representing the radical intelligentsia also came out for the policy of boycott. 134 For the most part, the radical left parties supported this position as well, in large measure because they, too, had persuaded themselves that the revolution would soon be in full swing again. Rosa Luxemburg's mood at the time was not uncommon, at least among leaders of the revolutionary movements. One of the more astute voices of European socialism, Luxemburg was then in Warsaw taking part in the revolution, and she was in touch with Russian radicals about developments in the rest of the Empire. In a letter of January I I, I9o6, to Karl and Luise Kautsky, she spoke of the recent defeat of the uprising in Moscow in distinctly euphoric terms: "I have learned much about Moscow that is most

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The Search for Stability

gratifying. ... [The outcome in Moscow] should be described as a victory rather than as a defeat. The entire infantry as well as the Cossacks were inactive! Only the cavalry and the artillery [units] are still 'capable of waging war.' The losses by the revolution are minimal," whereas the bourgeoisie and the nonparticipants suffered greatly because the soldiers fired indiscriminately at civilian targets and destroyed private dwellings. "The result: the entire bourgeoisie is furious and rebellious! Many of them give money to provide arms for workers. . .. Almost no leading revolutionary was killed. . . . The entire battle was led by S[ocial] D [emocrats]." 135 Although the Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Bolsheviks all took a dim view of the Duma, there were differences among them. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, contended that participating in the elections implied faith in the Duma as an institution that could be expected to introduce basic political and social reforms. But in practice, the Leninists insisted, the Duma would be dominated by reactionaries or by liberals who would enter into compromises with the autocracy. Whatever the outcome, the Duma would serve the cause of counterrevolution. Thus, Social Democratic support for the Duma would only confuse the people: it would encourage the masses to believe in the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the conflict with the old order.u• Actually, Lenin proposed something more than nonparticipation in the elections. The kind of boycott he had in mind was an "active boycott," which meant "not simply keeping aloof from the elections but an extensive utilization of electoral meetings for Social Democratic agitation and organization.'' 137 The Mensheviks, on the other hand, favored participating in the first two stages of the electoral process (the voting was indirect) and abstaining from the last stage, at which point Duma deputies were to be selected. Such involvement in the process, they contended, would give Social Democrats an opportunity to establish links with the masses, which in turn would be helpful in accelerating the revolutionary process. Privately, F. I. Dan, one of the leading Mensheviks in St. Petersburg at the time, denounced Lenin's position as "nonsense without parallel. The only possibility we have of placing the government in an impossible position, of organizing the masses and gathering them around us and thus rebuilding the shattered party organization on a new basis is through participation not in the Duma but in the elections of the 'electors' [who would then select the deputies].'' 138 In light of this difference on tactics between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, the Unified Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP) urged local affiliates to sponsor meetings to discuss the issue. In January and February 1906 more than 2,ooo party

The Search for Stability

members attended about r 20 meetings in St. Petersburg, at two of which Lenin himself made the case for active boycott. In the balloting on various motions, the Bolsheviks emerged victorious, garnering r,r68 votes to the Mensheviks' 926. 139 But since a fair number of Mensheviks remained adamant, the movement's leadership permitted local committees to make the final decision on the campaign. Most Menshevik committees adhered to the policy of active boycott, but a few chose to participate. 140 The Socialist Revolutionaries' position on the Duma was in some ways more militant than Lenin's. Totally disregarding the defeat the revolutionaries had suffered in Moscow, the SRs contended at their congress in early January 1906 that the revolution, as one historian has put it, "does not need to accept crumbs from the table of the old order." Not only did the delegates vote unanimously in favor of boycotting the elections; they also rejected the call of their party leader, V. M. Chernov, for agitation against the Duma. Even that, the SRs insisted, would amount to timid submission to the authorities and a betrayal of party principles. The extremism of the SRs is perhaps best demonstrated by a comment made by the delegate 0. S. Minor: "Let [the Duma] be dominated by brazen Black Hundreds, let it be composed of scoundrels only; that would be better for us, because then there will be no illusions." 141 In large measure, the search for stability in the first four months of 1906 proved unrewarding because almost every political leader mis-

judged the mood of the country. Despite the recent unrest and continuing signs of disaffection among the people, the Tsar believed that the bulk of the masses remained loyal to him, and that he would therefore be able to weather the storm without having to live up to the commitments he had made in the October Manifesto. The Minister for Internal Affairs, Durnovo, had a better grasp of the national mood, but he made the mistake of assuming that unbridled repression would cow the population into submission. Witte also knew that disaffection was still widespread, but he deluded himself on two scores. He believed that many peasants would support conservative candidates in the elections for the Duma, and he thought that his dual program of reform and repression would conciliate large sectors of the more moderate opposition, enabling him to pacify the country. The most critical defect of Witte's overall program was its internal inconsistency, which led most activists within the opposition to question the Prime Minister's sincerity. At the very time that Witte claimed to be guiding the country toward a constitutional order, toward a state based on law, his government engaged in a campaign of repression, often in

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The Search for Stability

violation of generally accepted canons of legality. It is true that Witte criticized his Minister of Internal Affairs for going too far in indiscriminately applying force against suspected and actual troublemakers, but he himself was not squeamish about using drastic measures. When twelve deputies-elect to the State Duma from Samara sent him a telegram on March 30 protesting against capital punishment, Witte replied that the government was meting out death sentences only in accordance with the law, which was simply not true. "In order to bring about tranquility in the country," he told them, "it is necessary first of all for the revolutionaries to put an end to the daily assassinations throughout Russia-then the state will be spared the disagreeable necessity of resorting to capital punishment." 142 As long as Witte favored such a draconian approach to unrest, he could not succeed in attracting the support of society for his program. Had he abandoned that approach-and there is not much evidence to suggest that he was so inclined-he would no doubt have lost whatever support he still enjoyed at Court. The architect of the new order emerging in Russia was in a hopeless situation, and it was only a matter of time before he would be obliged to leave the arena of high politics. The Kadets and the revolutionaries also misjudged the mood of the country. For about the first two months of 1906, the Kadets shared Witte's assumption that the electorate would be conservative, which militated against their adopting a cooperative stance toward the Duma. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, contended that the masses would soon take up the cudgels again with the same intensity as in 1905, and this led them to shun electoral politics, a decision that would cost them dearly. It may be that in the tense, confusing, highly precarious stability that marked the Empire in the early months of 1906, a foreign observer was in the best position to reach a dispassionate and sound evaluation of the political situation. By early February, it seemed clear to the British Ambassador that the "left parties" were wrong in assuming the Duma would simply be an "instrument of the Government. Now it is openly stated that if all the members were elected by the police (as a large number very probably will be) it would still by the nature of things be more serviceable to the party of reform than to the Government. It is believed that the feeling of discontent is so universal that any popularly elected body is certain to reflect it." 143 Within a few weeks the ambassador's analysis and prognostication proved to be correct. The masses, it turned out, were neither conservative nor revolutionary. They yearned for far-reaching reform but were prepared to put their trust in the electoral process. Events since October 1905 had changed the political landscape in more basic

The Search for Stability

and subtle ways than any of the leaders recognized. Although the revolution could not be said to have ended, it had entered a new phase. By no means completely but to a remarkable degree, the word replaced the sword as the main weapon in the struggle between the opposition and the autocracy. This became abundantly dear as the country embarked on the electoral campaign for the Duma, and the authorities proceeded to draft a constitution.

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Chapter Two

Implementing Political Reform

THE APPREHENSIONS in liberal circles that the elections to the Duma might never be allowed to take place began to dissipate by mid-February I906. True, the authorities showed no enthusiasm for a representative legislature, which they feared would display "an indiscreet and unwelcome curiosity as to the workings of the Government machine." But Witte knew that abandoning the elections would undermine his efforts to achieve pacification and would make it impossible for him to float a loan in the West. Foreign bankers and governments wanted order and stability in Russia before committing themselves to advance the huge loan Witte sought. "From this point of view," one observer noted, "the Duma becomes of immense importance to the Country." 1 The electoral procedures were formulated at a series of conferences held in the fall of I 90 5 to liberalize the very limited suffrage envisioned in August, when the government announced the election of the so-called Bulygin Duma. Witte, who insisted on drawing representatives of the bureaucracy and society into the discussions, clearly wanted to dilute responsibility for the final decisions. For his part, he could not bring himself to take an unambiguous position. Occasionally, he suggested to liberals that he favored their views on electoral reform, going so far as to express support for universal suffrage; at other times, he assured conservatives that he favored their approach to suffrage, and that he instinctively feared a genuinely democratic process. Of course, Tsar Nicholas would accept only moderate reform, which excluded universal suffrage, and his wishes played a decisive role in determining the outcome of the deliberations. 2 On December I I the government finally promulgated an electoral law, one of whose most distinctive features was its complexity. "I tried during

Implementing Political Reform

the whole of yesterday," Maurice Baring wrote in Moscow on March 3, I 906, "to grasp thoroughly the working of the franchise law. I failed to grasp it. I asked one Russian how many degrees [stages] there were in the suffrage. He said four. I asked another; he said three. I asked a third; he said two." 3 In fact, all three interlocutors answered Baring's question correctly. The Law of December I I vastly increased the number of eligible voters, so that somewhere between 20 and 25 million citizens could cast ballots, but the suffrage was not universal, equal, or direct. Eligibility depended on the ownership of property or the payment of taxes, and the population was divided into four curiae: landowners, peasants, town dwellers, and workers. The landowners' curia chose electors to the Provincial Electoral Assemblies in two stages; the peasants chose them in three stages, town dwellers in two stages, and workers voting in industrial enterprises in designated provinces employing more than 50 workers in two stages. At the Provincial Electoral Assemblies, where the final choice of Duma deputies was to be made, electoral power was distributed unequally: peasants represented 42.3 percent of the electors, landowners 32.7 percent, town dwellers 22.5 percent, and workers 2. 5 percent. This worked out to one elector for every 2,ooo landowners, 4,ooo urban dwellers, 3o,ooo peasants, and 9o,ooo workers. Women, some seven million agricultural workers, three and a half million servants, two million day laborers, one million construction workers, one million employees in commerce, and a few smaller groups were not represented at all. • Under this arrangement, the peasants were bound to elect a very substantial portion of the Duma, since they constituted well over 70 percent of the total population. The elections for the 5 24 deputies began at the end of February and in most regions of the Empire ende,d in mid-April. But in certain outlying regions the process dragged on, and in some it was not completed even in July. By the time the Duma convened on April27, only 436 deputies had been selected, mainly in the central provinces and partly in the Polish provinces. Deputies continued to trickle into St. Petersburg for over two months, but at no time did the Duma membership number more than 499. 5 Local institutions played an important role in the entire electoral process. Electoral commissions supervised by governors or mayors were established in each province, city, and district to approve lists of voters and to adjudicate complaints about procedures. Their decisions could be appealed to higher authorities all the way up to the Senate in St. Petersburg. City council boards and local zemstvos (or the police where no zemstvos existed) drew up the list of eligible voters. At the final stage in the process, in the elections held by the curiae in the provincial assemblies, a majority was initially required for the selection of deputies. If the assemblies were

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Implementing Political Reform

deadlocked for three days, a plurality sufficed. Not infrequently, deals were struck between electors from different parties to secure election. 6 In a series of circulars, the government directed local officials to refrain from interfering in the elections and to allow citizens to hold meetings before voting. 7 In his memoirs Witte noted with pride that his government remained aloof from the electoral process; even if Durnovo had wanted to interfere, he, as Prime Minister, would not have permitted it. 8 It is true that neither Witte nor the provincial authorities made any systematic effort to establish a pro-government party for the purpose of selecting and supporting candidates. But this stance undoubtedly reflected Witte's confidence that conservatives would do well and his belief that, in any case, the Duma would not be permitted to develop into an institution with a decisive voice in governing the country. 9 Even so, there is a welter of evidence to indicate that the government did interfere in the elections far more extensively than Witte acknowledged. In his testimony in I9I7 before the Commission of Inquiry on the collapse of the old regime, S. E. Kryzhanovskii, who had occupied a high post in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, recalled a discussion between Witte and Durnovo in March or April I906 on searching for reliable candidates in local areas and influencing people to vote for them. 10 Moreover, Kryzhanovskii revealed that he himself offered A. N. Naumov, Marshal of the Nobility in Samara, some 25,000 rubles to support the conservative press during the electoral campaign. Kryzhanovskii assured Naumov that governments in constitutional countries regularly engaged in such practices. In Naumov's own telling, he let Kryzhanovskii know that he considered the notion shocking and turned down the offer with a proud declaration that the Russian people should not follow the example of the rotten West. 11 Other officials were much less squeamish and found numerous ways of hampering the opposition. In many regions they repeatedly violated amendments to the Law of December I I that allowed citizens to hold meetings to discuss the elections without the presence of policemen. Moreover, policemen in several districts in Saratov province threatened peasants with imprisonment if they voted for "progressives." In the Poshekhonskii district in Iaroslavl province, the village constable stood at the door of the meeting preceding the local election and prevented the entrance of peasant candidates for whom many of the people wanted to vote. 12 In Rostov-on-Don Cossacks interrupted a meeting of workers discussing the election; shooting broke out between the Cossacks and the workers, during which four were killed and eighteen wounded. Fifty people were arrested.u In many parts of the country, officials refused to allow Kadets to hold meetings, but left unmolested Octobrists and

Implementing Political Reform

groups to their right who wished to campaign. In addition, the authorities hindered the distribution of party literature, harassed public employees who took part in electoral meetings, and randomly arrested party activists. 14 By mid-April the Prime Minister's office was deluged with telegrams protesting the arrest of "electors," their frequent exile to remote regions, and many irregularities in voting proceduresY Church officials also sought to influence the outcome of the election. Although Prince A. D. Obolenskii, the Chief Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, directed the parish clergy to abstain from political agitation, the injunction was widely ignored. For example, during church services in Tsaritsyn on March 26, priests with crosses in their hands asked their parishioners to vote for members of the Union of October I? and for Black Hundreds. For conservatives, the entrance of clerics into the political arena was not an unmixed blessing. In some electoral districts clergymen chose to work for the opposition. Dismayed, the Synod sought to put a stop to this political activism by punishing a few of the more militant priests. Apparently, not many were deterred. 16 It is hard to believe that the interference in the electoral process would have been as extensive and as prolonged had the authorities been serious about stopping it. On the other hand, the interference was not so severe that it prevented opposition candidates from conducting a far-reaching campaign, or voters from casting their ballots in sizable numbers. Initially, it seemed as though the people would take little interest in the elections, either out of indifference or out of fear of reprisals. In early March Russkie vedomosti reported that in some districts fewer than I percent of the eligible voters cast ballots, and that in others an inordinate number of priests were being chosen as electors in the first stage of the process-in one district, 22 of 23 electors were clergymenY These early returns, however, proved to be atypical. Once the electoral campaign swung into high gear, masses of people, excited by the opportunity to participate in the political process, ignored the entreaties of the church and the repressive measures of the authorities. The historian A. A. Kizevetter noted the enthusiasm of a sick, elderly general, who declared after he had voted in Moscow: "You know, all my life I dreamed of this day, dreamed of living until then." A large number of Muscovites went to the urn in the same sort of "solemn mood" to "fulfill their civic duty." 18 But participation varied from region to region. According to one estimate, between 5o and 55 percent of the eligible voters in 36 of the provinces of European Russia cast ballots. In the Empire as a whole, participation ranged between 30 and 40 percent. 19 All things considered, these statistics are impressive for a country holding its first-ever national election and in which a large percentage of the voters were still illiterate.

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Implementing Political Reform

Of all the parties, the Kadets waged the most extensive and thorough campaign. They could draw on a large number of professors, junior university lecturers, doctors, and lawyers to give lectures and address meetings either in public halls or in private apartments. V. A. Maklakov, himself a powerful speaker, ran a "school for orators" in Moscow to train party activists, who were then sent to remote parts of the country. Russkie vedomosti, a paper widely read by the better educated groups in society, devoted many columns to the Kadets' goals and activities, as did the legal journal Pravo. In February 1906 several prominent Kadets launched Rech, a daily newspaper that also attracted a wide readership. At about the same time, a weekly paper, Vestnik partii narodnoi svobody, was founded as an official party organ. By April the Kadets published between 40 and 50 newspapers in the 48 provinces of European Russia in which the party had established an organized presence. In those same provinces, there may have been as many as 200 local party committees. Between January and April party membership rose from approximately 1oo,ooo to about 12o,ooo. The more active members saw to the distribution of hundreds of thousands of copies of the party program, electoral appeals, brochures, and leaflets, most of them printed in various languages. They also pasted proclamations and leaflets on trees and walls of buildings. 20 Apparently, the expenses of these costly activities were covered by generous donations to party coffers by well-to-do sympathizers. 21 The core of the Kadets' message was that they deserved the people's support because they alone defended the true interests of the country. Typically, their appeals contained alluring promises and dire predictions about the country's fate should the conservatives win: "Citizens, the time of the elections for the State Duma is approaching. The future of Russia depends to a significant degree on the results of these elections. If they produce a constitutional and democratic majority, Russia will enter the path of peaceful cultural, political, and social life. If they produce a majority that is not for decisive reform, then civil war, shooting, and blood will inundate Russia, will grow and spread," producing "anarchy in the economic life of the country." Accordingly, if people were for the wellbeing of the country, they should vote for Kadets: "If you want the national legislature to enact laws that will enable all citizens and all nationalities of Russia to live in peace, if you are for the triumph of freedom and justice, and not for repression and lawlessness, do not fail to vote, give your vote to the candidates of the party of 'National Freedom."' 22 These were simple but stirring words, a dear sign that the Kadets had quickly learned how to appeal to a mass electorate. The Octobrists also formed a national network of organizations for the election, but it did not match that of the Kadets. Octobrist organiza-

Implementing Political Reform

tions in 46 European provinces and in seven other regions enlisted a membership perhaps one-fourth as large as that of the Kadets. Still, the party activists campaigned vigorously. They distributed a large quantity of campaign literature, and one of their leaflets, "On the State Duma," had a run of over I. I million copies. Speakers from Moscow and St. Petersburg frequently appeared in provincial towns to urge citizens to vote for Octobrist candidates, who throughout the country could count on the support of about 20 newspapers. In order to maximize its chances in the election, the Union of October 17 formed blocs with the eighteen or so small middle-class groups that fielded candidates. Since some of these groups stood well to the right of the Octobrists, the Union ran on a platform notable for generalities. Actually, the leaders of the Union in Moscow had opposed alliances with rightist groups, but the party congress in February 1906 had refused to adopt this injunction. In some local areas Octobrists went so far as to form alliances with groups that were not even sympathetic to constitutiona:Iism. 23 On the other hand, the Octobrists took pains to differentiate themselves clearly from the Kadets-those "political opportunists, secret republicans, and rabble rousers" who in late 1905 had sided with the revolutionaries in the expectation that the unrest would catapult them into power. At times the Octobrists went to great lengths to prevent the Kadets from disseminating their message. In the Moscow region, for example, they joined forces with their allies to buy up 2o,ooo copies of one issue of Russkie vedomosti and one entire run of Put to prevent a particular Kadet appeal to the voters from reaching the public. Insofar as the Octobrists focused on issues, they indicated that they stood for the sanctity of private property, the October Manifesto, constitutional monarchy, and the preservation of the "integrity and indivisibility of Russia." 24 Several Octobrist leaders, more liberal than much of the rank-andfile membership, made a point of criticizing the government for unnecessary brutality, especially for the excesses of the punitive expeditions. But these expressions of liberalism were rare. Generally, the Octobrists' campaign was decidedly bland, and this enabled them to hold on to allies on their right. On the other hand, their appeal to the electorate did not arouse great enthusiasm. Significantly, the people in the countryside paid virtually no attention to the pleas of the Peasants' Union, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Social Democrats that they boycott the elections. The Peasants' Union went so far as to denounce "as an enemy of the people anyone who takes part in the elections"; a peasant who heard these words did not lightly undertake to disregard the call for a boycott. 25 But the chance to choose their own representatives for a national legislature had revived the peas-

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Implementing Political Reform

ants' hopes that their needs would be met after all. Despite their many disappointments in securing more land from the authorities, despite the meager results of the agrarian unrest in 1905, a remarkably large number of peasants believed that once their elected deputies demanded land, the government would have to yield. Although peasant participation in the elections was not uniform throughout the Empire, the overall turnout was quite high.* Despite the contempt that extremists on the right and left displayed for the elections, not all of them felt free to act according to their convictions. In fact, the elections placed the ultraconservatives and in particular the Union of the Russian People (URP) in a quandary. As firm upholders of the principle of autocracy, they opposed the very idea of a legislature with real powers. On the other hand, the Tsar himself had authorized the creation of a Duma; how could monarchists oppose his will? After some soulsearching, the URP decided to form a bloc with other monarchist groups and to take part in the elections in the hope that the Duma would prove to be loyal to the autocrat. Basically, the bloc's campaign platform amounted to a call for maintaining the status quo. The URP and its allies distributed leaflets, programs, and appeals, and wherever possible made use of Orthodox churches to disseminate their message, but they were not sufficiently well organized to exert a strong influence on the outcome. 26 The Bolsheviks, under no compunction to moderate their repudiation of the Duma, pressed their campaign to persuade the workers to follow the tactic of "active boycott." Lenin took the lead in denouncing the proposed Duma as a "spurious" and "counterfeit" representative body designed to serve only the interests of landlords and the police. In line with his slogan "Long Live the Freely Elected All-National Constituent Assembly," he urged Social Democrats to take advantage of the electoral campaign to agitate for a democratic suffrage under which such an assembly was to be chosen.H V. S. Voitinskii's vivid description of Lenin's personal role in the campaign reveals much about the Bolshevik leader's political style and his ability to attract followers. In mid-February Lenin addressed a gathering of 100 to 120 people, about half of them workers and the other half * Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros, II, pp. 269-70. The peasants' faith in the Duma also manifested itself when the villagers, once again resorting to issuing the kinds of "resolutions and instructions" they had composed in 1905, chose to direct them to the deputies, not to the authorities in St. Petersburg. Generally suffused with hope and impassioned in their descriptions of the peasants' burdens and needs, these documents, roughly comparable to the cahiers drawn up by the peasants during the French Revolution, were to become one of the key elements in the unrest that engulfed many regions in the spring and summer of 1906; they will be taken up in some detail when we come to discuss that turbulent period (Chapter 4).

Implementing Political Reform

"party intelligentsia." Lenin, according to Voitinskii, was not a brilliant speaker in the usual sense of the term: he lacked presence, he exhibited little emotion, and his language was not in any way striking. He tended to repeat his thoughts and key words to drive "his ideas into the heads of his listeners." Occasionally, he devoted too much time to rather obvious points. But he was never boring because he impressed his listeners as a man with total confidence in the correctness of his views. He dismissed any tactic other than the one he proposed as simply not feasible. If objections to his arguments were raised from the floor, he either ignored them or called them ridiculous. He showed nothing but contempt for the Mensheviks, who voiced reservations about his approach, and referred to them as "liberal imbeciles." For Lenin, it was self-evident that Social Democrats could follow only one of two paths: constitutionalism or revolution, Duma or an uprising. Anyone who supported revolution must be against the Duma; and anyone who favored the Duma must be against revolution. "From such a style there flowed enormous power." Lenin made an "irresistible impression" on his listeners, who became convinced that a boycott of the elections was the only conceivable tactic. Everyone at the meeting in the end expressed agreement with Lenin, certain that by adopting his approach the country would soon return to the "golden days of October [1905]." 28 The success of the boycott depended generally on the strength of revolutionary groups in a particular city, but on the whole it was quite effective. In Warsaw virtually all workers stayed away from the polls. In 49 percent of all industrial enterprises in St. Petersburg and in 70 percent of the enterprises in the suburbs, workers did not vote at all. In Kharkov no worker showed up to vote in 71 percent of the factories; in Odessa the same was true in 54 percent of the industrial establishments. The figures for some of the other major cities are Kiev, 48 percent; Ekaterinoslav, 42 percent; lvanovo-Voznesensk, 33 percent; Moscow, 23 percent; Tver, 13 percent; Tula, 6 percent. Workers in large establishments were more likely to abstain than those in small ones. Even in factories where workers did vote, often only a small proportion showed up. Thus, in many of the factories in St. Petersburg where workers participated in the election, not more than about 20 percent cast ballots. In some factories in other cities, about 10 percent voted. In one factory in Moscow with a work force of 1,ooo people, 70 turned up to vote. 29 A Soviet historian has argued that the campaign of "active boycott" proved to be of "enormous general political and psychological significance for the proletariat in the capital." Tired and depressed over the defeats of late 1905, the proletariat was reinvigorated by the campaign of active boycott in the spring of 1906.30 But that campaign also influenced the out-

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come of the election in a direction neither foreseen nor desired by the Bolsheviks. The absence of viable working-class candidates facilitated victories by the Kadets. During the first two weeks or so of the electoral campaign, the government exuded great confidence about the outcome. At a private dinner on March 7 given by Count V. N. Lamsdorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witte told the American Ambassador that he expected the Duma to be dominated by moderates, and that he did not fear serious conflicts between the legislature and the authorities. 31 Gurko recalled that he and his colleagues in the government were enormously pleased with the early election returns: "the majority of those elected belonged to the peasant class; many of the clergy were also elected. Not only Witte but also the public was certain that the peasant deputies were the most respectable and intelligent of their class, something like our volost heads (starshiny), and would be as wax in the hands of the government." At a meeting of the Council of Ministers at the time, "everyone present was pleased; Witte expressed a common feeling when he said: 'Thank heaven! The Duma will be predominantly peasant.' The Ober-Prokuror of the Synod, Obolensky, added: 'And a clerical one, too. Not bad at all... .' It occurred to no one that the fact of being a peasant did not constitute a guaranty of political loyalty." 32 The Kadets, on the other hand, were thoroughly pessimistic and ascribed the poor showing of the opposition to government repression. 33 All of these assessments turned out to be premature. In mid-March returns came in from St. Petersburg and Moscow showing remarkable strength by the Kadets. The government became slightly nervous but tended to play down the significance of the returns with the comforting thought that the Kadets were stronger in the two capitals than anywhere else. It soon emerged that the Kadets were in fact a very strong party in a great many urban centers, in part because the parties on the left had not fielded candidates. In Moscow 6 5 percent of the votes went to the Kadets, in St. Petersburg 62 percent, in Voronezh over 54 percent, in Odessa slightly over 70 percent. 34 The Kadets did not fare nearly so well in the countryside, so that in the final stage they were forced to enter into blocs with other political groups to secure the election of some of their candidates. They also entered into electoral agreements with other parties in numerous provincial cities. The final result was a victory beyond the dreams of any Kadet leader. As Terence Emmons put it, "The Kadets could not claim to be the party of 'the broad popular masses' [peasants and workers], but they did seem to have the prospect of becom-

Implementing Political Reform

ing a mass party." 35 Another shock awaited the authorities: it soon became evident that the deputies elected by the peasants would not be conservative. Gurko contemptuously referred to them as "a herd led by a few Cadet intellectuals," which hardly did them justice. 36 But it was true that the overwhelming majority of the deputies elected in the countryside were hostile to the prevailing order of things and would align themselves with the Kadets on many issues. None of the parties to the right of the Kadets did well. The ultraconservatives were devastated: in St. Petersburg the monarchist alliance received about 3,ooo votes out of a total of 51,ooo; in Moscow, about 2,100 out of 41,ooo. Throughout the country, only about 5 percent of the votes went to the alliance.J? "It is a sad and difficult time," the URP's paper complained, "a time of celebration for the dark forces. Lord, Lord! Elections to the State Duma, and for a glass of tea the voters are ready to elect anybody." 38 The Octobrists did better than the ultraconservatives, but the few victories they scored seem to have been personal triumphs of individual leaders rather than expressions of support for Octobrism as such. 39 The elections demonstrated beyond doubt, as one observer put it, "the deep feeling of resentment ag.[ainst] the Govt. which seems to pervade all classes." 40 A precise breakdown of the Duma's membership is not possible. As already indicated, elections in some parts of the country were not completed by the time the Duma was dissolved in July. More important, party allegiance was still very weak, and a fair number of deputies shifted from one party to another. A good many others never formally entered any party and were officially listed as "nonparty." The most reliable breakdown of the political affiliations of the deputies (at the time when 4 78 had been elected) has been provided by Terence Emmons. 41 The figures are as follows:* Political affiliation

No.

Political affiliation

No.

Kadets (with adherents) Non partisans Socialists (SD, SR, PSP) Other left (incl. Trudoviki)

185 112 17

Progressives (incl. Peaceful Renewal) Polish National Democrats Octobrists (with other moderates) Extreme right

25 32

94

13

0

The deputies represented a wide range of social groups. The largest contingents came from the peasantry (231) and the nobility (180), with • The Polish Socialist Party (PSP) favored socialism and independence for Poland. The Trudovik fraction, organized in late May 1906, consisted mainly of deputies of peasant origin. By political orientation somewhere between the Kadets and the moderate socialists, they were interested above all in a solution to the agrarian problem satisfactory to the peasants. The Group for Peaceful Renewal was a small liberal party that stood politically between the Octobrists and the Kadets. The Polish National Democrats are also referred to in the literature as the Polish Kolo.

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most of the rest divided among Cossacks (14), merchants (r6), and lower middle class (24). About roo of the noble deputies were landowners, some of whom were also engaged in other occupations, and about roo of the peasant deputies worked on the land. Sixty-seven deputies earned their living in trade and industry, 45 as salaried employees, and 25 as workers; seventeen of them were clergymen. Slightly more than one-fifth (ro8) of the deputies belonged to one or another of the intelligentsia professions (teaching, medicine, law, journalism, etc.), and this group not surprisingly came to play a major role in the Duma's debates and parliamentary maneuvers. Wags, fearing that the intelligentsia's penchant for taking doctrinaire positions would paralyze the assembly, recalled Heinrich Heine's quip about the Frankfurt Assembly in r848: "140 Professoren-armes Vaterland, Du bist verloren [140 professors-wretched fatherland, you are lost]." 42 Elated by their unexpected victory, the Kadets quickly regained their self-confidence, which had been shaken by the defeats of late r 90 5, and began to speak in grandiose terms about the changes the Duma would make in the country's political structure. In late March Miliukov merely suggested that the probable victory of the opposition in the election would create "an entirely new political situation." Privately, he spoke in fairly moderate terms about the electoral outcome, telling acquaintances that "the era of violence is over and ... a new era of constitutional agitation has begun." 43 He took a quite different tack on April 20, however, when he wrote in Rech: "The strictly constitutional principle would now demand the formation of a ministry composed of members of the majority [in the Duma]. The majority, of course, will support its ministers, and as a result, instead of an oppositional Duma we would have a powerful governmental party in the Duma, leaning on the support of the entire country."« In proposing a structural reordering of this magnitude, Miliukov was in effect advocating nothing less than the transformation of Russia into a constitutional monarchy in which the Duma would be the preeminent force. The discrepancies in Miliukov's assessments of the electoral results are yet another example of his tendency to vacillate between caution and militance; this was perhaps his most serious failing as a political leader, in 1906 and for the rest of his career. Russkie vedomosti, a liberal paper close to the Kadets, was also optimistic about the significance of the election's outcome. On March 22 it announced in an editorial that "Russia is experiencing a great moment. A powerful force of national self-consciousness has arisen and has firmly pushed aside what was obsolete into the irrevocable past. The bureaucracy is in its last days; its most desperate efforts do not and will not help it to retain the power that has slipped out of its grasp. All vital and con-

Implementing Political Reform

scious elements of the Russian people must exert themselves finally to break the last vestiges of the hated system." 45 Many Kadets were more cautious and realistic, but they sensed that the party would be under pressure from its "impatient supporters," who expected a cabinet composed of committed liberals in the near future.•• Impressive as their victory had been, the Kadets' popular support was not as extensive and deep as many of the party activists assumed. If the electoral system had been different-for example, had suffrage been universal and direct-and if the process of political mobilization had been further advanced, the Kadets would almost certainly not have fared as well as they didY Given the euphoria of the time, it is understandable that party leaders did not grasp this. On the other hand, in light of their experiences during the preceding eighteen months, it is surprising that the liberals still did not reckon with the resourcefulness of the authorities and their determination to hold the line against the demands of the opposition. The government and its supporters were stunned by the victory of the opposition; Witte was so distressed that he "again began to show signs of extreme nervousness and irritability." .. Even before the elections were completed, Durnovo sent a confidential telegram to governors asking for their assessment of the impending debacle. What had gone wrong? Was the cause of the defeat to be sought in the electoral system? In the conduct of the political parties? In the failure of moderates to campaign strenuously? In the people's resentment of the government's attempts to restore law and order? The governors differed among themselves in their emphases, but a substantial number of them blamed the defeat on popular discontent with long-standing official policies, discontent that the Kadets had exploited effectively. Some governors also pointed out that by not providing for proportional representation, the electoral system helped the Kadets to secure a "disproportionate" number of Duma seats in the provincial assemblies, where the final selections were made.•• As had been the case for almost two years now, the men in positions of power failed to reach a consensus on the causes of popular discontent or on how to cope with it. The only remedy for the latest expression of antigovernment sentiment that Durnovo could think of was to let it be known to conservatives that if the Duma veered too far to the left, it would have to be dissolved.so Increasingly, however, conservatives lost confidence in the Tsar's willingness to act resolutely or to act at all. During the entire period of the electoral campaign, Nicholas seems to have been remarkably uninvolved in affairs of state. His diary for the period contains only one reference to the election-in his entry for April 27, where he noted that the State

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Duma had begun its deliberations and then added the following innocuous comment: "The State Council stands to the right and the Duma to the left of the throne." 51 On April I V. A. Gringmut, editor of the rightwing Moskovskie vedomosti, told friends that on being informed the Duma would be dominated by peasants, the Tsar expressed satisfaction because he was sure the peasants loved him. Someone then told Nicholas that the peasants were demanding land, to which the Tsar responded: "Then we will have to thumb our nose at them." "They will rebel," the interlocutor warned, a comment that did not faze Nicholas, who merely replied: "Then the army will pacify them." The author of this account, A. V. Bogdanovich, a former general, a member of the Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a staunch conservative, concluded that the "Tsar does not understand his situation, does not understand what he has been reduced to during the recent period." 52 The reports from around the country that the people strongly supported their deputies only added to the conservatives' dismay. On April2o, for instance, P. A. Stolypin, Governor of Saratov, informed the Minister of Internal Affairs that a day earlier, when the deputies in his province were scheduled to leave for St. Petersburg, a crowd of Io,ooo inhabitants of the city, "among them many workers and students," filled the entire railway station and began to sing the Marseillaise. To prevent any "undesirable incidents" during the send-off, Stolypin ordered that the trains be dispatched ahead of schedule. Only after the people had encountered mounted patrols and had left the station did they stop singing. 53 While the electoral campaign was in progress, Witte's government faced two other major challenges: the procurement of a foreign loan and the formulation of rules under which the government and the Duma would operate once the legislature met. Each was a herculean task, and in view of Witte's precarious tenure as Prime Minister and the sharp divisions within the cabinet, it is astonishing that he accomplished as much as he did. Not all of Witte's boasts about his achievements deserve to be taken seriously, but he was probably right in saying that "without me no one would have concluded [the loan]." Only he possessed the necessary prestige "in all international financial circles" and the necessary "experience." 54 Ever since 1888 Russia had relied heavily on foreign loans to help finance the country's program of industrialization. During the succeeding sixteen years France, the major source of funds, lent Russia about six billion francs, but in 1904, just when expenditures began to mount precipitately, the French government cut back, in large part to pressure the

Implementing Political Reform

Russians to conclude peace with Japan. The war alone consumed 40 percent of the total revenues, and then the widespread unrest in Russia in late I 904 and throughout I 90 5 greatly added to the government's expenditures. For about a year it managed to limp along by relying on its large gold reserves and by issuing short-term notes at 5V2 percent interest.S' By late I905, however, Russia's financial situation had deteriorated dramatically. Not only had the government used up much of its gold reserves; the harvest was poor, producing a decline in exports, and strikes greatly reduced industrial output. According to one estimate, Russia's foreign trade deficit for I905 amounted to 523 million rubles. Within two years, from January I904 to January I906, what had been a surplus of some 38 I million rubles turned into a deficit of I 58 million rubles. The projection for I906 was a deficit of over 48I million rubles. 56 By early February I906, it was widely feared in St. Petersburg that the government would not be able to meet its payroll; inevitably, the authorities were concerned about the reliability of an army whose men were not receiving their allowances. The business community panicked, and many affluent citizens began to send gold and other forms of capital abroad. According to the British Ambassador, the financial crisis was "probably the most serious preoccupation of the Government both in domestic and in foreign affairs." 57 The government considered abandoning the gold standard but rejected this step because it would have been viewed as a sign of bankruptcy, which is precisely what the revolutionaries had been hoping for. 58 For much of I905 the Russian government sought a substantial loan in France, but for a variety of reasons it was repeatedly rebuffed. French public opinion had turned against Russia because of the mounting unrest after Bloody Sunday and the defeats suffered at the hands of the Japanese. In financial circles in Paris, there was growing fear of a successful revolution in St. Petersburg and insolvency of the Russian government. To counteract these unfavorable impressions, Maurice de Verneuil, a French stockbroker and close friend of Maurice Rouvier, the Prime Minister, urged the Russians to "influence" the French press by putting 25o,ooo francs a month at the disposal of the Russian Ambassador in Paris for disbursement to editors and journalists. This sum was to be added to the Ioo,ooo francs already being handed out to the press. After some haggling, a compromise was reached: each month the Russian Embassy would disburse a total of 3oo,ooo francs. Between May and October of I905 about 50 French newspapers, journals, and news agencies, as well as 38 editors and journalists, received generous bribes. 59 In the end, after many twists and turns on the part of the French government, it seemed as though the bribes had been well spent. Public opin-

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ion in Paris became more sympathetic to Russia. Moreover, by the fall of 1905 the Russians had met a critical demand of the French government, the abandonment of the Bjorko Treaty, and this further encouraged Paris to take a more kindly attitude toward Russia's needs. • On October 6 a delegation of bankers arrived in St. Petersburg to discuss a new loan, but this was hardly a time for serious negotiations. Because of the general strike, there was no electricity, and the talks were often conducted in darkness at the home of the Minister of Finance, V. N. Kokovtsov. The French bankers also had to be provided with special guards as they traveled from the Hotel d'Europe to Kokovtsov's home. Still, after ten days of negotiations an agreement seemed to be within reach, but at the last moment Witte insisted on ending the discussions. It is not dear why he did so. He said that it was humiliating for Russia to conclude formal arrangements for a loan during a period of revolutionary turbulence, but in fact he may not have been fully aware yet of the precariousness of Russia's financial situation. It is also possible that he thought he could get better terms if he secured an international, rather than a purely French, loan; or, conceivably, he simply did not want to expose himself to criticism by beginning his tenure as Prime Minister with a huge loan. 60 Within a few weeks, however, Witte was forced to turn again to France for financial help. He asked Kokovtsov, no longer Minister of Finance, to go to Paris to resume negotiations. Kokovtsov refused, in part because his relations with the Prime Minister had recently turned sour. 61 Only after Tsar Nicholas himself appealed to Kokovtsov to undertake the assignment did he agree to go to Paris. But by that time, early 1906, the French were once again reluctant to enter into an agreement with Russia. Bankers feared that in view of the mounting unrest in the country a loan might be too risky after all. Then a new issue was raised: a number of French businessmen wanted assurances that Russia would place more orders for goods (especially wine) in France. The most serious stumbling block, however, was the French government, which had lost interest in the negotiations because it was now locked in a bitter conflict with Germany over influence in Morocco that threatened to erupt in war. Under the circumstances, France refused to act on the loan until it could be certain of Russia's support. An international conference that had been • At a meeting in July 1905 in Bjorko, Sweden, Kaiser William II of Germany persuaded the Tsar to sign a treaty stipulating that in case of an attack by a European power, Germany and Russia would suppott each other. Neither the German nor the Russian Foreign Minister attended the meeting; both ministers opposed the treaty, the Russian (Lamsdorff) because it was bound to offend France. In late September, after being made aware of his blunder, Nicholas tried to amend the treaty to exclude a war between Germany and France. Germany then lost interest, and the treaty remained a dead letter, though it was never formally abrogated. See Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 432-34.

Implementing Political Reform

convened in Algeciras over the issue dragged on until early April, and only after Witte strongly backed France against Germany was the French government prepared to enter into a final agreement.•> In the meantime liberals in Russia mounted a campaign against the loan because they resented the government's attempt to secure one before the Duma met and feared the funds would be used by the autocracy to shore up its position within Russia. Two leading Kadets, Prince P. D. Dolgorukov and V. A. Maklakov, went to Paris in an effort to persuade the French government not to conclude an agreement with Russia. The two Kadets argued that once the Russian authorities were financially secure, they would feel free to dissolve the Duma, an action that would produce a new surge of revolutionary unrest. The government and the economy would be further weakened, jeopardizing all of France's previous loans. The Kadets also raised the question of the legality of a loan negotiated without the Duma's approval. Raymond Poincare, the French Minister of Finance, was troubled by the legal issue and requested clarification from the Russian government. Predictably, the authorities in St. Petersburg were enraged, not only because their good faith was being questioned but also because they felt betrayed by their own citizens. "Among the dark deeds of the Cadet party," Gurko wrote in his memoirs, "this sending of emissaries abroad for the purpose of undermining the credit of their own country was perhaps the darkest and most disgraceful, even though such action was represented as directed against the Russian government and not against Russia herself."•' Increasingly desperate, Witte personally intervened in the negotiations. He sent urgent messages to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, the chairman of the Paris stock exchange, and several other notables. He also asked Professor F. F. Martens, an authority on international law at St. Petersburg University and a permanent member of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, for an opinion on the legality of the loan. Martens argued that while the October Manifesto granted the Duma certain powers in financial matters, the government was free to act on a loan until the legislature met. He also pointed out that the Duma did not have the constitutional authority to repudiate state debts. In the end, the French government concluded that, however risky, a loan was justified: it would bolster the alliance with Russia and prevent a rapprochement between Russia and Germany. 64 The contract for the loan, the largest ever for Russia, was signed in Paris on April 16, 1906 (Western calendar). A consortium of French, British, Austrian, Dutch, and Russian banks advanced a total of 2.25 billion francs at 5 percent interest. The French banks assumed the largest share of the loan, almost one-half. For Witte, the outcome of the painful

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negotiations was a great personal triumph, as even Tsar Nicholas acknowledged, despite his long-standing reluctance to praise the Prime Minister. "The successful conclusion of the loan," Nicholas wrote to Witte on April 16, 1906, "was the best achievement in [all] your activities. This was a great moral success for the government and provided an assurance of calm and of peaceful development for Russia in the future. It is evident that even in Europe the prestige of our country is high."•s The loan stabilized the country's finances and made it possible for Russia to remain on the gold standard. It also provided the government with the wherewithal to carry out its functions for about a year without regard to the wishes of the Duma. It was for this reason that Witte was determined to secure the funds before the Duma met; at a meeting of the Crown Council in February, he had said that "it would be the greatest calamity to hand the question of a loan over to the Duma."•• In his memoirs he claimed that had he not succeeded in his endeavors, the government would have been "completely deprived of freedom of action" in the event of a new outburst of unrest. 67 The loan was unquestionably a tremendous boon to the autocracy, without which it might not have survived. Witte paid a price for his success. The opposition deeply resented the government's action, which amounted to a cavalier disregard of the Duma at the very moment of its election. The SDs and SRs actually sought to undermine Witte's chances of procuring the loan by announcing that they would repudiate all foreign debts once the old order had been overthrown. The Kadets did not go that far, appreciating that the reforms they themselves wished to institute would require financial assistance from abroad. The party even disavowed the attempts by Dolgorukov and Maklakov to persuade the French not to make the loan. Nonetheless, the Kadets denounced the financial agreement in harsh terms as "unconstitutional" because it had been concluded before the Duma met. 68 Inevitably, Witte's action further poisoned the political atmosphere, and this in turn made cooperation between the legislature and the government all the more difficult. But Witte also paid a personal price. Once he had procured the loan, he was no longer perceived by the Tsar to be indispensable as Prime Minister. Ironically, the one other achievement of the authorities during Witte's tenure as Prime Minister, the final implementation of the promise in the October Manifesto to establish a national legislature, also proved to be counterproductive. The election satisfied only a part of the promise. The government also had to define the powers and rules of the legislature and determine the role of other existing institutions in the legislative process.

Implementing Political Reform

When the government made public its decisions on these matters, it became evident that the authorities intended not only to circumscribe the powers of the Duma but also to disavow some of the promises of the manifesto. The manifesto had referred to only one legislative body, the State Duma, without whose approval no law was to be enacted. In late 1905, however, senior officials began to discuss transforming the State Council, a purely advisory body established by Tsar Alexander I in r8ro, into a second chamber with real powers. Actually, Witte had proposed such a scheme as early as September 1905 in a conversation with Count D. M. Solskii, one of Nicholas's closest advisers. Solskii turned the suggestion over to S. E. Kryzhanovskii, a high official in the Department of Internal Affairs, who drafted many of the reforms at this time. On October 9, I 90 5, before the manifesto was issued, Kryzhanovskii submitted a memorandum to Solskii, in which he argued in favor of a reformed State Council that would represent the conservative forces of the country and act as a counterweight to the so-called Bulygin Duma, which, it was feared, might be inclined to favor extremist measures. At the time, the proposals for a reformed State Council were not made public. 69 In the winter of 1905-6 the idea was revived; on February 14 and r6 a Crown Council under the chairmanship of the Tsar himself met to discuss the proposal, as well as regulations governing the conduct of affairs by the Duma. Thirty-nine dignitaries, some of them from outside the government, participated, and the Tsar always made the final decision on specific issues under discussion. The minutes of the meetings are fascinating, for they reveal the extraordinary reluctance of many notables even at this stage of the revolution to accept basic changes in the political system. And some, most notably Witte, who had appeared to have made their peace with fundamental political reform sought to minimize the significance of the changes by using obscurantist language to describe the new, emerging polity. It was also at these meetings that Witte's indecisiveness on some critical issues manifested itself most clearly. The project for the reformed State Council, submitted to the Crown Council by a committee chaired by Count Solskii, was thoroughly conservative. It transformed the Council into a legislative body with powers equal to those of the Duma. A measure introduced in the Duma would be sent to the Tsar for his consideration only if both houses had voted in its favor. Solskii's committee wanted to avoid placing on the Tsar the "entire burden of resolving differences" between the two legislative houses and therefore devised rules for the selection of the upper chamber that would yield a membership compliant to the wishes of the sovereign and his entourage. 70 Half the 198 members were to be appointed by the

59

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Tsar, who would make his choice known each year on January 1. This meant that the appointed members who did not fully support Nicholas's policies could be speedily removed from office. It also meant that onehalf of the Council enjoyed less independence than the members of the old Council, who used to be appointed for life. The remaining 98 members of the new Council were to be elected by various social groups according to the following formula: the dvorianstvo (nobility or gentry) would elect eighteen; the provincial zemstvo assemblies, 34; large landowners in provinces without zemstvo assemblies, 22; the Orthodox clergy, six; the Academy of Sciences and universities, six; and the commercial and industrial middle class, twelve. But even this arrangement did not satisfy the ultraconservative A. S. Stishinskii, who at the very first session objected to an upper chamber composed of an equal number of appointed and elected members. In Western European countries, he pointed out, all members of that chamber were appointed, and he advocated the same procedure for Russia. Witte opposed Stishinskii on the ground that the selection procedures would guarantee the Council's conservative orientation and would enable it to serve as a "buffer" between the Duma and Tsar, which was of course true. But in a second intervention in the debate, Witte declared that while he still favored the proposal of Solskii's committee, he attached no special significance to it. The critical point, Witte now claimed, was that the new arrangements did not amount to a constitution. They simply represented a reform of the apparatus with which the Tsar wished to govern. "This is only a new government structure," Witte declared. "But the Duma and the Council must not even be compared to a lower and upper house. The present act is by no means a constitutional [act]: no obligations whatsoever have been imposed [on the Tsar]." Nicholas then approved the structure of the State Council as proposed by Solskii's committee. 71 But this did not end the discussion of whether Russia now had a constitution. Eager to counter the charge that in securing the promulgation of the October Manifesto he had fundamentally changed the political system of the country, Witte at another session repeated his claim that Russia would not be governed in accordance with a constitution. When Count K. I. Palen, himself a conservative, contended that there could be no doubt whatsoever that as a result of the manifesto, Russia had been transformed into a constitutional polity, Witte made the following rather startling comment: "Not a single university faculty defines a constitution the way Count Palen does. First of all, [the Tsar] did not take an oath of loyalty to the established system. The Sovereign Emperor introduced this system on his own initiative. How can this be a constitution? Even the extremists understand this the way I do. Therefore, even so moderate a

Implementing Political Reform

party as the Octobrists [and such people] as Shipov and Guchkov say that it is necessary for the Sovereign to take an oath."n Several participants took issue with Witte. F. G. Terner pointed out that Prussia had a constitution, although the monarch was not required to take an oath to uphold it. N. S. Tagantsev, a scholar Witte respected and had consulted the previous October on granting freedom of the press, declared that he himself was a member of a university faculty and could attest that nowhere was an oath by the monarch a necessary feature of constitutional systems of government. The "distinctive feature" of such systems was the participation of two chambers in legislative work "and that exists here [in Russia]." That ended the discussion of the issue. Many participants were clearly irritated by Witte's "deceitful pronouncements," as one scholar correctly describes them. The Prime Minister's interventions had not enhanced his reputation for clear thinking or honesty. Everyone realized that he was simply trying to ingratiate himself with the Tsar. 73 On another issue, whether the deliberations of the two chambers should be open to the public, Witte revealed his deep distrust of the people. It was all right for the State Council to allow the public at its meetings because the presiding officer could be expected to be firm in maintaining order, he suggested, but only the diplomatic corps and the press ought to be allowed to attend Duma sessions. "Given our lack of self-restraint, our wildness, major scandals might arise during the first week [of deliberations]." People in the galleries would harass the ministers by throwing "rotten apples at them." M.G. Akimov, the Minister of Justice, disagreed; although there might be "scandals," closed sessions would create a "foul impression." 74 The archconservative Pobedonostsev privately heaped ridicule on Witte over this issue. He could understand that the Prime Minister might wish to retract all the concessions he had made over the past few months. But once he had granted political rights to the people, he could not tell them: "Go and read in the papers what the chosen ones do and say." 75 The Tsar accepted the majority's position, which was to allow the public at the meetings of both chambers, though the Duma could decide to hold closed sessions on specific occasions. Witte displayed his capriciousness on yet another occasion, when Prince A. D. Obolenskii, Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, reopened a question that had already been settled by the Tsar. Obolenskii contended that it would not be advisable to give the State Council a veto over measures passed by the Duma. It seemed to him that the public, which had expected the Duma to be the only legislative body, would be deeply distressed to learn that the powers of the popularly elected body had been whittled down to such an extent. Witte, supported by a rna-

61

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jority of the Council, argued against Obolenskii, and the Tsar again indicated that he favored Witte's position. To everyone's astonishment, Witte raised the question once again at the next meeting. He now contended that the peasants would be extremely unhappy if measures favored by them and passed by the Duma were blocked by a body in which they had no representation. Witte suggested that any time a project was passed by the Duma but vetoed by the Council, the lower house should have the right to send the measure on to the Tsar, who could then direct a minister to resubmit it to the legislature. The conservatives were enraged. Baron Iu. A. Iskul charged Witte with wanting "to turn legislation over to the hands of the mob." Under attack, Witte made several amendments to his proposal, each one of which weakened his initial suggestion. He was overruled by the Tsar, who insisted that the two chambers should be co-equal. 76 After two days of this sort of haggling, Nicholas ended the meeting by asking a committee of four (Palen; E. V. Frish, chairman of the Council of State's Department of Law; Solskii; and Witte) to prepare three documents: a manifesto announcing the creation of two legislative chambers, a ukase on the reform of the State Council, and a ukase on the institution of the Duma, defining its functions and procedures. Witte succeeded in adding one point to the final version: a bill introduced and passed in either chamber but vetoed by the other one could be resubmitted by the Tsar for reconsideration. When the Tsar signed the documents on February 20, he made a change of his own: he added one word to the description of his "supreme authority"; he insisted on "supreme autocratic authority." 77 The public reaction to the documents was predictable. The conservative press hailed them because they appeared to leave the basis of the Russian state system untouched and because the Tsar still insisted on the exercise of unlimited autocratic authority. 78 The Octobrists, on the other hand, were split. At a meeting of the central committee in late February, Shipov and most of the Moscow representatives spoke out strongly against the reformed State Council, but the Octobrists from the capital praised it as a useful check against a Duma that might be too radical. By a vote of eleven to six, the central committee adopted a resolution in keeping with the views of the Muscovites; it rejected the State Council as a "bureaucratic barrier" that would severely hamper the work of the Duma. The committee also denounced the Tsar's action as a "deviation in essentials" from the principles of the October Manifesto. 7 • The Kadets were even more vehement in condemning the government. To P. B. Struve, changing the State Council into an institution co-equal in power with the Duma was nothing less than a coup d'etat, an action that clearly contra-

Implementing Political Reform

dieted the October Manifesto. 80 Miliukov repudiated the government's action as an "insult" to the Duma and warned that "there can be no doubt that the struggle against the very existence of the Council has become a new slogan of the liberation movement, and thus does not facilitate but complicates the task of pacifying the country." 81 The liberal press did not devote a great deal of attention to the laws of February 20, probably because news of the government's intentions had leaked out weeks before the Crown Council's deliberations. Nonetheless, the reaction was strongly negative. Russkie vedomosti stressed that the appointed members of the new upper chamber would in effect be agents of the government, since they would be subject to reappointment each year. 82 "The new product of bureaucratic creativity," the paper stated in another editorial, "bears the stamp of manners customary to the bureaucracy, its art in playing with words and ideas, in giving with one hand while taking always with the other, its fear of public opinion, its unwillingness to yield before the onslaught of the demands of time, its failure to understand the spirit of free institutions." 83 However harsh, these words of censure were just. Yet the men in authority paid little heed. Indeed, within two months the government issued a new compilation of the Fundamental Laws that further demonstrated its determination to renege on certain basic commitments it had made in October I 90 5. Little is known about the decision to undertake a revision of the Fundamental Laws, which consisted essentially of a codification of all laws of the Empire. It seems that in late I905 Trepov broached the subject of issuing a new edition: according to Witte, the Commandant of the Court, at least as adept at intrigue as the Prime Minister, wanted to impart a liberal thrust to what would be regarded as a constitution for the Empire. As Witte tells it, Trepov knew that this would prove to be disastrous for the country, and that the Prime Minister-whom the Commandant of the Court despised-would receive most of the blame. There is evidence to support these charges against Trepov. The first draft of the Fundamental Laws, probably written by Baron Iskul, the Imperial Secretary, and his assistant, P. A. Kharitonov (under the general supervision of Count Solskii), was fairly liberal. Moreover, Trepov had made strenuous efforts to exclude both Witte and the Council of Ministers from the work of revision. Only after Witte protested were he and the cabinet included in the deliberations. 84 Witte quickly saw to it that the draft was purged of its liberalism. He had abandoned his own liberal positions of the fall of I 90 5 and had reached the conclusion that repression would be needed to restore order.

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And he was eager to demonstrate to the Tsar and to ultraconservatives that he was loyal to the throne. Witte's initial attempt to wrest control over the drafting of the Fundamental Laws from Count Solskii was actually rebuffed. But after Witte saw several versions and told Nicholas that the draft Trepov favored (the so-called Project One) contained dangerous provisions, the Tsar handed the entire matter over to the Council of Ministers. This took place in mid-March and, of course, placed Witte in a very powerful position to influence the deliberations. 85 The new project for the Fundamental Laws, drafted by Witte with the help of his assistant Baron E. Iu. Nolde, was discussed by the Council of Ministers at five meetings. Then, from April 7 to April 12, a new Crown Council, also chaired by the Tsar, considered the draft at four meetings in Tsarskoe Selo. Many of the participants in the Crown Council held in February attended this session too, but several moderates and ultraconservatives present at the earlier meeting were not invited. The authorities went to great lengths, as they had done in February, to keep the deliberations confidential, though, as we will see, information on them was leaked to the press. The Crown Council made no major changes in the draft, but the discussions are once again extremely interesting in revealing the concerns and anxieties of the highest officials in the Empire. The overwhelming majority of the participants agreed that future changes in the Fundamental Laws should be the sole prerogative of the Tsar. To give the Duma or the State Council any role in amending them would, in P. N. Durnovo's view, only "engender unrest." Witte agreed and noted that it would be especially dangerous to accord the legislature any authority on such matters as the succession to the throne, the composition of the government, religious affairs, or the affairs of the Imperial family. The Prime Minister also insisted on not allowing the Duma to tamper with the rights of the State Council, as specified in the decrees of February 20, or with the Tsar's authority to negotiate foreign loans. He warned that failure to put the Fundamental Laws beyond the purview of the Duma would embolden it to turn itself into a constituent assembly. Witte feared that if the Duma took such an action, the government would inevitably resort to force to crush it. "I believe," he declared at the Crown Council, "that it is better to endure now the displeasure [of society] and leave everything that is necessary exclusively in the hands of the Sovereign than to risk unrest in the entire state in the future." In his memoirs Witte indicated that for him it all came down to one question: should the new state order be preserved or should it be overturned by violence? Those who favored the first goal had no alternative but to support the promulgation of the Fundamental Laws in the form he presented them and before the Duma convened. 86

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Only four participants (Frish, A. A. Saburov, I. Ia. Golubev, and Obolenskii) argued against Witte's position, and their comments were incisive. They all pointed out that the Fundamental Laws as formulated would violate the Tsar's promise in the October Manifesto that no law would be enacted without the approval of the Duma. The very promulgation of the Laws would be a violation, and the prohibition against their amendment by the legislature would be a further violation. Frish also contended that it would arouse so much hostility as to endanger the program of pacification. Obolenskii considered it to be nothing less than an infringement of the people's rights. The Tsar ended the discussion by indicating that he would appoint a special committee to study the question. 87 On the one occasion when the Tsar intervened at length in the discussions, the conference reached a level of high drama. Nicholas raised the question of the ruler's prerogatives, a question, he said, that had been tormenting him ever since the idea of reissuing and revising the Fundamental Laws had been drawn to his attention. As was his wont when his authority was at issue, he wondered whether he had the right to make changes in the autocratic system passed down to him by his ancestors. A month earlier, he noted, it seemed to be easier than now to decide in favor of limiting the powers of the autocracy, but recently he had received dozens of telegrams and appeals from all corners of the country and from every "social group" (sosloviia). "They express in moving terms loyalty to me together with a plea not to limit my authority [but they also] thank me for the rights granted in the Manifesto of October 17.... I sincerely say to you, believe me, that if I were convinced that Russia wants me to renounce my autocratic rights, I would gladly do this for its sake. I granted the act of October 17 with full awareness [of its significance], and I firmly decided to implement it. But I am not convinced of the necessity under the circumstances of renouncing my autocratic authority and of changing the attributes of the supreme authority that have been described in the first article of the Fundamental Laws for 109 years."* In fact, Nicholas did not want to change that article in any way. Even the change proposed by the Council of Ministers, which merely excised the word "unlimited" in describing the powers of the "autocrat," was unacceptable to him. He realized that he would be accused of retreating from the manifesto, but he was prepared to take full responsibility for restoring the previous wording of the first article. After all, he continued, only the "so-called educated groups, the proletariat, [and] the third estate" favored limitations on his powers. "But I am confident that 8o percent of *The reference to "109 years" is puzzling, since the Fundamental Laws in force had been published in 1833. Nicholas probably had in mind Paul's succession to the throne in late 1796; at the time Paul expressed strong support for the principle of autocracy.

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the Russian people will be with me, will support and will thank me for such a decision .... The question of my prerogatives is for me a matter of conscience, and I will decide whether to keep them as they are or change them." 88 I. L. Goremykin, a bureaucrat and former Minister of Internal Affairs, was the first to respond to the Tsar's emotional speech. Eager to curry favor with the monarch and the Court, he went out of his way to distance himself from Witte and his policy, which he wanted to discredit. In his view the only legitimate limitation on the Tsar's authority that might be indicated in the Fundamental Laws was in the area of legislation, since this had been promised in the October Manifesto. In the area of administration, the authority of the Tsar must remain unlimited. Goremykin urged that the word "unlimited" be retained in the description of the Tsar's rights because it was impossible to anticipate future contingencies under which the Tsar might need to use his powers. Unwilling to be surpassed by Goremykin in loyalty to the Tsar and his prerogatives, Witte once again rejected the claim that the October Manifesto had placed any new restrictions on the ruler. Indeed, he insisted that ever since the rule of Alexander I in the early nineteenth century, it had been recognized that administrative authority in Russia was circumscribed by the obligation to act in accordance with the law. Witte singled out Turkey as the only country where the highest authority was unlimited. No sooner had Witte made these comments, which amounted to an argument in favor of excising the word "unlimited," than he announced that he understood the Tsar's reluctance to part with it, and that he found Nicholas's statement on the people's loyalty to him "moving." If the ruler did not think that he had the right to renounce "unlimited authority," then it seemed to him unnecessary to promulgate a new version of the Fundamental Laws. Only the intelligentsia would be distressed. Witte's confusing comments clearly reflected his desire at one and the same time to defend his critical role in the issuance of the October Manifesto and still please the Tsar, who was inclined to back away from the commitments he had made in that document. 89 Significantly, several unabashed conservatives spoke out against including the word "unlimited" in the Fundamental Laws. Count Palen, repeating the views he had stated at the February meetings, declared that though he was not sympathetic to the October Manifesto, it had been issued, and it did place limits on the Tsar's authority. Akimov, Solskii, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich, and even Durnovo agreed with Palen. Only Goremykin and Stishinskii stated flatly that the Tsar still exercised unlimited authority. Appar-

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ently shaken by the lack of support for his position, Nicholas decided to postpone a final decision on the issue. 90 In yet another attempt to demonstrate his commitment to a strong monarchy, Witte introduced new language to define the Tsar's powers in dealing with emergency situations: "In times of emergency, the Sovereign Emperor may promulgate decrees (ukases) to stave off dangers threatening state order. The operation of such decrees will end when the emergency has passed." Such an article should be in the Fundamental Laws, Witte contended, because in the life of every state there were occasions when it was threatened by unrest; the ruler's only recourse was a coup d'etat against the prevailing political system. "God forbid that we will have to endure this. But if it does happen, it is better to have the possibility of relying on the law rather than having to stage a coup d'etat and to overturn the Fundamental Laws." A. A. Saburov, a member of the State Council and certainly no liberal, made an impassioned plea against the adoption of Witte's proposal. First of all, since the Fundamental Laws already contained provisions on exceptional laws, Witte's language was bound to be widely regarded as provocative. More to the point, according to Saburov, the government's excessive use of arbitrary powers was one of the principal causes of the present unrest. Each and every year until I 90 3, the police had sent some 5,coo people into exile without trial. The exile of every person aroused the hostility toward the government of all his relatives and acquaintances, about 20 citizens for each exile. Thus, the practice of arbitrary exile had produced Ioo,ooo malcontents a year. "This was one cause of the revolution. We must not retain lawlessness in the state. At the present time we must not allow the repetition of [our] mistakes. We must punish only according to the law.... We must not base our government on bayonets." Several participants in the conference supported Saburov, and the Tsar decided to reject Witte's proposal. 9 ' In the discussion of civil liberties, Witte did receive support from the Tsar. Witte was dissatisfied with the list of civil liberties in Solskii's draft of the Fundamental Laws, but he succeeded in excising only the statute prohibiting the inspection of private correspondence. When Solskii asked why this item had been deleted, Witte merely replied that under present circumstances the police had to have the right to examine personal letters. Even the Minister of Justice, Akimov, opposed Witte on the ground that in no constitutional states were the authorities permitted to read private mail. Sarcastically, Durnovo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, noted that if the Russian government were constrained in this manner, "there will be a lot of complaints about torn envelopes." Nicholas ruled that the police should be allowed to examine personalletters. 92 The most explosive and ominous debate at the April Crown Council

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meetings turned on the agrarian question. Goremykin thought the Fundamental Laws should explicitly state that the Duma could not discuss any proposal to confiscate private property unless it was designed to meet specific needs of the state. Goremykin was objecting to Witte's proposal that the Duma be permitted to consider measures providing for alienation to meet the needs of the state or of society. A mere discussion of the matter, Goremykin insisted, would end in a vote by the Duma to declare all land Nationaleigentum (national property), and a rejection of such a law by the State Council or the sovereign would surely produce a revolution "for which at present there is no basis." Witte argued with equal vehemence that the adoption of Goremykin's language would provoke "the entire peasantry to rise up against the highest authority." Even conservatives agreed that some compulsory alienation might be advisable and necessary, he noted. If the Duma were to vote for very extensive expropriation, the State Council could be relied on to reject it. Count Palen, who had taken moderate positions on other issues, came down on the side of the hard-liners, presaging the bitter conflicts over the agrarian question that would later figure prominently in the dissolution of two Dumas. "To permit compulsory alienation of private property for distribution to the peasants," Palen declared, "will shake the foundations of the state." Frish proposed a compromise: compulsory alienation would be permitted to meet state or public needs but with just and adequate compensation. The Tsar ruled in favor of Frish's language. 93 Three months later, when the Duma took up the agrarian question, Nicholas abandoned even this relatively moderate position. Although the deliberations on the Fundamental Laws were shrouded in strictest secrecy, a copy of the entire document was given to the editors of Rech, who published it on April I I. I. V. Gessen later claimed that A. I. Braudo, a highly placed employee in the Public Library in St. Petersburg, had passed the document on to the editors. Gessen did not explain how Braudo managed to secure so confidential a document; he merely indicated that Braudo knew many influential people and enjoyed the trust not only of the intelligentsia but also of bureaucrats at the highest levels of government. •• It may well be that Gessen put out this story because he himself leaked the draft to the editors of Rech, as is suggested by the following series of events. At Trepov's direction, the draft of the Fundamental Laws prepared by the Council of Ministers was given to a group of Kadets (1. V. Gessen, F. A. Golovin, N. I. Lazarevskii, and S. A. Muromtsev) and two members of the Party of Democratic Reform (V.I. Kovalevskii and M. M. Kovalevskii) to elicit their reaction. It is not clear exactly when this was done,

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but the evidence suggests it must have been at about the time the Crown Council began to meet-that is, toward the end of the first week of April. In any case, on April r 8 the six liberals, upset by the thrust and tenor of the draft, sent a memorandum to Trepov urging some extensive, though on the whole fairly moderate, changes. The single most notable recommendation touched on the all-important question of how the Fundamental Laws might be changed. The liberals sugg~sted that if two-thirds of the Duma and State Council meeting as one body voted to petition the Tsar for a change, the proposal would be passed on to the monarch; if the Tsar approved the measure, it would go into effect upon a favorable vote of both chambers. The liberals also made several other recommendations: that ministers be required to respond to an interpellation by Duma deputies within one week, not one month; that decrees issued in the name of the ruler must be countersigned by a minister, who would thus officially share responsibility for the act; that the powers of the Crown and ministers in issuing decrees be limited; that if the Duma were dissolved, new elections would have to be held within four weeks; that all parts of the budget be subject to consideration as one measure by both chambers, which would deprive the State Council of the right to veto specific items in fiscal bills; and that the people be granted the right to submit petitions to the Tsar and the legislative institutions for redress of grievances. On April r8 Trepov submitted the memorandum to the Tsar. Convinced that Trepov, who was known to be extremely influential at Court, supported their changes, the liberals persuaded themselves that Witte's draft of the Fundamental Laws was "dead." In an editorial of April 19, 1906, Rech claimed that Witte, whose departure from office was known to be imminent, had become a victim of his attempt to nullify the promises of the October Manifesto.9 5 Apparently the memorandum caused Nicholas to waver for a few days; he ordered last-minute changes to incorporate some of the suggestions made by the liberals, but these did not affect the basic character of the document. Anxious over the delay, Witte telephoned Trepov and warned him of "a great disaster" if the Fundamental Laws were not adopted before the Duma met on April 27. Within hours, Trepov called back to inform the Prime Minister that he had delivered his message to Nicholas, who then made his final decision. On April 23 he sent a ukase to the Ruling Senate ordering the publication of the Fundamental Laws, making them the law of the land; the order was carried out the following day. 96 Although the authorities rigorously avoided the use of the word "constitution" because of its Western overtones, the Fundamental Laws amounted to nothing less. They provided a detailed framework for the

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operation of the government and for the enactment of laws. The Fundamental Laws differed from all other laws in that they alone could be revised only on the Tsar's initiative. Even the notorious article 87, which accorded the government the power to issue decrees with the ruler's approval when the Duma was in recess, did not permit the government to introduce changes in the Fundamental Laws themselves. It was, however, a strikingly conservative constitution. To be sure, Nicholas did not in the end insist on the appellation "unlimited autocrat," settling for the language of article 4: "To the all-Russian Emperor belongs the Supreme Autocratic power." But he retained a veto power over all legislative measures, controlled the administration of the Empire, determined foreign policy, commanded the military forces, appointed and discharged all ministers, and had the right to impose martial law or states of emergency on regions beset by unrest. Moreover, the Tsar alone could pardon convicts, commute penalties handed out by courts, and issue a "general forgiveness" to criminals. The Tsar also remained the "Head of the Church," which he administered through the Most Holy Ruling Synod. Finally, he retained the authority to dissolve the Duma at his discretion; the only condition was that the ukase of dissolution must indicate when new elections would be held and when the new Duma would be convoked. These provisions were not the only conservative features of the constitution. The ukase of February 20 according the State Council rights equal to those of the Duma was incorporated into the Fundamental Laws. Moreover, if the legislatures failed to adopt a budget "at the beginning of the fiscal period," the previous budget would remain in force. The list of civil rights accorded to Russian subjects was quite modest: the Fundamental Laws provided for due process, the inviolability of private property, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression ("within the limits fixed by law"), freedom of association ("for purposes not contrary to laws"), and freedom of religion, although "the conditions under which [the people] may avail themselves of this freedom are determined by law." 97 As noted, when the Duma was in recess, the government could govern by decree, which would become a dead letter if it were not passed by both houses of the legislature within two months after they reconvened. If the constitution of 1906 marked a liberalization of the political order that had existed at the beginning of the revolution in 1904, it was a far cry from the aspirations of liberal society. Perhaps more important, it met few of the expectations that had been aroused in October 1905, when the revolution seemed to have triumphed. Had it not been for the fact that the elections had produced a Duma overwhelmingly hostile to

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the old order, the opposition might well have concluded that the autocracy had inflicted a fatal blow on the revolution. Witte was such a dominant figure in public affairs-not only because of his official position but also because he took the initiative on virtually all of the most critical issues-that the announcement on April 22 of his departure from office inevitably created a great stir and aroused much speculation on the reasons for the change in governmental leadership. Witte had, after all, guided the country through its most perilous period and had played a key role in establishing the new structure of government that permitted the main struggle between the authorities and the opposition to shift from the streets to the halls of the legislature. True, his tenure as Prime Minister was never very secure, but his achievements were impressive, and the pool of talent from which the Tsar could draw a new head of government was extraordinarily small. In a private conversation at the time, Witte attributed his departure from government service to the fact that the Tsar faced a quandary from which he could not extricate himself gracefully. On the one hand, he could not possibly retain Durnovo as Minister of Internal Affairs; the man was so unpopular because of his repressive policies that it was unthinkable to have him appear in the Duma as a government spokesman. On the other hand, to dismiss only Durnovo would give the impression of approving Witte's conduct of affairs, something Nicholas certainly did not wish to do. The Tsar, according to Witte, resolved the dilemma by letting both ministers go at the same time/ 8 Witte also insisted that had it not been for his sense of duty and selfsacrifice, he would have resigned earlier. He-confided to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Maurice Bompard, that he had stayed in office as long as he had only because he felt obliged to stabilize the government and the country and had not wished to add to the Tsar's difficulties by leaving office prematurely. "I was born a monarchist," Witte explained in his autobiography, "and I hope to die as one." 99 By mid-April 1906 he believed that he had attained his goals: he had secured the funds the government needed to cover public expenditures, and he had built up the country's police force to a level at which it could maintain order. 100 There was no longer any reason for him to hold on to the reins of power. Ultraconservatives offered a less flattering explanation for Witte's departure from office. P. Kh. Schwanebach, a zealot of the right and Minister of Agriculture from mid-June until late October 1905, told the German Ambassador that Witte's conflicts with Durnovo had nothing to do

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with the Prime Minister's resignation. The real cause was Witte's "unprincipled vacillation between liberalism and reaction, the dubious methods [he had used] and [the dubious] people with whom he has worked, and the dictatorial pressure that he exerted on the Tsar, on his colleagues, and on the entire Administration." At Court he was now regarded as a man "who works not for the well-being of the Crown and the country but is assuming the role of a Coriolanus [a legendary Roman leader of the fifth century B.C. known for his ruthlessness and treachery.]" The German Ambassador thought that Schwanebach's assessment of Witte was one-sided and somewhat exaggerated, but the important point was that many people in Russia shared this view of the Prime Minister. 101 In short, Witte was let go because in the eyes of the Tsar, his advisers, and much of society, he was thoroughly discredited. Witte was, of course, aware of the attacks on him, and in his formal letter of resignation, dated April 14, he gave as one of his seven reasons for wishing to step down the barrage of "badgering" to which he had been subjected during the previous six months. As a result, he was "so nervous that I will not be in a condition to maintain that composure that will be required of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, especially under the new circumstances [the existence of the Duma]." For the rest, he mentioned his differences with Durnovo, the divisions within the cabinet, and the fact that he had recently completed his major task, the negotiations for a foreign loan. On April 22 Nicholas accepted the resignation with a brief note, in which he thanked Witte for his many valuable services to the country and indicated that he would bestow on him the Order of the Saint Alexander Nevskii studded with diamonds. 102 Privately, Witte was less than gracious in commenting on his departure. On April 19 he told Kokovtsov that he was delighted at having been "dismissed" by the Tsar "from this prison where I have been languishing. I am going abroad at once to take a cure; I do not want to hear about anything and shall merely imagine what is happening over here. All Russia is one vast madhouse and the renowned intelligentsia is no better than the rest." 103 Witte's departure from office marked the end of an era in the country's history. For almost a decade and half, he had been a powerful presence at the pinnacle of the bureaucracy, and his influence had been enormous in shaping the Empire's economic evolution and the changes in its political institutions. But his legacy, as was recognized at the time, was ambiguous at best. As Minister of Finance, he had played a critical role in promoting the industrialization of the country. As Russia's representative in the peace negotiations with Japan, he was instrumental in bringing that catastrophic war to an end. His arrogance and penchant for intrigue,

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however, left him with few devoted friends or subordinates willing to support him when he was under attack. More serious, his duplicitous and inconsistent behavior in the conduct of public affairs, especially after the promulgation of the October Manifesto, poisoned the political atmosphere. Neither the moderates, who initially wanted to trust him, nor the liberals had a good word to say about him. His last major achievements, the foreign loan and the Fundamental Laws, as one observer put it, "excited the most profound resentment and ... very greatly increased that bitter feeling which is the most dangerous factor in the present situation. [Even among the moderate liberals these actions are] regarded as proof that the Government having now obtained the pecuniary means of carrying on the administration is resolved to govern with as little reference as possible to the national will as clearly shown by the elections. Under the circumstances the attitude of the opposition is clear. They intend, as I understand, to conduct a violent campaign in the Duma when it meets against the Government." 104 During his six months as Prime Minister, Witte's government had succeeded in reducing revolutionary unrest, but it had not achieved its larger goal, the pacification of the country. Although rumors of Witte's imminent departure had been circulating for months, and most people at Court were eager to see him go, at the time of his resignation the highest authorities had no plans for the succession. Later, in I9I7, when the Commission of Inquiry into the collapse of the old regime asked I. G. Shcheglovitov, Minister of Justice from I 906 until I 9 I 5, to characterize the government that assumed office in April I906, he responded that he found it difficult to do so because the new cabinet was "formed entirely accidentally," in a haphazard way. Shcheglovitov recalled that his predecessor as Minister of Justice, M. G. Akimov, had told him that he, Akimov, had been asked if he would serve as Prime Minister. Akimov "categorically refused" on the ground that he felt "completely unprepared" for that position. Asked to make a recommendation, Akimov proposed I. L. Goremykin. 105 Rediger, the Minister of War, learned only by chance that there was to be a major reshuffling of the government. He happened to be talking to Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, who mentioned the impending departure of Witte. Only in I909 did Rediger hear some of the details of how the government was formed and of Akimov's refusal to serve as Prime Minister. 106 In truth, for several days following Witte's resignation, the Court seemed to be in a state of utter chaos. Not only did Nicholas and his advisers have to deal with the new appointments to the cabinet, they also had to reach a final decision on the Fundamental Laws, which had not yet been promulgated. "All affairs and questions became entangled," and consequently nothing was decided. 107 There were rumors that Goremykin

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would be named Prime Minister, but even ultraconservatives found it difficult to believe this. Privately, they said that "he is not Witte" and would not be able to deal with the Duma, which "would quickly send him and the entire cabinet packing." 108 As late as April 24, cabinet ministers still did not know which of them, if any, would remain in their posts. That evening four members of the cabinet (K. S. Nemeshaev, Minister of Transportation; Prince A. D. Obolenskii, Chief Procurator of the Most Holy Synod of the Russian Church; Count I. I. Tolstoi, Minister of Education; and A. P. Nikolskii, Minister of Agriculture) were asked, "in an unprecedented and disgraceful manner," to submit their resignations. None received any kind of honorific appointment, which was customary whenever a minister left his post. (However, Durnovo, who also resigned, was said to have been given a gift of 2oo,ooo rubles.) 109 According to newspaper reports, several men had joined Akimov in declining offers of appointment, still further narrowing the field for the Court officials trying to find suitable candidates.U 0 Quite a few people seem to have been reluctant to take on high government posts because they had no appetite for what, under existing circumstances, promised to be a thankless task. "It is generally believed," the British Ambassador reported, "that even if the Emperor agreed to appoint members of the extreme left of the present Duma to form his Ministry, they would in a very short time be regarded with as much hatred and distrust as the present administration. Matters have already gone too far."m In the end, the Tsar was able on April 24 to announce the selection of a new government whose one distinguishing feature was its lack of distinction. To be fair, several men in the new cabinet were competent bureaucrats, but the Prime Minister, I. L. Goremykin, was so obviously a nonentity that society was taken by surprise at his appointment, and virtually no one could be found to say a good word about him. It is worth noting that six weeks earlier, when diplomats in St. Petersburg speculated about Witte's likely successor, Goremykin's name was not even mentioned. 112 Kokovtsov, an intelligent and experienced civil servant, actually refused Goremykin's offer of the post of Minister of Finance because of his doubts about the man's abilities. The Tsar then invited Kokovtsov for an audience to persuade him to change his mind. "I frankly expressed to the Tsar all my fears that Ivan Logginovich's [Goremykin's] personality, his great indifference toward everything, his utter inability to compromise, and his outspoken unwillingness to meet the new elements of our state life would not only fail to help us get acquainted with them but would serve to increase the opposition." Nicholas granted that Kokovtsov might be right, but he also indicated that nothing could be done, since Goremykin

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had already accepted the post. In any case, the Tsar was confident that the new Prime Minister "will not act behind my back" and would not do anything to "damage my authority"; clearly, Nicholas was determined not to be saddled with a Prime Minister who would be as independent as Witte. The monarch was also sure that if it became necessary to change the government, Goremykin would leave without creating any difficulties. Still, if Kokovtsov had made up his mind not to serve in the cabinet, the Tsar assured him that he would honor his wishes. Nonetheless, late in the evening of April 2 5, Kokovtsov received a package announcing his appointment as Minister of Finance. Goremykin, it turned out, insisted on the appointment, and Nicholas simply signed a ukase to that effect without first informing Kokovtsov. Not prepared to disobey a directive from the Tsar, Kokovtsov agreed to serve. 113 Goremykin had begun his career in government service in r 866 at the age of 2 7 and had held several high positions before he became Minister of Internal Affairs in r895. In that post, he acquired the reputation of being a "red," but as Miliukov put it somewhat unkindly, only because he served in the position between two unyielding reactionaries. 114 Actually, as Minister of Internal Affairs he did advocate the extension of selfgovernment to the western provinces, a major reason for his dismissal in r899. He had become considerably more conservative by 1906, but that was not the main reason why he was universally considered a bad choice. He was a colorless man without firm convictions or any strong urge to exercise leadership. When Goremykin asked Shcheglovitov to accept the post of Minister of Justice, the Prime Minister-designate did not even touch on the question of the government's future program. In response to Shcheglovitov's query about his functions in the post, Goremykin simply said that they would discuss this in due course. Shcheglovitov later revealed that he never participated in any overall discussions of government policies while Goremykin was in office.U 5 A. V. Gerasimov, head of the St. Petersburg Okhrana and a staunch conservative, dismissed Goremykin as "an indolent person who is not at all interested in politics. He asked for only one thing, that he be bothered as little as possible." 116 Clearly, he was not a suitable head of government under the new and difficult conditions prevailing in Russia in 1906. Except for Kokovtsov, P. Kh. Schwanebach was the only person in the cabinet with experience in national domestic affairs, and he was more interested in gaining support for ultra-right-wing causes and intrigues than in running the Office of the State Comptroller. Witte scornfully dismissed him as a man whose only merit lay in the fact "that he had fallen in with a Montenegrin princess." 117 The Minister of Internal Affairs, P. A. Stolypin, who will loom large later in this study, was without question a

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highly competent person, but he had no experience in national politics. The new Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. P. lzvolskii, was an able and sensible diplomat who did not want to accept the cabinet position because he felt "inadequately prepared," having been "out of active diplomatic service for three years." He finally accepted the appointment, "quite against my will," only because the man he had recommended, D. A. Nelidov, refused to be considered. 118 Two cabinet posts went to ultraconservatives: A. S. Stishinskii, who had urged the Tsar to declare himself an "unlimited" autocrat at the April Crown Council, became Minister of Agriculture; and Prince A. A. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov assumed the post of Chief Procurator of the Most Holy Synod. Only two men were holdovers from the previous cabinet, A. F. Rediger, the Minister of War and A. A. Birilev, the Minister of the Navy. The other members of the cabinet were not sufficiently known to the public to arouse much comment. Basically, the cabinet consisted of bureaucrats, and this in itself signified the Court's clear intention not to create a parliamentary system of government. That, of course, was not surprising, but the critical question was whether a government composed largely of mediocre, unimaginative civil servants would be capable of finding common ground with a Duma that was overwhelmingly hostile to the Tsarist regime. Nervous about how the new government would be received by the public, the authorities in St. Petersburg made special efforts to persuade foreign diplomats and the foreign press to express strong support for the cabinet. The response was not encouraging. Indeed, not all foreign powers wished to see a strong government in St. Petersburg. The German Ambassador to Russia, who was in any case displeased by the Russians' support of France during the Moroccan affair, did not think it was in Germany's interest to reinforce Goremykin's government. "Our interests are best served if Russia has to contend for a long time with internal unrest. Its ability to be active in London, Paris, or Constantinople will be hampered under such circumstances." So long as the "general monarchical interests" were not threatened, Germany's best policy was to treat the government in Russia with "reserve." 119 In truth, the attitude of foreign governments toward the Goremykin administration was not likely to have a strong bearing on domestic developments in Russia, which had their own momentum. Society generally applauded Witte's departure from office without, however, expressing any support for the new cabinet. The change in government, it was widely believed, proved that the authorities could no longer ignore the

Implementing Political Reform

opposition. Thus, Rech referred to Witte's resignation as "the first victory of organized public opinion," and Pravo thought that it would facilitate the tasks of the Duma, since the former Prime Minister had emerged as the leader of the counterrevolution.12° Most liberals, reinvigorated by their victory in the election and their fury over the last steps of the outgoing government, were resolved to go on the offensive. The mood of pessimism within the opposition so pervasive only four months before gave way to a mood of exuberance, exemplified by F. I. Rodichev's declaration that "it will be impossible to dissolve the Duma; the Duma will do its work." 121 To which Kizevetter added: "And if ... the Duma is dissolved, that will be the government's last act, after which it will cease to exist," a prediction applauded by a large Kadet audience. 122 If in January the watchwords had been caution and ambiguity, now they were militancy and maximalism. This change in mood manifested itself most markedly at the Third Congress of the Kadet party, held from April2r to April25. The congress was convened primarily to formulate tactics for the Duma, where the Kadets would command a far larger following than any other party. The task was bound to be extraordinarily difficult, since the divisions within the party had deepened over the preceding few months. The delegates from the provinces, where repression had been especially intense, continued to be much more radical than their colleagues from St. Petersburg and Moscow, who occupied most of the positions of leadership. A sizable number of the radicals were opposed to introducing any constructive legislative proposals in the Duma. They wanted the Duma, immediately upon convening, to submit an ultimatum to the government demanding the convocation of a democratically elected constituent assembly, whose task it would be to restructure the political system. This was clearly a revolutionary path, but a path that the radicals believed the masses would back, with "armed force" if necessary. One of their spokesmen, the delegate from Tomsk, Veisman, declared: "We must lean for support on the all-national protest movement. We must lean for support on those extreme parties that have no representation [in the Duma], but that are strong in the country." Many delegates applauded Veisman's statement, even though no radical provided any hard evidence to support the claim that the people were once again in a revolutionary mood. As Kizevetter put it, the radicals considered their position to be "selfevident" simply because the people had supported the opposition in the election. 123 Of course, the government's adoption of the Fundamental Laws, which occurred while the congress was in session, was grist for the militants' mill. On several occasions during the deliberations, radical delegates raised

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their voices to indicate disapproval of various condemnations of the government that they regarded as insufficiently militant.' 24 A resolution Rodichev put forward denouncing the promulgation of the Fundamental Laws, for example, was greeted with cries of "weak!," "necessary to have a stronger [resolution]," and "does not express our mood." On the other hand, when a speaker announced from the podium that an assassination attempt had been made on Admiral F. V. Dubasov, the Governor-General of Moscow who had suppressed the insurrection in December, half the audience applauded, which was taken as proof by conservatives that the Kadets had formal ties with terrorists.' 25 The Kadet leaders, however, sought to steer the party along a more moderate path. To be sure, Miliukov, who delivered the report on tactics in the name of the central committee, did not favor a formal break with the revolutionary parties. Shortly after his return to Russia from a foreign trip in early April, he declared that "only on the basis of a peaceful agreement between the 'liberals' and 'revolutionaries' would the revolution succeed in attaining its immediate goal, political freedom." 126 But at the congress he merely raised the question-without answering it-of whether or not the revolution would continue. In his mind the election of the Duma had demonstrated that the mood of the people was one of "anger and indignation," but beyond that he found it difficult to speculate on the future. Miliukov was clearly trying to avoid offending either the moderates or the radicals and to formulate tactics that would be acceptable to the entire party. Miliukov insisted that because the party had scored a great victory in the elections, it must assume grave responsibilities. "Not only the party's reputation and future depend on our success or failure: the entire course of political events in Russia in the near future depends on us." Miliukov acknowledged that the congress was divided into two broad camps: some delegates argued that in the Duma the Kadets should do their utmost to end the unrest in the country and devote themselves to "constructive" legislative work, whereas others wanted the Duma to continue the struggle for freedom until the national legislature achieved "full power." Miliukov rejected both these "extreme" positions. He wanted the party to strive for a thorough democratization of the country, for reforms on the agrarian and nationalities questions, for the abolition of capital punishment, and for full amnesty for political prisoners, but it should do so through constructive work in the Duma. Such a course would assure the party's followers that the Kadets had not abandoned their goals. At the same time, the party must realize that the Duma deputies could succeed only if the legislature remained in session for a protracted period of time, a warning against unnecessary provocations that might prompt the gov-

Implementing Political Reform

ernment to dissolve the Duma. "At this time it was necessary," Miliukov stated in his memoirs, "to avoid very sharp collisions that would give the initiative to the government in any conflict." 127 Miliukov denounced the Law of February 20 that had accorded the State Council co-equal powers with the Duma, but here again he adopted a tone designed to appeal to both wings of the party: the Kadets in the Duma would have to come to terms with this new arrangement, he told the delegates; but if the State Council became an insuperable block to fundamental reform, "then the [Kadet] party will have no option but to protest or enter the path of open revolutionary struggle against these formalities that limit the Duma." In short, it was up to the government whether or not the liberation movement pursued its aims by legal means or turned revolutionary. 128 Three days after he had given this report, while the congress was still in session, the newspapers announced the adoption of the Fundamental Laws. Miliukov immediately delivered a passionate condemnation of the government. "Like thieves in the dead of night, all the specialists on state law organized, [and] these people staged a conspiracy against the people (applause) . ... That which we read in the newspapers today is a fraud, a fraud against the people, and we must immediately answer this fraud." F. I. Rodichev then introduced a motion denouncing the Laws as a "clear and harsh violation of the people's rights that had been solemnly acknowledged in the Manifesto of October 17." The motion further stated that "no sort of obstacle created by the government will prevent those elected by the people from fulfilling the tasks placed upon them by the people." As noted, many delegates considered the resolution much too mild, and only the pleas by Rodichev and I. I. Petrunkevich that a unanimous vote was necessary to maximize the effect of the protest forestalled a split vote. 129 Similarly, many delegates voiced strong reservations about Miliukov's tactical line, but in the end the congress voted in favor of the four theses that embraced his position. Among other things, the theses called for universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, including the extension of the vote to women; agrarian reform; legislation on the workers and nationalities questions; full amnesty for political prisoners and an end to capital punishment; and a "parliamentary inquiry of all illegal actions taken by the administration in its struggle with the social movement since October 17." In pursuing these goals, the Kadets vowed not to shy away from an open break with the government, but they insisted that if a rupture became inevitable, they would see to it that the onus would fall on the government. 130 Miliukov and the central committee thus succeeded in securing the

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support of the congress for what they considered to be a constructive role in the Duma. But by the standards of the time and under the circumstances then prevailing in Russia, the program the Kadets had adopted was so far-reaching and radical that cooperation between the Duma and the government was hardly possible. That the impediments to such cooperation would be insurmountable became evident even before the deputies began their formal deliberations.

Chapter Three

The First Steps of the Duma

THE TsARIST authorities could not settle on a clearcut policy toward the Duma. They allowed the elections to be held, they arranged a solemn ceremony to mark the opening of the legislature that enhanced its aura of legitimacy, and they made several other gestures that suggested willingness to cooperate with the new institution. On the other hand, the authorities had limited the Duma's prerogatives before it ever met, had appointed a Prime Minister and several other ministers hostile to any form of representative government, and in numerous other ways had indicated deep distrust of the legislators, who in turn gave little evidence of favoring a conciliatory strategy. On the contrary, most deputies were determined to test the government to the limit by pressing for immediate and extensive political concessions. As a result, relations between the legislature and the men in power were strained from the moment the deputies assembled on April 27. Very quickly, the relationship turned acrimonious, condemning the first experiment in popular government to ignominious failure. For days before the opening of the Duma, the Tsar's entourage was apprehensive. General Trepov privately told the American Ambassador that "the Russians did not realize how critical and how delicate the present situation was. Nearly all the members elected to the Duma were opposed or unfriendly to the Administration, and consequently the actions of the Duma were an unknown quantity." Trepov added that "the occasion required leaders of skill, experience and tact (in which they were lacking), to direct legislation."' The Minister of War, Rediger, noted in his memoirs that "the future appeared to be completely unclear and fraught with every danger, since the new Duma, introduced to pacify the country, could, on the contrary, completely revolutionize it."z

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Uncertain about how to cope with the new political realities, the government resorted to the proverbial carrot and stick. In one of Durnovo's last acts as Minister of Internal Affairs, he directed local officials to permit citizens to celebrate the opening of the Duma by decorating their homes with flags and to manifest their support by other peaceful means. At the same time, he ordered officials to keep the police and army in readiness to prevent "stormy meetings, processions and demonstrations with criminal speeches and revolutionary songs," and gatherings where red flags were displayed. Order was to be preserved at all costs, and any attempt to disturb the peace was to be stopped "in the most resolute manner." 3 The authorities in the capital obeyed these directives so scrupulously that St. Petersburg did not have the appearance of a city eager to welcome the people's representatives. "It resembled, rather, a city prepared to meet an enemy. Everywhere in all the streets soldiers were parading with all kinds of weapons, and so were policemen, some on horse and some on foot, [all] armed with rifles." Patrols of soldiers, policemen, or Cossacks could also be seen in the streets near factories and in the courtyards of the university and the Academy of Sciences. Employees at hospitals made hurried preparations to handle emergency cases "in the event of mishaps in the streets." Even though houses and streets were draped with flags, the city seemed to be in a despondent mood.• Senior officials at Court bickered with each other over the most appropriate way to inaugurate the Duma. The reactionaries did not want the Tsar to have any contact with the deputies, whereas more moderate officials thought that Nicholas would be well advised, as a gesture of conciliation, to appear at the Tauride Palace, the Duma's meeting place, to greet the deputies. After studying procedures in similar circumstances in other countries, the Tsar's entourage agreed to adopt the German format: deputies would be invited to the Winter Palace, where the Tsar would open the Duma sessions with an "Address from the Throne." 5 Once this decision had been reached, the Court spared no efforts in arranging a grand and "wonderful display." The description of the 30minute affair that the American Ambassador sent to Washington provides a vivid picture of the elaborate and colorful proceedings: All the Russians were instructed to assemble in the Grand Salon at one o'clock and the diplomats in a special room at 1. 1 5. At half past one we were notified by the Master of Ceremonies to form in line, the Turkish and French Ambassadors leading, next the Italian and American, then the German and Spanish, the Austrian and English Ambassadors being absent. The Ministers formed in line according to their rank. We formally proceeded through several great halls, the Russian members of the Court drawn up on the right and hundreds of ladies on the left, all the latter in the Russian national costume with the attractive head-

The First Steps of the Duma gear, known as the kokoshnik, and all dresses decolletees [de] rigueur. The throne is in the great hall of St. George and the diplomats were stationed on a raised stand on the right of the throne, but to the left of the entrance. In the throne room of the Winter Palace there was an assemblage of people different from any that has ever taken place in the history of Russia. On the left of the throne, taking up the entire left side of the hall, were the members of the Duma, in every conceivable costume, the peasants in rough clothes and long boots, merchants and trades people in frock coats, lawyers in dress suits, priests in long garb and almost equally long hair, and even a Catholic bishop in violet robes. On the opposite side of the hall were officers in braided uniforms, courtiers covered with decorations, Generals, members of the Staff and members of the Imperial Council of Russia. At a quarter of two one heard in the distance the national anthem, played by the trumpeters, growing gradually louder as the Emperor and his courtiers approached. Finally the doors were thrown open, and first came richly attired court servants, then two Masters of Ceremonies carrying wands of office, two grand Masters of Ceremonies each bearing an Imperial golden eagle, followed by others carrying the sword of State, the Seal of the State, the Imperial Banner, the globe, the sceptre and finally the crown, glittering with beautiful jewels. Directly behind the crown came twelve Palace grenadiers, wearing uniforms of a century ago. Immediately after came His Imperial Majesty, with the Empress Alexandra on his left and the Empress Dowager on his right. The Grand Dukes Michael and Vladimir and the remainder of the Imperial family followed in order of precedence. Half-way down the hall the Emperor stopped and kissed the cross in the hands of the High Priest and then the religious ceremony commenced with chanting and choir. That finished, the Emperor proceeded alone to the throne, where he seated himself while the two Empresses walked to the right of the throne and remained standing. The Grand Dukes and Grand Duchesses assembled further to the right, but not on the steps of the throne. In watching the deputies I was surprised to note that many of them did not even return the bows of His Majesty, some giving an awkward nod, others staring him coldly in the face, showing no enthusiasm, and even almost sullen indifference. As he rose again from the throne, there was an absolute stillness. He then proceeded in a firm voice to read his address. When he finished there was a tremendous outbreak of applause, but limited almost entirely to the right side of the hall, the deputies remaining quiet. As he descended from the throne and the members of the Royal Household formed in line according to their rank, the applause and shouting on the right continued and increased, but the marked silence on the left was ever noticeable. The Emperor carried himself with dignity under the trying ordeal and should receive credit for what he said in his address to the members of the Duma. Judging merely from appearances, it was difficult to recognize any marked ability or distinguishing trait among the members of the Duma which would specially fit them for the great task that is before them, but the contrast between those on the left and those on the right was the greatest that one could

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The First Steps of the Duma possibly imagine, one being a real representation of different classes of this great Empire, and the other of what the autocracy and bureaucracy has been. 6

Whether by design or from thoughtlessness, the Tsar's speech was inappropriate for the occasion. According to one account, Nicholas's advisers and subordinates at Court were so confused by the unprecedented task of composing a speech for Duma representatives that for a few days they simply did not know what tone to adopt.7 Although not explicitly provocative, the address they finally produced was so vague as to suggest a lack of serious interest in the work of the Duma. It did not include a single proposal for reform, and this was bound to offend even the moderate deputies. After all, the legal and peaceful reform of Russia's political, economic, and social institutions was a primary reason for the establishment of a legislature in the first place. Nicholas confined himself to words that appeared to be gracious and generous but in fact did not in any way meet the concerns of the liberals and the moderate left, not to mention the radicals. The brief speech is worth quoting in its entirety: Almighty God entrusted to My care the welfare of the Fatherland and impelled Me to summon representatives of the people to assist in legislative activity. With abiding faith in the great future of Russia, I greet in you the elite, whom I ordered My beloved subjects to choose from their midst. Difficult and complex work lies before you. I trust that love of your native land, and a burning desire to serve it, will inspire you. I will safeguard the unshakable tenets I granted, in the firm conviction that your unselfish service to the Fatherland will help determine the needs of the peasants so near My heart, and contribute to the enlightenment of the people and the advancement of their welfare. Remember that spiritual greatness and the welfare of the nation depend not only on freedom, but also on order based on justice. May My earnest desire be fulfilled: may I see My people happy and pass on to My Son, as his inheritance, a strong, well-ordered, and enlightened state. May God bless the work confronting Me and the State Council and the State Duma, and may this day be henceforth remembered as the day of the rebirth of the morality of the Russian land, the day of the rebirth of its best forces. Approach with faith the work for which I summoned you, and justify in a worthy manner the confidence of the Tsar and the nation. May God help You and Me.•

It was not only the generalities of the Tsar's speech and the deputies' cool response to it that seemed to spoil the inaugural ceremonies. Somehow, the atmosphere was all wrong. The dignitaries at Court and conservatives in general were appalled at seeing representatives of the "dark masses" right in the throne room of the Winter Palace. In their memoirs the dignitaries invariably commented on the fact that many deputies were

The First Steps of the Duma

"dressed in a deliberately careless fashion," which was taken as an intentional expression of disrespect for the monarchy. By the same token, peasant deputies were shocked by the dignitaries' ostentatious display of wealth. Most of the deputies had never seen such ornate clothes and brilliant jewels, and they were perplexed at their being flaunted at a time when the Tsar was solemnly seeking the support of the people to save the country from chaos. 9 V. I. Gurko, no friend of the Duma, nicely captured the irony of the proceedings: The Imperial regalia had been brought from Moscow and these were to be borne by the highest officials, ranged on both sides of the throne. The throne was draped in the Imperial ermine mantle; it was said that the Tsarina herself had draped the mantle so that it would hang in artistic folds. Velvet ropes down the center of the room formed a sort of corridor through which the Imperial suite was to pass. On one side of this corridor were members of the State Duma and on the other members of the State Council, senators and the other higher civil and military officials. The contrast was striking. The court and the government, flourishing gold-laced uniforms and numerous decorations, was set opposite the gray, almost rustic group representing the people of Russia. Naively believing that the people's representatives, many of whom were peasants, would be awed by the splendor of the Imperial court, the ladies of the Imperial family had worn nearly all their jewels; they were literally covered with pearls and diamonds. But the effect was altogether different. This Oriental method of impressing upon spectators a reverence for the bearers of supreme power was quite unsuited to the occasion. What it did achieve was to set in juxtaposition the boundless Imperial luxury and the poverty of the people. 10

Far from promoting goodwill and harmony, such an encounter between the privileged and the elected representatives could only deepen the distrust with which the two sides eyed each other. Popular support for the Duma continued to be high throughout Russia, a critical asset for the deputies as they began their work. In Kherson, for example, the city council planned to celebrate the opening of the legislature with a "solemn meeting" dedicated to the new parliament. When the local administration prohibited the meeting, representatives of the city's physicians, lawyers, Jewish community, and other groups sent telegrams of good wishes to the Duma deputies in St. Petersburg. The citizens of Kherson urged the Duma to proceed immediately to create a free society and, more specifically, to abolish the exceptional laws and to free all political prisoners. Notables in Simbirsk, Simferopol, Kharkov, Orel, and Iaroslavl sent similar telegrams. In many other cities, the launching of the Duma was celebrated with public prayers, the display of

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flags, and the closing of schools; in quite a few, there were also street demonstrations (which the police quickly dispersed). 11 Only the extremes on the political spectrum, workers under the influence of Social Democrats and members of the Union of the Russian People, remained aloof from the celebrations. The St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDWP adopted a resolution calling on workers not to observe April 2 7 as a holiday even though a number of factory owners had indicated that they would give their employees the day off with full pay. If factories were closed, workers should organize political meetings to press for two demands: the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly and the right to form independent organizations of the proletariat. Most large industrial enterprises continued to operate because of worker resistance to the holiday, but many small factories and shops were closed, and their employees joined the celebrations in the streets. 12 Right-wing extremists, as unalterably opposed as ever to what they considered an infringement of the autocratic principle, also refused to participate in the festivities. But since the Tsar had agreed to the Duma's creation, they felt bound to maintain a low profile. 13 The deputies ran into emotional expressions of popular support for the Duma as they made their way from the Winter Palace to the Tauride Palace, a two-story, white building erected at Catherine the Great's behest for her adviser and lover, Prince Gregory Potemkin. Situated on a large plot of land in an angle of the Neva River, the palace seemed to be an ideal meeting place for the Duma. An imposing structure, it could be protected fairly easily, since it was isolated from the main parts of the city and was not far from several military barracks. The deputies made their way to the Tauride Palace via steamship, and when they disembarked, they were startled to discover the streets surrounding the building filled with 5,ooo to 6,ooo "ordinary people," who hugged the deputies, kissed them, squeezed their arms, and cried out "amnesty." There were also frequent shouts of "Hurrah"; the shouting became especially loud whenever a deputy in peasant dress appeared. The warm reception made a deep impression on the deputies, several of whom delivered short speeches calling for calm and promising to implement the wishes of the people. 14 Once inside the hall, the deputies wasted no time in taking up a critical and highly sensitive issue. Several Kadet deputies and many Trudoviks wanted the Duma to pass a resolution immediately demanding complete amnesty for political prisoners. But the Kadet leaders did not wish to initiate the proceedings of the parliament with the adoption of a resolution that would be regarded

The First Steps of the Duma

as provocative by the Tsar, who, according to the Fundamental Laws, retained the right to grant amnesties. The Kadet leaders also feared that such a resolution might be taken by the country at large as a full response to the Address from the Throne. The chamber's first formal statement to the highest authorities, they contended, should make it clear that the Duma intended to deal with a wide range of issues. In any case, they pointed out, the rules of the Duma stipulated that no substantive issues would be taken up at the first meeting. To placate the militant deputies who wished to voice their outrage over the treatment of political prisoners, the Kadet leaders devised a scheme to permit an expression of disapproval of the government without a vote on the question of amnesty. After Secretary of State E. V. Frish's opening remarks on behalf of the monarch, the administration of the oath of loyalty to the deputies, and the election of S. A. Muromtsev as President, I. I. Petrunkevich took the floor (before the President's acceptance speech) to deliver the following short address: 15 Our honor and conscience demand that our first thoughts and our first freely spoken words should be devoted to those who have sacrificed their freedom for the liberation of our country that is dear to all of us (loud applause). All the prisons in our country are overflowing (prolonged applause), thousands of arms are stretched out to us with hope and prayer, and I believe that our conscience compels us to exert all efforts at our disposal to see to it that the achievement of freedom in Russia will not demand any kind of additional sacrifices (prolonged applause). We ask for peace and accord. I believe, gentlemen, that if at the present time we do not enter into a discussion of this question and touch upon it when we respond to the Address from the Throne by the Sovereign Emperor, [nevertheless] we cannot now refrain from expressing all our accumulated feelings, our cries from the heart, and say that free Russia demands the liberation of all victims .. .(prolonged applause). 16

Petrunkevich's moving address clearly expressed the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the deputies. It also marked the start of a pattern in the conduct of the Duma necessitated by the ideological makeup of the membership: the adoption by the Kadet leadership of procedures that would enable the legislature to express the wishes of the more militant deputies without voting on measures that the government would consider provocative. As long as the Kadet leaders sought to shape the Duma's agenda, they had no choice but to opt for such a two-pronged strategy. Only about 37 percent of the deputies belonged to the Kadet party, and even they were sharply divided. E. N. Shchepkin, for example, led a group of 40 leftists who leaned toward socialism but were prepared to support the more moderate positions of the party leadership. On the

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other hand, a number of Kadet deputies from the provinces favored revolutionary action and chafed at the party's insistence on legislative measures to attain change. 17 The Kadets especially counted on the support of the Trudoviks (or Labor Group), whose strength ranged anywhere from 94 to 13 5 deputies. The group had been formed shortly before the convocation of the Duma by several deputies who had been active in the Peasant Union in 1905. All told, about 8o percent of the Trudovik deputies were of peasant origin, though most were now intellectuals. Though more militant on ideological issues and on tactics than the Kadets, the Trudoviks did not subscribe to a clearly defined doctrine and did not act as a well-disciplined fraction in the Duma. On the contrary, the group was remarkably heterogeneous: of the 107 Trudovik deputies over the Duma's life, nine belonged to the Peasant Union, three were SRs, seven defined themselves as nonparty socialists, eleven were SDs, eighteen considered themselves Left Kadets, eight were Autonomists, 25 remained "nonparty" deputies, and 26 were "undefined."ts Another group in the Duma, consisting of slightly over 100 deputies, never joined any party, apparently because of fear of punishment by the authorities in the localities where they had been elected. Many of these "nonparty" deputies sympathized with the Kadets or other opposition parties, but some of them, Russian landowners and nobles, tended to be conservative, though they did not join any of the monarchist organizations.19 Finally, slightly over 6o deputies aligned themselves with the Autonomous group, which strove to advance the interests of the national minorities. The Polish Circle (Kolo) composed the largest number (32 deputies) within this fraction. 20 To add to the complexity, a fair number of deputies moved from one group to another during the 72 days the Duma remained in session, and the arrival of newly elected representatives from outlying parts of the Empire not only changed the numerical makeup of the parties but led to the formation (in mid-June) of a Social Democratic fraction composed of seventeen members. By virtue of their relative cohesiveness, political experience, and native talents, the Kadets quickly secured a predominant position in the Duma. Not only the President, but also the two Deputy Presidents (P. D. Dolgorukov and N. A. Gredeskul) and the Duma Secretary (D. I. Shakhovskoi) were party members. In addition, Kadets held two-thirds of the places in the Presidium, the chairmanships of seven standing and fifteen temporary committees, and over 55 percent of all seats on various committees. Some Kadets chaired two or more committees. 21 Despite their undisputed influence on the affairs of the Duma, the Kadets always had to be mindful of

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the wishes of other fractions. Nothing could be achieved without interminable discussions, negotiations, and backstage maneuvers. Miliukov was without question the preeminent leader of the Kadet fraction in the Duma, even though he was not a deputy. He had been prohibited from running for a seat in the legislature as punishment for publishing the St. Petersburg Soviet's Financial Manifesto, which had sought to bring about the government's bankruptcy, in Narodnaia svoboda, the paper he edited in December 1905. 22 Charged with "attempting to overthrow the existing order," Miliukov was awaiting trial. But this did not prevent him from remaining politically active. A man of great intelligence and vast energy, Miliukov assumed the leading role in formulating Kadet positions on all major issues and on tactics in the Duma. 23 He was almost always in the Tauride Palace when the Duma was in session. Early in the morning he could be seen in the buffet discussing strategy over breakfast with other Kadet leaders (Rodichev, V. D. Nabokov, F. F. Kokoshkin, M. M. Vinaver, and Petrunkevich). As the official reporter for the Kadet paper Rech, he occupied a seat in the press gallery, from which he could communicate with his colleagues during the debates. Miliukov later denied that he "managed" the affairs of the entire Duma, though he acknowledged that from his place in the gallery "contact with the deputies was constant." 24 He was a key person in all the negotiations the Kadets conducted, whether with other parties, with the Court, or with government officials. But it was Muromtsev, the President of the Duma, who formulated the rules under which it operated. I. V. Gessen, a prominent leader of the Kadets, thought that Petrunkevich, the man with the longest and most distinguished record of service to the constitutional movement, deserved to be chosen as President, roughly comparable to the post of Speaker in the U.S. House of Representatives. "But Muromtsev seemed to have been born to become President of the parliament. Handsome, with regular features, intelligent black eyes, [he was a man whose speech was] measured [and] authoritative-every word he uttered was weighty and his majestic bearing gave the impression, rarely encountered, of a harmonious being." 25 Muromtsev had a very clear conception of his role as President: he considered it necessary to separate himself from the Kadet party so that he might remain above party squabbles and function as an impartial chairman during the debates. A professor of law at Moscow University, the 56-year-old Muromtsev had acquired a reputation as a committed constitutionalist and as a man of principle in his work in the Moscow provincial zemstvo and in the liberal movement in r 90 5. He actually favored a republic, which placed him on the left wing of Russian liberal-

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ism, but in his demeanor and in the discussion of tactics, he was always judicious and moderate. "A lawyer to the core," his colleague F. A. Golovin recalled, "Muromtsev always sought to achieve changes in the political system exclusively by legal means and always opposed every action that went beyond the bounds of legality." 26 As soon as it became dear that he would be chosen President of the Duma, Muromtsev began meticulously preparing himself for the position. He studied the procedures of various parliaments and also the demeanor of a highly respected parliamentary leader in France, Eugene Henri Brisson, whom he tried to emulate. He even gave considerable thought to the clothing he should wear in the Duma; he finally decided on tails but refused to put them on before the vote, lest that suggest he was taking his election for granted. For his meeting with the Tsar, he also opted for tails but would not wear his official decorations because he wished to make a point of his "independence from the Sovereign." He worried, too, about how he should end a session of the Duma if there happened to be so much tumult that he could not be heard (he was not frivolous in foreseeing such an eventuality). At first he thought he would place a top hat on his head, but he rejected this because it seemed a bit ridiculous to bring a top hat to the Duma for use only on such unruly occasions. He decided simply to leave the rostrum, since without a chairman the session would necessarily come to an end. 27 The rules of procedure Muromtsev formulated remained essentially unchanged not only during the First Duma but also during the three succeeding Dumas. Yet Miliukov is probably right in pointing out that Muromtsev's conduct in office as President reduced his effectiveness as a political leader. His conception of the Presidency made it impossible for him to establish dose relations with the authorities or with his own party. On the one hand, Muromtsev regarded himself as the second-mostimportant authority in the state, surpassed only by the Tsar, and therefore believed that it would be inappropriate for him to initiate any personal contact with the ruler; he would go to Court only when formally summoned by the Tsar. Muromtsev did not even take advantage of his right to report periodically to the Tsar on the Duma's activities. During the two and a half months of the legislature's existence, he saw the Tsar only twice, on April 28 and May 6. Nor did Muromtsev take any initiatives to see Goremykin, who for his part considered it beneath his dignity, as the head of the government appointed by the Tsar, to call on the man who was "merely" the head of an elected body. On the other hand, because of his insistence on being an impartial chairman of the Duma, Muromtsev separated himself from the Kadet fraction, which meant that he could not contribute to shaping his own party's strategy and could not

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serve as its spokesman. Isolated from both centers of political power, he could influence neither and could not even seek to resolve clasheswhich were inevitable-between the Duma and the Tsarist authorities. Thus, at the critical moments of conflict, there was no one who could act as a "natural intermediary" between the contending forces. 28 A. F. Aladin was the most notable leader of the Trudoviks. A colorful eccentric who became adept at throwing the Duma into a state of confusion with intemperate attacks on the authorities, Aladin often also made collaboration between his fraction and the Kadets extraordinarily difficult. Born in r873 in a small village in Simbirsk province, Aladin was raised in a fairly affluent family. He attended the grammar school at which Alexander Kerensky's father was the headmaster, the very same school at which the young Lenin was a student. Aladin began to read radical literature as an adolescent and was expelled from school for rebelliousness a few months before his scheduled graduation. He nevertheless gained admission as an "external student" at the University of Kazan, but, again before completing his studies, he was expelled (in r896), apparently for political activities. He was then sentenced to prison for nine months, after which he was exiled. Managing to escape, probably in r897, he went to the West, where he spent several years in Belgium and Paris before reaching London in r 900. According to one source, while in Paris and Belgium he made his living manufacturing bogus antiques. 29 In London he soon became politically active; after Bloody Sunday he addressed several public meetings, urging his listeners to express sympathy for the people killed that day. V. A. Maklakov, who met him in England in 1904, had been very much impressed with him as a man with sensible and moderate views. Aladin "ridiculed Russian revolutionary parties; favored gradual reforms, preferring practical achievement to pure idealism, and cooperation instead of war with the government. That is how familiarity with English life changed a Russian revolutionary. Later, when I learned from the press that he returned to Russia and was elected to the Duma, I expected much of him. I hoped that he would become the spokesman of a practical left wing that would finally descend from the clouds. Whether he was infected by the harmful atmosphere of Russia, or he simply was not sincere in his former conversations with me, I do not know, but in his demagogic, arrogant speeches in the Duma, I failed to recognize my interesting London guide." 30 Aladin returned to Russia in November 1905, having been granted amnesty. After a short stay in St. Petersburg, he set out for Simbirsk, where he secured election to the Duma. He was instrumental in organizing the Trudovik group, and with the help of the deputies F. M. Onipko and G. N. Shaposhnikov, he opened a club in the capital for peasant

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members of the Duma. At this club the Trudoviks developed their tactics and their program, which, as already noted, was not very clearly defined. Two demands, however, were central to the Trudoviks' creed: they favored a thorough democratization of political institutions at all levels and the expropriation of privately owned lands, though they did not specify whether or to what extent owners should be compensated. A powerful orator, Aladin spoke frequently in the Duma, but as his biographer notes, his speeches, especially those he delivered in the first days of his legislative career, were not models of "clarity, incisiveness, [or] closely reasoned argument." And during the last days of the Duma, his speeches "became progressively more uninhibited." At one session he read a telegram from some of his constituents that "branded Government ministers as enemies of the people." When he was accused in mid-1906 of having been one of the instigators of a mutiny in Sveaborg, he fled the country and returned to England, where he made numerous speeches in support of the opposition in Russia. Within a few years he turned to journalism and began writing for the conservative Novoe vremia and moderately liberal Birzhevie vedomosti, but he apparently could not make a living as a writer. In 1910 he took to producing buttermilk and cheese and also worked at a variety of odd jobs. He returned to Russia shortly after the Revolution of 1917 broke out and sided with the Whites during the Civil War. After fighting in their ranks on several fronts, he left for England in 1920, where he spent the last seven years of his life. 31 Collaboration with so mercurial a man required enormous patience, and yet the Kadets could not afford to ignore him. Only if the Kadets secured the support of the Trudoviks could they command a majority in the chamber (about 57 percent of the votes). The trouble was that not more than about 20 Trudoviks could be counted on as consistent allies. Many of the other Trudovik deputies greatly respected Miliukov and even voiced regret that "we do not have anyone who can expound [ideas] so clearly and sensibly," but they did not necessarily cast their votes as he wished. 32 For his part, Miliukov (supported by Vinaver) spent endless hours seeking to consolidate an alliance with the Trudoviks, only to run into innumerable obstacles. Two of the Trudovik leaders, I. V. Zhilkin and S. V. Anikin, were moderate and reasonable men with whom Miliukov could usually reach agreement. Unfortunately for the Kadets, both lacked the qualities of leadership necessary to persuade a large contingent of the Trudoviks to follow their advice. Aladin, a much more forceful personality, exerted strong influence over the fraction, but he insisted on militant tactics. Moreover, when his crude and provocative speeches in the Duma gained him wide popularity throughout the country, he became increasingly self-confident and even arrogant. The Kadets, fearful

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that Aladin's excesses would irreparably harm the Duma, sought to restrain him, but he disdained their pleas for moderation. After one of his vituperative speeches in the chamber, Aladin sat down next to Miliukov in the halls of the Duma and asked how he assessed his performance. "Very poorly!," Miliukov replied. Unfazed, Aladin shot back: "You don't understand. That is how it must be now. Even you will see that it will be [necessary]." The Kadets and Trudoviks never bridged their differences.JJ

On April 26, one day before the Duma held its opening ceremonies, representatives from various opposition groups decided to form a committee of three Kadets, three Trudoviks, and two deputies from the nationality groups to prepare an "Answer to the Throne." The Kadets chose Miliukov, Kokoshkin, and Vinaver, the Trudoviks Aladin, Anikin, and Zhilkin; the nationality groups did not yet have any kind of organization and therefore failed to choose anyone. Miliukov suggested that the Duma adopt the custom of the British legislature, which responds formally to the monarch's address delivered at the first session of a new parliament. It appeared to be an astute strategy. However, Miliukov did not take into account the differences in the political systems in Great Britain and Russia. In Great Britain the monarch's address is in fact composed by the Prime Minister and represents the basic principles of his or her political party, which commands the support of a majority in Parliament. In Russia the address was written in secret by the Tsar's assistants (and edited by the ruler himself), who repudiated the goals of the dominant parties in the legislature. Under the circumstances, any Answer to the Throne drafted by the Duma was bound to be unlike Parliament's responses to the British monarch, which do not take issue with the substance of the royal address. The Answer in Russia necessarily amounted to a statement of the opposition's program, and as such it was bound to provoke resentment in government circles. At its second meeting, on April 29, the Duma elected a committee of 33 to consider the draft of the smaller committee; after making some amendments, that committee then submitted its version on May 2 for debate by the entire Duma. The document demanded political changes of the most fundamental kind, changes that would, if implemented, have transformed the country's political system into a constitutional monarchy with paramount authority vested in the Duma. "Pacification of the country," according to a key portion of the Answer, "is impossible so long as it is not clear to the people that from now on the authorities cannot govern by force, under the shield of Your Imperial Highness, so long as ministers are not responsible to the people's representatives, and

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so long as the administration on all levels of state service is not reformed .... Only a ministry enjoying the confidence of a majority of the Duma can strengthen confidence in the government, and only if such confidence prevails will it be possible for the State Duma to proceed calmly with its proper work." The Answer then proceeded to call for the abolition of the emergency regulations of r88r; changes in the authority of the State Council or its elimination; guarantees that civil liberties would be protected; the introduction of universal suffrage; the elimination of all restrictions based on class, religion, or nationality; the adoption of a law providing for universal and free education; agrarian reform that would include the compulsory alienation of private land; the abolition of capital punishment; and the granting of full amnesty to all political prisoners. 34 At least three of the demands-those relating to the State Council, ministerial responsibility, and amnesty-clearly went beyond the bounds of the Duma's authority, since they involved changes in the Fundamental Laws, and only the Tsar had the right to take the initiative in proposing such changes. To adopt the Answer, consequently, was tantamount to throwing down the gauntlet-nine days after the Duma's first sesston. The text was greeted in the Duma with "prolonged applause," and only a few deputies sought to amend it. The moderate liberal M.A. Stakhovich, then a member of the Group for Peaceful Renewal, declared that he could not support, "especially at this time, a parliamentary regime for Russia" and offered an amendment striking the call for a ministry responsible to the Duma. 35 Several deputies vigorously opposed Stakhovich's proposal, which Vinaver denounced as the old formula: "For the people, opinions; for the Tsar, authority." Stakhovich's amendment received only fourteen votes. Subsequently, Stakhovich introduced another amendment, which read as follows: "The State Duma expresses the hope that now that a constitutional system has been established, there will be an end to political assassinations and other violent acts, which the Duma condemns decisively, regarding them as an insult to the moral sensibilities of the people and the very idea of a national legislature." 36 Although several Kadets declared their opposition to political assassinations, they did not think it would be wise to pass Stakhovich's amendment. The task of the Duma was not to vote to condemn anyone, they claimed, but to implement changes in political institutions and in the law. As Rodichev put it, "We must say in all candor: in Russia there is no justice, in Russia the law has become a mockery! In Russia there is no justice! Russia this year experiences that which was experienced during the time of [the Mongol Khan of the thirteenth century] Batu! We must put a stop to this .... I believe

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that this is not the time to issue moral condemnations [of terror]; our task is to explain the political conditions in our time, and we have made such explanations in our Address." Stakhovich's second amendment was supported by only 3 5 deputies, among them one Kadet (N. N. Lvov)Y To the government and to conservatives, the defeat of Stakhovich's amendment was yet another sign of the liberals' unwillingness to repudiate violence. One right-wing newspaper gleefully printed the following letter from a reader: "Dear Mr. Rodichev, I am going to kill you for political reasons; please will you ask an amnesty for me in advance?" 38 At 2:30 A.M. on May 5, after better than three days of debate, the Duma unanimously adopted the Answer to the Throne. Stakhovich, Geiden, and six other deputies left the chamber before the balloting so that the measure could pass without any negative votes. Three days later four more deputies announced that they agreed with Geiden's decision to leave the hall rather than vote on the motion. 39 Predictably, the debate provoked great consternation within the government. Even before the Duma had concluded its deliberations, seven of the sixteen ministers urged the cabinet to issue a declaration denouncing the Duma. General Rediger dissuaded the cabinet from taking such a step. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on May 4, Rediger argued (and was supported by Goremykin) that a denunciation of the legislature would precipitate an open conflict with the Duma and "would require [its] immediate dissolution." Although Rediger had no illusions about the government's ability to work with the Duma in the long run, he believed the people "had placed such great hopes in it that an immediate dissolution would be a great disappointment to them"; it would be wise for the authorities to continue efforts to cooperate with the legislature. The Council of Ministers followed Rediger's suggestion.•" But the Tsar, unwilling to give an inch, made a point of rebuffing the Duma by refusing to allow a delegation of deputies led by Muromtsev to come before him to submit the Answer in person. For the Kadets, the projected visit to the Tsar was of great symbolic significance. "As in parliamentary systems," Miliukov later stated, "this was to be the only direct address of the national legislature to the monarch." And the Kadets were very proud of the document, the adoption of which Miliukov considered to be "an act of the greatest political significance." They saw to its wide distribution throughout the country by having it printed in tiny script on postcards. The Kadets believed that if the Duma were dispersed, the Answer "would serve as its testament of all the things it planned to do and that are to be realized in the future."•• To add insult to injury, the Court did not even communicate directly with President Muromtsev; the Prime Minister informed Muromtsev of

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the Tsar's decision and asked that the document be sent to him. He would then pass it on to Nicholas. Many people and virtually all Duma deputies were stunned, and the cry rang out, "The Government is defying us." The journalist Maurice Baring concluded that "the higher authorities here are destined to take no single step which is not fatal." 42 Deeply offended, the Trudoviks proposed that another vote be taken on the Answer, but Miliukov was eager to avoid an open clash with the government and urged moderation. The issue was resolved when the Kadet deputy P. I. Novgorodtsev declared in the Duma that the importance of the Answer lay in its content, not in the manner in which it was communicated to the authorities. He proposed that the chamber simply pass on to the next item of business, a proposal that an overwhelming majority of the legislature accepted. 43 Neither the Tsarist authorities nor the Duma emerged unscathed from this first skirmish. The Duma leaders, in sending to the Tsar a program that they knew would be totally unacceptable to the government, and that was, in any case, a violation of the Fundamental Laws, gave the impression of being more interested in a power struggle than in implementing reforms on specific issues. The Kadets had announced earlier that they were determined to press their demands in the Duma within the confines of the Fundamental Laws so as to demonstrate their capacity for constructive work, but right at the beginning, they demonstrated instead that their goal was to transform the Duma into a sovereign legislative body. It is no doubt true that under prevailing conditions, the Duma

could not have secured the adoption of radical reforms (because of likely vetoes by the State Council or the Tsar), but it is an open question whether it might have succeeded in achieving modest reforms. Quite clearly, the Kadets overestimated their own strength; they had persuaded themselves that the opposition's success at the polls had intimidated the Tsarist authorities, who would be impelled out of fear of a new upsurge of revolution to make far-reaching concessions. The Court and the government were indeed nervous about rumblings from below, but they trembled at the thought of losing their prerogatives. And they were not convinced that in an ultimate test of strength with the Duma they would necessarily be defeated. The Tsar's gratuitous rebuff of the Duma's delegation only served to embitter the legislators, who were now even less inclined than before to confine themselves to moderate reforms and to a slow and gradual transformation of the Duma into a legislature with substantial influence over political affairs. Izvolskii, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the few moderates in the cabinet, sensed this and advised the Tsar to appear in person in the Duma to respond to the Answer. Nicholas reacted favor-

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ably to Izvolskii's suggestion, but the strong opposition of other ministers prompted him to change his mind. 44 "From this day on," Kokovtsov noted, "the conflict between the Duma and the government, and even the Tsar himself, was definitely declared-a conflict which every day intensified." 45 After extensive discussions lasting several days, the cabinet decided that the Prime Minister should appear at the Duma to deliver an official response to the Answer. The first draft, prepared by the Minister of Justice, Shcheglovitov, was rejected as too mild. The Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, Gurko, a reactionary firebrand, then prepared a new draft that Goremykin and the cabinet found to their liking. Nicholas wanted an even more forceful statement, but did not press his views lest he be blamed later for pushing the government into an intransigent position. 46 At 2:25P.M. on May 13 Muromtsev called the legislators to order and immediately gave the floor to the Prime Minister. Everyone in the chamber sensed that the government's statement would be a momentous event. Goremykin's hands "were shaking with agitation" as he read the speech in a voice "hardly audible." Throughout his delivery, there was a deathly silence in the chamber, initially because the deputies were eager to catch every word and then because they were stunned by the Prime Minister's intransigence. Goremykin began his speech on a conciliatory note: he expressed the government's readiness to work with the Duma on all questions that were not beyond the bounds of its legal competence. Only after he had enumerated the measures proposed by the Duma did he display inflexibility and arrogance. He announced that the Duma's proposal to resolve the agrarian question by compulsory alienation of privately owned lands was "absolutely inadmissible." Goremykin insisted that "the state cannot deny the right to private ownership of land in general without denying at the same time the right to private ownership of every other kind of property." In his view the principle of the inviolability of property was everywhere in the world the cornerstone of national well-being and social progress, the foundation of all societies, without which the very existence of states was inconceivable. The government would not sponsor a measure that would undermine the "vital forces of our country." Nor could the cabinet agree to the establishment of a ministry enjoying the confidence of a majority of the Duma, the abolition of the State Council, or the elimination of various legal limitations placed on the Duma. Indeed, the cabinet could not even consider these measures, since they

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called for changes in the Fundamental Laws, something the Duma had no right to consider. The Council of Ministers, Goremykin continued, also would not take up the Duma's proposal that the emergency regulations be abolished; these regulations were the prerogative of the state administration. By law, the Duma could do no more than raise questions about the legality of specific actions by the administration. Nor was the granting of amnesty to political prisoners within the Duma's jurisdiction; the "highest authority" alone had the right to pardon criminals. "For its side, the Council of Ministers believes that [the common] good would not be served at this time of unrest by a pardon to criminals who have committed assassinations, robberies, and violence." The cabinet, Goremykin insisted, could take no other stand, since the Tsar was unyielding on this question. In making this statement, the Prime Minister did not mislead the deputies. A day before Goremykin delivered the speech, Nicholas had told the Austrian Ambassador that in his view "even the granting of a partial amnesty would increase the ranks of the revolutionaries." 47 Goremykin ended his address on a positive note, listing the projects for reform that the government planned to bring to the Duma for its consideration. He pointed out that, among other things, the Council of Ministers was working on proposals to encourage the colonization of the vast territories in Asiatic Russia suitable for agriculture, facilitate peasant withdrawal from communes, grant peasants full legal equality, increase peasant purchases of land with the help of the Peasants' Bank, reorganize the system of secondary schools, and restructure local courts. He offered no specifics on any of these projects. The Prime Minister's last words were a call to the Duma to help restore calm in the country: "The Council of Ministers is confident that the State Duma, convinced that the ... well-being of the Russian state depends on a reasonable combination of freedom and order, will with its calm and constructive work help [the government] to bring tranquility to all groups of society, a tranquility that is so necessary for the country."•s No sooner had the Prime Minister completed his remarks than the Kadet deputy V. D. Nabokov rose to denounce him. He and six of his colleagues, who also responded to Goremykin, were well prepared, since they had somehow learned the contents of the Prime Minister's speech a day earlier, on May 12.49 "I believe," Nabokov declared, "that I express the general mood of the Duma if I say that the feeling of all of us is one of deep disappointment and complete dissatisfaction." The government's categorical rejection of the Duma's demands could only be regarded as a "direct and blatant challenge to the national representative body." Nabokov claimed that "the entire country is behind us" in repudiating the government's "halfhearted concessions and discordant words." If the

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government insisted that its role was not to execute the will of the legislature, then the Duma would be left with no option but to say that "the executive authorities must be subordinated to the legislative authorities." The deputies responded to this call to the government to yield its power with prolonged applause. 50 They reacted in the same vein to Rodichev's more explicit demand that the government step aside: "A ministry that wishes to renew the country ought to be in agreement with the national legislature .... Your conscience should tell you what you must do-leave and make room for others." 5 1 The Kadet E. N. Shchepkin supported his colleagues by charging the government with massive violations of the law. According to the Fundamental Laws, Shchepkin pointed out, only the "highest authority" had the right to place a region of the country under emergency regulations, but in many areas this had in fact been done by city governors or even generals in charge of a brigade. 52 The Trudovik Aladin delivered the most passionate and provocative speech. No one would disagree with him, he began, that "at this moment only we stand between revolution in the country and the government; if anyone dares in one way or another, in the form of a dissolution, or in the form of closing the doors ... " At this point Aladin was interrupted by applause and noise as well as shouts of "enough." When he resumed, he declared that he merely wanted to save the country from revolution, but then he returned to the point at which he was interrupted and warned the government that the nation was seething with anger. "And the only force that restrains the passions of the people, who tomorrow are capable of covering the country with streams of blood, to bring on the revolution, ... the only force that restrains them-that is us, our Duma, our meetings, our work." 53 Quite a few deputies squirmed in their seats during Aladin's effusions, but no one repudiated his thinly disguised threat of unleashing a revolution. Nor did a single deputy rise in defense of the government. In fact, the deputy who spoke immediately after Aladin had said his piece, F. F. Kokoshkin, normally not one of the more militant Kadets, ended his denunciation of the government with yet another call for its resignation: "I believe that today [Goremykin] delivered such a heavy blow not only against the tranquility of the country but also against its dignity that there is only one way of repairing [the damage]-that is for the present ministry to resign." 54 Even the Octobrist Count P. A. Geiden, always a cautious man, could not bring himself to defend the government: when he was elected to the Duma, he had assumed that the legislature would be given the opportunity to discharge its obligations in a calm atmosphere, and that the government would be sympathetic to the deputies' endeavors, "but unfortunately today's declaration by the cabin~t has con-

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vinced me that the complete opposite is the case. (Thunderous applause.) With its incomprehensible stand, the cabinet has reached a blind alley, from which, I think, it will find it difficult at the present time to emerge .... It seems to me that any cabinet that wants to work with the Duma must extend a hand of reconciliation . . . and must respect the rights of the Duma." Because the government had failed to do so, it should resign and permit the formation of a government that would enjoy the confidence of the Duma. 5 5 Though A. I. Guchkov, one of the two leaders of the Octobrists and a staunch defender of the monarchical principle, chose to hold his tongue for the moment, he felt that the government had displayed incredibly bad judgment. In a private letter, he denounced Goremykin's speech as a "complete political mistake" that had prompted the opposition, which was beginning to crack, to close ranks. He foresaw two possible outcomes of the political crisis: an overthrow of the government or the dispersal of the Duma. Either eventuality would be catastrophic for the country. The first alternative would produce anarchy followed by a dictatorship; the second would produce a dictatorship followed by anarchy. "As you can see," Guchkov wrote, "in my view the situation is entirely hopeless." 56 Only the Minister of Justice, I. G. Shcheglovitov, came to Goremykin's defense, and then only on the question of whether the government was observing the law. Without answering any of the specific charges, Shcheglovitov simply stated that Goremykin's declaration was entirely in accordance with the law, and that "for the government, for the cabinet, the law was the first and main foundation of its actions." However the deputies might assess the existing law, so long as it was not changed, "we must be guided by it." 57 Shcheglovitov's statement did not impress the deputies. On the contrary, they applauded deputy I. I. Sedelnikov's assertion that in promulgating the Fundamental Laws four days before the Duma met, the authorities had disregarded the October Manifesto, which had promised that no law would be enacted without the approval of the State Duma. 58 And they also applauded after M. I. Mikhailichenko, a worker from Ekaterinoslav, had completed his speech, the most explicitly revolutionary of them all: "We have no faith, our faith has been used up, and we believe only in the power of the people. The liberation of the people can be achieved only by the people themselves.... We have the right to declare: all the powers that be, having committed crimes against the people, having tormented the country for several months, must be brought before the people's court. And our business is to fight, fight, and fight." 59 The declamations-one can hardly call the proceedings a debate-

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continued for several hours, after which the President read the resolution that had been submitted to the chamber for adoption. It was a remarkably blunt statement: because the government had refused to meet the demands of the people enumerated in the Answer to the Throne and had shown contempt for the interests of the people, the legislature declared its complete lack of confidence in the government and demanded its immediate resignation and replacement by a cabinet enjoying the confidence of the State Duma. 6° Four hundred and forty deputies voted for the resolution; only eleven voted against it, and ten of them subsequently indicated that they had done so only because they questioned its legality, not because they wished to support the government. 61 The Duma had thrown down another gauntlet. To the liberals it now seemed that the Duma and the government were hopelessly deadlocked, and that unless Goremykin's cabinet resigned, "the political situation would remain confused [and] fraught with complications and dangers." Given the intense hostility between the legislature and the authorities, cooperation between them was inconceivable. Nothing would be stranger, Russkie vedomosti averred, than for "this government" to remain in power together with a "State Duma, the composition of which reflects in the clearest form the sharply oppositional mood of the country."•z The Kadets generally appeared confident-even exultant-that the government would soon realize the hopelessness of its position. 63 The various references by deputies to the likelihood of violence from below if the legislature failed to enact major political, economic, and social changes were, of course, designed to increase the pressure on the government. But once again the liberals failed to take into account the tenacity and resourcefulness of the Tsar and his advisers. To be sure, for a brief period the authorities, according to one report, displayed "considerable nervousness" about the likelihood of an eruption of disturbances, "and all the troops were kept under standing orders." But when "nothing ... transpired," the Prime Minister regained his composure and adopted a stance toward the legislature that astonished even some of those who were hostile toward it.•• He decided to treat the Duma with the utmost contempt. He would ignore the chamber; he would not bother to attend its sessions and would urge his ministers also to stay away. If government officials were summoned by deputies to answer queries, the ministers should send subordinates to speak in their behalf. Goremykin indicated that he would act, as his Minister of Foreign Affairs put it, "as if [the deputies] did not exist." In early May the Prime Minister asked S. E. Kryzhanovskii, an

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Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs, to prepare a plan to change the electoral law so that more "satisfactory" results could be assured in a new election. For Goremykin, it was now a matter of time before the legislature would be dissolved.•s From this time, Stolypin was the only minister who regularly attended the Duma debates; the other ministries were represented by lower-ranking officials.•• The government, moreover, did not bother to introduce any significant legislative proposals. It was not until May I 5 that it submitted the first two proposals for the Duma's consideration, both of them trivial: one called for the establishment of a local school, and the other for the building of a steam laundry and a greenhouse for the University of Iuriev. In truth, the government had not properly prepared itself for constructive collaboration with the Duma. Witte had emphasized the need to develop legislative projects in time for the first meeting of the parliament, and had formed a commission to prepare drafts of recommendations on a wide range of subjects; the most notable called for full equality for the peasants and specified measures to facilitate their withdrawal from the commune. The day Witte left office he submitted the drafts to the Tsar, who expressed no opinion on them. Goremykin also showed little interest in Witte's proposals; he actually berated Kokovtsov for suggesting that the government should seek to cooperate with the legislature. "The Duma," Goremykin told Kokovtsov, "will do nothing but fight the government and attempt to seize complete power. It will become a question whether the government is strong and skillful enough to retain its authority in the midst of all this incredible nonsense. It will be an attempt to govern a country suffering the ill effects of revolution by a system that is a parody of Western European parliamentarism." 67 Instead of concentrating on serious legislative proposals, the authorities-even before the Prime Minister's defiant speech-directed their energies toward a campaign against the Duma. On May 5 and for several days thereafter, Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, a government daily, printed a series of telegrams that the Tsar had received from right-wing groups reviling the Duma and demanding its dissolution. Among other things, the senders charged that the Duma sought to seize power, had acted "in a revolutionary spirit," was bent on destroying the state, and had cooperated with foreigners who planned to "encroach upon the unity and integrity of the Russian state." Taken aback by the government's attacks, 36 deputies proposed an interpellation; after the legislature gave its approval, the Prime Minister was asked to appear for questioning. According to the rules of the Duma, formulated by the government, deputies could conduct an interpellation whenever any government de-

The First Steps of the Duma

partment was suspected of wrongdoing. The minister of that department was expected to appear in person in the chamber to answer the deputies' queries. In this instance, deputies wished to know who had authorized the publication of the telegrams and why they had been published. The deputies also intended to compel the Prime Minister to state explicitly whether he and the Tsar agreed with the contents of the telegrams. Goremykin refused to respond to the request on the ground that article 40 of the rules permitted the Duma to initiate an interpellation only on matters on which it was planning to legislate. The telegrams in question, Goremykin insisted, did not touch on any legislative concerns of the chamber. The Duma then tried another tack: it proposed an interpellation on the basis of article 58 of the rules, which explicitly prohibited anyone from inciting one group of the population against another and from expressing impertinent disrespect for the Duma. Goremykin still refused to respond to the interpellation, arguing, on two separate occasions, that the Duma was exceeding its authority in raising questions about the government's right to print the telegrams.•• Even some staunch conservatives believed that Goremykin was acting unwisely in ignoring the Duma. As Gurko put it in his memoirs: To ignore an institution established by Sovereign will and consisting of representatives of the people only served to emphasize the fact that the government did not favor the new constitution and was merely yielding to the insistent public demands. This attitude on the part of the government deprived the public of all assurance that the rights given today would not be withdrawn tomorrow; also it suggested that the public might obtain still wider rights by continuing its attacks. Success in having once prevailed against the government roused hopes of being able to repeat the process.••

The German Ambassador to Russia, also no friend of liberalism, was appalled by the Prime Minister's behavior. He failed to understand Goremykin's argument that the Kadets' agrarian proposals could not be discussed at all because they were at variance with prevailing laws; "even the [intellectually] most limited peasant deputies understand that the Duma, out of consideration for the needs of the peasants, is faced precisely with the task of changing the existing laws." In no parliament had there ever been a comparable situation, "not even in the Prussian Landtag at the time of the conflict [between Bismarck and the liberals in the r86o's]. Whereas in other parliaments the fall of the government could be brought about under such circumstances, [in Russia] the cabinet goes on the offensive or challenges the Duma with insults [a reference to the telegrams in Pravitelstvennyi vestnik]." The government, the ambassador continued, "adopts reforms only when it is forced to do so by acts of

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violence." Right now, it had the upper hand and therefore did not feel under pressure to introduce reforms. It devoted most of its time and energy to ferreting out those who had instigated unrest during the past year. The ambassador conceded that the government might succeed in frightening the masses into quiescence, but he did not rule out the possibility that the opposition would become so aroused "that it will feel itself forced against its own will to renew the terror." 70 It is true that many senior officials at Court and in the government believed they could afford to ignore the legislature because they had turned back the tide of revolution, but their haughty attitude toward the Duma also stemmed from their deep contempt for the deputies. A. A. Mosolov, the Director of the Chancellery, recalled the comment of the Minister of the Court, Count V. B. Frederiks, a few hours after the opening ceremonies at the Winter Palace: "The deputies? They give one the impression of a gang of criminals who are only waiting for the signal to throw themselves upon the Ministers and cut their throats. What wicked faces! I will never again set foot among those people." As for the Tsar himself, Mosolov said, "the idea never entered [his] head that these few hundreds of men could be accepted as legitimate representatives of his people, the people who had accustomed him to the spectacle of delirious acclamations." No one thought that Nicholas would really allow these "drab nobodies" to help him "in the accomplishment of his duties as Tsar." 71 According to Kryzhanovskii, the cabinet did not devote much time to preparing legislative proposals because it did not consider the Duma capable of serious work on complicated issues. A majority of the deputies, he claimed, were devoid of the most rudimentary education, and many of them were not even literate. In r 9 I7 he told the commission investigating the collapse of the old regime that two-thirds of the peasant deputies "were completely untutored," and that their horizons and interests did not extend beyond "their streets .... I believe that the overcrowding of the state institution with peasants could hardly be beneficial for the institution." In Kryzhanovskii's view the peasant deputies could act only on the basis of instinct, not reasoning. Moreover, the government considered many deputies to be debauched, and Kryzhanovskii clearly relished recounting the details of various scandals. Deputies, he recalled, regularly drank to excess at inns and then would become rowdy and unruly; when other citizens tried to calm them down, the troublemakers would claim that as legislators they enjoyed immunity, giving them the right to do as they pleased. Even the police were confused by these claims and did not know whether they should try

The First Steps of the Duma

to restore order. During one melee at an inn, the owner, an old woman, took matters into her own hands. When an inebriated Duma deputy referred to his immunity, she beat the dignitary with a mug and threw him forcefully out the door. The police officer who witnessed the scene merely recorded the details of the incident and left. Another deputy, who had died from excessive drinking, was given an elaborate funeral attended by many people; speakers at his funeral hailed him as a "fighter who had died gloriously at his post." Kryzhanovskii also claimed that a number of deputies conducted revolutionary propaganda in factories, organized street demonstrations, and incited crowds against the police. During one demonstration, the Ekaterinoslav deputy M. I. Mikhailichenko became involved in a brawl and was badly beaten by policemen. The next day he took part in an interpellation on this incident with his face so covered in bandages that only his nose and eyes were visible. 72 There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Kryzhanovskii's account of misbehavior by Duma deputies; a fair number of them were uneducated and unruly. But most deputies were serious, though politically immature, and dedicated to the reform and renewal of Russia. The critical point is that the men in authority who could not abide the idea of sharing power with any elected institution seized on the misdeeds of miscreants as yet another reason for ignoring the Duma. The Court and the government made a serious political mistake in viewing the Duma deputies as one undifferentiated mass, all of them, or virtually all of them, allegedly committed to a revolutionary upheaval. Guchkov was closer to the mark when he noted in the private letter cited above that the opposition was not without its divisions. From the moment the Duma met, the Trudoviks pressed for much more militant measures than the Kadets were prepared to support, especially on such highly charged issues as amnesty for political prisoners and the abolition of capital punishment. The Kadets knew that the Tsar was adamant on these issues, and that he would be enraged if the Duma took any formal votes on subjects explicitly outside its competence. On several occasions the Kadets engaged in elaborate parliamentary procedures to rein in the Trudoviks. As already noted, at the very first session of the Duma, Petrunkevich issued a plea for amnesty so as to mollify the Trudoviks and forestall a vote on the subject. Another example of Kadet moderation can be cited. On May I 8 the Trudoviks, infuriated over the execution of eight workers in the Baltic provinces a few days earlier, proposed an immediate vote on a bill to abolish capital punishment. But this would have violated the rules of the chamber, which required a waiting period of 30 days (to give the relevant government agencies time to report to the deputies) before voting on a

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proposal. Unwilling to support a move that would tarnish the legislature as an impetuous and irresponsible body, the Kadets urged that the vote be delayed for fifteen days, in the hope that this would give the government enough time to prepare its report on the measure. The Trudoviks were in no mood to compromise, especially once the government refused to respond to queries before the full month had passed. 73 To avoid violating the rules, the Kadet deputy Nabokov proposed that the chamber simply proceed with its agenda, but at the same time he sought to mollify the Trudoviks by demanding an end to capital punishment and by announcing that any further executions would be considered acts of murder. The Duma voted for Nabokov's motion and thus escaped having to vote on the Trudoviks' bill. The Kadets' parliamentary maneuver extricated the Duma from a dilemma-no one wanted to vote against the motion to end capital punishment-but it did little more than temporarily salve the hurt feelings of the Trudoviks. 74 An astute and politically agile Prime Minister might have been able to exploit the differences between the Kadets and the Trudoviks. But a crude posture of hostility toward the Duma suited Goremykin's temperament perfectly and fitted in with his notion of how the government should be run. Not only did he not want the Duma to meddle in affairs of state; he did not think the Council of Ministers ought to trouble itself about domestic or international affairs either. He regularly held meetings of the cabinet, but "merely for the sake of form." He presided in "a tired and absentminded fashion," allowed each minister to have his say as long as he was brief, and would then announce, "in a fatherly and polite tone," that he would reach his own decisions, which he intended to submit to the Tsar for final action. Gurko, who attended the meetings, recalled that Goremykin assumed "an air which seemed to say: 'Babble as you will, for I shall act as I see fit."' However, the Prime Minister conducted the meetings in such a calm and good-natured way that no one was offended. 75 Cabinet meetings turned into a kind of ritual. The reactionaries, Shirinskii-Shikhmatov and Stishinskii, inevitably asserted that nothing could be achieved until autocratic rule had been restored. The third reactionary, Schwanebach, invariably digressed from the topic under discussion and engaged in endless harangues against his bete noire, Witte. Shortly after meetings were adjourned, he would visit the AustroHungarian Ambassador, Aehrenthal, to tell him what every minister had said, and within a day Vienna knew all about the inner workings of the Russian government. General Rediger generally remained silent at cabinet meetings, since he did not feel competent to speak on domestic issues. Admiral Birilev also remained silent, but for a different reason; he was

The First Steps of the Duma

deaf and did not know what was going on. Izvolskii, the Foreign Minister, said very little because he knew that as a liberal his opinions would not count for much. Only Stolypin and Kokovtsov tried to discuss issues "in a serious and dignified" manner, but no one paid much attention to them. If anyone dared to suggest that the conflict between the government and the Duma might provoke unrest among the masses, Goremykin dismissed the warning as "childishness" and pointed out that the telegrams from the people printed in the press proved they strongly supported the Tsar.1• Society was aware of the incompetence in the highest circles of the administration. On June 6 Russkie vedomosti stated bluntly in an editorial that the government was once again in disarray. Official communications issued late one day were retracted the next morning. Ministers constantly altered their decisions, moving from one course of action to another. As an example of the chaotic way the government functioned, Russkie vedomosti cited a recent report in Pravitelstvennyi vestnik that the authorities had decided to dissolve the Duma between June I 5 and June 20. Two days later two ministers had then issued a statement through an official press agency denying the accuracy of that news story. The editors of Russkie vedomosti saw only one way out of the morass: Goremykin's government should give way to a ministry enjoying the confidence of the Duma and committed to carrying out a program of reform. 77 The government, however, had reached a different conclusion. The Council of Ministers met on May 14, a day after the Duma's vote of no confidence, and every minister agreed that cooperation with the Duma was now impossible, and that the legislature would have to be dissolved. The only question was the timing. According to Kokovtsov, Izvolskii and Stolypin were alone in urging patience. Izvolskii feared that a dissolution at that time would anger public opinion in Europe and damage Russia's international standing. Stolypin conceded that forceful action against the Duma was unavoidable, but he preferred to stand fast for now. He and Izvolskii wanted to wait until passions calmed down; perhaps the Duma might yet come to its senses and engage in constructive work. All the other ministers insisted that the deputies were deliberately stirring up the opposition, possibly to the point of revolution, so that they would be able to take power. Goremykin apparently did not reveal his own views on disbanding the legislature. He merely asked that the deliberations be kept confidential, and that all the ministers should be prepared for an emergency. 78 No action was taken against the Duma at this time, but for the next few weeks the newspapers carried numerous articles, many of them well

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founded, about discussions within the government and at Court on whether and when to do away with the legislature. The deterrent was always the fear that decisive action would lead to "acute complications," that is, a new upsurge of unrest from below. On June 10 Nasha zhizn reported on a struggle between the "left" and the "right" at Court, the left being in the ascendancy at the time. Surprisingly, the Court Commandant, Trepov, belonged to the left, arguing that "perhaps the Duma should not have been convoked at all, but to dissolve it now would be madness." The Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Pobedonostsev, who frequently visited the Court, spoke for the right in pressing for immediate dissolution. But Pobedonostsev was suspected by some of his supporters of being insufficiently militant and energetic. He had apparently been asked to draft an important state measure-the contents were not known, though it was assumed to be a manifesto explaining the need to dissolve the Duma-but he had so far not produced the document.79 On several occasions the government felt called on to issue firm denials that it intended to make any major political changes. 80 But the rumors kept circulating and became increasingly ominous and sometimes quite bizarre. On May 14 Russkie vedomosti reported having received information about a plot by the army to arrest the Duma deputies and install General Trepov as dictator. Two weeks later the paper announced that Kokovtsov would assume the premiership and would appoint members of the Duma to his cabinet. Three days after that, Russkie vedomosti declared that "with each passing day the rumors were becoming increasingly persistent" that Goremykin's entire cabinet would resign, but this time no successor was mentioned. Then, on June 6, the paper reported that President Muromtsev would soon be named Prime Minister. But within two days he had been replaced by Trepov as the favored candidate. The editors of Russkie vedomosti urged the government to put a stop to the rumors, which "were too reminiscent of the Turkish East and Russia of the eighteenth century."s' In the meantime relations between the government and the Duma continued to deteriorate at a rapid pace, most notably after the tumultuous session of May 24. That day Muromtsev gave the floor to Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs Gurko, who had been authorized by Stolypin to speak on the agrarian question. Before Gurko uttered a single word, he was greeted by catcalls: "Resign! Resign!" The President politely called for decorum, a request that provoked further shouts of "Resign! Will the [ministers] leave soon?" When Gurko began to speak, there was so much noise that he could not be heard. He offered to "try to speak louder" and somehow managed to deliver his speech. As soon as Muromtsev introduced the Minister of Agriculture, A. S. Stishinskii, as the next speaker,

The First Steps of the Duma

the shouting from the floor burst out once more. The Trudoviks were the main offenders. The President's warning that "we can do our work only if order is maintained" had no effect on them. Nor could the Trudoviks be swayed from their tactic by private pleas from leading Kadets, who still wanted to prove that the Duma could conduct its business in an orderly manner. 82 For the next six weeks whenever government officials sought to address the legislature, they were met by angry shouts urging them to resign. The Trudoviks' behavior further strained the relations between them and the Kadets. Needless to say, it also contributed to a hardening of the government's attitude toward the Duma. By late May the divisions within the government on how to deal with the Duma had so intensified that Goremykin could not follow his preferred procedure of acting on his own without regard to the wishes of the cabinet. It was considered necessary to ask the Tsar to sit in at meetings of the Council of Ministers to acquaint himself with the various positions on the most critical issue of the day. Although Nicholas had not committed himself publicly on the question, he was determined to act decisively against the opposition. In a letter to Goremykin he denounced the press in the capital for publishing articles inciting the people to violence. "Once newspapers call for revolution," the Tsar wrote to the Prime Minister, "they should be closed at once. One cannot fight anarchy by legal means. The government is obliged to save the people from the poison being administered to it and not to sit on its hands.""' The Council of Ministers discussed the Tsar's missive at its meetings of June 7 and 8 and concluded that compliance with the monarch's wishes was very difficult and hazardous. The new press laws required that anyone accused of violating the law must be accorded due process. Only if St. Petersburg were placed in a State of Extraordinary Security could the authorities act swiftly to close down the offending newspapers. But the Duma could be counted on to react to such a step with vigorous protests, which would only enrage and embolden the opposition. To Goremykin it now seemed clear that the struggle against revolution required the dissolution of the Duma. Within the cabinet, however, a vociferous minority led by Kokovtsov, Izvolskii, and the Minister of Education, P. M. Kauffmann, argued against dissolution on the ground that it would further erode popular support for the government. lzvolskii and Kauffmann, in particular, thought that cooperation with the Duma might yet be possible, and they went so far as to suggest that it might be necessary to replace at least some of the ministers with moderates from the bureaucracy who would be in a better position to work with the Duma. Goremykin, supported by a majority of the cabinet, continued to insist on dissolution, but his

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advice carried little weight because he was now held in low esteem at Court. His poor performance in the Duma and his inability to influence the legislators had raised doubts about his abilities to lead the government. Instead, senior officials at Court decided to bend their efforts to working out some sort of accord between the monarchy and moderates in the Duma, an approach that appealed to those conservatives who championed the idea of direct contact between the Tsar and the people. 84 The new strategy, which necessarily led to a postponement of any final decision on the Duma for a month, will be discussed after a survey of social and political developments in the country at large, developments that were closely watched by the deputies and the government.

Chapter Four

Stirrings from Below

ALTHOUGH THE FATE of the Duma appeared to have been settled by the time it was three weeks old, neither the Tsarist authorities nor the Kadet leaders wanted to initiate an ultimate confrontation, fearful of what might come of such a leap into the dark. It is true that each side exuded confidence about its support among the people and claimed that in a new test of wills it would emerge victorious. But on both sides there were also voices of caution. Several of the Tsar's advisers and ministers warned him that precipitate action against the Duma could unleash a bloody and dangerous upsurge of violence. The Kadet leaders, on the other hand, had been sobered by the violence of the last months of 190 5, and thus were inhibited from adopting explicitly revolutionary tactics. As a result, the Duma and the government were at an impasse that lasted for about two months. In the meantime unrest once again erupted in various regions of the Empire, a rude reminder that the government's program of pacification was only partially effective. Serious disorders began in early May. When they subsided in July, they had left their mark in the countryside, in several cities, and in the army. For the authorities the stirrings from below seemed to be the last gasp of the revolution; for many leaders of the opposition, they appeared to be the start of a new upheaval that would undermine the foundations of the old order. Inevitably, the different perceptions of the disturbances further impeded an accommodation between the contending forces.

In scope and intent the agrarian unrest that began in May and lasted for three months was comparable to the turbulence in the countryside

I I 2

Stirrings from Below

during the last three months of I905. Close to I,6oo peasant disorders broke out in both periods. 1 The primary goal of the rebellious peasants remained constant-to obtain more land. But there were significant differences in the two waves of protest. The unrest of r 906 tended to be less violent, although some looting and arson did take place. Most notably, only in 1906 did the peasant question become a central issue in national affairs. The unrest in the countryside in r 90 5 certainly perturbed the authorities, who frequently worried about the sufficiency and reliability of the troops at their disposal to quell the disorders. But by resorting to modest concessions and brute force, the government managed to restore a semblance of order in the villages by early 1906. Up to that point the peasant movement did not exert a decisive influence on the development of the revolution. Both the dramatic confrontations of 1905-Bloody Sunday, the general strike in October, the December uprising in Moscow-and the political reforms, such as the October Manifesto, resulted from the actions of workers and/or liberals. Indeed, had the peasants in 1905 been perceived as a force committed to undermining the existing order, they would not have been given such a large share of the vote. It is true that many peasants in 1905 learned some important lessons about common action, and that the agrarian unrest frightened a sizable number of the landed gentry, impelling them to turn to the right politically the winter of 1905-6. But these consequences of the peasant movement did not become a critical factor in national politics until the spring of 1906. At that time the agrarian issue moved to center stage of national concern, and the ultimate outcome of the struggle between the Tsarist authorities and the opposition depended very much on how the issue would be handled. By far the best source for the study of agrarian unrest during the Revolution of r 90 5 is a two-volume work prepared in r 907 by a commission of experts and scholars under the sponsorship of the Imperial Free Economic Society. Entitled Agrarnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v L90J-L906 gg. (The Agrarian Movement in Russia in I90J-I906), the work is based on some 2o,ooo questionnaires sent to a wide range of informed citizens in 4 7 provinces of European Russia: employees of the zemstvos and provincial boards of insurance agencies, agricultural societies, editors of provincial newspapers, teachers, priests, bureaucrats, and policemen. To secure responses from every shade of the economic and political spectrum, the commission also sent questionnaires to peasants known to have participated in the unrest, to landowners who were victimized by the disorders, and to individuals who considered themselves radicals as well as to persons who belonged to right-wing movements. The commission re-

Stirrings from Below

ceived about 1,400 replies, 702 of them from areas that had witnessed unrest. The questionnaires posed the following questions: when did the unrest begin, what forms did it take, who participated, what were the causes of the disorders, who were the targets, how did the unrest end, how extensive was it, and what was the mood of the peasants in the areas of unrest before and after the disorders? Respondents were also invited to make any additional comments they considered pertinent. The 4 7 provinces were divided into eleven regions, and one editor collated the material for each region. Although the editors wrote articles summarizing the findings, the bulk of the two volumes consists of long quotations from the replies to the questionnaires. The editors tended to be sympathetic to the peasant movement, but at the same time they made every effort to be dispassionate and scholarly. Still, several editors conceded that their surveys could not be altogether objective. The personal views or prejudices of the respondents "often played a decisive role" in how they answered questions; some respondents were selective in the questions they chose to answer, and almost no one answered all of them. 2 Nonetheless, the answers contain a vast amount of information presented in such vivid and eloquent form that its reliability is beyond doubt. The first impression produced by these volumes is the enormous complexity of the peasant movement during the Revolution of 190 5. 3 For one thing, the behavior of peasants depended to a very large extent on local conditions. The peasant movement was most intense in the black-earth regions of the central Russian provinces, where serfdom had been most highly developed prior to 1861 and where peasant land hunger was greatest. In the Volga region peasants had lost an inordinate portion of the land that they had worked before Emancipation; in Saratov province, for example, two-thirds of the peasants received less than one-half of the land they had cultivated.• The unrest was also intense in the Baltic provinces, where the nobility of German extraction owned a vast proportion of the arable land. In the northern regions of the country, where large numbers of state peasants lived before 1861, the landholdings of the average peasant were larger than elsewhere, and consequently there was less unrest. In addition, the type of unrest depended on the kind of agriculture prevalent in a specific area: violence tended to mark the regions where peasants worked on their own, strikes and political protests to mark those with large numbers of agricultural laborers. It would be a mistake in any event to assume that all the peasants in any specific locale joined in the disturbances: the level of participation in the more destructive actions ranged from 10 percent to 50 percent and

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was probably considerably higher in strikes.' Nor did the peasants who took part in the unrest necessarily agree on all the measures to be taken to improve their lot. In the Gorodiansk district in Chernigov province, for example, landless peasants and small holders collaborated in the disorders, but only as long as they were directed against "landlords or Jews." When the violence was directed at prosperous peasants, ghastly conflicts occasionally broke out in the villages. "It was an inexpressibly horrible, wild, and repulsive scene. People suspected of burning or destroying peasant farmsteads were immediately sentenced to death by their fellow villagers and were killed on the spot by rifles or pickets or torn to pieces by pitchforks .... In the village of Smychin, 9 people were killed in this manner; in the village of Tupichev-16 people; in the village of Vykhvostov-17 people; in Ivashkov-7 people." This sort of brutality occurred throughout the district.• Violent conflict between peasants also broke out in the Steppe region (New Russia). In the Bakhmut district the population "was divided into two hostile camps, leftists and rightists, [and] the sharp antagonism between them reached the point of open strife." In the Aleksandriisk district, there were incidents of "lynch law being applied against pogromshchiki by householders who did not sympathize with the movement." 7 These are, to be sure, extreme examples of discord among peasants, but they point up the hazards of generalizing about the peasant movement. There is another reason for caution in generalizing about the agrarian unrest during the Revolution of 1905. Many observers who answered the questionnaire tended to lump together the unrest of 1905, 1906, and 1907, and this makes difficult any attempt to delineate the characteristics of each of these waves of agrarian upheaval. Still, the responses contain enough information to depict the differences between them in broad strokes. Several factors precipitated the vast agrarian movement in the fall and winter of 1905. In the first place the harvest that year was poor in all of central Russia; in the black-earth provinces, it amounted to slightly less than half the average of the preceding five years. 8 News of the government's disastrous handling of the war with Japan and the turbulence in the cities clearly contributed to restlessness in the countryside. And the proclamation of the October Manifesto was an immediate spur to unrest, since many peasants presumed that it gave them license to attack the estates of landlords. Several respondents to the questionnaire-in the provinces of Tambov, Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk, Orlov, Riazan, Tula, and Voronezh-also pointed out that peasants interpreted the indifference of local authorities to the attacks on the Jews as an invitation to "rob landlords' estates." As one observer put it: "The agrarian move-

The First All-Russian Congress of the Marshals of the Nobility, Moscow, January 7-11, 1906. Reacting to the unrest in the countryside, some 120 marshals of the nobility urged the government to resort to firm measures to restore order and to pursue more consistent policies in introducing political reform. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 6, p. 89.

Preparing for elections to the First State Duma. Officials in the Alexander Hall of the City Council in St. Petersburg check electoral lists to make sure that only qualified voters cast ballots. The government had formulated highly complicated electoral procedures in order to keep support for opposition parties to a minimum. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 6, p. 95·

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Elections to the First State Duma, March 1906. This page from the journal Niva (1906, no. 14, p. 222) shows scenes of the balloting and the counting of votes in various parts of St. Petersburg. Voting was especially heavy in the cities, and observers noted very little tampering with electoral results.

The formal procession at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg preceding the opening of the First State Duma. Russian dignitaries, foreign ambassadors, and Duma deputies attended the elaborate ceremony. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 19, p. 298 .

Tsar Nicholas about to deliver his speech from the throne. Although the speech was gracious, it displeased most deputies because it did not contain any proposals for reform. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 19, p. 299·

The Presidium of the First State Duma. From left to right, G. N. Shaposhnikov (Assistant Secretary), Prince D. I. Shakhovskoi (Secretary), F. F. Kokoshkin (Assistant Secretary), Prince P. D. Dolgorukov (Vice President), S. A. Muromtsev (President), G. F. Shershenevich (Assistant Secretary), N. A. Gredeskul (Vice President), Shch. A. Poniatovskii (Assistant Secretary), and M. G. Bolkvadze (official in charge of the Press Bureau; not a Duma member). Source: Postcard courtesy of the Helsinki University Library.

Facing page (bottom left) : S. A. Muromtsev, the President of the First State Duma. A professor of law at Moscow University, Muromtsev was a Kadet committed to a constitutional order in Russia. The rules of procedure he formulated for the Duma remained essentially unchanged during the succeeding three Dumas. Source: Postcard courtesy of the Helsinki University Library. Facing page (bottom right): I. L. Goremykin, a civil servant who had occupied several high positions before his appointment as Prime Minister on April 24, I906. An ineffective leader, he was replaced at the time of the Duma's dissolution on July 9, I 906. Source: Gosudarstvennyi Sovet (Petrograd, I 9 I 5), p. 32.

The opening session of the reformed State Council, April 28, 1906. Established in I 8 IO, the State Council for almost a century was a purely advisory body. Early in 1906 it was transformed into a second chamber with real powers equal to those of the Duma. It was designed to serve as a conservative counterweight to the popularly elected Duma. One half of the 198 Council members were appointed by the Tsar. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 19, p. 302.

Above left: A. F. Aladin was the colorful and eccentric leader of the Trudoviks in the First State Duma. An eloquent orator, he frequently delivered provocative speeches that caused an uproar in the legislature. Above right: D. N. Shipov was a highly respected leader of the Octobrists. Long active in the zemstvo movement, he favored extensive reform but still wished to retain the monarchical system of rule.

Above left: G. B. Iollos was an editor of the liberal Russkie vedomosti and a Kadet deputy in the First Duma. He was assassinated in March 1907 as part of a concerted right-wing campaign of terror against the opposition. Jewish deputies such as Iollos were a particular target. Above right: M. Ia. Herzenstein, a Kadet deputy in the First Duma, was the liberals' leading advocate of compulsory expropriation of privately owned land (with compensation). For this and because of his Jewish descent he was detested by right-wing extremists, who murdered him on July 18, 1906. All photos on this page courtesy of the Helsinki University Library

A group of workers who were deputies in the First State Duma. All told, 25 workers served in the legislature. Source: Postcard courtesy of the Helsinki University Library.

A group of peasants who were deputies in the First State Duma. Almost half (231) of the deputies came from the peasantry. Source: Postcard courtesy of the Helsinki University Library.

A meeting of the Kadet club in the capital. The man addressing the assembly is Prince D. Bebutov. Source: Postcard courtesy of the Helsinki University Library.

A meeting of Duma deputies in a forest in Finland after the dissolution of the First Duma. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 29, p. 461.

P. A. Stolypin, appointed Minister of Internal Affairs in April I 906 and Prime Minister in July 1906. Source: Niva, 1911, no. 38, p. 697.

The result of an assassination attempt on Stolypin at his summer dacha on Aptekarskii Island, August 12, 1906. The Prime Minister's reception room was destroyed by bombs hurled by terrorists, and 2 7 people were killed and 70 (including 3 of Stolypin's children) were wounded. The Prime Minister incurred only minor injuries.

The shattered carriage used by the three terrorists, all of whom died in the explosions. Source: Niva, 1906, no. 34, pp. 542-43 .

The aftermath of the Bialystok pogrom of June 1-3, 1906. In the top photograph anguished women weep, while in the bottom one people appear to be trying to identify corpses outside the hospital. Source: Public Record Office, London, FO 371/125, BC 3151.

I. Ia. Golubev, Assistant Chairman of the State Council, is reading the Tsar's ukase formally opening the Second State Duma, April 20, 1907. Source: Niva, 1907, no. 9, p. 143 .

The hall where the Second Duma met after the collapse of the ceiling early on the morning of March 2, 1907. Fortunately no deputies had yet arrived. Source: Niva, 1907, no. 10, p. 157.

The Presidium of the Second State Duma. From left to right, N. N. Poznanskii (Vice President), F. A. Golovin (President), M . E. Berezin (Vice President), V. P. Uspenskii (Assistant Secretary), V. V. Sviatlovskii (Chairman of the Press Bureau), L. V. Kartashev (Assistant Secretary), M. V. Chelnokov (Secretary), S. N. Maksudov (Assistant Secretary), S. N. Saltykov (Assistant Secretary), M. G. Bolkvadze (Deputy Chairman of the Press Bureau). Source: Niva, I907, no. I I, p. I70.

Above left: V. M. Purishkevich, leader of the right-wing extremists in the Second State Duma. He frequently caused uproars in the legislature with virulent attacks on liberals and leftists. Above right: V. N. Kokovtsov, Minister of Finance from I906 until I914 and also Prime Minister from I911 until I9I4.

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ment was caused by the fact that at a certain time rumors from all corners of Russia reached the villages stating that in the cities Jews were beaten with impunity and people were allowed to rob their property. Here, there, and everywhere peasants appeared from the cities after having taken part in the pillaging during the rioting; they said that the soldiers and the police watched the carnage and did nothing."• But the peasants rarely inflicted bodily harm on the landlords; only one is known to have been killed. The idea was to frighten them into fleeing from their estates so that the land could be appropriated. In most instances the unrest was spontaneous. Few issues have produced more conflicting claims than the role of revolutionaries, the rural intelligentsia, or local agitators in instigating the peasant movement. Generally, observers unsympathetic to the unrest blamed outsiders; and radicals, eager to take credit for the upheaval, made excessive claims about their influence in the countryside. In response to an inquiry by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in late I 90 5, most governors contended that "revolutionary propaganda was the main cause of rural disturbances." But as Richard G. Robbins has aptly noted, the governors tended to "view ... the peasants as naive children, easily misled by wily outside agitators." In addition, several governors did not wish to "bring the full weight of repression to bear on the peasants and preferred instead to concentrate on revolutionary and socialist propagandists." 10 Prime Minister Witte agreed with the governors' assessment. The fact that poor and well-to-do peasants alike took part in the rampages proved that political propaganda, not economic considerations, had stimulated the unrest, he informed Tsar Nicholas in early February I9o6. But unlike the governors, Witte was convinced that the disturbances could only be stopped by "firm repression" of the insurgents.U Reputable scholars tend to emphasize the peasants' own initiative in launching the unrest, and there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that peasants showed increasing interest in organizing themselves for both economic and political action without outside prompting. 12 It was not uncommon for peasants to hold meetings in their villages to discuss their grievances and the demands they wished to submit to the authorities. Quite often, peasants refused to pay taxes, and more often still, they joined unions formed in response to the appeals of the All-Russian Peasants' Union, an organization that had been created in July I905 and pushed a radical economic and political program. By the end of I905 the Union had some 470 local branches, with an estimated membership of 2oo,ooo, operating under twelve provincial committees and four interprovincial committees. Although some sources suggest that the membership may have reached a million in the next year, the Union's actual influ-

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ence over the peasants, is, as one scholar puts it, "hard to ascertain." Part of the problem is that the government dealt harshly with the Union's leaders, many of whom were arrested in late 1905. In addition, the Union's opposition to participation in the election of the Duma lost it the support of many peasants, who voted for nonpartisan candidates, subsequently the core of the Trudovik fraction in the Duma. 13 The most dramatic form of political action by peasants was the creation of local institutions of self-government, or "peasant republics." Some historians, in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent in the West, have made much of this development, and in the process have tended to romanticize the peasant movement. "The evidence [about them] is scarce and patchy," one scholar concedes, but he nevertheless pronounces them "of major significance." 14 Such a conclusion, however, seems somewhat exaggerated. There were not very many cases of "peasant rule," they generally did not last more than a few weeks, the number of peasants who participated in them constituted a small proportion of the total population in the countryside, and they had few if any links with each other or with opposition organizations in the citiesY Among the examples of peasant rule mentioned most frequently in the literature are the Sumy district in Kharkov province, where peasant committees ran local affairs for a while, and Guriia, in western Georgia. 16 Another is the Markovo Republic in Volokolamsk district some 100 miles from Moscow.* Knowledgeable contemporaries sympathetic to the peasants, such as the editor of the section on southwest Russia in Agrarnoe dvizhenie, acknowledged that peasant rule was a rarity. After listing various forms of unrest in that vast region, he wrote: "Finally, there is evidence about the formation of one elected committee for the administration of a village after the removal of the local authorities." 17 Still, the instances of peasant self-rule merit some attention because they are an indication of the emerging politicization of the peasant movement and because they provide additional evidence of the Tsarist regime's loss of authority. The incident to which the editor on southwest Russia referred occurred in the village of Olshanits in the Vasilkov district of Kiev province. The history of this experiment in self-government was in many ways typical of the movement. The economic plight of the peasants in Olshanits was miserable: individual landholdings, as well as access to meadows and forests, were thoroughly inadequate, and the system of strip farming was *The Markovo Republic seems to have lasted longer than most, from October 31, 1905, rill July 18, 1906. The information on it is rather meager. Apparently, it incorporated six villages, and the local peasants refused to pay taxes and rents or report for army service. See Smirnov, 'Markovskaia Respublika'; and Demochkin, "Revoliutsionnoe tvorchestvo," p. 56. On Guriia, where peasant rule hung on longer than anywhere else, see Ascher, Revolution, I, pp. I 52- ss; and Jones, "Marxism and Peasant Revolt."

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inefficient. Out of desperation, the villagers in mid-October I905 seized political power on the local level on the assumption that this would enable them to seize all the land in the town and in the surrounding area. Significantly, the peasants refrained from "any kind of excesses." After all, why would they want to spoil the property that would soon be turned over to them, as they put it. The peasants held several meetings at which they decided to send two delegates to the congress of the Peasants' Union in Moscow, to boycott the liquor stores and punish drunkards, and to shun the village teacher, whom they denounced as "the landlords' lackey" because he was careless in carrying out his duties. They also resolved to secure an adequate supply of fuel for the village, and, most important, to replace the local authorities with an elected committee composed of twelve peasants and two Jews. With the exception of the well-to-do citizens and the "debauchees," the entire local population supported the movement for self-government. People who had previously taken part in anti-Jewish pogroms were so impressed that they abandoned their violent activities and joined the new movement. Although mass meetings continued to be held even after the committee had been elected to run local affairs, its influence "was very great." It enforced the rules against alcoholism and thievery, administered the Crown forests, obtained the needed fuels, and regulated the conditions of work at the local distillery. When the freight handlers at the railway went on strike, the new local authorities quickly settled the conflict by almost doubling the pay of the workers. Incapable of quelling the rebellion at Olshanits, the Tsarist officials "trembled and retired to the background." But the new dispensation lasted only six weeks. On November 20 the police chief appeared with I20 dragoons and quickly restored the old order. There were no executions, but several of the "best people" were arrested, and others fled. All this depressed the villagers, and "everyone fell silent." 18 All in all, the treatment of the villagers was relatively mild. In other parts of the Empire, where agrarian unrest lingered on for several weeks, much harsher methods were used to bring the rebellious peasants to heel. By January I 906 much of the countryside, exhausted from weeks of turbulence and repression, was calm again. 1• Agrarian disorders flared up again four months later, in early May, and soon enveloped most of the regions that had been affected in I 90 5. By mid-I906 almost half of all the districts in European Russia were affected in one way or another. On May I9 Stolypin alerted provincial governors to what he perceived to be a dangerous development and directed them to take stern measures against unruly villagers. 20 Another poor harvest, the second in a row, was the economic backdrop

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to this new outburst of disorder. The winter crop in I906 was about 5 percent lower than in I 90 5; the spring crop declined by 28 percent. Per capita productivity in the agricultural sector had declined by almost I 5 percent in one year. Because of the relatively poor harvest in I905 and the widespread disturbances that year, food reserves were extremely low. The consequence was a very serious famine, which struck the Volga Basin, a region with a population of approximately 20 million, with particular ferocity. In mid-March the United Zemstvo Organization (an informal national group of zemstvo activists) and zemstvo boards in Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Ufa, Penza, Tambov, Nizhegorod, and Simbirsk distributed food to over a million people. The Red Cross gave help to more than 2oo,ooo people. 21 A theme that recurs frequently in the contemporary accounts of agrarian unrest is the participation not only of poor peasants but also of "middle" and even "rich" peasants. Again, local factors were decisive in determining the contours of the disturbances. 22 But by the spring of I906 there was one new element in the situation in many parts of the country: disgruntled peasants in the villages had been reinforced by a new and angry group, soldiers who had returned from the battlefields in Manchuria. Numerous observers noted that the former soldiers now "played a significant role in the movement" in the countryside. In Pskov province, for example, sixteen of 28 respondents to questionnaires commented on the involvement of this group in the disturbances. The cry of the ex-servicemen in the Balashovsk district, Saratov province, was widely echoed: "We spilled our blood, but we have no land. " 23 These men were, of course, young people, a group that was regularly in the forefront of the peasant movement. Older people were often more cautious, but many sympathized with the activists and joined them in their forays. In Tula province even 75-year-old women were noticed among the militants. 24 Women generally participated in large numbers in the unrest, and occasionally they showed greater fervor than young people. Teachers, doctors' assistants (feldshers), and sextons also took part, as did workers who had returned to the villages.2s The convocation of the Duma served in various ways to stimulate unrest in the countryside, just as the proclamation of the October Manifesto had six months earlier. Most of all, it aroused peasant interest in national affairs. Before the Russo-Japanese War and the revolutionary events of I905, relatively few newspapers reached the villages. By 1906, according to one study of 700 villages in Moscow province, newspapers and journals were available in 79 percent of them, and each of these villages now regularly received two to three journals. Newspapers, moreover, would

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be passed from one person to another, and from one village to another. In many instances literate villagers would read the papers to several peasants who were illiterate, usually at "political clubs" that met in village tearooms. 2 • Provincial officials were alarmed by the peasants• growing interest in politics. Thus, on July 3 the Governor of Vitebsk, B. B. Gershau-Flotov, complained to the Minister of Internal Affairs that the peasants in his province were now convinced that the Duma would give them land under the most favorable conditions. They also showed increasing hostility toward the nobles and all landowners, whose land, they believed, would soon pass into their hands. The governor proposed that all newspapers with "clearly harmful" content be confiscated before they ever reached VitebskY The authorities made some attempts to reduce the flow of newspapers to the countryside, but they did not succeed in keeping the villagers in ignorance. On the contrary, peasants were remarkably well informed about the debates in the Duma, and although the Law of February 20, I 906, prohibited the sending of petitions to the legislature, villagers throughout the country bombarded the deputies with resolutions, "instructions," telegrams, and petitions; the total number of these cahiers may have run to several thousand. Peasants had begun the practice of drafting petitions at meetings in I 90 5, long before the Duma met, but in most regions of the country, the practice became widespread only in I906. Of 86 extant cahiers from the Steppe Predkavkaz region, just I9 were composed in the months from late November I905 to late April I9o6; the other 67 reached the capital during the weeks that the Duma was in session (late April through early July). About two-thirds of the messages from this region were sent either to Trudovik deputies or to the Workers' Group (as the seventeen SD deputies were collectively known). 2 " Although often written by local intelligentsia, there is little doubt that the contents of these cahiers and of those from other regions of the country represented the views of the people, who would gather at meetings to give their approval to the resolutions. Probably no other source provides as much accurate information on the mood and attitudes of the countryside. By and large the peasants placed great hopes in the Duma, certain that it would meet their demands, the most numerous and urgent of which was for land. The peasants also asked for political and social reforms, but, as we shall see, there were some differences among villagers on these issues. Not all the resolutions were grounded in humane and liberal principles. It is worth quoting at length from two petitions from different parts of

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the country, for they reveal not only the peasants' concerns, but also their deep feelings of despair. The first, sent to the Duma on February 8, 1906, by the peasants and townsmen of Sviatii Krest, Stavropol province, read as follows: The land, like air, water, and sunshine is a gift of God, and no one may dispose of it at will or exploit it. God created the world and gave human beings full control [of the land]; [but] God created neither nobles nor peasants; we are all God's children, and we have a right to demand our father's inheritance, and God is the father of all of us. Are we peasants really only his stepsons, and the nobles his sons? This is a gross injustice. Whoever works the land should have as much of it as he and his family cultivate. 29 The second petition is noteworthy because it demonstrates the peasants' faith in the Duma and their deep disappointment in the government's attitude toward the legislature: At a meeting on May 28, 1906, we, the peasants of the village of Vtory Birki [Kiev province], discussed our needs and, in view of the government's attitude of May 13 [the date of Goremykin's address to the legislature] toward the members of the State Duma, we, citizens of the village of Vtory Birki appeal to you, deputies of the Kiev province who are unknown to us, to propose to you that you firmly defend the interests of the people, that you protect us from further arbitrary rule. Here in our native country, we are not sure that tomorrow we will not be plundered and that our property will not be burned, we are not confident that tomorrow our wives and children will not be violated by ferocious Cossacks and their commanders. We see and hear about the outrages that are committed all around us. We hear the moans of villages that are starving in I 50 districts. We hear the weeping of fathers and children who have lost their kin. Our hearts are lacerated from these moans and tears; we are in no condition to endure this any longer. Our craving for a better life, the yearning to end these groans, impel us in despair to rise up against our sworn enemy, who does not want to understand our pain. We suggest that you join the Trudovik group and fight for a Constituent Assembly, for full freedom, for all the land, for the liberation of all who are being victimized for having fought for justice, for freedom. We for our part will keep an eye on your activities, and in case of need we will support you, even if this will cost us our lives. Thus, for land and freedom by means of the Constituent Assembly! Many signatures affixed. 30 Other resolutions adopted by peasants were less emotional and concentrated on specific demands. An overwhelming majority of them proposed the confiscation of "all monastery, church, crown, and private land" and its distribution to the people, but hardly any touched on the critical question of how this land was to be transferred. Specifically, the peasants did not express an opinion about whether the owners of the land

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should be compensated. The statement by a meeting of peasants in Saratov province on May 28 nicely sums up their view of what should be done with the land, in words strikingly similar to those in the first petition quoted above: "We believe that the land, a gift of God, must belong to those in the population who work it." Others quoted the words of Christ: "He who does not work, does not eat." 3 ' For the rest, many resolutions contained demands for such reforms as the granting of amnesty to political prisoners; the abolition of capital punishment; the introduction of a democratic suffrage and of a ministry responsible to the Duma; the convocation of a constituent assembly; the elimination of indirect taxes and their replacement with an income tax; the abolition of the estate system; the establishment of a system of universal and free education; the implementation of the October Manifesto; the abolition of the State Council; and the lifting of the emergency regulations. Although peasants attached considerable importance to these political and economic reforms, they placed much less emphasis on them than on the demand for land. 32 Not all the cahiers were radical or liberal in content. The resolution adopted by a meeting of 840 people in Nogutsk (a village of 900 heads of households), Stavropol province, repudiated the granting of amnesty to political prisoners and urged the Duma not to "give rights of autonomy to anyone, because this will lead to new sacrifices on the part of the peasants." The resolution called for the retention of emergency regulations and the State Council. It also stated that "under no circumstances" should Jews be given equal rights, "since these people seek to gain power over us; they wish to destroy the existing state system in Russia and to arrange things so that Jews will govern Russia in place of God's anointed." Moreover, "all non-Russians and persons of Jewish nationality who have converted from Judaism to our faith" should be excluded from the State Duma. The bureaucracy and the military services "should be composed of Orthodox Russian men-not foreigners, or non-Orthodox people, or people of Jewish origin who converted to Christianity, or Poles." But, paradoxically, the last request addressed to the Duma read as follows: "Publish a law on the equality of all citizens." 33 Two generalizations about the extensive peasant participation in the cahiers campaign are worth noting. In the first place the intelligentsia's role in drafting the petitions produced a change, even if on a modest scale, in the relations between the villagers and outsiders. The political and cultural isolation of the countryside, deeply rooted in Russian history, began to break down. Second, the peasants' attitude toward their ruler had visibly changed. In composing their petitions in 1905, the peasants had tended to pour out their hearts to their Little Father and to ask

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him for a redress of their grievances. 34 Now, a year later, the Duma had emerged as a new center of political power, and the politicization of the peasantry had produced a distinctly different attitude: many villagers were no longer content to rest their hopes for "land and liberty" or for the satisfaction of other demands on the magnanimity of the Tsar; they had decided to appeal to their representatives to take control of affairs and to do their bidding. A few more examples of peasant activism will suffice to indicate the villagers' reliance on the Duma. In Kiev province peasants began to send resolutions to the Duma in early May and continued to do so for two months. They expressed sympathy for the legislature in its conflict with the government, urged the Duma to continue the struggle, and promised strong support to the deputies. In Zvenigorodsk district peasants in one locale held a meeting attended by 2,ooo people and sent a telegram to the Trudovik and Social Democratic deputies imploring them to insist on the government's resignation, on the granting of civil liberties, and on the transfer of all land to a national fund, to be distributed to elected, regional committees. On June 19 a crowd of "many thousands" of peasants and workers met in a town in the Chigirin district to voice solidarity with the SD fraction in the Duma. Occasionally, the authorities sought to prevent such gatherings, which often provoked violent confrontations. Thus, when the peasants in the Cherkassk district held a meeting on June 6 to select an emissary to be sent to the State Duma, local officials dispatched a detachment of Ingush police constables to break up the meeting. The peasants resisted with cudgels and stones. At that, a whole company of Ingush appeared, and a nasty brawl ensued, during which two people were killed and many were mutilated. 35 Some Duma deputies regularly visited the countryside and did their best to heighten the peasants' political awareness. A few Trudovik deputies even encouraged peasants to press their demands with armed actions against the authorities. For example, the Trudovik deputy T. 0. Volkov delivered a series of speeches in the villages of Belsk district, Smolensk province, calling on the local population to "annihilate" the police defending the landlords, "to refuse to supply recruits [for the army or] to pay taxes, and to organize agrarian strikes." The peasants should also take "armed actions" in support of the Duma if the government rejected its demand that land be transferred to them without compensation to the owners. 36 On June ro the Trudoviks decided to establish closer ties with the people by forming special committees in all the districts of European Russia with two functions: to inform the masses of the Trudoviks' program and to provide the deputies with information about the political mood in the countryside. The Trudoviks were convinced that "when such

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committees are organized in all of Russia, they will constitute an enormous force that no government will be able to resist." 37 Officials at all levels of government took such predictions seriously and expressed deep concern about the Duma's impact on the mood of the peasants. In a report of June 8, 1906, a certain district police officer named Falkovskii warned that in the Nezhin district, Chernigov province, "the revolutionary lust within the peasant community has grown significantly since the opening of the Duma. The peasants, avidly awaiting unbridled freedom and the land that they will have robbed from the landlords, know to the minutest detail what is being said [and] what is being done within and behind the walls of the Tauride Palace." At frequently held peasants' meetings, Falkovskii continued, speakers were filling people's ears with revolutionary propaganda. "The perniciousness of the State Duma as it is presently composed reverberates in the district almost every day." 38 Relying on such reports, many governors, senior police officials, and members of the government concluded that far from serving as a brake on the revolution, the Duma was actually driving the masses toward militant action. 39 The peasants' growing reliance on the Duma for relief did not lead them to abandon other forms of pressure. On the contrary, peasant unrest increased sharply in the spring of 1906 after the Duma had begun its meetings and continued at a high pitch until after the legislature had been dispersed. In some measure the peasants acted out of sheer despair, but it is also likely that many were reluctant to put their trust solely in the Duma. To obtain the land, their principal goal, it would still be prudent to maintain pressure on the landlords and the government. Indeed, peasants often indicated that their support for the Duma was conditional. They fervently hoped that the legislature would improve their economic and legal conditions, but they warned that if the Duma disappointed them, "the agrarian movement can assume a more serious character."•o Almost without exception, observers of the agrarian movement reported that whereas the destruction and burning of landlords' estates and manor houses had been the most distinctive feature of the unrest in I905, such acts of violence were much less frequent now than other forms of disorder: the carting off of hay, illegal felling of timber, unlawful grazing on meadows, and refusal to pay taxes, for example. But a major form of unrest of I906 was the strike, a weapon whose effective use requires a considerable degree of restraint, political sophistication, and organization. Apparently, peasants resorted to strikes in I 906 to avoid the severe repression they had endured during the disorders in late I 90 5. Not only did the authorities maintain strong military forces in some of the more volatile regions; the landlords had also increased the number of guards

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Sti"ings from Below

on their estates, and they showed an increasing determination to deal harshly with attacks on their property. 41 Fearful that strikes in the countryside would pose a "serious danger" to the national economy, the Council of Ministers in mid-March 1906 considered various punitive measures to prevent work stoppages. On April 17 the government issued a series of "Regulations Against the Rise of Strikes by Agricultural Workers." Anyone instigating a strike would be subject to imprisonment for a period ranging from six months to a year; anyone guilty of damaging property during a strike would face imprisonment for three to six months; and anyone who took the initiative in organizing agricultural workers for collective action would be subject to a prison term ranging from sixteen months to four years. 42 These were harsh measures, but their deterrent effect was slight. Agricultural workers went on strike for a variety of reasons: some wanted higher pay, others sought a reduction in the workday (a fifteenhour day was not unknown), and some wished to make it impossible for landlords to continue to run their estates. Thus, in the central black-earth regions, peasants occasionally demanded pay increases of 500 to 6oo percent, which no landlord could possibly afford. The peasants hoped that hard-pressed lan