The Republic of Armenia: From London to Sèvres, February-August 1920 [3] 0520088034, 9780520088030

Table of contents :
Contents
Maps
Preface to Volumes III and IV
Abbreviated Titles
1 The State of the Republic
2 The London Conference
3 San Remo and the Armenian Divestiture
4 Transcaucasian Conflicts: Kars and Karabagh
5 Bolshevik Movements in Transcaucasia
6 The May Uprising in Armenia
7 The Bureau-Government
8 The Summer Campaigns of 1920
9 Arms for Armenia and the Batum Question
10 Armenian Affairs Abroad
Transliteration Key
Glossary of Place Names
Bibliography
Index
Errata

Citation preview

The Republic of

ARMENIA Volume III

Other University of California Press titles by Richard G. Hovannisian

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 The Republic of Armenia: Volume I: The First Year, 1918-1919 The Republic of Armenia: Volume II: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920 The Republic of Armenia: Volume IV: Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization

The Republic of

ARMENIA

VOLUME III From London to Sèvres February-August, 1920 RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY • LOS ANGELES • LONDON

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1996 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data (Revised for vols. 3-4) Hovannisian, Richard G. The Republic of Armenia. (Bibliography: v. 1, p. 479-518; v. 2, p. 53 >-572; ) Contents: v. 1. The first year, 1918—1919 — v. 2. From Versailles to London, 1919—1920 — v. 3. From London to Sèvres, February-August, 1920 — v. 4. Between crescent and sickle: partition and sovietization. 1. Armenia—History—Revolution, 1917-1920. I. Title. DS195.5.H56 956.6'2 72-129613 ISBN 0-520-01984-9 (v. 1) ISBN 0-520-04186-0 (v. 2) ISBN 0-520-08803-4 (v. 3) ISBN 0-520-08804-2 (v. 4)

Printed in the United States of America 9876543 2 1 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48—1984.

For the Generation of GARIN, DARON, VAN, and SHUSHI

and of

DATEV, SEVAN, and EDWARD ARMEN

and of

THOSE WHO SHALL FOLLOW

Contents

LIST OF MAPS

ix

PREFACE

xi

xvii

ABBREVIATED TITLES

1

1.

THE STATE OF THE REPUBLIC

2.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

20

3.

SAN REMO AND THE ARMENIAN DIVESTITURE

71

4. TRANSCAUCASIAN CONFLICTS: KARS AND KARABAGH

113

5. BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENTS IN TRANSCAUCASIA

173

6. THE MAY UPRISING IN ARMENIA

209

7.

THE BUREAU-GOVERNMENT

254

8.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

290

9. ARMS FOR ARMENIA AND THE BATUM QUESTION

326

IO. ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

369

TRANSLITERATION KEY

439

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

441

BIBLIOGRAPHY

447

INDEX

499

vii

Maps

1. THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, SUMMER 1920

4

2. THE EASTERN OTTOMAN PROVINCES—“TURKISH ARMENIA”

28

3. THE KARS OPERATION: CHILDER, ZARUSHAT, AND AGHBABA

120

4. THE STRUGGLE FOR MOUNTAINOUS KARABAGH, 1920

146

5. THE ZANGIBASAR OPERATION

294

6. THE PENIAK OPERATION

299

7. THE LOWER ARAXES RIVER VALLEY

311

Preface to Volumes III and IV

Thirty years ago, it was my intent to write a complete history of the Armenian republic as a doctoral dissertation. But that was an ambitious plan, and it is only now, toward the end of a rewarding professional career at the University of California, that the process has reached fru­ ition—except perhaps for the realization that, instead of becoming the definitive history, this series may simply point the way to additional, more comprehensive investigation. The wealth of recently declassified archival material in all parts of the former Soviet Union now makes possible separate monographs on each theme and nearly every chapter heading included in the four volumes of The Republic ofArmenia and its precursor, Armenia on the Road to Independence. It was a youthful idealization and romanticization of Armenian inde­ pendence that initially attracted me to the study of the Armenian re­ public, the first sovereign Armenian state in several centuries. Though not long-lived, the Republic came to represent a major turning point, enabling the Armenian people to maintain a national existence on a small part of their historic homeland, albeit ultimately in the form of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Its legacy inspired enduring vi­ sions of future renewed independence. There was the danger, however, that a multidimensional history of the Republic might never be written because of ideological and geopolitical circumstances. Under the Soviet system, the Armenian language and culture were allowed to flourish as long as they adhered to the formula of “national in form and socialist in content.” In a trade-off for this concession, Armenian intellectuals were constrained to write within parameters set down by the Soviet au­ thorities in the presentation and interpretation of Armenian history. As the Armenian republic had been dominated by political currents opposed to communism and oriented toward the West, it was only nat­ ural that Soviet historians should portray the Republic’s leaders as lack­ eys of imperialism and avowed enemies of the workers and peasants.

xii

PREFACE

The bourgeois-nationalist government, it was said, came into constant conflict with neighboring states and ruthlessly suppressed the progres­ sive elements within Armenia. Only the heroic intervention of the Red Army and assistance of Soviet Russia spared the Armenian people from complete annihilation and began the process of fraternal reconciliation among all the peoples of the Caucasus and the entire Soviet Union. These themes characterized Soviet historiography for several decades, requiring the serious researcher to read through hundreds of monoto­ nously similar publications in order to glean a few useful facts. The post­ Stalin era brought gradual liberalization, especially in questions relating to the Armenian emancipatory movement, the Armenian genocide, and other issues that deeply touched Armenian national sentiment. Stretch­ ing but not breaking the tolerated bounds, the boldest historians even tried to show that the establishment of the independent pre-Soviet Ar­ menian republic was a salutary development, despite the shortcomings of its leaders. Revision and reinterpretation were gready accelerated with the manifestation of the Karabagh movement in 1988. It was both grat­ ifying and ironic when I—the historian of the Armenian republic—was elected in 1990 to membership in the esteemed Academy of Sciences of Soviet Armenia, now the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia. The implications of that act were profound. While Soviet historians conformed to the restrictions of the Stalinist era, surviving leaders of the Armenian republic wrote in the diaspora about the events with which they had been intimately associated. But this important genre did not progress much beyond the valuable yet incomplete history of the Republic published in 1928 by the last prime minister, Simon Vratzian. As it happened, therefore, predetermined content and conclusions prevailed in the Soviet Union, and in the di­ aspora intellectual curiosity and creativity decreased. The Armenian re­ public became shrouded in partisan politics, symbolism, and various shades of mythology. It was my goal, therefore, to bring the Armenian republic out from the shadows and to free it from partisan stereotypes through a compre­ hensive history based on multilingual and multiarchival research. Al­ though the planned doctoral thesis actually ended up becoming only a prehistory of the Republic, covering the period from 1914 to 1918, my subsequent years of research were facilitated by the declassification of relevant holdings in the national archives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States and of the private papers of diplomats, educators, missionaries, and philanthropists who were participants in the events of the time. Moreover, this study is the first and perhaps still only one to make extensive use of the archives of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia to the Paris Peace Conference. That repository includes not

PREFACE

xiii

only the primary records of Avetis Aharonian’s delegation but also copies of thousands of documents sent from Erevan to Paris to keep the dele­ gation apprised of developments in the Caucasus, especially in foreign relations with neighboring states and with both the White Armies and the Soviet government of Russia. At a time when all Soviet archives were inaccessible, these materials provided details and perspectives that other­ wise could not have been obtained. In more recent years, the records of Boghos Nubar’s Armenian National Delegation have also become avail­ able and are particularly useful in matters relating to relief and refugee affairs, the future of Cilicia, and the activities of the diasporan Armenian communities. It was only after I had completed writing the drafts of Volumes III and IV of The Republic of Armenia that developments in the Soviet Union unexpectedly resulted in the unlocking of previously classified archival holdings and I found myself facing hundreds of files of relevant docu­ ments. During my many previous visits to Soviet Armenia, I was taken through the State Historical Archives and shown where the restricted materials on the Republic were kept, but with sympathetic smiles my guides indicated that it would be improper for me to request access. Many subjects about which I could find only sketchy information else­ where were obviously covered in great detail in those closed funds: do­ mestic politics, agriculture and labor, welfare and reconstruction, com­ merce and communications, and justice, education, and culture. Still, it was a consolation to know that the records of the Republic remained largely intact. Receipt of permission in 1991 to use the State Historical Archives after so many years of waiting was both exhilarating and unnerving. If my work of three decades had hitherto been touted as an unparalleled his­ tory of the Armenian republic based on the available materials world­ wide, that description would now certainly require qualification. For the next two years, I revised the drafts of these two volumes, working dili­ gently to incorporate the new material. This process delayed publication but made the volumes fuller and more accurate—without, however, al­ tering any of the previous themes or conclusions. The extensive holdings in the State Historical Archives leave no doubt that the study of the Republic is not complete but only beginning and that, given a normal­ ization of conditions, a new generation of scholars will enhance, revise, and rectify that which I have written in this series. The publication of the third and fourth volumes of The Republic of Armenia brings this history to a close. The narrative ends with the par­ tition and sovietization of the Republic in December 1920. Outlined as an epilogue in the final volume but awaiting a thorough study is the halfyear period from the declaration of Soviet rule to mid-1921 : the policies

xiv

PREFACE

and actions of the first Soviet Armenian government; the requisitions and repressions leading to an anti-Soviet rebellion; the attempts of the Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland to secure external sup­ port; the sovietization of Georgia and concentration of the Red Army against the rebels in Armenia; the withdrawal of the Salvation Commit­ tee and much of the population of Erevan to the Zangezur highlands; the continuation of the battle there under the direction of the so-called government of Mountainous Armenia; the negotiations and resulting agreements with a reinstated but more moderate Soviet Armenian gov­ ernment; the ultimate exodus of compromised rebels and political lead­ ers into Persia; and the cautious resovietization of Armenia. This lengthy postscriptum is integral to the history of the Republic of Armenia and shall surely find its learned chronicler. What began as an attempt to preserve a short but critical period in Armenian history has taken an astounding turn. As I reconstructed the past, many unfamiliar persons and places gradually transformed into my steady companions. It was satisfying to rescue them from historical ob­ scurity and to give them new life through the written word. Yet by no measure could I have imagined that before this series was completed— or, for that matter, during the course of my lifetime—Armenia, together with Azerbaijan and Georgia, would again become independent and that problems and challenges about which I had written from a historical perspective would surge to the fore as contemporary, pressing reality. The worldwide Armenian euphoria at the declaration of Armenian independence in September 1991, however breathtaking, also stirred deep anxieties in the wary historian, who had long examined the trials and tribulations of the first republic. It seemed that almost everything was the same: the overwhelming struggle of a small, landlocked, resource-poor country to secure a place among the family of sovereign states; the devastation and bloodshed in Mountainous Karabagh and elsewhere; the crush of refugees; the economic blockade, turmoil, and dislocation; the perpetuation of abuses of the previous regime; the ten­ sion between democratic principles and authoritarian tradition; the un­ easy relationship between homeland and diasporan communities; and the shifting, unreliable stances of the world powers. Yet, on closer ex­ amination, significant differences also became apparent. The new re­ public could benefit from the organic advances made and the national self-confidence acquired during seven decades of Soviet rule, from a welldeveloped administrative, economic, educational, and cultural infra­ structure, and from the ethnographic and demographic consolidation that had taken place. The experience of the first period of independence should compel the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian governments to seek regional peace and cooperation, if only for the prosperity and

PREFACE

XV

durability of their own particular republic. The test will be in transform­ ing lip-service into concrete action and result. Most unanticipated and fateful for the historian of the Republic of Armenia was the selection of his son—whose name appears among those to whom the opening volume of this series is dedicated—as the first Min­ ister of Foreign Affairs of the new republic. It was as if the muses had ordained the impossible—a child of the diaspora becoming the foreign minister of a country still in the process of disengaging from the Soviet Union. In that capacity, he became the first spokesman of his people to address the United Nations and there to raise the tricolor—the red, blue, and orange flag adopted by the new republic in symbolic association with the initial Republic of Armenia. That day, this student of history at last saw the fantasy of youth fulfilled, with the hope that beyond such aus­ picious ceremonies Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would find a way to complete the tortuous road to full national independence. With the publication of the final volumes of this series, it is a pleasure to acknowledge once again the assistance of colleagues in Armenia who offered encouragement at a time when scholarly study of the Republic of Armenia was not tolerated in the Soviet Union. I am grateful to the staffs of the State Historical Archives of Armenia for making hundreds of files available to me on request, to the National Academy of Sciences and the Institutes of History and of Oriental Studies for facilitating my research trips to Erevan, to the UCLA Academic Senate for its annual research grants, and to the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for grants for conference travel and the support of joint studies between American and Soviet and post-Soviet scholars. Dr. Hakob Grgiarian assisted in the compilation of the glossary of place names, and Dr. Robert Hewsen drafted the maps I composed for volumes III and IV. Houri Berberian shared in the belabored process of preparing the final manuscript for production. Vartiter Kotcholosian Hovannisian entered the musty archives with me in the 1950s and has remained a steady companion through the years, leading to the memorable occasion when we at last found ourselves seated side by side in the reading room of the State Historical Archives of Armenia in the 1990s. This has been a partnership of four decades, whose imprint cannot be missing from these volumes. Siroon Hovanni­ sian, my mother, has been a continuing source of inspiration. From her humble beginnings in a world now destroyed to her role of esteemed, wise, and loving matriarch in Fresno, California, she personifies in many ways the turbulent passage of the Armenian people through the twen­ tieth century. She and the generations that have followed continue to be drawn to the twin peaks of Ararat and to the renewed saga of the Republic of Armenia.

Abbreviated Titles

Armenia Archives

State Historical Archives of Armenia (formerly of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic), Erevan. The fund, register, and file are com­ bined as, for example, 200/1/602 (fund 200, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, register 1 of 2 reg­ istries, and file 602 of 667 files in this register).

Arm. Nat. Del. Archives

Archives of the Armenian National Delegation (now deposited in the State Historical Ar­ chives, Erevan, with microfilm copies in the Nubarian Library in Paris and at the head­ quarters of the Armenian General Benevolent Union in the United States).

Banber Ereuani Hamalsarani

Banber Ereuani Hamalsarani. Hasarakakan gitutiunner [Vestnik Erevanskogo Universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki]. Erevan, 1967- .

Banber Hayastani arkhivneri

Banber Hayastani arkhivneri [Vestnik arkhivov Armenii]. Publ. of Chief Archival Administration attached to the Council of Ministers of the Ar­ menian Soviet Socialist Republic (from 1990, of the Republic of Armenia). Erevan, i960- .

BRITAIN, CAB

GREAT BRITAIN, CABINET OFFICE, PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE.

Cab 23

Class 23: Cabinet Minutes.

Cab 24

Class 24: Cabinet Memoranda.

Cab 25

Class 25: Supreme War Council (igiy—igig).

Cab 27

Class 27: Committees: General

Cab 28

Class 28: Allied War Conferences.

Cab 29

Class 29: International Conferences.

xvii

xviii Cab 45 BRITAIN, FO

ABBREVIATED TITLES

Class 45: Historical Section. Official War Histories. Correspondence and Papers. GREAT BRITAIN, FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES, PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

FO 371

Class 371 : Political. The class and volume num­ bers are followed by the document numbers, the file number, and the index number; for example, FO 371/3657, 3404/9846/512/58 represents Volume 3657, Documents 3404 and 9846, File 512 (Armenia, 1919—1920), Index 58 (Caucasus).

FO 406

Class 406: Confidential Print: Eastern Affairs, 1812—1946.

FO 418

Class 418: Russia and the Soviet Union, 1821— 1954Class 424: Turkey, 1841—1951.

FO 424

FO6O8

Class 608: Peace Conference, 1919—1920: Corre­ spondence. The volume number and file num­ bers (three figures) are followed by the docu­ ment numbers; for example, FO 608/78, 342/1/2/7948/10174 represents Volume 78, File 342/1/2 (Middle East, Armenia, Internal Situation), Documents 7948 and 10174.

BRITAIN WO

GREAT BRITAIN, WAR OFFICE ARCHIVES, PUBLIC REC­ ORD OFFICE.

WO 32

Class 32: Registered Papers: General Series.

WO 33

Class 33: Reports and Miscellaneous Papers (1853-1939).

wo 95

Class 95: War Diaries, 1914—1922.

WO 106

Class 106: Directories of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1870—1925.

British Documents

Great Britain, Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919—1939. 1st ser. Ed. W. L. Woodward, Rohan Buder, et al., 27 vols. London,1947—1986.

FRANCE, ARCHIVES DE L’ARMEE

MINISTRE D’ETAT CHARGE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE. ETAT-MAJOR DE L’ARMEE DE TERRE. ARCHIVES DU SER­

VICE HISTORIQUE DE L’ARMEE FRANÇAISE (CHATEAU DE VINCENNES), VINCENNES.

ABBREVIATED TITLES

xix

16N

Class 16N: Commandement du grand quartier ge­ neral The carton, dossier, and document num­ bers are listed after the class number; for ex­ ample, 16N/3016, dossier 2, no. 17.

17N

Class 17N: Missions militaires françaises (Mis­ sions to South Russia and the Caucasus, Car­ tons 581-590).

20N

Class 20N: Front Oriental (including Corps ex­ péditionnaire d’Orient, Corps expéditionnaire des Dardanelles, Armée d’Orient, Commandement des armées alliées en Orient, Armée française d’Orient, Corps d’occupation de Constantinople, and Corps d’occupation française de Constantinople).

Hoktemberian meds revoliutsian

Hoktemberian sotsialistakan meds revoliutsian ev Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanake Hayastanum: Pastatghteri ev niuteri zhoghovadsu. Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian et al. Publ. of Institut Istorii, Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR—Armianskii Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie MVD Armian­ skoi SSR. Erevan, i960.

Hovannisian, Republic, I

Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Arme­ nia. Volume I. The First Year, 1918—igig. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971.

Hovannisian, Republic, II

Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Arme­ nia. Volume IL From Versailles to London, igig— igso. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1982.

Hovannisian, Road to Independence

Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, igi8. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1967.

Lraber

Lraber hasarakakan gitutiunneri [Vestnik obshchestvennykh nauk]. Publ. of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Re­ public (from 1990, of the Republic of Arme­ nia). Erevan, 1966- .

Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives

Archives of the Republic of Armenia Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (now integrated into the Archives of Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun, Watertown, Massachusetts). The title of each individual file is given only the first time the file is cited in the notes of volumes III and IV combined.

XX

ABBREVIATED TITLES

Teghekagir

Teghekagir. Hasarakakan gitutiunner [Izvestiia. Obshchestvennye nauki]. Publ. of Academy of Sci­ ences of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Repub­ lic. Erevan, 1940—1965.

US ARCHIVES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (WASHINGTON, D.C.).

RG 45

Record Group 45: Records of the Department of the Navy.

RG59

Record Group 59: General Records of the Depart­ ment of State (Decimal File, 1910—1920). Fig­ ures representing class, country, and subject precede the document numbers; for example, 860J.01/60/173 represents Internal Affairs (8), Armenia (60J), Government (.01), Doc­ uments 60 and 173.

RG84

Record Group 84: The United States Foreign Ser­ vice Posts of the Department of State.

RG 256

Record Group 256: Records of the American Com­ mission to Negotiate Peace. The citation form is the same as that used in RG 59.

Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia

Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetshoi vlasti v Armenii (sbomik dokumentov). Ed. A. N. Mnatsakanian, A. M. Akopian, G. M. Dallakian, Publ. of Armianskii Filial IML pri TsK KPSS—Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Arm. SSR—Arkhivnyi Otdel MVD Arm. SSR. Erevan, 1957.

1

The State of the Republic

As the Republic of Armenia endured the winter and welcomed the warm­ ing rays of spring 1920, its achievements and shortcomings formed a disharmonious picture. The mere existence of the state could be re­ garded as a major accomplishment in view of the prevailing challenges and adversities. Yet survival alone could not guarantee viability and in­ dependence. The Republic needed a strategy that would lead to favor­ able resolution of disputes with neighboring states, secure and perma­ nent boundaries, and political and economic stability. With the second anniversary of the Armenian republic approaching, it was time for an assessment.

A Western Orientation Throughout the premiership of Alexandre Khatisian, the Armenian gov­ ernment followed a firm Western orientation. That policy was based on the premise that the Allied Powers would fulfill at least in part their many pledges concerning the restoration and rehabilitation of the Armenian survivors and a guaranteed Armenian national existence. Armenians around the world fervently hoped that their ancient homeland would be called back into being as a modem nation-state under the guidance and protection of the West. The Allies had the military and economic resources, the political authority, and the moral prestige to make a free and united Armenia a reality. But the Western orientation was a risk, as it turned Armenia away from dependence on Russia to reliance on the very powers that had contrib­ uted so much to the Armenian tragedy of the preceding half-century. The selfish motives of the European Allies were clearly understood by the Armenian leaders. There nonetheless seemed to be room within 1

2

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

European colonialist designs in the Near East for an independent Ar­ menia. It was hoped that Russia, too, whatever its eventual form of gov­ ernment, could be brought to realize that a separate Armenian border state would not compromise its national interests. Although the divisive rivalries of the Allies and their failure to settle the Armenian question expeditiously caused grave apprehensions, all Armenian political ele­ ments, except for the small circle of Bolsheviks, could find no feasible alternative to the Western orientation. In regional affairs, that disposition led the Armenian government away from seeking local solutions in disputes with Azerbaijan and Geor­ gia. The Armenian strategy was to reject major concessions as the price for improved mutual relations and instead to hold out in anticipation that the Allied Powers would incorporate more favorable terms into the general Eastern setdement. Though relations with Georgia had im­ proved by the end of 1919, in part because of direct Allied and American intercession, hostilities with Azerbaijan flared repeatedly. The Armeni­ ans were distressed that some British officials supported the Azerbaijanis in order to draw them away from the Turks, but Khatisian’s government never wavered in its claims to Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabagh. It acted as if Armenia’s Western orientation would ultimately rescue those districts and ensure their incorporation within the Arme­ nian republic. Pending a ruling from the West, grand concessions to the other Transcaucasian states in exchange for normalized relations and economic favors seemed neither prudent nor timely.1 In intra-Armenian relations, Khatisian’s Western orientation was re­ flected in his reluctance to fill all cabinet posts. The prime minister’s hesitation was part of an attempt to reach agreement with Boghos Nubar Pasha and the Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) and Zhoghovrdakan (Populist) parties on a mixed cabinet, legislature, and peace delegation of united Armenia.2 Such an accord would increase the support and confidence of the Western Armenians living in the Near East, Europe, and America. The active collaboration of Armenian lib­ eral, bourgeois elements was considered important not only because of their financial resources and professional skills but also because the Western governments shared their political and economic views and might therefore support the Republic more enthusiastically if those ele­ 1 Armenian-Georgian relations and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations from 1918 to the spring of 1920 are discussed in volumes I and II of The Republic of Armenia (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971 and 1982), especially I, chapters 3—8, and II, chapters 6-8. 2 Negotiations for a united government are discussed in Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 267—279. On the life and career of Khatisian, see Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, IV, no. 9 (1964), pp. 257—288; [Armenian Revolutionary Federation], Hushapatum H. H. Dashnaktsutian, iSgo-igtjO, ed. S. Vratzian (Boston, 1950), pp. 537—540.

THE STATE OF THE REPUBLIC

3

ments were included in the affairs of state. Hence, the nominally socialist ruling party, the Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), was willing to veer to the right to demonstrate the sincerity of its Western orientation. The effort was not without cost, though, for several cabinet members were temporarily obliged to head two ministries each, and Khatisian’s administration was criticized as being lackluster and indeci­ sive. Caution also characterized most of the government’s domestic pro­ grams. In considering reforms, it was always necessary to weigh whether under the existing circumstances the change would bring improvement or simply cause greater disorder and whether the Western powers and Armenian monied classes abroad would react negatively. Moreover, as long as the country remained crammed with refugees and as long as Armenia’s boundaries had not been finally determined through a gen­ eral Eastern setdement, the government had neither the capacity nor time to revamp the entire administrative apparatus. Makeshift arrange­ ments and small improvements in living conditions and administrative functions became the order of the day. Once the Armenian question had been settled, a constituent assembly would be summoned to draft the fundamental law of the land. Until then, the Republic would be governed according to a conglomeration of statutes based on the law codes of imperial Russia as progressively amended and liberalized by the Russian Provisional Government in 1917, the Transcaucasian Seim and Commissariat in 1917—1918, the Armenian Khorhurd in 1918—1919, and the Armenian Parliament in 1919—1920. Prime Minister Khatisian’s approach to matters of internal security and race relations was also colored by expectations from the West. The Muslim uprising in the summer of 1919 had expelled the Armenian administration from Sharur and Nakhichevan and enabled the BaoukVedi and Zangibasar districts near Erevan and Etchmiadzin to maintain a semiautonomous existence.3 The Armenian army, repeatedly engaged in skirmishes, was exhausted by the constant tension, but the weariness and privations of the troops were not the only factors that forestalled decisive action to force submission of the Muslim inhabitants. Khatisian’s administration believed it was necessary to prove to the Western powers, the Muslims, and the Armenians themselves that an Armenian govern­ ment could rule with equanimity and justice for all citizens regardless of race or religion. In whatever way the boundaries of the anticipated united state might be drawn, Armenia would have a significant Muslim minority, and it was important to demonstrate that this community could live in peace and safety. Khatisian and officials such as Kars Governor 3 For the Muslim uprisings in Armenia, see Hovannisian, Republic, II, chapter 4.

1

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32

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

had been away from London, bristled against his adversaries in the War Office. In a lengthy memorandum of February 9, he warned the cabinet of the disastrous political consequences of a withdrawal. The Allies had just recognized the Transcaucasian states and pledged to supply them with arms and supplies, and Batum would probably be made into a free port under supervision of the League of Nations. Evacuation now would be regarded as a betrayal by these states and would prompt Georgia to seize Batum, wrecking plans for a free port and throwing the region into chaos and bloodshed.24 Curzon continued to fight for a reversal in the ensuing days. On Feb­ ruary 18 he argued: “It would be impossible to carry out the policy of the Supreme Council if the evacuation of Batum took place immediately, and the only result would be a general scrimmage between Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and General Denikin.’’ Despite the fact that Chief of the Imperial General Staff Henry Wilson declared that it was unsafe to retain the garrison at Batum much longer, the cabinet that day decided (a) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should propose to the Su­ preme Council that a mixed international force under British control should be formed at once at Batum, and should hold the town pending its transference to the League of Nations; (b) That, pending a decision on this proposal, the evacuation of Batum should proceed no further.25

General Wilson scoffed at the decision, writing in his diary that the League did not have and would never have an army or police. “But what a hopeless muddle the Frocks are in. They can’t get out of their diffi­ culties by voting that the League of Nations take over Danzig, Fiume, Constantinople, Batoum, and other parts, well knowing that the League can take over nothing.’’26 Curzon tried to soften the concern and criti­ cism in the cabinet by getting the French and Italians to share in the burden of protecting Batum. After preliminary negotiations, he made the proposal formally on February 25. Both Berthelot and Nitti com­ plained of the great burdens already shouldered by their respective ar­ mies but reluctantly consented to send a battalion apiece for the time being. It was agreed:

24 FO 371/4931, E149/1/58 enclosure. See also E133/1/58, and 371/3673, 177722/ 177803/176894/58. 25 Cab 23/20, Cab. Concl.(2o), 11(1), Feb. 18, 1920. 26 C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, II (London, [1927]), p. 228.

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(a) That Batum should be made a free port under the guarantee of the League of Nations. (b) That for the present an Allied composite garrison should be maintained in Batum, consisting of one British, one French and one Italian battalion.27

The Armenia Commission ’s First Report On February 27, before the Armenia Commission presented its recom­ mendations, a change in the structure of the London conference was implemented. The prime ministers or their alternates were now to meet separately to consider general policy issues and problems relating to high prices and inflationary pressures in Europe. Meanwhile, work on the Turkish treaty was to be handled by the foreign ministers and am­ bassadors, who would meet in the Foreign Office with broad latitude but refer specific matters to the prime ministers as necessary.28 One of the first issues to come before the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Am­ bassadors was an inquiry from the drafting committee as to whether Armenia was to be a signatory of the treaty. Curzon stated that, because the Allies had recognized the Armenian republic and intended to award it territory from the Turkish empire (thereby requiring it to accept cer­ tain obligations, such as assumption of a share of the Ottoman public debt), Armenia should be a signatory state. It was thus agreed “that Armenia should be included in the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.”29 Curzon then read the Armenia Commission’s report, which began on an apologetic note. The commission wished Armenia could have as much territory as possible, including an outlet at the port of Trebizond; unfortunately, reality militated against such a solution. Because of the decimation of the Armenian people, probably no more than 500,000 would return; even with the 1.2 million in the existing republic, the new country would have fewer than 2 million Armenians at the outset. “The Armenian territory must therefore not be too extensive in order that the Armenian element may rapidly obtain preponderance.” Strategi­ cally, it would have been desirable to include Trebizond and Erzinjan in Armenia, because these approaches to the Armenian plateau were easily defended and, in enemy hands, would serve as concentration points against Armenia. Political and ethnographic reasons precluded this arrangement, however. The zone between Trebizond and Tireboli

27 Cab 23/20, Cab. Concl.(2o), 12(6), Feb. 24, 1920; British Documents, VII, pp. 253— 25528 British Documents, VII, pp. 268—269. 29 Ibid.,

34

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

should be left to the Turks but permanently demilitarized, and the for­ tifications at Trebizond should be dismantled. The Armenian boundary would thus run from the juncture of the Erzerum and Trebizond vilayets to the west of Baiburt into the Bitlis vilayet, taking in the watershed around the plain of Mush, the highlands of Sassun, and Bidis city; it would then turn eastward, skirting Lake Van and extending to the Per­ sian frontier. To provide Armenia exits to the sea, the commission first proposed to partition the province of Batum in such a way as to create a free state, including the city and port of Batum and a certain hinterland, and to award Armenia a strip of territory to give it unhindered access to the free state. The Kars-Ardahan-Artvin road to Batum would lie within Ar­ menia, and an Armenian railway from Kars to Batum could be con­ structed through the Chorokh Valley. The boundary between the free state and Armenia and Georgia would be determined on the spot by an inter-Allied commission. Second, Lazistan east of Trebizond should be made into an autonomous state under the nominal suzerainty of Ar­ menia. This provision would allow Armenia to convert the passages be­ tween Baiburt and the small ports in Lazistan into carriage roads. The Lazes, it was reasoned, might be of Georgian origin, but they had no Georgian sympathies and wished to live as independently as possible. In addition, Armenia should be given special transit privileges over the road from Erzerum and Baiburt to Trebizond and should receive export-import rights at that port. Insofar as the mutual boundaries of the Transcau­ casian states were concerned, it was hoped that the three governments would reach agreement among themselves; otherwise, there should be arbitration by the League of Nations, which might appoint an interAllied commission to draw the borders on the spot, using when possible the ethnographic principle as a guide. The commission concluded that the formulation of an Armenian state that included former Turkish territory could be realized only if the Turk­ ish armed forces in the area were withdrawn, and this would require strong external pressure. Without European assistance, the Armenian state would face great difficulties. If no government was willing to furnish troops, Armenia at least should be afforded the officers and matériel needed to organize a solid national army, stiffened if possible by vol­ unteers recruited from among the Allied and Associated Powers. In any case, Armenia’s existence and economic development should be guar­ anteed by the League of Nations.30 30 FO 371/493 2, Ei 066/1/58, enclosing extract of Cabinet Paper 729. For a map of the proposed boundaries, see FO 371/4953, Ei 123/134/58. See also US Archives, RG 59, 760J.6715/65, App. I, no. 2.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

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After Curzon had read the report, Colonel Chardigny explained that the recommendations were the best possible under the circumstances. The proposed western frontier of Armenia did pass along a series of mountain ridges, making a practical boundary. Curzon was pleased when Berthelot suggested that the commission’s recommendation about a Turkish demilitarized zone did not go far enough; because Erzinjan was to be left to the Turks, the French delegate reasoned, the zone should extend inland from Tireboli to Kemakh, creating a buffer as wide as 50 miles. Cambon and Imperiali expressed reservations about the arrangement for Lazistan, maintaining that it would be better to leave the region under Turkish suzerainty on condition that Armenia be granted servitude over the roads leading to the sea. Curzon, however, warned that Turkey would use Lazistan as a point of concentration in schemes to seize Batum. Armenia would not interfere with the autono­ mous state as long as use of the roads was guaranteed. Upon Berthelot’s clarification that “nominal sovereignty’’ was understood to mean simply the right to fly the Armenian flag, the conference accepted the com­ mission’s recommendation.31 Curzon then turned to the most serious point in the report, the need to remove the Turkish troops. Colonel Chardigny advised that a Euro­ pean force of from 15,000 to 20,000 men would be needed for two to three years to enforce the treaty. During that time, they might also serve as cadre for the organization of an efficient Armenian army. Curzon, doubting that the Allies would make such a commitment, stated that Armenia would have to create a national army to do the job, with arms, munitions, money, and possibly volunteer staff officers provided by the Allies. Ambassador Imperiali was visibly uneasy with the discussion and insisted that it was a matter not for the foreign ministers and ambassa­ dors but for the prime ministers. Striking on an escape hatch that was to be used on several occasions thereafter, Berthelot suggested that the League of Nations might be asked to deal with the question. The League could appeal to “civilized” governments, and there were also many wealthy Armenians abroad who could help. Before the session ad­ journed, it was agreed that “the Council of the League of Nations should be invited at a later date to consider the supply to Armenia of the ma­ terial and funds necessary for the creation of a national army, and, if necessary, the raising of volunteers among the Allied and Associated Powers for the service of the new State.”32

31 British Documents, VII, pp. 280—282. 32 Ibid.,, pp. 283—285. See also FO 371/4953, E1457/134/58, Curzon to Derby, March 12, 1920.

36

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The Marash Affair

While the Allied leaders deliberated in London, the influence of the Turkish Nationalists spread. Grand Vizier Ali Riza Pasha sought accom­ modation with Mustafa Kemal, sending into Anatolia sympathetic inter­ mediaries and sanctioning new elections for the Ottoman Parliament. The Christian minorities boycotted the elections in protest, but this had little effect on the outcome, which returned a pro-Nationalist majority to the National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal still faced widespread opposi­ tion and vacillation in Anatolia, but the momentum had passed to his side. He was disappointed that he could not persuade the deputies to meet in an Anatolian city rather than in Constantinople, and he was hurt that he was not elected in absentia as president of the National Assembly. His close associates offered encouragement, predicting that time would work to the benefit of the Nationalists; undoubtedly the legislative body would be dispersed on demand of the Allied Powers and the moral initiative would pass to Mustafa Kemal, who could then sum­ mon the delegates to continue their patriotic labors in Anatolia.33 By the time the legislature convened on January 16, 1920, Allied of­ ficials had strong evidence that members of Ali Riza’s cabinet, especially Minister of War Mersinli Jemal Pasha and Chief of Staff General Jevad Pasha, were deeply implicated in the resistance, supplying the Nation­ alists with sensitive information, equipment, and weapons and arranging for successful “bandit” raids on arms depots nominally supervised by Allied control officers. Pressure forcing Jemal and Jevad to resign cre­ ated deep resentment in the National Assembly, which responded on January 28 by adopting the Nationalist Pact, the Kemalist platform that had evolved from the previous conferences at Erzerum and Sivas de­ manding, inter alia, the uncompromised integrity of the Turkish home­ lands and rejecting any concessions to the Armenians and any special privileges or guarantees to minority groups.34 That same month, the Nationalists launched their armed struggle against the Allied forces of occupation. Accurately judging the scattered French detachments in the sanjaks of Marash, Aintab, and Urfa to be the most vulnerable, Kemal dispatched officers to organize the tribal units and irregular chetes and to break open the caches of arms and 33 See Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 228-238, 291; Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London, 1964), pp. 227-232. 34 Kemal, op. át., pp. 312—318; Gotthard Jäschke and Erich Pritsch, “Die Türkei seit dem Weltkrieg,“ Die Welt des Islams, X (1927—1929), pp. 25—26; Elaine D. Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919—1923) (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 153—156. See also the British intelligence reports in FO 371/5165-5166, File 262/44.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

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weapons that had been hidden by the retreating Ottoman army after the armistice. When the French replaced the British in these “eastern territories’’ and in Cilicia proper in November 1919, they were not pre­ pared for an effective occupation. Most of the French troops under the command of General Henri Gouraud were deployed in Syria, and the bulk of heavy artillery, automatic machine guns, armored cars, airplanes, and communications equipment for the regiments assigned to Cilicia was kept in Beirut and never dispatched. The lack of wireless radio equipment and even of carrier pigeons was to have a telling effect on French designs to assert control in the eastern territories. The moun­ tainous terrain of the Amanus and Taurus ranges created hundreds of safe hideaways for Turkish partisans, who knew the land well and were able to disrupt telegraph, telephone, and railway service in unprotected stretches. The French faced the added disadvantage of trying to establish themselves at the onset of winter, when the freezing winds and blizzards lashed the troops—most of them Algerians and Senegalese—and turned the movement of supplies and the maintenance of communications into major problems.35 The change from British to French command gave Mustafa Kemal the opportunity to coordinate a nationwide campaign of protest against the occupation, denunciation of purported excesses—especially by Arme­ nian legionnaires in French uniform—and exhortation to patriotic re­ sistance. Yet the French, priding themselves on their colonial experi­ ence, recruited largely Muslim gendarmerie units and initially gained professions of support, particularly from Muslim national minorities such as Circassians, Alawis, and Kurds. They soon made the error, how­ ever, of trying to implement the same type of supervisory administrative control in the eastern territories as Colonel Edouard Brémond exercised in the zone around Adana. Regarding such a measure as the first step toward permanent French domination, the Nationalists sent chete bands into Marash to hoist the Turkish flag above the abandoned citadel and to insult and intimidate Muslim officials who were collaborating with the French (see map a).36 The 20,000 Armenians who had returned to Marash in 1919 and who 55 Edouard Brémond, “La Cilicie en 1919—1920,” Reuue des études arméniennes, I, no. 3 (1921), pp. 327—335; Paul du Véou, La passion de la Cilicie, igig-ig22, 2d ed. (Paris, 1954), pp. 75—89. For a study based almost entirely on the French military archives in the Château de Vincennes, see Général du Hays, Les armées françaises au Levant, igig—iggg, II: Le temps des combats, ig2O—ig2i (Vincennes, 1979). 36 See, for example, France, Archives de l’Armée, Classe 20N: Front Oriental, carton 157, dossier 3, carton 158, dossier 2, and carton 202, dossier 2, Nov.-Dec., 1919. See also FO 371/5043-5044, Ei358/E1978/E2310/3/44;Du Hays, op. at., pp. 230-232; Ruben G. Sahakian, Turk-fransiakan haraberutiunnere eu Kilikian igig—ig2i tt. (Erevan, 1970), pp. 144-148.

38

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

constituted a third of the city’s inhabitants became deeply apprehensive at this demonstration, understanding full well their own vulnerability in case of conflict. Already, Armenian villagers who had reclaimed their lands near Marash were being harassed to leave again, and rumors of Nationalist troop concentrations to the north near Shar and Goksun raised the specter of renewed tragedy for the Christian population.37 The inability of the French officials to respond swiftly and effectively to the first challenge to their authority encouraged the Nationalists, frightened Muslim leaders who had preached submission and cooperation, and raised questions about the invincibility of the Allies. When Captain An­ dré, the officer in charge of the Marash detachment, requested rein­ forcements to strengthen his hand, the regional commander at Aintab was indecisive, first summoning André for consultations, then sending him to Adana to report to division commander Brigadier General Julien Dufieux.38 By the time Dufieux ordered reinforcements to Marash in early Jan­ uary, the Nationalist bands had taken the initiative, attacking French supply convoys in the vicinity of Bel Punar and El-Oghlu as they moved between Aintab and Islahie toward Marash. News that the first relief column under battalion commander Major Comeloup had been pinned down by hostile forces prompted Dufieux to dispatch additional eche­ lons from Aintab and Islahie and to transfer district commander General Quérette from Aintab to Marash to lead the operation. All companies, withstanding the bitter cold and several raids from ambush, reached Marash by January 17, strengthening the French garrison to more than 2,000 men. Because of the weather and billeting limitations, the force was dispersed in schools, churches, and public buildings. General Quér­ ette established his headquarters at barracks north of the city near the American compound, where personnel of the Near East Relief organi­ zation and medical missionaries were assisting the population. Without 37 Extensive materials on the events in Marash and other parts of Cilicia are included in the Arm. Nat. Del. Archives. For the period under consideration, see microfilm C-10, pp. 842 ff. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/202, dossier 2; FO 371/5044, E1941/3/44, and 371/5165, File E262/44; US Archives, RG 59, 860J.4016.The accounts of American relief and medical personnel in Marash include Stanley E. Kerr, The Lions of Marash: Personal Experiences with American Near Exist Relief, 1919—1922 (Albany, NY, 1973), and Mabel E. Elliot, Beginning Again at Ararat (New York, 1924), pp. 62—143. Of the numerous Armenian accounts, see especially Hovsep Ter-Vardanian, Marashi djarde 1920-in ev patmakan hamarot aknark me antsialin vra (Jerusalem, 1927), and Grigor H. Gaiustian, Marash kam Germanik ev heros Zeitun (New York, 1934). For Turkish accounts and interpretations, see, for ex­ ample, Genelkurmay Ba$kanhgi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Türk istiklâl Harbi, IV: Güney Cephesi (15 Mayis-20 Ekim 1921) (Ankara, 1966), pp. 81—99, and Adil Bagdadlilar, Uzunoluk. Istiklâl harbi'nde Kahramanmara$ (Istanbul, 1974). 38 Brémond, op. át., pp. 338—339; Du Véou, op. át., pp. 112-113, 122.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

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wireless radio equipment, the French units could keep in touch only by messenger.39 After a French supply convoy was ambushed near El-Oghlu on January 19 and a relief party from Marash was attacked the following day, Quérette summoned the Muslim civil, military, and religious authorities of Marash on January 21 and presented to them evidence of collusion be­ tween the partisan bands and suspicious elements within the city. He detained several of the notables, dismissing the others with demands for immediate measures to prevent any more hostile acts. As soon as the leaders had departed, however, the Turkish chief of police gave a signal with a pistol shot, and the city reverberated with the sound of rifle fire. The Marash rising had begun. French troops riding with the local gen­ darmerie or standing guard and unfortunate Armenians who happened to be outdoors at the moment became the first victims of the battle, which was to rage for three weeks.40 The siege separated the French contingents into several isolated groups. The terrified Armenians fled into their churches for protection, as they had done for centuries in times of trouble. Women and children filled the six Armenian Apostolic churches, the three Evangelical churches, and the large Catholic cathedral; most of the men tried to take up positions to defend their homes and religious sanctuaries. Bom­ bardment of the Turkish positions by French field guns only intensified the conflict within the city, where the insurgents advanced from house to house. The Turks threw kerosene-doused rags on the Armenian homes, burning a path toward the churches. Despite efforts by the Ar­ menian legionnaires and defenders, the churches, one after the other, were put to flame. The hysterical people within tried to escape but were struck by barrages of bullets and driven back into the inferno. The shrieks of the burning victims rose up to the American compound, where sickened relief workers looked on helplessly through binoculars. By the end of the siege, only charred bodies and incendiary rubble re­ mained in place of the First, Second, and Third Armenian Evangelical churches, the Apostolic churches of St. Gevorg, St. Astvadsadsin, and Karasun Mankats, and most of the Armenian quarters.41 59 Kerr, op. át., pp. 78—82; Du Véou, op. át., pp. 122—123; Du Hays, op. át., pp. 239—240. 40 Kerr, op. át., pp. 87—99; Du Véou, op. át., pp. 123—125. See the daily diary entries (January 2 i-February 14,1920) of American Y.M.C.A. officer C. F. H. Crathem in FO 371/ 5041, E1784/3/44 enclosure, Kerr, op. át., pp. 259—271, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 422/2, Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 1920 t., no. 134. For the same period, see the diary of Dr. Mabel Elliot, op. át., pp. 98—114. See also the secret report of French intelli­ gence officer Edgar Pech in Archives de l’Armée, 20N/202, dossier 2, no. 478, March 7, 1920. 41 Materne Muré, Le massacre de Marache (février, 1920) (Brussels, 1920), pp. 6—14; Kerr, op. át., pp. 99—142; Missionary Herald, CXVI (April 1920), pp. 165—166, 185—187, and (May 1920), pp. 211—212; Du Véou, op. át., p. 129; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 150—152.

4°

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Throughout the siege, the French had not been in direct contact with divisional headquarters in Adana. A number of Armenian legionnaires and native Armenians disguised as Muslims tried to pass through enemy lines, but only a few made it. Not until January 31 did General Dufieux receive firsthand accounts of the critical situation in Marash. He im­ mediately selected Lieutenant Colonel Robert Normand to direct a relief expedition and ordered reconnaissance flights by the first airplane he received from Beirut. The appearance of the plane over Marash gave fresh hope to the French, Americans, and Armenians and worried the insurgents, who had been unable to dislodge Major Corneloup’s com­ panies from the southern quarters commanding the approaches from Aintab and Islahie. On the night of February 7, Normand’s expedition fought its way into the city and the next day bombarded the Turkish positions, establishing liaison with Corneloup and then breaking through to Quérette’s headquarters in the north.42 The thanksgiving of the Armenian population was to be short lived. Claiming to have orders to evacuate the French garrison unless Quérette had the situation in hand within forty-eight hours, Normand took it upon himself to order Corneloup’s withdrawal from the southern quar­ ters. Though reluctant to relinquish positions that his men had stub­ bornly held for three weeks, Corneloup finally submitted to Normand’s insistent bidding. This accomplished, Normand met with Quérette to urge a full evacuation, explaining that General Dufieux had ordered that the security of the troops should be the paramount concern, fol­ lowed by the humanitarian consideration to protect the Christian and loyal Muslim elements as much as possible. When Quérette vacillated, Normand insisted that no more troops would arrive, that arms and am­ munition would soon be exhausted, and that the military situation could not justify risking the loss of the entire garrison for the sake of defending an isolated outpost.43 General Quérette, reasoning that Corneloup’s men had already been withdrawn in the south and that he had been forced to slaughter many mules and horses for food, acceded to the caveats of his subaltern and began preparations to depart. Ironically, at the time the decision to evac­ uate came, the Turks had sent emissaries to seek a cease-fire and terms of submission. Many of the chete bands were already leaving the city. But Quérette was not a resolute commander and found it difficult to order his men back to their abandoned positions. At 3 o’clock in the 42 Du Véou, op. át., pp. 126-129; Kerr, op. át., pp. 143—150; Du Hays, op. át., p. 243; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 152—153; FO 371/5044, E1803/3/44 enclosure; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 422/2, no. 112, Jan. 17, 1920. 43 Kerr, op. át., pp. 150-153,161—162; Du Véou, op. át., pp. 129—132; Colonel [Robert] Normand, Colonnes dans le Devant (Paris, 1924), p. 39; Du Hays, op. át., pp. 244—245.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

41

morning on February 11, the French columns moved out toward Islahie to the sound of the explosions of their remaining ammunition dumps.44 In order that their exit from the city not be prevented or hindered, the French tried to keep their evacuation a secret from Turks and Armeni­ ans alike. During the final hours before departure, however, the news spread rapidly among the Armenians in the American compound and other buildings near the French positions. Several thousand panicstricken Armenians fled into the night to escape with the retreating troops, but those who poured out of the Catholic cathedral to catch up with the columns after they had left the city were cut down by Turkish rifle and machine-gun fire. The Armenians of Marash had been aban­ doned.45 The four to five thousand Armenians who managed to flee the city soon found that the cup of misfortune continued to run over. During the three-day, 75-mile march to Islahie, hundreds of them lost the last measure of strength, first dropping their babes into the snow and shortly thereafter falling themselves. On the last day of the death march, a rag­ ing blizzard whipped the caravan from before dawn until after nightfall, turning hundreds of Armenians into snow-covered mounds. Through­ out the night of February 13 and into the next day, some 1,500 refugees straggled into Islahie, frozen and forlorn.46 The Marash affair spelled renewed tragedy for the Armenians, mo­ mentous victory for the Turkish Nationalists, and an end to any French designs to maintain long-term political control in Cilicia. French casu­ alties included 160 killed, 280 wounded, 170 missing, and 300 severely frostbitten. Even more damaging, those Muslim elements that had ini­ tially cooperated with the French now became aloof and began to listen to the message carried by the agents and emissaries of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The role of Colonel Normand in this decisive loss of French pres44 Brémond, op. át., p. 340; Du Véou, op. át., pp. 131—136; Kerr, op. át., pp. 157—162, 191—192; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 152—158. 45 Muré, op. át., pp. 15-17; Du Véou, op. át., pp. 136-138; Kerr, op. át., pp. 171—174. See also Rep. of Ann. Del. Archives, File 422/2, nos. 117, 121, 125—128, 131—132, Feb. 18-March4, 1920. 46 Brémond, op. át., p. 340; Du Hays, op. át., p. 245; Kerr, op. át., pp. 186-192; Muré, op. át., pp. 18—20; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 159—162; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 422/2, no. 140, March 24, 1920; FO 371/5044, E2120/3/44 enclosure, and 371/5047, E3675/ E4269/3/44. Du Véou, op. át., p. 139, gives the number of Christians who perished in the retreat as 3,000. See Dr. Elliot’s personal account, op. át., pp. 115—131. She states (pp. 129-130) that just when they could proceed no farther because of the blizzard, a train whisde was heard from Islahie: “There were some who began trying to run toward it. In the darkness there were screams, groans, calls of those suddenly separated from the mob. The last half-mile, I think, more people dropped and died than in any of the miles we had toiled over.... Hundreds of the refugees died in Islahai. What it must have been to them, the thousands who poured down on the litde station to find no shelter and to be helped by no last heroic efforts of exhausted men, I do not want to imagine.”

42

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

tige stirred deep controversy, as sources close to General Dufieux main­ tained that there had been no intention to evacuate Marash and that the commanding officer had been genuinely amazed to learn of the withdrawal. What was most disturbing was that the Turks had already shown signs of giving up the siege and seeking accommodation and that the massacre and immolation of thousands of Armenians had occurred under the eyes of an armed force of an Allied nation. Raising even greater suspicion and speculation, Dufieux was given to understand by General Gouraud’s headquarters in Beirut that Normand’s role in the Marash fiasco should be probed no further.47

The Reaction

Even before the French garrison had evacuated Marash, reports of the siege were relayed to Europe by American and Allied representatives. Prominent British relief official Harold Buxton, in Adana at the time, was among the first to telegraph that Marash was burning and Armenians were again being massacred.48 Bits and pieces of information came in from a variety of sources thereafter, some of them exaggerating the num­ ber of Armenians actually killed but all accurately portraying the seri­ ousness of the situation. The French were at first tight-lipped, then re­ assuring about the affair; internally, though, they were stunned. High Commissioner Jules-Albert Defrance made strong representations to the Constantinople government, protesting that the incursions were being organized from territory under jurisdiction of the Turkish authorities.49 On February 16, Lord Curzon instructed High Commissioner John Michael de Robeck, in making public the decision to leave Constanti­ nople to the Turks, to warn at the same time that “unless the massacres of Armenians and the attacks on Allied troops in Asia Minor cease im­ mediately, the peace terms will probably be modified to the detriment of Turkey.’’50

47 See especially Archives de l’Armée, 20N/1088, dossiers 2 and 3, and 20N/202, dossier 2. See also Du Véou, op. át., pp. 138-139, showing that the French had suffered 1,200 casualties and that 200 officers and men had one to four limbs amputated because of frostbite. The casualties among the Senegalese troops were inordinately high. Kerr, op. át., p. 196, calculates that nearly 12,000 Armenians perished in Marash or on the road to Islahie. 48 FO 371/5041, E32/3/44, de Robeck to Curzon, Feb. 10, 1920, enclosure. See also 37i/5o43. Ei 168/3/44. 49 FO 371/5041, E438/E468/E516/3/44. For the version of events as given out by the Turkish government, see Archives de l’Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, no. 31. See also Galip Kemalî Sôylemezoglu, Ba$tmtza gelenler: Yakin bir mazinin hâttralan, Mondrosdan-Mudanyaya, igi8—ig22 (Istanbul, 1939), pp. 179—182; Kemal, op. át., pp. 326-333. 50 British Documents, XIII, p. 2; FO 371/5041, E103/3/44.

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43

It was on the very same day that the London conference first addressed the Armenian question. During that discussion, Berthelot signaled a de­ parture in French policy regarding Cilicia. Responding to Curzon’s ref­ erence to the Marash massacres and the need for France to provide special protection for the Armenians on assuming a mandate over Cili­ cia, Berthelot admitted that a few French officers had been killed but insisted that Mustafa Kemal “was merely playing a game of bluff.” The situation might be serious if France planned to stay on, but “he wished categorically to state that the French Government did not intend per­ manently to occupy Cilicia, they intended eventually to withdraw, merely maintaining a certain control.”51 On February 17, before the conference appointed the commission to deal with the boundaries of Armenia, the future of Batum, and the pro­ tection of Christians in Cilicia, Berthelot laid out the French strategy, which was to gain most-favored-nation status in Cilicia but return the region to Turkish suzerainty. It was necessary, he began, to take into account the wishes of the Turkish population. This had already been done in regard to the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor. As to Cilicia, “the French Government were prepared to make considerable sacrifices, and he would state at once that they did not envisage annex­ ation now or in the future.... Further, France would see that Turkey exercised not merely a nominal sovereignty over the province, but she would retain a real sovereignty, subject, of course, always to the general financial and administrative control and the establishment of a native gendarmerie, with foreign instructors, to keep order.” Berthelot admit­ ted: “Possibly it might be true to say that France had reached her present decision on account of events which had recently occurred there.”52 Lloyd George responded that the French had come to “a sound conclu­ sion,” especially as Muslims outnumbered Christians three to one in Cilicia, but that France should not expect additional concessions else­ where.53 Curzon cautioned that the Allies were obliged to protect the Armenians of Cilicia and if the French withdrew summarily the Turks would be tempted to make “a clean sweep of all the remainder.” Ber­ thelot gave assurances that “the French troops would only be withdrawn from Cilicia after the treaty with Turkey had come into force, and after the guarantees laid down in the treaty had actually been applied.”54 51 British Documents, VII, pp. 82—83, 84—85. 52 Ibid., pp. 89-90,91. 53 Ibid., pp. 90-91. Lloyd George subsequently wrote that France and Italy desired eco­ nomic privileges more than territorial control in Turkey and that neither was really inter­ ested in the emancipation of subject peoples. See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, II (London, 1938), pp. 1273—1282. 54 British Documents, VII, pp. 93—94.

44

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Protection of the Armenians in Cilicia came up from time to time during the next several days, especially in connection with a proposed tripartite agreement on French, Italian, and British zones of economic priority in Turkey.55 Curzon expressed concern that the massacres of Armenians in Cilicia would continue after the French withdrew unless there were some direct guarantees: “It would be impossible to leave the Allies open to the charge that they were taking all they could out of these countries, putting money in their pockets, and leaving the Arme­ nians to be killed.’’56 Berthelot reiterated France’s commitment to pro­ tect the 150,000 Armenians in Cilicia but added that what was needed was “some honest, straightforward formula which could not be inter­ preted to mean that France intended permanently to retain Cilicia on the pretext of safeguarding the Armenians.”57 The following decisions were ultimately adopted on February 27 and formalized on March 3, 1920: It was ... agreed that the obligation of protecting the Armenians in Cilicia from persecution and massacre was one that devolved naturally upon the Allied Power at the present time in military occupation of that area, namely France. Any one of the Great Powers who enjoys special economic interests in any part of the Turkish Empire shall accept therewith the responsibility for supervising the provisions of the treaty with regard to the protection of minorities in that area.58

By the latter part of February, newspapers were printing the grisly details of the Marash debacle. Pointed questions were being asked in European legislatures, and protest meetings were taking place in many cities. The British Armenia Committee, headed by Member of Parlia­ ment Aneurin Williams, held the Allies responsible, as the massacre had occurred fifteen months after the complete defeat of Turkey and under the eyes of Allied troops. The committee demanded swift action to arm the Armenians for self-defense, dispatch reinforcements to prevent a recurrence, and establish a mandatory administration in Cilicia “without any interference or suzerainty of Turkey, and over a territory extending up to the frontier of the Armenian Republic.”59 Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar made the rounds to all the Allied delegations, and Patri­ arch Zaven elicited statements of compassion and concern from King 55 Ibid., pp. 99-102, 128-133, 164-173, 191, 257-262. 56 Ibid., p. 171. 57 Ibid., p. 172. 58 Ibid., pp. 285, 381. 59 See, for example, FO 371/5041—5042, E102/E230/E275/E284/E315/E667/E716/ E1048/E1055/3/44, and 371/5209—5210, E1703/E4026/1214/44. On the British Ar­ menia Committee, see Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915—1923 (Lon­ don and Sydney, and New York, 1984), pp. 44-57.

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George, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and other prominent figures.60 The Marash affair, Mustafa Kemal’s increasing influence over the Turk­ ish government, and the alarming reports of the Allied high commis­ sioners at Constantinople made it clear that a show of Allied force would be necessary to compel the Turks to acquiesce in the onerous terms of peace. David Lloyd George and Lord Curzon thus used Marash as an excuse to propose formal Allied occupation of the Ottoman capital. The French and Italians reacted coolly. Berthelot admitted a setback at Mar­ ash, but he ascribed it to logistical difficulties and the inexperience of young officers. Moreover, the earlier casualty figures were being revised downward—no more than 5,000 Armenians had died—and the French command was taking steps to restore order. It was right to hold the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) responsible because of the linkage between Mustafa Kemal and the authorities in Constantinople, but threatening to expel the Turks from their capital would be excessive. Ambassador Imperiali added that “nothing could be more dangerous than to make a threat which the Allies would not afterwards be prepared to carry out.’’61 The prime ministers, foreign ministers, and ambassadors met joindy as the Allied Supreme Council for the next several days, during which Lloyd George was again animated by the possibility of expelling the Turks from Europe. There was no use discussing spheres of influence, Armenian boundaries, or the protection of minorities, he insisted, if such agreements were to be flouted. Something dramatic had to be done. Since the time of Sultan Abdul-Hamid, the Turks had shown that they would resist if they thought the Europeans did not mean business. The recent massacres of Armenians had aroused the civilized world, and the Turks had to be taught a lesson. Prime Minister Nitti, intimating the need to soften the peace terms, expressed the wish that the conference could have somehow encouraged Sultan Mehmed (Vahideddin) to resist the Nationalists, but he was coaxed along by the admonitions of Lloyd George and Curzon. Berthelot and Cambon likewise advised caution yet were occasionally carried away by the vision of breaking Turkish resis­ tance with one grand display of Allied power.62 Despite the uneasiness of the Italian and French leaders, the Supreme Council agreed on March 5 to have Curzon draft a dispatch to the Allied high commissioners in Constantinople. The commissioners were to re­ port on what appropriate action might be taken—such as the occupation 60 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 105/4, Patvirakutiun, 191g t.: Hushagrer, and Files 118/17, 132/31,334/4, 422/2; FO 371/5209-5210, E1214/E5483/E5613/1214/ 44, and 371/5041-5042, E357/E710/3/44. 61 British Documents, VII, pp. 291—296. See also FO 371/5042, E725/E1001/3/44. 62 British Documents, VII, pp. 297—299, 300-306, 358—364, 377—379.

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of key government offices or possibly even the arrest of the grand vizier and minister of war—in order to prevent a repetition of the “atrocious crimes” in Cilicia and to avoid the old ineffectual procedure of diplo­ matic notes.63 Curzon also wrote British High Commissioner de Robeck separately to explain that the Supreme Council favored the formal oc­ cupation of Constantinople, with an admonition to the Turkish govern­ ment that this state would continue until the peace treaty was signed and executed and that the terms would be made even more severe if there were any further outrages.64 The Allied high commissioners responded that the tragedy in Cilicia, however deplorable, should not become the basis for punitive action in Constantinople, as that would serve more as an irritant than a deterrent. The Allies should face the larger issue of a Turkish Nationalist rejectionist front. If the European powers were intent on imposing drastic terms of peace, they should try to forestall and diminish the anticipated resistance by fortifying themselves in Constantinople. De Robeck re­ ported that the Italian high commissioner “refused flatly to associate himself with proposal to recommend occupation of Constantinople” and “appeared to hope that Conference might alleviate peace terms, even after first presenting them to Turks sufficiently to make them ac­ ceptable to many adherents and some leaders of nationalist movement.” His French colleague, too, wished to reiterate the advantages of relatively lenient peace terms. If there was to be an occupation of Constantinople, however, it should include not only the war ministry but also the post and telegraph, as well as control over the police and gendarmerie. Un­ fortunately, the brunt of the Turkish reaction was likely to fall on Chris­ tians in the interior.65 As the Supreme Council moved closer to sanctioning the occupation, Allied military experts were brought into the deliberations. Minister of War Winston Churchill, faced with rapid demobilization and an end to military conscription, strongly counseled against a formal occupation. The Allies already controlled Constantinople, and the contemplated measures would have no salutary effect on the Nationalists in Anatolia. Churchill even suggested that the time may have arrived for the Allies to address Mustafa Kemal, “the real master of the Turkish forces.”66 Buoyed up by the assurances of Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Ve­ nizelos that if necessary his country could put nearly 100,000 men in 6S Ibid., pp. 411—423; Cab 24/154, Foreign Countries Reports, no. 12, March 10, 1920, enclosure. See also FO 371/5042, E719/E864/3/44. 64 FO 371/5042, E946/3/44 enclosure. 65 British Documents, XIII, pp. 9—10; FO 371/5042, E1058/3/44, de Robeck to Curzon, March 5, 1920. See also 371/5043, E1297/3/44. 66 British Documents, VII, pp. 453—454.

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the field to enforce the treaty, Lloyd George overruled his military spe­ cialists and cajoled his French and Italian colleagues by declaring that although inter-Allied collaboration was most desirable, Great Britain was prepared to act alone if necessary. On March 10 the three powers reached agreement to proceed with the operation and gave appropriate instructions to the high commissioners.67 The decision came at the time of another cabinet crisis in Turkey. Italian and French officials in Constantinople, as if to disassociate their governments from the stringent British position, let it be known to the new grand vizier, Salih Pasha, that action was imminent, and information was even leaked to the local Turkish press. These forewarnings, however, did not impair General George F. Milne, commander of the British Army of the Black Sea, who seized all objectives on the morning of March 16 with no more than token resistance. The arrest of Nationalist sympa­ thizers put to flight scores of Turkish leaders, who now sought safety across the Bosporus in the sphere of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.68 Just before the Allied high commissioners learned of the Supreme Council’s deci­ sion to order the occupation, they reported their assessment of the prob­ able consequences of a harsh treaty in view of the turn of events since the Mudros Armistice (1918): “First, a refusal by Turkey to sign the treaty or to ratify it if it is signed or to execute it if it is ratified. Second, the abdication or deposition of the Sultan, the accession of a new Sultan, and the creation of a new Government in Asia, the flight of Parliament to Anatolia, the rising of the whole of the Turkish elements and wide­ spread massacre of Christians in Asia Minor and Thrace. As soon as the stipulations of the treaty become known there is a danger that these consequences, and in particular the massacres, will at once ensue.”69 Fulfillment of the prediction began in short order. Within less than a month, Salih Pasha’s cabinet had fallen, and Damad Ferid Pasha was back as grand vizier. At the head of an unpopular cabinet, he immedi­ ately tried to rid the capital of Nationalist collaborators, leading to the dispersal of what remained of the Ottoman Parliament.70 Now Mustafa Kemal was afforded the moral justification to declare the sultan-caliph a hostage and to create a countergovernment and legislature in Angora 67 Ibid,., pp. 416, 450-457. See also XIII, pp. 10-11, 25—26. 68 For correspondence relating to preparations for and the actual occupation of strategic sites and offices in Constantinople, see FO 371/5042-5045, File 3/44 for February and March 1920, especially E2781/3/44 enclosures; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/168, dossier 1, Feb.-April 1920 passim. See also British Documents, XIII, pp. 38—40, 43—47; Kinross, op. át., pp. 232-241; Helmreich, op, tit., pp. 277—283. 69 British Documents, VII, p. 500. 70Jaschke and Pritsch, op. át., pp. 29-30; Kinross, op. át., pp. 240-241; Ahmet Cevat Emre, Iki neslin tarihi: Mustafa Kemal neleryapti ([Istanbul], i960), pp. 265—270; FO 371/ 5045, E2635/E2636/E2746/E2822/3/44.

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(Ankara). In April 1920 dual government became an established fact, compounding the distress of the Allied Powers and further jeopardizing the formation of a united Armenian state.

Sidestepping to the League of Nations

While the Supreme Council arranged for punitive measures in Constan­ tinople, public clamor over the Marash massacre heightened. The ques­ tions and criticisms in Parliament brought Earl Curzon of Kedleston to the House of Lords on March 11 to listen to James Bryce and the Arch­ bishop of Canterbury denounce the Turkish record of misgovernment and remind the Allies of their responsibilities to the Armenians. For an hour, Bryce reviewed the century of bloodshed endured by the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, the sinister designs of the Young Turks, especially former war minister Enver and former interior minister Talaat, to eliminate the Armenians, and the deplorable failure of the Allies to enforce the terms of the armistice and alleviate Armenian suf­ fering by repatriating the refugees and swiftly settling the Eastern ques­ tion.71 The renewed defiance of the Turks had led to the terrible slaugh­ ter at Marash: The massacres are simply a resumption of the old policy of extermination. They are designed to get rid of the Christian population of Cilicia. When the fate of Cilicia was to come to be decided, people would ask what was the population of Cilicia; and the object of the Turks was, of course, to have no Christians there. The simplest way of doing that was to kill them all. They had killed an enormous number in 1915, but enough were left to oblige them to recognise that there was a Christian population, and they wanted to get rid even of that.... The Turkish way is first to create a solitude by a slaughter and then pronounce it peace—because the country is empty.72

During the war, Bryce continued, Enver and Talaat had surpassed even Abdul-Hamid by annihilating a million Armenians in order to cre­ ate a homogeneous Turkey. There was no more doubt about the system­ atic massacres than there was about the Batde of the Mame. The Allies were obliged to live up to their admonition of the previous June to the Turkish government that it could no longer rule over subject peoples. The Allies were honor-bound to “redeem the promises they have given.” The Turkish state, Bryce continued, should not extend beyond the Tau­ rus and Anti-Taurus mountains, and Cilicia should be freed uncondi­ tionally from Turkish rule. If the French had changed their minds about 71 Great Britain, The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Lords, XXXIX (London, 1920), cols. 394-433. 72 Ibid., cols. 398—399.

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taking a mandate there, every effort should be made to have a secondary power or the League of Nations itself assume responsibility. He con­ cluded: “Many of us felt that the late war, with all its sorrows and calam­ ities, would have at least this one compensation, that it would bring about the future peace and safety of the Christian populations in the East, and give a chance of regaining for civilisation what had been some of civilisation’s earliest hopes.... Never did justice and humanity make a stronger and clearer appeal to any nation to put forth its strength for good.’’7’ In an equally lengthy speech in response, Lord Curzon concurred that the history of Turkish rule was “a long and dismal tale, without respite and without repentance.” His Majesty’s Government was doing every­ thing possible to guarantee the safety and collective future of the Ar­ menian people. It had to be noted, however, that the Armenians had long been a minority in Cilicia, that neither the British nor the French could have supervised a general disarmament in the region with the forces available for service there, and that the ill-advised use of Algerian, Senegalese, and Armenian troops by the French and the retreat in bliz­ zard conditions had contributed to the Marash tragedy. The French were sending strong reinforcements to restore order, and the Allies were pre­ paring to take joint punitive action.74 Curzon continued that the suggestion to place Cilicia under a man­ date of the League of Nations did not seem practical, as that body had barely been set up and existed only on “sound intentions and prestige” rather than force. It was true that the French wanted to limit their re­ sponsibilities in Cilicia but in all events “they have entered into definite obligations to protect the Armenians there, and that obligation I am certain they have not the slightest intention of evading.” As to the future Armenian state, Curzon explained that some favored a large country with as much territory as possible, whereas others called for a compact nation. In defending the peace conference’s decision to contract the Armenian boundaries, he explained: “The real test between the two solutions is what is the more likely to survive.” It could not be forgotten that great numbers of Armenians had been massacred and the rest scat­ tered as refugees; that Turkish Armenia had not been evacuated by the Turkish armies and had now become a center of Nationalist activity; and that there would be very serious difficulties in reclaiming and repopu­ lating the territories in question. Based on ethnographic, geographic, strategic, and economic considerations and with the goal of peace be­ tween Armenia and its Muslim neighbors, a smaller state with an outlet7 7S Ibid., cols. 400-409. M Ibid., cols. 410-413.

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on the Black Sea had been decided upon. In a seeming contradiction, Curzon then suggested that, in the absence of the United States as a mandatory for Armenia, it might be desirable to place the new country under the protection of the League of Nations: “Armenia is really an international interest, and it ought not to fall to the duty or to the charge of an individual State to be solely responsible for this people in the future. Their sufferings have touched the whole world.’’75 The Armenian problem weighed heavily on the Allied leaders, who had made so many public pledges on the subject. Searching for means to lighten this burden, Curzon on the day following his speech in the House of Lords picked up on Berthelot’s earlier suggestion to ask the League of Nations to help in the rehabilitation and defense of the Ar­ menians. The British foreign secretary reiterated the view that in the absence of an American mandate the League should accept responsi­ bility for Armenia and that an inquiry should be addressed to the Coun­ cil of the League about what steps it might take to build up the Armenian army to defend the state. Cambon was skeptical, but he and Italian For­ eign Minister Scialoja agreed that Curzon could raise the issue with the League Council, then meeting in Paris.75 76 In his dispatch to that body, Curzon explained that the Supreme Council, in accordance with the pledges repeatedly made by the Allied and Associated Powers during and after the war, had decided that Ar­ menia would be constituted as a free and independent state. Because no power was yet willing to accept the mandate for Armenia, the Su­ preme Council considered it desirable that the League of Nations take the country under its general protection. The existing Armenian army would have to be reorganized and built up for the defense needs of the country. Armenian representatives were requesting foreign officers and volunteers if regular forces were not available, as well as military and civil advisers. Although the Allies were taking some action to meet these needs, it was felt that the League of Nations was best suited to make public appeals to provide the country with means for self-defense and to promote its economic development. The League’s cooperation was deemed essential to the establishment of peace in the East.77 In Paris, the Council of the League was taken by surprise. It was dom­ inated by the same powers that made up the Allied Supreme Council; the individuals representing the Allied governments on the League Council could not accept commitments that the Supreme Council itself was unwilling to undertake. The irony of the situation escaped no one. 75 Ibid,., cols. 413—418. 76 British Documents, VII, pp. 477—479. 77 FO 371/4953, Ei 457/134/58; League of Nations, Procès-Verbal of the Third Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Geneva, 1920), p. 33.

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The British, French, and Italian representatives—Arthur Balfour, Léon Bourgeois, and Tomasso Tittoni, respectively—voiced doubts about the wisdom of accepting the obligation in view of the League’s lack of an international military force and its manifold other duties. Tittoni stated bluntly that the Allied Powers, not the League of Nations, had the means to act in this matter. Nonetheless, because the League Council under­ stood the importance of the Armenian case in the context of the overall goals of the League of Nations, it refrained from giving a clear-cut negative response. Instead, Secretary-General Eric Drummond was in­ structed to obtain more information and apprise the Supreme Council of the League’s reservations.78 In his reply to the Supreme Council, Drummond drew attention to the fact that the League had no military force. Moreover, he noted, acceptance of obligations such as those implied by Curzon would require the assent of the League of Nations Assembly, which had not yet been summoned for its first session. The League Council was nonetheless prepared to consider the issue again at its next meeting, scheduled for Rome at the end of April, or at an earlier special session, if desired.79 Balfour wrote Curzon and the British Foreign Office on March 16 that it was unreasonable to expect the League to take responsibility for the protection of a still undefined Armenian state: As regards the suggestion that the League of Nations should become in fact the mandatory for Armenia it is evident that as yet, and probably for a long time to come, the League of Nations is not and cannot be adequately equipped to carry out duties which may well prove to be of the most onerous kind.... The League of Nations have no resources, nor have they at present the machinery for creating them. And there is a serious danger that if they were to undertake a responsi­ bility, which powerful and well organised states apparently shrink from accepting, they will break down under the strain.80

In the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors that same day, Curzon reported on the League’s response, which he termed very reasonable and encouraging, and urged that all available information be gathered and communicated forthwith so that the matter might be taken up at a special meeting of the League Council. The French and Italian representatives expressed doubts about the ability of the League to assume the suggested responsibilities under its existing structure but, unwilling to commit their own governments to those obligations, went along with Curzon’s proposal.81 78 League of Nations, Third Session of the Council, pp. 16—19. 79 Cab 24/104, C.P. 1186. See also FO 371 ƒ4953, E1704/134/58, Philip H. Kerr to FO, enclosure, March 15, 1920. 80 Cab 24/100, C.P. 898. 81 British Documents, VII, pp. 507—508.

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Without losing any time, Robert Vansittart summoned Aharonian, Boghos Nubar, and Patriarch Zaven for a third meeting with the Ar­ menia Commission. There, Vansittart revealed the plan to place Arme­ nia directly under the supervision of the League and requested swift provision of information about Armenia’s financial, military, and ad­ ministrative needs. When asked by Aharonian as to what territory should be considered in compiling the information, Vansittart replied that he was not at liberty to divulge exact boundaries, but he let it be known that Erzerum, Mamakhatun, Mush, Bitlis, and Van would be included. The Armenian delegates, having already read in French and British newspapers about the “confidential” appeal of the Supreme Council to the League, voiced concern about the proposed shift of responsibility but agreed to submit the data requested.82* As the Armenian representatives prepared their response, sharp dif­ ferences arose between Aharonian, who tried to preserve maximum independence for the Armenian government, and Boghos Nubar and Patriarch Zaven, who argued that Armenian inexperience in self-govern­ ment necessitated broad foreign supervision and aid. The differences were resolved in compromises worked out by legal experts Movses S. Ajemian, former deputy in the Russian State Duma, and Hovhannes Khan Massehian, former ambassador of Persia to Germany. The mem­ orandum, submitted to Vansittart on March 20, stated that the Delega­ tion of Integral Armenia had always favored the protection and advice afforded through the mandatory system and, although disappointed that a major power had not come forward to assume that role, was now willing to accept direct supervision of the League of Nations. This plan could be implemented either under Article X of the League Covenant, guar­ anteeing the territorial integrity of member states against external ag­ gression (in which case Armenia should immediately be admitted to the League), or under Article XXII, which related to mandates. In the latter case, a mandatory regime to direct the work of organization and recon­ struction should be established for a period of twenty years, with up to two five-year renewals if needed. The League would exercise its man­ datory powers through a resident high commissioner and advisers, pref­ erably all of the same nationality. The advisers could draft bills and propose administrative measures, which would be studied by the appropriate state ministry and passed on with observations to the council of ministers for submission to the legislature. The high commissioner would moderate differences between the advisers and the ministers. There was a particular need for assistance in finance justice, and military 82 Aharonian, op. át., pp. 51—52; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 133/32, Aharonian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 17, 1920.

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affairs, and presumably the League of Nations would solicit the help of its member states in addressing these questions.83 Additional memoranda prepared by General Korganian outlined the responsibilities of a proposed foreign military mission to Armenia. The chief of the force would also be the adviser to the minister of military affairs. With his staff he would direct the growth of the Armenian army from 25,000 to a minimum of 40,000 men and offer instruction partic­ ularly in the specializations of artillery, aviation, radio-telegraph, and military and armored vehicles. The plan for a phased occupation of the Western Armenian territories entailed gradual advances from Kars and Sarikamish toward Erzerum, Mamakhatun, Khnus, Mush, and Bitlis and from Igdir to Bayazit, Diadin, Malazkert, Aijesh, and Van. The full op­ eration, including the phased repatriation of refugees, would require 25,000 men under arms and various auxiliary forces. Allied control of­ ficers would supervise the operation, which would benefit greatly from the prestige afforded by the Allied presence.84 In relaying these memo­ randa to League Secretary-General Drummond, Vansittart wrote with satisfaction: “You will see that they ask far much less than expected, at least far less than I had expected. Indeed the request is a moderate one.”85 The Armenians, too, were pleased with the support and sympa­ thy shown in London. In reports to Erevan, Aharonian and Korganian contrasted the cordial atmosphere in London with the cold indifference in Paris.86

Batum and the Armenia Commission

The new developments in the Armenian case and the question of Batum necessitated some rethinking by the Armenia Commission. Since Feb­ ruary, when the commission had submitted its first report, the Georgian delegation had repeatedly petitioned against the partition of Batum province and insisted on the incorporation of all of Ajaría into the Geor­ gian republic. The Georgians offered guarantees regarding transit priv­ ileges for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the entire international trading com­ munity. Ways could be found to give Armenia direct railway access to the port without violating the territorial integrity of Georgia.87 In an attempt to force the issue, in March the Georgian government sent armed detachments from Ardahan across the provincial border into88 88 Ibid. 84 See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 118/17 an April 30, 1920.

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and Soldiers’ Deputies; 4) all current functionaries would retain their posts and only persons holding positions of high responsibility would be replaced; 5) the newly formed revolutionary government would guar­ antee the life and property of members of the existing cabinet and leg­ islature; 6) the revolutionary government would take measures to pre­ vent the entry of the Red Army under war conditions; and 7) the new government would resist all outside forces, from whatever quarter, striv­ ing to extinguish the independence of Azerbaijan.25 The temporary military revolutionary committee took over most gov­ ernment buildings shortly after midnight. By that time, Khan Khoiskii and other compromised officials had already departed on the last trains for Tiflis. The Azerbaijani Revkom welcomed the first Soviet armored train in Baku before dawn on April 28, 1920, and on the same day proclaimed the creation of the Azerbaijani Socialist Soviet Republic. Na­ riman Narimanov was named to preside over the Revkom and the Coun­ cil of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), with Mirza Davud Huseinov as foreign affairs commissar and Hamid Sultanov as internal affairs com­ missar. Azerbaijan had been sovietized in a bloodless coup.26 Two telegrams were dispatched to Lenin that day. The first read: “Bas­ ing itself on the will of the revolutionary Baku proletariat and the peas­ antry of all Azerbaijan, the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Com­ munist Party declares the treacherous, criminal, counter-revolutionary government of the Musavat Party to be overthrown.”27 The second was 25 Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhane, pp. 461—462; Swietochowski, op. át., p. 182. See also FO 371/4943, E8125/1/58 enclosure. There were three abstentions and no deputies opposed to the transfer of power, according to Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Azerbaidzhana, p. 327. 26 Zhvaniia, op. cit., p. 259; Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, III, pp. 459—460; Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 106—107; Swietochowski, op. át., pp. 183—184. See also Mirza-Bala, op. át., pp. 194—196. Pending Narimanov’s arrival from Russia, the Azerbaijani Revkom was headed by Hu­ seinov. Other members of the Revkom included Hazanfar (G. A.) Musabekov, Abid Alimov, Ali Haidar Karaev, and Hamid Sultanov. The composition of the first Sovnarkom of Azer­ baijan was as follows: Narimanov, president and foreign affairs; Sultanov, internal affairs; Jingiz Ildrym, military and naval affairs; Karaev, labor and justice; Musabekov, agriculture, commerce, industry, and provisions; Huseinov, finance and acting in foreign affairs; Dadash Buniatzade, education and state control; Jamil Vezirov, post, telegraph, roads; Alimov, health and welfare. See Bor'ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhane, p. 463; Istoriia Azer­ baidzhana, p. 230. Huseinov soon formally assumed the position of commissar for foreign affairs. For biographical sketches of members of the Revkom and other prominent Bol­ sheviks in Azerbaijan, see Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Azerbaidzhana—Filial Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Aktivnye bortsy za Sovetskuiu vlast’v Azerbaidzhane (Baku, 1957), especially pp. 13—17 (Narimanov), 45—47 (Buniatzade), 56-58 (Musabekov), 59— 61 (Sultanov), 64-66 (Karaev), 79-80 (Huseinov), 226-227 (Ildrym). 27 Kazemzadeh, op. át., p. 284. See also Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, III, p. 462; Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSR, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, II (Moscow, 1958), p. 327-

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intended to provide ex post facto justification for the invasion by the Red Army: The Provisional Military Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijani Soviet Independent Republic, having assumed power by the will of the revolutionary Baku proletariat and the toiling peasantry of Azerbaijan, proclaims the old Musavatist government traitors to the people and enemies of the independence of the country, and breaks all relations with the Entente as well as with other ene­ mies of Soviet Russia. Not being able to withstand with its own forces the united pressure of the bands of the external and the internal counter-revolutions, the Military Revolutionary Committee offers the Government of the Russian Soviet Republic to enter into a fraternal union for a common struggle against world imperialism. We beg you to give us immediately real help by sending here de­ tachments of the Red Army.28

The Red Army, of course, was already in Baku, and its numbers in­ creased on April 30 with the arrival of the 3 2d Rifle Division, accom­ panied by Sergei Kirov and Sergo Ordzhonikidze. The embracing com­ rades celebrated their stunning victory with much fanfare. During the next several days, Red Army detachments spread out into all the major cities of Azerbaijan. The first armored train reached Ganja on May 1 and Kazakh on the following day. By May 5, Red Army units were at the frontier at the Poili bridge, coming face to face with the armed forces of the Republic of Georgia.29 Revolutionary committees were organized throughout the country under the supervision of the internal affairs commissariat. And in Shushi, Khosrov Bek Sultanov, donning the color red, now declared himself the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee of Red Karabagh.30 28 Kazemzadeh, op. át., p. 284. See also Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR, III, pp. 462— 466; Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhana, pp. 462—463 and, for the Revkom’s appeal to the people of Azerbaijan, pp. 478—479. 29 IstoriiaAzerbaidzhana, p. 223; Ocherkiistorii Kommunisticheskoipartii Azerbaidzhana, p. 328; Tokarzhevskii, op. át., pp. 267—268. Already on April 23, 1920, the Caucasus Army com­ mand had ordered General Levandovskii to occupy not only the province of Baku but the whole of Azerbaijan. See Mnatsakanian, op. át., pp. 88—89. For details on the Eleventh Army’s advance into Baku and the rest of Azerbaijan, see Kadishev, op. át., pp. 247—261. On May 4, Kirov and Ordzhonikidze reported to Lenin that Turkish soldiers and officers had played an important role in the revolution in Baku. See A. N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia Rossiia i sopredel’nye strany Vostoka v gody grazhdanskoi voiny (igi8—ig2o) (Moscow, 1964), pp. 108— 109. 90 Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Azerbaidzhana—Filial Instituía Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, K istorii obvazovaniia Nagomo-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, igi8—ig2^:Dokumenty i materialy, ed. D. P. Gulieva (Baku, 1989), pp. 42—46; Bor’ba, May 22:4, 1920; Haradj, May 25:3, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 55; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no. 109, May 22, 1920; Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 160161; Arsen Mikayelian, “Gharabaghi verdjin depkere,” Hairenik Amsagir, I (Oct. 1923), p. 125-

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During the following months, the relationship between Soviet Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan was formalized through a series of agreements and treaties. In September 1920 the two sides entered into an economic and military union. The treaty protocols provided for the unification of armed forces, finances, foreign trade, transportation, and post and tel­ egraph. A representative of the Azerbaijani Communist Party was to serve on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In this way, the concept of “national in form and socialist [Soviet] in content” was given practical application.31

The Armenian Reaction News of the coup in Baku swept over the Caucasus with extraordinary rapidity. The immediate reaction in Armenia was slightly optimistic, as the Armenians tended to place more hope on Russia, whether White or Red, than on Turkey, whether Anatolian or Azerbaijani. It was true that the Dashnaktsutiun was ideologically opposed to Bolshevism and re­ garded Armenian Bolsheviks with particular disdain, but Lenin and the Sovnarkom had made many pronouncements about the right of selfdetermination with specific reference to the Armenians. Moreover, Ar­ menia’s Western orientation had still to bear tangible results. Aside from professions of goodwill and the shipment of American flour, the Allied Powers had done litde to repatriate and rehabilitate the refugee masses, to settle the enervating territorial disputes in Transcaucasia, and to give substance to a united Armenian state. In any case, the entrance of the Red Army into Azerbaijan made it imperative to seek a modus vivendi with Soviet Russia. On April 29, the day following the bloodless transfer of power at Baku, the Armenian government selected a parliamentary delegation to pro­ ceed to Moscow for negotiations. In announcing that decision in Parlia­ ment on April 30, Prime Minister Khatisian stated that, although the Republic of Armenia was neutral in the Russian civil war, it could not ignore the important changes that were occurring and desired peaceful, normal relations with Russia. The European powers had shown a will­ ingness to negotiate with Soviet Russia, and the Armenian republic, too, needed to determine the disposition of the Sovnarkom. Based on pre­ vious Soviet decrees and the fact that Armenian representatives were operating under the Armenian flag throughout Russia, the Republic had grounds to expect official recognition by the Sovnarkom. Yet disturbing ” Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III (Moscow, 1959), pp. 222—224; Iu- V- Kliuchnikov and A. Saban in, eds., Mezhdunarodnaia politika noveishego uremeni v dogpvorakh, notakh i deklaratsiiakh, III, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1928), p. 64. See also P. A. Azizbekova, V. I. Lenin i sotsialisticheskiepveobrazovaniia v Azerbaidzhane (ig2O—ig2$ gg.) (Moscow, 1962), pp. 91—92.

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word had just arrived about the appearance at Evlakh of Red Army de­ tachments under orders to advance over Karabagh and Nakhichevan to establish contact with Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish Nationalists. The govern­ ment was making inquiry with both Baku and Moscow as to the purpose of this military concentration and requesting measures to forestall any unfortunate misunderstanding.32 Khatisian had reference to a radiogram dispatched on April 29 by his foreign minister, Hamazasp Ohandjanian, to Azerbaijani Revkom chair­ man Nariman Narimanov asking that the new revolutionary government renounce the aggressive policies of the former Musavat government and withdraw all Azerbaijani armed forces from Karabagh. The district’s workers and peasants, in eight consecutive assemblies, had clearly ex­ pressed their will to join Armenia. The Musavat policy of using sword and fire to coerce the Armenian villagers to submit should be repudiated by the new worker-villager government of Azerbaijan, which had en­ dorsed the principle of the free will of the people and had branded the erstwhile Musavat government as “a traitor to the interests of the work­ ing class.” All Azerbaijani troops in or en route to Karabagh and Zangezur should be recalled immediately.33 A similar message was dis­ patched the next day to Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Grigorii Chicherin, with the reminder that Lenin and the All-Russian Soviet had acknowledged Armenia’s right to self-determination, including indepen­ dence. The continuing acts of aggression in Karabagh by elements claim­ ing to be part of the Red Army were therefore incomprehensible.34 Armenia’s diplomatic notes were rich in innuendo, but the Azerbai­ jani Revkom left no doubt as to where it stood on the issue when it decided on April 29, just a day after taking power, that Karabagh and Zangezur should be occupied by force of arms. The Azerbaijani army was to come under the supervision of the Eleventh Red Army and re­ organize on the basis of a worker-peasant army. All units in the Ganja and Zakatal districts were placed under the command of General Javad Bek Shikhlinskii, whereas the units in Karabagh were to operate on or­ ders directly from Eleventh Army headquarters.35 * Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 66a/ 3, no. 95, May 5,1920. The minutes of the eighty­ sixth session of Parliament (April 30) are reprinted in Simon Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), pp. 454—459. M Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 19; Haradj, May 5:1—2, 1920. M Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no. 94, May 4, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/412, p. 28, and 200/1/581, p. 24; Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:2, 1920; Haradj, May 1:3, 1920. See also Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Armenii, Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri SM Respubliki Armeniia, Kafedra Istorii Armianskogo Naroda Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Nagomyi Karabakh v igi8—ig23 gg: Sbomik dokumentw i materialov, ed. V. A. Mikayelian et al. (Erevan, 1992), pp. 443—444. Some sources give the date of the radiogram to Chicherin as May 1. 35 Bor'ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Azerbaidzhano, pp. 481—482. See also K istorii obrazovaniia Nagomo-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, p. 42.

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Any hopes the Armenians might still have held regarding the dispo­ sition of Soviet Azerbaijan were dispelled by an ultimatum from Acting Foreign Affairs Commissar Huseinov on April 30: “The worker-peasant government of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic, through its Revolution­ ary Committee, demands that first, you clear your forces from the ter­ ritory of Karabagh and Zangezur, second, withdraw to your boundaries, third, cease the interethnic massacre. In the contrary event, the Azer­ baijani Socialist Soviet Republic’s Revolutionary Committee will regard itself in a state of war with the Republic of Armenia. Three days are given for an answer to the ultimatum.”36 Receipt of the ominous telegram on the morning of May 1 was followed a few hours later by a second ulti­ matum issued in the name of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front and signed by G. K. Ordzhonikidze, S. M. Kirov, council member K. A. Mekhanoshin, and Eleventh Army commander M. K. Levandovskii. The worker-peasant government of Russia was supporting the establishment of a similar administration in Azerbaijan, yet the inter­ racial conflict between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, provoked by England and the Dashnak and Musavat parties, played to the advantage of those who would continue to exploit the laboring classes of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was imperative that all boundary disputes should now be settled by the will of the working population, and there could be no more internecine bloodshed. “In the name of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, I am proposing to the government of Armenia to cease immediately all military operations within Soviet Azerbaijan and to take its troops out of those boundaries. This action must be effected within twenty-four hours of the receipt of this telegram. Failure to comply with this demand shall be considered a declaration of war against the R.S.F.S.R. [Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic]. In that event, the forces of the Red Army shall effectuate the proposal and the responsibility for the consequences shall fall on the Armenian government.”37 Ohandjanian replied to Ordzhonikidze on May 2, pointing out that there had at no time been any Armenian soldiers on Azerbaijani terri36 Armenia Archives, 200/1/271, p. 203, 200/1/529, pp. 33, 35, 200/1/581, pp. 22— 23, and 200/2/85, p. 5; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, no. 161, File 660/3, no94, May 4, 1920, and File 67/3«, Huseinov’s no. 161, April 30, 1920. 37 Armenia Archives, 200/1/412, p. 36, 200/1/427^. 274, 200/1/529, p. 36, and 200/ 1/581, p. 25; K istorii obrazovaniia Nagpmo-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, p. 41; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 9/9 and File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Evangulov, May 2, 1920; US Archives, RG 59, 760J.90C/5/6, and RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 800, Moser to Secretary of State, May 4,1920, enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 3, Corbel’s no. 163, May 1, 1920, and 20N/141, dossier 3, Report of June 1, 1920; FO 371/4939, E5778/1/58, Luke to FO, May 5, 1920, enclosure; Haradj, May 4:2, 1920; Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:2, 1920.

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tory. On the contrary, the army of Musavat Azerbaijan had violated the boundaries of Armenian Karabagh and had tried to subject the popu­ lation with sword and fire. Ordzhonikidze, as the head of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front, should require the new government of Azerbaijan to remove its armed forces and allow the peo­ ple of Karabagh to express their will for the ninth time.38 In an imme­ diate follow-up message, Ohandjanian drew attention to the fact that the issues raised by Ordzhonikidze would be taken up during the impending negotiations between the Republic of Armenia and the R.S.F.S.R.39 And in a telegram to Chicherin and Lenin on May 3, he expressed concern that the new government of Soviet Azerbaijan, either through misinfor­ mation or inertia, might against its will allow the policies of the former Musavat government to continue, especially as many ranking officials of that regime remained at their posts. Ohandjanian asked the central So­ viet government to apprise its representatives in the Caucasus of the recent anti-Armenian violence in Karabagh, Nukhi, Shemakha, and else­ where and to remind them of the immutable will of Mountainous Karabagh’s working peasantry to remain free of Azerbaijani domination.40 In his response to the Azerbaijani Revkom’s demands, Ohandjanian wrote Acting Foreign Affairs Commissar Huseinov on May 3 that each of the points in the ultimatum did not correspond with the facts. It had been the former Musavat government of Azerbaijan, not Armenia, that had invaded Karabagh, massacred the working peasants, and burned Shushi and many villages. The eight assemblies of Mountainous Kara­ bagh had reaffirmed their unshakable resolution to be included in the Republic of Armenia. And, as Azerbaijan had never controlled Zangezur even temporarily, it had neither legal nor factual bases to lay claim to the district. By the will of the people, Zangezur was ruled by its own administrative council and regarded itself as an indivisible part of the Armenian republic. There was, moreover, no violence against the Mus­ lim inhabitants of Armenia. Previously, the Musavat government and Turkish agents had fomented revolts on Armenian territories, requiring preventive measures against external provocation, but this period had passed. By contrast, Armenians throughout Azerbaijan had been mas­ sacred and tens of villages burned during the troubles in Karabagh. De­ spite all this, the Armenian government sought to settle disputed ques88 Bor’ba, May 5:3, 1920; Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:2,1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Evangulov, May 2, 1920; FO 371/4939, E5778/1/58, Luke to FO, May 5,1920, enclosure; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Class 800, Moser to Secretary of State, May 4, 1920, enclosure. Some sources give the date of this document as May 1. See, for example, Armenia Archives, 200/1/412, p. 37, 200/1/427, p. 275, and 200/1/ 581, p. 29. 59 Armenia Archives, 200/1/427^. 275, and 200/1/581, p. 29. 40 Armenia Archives, 200/1/271, pp. 213—214; Nagpmyi Karabakh, pp. 452—454.

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tions in a peaceful manner and, noting that this view was in conformity with Ordzhonikidze’s professed position, requested that Azerbaijan cease all military activity and enter into negotiations with the Armenian government to create conditions for normal relations between two neighboring republics.41 As the diplomatic exchanges unfolded, the Armenian press of Erevan and Tiflis quickly denounced the events in Azerbaijan as a ruse. The revolution in Azerbaijan was not khorhrdayin (“soviet”) but khorhrdavar (“mysterious”; “delusive”), the Dashnakist organs noted derisively. In­ stead of repudiating the bloody path of the Musavatists, the new Azer­ baijani government had gathered the most reactionary elements under a red facade to promote the Pan-Turkish goal of destroying Armenia. The Azerbaijani revolution unfortunately had been born not among the workers of the Balakhani oil fields but rather in the home of the noto­ rious butcher of Baku’s Armenians, Behbud Aghajivanshir. The Musavat Party had given way to the Communists knowing full well that its own objectives would be espoused by the new “revolutionary” government, which in fact was dominated by the Turco-Azerbaijani chauvinists. It could only be hoped that in the end the internationalist principles of the Russian democratic revolution would prevail, in which case “we will take the extended hand of friendship of a neighboring republic.”42 In a special session of the Armenian Parliament on May 3, Foreign Minister Ohandjanian reviewed the developments in Azerbaijan and the exchange of notes with the Azerbaijani Revkom and the Red Army’s Voinrevsovet of the Caucasus Front. He reported that some 10,000 Azerbaijani regulars, together with thousands of irregulars, were currently poised against Karabagh. The Armenian government was disappointed that one of the first acts of the Azerbaijani Revkom had been to address demands and threats to Armenia. Even more disconcerting was Ordzhonikidze’s ultimatum, which raised serious questions about the attitude of Soviet Russia. The Armenian government had always sought the peaceful res­ olution of disputes but was obliged to declare that, on the basis of the high principle of the self-determination of peoples and the indomitable will of the entire nation, it was prepared to defend Armenia’s boundaries and independence against all threats from any quarter.43 During the ensuing parliamentary debate, the Dashnakist deputies 41 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Huseinov, May 3, 1920; Bor’ba, May 6:4, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 30-31 (this copy is dated May 4). 42 Haradj, May 5:12, 1920; Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:1, 1920; Hairenik, July 8:1, 1920. See a similar statement in the May 7 issue of the Populist Party’s newspaper, Zhoghovurd, re­ printed in Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 458—459. 48 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 459—464, Eighty-seventh session of Parliament. See also Armenia Archives, 198/1/52, p. 35.

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rallied in support of the government and characterized the sovietization of Azerbaijan as a chimera, but they were careful to differentiate between the worker-peasant government of Soviet Russia and the khan-bek pseudosoviet regime in Baku. Dashnakist deputy Sahak Torosian de­ clared that the red mask of the khans and beks should be ripped off to expose the lie that Azerbaijan, which had not developed beyond the stage of feudalism, had become Communist. Any student of history could affirm that great leaps taken without the necessary preliminary steps were tantamount to political adventurism. That had been borne out once again by the fact that in its first decrees the so-called Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, instead of advancing new slogans and taking steps to end the bloodshed, issued ultimatums to Armenia. Soviet Azer­ baijan was the “genuine child’’ of its Musavat predecessor and a fanatical adherent of its goals. Ordzhonikidze’s ultimatum was probably the result of Azerbaijani misinformation and an object lesson of how important it was to make the true facts known in Moscow. The Armenian people had a close cultural bond with Russia and valued that association, but the Sovnarkom had to honor its pronouncements regarding Armenian selfdetermination. That was the precept on which the Armenians would begin their negotiations with Soviet Russia. Sebouh (Arshak Nersesian), the popular Western Armenian com­ mander, likened the coup in Azerbaijan to the 1908 Young Turk revo­ lution, whose leaders had quickly betrayed its ideals and unleashed ter­ rible massacres against the Armenian people. The Azerbaijani Revkom was not even two days old before it demanded the right to march over Armenia to unite with Turkey’s “Red” army, “that same Turkey, where there is not, has not been, and cannot be a ‘Red’ army, only a Red Sultan.” The heroic Armenian army would buttress the government against the “Red butchers of Azerbaijan.” By contrast, it was always pos­ sible to speak with the Russian revolutionary army and government as long as they recognized Armenia’s independence.44 In this charged atmosphere, the Armenian Parliament’s small Social Revolutionary faction had the courage to call for a radical change in orientation. Levon Tumanian, the most outspoken and internationalist of the three Social Revolutionary deputies, declared that there was no reason to dismiss the coup in Baku as a masquerade. The criminal Mu­ savat had been driven from power, and even if the old leaders tried to exert influence on the Revkom they would fail because the Russian rev­ olutionary army was descending into the Caucasus. Ignoring the taunt of Dashnakist deputy Arshak Shirinian that the so-called revolutionary army was actually the Daghestan Muslim army, Tumanian then hurled 44 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 464—466.

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a thunderbolt: “Today, the turn has come for the imperialist-applauding Armenian ‘Musavat,’ the Dashnaktsutiun, to leave the arena.... Yes, the Armenian ‘Musavat’ must withdraw if it does not want to be expelled by force.’’45 In a rebuttal studded with caustic sarcasm, Arshak Hovhannisian re­ minded the Social Revolutionary critics that Azerbaijan had drained the blood of the Armenian people for two years. Could the “Messieurs SR” deny that hundreds of Armenian boys in Dahna village (in Nukhi) had been forcibly circumcised, that Jalut, Vardashen, and many other Ar­ menian villages in Azerbaijan had been put to the sword, that countless Armenian women and girls had been kidnapped and violated, that Ar­ menian Shushi was in ashes, and that the innocent population of Kara­ bagh was being ripped apart? Mr. Tumanian greeted the Soviet regime of Azerbaijan. But where were its decrees freeing prisoners and enslaved women and maidens? Where was its appeal for harmonious neighborly relations? What had changed by the seating of a Narimanov in place of an Usubbekov? The Social Revolutionaries accused the Dashnaktsutiun of applauding the imperialists, but had they forgotten that the SRs them­ selves had started the Russian civil war against the Bolsheviks? “Today, in order to save your skins you are whirling your censers toward Soviet Russia. But where is your hero, the glorious Kerensky? In Paris, spinning plots against the Soviet regime!” The Social Revolutionary Party, which had 80 percent of the Russian peasantry behind it and still was incapable of creating a government, now had the audacity to tell the Dashnaktsu­ tiun to relinquish power. That advice was needed no more than the SR’s attempt to show the way to Russia. The Dashnaktsutiun was well aware of Russia’s whereabouts and would act toward Soviet Russia fraternally if the Sovnarkom respected “the unyielding will of the Armenian people to live freely in United and Independent Armenia.”46 Social Revolutionary deputy Arsham Khondkarian tried to temper the offensive epithets of Levon Tumanian by declaring that his party, too, was critical of the Azerbaijani Revkom but regarded it as an improvement over the murderous Musavat. Armenia now faced a crisis and had to act with prudence. Though it was always desirable that a people should be the master of its own destiny, not all had enough power to attain that goal. It was senseless to do battle with the entire world in defense of an ideal that could not be achieved. Reality had to be accommodated, which in the case of Armenia meant adaptation to Soviet power. “We must try to win the maximum, but if that is not possible then we must be prepared to make concessions, up to and including our independence. ... The 45 Haradj, May 8:2, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 466—467. 46 Haradj, May 8:2—3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 467—468.

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physical existence of the Armenian people should be our point of de­ parture.” It followed, therefore, that the only realistic course was the establishment of Soviet order in Armenia. Khondkarian had stated his views more tactfully than Tumanian, yet his solution was the same.47 Minister of Communications Arshak Djamalian refuted both Tuma­ nian and Khondkarian, mocking the party that had once fervently backed Bicherakov, Denikin, and other anti-Soviets but was now pros­ trating itself before the Bolsheviks. In response to Tumanian’s question of what good had come from the imperialists, Djamalian noted that Europe had kept the starving Armenians alive—far more than could be said for Soviet Russia. But erstwhile Dashnakist Vahan Minakhorian, the third and most circumspect Social Revolutionary critic to take the floor, reminded Djamalian that the Allied Powers had tossed the Armenians some crumbs only because they had contributed so heavily to the Ar­ menian tragedy. The Dashnaktsutiun should acknowledge that its policy of clinging to the skirts of Europe had been disastrous. The physical existence of the Armenian people was now paramount, and this dictated a turn toward revolutionary Russia. Hovakim Budaghian retorted with ridicule that Social Revolutionary confidence in the Azerbaijani coup was not surprising: ‘ ‘If Leva Tumanov could become Levon Tumanian, why couldn’t Hamid Sultanov become a Communist?” As for friendship with Russia, the Dashnaktsutiun had not wavered in that policy but simply required respect for the principle of self-determination. ‘‘Are we at fault that we hold as hallowed the ideal of independent Armenia?” Moreover, the Social Revolutionary gentle­ men should know that no political force existed that could take the place of the Dashnaktsutiun, which over many years had come to personify the decisive will of Armenia’s democratic elements.48 Vahan Navasardian, a powerful orator, brought the debate to a close by reminding his colleagues that, even as they spoke, Armenian blood was being spilled on the heights of Karabagh and Zangezur. There no longer existed Baludja, that gem of Khachen, or Shosh, the jewel of Varanda. The sword had passed over the prosperous, picturesque vil­ lages of Gulistan. And Shushi, that marvelous, fabled, impenetrable for­ tress of the Caucasus, had disappeared together with its Armenian in­ habitants. The Social Revolutionary deputies spoke of patience and accommodation as if these were new concepts. The Armenian people knew everything there was about the subject. For centuries they had patiently bent their necks to receive the sword in the name of conform­ ity. But there was another element that had been strong enough to keep 47 Haradj, May 8:3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 468. 48 Haradj, May 8:3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 468—470.

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the Armenians from becoming submerged in a sea of Islam. That ele­ ment had now become a great host, which understood that a people’s salvation rested on its own might. The Armenian people sought peace and, even after all that had happened, extended a hand to Turkey; but the exploiting classes of that blood-stained country had not and would not clasp that hand in peace until the Armenian arm had been sinewed sufficiently to be victorious and command respect. “Gentlemen of the opposition, listen carefully. We are neither Russophobe nor Russophile, neither Turcophile nor Turcophobe. We love our people with a blind and zealous love, and shall defend its existence at any price. We are prepared to negotiate with all who are willing to accept the existence of the Armenian people and the independence of its fatherland.” At a time when gods, sanctities, ideals, and creeds were being disa­ vowed, Navasardian observed, everybody could be Red: “All—and Nuri, and Halil, and Kiazim, and Kemal, and Sultanov.” The word had clearly lost its meaning. As usual, the three deputies of the Social Revolutionary faction each had a different opinion, but if they were suggesting that they should take power, the Dashnaktsutiun would reply: “Please, we are not opposed, except that whosoever might wish to sit in this loge must first sit among the people. Enter among the people and only then rise up through them toward power.” Critical events were taking place, and only with a singular iron will could Armenia survive. The government should be all the more resolute in the course it had adopted, for there was no other way.49 It was midnight when the Dashnakist faction ended the debate with the following resolution: “Having heard the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the note of the Azerbaijani government and the an­ swer to it, the Parliament expresses confidence in the government’s ac­ tion and at the same time instructs it to spare no effort to safeguard the existence and independence of the Armenian people.” The motion car­ ried with thirty-three deputies in favor and three (Social Revolutionar­ ies) abstaining.50 Relations with Azerbaijan deteriorated further when it was learned that the entire Armenian diplomatic mission in Baku had been impris­ oned. After the arrest of the British and French representatives in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet coup of April 27—28, mission chief Martiros Harutiunian and his staff decided to remain at their posts and 49 Haradj, May 8:3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 470-472. On the life and political career of Navasardian, see Gevorg Sahakian, “Vahan Navasardian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXV (Nov.-Dec. 1954), pp. 1—15, 28—40. 50 Armenia Archives, 198/1/52, p. 35; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bekzadian, May 4, 1920; Haradj, May 8:3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 472.

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to regard the revolution as simply a change in government of the in­ dependent Republic of Azerbaijan. But on April 30 all were placed un­ der house arrest, together with the agents of the Armenian republic’s ministries of welfare and finance, then transferred five days later to the Bagilov prison.51 News of these actions elicited stringent Armenian pro­ tests both to Soviet Azerbaijan and to Soviet Russia. Ohandjanian ex­ pressed amazement to Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin that Soviet Russia would tolerate such violations of international law, especially at a time when an Armenian delegation was en route to Moscow to establish friendly relations and when the Armenian government had offered to meet in conference with Soviet Azerbaijan for the peaceful resolution of disputes. In fact, the delegation named for the meeting included Ha­ rutiunian, along with Alexandre Papovian and Ruben luzbashian, mem­ bers of the mixed cease-fire commission that had been sent to Karabagh by the Transcaucasian conference but was subsequently forced to pro­ ceed to Baku because of the developments in Azerbaijan. In retaliation for Harutiunian’s imprisonment, the former Azerbaijani government’s mission in Erevan was placed under house arrest.52 Harutiunian remained imprisoned until May 18. He was then brought before Revkom members Nariman Narimanov, Mirza Davud Huseinov, and Ali Haidar Karaev, all of whom tried to conceal a shift in strategy by explaining that the arrest of the Armenian officials had been the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding. Harutiunian was released imme­ diately, and his staff was freed the following day. When the mission build­ ing was finally unsealed on June 1, Harutiunian found that it had been completely ransacked. Drawers and files had been broken into and pil­ fered, most of the furniture had been carted away, and the floors were strewn with discarded items. Nonetheless, Harutiunian immediately urged his government to release the Azerbaijani mission. He then began the arduous, often impossible task of defending Armenian interests and Armenian citizens in a hostile environment characterized by frustrating bureaucratic evasiveness and procrastination.53

Withdrawal from Karabagh Armenian portrayals of the Soviet coup in Azerbaijan as a grand decep­ tion were reinforced by curious developments in Karabagh. Upon learn­ ing that the Red Army had entered Baku, Governor-General Khosrov

51 Armenia Archives, 200/1/571, p. 7. 52 Armenia Archives, 200/1/412, p. 56, and 200/1/581, pp. 61, 65-67. 53 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /571, p. 8. For Harutiunian’s subsequent reports from Baku, see especially file 200/1/4.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Bek Sultanov proclaimed himself chairman of the “Karabagh Revolu­ tionary Committee’’ and, dropping allegiance to the Musavat Party, tel­ egraphed warm greetings to the Azerbaijani Revkom of Nariman Nari­ manov. “Revolutionary Karabagh,” Sultanov declared, had always stood for the interests of the Azerbaijani proletariat and waited impatiently for emancipation from capitalist exploitation through the victory of the So­ viet order. With that vision now a reality, the Karabagh democracy voiced its desire to join Soviet Azerbaijan. It was confident that the peoples of the East would be liberated from the oppression of England and the other imperialist powers of the West through the alliance of Soviet Rus­ sia, Soviet Azerbaijan, and Revolutionary Turkey.54 Dr. Sultanov addressed the same message to the Armenians of Kara­ bagh, appealing to them to end the internecine bloodshed and live in peace with their Azerbaijani neighbors. He demanded that Dro dissolve his directorate and leave Karabagh, and he called on the working villag­ ers to send their elected representatives to Shushi to participate in the labors of the Karabagh Revkom.55 These declarations drew the ire and ridicule of the Dashnakist press. Had there been no other proof of what was transpiring, “these marvelous Communist proclamations” were enough to show what plots the Bolsheviks and Turks were spinning.56 Dro’s directorate had sufficient respect for Sultanov’s political acu­ men that it sought to neutralize his attempt to pit the Armenians against one another. On May 6 the directorate wrote Sultanov, with copies to Lenin in Moscow and Narimanov in Baku, that the Armenian workers of Karabagh had for years engaged in the unequal struggle against the Russian autocracy and the Azerbaijani khans and beks. The Karabagh Armenians were motivated by friendship toward Soviet Russia, but they could not support or have confidence in a revolution heralded by a person whose bloodthirsty and reactionary essence was notorious. As long as Khosrov Bek Sultanov stood at the head of Karabagh’s so-called revkom, the Armenians would continue to resist. The will of Mountain­ ous Karabagh to enter into the Republic of Armenia remained unal­ tered.57 54 Bor'ba, May 22:2, 1920; Haradj, May 14:3, 25:3, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 56; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 1 x4> May 30, 1920; Mikayelian, op. át. (Oct. 1923), p. 125; Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 160-161. For Sultanov’s directive on April 30 to his administrative officials to remain at their posts and to preserve law and order, with the warning that anarchism would be punished by revolutionary means, see Nagpmyi Karabakh, p. 444. 55 Dashnaktsutiun Archives, File 1649, Melkumian report, pp. 42—43, and Balayan and Yolian report, p. 40; Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 160—161; Haradj, May 25:3, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, p. 54. 56 See, for example, Haradj, May 26:2, 1920. 57 Mikayelian, op. át. (Oct. 1923), p. 125; Hovhannisian, op. át., p. 161; Nagomyi Kara­ bakh, p. 457.

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Delegates of the Dizak district gathered at the village of Togh on May 14 to hear Arsen Mikayelian’s report about the ultimatum of the Shushi “revkom” and to approve the directorate’s reply. The assembly unani­ mously concluded that 1 ) the bloodless coup in Baku was Pan-Islamic rather than Bolshevik in character, 2) the aghalars and beks who had controlled the former government still retained their positions and priv­ ileges, 3) the government of Soviet Azerbaijan was led by persons whose policies did not differ from those of the previous regime regarding Kara­ bagh and Zangezur, and 4) the aggression of Azerbaijan had not ceased, and Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha were continuing to oppress the unfor­ tunate Armenians remaining in Shushi. In reaffirming the directorate’s answer to Sultanov, the assembly resolved that henceforth all questions dealing with the future of the region should be addressed in close co­ ordination with the Republic of Armenia.58 However bold the Armenian declarations, the fact was that Dro was experiencing significant disaffection. The approach of the Red Army inspired Armenian Bolsheviks to undertake intense propaganda and or­ ganizational activities. Much of the population had suffered dislocation and ruin as the result of the abortive rising against Azerbaijan, and many blamed the external agents from Erevan and the Dashnaktsutiun. More­ over, communication with Erevan was virtually impossible, and rumors abounded that a May Day revolt had overthrown the Dashnakist govern­ ment and established Soviet rule in Armenia. In any case, the Armenian peasantry, though willing to give its youth and resources in the struggle against Azerbaijan, would not raise its weapons against the Red Army of Russia. Dro, too, was apparently influenced by these factors, and his normal resolve turned into passive anticipation. His month-long prep­ arations for warfare were not implemented. By the second week of May 1920, Red Army detachments had branched out from the Baku-Tiflis railway and were making their way from Evlakh up the Terter River Valley toward Mountainous Karabagh. Under the influence of Sergo Ordzhonikidze, General Ivan T. Smilga, the commander of the Caucasus Front, directed the Eleventh Army on May 11 to occupy the Shushi-Nakhichevan-Ordubad region, to end the mutual massacres of Armenians and Muslims, and to maintain law and order until a solution to the Azerbaijani-Armenian territorial dispute was reached.59 The first contingent of the 281st Regiment entered Shushi on May 12. Two days later, Narimanov appointed Dadash Buniatzade as 58 Nagornyi Karabakh, pp. 465—466. 89 Ibid., p. 462; B. A. Khudaverdian, “11-rd Karmir Banaki ognutiune Lemayin Gharabaghi, Zangezuri u Nakhidjevani ashkhatavorutiane ev Komunistakan kazmakerputiunnerin Sovetakan ishkhanutian hastatman hamar nrants mghads paikarum,” Banber Ha­ yastani aikhivneri, 15th yr., no. 3 (1974), p. 140.

igô

the republic of armenia

extraordinary commissar for Karabagh, with instructions to liquidate Sultanov’s self-styled revkom.60 As Buniatzade set out from Baku with a group of Armenian and Azerbaijani Bolshevik cadres in mid-May, Ord­ zhonikidze arrived in Shushi along with Eleventh Army commander Levandovskii. On May 19 they sent a deputation to Dro’s headquarters at Karabulagh to demand the withdrawal of the Armenian expeditionary force to Zangezur, beyond the Hakaru River. Sahak Ter-Gabrielian, the liaison of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front, to­ gether with the 281st Regiment’s deputy commander (Pernakii) and instructor-organizer (Gaidalov), first encountered Armenian military de­ tachments at Shosh. Ter-Gabrielian used the opportunity to declare that the Red Army was coming not to do batde but to restore peace and tranquility in Transcaucasia. He extolled the might of the Red Army, which had crushed ludenich, Kolchak, Denikin, and other enemies of the peasants and workers, who were now being given the estates of the great landowners and the factories of the exploiting industrialists.61 Receiving the trio in Karanlugh at nightfall on May 19, Dro inquired into the nature and purpose of the Soviet mission. Ter-Gabrielian an­ nounced that the Red Army was to occupy Mountainous Karabagh and that it was with the knowledge and consent of the Erevan government that Dro was being asked to remove his armed forces from the district. Mountainous Karabagh would be demilitarized and placed under an Armenian Bolshevik administration. Dro replied that he was merely a soldier and had entered Karabagh on the orders of his government at a time when the Azerbaijani army had massacred the population of Shushi and was destroying scores of Armenian villages. As a military man and not a politician, he could leave only upon the receipt of directives from Erevan. To Ter-Gabrielian’s assertion that Soviet rule had also been pro­ claimed in Armenia, Dro stated that even if that was the case he still needed orders from the Armenian government, whether old or new. He had been informed that the Armenian government had recently dis­ patched a delegation to Moscow to resolve all outstanding issues between Armenia and Soviet Russia and was confident that such an agreement would include a solution to the Karabagh question.62 Dro insisted that 60 Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 162—164; Istoriia Azerbaidzhana, p. 233. 61 Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 467. Ordzhonikidze’s arrival in Shushi is given as May 15 by Hovhannisian, op. át., p. 164, and as the more probable date of May 18 by H. B. Abrahamian, “Gharabaghi hayutian hamagumarneri patmutiunits (19181. hulis-19201. mayis),” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 27th yr., no. 1 (1986), p. 32. 62 Mikayelian, op. át. (Oct. 1923)^. 126; NagomyiKarabakh, pp. 467—468; Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 164—165 (giving the incorrect date of May 15 for the meeting) ; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1Q2O t., Bulletin no. 8, June 18, 1920. According to the reports of Khachik Melkumian and Balayan-Yolian, Dro received an order on May 6 from Armenia’s prime minister and minister of military affairs to refuse to enter

BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENTS IN TRANSCAUCASIA

IQ?

the Red Army withdraw all Azerbaijani and other Muslim forces in Kara­ bagh and protested the continued excesses of the Azerbaijani army, now operating under a red banner. Toward the end of the exchange, Dro reportedly proposed a compromise whereby the Red Army would pull back 30 versts (20 miles) and he, on his own responsibility, would with­ draw the Armenian forces 45 versts (30 miles) toward Zangezur. Ter­ Gabrielian’s delegation returned to Shushi late that night under the impression that Dro would not actively oppose the Soviet occupation and administration of Mountainous Karabagh.63 Upon receipt of Dro’s report of this meeting, Foreign Minister Ohandjanian telegraphed Chicherin and Ordzhonikidze to protest the an­ nouncement, issued by Ordzhonikidze and Ter-Gabrielian, that the Red Army would occupy Mountainous Karabagh and that this territory up to the Hakaru River was to belong to Soviet Azerbaijan. Reiterating that Mountainous Karabagh had maintained its integrity against all adversar­ ies, including Turks, Tatars, and Kurds, and had reaffirmed its will in nine assemblies to unite with the Republic of Armenia, Ohandjanian insisted that these sentiments remained unchanged after the sovietiza­ tion of Azerbaijan. The Armenian government did not wish to subject the people of Karabagh to added horrors and had asked Azerbaijan for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Yet, at a time when an Armenian delegation was en route to Moscow to establish neighborly relations with Soviet Russia, Military Revolutionary Council chairman Ordzhonikidze had demanded that the Karabagh peasantry submit to Azerbaijani rule. It was not clear for which government Ordzhonikidze was speaking— Soviet Russia or Soviet Azerbaijan. The Armenian government had al­ ready announced its readiness to settle the future of Karabagh based on the will of the people, which could be voiced for the tenth time through a plebiscite to determine with which state the region should be joined. To make possible the popular expression of free will and to spare Kara­ bagh the bloodshed that would inevitably result from the advance of the Red Army, the Armenian government was asking that the deployment of troops into Armenian Karabagh be postponed and that the detach­ ments already in the Armenian sector of the Jevanshir district be with­ drawn.64 into negotiations in case of such a proposal by any Soviet deputation or organ, to defend Armenian Karabagh with all his means, and to insist that any negotiations be taken up with the Armenian government. Dro was later accused and criticized for nonetheless extending a cordial welcome to Ter-Gabrielian. Mikayelian, too, was strongly opposed to seeking an accommodation with the Bolsheviks, but Dro apparently lacked confidence that the Ar­ menian soldiers and peasants would lift arms against the Red Army. See Dashnaktsutiun Archives, File 1649, Melkumian report, pp. 43—45, Balayan and Yolian report, pp. 40-41, and “Gords Arsen Mikayeliani.” 63 Dro’s account of the meetings is in Armenia Archives, 200/1/563, p. 184. 64 Armenia Archives, 200/1/563, pp. 191-195.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

On his return from Shushi to Baku, Ordzhonikidze telegraphed Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin that the Red Army would be able to occupy not only Karabagh but also the Ordubad-Nakhichevan-Julfa area without encountering serious Armenian resistance. The Muslims had burned much of Shushi and the Armenian villages in the plain of Karabagh, whereas the Armenians had done the same to the Muslim villages in Zangezur. Hence, both sides were well disposed to accept the introduc­ tion of the Red Army.65 Ordzhonikidze exaggerated but did not mis­ judge the prevailing atmosphere. As elements of the 20th and 32d rifle divisions of the Eleventh Red Army moved into Shushi, Khankend, and Jebrail, Dro was receiving reports that the attitude of the peasantry had shifted and that some villages of Gulistan, Jevanshir, and Khachen had become openly hostile. Armenian Bolsheviks had combined with a Red Army detachment to dislodge Lieutenant Colonel Mesian from the vil­ lage of Vank, and Captain Ter-Martirosian was killed, possibly by muti­ neers, on the road between Martakert and Vank. Within Dro’s admin­ istrative council, there were now those who called for an accord with the Red Army and Armenian Bolshevik intellectuals.66 The rapid change in sentiment among the population left no other course, and on the night of May 22 Dro and Nzhdeh met with the chair­ man of the Revkom of Mountainous Karabagh, Dr. Sargis (Sako) Hambardzumian, to arrange the terms of withdrawal. Hambardzumian gave assurances that the Red Army would not hinder the expeditionary force’s retreat to Zangezur and that Mountainous Karabagh would re­ main Armenian. In return, he persuaded Dro to turn over significant quantities of arms and ammunition, telephone equipment, clothing, grain, and salt. A mountain cannon that Armenian partisans had cap­ tured from the Turks in 1918 was also left in the Hadrut vale. These, Hambardzumian pledged, would be used for the defense of the local population.67 On May 24, Dro met with his closest associates from Armenia, Lieu­ tenant Colonel Nzhdeh, and Arsen Mikayelian in the village of Chanakhchi (Avetaranots) for a final time to report on his agreement with Hambardzumian. The assembled leaders, recognizing that the dis­ position of the population had changed and could become hostile, that there had been no word from Erevan for nearly two weeks, that Nzhdeh’s warriors from Ghapan could not remain in Karabagh indefinitely, and that the routes of retreat might soon be blocked by the Red Army, de­ 65 Nagpmyi Karabakh, pp. 464—465. 66 Ibid., pp. 469—470; Mikayelian, op. át. (Oct. 1923), p. 126; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 8, June 18, 1920; Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 32. 67 Dashnaktsutiun Archives, File 1649, Melkumian report, p. 44, and Balayan and Yolian report, p. 41; Hovhannisian, op. át., p. 165.

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cided to give way to the Armenian Bolsheviks and to withdraw the ex­ peditionary force and any compromised field workers or party activists.68 During the next two days, Hambardzumian took control from his head­ quarters in the village of Taghavard, and Dro’s men trudged over the snow-covered heights of Kirs and Khdsaberd to Zangezur. The sullen column moved in silence with bowed heads.69 Months of intense activity had failed to bring Mountainous Karabagh into the Armenian republic. The decisive blow that Dro was preparing never fell, as the sovietization of Azerbaijan and entry of the Red Army into Shushi voided all earlier calculations. The Bolsheviks now savored their victory. On May 25, the Karabagh Revkom appealed to the Arme­ nian workers and villagers to rally around the Communist Party and to assume power hand in hand with the Muslim workers and villagers. The Russian autocracy had followed the slogan of “divide and rule’’ by fo­ menting warfare between Armenians and Muslims. The great October Revolution should have put an end to the intolerable situation, but even as the rays of Soviet Russia extended to the boundaries of the Caucasus, the Musavat and Dashnak regimes, in their death throes, again evoked the Karabagh question and accompanying turmoil and torment. The Azerbaijani people, having stretched out their hand to Russia, had freed themselves from the clutches of the Musavat and wished to live in broth­ erhood with the Armenian villagers: “Turn your power against the lech­ erous Dashnaks who have caused so much destruction and answer their terror with the Red Terror; organize and the Azerbaijani workers will be at your side in the front ranks.” With the fraternal help of Soviet Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan, the economy of Karabagh would be revived, and a new, free, blissful life would await the long-suffering population. The appeal concluded by admonishing the villagers not to allow “yesterday’s Dashnaks” into the soviets and revkoms that were being organized. So68 Mikayelian, op. át. (Oct. 1923), p. 126. 69 Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 149-151, 166; Mikayelian, op. át. (Oct. 1923), p. 127; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 353. Dro and Mikayelian were severely criticized for not forewarning the military commanders of the impending withdrawal so that they could make arrangements for their families. Even when they were ordered to Sarushen, the commanders assertedly did not know that they would be retreating to Zangezur. See Melkumian report, pp. 44—50, Balayan and Yolian report, p. 41, and Stepanian report, pp. 17-18. In a protest to the Armenian government at the beginning of June, the general com­ missar of Zangezur, Sergei Melik-Yolchian, accused Dro of abandoning Karabagh for mys­ terious, incomprehensible reasons and of transferring power “with his own hands” to the local Bolsheviks. The haste and panic with which Dro had pulled out of Karabagh was destabilizing the situation in Zangezur, where rumors were circulating that the expedi­ tionary force would also withdraw from that district. It was essential to send a strong bat­ talion and a reliable leader to deal with the anarchy and reestablish order. “I cannot work in the conditions that have been created and am departing for Erevan. Dro operates on his own with detrimental results.” See Nagomyi Karabakh, p. 484.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

viet rule would create a strong foundation for the unity of the working Armenian and Muslim peasantry.70 On May 26, as Dro’s expedition moved beyond Kirs, the provisional Revkom of Mountainous Karabagh hastily summoned the Tenth Assem­ bly of Karabagh Armenians, with the Bolsheviks now setting the agenda. The Tenth Assembly proclaimed the establishment of Soviet rule in Mountainous Karabagh and sent felicitations to Lenin and the Azerbai­ jani Revkom and Communist Party.71 No longer were there resolutions about the indomitable will to be united with the Republic of Armenia. The declaration of Soviet order did not eliminate the division in Kara­ bagh. The Azerbaijani-dominated Karabagh Revkom sat in Shushi not far from the all-Armenian Revkom of Mountainous Karabagh at Taghavard. This situation continued until the middle of June, when, after the recall of Sultanov to Baku, Dr. Hambardzumian and several of his colleagues moved back to Shushi for the merger of the two committees. As a member of the new Karabagh Revkom under Bahadur Kasem oghli Velibekov, Hambardzumian also was named to head the party organi­ zation of the county of Shushi.72 The restructuring was achieved, how­ ever, only after a massive anti-Soviet rising in Terter and Ganja spread to Shushi at the beginning of June. As elsewhere, the newly sovietized Azerbaijani garrison went over to the rebels. Nuri Pasha was to have his last hurrah at Shushi before fleeing over Kariagin and Persia to Anatolia.

The Georgian Reaction The coup in Azerbaijan propelled the Red Army to the frontiers of Geor­ gia, unsettling the government and altering the delicate political balance in the Caucasus. Georgia had often found more in common with Azer­ baijan than with Armenia and as recently as the Transcaucasian confer­ ence in April had received the Baku government’s assurances that it would stand firm against the threat of Soviet aggression. Azerbaijan had sought pledges from Georgia and Armenia that they would not seize disputed border territories while the Azerbaijani army deployed all its strength along the northern frontier.73 This, Noi Zhordania’s govern70 Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 166—167; Hoktemberian meds revoliutsian, pp. 340—341; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia reuoliutsiia, pp. 360—361. See also K istorii obrazovaniia Nagorno-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR, pp. 45—48. 71 Hovhannisian, op. cit., pp. 167-168; Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 33. 72 Hovhannisian, op. át., pp. 179—180; Abrahamian, op. át., p. 33. Apparently, Khosrov Bek Sultanov was later allowed to emigrate to Persia. See Abrahamian, op. át., p. 36 n. 87. 73 The Allied representatives in Tiflis had urged the Georgian and Armenian govern­ ments to give a pledge of nonaggression to Azerbaijan so that Azerbaijan could concentrate on the threat posed by the Red Army on the northern frontier. See Armenia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 1—3, and, for Khatisian’s reply, 200/1/217, pp. 199-200, Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 92» April 30, 1920.

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ment now concluded, had been a ruse; the Azerbaijani army had actually concentrated in the west against Karabagh and made no attempt to resist the rapid advance of the Red Army toward Baku.74 The Georgian press bristled with outrage. The National Democrat Gruziia put aside its customary defamation of Armenians to denounce the Musavat Party for pretending to seek Georgian help even as it ar­ ranged the shameful surrender of Azerbaijan to the Soviets. The Musavatists should at least have been honest enough to admit openly that they had become the vassals and servants of Pan-Turan. The Social Fed­ eralist Sakhalkho-Sakme pointed to the parallels with 1918, when the Azer­ baijanis had betrayed the Georgians and Armenians to the Turks. Now they were scheming to crush both peoples in the Soviet-Turkish vise. The organs of the dominant Menshevik Party declared that the Azer­ baijani-Soviet entente was being sealed with Armenian blood, as Khosrov Bek Sultanov and company were continuing their policy of extirpation under the mantie of Bolshevism. In the East, observed Bor’ba, Bolshevism and Pan-Islam were working hand in hand, allowing Turkish reaction­ aries to raise their daggers once more over the heads of the Armenian toilers. These malevolent elements were trying to combine over the Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan corridor, trampling the principle of selfdetermination. Who, the Menshevik journal asked rhetorically, had in­ quired into the will of the inhabitants of Karabagh and Zangezur? It was most telling that the first act of the “socialist democracy” of Azerbaijan was to thrust an ultimatum before Armenia.75 Though it supported Armenia against the aggression of Soviet Azer­ baijan and the obvious power behind it, Bor’ba nonetheless expressed concern that the Armenians were not ready to meet the challenge, es­ pecially as some Dashnakists refused to believe that there was real danger from the north. The Dashnakist organ of Tiflis, Nor Ashkhatavor, had gone so far as to hail the pseudo-revolution in Azerbaijan and to wel­ come the new “government of the proletariat.” But the Armenians should beware, for the specter of renewed massacre hung over them. As for their own republic, the Georgians were prepared to deal with all threats to its independence.76 The Tiflis press reported with some relief that Isador Ramishvili, a member of the peace commission sent by the recent Transcaucasian 74 Gruziia, April 30, 1920; Ertoba, as reprinted in Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:3, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 92» April 30, 1920; FO 371/5167—5168, E5255/ E5861/262/44 enclosures. 75 Archives de l’Armée, 20N/786, dossier 1, Revue de la Presse, 24-30 avril 1920; Gruziia, April 30, 1920; Bor'ba, April 30:1, May 1:2, 4:1, 1920; Haradj, May 6:1, 7:2, 9:4, 1920. 76 Bor'ba, May 4:1—2, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, 192O> no- 95» May 5, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

conference to Erevan and Nakhichevan, had returned with news that the Armenian government was firmly resolved to resist Azerbaijan and the Red Army and was particularly incensed over the ultimatum of Sergo Ordzhonikidze. Local Armenian Bolsheviks, Ramishvili added, dis­ counted the authenticity of the ultimatum and ascribed it to anti-Soviet enemy provocation.77 For their part, the Armenians now gained some satisfaction that the full Georgian political spectrum condemned the treachery of the former Musavat leaders of Azerbaijan. Nor Ashkhatavor observed that the Georgians had belatedly realized they had been de­ ceived by the very Musavatists with whom they had often made common cause against the Armenians. It was now clear even to the Georgian Mensheviks that Azerbaijan was using the cover of Bolshevism to join with the Kemalists to crush “the Transcaucasian democracy.’’78 Zhordania’s government had to face both external and internal chal­ lenges at the beginning of May. Azerbaijani detachments that had in­ stantaneously transformed into elements of the Red Army moved along the Transcaucasian railway and main road from Elisavetpol (Ganja) and Akstafa toward the Georgian frontier. As a precautionary measure, the Georgian command dynamited a segment of the railway bridge at Poili to prevent the advance of Soviet armored trains. Azerbaijani units did make minor incursions into Georgian territory by crossing the Kur River at the so-called Red Bridge, initiating two weeks of skirmishes. To sur­ mount the crisis, the Georgian government organized a supreme de­ fense council composed of political and military notables, mobilized men through twenty-five years of age, and placed several of the endan­ gered districts under martial law.79 Internally, a group of Bolshevik youths and cadets tried to seize power in Tiflis and follow the pattern of the Azerbaijani coup. On the night of May 2—3, the band of about twenty-five armed men, headed by Alexan­ dre (Sandro) Makharadze, occupied the military academy and there pro­ claimed the establishment of Soviet rule in Georgia. In the ensuing bat­ tle with Georgian regulars and national guardsmen, the insurgents were quickly overpowered, leaving two dead and three captured. The rest fled or went underground. The arrested conspirators were given a summary trial and shot. The Georgian newspapers reported these events with strong insinuation, as the names and places of origin of the three exe­ cuted Bolsheviks left no doubt that all were Armenian.80 77 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no. 96, May 6, 1920; Bor’ba, May 6:2, 1920. 78 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 9$» May 6, and no. 99, May 9, 1920; Nor Ashkhatavor, May 5—9, 1920. For reports and evidence of improved Georgian-Armenian relations after the sovietization of Azerbaijan, see Armenia Archives, file 200/1/201. 79 Kazemzadeh, op. át., p. 296. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, reports of May-June, 1920. 80 FO 371/5168, E5861/262/44; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 3, no. 520,

BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENTS IN TRANSCAUCASIA

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The Georgian Bolsheviks’ plan to stage a coup and call for the support of the Red Army was in keeping with the strategy of Sergo Ordzhonikidze and his colleagues of the Caucasian Bureau and the Military Revolution­ ary Council of the Caucasus Front. On May 3, Ordzhonikidze tele­ graphed Moscow that he expected the Red Army to be in Tiflis within ten days.81 But the enthusiasm of the Kavburo was not matched by Lenin and the central committee. On the western front, the Poles had resumed their offensive and were advancing into the Ukraine; in the south, the army of General Petr Wrangel held the Crimea and remained a force to be reckoned with; and in Azerbaijan, much of the country still had to be pacified. Moreover, there was serious concern that an attempt to capture Tiflis would draw the British back into the Caucasus. The reports from the Allied conference at San Remo indicated that the British gar­ rison at Batum would hold in place and even be reinforced by French and Italian battalions. Batum was critical militarily and economically, and nothing should be done that might prolong the British presence there. For all these reasons, the Politburo on May 4 denied authorization to employ the Red Army in Georgia. The next day, Lenin and Stalin wired Ordzhonikidze that the central committee had ordered him to withdraw all troops to Azerbaijani territory and to refrain from further military action in Georgia. A treaty of peace with Georgia was not out of the question.82 Ordzhonikidze and Kirov replied on May 7 that they would abide by the directive but reiterated the necessity of establishing Soviet rule in Georgia as soon as possible. Menshevik Georgia had become the foremost counterrevolutionary center in the Caucasus and a potential launching ground for offensive action against Soviet Azerbaijan and the Soviet North Caucasus. The country was turning into an arsenal of weap­ May 5,1920; Haradj, May 11:4,1920; G. A. [Hrand] Avetisian, KomsomolZakavkazïa v bor’be zapobedu i uprochenieSovetskoivlasti (igiy—igsi) (Erevan, 1964), pp. 277—279. See also FO 371/4937, E4702/1/58, Luke to FO, May 12, 1920. 81 Pipes, op. át., p. 227; Zhvaniia, op. át., p. 269; Mnatsakanian, op. át., p. 129. 82 Pipes, op. át., p. 227; Swietochowski, op. át., p. 186; B. H. Lalabekian, V. I. Lenine ev Sovetakan kargen hastatumn u amrapndumn Andrkovkasum (Erevan, 1961), pp. 209—210. See also The Georgian Mail, May 19:3, 1920. At the same time (May 5), Foreign Affairs Com­ missar Chicherin sent a message to the British government expressing the Sovnarkom’s readiness to begin negotiations for an end to hostilities with Baron Wrangel in the Crimea. Chicherin continued: As for the Caucasus, the Russian Government point out that the military operations of the Soviet troops in that region have already been suspended and that the Soviet Government have directiy communicated with the adjacent Government, proposing that peace negotiations shall be opened immediately, such a course being evidendy not in the least incompatible with the readiness of the Russian Government to take into con­ sideration and to discuss the special interests of Great Britain in the Caucasus, so far as these exist and so far as the British Government will amicably make them known.

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ons acquired from Denikin’s defeated Volunteer Army. It was essential to gain control of Georgia, with its strategic Black Sea coast. Ordzhoni­ kidze and Kirov suggested repeating the tactic successfully used in Azer­ baijan—a staged coup followed by an immediate appeal for help from the Red Army. They asserted that revolutionary ferment was increasing and asked whether or not they should lend support to the movement developing against the Menshevik government.83 The response from Moscow came in the form of a Soviet-Georgian treaty signed on the same day, May 7, 1920. By the terms of the sixteenarticle treaty, speedily negotiated by Soviet Assistant Foreign Affairs Commissar Lev Karakhan and Georgian envoy Grigorii Uratadze, the R.S.F.S.R. extended official recognition to the Republic of Georgia and pledged noninterference in its domestic affairs. Article 3 confirmed the existing boundary between Russia and Georgia, whereas Article 4 iden­ tified the territory of the Georgian republic as including the provinces of Tiflis, Kutais, and Batum in their entirety, together with the counties of Sukhum and Zakatal. The R.S.F.S.R. would also recognize any terri­ tory subsequently acquired by Georgia through international agree­ ment. Other articles committed Georgia to disarm and intern all military and naval units, groups, or individuals feigning to represent the legiti­ mate government of Russia or wishing to overthrow the government of Soviet Russia or any of its allies. Reciprocally, the R.S.F.S.R. would not tolerate elements purporting to be the government of Georgia or trying to overthrow the existing government and would influence its allies to deter anti-Georgian activities within their boundaries. The two sides would grant each other most-favored-nation status in trade and would soon negotiate a separate commercial agreement. The treaty was to take effect immediately, without having to await ratification.84 The Georgians made their greatest concession in a secret annex that legalized the Communist Party in Georgia and recognized its right to free expression, assembly, and political agitation. Some observers be­ lieved that allowing the Bolsheviks to engage in legal propaganda and agitation virtually nullified Soviet recognition of Georgian indepen­ dence. Many Georgian Bolsheviks, however, felt let down by Moscow’s pledge of nonaggression and noninterference in the internal affairs of Georgia. Reflecting Russia’s fear that the British might return in force 83 Zhvaniia, op. át., pp. 269—270. 84 Akademiia Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR—Gruzinskii Filial Institute Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS—Arkhivnoe Upravlenie Gruzinskoi SSR, Bor'ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii: Dokumenty i materialy (1917—igsi gg.), comps. S. D. Beridze et al. (Tbilisi, 1958), pp. 563— 568; Kliuchnikov and Sabanin, op. át., pp. 22—23; Kazemzadeh, op. át., pp. 297—299; Ar­ menia Archives, 200/1/581, pp. 76—77. For contemporary English translations and re­ ports, see FO 371/4942—4943, E7446/E8161/1/58 enclosures. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 1, Revue de la Presse, 9—14 mai 1920.

BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENTS IN TRANSCAUCASIA

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to the Caucasus, one of the provisions of the secret annex obliged the Georgian government to do everything in its power to remove all foreign troops from Batum and particularly to prevent the disembarkation of reinforcements. Inasmuch as the treaty recognized Zakatal as a part of Georgia even though much of the district was under Azerbaijani control, a brief supplementary treaty on May 12 stipulated that the dispute would be resolved by arbitration and that meanwhile neither Georgia nor Azer­ baijan would introduce any additional armed elements.85 The Soviet and Georgian press lauded the treaty that was to normalize relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Republic of Georgia. But rev­ elation of the terms caused deep consternation in Erevan. If Georgia were actually to include the provinces of Tiflis and Batum in their en­ tirety, Armenia would be deprived of the Chorokh River Valley as a cor­ ridor to the port of Batum and would have to relinquish its strong claims to the county of Akhalkalak and the southern part of Borchalu in the former Tiflis gubemiia. As a matter of fact, the Lori district in southern Borchalu was already divided such that part of it was fully integrated into the Armenian republic and the rest was a neutral zone where there was strong sentiment for adhesion to Armenia. It seemed in Erevan, there­ fore, that the government of Soviet Russia either was not fully aware of the local political geography or else had committed an act of provoca­ tion by acknowledging the Georgian maximalist claims to the two prov­ inces. The Armenians were also concerned that the provision binding Georgia to forestall action hostile to Soviet Russia or any of its allies might be used by the Tiflis government to block the transit of arms and equipment being sent to Armenia by the European Allies on grounds that the weapons might be used against Nationalist Turkey, an ally of Soviet Russia. In his protest note to Moscow, Armenian Foreign Minister Ohandjanian invoked the principle of self-determination in reasserting Armenia’s right to the Armenian-populated southern districts of the Tif­ lis gubemiia, the boundaries of which stemmed from tsarist colonial policies and were therefore in conflict with the precepts espoused and proclaimed by the Sovnarkom of the R.S.F.S.R.86 The Georgian press ridiculed the protest, questioning why the Ar­ menians had addressed themselves to Russia rather than to Georgia, under whose jurisdiction the territories in question belonged. Unfor­ 85 FO 371/4942, E7446/1/58 enclosure; Bor'ba zapobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii, pp. 571— 572; Pipes, op. cit., p. 228; Kazemzadeh, op. át., pp. 299—300. 86 Armenia Archives, 200/1/427, p. 338, and 200/2/83, p. 2; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin 8, June 18, 1920, File 660/3, no- 128, June 6, 1920, and File 67/30; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, Press reports, Slovo, June 6, 1920; Archives de 1’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, no. 770, June 25, 1920, enclosure; FO 371/4950, E7979/36/58 enclosure, and 371/4958, E8639/134/58, Luke to FO, June 22, 1920, enclosure; Haradj, June 16:1, 1920.

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tunately, even in this time of grave danger the Armenians had not curbed their Imperialistic appetites. The Dashnakists had apparendy learned nothing from past errors. Obviously, complained Bor’ba, they had not even taken the time to study the treaty before spreading their calumnies. It was beyond all reason to conclude that the treaty would be manipulated to deny the delivery of military equipment to Armenia. Such far-fetched accusations had been absent from the Dashnakist or­ gans for a while, and it had been hoped that the Armenians had finally come to their senses. Alas, the latest Dashnakist demagoguery had dis­ pelled such illusions—but perhaps the petty Armenian nationalists should not be blamed, as such behavior was in their blood and intrinsic to their nature.87 The mutual taunts of the Armenian and Georgian press notwithstand­ ing, Russo-Georgian relations entered a new phase with the treaty of May 7. Grigorii Uratadze remained in Moscow as the Georgian plenipoten­ tiary, and Sergei Kirov was named to head the mission of the R.S.F.S.R. in Tiflis. On May 15, Kirov departed for Moscow to receive his creden­ tials and personal instructions from Lenin. On Georgia’s eastern fron­ tier, the conflict with Azerbaijan subsided after terms of the treaty be­ came known, and the new government of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Red Army had to face widespread revolts at Ganja and in many other parts of the country. Having lost some of its initial confidence and following the example set in Moscow, Soviet Azerbaijan now indicated a readiness to normalize relations with the Republic of Georgia. By the Treaty of Akstafa on June 12, 1920, the two governments formally recognized each other and agreed to establish diplomatic relations, resolve the Zakatal dispute through arbitration, neutralize the left bank of the Kur River near the Poili and Red bridges, allow for Azerbaijani herdsmen to continue traditional grazing patterns across international frontiers, per­ mit inhabitants of one state to relocate to the other with all movable possessions free of duties or other fees, and negotiate a commercial treaty based on the principle of free transit.88 Legalization of the Communist Party in Georgia brought the release of many imprisoned Bolsheviks and the formulation of new strategies by which to conduct concurrent legal and underground activities. The cre­ ation of Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Armenian Communist parties on a 87 Bor’ba, June 18:1, 19:1, 25:2, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 2, Bulletin 9, July 8, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no. 131, June 19, 1920. 88 Bor’ba, June 27:2—4, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 137» June 27, 1920, and File 67/30, H. H. Vrastani Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani Karavarutiun, 19201., “Dogovor mezhdu Gruziei i Azerbaidzhanom ... ”; FO 371/4944, E9507/ 1/58, Stokes to FO, Aug. 7, 1920, enclosure, and 371/4950, E8369/1/58, Luke to FO, June 30, 1920, enclosure.

BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENTS IN TRANSCAUCASIA

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territorial rather than ethnic basis made the continued existence of the Caucasian Regional Committee (Kraikom) superfluous. The Kraikom had stood against separate Transcaucasian republics and parties and had already been overshadowed by the recently organized Kavburo, headed by Ordzhonikidze and Kirov. Henceforth, the Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Armenian parties were to function as affiliates of the Russian Com­ munist Party and link together on a regional level through the Kavburo. The dissolution of the Kraikom on May 20 was paralleled by the selection of a temporary central committee of the Georgian Communist Party, first headed by Filipp Makharadze and then by Mamiia Orakhelashvili. The central committee appealed to its followers to continue the struggle against the reactionary forces and foreign imperialists and to take ad­ vantage of the legal opportunities now afforded the party. Ordzhoni­ kidze reminded his comrades of the Russian Communist Party’s decision to honor the treaty obligations with Georgia and to prohibit further armed opposition. Should the Georgian Mensheviks violate the treaty by seeking British intervention, however, Soviet Russia would then step in to help. In the short term, the party should concentrate on getting the British out of Batum.89 The Menshevik Bor’ba welcomed the liquidation of the Kraikom, which had been vociferous in its opposition to national independence, and the creation instead of the Georgian Communist Party. Ideological competition was healthy and gave strength to the people and country. But the Menshevik organ was quick to point out that the Bolsheviks had apparently not changed their old ways even after being allowed to op­ erate on a legal basis. The Georgian-language Kommunisti, which began publication at the beginning of June, was filled with articles and edito­ rials deemed seditious, giving the internal affairs ministry a pretext on which to suspend the newspaper after only a few issues.90 Zhordania’s government became all the more distrustful when Sergei Kirov arrived on June 20 at the head of a large Soviet mission that included several of the Bolsheviks recently released from Georgian prisons. Kirov exac­ erbated the situation when, on his first day in Tiflis, he chose to address a rally of workers with firebrand rhetoric and revolutionary slogans. He protested the renewed harassment of Bolsheviks and the dispatch of a Georgian envoy to General Wrangel’s headquarters in the Crimea. Nonetheless, in a press conference on June 23, Kirov oudined the goals of his mission and gave assurances of Soviet friendship, denying any “Zhvaniia, op. át., pp. 273—274; Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii, pp. 572—574, 579» 585—586; Bor’ba, May 26:4, 1920. 90 Bor’ba, May 28:2, 1920. For Soviet protests against continued harassment and sup­ pression of Communists in Georgia, see Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii, pp. 581, 582-583, 586-593, 605-606; Kazemzadeh, op. át., pp. 308-309.

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intent to use his office as a base of operations for other purposes. His declaration mirrored the Politburo’s decision of the previous day to honor all aspects of the Georgian treaty, to normalize relations with the Transcaucasian states, to pressure the English and other foreign troops to leave Georgia, to prevent elements of the White Armies from gaining haven in Georgia, and to refrain from armed rebellion in Georgia and Armenia in view of current regional and world conditions.91 In his reports to Moscow, Kirov wrote that the Georgian government and all foreign representatives in Tiflis acted as if the Soviet mission were a Georgian military revolutionary committee. The Mensheviks could not swallow the legalization of the Communist Party and were again finding excuses to persecute Bolsheviks. Only after a stern warning that the Georgian mission in Moscow might be subjected to similar treat­ ment had the Mensheviks eased up. Still, Zhordania’s government could barely conceal its glee whenever General Wrangel registered even a mi­ nor success against the Red Army. Kirov nonetheless stated that he would continue to carry out his instructions relative to the party’s policies in the Caucasus, and he advised immediate negotiation of a Soviet-Geor­ gian treaty of commerce. The Soviet envoy was also concerned that Azer­ baijan, in the absence of clear directives from the center, was assuming an air of undue independence. It was only through strong personal co­ ercion that he was able to block a fully negotiated commercial compact between Georgia and Azerbaijan. Unless Moscow supervised the affairs of the Caucasus more closely, the Azerbaijanis might think themselves independent lords of all the oil of Baku. Finally, Kirov concluded, the Armenian question was hopelessly entangled in conflict with Azerbaijan. Only Soviet Russia had the power and prestige to cut the Gordian knot. The time had come for the R.S.F.S.R. and the Russian Communist Party to determine their relationship with the Republic of Armenia.92 91 Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, no. 770, June 25, and June 26, 1920, enclos­ ing Skruo, June 24, 1920; FO 371/4942, E7238/1/58, Luke to FO, June 22, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 132, June 20—22, 1920; Kazemzadeh, op. át., p. 301. 92 S. M. Kirov, Stat’i, rechi, dokumenty (Moscow, 1936), pp. 231—232; Bor’ba za pobedu Sovetskoi vlasti v Gruzii, pp. 610-618; Mnatsakanian, op. cit., pp. 197, 199; S. T. Alikhanian, Sovetakan Rusastani dere hai zhoghovrdi azatagrman gordsum (igi 7—1Q21) (Erevan, 1966), pp. 119—120.

6

The May Uprising in Armenia

The sovietization of Azerbaijan had a strong ripple effect in Transcau­ casia and emboldened the Bolsheviks of Armenia to unfurl the flag of revolt. The Red Army’s appearance along the frontiers now seemed to make the early establishment of Soviet rule a distinct possibility. The challenge was to take advantage of the deep discontent among the longsuffering population and within the ranks of the regular army. Renewed Russian protection under the aegis of Bolshevism could be offered as a way out of the terrible Armenian predicament. Yet the Armenian Bol­ sheviks were to learn that without the active intervention of the Red Army their movement could not succeed. Most of the population, in­ cluding the entire mass of Western Armenian refugees, remained aloof or hostile, whereas the disaffected armed forces quickly abandoned the uprising and professed loyalty to the government. The unrest in Armenia in May 1920 did bring to an end the stewardship of Alexandre Khatisian and ushered in the undisguised dictatorship of the party Dashnaktsu­ tiun. The Communist Party of Armenia Until the end of 1919, the Bolsheviks of Armenia were primarily intel­ lectuals who believed that the fragile state of the population necessitated a gradualistic approach to communism. Any suggestion of an armed revolt in the prevailing circumstances was considered not only imprac­ tical but opportunistic. Thus, in mid-1919, when members of the Spartak (Spartacus) youth group posted fliers calling upon the soldiers to diso­ bey their commanders, older Bolsheviks such as Arshavir Melikian dis­ sociated themselves from the provocation and continued to stress the need for legal methods to educate the public about the principles and objectives of communism. 209

210

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Many Armenian Bolsheviks were newcomers from other parts of the Caucasus or Russia and had been offered employment on their pledge to refrain from antigovernmental political activity. Some were given teaching positions; others were placed in state ministries or the civil service. The Armenian government, unlike that of Georgia, did not seem to take alarm at the modest Bolshevik presence in 1919. Despite ideo­ logical differences and stormy relations, the Dashnakists and Bolsheviks had collaborated in the defense of Baku in 1918 and subsequendy main­ tained furtive contacts in Tiflis and elsewhere. In view of the constant Turkish menace, Dashnakist leaders tended to regard Armenian Bol­ sheviks as potential intermediaries to Soviet Russia and hopefully as be­ ing sufficiently patriotic or conscientious to argue the Armenian side regarding the ongoing disputes with neighboring states. A change in the demeanor of the Bolsheviks became perceptible dur­ ing the latter part of 1919, when many party members, persecuted in Georgia and elsewhere, moved to Armenia, along with a large number of railway and communications workers who found employment in the Alexandropol railyards and auto garages. Some of the younger Bolshevik newcomers rejected the contention of the old guard that the objective circumstances in Armenia precluded the early establishment of Soviet rule. They were impatient and outspoken. Even with the significant in­ flux, however, there were reportedly no more than 500 Bolsheviks in Armenia in 1919, and little coordination existed among them. A na­ tional conference scheduled for September turned into a consultative meeting because only a few districts were represented. Nonetheless, the one-day gathering in a hidden location in Erevan did adopt a number of resolutions about the need for energetic work among the masses and selected a regional administrative board known as the Armenia Com­ mittee (Armenkom) of the Russian Communist Party (RKP).1 The formation of the Communist Party of Armenia took place during a meeting held in Erevan in the latter part ofJanuary 1920. By that time, the RKP’s Politburo and Orgburo had ruled in favor of having separate party organizations in the three Transcaucasian states as affiliates of the Russian Communist Party. The eighteen delegates and four others in attendance represented the Armenkom and party units of Erevan, Al­ exandropol, Nor-Bayazit, Etchmiadzin, Dilijan, Ijevan (Karvansarai), Karakilisa, and the Lori neutral zone, as well as the cells formed among the railway workers. Many districts of the Republic were not represented, but there were enough delegates to proceed with the agenda as a na­ tional conference. Armenkom member Sargis Kasian reported on behalf 1 For a discussion of Bolshevism in Armenia in 1918—1919, see Hovannisian, Republic, I, PP- 43—44, 385—415 passim, and II, pp. 248—252.

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of the Armenkom, and several of the attendees spoke of the achieve­ ments and problems in their respective districts.2 During the deliberations, the conference resolved to increase both legal and illegal activity among youth groups, professional unions, the army, and the peasantry in order to draw these segments away from the Dashnaktsutiun. The most important and controversial item—which many Soviet publications have cited as evidence of the revolutionary disposition of the conference—related to the question of the current moment and party tactics. That statement called for civil war against the exploiting classes and the violent overthrow of the Dashnakist regime. In Armenia there was assertedly no national question, only one about the victory of socialism, and the struggle against the Dashnaktsutiun was a link in the common revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the East. The evidence at hand, however, suggests that the conference never adopted such a resolution, although like views were expressed by Avis Nuridjanian and his colleagues from Alexandropol. Nuridjanian, a for­ mer left-wing Dashnakist in Baku, was now filled with loathing and ven­ geance toward the Dashnaktsutiun. He and a few other Bolshevik activ­ ists had succeeded in radicalizing the Alexandropol party organization and wresting control from the defense-minded older Bolsheviks there. The wording of the resolution ascribed to the first national conference in fact bore many similarities to one that Avis had composed at a district meeting in Alexandropol.3 The Erevan conference did not call for the immediate overthrow of the Dashnakist government; rather, it issued a dialectical statement on the current moment. The document noted that there were both objec­ tive and subjective conditions for the establishment of the Soviet order in Armenia, that the Communists in Armenia could not achieve that goal by their own means, that support of an external revolutionary force and linkage with Soviet Russia were critical, and that an increase in pro­ paganda and agitation against the imperialist powers and the prevailing classes and bourgeois government of Armenia was essential. An imme­ diate coup was therefore untimely; political agitation among the soldiers, 2Kh. H. Barseghian, Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi kazmavorume (Erevan, 1965), pp. 268-288; G. B. Gharibdjanian, Hayastani Komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanaki hamar mghvads paikarum (Erevan, 1955), pp. 317—323; [H]A. M. Elchibekian, Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia reuoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii (Erevan, 1963), pp. 114—117. See also Hoktemberian meds reuoliutsian, pp. 299-301; Velikaia Oktabr’skaia reuoliutsiia, pp. 303—307. ’ Barseghian, op. át., pp. 278—280; Elchibekian, op. át., p. 115; Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii—Armianskii Filial Instituía Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Hayastani Komunistakankusaktsutianpatmutian urvagdser, ed. Ds. P. Aghayan et al. (Erevan, 1967), pp. 248-249; A. H. Melkonian, Mayisian apstambutian patmutian hartsi shurdje (Erevan, 1965), pp. 24—28; Hoktemberian meds revoliutsian, pp. 301—306; Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia reuoliutsiia, pp. 307-312-

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villagers, and professional unions was a prerequisite. The phase of armed struggle could begin only after the sovietization of the neighboring re­ publics had been achieved. At that time, any revolt should begin in the northern border district near Kazakh, so that the Red Army could quickly step in. The anticipated uprising would then spread westward toward Karakilisa-Alexandropol-Kars-Sarikamish and southward toward Dilijan-Elenovka-Erevan. A successful operation would require coordi­ nated action from within and Red Army intervention from without. Only if the Dashnakist regime joined with Menshevik Georgia or Musavatist Azerbaijan to batde Soviet Russia or to crush Communist insurgency in either of those countries would the Communist Party of Armenia take arms against the Erevan government prior to the entry of the Red Army.4 Sargis Kasian later wrote that the conference rejected an immediate coup because of the party’s limited popular following, lack of experi­ ence, unpreparedness to organize a government, and inability to with­ stand a civil war or any hostile external intervention. The economic con­ ditions in the country were such as to make endurance impossible without the assistance of Soviet Russia.5 Shavarsh Amirkhanian, the liaison of the Armenkom in the Dilijan-Ijevan district, admitted that Bol­ shevism in Armenia at the time existed only in the minds of intellectuals and had little draw among the workers and villagers. Considering the fact that Armenia lacked an industrial proletariat and was vulnerable to Turkish aggression, sovietization had to be achieved peacefully. Hence, according to Amirkhanian, the question of an armed revolt was never raised.6 Avis Nuridjanian nevertheless used his manipulative talents to report to party organs in Baku that the conference had adopted a resolution for the violent overthrow of the Dashnakist government. When exposed by others who had been present at the meeting, Avis claimed that he was misquoted, but he then continued to propagate his militant account. Down through the years, the spurious resolution has appeared time and again in Soviet publications as proof of the militancy of the Communist Party of Armenia from its inception.7 Before the two-day organizing conference adjourned, it selected a new Armenkom to coordinate activities within the bounds of the Armenian 4 Barseghian, op. át., pp. 275—276; Melkonian, op. át., p. 26. See also Simon Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji eu trkakan sali midjev (Beirut, 1953), pp. 49—55 (cited hereafter as Hayastane murji eu sali midjeu). 5 Barseghian, op. át., p. 282. 6 Ibid., p. 306 n. See also Melkonian, op. át., p. 43. 7 Barseghian, op. át., pp. 280—288; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 25, 29—30 n. See also Rezoliutsiia konferentsii Kommunisticheskikh organizatsii RKP u Armenii (Baku, 1920). For a discus­ sion of intraparty quarrels and the controversy regarding the resolution, see Melkonian, op. át., pp. 28—35.

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republic. Named to that committee were Sargis Kasian, Askanaz Mravian, Stepan (Stêpa) Alaverdian, Danush Shahverdian, and Sergei Martikian of Erevan; Avis Nuridjanian of Alexandropol; and, according to some sources, Hovsep Poghosian of Etchmiadzin. The Armenkom subsequendy co-opted Haikaz Kostanian, Drastamat Ter-Simonian, Hovhannes Sarukhanian, Arshak Gogunts, Alexan (Sasha) Grigorian, and Ghukas Ghukasian of the Spartak youth movement.8 Although the organizational conference of the Communist Party of Armenia did not adopt the tactic of immediate rebellion, neither did it take a defensist or collaborationist stance. The Armenkom demon­ strated that fact on the occasion of Allied recognition of the Republic of Armenia in January 1920, at about the same time as the underground Bolshevik conference. Whereas most of Armenia celebrated the inter­ national recognition, the Armenkom issued a stinging denunciation of the Entente (Allied) Powers, who had extended this “favor” to the Dash­ nak government only in a desperate measure to stop the successful ad­ vance of the Red Army in its emancipatory mission. The exhausted, mis­ erable peasantry should not be deluded into believing that the “bloodsucking bandits” had been satiated on the blood of the Armenian people. Trembling before the international army of the oppressed, the vultures of the Allied Supreme Council had now granted “indepen­ dence” to their Dashnakist lackeys as a way of tricking the enslaved masses. “Your enemies, whether foreign or Armenian, are deceiving you so that they can squelch in you the striving for real freedom and real independence.... Workers and impoverished villagers, you do not have independence, you do not have freedom, you do not have your own Armenia. You will have independence and freedom only when you have established your own rule in Armenia, when you become the masters of the land, when you have a socialist fatherland.” The Armenian workers and villagers would join with neighboring peoples and the Red Army to welcome the glorious day of independence, crying, “Long Live the Red Army, Long Live Soviet Russia, Long Live Soviet Armenia, Death to the Enemies of the People, Long Live Socialism!”9 The intensification of Bolshevik activities at the beginning of 1920 led the Ministry of Internal Affairs to take its first significant measures against the party. At the end of January, a few Bolshevik agitators were placed under administrative arrest in Erevan and Dilijan, and in Feb­ ruary, Askanaz Mravian and several other comrades were expelled from 8Barseghian, op. át., pp. 277—278; Elchibekian, op. át., p. 117; Hayastani Komunistakan patmutian uroagdser, p. 249. For a discussion of the membership of the Armenkom, as given by various sources, see Melkonian, op. át., pp. 39—40. 9 Hoktemberian meds revoliutsian, pp. 308—310; Vetikaia Oktiabr’skaia revohutsiia, pp. 315— 316.

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the country. The arrest of a small number of labor organizers in Alexandropol drew strong protests from the workers, including those adher­ ing to the Dashnakist-dominated professional union, and the men were soon released.10 The issue was raised in Parliament by the Social Revo­ lutionary faction on February 20. Vahan Minakhorian asked to know by what law or legislation the arrests had been made and whether they were aimed at a political current or at individuals. In a democracy, all political currents were to be free of persecution, and the interior ministry was obliged to give concrete bases for its action against individuals. There was nothing truly seditious in the books and circulars of those arrested, and the rumors that the Bolsheviks were plotting with the Turkish re­ actionary forces against Armenia had not been proved. The Social Rev­ olutionary faction therefore demanded the immediate release of those still illegally detained. Rising in support of Minakhorian were Lev Tumanian and Dr. Artashes Melkonian, the sole deputy of the Independent Peasants Union and the editor of Giughatsu Dzain (“Voice of the Pea­ sant’’), which became progressively radicalized and made its columns available to Bolshevik sympathizers.11 Minister of Internal Affairs Abraham Giulkhandanian began his de­ fense by casting aspersions on those who would pose such a question. A new state could falter because of the simplest of adversities, and the government therefore was duty-bound to do everything possible to allow independence to take root. Many Bolsheviks had been granted haven in Armenia in return for their pledge not to engage in antigovemmental activity. Yet during the Turco-Tatar (Azerbaijani) uprising at Baouk-Vedi in the summer of 1919, they had distributed circulars urging the troops not to go to the front. Thereafter they had engaged in treacherous ag­ itation on the Sarikamish-Alexandropol railway, in Alexandropol itself, and then in Dilijan. On the day the Republic was celebrating Allied recognition of its independence, the Bolsheviks had plastered seditious circulars on the walls. It was now irrefutable that Soviet Russia was invit­ ing the Turks to march across Armenia to fight against General Denikin, even though the Armenian people would be taken underfoot. Turkish

10 Ds. P. Aghayan, Hoktemberian revoliutsian eu hai zhoghovrdi azatagrume (Erevan, 1957), pp. 229-230; H.K.(B)K. K.K. kits Kuspat. Institut, Aradjin massayakan-heghapokhakan sharzhumnere Hayastanum (Mayisian apstambutiune): Niuter ev pastatghter, ed. K. Chazarían and M. Nersisian (Erevan, 1932), pp. 229—230 (cited hereafter as Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere). n State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 198, register 1, file 64, pp. 1—41, and 200/1/467, pp. 30-45; Haradj, Feb. 25:4, 1920. On the political career of Vahan Minakhorian, see A. Astvadsatrian, “Vahan Minakhorian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXXVII (Nov. 1959), pp. 80-97.

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butchers such as Nuri Pasha were in the forefront of the Bolshevik move­ ments in the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. The Armenian govern­ ment had no choice but to take action against this criminal element. Vahan Navasardian and Arshak Djamalian berated the Social Revolu­ tionaries for their dualism and naiveté. It was clear that the Armenian Bolsheviks were following the dictates of the Caucasus Regional Com­ mittee (Kraikom), which was committed to the subversion of Armenian independence.12 The Dashnakist Haradj noted that Bolsheviks were employed in Ar­ menia’s schools and in the ministries of finance, provisions, and com­ munications. They themselves had professed that Bolshevik activism in Armenia would be senseless and gave their word of honor to remain loyal. They had kept their pledge until the Red Army reached the Don River, when they began to advocate the overthrow of the government. It was obvious that there was a sharp division of opinion and tension between the Bolsheviks who had come from abroad and those who were indigenous to the region and understood the grave problems facing the Armenian people. Those Bolsheviks who were prepared to betray Ar­ menian independence were being shown the way out of the country.13 The security measures notwithstanding, the number of Bolshevik cells grew in 1920, as radicalized Armenians from Baku and elsewhere re­ turned to their native towns and villages in the provinces of Erevan and Kars and the districts of Zangezur, Dilijan, and Lori. There was much cause for discontent in Armenia. The European Allies had still not re­ solved the Armenian question or arranged for the repatriation of several hundred thousand Western Armenian refugees. The population was ex­ hausted from years of warfare and the breakdown of law and order and remained largely dependent on relief for survival. The militia was af­ flicted by corruption, officials were inept, and conditions in the army were unbearable. Only a supreme sense of patriotism kept most soldiers from joining the steady stream of deserters. In all this turmoil, the yearn­ ing for normalcy made the prospect of renewed Russian rule increasingly attractive to many native Eastern Armenians. Moreover, the officer class, having trained and served in the imperial armies, had been acculturated in Russia and was never at ease in the provincial atmosphere of Armenia. The draw of Russia remained strong in Armenia and, combined with the misfortunes of the Armenian people, set the stage for the May up­ rising of 1920.

12 Armenia Archives, 198/1/78, pp. 1-45; Haradj, Feb. 25:4, 1920. ,s Haradj, February 24:1, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The May Day Demonstrations As the international workers’ holiday on the first of May approached, both the government and the professional unions made plans for rallies and festivities. The central council of the professional unions, domi­ nated by left-wing Dashnakists, planned to march not only with the por­ traits of party founders Kristapor, Rostom, and Zavarian but also with those of Karl Marx, Stepan Shahumian (the martyred Bolshevik chair­ man of the Baku Commune), and Social Revolutionary idealist Levon Atabekian, who in 1905 had fallen trying to reconcile Muslims and Ar­ menians during the “Armeno-Tatar war.” The council invited all labor organizations and socialist parties to join in its procession to the main government rally under banners hailing the Russian revolutionary pro­ letariat and peasantry, the harmony of all peoples, and a united, inde­ pendent Armenia. For its part, the government prepared for a parade and rally in front of the Parliament building and even went so far as to permit a Bolshevik spokesman to participate in the program.14 The Communist Party of Armenia also looked forward to May Day. Still cautious, the Armenkom decided in mid-April not to sponsor a separate demonstration but rather to take part in the government rally with distinct Communist slogans and banners. Yet there was little coor­ dination among Armenia’s Bolsheviks. The radicals at Alexandropol de­ vised their own course of action, and the small party organization in Kars accepted the invitation of the left-wing Social Revolutionaries for a joint program. News of the sovietization of Azerbaijan on the eve of the May Day celebrations charged the atmosphere and emboldened the Bolshe­ viks. On April 30, the Armenkom sent a messenger to Shavarsh Amir­ khanian in the border district of Kazakh with instructions to establish contact with the Red Army and Soviet Azerbaijan to learn of their inten­ tions regarding Armenia. At the same time, the Armenkom decided to enhance its participation in the May Day celebration by marching with a band put together by students of the Erevan gymnasium and under the red banner of the Russian Communist Party.15 During the May Day rally, Dashnakist orators on the balcony of the Parliament harangued the crowd about the most recent threats to the realization of united, independent Armenia. They read resolutions from around the country calling upon the laborers of Azerbaijan to respect the right of the workers and peasants of Karabagh and Zangezur to determine their own future. Prime Minister Khatisian exalted the sig­ nificance of May Day, and Georgian Menshevik ideologue Isador Ram14 Simon Vratzian, HayastaniHanrapetutiun (Paris, 1928), p. 357; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 40—41, 271—272. 15 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 11, 14, 15; Gharibdjanian, op. át., pp. 347—349.

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ishvili acclaimed Armeno-Georgian solidarity against all threats, whether from north or south. While the rally was still in progress, two military automobiles approached bearing the slogans, “Long Live the Russian Communist Party” and “Long Live Soviet Armenia.” Armenkom mem­ ber Stepan Alaverdian, taking advantage of the opportunity, appeared on the balcony to deliver a blistering denunciation of Dashnakists, Men­ sheviks, and Musavatists as enemies of the people and the socialist rev­ olution. He insisted that the reputed ultimatums from Soviet Azerbaijan were actually fabrications intended to distract the workers and peasants from the revolutionary struggle.16 In the afternoon, government officials and guests proceeded to the formal opening of Erevan’s new railway station, where Alexandre Kha­ tisian, Arshak Djamalian, Simon Vratzian, and Avetik Sahakian, the speaker of Parliament, characterized the event as a symbolic precursor to the rapid development and progress of united, independent Armenia. But another column, headed by Bolsheviks, made its way to the city’s Muslim quarter, where left-wing Social Revolutionary Paruir Stamboltsian and others extolled interracial harmony and the benefits of social­ ism. By nightfall, the Dashnakists were not in a tolerant mood, and when a Bolshevik tried to interrupt a formal program in the parliamentary chamber, he was handled roughly and ejected.17 The embarrassment to the government and the dominant party was serious, but it had been quickly contained. The same did not hold true in Alexandropol. The weakness of the local administration, the concen­ tration of most of Armenia’s railway and maintenance workers there, and the militancy of most of its 100 Bolsheviks produced great effer­ vescence upon receipt of news of Azerbaijan’s sovietization. Bolshevik activists hoped to attract up to 500 sympathizers at their May Day rally in the railway depot. The meeting was to be peaceful and efforts would be made not to respond to provocation, but if the Dashnaktsutiun tried to use force to disperse the demonstrators, defensive action would be taken.18 The May Day manifesto prepared by Avis Nuridjanian and his collab­ 16 Haradj, May 1:1—2, 1920; Al. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume (Athens, 1930), pp. 180-182; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 4, 12—13, 16—18, 21— 22. 17 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 357—358; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 18-20. See also the Armenkom’s greetings to Narimanov on the establishment of Soviet order in Azerbaijan, in Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 325. 18H.K.K.(B) K.K. Kuspat. Bazhin, Mayisian apstambutiune Hayastanum: igzo—ig^o (Hishoghutiunneri eu dokumentneri zhoghovadsu) (Erevan, 1930), pp. 26—29, 46—47 (cited here­ after as Mayisian apstambutiune). For an overview of the May rebellion by a prominent Soviet historian, see Aghayan, op. át., pp. 236-259, and for a description of die movement in each of Armenia’s major cities, see H. S. Karapetian, Mayisian apstambutiune Hayastanum, iggo (Erevan, 1961).

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

orators in Alexandropol proclaimed that the deprived masses in the bourgeois-nationalist state of speculators, khmbapets, and perpetrators of interracial pogroms were stretching their hand over the perfidious Dash­ naktsutiun to greet the Red Army and the Baku proletariat and that their struggle was not against the Turkish workers and peasants but against the tottering Dashnakist regime.19 In a message to Nariman Narimanov of the Azerbaijani Revkom, Avis and Arshak Gogunts repeated the image of extending a fraternal hand over the head of the “Armenian Musavat’’ counterrevolutionary government and of clearing accounts with the cul­ prits in the same way that revolutionary Azerbaijan had dealt with the “Turkish Dashnak” regime in Baku.20 Speeches of similar content were delivered during the Bolshevik May Day rally at the Alexandropol railway station. From the depot, the dem­ onstrators moved into the city, where they encountered the parade or­ ganized by the Dashnaktsutiun. The two sides exchanged epithets and the shaking of fists but without incident. Avis, wearing the greasesmeared uniform of a railway worker, tried to address the crowd, prompt­ ing the Dashnakist sponsors to cut short the program and disperse. But the Bolsheviks, encouraged by the large number of laborers who passed under their banner, marched to the Severskii military barracks, where Major General Khachatrian had kept his men confined that day. When Avis, Gogunts, and Captain Sargis Musayelian, the commander of the Vardan Zoravar (“General Vardan”) armored train, entered the fort, Khachatrian requested that they not involve the troops in political af­ fairs.21 Unable to persuade the Bolsheviks to leave, he finally consented to permit them to speak to the men in their separate military formations. But many of the soldiers broke ranks and mixed with the civilian dem­ onstrators. The mood turned angry, and as some of the marchers re­ turned to the city they burst into the Dashnakist clubhouse, smashing furniture and tearing down the portraits of party founders and partisan heroes. The city administration left the violence unchecked as the dem­ onstrators drew back to the railway depot. The Bolshevik organizers were overjoyed, for they had won over hundreds of marchers, challenged the Dashnaktsutiun in the city center, and garnered the sympathy of the military garrison.22 19 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 158—159; Aradjin massayakan shanhumnere, pp. 273—274. 20 Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 323; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 158—159; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, p. 274; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 110—112. 21 Musayelian had brought one section of the armored train from the southern front at Khamarlu to the Alexandropol rail garage under the pretext of having essential repairs made. For a presentation of the life and activities of Captain Musayelian, see M. V. Arzu­ manian, Sargis Musayelian (Erevan, 1955). 22 Elchibekian, op. át., pp. 124—127; Mayisian apstambutiune, p. 52; Garo Sassuni [K. Sasuni], Mayisian khrovutiunnere eu tatarakan apstamb shrdjannere (Hayastan ig2O-in) (Beirut, 1968), pp. 52—57; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 122—124; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 91—93.

THE MAY UPRISING IN ARMENIA

«IQ

Despite this stunning accomplishment, the Bolsheviks did not press their initiative. For two days they engaged in a standoff with the city administration, which made an unsuccessful, halfhearted attempt to cap­ ture the armored train. To get the train out of Alexandropol, where it had been brought for repairs, the army command ordered Captain Mu­ sayelian to return it to the southern front at Khamarlu. Musayelian re­ fused, committing his first clear breach of military discipline. Bolshevik guards took control of the railway depot on May 3, although the city remained in government hands. The next day a group of American relief personnel who had been ordered out of the country by Colonel William Haskell were detained in Alexandropol. They were released only after Prime Minister Khatisian communicated with Musayelian by direct wire to impress upon him the tragic consequences of losing future shipments of American flour and after Lieutenant Colonel Charles Livingston, in charge of relief operations at Alexandropol, gave assurances that the deliveries would continue regardless of the form of government in Ar­ menia.23 As there was no direct communication between Alexandropol and Baku, on May 3 Avis relayed a second message to Nariman Narimanov through the Armenkom in Erevan. He wrote that the “Red Proletariat and Red Soviet Armored Train,” headed by the Alexandropol commit­ tee of the Russian Communist Party, were in an intense state of warfare with the Dashnak regime and were laying the groundwork for revolts throughout Armenia. The Dashnaktsutiun, sensing its approaching de­ mise, was doing everything possible to suppress the revolutionary fervor by inciting an armed conflict with Azerbaijan. The Armenian and Mus­ lim workers had to be cautioned not to succumb to the provocation. As a Bolshevik coup in Armenia would create an immediate economic crisis, Avis asked Narimanov if Azerbaijan could help by sending provisions by way of Kazakh. In case of a favorable reply, the Bolsheviks of Alexandro­ pol would seize power.24 Avis’s two messages to Narimanov were never relayed to Baku by the Armenkom, which grew increasingly uneasy over the developments in Alexandropol. At a time when the Dashnakist government was broad­ casting the existence of a Turco-Tatar-Bolshevik plot to destroy Armenia, Avis only exacerbated the situation by appealing for Azerbaijani inter­ vention. Wary of Avis since the organizational conference in January, most Armenkom members believed that his actions verged on adven­ 23 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 47—48; Melkonian, op. át., p. 101; Arzumanian, op. át., pp. 40-51; Gharibdjanian, op. át., pp. 355—359 (stating that the railway workers seized the station on May 2); Aghayan, op. át., pp. 245—246. See also Khatisian, op. át., pp. 182—183. 24 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 160-161; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia reuoliutsiia, p. 324; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, p. 275; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 100-101.

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turism and opportunism. If there was to be a revolt, it should begin along the northern border in coordination with the Red Army. The Armenkom, itself in need of experienced leadership, urged exiled members Kasian and Mravian to return to Armenia immediately.25 In a report to the Armenkom on May 3, Avis painted the Bolshevik achievements in Alexandropol in glowing colors and asked authoriza­ tion to revolt. The request was actually a threat: “We will accept all your directives but must forewarn you that if you tell us not to respond to arrests, terror, and the disabling of the armored train by taking over the government, then we disavow all responsibility for the inevitable results of which the Armenkom should be aware. The Armenkom will be an­ swerable to the Russian Soviet Government and to history for the de­ struction of the party organization in order to delay the assumption of power for one or at most two months.’’26 Stepan Alaverdian, who then chaired the Armenkom, did not trust Avis and saw many contradictions in the letter. Avis asserted, for example, that the entire military garrison was at the disposal of the Bolsheviks, who were so well organized that they could easily take control of the government; he then went on to explain, however, that the Bolsheviks had refrained from seizing power because the military rank and file was not yet sufficiently prepared and widespread looting was likely to follow. The Armenkom withheld the authorization that Avis sought and refused to alter the strategy of await­ ing the initiative of the Red Army in Kazakh.27 In his second letter to the Armenkom, on May 5, Avis warned that time was working in favor of the counterrevolutionaries. Together with Gogunts and Musayelian, he had told Alexandropol county commis­ sioner Loretsian and mobilization commissioner Valad Valadian that the Bolsheviks would not try to seize power for the moment on condition that all imprisoned comrades be released and a workers’ conference be summoned to express its will. This pledge, Avis explained, had been made to stall for time until a reply was received from the Armenkom. A critical economic situation existed, as the flour reserves were being plun­ dered. The real enemy of the revolution was not the khmbapets but the specter of famine. In another message, Avis complained that the Armenkom’s fixation on Kazakh was fundamentally wrong. The rebellion should begin in Alexandropol and spread to Kazakh and the Azerbaijani 25 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 276, 278; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 96—98. For crit­ icism of the Armenkom’s position by an “old” Bolshevik, see B. A. Bo rian, Armeniia, mezhdunarodnaia diplomatiia i SSSR, II (Moscow-Leningrad, 1929), pp. 99—103, 106. 26 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 282—284; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 162—164; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 98—99. 27Borian, op. át., p. 106; Arzumanian, op. át., pp. 43—45. See Alaverdian’s charge of “opportunism” against Avis, in Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 277—278.

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frontier. It was now “us or them.” The Armenkom should at least come to Alexandropol to judge the situation firsthand. As an admonition, Avis cautioned that the threat of Dashnakist terror was ever present and that the Bolshevik position was weakening with each passing day.28 The Armenkom dispatched Drastamat Ter-Simonian and Parliament member Artashes Melkonian to liquidate the adventure or, if that was not possible, at least to give direction and coordination to the move­ ment. On May 7 the pair met in the armored train with the Alexandropol leaders, as well as with Spartakist Ghukas Ghukasian, who was en route from Erevan to Kars; Kostia Aivazian, a Bolshevik operative, on his way to Dilijan; and Adok (Andranik Jughurian), the Bolshevik activist from Sarikamish. Avis and his supporters managed to persuade the Armenkom’s liaisons that there could be no turning back and that unless the party took advantage of the present opportunity it would be physically destroyed. There were both objective and subjective reasons to expect a successful coup. The country was exhausted from the constant state of siege; the native Russian Armenians were deeply resentful of the Turkish Armenian partisans and refugee masses; the army’s action against the Muslims of neighboring Aghbaba had made that district ripe for Bol­ shevik agitation; the labor and land policies of the government had left the workers and peasants disgruntled; the soldiers were worn out and wanted to go home; the administration of Alexandropol was weak and unpopular; and the sovietization of Azerbaijan had turned everyone’s attention toward Russia.29 During that meeting, a nine-member military revolutionary commit­ tee (the Alexandropol Revkom) was formed, including Avis, Musayelian, Gogunts, Ter-Simonian, and Melkonian. Two days later, Ghukasian cre­ ated a similar committee from among the forty Bolsheviks who made up the five cells of the city and fortress of Kars, and Adok organized one at Sarikamish from the five local cells, two of them in the armed forces. Still, the Bolsheviks suffered from contradictions. Though insisting on the need to begin the revolt in Alexandropol, the comrades who had gathered in the armored train nonetheless dispatched Kostia Aivazian to Dilijan to have the local party leaders apprise the Red Army at Akstafa of the situation and seek assistance. As soon as Kazakh moved, supported by the Red Army, the whole of northern Armenia—Alexandropol, Kars, Sarikamish—would rise up and then advance on Erevan to compel the government to relinquish power.30 28 Aghayan, op. át., pp. 247—248; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 284—285; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 165—167; Melkonian, op. cit., pp. 101—103. 29 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 278—279; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 26, 53—54; Karapetian, op. át., p. 138; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 103—104. 30 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 53-54; Aghayan, op. át., pp. 249-250; Melkonian, op. át.,

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In their report to the Armenkom, Ter-Simonian and Melkonian wrote that they had been put before an accomplished fact and had no alter­ native but to endorse Avis’s plan. As a revolt was now inevitable, they asked the Armenkom to create a diversion by intensifying agitation among the armed forces around Erevan and fomenting disturbances in Nor-Bayazit and in the direction of Elenovka and Dilijan.31 Matters were slipping beyond the control of the Armenkom, which by that time had dwindled to two persons, Alaverdian and Martikian. Their military con­ tacts indicated that the army would not come out against the govern­ ment without a period of concentrated agitation. Nonetheless, on the night of May 9 the Armenkom dispatched Hovhannes Sarukhanian to Nor-Bayazit to do whatever was possible.32 But time was running out, for the government had already begun a sweep of Erevan in search of con­ spirators. Governmental Countermeasures

The surprising Bolshevik showing on May Day and the unreliability of several army units stunned the government and brought to a head the debate within the Dashnaktsutiun about the suitability of Alexandre Khatisian to lead the country in time of crisis. Since the Muslim unrest in Childer, Zarushat, and Aghbaba at the beginning of the year, many party militants had called for a more centralized, revolutionary regime. Khatisian might be a capable administrator and excellent head of state in normal times, but the immediate threats to Armenia’s existence re­ quired strong, decisive leadership. The debate flared up within the Dash­ nakist faction of the Parliament and between the faction and the su­ preme party Bureau. Ruben Ter-Minasian and his supporters demanded a quasi-dictatorship of the Bureau to eliminate the tension between the party and government and to allow for swift, revolutionary measures to save the nation. The Dashnakist parliamentary faction had long rejected

pp. 120-121,123-124. Gharibdjanian, op. át., p. 359, lists eight rather than nine members of the Alexandropol committee, which by assuming the name of Military Revolutionary Committee of Armenia further challenged and undermined the authority of the Armenkom in Erevan. The composition of the various military revolutionary committees orga­ nized in Armenia during the May uprising and the discrepancies in Soviet sources regard­ ing the membership of these committees are discussed by A. Melkonian, “Mayisian apstambutian patmutian mi kani hartser,” BanberHayastani arkhivneri, 7th yr., no. 2(1966), pp. 26—32. He omits Avis Nuridjanian from the roster of the Military Revolutionary Com­ mittee of Armenia (citations of Melkonian below refer to his Mayisian apstambutian pat­ mutian hartsi shurdje). S1 Aghayan, op. át., p. 248; Elchibekian, op. át., pp. 129-130. 32 Karapetian, op. át., pp. 186—189; Melkonian, op. át., p. 157, giving May 8 as the date of Sarukhanian’s departure.

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this line of reasoning, but in April the Bureau’s influence over the government increased significantly with the inclusion of Ter-Minasian, Djamalian, Vratzian, and Ohandjanian in Khatisian’s cabinet. The May Day manifestations now raised the question of a combined BureauGovernment. In closed caucuses on May 3 and 4, the Dashnakist faction examined the ailments within the administration and armed forces and the impli­ cations of the ultimatums from Soviet Azerbaijan and the Red Army’s Military Revolutionary Committee of the Caucasian Front. Then, in a joint session with members of the cabinet and Bureau on May 4, the faction learned of Captain Musayelian’s refusal to return the armored train to Khamarlu and of the growing disaffection within the military establishment. The Bureau’s proposal to take control of the government produced a sharp division, as the party democrats, including nearly all Western Armenian deputies, argued against ultracentralization. In the end, the parliamentary faction gave in to the Bureau’s pressure, en­ dorsing the proposal for a Bureau-Government by a vote of 22 to 15. Hamazasp Ohandjanian was named the party’s candidate for prime min­ ister, or minister-president. Ohandjanian pledged that he would not di­ gress from the principles and objectives of the party’s world congress (held in Erevan a few months earlier) and that once Armenia’s external and internal enemies had been thwarted the Bureau would withdraw. Still, he was unable to win unanimous consent of his proposed slate of ministers, as twelve Dashnakist deputies were implacable in their oppo­ sition to the convergence of Bureau and government.33 During an extraordinary session of Parliament on May 5, Alexandre Khatisian, skillfully disguising his personal perturbation at being told to step aside, described the crises besetting the country and then tendered the resignation of his cabinet. Ohandjanian was immediately selected as prime minister-designate and after a fifteen-minute recess submitted his cabinet slate, the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun: Hamazasp Ohandjanian

minister-president; foreign AFFAIRS

Ruben Ter-Minasian

INTERNAL AFFAIRS; MILITARY

AFFAIRS

Abraham Giulkhandanian Sargis Araratian

FINANCE; JUSTICE WELFARE AND RECONSTRUCTION

” Khatisian, op. át., pp. 184—185; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 63—70. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, May 4:1,1920. For biographical materials on Ohandjanian, see Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, I, no. 4 (1956), pp. 119—124; Ellen Biuzand, “Mer bzhishke (H. Ohandjanianianmah hishatakin),” HairenikAmsagir, XXXVI (April-June, Aug.-Sept. 1948), pp. 38-49» 57-63» 84-92, 89-95, 85-92-

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Simon Vratzian

LABOR; AGRICULTURE AND STATE

PROPERTIES

Arshak Djamalian Gevorg Ghazarian

COMMUNICATIONS PUBLIC EDUCATION AND

CULTURE34

The Dashnakist faction moved swiftly to a confirmation vote, denying the Social Revolutionary faction and Dr. Artashes Melkonian, the deputy of the Independent Peasants Union and an active collaborator with the Armenkom, the opportunity to voice their criticism of the proposed slate. Then, again without allowing debate, the Dashnakist faction pro­ posed and Parliament agreed to dispatch commissions to study the sit­ uation in Alexandropol (Arsen Shahmazian, Garo Sassuni, Hovakim Budaghian) and Kars (Vahan Khoreni, Nikol Aghbalian, Arshak Hovhannisian). Thereupon, Parliament recessed for a month, entrusting all legislative prerogatives to the cabinet and empowering the parliamen­ tary presidium to summon a special session if the need arose.35 The Council of Ministers immediately formed a “little cabinet’’ of the assis­ tant ministers, chaired by Artashes Chilingarian (assistant minister of justice), to deal with all matters except important political and legislative questions so that the ministers could concentrate on the defense of the Republic.36 At the same time, Ruben Ter-Minasian, concerned about the indecisiveness of the regular army, called upon Sebouh to organize an expeditionary force of Western Armenians, primarily from the 8th Reg­ iment at Igdir, and to muster at Etchmiadzin for a march on Alexan­ dropol.37 In its first public appeal on the same day, the Bureau-Government extolled the heroic struggle and untold sacrifices that had led to Ar­ menian independence and the drawing together of the two segments of the centuries-long-partitioned fatherland. The government had labored to safeguard the physical existence and unhindered social development of the working people and to keep steadfast the Republic’s democratic foundations. But dark clouds had again gathered over the Armenian people as the Turkish pashas and Azerbaijani khans, desperately trying 34 Khatisian, op. át., p. 186; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 97» May 5, 1920; Haradj, May 6:2,1920; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 72-73; Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371 ƒ4937, E4550/1/58 enclosure, and 371/4943, E7919/1/58 enclosure. 35 Armenia Archives, 199/1/115, p. 128; Haradj, May 6:2, 1920; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 737436 Karavarakan Lratu, 1920, no. 20 (June 29, 1920); Haradj, May 12:4, 13:4, 1920; Ar­ menia Archives, 200/1/133, pt. I, pp. 68, 70. For records of the “little cabinet,” see Armenia Archives, files 199/1/53 and 199/1/237. 37 Hovhannes Sahakian, “Erku tari haikakan banakin medj,” and Tigran Baghdasarian, “Hayastani Hanrapetutian verdjaluisin,” both in Edjer mer azatagrakan patmutenen (Paris, 1937), pp. 64—65, 217—219. See also Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, p. 336.

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to save themselves from oblivion, had donned a red Bolshevik mantle to extinguish Armenia’s freedom. Moreover, certain elements within the country knowingly or unknowingly were aiding and abetting the enemies of the Armenian people by exploiting the food crisis and the exhaustion of the population in order to create turmoil to satisfy their own narrow personal ambitions. They were attempting to produce a split in the coun­ try at a time when Azerbaijani troops and bandits were spilling Armenian blood in Karabagh and Gandzak and when Turkish askers were afoot in Sharur and Nakhichevan, putting Armenian villages to the torch: Citizens ... Armed with extraordinary power granted by Parliament, the gov­ ernment is appealing to your civic consciousness and summoning all of you, at this critical moment for the Armenian people, to rally around the government, whose slogan is Defense of the Independence and Freedom of Armenia and Reinforcement of Its Internal Democratic Order. For realization of this goal, the government will spare no effort, and it will be triumphant with you and for you.38

The Bolshevik agitation brought together almost all political currents in Armenia. Frequent critics of the Dashnaktsutiun, including the Pop­ ulist, Ramkavar, Hnchakist, and Social Democrat (Specifist) parties, joined with the Non-Partisan Union, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and scores of professional, cultural, and civic organizations in issuing denunciations of the disturbance and exhortations to resist the external and internal threats to the Armenian republic. Catholicos Gevorg V called upon the loyal sons of the nation to defend the Republic so that the sacrifice of myriads of martyrs would not have been in vain. Those who could not see the danger from east and west, who were hatching plots to obliterate the ideal of independent Armenia, who refused to recognize the intrigue to destroy the Armenian people, would be judged severely by history. The Church could not remain indifferent to the as­ sault upon the unity of the fatherland and admonished those who would divide the nation to repent and join in the work of rehabilitation and reconstruction.39 The Ramkavar Party declared that the Turkish Ittihadists who had massacred the Western Armenians and laid waste to the land were now in Azerbaijan. Through Nuri and Halil, they were disguising themselves under a Bolshevik fleece in order to assist Mustafa Kemal, who was fur­ thering the Ittihadist objective of annihilating the Armenians, as recently demonstrated in Cilicia. “Only an insane person blind in both eyes 38 Haradj, May 8:2, 1920; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 416—417. 39 Haradj, May 9:3, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no- 114> May 30, 1920; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 368—375; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 262— 263, and Hayastane murji ev sali midjev, pp. 67—69; FO 371/4942, E7619/1/58 enclosure.

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would be unable to see the new menace threatening the Republic of Armenia generally and Turkish Armenia particularly,” especially at a time when a solution to the Armenian question was finally coming to fruition. Yet there were persons with Armenian names but void of Ar­ menian spirit who had joined the mortal enemies scheming to march over the body of Armenia and unite with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the true successor of Enver and Talaat. No one understood the danger better than the Western Armenians, who, with the Ramkavar Party, would place all their means at the disposal of the government to crush the deadly conspiracy.40 Perhaps the strongest denunciation of the Marxist Bolsheviks came from the Marxist Specifists, who ridiculed the falsity of the Bolshevik slogans and observed that whereas there was no freedom of expression in Soviet Russia, Dashnakist Armenia had provided Bolshevism a forum, which had been thanklessly and treacherously exploited. In his vibrant oratorical style, Bakhshi Ishkhanian exposed the Turco-Tatar-Bolshevik collusion to wipe out the last bit of historic Armenia and parodied the Soviet regime as being not sovetakan (“soviet”) but swamah (“starv­ ing”).41 The Specifist public appeal, composed by Ishkhanian and Davit Ananun, noted that the political comedy in Baku was turning into an adventuristic tragedy in Alexandropol. The allied forces of Bolshevism and Pan-Islam were finding it possible to clap hands together because a group of depraved Armenian adventurists had auctioned their souls and were prepared to deliver the sad fatherland of drained people, orphans, and refugees to the monstrous schemes of Moscow and Erzerum. Workers, Comrades, Citizens! It is the sacred duty of each of you in these difficult days to dedicate your maximum strength and vigor, ability and talent, in defense of the endangered fatherland. All in whom there sparks the bright sense of responsibility for defending a most unfortunate people and its su­ premely just cause must rise to their feet... and assist the government of Ar­ menia scotch in the nest the revolt of abominable criminals who would under­ mine the foundations of our democratic system and introduce an already-condemned repressive-terroristic system.42

While the political parties penned appeals and the Dashnaktsutiun declared a full mobilization of the party rank and file, the government

40 Haradj, May 9:3, 1920; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 369—370; Gabriel Lazian, Hayastan ev hai date: Hai-ev-Rus haraberutiunneru luisin tak (Cairo, 1957), pp. 206—208. The appeal of the Zhoghovrdakan (Populist) Party is in Haradj, May 8:2—3, 192O> Bor’ba, May 8:2, 1920; and Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 363—368. 41 Haradj, May 16:4, 1920. See also Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, p. 360. 42 Haradj, May 9:3, 16:3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 361-362. See also Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 358—361.

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adopted a number of emergency measures.4*43 On May 6 the justice min­ istry was instructed to prepare a statute for extraordinary courts-martial with the power to decree the death penalty for treason and malefic spec­ ulation. The regulation that was confirmed two days later by the cabinet empowered the field courts to deal with cases involving treason, advocacy of armed rebellion, sabotage of communication and transportation lines, and abandonment of a theater of war or refusal to fight. The tri­ bunals were to complete their investigations in one to three days, with their sentences to be carried out immediately. There was to be no ap­ pellate process, except that the sentence of death was to be confirmed by the military ministry. Punishments ranged from one to six years of hard labor for antigovernmental pronouncements or publications to ex­ ecution by firing squad for high treason.44 The Council of Ministers also outlawed strikes of government employees and gave notice that it would charge anyone trying to cause a work stoppage with sabotage and turn him over to the extraordinary courts. The regulation was to remain in effect until Parliament reconvened.45 Meanwhile, the parliamentary commission that had departed for Alexandropol met on May 7 with Captain Musayelian, who explained his adherence to the Bolshevik movement and his refusal to take the ar­ mored train to Khamarlu. Only through Russian revolutionary power, he told Arsen Shahmazian and Garo Sassuni, could Armenia ever be secure; the prestige of Russia was sufficient to constrain all enemies to withdraw from the country. The Armenian people were exhausted and did not want to fight the Turks any longer, but the Dashnaktsutiun con­ tinued its militancy and furthered the interests of the bourgeois, ex­ ploiting classes rather than the workers and peasants. Musayelian ad­ mitted that it might be too early to establish Soviet rule, but matters had gone too far and he could not retreat.46 That same day, Colonel Shahmazian met with the commanding offi­ cers of the 1,300-man Alexandropol garrison. The officers, among them a significant number of Russians, ascribed the disposition of the troops to a manifestation of friendship for Russia. They complained of the in­ ertia of the Alexandropol administration and the lack of support from 4i Haradj, May 7:1—2, 1920. The conclusions of the cabinet are recorded in Armenia Archives, file 199/1/133. ** ArmeniaArchives, 199/1/133, pt. I, pp. 72,74; Haradj, May 8:3,13:1,16:1,1920; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 417-420, and, for restoration of the death penalty, p. 424. 45 Karavarakan Lratu, 1Q2O, no. 21 (July 6, 1920); Armenia Archives, 199/1/133, pt I» p. 74; Haradj, May 12:4, 1920; Oktiabrina Balikian and Vladimir Evoyan, comps., “Novye dokumenty o revoliutsionnom dvizhenii v Armenii v 1917—1920 gg.,” Lraber, no. 11 (1977), pp. 99-100. For government regulations relating to the revolt, see especially Ar­ menia Archives, file 199/1/117. 46 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 74—80.

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the government. Some expressed the view that the defeat of Denikin had made the return of Russian rule in the Caucasus inevitable, and Russia was now represented by Bolshevism. Others asserted that they were not sympathetic to Bolshevism but had gone along with the May Day demonstrations in order to maintain the trust and discipline of their men. Several of the Armenian officers accused their Russian colleagues of advancing the Bolshevik cause as a way to restore a Russian empire, and all complained about the terrible privations of the troops. It was also pointed out that although a week had passed since May Day, neither the government nor the Dashnaktsutiun had sent anyone to speak to the men. Only Bolshevik activists were being heard, promising that the soldiers could soon return to their homes and loved ones. Most of the officer corps claimed to be loyal to the government but admitted that if another regime was swept to power as the result of an insurrection they would remain neutral and continue to perform their military obliga­ tions. Colonel Shahmazian did not find the situation reassuring.47 Shahmazian and Sassuni appeared at the Severskii barracks on May 8 to try to convince the troops that the Turks were plotting to destroy Armenia by using a Russian and Soviet cover. The pair was given a cold reception by the enlisted men, who refused to engage in a dialogue, complaining that they had tried to be heard for two years but no one was listening. Drastamat Ter-Simonian of the Alexandropol Revkom was also present to prevent the Dashnakist spokesmen from exploiting fear of the Turks as a way of regaining the loyalty of the garrison. The en­ counter ended with the troops chanting pro-Soviet and anti-Dashnakist slogans.48 The status quo had not changed by the evening of May 8, as the railway depot remained in Bolshevik hands and the city under government con­ trol. That night Dashnakist loyalists headed by Dr. B. Baghdasarian marched to the depot in an attempt to capture the armored train, but they were met with machine guns and artillery and had to retreat. Mean­ while, a gathering of Western Armenian representatives resolved to take arms against the Bolshevik agitators and dispersed to nearby refugee centers to organize loyal contingents.49 The apparent desire of both sides to avoid bloodshed was evidenced once again on May io in a direct-wire exchange between Major General Konstantin Gamazov (Gamazian) in Erevan and Captain Musayelian in Alexandropol. Gamazov appealed to Musayelian’s sense of patriotism by 47 Haradj, May 22:3, 1920. 48 Melkonian, op. át., pp. 124—126; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 131-136; Haradj, May 22:3, 1920. Sassuni, op. át., pp. 85—87, gives the date of the meeting as May 9. 49 Melkonian, op. át., pp. 126—127; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 140-141; Elchibekian, op. át., p. 128; Mayisian apstambutiune, p. 48; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 87—88.

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drawing attention to the concentration of Turkish armed forces along the frontier and the need to focus on the external threat. Musayelian responded that under the Dashnaktsutiun, Armenia would always be surrounded by hostile neighbors and would receive no help from any­ where. Only the Russian revolutionary proletariat could and would assist, and for that the establishment of Soviet order was essential. The Com­ munist Party, Musayelian explained almost apologetically, was merely following the will of the people and had stepped in to prevent the break­ down of law and order. The Dashnaktsutiun should not try to halt the wheel of history but rather should give way to the forces that would bring salvation. Gamazov replied that he was speaking not as a politician but as a soldier who had served for three decades in the Russian army and two years in the Armenian army. Georgia, he said, was not asleep; in case of a civil war it would seal the roads, and the Americans would suspend all shipments of flour. Any disturbance would cause the physical ruin of the Armenian people. Soviet Russia remained distant and could give no real aid. This was not the time for a breakdown of discipline. It was still not too late. Musayelian should move the armored train to the front. Mu­ sayelian retorted that he had heard that reasoning a thousand times. “If you speak as a representative of the Dashnakist government, then we can find no common language, but because of my great respect for you, I am asking you to come to Alexandropol for a day to become acquainted with the facts. If you really love the fatherland, then you should do that, and I will greet you with an honor guard and you will be persuaded what the Red Army means and what miracles it can accomplish.”50 The Alexandropol Bising

After more than a week of indecision, the Alexandropol Military Revo­ lutionary Committee (Revkom) raised the banner of revolt on May 10. In the distribution of portfolios for the Soviet administration, Avis Nuridjanian received foreign affairs; Artashes Melkonian, internal affairs; Drastamat Ter-Simonian, provisions; Bagrat Gharibdjanian, finance; Hmayak Amatuni, chief of militia; Sasha Grigorian, Alexandropol county commissar; and Egor Sevian, city commandant, among others. Sargis Musayelian headed the Red armed forces, with Colonel of Cavalry Dmitrii Korganov (Korganian) his chief of staff and Colonel Andrei MelikShahnazarian (Shakhnazarov) of the ist Cavalry Regiment his field com50 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; Aradjin massaydkan shanhumnere, pp. 292—294; Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoUutsiia, pp. 327—329.

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mander.51 Messages were dispatched to the revkoms of Kars and Sarikamish to be prepared to rebel as soon as the armored train from Alexandropol appeared. On the morning of May 10, Melik-Shahnazarian’s men advanced from the Severskii barracks to the Kazachii post inside the city, where American relief personnel and Armenian partisans were forced to surrender.52 The Revkom’s declaration of Soviet rule read: By the will of the impoverished workers, peasants, and Red armed forces, the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia proclaims the establishment of Soviet order in the Armenian republic. From this day, the Dashnak government, which relies on Mauserists, khmbapets, and speculators and is founded on tyranny, thievery, and monopolistic power, is overthrown. The Military Revolutionary Committee appeals to the population to maintain revo­ lutionary discipline and order. All efforts to hinder this constructive work will be snipped in the bud by the Red forces of Soviet Armenia.53

The Revkom instructed all civil servants to continue to function in a normal manner, imposed a curfew, suspended the sale of liquor, de­ creed that looters and marauders would be shot on the spot, and warned that any home serving as a haven for provocateurs would be razed. Fi­ nally, to ensure the peaceful submission of the city, the Revkom de­ manded twelve prominent hostages, including county commissioner Loretsian, mobilization commissioner Valadian, Parliament member Sassuni, and Dashnakist activists Baghdasarian and Banvor (“Worker”) Serko. In a public declaration that day, the Revkom wrote: The days of the Dashnak counterrevolutionary government are numbered. The Red Army and workers have already captured Kars and Alexandropol, de­ manding that the treacherous government relinquish the administration to the revolutionary proletariat and Red Army. In the city at present the Dashnaks, having lost their head, are attempting in their death throes to incite the peaceful citizenry against the army and workers and to foment a civil war. The Military Revkom, relying on the will of the workers, villagers, and soldiers of Armenia, is resisting the provocative steps of the Dashnak regime with the support shown by the citizenry of new and jubilant Soviet Armenia. Comrades and Citizens. The Dashnak government’s agents have given up

51 Melkonian, op. cit., p. 122; Elchibekian, op. cit., p. 130; Arzumanian, op. át., pp. 51— 52; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 138—139. Colonel Korganov’s name is given as Nikolai A. by Jacques Kayaloff, The Battle of Sardarabad (The Hague, 1973), p. 23 n. Colonel A. P. MelikShahnazarian was the son of Armenia’s military attaché in Azerbaijan, Major General Pavel D. Melik-Shah n azari an. Colonel Shahnazarian later served in the Red Army as commander of a rifle division and then of an army corps. In 1937 he became a victim of Stalin’s purges. 52 Melkonian, op. át., pp. 127—128. 53 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 286—287.

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hope in the city and are fleeing to the villages in order to effect their base schemes in a dark atmosphere, but the heavy fist of the villager also will come down on their heads. The Military Revolutionary Committee is announcing that soon the Red Army will enter the city to secure the life and property of the citizenry from both external and internal foes. Any attempt at resistance, looting, obstruction of normal life, will be subject to the severest punishment of the revolutionary tribunal.54

The Revkom also sent an ultimatum to the municipal administration to deliver the city peacefully by noon, then extended the deadline by four more hours. When the local officials answered that they were not empowered to surrender the city, Musayelian gave orders to MelikShahnazarian to occupy municipal buildings and various strategic posi­ tions. All this was accomplished without resistance or bloodshed. Sassuni and other Dashnakists went into hiding to slip out of the city under the cover of darkness. The red flag flew over Alexandropol.55 The vacillation and defensive stance of the insurgents doomed the rebellion. Even though Musayelian had at his disposal six companies of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, a machine-gun battery, eight pieces of artillery, and an armored train, together with Red Guard worker de­ tachments—in all, some 1,500 men—the Revkom did not pursue its advantage by expanding to Kars and Karakilisa. Despite his courage, Musayelian romantically envisioned a peaceful transition of power, and Avis, with all his revolutionary rhetoric, lacked the qualities of leadership in practical matters. In the city, the majority of officials remained at their posts, and although some prominent figures were arrested (including militia commander Eghishe Pahlavuni), Internal Affairs Commissar Ar­ tashes Melkonian arranged for most of them to be released. The Revkom stayed confined to the armored train, venturing only once into the city, where the population showed no enthusiasm for Soviet rule. Within a day, defections had begun in the military ranks. Although Avis had re­ ported to the Armenkom that the existing provisions would last for fif­ teen days, on the evening of May 11 it became known that there was only a three-day reserve for the armed forces, necessitating the reduction of rations by half and the suspension of all distribution of bread to the public.56 Militarily, indecision plagued the Revkom. There was much talk about advancing to Karakilisa and Erevan, but the interminable discussions 54 Ibid., pp. 285—286; Vetikaia Oktiabr’skaia revoliutsiia, pp. 326—327. 55 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 89—92; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 55—56; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 129-130. “Borian, op. át., pp. 106—108; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 152—153; Mayisian apstambutiune, P-49-

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about where to move and what to do accomplished nothing. Already on the first day of the rising, Dashnakist partisans had cut the rails and blocked the Jajur tunnel between Alexandropol and Karakilisa to pre­ vent the armored train from moving closer to the Azerbaijani frontier or the Lori neutral zone. On the second day (May 11 ), the Republic’s expeditionary force, led by Sebouh, set out from Etchmiadzin with sev­ eral hundred Western Armenian partisans and a part of the 8th Infantry Regiment, a machine-gun squad, and eight field guns.57 That same day, near Alagiaz (Aragads) station, the expedition encountered the second unit of the armored train under the command of Lieutenant Gaspar Evangulov (Evanghulian), who had managed to bring the unit from Khamarlu to Alexandropol on May 6. Sebouh engaged the armored train near Ani station on May 12; Lieutenant Evangulov was wounded and had to return to Alexandropol for medical attention. Soviet sources as­ sert that Chief of Staff Korganov, using Musayelian’s name, then ordered the armored train to draw back. Korganov has thus been branded a traitor who secretly conspired with the Dashnakist government and ma­ nipulated the retreat of the train and Soviet troops to clear the way for Sebouh’s advance. Also on May 12, General Khachatrian, who had ac­ knowledged the jurisdiction of the Revkom, was shot and wounded as he returned from a meeting with Musayelian. He died in the military hospital the next day under moot circumstances.58 Within forty-eight hours of the proclamation of Soviet order, the Rev­ kom was in disarray. The rising’s leaders decided to repair the railway to Karakilisa in order to have the option of linking over Dilijan-Kazakh with the Red Army, of advancing over Akhta to Erevan, or of falling back into the Lori neutral zone. The plan was thwarted, however, by the ap­ proach of Sebouh’s expedition and disaffection among the detachment at Kazachii post. The Revkom was unable to muster the initiative or resources to break out of its defensive position. Matters became critical on May 13 when the Red insurgents, taking cover within a sandbagged rail flatcar, failed to halt Sebouh’s column between Ani and Aghin sta­ tions. Western Armenian partisans under Sassuntsi Mushegh, Moruk, Cholo, Ghazar, and Akho harassed the rebel force from the rear and overpowered the pro-Bolshevik villages around Kavtarlu, taking captive the Revkom’s liaison, Dr. Arshaluis Panian. The partisans led by Hambo and Eghishe Pahlavuni advanced from the direction ofJajur in the east, 57 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 328—330; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 132—134; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 65—68; Sassuni, op. át., p. 100. 58 Melkonian, op. át., pp. 134—135; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 300—301; May­ isian apstambutiune, pp. 29, 57. See also Haradj, May 15:4, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Han­ rapetutiun, p. 365; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 100-101. Colonel Korganov was executed by orders of a Soviet revolutionary tribunal in February 1921.

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while Loretsian’s men moved from the Poligon barracks in the northern outskirts of Alexandropol to the perimeter of the city.59 As the ring closed in around the Revkom, Captain Musayelian searched for a way out of the dilemma. He sent a detachment on the armored train to repair the railway near Jajur to secure a route of escape, holding Colonel Melik-Shahnazarian’s men on the front near Bayandur to resist Sebouh for as long as possible. As the armored train ascended toward Jajur station, however, Hambo’s partisans cut loose a string of empty cars, which derailed the train and kept it immobile for several hours.60 The situation had become desperate when the Revkom reacted favor­ ably to offers of mediation from General Andranik’s old comrade-inarms, Smbat (Baroyan), who cautioned that a forceful occupation of the city would result in senseless bloodshed. May 13 was a day full of devel­ opments, as an interparty delegation set out from Alexandropol to urge Sebouh to delay action so that it could proceed to Erevan in an effort to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The trio—composed of the chairman of the Dashnaktsutiun’s Shirak Central Committee, Hibemik Cholakian; Menshevik Isahak Ter-Nersisian; and independent so­ cialist Levon Sargsian—found Sebouh in an intractable mood. He told them there was no need to go to Erevan, as he was fully empowered to deal with the situation. Furthermore, he demanded the surrender of the Revkom, whose members would be taken to Erevan to be tried, but gave his word to protect them en route and to recommend that rather than receiving the death penalty they be exiled from the country. As for the disloyal but now recanting troops of the Alexandropol garrison, they would be sent to serve on the front lines. Sebouh warned the interme­ diaries that unless the terms were met he would begin a full-scale attack from all directions at dawn the following day.61 On their return to Alexandropol, the three intermediaries, with the consent of the Revkom, communicated by direct wire with Assistant Min­ ister of Military Affairs General Hovhannes Hakhverdian (Ivan Akhverdov) to make known Sebouh’s uncompromising attitude and unwilling­ ness to allow time for a peaceful liquidation of the uprising. Hakhverdian replied that the government desired to avoid a civil war but required the surrender of the principal organizers of the disturbance, including Mu­ sayelian, Evangulov, Melkonian, and Nuridjanian, and the return of the Vardan Zoravar armored train without damage. In that case, he would 59 Melkonian, op. dt., pp. 135—136, 137-138, 151-152; Karapetian, op. dt., p. 158; Sas­ suni, op. dt., pp. 103—104. 60 Mayisian apstambutiune, p. 58; Melkonian, op. dt., pp. 135—136, 138—139. 61 Baghdasarian, op. dt., pp. 222—223; Vratzian, Hayastane murji eu sali midjev, pp. 72—73; Arzumanian, op. dt., p. 54; Melkonian, op. dt., pp. 139—140.

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support Sebouh’s recommendation to set aside the death penalty in an act of clemency.62 About twenty-five members of the Revkom, local Bolshevik organiza­ tion, and railway workers’ union met in the early evening of May 13 to decide on a course of action. Musayelian reported on the prevailing situation and explained that the plan to move on Karakilisa and Erevan had not succeeded because of the provisions crisis, the unreliability of certain military units, and the partisan attacks from the rear. The gath­ ering then considered various options, including political compromises such as a coalition government with left-wing Dashnakists or with Men­ sheviks and Social Revolutionaries. Some of those present now insisted that they had not been in favor of the premature rising but had been drawn along against their will. Nonetheless, all agreed that Sebouh’s ultimatum was unacceptable and that the Revkom should prepare for the active defense of the city.63 But the spirited, nervous exhortations of Avis and the resolve of Mu­ sayelian to fulfill the heavy obligation he had taken upon himself did not endure. In a closed three-hour meeting later that night, the Revkom reached an impasse: A motion to abandon the city resulted in a split vote of three to three, with Musayelian abstaining. It was after midnight on May 14, only a few hours before Sebouh’s promised offensive. Panic overtook the Revkom and its supporters, who fled in the darkness toward Aghbaba, Akhalkalak, and the Lori neutral zone without even notifying Melik-Shahnazarian and others still entrenched near Bayandur. Musay­ elian and several fellow members of the Revkom took the armored train as far as Ortakilisa station and then set out on foot toward Akhalkalak.64 By that time, Loretsian’s company had entered the city from the di­ rection of the Poligon barracks, and other groups followed before dawn. The mounted detachment of Pahlavuni and Hambo arrived from Jajur early in the morning, and the last pocket of resistance at Bayandur folded at 11 o’clock when Sebouh took Evangulov and twenty-two of his men prisoner. In the early afternoon, Minister of Military Affairs TerMinasian, General Gamazov, and Sebouh arrived at the Alexandropol depot, where they were met by Colonel Korganov and given a rousing welcome by the contingents that had entered the city before them. To­ gether, officers, expeditionary force, and partisans marched victoriously 62 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 295—296; Vratzian, Hayastane murji eu sali midjeu, p. 74. Cholakian, who aside from his party postition was also the chairman of the Alexan­ dropol zemstvo, was killed by “a stray bullet’ ’ on May 15, the day after the city was occupied by Sebouh’s forces. See Haradj, May 18:1, 4, June 22:1, 1920. 6S Arzumanian, op. át., pp. 141—144; Barseghian, op. át., pp. 308—309; Mayisian apstam­ butiune, pp. 49, 59-60. 64 See Musayelian’s account in Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 172—176. See also Karapetian, op. át., pp. 158—159; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 145-147; Barseghian, op. át., p. 309 n.

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into the city, where they were cheered by the populace that had borne witness to the bewilderingly rapid shifts in power and political fortunes. The military parade then proceeded to the forts, where yesterday’s rev­ olutionary citizen-soldiers now received Sebouh’s expeditionary force with the strains of “Mer Hairenik” and joyous fraternal embraces. The uprising and Soviet order in Alexandropol were at an end. Musayelian, Melkonian, Gharibdjanian, Sevian, and other standard-bearers were ap­ prehended, but Avis Nuridjanian evaded his pursuers and escaped to Azerbaijan, where he was consumed with thirst for revenge.65

Kars and Sarikamish

The revolutionary committees in Kars and Sarikamish, in their only in­ stance of coordination with the Alexandropol Revkom, proclaimed the establishment of Soviet order on May 10. The Bolsheviks were not nu­ merous, but they took advantage of the fatigue and inordinate hardships of the armed forces. Although the mass of Western Armenian refugees in the province remained aloof from the movement, Russian, Muslim, and to some extent Greek villages around Kars looked to the Bolsheviks to restore the accustomed rule of Russia in place of the capricious Ar­ menian administration. The May Day celebration in Kars—organized by the Dashnaktsutiun’s Vanand Central Committee, the professional and railway unions, and city employees—began with a rally at city hall and then a parade to Mikhailovskii Square, where Garo Sassuni (prior to departing for Alexandropol) and others addressed the large crowd. The gathering was interrupted by men on vehicles from the auto garage shouting pro-Soviet and anti-Dashnakist slogans. The Bolshevik and left­ wing Social Revolutionary dissidents then made their way up to the forts, where they held their own rally with some of the 1,000 garrison troops and cannoneers.66 Youthful Armenkom member Ghukas Ghukasian returned from Ere­ van and Alexandropol on May 8. In a meeting of comrades and sym­ pathizers, he delivered a fiery speech full of hatred for class enemies and exhortations to engage in a revolutionary struggle against the odious Dashnakist regime. He was then chosen to direct the Kars Revkom (Mil­ 65 Haradj, May 14:1, 15:1, 4, 18:2, 1920; Hairenik, July 3:2, 1920; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 105-108; Baghdasarian, op. át., p. 224; Gharibdjanian, op. át., pp. 372—373; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 148—150. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/183, dossier no. 3, Revue de la Presse, 7-13 and 14—21 mai 1920. For a discussion between Prime Minister Ohandjanian in Erevan and Parliament member Hovakim Budaghian in Alexandropol regarding the liquidation of the uprising, see Armenia Archives, 200/1/412, pp. 50—51. “Sassuni, op. át., pp. 46—51; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 113—115; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 61-63.

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itary Revolutionary Committee), along with Staff Captain Dmitrii Melikov (Melikian), Alexandre Nazarian, Arshak Tomasian, and enlisted man Grigor Baituni.67 As arranged in his meetings with Avis and Musayelian in Alexandro­ pol, Ghukasian had small detachments of soldiers and workers occupy the city hall, railway station, post-telegraph office, and treasury building on May 10, ordering all personnel to carry on with their duties. Mayor Hamazasp Norhatian and Chief of Militia Keoseyan were arrested, and Governor-General Stepan Korganian was confined to his residence, but they were soon released, possibly in compliance with the Alexandropol Revkom’s directive to try to avoid violence and bloodshed.68 That same day, the insurgents demanded that the armed forces pledge fidelity to the new Soviet order. As the city remained free of occupation, Nikol Aghbalian, a member of the parliamentary commission sent to Kars, delivered a rousing oration to government supporters gathered in the theater about the sacred duty to defend the cause of united, inde­ pendent Armenia. Nevertheless, in consultation with Korganian and for­ tress commandant General Daniel Bek Pirumian, Aghbalian concurred that nothing should be done that might weaken the front. In view of the unreliability of the Kars garrison, on the morning of May 11 General Pirumian announced that he would submit to the Revkom in order to preserve military order and discipline.69 A joint session of the Russian, Muslim, and Greek national councils also recognized the Revkom and offered to collaborate with the insurgents. The Revkom, headquartered in the auto garage, was elated, even though the armored train had not arrived from Alexandropol as anticipated.70 As it happened, a reaction began almost as soon as Pirumian had given his pledge of submission. Elements within the 7th Infantry Regiment joined with Western Armenian partisans under the slogan, “For People and Government,” demanding liquidation of the adventure. On the af­ ternoon of May 11, khmbapets Pilos (Sargisian) and Matsak led the par­ tisans of Khnus and Mush against the Revkom’s headquarters but were driven back by machine guns. Nonetheless, by nightfall loyal troops had 67 Karapetian, op. dt., p. 162; Gharibdjanian, op. dt., p. 364; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 64—66 and, for the subsequent report of Captain Melikov as commander of the Revkom’s armed forces, pp. 67—72. A. M. Melkonian lists also Vram Ghazandjian as a member of the Revkom. The government’s communication on the agitation at Kars is in Aradjin massay­ akan sharzhumnere, pp. 298—300. 68 Elchibekian, op. dt., pp. 134—135; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 162—165; Mayisian apstam­ butiune, pp. 64-65, 68—69. 69 Sassuni, op. dt., pp. 92—95; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 326, 328—329; Aghayan, op. dt., pp. 249—251. 70 Velikaia Oktiabr’skaia reuoliutsiia, pp. 331—333; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 327, 332—333; Nor Ashkhatavor, June 24:3, 1920; Haradj, June 2:1, 1920.

THE MAY UPRISING IN ARMENIA

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seized the railway station and isolated the Revkom in the auto garage. Ghukasian and his comrades had to seek refuge in the Alexander II fort towering over the city.71 On the morning of May 12, a large crowd of Kars inhabitants appeared in the street chanting for an end to the disturbance. The army command now followed the lead of the civilians and Western Armenian partisans by organizing the Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland, headed by Garegin Sargisbekian, Paruir Levonian, and regimental commander Lieutenant Colonel Mikayel Harutiunian. As more and more soldiers abandoned the Revkom, the civilians, preceded by a band and guild banners, moved toward the forts and captured two armored cars near the stone bridge over the Kars River. Captain Melikov of the Revkom responded by bombarding the city. That afternoon the Shatilov fort, which overlooked the Revkom’s position in the Alexander II fort, de­ clared its loyalty to the government, forcing Ghukasian and Melikov to move to the Buchkiev fort. From there they continued to shell the city, but by nightfall the entire 5 th Infantry Regiment had turned against the Revkom, leaving only a handful of men of the 2d Artillery Battery and the fortress garrison.72 As the salvation committee prepared to storm Buchkiev on the night of May 12, the commander of the artillery battery loyal to the Revkom requested a cease-fire until dawn while the insurgents contemplated end­ ing the revolt. Thereafter, the Revkom and its followers quarreled over a course of action. As their support dwindled by the hour, Ghukas Ghu­ kasian and twenty-six of his comrades decided to make a break for Alexandropol, thinking that Avis and Musayelian were still in control there. Under the cover of darkness, the Revkom slipped out of the Buchkiev fort and, passing through the sympathetic Russian Molokan village of Blagodarnoe (Chakmakh), hastened toward Alexandropol.73 On May 14, the partisans of Matsak, Zelim Khan, and Murad Khan caught up with the band in the Argina vale only a short distance from Alexandropol. In the fierce battle that ensued, Ghukasian and eight of his comrades were killed, seven were taken prisoner, and the rest fled into the nearby hills.74 That same day in Kars, Parliament member Vahan 71 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 97-98; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 65-66, 70; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, p. 227. 72 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 98-99; Haradj, May 19:1, 1920; Hairenik,]vly 18:1, Sept. 3:1, 1920; Elchibekian, op. cit., pp. 136-137; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 153-154. 73 Mayisian apstambutiune, p. 71; Karapetian, op. cit., p. 169. See also R. Remkaz (Rem Kazandjian), “Kommentarii k dokladnoi A. M. Nazariana i D. Kh. Melikova o Maiskorn vosstanii V Karse v 1920 godu,” BanberHayastaniarkhivneri, 4th yr., no. 3 (1963), pp. 218— 228. 74 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 66, 71—72, stating that eleven members of the party were killed and ten were captured; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 331, 332; Avetisian, op.

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Khoreni supervised the formation of a military tribunal, which imposed a heavy indemnity on Blagodamoe for its disloyalty and within three days sentenced six conspirators to death, four to hard labor, and five to exile. The sentences were not confirmed by the Erevan government, which had established extraordinary courts-martial to handle such cases. In the new proceedings, thirty-eight individuals were expelled from the country, sixteen were acquitted, and two officers were sent to Erevan for trial.75 The rising at Kars had ended in four days. The insurgents, lacking an experienced cadre, had been unable to coordinate their activities, to take advantage of the friendly disposition of the non-Armenian ele­ ments, or to maintain communication with Sarikamish and Alexandropol. Like its counterpart in the Alexandropol rising, the Kars Revkom did not implement decisive revolutionary methods and failed to win the support of the civilian population or retain the fidelity of the armed forces. But there were those who insisted that even in the most favorable of circumstances the existing objective conditions in Armenia precluded the triumph of Bolshevism in May 1920. The same conditions prevailed at Sarikamish, which lay in a forested area near the Turkish frontier and had been developed into an impor­ tant military base under Russian rule. Elements susceptible to Bolshevik influences in 1920 included the 2,000 railway and sawmill workers and the men under arms, who had to endure extreme deprivation. Adok and a handful of other Bolsheviks had made some headway in the 4th Infan­ dt., pp. 280—285; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 169—172. For a non-Soviet account, see Haradj, May 18:2,19:2,1920. In 1937 seven former “Mauserist bandits” were arrested and charged with the murders of Ghukasian and seven of his comrades. The accused were tried before a people’s revolutionary tribunal in Leninakan (Alexandropol) in March 1938 and sum­ marily executed. For the indictment and notice of the trial, see Kh. H. Badalian, comp., ‘‘Karsi Heghkomi andamneri ev apstambutian ail masnakitsneri herosamarte Arghinayi dzorum 1920 t. mayisin,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 25th yr., no. 3 (1984), pp. 30—38. Those indicted were Erem Mkhitarian (Shek Erem), Hmayak Sahakian-Dunamalian (Kor Hamo), Sahak Kocharian (Sev Sahak), Mkhitar Poghosian, Abgar Tonoyan, Manuk Sirunian, and Aivaz Aivazian. Other persons figuring prominendy in the indictment were Matsak and the priest of Mazra village, Hovhannes Hadjian. 75 Haradj, May 19:1, 28:5, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 660/3, no. 110, May 23, 1920; Hairenik,]\i\y 18:2, 21:1, 1920. Karapetian, op. át., p. 173, states that four of the rebel leaders at Kars were executed in that city and one in Erevan. For the government’s declaration about the end of unrest in Kars, see Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 331— 332; for the report of the Salvation Committee on May 15, pp. 330—331; for Revkom member Nazarian’s report to the Russian Communist Party’s Caucasian Regional Com­ mittee, pp. 325—330; for the report of Amirov, a participant in the events at Kars, pp. 394— 398; and for Vahan Khoreni’s report, pp. 415—416. The Ministry of Internal Affairs ap­ pointed Nikol Aghbalian as extraordinary commissar for Kars on May 13. Two days later, Aghbalian, Khoreni, and Hovhannisian announced that they would receive and study all citizen complaints against government officials for one week and would personally visit the armed forces to investigate any grievances. See Armenia Archives, 199/1/128, p. 63, and 199/1/133. PL I. P- 84-

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try Regiment, where they formed two party cells. In April the enlisted men demonstrated against their officers, whom they accused of hording plundered goods, and when regimental commander Colonel A. I. Mirimanian tried to isolate two ringleaders and transfer them to Kars, the soldiers made a hostile show of force and obtained their release.76 During the May Day celebration at Sarikamish, the joint BolshevikLeft Social Revolutionary procession competed with the program spon­ sored by the Dashnaktsutiun, where partisan chief Apro of Khnus and others, playing upon the threat posed by the unholy alliance of Turks and Bolsheviks to the goal of independent, united Armenia, called for dedication and sacrifice in the name of nation and religion. When the pro-Soviet counterdemonstrators were menaced by partisans Mikho (Mekhak Simonian) and Shabo, they moved to the train depot, where they continued their denunciations of the Dashnaktsutiun under the protective watch of men of the 4th Infantry Regiment.77 In preparation for a coordinated Alexandropol-Kars-Sarikamish up­ rising, Adok organized a local revolutionary committee, with Left Social Revolutionary Captain Liparit Mkhchian as military commander. At the same time, the local Dashnakist committee named Poghos Hiusian, Ni­ kol Otapashian (Odabashian), and Mikho to an extraordinary body to pacify the region. Mikho took over as district commissar and immedi­ ately sent couriers to summon his partisans from Karakurt and else­ where. These measures were insufficient. Late at night on May 10—11, Adok and Mkhchian had a machine-gun squad and two companies of the ist Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, surround the railway depot, post-telegraph office, city hall, and Dashnakist clubhouse, ordering all within to surrender. Unlike the troops of Alexandropol and Kars, how­ ever, this small band of government loyalists offered fierce resistance, ending at dawn in the death of Mikho and the imprisonment of several of his comrades. Yet the awaited reinforcements from Alexandropol did not arrive, and the 4th Regiment, initially neutral, soon began to turn antagonistic. News that Adok was attempting to trade hay and railway ties to Turkish border detachments for flour and other provisions for the Revkom’s forces enraged the khmbapets and the large Western Ar­ menian population in the region.78 As dispositions turned against the Revkom, it abandoned the town 76 Sassuni, op. cit., pp. 110-111; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 173—175; Mayisian apstambutiune, PP- 73-7477 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 74—76; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 175—179. See also S. Abra­ mov, “O Maiskorn vosstanii v Sarykamyshe,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 9th yr., no. 3 (1968), pp. 247-252. 78 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 111—114; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 76—78; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, p. 334; Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 175—179; Elchibekian, op. át., pp. 137—138. For the naming of a street in Mikho’s memory, see Haradj, June 24:3, 1920.

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and drew back to the railway depot, beginning a standoff for several days as both sides awaited reinforcements. During this impasse, Colonel Mirimanian sought ways to end the disturbance. On May 17 he persuaded the Revkom to send a representative, accompanied by a government official, to Kars to confirm that the rising there had failed. That confir­ mation dispirited the Revkom further, and on May 18, as Sebouh’s ex­ peditionary force approached, it decided not to resist. A few rebels sought safety by crossing the border into Turkey, but most were captured by partisans, and Adok paid with his life. Sebouh received a tumultuous welcome in Sarikamish on May 21 and immediately transferred Captain Mkhchian and other implicated military personnel to Kars for trial by the extraordinary court-martial.79

Bayazit-Dilijan-Shamshadin It was only after the liquidation of the Alexandropol and Kars revkoms that the Bolsheviks tried to rise in the northeastern sector of the country. Nor-Bayazit was the poorest and least developed county of Erevan prov­ ince. Its overtaxed resources were strained even more with the influx of thousands of refugees from Sharur-Nakhichevan, and there was constant trouble with the Muslim settlements bordering the Karabagh highland and Azerbaijan. A parliamentary commission reported that conditions were intolerable in this semiarid district near Lake Sevan and that most provisions and relief supplies were pilfered by the time they arrived there.80 The most prominent Bolshevik of Nor-Bayazit was Hovhannes Sarukhanian, an intellectual who had been given employment as a teacher in return for a pledge to stop circulating subversive propaganda. He was in Erevan at the time of the May Day demonstration and was made privy to the exchanges between the Armenkom and Avis Nuridjanian. When the Armenkom found it impossible to forestall the Alexandropol rising, it sent Sarukhanian back to Nor-Bayazit to create a diversion and if pos­ sible to advance with a rebel force along Lake Sevan toward Elenovka and Dilijan, where—it was hoped—either the Alexandropol Revkom or the Russian Red Army would be in control.81 79 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 78—79; Melkonian, op. át., pp. 155—156; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 179-185; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 115-116; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 69-70. For the gov­ ernment’s declaration, see Haradj, May 23:2,1920. Turkish commander General Karabekir reported on May 25, 1920, that several Armenian Bolsheviks had fled to “our territory” and wanted the Turks to take action against the Dashnaks. See Kâzim Karabekir, Istikläl Harbimiz (Istanbul, [i960]), p. 751. 80 Armenia Archives, 199/1/117, PP- 46-48. See also Simon Vratzian, Kianki ughinerov: Depker, demker, aprumner, V (Beirut, 1966), pp. 74—76. 81 Elchibekian, op. át., pp. 138—139; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 186—187; Aradjin massayakan

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24I

En route to Bayazit, Sarukhanian was intercepted between Elenovka and Ordaklu by district commissioner Mikayel Movsisian, but eastern front commander Lieutenant General Movses (Moisei) Silikian, then at Nerkin Gharanlugh (Martuni), allowed Sarukhanian to proceed and even suggested a meeting with the Bolshevik intellectual. In Nor-Bayazit on May 10, Sarukhanian conferred with his comrades about joining the rising that was to begin that day in Alexandropol. When it was learned that several companies under Hamazasp Srvandztian’s command at Basargechar had disobeyed orders to carry supplies over Daralagiaz up to Zangezur and were returning to their homes around Nerkin Gharanlugh, Sarukhanian dispatched a deputation to persuade the disgruntled sol­ diers to join the insurgents and to ignore the caveats of khmbapet Mkhi­ tar, district commander Lieutenant Colonel Kafiev, and other officers to return to duty.82 In his meeting with Sarukhanian at Nerkin Gharanlugh, General Si­ likian raised the specter of hostile foreign encirclement and urged the Bolshevik intellectual to remain loyal for the sake of the Armenian peo­ ple and to resume his teaching duties. But matters had gone too far. On the night of May 13, the district revolutionary committee, headed by Sarukhanian with Lieutenant Haik Grigorian as military commander, arrested Silikian and his staff. The rebels then set out for Nor-Bayazit and on May 17 reached the village of Pashakend on the outskirts of the city.83 Upon learning of Silikian’s capture, the Bureau-Government sent Par­ liament members Garnik Kialashian and Garnik Shahinian to deal with the crisis. In Nor-Bayazit on May 14, they found that, aside from the militia under Hovhannes Arakelian, there was no reliable force to ad­ vance on Gharanlugh. Two days later, Mayor Vahan Afrikian and other government officials withdrew to Elenovka, leaving only thirty-five mili­ tiamen to defend the city. Kialashian and Shahinian, in the company of 150 men headed by Beno Nalchadjian, set out from Elenovka on May 17 to return to Nor-Bayazit, but they halted when it was learned that General Khankalamov would arrive the next day with twenty truckloads of reinforcements from Kanaker.84 On the afternoon of May 17, the Revkom entered Nor-Bayazit after a sharzhumnere, p. 279. See also Nor Ashkhatavor, June 25:3,1920. For a eulogistic presentation of the life and activities of Sarukhanian, see V. N. Nerkararian, Hovhannes Sarukhanian: Hamarot kensagrakan aknark (Erevan, 1955). 82 Karapetian, op. át., pp. 189—190, 191—193; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 335— 336; Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 83, 87, 96-97; Nerkararian, op. át., pp. 54—56; Sassuni, op. át., pp. 117—118. 8S Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 87—89, 97; Nerkararian, op. át., pp. 56—60; Karapetian, op. at, pp. 190-191, 193-197. 84 Sassuni, op. át., pp. 118—119; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 335—337.

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two-hour skirmish. But, as was the case elsewhere, hardly had Sarukhanian achieved his objective than he was beset with vacillation and defec­ tion. In this instance, Lieutenant Grigorian could not overcome his deep esteem for General Silikian and spirited him away to a hiding place in the village of Hajimukhan. Lacking both experienced administrative and military cadre, the Revkom was soon faced with the choice of retreating, surrendering, or fighting a hopeless battle. Defections within the ranks made retreat to Elenovka and Dilijan impossible, so the Revkom stood its ground until May 19, when General Khankalamov drew up his troops before the city and issued an ultimatum for the rebels to disarm, hand over their leaders, and throw themselves upon the mercy of the govern­ ment. Offering to recommend clemency if the traitors surrendered peacefully, Khankalamov warned that in case of noncompliance the army would storm the city at noon. In a heroically romantic gesture, Hovhannes Sarukhanian reportedly replied that he and his comrades were not traitors but were responding to the misery of the Armenian people and their exploitation at the hands of the insufferable Dashnakist regime. He offered to give himself up if his fellow Communists were released and if Mayor Afrikian, district commissioner Movsisian, and other enemies of the people were arrested immediately and handed over to the courts. Khankalamov waited no longer and bombarded the rebel positions, dispersing most of the Revkom’s remaining supporters. Only the left wing, personally inspired by Sarukhanian, held out for a time against Beno Nalchadjian’s men, but by early afternoon all had surren­ dered or fled. Khmbapet Aziz uncovered Sarukhanian’s hiding place at Pashakend, just as General Silikian was leaving his haven at Hajimukhan and proceeding to Nor-Bayazit to the cheers of his troops and the sounds of martial music.85 The next day the government forces marched into Nerkin Gharanlugh, where the scene was repeated with a military parade, the singing of “Mer Hairenik,” and joyous manifestations on the part of Western Armenian partisans, who descended from the surrounding hillsides. Garnik Kialashian stayed the hand of khmbapets who wanted to punish Nerkin Gharanlugh as the starting point of the disturbance, but he did order the arrest of soldiers who had plundered the military stores, and deserters were rounded up and sent to Nor-Bayazit for rehabilitation and reassignment. Most of the former rebel troops now insisted that they had been misled and had not understood what was occurring. But Hov85 Mayisian apstambutiune, pp. 89—90, 99; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 334—335, 337—340; Melkonian, op. cit., pp. 158—159; Nerkararian, op. át., pp. 60—64. $ee älso Sassuni, op. át., p. 119; FO 371/4942, E7619/1/58 enclosure.

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hannes Sarukhanian faced the firing squad bravely, adding to the pan­ theon of Bolshevik martyrs in Armenia.86 The only active involvement of the Soviet Red Army in the May dis­ turbances in Armenia took place in the Kazakh-Shamshadin-Dilijan sec­ tor along the northeastern frontier, exactly where the Armenkom had insisted the revolt should begin. The intermixed Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Molokan villages there were remote from Erevan geographically and politically. Many of the Armenians had been radicalized by their years of seasonal labor in the oil industry at Baku. The Shamshadin villages of Choratan, Norashen, Karmir Aghbiur, Moseskend, Ghulali, and Tauzkala (Berd) lay near the Azerbaijani frontier, and soon after the soviet­ ization of Azerbaijan they made contact with the 2d Cavalry Regiment of the Eleventh Red Army, which assigned seven officers to help the vil­ lagers organize. On May 17 another deputation appeared in Tauz, just inside Azerbaijan, to seek supplies and uniforms from the Red Army and to ask it to deploy a force to Ijevan (Karvansarai) to initiate the revolt in the part of Kazakh county under Armenia’s control (see volume IV, map $).87 The Red Army, then engaged in skirmishes with Georgia, uneasy about Muslim disaffection in Azerbaijan, and prohibited from taking ag­ gressive action in Georgia and Armenia, released some supplies but could not commit itself to a military campaign. As it happened, by the time the pro-Soviet elements decided to rise in Armenian Kazakh, nearly all the other revolutionary committees had been arrested or dispersed. Kostia Aivazian left the meeting with the conspirators in the Alexan­ dropol armored train on May 7 with instructions to secure the interven­ tion of the Red Army. He was accorded a cold reception from comrades in Karakilisa, who opposed an armed uprising, but the response in Dilijan and Ijevan was more positive. Armenkom liaison Shavarsh Amir­ khanian sent him on to Akstafa to place the appeal before officers of the Eleventh Red Army.88 Meanwhile, on an inspection tour of the dis­ trict, former assistant interior minister Sargis Manasian reported to Ere­ van that the local militia was inept, corrupt, and void of public confi­ dence. The conditions in the regular army were no better. Enlisted men 86 Haradj, May 28:5, 1920; Bor'ba, June 3:2, 1920; Karapetian, op. át., pp. 197-201, show­ ing that Sarukhanian was executed on the night of May 22—23, l92O> Minister of Military Affairs Ter-Minasian inspected Nor-Bayazit on May 20, according to Haradj, May 22:4, 1920. For the government’s communication regarding the situation in Nor-Bayazit, see Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 240—241,280, and for recommendations of members of Parliament Kialashian and Shirinian, pp. 166—167, an3» 53-65« 87-95« 58-7°» 33-44« 39-5 U XXXII (July 1954), pp. 84-97,2111(1 XXXIII (Jan. 1955), PP- 80-100. During the summer of 1920, several villages of Zangibasar were reset­ tled by refugees from Van, but many became critically ill or died from malaria and water­ borne diseases. See, for example, Haradj, Aug. 14:2, 18:1, Sept. 2:1, 23:2, 1920.

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ence of Turkish regulars in the district violated the Mudros Armistice and contravened Mustafa Kemal’s directives to desist from offensive op­ erations for the time being, but Karabekir rationalized his action by stressing that control of this mountainous area was essential to the de­ fense of Erzerum and the supply of food for his troops. Moreover, the Armenians had no right to be there.16 Both Armenian and Turkish sources confirmed that Turkish regulars with cannons and machine guns were operating in Olti during the winter and spring of 1920. In March a detachment of the 3d Battalion, 29th Regiment, 9th Caucasus Infantry Division, moved into Olti to establish an outpost with 1,000 fighters and heavy weapons, together with medical facilities and food rations, facing the Armenian positions at Merdenek.17 Azerbaijani agents were also active in Olti. Karabekir regarded them with deep suspicion, believing they may have been sent with the connivance of the British to create an autonomous Kurdish region in order to keep it away from Turkey. He was particularly wary of Captain Yusuf Zia, who at the end of 1919 delivered to Erzerum a monetary contribution from the Baku government for the Nationalist cause and then slipped over the frontier into Olti, where he assumed a prominent role in the local administrative council. After the sovietization of Azerbaijan, however, Yusuf Zia repeatedly appealed to Karabekir to save Olti from Armenian encroachments.18 By May 1920 components of the Turkish 3d and 9th Caucasus infantry divisions were positioned at Barduz and Olti. The Olti, Narman, and Tortum militias operating in the district were combined into the Olti detachment, commanded by Turkish Major Ibrahim and with Turkish officers and enlisted men assigned to each company. Turk­ ish officers Ahmed, Zeki, Selaheddin, and Sennet headed the detach­ ment’s four infantry battalions, made up of fourteen companies and seven machine guns; Tevfik led the cavalry squadrons, and Lieutenant Jemal was in charge of an artillery battery of two cannons and four moun­ tain guns. As many as 1,200 local levies and 500 Turkish regulars now held a perimeter around the Peniak coal fields and the Akundir (Aghundur) pass (see map 6).19 As one of the counties of Kars province, Olti was claimed by the Ar­ menian republic and so acknowledged by the British military authorities in 1919. Yet almost all of Olti remained under the control of Kurdish chieftains and Turkish and Azerbaijani officers, even as Armenian juris­ 16 Karabekir, op. dt., p. 360. 17 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 73—74; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25; Karabekir, op. dt., pp. 559» 578; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, no. 854, July 17, 1920. See also Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçLeri, p. 94. 18 Karabekir, op. dt., pp. 519, 619, 680. 19 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 74—75; Karabekir, op. dt., p. 804.

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diction in Kars province filled out to the border districts at Kaghisman, Bashkoy, Karakurt, and Karaurgan and northward into Ardahan. Gov­ ernor-General Stepan Korganian of Kars tried to penetrate the district peacefully by bestowing titles and honors upon Iso Bek and other ad­ vocates of accommodation. Much of the population reportedly resented the overbearing demeanor of the Turkish officers and might be per­ suaded to accept incorporation into the Armenian republic under their traditional Kurdish leaders. Korganian complained bitterly that General Hovsepian and the military establishment were undermining his efforts by conducting separate negotiations with the chieftains of Olti, threat­ ening the Muslim population, and mixing in every aspect of the civil administration. The Kurds and other Muslims, Korganian maintained, were orientals and as such were accustomed to a clear and simple chain of command. They could be pacified quickly by a strong show of force. Hence, Armenian power in the mountainous areas of the province could have been demonstrated by conducting military maneuvers rather than engaging in hostilities. Korganian was trying to convince the leaders of Olti that acceptance of the Republic’s jurisdiction would entail only a symbolic Armenian military presence, with the civil administration en­ trusted to Muslim officials confirmed by the government. But Major General Hovsepian and his cohorts sabotaged this endeavor and tried to alarm Erevan with exaggerated reports of Turkish troop concentra­ tions and “a thousand and one other excuses.”20 Korganian may have been naive in believing that he could have won over Olti by peaceful means, especially in view of the calculations of General Kiazim Karabekir. Moreover, Iso Bek was being eclipsed by Zia Bek and others who rejected the jurisdiction of Armenia. In any case, the end of Armenian patience, as practiced by the administration of Alexandre Khatisian, was signaled from the first days of Hamazasp Ohandjanian’s Bureau-Government. Immediately after the suppression of the May uprising, the cabinet allocated funds to occupy the Peniak coal fields for the dual purpose of expanding to the former Russo-Turkish frontier and alleviating the chronic fuel crisis.21 The military expedition, headed by 4th Regiment commander Mirimanian, took up battle positions on the evening of June 18. The right wing, under Colonel Mazmanian (Mazmanov), held the road from Arda­ han to Dort Kilisa leading to the Pandjuret pass; the center, under Lieu­ tenant Colonel Shahbudaghian, stood outside Merdenek near the 20 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 137—139. For Korganian’s report on the Kurds and, under Kadimov’s influence, their preference to live under Armenian rather than Georgian jurisdiction, see Armenia Archives, 200/1/274, pp. 12-13. 21 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 8/8, Svodka no. 10, jan. 22, 1920, and File 25/25; Armenia Archives, 199/1/133, pt. I, p. 100, and 199/1/152, p. 9.

6. THE PENIAK OPERA TION

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Akundir pass; and the left wing, under Lieutenant Colonel Nesterovskii, was poised at Bekkoy. Facing the Armenian expedition were the four militia battalions of the Olti detachment, together with a company of cavalry, two cannons, a machine gun squad, and Izzet Bey’s partisans. The front line extended from Teterkush to the plain of Akundir, with de­ tachment headquarters at Kosor. Farther south, around Barduz, two Turkish battalions and a machine gun squad of the 29th Regiment, gth Caucasus Division, bolstered the militias of Sermet Bey and Mehmed Bey. When the general advance began on the morning of June 19, the Armenians met stiff resistance from the entrenched defenders, who were linked by field telephones. After two days of close combat, Mazmanian captured the Pandjuret pass, and Shahbudaghian took the Akundir pass. Nesterovskii continued to encounter a spirited defense from the Kurdish levies, especially after they were joined by Turkish regulars on June 20.22 Armenian occupation of the Pandjuret pass threatened the Kosor-Tuzla road, the route of escape for the Olti detachment. Major Ibrahim ap­ pealed for immediate reinforcements and reported to regimental head­ quarters on June 20 that the detachment would have to draw back to Tuzla (10 miles) to avoid entrapment by the Armenians flanking from north to south. General Karabekir, reiterating the critical importance of keeping Olti out of Armenian hands, ordered one battalion each from the 3d Caucasus Division’s 8th Regiment and the 9th Caucasus Division’s 29th Regiment to hasten to the relief of the detachment. Deserters were to receive their due reward—the death penalty.23 Before these reinforce­ ments arrived, however, Colonel Mazmanian’s ist Infantry Regiment, especially Murad Khan’s partisans, had dislodged the last defenders, and on June 22 the three Armenian columns converged at Peniak. The ex­ pedition suffered light casualties (5 killed and 22 wounded) and seized significant booty, including 2 rapid-fire mountain guns with 300 shells, 4 Maxim machine guns, 100,000 rounds of ammunition for Mosin rifles, hand grenades, livestock, and stores of grain, sugar, and meat.24 Most of the Olti detachment retreated through the Tuzla pass on the night of June 21—22. Major Ibrahim distributed as much ammunition as his men could carry and destroyed two cannons and some of the arms caches to deprive the Armenians of their use. The Armenian advance

22 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Major General Hovsepiants to Commander of the Army (Nazarbekian), June 22, 1920, and File 25/25, Kratkii ocherk, April-Sept. 1920; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 117—118; Armenia Archives, 200/2/86, pp. 3—5; Nor Ashkhatavor, April 25:2, 29:1, 30:3, 1920; Haradj, June 23:3, 24:1, 25:2, 1920; Hairenik, July 30:3, Aug. 1:3, 6:1, Sept. 18:5, 1920. 23 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 118—120. 24 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Hovsepiants to Nazarbekov, June 22, 1920; Kratkii ocherk, April-Sept. 1920. See also FO 371/4962, E3994/134/58 enclosure.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

3OI

stopped at the Olti River, a short distance from the town of Olti and the prewar Russo-Turkish frontier. The Turkic forces regrouped at Tuzla following the arrival of additional elements of the 3d and 9th Caucasus divisions at the end ofJune. Major Atif, commander of the 8th Regiment, now led the Olti detachment. Although the Armenian outposts at Israil and other camps from Mount Susuz to Mount Vaskut (Baskot) were small and semi-isolated, only minor skirmishes between the two sides occurred during the summer of 1920.25 On the Barduz front, Armenian probes produced only small changes in the front lines. During engagements from June 18 to June 21, the Turkish command reported that Armenian columns advancing from Yenikoy, Paldum pass, and Mount Kumru had forced the retreat of Meh­ med Bey’s militia from Mount Allahekbar, Sermet Bey’s militia from Verishan, and Lieutenant Naji’s company from Mount Akmezar. Each column of several hundred men was moving with two cannons, sizable cavalry, and infantry companies believed to be from the Armenian 5th Regiment. To meet this threat, General Karabekir ordered the remain­ der of Halid Bey’s 9th Caucasus Infantry Division (17th, 28th, and 29th regiments and auxiliary battalions) to pass over the old border from Zevin to Barduz to retain possession of that strategic district. The 15 th Cavalry Regiment was dispatched to Posik with the responsibility of pa­ trolling the rugged terrain between Barduz and Olti and filling the gap between these two vital passageways leading from the province of Kars to Erzerum. At the beginning of July, the Armenian forward positions stabilized along the eastern slopes of several mountains from Hamid Dagh to Chambar Dagh and Keroghli.26 The Armenian occupation of Peniak and most of the county of Olti gave rise to waves of excitement, anticipation, and optimism in Erevan. The success of the expedition not only held out the prospect of miti­ gating the shortage of fuel but also brought the Republic to within a few miles of the western perimeter of Kars province, beyond which lay Er­ zerum and other territories that the Allied Powers had agreed in prin­ ciple to award to united, independent Armenia. The government made immediate allocations for the administration of Olti and appointed Le­ von Khatisian and Professor Savich Zablotsky to head a team of special­ ists to hasten the exploitation of the extensive coal deposits at Peniak.27 During the Armenian military operations, Commander in Chief Na25 Dogu Cephesi, pp. 120—121. 26 Karabekir, op. át., pp. 802, 807—808, 812, 815—816; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 118—119, 122— 123; Atatürk’ün söyleu ve demeçleri, p. 94. 27 Armenia Archives, 199/1/133, pt. I, p. 10, and 199/1/152^. 1 o. See engineer Avetis Ohandjanian’s assessment of the Olti coal deposits, in Haradj, June 19:2—3, 1920. For another study, see Armenia Archives, 199/1/179, pp. 1—11.

302

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

zarbekian took the precaution of writing General Karabekir to disclaim any intent of aggression against Turkey. The action at Olti, he stated, had been initiated at the request of the local Muslim inhabitants, who were troubled by anarchic, lawless elements. The district lay on the Cau­ casian side of the prewar frontier and fell within the boundaries of the Armenian republic. Pending the decisions and arrangements of the world peace conference, Armenia would respect the status quo and make no attempt to advance beyond the former international boundary. Nazarbekian concluded by expressing hope for improved neighborly relations between the two countries.28 Such sentiment aside, the Armenian armed forces acted with impunity in the occupied sector of Olti. Governor Korganian protested that they harassed the inhabitants and requisitioned at will. The thirty-six villages in the affected area were tired of Turkish interference and ready to enter into a just and lasting relationship with the Armenian republic. Yet Gen­ eral Hovsepian and his ilk were ruining everything. They allowed the Armenian partisan bands free rein and closed their eyes to intolerable acts that could only alienate men of moderation such as Iso Bek, from whom 800 head of sheep had been rustled.29 It was obvious that the deep estrangement between the civil and military administrations of the province of Kars augured no good for the Republic of Armenia. Preliminary Turkish-Armenian Exchange

The Armenian foray into Olti elicited the first formal diplomatic ex­ change between the Turkish Grand National Assembly at Angora and the Armenian government in Erevan. Mustafa Kemal was under strong pressure from Kiazim Karabekir to sanction a limited offensive into the province of Kars, but for several reasons, including the evolving relations with Soviet Russia, he decided to bide his time and simply lodge formal protests against the actions of the Armenian government. On June 24 Foreign Affairs Commissar Bekir Sami Bey signed the first note, which reminded the Armenian foreign minister that since the moment of its creation the Armenian government had received the friendship of Tur­ key. Despite the excesses against the Muslim population on Armenianoccupied lands, the Grand National Assembly had confined itself to con­ structive criticism. When the most recent Armenian march against the innocent Muslim inhabitants of Olti had begun, General Karabekir had addressed a well-intentioned message to the Armenian commander to

28 Armenia Archives, 200/1/442, pt. I, p. 334; Karabekir, op. át., p. 811. 29 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 139—140.

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stop the operation, but no reply was received. Armenian interests, Bekir Sami asserted, were not irreconcilable with those of Turkey and in fact could be quite in harmony with them. Evaluating the situation objec­ tively, the Armenian government itself would see that its course of action was not in the national interest: “We are convinced that the English are engaged in pushing toward bloodshed two neighboring races which are destined to live together. We find it entirely detrimental for you and your nation, becoming a plaything in the hands of the English, to take an antagonistic posture toward us.’’ Armenia’s behavior was all the more surprising in view of the fact that both Turks and Armenians were ne­ gotiating with Soviet Russia in an effort to reach peaceful solutions. Warning that the Armenian government would be held responsible for continued aggression, Bekir Sami concluded that as foreign affairs com­ missar, “I am once more requesting Your Excellency to give the neces­ sary orders to your armed forces to cease their hostile actions.’’30 Receipt of the communication from Angora added to the sense of success and self-importance of the Bureau-Government. In deliberations of the Council of Ministers, it was decided to respond in kind but to have the note signed by Alexandre Ter-Hakobian, the secretary-general of the foreign ministry, rather than by Prime Minister and Foreign Min­ ister Ohandjanian. The reply, dated June 20, 1920, was relayed by Colo­ nel Mirimanian to Karabekir Pasha and on to Bekir Sami in Angora. The Armenian government declared that from the day of its formation it had striven to maintain friendly, peaceful coexistence with all neighbors and peoples inhabiting the region. The loyal Muslim elements in Armenia had always enjoyed equal rights and opportunities. Their lives and prop­ erties were protected against criminals and evildoers, most of whom were agitators from abroad. The recent military action in Olti had been re­ quired to safeguard Armenian territory from anarchic elements and had brought no harm to the peaceful Muslim population. The district’s ad­ ministration had been entrusted to Muslim citizens of the Armenian republic: The Armenian nation has for a long time been trying sincerely to put aside the dark past and to create friendly neighborly relations with Turkey. The res­ toration of cordial relations between Armenia and Turkey is entirely dependent on the course of the Turkish leaders, who must recognize once and for all the rights of the Armenian people relating to the boundaries of integral Armenia, and they must put to an end the agitation of their agents within the boundaries of the Republic of Armenia.

50 Armenia Archives, 200/1/560, p. 248, and 200/1/604, pp. 2—3; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920, App. 7.

304

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

There would be a firm basis for the normalization of relations once the Grand National Assembly had recognized the legitimate rights of the Armenian people, including the emancipation and independence of “the Armenian vilayets of Turkey.”31 The initial phase in relations between Nationalist Turkey and the Ar­ menian Bureau-Government lapsed with a second exchange of notes, in which the tone and tenor became britde. On July 8, Bekir Sami wrote that, despite Turkish requests for the withdrawal of the forces that had attacked Olti without any legitimate grounds, the Armenians had as re­ cently as July 2 resumed their acts of aggression. Neither the Armenian government nor commander in chief had denied that a campaign was in progress. The arguments that the action was initiated at the request of the local Muslim population, that there was no intent to breach the Ottoman frontier, and that there would be no change in the status quo between the two states were unacceptable excuses: “It is not unknown to you that the basis for the relations of the two governments is the formal recognition by the Republic of Armenia of the Brest-Litovsk treaty and its supplement, the Batum treaty, which were signed by duly empowered plenipotentiaries and accepted and confirmed by the two governments.” In accordance with those international agreements, Olti, as a part of the three sanjaks (Kars, Ardahan, Batum) and by the free will of its people, had been restored as an indivisible part of the Ottoman state. The present temporary absence of Turkish officials or armed forces had no effect on the district’s legal status. At a time when the Grand National Assembly was prepared to resolve justly and in good faith disagreements stemming from the Batum treaty—if any such differences in fact existed—the Armenian armed forces had attacked Olti and taken underfoot the absolute rights of Turkey, dealing a serious blow to the establishment of cordial neighborly relations: As I have expressed in my first correspondence, our government and the Turkish nation are not the enemy of the Armenian government and the Arme­ nian people, and they desire to find a bond to protect our mutual interests. If my views are studied objectively and with circumspection by the Armenian gov­ ernment, I hope that the sincerity of my observations and the sentiments of my nation toward your nation will inspire trust. Finally, I am again asking that you draw back your armed forces immediately, and on the basis of the Batum treaty, which from the factual and legal point of view is in effect between the two of us, I am protesting against the movements that have taken place, and I hold responsible those who have been the cause of the harm suffered by the Muslim population.32 31 Armenia Archives, 200/1/560, p. 249, and 200/1/604, p. 16; Rep. of Arm. Del. Ar­ chives, File 17/17 and File 24/24, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920. 32 Armenia Archives, 200/1/560, p. 246, and 200/1/604, p. 17. For an English trans­ lation, see FO 371/4959, Ei 1703/134/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 24, 1920, enclosure.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

3O5

Invocation of the Brest-Litovsk and Batum treaties by Bekir Sami Bey stirred the ire of the Bureau-Government. Those treaties allowed Turkey to annex not only the former sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, ceded by the Ottoman Empire to Russia in 1878, but also half of the province of Erevan and two heavily Armenian-populated counties of the province of Tiflis. Surely, the Angora regime could not be serious in suggesting the regularization of Armenian-Turkish relations based on the crushing terms of those nullified and repudiated documents. It was again Ter-Hakobian who signed the reply to Bekir Sami Bey, dated July 28. The Armenian government would not dwell on the fact that the Brest-Litovsk and Batum treaties were signed by the sultan’s government, which the Grand National Assembly did not recognize. But Bekir Sami should have known that Armenia had not been party to the Brest-Litovsk treaty and that the Batum treaty had not been ratified by either side and had no legal force so far as Armenia was concerned. The fact that you accept as a basis [for bilateral relations] the Brest-Litovsk and Batum treaties, which absolutely do not admit the existence of a viable Ar­ menia, with much regret deprives us of all hope of coming to an agreement with you so long as you continue to be led by the dispositions of those treaties which were founded on the ambitions of the German imperatorial and Sultanic im­ perialistic, counterrevolutionary governments and contrary to the principles of national self-determination, right, and justice in governmental and international relations.

The Armenian people, deeply desirous of enjoying solid neighborly relations with the Turks and all other nationalities, believed that a pre­ condition was mutual recognition of historic, ethnographic, and eco­ nomic rights. Armenia’s indisputable claims to the Armenian provinces of Turkey had been recognized by the Allied Powers in the peace treaty with Turkey, and the president of the United States was to act as the supreme arbiter of the boundaries. Armenia, a signatory of that treaty, would await the arbitration decision and pledged in the interim not to pass beyond the former Russo-Turkish frontier. On its part, Turkey should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Armenia. From that point of view, the demand to withdraw from Olti, an inalienable part of the Republic of Armenia, was completely incomprehensible and unacceptable. “Faithful to its love of peace, the Armenian nation is pre­ pared to extend the hand of friendship to each nation which on its part recognizes fully its [Armenia’s] legitimate historic, ethnographic, and governmental rights.”33 ss Armenia Archives, 200/1/560, p. 247, and 200/1/604, p. 19; Rep. of Arm. Del. Ar­ chives, File 24/24. For an English translation, see FO 371/4956, Ei 1868/134/58, Luke to FO, Sept. 6, 1920, enclosure.

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the REPUBLIC of armenia

The courtesies of diplomatic language aside, Armenia made clear that it reserved to itself freedom of action on the Caucasian side of the former Russo-Turkish frontier. This sentiment was made all the more emphatic in Ruben Ter-Minasian’s praise for the dedicated service of General Pirumian and General Hovsepian at Kars and for the courage of Armenia’s men under arms, who were overpowering one rebel district after an­ other. These triumphs, the war minister exclaimed, did not fall like manna from heaven but were won through heroic sacrifice. “Forward to new victories in the name of the promised land, in the name of free, independent, united Armenia.” The time had come to put an end to the defiance of Baouk-Vedi and all the other vedis.34 Vedibasar Armenian successes in Zangibasar and Olti strengthened the hand of militants who insisted that only by a display of might could Armenia rid itself of internal enemies, safeguard routes of communication, and break out of its externally imposed isolation. These objectives could be achieved by recapturing the lower Araxes River Valley and opening the railroad to Julfa and Tabriz, linking Armenia with the entire Persian network of communication, transportation, and trade. Between Erevan and Julfa lay the broad expanse of Vedibasar, Sharur, and Nakhichevan, nearly all of which was controlled by “Tatar” partisans commanded by Turkish and Azerbaijani officers (see map 7). Vedibasar was centered around the fortified village of Baouk-Vedi in the southern sector of the county (uezd) of Erevan. In the summer of 1919 the Armenian army had suffered humiliating losses at Baouk-Vedi before falling back to Khamarlu.35 The expulsion of the Armenian army and administration from not only Vedibasar but the whole of the lower Araxes Valley had put to flight thousands of Armenian villagers and townspeople, sharply aggravating the refugee problem. Now, on the heels of the operations in Zangibasar and Olti, the moment of retribu­ tion had arrived. On June 30 the military authorities adopted a plan to occupy Vedibasar and advance as far as the defile known as Volch’i Vorota, or Wolves’ Gates, at the entrance to Sharur.36 News of the Armenian sweep through Zangibasar caused alarm and confusion among the Turkic inhabitants to the south. Their fear that the Armenians would at last muster enough force to suppress them was exacerbated by troubles arising from personality clashes and conflicting 34 Hairenik, Sept. 18:5, 1920. 35 See Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 62—77. 36 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

SO?

policies among their own leaders. The power structure was dominated by the hereditary khans of Nakhichevan—headed by Jafar Khan and his son Lieutenant Colonel Kalb Ali (Kerbala)—Azerbaijani administrators, and Turkish officers and soldiers from the nth Caucasus Infantry Di­ vision at Bayazit. The Azerbaijani and Turkish officers competed for primacy, and the local khans, jealous of their prerogatives yet in need of external support, were suspicious of both. Some of the khans report­ edly came to believe that Armenian rule was inevitable and that a ne­ gotiated modus vivendi was preferable to subjugation by force of arms.37 The militia units from Baouk-Vedi and Davalu in the north to Julfa and Ordubad in the south were characteristic of partisan irregulars. Their ranks swelled at times of raids and expeditions and contracted in periods of inactivity or in face of superior strength. The Turkish officers, headed by Captain Halil Bey, tried to maintain military discipline, but they were hampered by the particularism and self-interests of the khans. The Turkish presence in the Araxes Valley was enhanced in February and March 1920 with the arrival over Maku and the Shahtaght branch railway of more than 300 men from the 11th Caucasus Division. Turkish officers and instructors, posted at every station from Davalu to Julfa, trained Kalb Ali Khan’s militia, which harassed the Armenian positions along the perimeters of Zangezur, Daralagiaz, and Khamarlu. Osman Pasha supervised operations in Sharur, and Haji Ali Bey led a detach­ ment into Baouk-Vedi to assist Abbas Quli Bek Severskii’s warriors. In the aftermath of the anti-Soviet revolts in Azerbaijan in May and June, hundreds of Azerbaijani rebel soldiers fled to Nakhichevan, among them General Habib Selimov, a battalion of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a number of gunners. Nuri Pasha, too, made his way to the Araxes Valley en route to Anatolia.38 Despite the increase in Turkish and Azerbaijani manpower in SharurNakhichevan, breaches of discipline and instability afflicted the partisan formations. In Baouk-Vedi, the constant state of alert grated on people’s nerves and depleted military supplies. Unable to get sufficient ammu­ nition from Captain Halil, Abbas Quli Bek tried to send a camel caravan to bring back supplies from Bayazit. At the beginning ofJuly, Armenian military intelligence reported that Abbas Quli Bek controlled as many as 700 foot soldiers and 300 mounted men, supported by cannons and machine guns; all indications, however, were that discipline was breaking ” Dogu Cephesi, p. 102; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25. See also Karabekir, op. át., pp. 768-769. “Karabekir, op. át., pp. 426, 582; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 66—67, 99—100; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25. See also British intelligence reports in FO 371/3165—3167, File 262/ 44 passim.

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down and that the frightened inhabitants of Vedibasar were turning against their leaders.39 The sovietization of Azerbaijan produced ferment in the Muslim-pop­ ulated portions of Erevan province, as it did throughout the rest of Transcaucasia. An advance by the Red Army over Zangezur into Na­ khichevan could bring direct Soviet military and financial aid to the Turkish Nationalists and permanently exclude Armenian rule from the lower Araxes Valley. When Msyor Veysel [Ünûvar], the chief of staff of the Turkish nth Caucasus Division, arrived in Nakhichevan in May, he found Kalb Ali Khan, Bolshevik Behbud Shahtaghtinskii, and Young Turk fugitives all encouraging the worried population with descriptions of the anticipated assistance of the Red Army. At rallies in Nakhichevan and elsewhere, they extolled Soviet-Turkish friendship and the dedi­ cated leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Kiazim Karabekir, Nariman Nari­ manov, Lenin, and others. Acceptance of the Soviet order, it was im­ plied, was the only way to remain free of Armenian domination.40 While in the Araxes Valley, Msgor Veysel inspected the militia from Julfa to Davalu, where seven battalions were deployed. He returned to Bayazit confident in the defense system.41 In June, however, conditions deteriorated, as the Armenians struck out against Zangibasar and Olti. Tales of Bolshevik horrors in Azerbaijan caused some Muslim notables to suggest forging an understanding and possibly even a joint defense with the Armenians against the new menace. Fugitive Azerbaijani Gen­ eral Selimov reportedly tended in this direction, undermining the au­ thority and unity of Captain Halil Bey’s command. The Turkish detach­ ments, the Azerbaijani military components, and the local militia units each seemed to be operating independently and often at cross-purposes. Even Halil Bey began to vacillate regarding further resistance to the Armenians, and this indecision, according to Veysel, was the cause for his recall. He was replaced by Major Ali Demir (Timur).42 While the khans of Nakhichevan were troubled by the uncertainties connected with a Soviet presence, General Karabekir and other Turkish Nationalist organizers waited impatiendy for the appearance of the Red Army. At the end of June and in July, Karabekir dispatched couriers to Baku and Karabagh to apprise the government of Soviet Azerbaijan and Eleventh Army commander Levandovskii of Armenian excesses in Zangibasar and Olti and to urge them to break over Zangezur into Nakhichevan.43 39 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25, Svodka no. 16, events to May 7, Svodka no. 19, events to June 17, Svodka no. 20, events to July 6, 1920. 40 Veysel Ünûvar, IstiklälharbindeBolyeviklerlesekizay, 1920—1921 (Istanbul, 1948), pp. 5— 8, 18—20. 41 Ibid., pp. 8—10, 17. 42 Dogu Cephesi, p. 102; Ünûvar, op. át., pp. 23—24. 43 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Moskovahâtiralan (21/11/1920-2/6/1922) (Istanbul, 1955), pp. 33—

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

SOO

Soviet Azerbaijan showed no less interest in the fate of the lower Araxes River Valley than had the previous, Musavat-led Azerbaijani repub­ lic. From Tiflis on July 5, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mirza Davud Huseinov addressed a protest note to Foreign Minister Ohan­ djanian: “According to information received, the Armenian armed forces, after having plundered Zangibasar and expelled its Muslim in­ habitants, have begun to attack the Sharur-Nakhichevan district.’’ Other Armenian units were engaged in aggression along the Kazakh frontier. Unless these hostilities ceased immediately, they would be regarded as acts of belligerence against Soviet Azerbaijan, which would consider it­ self free to adopt appropriate countermeasures. In his reply three days later, Ohandjanian first stated that Huseinov’s note was tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of the Armenian republic, then pointed out that counterrevolutionary elements, directed by Turkish im­ perialists and assisted by Turkish military units, were fomenting sedition in Zangibasar and Sharur-Nakhichevan, inalienable parts of the Arme­ nian republic, in order to undermine the Armenian democracy. Fur­ thermore, Armenia had taken no hostile action against Soviet Azerbai­ jan. On the contrary, armed forces from Azerbaijan had invaded the Ijevan and Shamshadin sectors both in May and in June and, when com­ pelled to withdraw, had plundered several villages and killed or taken captive a number of officials of the Armenian government. Armenia had no interest in occupying territory beyond its borders and was prepared to resolve all disputed questions by peaceful means. Ohandjanian ex­ pressed confidence that Soviet Azerbaijan would prevent any aggression by the armed forces that were now being concentrated along the bound­ aries of the Republic of Armenia.44 The Armenian press was not so diplomatic in its choice of words. The recent Azerbaijani notes made it clear that something foul was again brewing in that country. Obviously, Huseinov and his fellow Communists did not believe their own words and were merely trying to create an atmosphere to justify their intended aggression against Armenia: They know that under the very nose of our capital, an entire Turkish-populated 34; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 820, 854; Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Armenii, Glavnoe Arkhivnoe Upravlenie pri SM Respubliki Armeniia, Kafedra Istorii Armianskogo Naroda Erevanskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Nagomyi Karabakh v 1918—1923 gg.: Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, ed. V. A. Mikayelian et al. (Erevan, 1992), pp. 525, 534, 545-546 (cited hereafter as Nagomyi Karabakh)', Simon Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji ev Trkakan sali midjev (Beirut, 1953), pp. 38—39. See also Gotthard Jäschke, “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kampfes der Türkei um ihre Unabhängigkeit,” Die Welt des Islams, n.s., V, 1-2 (1957), p. 49; Cemal Kutay, KarabekirErmenistani nasilyok etti? (Istanbul, 1956), pp. 5-10. 44 Haradj, July 8:2, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

district living in a state of insurgency for almost two years, because of poisonous agitation, has become a boil upon the body of our infant state. They know that Sharur-Nakhichevan, that inseparable part of Armenia, has become the restless den of Turkish and Azerbaijani agents and bandit groups, which continuously attack the Republic’s armed forces and the peaceful inhabitants of nearby vil­ lages. ... But knowing all this, they shower the Armenian government with the thunderbolts of Aramazd [Zeus]. This is a clear indication that a new plot is being hatched against our country by these gentiemen.... If we are wrong, then it would be good if Azerbaijan, instead of sending the Armenian government baseless notes, would demonstrate through actions that it desires to live in peace with the Armenian people and sincerely and once and for all comes to terms with the existence of the Armenian state.45

Meanwhile, on July i, Lieutenant Colonel Javid Bey, commander of the Turkish i ith Caucasus Division at Bayazit, sent the ist Battalion of the 18th Regiment to Shahtaght. Major Veysel again set out for Na­ khichevan as military inspector with three battalions of infantry, a battery of artillery, and accompanying officers. Regional commander Major Ali Demir led the ist Battalion, 34th Regiment, and an artillery battery to Davalu, and other units remained at Shahtaght while Veysel consulted with the National Council (miUi shura) of Nakhichevan. Kalb Ali Khan and most other notables expressed their readiness to take arms against the Armenians, but there were some who accused the Turks of wanting to sacrifice the region to the Bolsheviks for their own selfish ends.46 The dissension did not bode well for a determined, unified stand against the anticipated Armenian invasion. That advance began on the morning ofJuly 11 with twenty companies of infantry, seven squadrons of cavalry, and several artillery batteries and machine gun squads stretched out from Khor-Virap on the Araxes River to Mount Bozburun, facing Baouk-Vedi. General Shelkovnikian’s order of the day called for the main Khamarlu detachment to attack BaoukVedi. Colonel Dmitrii Korganian would lead six squadrons of cavalry and four companies of infantry against the villages to the east of the railway before joining up with Lieutenant Colonel Kafiev’s detachment, which would advance from the Nor-Bayazit perimeter over Jghin. After over­ powering Vedibasar, the combined Armenian forces were to move south­ ward with the Vardan Zoravar armored train (which had been returned to the southern front from Alexandropol) into Ararat station and Davalu and as far as the narrow pass at Volch’i Vorota.47 The high-spirited, confident Armenian forces rolled over most of Ve­ dibasar on the first day of the campaign. Karalar, Djatkran, Ali Mamed, 45 Ibid. 46 Ùnûvar, op. át., pp. 23—25; Dogu. Cephesi, pp. 103—105; Karabekir, op. át., p. 824. 47 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25; Hairenik, Aug. 26:1, 1920.

7. THE LOWER ARAXES RIVER VALLEY

312

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Kotuz, Aghasibekli, Engidja, Lower Karabaghlar, and other villages fell one after the other; in the northeastern sector the Turkic defenses col­ lapsed in face of the 3d Regiment’s advance from Nor-Bayazit overJghin, Aghkilisa, Geol, Manguk, Zimi, Kiusuz, Germanis, and Dahnaz. By night­ fall on July 11, the main Khamarlu detachment had moved to within a mile of Baouk-Vedi. In a desperate effort to hurl back the Armenians, the defenders left their positions on Mount Giavur Ghalasi, but the Ar­ menian 2d Regiment, engaging in hand-to-hand combat, claimed many lives and captured the strategic commanding height. As Baouk-Vedi’s defenders and inhabitants fled into the darkness over Zindjirlu toward Davalu, the Khamarlu detachment entered the nearly abandoned village at dawn on July 12, seizing a cannon, machine guns, shells, grenades, ammunition, and other booty of war. The symbol of Turkic defiance had fallen.48 From Davalu, Major Ali Demir informed Veysel Bey that the defenses of Vedibasar were crumbling and that the panic-stricken militiamen and peasantry were fleeing into Sharur. Veysel dispatched the ist Battalion of the 18th Regiment to assist, along with Kalb Ali Khan’s militia and General Selimov’s Azerbaijani unit. Nothing could stem the exodus, however, and the new arrivals became a part of the disorderly retreat.49 By nightfall on July 12, the Armenians had occupied Shahablu, Zindjirlu, Davalu, and Sadarak, and the Armenian armored train pressed south­ ward from Ararat station. Armenian work crews were quickly brought in to repair the rails that the retreating militia had cut to stall the advance of the armored train. On the morning ofJuly 14, the Khamarlu detach­ ment marched through the Volch’i Vorota pass and into Sharur, again putting to flight the detachments of the Turkish 18th and 34th regi­ ments, the militia, and the terrified population.50 Outside of BashNorashen, General Shelkovnikian’s expedition was joined by the Daralagiaz detachment, which had overrun the Turkic settlements around 48 Hairenik, Aug. 22:1, 26:1, Sept. 1:1, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 374. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, no. 854, July 17, 1920, stating that 2,000 “Tatars” commanded by Turkish officers defended Baouk-Vedi, 35 kilometers (21 miles) south of Erevan, with 2 cannons and 9 machine guns and that during its successful cam­ paign to capture the district the Armenian army suffered 5 officers and 5 enlisted men killed and 5 officers and 55 enlisted men wounded. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 374, states that 15 Armenian officers and enlisted men were killed and that they were given a solemn state funeral in Erevan on July 13. Armenian casualties are placed at 250 by Garo Sassuni, Mayisian khrovutiunnereev tatarakan apstamb shrdjannere (Hayastane 1 Q2O-iri) (Beirut, 1968), pp. 141—142. See also Archives de l’Armée, 20N/187, dossier 1, Bulletins, JulyAug.,_ 1920; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 104—105. 49 Unùvar, op. át, pp. 25—26; Dogu Cephesi, p. 105. See also Karabekir, op. át., pp. 820821. 50 Zhoghovurd, July 16, 1920; Dogu Cephesi, p. 105; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, no. 854, July 17, 1920; FO 371/4959, E10343/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, July 20, 1920.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

SIS

Keshishkend, including Djul, and then descended over Arpa and Yaidji to Norashen and Dudanga. The Khamarlu, Nor-Bayazit, and Daralagiaz columns now combined as the Sharur detachment and, with their initial objectives achieved, prepared to subdue the whole of Sharur and Na­ khichevan. On July 16 the Armenian front extended from the Araxes River to Agh-Ahmed, Kushchi-Demurchi, Bash-Norashen, Ulia-Norashen, and Akhura.51

Sharur-Nakhichevan The sweep of the Armenian forces to Bash-Norashen, only 33 miles from Nakhichevan, threw the Muslim militia into disarray and put to flight most of the population of the more than sixty villages of Sharur. Aban­ doning home and field, the people poured into Shahtaght to get across the bridge into the Maku khanate of Persia before it was too late. Con­ cerned about the safety of the Turkish detachments posted as far away as Ordubad, Major Veysel demanded reinforcements from the Nakhich­ evan National Council, complaining that the Muslim partisans and Azer­ baijani soldiers were refusing to engage the enemy. The Turks had come to assist against Armenian aggression, but the land belonged to the khans and people of Sharur-Nakhichevan, and unless they were willing to participate in its defense the Turkish contingents would have no choice but to withdraw.52 Similar admonitions were telegraphed to Nakhichevan by Colonel Javid Bey at Bayazit. Javid reminded the Muslim notables of the sincere support shown by the Turks in spite of the many faults and errors of the local leaders. Captain Halil Bey had fulfilled his political and military responsibilities conscientiously, yet the milli shura had not desisted from mixing in everything. Nonetheless, upon the renewed call for help from Nakhichevan, Javid had sent one of his most trusted slides (Veysel), who even now was holding the Shahtaght bridge to protect the civilians es­ caping across the Araxes River; only after they had reached safety would he withdraw the Turkish askers, if necessary.53 Javid instructed Veysel to concentrate all components of the 11th Division operating in SharurNakhichevan at Shahtaght to make a decisive stand. If despite all efforts the force was insufficient to halt the enemy advance, it should draw back to the west of the Araxes River (into the Maku khanate of Persia), en­ 51 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 374; FO 371/4959, E10343/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, July 20, 1920, and 371/4960, E12813/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Stokes, Sept. 30, 1920. The composition and strength of the Turkish detachments in Sharur-Nakhichevan on July 15, 1920, is given in Dogu Cephesi, p. 106. 52 Unûvar, op. át., pp. 27—28. 5S Ibid,., pp. 29—30.

3H

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

trusting Major Ali Demir with the heavy obligation of trying to defend the Nakhichevan, Julfa, and Ordubad districts with the local militia.54 As Armenian work crews quickly repaired the railroad to allow the armored train to advance toward Shahtaght and Nakhichevan, the milli shura, having lost trust in the Turks, applied to General Shelkovnikian for a truce and negotiations to end hostilities. The Armenian offensive was halted on July 16, and the four-member Muslim delegation headed by Jafar Khan Nakhichevanskii was swiftly transported to Erevan. There, Minister of Military Affairs Ter-Minasian and Assistant Minister Hakhverdian presented the government’s terms for peace. The milli shura was to recognize Sharur-Nakhichevan as an inseparable part of the Ar­ menian republic; to restore Armenian goods and properties seized dur­ ing the uprising of 1919; to provide labor as needed for the repair of the railroad; to pay reparations of 50,000 gold rubles, 300,000 poods (5,4 t 5 tons) of wheat, 100,000 poods (1,805 tons) of rice, 4,000 head of livestock, and 200 horses; and to clear all Muslim settlements in the proximity of the railroad. In return, Muslim officials would be appointed in districts of Muslim preponderance; the judicial system would be or­ ganized in accordance with local laws and customs; and the population would enjoy all the benefits of citizenship, including complete religious and cultural autonomy, participation in elections, representation in the Parliament, and local initiative and self-government as provided by the zemstvo system. Muslim refugees could repatriate to their homes, with the exception, pending future arrangements, of those from Zangibasar, Vedibasar, and other strategic sites. Persons not wishing to become cit­ izens of the Republic of Armenia would be free to leave the country within a specified period. Finally, the region was to be disarmed, with one weapon to be surrendered for every second household. Unless these conditions were met within a stipulated time limit, each town was to give five hostages and each village three hostages to guarantee compliance. And unless the terms proposed by the Armenian government were ac­ cepted within sixty hours, military operations would resume.55 The Muslim negotiators returned to Nakhichevan on July 19, and on 54 Dogu. Cephesi, p. 107. 55 Hairenik, Sept. 5:2, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 374—375; Sassuni, op. cit., p. 143; FO 371/4959, E10343/134/58,Luke to FO, Aug. 2, 1920, enclosing Gracey’s nos. 29—32. According to a document in Nagpmyi Karabakh, pp. 575—576, 300 horses and 200 head of cattle were to be sold to the Armenian government within 2 weeks, and 300,000 poods of wheat (half free and half sold) were to be provided over a period of 6 weeks, all at prices specified in the draft agreement. Each household was to deliver 1 rifle with 80 bullets, and 3 hostages from each town and 2 from each village were to be taken until fulfillment of the terms. A 48-hour deadline was given from the time the delegation had returned to Shahtaght and set out from that station toward Nakhichevan. See also Unúvar, op. át., pp. 30—31; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 105, 107.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

315

the following day the milli shura gathered to determine a course of action. The meeting was tom with dissension. Kalb Ali Khan, attended by armed guards, demanded rejection of the Armenian terms and a fight to the finish. But in view of the collapse of the militia, which had joined the population in flight across the Shahtaght bridge, most members of the council concurred that a settlement with the Armenian government was necessary to stop the bloodshed and spare the people. Every effort should be made to lighten the terms or at least to gain time, as it had been reported that the Red Army was preparing to march over Zangezur to Nakhichevan. General Karabekir had received assurances from Gen­ eral Levandovskii that contingents of the Eleventh Red Army would soon be in the Araxes River Valley. Unable to risk the deployment of more Turkish troops to Nakhichevan, both Karabekir Pasha and Colonel Javid seemed to be in favor of diplomatic maneuvers to stall for as long as possible.56 On July 20, therefore, Jafar Khan Nakhichevanskii and local notable Mehti Bagirov, on behalf of the Nakhichevan National Council, replied to the Armenian government that if the Muslims were to acknowledge the region as a part of the Republic of Armenia they should have full internal autonomy from Volch’i Vorota to Ordubad—that is, in all of Sharur-Nakhichevan. To work out the particulars of this plan, represen­ tatives of Sharur-Nakhichevan should meet with Armenian officials in Erevan in a conference chaired by a representative of one of the Allied Powers. If the Armenian government accepted these central points, then the main cause of conflict would be resolved, and all other demands could be addressed and settled during the proposed conference. At the same time, however, the milli shura called upon Major Veysel Bey, who was present for the council’s meeting, to reorganize the Muslim militia and to bolster the defenses around Shahtaght.57 It is not clear whether the counterproposals signed by Jafar Quli Khan were actually relayed to Erevan, but even if they were received the Ar­ menian government would have considered them unsatisfactory. On July 22, shortly after the expiration of the sixty-hour time limit for acceptance of the Armenian conditions, General Shelkovnikian was authorized to resume the offensive. The following day, the armored train and a com­ pany of infantry scouted the approaches to Shahtaght and occupied Tazakend while the main Armenian force pressed toward the Kabullu56 Unûvar, op. át., p. 31; Cebesoy, op. át., p. 35. A. B. Kadishev, Interventsiiai grazhdanskaia voina v Zakavkaz’e (Moscow, i960), p. 305, states that Turkish representatives arrived in Goris (Gerusy) on July 7 to urge the Red Army, which had just occupied the town, to advance to Ordubad and Nakhichevan. 57 Unûvar, op. át., pp. 31—32. See also FO 371 ƒ4959, E10343/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke, July 22 and 28, 1920.

316

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Kivrag line. Everywhere, the Muslim militia melted away at the sight of the Armenian column.58 Distressed by the unreliability of the local levies and Azerbaijani contingents, Veysel Bey recalled his men from Ordubad, Julfa, and elsewhere and concentrated them at Shahtaght, either to make a last stand or to be ready to withdraw quickly over Persian territory to Bayazit. His own battalions, too, were dwindling. The brunt of the Armenian offensive struck on July 24, as several hundred infantrymen (2,000 by Turkish estimates), supported by cavalry, artillery, and ma­ chine gun squadrons, advanced along the railway and main road, cap­ turing Pusian and Kivrag by the end of the day. The terrified population and Muslim militia streamed across the Shahtaght bridge.59 Veysel Bey held the bridge until nightfall but then, upon orders from Bayazit, withdrew to Arablar (Arpalar) in the Maku khanate with the Turkish regulars who had been serving in the Araxes Valley in violation of the Mudros Armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers.60 The Azerbaijani cavalry regiment scattered in disorganized re­ treat and was able to regroup only after reaching Bayazit. Veysel vented his rage against the cowardly militia and “dark elements’’ that had caused the fiasco.61 On July 25, an Armenian detachment of 200 men and a battery of mountain guns occupied the key village of Khok and the town and station of Shahtaght, where they recovered 6 locomotives and 40 freight cars, 2 machine guns, 1 cannon, and a large store of ammunition. The Armenians now held the strategic junction only 27 kilometers (16 miles) north of Nakhichevan on the main line and at the starting point of the branch railway to Maku and the roads to Bayazit and Van beyond.62 The Armenian government lost no time in making plans to break out of its isolation. As an initial step, it allocated funds to restore the international Indo-European telegraphic system, which passed through the Araxes Valley. A preliminary inspection showed that there was no line at all southward from Shirazlu for 10 kilometers (6 miles) toward Sadarak. Thereafter, the line was in good condition as far as Bash-Norashen except for two interruptions at Volch’i Vorota, but the cable was cut in more than 20 places from Norashen to Kivrag. Armenia 58 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 375; Unûvar, op. át., pp. 32-33. 59 FO 371/4959, Ei0343/134/58, enclosing Gracey to Luke,July 28, 1920; Unûvar, op. át., p. 34; Dogu Cephesi, pp. 108—109. 60 The 2d Battalion, 34th Regiment, 1 ith Caucasus Division, had arrived in Arablar from Bayazit on July 18. See Dogu Cephesi, p. 108. 61 Unûvar, op. át., pp. 34—35; Dogu Cephesi, p. 109. See also Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, P- 9462 Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 375; FO 371/4958—4959, E9081/E10343/134/ 58 enclosures.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

SI?

had the equipment and technicians to restore the line quickly, as soon as Nakhichevan and Julfa were reoccupied.63 Afraid of Armenian retribution, thousands of townspeople and villag­ ers from the Nakhichevan district now forded the Araxes River or con­ centrated at Julfa at the southern extremity of Erevan province to be prepared at a moment’s notice to cross the bridge to Persian Djolfa and the road to Tabriz. Under these circumstances, the Nakhichevan Na­ tional Council again appealed to the Armenian command to halt the advance to permit further negotiations for the district’s peaceful sub­ mission. When those discussions resumed in Erevan on July 26, the Ar­ menian government reiterated most of its previous conditions, adding that for the time being Sharur would remain under military occupation and the refugees would have to wait to return. The bountiful fields of Sharur were ripe for the harvest, and it was apparent that the Armenians wanted to reap these spoils of war before letting the Muslim villagers come back. Moreover, Armenian officials were being sent to Tiflis and elsewhere to register Armenian refugees from Sharur and Nakhichevan for their repatriation.64 The delegation of the milli shura was in no position to reject the government’s terms and, pledging that it would urge the full national council to give a positive response, departed for Nakhichevan on July 27.65 But no reply was forthcoming. By the time the delegation returned home, matters had changed dramatically. On July 28, two companies of cavalry attached to the 28th Division of the Eleventh Red Army (though belonging to the 32d Rifle Division) descended through the Djaghri Valley and rode into Nakhichevan with thirty machine guns and a battery of artillery. They were followed by General Halil Pasha and the Soviet mission, which was bringing the first substantial consignment of gold supplied by Soviet Russia for Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish Nationalists. The entry of components of the Red Army into the Araxes Valley altered the balance of power and spared Nakhichevan from the impending Arme­ nian occupation.66 63 Armenia Archives, 199/1/133, pt. II, p. 23; FO 371/4959, E10343/E10733/134/58 enclosures. 64 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25, Kratkii ocherk, April-Sept. 1920; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, 646(68), Moser to Department of State, July 19, 1920, enclosure; Bor’ba, July 29:4, Aug. 3:4, 1920. 65 It was reported that the chief of the Nakhichevan militia, Kalb Ali Khan, had been wounded by his relative, Taghi Khan Erivanskii, who favored an accommodation with the Armenian government. See Haradj, Aug. 3:4, 1920. Kalb Ali Khan was later reported to have fled to Maku (Aug. 25:2, 1920). 66 FO 371/4958, E9509/134/58, and Great Britain, War Office, 106/333, nP- 216; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 3, Corbel’s nos. 354—355, July 29, 1920; Unûvar, op. át., p. 44; Karabekir, op. át., pp. 824—825. See also Cebesoy, op. át., p. 35. Kadishev, op. át., pp. 305-306, states that the cavalry brigade set out from Goris toward Nakhichevan

318

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Addressing the Armenian command at Shahtaght on July 30, Colonel V. Tarkhov, identifying himself as the “commander of the united troops of the R.S.F.S.R. and Red Turkey occupying Nakhichevan and vicinity,’’ wrote (as translated at the time): On July 28th, 1920 Red Troops of Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republics and allied troops of Red Turkey in compliance with orders have entered Na­ khichevan and its district, having no object to act hostile towards Armenia. In accordance with trustworthy information obtained your troops intend to advance on Nakhichevan and to put it to the sword and fire. In order to avoid misunderstandings and useless bloodshed which may result in consequence it is of State importance that I inform you about our occupation of Nakhichevan and its vicinity.67

At the same time, Major Veysel Bey, who continued to trespass on Persian territory by encamping with three Turkish battalions in the khanate of Maku, received instructions from division headquarters at Bayazit to be prepared for action in case conflict erupted between the Red Army and the Armenians. It was his assignment to exert pressure on the Armenians at the northern passes of the Araxes as they tried to retreat and to keep the Shahtaght bridge within machine-gun range to prevent them from burning or dynamiting it. He also was to establish a direct line of communication with Nakhichevan to facilitate the relay of information to Turkish headquarters.68 On July 31, General Halil Pasha dispatched through Veysel Bey a tel­ egram to General Karabekir cautioning that Turkish abandonment of Nakhichevan would be regarded as cowardice by the Bolsheviks. He urged the immediate deployment of a division to collaborate with the Red Army. That same day, headquarters of the 11th Caucasus Division ordered the 3 battalions in the Maku corridor—altogether some 500 men with 100 animals, 4 cannons, and 2 machine guns—to cross to the opposite shore of the Araxes River into Nakhichevan. The cavalry was to remain at Arablar to harass the Armenians at Shahtaght should hos­ tilities resume. The battalions proceeding directly to Nakhichevan were to place themselves under the command of General Halil Pasha. All were to remove their symbols of rank and leave only a red star and crescent

on July 17, 1920. That is also the date given in the Eleventh Army’s orders issued on July 16, 1920. See Nagomyi Karabakh, pp. 538—539. 67FO 371/4959, Ei 1379/134/58. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Corbel’s no. 986, Aug. 17, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/468, p. 33, and 200/1/581, p. 223; Haradj, Aug. 3:4, 1920. 68 Unùvar, op. át., p. 25; Karabekir, op. át., p. 825.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGNS OF 1920

SIG

on their caps in order to gain the trust and sympathy of the Bolsheviks.69 The Turkish troops forded the river with much difficulty on August i near the Shibli pass.70 They were impatiently awaited by Halil Pasha and other Turkish collaborators with the Bolsheviks, at whose suggestion the Turkish regulars assumed the name of Revolutionary Turkish Eastern Front Red Detachment (Inkilabi Türkiye shark jephesi kizil mufrezesi). The Turkish and Bolshevik troops greeted each other with red flags and rev­ olutionary songs and slogans. The 34th Regiment’s ist Battalion took up positions in the direction of Ordubad, whereas the 2d Battalion and the 18th Regiment’s ist Battalion protected the railway and the area between Nakhichevan and the Araxes River. The Red Army cavalry was ranged to the north of the Turkish units and at Djaghri on the road to Zangezur.71 Yet the joint force did not venture to challenge the Arme­ nian positions at Shahtaght. Colonel Tarkhov was under orders to avoid offensive action pending further instructions. Scouting parties occasion­ ally engaged in skirmishes, and in early August the Armenian armored train demolished Turkish barricades near the salt mines only 4 miles from Nakhichevan, but by and large the two sides were held to a standoff.72 Because of trouble in other parts of the Caucasus and the blockage of the routes over Zangezur by Armenian partisans, the Red Army was unable to send reinforcements to Colonel Tarkhov. For its part, the Armenian army was dangerously overextended, leaving the country without reserves. General Shelkovnikian’s expedition had cov­ ered a broad expanse and advanced more than 50 miles south of the previous front at Khamarlu. The districts of Zangibasar, Vedibasar, and Sharur had been quickly overrun, but it would take much longer to integrate them into the Armenian republic. The occupation of Na­ khichevan, in light of the new developments in that district, would have to be postponed.73*7

69 Unûvar, op. át., pp. 37—39,41; Dogu Cephesi, p. 110. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/ 829, dossier 2, no. 52, Dec. 30, 1920. 70 See a description of the crossing in Dogu Cephesi, pp. 110-111. 71 Unûvar, op. cit., pp. 39-41; Dogu Cephesi, p. 111. See also Kadishev, op. át., p. 306; Atatürk’ün söylev ve demeçleri, pp. 94—95. n Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 25/25; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Rap­ port militaire, no. 5, Aug. 3,1920; FO 371 ƒ4959, E10734/134/5$ enclosure. For a report of the deputy commander of the cavalry brigade of the 28th Division regarding the situa­ tion in Nakhichevan in August and September 1920, see A. O[H]. [H]Arutiunian et al., comps., “Osvoboditel’naia missiia 1 i-i Krasnoi Armii,” Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 2 ist yr., no. 2 (1980), p. 27. 7SRep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 17/17; FO 371/4959, Ei 1868/134/58 enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, no. 1085, Sept. 1, 1920, and Rapport militaire, Aug. 31, 1920, App. 1.

320

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The Aftermath

The Armenian government’s hope of filling the state granaries with the bounteous crops of the occupied territories was never realized. While exclusive military control was being imposed in the border zones be­ tween the railroad and the Araxes River and around Pusian and Shahtaght in the northern reaches of the county of Nakhichevan, most of the Sharur district was opened up for harvest under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture. It was estimated that the villages of Sharur had planted 300,000 poods of wheat, 150,000 of barley, 50,000 of rice, and 4,000 of oats. In addition, fruits and melons, corn and onions, and gar­ den greens of all kinds were plentiful. On July 30 the Ministry of Agri­ culture appointed Djumshud Abrahamian procurement chief for the district, authorizing him to supervise the harvest so that the government would receive half of whatever was reaped or milled. Cooperatives, pro­ fessional unions, public and private associations, or individual entrepre­ neurs could be assigned to gather the harvest of fields or entire villages.74 As had been the case in Zangibasar, however, chaos and anarchy pre­ vailed because of overlapping jurisdictions, disputes between the agri­ culture ministry’s controllers and the armed forces, and profiteering and speculation by persons who, through evasion and bribery, were able to remove enormous quantities of grain without any payment or appor­ tionment to the government. Before Abrahamian’s appointment as chief procurer, General Shelkovnikian had already appropriated several vil­ lages for the needs of his general staff and technical units, and the tem­ porary commissar for the occupied territories, P. G. Yalamov, made similar allotments to other groups. Even after being notified of Abrahamian’s jurisdiction, the welfare ministry continued to send ech­ elons of Armenian refugees to Yalamov for resetdement in one or an­ other of the abandoned Muslim villages.75 The humid, unhealthy cli­ mate, prevalence of malaria, and heavy concentration of minerals in the water supply afflicted the Armenian newcomers. For example, the older orphans sent by the welfare ministry to harvest the crops of Engidja village began their labor with great enthusiasm, but they soon became sick from the water and had to be evacuated. The ministry’s committee on tropical diseases set up several ambulatoriums and a malaria clinic in Bash-Norashen, and it organized displays and published pamphlets74 75 74 Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 162—163; Hairenik, Sept. 29:2—3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 376. 75 A. Sargsian, “Hai giughatsiutian tntesakan vijake Dashnakneri tirapetutian orok, 1918—1920 tt.,” BanberHayastani arkhivneri, 3d yr., no. 1 (1962)^. 245; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 123—125; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 376—377. See also Ar­ chives de l’Arñiée, 7N/829, dossier 3, Rapport militaire, July 30, 1920.

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on means of prevention and treatment. With no insecticides and very little quinine, however, the results were negligible.76 A commission of inquiry headed by Nikol Aghbalian reported in Au­ gust that the government was losing hundreds of millions of rubles in income because of the unbridled plunder of the region. The Nukhi volunteer battalion, for example, had on its own authority taken over several villages and insulted and forcibly ejected the procurement offi­ cers. The entire military establishment acted as if it were exempt from the agriculture ministry’s regulations. In all of Sharur, the government was receiving a part of the harvest from only eight villages. The general disorganization and the rivalry between the agriculture and military min­ istries were keeping the treasury empty and threatening to produce ter­ rible waste and spoilage. The haste and avarice with which the crops were being reaped and threshed left half of the grain in the stems. Agh­ balian recommended immediate steps to salvage what was possible: A government-supervised second threshing should take place, and control stations should be set up on all routes leading out of Sharur in order to requisition half of the goods whose bearers lacked documentation of previous payment or apportionment. The commission of inquiry also cautioned that, unless the government itself organized the approaching rice harvest, a repetition of the ruinous chaos would be inevitable. With grain selling for up to 5,000 rubles a pood, the government could meet most of its annual budget by careful supervision of the remaining har­ vest.77 Despite the recommendations of commissions of inquiry, complaints of the agriculture ministry, and concerns of the cabinet that the Arme­ nian army could turn into an undisciplined horde, there seemed to be a certain tolerance for Armenian satiation at the expense of the TurcoTatar strongholds that had caused so much hardship and humiliation. Praise for the army sounded from all quarters. Within a few weeks, Peniak, Zangibasar, Vedibasar, Sharur, and Shahtaght had been occupied, and if not for complications created by the appearance of the Red Army detachments, the Armenian sweep probably would have continued through Nakhichevan to Julfa. All of these operations were reviewed by Prime Minister Ohandjanian when Parliament reconvened on August 2 after a two-month recess.78 In his accounting of the government’s activities, Ohandjanian spoke for 76 Haradj, Sept. 2:1, 7:3, 19:2—3, 1920. 77 Armenia Archives, 199/1/114, pp. 29—32; Aradjin massayakan sharzhumnere, pp. 123— 127; FO 371/4960, Ei2652/134/58 enclosure. See also Armenia Archives, 199/1/159, p. 1, and 199/1/184, P* 8°78 See the stenographic minutes of this session of the Parliament in Haradj, Aug. 4—7, 1920, and Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 485—499.

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more than two hours about the achievements of each ministry, the mil­ itary successes in Peniak and from Zangibasar to Nakhichevan, the ex­ changes with Mustafa Kemal’s regime in Angora, and the implications of Red Army involvement on and within the boundaries of the Armenian republic. When the Bureau-Government was called into existence, Ohandjanian reminded the deputies, the Republic of Armenia had been pushed to the precipice of destruction. The nation had been put to a severe test but had saved itself through extraordinary heroism: “The Armenian people demonstrated such vitality and intensive labor that it was unique not only in the history of our people but would also be considered so in the life of nations. Our people performed during this period such feats that at other times it would take years to accomplish.’’ Just emerging from the jaws of famine and epidemic, the Armenian people had become as one with all political parties to save the fatherland and protect the platform of independent, united Armenia. And the army, which was only beginning to recuperate from the stressful chal­ lenges of constant self-defense, had enthusiastically taken up the task of filling out the boundaries of the state, an object achieved with valor and glory. There would be peace and protection for all who accepted the rightful jurisdiction of the Armenian republic, as evidenced by the pros­ perity of the large Turkish village of Ulukhanlu, but Zangibasar and Vedibasar should serve as a warning to those at Nakhichevan and else­ where who would deny that right. At present standing against us are not only the locally organized forces but also from the far north Red Russia’s, and from the far south equally red—not in words but in blood—Red Turkey’s riff-raff, the three joined together, the three allied with one another. We shall not falter before any obstacle in guaranteeing our independence against the conspiracies of such collaboration ... and we are convinced that we shall be successfill in repelling and becoming free of both internal and external provocateurs.79

In response to the prime minister’s detailed report, Dashnakist Nikol Aghbalian spoke optimistically about the progress registered within the state ministries and especially by the armed forces in recovering inalien­ able parts of the fatherland. Only an ill-omened intervention had de­ layed Armenia’s breaking out over the railway to Julfa and on to Persia, but this goal, too, would soon be realized. The sweep to Nakhichevan had shown that the Tatars no longer figured as a serious danger and that it was possible to proceed to the solution of other historic issues. “The day is near when our neighbor Azerbaijan will come to realize that 79 Haradj, Aug. 6:2—3, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 485—496.

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all its games are futile and that peace will be established when our forces take up positions in Gandzak [Ganja] and at Askeran [Karabagh], turn­ ing us into the best of friends and making the Armenian and the Tatar fully reconciled and amicable from every point of view.” Armenia did not desire the patrimony of other peoples, only the fatherland as already defined by the government, no more and no less. Another “friend” had appeared on the horizon and was trying to foster peace and goodwill by claiming Armenian territory for Azerbaijan. Russia under the Bolsheviks, Aghbalian exclaimed, had become even more doctrinaire and thick-headed than the old regime but, like that toppled government, was digging its own grave. The Soviets were inca­ pable of understanding their international status or recognizing that they would be eclipsed by peoples more advanced intellectually and eco­ nomically. Soviet Russia, “that impoverished land, ragged in mind, spirit, and essence,” desired to open the way to India with the assistance of the pathetic forces of Mustafa Kemal. By that unholy alliance, Russia was thrusting the hand of socialism into a claw dripping red with blood. It was this fanatical Russia that had temporarily halted Armenia’s suc­ cessful military campaign. But Armenia had now been freed from Rus­ sian enchantment and would compel the Red Army to respect the rights of the Armenian people. “Even in the most difficult of circumstances, we were able to show the Turks and Tatars that this land is Armenia and that the Armenian people desires to live in freedom. Now we shall also demonstrate this to the Russians. We must loudly proclaim to all that we are the friend of that Russian who does not pass to this side of the Caucasus chain and of that Russian who does not cross the Armenian boundary.” Aghbalian concluded by warning that during the forthcoming winter Armenia’s adversaries would intensify efforts to destroy the Republic: “Our enemies are jealous that this country, which has just emerged from bondage, is gaining strength. Once and for all, we must prove that our country is impregnable, that we know how to defend our indepen­ dence—until such time as they are convinced that this people desires to live free, until they are convinced that this country must be indepen­ dent.” Before the end of autumn, the army should secure the perma­ nent boundaries in the north and east so that the Republic of Armenia could turn to its next major objective—access to the sea and incorpo­ ration of the Turkish-controlled Western Armenian provinces.80 As the emotion-charged session of Parliament drew to a close on the night of August 2, Arsham Khondkarian rose to make a formal decla­ ration on behalf of the Social Revolutionary faction. At the time of the 80 Haradj, Aug. 7:2, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, pp. 498—499.

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sovietization of Azerbaijan and the May disturbances in Armenia, the Social Revolutionaries had taken a bold stance by suggesting the with­ drawal from power of the Dashnaktsutiun and even the establishment of Soviet rule in order to safeguard the physical existence of the Arme­ nian people. The SRs, who had not joined in the anti-Bolshevik appeals issued by the other Armenian political parties, were subjected to scorn and accused of betraying the ideal of united, independent Armenia. Now, as evidence of Soviet-Turkish collusion increased and as the Re­ public of Armenia gained international recognition and pushed out to­ ward the frontiers of 1914, the Social Revolutionaries made unanimous the espousal of national independence. Khondkarian reminded the Dashnakist-dominated Parliament that his party, with all its reservations about the political future of Armenia, had participated in the organic life of the state since the outset. Like all births, that of the Armenian republic had been painful. It was the role of politicians to do everything possible to ease the birth pangs of new states, and this duty the SRs had performed conscientiously, sometimes at great personal and collective sacrifice. If at one time Armenia had looked to Europe in search of a foreign power to assume a mandate for the country, “today the political conditions are such that the moment has arrived to declare that our state shall endure by its own power.” Nor was the Russian orientation of value any longer, either from the point of view of existing Transcaucasian realities or in terms of political ide­ ology. To cheers and resounding applause, Khondkarian then reached the high point: “I have the obligation to declare here on behalf of the Social Revolutionary faction that we have come to the conclusion that the Transcaucasian democracy shall live independently unto itself.” Un­ wavering in its commitment to defend the interests of the Armenian working masses, the Social Revolutionary faction fully endorsed the goal of “United and Independent Armenia.”81 Before returning to his seat, Khondkarian argued that the SR faction had an important role to play as the voice of legal opposition and that the Parliament should continue its labor without recessing. Now that matters in the international arena seemed to be turning in favor of Ar­ menia, the government should draw upon a broad coalition to resolve internal problems, in particular the fiscal crisis. Khondkarian’s call to exercise the functions of parliamentary democracy notwithstanding, the legislature’s Dashnakist faction had already decided to prolong the dic­ tatorship of the Bureau-Government. On the motion of Hovakim Budaghian, the Parliament first voiced a vote of confidence in the govern­ ment and expressed its appreciation for the heroic armed forces. It then 81 Haradj, Aug. 7:2, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 499.

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adopted Garnik Kialashian’s motion to transfer all legislative preroga­ tives to the government for two more months and to recess until October 31. Only the two Social Revolutionary deputies present registered their opposition.82 It was the opinion of some political observers that the military suc­ cesses in Peniak and in the southern half of the province of Erevan should have been followed by the resignation of the Bureau-Government and the return to the separation of powers that had been promised by Hamazasp Ohandjanian when he had taken the reins of government in May. The threat of internal subversion had been surmounted, the mili­ tary forces had stabilized, and the Republic had expanded to include nearly all of former Russian Armenia. Yet it was not difficult to find justification for the continued firm leadership of the Bureau-Govern­ ment. Success inspired success, and there was still much to be accom­ plished. The menace of Turkish-Russian collaboration had to be met, and on the international scene the Allied Powers had summoned the sultan’s plenipotentiaries to sign the treaty of peace at Sèvres. That treaty would award the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire to the Re­ public of Armenia; implementing this provision, however, was another matter. The Allies had made it clear that they would not furnish the troops to enforce the treaty, but they might help the Armenians with weapons. The shipment of arms to Armenia became a protracted affair that exposed the underlying contradictions in Allied policies and atti­ tudes toward the independent republics of Transcaucasia. 82 Haradj, Aug. 7:2, 1920; Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, p. 499.

9

Anns for Armenia and the Batum Question

In 1920 it was universally accepted that a viable Armenian state could not exist without the Western Armenian territories in the Ottoman Em­ pire and an outlet to the sea. It was also obvious that Armenia could survive only with external assistance, ideally in the form of a protectorate or, in the absence of a mandate, through an Allied or American expe­ ditionary force. As a last resort, the Armenians might be supplied with arms and ammunition to give them a fighting chance to make their way into the company of independent nation-states. It was this minimal course that the Allied Powers adopted when it became apparent that the United States would neither ratify the Treaty of Versailles with Germany nor participate in negotiation and implementation of the Turkish set­ tlement. Yet even the halfhearted decision to furnish arms to Armenia became a subject of strong contention within the British government. Months were to pass before the promised aid was finally delivered. The reluctance of the British War Office to buttress the Armenian army was linked closely with its persistent efforts to withdraw the last two British battalions at Batum. Arms for Armenia and the future of Batum became inseparable issues within His Majesty’s Government.

The Decision for Arms

Throughout 1919 and into 1920, Armenian spokesmen repeatedly pointed out that in the Near East-Caucasus region it was their people alone who lacked the means for self-defense. The Turks, despite the strict limitations imposed by the Mudros Armistice of 1918, controlled huge caches of light and heavy weapons and sent agents, officers, and arms into Armenia to incite antigovemmental elements, to destabilize the state, and to defy the decisions of the Allied Powers and the Paris 326

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Peace Conference. Georgia and Azerbaijan had taken over the arsenals and resources of the former Russian imperial armies in the Caucasus and continued to add to their stockpiles by disarming White Army de­ tachments and naval squadrons that were being pressed into the region by the advancing Red Army. General Gabriel Korganian (Gavriil G. Korganov) of the Armenian republic’s delegation in Europe spent six weeks in London during the latter part of 1919 trying to secure military aid and advisers for the reorganization and modernization of the Armenian army. His memorandums outlined the needs and potential of the armed forces, the projected role of the Allied officers, and the scheme for a gradual occupation of the Western Armenian territories. Aside from re­ ceiving expressions of understanding and sympathy and support in the Foreign Office and courteous treatment in the War Office, however, Korganian failed to gain any firm commitments.1 It was only with the rapid retreat of the Volunteer Army in southern Russia that the Allied Supreme Council resolved in its session ofJanuary 19, 1920, to supply arms to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Allied officials in Transcaucasia were instructed to submit estimations of the military requirements of the three states.2 By the time this information was received in London at the end of February, conditions in Russia had deteriorated further. As the Volunteer Army disintegrated, thousands of panic-stricken soldiers and civilians fled toward Novorossiisk to escape by sea before it was too late. In March, General Anton Denikin acknowl­ edged defeat by relinquishing command of the anti-Soviet forces to Baron Petr Wrangel, who was to enjoy a last hurrah in and around the Crimean peninsula. Under these circumstances, the Allied Supreme Council did not hurry to carry out its decision to arm the Transcaucasian republics. The British War Office had always been skeptical about the viability and reliability of the three new states and believed that a restored Russia, whether Red or White, would eventually reassert its control over the entire Caucasus. The collapse of the Volunteer Army only added to the lack of enthusiasm about providing arms; Secretary of War Winston Churchill predicted that any munitions would only end up in the hands of the Red Army 1 See Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 95—102; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 14/14, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, igzo t., File 235/134, H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Britanakan Karavarutiune, igig-igso t.; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm i-D, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 74, Jan. 17, 1920. 2 Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4931-4932, E77/E519/1/58, Georgian delegation to FO, Feb. 12, 1920, and minute of E. Phipps, and Wardrop to Foreign Office, Feb. 14, 1920, enclosure; FO 371/4952, E405/134/58, General Headquarters (GHQ) Constanti­ nople to War Office, Feb. 18, 1920; France, Archives de FArinée, 20N/186, dossier 2, Nonancourt to Ministry of War, nos. 22—27, Feb. 26, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 234/133, Korganian’s report no. 13, Jan. 21, 1920.

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and the Turkish Nationalists. The Army Council maintained that the British defense perimeter should be drawn back to the railheads in Pal­ estine, Mesopotamia, and Biijand in northeastern Persia. On this prem­ ise, keeping the isolated British garrison at Batum was superfluous, wasteful, and dangerous. The two imperial battalions of the 89th Punjabi Regiment and 2d Durham Light Infantry Regiment might give Armenia moral support and help keep the supply line open for relief shipments, but militarily the garrison was a liability. A rapid descent by the Red Army or a combined Soviet-Turkish campaign would jeopardize the small force and compel the British to withdraw under ignominious con­ ditions. As much as the Foreign Office under Earl Curzon of Kedleston might champion the cause of the Transcaucasian republics, there were at least private admissions that the Army Council’s arguments were sound. In an internal memorandum on March 11, Dwight Osborne of the Eastern division noted that the War Office could not be criticized for refusing to act on the detailed information received on the military needs of the Transcaucasian states; if the republics were not armed, the Bolsheviks would be unable to demand that they cooperate in military action against the Volunteer Army. Moreover, without arms they might be in a stronger bargaining position to gain recognition from the Bolsheviks, who repeatedly professed the right of self-determination of all peoples and noninterference in the affairs of other states. Naturally, the Soviets wanted the oil of Baku, but no quantity of arms could stop them if they decided to advance. Denied Western arms, the Transcaucasian govern­ ments would be able to come to terms with Soviet Russia “with a clear conscience.” Osborne concluded: “Our policy of arming people against the Bolshevists has been a conspicuous failure. ... If we did send arms, they would probably either be used against Denikin or else be obtained by the Bolshevists within or without the Republics. There are already quite enough armed peoples in the Middle East and we may want all our own military supplies ourselves. I would therefore suggest that we reconsider our decision and inform the Republics that we find we have not sufficient military supplies available, but that we are trying to facili­ tate their own purchase here of food etc., and, if desired, will try to facilitate any military orders they may wish to place.” In his minute on the memorandum, Curzon noted that “if as seems likely these States mean to make peace with the Soviet Govt, the raison d’etre for giving them arms has gone & the arms had much better go to the Armenians.”3 Curzon was differentiating between Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the one hand, and Armenia, on the other. He believed that Great Britain 3 FO 371 ƒ4932, E1287/1 ƒ58, minutes.

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was morally bound to assist the Armenians and that a solution to the Armenian question was linked primarily to the Turkish settlement. On March 11, the same day Osborne wrote his memorandum, Curzon par­ ticipated in a lengthy session of the House of Lords devoted to the Ar­ menian question. In response to the call of Viscount James Bryce for measures to protect the Armenians, Curzon reviewed the problems as­ sociated with the Armenian case. He nonetheless voiced the opinion that with Allied arms and ammunition the Armenians could defend themselves: I think that so far as men are concerned the Armenians should be capable of providing them themselves. They are a very virile people; they are quite capable of holding their own, and if the Allied Powers can secure them arms in sufficient numbers, as we are attempting to do, I think they ought to be able, with material assistance, to render a very good account of themselves.... Their sufferings have touched the whole world. The obligation to restore them has been given by the fighting powers of the world, and it is no unreasonable thing to ask the world— and by the world I mean the Allied Powers in the recent war—to show their interest in the future of that country.4

As the Allied conference at London moved toward creating a united Armenian state—but without committing resources to enforce the award—the War Office finally assented, subject to the sanction of the Treasury Office, to provide the Armenians with some military matériel. Thereupon, on March 18 Lord Curzon announced in the Allied Su­ preme Council that His Majesty’s Government was prepared to furnish military aid to Armenia, and Assistant Foreign Secretary J. A. C. Tilley wrote Boghos Nubar of the welcome news.5 The following day the Treas­ ury announced that there were no funds available to pay for the surplus stores but that it might be possible to authorize their sale and delivery to Armenian officials in London and Paris in exchange for twelve-month treasury bills, including 5 percent prepaid interest.6 Matters were complicated further when the War Office seemed to reverse its reluctant approval of an arms shipment by asserting that the only available surplus munitions had been debited against a loan made to General Denikin and could not therefore be allocated to Armenia.7 4 Great Britain, The ParUamentaiy Debates, 5th series, House of Lords, LXIX (London, 1920), col. 418. 5 FO 371 ƒ4953, E1613/E1981/134/58, WO to FO, March 1 o, and Tilley minute, March 16,1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 335/5, Tilley to Boghos Nubar, March 18, 1920, stating that Lord Curzon was submitting the issue of assistance to Armenia to the League of Nations but that in the meantime Great Britain was willing to supply Armenia with munitions and equipment, and File 334/4, Sperling to Aharonian, April 17, 1920. 6FO 371/4954, E1981/E2352/134/58,Tilley minute, and Treasury to WO, March 19, 1920. 7FO 371/4954, Ei981/134/58, WO to FO, March 19, 1920.

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After several intercessions by the Foreign Office, the Army Council fi­ nally responded on March 27 that it was “alive” to the importance of arms for Armenia “now that the future area of the State has apparendy been decided.” Once the accredited Armenian representatives had signed and delivered the requisite treasury bills, they could take posses­ sion of the goods. The Army Council let it be known, however, that it had no funds to cover the cost of shipping.8 With these exchanges, it became obvious that the British government intended to charge the Armenians rather than simply give them the surplus matériel. In the Foreign Office, Tilley noted that the demand for prepaid interest was going too far: “Without being at all fanatical in favour of the Armenians I feel that we have sufficient responsibility for their safety to justify us in forgoing interest in advance.” Undersecretary Charles Hardinge added: “We gave arms to Denikin to the tune of 100 millions [pounds sterling]. Surely we might give some arms to the Ar­ menians to defend themselves with. But of course the W.O. are not in­ terested in Armenia. The idea of claiming interest in advance seems very mean.” Below these minutes, Curzon scrawled: “Don’t stand it for a moment.”9 The Foreign Office wrote the Treasury on April 3 that the demand for prepaid interest was incompatible with the Supreme Council’s de­ cision to assist the Transcaucasian republics and with Great Britain’s responsibilities to the Armenian people. Withholding the arms would subject His Majesty’s Government to the severest criticism for imposing conditions “so contrary to the policy of benevolence and assistance to Armenia which has so constantly been proclaimed.”10 A week later, the Treasury replied that it was unable to depart from the decision to regard the surplus goods as a loan, adding, however, that there would be no insistence on cash payment, as the Armenian representatives could sub­ mit treasury bills for both the loan and the interest.11 Informed of this arrangement while he was in San Remo, Avetis Aharonian hastened to express his “deep gratitude” and readiness to accept the “magnanimous conditions” for the sale of the supplies.12 With these developments, the Foreign Office asked James Malcolm, the Armenian National Delegation’s representative in London, to request that Prime Minister Khatisian deposit with the British commission in Tiflis a letter authorizing Boghos Nubar and Aharonian to sign the treasury bills and 8FO 371/4954, E2352/134/58, WO to FO, March 27, 1920. 9 FO 371/4954, E2352/134/58, minutes. 10 FO 371/4954, E2352/134/58, enclosing FO to Treasury, April 3, 1920. 11 FO 371/4954, E3071/134/58, Treasury to FO, April 10, 1920. 12 FO 371/4955, E4051/134/58, Aharonian to FO, April 27, 1920.

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take delivery of the goods.13 The equipment available for shipment, ac­ cording to a communication of the War Office on April 17, included 48 field guns, 400 machine guns, 25,000 rifles with ammunition, 40,000 uniforms, and various accessories at a total cost of £1,060,000. The Army Council also stipulated that a £25,000 charge for nonsurplus items, cases, and packing, together with all transportation costs, would have to be prepaid in cash. Annoyed with this unrealistic demand, the Foreign Office complained that the Armenians were to receive only what would have been shipped to Denikin, and even that was to be paid with interest. “We have spent millions on Denikin. Surely we can help the Armenians to reinstate themselves.’’14 There seemed no end to the technicalities that could be raised to withhold the arms. Even as the Foreign Office informed the Treasury that Aharonian and Nubar were authorized to sign for the loan, the Ministry of Shipping pronounced that it could make no arrangements until it had received details as to the quantity and description of the stores and the port from which they would be dispatched.15 On May 1, nearly four months after the Allied Supreme Council’s decision to fur­ nish arms, the Foreign Office had to write the War Office “to draw the attention of the Army Council to the urgency of having all arrangements in readiness for the shipment of these supplies” and of informing the Ministry of Shipping “without delay” about the naval tonnage needed and the details of the consignment.16 The Case of Azerbaijan and Georgia If the War Office was wary of assisting the Armenians, it was adamant in its opposition to arming Azerbaijan and Georgia. A shipment of muni­ tions for Armenia to use against the Turkish Nationalists might be jus­ tified, especially as the Allies would provide no troops to enforce the forthcoming treaty with Turkey, but the suggestion of Azerbaijani and Georgian military action against the Red Army was deemed preposter­ ous. Any arms shipped to those two unstable states would surely end up in Bolshevik arsenals. The Foreign Office, however, was not so unequiv­ ocal. Distrustful of the Azerbaijani and Georgian governments, Curzon nonetheless did not rule out offering some support in fulfillment of the Supreme Council’s commitment. Moreover, if the Armenians alone re­ 1SFO 371/4955-4956, E4051/E4072/E4466/134/58, enclosing FO to Malcolm, May 3, Malcolm to Khatisian, May 4, Malcolm to MacDonell, May 4, 1920. 14 FO 371/4955, E3385/134/58, WO to FO, April 17, 1920, and FO minutes. 15 FO 371/4955, E3891/E3906/134/58, FO to Treasury, April 29, and Shipping Min­ istry to FO, April 28, 1920. 16 FO 371/4955, E3906/134/58, FO to WO, May 1, 1920.

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ceived arms, they might become all the more aggressive against the Turco-Kurdish elements in areas of mixed population, such as Kars and Zangezur.17 When Lieutenant Colonel Claude B. Stokes, a member of the British commission in Transcaucasia, returned to London on furlough in March, he immediately began to lobby on behalf of Georgia and espe­ cially Azerbaijan, where he had served. In a lengthy report of March 21, Stokes complained of French obstructionism, as the French mission in Tiflis was advising the Armenians to spurn both Azerbaijani proposals for a regional federation and British attempts to resolve the ArmenoAzerbaijani disputes. The combined French and Armenian propaganda, Stokes warned, might lead the Allies to give the Armenians favored treat­ ment despite their misconduct and dishonesty. It should not be forgot­ ten that Armenia was dominated by Dashnaks, “formerly a secret society, whose methods are those of terrorism.” If Great Britain desired a Trans­ caucasian federation and a short, direct route to Persia that would also serve as a barrier to Russian expansion, “we shall need to assert ourselves by putting an end to the intrigue and hostile activities of our Allies ... helping the three States with civil officials, military instructors, arms, ammunition and equipment... [and] advising any of these States which wish to make terms with Bolsheviks what terms we consider would be injurious to our interests.” Lord Curzon, however, was not much im­ pressed, minuting the report: “Col. Stokes like most loyal men working at a great distance thinks his own locality the hub of the universe, imag­ ines that G.B. has little to think of but Georgia & Azerbaijan and has unlimited resources to squander upon them.”18 Stokes continued to press the Foreign Office in a meeting with Tilley on April 3. In response to a suggestion that he return to Transcaucasia to replace ailing Chief Commissioner Oliver Wardrop, Stokes insisted it would be useless for him to accept the assignment if the Armenians alone were to receive arms. He was troubled by Tilley’s explanation that, whatever else Great Britain might do, it had been decided that the Ar­ menians should be given the means to defend themselves and that in the matter of military matériel the interests of Armenia must come first. 17 See the views of the War Office and British commanders in Constantinople and Batum in the correspondence of the War Office with the Foreign Office in files 1/58 and 134/ 58 passim. 18 British Documents, XII, pp. 577—580; FO 371/4933, E1914/E2107/1/58. For a mem­ orandum by Stokes urging action to secure the removal of the chief of the French military mission in Transcaucasia, Colonel Pierre-Auguste Chardigny, see FO 371/4932, E1293/ 1 /5s. Stokes complained that Chardigny was “not only strongly pro-Armenian but bitterly anti-Mussulman.” Foreign Office clerk Ranald MacDonell, in agreement with Stokes, added that Chardigny “is more pro-Armenian than a ‘Dashnac’ and is reactionary Russian. ... He is a bom intriguer.”

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Stokes cautioned that such a policy would “throw Azerbaijan into the arms of the Turks’’ and, because the Azerbaijanis feared being left to the “tender mercies” of the Armenians, would expose Armenia to ajoint Turkish-Azerbaijani attack. Thus, supplying weapons only to the Arme­ nians would actually be a great disservice to them, apart from eliminating all British influence in Baku.19 In reporting on this exchange to Lord Curzon, Tilley suggested that there was enough in the argument for the Foreign Office to support the allocation of a small quantity of arms to both Azerbaijan and Georgia. But Curzon was not persuaded: “The whole point of the question is ‘against whom will the arms be used.’ The Armenians are to use them against the Turks.... Are the Georgians ¿¿Azerbaijanis to use them against the Bolsheviks?” Stokes was ignoring the fact that the Azerbaijani gov­ ernment had “the worst of reputations” and was “in sympathy & con­ nivance” with the Turks and in secret negotiations with the Bolsheviks. When confronted with these points, Stokes gave assurances that Azer­ baijan was beginning to turn against the Turks and was trying to rid itself of Young Turk notables such as Nuri Pasha. Azerbaijan had no desire to make common cause with Turkey or the Bolsheviks, and Armenia’s only chance of survival was to befriend Azerbaijan and Georgia. Stokes be­ lieved that if he could distribute arms to all three states, he could draw them together.20 While this question was still open, General G. F. Milne, commander of the British Army of the Black Sea, recommended strongly against providing arms to the Transcaucasian states. He and Acting General W. J. N. Cooke-Collis, the military governor of Batum, were particularly annoyed with and hostile to the Georgians, whom they termed “inept, defiant and insolent” in their brazen attempts to win control of Batum and the rest of Ajaría.21 Milne was joined by Vice Admiral John de Robeck, British high commissioner at Constantinople, in advising against “war material of any sort whatever” for Azerbaijan “so long as their army is controlled by or ‘instructed’ by Turkish officers and Nouri Pasha re­ mains their guest.”22 With these and similar reports in hand, the War Office notified the Foreign Office on April 6 that it was not “expedient” to supply either Azerbaijan or Georgia. If, however, Lord Curzon be­ lieved otherwise, he should advise the Azerbaijani and Georgian repre­ sentatives to address themselves to the French or the Italian govem19 FO 371/4934, E2826/1/58 enclosure. 20 FO 371/4934, E2826/1/58, minutes. 21 British Documents, XII, pp. 584—585; FO 371/4934—4936, E2641/E2843/E3890/1/ 58. 22 British Documents, XII, pp. 575—576; FO 371/4933, E2055/1/58.

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ment.23 In the Foreign Office, A. E. R. MacDonell reacted with irritation: “I am very strongly of the opinion that it would be a fundamental error to arm Armenia and not to arm the other Caucasian Republics. Such an action would alienate all sympathy for ourselves both in Georgia and Azerbaijan.... It was this very policy of supporting the Armenian armed forces in 1917 that threw Georgia & the Tartars [Azerbaijanis] into the arms of our enemies.”24 Elsewhere, MacDonell wrote that denying arms to Azerbaijan ‘‘will deprive us of any hold over these people and they will certainly endeavour to get arms elsewhere.” If the only recipients were the Armenians, they would undoubtedly try to settle affairs ‘‘in their own way.”25 The arguments of Stokes and MacDonell made some headway with senior officials of the Foreign Office. On April 8, Tilley wrote: ‘T am disposed to think that whatever arms are available should be sent out to Batoum & distributed among the various Republics according to the state of our feelings towards them at the moment.” Curzon now reacted favorably: ‘‘The most practical suggestion is to send arms to Batoum and leave the British Commander there in consultation with our local rep­ resentatives to distribute them.”26 But the proposal to ship munitions to Batum, where they could be distributed as circumstances warranted upon arrival, was received coldly by the War Office. The Army Council wrote that the available arms were reserved for Armenia, although ap­ parently even Lord Curzon had recendy expressed doubts about the wisdom of such a delivery. The suggested plan would cause an “un­ seemly scramble for favour” and possibly even violence, and the arms would be used by the “more successful advocates for the intimidation of their less successful rivals.”27 In reply, the Foreign Office insisted that it had no reservations about assisting Armenia. Rather, it was of the opinion that concurrent, limited support of Georgia and Azerbaijan would be in keeping with the Allied Supreme Council’s decision and would stiffen the Transcaucasian states in their negotiations with the Soviet government. Moreover, releasing some arms to Georgia and Azer­ baijan would facilitate delivery of the bulk of the weapons to Armenia and uphold the prestige of Great Britain. Should conditions make de­ livery of the arms inadvisable, the shipment could easily be diverted to Constantinople or elsewhere.28 23 FO 371/4934, E2762/E2763/1/58, WO to FO, April 6, 1920. 24 FO 371/4934, E2763/1/58, MacDonell minute. 25 FO 371/3954, E3269/134/58, MacDonell minute. 26 FO 371/4934, E2826/1/58, minutes. See also 371/4955, E3719/134/58, enclosing WO to GHQ Constantinople, April 22, 1920, and the same in Great Britain, War Office, 33/1000. 27 FO 371/4935, E3294/1/58, WO to FO, April 15, 1920. 28 FO 371/4935, E3294/1/58, enclosing FO to WO, April 20, 1920.

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In an unexpected telephone message on April 19, the War Office momentarily reversed itself, informing the Foreign Office that the col­ lapse of the Volunteer Army had made a shipment of rifles, artillery, and ammunition available for sale. As Great Britain owed a certain sum to the Georgian government for transportation costs associated with the British occupation of parts of Transcaucasia in 1918—1919, it was thought possible to clear accounts in this manner.29 Undersecretary Hardinge telegraphed Curzon in San Remo of this development and of his efforts to have a part of Denikin’s final consignment of munitions allocated to the three Transcaucasian republics. Colonel Stokes could set out with a few officers to supervise the on-site distribution.30 The War Office’s apparent willingness to divert a shipment to Georgia did not last long, however. General Milne opposed giving arms to Azerbaijan and Georgia, as they had already obtained much materiel, including airplanes, armored cars, machine guns, and ammunition, from the Vol­ unteer Army. Furthermore, it was likely that both would soon turn Bol­ shevik.31 Milne’s advice coincided with the sovietization of Azerbaijan, removing that country from further consideration. A decision on arms for Georgia was still pending. In early May, one of the ships carrying weapons for the White Armies was diverted to Batum. After all that had been said and done, the War Office tried to make the best of the situation by authorizing General Milne to deliver the cargo of the S.S. Penpol to the Georgian government in exchange for the £25,000 owing in transit charges.32 As it happened, Milne was then on an inspection tour of Batum and the rest of Ajaría, during which he and his staff were fired upon by Georgian artillery. Milne was furious. Fulminating about the Georgian incursions into the province, he warned that he would order a full-scale military occupation unless the Georgians halted their intolerable antics and their provoca­ tions against the local Ajarían population. Matters became all the more tense when the Georgians interrupted rail service and telegraphic com­ munications in and out of Batum. The Tiflis government ascribed the shelling of Milne’s party to an unfortunate misunderstanding and pro­ 29 FO 371/4935, E3617/1/58, minutes. 50 FO 371/4935, E3617/1/58, Hardinge to Curzon, April 21, 1920; British Documents, XU, PP- 594-595; FO 4o6/48. no- 18531 FO 371/4935—4936, E3740/E3890/1/58, MacDonell minute, April 24, 1920, and GHQ Constantinople to WO, April 27, 1920. In April, General D. P. Dratsenko, one of the commanders of Denikin’s army, told the Armenian diplomatic representative in Baku, Martiros Harutiunian, that he had just sold to the Azerbaijani government 120 cannons, 200 machine guns, several tens of thousands of rifles, and millions of bullets. See State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 563, pp. 119— 119a. 32 FO 371/4937, E4740/1/58, WO to FO, May 13, 1920, enclosure.

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tested the unwarranted malignment of its honor. At a time when Georgia was menaced by Soviet Azerbaijan and Turkey, enemies that regarded Great Britain as their foremost adversary, the behavior of the British military authorities was incomprehensible.33 General Cooke-Collis made no effort to conceal the fact that he was an avowed enemy of the Geor­ gian republic. The repeated protests of Foreign Minister Evgenii Ge­ gechkori had no effect. In fact, General Milne countermanded the or­ ders to turn over the cargo of the S.S. Penpol, telegraphing the War Office that “to arm Georgia would be madness.” The Georgians were “unfit to be trusted” with the administration of Batum, especially as one of the provisions of the peace treaty they reportedly had just concluded with Soviet Russia was that they would make the province secure from forces hostile to the Soviet government. Nor did Milne see a way to get the arms safely to Armenia. In any case, it was probable that the Armenians, too, would soon turn to the Bolsheviks as a desperate defensive measure against the Turks.34 The Foreign Office was infuriated with Milne’s unilateral action. On May 18, Curzon wrote the Army Council that the reports about the Geor­ gians did not correspond with information in many other reports. He urged Anglo-Georgian cooperation against the Turkish and Soviet threat and suggested that the time was right for the transfer of Batum province to Georgia in exchange for “an undertaking on the part of the Georgian Government to give to Armenia all transit facilities to the Port of Batoum.”35 The War Office rejected Curzon’s request to allow the S.S. Penpol to discharge its cargo at the Georgian port of Poti, replying on May 31 that “the ship has been diverted to the Crimea in order that her cargo should be made over to General Wrangel, for whom it was origi­ nally destined.” The Army Council considered General Milne fully jus­ tified and would pursue the matter no further.36 Hence, the War Office effectively blocked the shipment of arms for Georgia and Azerbaijan and was still holding up the munitions earmarked for Armenia. Foreign Of­ fice clerk MacDonell succincdy put the British dilemma: It has been evident for some time that the Military Authorities and our Political officers in the Middle East are at cross purposes over the Caucasus. General Milne does not agree with Admiral de Robeck. General Cook[e] Collis does not agree with [British Chief Commissioner at] Tiflis and the Army Council do not agree 33 FO 371/4937, E4763/E4891/1/58, and 371/4941, E7061/E7062/1/58 enclosures. For Georgian protests, see Bor’ba, May 1920 passim. See also Harry Luke, Cities and Men: An Autobiography, II (London, 1953), pp. 147—150. 34 FO 371 /4937, E4618/E4763/1/58, enclosing GOC Batum to WO, May 11,1920, and FO minutes. 35 FO 371/4937, E4763/1/58, FO to WO, May 18, 1920. 36 FO 371/4939, E5596/1/58, WO to FO, May 31, 1920.

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with the Secretary of State. Under such circumstances no matter what decision may be arrived at by H.M.G. it is impossible to get them put into force without delays which will wreck any policy. Arms for Armenia is a glaring instance; these might have already been in the hands of the Armenians but they are not yet shipped.37

Military Advisers

Armenia’s many petitions for arms and ammunition were accompanied by appeals for military advisers, instructors, and inspectors to reorganize the army. Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar renewed these requests in March 1920 during the Allied conference in London.38 When the Foreign Office forwarded the memorandum to the War Office, the Army Council reacted with its usual skepticism in Armenian matters. The War Office thus gave an evasive reply on April 10, stating that before a con­ sidered opinion could be expressed it was necessary to know what funds Armenia had to meet the expenditure for the loan of the officers and to have more details on the pay scale, guarantees for on-time payment, number of appointments and their duration, status of the officers while on duty in Armenia, and provisions for military pensions and termina­ tion of service.39 Lord Curzon, who was then en route to San Remo for the continua­ tion of the Allied conference, expressed annoyance at this obstruction­ ism, and Undersecretary Hardinge observed that, as in the question of arms, the War Office was more interested in details relating to funding and other technical terms than in the primary objective. It was obvious that Armenia had no sterling credit, yet the War Office and the Treasury Office were insisting on prepayment and even refused to consider credits based on future exports from Armenia.40 On April 20 the War Office indicated a change in disposition, and three days later the Treasury wrote that it had no objection to the loan of some twenty officers but could not sanction any expenditures for the purpose.41 James Malcolm met with officials of the Foreign Office and War Office on April 26 to explore further the possible avenues of support for Ar­ menia. All in attendance agreed that no fewer than thirty to forty military advisers would be needed. Malcolm tactfully did not reject the broad executive powers demanded for such advisers and expressed confidence 37 FO 371/4939, E5596/1/58, minute, June 2, 1920. 38 FO 371/5209, E1473/1214/44, Aharonian and Nubar to Lloyd George, March 8, 1920; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 335/5, Malcolm to Nubar, April 26, 1920. 39 FO 371/4954, E3093/134/58, WO to FO, April 10, 1920. 40 FO 371/4955, E3527/134/58; British Documents, XII, pp. 595—596. 41 FO 371/4955, E3527/E3688/134/58, WO to FO, April 20, and Treasury Office to FO, April 23, 1920.

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that an arrangement could be worked out that would satisfy the needs of both the British and Armenian governments. He asked for a loan of £100,000 annually for five years to cover the cost. Boghos Nubar and Aharonian, he said, were prepared to deposit treasury bills, as they had in exchange for shipments of American flour. Stressing the importance of British officers for the well-being of all Transcaucasia, Malcolm pledged that Armenia would not seek the services of any other Allied power pending a decision of the British government and resolution of the financial question.42 The next day, he submitted a memorandum reiterating the points raised in the discussion and noting that Armenia would welcome the loan of officers with prior experience in the region such as General W. H. Beach, Colonel C. B. Stokes, Major W. D. Gibbon, and Captain C. E. Temperley.43 In his summary of these proceedings, Dwight Osborne wrote that with the decision to establish a united Armenian state Great Britain could not avoid further responsibilities. The Foreign Office should pressure the Treasury to make the £500,000 loan for five years to allow for em­ ployment of the British advisers.44 Curzon followed up on April 29 by asking the Treasury and the War Office to give “sympathetic consider­ ation’’ to the Armenian request. The Army Council, he wrote, should draw up a scheme showing the numbers and ranks of commissioned and noncommissioned officers needed to organize the Armenian army on the basis of 40,000 men, for which it had already been agreed to furnish munitions. He suggested that the selection of potential advisers proceed even as the scheme was being prepared.45 Neither the Treasury Office nor the War Office would cooperate, however, and when the issue was placed before Lloyd George’s ministers on May 21, “[t]he Cabinet took note that the War Office considered it unjustifiable, in existing condi­ tions, to send British officers, even those who volunteered, to Armenia, where, in certain eventualities, they would run grave risk of being cut off from all possibility of assistance, and perhaps even from every avenue of escape.”46 At about the same time, the War Office rejected Armenian requests to set up a plant for the production of small arms ammunition. Arme­ nia’s landlocked position and the state of constant conflict both on and within its frontiers depleted the reserves of ammunition to a critical level. 42 FO 371/4955, E3688/E3891/134/58, minutes. 43 FO 371/4955, E3859/134/58, enclosing Malcolm to Major C. E. D. Bridge and Mal­ colm to Major C. A. Cameron, April 27,1920. For the previous experience of these officers in Transcaucasia, see Hovannisian, Republic, I, pp. 90, 157, 190, 199, 204—212, 217, 225, 230-237, and II, pp. 32, 58, 78, 130-131, 158, 176, 213, 487-491,499, 502-505. 44 FO 371/4955, E3891/134/58, minute, April 27, 1920. 45 FO 371/4955, E3891/134/58 enclosures. 46 Great Britain, Cabinet Office, 23/21, Cab. Concl.(2o), 30(g), May 21, 1920.

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Whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan were able to replenish their arsenals by confiscating weapons and ammunition from White Army units seek­ ing haven in Transcaucasia, Armenia had to rely on small shipments surreptitiously acquired from General Denikin and other sources and transported via Batum. On several occasions Armenia’s reserve of am­ munition was virtually exhausted, severely hindering the fighting forces. While Hamazasp Ohandjanian was still in Europe as part of the Ar­ menian peace delegation, he traveled to Leeds with General Gabriel Korganian in November 1919 to explore the possibility of purchasing a factory that could produce as many as 120,000 bullets a day. The equip­ ment was available but the cost was prohibitive, and nothing came of the exploration.47 On April 7, 1920, Korganian revived the issue by urging Avetis Aharonian to allocate money collected for other purposes to pur­ chase a smaller plant with used machinery that could produce up to 50,000 bullets a day. Korganian asked permission to renew his negotia­ tions with the firm in Leeds or another company for this more modest undertaking.48 The importance of Armenia’s having the capability to manufacture its own small arms ammunition was put to the British government by James Malcolm in a memorandum of April 27. Pointing out that the Republic’s unenviable geographic position would hinder future shipments of mu­ nitions by the Allies, Malcolm asked that Armenia be supplied with the machinery to produce its own ammunition. The suspicions of Armenia’s neighbors would not be raised if the plant were to be sent along with the arms already earmarked for Armenia.49 The War Office, which was wary of providing even one shipment of arms to Armenia, rejected the petition. On May 12, Colonel W. H. Gribbon informed Malcolm that after careful consideration “the Army Council do not feel called upon to assist in this manner.’’ Rather, “they consider that the supply of this machinery would not necessarily be in the best interests of Armenia in the long run.’’50 On learning of this reply, a Foreign Office clerk wrote: “It is getting rather difficult to persuade the Armenians that we really are trying to help them. If we don’t let them have things they want they will get them elsewhere.’’ Osborne, who was becoming weary of Arme­ nian appeals, reacted, “So much the better.”51 Support for Armenia in the Foreign Office wavered in the aftermath 47 For correspondence relating to the acquisition of a munitions factory, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 14/14 and 16/16. 48 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16, Korganian’s memorandum of April 7, 1920. 49 FO 371/4955, E3859/134/58, enclosing Malcolm to Bridge, and Malcolm to Cam­ eron, April 27, 1920. 50 FO 371/4956, E4638/134/58, Department of Military Intelligence to FO, May 12, 1920, enclosure. 51 FO 371/4956, E4638/134/58, minutes.

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of the Bolshevik disturbances at Alexandropol and other places in May 1920. Only the persistent pro-Armenia lobby continued to press for ac­ tive military assistance and intervention. On June 10, Member of Parlia­ ment Aneurin Williams, on behalf of the British Armenia Committee, complained that the Armenian republic was in “suspended animation.” He protested that more concern was being shown for the Georgians and Tartars (Azerbaijanis), “to whom we owe litde or nothing, than to the Armenians, to whom we are under an undeniable moral and historical obligation.” Armenia needed arms and officers and the same facilities that its neighbors had acquired through confiscation or purchase of munitions from Denikin’s retreating army. Williams urged the loan of 200 British officers to organize the Armenian army and gendarmerie in order to help the country become stable and self-sufficient.52 Foreign Office clerks MacDonell and Osborne, who favored the dispatch of arms for Armenia, believed that loaning officers was financially impractical. In receipt of reports that the Armenians of Azerbaijan had helped the Red Army crush the anti-Soviet revolts at Ganja and elsewhere, Osborne observed sarcastically that although the Armenian home industries were languishing, “their old foreign industry of doing the jackals’ work of murder & intrigue for Russia is as flourishing as ever.” Lord Hardinge of Penshurst added with impatience that the Foreign Office always seemed to be writing to Aneurin Williams: “I think to do so is a mistake. Let this reply be as brief as possible.”53 When Alexandre Khatisian visited the Foreign Office in July 1920 while promoting the Independence Loan among the Armenian com­ munities abroad, he renewed the request for military as well as financial advisers. The Armenian government had enough resources to meet the salary of a couple of financial experts and sought first-class candidates. Khatisian had to admit, however, that there were no funds for military advisers, and he hoped the British government would assist. The Foreign Office forwarded the request to the War Office and the Treasury Office but without the previous accompanying recommendation for “sympa­ thetic consideration.”54 On August 19, four months after the Foreign Office had first asked the War Office to act on the Armenian appeal for a loan of British of­ ficers, the Army Council finally responded with an inquiry as to whether Lord Curzon thought it desirable to take any further steps in the matter. The reply was strategically timed, as it came during a phase when the 52 FO 371/4957, E6297/134/58, Williams to Curzon, June 10, 1920. 53 FO 371/4957, E6297/134/58, minutes. See also Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dos­ sier 3, no. 770, June 25, 1920. 54 FO 371/4958, E9127/134/58, Osborne minute, July 19, 1920, and enclosing FO to WO, Aug. 6, 1920.

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Foreign Office’s ardor for Armenia had cooled considerably. Confident that no officers would be sent to Armenia, the War Office now listed the military personnel that would be needed if the Armenian request were met. Heading the advisers would be a major general, who would be attached to the Armenian military ministry. He would be assisted by three brigadier generals in charge of training the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, as well as overseeing ordnance, commissariat, and medical serv­ ices. The reorganized army of 40,000 soldiers should be made up of 30,000 infantrymen placed in 3 divisions, each with 3 brigades, each in turn with 3 battalions. The 2,000 cavalrymen would be divided into 5 regiments of 400 sabres each. The artillery would have 3,000 men, the other services 5,000. A dozen British officers (3 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, and 6 captains) would be assigned to the infantry, 2 officers ( 1 lieutenant colonel and 1 captain) to the cavalry, 3 officers ( 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, and 1 captain) to the artillery, and 5 officers (2 lieu­ tenant colonels, 2 majors, and 1 captain) to the other services. The of­ ficers were not to be limited to an advisory capacity and should have broad executive powers. The memorandum also outlined the terms of employment, compensation, transportation and passage, subsistence and dependent allowances, annual emoluments, travel, leave, exemp­ tion from customs dues, provisions for horse and stable, pensions, and termination.55 By mid-August events in the Caucasus had dampened the Foreign Office’s interest in the matter. There were reports that the Armenian government had entered into some kind of treaty arrangement with Soviet Russia. Although the Allied governments had advised the Russian border states to come to terms with the Soviet regime, any actual move to follow up on the advice stirred Allied doubts about the loyalty and credibility of the state seeking a modus vivendi. On August 22, Curzon decided that “for the present the scheme is in suspense.”56 Four days later the Foreign Office informed the War Office that Lord Curzon was of the opinion “that in view of recent peace terms said to have been concluded by the Armenian Govt, with the Russian Soviet Authorities, H[is] L [ordship] considers that the proposal relative to the loan of Brit­ ish officers to the Armenian Army should for the present be held in suspense.”57 The War Office had arrived at that conclusion from the outset. 55 FO 371/4958, E10100/134/58, enclosing WO to FO, Aug. 19, 1920. 56 FO 371/4958, E10100/134/58, Curzon minute. 57 FO 371/4958, Ei0100/134/58, enclosing FO to WO, Aug. 26, 1920. In October the French government agreed to accept ten Armenian officers, especially aviators, for training in the military academies of St. Cyr and Fontainebleau. See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/139, Korganian to Tahtadjian, Oct. 20, and to Col. Fournier, Oct. 22, 1920. For details, see File 321/3, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Fransiakan Karavarutiune, igzo t.

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A Matter of Airplanes

Although several of the ministries of His Majesty’s Government tossed the Armenian issue from one department to another, attempts by the Armenians to secure military matériel on their own evoked strong sus­ picions in the War Office. A case in point was the matter of two airplanes bought with Armenian funds. Inasmuch as the Armenian republic pos­ sessed only one airplane in working condition, Aharonian’s delegation initiated a private subscription campaign to purchase two fighters and two reconnaissance aircraft, together with motors and spare parts for the existing grounded planes. British military personnel in Paris, including Brigadier General William Beach, assured the Armenian delegation that no objections would be raised to these transactions. Yet when the first two planes were purchased in France and shipped with an air force pilot, Captain Artur V. Gulian, in February 1920, the British military governor of Batum, General Cooke-Collis, impounded the aircraft and refused to release them to the Armenian government.58 On March 7, Cooke-Collis cabled the War Office, reporting that the planes were apparently the first of twelve consigned for Armenia. Pend­ ing instructions from London, he was holding them up.59 The Army Council wrote the Foreign Office on March 19 that, because the Allied Supreme Council’s decision to arm Armenia did not include the supply of aircraft and the French military authorities had not given any notice of such a transaction, the War Office had confirmed the military gov­ ernor’s action.60 The fact that France was the source of the airplanes created serious misgivings in view of the continuing rivalry between the two wartime allies. The Armenians now had to persuade the British that there was nothing underhanded in the purchase of two airplanes for their landlocked country, especially as all neighboring states had large squadrons and both Georgia and Azerbaijan were acquiring additional aircraft and war matériel from the disintegrating White Armies. The release of the two airplanes took many weeks. Armenian officials in Erevan, Tiflis, Batum, Paris, and London repeatedly protested and ap­ pealed to the British to lift the embargo.61 When Commander Harry C. 58 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 15/15, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1Q2O t., File 233/ 132, especially no. 1246, and File 234/133, Korganian’s report nos. 5, 6, 9, 14, 15, 18, Oct. 29, 1919-March 29, 1920. The airplanes were purchased from the Consortium Liquidation des Stocks Français and were shipped on the SS Phrygie. 59 WO 33/1000, March 8, 1920; FO 371/4954, E1884/134/58, WO to FO, enclosing Cooke-Collis to WO, March 7, 1920. 60 FO 371/4954, Ei884/134/58, WO to FO, March 19, 1920, and enclosure; WO 33/ 1000, March 18, 1920. For complaints of the French military mission in the Caucasus regarding the seizure of the planes by Cooke-Collis, see Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, no. 3, no. 395, April 8, 1920. 61 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 67/3a, Toumanoff to Wardrop and to de Martel, April

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Luke, a member of Admiral de Robeck’s staff, visited Erevan in April, Alexandre Khatisian, who was then prime minister, voiced bemusement that the Allies expected the Armenians to defend themselves yet held up two planes and a shipment of ammunition acquired from General Denikin while doing nothing to limit the military stockpiling of sur­ rounding states. Armenia was living through an exceptionally critical period, and the behavior of the Allied Powers was perplexing. Luke re­ ported to his superiors that the matter of the two airplanes was raising serious questions about the sincerity of the British government.62 In May Khatisian again complained to Luke, then acting British chief commis­ sioner in Transcaucasia, that the impoundment of the planes had strengthened the Bolshevik insurgents’ claim that Armenia had been abandoned by the Allied Powers. Luke urged the Foreign Office to se­ cure the release of the aircraft, which would create a moral effect far out of proportion to their actual value or importance.63 In his communication to Lord Curzon on May 15, Avetis Aharonian recounted the many memorandums and documents that had been sub­ mitted to the Foreign Office and War Office, the lengthy interviews and explanations given, and the compliance with each and every request for additional detailed information. Yet all had apparently been in vain: At the same time as Lord Curzon was telling the Armenians that His Ma­ jesty’s Government would “sell” them some military matériel, the British authorities in Batum were blocking the delivery of two airplanes paid for and shipped by the Armenian delegation. Moreover, it was clear that the arms promised in January still had not moved. Aharonian concluded: “The time has come when the Armenian Nation has the right to know on whom to rely for guidance, aid, protection, salvation, and justice.”64 In a swift reply on May 17, the Foreign Office stated that it had already asked the War Office to release the planes.65 Despite this assurance, it took the War Office nearly two weeks to act, and even then its instruc­ tions to General Milne were equivocal: “If it is practicable for Armenians 17, 1920; FO 371/4938, E5049/1/58 enclosure, and 371/4955~4957> E4091/E4974/ E5328/E5432/E578 1 /134/58. 62 FO 371/4936, E4132/1/58, Luke to FO, May 2, 1920. See also 371/4956, E5328/ 134/58; Luke, op. át., pp. 170—171, for a personal account of his journey to Erevan and meetings with Khatisian and other officials. 63 FO 371 /4957, E5511 /134/58, Luke to FO, May 21,1920. See also 371 /493Ô, E4132/ 1/58, enclosing FO to WO, May 7, 1920; Rep. of Ann. Del. Archives, File 320/2, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ohandjanian to British Foreign Secretary, May 5, 1920. 64 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134, no. 1716; FO 371/4956, E4869/134/58, Vansittart to Curzon, May 15,1920, enclosure. See also File 235/134, no. 1684, Aharonian to Curzon, May 8, 1920; FO 371/4936, E4132/1/58, and 371/4956, E4674/134/58 en­ closures. 65 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4. See also 371/4956, E4869/134/58, minutes.

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to receive them you are authorized to effect this release.”66 The inter­ ministerial discord turned crimson; Foreign Office personnel railed against ‘‘the inexcusable dilatoriness” and obstructionism of the War Office. On May 26, Curzon formally protested to the Army Council, but still it was not until June that General Cooke-Collis finally lifted his pro­ scription.67 Armenia’s pro-Western government seemed to have good cause to question the sympathy and support of the Allied Powers. The tepidness of Winston Churchill’s War Office toward Armenia was demonstrated in another affair involving airplanes. The Royal Air Force had several hundred surplus aircraft lying idle at a desert site near Al­ exandria. The affluent Armenian community of Egypt expressed an in­ terest in purchasing and shipping some of these planes to the Armenian republic. This development reflected the gradual change in attitude among non-Dashnakist Western Armenians toward the “Araratian” re­ public, even though the state was still dominated by the Dashnaktsutiun and confined to Eastern Armenia. Egypt was the stronghold of the Sahmanadir Ramkavar Party and the Armenian General Benevolent Union, both of which were closely associated with Boghos Nubar and the Ar­ menian National Delegation. The Ramkavar Party was hopeful that the British would make the surplus aircraft and parts available for Armenia, the ‘‘Little Ally,” free of charge or at a nominal price, with the party paying the £100 to £200 required to ship each plane from Alexandria to Batum.68 There was reason to believe that Lloyd George’s government would facilitate the transaction. Standing before the House of Commons on March 25, the prime minister delivered a lengthy speech on foreign affairs, including an assessment of conditions in the Middle East. As for the Armenian republic, he declared: With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenian, it depends entirely on the Armenians themselves—whether they protect their independence. They must do so; they must begin to depend upon themselves. They are an intelligent people; they are an exceptionally intelligent people. In fact, it is their intelligence which gets them into trouble sometimes, from all I hear. That is what is so ob­ noxious to the Turks. I am told that they could easily organise an army of about 40,000 men. If they ask for equipment we shall be very happy to assist in equip­ ping their army. If they want the assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing

66 FO 371/4938, E5086/1/58 enclosure; WO 33/1000, WO to GHQ Constantinople, April 19, 1920. 67 FO 371/4938, E5086/1/58 enclosure, and 371/4957, E5992/134/58, Fleuriau to Hardinge, June 7, 1920, enclosure; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/186, dossier 3, Corbel’s no. 186, June 13, 1920. 68 FO 371/4956, E4466/134/58, Allenby to FO, April 27, 1920, enclosures.

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to assist in that respect. That is far and away the best thing for themselves. It would increase their self-respect. It would make them a manlier and more virile people. Instead of always casting themselves upon other countries and sending supplications and appeals, let them defend themselves. When they do so the Turk will have too much respect—not for them, but for himself—to attempt any more massacres in that quarter.69

Emphasizing the theme of self-help, the Ramkavar committee of Egypt, headed by Levon Meguerditchian and Vahan Malezian, wrote to British High Commissioner Edmund Allenby in Cairo on April 7. They explained that their organization was the most moderate Armenian party and followed the democratic principles of Boghos Nubar Pasha. Encouraged by Prime Minister Lloyd George’s recent speech in the House of Commons, the Ramkavar Party was requesting that a number of aircraft be granted for the defense needs of the Armenian govern­ ment, with the transportation costs to be assumed by the party. Should it not be possible to make an outright gift of the airplanes, then perhaps they would be offered at the lowest possible price, not to exceed £100 each. In transmitting the correspondence to London, Field Marshal Al­ lenby stated that the Royal Air Force commander in the Middle East, R. M. Groves, had reported that there were more than 700 surplus air­ craft with engines and 150 without engines which could be made op­ erable. Groves had noted that the disposal of a part of the “obsolete machines at present lying at Alexandria” to an approved purchaser “at some sacrifice of value” would quite probably be sanctioned by the Air Ministry.70 Even before the receipt of Allenby’s message in London, James Mal­ colm, acting on instructions from Boghos Nubar, had raised the subject of surplus aircraft with officials of the Foreign Office. Initial inquiries to determine the disposition of the War Office were not encouraging, how­ ever. The Army Council believed that if the Armenians had any funds available, these should be used to pay for the transportation costs of the arms that were to be shipped to Armenia. Nonetheless, on May 15 the Foreign Office recommended favorable action on the Armenian re­ quest.71 On May 27 the War Office replied that the Army Council “would point out that, even supposing the Armenians were in a position to pur­ chase these machines, it is difficult to see how they could be made serv­ iceable and removed from Egypt, as our own commitments would pre­ vent any assistance in this respect being rendered by the personnel of

69 Great Britain, The Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons, CXXVII (Lon­ don, 1920), cols. 661—662. 70 FO 371 ƒ4956, E4466/134/58 enclosure. 71 FO 371/4956, E4466/134/58 enclosure and minutes.

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the Royal Air Force.” Furthermore, even if these difficulties could be surmounted, ‘‘the Council are of the opinion that this enterprise should not in any way be encouraged in view of the strong possibility that these machines would fall into Bolshevik hands.”72 The reaction in the Foreign Office was one of anger and frustration. Even MacDonell and Osborne, who were usually leery of Armenian claims and petitions, registered their disgust. ‘‘This is a camouflage and rather badly done,” minuted MacDonell. Osborne added: “An excellent example of the W.O. speciality of passive resistance. They meet our re­ quests & suggestions with a bland inertia which is as hard to surmount as a mountain of blanc-mange.”73 In what was becoming a futile exercise, the Foreign Office answered on June 5 that some of the best aviators of the former Russian air force were Armenians, who could fit out the machines if supplies and spare parts were made available. If the Army Council viewed the situation in the Caucasus with such alarm, then it would be logical to do everything possible to assist friendly elements “by fulfilling our engagements to them and so showing them that they have our sympathy and that we intend to assist them.” Lord Curzon was of the opinion that “the advantage of increasing the Armenian morale and power of resistance” far outweighed the potential risk of the planes’ falling into enemy hands. The foreign secretary was therefore requesting that the Army Council reconsider the question and, in case of its refusal, inform the Foreign Office what other use would be made of the surplus aircraft.74 It was more than a month later, on July 14, that the War Office replied: In view of the considerations raised by the Foreign Office, it was with­ drawing the military objections to releasing the airplanes for purchase. The Air Ministry would be unable, however, to make the necessary ar­ rangements or determine prices. The matter would have to be taken up with the Disposal Board of the Ministry of Munitions. The Army Council was therefore instructing the Royal Air Force commander in the Middle East that if and when he was notified that the Foreign Office approved of the sale, any surplus aircraft available for the purpose should be trans­ ferred to the jurisdiction of the Disposal Board. The War Office would have nothing more to do with this question. If Lord Curzon wished to seek special terms of acquisition for the Armenians, he should com­ municate directly with the Ministry of Munitions.75 72 FO 371/4957, £5449/134/58, WO to FO, May 27, 1920. 7S FO 371/4957, E5449/134/58, minutes. 74 FO 371 /4957, E5449/134/58 enclosure. See also 371 /4957, E7836/134/58, Allenby to FO, July 6, 1920. 75 FO 371 /495s, E8304/134/58, WO to FO, July 14, 1920. See also previous notification by the Air Ministry in E8013/134/58, July 9, 1920.

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Despite the continued maneuvers of Churchill’s men to hinder the transaction, the Foreign Office cabled High Commissioner Allenby on July 18 that the proposed ssde was approved subject to satisfactory ar­ rangements being worked out with and between the Armenian commit­ tee in Egypt and the Cairo agent of the Disposal Board. Assistant Foreign Secretary Tilley then tried to impress upon the Ministry of Munitions Curzon’s personal interest in the matter: “In view of the fact that it is the policy of H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] to assist the Armenian Republic in the reconstruction of their armed forces, H[is] L [ordship] considers that the easiest terms possible should be granted to the Ar­ menian Republic to enable them to acquire suitable aircraft.’’76 Though outwardly concurring, the Ministry of Munitions followed the lead of the War Office by replying on July 26 that instructions had been sent to the Disposal Board’s commissioner in Egypt “to make every en­ deavour to satisfy the requirements of the Armenian Government.” Then came the rub: “The Disposal Board are only authorised to dispose of surplus Government property by sale for cash at current market prices and that consequently this Department will be unable to consider the sale of Aeroplanes to the Armenian Government otherwise than upon such terms.” Foreign Office clerk MacDonell reacted: “I doubt if any­ body will pay current market prices much less the Armenians.”77 The obstacles raised first by the War Office and then by the Ministry of Mu­ nitions effectively blocked the shipment of any surplus airplanes to Ar­ menia. Once again, several months had elapsed since the issue was first broached. By August 1920 conditions had changed so dramatically in the Caucasus that the Foreign Office was no longer willing to press the matter. Surplus RAF aircraft were never to appear in the skies over Ar­ menia. The Shipment of Arms Successful in its effort to prevent the delivery of airplanes to Armenia, the War Office eventually had to yield to the decision of the cabinet to proceed with the supply of 25,000 rifles and 40,000 uniforms for the Armenian army. Aharonian and Nubar were to sign for the shipment and deposit the requisite treasury bills with the Bank of England. For a time, the Bolshevik uprising in Armenia jeopardized completion of the transaction. Even the Foreign Office vacillated. A. E. R. MacDonell sounded the alert that the Bureau-Government of Hamazasp Ohandja76 FO 371/4958, E8013/134/58, enclosing Tilley to Allenby, July 18, and Tilley to Min­ istry of Munitions, July 19, 1920. 77 FO 371/4958, E8983/134/58, Ministry of Munitions to FO, July 26, 1920.

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nian was made up of “extreme socialists” and “camouflaged Bolshe­ viks.”78 Assistant Foreign Secretary Tilley noted on May 13: I have never had any faith in the separation of the Caucasus from Russia & Russia is after all the natural protector of Armenia. Although our pledges to Armenia may stand I do not consider that if Armenia throws in her lot with the Soviet Govt, we shall be under any obligation—even moral—to her to take Erzerum, or Van 8c Bitlis. The brighter side of the picture is that if Russia annexes the Caucasus 8c patronizes Armenia the chances of her coalescing with Turkey will be diminished.79

Undersecretary Hardinge added that the arms for Armenia would have to be held up “until we know the position & character of the new Govt, at Erivan.” Reacting sharply to Osborne’s advice that the British pledges to Armenia should be honored even if that country accepted the Soviet form of government, Curzon wrote on May 15: “I cannot for a moment agree that if Armenia turns Bolshevik our pledges stand. On the contrary I think that they are dissolved.”80 After Acting Chief Commissioner Luke reported that the Bureau-Gov­ ernment was taking firm measures against the Bolsheviks and was not engaged in negotiations with the Soviets, the Foreign Office quickly re­ verted to its supportive stance. On May 18, Tilley wrote the Army Council that Armenia seemed resolved to maintain its independence and that the military supplies should be shipped without further delay.81 The cab­ inet that day reaffirmed the decision to dispatch the arms.82 The War Office, after having claimed that the S.S. Hamsea was in need of repairs and then that the dock workers were refusing to load arms destined for any port in the former Russian Empire, finally let it be known that the Hornsea was ready to receive the stores at the Victoria Docks in London. The Army Council nonetheless wondered if Lord Curzon might have any further instructions “in the light of recent developments in the Cau­ casus.”83 There were no further instructions except the request that ev­ erything be done to expedite the sailing. On May 20, Curzon informed Nubar and Aharonian of the impending shipment and asked them to be prepared to submit signed treasury bills before May 29, the date set for the sailing.84 78 FO 371/4956, E4670/134/58, MacDonell minute, May 12, 1920. 79 FO 371/4956, E4670/134/58, Tilley minute, May 13, 1920. 80 FO 371/4956, E4670/134/58, Curzon minute, May 15, 1920. 81 FO 371/4937, E4814/1/58 enclosure, and 371/4956, E5296/134/58 enclosure. 82 Cab 23/21, Cab. Concl.(2o), 30(f), May 21, 1920. 88 FO 371/4956, £4931/134/58,5. A. Corcoran to Tilley, May 18, 1920. 84 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 335/5; FO 371/4956, E4869/134/58. Ohandjanian’s Bureau-Government reaffirmed the authorization of Aharonian and Nubar to sign the necessary documents. See FO 371/4956, E5205/E5340/134/58, Luke to FO, May 23 and 24, 1920, enclosures.

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Neither the Treasury Office nor the War Office was enthusiastic about the cabinet’s decision. When the Treasury inquired if it was strategically wise to send arms, the War Office did not disguise its dissatisfaction but explained “that the Foreign Office having decided that arms shall go to Armenia, the Army Council have agreed subject to the necessary guar­ antee as to payment before 31st December [1920] and will despatch the arms unless a definite Cabinet order is received to the contrary.” The War Office did imply that there still was a way to block the sailing: The Treas­ ury could refuse to accept the Armenian bills that were to be deposited in payment.85 Tilley, however, reminded the Treasury that the decision to send arms had been made by the cabinet and that it was not up to the War Office or other ministries to question that decision.86 The Treas­ ury had no other recourse than to confirm that the papers and signa­ tures of the Armenian representatives were in proper order. On May 29 the Treasury advised James Malcolm that he would soon be informed by the War Office of the approximate value of the cargo; the Armenian government would deposit treasury bills for 80 percent of that sum and deliver a written undertaking to deposit further bills for the balance when the value was definitely established. The Armenian government was to make payment in cash for freight charges, nonsurplus goods, and accrued interest no later than December 31, 1920.87 After all was said and done, the S.S. Hornsea was still at its docking berth on May 29. The War Office reported belatedly that it was unable to find enough trucks to complete the loading, thus compelling the Foreign Office to make an urgent appeal to the Ministry of Transport to allocate the necessary vehicles.88 On May 31, Tilley received word that the Hornsea had at last been loaded and set sail for Batum. As it hap­ pened, however, the vessel was still in dock. It was not until June 4 that the War Office announced that the “difficulties with regard to trucks” had been overcome and that the Treasury was being informed about the amount of the financial undertaking.89 Finally, the S.S. Hornsea weighed anchor on or about June 10 and sailed down the Thames River en route to Gibraltar, the Bosporus, and the Black Sea.90 Listed on in­ ventory were 440 Vieker machine guns and accoutrements, 25,000 rifles, 85 FO 371/4956, E5296/134/58, WO to FO, May 25, 1920. 86 FO 371/4938, E5180/1/58, Tilley minute. 87 FO 371/4956~4957» E4469/E5536/E5543/134/58. 88 FO 371/4956-4957> e5274/e5335/e7445/134/58. 89 FO 371/4957, E5886/134/58, WO to FO.June 4, 1920. 90 The exact date of the sailing of the Hornsea is moot. The Ministry of Shipping wrote the Foreign Office that it had departed on June 10 (FO 371/4957, E6619/134/58), a date confirmed by the War Office (E6745). But the WO telegraphed General Milne that the ship had set out on June 11 (WO 33/1000, June 11, 1920) and then informed the FO on June 12 that the Hornsea had sailed “this morning” (E6361).

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57,500,000 small arms cartridges, 40,000 caps, overcoats, jackets, trou­ sers, and boots, 80,000 flannel shirts and brown socks, 1,077 packages of medical supplies, and various other goods, including compasses, watches, lubricating oils, binoculars, and telescopes.91 Even as the Hornsea was sailing through the Mediterranean, the For­ eign Office suspected that the War Office and Treasury were scheming to abort the delivery. When General Milne inquired as to what expenses he might incur for off-loading and storing the cargo and assisting the Armenians with railway transportation, the War Office replied that the Armenians should be responsible for all arrangements once the ship had arrived in port.92 Moreover, both the War Office and the Treasury seemed to tarry in submitting a final accounting of the goods and costs, which was necessary before Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar could sign the treasury bills in the presence of the British ambassador in Paris. The Armenian representatives were concerned that before they depos­ ited the bills the British government could change its mind and divert the shipment. When Malcolm expressed this concern in the Foreign Office at the end of June, Osborne wrote in his minutes: “I have no doubt this is the idea of the W.O. & Treasury.”93 Only after the Hornsea had dropped anchor at the small Georgian port of Poti at the beginning of July did the War Office inform the Treasury that the total estimated value of the cargo amounted to £829,634.9, calculated at 75 percent of the list price for guns and military stores, 50 percent for ammunition, 100 percent for new clothing, 50 percent for used clothing, and 75 percent for harness and saddlery. The Army Council understood that the Treasury had arranged for payment before the end of the year for nonsurplus stores but that, in the event of Armenia’s failure to pay, the estimated cost of £45,000 would be charged against army funds.94 Fi­ nally, on July 26, after the detailed invoices had been relayed to Paris, Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian were able to remit to Ambassador Derby thirteen treasury bills totaling 829,634 pounds, 9 shillings, and 3 pence.95 Delivery of the cargo of the S.S. Hornsea to Poti did not place the munitions within Armenia; they still had to be moved over Georgian territory to the final destination. For this, a price would have to be paid. Long before shipment of the arms, the Georgian unofficial representa­ 91 FO 371/4957, E6745/134/58 enclosure. 92 FO 371/4957, E6360/134/58, WO to FO, June 12, enclosing Milne to WO, June 4, 1920. 93 FO 371/4957, E7072/134/58, Osborne minute, June 24, 1920. 94 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 14/14; FO 371/4957, E7956/134/58, MacDonell minute, and FO to Boghos Nubar, July 8, 1920. See also 371/4958, E8137/134/58, WO to FO, July 9, 1920. 95 FO 371 /4958, E9001 /134/58.

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tive in London, David Ghambashidze (Gambashidze), wrote to James Malcolm to state that Georgia was willing to transport the goods to the Armenian border but was itself in great need and requested a share.96 Commander Luke, too, favored allocating some arms to the Georgians as a way of fostering a Georgian-Armenian entente against the Bolsheviks and Turks.97 Shown encouragement in the Foreign Office, Ghamba­ shidze and Georgian adviser Zurab Avalov (Avalishvili) and State Con­ troller F. Gogishaishvili met on May 26 with James Malcolm, General Korganian, and Hovhannes Khan Massehian to discuss the Georgian request for 2 5 percent of the cargo earmarked for Armenia. The Foreign Office indicated its support of an arrangement by informing the Ar­ menians that after they had signed and deposited the treasury bills they could use the arms and military equipment for their defense in any manner they saw fit. If they came to an understanding with Georgia, His Majesty’s Government would try to assist in whatever way might be sug­ gested. The Foreign Office thus attempted to obviate the War Office’s opposition to supplying the Georgians by getting the Armenians to re­ linquish a part of their shipment.98 During the Armeno-Georgian discussions in London, the Armenian representatives eventually agreed to allocate 27 percent of the shipment to the Georgians, with the understanding that payment would be on the same terms and conditions as those received by the Armenians. In re­ turn, Georgia undertook to transport and deliver the remaining 73 per­ cent to the Armenian frontier, it being agreed that representatives of the two governments would work out the details locally at Batum or Poti. On June 12, Nubar and Aharonian confirmed the accord.99 Three days later, Tilley wrote Malcolm that the Foreign Office had no objection to a part of the arms for Armenia being given to Georgia to facilitate transit. He added, however, that all the goods would have to be paid for in Armenian treasury bills and would belong in their entirety to the Ar­ menian government, which could then dispose of them for its protection as it chose.100 Although the Armenians in London and Paris believed that the agree­ ment with the Georgians was in keeping with the wishes of the Foreign Office and would ensure the delivery of most of the arms and equipment 96 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16, and File 335/5, Ghambashidze to Malcolm, May 13, 1920; FO 371/4938, E5091/1/58, Malcolm to Osborne, May 19, 1920. 97 FO 371/4938, E5179/1/58, Luke to FO, May 15, 1920. "Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 335/5, Malcolm to Ghambashidze, May 16, 1920; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm i-D, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 94, May 28, 1920; FO 371/4957, E5425/134/58, Malcolm to Osborne, May 27, 1920. "Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 16/16, and 235/134, Aharonian to Ohandjanian, no. 1875, June 12» 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 15. 100 FO 371/4938, E5091/1/58 enclosure.

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to Armenia, news of the concession was not received warmly in Erevan. Prime Minister Ohandjanian complained that a transit treaty was already in effect with Georgia and that exacting 27 percent of the shipment was an exorbitant price, especially as the Georgians had no lack of military equipment.101 When expressions of dissatisfaction reached Tiflis, Geor­ gian officials were quick to assert that the Armenian-Georgian transit treaty of November 1919 pertained only to commercial goods, not to military matériel. Despite the unhappiness of the Bureau-Government, it had no choice but to accept the arrangement.102 The munitions were unloaded at Poti, and, six months after the Allied Supreme Council agreed to send arms to Armenia, the first trainload of supplies passed the border checkpoint at Sanahin in the neutral zone and entered the territory of the Republic of Armenia.103 The receipt of thousands of rifles, small arms ammunition, coats, boots, and uniforms gave the Armenians a great moral boost and coin­ cided with the southward sweep of the Armenian army into Vedibasar and Sharur. Yet the Armenians were soon to discover serious problems with the newly arrived equipment. The rifles were very different from the Mosins, Lebels, and other makes used in the Armenian army. H. W. Harcourt, in Erevan on behalf of the semiprivate Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund, subsequently accused the War Office of dumping useless rifles on the Armenians and then charging for them. He wrote: At the same time the utility of the shipment was largely destroyed by the fact that the War Office took this opportunity to unload on the Armenians the Canadian Ross rifles—marksman’s rifles—which had been tried in France and proved use­ less for general field service. The rifle is heavy, difficult to manipulate, and the mechanism is of a complicated type, easily thrown out of order—and no straps for carrying them were sent out with those that came to Armenia: it has also an almost useless bayonet which, on all the examples examined at Erivan, did not fit properly, but wobbled about. It is scarcely to be expected that a weapon that proved useless to train British troops could be of much service to the ignorant peasants of Armenia.104

The Allied Powers had nonetheless fulfilled their obligation to provide the Armenians with weapons to defend themselves in the absence of Allied infantry divisions to enforce the forthcoming Treaty of Sèvres.

101 FO 371/4959, E10343/134/58; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11. 102 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920, and File 335/5. 103 The Hornsea dropped anchor at Poti on July 5, according to a notice in Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 55. See also FO 371/4945, E10962/1/58. 104 FO 371/6265, E46/23/58.

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The Batum Controversy

British interdepartmental tension over the shipment of arms to Armenia was paralleled by sharp disagreement over the timetable for withdrawal of the two battalions that had been holding Batum since the general evacuation of the Caucasus in the autumn of 1919. The Foreign Office tried to keep the garrison in place at least until after the arms for Ar­ menia had been delivered and Georgia had entered into a compact guaranteeing Armenia and other neighboring states free access to the port. In 1920, Curzon fought doggedly against Churchill to delay the withdrawal and during the London and San Remo conferences was suc­ cessful in getting the French and Italian governments, albeit begrudg­ ingly, to commit a battalion each to bolster the British garrison, made up of elements of the 2d Durham Light Infantry Regiment and the 89th Punjabi Regiment. In May, however, the War Office renewed its call to roll back the lines of defense to the railheads extending from Palestine to Persia. The with­ drawal of the British forces from the Caucasus in 1919 “had rendered inevitable the loss of British and Allied control throughout these regions.’’ It was better to recognize this reality and to pull out completely before being compelled to do so.105 Curzon’s argument that the British garrison should be maintained in order to facilitate the Turkish peace settlement was undermined by the long delay of the French and Italians in embarking their battalions for Batum. On May 5 the cabinet in­ structed the War Office to notify General Milne that the government desired to retain the garrison at Batum in connection with the Turkish treaty and other political reasons, but he was authorized to order its withdrawal as a last resort “to escape contingency of real disaster.”106 The message to Milne added that it was hoped that the garrison could stay in place until the consignment of arms for Armenia reached Batum and that upon embarkation the town and province should be handed over to Georgia.107 The War Office on May 21 again pressed for evacuation after a Bol­ shevik naval squadron surprised the small British detachment at the Caspian port of Enzeli and forced a retreat to Resht (Rasht) under hu­ miliating circumstances. The War Office warned against a similar even­ tuality at Batum and accused the Georgians of being entirely unreliable. The Foreign Office retorted that the decision to hold Batum had been 105 FO 371 ƒ4938, E5153/1/58 enclosures. See also 371 ƒ4936, E4130/1/58 enclosures. 106Cab 23/21, Cab. Concl.(2o), 24(1), May 5, 1920; FO 371/4936, £4320/1/58, FO minutes, May 6, 1920, and 371/4940, E6628/1 ƒ58 enclosure. See also 371/4935. E3836/ 1/58 enclosures; FO 406/43, no. 211; British Documents, XII, pp. 603-604. 107 FO 371/4936, £4335/1/58, WO to GHQ Constantinople, May 6, 1920, and 371/ 4940, E6886/1/58, May 21, 1920, enclosure.

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sanctioned by the Allied Supreme Council and by the British cabinet and that the situation had not deteriorated since that time. Batum should be retained as long as possible in order to prevent a junction between Turkish Nationalists and Russian Bolsheviks, to save Georgia from communism and block Bolshevik expansion toward Persia, and to guarantee Armenia access to the sea and delivery of the arms that were soon to be shipped from England. The cabinet again gave conditional support to Curzon by reaffirming the previous instructions to General Milne and asking him to report his views on the existing situation.108 The question was complicated by the hostility of both Milne and Cooke-Collis toward the Georgians and by news that the Tiflis govern­ ment had just signed a treaty (May 7, 1920) with Soviet Russia that in­ cluded a Georgian commitment to pressure the Allied armed forces out of Batum. This information coincided with Georgian military incursions into the province. The War Office now insisted that its garrison be with­ drawn forthwith, leaving the treacherous local peoples to their ways.109 The uncooperativeness of the Georgians had been demonstrated in Eu­ rope, too. Nikolai Chkheidze had repeatedly defied Lord Curzon at San Remo, not only refusing to acquiesce in the award to Armenia of a nar­ row belt of land in the Chorokh River Valley for a railway from Kars to Batum but also adamantly denying Armenia even the right to full pro­ prietorship of the line itself. Non-Menshevik Georgian officials in Paris and London, especially Zurab Avalov and David Ghambashidze, tried to temper Curzon’s outrage by deploring the behavior of their countrymen and promising to exert all their influence to bring the Georgian govern­ ment and peace delegation to terms acceptable both to the British and to the Armenians.110 At the end of May, when it had become clear that the Italians were reneging on their pledge to send reinforcements to Batum and that the French were embarking only a colonial unit (the 5th Algerian Tiralleurs), the War Office again demanded an extrication. General Milne had just cautioned that it would require ten to fourteen days to gather the necessary vessels and give advance notice to the inhabitants in prep­ aration for withdrawal.111 On May 31, as the War Office was making excuses for the delays in shipping munitions to Armenia, it informed 108 Cab 23/21, Cab. Concl.(2o), 30(3 and c), May 21, 1920; FO 371/4939, E5700/1/ 58. 109 See file 1/58 for May, 1920, in FO 371/4940—4941. 1,0 For a copy of a letter in this spirit from Ghambashidze to the Minister-President (Zhordania), see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134. See also FO 371 /4937, E4618/ 1/58, Vansittart to Curzon, May 10, 1920, enclosures. 111 FO 371/4937-4939» E4575/E4872/E4929/E5629/1/58. According to Archives de l’Armée, 7N/829, dossier 3, the 51st Battalion of the 5th Tiralleurs arrived in Batum on May 20, 1920.

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Curzon that any decision the Foreign Office might take regarding the political future of Batum would be relayed to Milne, though such deci­ sions should not prejudice the departure of the armed forces. “This garrison is in an unsound military position, and though the Army Coun­ cil hope that Georgians may withstand the Russian penetration into the Caucasus, at the same time they don’t consider that the promise of their doing so for any length of time is sufficient to justify the retention of British troops in Batum.”112 On June i the War Office added that in view of the unsettling reports from General Milne, the Army Council could no longer be responsible for the safety of the men at Batum and proposed to instruct Milne to begin the necessary arrangements for evac­ uation.113 In the Foreign Office, Tilley reacted: In leaving Batoum we shall practically cut ourselves off from sending any help to Armenia. Gen. Milne would apparently answer that in no case can we send enough help to do her any good, but we do nevertheless abandon the last pre­ tense of standing by her. We are also withdrawing from a place which has not yet been threatened: possibly this is better than withdrawing in the face of threats, but I have always felt that we might gamble on the unlikelihood of a Bolshevik attack at a time when they are trying to open commercial relations.114

Tilley recommended that it should be impressed upon the Soviet trade delegation, headed by Leonid Krasin, that any hostile action against the Batum garrison would preclude the possibility of a commercial treaty. Lord Hardinge was in full agreement, writing that there was no indica­ tion of an imminent Bolshevik move on Batum. “The political conse­ quences of evacuation appear to me to be of so serious a nature that I feel confident that the S[ecretary] of State will bring the matter again before the Cabinet before the W.O. are allowed to act.”115 Curzon himself moved swiftly to prevent the War Office from author­ izing Milne to give notice of withdrawal and gather the necessary naval vessels. On June 2 he reminded the Army Council that on three occa­ sions within the previous three weeks the cabinet had reaffirmed the desirability of postponing the evacuation because of political consider­ ations, though General Milne would be allowed to withdraw in case of an impending disaster. The War Office had opposed that decision on grounds that the Georgians were making common cause with the enemy and that there was serious danger to the small garrison. None of these 112 FO ,1SFO 114 FO 115 FO

371/4939, E5596/1/58 enclosure. 37i/4939> E5700/1/58; FO 406/43, no. 257. 371/4939, E5700/1/58, Tilley minute, June 1, 1920. 371/4939, E 5700/1/58, Hardinge minute, June 1, 1920.

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contentions had so far proved true, and recent reports from Batum showed that the situation was quiet. “There seems to be no likelihood of anything approaching a disaster and if Batoum be evacuated before any local settlement is arrived at, the fate of Armenia will be sealed.’’ It was hard to understand why General Milne suddenly claimed that ten days’ notice would be required to gather the necessary shipping. A pre­ cipitous departure, Curzon continued, would violate the decision of the cabinet. Moreover, the French government should be consulted, as a part of the Allied garrison was now composed of French soldiers. Finally, Curzon asked to know the nature of the notice that the War Office intended to issue at Batum and to whom and on what terms it was to be given. Such action, he concluded, “would appear to anticipate a deci­ sion, which whatever its merits, has not so far been taken by H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment].”116 Unbeknown to the Foreign Office, the War Office had already au­ thorized Milne to give notice and make arrangements for withdrawal at the earliest possible date but not to begin the actual embarkation pend­ ing further instructions. Only a week later, on June 7, did the War Office send the Foreign Office a copy of this telegram. A tempest of rage and denunciation followed. The War Office was preempting the authority and jurisdiction of the Foreign Office and the cabinet itself and, in an underhanded manner, had empowered Milne to proceed with the evac­ uation even before' communicating with Curzon. Osborne complained that the action of the War Office would prejudice the cabinet’s delib­ erations on the Batum question, and he dismissed the Army Council’s reasons for evacuation as self-serving excuses. Tilley observed that the War Office had deliberately kept the Foreign Office in the dark, and Hardinge added: “The W.O. have behaved very badly and have gone behind our backs.’’117 Curzon denounced the “entirely indefensible pro­ cedure’’ and took his complaints to the cabinet that very day. There, he pointed to the harmful divergence of policies pursued by the Foreign Office and the War Office and insisted that there had been no deteri­ oration of the situation at Batum. Curzon learned to his chagrin, how­ ever, that Prime Minister Lloyd George had apparently approved the War Office’s telegram to General Milne. No action was taken by the cabinet on June 7 except to note that the War Office had now advised Milne to await further instructions before actually embarking his troops at Batum.118 The issue came to a head on June 11, just as the S.S. Hornsea was 1,6 FO 371/4939, E5700/1/58, Curzon to WO, June 2, 1920; FO 406/43, no. 259. 117 FO 371/4939, E5979/1/58. 118Cab 23/21, Cab. Concl.(2o), 30(3), May 21, and 33(5),June 7, 1920.

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making its way down the Thames River and across the English Channel. The cabinet decided that Colonel Stokes should depart for Batum on a special mission to negotiate with the Georgian government an accord by which the city and province of Batum would be united with the Geor­ gian republic. Stokes would try to secure for Armenia and Azerbaijan free transit on the Transcaucasian railways and full facilities at the port of Batum. On reaching a satisfactory agreement, he would hand over the province to Georgia and the Allied garrison would withdraw. David Ghambashidze would accompany Stokes and use his influence in Geor­ gia to obtain an amenable setdement.119 Meanwhile, British Vice-Consul Patrick Stevens at Batum and Acting Chief Commissioner Harry Luke were repeatedly sending messages about the deleterious effects of a sudden exodus. Stevens predicted that abandonment of Batum would leave the city in worse condition than when the British had arrived at the end of the world war. Bolsheviks, Russian nationalists, Georgians, Ajarians, and Turks would all try to grab the strategic port and its hinterland.120 Luke complained that he had to learn from external sources that an evacuation had been ordered, and he cautioned against the impact of a hasty withdrawal on the fate of Georgia and Armenia and on the lives of countless individuals. “Arme­ nia will be isolated and probably unable to take delivery of arms sold to her while any hope of Tartars recovering Baku will be nullified. ... If evacuation takes place before our successors are enabled to establish themselves disorder and chaos seem inevitable. We shall be accused both in and outside Trans-Caucasia of having abandoned Armenia and Geor­ gia to disaster.”121 The Foreign Office notified Luke on June 17 that Stokes was supposed to have sailed from Marseilles the previous day. It was important that his arrival in Transcaucasia coincide with that of the S.S. Hornsea so that Stokes could make the transport of the munitions to Armenia a definite precondition to Georgia’s acquisition of Batum.122 The series of arrange­ ments was completed by the cabinet on June 18, after it heard the Gen­ eral Staff’s recommendation to reinforce Milne’s Army of the Black Sea with one division because of the Turkish Nationalist threat to Constan­ tinople and the Straits. “The Conference authorized the Secretary of State for War to send a telegram to the General Officer Commanding Constantinople, stating that Colonel Stokes’ Mission was to be expedited 119 FO 371 /4940, E6314/E6449/E6887/1 ƒ58; FO 371 /4957, E7206/134/58; FO 406/ 43, no. 283; WO 33/1000, WO to GHQ Constantinople, June 11, 1920; British Documents, XII, p. 619. 120 FO 371/4943, E8130/1/58; FO 406/44, no. 1; British Documents, XII, pp. 621—622. 121 FO 371/4940, E6577/1/58; British Documents, XII, p. 620. 122 FO 371/4940, E6577/1/58 enclosure; British Documents, XII, p. 623.

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in everyway, but that if he [Milne] considered it essential to the security of the positions in the Constantinople area at once to withdraw the Bat­ talions now at Batum, he was authorized to do so.”12S Allied Withdrawal from Batum

Claude Baynes Stokes set out from London on June 14 in the company of David Ghambashidze to make arrangements to turn all of Batum over to Georgia yet also protect the trade and transit interests of Armenia and the Allied Powers. The San Remo conference had adjourned with Chkheidze still resisting the compromise solution that would allow Ar­ menia to construct and operate a railway “en toute propriété” through the Chorokh River Valley. The collapse of the Volunteer Army, the so­ vietization of Azerbaijan, and the insistence of the War Office to clear out of Batum all worked in favor of Georgian aspirations to take control of Ajaría. En route to Transcaucasia, Stokes and Ghambashidze met in Paris with Robert Vansittart, who detailed the British position regarding a railway concession for Armenia.123 124 A draft agreement prepared by General H. O. Mance, head of the British peace delegation’s communications section, provided that Armenia would have a permanent concession for a railway from the Armenian frontier to the port of Batum, all required facilities at Batum, and a branch line along the seacoast to a future Armenian port in territory to be awarded the Republic of Armenia by the treaty of peace with Turkey. The draft agreement still maintained that Armenia should own the strip of land over which the railway passed. A private company, in which the Armenian government could control a majority or even all of the shares, would be vested with the concession. The com­ pany would have its own police force within prescribed numbers to en­ sure execution of the terms of the concession and to prevent thefts. Offenders arrested in the zone, however, were to be tried in the Geor­ gian courts of law.

123 Cab 23/22, Cab. Concl.(2o), 53(1), Sept. 30, 1920, App. 3, Conference of Ministers, June 18, 1920. 124 Vansittart telegraphed the Foreign Office on June 14 that he had tried to bring about an agreement between the Armenian and Georgian representatives in London, Malcolm and Ghambashidze (Gambashidze), respectively, and that once again the only impasse resulted from the suggestion of an Armenian railway to Batum. On Vansittart’s advice, both men had accepted calling on General Mance “as impartial expert to draft practical heads of agreement.” That draft was now in hand, and a copy would be given to Colonel Stokes. Vansittart added: “General agreement between Armenian and Georgian Delegation could perhaps be secured during his presence here; but it would be well if Monsieur Gambashidze came out too as stupidity of Monsieur Tcheidze is always an obstacle to be reckoned with.” See FO 371/4940, E6425/1/58.

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The Georgian government was to make available all necessary facilities at the port of Batum, including special sidings to handle Armenian goods, and was to treat Armenian traffic on absolutely equal footing with Georgian traffic in regard to charges, facilities, and transit. The draft also dealt with modifications of the concession and made the interna­ tional regime applicable to other Georgian ports. A commission was to be formed with representatives of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Persia serving under a president designated by the League of Nations to setde disputes by a two-thirds majority vote or, in case of deadlock, by decision of the president. Georgia was not to object to the transport of war materials to Armenia on demand of Armenia’s mandatory power or, if there was no mandatory power, by request of the Armenian govern­ ment, subject to the veto of the Council of the League of Nations. If Armenia constructed a port at the mouth of the Chorokh River or laid a branch line to a future Armenian port, these would be used for such transit. Finally, an Armenian-Georgian technical commission under a president designated by the League of Nations would draft a detailed permanent agreement, with the consensus of two of the three parties accepted as binding. Stokes was also informed of the British Trade Board’s insistence that all users of the railway be guaranteed “absolute equality of treatment’’ irrespective of the nationality of the passengers or the origin and ownership of the goods.125 With the draft agreement in hand, Stokes arrived in Batum on June 24 and began negotiations in Tiflis the next day with Foreign Minister Evgenii Gegechkori and Interior Minister Noi Ramishvili. Stokes was not in sympathy with the views of Robert Vansittart regarding the Armenian railway concession and therefore was ready to accept the Georgian ar­ guments that such a concession would incite the Ajarians and encourage Turkish intervention. Soviet Russia, moreover, had acknowledged the right of Georgia to the entire province of Batum. The Armenians them­ selves could raise only economic considerations; they had never claimed any part of Batum province on ethnographic, historic, or even strategic grounds. As it was now common knowledge that the British would soon withdraw from Batum, the Georgian negotiators were amicable but eva­ sive. They gave general assurances about freedom of Armenian rail traf­ fic and even a future railway concession. Colonel Stokes hastily con­ cluded two agreements with the Georgian government on June 28. Witnessed by Acting Chief Commissioner Harry Luke and David Ghambashidze, the first accord read:

125 FO 608/277, 256/1/1/379; FO 371/4940, E6773/1/58. $ee a*80 British Documents, XII, p. 626 n. 2.

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we, the undersigned, lieutenant-colonel c. b. stokes on behalf of his Bri­ tannic majesty’s government on the one side, and the representatives of THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT, THEIR EXCELLENCIES MESSIEURS E. P. GUEGUECHKORi, Minister for Foreign Affairs and n. b.[v.] ramishvili, Minister of the In­ terior on the other side, hereby make the following agreement:- On the handing over of the Province, Port and Town of batum to the Georgian gov­ ernment by HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT the GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT guarantees free transit to and from the port of batum on the Georgian rail­ ways to the Independent Republics of armenia and Azerbaijan and further undertakes to grant the said Republics free use of the port of batum. note:- Details to be arranged by mutual agreement between the Georgian government and the governments of the Independent Republics of armenia and AZERBAIJAN.

The second agreement, under the same format, read: the Georgian government hereby grant a concession for the construction of a line of railway from the Armenian frontier along the tchorokh river valley with an outlet on the black sea. The details of the said concession will be settled and the final agreement signed in London between his britannic majesty’s government and repre­ sentatives Of the GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT.126

In his report to the Foreign Office, Stokes repeated the Georgian explanation that the granting of a concession to Armenia such as that outlined in the draft by General Mance would inevitably arouse the Turks and Ajarians. “I accept validity of this argument and have ac­ cepted agreement in present form as best alternative obtainable. I have found Georgian Government quite reasonable.” Stokes added that since the British evacuation of Batum would be regarded as the final aban­ donment of Armenia and Georgia, the two republics should be told that they would continue to receive ‘‘all possible moral and political sup­ port.” He also urged that they be granted de jure recognition and that the Georgians be assisted in obtaining arms and ammunition to defend their independence. Quite aside from political considerations, these measures were essential from a humanitarian point of view ‘‘in order to save Armenia and Georgia from horrors and misery which accompany spread of Bolshevism, and which will undoubtedly be [the] lot of these States if they are left unsupported.”127 The reaction in the Foreign Office was one of wariness. Osborne noted: ‘‘The Georgian argument of Turkish and Adjarian hostility seems to me a weak one and it looks as [if] they [Georgians] are displaying the 126 FO 371/4944, E9346/1/58 enclosures; FO 406/44, no. 7. 127 FO 371/4942, E7467/1/58, Luke to FO, June 28, 1920, enclosure; FO 608/277, 265/1/1/433; British Documents, XII, pp. 626-627.

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same big headedness that annoyed the Secretary] of S[tate] at San Remo. We must, I suppose, wait until we hear more details.”128 Robert Vansittart wrote from Paris that the agreements were not satisfactory. “The second in particular does not appear to carry us much beyond the stage I reached at San Remo.” Distrustful of the Georgians, Vansittart suggested that Georgia be made a signatory of the forthcoming Turkish peace treaty, as “by signature Georgia would be automatically bound by all the provisions and safeguards concerning Batoum contained in Turk­ ish Treaty, and be an additional guarantee in case other weak points may be found in agreements when full text arrives.”129 The French protested their exclusion by the British once again. On June 25, Millerand’s government had agreed in principle to the with­ drawal of the Allied garrison from Batum and the transfer of the prov­ ince to Georgia but asked that the French commissioner in Tiflis have equal footing with Colonel Stokes in the negotiations with the Georgian government.130 In fact, however, Count de Martel was not even informed of Stokes’s actions. When on July 2 de Martel notified the British com­ mission that he had been directed to participate in the negotiations, he was told that they had already been completed. De Martel then asked to see a copy of the agreements, but Stokes put him off, stating that he had no authority to divulge their contents. The French commissioner re­ sponded that he did not wish to make trouble but that unless Stokes showed him the documents he would have to follow an independent line of action.131 Stokes nonetheless continued to refuse until he re­ ceived instructions from the Foreign Office on July 6 to allow a repre­ sentative of an allied government that was participating in the occupa­ tion of Batum to see the actual text.132 On his part, Acting Chief Commissioner Luke reported that the French and Italian missions in Tiflis had caused much tension between the British military authorities at Batum and the Georgian government. The Georgians had admitted that they had been intransigent because of the advice and encouragement of the French and Italian missions. The French in particular were trying to advance their own propaganda by, among other means, opening a Franco-Georgian chamber of com­ merce and a French lycée. The Italians, by contrast, were interested only in commercial affairs and were in contact with the Bolsheviks in Tiflis 128 FO 371/4942, E7467/1/58, Osborne minute. 129 FO 371/4944, E8759/1/58. See also 371/4942, E7617/1/58 enclosure. 130 FO 371/4942, E7239/E7716/1/58. See also British Documents, XII, p. 624. 131 Archives de l’Armée, 20N/1, Paléologue to de Martel, June 20,1920, 20N/82, dossier 4, 20N/186, dossier 3, nos. 330-332, July 6, 1920; FO 371/4942, E7716/1/58, Luke to FO, July 2, 1920. 132 FO 371/4944, E9346/1/58, Stokes to Curzon, Aug. 5, 1920.

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and in Baku. Colonel Stokes followed up with the exhortation that “if we play our cards well we can cut out both French & Italians.’’133 Meanwhile, the Allied officials in Tiflis tried to assuage Armenian mis­ givings. Stokes and Luke told Tigran Bekzadian, the Armenian pleni­ potentiary in Georgia, that Batum would become a free port {porto franco) and that Armenia had been guaranteed free transit. To Bekzadian’s argument that Armenia needed its own exit to the sea over its own territory, Stokes asserted that such a goal would be realized in time but that because of the delicate political situation no announcement in this sense should be made for the present.134 On July 5, Bekzadian com­ plained to all the Allied missions that Foreign Minister Gegechkori had declared in the Georgian legislature that the Allies had recognized Geor­ gia’s indisputable right to the whole of Batum province on condition that Azerbaijan and Armenia be allowed free transit. This declaration was disconcerting, as Batum was the only port Armenia could use in the foreseeable future. Under the rumored terms, Armenia would be at the mercy of Georgia and dependent upon its goodwill. At San Remo, the British had insisted that Armenia have an outlet to the sea over a route of its own. Hence, the Armenian government now requested de­ tailed information about the agreement entered into between Colonel Stokes and the Georgian government and hoped that the accord pro­ tected the rights that were due the Republic.135 Although Count de Mar­ tel himself was smarting under Stokes’s unilateral actions, he nonethe­ less replied to Bekzadian that the decision to withdraw and hand over Batum to Georgia had been taken by the Allies collectively on condition of freedom of transit for Armenia and acceptance in principle of a direct Armenian railway line to the port of Batum.136 The Armenian Bureau-Government was virtually helpless in the face of these developments. Ohandjanian instructed Aharonian to protest to the peace conference and to the League of Nations, stressing Armenia’s need for a railway from Kars to Batum and for absolute rights over a part of the port. This was the only way the Republic could grow and prosper, preserve its bonds with Europe, and defend against both the Russian and Muslim Bolsheviks.137 For its part, the Georgian government dis­ missed all Armenian remonstrances. On July 13, Gegechkori wrote Bek13SFO 371/4944, E9330/1/58, Luke to FO, July 11, 1920, and Osborne minute. See also £9429/1/58, July 15, 1920. 134 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16, Stokes to Bekzadian, July 8, 1920, and File 24/24, Bulletin no. 9, July 8, 1920 (also in Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, P- 3)135 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16. 136 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16, File 67/30, de Martel to Bekzadian, July 9, 1920, and File 320/2. 137 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to President of Peace Delega­ tion, July 16, 1920; FO 371/4944, E9391/1/58, Aharonian to FO, Aug. 2, 1920.

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zadian that Batum had been reunited with mother Georgia and that there could have been no other solution. Armenia would enjoy free transit privileges over Georgian territory for all goods imported and ex­ ported through Batum. A determination still had to be made about the status of goods originating in Batum and of goods originating in Ar­ menia but terminating in Batum.138 During the course of these exchanges, the Allied garrison was finally withdrawn. Immediately upon signing the agreement with Georgia, Colonel Stokes requested permission from General Milne to allow the Georgian troops to occupy the town and province of Batum without delay in order to relieve Georgian anxieties, facilitate rail traffic, and forestall any attempt by the French to create trouble about the evacua­ tion. In correspondence between Stokes, Milne, and Cooke-Collis, it was agreed to turn the railroad over to the Georgians on July 4 and to have them enter the city formally on July 7.139 Stokes hastened to Poti to arrange for the unloading of the arms and ammunition from the S.S. Hornsea before the British departure. The Georgian government and press hailed the impending restora­ tion of Batum to Georgia, although there were also words of criticism for the ambivalence of the British and the insulting demeanor of their military authorities. On July 2 the government appealed to the inhabi­ tants of Batum and all Ajaría to accept the Georgian army and admin­ istration in peace and as brothers. Justice had at last prevailed, and the past transgressions of the local inhabitants against Georgia would be forgiven. The commander of the Georgian forces preparing to occupy Batum, General Georgii Kvinitadze, called upon the Ajarians to remain calm and to disregard provocative and malicious rumors. Provisional Governor-General V. G. Chkhikvishvili made a similar appeal and an­ nounced the temporary imposition of martial law to deal with ill-inten­ tioned foreign agents, speculators, and other opponents of democracy in Georgia and all Transcaucasia.140 The Georgian detachments had already occupied Kobuleti station on July 1 and were camped on the outskirts of Batum on July 6. In the afternoon ofJuly 7, the Georgian civil and military administration made its formal entry into the city. At 6 o’clock in the evening, General CookeCollis and General Kvinitadze viewed a military parade and inspected the troops. This ceremony was followed by the playing of the French and British national anthems as the Allied flags were lowered; the Geor­ 138 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16, Bekzadian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 13. 192°139 FO 371/4942, E7720/1/58 enclosure. 140 Bor'ba, July 2:1, 3:3, 1920; FO 371/4950, E8576/36/58 enclosures; US Archives, RG 84, Tiflis Consulate, €46(68), Review of Press, July 1920.

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gian national hymn was sounded as the white Georgian flag, embossed with the image of Saint George, was raised over the city hall and forts. The French and British battalions then marched to the ships. A farewell banquet was attended by Foreign Minister Gegechkori and the new Georgian civil and military administration of Batum, together with Brig­ adier General Cooke-Collis, Rear Admiral Michael Culme-Seymour, Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, Commander Luke, Count de Martel, and other British and French officers and officials. The Allied naval trans­ ports set sail on July 8 and 9, with William James Norman Cooke-Collis departing on the last ship, the S.S. Field Marshal.141 The Allies had aban­ doned Batum. Further Negotiations

Upon receiving the texts of the agreements that Stokes, Gegechkori, and Ramishvili had signed, the British government was far from satisfied. Among other things, the accords had not defined the special position of Great Britain and the other Allies. The Foreign Office instructed Commander Luke to draft an agreement by which Georgia would rec­ ognize Batum as a porto franco without prejudicing its territorial sov­ ereignty; guarantee freedom of use by the nationals of Armenia, Azer­ baijan, Persia, and all members of the League of Nations; provide equal rights regarding facilities, berthing, loading, discharging, tonnage, and dues; establish equal and reasonable duties and charges; remove obsta­ cles to navigation; and assist in the creation of a free zone where the goods and warehouses would be exempt from customs, excises, and all other duties. There was to be freedom of transit over the entire Trans­ caucasian railway system, extending also to postal, telegraphic, and tele­ phone services.142 Foreign Minister Gegechkori, who was preparing to depart for London, asserted that there was no time to translate and approve the draft document before he left. He therefore requested that the negotiations be conducted in London.143 Georgia clearly hoped to win de jure recognition and other benefits in return for the economic concessions demanded by Great Britain. In reporting the Georgian request to Curzon, Luke stated that he

141 FO 371/4942—4945, E7720/E8320/E9344/E10962/1/58 enclosures; WO 106/330, no. 213. For a colorful description of the farewell banquet, see Luke, op. át., pp. 157—158. 142 FO 371/4945, E10732/1/58, draft treaty and FO amendments. 14S FO 371/4945, E10732/1/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 15, 1920. Luke characterized Ge gechkori as a man of “immense personal vanity” (E10729/1/58). See also Luke, op. cit., p. 158. In Erevan on August 3, Ghambashidze gave assurances that satisfactory con­ cessions would be made to Armenia regarding the port of Batum and routes of transpor­ tation. See also Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 10.

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would depart for Erevan shortly to secure an analogous agreement “which Your Lordship desires to be entered into by the Armenian Gov­ ernment.’’144 Although British officials in Europe and the Caucasus now tried to assure the Armenians that their vital interests had been safe­ guarded, the Armenian government was deeply disappointed by the turn of events. On August 6, Ohandjanian wired Bekzadian that even though Count de Martel had stated with certainty that the Chorokh River Valley would be awarded to Armenia as a passage to Batum and the sea, Com­ mander Luke had not even mentioned this possibility during a recent interview.145 Yet when Luke arrived in Erevan at the end of August, he stressed the importance of an accord that would make possible eco­ nomic exchange and development. The draft he put before the Arme­ nian government on August 31 ensured for Great Britain and the other Allied Powers most-favored-nation status and many privileges relating to railway and transit traffic, port facilities, and commerce. Luke asked that the draft be studied and signed within three days, but the BureauGovernment demurred. Ohandjanian complained that although Ar­ menia was an ally the terms offered it were no different from those imposed on Turkey, a defeated enemy power. Armenia was to become an economic vassal of the West. The government therefore replied to Commander Luke that it was not averse to an agreement as long as the terms were compatible with Armenia’s status as a friendly state and at the very least no worse than those concluded with non-Allied neighbor­ ing states. Nonetheless, the proposal should be held in abeyance until the question of a mandate for Armenia and other issues affecting the future of the Armenian people had been decided. As the country did not have any ports at present, a convention relating to international commerce, transit, and port privileges should be entered into only after Armenia’s boundaries had been finally determined. Moreover, the Ar­ menian Parliament, which was now in recess, would have to ratify any and all international conventions and treaties.146 Further British negotiations with the Georgians regarding economic concessions in Transcaucasia took place in September while Foreign Minister Gegechkori was in London on a political and economic mis­ sion. In a meeting with representatives of the Foreign Office, War Office, and Board of Trade on September 15, Gegechkori showed himself ame­ nable to satisfying the requirements of Great Britain without, however, 144 FO 371/4945, Ei0732/1/58, Luke to FO, Aug. 15, 1920. 145 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 16/16, no. 4644. 146 Armenia Archives, 200/1/12, pp. 55-60, and 200/1/607, pp. 35, 82; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 24/24, Bulletin no. 13, Sept. 15, 1920, File 116/15, for a legal opinion by an Armenian commission in Paris, Nov. 13, 1920, and File 334/4; FO 371/4946, Ei 1867/1/58.

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making a clear concession.147 When Colonel Stokes, who had himself returned to London, raised several of the points in the draft that Acting Chief Commissioner Luke had submitted to the Georgian government, Gegechkori guided the proceedings in such a way as to reach the fol­ lowing conclusions: That the question of free transit for the States of Azerbaijan and Armenia over the railways of Georgia, having been already made the subject of an agreement between those three countries, need not be included in the Draft Agreement under reference. That the Declaration of Batoum as a Port of International concern should be the subject of an agreement between the Georgian Government and His Majes­ ty’s Government, such agreement to be afterwards communicated to the Prin­ cipal Allied Powers. And that the document constituting the above Declaration, and that concern­ ing the right of access to the Black Sea for Armenia should be redrafted in consultation with the Board of Trade, and submitted, in separate forms, to the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.148

The Georgian government was successfully evading firm commitments while consolidating its position in Batum. Colonel Stokes, who had been a leading advocate of Azerbaijani in­ dependence, now returned from Tiflis as a champion of Georgian free­ dom against the threat of Bolshevism. He was pleased with his swift ne­ gotiation of the agreement to hand over Batum to the Georgians and to allow the British garrison to withdraw to Constantinople. In a lengthy accounting of his mission and of the state of affairs in the Caucasus, Stokes wrote that Georgia had consistendy been misrepresented in Lon­ don and Paris as being Bolshevik at heart. This malignment, he said, had emanated from General Denikin’s entourage because Georgia wanted to be independent. The Georgian government, having managed to get two million rounds of ammunition from the Italians, had thrown back the Bolshevik units on the frontiers. In fact, neither side intended to honor the Soviet-Georgian treaty of May 7, especially as the Soviet mission in Tiflis had turned into a propaganda mill. Fortunately, Geor­ gia’s present relations with Armenia were generally close and improving. The misunderstandings between the Georgian government and the Brit­ ish military authorities at Batum had been most regrettable, but the

147FO 371/4946, Ei 1417/1/58. Bor’ba, Aug. 21:2, 1920, states that Gegechkori de­ parted for London on August 18. 148FO 371/4946, Ei 1515/1/58. For objections of the British Board of Trade and a proposed modified draft treaty on Batum, see FO 371/4947, E12681/E13156/1/58.

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handing over of the province, town, and port to the Georgian republic had now created an atmosphere of trust. The Georgians were prepared to allow Great Britain to establish a naval base at Batum. Stokes recom­ mended the selection and dispatch of a suitable British mission to pursue this and other issues of great importance. Azerbaijan, Stokes continued, had been betrayed by those elements that had carried out the coup d’état with the assistance of Turkish offi­ cers. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Nuri Pasha were trying to link with the Bolsheviks in order to receive arms and ammunition and had done all in their power to persuade the Azerbaijanis to accept Soviet rule. Deep and widespread dissatisfaction with Soviet rule had led to rebellions at Ganja and elsewhere, and these would have succeeded “but for the local Armenians assisting the Bolsheviks.’’ Stokes explained: “The Armenians in Azarbaijan are actively co-operating with the Bolsheviks. This is due pardy to their overpowering animosity towards the Tartars and pardy to the desire to save their own skins. The Armenian representative at Tiflis, Begzadian, admitted to me that the Armenian Government is unable to influence them.” A reign of terror prevailed in Azerbaijan. The unhappy position of Armenia, Stokes maintained, “is in great measure due to the failure of the Armenian Government to control its animosity towards Azarbaijan.” The Armenians would prefer to see Rus­ sia permanendy reestablished in Azerbaijan than to have the country regain its independence. Ohandjanian’s Bureau-Government nonethe­ less was a significant improvement over the administration of Khatisian, who assertedly “really always wished to go back under Russian rule.” The new government had dealt sternly with Bolshevism in Armenia and had repelled Red Army units trying to breach the Armenian frontiers. The Armenians were threatened by a “joint Bolshevik-Tartar” invasion, “but the arrival of arms and ammunition has encouraged them, and it is probable that they will offer a stubborn resistance.” If, however, Mus­ tafa Kemal sent a sizable force to attack them simultaneously from the Turkish side, the Armenian position would be precarious. Fortunately, the Armenian leaders recognized the need of an entente with Georgia, and a military alliance seemed to be materializing. Colonel Stokes concluded: “It would be both unwise and unfair not to realise that the three Trans-Caucasian Republics are less to blame for the existing situation than we ourselves.” Great Britain had given De­ nikin wholehearted backing but had not made him concentrate on the Bolshevik menace and had not prevented him from causing trouble in Transcaucasia. The British had sacrificed their own interests by with­ holding arms and ammunition that could have enabled the three re­ publics to meet the Bolshevik peril. Nevertheless, Britain still enjoyed

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the greatest prestige in the region and with a policy of friendly support could be guaranteed “every commercial concession we may desire.’’149

During the month of July 1920, the long-awaited shipment of arms arrived in Armenia, and the Allied military garrison withdrew from Ba­ tum. The evacuation of Batum deepened the sense of Armenian isola­ tion, as the last Allied military foothold in the Caucasus was eliminated. Moreover, Georgia’s expansion into Ajaría without having to make a firm commitment regarding an Armenian railway concession rendered that plan increasingly remote and problematic. All the while, the leaders of Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey watched closely as the British de­ parted from Batum. The exodus of the Allied forces was of critical im­ portance in the strategies of the two outcast regimes. It was questionable whether a shipment of Canadian Ross rifles would be sufficient to pre­ vent the hostile encirclement of the Republic of Armenia. H9 FO 371/4944, E9429/1/58, Report on Situation in Transcaucasia, Aug. 5, 1920.

10

Annenian Affairs Abroad

As the Allied Powers drafted the Turkish peace settlement and gave clearer shape to the projected Armenian state, Armenian affairs beyond the Caucasus also became more sharply defined. Internal Armenian par­ tisan differences remained strong, yet by 1920 all political parties op­ erating in the diaspora had come to acknowledge the Republic of Ar­ menia as the foundation for a future integral Armenian state. Elements closely associated with Boghos Nubar and the Armenian National Del­ egation were troubled by the Dashnaktsutiun’s control of the Armenian republic and the great advantage the party would thereby hold in its bid to gain predominance in a united Armenia. Attempts to reach an accord for an integrated coalition cabinet, legislature, and peace delegation did not succeed in negotiations held in Erevan in the fall of 1919, and the National Delegation’s representatives, Vahan Tekeyan and Nshan TerStepanian, had returned to Paris annoyed and frustrated with the alleg­ edly overbearing demeanor of the Dashnakist spokesmen.1 These res­ ervations aside, all parties concerned understood that, with the recognition of the Armenian republic by the Allied Powers in January 1920 and their stance that the eastern territories to be detached from the Ottoman Empire would be added to the existing Armenian state in Transcaucasia, the international status of the National Delegation be­ came secondary to that of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia. However disappointing or unfair, it was likely that Avetis Aharonian, not Boghos Nubar, would be called upon to sign the Turkish peace treaty. These and related issues were to come before the Second National Con­ gress of Western Armenians. 1 The negotiations for a united government are discussed in Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 267—279. See also Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/4955, E4091/134/58, Gracey to Wardrop, March 28, 1920.

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At the same time, the Republic of Armenia established or sanctioned diplomatic missions in many parts of the world to defend its interests and those of the Armenian communities. The endeavor was fraught with serious difficulties regarding finances, legal standing, political rivalries, and personalities. Nonetheless, during 1920 official and unofficial plen­ ipotentiaries were at work on five continents. Many long-dormant Ar­ menian communities began to stir with revived national consciousness.

The Second National Congress of Western Armenians The First National Congress of Western Armenians, held from February to April 1919, had authorized Boghos Nubar’s National Delegation to summon a new sitting in case of urgent need or when there had been significant progress in securing a mandate for Armenia or completing the peace treaty with Turkey.2 Allied concentration on the Turkish set­ tlement during the London conference and the alarming spread of Kemalist influence in Anatolia prompted Boghos Nubar in March 1920 to issue a call for the Second National Congress. The shocking massacre at Marash raised the specter of renewed Armenian bloodshed through­ out Cilicia and deepened misgivings about the role of the French mili­ tary authorities and the policies of the French government. Moreover, it was necessary to decide what position to take in the event that most of Turkish Armenia was either included in or excluded from the united Armenian state.3 The summons to the Second National Congress was met with mixed reactions. Overall, there was a lack of enthusiasm or perhaps a prevailing sense of helplessness in the face of a swirl of events over which the Ar­ menians seemed to have little control. In addition, nearly all of the Dash­ nakist delegates of the First National Congress had subsequently re­ signed, either out of loyalty to the Republic of Armenia or in protest against various actions of the National Delegation. A third of the thirty­ eight delegates (forty-four by a later count) in that first gathering had been Dashnakists, but no more than four of them would heed the new summons. The Dashnakist press in the United States branded Boghos Nubar’s National Delegation “a den of traitors.” In an editorial entitled ‘‘Plotters Are Still in the Arena,” the Boston-based Hairenik wrote on April 17: “The sad and shameful role that has been played during the 2 For the first Armenian National Congress, see Hovannisian, Republic, I, pp. 454—459. 3 The congress was initially scheduled to convene on February 15 but was then postponed until March 31 because of “political circumstances.” See Kochnak Hayastani, XX (March 20, 1920), p. 380; Hairenik, April 7:2, 1920. On a further postponement until late April, see Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm i-D, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 85, April 17, 1920.

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past year or two by the body known as the National Delegation and its representatives in London, Constantinople, Washington, and elsewhere is clear to all.” That self-centered clique and those around it not only refused to accept the Armenian state and government but also divided the people and weakened the heroic Armenian army by boycotting the fund-raising campaign of the Armenian military mission in the United States and organizing a counter-campaign by exploiting General An­ dranik and relying on the moribund Armenian National Union of Amer­ ica, headed by Mihran Sevasly.4 The denunciations in the Hairenik were embellished by Garegin Pasdermadjian, who had broken with Boghos Nubar and the National Del­ egation over the accord entered into with Kurdish spokesman Cherif Pasha in November 1919. A member of the Dashnaktsutiun’s Bureau and the envoy of the Armenian republic to the United States, Pasdermadjian encouraged the campaign against Nubar and made common cause with Vahan Cardashian against Sevasly and the Armenian National Union of America.5 The boycott of the Second National Congress was not confined to the United States. The Bulgarian Armenian community, for example, declared that it would send no representatives to the gath­ ering and that henceforth it would recognize only the Republic of Ar­ menia and its delegation in Paris.6 Other communities and former del­ egates simply ignored the summons and were absent when the congress finally convened. The internal dissension and Boghos Nubar’s preoccupation with the London and San Remo conferences caused repeated delays, and it was not until May 5 that enough delegates had gathered in Paris to open the Second National Congress. None of the enthusiasm and anticipation of the first sitting remained. The Armenians had lost their visions of a united state extending from sea to sea, suffered renewed massacres and troubles in Cilicia, failed to secure a mandatory power, and found the Allies unwilling to commit the forces required to implement the treaty they intended to impose on Turkey. The mood was somber when Gabriel Effendi Noradoungian called the meeting to order in the headquarters of the National Delegation on the Rue de Boccadore. Only sixteen mem­ bers of the first congress were present. In the following session, persons who had resigned, not responded, or were away on official business were * Hairenik, April 17:2, 1920. Already on March 10, Manuk Hambardzumian and Zatik Matikian, two of the Dashnakist delegates to the first congress from the United States, gave notice that they would not participate in the second congress. See Hairenik, March 21:1, 1920. See also the issue of April 21:2, 1920. 5 See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Amerikayi Karavarutiune, 1920 t. See also Hairenik, April 4:1, 6:1, 1920. 6 Hairenik, April 17:2, 1920.

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removed from the roster, leaving twenty-four names, but even then it was often difficult to muster a quorum.7 Boghos Nubar himself was fre­ quently absent attending to other duties. It was particularly painful for him and his closest associates that, although the Armenian question had from its inception focused on the Western Armenians, quirks of fate had given primacy to the unanticipated Armenian state that had emerged in the Caucasus. For considerations of international law, only the Republic of Armenia had received official Allied recognition, and its representa­ tive alone would have the privilege of signing the Turkish peace treaty. Allied officials might have far more respect for and confidence in Boghos Nubar, but it was Avetis Aharonian whom they were to invite to affix his signature to the Treaty of Sèvres. Addressing the Second National Congress just five days before the Allied Powers handed the draft treaty to the sultan’s envoys in the Quai d’Orsay, Gabriel Noradoungian underscored the critical importance of the current historical moment and the supreme need for internal har­ mony to meet the awesome challenges and consequences facing the Armenian people. When the First National Congress had recessed in April 1919, it had been thought that the selection of a mandatory for Armenia and other pending issues would soon be resolved and that the delegates could swiftly reconvene to take the necessary related actions and conclude their labors. Unfortunately, more than a year had passed, and the Armenian question still awaited a final solution. If that question was a matter of physical and political survival for the Armenian people, it was equally a matter of moral commitment and honor for the civilized world. The Armenians, possessing unique characteristics and extraor­ dinary abilities, had the right to exist as a nation alongside the great powers. But what had the civilized world done to fulfill its pledges to liberate the Armenian people once and for all, and what was the present status of the Armenian question? These and other issues would come before the congress as it searched for ways “to bring our ship safely to harbor as soon as possible.” Never had the need for unity been so crucial “because never has there been a time when so much suffering and mis­ ery has been visited upon our nation as today.” This was a period of great expectation and great anxiety, but from day to day the expectations diminished and the anxieties intensified. It was necessary to determine what orientation to follow and where the collective energies of the Ar­ menian people should be concentrated. “The salvation of the Armenian

7 Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Aug. 28, 1920), pp. 1148—1149; Hairenik, May 26:1, June 27:1, 1920. For minutes of the second congress, see Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 8411-9224. The minutes of the opening session are on pp. 8433-8439, and rosters of delegates are on pp. 8359—8368.

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nation depends on the collaboration of us all.” The various political parties, working with the same heart and soul, should rally together in the common cause: In a bouquet, there are all kinds of flowers. None looks like the other, either in form or in color. Yet each one, placed side by side with the others, joins to form an appealing wholeness, some with their vigor, some with their prudence, some with their power. Naturally, there will always be differences of opinion, and this is as it should be, but those differences, complementing and correcting each other, must be directed toward the general good of the nation and not allow painful deviations which can produce no results except harm, as is now occurring within our people in America and elsewhere.... The purpose of all of us is one and the same—the salvation of the nation.8

Boghos Nubar Pasha welcomed the delegates and spoke of develop­ ments since the Allied conferences at London and San Remo.9 In his comments, Ramkavar intellectual and delegation member Arshak Chobanian declared: “Last year at this time was a period of hope for us. .. . We believed that the realization of our dreams was so near... . But today we find ourselves in a renewed moment of darkness.”10 Patriarch Zaven of Constantinople attended the opening session along with Catholic Pa­ triarch Poghos Terzian and Bishop Jean Naslian of Trebizond, offering prayers and blessings. Dispatched to Paris and London by the Armenian national bodies of Constantinople after the Marash massacre to plead for effective measures to protect the remaining Armenians in Turkey, Archbishop Zaven told the assembled delegates: “What compelled me to come to Europe was the imperative need to concentrate during these decisive days every able force to participate in the Armenian question.” The clergy, he said, did not possess great power, but they did what they could, and every effort, no matter how small, contributed to the national cause. “I am motivated to state that, even with all these sad developments and unfavorable conditions, we should not submit to despair. It is true that we set out with great hopes, but those hopes seemed attainable because they were based on just rights.”11 It was apparent from the many exhortations that day that there was in fact ample cause for deep con­ sternation and perhaps even despair. The Second National Congress elected Gabriel Noradoungian as its chairman, despite his repeated objections that he preferred to partici­ pate freely and actively in the forthcoming deliberations. Dr. Grigor (Grégoire) Sinapian was elected vice chairman, Garnik Fntuklian, first 8 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 8412—8413. 9 Kochndk Hayastani, XX (March 20, 1920), p. 1149. 10 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 8418—8419. 11 Ibid., pp. 8421-8422.

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secretary, and M. S. Davit Bek, second secretary.12 The entire fourth ses­ sion, on May 21, was given over to Arshak Chobanian for the National Delegation’s accounting of activities for the preceding year. Chobanian outlined the developments in the Eastern question, of which the Ar­ menian question was but one part. He reviewed the delegation’s prin­ cipal memorandums and interviews, relations with the Allied Powers, and efforts to discharge the obligations placed upon it by the First Na­ tional Congress. Chobanian also assessed the conditions that had con­ strained the joint Delegation of Integral Armenia to compromise and alter the maximal desiderata that had been presented to the Paris Peace Conference by Boghos Nubar and Aharonian. There was a moment in 1919, he explained, when a solution to the Armenian question and the formation of a large, united state seemed imminent, but the failure of President Wilson to secure an American mandate for Armenia had con­ stituted a severe setback and had reactivated the Turcophile elements in Europe. Chobanian justified the controversial Armeno-Kurdish agree­ ment and reviewed the discussions with the Pontic Greek delegation about the future of the Black Sea littoral around Trebizond, the com­ plications that arose during negotiations with the Georgian and Azer­ baijani delegations regarding the status of Batum, and the unsuccessful effort to reach an accord on a coalition government of united Armenia. Chobanian concluded by noting the irony of the Armenian case: At the very moment when our cause is reaching fruition from a legal point of view, at a moment when the Allies are recognizing with finality the legal inde­ pendence of Armenia, our country finds itself, as the result of recent events, in a most critical situation. ... We are filled with hope that our people will show the necessary vigor, wisdom, unity, and sacrifice to overcome this final crisis and succeed in attaining our dream of centuries by creating a real united Armenia, resurrected and truly independent and viable.13

The National Delegation also gave an accounting of its expenses and of the activities of the Armenian Press Bureau, formed under the auspices of the Delegation of Integral Armenia and headed by Artavazd Hanemian, assisted by Zapel Esayan.14 Although most of the delegates were sympathizers and supporters of Boghos Nubar, the two sessions following Chobanian’s report were filled with hard questions and criticism. Explanations were demanded regard­ ing the Allied retreat on the Armenian question and the alarming state 12 Ibid., pp. 8451—8452. 15 Ibid., pp. 8456—8488, and, for a French text, pp. 8544—8592 14 Kochnak Hayastani, XX (March 20, 1920), pp. 1149—1150. See also Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm, O7, Bureau de Presse et d’Informations Arménien, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 421/1 and 422/2, H. H. Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum.

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of affairs in Cilicia and elsewhere. Lingering discontent over Nubar’s accord with Cherif Pasha prompted Noradoungian to meet with mem­ bers of the Armenian press to argue that major advantages had been gained by that agreement—namely, commitment to a common struggle against Turkish aggression, the end of harmful Armeno-Kurdish rivalry, and a mutual pledge to abide by the territorial boundaries drawn by the peace conference. The protocol had secured the friendship of countless Kurds and was facilitating the rescue of thousands of Armenians still held in captivity.15 Three separate resolutions were introduced on the National Delega­ tion’s report. A resolution of commendation by Garnik Fntuklian was quickly put aside. A far more reserved text submitted by Artavazd Hanemian picked up the strongest support. It read: “The National Con­ gress, having heard the National Delegation’s accounting of activities of one year, as well as the pro and con criticisms and commendations, and having also heard the replies and explanations of the president and mem­ bers of the National Delegation, declares this question closed and passes to the next item on the agenda.” To block the resolution, Arshak Chobanian argued that it would be improper to act without first giving Boghos Nubar, who was not present, the opportunity to voice his opinion and if necessary to defend himself. The resolution was therefore tabled and apparently never was put to a formal vote.16 The Deliberations

Major questions coming before the Second National Congress included the crisis in Cilicia, dissension within the Armenian American commu­ nity, and adoption of guidelines for and elections to a new National Delegation. The deteriorating conditions in Cilicia weighed heavily on the congress. It was clear that there was no longer any possibility that Cilicia would be included in the united Armenian state. The French had already announced that the region would be restored to Turkish sover­ eignty provided that minority rights and French economic interests were protected. The sanjak of Alexandretta and a line of towns extending to the east were to be left outside the new frontiers of Turkey according to the draft treaty, but Zeitun, Marash, Aintab, and the entire vilayet of Adana, including Hadjin, Sis, Osmanie, Baghche, Tarsus, Mersina, and other centers of Armenian population, were to remain in Turkey. The fate of the 150,000 Armenian repatriates in Cilicia, along with that of 15 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 8703—8747. For the Kurdish-Armenian agreement of November 1919, see Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 43—47. 16 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 8955—8957.

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the other Christian communities, lay in the balance. The National Del­ egation was inundated with telegrams and appeals to save Cilicia and to reject all plans and decisions that violated the rights of the Armenian people. Mihran Damadian, the representative in Cilicia of the Delega­ tion of Integral Armenia, and the Armenian National Council of Adana tried to persuade the French authorities to defend and arm the Arme­ nians, to cease the demobilization of the Armenian Legion, and to take decisive action to prevent a recurrence of the fiasco at Marash, which had led to renewed Armenian bloodshed, shocked the civilized world, embarrassed the French government, and given a great moral, political, and military boost to the Turkish Nationalists. The anti-Kemalist ele­ ments among the Muslim population now feared being compromised by their association with the French administration and showed signs of changing their disposition.17 While the Second National Congress was in session, it was learned that Robert de Caix, the general secretary of the French high commissioner of the Levant, General Henri Gouraud, had traveled to Angora (Ankara) and negotiated a temporary truce with Mustafa Kemal. During the twenty-day truce, which began at midnight on May 29, 1920, the French were required to pull back their garrisons from Sis and northern Cilicia to the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana railway and to give up their positions within the city of Aintab. The evacuation of Sis completely isolated Hadjin, where since March some 8,000 Armenians had been resisting a con­ certed Nationalist siege.18 The crisis in Cilicia, including the loss of the strategic Bozanti pass leading from Anatolia to Cilicia, the withdrawal from Sis, the abandon­ ment of Hadjin, and the measures to neutralize and eliminate the Ar­ menian Legion, raised the fundamental question of whether the Ar­ 17 For the crisis in Cilicia, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 136/35, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Kilikia, File 132/31, and File 422/2; FO 371, Files 3/44 and 242/44 for 1920; France, Archives de l’Armée, 20N/172, telegrams, parts I-V; Ruben G. Sahakian, Turk-fransiakan haraberutiunnere ev Kilikian, 1919-1921 tt. (Erevan, 1970), pp. 107—180. The Armenian periodic press of the Near East, Europe, and the United States carried daily accounts of the developments in and affecting Cilicia. For Damadian’s activities in Cilicia, see MihranTamatian,Imhusheres,ed. VachéGhazarian (Beirut, 1985),pp. 142—158;Petros H. Tepoyan, Mihran Tamatian (1863—1943) (Beirut, 1964), pp. 168—216. 18 For correspondence regarding the negotiation and terms of the truce, see FO 371/ 5°49-5°53» E5870/E5874/E6420/E6433/E6526/E7239/E7898/E7901/E7993/ E8237/E8545/3/44. See also Paul du Véou, La passion de la Glide, 1919—1922, 2d ed. (Paris, 1954), pp. 214—226; Général du Hays, Les armées françaises au Levant, 1919—1939, II: Le temps des combats, 1920—1921 (Vincennes, 1979), pp. 248—265, 354—360; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 85—89. Genelkurmay Baçkanhgi Harb Tarihi Dairesi, Turk Istiklâl Harbi, IV: Güney Cephesi (15 Mayis 1919—20 Ekim 1921) (Ankara, 1966), pp. 143—153; Tûrk Inkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsû, Atatürk’ün tamim, telgrafve beyannameleri, IV: (1917—1938) (Ankara, 1964), pp. 333—334; Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927 (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 390-391.

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menians could maintain their centuries-long presence in the region or whether they should forsake their homes and leave, never to return. Although the issue of Cilicia ran through the proceedings of the Second National Congress, the sessions ofJune 11 and 12 were devoted entirely to the problem. Sahak II, Catholicos of Cilicia, participated in these deliberations, but he was disadvantaged by the fact that he had been away for nearly three months. In Paris he had tried to persuade Millerand’s government to protect and arm his people, who by defending themselves would be upholding the rule of France. His reception had been cordial but evasive. During the congress deliberations, Gabriel Noradoungian observed that the truce with Kemal would result in serious harm to the Christian communities in Cilicia, but the most recent re­ ports from Adana were somewhat encouraging, and the French now seemed resolved to stand firm. Arshak Chobanian reported that he had just been to the Quai d’Orsay, where foreign ministry officials had flatly denied rumors of a total evacuation. The foreign ministry explained that there had simply been a limited truce with the Kemalist forces. When Chobanian inquired how there could be a truce within a truce (the Mudros Armistice), he had been told that the twenty-day cease-fire was only a military maneuver and had no political significance whatsoever.19 For Avetis Terzipashian, the experienced Ramkavar leader from Van who was representing the Western Armenian refugees in the Armenian republic, the issue was clear—the Allies had given Cilicia to the Turks: “I believe we must come to terms with that reality.” The Armenians should take active measures for self-defense while directing their polit­ ical program toward fulfillment of the guarantees regarding minority rights included in the Turkish peace treaty. They would have to accept Turkish suzerainty with certain conditions or else pull up and leave Ci­ licia for good.20 The congress seemed to be at a loss in determining a clear-cut course of action. When Noradoungian asked the National Del­ egation to make a proposal on which the meeting could act, Arshak Chobanian replied evasively that the delegation was doing everything possible and making all the necessary appeals and proposals. The com­ mittee charged with formulating the guidelines for the new National Delegation included the following recommendation regarding Cilicia: ‘‘The delegation must pursue every means to succeed in bringing about an autonomous regime there.”21 As the congress moved toward adjournment, Vahan Tekeyan insisted 19 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 8881—8930 passim. For Patriarch Zaven’s discussion with French Prime Minister Alexandre Millerand, see microfilm i-D, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 87, May 7, 1920. 20 Ibid., microfilm C-5, p. 8927. 21 Ibid., p. 9005.

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that a substantive resolution be adopted. During the twenty-ninth ses­ sion, on July 9, he asked and answered rhetorically: “What have we done? We have done nothing!” He warned that the plight of Cilicia had aroused the entire nation and that if the delegation and congress failed to fulfill their obligations in this matter, other bodies were preparing to organize to meet the need. Several delegates expressed optimism that the French would remain in Cilicia and establish a mandate over the region. Noradoungian noted that southern Cilicia, including towns such as Dortyol and Hasanbeyli, together with the port of Alexandretta (Is­ kenderun) , was to be left on the Syrian side of the new frontier and was already factually separated. He suggested that, as in the case of Lebanon, the French might not want any part of Cilicia to be included directly in the Syrian state, implying that the Armenians might concentrate in that zone and make it a national home under French auspices.22 That same day, in its penultimate session, the National Congress fi­ nally adopted a general resolution drafted by Mikayel Papadjanian and amended by Tekeyan and Chobanian: “Taking into consideration the new political circumstances in Cilicia, the congress finds it essential to follow the policy of creating an autonomous or, if possible, independent government under a French protectorate in Cilicia and to the degree possible in surrounding Armenian lands.”23 ByJuly, however, Hadjin was in its fourth month of encirclement, the French garrison had been driven out of Urfa and massacred, and the Armenians of Aintab had thrown up new barricades to withstand a lengthy siege and repeated attacks.24 The conflict within the Armenian American community came before the National Congress on several occasions. On the one hand, Vahan Cardashian and the American Committee for the Independence of Ar­ menia (ACIA), supported by the Dashnaktsutiun, lobbied for direct American aid to Armenia rather than a protectorate or mandate. On the other hand, the Armenian National Union of America, influenced primarily by the Ramkavar and Reformed Hnchakian parties, and the National Delegation’s special mission, headed by Abraham Ter-Hakobian, tended to favor the views of James Barton and other Protestant and relief officials who insisted that a separate Armenian state was not feasible without an American mandate or direct supervision. The latter grouping lent its support to a new American lobbying group, the Ar­ menia America Society, which was organized in 1920 under the lead­ 22 Ibid., pp. 9160—9164. 23 Ibid., p. 9182. 24 See Archives de l’Armée, 20N/168, dossiers 4 and 5; FO 371/5053, E8264/3/44; Sahakian, op. át., pp. 166—202; Güney Cephesi, pp. 102—169; Ali Sâib [Ursava§], Kilikya fadatan ve Uifa’nin kurtuluçu mücadeteteri (Ankara, 1924).

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ership of Walter George Smith and George Montgomery and which was somewhat less radical and confrontational than the ACIA. At a time when it seemed that President Wilson was preparing to ask the Senate for authority to accept the Armenian mandate, National Un­ ion chairman Sevasly and Professor Ter-Hakobian cabled Boghos Nubar that Pasdermadjian, Cardashian, and Archbishop Khoren (Muratbekian), the Primate of Erevan, had informed Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and others that the Armenians did not want a mandate.25 In the bitter journalistic exchanges that followed, Pasdermadjian adamantly denied that he had recommended against a mandate. Rather, he and Arch­ bishop Khoren had advised that it would be better not to put the issue to the Senate if, as was certain, that body would deny the request, as rejection would strike a mortal blow by encouraging Armenia’s enemies to attack. The Armenian spokesmen had therefore urged that the ques­ tion be deferred. Pasdermadjian reiterated these points in an unpleasant personal exchange with Mihran Sevasly.26 Sevasly cabled Pasdermadjian’s logical explanation to Boghos Nubar, but the matter did not rest there. As the National Congress drew toward a close, Sevasly again accused Pasdermadjian of outright lobbying against the mandate, as Lodge and other senators had attested. The Ramkavar leaders in the National Congress were particularly agitated by this rev­ elation. Arshak Chobanian absolved Archbishop Khoren of blame—the cleric did not know English, and it had been reported that Vahan Car­ dashian had translated his words in such a way as to back Cardashian’s own opposition to the mandate. Pasdermadjian and Cardashian were roundly criticized by several delegates, but the congress did little to mit­ igate the strife except to instruct the National Delegation to seek means, in collaboration with the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, to end the harmful rift within the Armenian American community.27 The Dashnakist press meanwhile showered derision and denunciation upon the National Delegation and the Second National Congress, in­ sisting that the four Dashnakists still in attendance—Artavazd Hanemian, Martiros Ter-Peterian, Armenak Barseghian, and Hakob Nevruz— withdraw from the assembly of scoundrels. In an editorial entitled “Just Criticism,” the Hairenik observed that the opponents of the Dashnaktsu­ tiun were entirely justified in pointing to the contradiction in the party’s 25 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 9194-9195, microfilm i-D, Minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, no. 94, May 28, 1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (June 12, 1920), pp. 757—758, 776—778; Manuk G. Jizmejian, Patmutiun amerikahai kaghakakan kusaktsutiants, i8go—ig2§ (Fresno, 1930), pp. 434—444. 26 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, Pasdermadjian to Sevasly, May 29, to Dash­ naktsutiun Central Committee of North America, June 3, and to Aharonian, june 18,1920; Hairenik, May 30:1, June 3:1, 1920. 27 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, p. 9209.

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repudiation of the National Congress when several prominent party members were among the participants. “Dr. Nevruz and the other Dashnakists must resign either from the Dashnaktsutiun or from the National Congress,’’ the editorial proclaimed.28 It was perhaps significant, how­ ever, that the four Dashnakist delegates were all in close communication with Avetis Aharonian, who apparently deemed it useful to have several confidants in the congress and, though often at odds with Boghos Nubar, may have wished to be conciliatory as the moment for signing the Turkish peace treaty approached. Guidelines for the new National Delegation were deliberated and ap­ proved during several sessions at the end of June. Insofar as foreign policy was concerned, the committee on guidelines presented two pos­ sibilities. If the peace treaty gave adequate satisfaction through the uni­ fication of most of Western Armenia with the Republic of Armenia, then the delegation would cease its separate existence. If, however, the treaty trampled upon the Armenian cause by awarding only a small part of Western Armenia to the new united state, then the delegation should continue its labors until a new congress of Western Armenians gathered to decide upon a course of action. The recommendations did not specify what “adequate satisfaction” entailed, but the discussions made it clear that the award of most of the territories in the four vilayets (Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Trebizond) within which President Wilson was to arbitrate the Armenian frontier would be deemed sufficient. The committee noted that there were no international legal grounds on which the National Delegation would be called upon to be a party to the Turkish peace treaty. Whether Boghos Nubar might sign at the behest of the govern­ ment of the Armenian republic was a personal matter.29 Avetis Terzipashian suggested omitting any guidelines about who should sign the treaty. That aspect was not resolved, however, and Boghos Nubar would come back to the question in the concluding session. The guidelines reiterated the charge upon the National Delegation to strive toward the establishment of an autonomous regime in Cilicia under French auspices and to try to secure reparations for Armenian wartime losses. The issue of reparations was also put by Noradoungian to members of the Phil-Armenian conference, which met in Paris on July 6—7, 1920. Armenophile societies from England, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Denmark were represented by many distinguished figures, including Auguste de Morsier (president), Antony Krafft-Bonnard (sec­ retary), Léopold Favre, Victor Bérard, Gaston Deschamps, L’abbé De­ larue, Frédéric Macler, Emily Robinson, and Inga Collin Nalbandian. At 28 Hairenik, June 20:1, 1920. See also issue of July 16:2, 1920. 29 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 9027—9032.

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a dinner hosted by the Delegation of Integral Armenia on July 6, toasts and words of appreciation were given by Boghos Nubar, Avetis Aha­ ronian, General Korganian, and Gabriel Noradoungian, to which the Armenophiles responded with expressions of hope and confidence that the much-tormented Armenian people would soon be rewarded with peace and justice. Noradoungian suggested to Victor Bérard that the question of reparations be included in the appeal the Phil-Armenian conference was preparing to send to the Allied Powers. If the Turkish finances were not sufficient to meet the demands both of the Allies and of the Armenians, then perhaps a fraction of the German reparations could be allocated for the Armenians. Even half of 1 percent would give the struggling Armenians an enormous boost. Though Bérard indicated support for the suggestion, the final text of the Phil-Armenian appeal made no mention of reparations. The Armenians were to remain un­ indemnified.30 The guidelines on internal affairs called upon the National Delegation to continue efforts to bring about an integrated government of united Armenia. Following the interruption of the negotiations in Erevan in November 1919, Prime Minister Khatisian had written a conciliatory letter to Boghos Nubar, leaving the door open for a future accord. Now Avetis Terzipashian and Nshan Ter-Stepanian proposed that, standing on Khatisian’s assurances regarding the equal participation of Western Armenians in the cabinet and legislature, the National Delegation should resume the negotiations as soon as the peace treaty had been signed. If the negotiations failed to produce satisfactory results, the del­ egation should organize the election of about fifty Western Armenian representatives, who would convene in Erevan and defend Western Ar­ menian interests. Should that body reach agreement with the Erevan government, it could then merge with the existing legislature in forming the Parliament of United Armenia. During the final session on July 13, Noradoungian announced that Alexandre Khatisian, who was then in Paris en route to Egypt to promote Armenia’s Independence Loan, had reiterated his keen desire for a united government and had offered to bring that message personally to the National Congress but was pre­ vented from doing so by other pressing business. The resolution adopted by the congress authorized renewed negotiations for a united govern­ ment but left open the possibility for election of a Western Armenian assembly pending the conclusion of an accord sensitive to the needs of 30 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 122/21, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 19201.: Spayi Hamagumar, File 336/6, H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1920t., and Files 236/35, 320/2, and 422/2; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, p. 9153; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Aug. 6, 1920), p. 1034.

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the Western Armenians (and by extension of the non-Dashnakist polit­ ical parties) .31 The selection of the new National Delegation took many weeks of coaxing and cajoling. From the outset, Boghos Nubar, who had headed the delegation since his appointment by Catholicos Gevorg V in 1912, announced his intent to resign. He had thought that the Armenian ques­ tion would have been settled by then, but it was obvious that a solution would require some time longer. He was physically and mentally ex­ hausted and unable to continue under the enormous strain and respon­ sibility of his position. Boghos Nubar’s impending resignation was re­ ported in the Armenian press, prompting scores of telegrams and appeals imploring the veteran diplomat to persevere until justice had been achieved for the Armenian people.32 The non-Dashnakist press had its own interpretation of Nubar’s res­ ignation. The Kochndk Hayastani of New York, for example, explained that Boghos Nubar had been deeply wounded by the Dashnaktsutiun’s smear campaign against him and his delegation. With haughty arro­ gance, the Dashnakists were insisting that, because the Republic of Ar­ menia was the only existing legal entity recognized by the Allied Powers and because it alone would be party to the peace treaty, Boghos Nubar and the National Delegation had become superfluous. The Kochnak ob­ served that after serving his people selflessly for years, Boghos Nubar was being vilified by narrow-minded partisans. Moreover, the Dashnakist logic was faulted, inasmuch as the Armenian question had centered on Western Armenia since the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. Even if the Dashnaktsutiun was the most active and influential party in the diaspora, that was no reason to try to neutralize and denigrate capable civic leaders simply because they were not party members or adherents. At this critical historic moment, the Dashnaktsutiun should cease such divisive acts, “which violate the conscience of the Armenian people.”33 During the second half of June, Boghos Nubar indicated he might withdraw his resignation if Gabriel Noradoungian, a highly experienced civil servant, agreed to serve with him. But Noradoungian was adamant in his refusal, arguing that he could be of greater good from the outside and that because he was leaving Paris he could not participate in the routine activities of the delegation. Wavering, Boghos Nubar met with Avetis Aharonian to discuss their mutual relations and to receive a pledge of harmonious cooperation. Finally, at the end of the month Nubar announced that he would reluctantly allow himself to be drafted 31 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, pp. 9030—9031, 9196, 9201, 9210. 32 Ibid., pp. 8932—8934, 8936, 9005, 9020-9024, 9058—9062; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (July 24, 1920), pp. 959-960. 33 Kochnak Hayastani, XX (July 31, 1920), pp. 975—976.

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and suggested that the reconstituted delegation should include no more than three other members. On July 3, Grigor Sinapian, Levon Mkrtichian, and Hakob Nevruz were elected.34 Nevruz’s inclusion in the new delegation elicited renewed complaints and denunciations from the Hairenik: “Dr. Nevruz’s election causes us sorrow. He should have re­ signed long ago. He has failed to do so for incomprehensible reasons. His presence on the ‘new delegation’ is even more incomprehensible. Dr. Nevruz, however, must resign either from the Dashnaktsutiun or from that tarnished chair.’’35 On its final day of deliberations on July 13, the National Congress again concerned itself with the peace treaty. Although the delegates un­ derstood that for considerations of international law the National Del­ egation would not be invited to sign the forthcoming treaty, there was strong sentiment to find a way to have Boghos Nubar Pasha participate in that ceremony on behalf of the Western Armenians. Arshak Chobanian declared that it should be made clear that Western Armenia was not being annexed by Eastern or Russian Armenia but rather that the Allies were granting independence to both sectors, which were uniting through the free will of their duly elected representatives. Boghos Nu­ bar, as the leading spokesman of the Western Armenians, should surely be a signatory of the treaty.36 Gabriel Noradoungian viewed the issue in legal terms. Giving Boghos Nubar a mandate to sign the treaty would accomplish nothing, he said. The Allied Powers could not accept such credentials; the treaty had to be signed in the name of a duly recognized state. For the Armenians, that right belonged to the government of the Republic of Armenia. Boghos Nubar, who was painfully aware of the juridical validity of Noradoungian’s logic, nonetheless wished desperately to find a way to experience the supreme moment after eight years of continuous service to the Armenian cause. He told the delegates that the matter was not one of personality but of principle. If the National Congress did not care whether or not the Western Armenians were represented, that was well and good. “But in my opinion it is imperative that the treaty be signed in the name of the Western Armenians.... The unification of Armenia and the Arme­ nians should be consummated in the treaty by the signatures of repre­ sentatives of both Eastern Armenians and Western Armenians.”37 34 Hairenik, July 16:2, 1920; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Sept. 4, 1920), pp. 1148—1151. Si­ napian (Krikor Sinabian) also served as legal adviser to the Republic of Armenia Delegation headed by Avetis Aharonian, with Nevruz (Agop Nevrouze) as technical adviser. See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134, correspondence ofJune 8, 1920. 35 Hairenik, July 16:2, 17:2, 1920. 36 Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-5, p. 9212. 37 Ibid., pp. 9212-9213.

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Arshak Chobanian, who had great difficulty disguising his personal dislike of fellow writer Avetis Aharonian, cautioned that if Aharonian alone signed the treaty, “this will signify that the Russian Armenians are uniting the Turkish Armenians to themselves, whereas, on the contrary, it is the latter who themselves are joining with the Republic.’’ Hakob Nevruz, in the role of mediator and conciliator, explained that Aha­ ronian had intended to ask the Erevan government to allow Boghos Nubar to share in the signing of the treaty, but the Bolshevik uprising in May and the subsequent confusion and problems in communications had prevented him from doing so. In any case, it was Aharonian’s view that credentials accorded to Boghos Nubar by the National Congress would carry greater weight than any issued by the Catholicos or the Armenian National Assembly (Azgayin Zhoghov) in Constantinople.38 The troubling subject was concluded with adoption of the following resolution: The National Congress gives a mandate to the President of the National Del­ egation so that, in the event the treaty satisfies Western Armenian demands at least minimally, he take the requisite measures to receive the right to sign the treaty in the name of the Congress of Turkish Armenian representatives. Furthermore, the Congress authorizes its chairman to submit the credentials for signing the treaty once the President of the Delegation has received that right.39

The Second National Congress completed its labors by extending greetings to the Republic of Armenia, the heroic Armenian army and Western Armenian fighters, the people of Cilicia, and Dr. James Barton in appreciation of the humanitarian assistance of the Near East Relief. After nine weeks and thirty-one sessions, the National Congress ad­ journed on July 13, 1920. Within the next month, Avetis Aharonian would sign the Treaty of Sèvres without Boghos Nubar Pasha, whose only consolation would be to affix his signature to the protocol between the Allied Powers and Armenia for the guarantee of minority rights in the new Armenian state.40 Also during that month, on August 4—5, Mihran Damadian would initiate an ill-fated coup in Adana in a desperate at­ tempt to create a Cilician republic under a French mandate and prevent the region’s restoration to Turkey. The declaration of a Christian ad­ ministration made up of Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, and Chaldeans strained Franco-Armenian relations further and had no salutary effect 38 Ibid., pp. 9213-9216. 39 Ibid., pp. 9216—9217. 40 Ibid., p. 9220. For materials on the signing of the treaty on minorities, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 119/18, and File 124/23, H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t..

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in alleviating the plight of the beleaguered Armenians of Hadjin, Zeitun, Aintab, and elsewhere.41 Though the final French abandonment of the Cilician Armenians was still some months off, the Armenians had devel­ oped a refined nose for trouble, and many survivors who had returned to the region in 1919 with great hopes and expectations were again setting out on the road to exile. The Armenians of Hadjin would put up a heroic defense for seven months until nearly all were massacred by the victorious Turkish Nationalist forces in October 1920, and the Arme­ nians of Aintab would raise their barricades repeatedly until a general accord and modus vivendi between France and Nationalist Turkey in October 1921 translated into the final exodus of the entire Armenian population of greater Cilicia.42

Diplomatic Activities in Central Europe During the course of 1920, Armenian plenipotentiaries and diplomatic agents were operating in many countries, particularly those with signif­ icant Armenian communities. Most of the representatives functioned in an unofficial capacity, as the governments of their host countries held off formal recognition pending the determination of Armenia’s bound­ aries, ratification of the Turkish peace treaty, and implementation of the provisions therein regarding Armenia, as well as practical evidence that

41 For the abortive declaration of Cilician independence under French protectorate, see Tamatian, op. dt, pp. 164—186; Tepoyan, op. dt., pp. 209—216; Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-i 1, second series, pp. 1215//, and C-i 3, pp. 5167 ff.; Edouard Brémond, “La Cilicie en 1919—1920,” Revue des études arméniennes, I (no. 3, 1921), p. 366; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/1115, dossier 6; Kochnak Hayastani, XX (Aug. 28, Sept. 11 and 25, Oct. 2, 1920), pp. 1122, 1222—1224, 1235-1236, 1269, 1282-1284.; Du Hays, op. dt., p. 234; Sahakian, op. dt., pp. 221—226. 42 For developments in Hadjin, Zeitun, Aintab, and other Armenian population centers in Cilicia until the general exodus at the end of 1921, see Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, micro­ films C-7, C-i 1, D-2 through D-6 passim.; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 132/31, 136/ 35, and 241/140; Archives de l’Armée, 20N/157, dossier 3, 20N/171, dossiers 1—3, 20N/ 172, dossiers 1—2, 20N/1088, dossiers 1—3, 20N/1115, dossiers 6—8 passim; FO 371, files E3/44 and Ei 214/44 f°r 192°; US Archives, RG 59, File 860J.4016 passim; Maurice Aba­ die, . . . Opérations au Levant: Les quatre sièges dAintab (1920-1921) (Paris, 1922); Sahakian, op. dt., pp. 166—268; Du Hays, op. dt., pp. 296—335, 367—384, 408—411; The Missionary Herald, CXVI-CXVIII (1920—1922); Levon Norashkharian, Zeitun, 1914—1921 tt. (husher) (Erevan, 1984), pp. 133—271. Nazaret Zeituntsian, Zdtuni verdjin depkere (1919—1921) (Al­ exandria, 1922); Aram Aspet, Drvagner Hajno herosamarten ev herosin odisakane (Beirut, 1961); M. Sepuh, Hajeni voghbergutiune (pasharum ev kotorads): Vaverakan ev antip teghekutiunner (Aleppo, i960); Vard Mekhak, Zdtuni nahandje (Constantinople, 1922); A. Kesar, Aintapi goyamarte (Boston, 1945); Sokrat H. Terzian, Hajeni utamsia tiutsaznamarte (Buenos Aires, 1956). For Turkish sources, see Güney Cephesi, pp. 171—263; Recep Dalkir, Yigitlik giinleri: Midi mücadelede Çukurova (Istanbul, 1961); Ali Kiliç, Istiklâl mahkemesi hâttralan (Is­ tanbul, 1955); Sahir Uzel, Gazi Antep savaçtnin iç yüzü (Ankara, 1952).

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an independent Armenia would endure. There were other problems, too. The Armenian government had no hard currency to establish and maintain diplomatic posts; it lacked professionally trained diplomatic personnel; and it was often caught in the middle of deep-seated rifts and personality conflicts within the various Armenian communities. The Ar­ menian diplomatic representatives, in turn, were repeatedly exasperated by the long delays in receiving the essentials of their position, including proper credentials and basic information about the Armenian republic, its governing organs, its leaders, its passport and visa regulations, its national hymn, money, and postage, its regulations regarding foreign investment, and so forth. As subjects of the Turkish and Russian empires, Armenians scattered around the world were frequently deprived of dip­ lomatic assistance and, along with other natives of those empires, faced enormous difficulties in securing official documents and visas. These circumstances only added to the urgency of establishing Armenian dip­ lomatic posts and securing formal recognition from the world commu­ nity of sovereign states. Despite all the complications involved, Armenian representatives were at work in many places in Russia and the Caucasus; in Germany, Finland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece; in Bel­ gium, Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain, and France; in Constantinople, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Mesopotamia, and Persia; in Japan and Manchuria; in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile; and in the United States of America. Germany was the center of Armenian diplomatic activity in Central Europe. During the final months of the world war in 1918, Hamazasp Ohandjanian and Social Democrat intellectual Arshak Zohrabian had traveled from Tiflis to Berlin to try to persuade the Kaiser’s government to pressure Turkey to honor the boundaries established by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdraw from the plain of Ararat and other parts of the Erevan and Tiflis gubemiias. Even though it was not German pres­ sure but the Allied victory over Turkey that ultimately forced the Turkish armies to evacuate the province of Erevan and subsequently Kars, the postwar German government allowed Armenian diplomatic agents to operate freely in the country. The unofficial Armenian mission in Berlin was headed by Dr. James Greenfield, a native of Persia and a graduate of the University of Berlin. Before the world war he had been instru­ mental in the organization of the Armenian German Union, and after the war he collaborated with prominent Armenophiles such as Armin Wegner, Johannes Lepsius, and Josef Markwart in the formation of sup­ port groups. With his assistant, Haik Ter-Ohanian, Greenfield worked to segregate Armenians from among the Russian prisoners of war in Germany and succeeded in June 1919 in concentrating most of them

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in Minden, Westphalia. Nearly 1,000 of these men were eventually re­ patriated to Transcaucasia at the expense of the German government.43 The many weeks that it took for infrequent couriers to travel between Erevan and Paris prompted the Armenian government in February 1920 to grant Avetis Aharonian authority to appoint Armenian diplomatic personnel in Europe subject to ultimate confirmation by the foreign ministry.44 Using that authority in May 1920, Aharonian, at Greenfield’s urging, appointed Avetik S. Avetikian as Armenian consul-general in Berlin. A prosperous merchant with headquarters in Smyrna, Avetikian was able to cover most of the expenses of the consulate. Avetikian and Greenfield solicited and shipped medications to Armenia and actively explored the possibility of securing German credits for the purchase and export of equipment and machinery. In particular, the Armenian con­ sulate, assisted by honorary adviser in military affairs Mikhail Dolukhanian, sought ways to purchase and transport a small-arms ammunition factory to Armenia. Moreover, there were great quantities of Russian war matériel captured by the Germans which could be purchased cheaply in large lots. The consular officials believed it would be possible to send some of this matériel to Armenia at virtually no cost by finding a French company that would ship a part of the stock to Armenia and recoup its expenses and gain a profit through the sale of the rest in smaller lots.45 By the summer of 1920, the Berlin consulate had become better or­ ganized, as legal expert Liparit Nazariants, having been released from confinement in Moscow, assumed the post of senior counselor and drew up the consulate’s regulations. Nazariants had been educated in Ger­ many and had previous experience there in advancing the Armenian cause. Haik Ter-Ohanian was in charge of the press bureau, and hon­ orary advisers Dolukhanian, Hovhannes Ikchikjian, and Vahan Zakarian were in charge of military, financial, and economic affairs, respectively. The small Armenian community of Germany was enthusiastic about the rebirth of a sovereign Armenian state. Greenfield made repeated re­ quests to Aharonian for Armenian stamps and currency to be given as souvenirs in a fund-raising campaign. In October the consulate moved to new offices in a fashionable quarter of Berlin and intensified efforts

4S State Historical Archives of Armenia (Armenia Archives), fund 200, register 1, file 420; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 234/133, and File 353a, H. H. Bertini Nerkayatsutschutiun, igig—igso. 44 Names and addresses of diplomatic personnel appointed by Aharonian are in Armenia Archives, 200/1/470, p. 121. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 234/133. 45 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, Lettre de créance, May 22, 1920, File 235/ 134, Lettre de créance, June 3, 1920, File 353a, Greenfield to Aharonian, Feb. 16, June 16, Oct. 23, 1920.

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to gain de jure recognition of the Armenian republic and to transform from an unofficial consulate to an official Armenian legation.46 In the same way that German influence had permeated the lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland, so, too, did the Berlin con­ sulate become the liaison with the largely assimilated Armenian com­ munities of Central Europe. In the wake of the Counter-Reformation in the seventeenth century, these historic communities had been com­ pelled to convert to Roman Catholicism and gradually lost their native language and close contact with the homeland. Now the formation of the Armenian republic and the possibility of its expansion into a sizable united state produced a strong stimulus that began to awaken the Ar­ menians of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland. The stir­ rings of national consciousness were nurtured by the Armenian Roman Catholic Mekhitarist order based in Vienna. In addition to the longdomiciled Armenian Catholics, there were more recent immigrants, mostly traders and merchants from the Ottoman Empire, who still be­ longed to the national Armenian Apostolic Church. They tended to re­ main on good terms with the Turkish diplomatic missions, which on occasion had even interceded on behalf of certain of these individuals in their difficulties with the Austrian authorities. Ironically, there were members of this group who now sought appointment sis consul or hon­ orary consul of the Republic of Armenia. The duality and divisiveness that characterized many Armenian com­ munities were not absent in Vienna. When wealthy, influential mer­ chants such as Zareh Gabrielian and Tigran Papazian sought diplomatic appointments, they were vilified by the “patriotic elements”—namely, the adherents of the Dashnaktsutiun and fervent supporters of the Ar­ menian republic—as opposed to the “rug merchants,” who were related to the bourgeois collaborators of Boghos Nubar Pasha. The files of the Armenian republic’s Paris delegation reveal how difficult it was for Avetis Aharonian to steer between opposing factions and to try to select indi­ viduals who could bring the most good to the community and to Ar­ menia without exacerbating internal community friction. Such consid­ erations delayed the appointment of certain officials and ultimately led Aharonian and the Armenian government to the conclusion that new persons from the outside should be assigned to these posts. Yet imple­ mentation of that decision was hampered by the incumbent cost factor. In his bid to be appointed honorary consul, Zareh Gabrielian drew attention to his previous service as Persian vice-consul in Alexandria, Egypt, and to his close association with the diplomatic corps in Vienna. 46 Rep. of Ann. Del. Archives, File 353a passim, and File 236/135, Aharonian to Green­ field, June 28, 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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He was confident that he could secure aid for Armenia and represent the political, economic, and social interests of the Armenians of Austria. Yet reports reaching Aharonian warned that Gabrielian was isolated from the Armenian community and that his past shady business dealings could reflect badly on the Armenian government. Even greater contro­ versy was raised over the petitions to name Tigran Papazian as consul. A wealthy rug merchant who had lived in Vienna for twenty years, Pa­ pazian headed the Ani Cultural Society and engaged the support of the erudite Mekhitarist scholar and community leader Father Nerses Akinian. During the visit of James Greenfield to Vienna in April 1920, Papazian donated half of the 200,000 Austrian korona collected for the Armenian army immediately following religious services and the blessing of the Armenian tricolor flag in the historic Mekhitarist church. Yet the proDashnakist elements of the community denounced Papazian as a spec­ ulator and price-gouger who during the war had escaped prosecution by the Austrian authorities only through the intercession of the Turkish embassy—this at a time when hundreds of thousands of Armenians were being massacred by the Turks. It was essential, wrote the protesters, to appoint a person of good character, not a profiteer who had betrayed the Armenian cause. He was a cohort of Boghos Nubar Pasha and un­ fortunately had even been able to deceive Dr. Greenfield with false man­ ifestations of patriotism. Such a scoundrel “will turn the consulate into a den of iniquity.’’47 Greenfield reported to Aharonian that Papazian could be a useful appointee but that he had personal enemies and was accused of disreputable dealings associated with the Turkish embassy. He advised that the opinion of the Austrian government be sought and, if either the government or a large segment of the Armenian community found Papazian objectionable, that a representative be brought in from the outside. Greenfield added that while in Vienna he had been assured by Vice Chancellor Fink that the Austrian government would welcome the establishment of an Armenian diplomatic mission and that he had been given a cordial reception by the Hungarian and Czech consuls.48

47 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 365, H. H. Viennayi Hiupatosutiun, 1920—1921 t., File 235/134, Aharonian to A. Hiuseinjian, May 31, 1920, File 236/35, Secretary-General of Delegation to Foreign Minister of Armenia, Aug. 17, 1920, also in Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/420, pp. 35-36; Hairenik, Jan 14:2, 1920. 48 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 353a, Greenfield to Aharonian, May 3, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/420, pp. 2, 21-22, and 200/1/596, pp. 2—3. Already on April 3 and again on July 3, the Armenian foreign ministry rejected the proposed appointment of Papazian because of numerous unfavorable reports about him. See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ter-Akopian (Ter-Hakobian) to Aharonian, April 3, 1920, and Armenia Archives, 200/1/420, p. 36, Armenian foreign ministry telegram, July 3, 1920. See also Hairenik, May 9:2, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

From Vienna, Greenfield traveled to Budapest at the invitation of the Masis Society, composed of prominent Armenian Catholics who had or­ ganized under Dr. Felixe Avedik to study their history and culture and assist the resurrected Armenian homeland. The society, Dr. Avedik in­ formed Greenfield, was working to inform Hungarian public opinion that Pan-Turanism, which had attracted certain Hungarian intellectuals, was a defunct concept. After the celebration of an Armenian-rite Cath­ olic mass by Father Akinian, Greenfield and Akinian addressed the mem­ bers of the Masis Society and Hungarian officials in attendance about the Republic of Armenia, its needs, potential, and opportunities. Dr. Greenfield was also received by the chancellor of the Hungarian foreign ministry, who declared that the Turanist movement had few followers left in Hungary. The Budapest government desired cordial relations with the Armenian republic and would welcome the appointment of an Ar­ menian representative. The invigorated local community asked that superior court judge Paul Jakobfíy be named Armenia’s minister. Dr. Avedik also recommended that Dr. Gustav Papp, a former mayor, be appointed consul for Transylvania.49 In the new Czecho-Slovak federation, the small Armenian community organized under the leadership of D. Sahakian. It was able to persuade the Czech authorities to separate Armenian prisoners of war from other Russian prisoners and in 1920 assisted in the repatriation of about 100 of the men to Armenia. It also engaged in modest fund-raising for the Armenian army and for the shipment of shoes to Armenia’s orphans. The Czechoslovak-Armenian Commercial Society came into being with considerable assets during the summer of 1920 and received the moral support of the Prague government, which expressed strong interest in developing trade relations with Armenia.50 The Armenian communities in the medieval Polish kingdoms had been large and prosperous, maintaining an autonomous existence and living by their own code of laws until the Counter-Reformation had com­ pelled them to adopt Roman Catholicism, which was followed by gradual assimilation. At the end of the world war, there were only about 4,000 persons who still identified themselves as Armenian. Some of them, en­ couraged by Archbishop Theodorovich of Lemberg (Lvov), sought their roots through the aegis of a newly formed Armenian society. The thriv­ 49 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 353a, Greenfield to Aharonian, Sept. 23, 1920, and File 233/132, Armenian Delegation to Hungarian-Armenian Society, Jan. 13, 1920; Ar­ menia Archives, 200/1/420, pp. 24-26, and 200/1/596, pp. 1, 29. 50 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 377, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Chekhoslovakiayi Netkayatsutschutiun, 1921 t., File 243/142, Sahagian (Sahakian) to Armenian Delegation, Dec. 1920, File 353a, Greenfield to Aharonian, Aug. 17, 1920, and Greenfield to Hanemian, Jan. 17,1921; Armenia Archives, 200/1 /ggô, pp. 4—17. For the activities of a Czech mission in Armenia in September, see Haradj, Sept. 15:1, 19:2, 30:3, 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

SOI

ing communities had vanished, but historic Armenian churches and buildings stood as impressive reminders. When Avetik Avetikian, the Armenian honorary consul-general in Ber­ lin, traveled to Warsaw in June 1920, he met Archbishop Theodorovich and through him Dr. Opinski, chief of mission of the foreign ministry. Opinski seemed very agreeable to the appointment of an Armenian rep­ resentative in Poland and looked forward to favorable mutual commer­ cial relations. Pending the creation of a diplomatic mission in Warsaw, the Berlin consulate could issue passports to citizens of the Armenian republic residing in Poland. The Armenian National Council of Poland was organized that same month with encouragement from Avetikian and Greenfield.51 In August, Avetis Aharonian made formal application for the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of a consulate in Warsaw. He nominated Muguerditch Papazian to serve as honorary consul pending the arrival of a career diplomat. Meanwhile, the Polish government had already dispatched a special mission headed by Titus Filipowicz to explore the prospect for trade and investment in Armenia and the other Transcaucasian republics; it subsequently appointed Waclaw Ostrowsky as diplomatic representative to Georgia and Armenia.52 The governments of Central Europe were well disposed toward Ar­ menians and the Armenian republic, and it seemed that before long formal relations would be established and diplomatic missions ex­ changed with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. On October 30, 1920, the Armenian foreign ministry appointed Dr. James Greenfield to serve as consul for all five countries, with the au­ thority to name vice-consuls or diplomatic agents wherever proper and necessary.53 In addition, preliminary inquiries were being made about the possibility of appointing Inga Collin Nalbandian, a prominent Dan­ ish Armenophile, to be Armenia’s consular agent in the Scandinavian countries.54 In Finland, many Armenians who had managed to get away from Pe­ trograd and other parts of Russia were stranded in Helsinki (Helsing­ fors) and especially at Terioki just inside the frontier. Formerly a part 51 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 353a, Avetikian report, July 6, 1920. 52 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 351/1, Aharonian to Count Maurice Zamoysky, Aug. 2, 1920, File 236/135, Armenian Delegation to Armenian National Council of Poland, and to Chilingirian, Warsaw, both dated July 15, 1920, File 376, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Lehastani Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919—1921 tt.; Armenia Archives, 200/1/468, p. 35. Filipowicz’s mission arrived in Tiflis at the end of March 1920. See Bor’ba, March 31:4, April 1:4, 1920 (listing personnel of the mission). 5SRep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 353a, Aharonian to Greenfield, Nov. 30, 1920; Ar­ menia Archives, 200/1/420, p. 53. The decision by the government was taken on October 6, 1920, according to correspondence in 200/1/545, p. 54. 54 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Secretary-General to Nalbandian, Aug. 18, 192°-

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

of the Russian Empire, Finland did not look favorably upon Russian subjects and did little to facilitate their business or transit. It was impor­ tant to impress upon the Finnish government that Armenia, too, was now independent and that Armenian subjects of the former Russian Empire could opt for Armenian citizenship. On April 16, 1920, the Paris delegation of the Republic of Armenia wrote the minister plenipoten­ tiary of Finland in France requesting the recognition of Mikhail TerAsaturov (Michel Assatouroff, Asaturian) as Armenia’s honorary viceconsul in Helsinki. Ter-Asaturov’s credentials authorized him to issue passports and defend Armenian interests in Finland. By the time he received his credentials in May, Ter-Asaturov was preparing to depart for Poland on business. Unwilling to postpone his trip until he could formally present his credentials in the foreign ministry, he telegraphed Aharonian to nominate a temporary replacement, Alexandre M. Sitni­ kov, who was fluent in Finnish, Swedish, and Russian. Ter-Asaturov also urged the appointment of Vardan Chmishkian (Vartan Tschimischjan, Tchimchkian), a native of Terioki, as a consular agent to help the Ar­ menian refugees escaping from Russia and of Tigran Tsitsikov of Revel as consular agent in Estonia. In reply, the Paris delegation telegraphed that the Finnish legation was advising its foreign ministry of TerAsaturov’s nomination and that, following regular diplomatic proce­ dures, Sitnikov was being appointed chancellor and as such would act in the absence of the vice-consul. Chmishkian was named secretary of the consulate but would maintain his residence in Terioki.55 Despite these arrangements, the difficulties of many Armenian refu­ gees persisted. Vardan Chmishkian reported that Armenians carrying Russian passports or citizenship papers were denied visas for travel to the West and that the Finnish authorities were still refusing to recognize the passports issued by the vice-consulate. Consequently, the Armenians were left in inhospitable surroundings with no means of livelihood.56 Nikolai Adontz, former director of the Lazarían Academy of Moscow, arrived in Finland in the spring of 1920 hoping to return to Armenia by way of Paris. In June he wrote the Paris delegation that, despite his repeated appeals, he could not get out of the country, “which is like a prison.’’ The Finns and Allied officials were ill-disposed toward Russian subjects, and it was essential that Armenia secure formal recognition of 55 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Minister of Finnish Republic (Paris), April 16, 1920, and Aharonian to Assatouroff, May 17, June 8 and 9, 1920, and File 374, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Finlandakan Karavarutiun, igso—ign t., Assatouroff to Aharonian, May 29, 1920. 56 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Assatouroff, June 14, 1920, File 235/134, Aharonian to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, June 29, 1920, and File 237/!36, Annenian Delegation to Tchimchkian, Sept. 27, 1920, and File 371.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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its independence and establish its own diplomatic missions. He com­ mended the good work of Alexandre Sitnikov in helping to ameliorate conditions but reiterated that until arrangements were made from abroad, “we are stuck.”57 In reply to the many appeals and complaints from the unofficial Ar­ menian vice-consulate and from prominent refugees, the Paris delega­ tion gave assurances in September that measures were being taken to remedy the situation. Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, Aharonian wrote the legations of many countries requesting de jure rec­ ognition as was deserving to the Republic of Armenia by virtue of its participation as a signatory of the treaty. Finally, on October 13, 1920, the Finnish chargé d’affaires informed the Armenian delegation that he had just received notification from his foreign ministry that Finland rec­ ognized the Republic of Armenia and expressed the desire to enter into regular diplomatic relations.58 Thereafter, the vice consulate was able to issue passports, and the refugees stranded in Terioki and Helsinki were allowed to travel onward. Finland and Armenia, the two possessions of the former Russian Empire about which so many international decla­ rations had been made, seemed to be on the threshold of a new mutual relationship.59

Russia and the Caucasus In other territories of the former Russian Empire, Armenian consuls, vice-consuls, consular agents, special envoys, military attachés, and na­ tional councils operated at various places and at various times during the existence of the Armenian republic. Some of the officials were ap­ pointed by the Erevan government, others served as local representatives of the consuls and envoys, and still others acted virtually through self­ appointment or questionable mandates. Cut off from direct communi­ cation with Erevan, the sundry diplomatic and military representatives tried as best they could to defend the interests of the Armenian republic and its citizens and to safeguard the thousands of Armenian refugees who had fled from the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus between 1915 and 1918. Most of the national councils predated the Armenian repub­ lic, functioning in cities and provinces with sizable Armenian commu­ 57 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Armenian Delegation to Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, May 29, 1920, and File 374, letters of Adontz. 58 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 239/138, H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920 t., Aharonian to Tchimchkian, Nov. 2, 1920, and Files 140/39 and 371. 59 In April 1920 the Caucasian press reported that a Latvian mission to the Caucasus headed by Oscar Buman and a Ukrainian mission headed by P. I. Krasovskii had arrived in Tiflis. See Bor’ba, April 2:4, 1920.

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nities such as Moscow and Petrograd in central Russia; Kharkov, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav,and Odessa in the Ukraine; Astrakhan, Krasnovodsk, and Tashkent in the Volga and Transcaspian regions; and Rostov, Nor Na­ khichevan, Ekaterinodar, Kislovodsk, Piatigorsk, Georgievsk, Vladikav­ kaz, and Stavropol in the broad expanses of the Don, Kuban, and Terek. By and large, the consular officials and national councils were able to function with relative freedom in areas under the control of the White Armies. From the anti-Soviet generals and regional administrations, the Armenian spokesmen worked to secure relief supplies and military ex­ emption for the refugee masses as well as measures to spare both the refugees and indigenous Armenians from the virulent hostility and per­ secution often befalling the Jewish population. As the Red Army pressed southward, these officials tried to gain permission and means to transfer refugees, intellectuals, and volunteers for the Armenian army from the Kuban and Terek over the Georgian Military Highway to Tiflis and Ere­ van. For the domiciled communities, they sought protection for Arme­ nian homes and businesses and especially for the national properties, including schools, churches and consistories, libraries, and cultural in­ stitutions. Most diplomatic representatives were assigned to a specific city or guberniia, but several were attached to a particular administration or head­ quarters and moved from place to place according to the shifts of for­ tune in the Russian civil war. Hovhannes Saghatelian (Ivan Iakovlevich Sagatelian), a member of the second and third Russian State Duma, served as the Armenian envoy at the headquarters of the High Com­ mand of the Armies of South Russia. In 1919 he dealt with General Denikin’s staff at Ekaterinodar, but as the Red Army advanced he moved to Novorossiisk in early 1920 and then transferred to Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula to represent Armenia at the headquarters of the new commander in chief of the White Armies, Baron Petr N. Wrangel. Sagh­ atelian enjoyed considerable sympathy and influence, which allowed him to obtain several million rounds of ammunition for the Armenian army. In Sevastopol his mission’s information bureau tried to reach the Crimean Armenians, more than 100,000 in number, through local na­ tional councils and a Russian-language periodic bulletin describing Saghatelian’s activities and the developments on Wrangel’s front, in Ar­ menia and the Caucasus, and on the European and world scene. Because of problems in communication, the Armenian government authorized Saghatelian to name acting consuls and consular agents in areas under his jurisdiction.60 While still at Ekaterinodar, he appointed Alexandre B. 60 For Saghatelian’s activities in Ekaterinodar, Novorossiisk, and Sevastopol, see Armenia Archives, fund 200, register 1, especially Files 6, 164, 342, 348, 408, 412, 562. His deputy

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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Asribekian and then Petros Hovhannisian (Petr E. Ovannesian) at Kis­ lovodsk, Captain Ashot Toniants (Toniev) at Novorossiisk, Arsen Kalantar at Stavropol, Aram Hakobian (Akopian) at Sochi, Stefanos Baghrian (Bagirian) at Simferopol, and Captain Aram Telfeyan at Sevastopol.61 Other representatives functioned at Armavir (Nervilian, then Dr. Tamashian), Groznyi, Piatigorsk, Vladikavkaz, and Petrovsk (Kristafor I. Karaketev) .62 Such liaisons with the White Armies only deepened suspi­ cions in Georgia and Azerbaijan of a secret alliance between the Vol­ unteer Army of General Denikin and the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia. The consulate-general at Rostov-Nor Nakhichevan was among the best-organized missions in Russia. Consul-General Grigor Chalkhushian had a professional, specialized staff to represent the interests of the Armenian government, the refugee population, and the indigenous Armenian communities that dated to the eighteenth-century reign of Empress Catherine II (the Great). Chalkhushian had jurisdiction over the vice-consulate at Ekaterinoslav (Nikolai S. Zakarian) and the con­ sulate of Kharkov (Dr. Mkrtich S. Melikiants and then Dr. Ruben S. luzbashian) .63 Until the beginning of 1919, Kharkov and Kiev lay within the bounds of the secessionist Ukrainian state, to which Dr. Grigor Dsamoian (Grégoire S. Dzamoeff, Dsamoev) was accredited in October 1918. He was assisted in Kiev by a preexisting Armenian military com­ missariat headed by Colonel Mikhail Kh. Lomize, Lieutenant Colonel Margar B. Popov, and Captain Ashot N. Toniev.64 With the fall of Khar­ kov and Kiev to the Red Army, Dsamoian and the others transferred to Odessa, where they maintained a consulate until evacuating with the French forces on the eve of the entry of the Red Army. When Baron Wrangel liberated the city and the Crimea during the summer of 1919, Dr. Eghishe Melikian and Sahak G. Isahakian took charge of the Ar­ in Ekaterinodar was Bakhchisaraitsev. For an incomplete list of Armenia’s diplomatic rep­ resentatives as reported by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Council of Ministers in September 1920, see R. A. Nahatakian, comp., “Pastatghter Hayastani patmutian masin,” Lraber, no. 4 (1991), pp. 159—161. 61 Armenia Archives, fund 200, register 1, files 6, 89, 295, 342, 363,442, 536, 545, 551, 594, and 200/2/75. These files include charges and countercharges involving an intense controversy between Telfeyan and Baghrian in the Crimea and between the Armenian National Council and Asribekian at Kislovodsk. Materials on the Armenian mission in No­ vorossiisk are also included in the 11 files of fund 275, Konsuistvo “RespubHki”Armenti v g Novorossiiske. 62 Armenia Archives, 200/1/391, pp. 9-10, and 200/1/545, p. 52. 63 Armenia Archives, especially files 200/1/89, 374, 380, 422, 524. M Armenia Archives, files 200/1/73,148,306,329,664; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 72. For the memoirs of Toniev (Tonian) relating to his activities in the Ukraine and sub­ sequently in Russia, see Ashot Tonian, “Rusakan banaki hai spayi me hushere,” Hairenik Amsagir, XLII (July-Oct. 1964), pp. 1—12, 56-67,48—57, 68—78.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

menian consulate, and Mikhail I. Asaturian acted as consular agent at Yalta.65 The shift in the tide of the Russian civil war in favor of the Red Army in the latter part of 1919 caused confusion and apprehension among many of the Armenian representatives. Some fled with the envoys of other governments just before or after the entry of the Red Army; others tried to function until they were forced to surrender their mission or gained semiofficial recognition from the Soviet authorities. The Soviet Commissariat for Nationalities, headed by I. V. Stalin, and its Armenian division, known as the Armenian Affairs Commissariat, regarded the Ar­ menian consulates and national councils as counterrevolutionary estab­ lishments. In most regions occupied by the Red Army, agents of the Commissariat for Nationalities or its Armenian affiliate sealed the Ar­ menian missions, liquidated the national councils, and sent their own officials and field workers to enlighten, reeducate, and revolutionize the Armenian masses.66 Consistency, however, was lacking in the actions of the new Soviet administrators. In some locations, the seizures took place in a perfunctory manner, forcing the consular officials to leave hastily for Tiflis or Erevan, whereas in other cities, such as Kharkov, the tran­ sition was orderly and completed with a formal transfer of ownership and a certificate of safe passage for the departing consul.67 The consul at Krasnovodsk, Bakhshi Atayan, had to flee to Tiflis, but the Soviet au­ thorities allowed the representatives of the Armenian refugees in Tur­ kestan, Arshak Tarumian and Mkrtich Khanbekian, to communicate with the Armenian government through its Baku mission.68 At Stavropol, Consul Arsen Kalantar was arrested by the Cheka, even as the local rev­ olutionary committee acknowledged A. I. Tikidjiev (Hamazasp Tikidjian) as acting consul.69 Personal acquaintances sometimes proved crit­ ical, as certain national councils and missions were able to continue operations through the good offices of prominent Bolsheviks. Of the diplomatic personnel who returned to the Caucasus, some were reas­ signed, as in Grigor Dsamoian’s mission to Siberia. Others accepted new positions. Ruben luzbashian, for example, served on the commission sent to Karabagh by the Transcaucasian conference in April 1920, and Grigor Chalkhushian became president of the Armenian Red Cross, vice chairman of the Independence Loan campaign, and the organizer of the Non-Partisan Union of Armenia. 65 Armenia Archives, files 200/1/148, 217, 331, 363, 413. 66 On the organization and activities of the Armenian Affairs Commissariat, see S. T. Alikhanian, Haikakan Gordseri Komisariati gordsuneutiune (igif—igzi) (Erevan, 1958). 67 Armenia Archives, files 200/1/89, 380, 616. 68 Armenia Archives, file 200/1/530. 69 Armenia Archives, file 200/1/594.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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The consul at Vladikavkaz, the Reverend Hakob (Akop A.) Sarikian, denigrated his colleagues who abandoned their posts. By the time the Red Army reached the North Caucasus in 1920, both domestic and in­ ternational considerations made the Soviet government more amenable to a dialogue and even normalization of relations with Georgia and Ar­ menia. The continued operation of the Vladikavkaz consulate under these circumstances was especially advantageous. Sarikian maintained proper, even cordial relations with Armenian Bolsheviks and Soviet of­ ficials, including Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who professed their govern­ ment’s sincere desire for political, diplomatic, and economic relations with Armenia. Sarikian was highly resourceful, and his lengthy reports provided the Armenian government with valuable information about local conditions, the status of the Armenian refugees and residents, the disposition of the Bolshevik administration, and issues related to the transportation of goods and people over the Georgian Military Highway toward Armenia.70 The Armenian consulates and legations in Transcaucasia were critical as channels to Europe and to the representatives of the Allied Powers. In Abkhazia—most of whose Armenian population had originated in the littoral of the Black Sea between Trebizond and Ordu and spoke the Hamshen dialect of that region—Consul Vagharshak Sahakian and then Vahram Gasabian represented the Armenian republic at Sukhum.71 At the Georgian port of Poti, Consul Daniel Turkiants received the ship­ ments earmarked for Armenia.72 The port of Batum served as Armenia’s primary artery of imports and exports. Until the withdrawal of the British military governorship and the occupation of the entire province by Geor­ gia in July 1920, Armenia actively coveted a part of the port as the ter­ minus of a railway to be built from Kars over Georgian territory. The Armenian representatives in Batum were busy welcoming and bidding farewell to both Armenian and foreign dignitaries and arranging for the shipment or rail transport of goods destined for or arriving from Ar­ menia. Consul-General Mikayel Atabekian and Consul Harutiun Chmshkian collaborated with the president of the Batum Armenian Na­ tional Council, Ashot Mndoyants, and the local agents of several Arme­ nian state ministries to meet the needs of the Armenian government

70 Armenia Archives, files 200/1/210, 331, 474, 616, 629, and 200/2/57. On the con­ sulate at Vladikavkaz and Armenian representation in the Terek, see the 20 files in the State Historical Archives of Armenia, fund 369, Dashnaktsakan Karavarutiane Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiune Vladikavkazum, igi8—ig2O. See also fund 200, register 1, files 295, 372, 393» 465» 581» 634, and register 2, file 84. 71 Armenia Archives, files 200/1/350, 373, 391, 405, 409, 517, 613. 72 Armenia Archives, files 200/1/321, 327, 373.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

and to receive, shelter, and transfer to Armenia the thousands of refu­ gees who arrived by sea from Russian ports.73 The most vital Armenian diplomatic post in the former Russian Em­ pire was undoubtedly the Tiflis legation, first headed by Arshak Djamalian and then successively by Leon G. Evangulov (Levon Evanghulian), Prince Mikhail G. Toumanov (Toumanoff, Tumanian), and Tigran A. Bekzadian. Landlocked and isolated, the Erevan government was able to communicate by courier and radiogram with Tiflis, relying on the mission there to transmit its messages to Moscow, Paris, London, and elsewhere in the outside world. As all the Principal Allied Powers based their Transcaucasian commissions at Tiflis, the Armenian diplo­ matic representatives often were able to present their government’s views in personal exchanges with British, French, Italian, and American officials. The mission’s military attaché, Major General Iosif A. Kishmishev (Kishmishian), played a critical role in the receipt and transferral to Erevan of Armenian officers and volunteers from Russia and military shipments in transit from Batum. An information bureau published daily bulletins in Russian and Armenian to keep foreign missions and the half­ million Armenians in Georgia apprised of developments affecting the Armenian question and the Armenian republic. The diplomatic repre­ sentatives also collaborated closely with the Armenian National Council of Georgia in its efforts to define and guarantee the individual and col­ lective rights of the Georgian Armenians. The voluminous records of the Tiflis legation attest to the importance and intensity of its activities.74 The Armenian mission at Baku was beset by great hardship from be­ ginning to end because of the ceaseless conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Neither Tigran Bekzadian nor Martiros Harutiunian, who took charge in March 1920, was able to safeguard the several hundred thousand Armenians in Azerbaijan. Their frequent exchanges with Azer­ baijani officials focused largely on permission and measures to allow the Armenian survivors of Nukhi, Aresh, Geokchai, Shemakha, and other devastated districts to emigrate to Armenia. During the Karabagh crisis in March and April, Harutiunian wrote lengthy, almost desperate reports to his government about the plight of the Armenians throughout Azer­ baijan and urged immediate negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. He complained about being left uninformed of the govem73 See especially the 23 Files in the State Historical Archives of Armenia, fund 368, Predstavitel'stvo Dashnakskogo Pravitel'stua v Batumi, 1918—1920 g.g., and fund 200, register 1, files 151, 302, 349, 393, 493, 508, 613. 74 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, files 65-68; Armenia Archives, files 200/1/17, 135, 143, 147, 150, 154, 155, 165-167,174-176,188, 190, 196, 198, 221, 245, 246, 249, 258, 265, 273, 279, 291,300, 313, 319, 322, 323, 340, 344, 357, 375, 377, 396,401,440, 491, 509, 520, 526, and 200/2/56, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77.

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merit’s strategies and explanations, compelling him to operate almost by instinct. Imprisoned for a time after the sovietization of Azerbaijan, Harutiunian reopened the Armenian mission in June 1920, and en­ gaged in frequent and sometimes humiliating exchanges with the Soviet authorities in his futile attempts to gain the release of Armenian political hostages and prisoners of war and the repatriation of stranded refu­ gees.75 But there was much that was unpredictable in Soviet-Armenian relations. Even as the Azerbaijani Revkom was frustrating Harutiunian through evasive bureaucratic maneuvers and the Armenian Affairs Com­ missariat was zealously suppressing Armenian councils, missions, and institutions throughout Russia and the Ukraine, the central Soviet gov­ ernment found it expedient in the summer of 1920 to extend unofficial recognition to Eghiazar Eghiazarian as the Armenian republic’s repre­ sentative in Moscow.76 Such apparent contradictions mirrored the real­ ities of the time.

Southeast Europe

The Armenians of Southeast Europe included both the descendants of the assimilated medieval communities, especially those in Moldavia and Wallachia (Romania), and recent immigrants who had fled Turkish per­ secution. In the Balkans, the largest and most active communities were in Bulgaria, and the smallest were in the new Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom, which became known as Yugoslavia. The developments during and after the world conflagration had stirred these communities but had also created many complications for Armenians who were technically still citizens of the Ottoman Empire. In Yugoslavia, Armenian colonies existed in Belgrade, Nish, Skoplje, and several other cities. In Belgrade, the community was organized by Sava Giorgiewitz (Sahak Gevorgian), a resident of Serbia for some thirty years. He was able to persuade the military ministry to free a number of Armenians held as Turkish prisoners of war and helped them to repa­ triate to Constantinople or Armenia with the assistance of Dr. Galust Arslanian at the port of embarkation at Salónica.77 On February 26, 1920, Avetis Aharonian, exercising his authority to appoint diplomatic personnel in Europe, invited Giorgiewitz to serve as honorary consul in Belgrade. Giorgiewitz was gratified by the nomination and replied that 75 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 69-70; Armenia Archives, especially files 200/1/4, 70, 180, 286, 293, 303, 308, 382, 394, 417, 487, 512, 571, 579, and 200/2/79, 85, 90. 76 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /4Ô5, p. 39. 77 See especially Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 366, H. H. Belgradi Hiupatosutiun, 1920— 1921 t.t. See also File 233/132, Secretary of Delegation to Kevorkov and to Aslanian, both Feb. 26, 1920, and File 235/134, Aharonian to Aslanian, May 12, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

he had already gained the approval of the Serbian authorities to issue Armenian passports as soon as a supply was received from Paris or Ere­ van. The Paris delegation formally submitted his credentials (lettre de créance) to the Yugoslav legation on April 17, with the request that the proper notification be relayed to Belgrade.78 Throughout 1920, Giorgiewitz operated as the Armenian consul, but he complained that the Yugoslav government still had not received no­ tification of his appointment and therefore accepted him only on an informal or de facto basis. Fortunately, the Greek, French, and British consulates were granting visas to persons who had been issued Armenian passports, and the disposition of the Serbian authorities was very friendly. The local press published articles he submitted about the Ar­ menian people, the Republic of Armenia, and the importance of assist­ ing the reborn nation financially and militarily.79 Despite Giorgiewitz’s many communications about his being encum­ bered by continued exclusion from the diplomatic register, the Arme­ nian delegation in Paris was unable to rectify the situation, explaining that apparently he would not be accorded official recognition until for­ mal diplomatic relations had been established between Yugoslavia and Armenia. Giorgiewitz was not consoled, however, and protested that his status was an outrage against himself and the nation. In October he wrote that young men were volunteering to fight for Armenia but he had no passports left or even the right to issue them. In November he complained that the foreign missions were no longer honoring Armenian passports and that without the appropriate documents Armenians could not find employment. It was ironic, he added, that the passports he had for­ warded to the Bulgarian Armenian National Union were being accepted by the Sofia government and that many Armenian volunteers in Bulgaria were preparing to depart to defend the homeland. The matter was never resolved, however, and Sava Giorgiewitz had to do the best he could as the unofficial honorary consul of the Armenian republic.80 The Armenian communities of Bulgaria had played an active role in the Armenian emancipatory movement. The Dashnaktsutiun and Social Democrat Hnchakian Party had many adherents and sympathizers in Plovdiv, Varna, Ruschuk, and elsewhere in the country. During the first Balkan War (1912—1913), General Andranik had organized an Arme­ nian volunteer detachment to fight alongside the Bulgarians against 78 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134, Aharonian to Legation of Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and Secretary-General to Kevorkov, May 17, 1920. See also Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/629, P- i79 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 366. 80 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 243/142, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920: Copies des Lettres, 1920-1921 t., Hanemian to Kevorkov, Nov. 20, 1920, and File 366.

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Turkey. Now the Armenian National Union of Bulgaria declared its un­ qualified loyalty to the Republic of Armenia and on that basis refused to send a representative to the Second National Congress of Western Armenians summoned by Boghos Nubar. On behalf of the Armenian National Union of Bulgaria, Movses Petrosian, who had recentiy re­ turned from the Dashnaktsutiun’s ninth world congress in Erevan, wrote the Paris delegation in February 1920 that the Sofia government was prepared to establish diplomatic relations as soon as it received formal notification of Allied recognition of the Armenian republic. Petrosian asked for immediate action to have the Allies give that notification. He added that Alexandre Stamboliiski’s cabinet was also willing to recognize Armenians from the Ottoman Empire as citizens of the Republic of Ar­ menia.81 During the latter part of 1919, Avetis Aharonian had asked Garo Balian to serve as the Armenian consul in Sofia. A member of the renowned family of Ottoman Armenian architects, Balian was sent credentials from the Armenian foreign ministry in April 1920. He was not content, how­ ever, because of the tenuousness of his appointment and the apparent lack of community support, and after a period of inactivity he resigned.82 In response to the Armenian National Union’s repeated requests for qualified diplomatic personnel, the Paris delegation replied in Septem­ ber that a new nomination would soon be made, and the Armenian foreign ministry announced in October that it intended to appoint a consul-general in Sofia and a consul in one of the Armenian centers. The Bulgarian foreign ministry, answering a petition of the Armenian National Union, stated that the government was ready to recognize the Armenian republic and exchange diplomatic missions, to allow Bulgar­ ian reserve officers to serve in Armenia if the Allied Powers granted permission, and to honor Armenian passports held by persons not pre­ viously domiciled in the country. As it turned out, Armenians who were not citizens of Bulgaria had to continue to seek the protection of one or another of the foreign consulates or to rely on the Armenian passports that had been received by the Armenian National Union via the con­ sulate in Belgrade.83

81 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Petrosian to Khatisian, Feb. 10, 1920. For correspondence relating to the Armenian representation in Bulgaria, see also Armenia Archives, 200/1/432. The Armenian government first nominated Dr. Grigor Saiyan as consul at Sofia, but on learning of Balian’s appointment by Aharonian it withdrew his credentials before they were delivered to the Bulgarian legation in Constantinople. See 200/1/432, pp. 6-7, 10-13, 18. 82 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 233/132, Secretary-General to Balian, March 10,1920, and File 10/10, Khatisian to Balian, April 17, 1920. 83 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 237/136, Aharonian to Armenian National Union of

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Only at the beginning of 1921 was Jacques Manouel Mavi (Agop M. Mavian) named Armenian plenipotentiary. He was well known in dip­ lomatic circles, having served in Varna as secretary of the Italian con­ sulate and then as the diplomatic agent of Persia. Mavi also presided over the Armenian National Union of Bulgaria. A native of Varna and a Bulgarian citizen, Mavi was nonetheless officially accepted by the Sofia government as the consul-general of Armenia. Starting in 1921, a new wave of Armenian refugees arrived in Bulgaria. Mavi, assisted by the National Union, helped to resettle them in Bulgaria or to facilitate their movement abroad by issuing them Armenian passports and travel doc­ uments.* 84 Ironically, during the 1920s Armenian diplomatic represen­ tatives would continue to operate at various posts around the world long after the Republic of Armenia had ceased to be. The kingdom of Romania expanded to include Bessarabia and much of Transylvania as the result of the postwar peace settlements. Some 15,000 Armenians in Bessarabia, 20,000 in Transylvania, and 5,000 ref­ ugees in Bukovina and Dobrudja thus came under Romanian rule, in­ creasing the Romanian Armenian community to more than 50,000 per­ sons.85 As almost all refugees and many of the domiciled Armenians were still Turkish subjects, they faced numerous hardships. Citizens of enemy states had their bank assets frozen, were restricted in the purchase and sale of property, and found it very difficult, if not impossible, to travel to or conduct business in other countries. To represent Armenian interests in the enlarged Romania, the Union of Romanian Armenians was organized after the war under the presi­ dency of Harutiun A. Khentirian (Khndirian), a native of Constantino­ ple who had been an official in several foreign firms and insurance com­ panies and had even served briefly in the Ottoman vice-consulate at Constanta.86 In its correspondence with the Armenian government, the union requested the appointment of a minister plenipotentiary to col­ laborate in gaining minority rights for the Romanian Armenians and in repatriating to the new Armenia the refugees and others wishing to be­ come Armenian citizens. The postwar peace treaties gave inhabitants in the annexed territories the right to opt for citizenship in another state and to relocate there with all movable possessions within a specified Bulgaria, Sept. 7 and 9, 1920, and File 243/142, Hanemian to Armenian National Union, Dec. 6, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/432, pp. 15—16, and 200/1/577, pt. I, p. 136. 84 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 245/144, H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1921 t., Armenian Delegation to Bulgarian Envoy Extraordinaire, May 24, 1921; Armenia Ar­ chives, 200/1/432, pp. 19, 25. 85 Armenia Archives, 200/1/618, pp. 275—276. 86 For a biographical sketch of H. A. Khentirian, see Suren Kolanjian, “Hayastani Ankakh Hanrapetutian Hiupatos Harutiun Khndirian (1870-1959) Rumanio medj,” Asbarez, Sept. 11:17, 1993.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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time. In view of the fact that the Romanian government intended im­ mediately to call up Bessarabians for military service, swift action was required to repatriate those Armenians who so desired. Armenian pass­ ports and identity papers needed to be distributed to the refugees from the Ottoman Empire to relieve them of their debilities, and it was im­ portant that claims for reparations be lodged on behalf of both the refugees and the indigenous Armenians who had sustained losses as the result of the wartime German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of much of Romania. The Armenians felt confused and defenseless and urgently appealed for the protection that could be afforded through a diplomatic mission of the Republic of Armenia.87 The Armenian government thanked the Union of Romanian Arme­ nians for its felicitations on the de facto recognition of the Republic by the Allied Powers in January 1920 and for its loyalty and contributions to the welfare of Armenia’s army and orphan population. In June, For­ eign Minister Ohandjanian named Khentirian to act as consul-general in Bucharest until the formal exchange of diplomatic missions. When Romania became a co-signatory with Armenia of the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, the Armenian government maintained that such action was tantamount to de jure recognition, and both Ohandjanian and Aha­ ronian renewed the request for the exchange of ministers plenipoten­ tiary. Although the Romanian government, especially Foreign Minister Take Jonesco, repeatedly voiced sympathy for the Armenians and re­ laxed some of the restrictions pertaining to subjects of enemy states, it withheld official recognition pending the final determination of Arme­ nia’s boundaries and ratification of the Turkish peace treaty. Nonethe­ less, Jonesco accepted Khentirian in a semiofficial capacity and, acting on Armenian appeals, instructed the Romanian delegate to the League of Nations to urge that body to intercede militarily on behalf of Armenia in face of the resurgent Turkish threat.88 In September 1920 the Armenian government sent Abraham Dastakian, a petroleum specialist and one-time member of the Azerbaijani cabinet, to Bucharest to purchase oil and wheat for the beleaguered country. Two months later, Grigor Chalkhushian (Grégoire Tchalkhouchian) was appointed counselor of the Bucharest mission, but he apparendy did not assume the position because of the rapidly evolving developments in Armenia. Only at the end of 1921 did the Romanian government agree to recognize Harutiun Khentirian formally as hon­ orary consul-general of the Republic of Armenia. He functioned in that 87 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /404, pp. 4—5, 10—11 (reports of the secretary of the Union, Khachatur Vostanikian). 88 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 364, H. H. Bukreshi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921— 1929 t.; Armenia Archives, 200/1/404, pp. 8, 12, 19.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

capacity from 1922 through 1924, issuing thousands of identity papers and documents to Armenians who had nowhere else to go or who found somewhere to go after the Republic no longer existed.89 One of Armenia’s most steadfast supporters in southeastern Europe was Greece. It was only natural that there should be a close bond be­ tween the Greeks and Armenians, given their common anxieties, antip­ athies, and pretensions relating to the Ottoman Empire and the nascent Turkish Nationalist movement. The previous rivalry between the Greek and Armenian patriarchates of Constantinople had been largely atten­ uated by the threats to the continued existence of both peoples in the empire. The Pontic Greeks were not happy about the intent of the Allied Powers, with the assent of the Athens government, to assign the Black Sea littoral to the new Armenian state, but Greek and Armenian officials were confident that the issue could be resolved through adequate guar­ antees for an autonomous administration in the Pontus. Moreover, the Delegation of Integral Armenia had even indicated a willingness to forgo claims to Trebizond and to concentrate instead on the Lazistan coastline to the east to satisfy Armenia’s need for an outlet to the sea. Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos was a staunch champion of the Armenians and arranged for communications between Aharonian and the Erevan government to be transmitted via the Greek legation in Paris and the Greek high commission in Constantinople. He frequently shared information with Aharonian and Boghos Nubar about what was transpiring in the Allied Supreme Council and offered advice on how the Armenian representatives should state their case before the Allied Powers. At the same time, the Greek government was most appreciative of Dashnakist delegate Mikayel Varandian’s declarations in the Second Socialist International justifying the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the territorial goals of Hellenism in Asia Minor.90 On August 17, 1920, a week after the Republic of Armenia had be­ come a signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres, Avetis Aharonian wrote the Greek minister in Paris, Athos Romanos, that pursuant to a verbal un­ derstanding with Prime Minister Venizelos and in consideration of the need for regular accredited representatives, the Armenian government wished to name an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Athens. Aharonian nominated Tigran Chaiyan (Tchaïan), an experi­ enced civil servant well known to Greek officials in Constantinople and 89 Armenia Archives, 200/1 /404, pp. 13—15, 24, 29—42; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 364. 90 See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 354/1, H. H. Atenki Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Hunakan Karavarutiune, 1 gig—1920 t. For materials relating to the International, see the Archives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun), Files 1687/18 and 1688/ 19, H. H. D. Erkrord Midjazgainakan, 1919 and 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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at the time technical adviser of the Armenian delegation.91 The Greek government quickly approved the nomination and pledged to cooperate with the Armenian minister in furthering the mutual interests of Ar­ menia and Greece and developing close, cordial relations. Chaiyan’s appointment was announced to the press on September 6.92 On October 18, Aharonian telegraphed Ohandjanian that the Greek government had nominated Jean Papas as its envoy to Armenia. Papas was an excel­ lent choice, as he was both knowledgeable and sympathetic, and the government, Aharonian concluded, should confirm the appointment immediately.93 Developments in Greece affected the exchange of diplomatic repre­ sentatives. By the time Chaiyan’s credentials arrived from Erevan, King Alexander had died, and a new lettre de créance was required, thereby delaying official accreditation until June 1921. Chaiyan was received in Athens with honors and ceremonies by officials of the foreign ministry and members of the Armenian community. Despite the change of re­ gime in Greece, the Royal Government of King Constantine assured Chaiyan of its support and solidarity with the Armenian people.94 The ultimate Greek military fiasco in Asia Minor in 1922, the Turkish reoc­ cupation and burning of Smyrna, and the compulsory exchange of pop­ ulations provided for in the resulting peace treaties caused a flood of refugees into Greece, among them many thousands of Armenians. Tig­ ran Chaiyan, the Armenian community, and the international relief agencies were to have their hands full for many years. Western Europe

In Europe, countries with strong socialist currents expressed the greatest sympathy and support for the Armenians. Their representatives in the Assembly of the League of Nations made stirring speeches about the 91 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Romanos, Aug. 17, 1920, and File 237/136, Aharonian to Tchaian, Aug. 26, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/616, p. 3. See also file 200/1/610 for materials relating to the Armenian representation in Greece. 92 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 354/1, Romanos to Aharonian, Aug. 25, 1920. In the same file is confirmation of the appointment by the Erevan government. See also Armenia Archives, 200/1/616, p. 7. 93 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 115/14, H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t., press release of Sept. 6, 1920, and File 239/138, H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1921 t., Aharonian to Ohandjanian, and Aharonian to Chargé d’Affaires of Greece, both dated Oct. 18, 1920. 94 For subsequent activities of the Armenian mission, see File 355/2, H. H. Atenki Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Hunakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. On September 22, 1920, the Armenian government decided to have a permanent representative for the Balkans headquartered in Athens, with an honorary consul-general in Bucharest and honorary consuls in Sofia and Belgrade. See Armenia Archives, 200/1 /545, p. 54. In October the government nom­ inated Vahan Bardizbanian as Armenian consul in Smyrna. See File 200/1/616, p. 14.

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world’s obligation to save the Armenian people. The Belgians in partic­ ular drew many parallels between their own history and that of Armenia. King Albert’s Royal Government repeatedly urged the Principal Allied Powers to resolve the Armenian question according to the supreme laws ofjustice and humanity. The small Armenian merchant and professional community of Belgium was concentrated in Antwerp. In February 1920, Avetis Aharonian appointed the president of the Comité Arménien de Belgique, tobacco importer Tigran Chamkerten (Tigrane Tchamkerten), to act as consul of the Armenian republic. As in the case of similar appointments elsewhere, Chamkerten’s correspondence included many requests for detailed information about the Republic, passport and visa regulations, flags and coats of arms for distribution, and measures to gain official recognition and be placed on the diplomatic register.95 Chamkerten received the active support of the Comité Belge Pro Ar­ menia, composed of influential intellectuals, politicians, and humani­ tarians, and had various courtesies extended to him by the Belgian for­ eign ministry. Armenian observers were allowed to sit at an international financial conference in Brussels in May, and the foreign ministry made accommodations for Boghos Nubar and Aharonian during the meeting of the Allied Supreme Council at Spa in July. By that time, the unofficial Armenian consulate had added Grigor Parsamian (Krikor Barsamian) as first secretary.96 On August 27, in the same month the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Hymans wrote Avetis Aha­ ronian to announce that the Royal Government was extending official recognition to the Republic of Armenia. A longtime champion of Ar­ menia, Hymans drew attention to the old bonds between the two coun­ tries and the Belgian government’s continued efforts to help Armenia enjoy the rule of liberty, security, and free development.97 In reply, Aha­ ronian wrote: “Armenia will not forget the sympathy of Belgium and the refuge given our people/’98 95 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 233/132, Secretary to Tchamkerten, Feb. 2, 1920, and File 235/134, Secretary to Tchamkerten, April 22 and May 17, 1920. For materials relating to the Armenian representation in Belgium, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 368/1, Beldjikakan Karavarutiun ev Briuseli Hiupatosutiun, 1919—1920 t.t., and File 369/2, 1921—1922 t.t. See especially Aharonian to Tchamkerten, Feb. 17,1920, and Tchamkerten to Aharonian, Feb. 19, 1920. 96 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to President, Supreme Council, Spa, July 7, 1920, File 237/136, Papazian to Layton, Sept. 17, 1920, Papazian to President, International Monetary Conference, Sept. 22, 1920, and File 239/138, Enfíadjian, Buniatian, and Berberian report. 97 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 368/1, Foreign Minister of Belgium to Aharonian, Aug. 27, 1920, File 119/18, H. H. Patvirakutiun, 1920 t.: Hashtutian Konferans, Embassy of Belgium to Aharonian, Aug. 28, 1920, and File 115/14, press release, Sept. 6, 1920. 98 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 237/136, Aharonian to Foreign Minister of Belgium, Sept. 12, 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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Switzerland, like Belgium, boasted influential pro-Armenia societies. Dr. Antony Krafft-Bonnard had long campaigned for the extension of reforms and human rights to the Armenians and had spearheaded relief activities. He had helped to organize the Phil-Armenian congress that convened in Paris in July 1920." As in the case of Belgium, there was a small Armenian community in Switzerland, primarily in Geneva, made up of professionals and merchants. Moreover, Switzerland had long been a haven for political exiles and protected the freedom of the press. Geneva was the birthplace of the Hnchakian Party and had been the headquarters of the Western Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun. In September 1919, Aharonian named Levon Nevruz (Léon Max Nevrouze) to represent Armenian interests in Switzerland, especially in mat­ ters related to repatriation, and in February 1920 appointed him dip­ lomatic representative in Geneva “to protect the rights and interests of Armenia and of Armenian citizens.’’99 100 Although the Federal Council of Switzerland and its president had often expressed sympathy for the Ar­ menians, the government withheld recognition of Nevruz and even re­ quested that he refrain from using the title “Consul de la République Arménienne à Geneve.’’ The creation of an Armenian consulate, the foreign affairs ministry wrote Nevruz, was premature. As a preliminary step, according to the established procedures of international diplo­ macy, the Armenian government should submit an official letter indi­ cating its desire to appoint a consul. In any case, as much as the Swiss government might sympathize with the Armenians and their cause, of­ ficial relations and the exchange of diplomatic missions would have to await Armenia’s admission into the League of Nations or de jure rec­ ognition by the major powers.101 Meanwhile, Levon Nevruz would have to continue to function in an unofficial capacity and pay careful heed to established procedures and international protocol. No government was more enigmatic than that of Italy in Armenian matters. On the one hand, it welcomed Armenian representatives and offered encouragement and pledges of political support, including back­ 99 For a partial list of Krafft-Bonnard’s publications on Armenian issues, see Richard G. Hovannisian, The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, igi^—igsg (Cambridge, MA, 1980), p. 27. 100 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/39, Aharonian to Nevrouze, Feb. 6, 1920, and File 237/136, Aharonian to Foreign Minister of Switzerland, Sept. 27, 1920. For expres­ sions of surprise by the Armenian government over the appointment of “a pharmacist with no diplomatic experience” when there were others far more capable, see Armenia Ar­ chives, 200/1/545, p. 54. For materials on the representation in Switzerland, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 367, H. H. Zheneui Hiupatosutiun, igig—igzi t.t.; Armenia Ar­ chives, 200/1 / 536. 101 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 367, Division of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, to Nev­ rouze, Oct. 22, 1920, and Nevrouze to Aharonian, Dec. 11, 1920, File 140/39, Aharonian to Nevrouze, June 14, 1920, and File 239/138, Aharonian to Nevrouze, Nov. 2, 1920.

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ing for Armenia’s application for admission to the League of Nations. On the other hand, the Italians were actively currying favor with the Turkish Nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal and permitting the clan­ destine sale and shipment of arms to the Nationalists. Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza was the former Italian high commissioner at Con­ stantinople and, even after the defeat of the Young Turks, had not lost contact with certain of their leaders. Overshadowed by Great Britain and France during the postwar peace conferences, Italy sought alternative ways to achieve its political and economic goals. All avenues, whether open or covert, were explored. At one point Italy even agreed to assume a mandate in Transcaucasia and then, after reneging, sent various po­ litical, military, and economic missions to investigate other options.102 A Georgian economic delegation also visited Italy to promote the ex­ change of raw materials for manufactured goods. The appointment of an Armenian diplomatic representative in 1920 was preceded by the mission of Mihran Damadian on behalf of the Ar­ menian National Delegation from September 1918 to February 1919. Damadian, a prominent political figure who had studied at the Mekhitarist Moorad Raphaelian school in Venice, worked closely with Dr. Nshan Ter-Stepanian in efforts to organize the small Italian Armenian community and especially to present the Armenian case to Italian public officials, newspaper editors, and the Vatican. Public events and recep­ tions were held in Milan, Florence, and Rome, and the Armenian rep­ resentatives were given the full cooperation of former prime minister Luigi Luzzatti and the Italian Committee for the Independence of Ar­ menia. Luzzatti was eloquent in his advocacy of a unanimously adopted resolution in the Chamber of Deputies calling for the freedom and in­ dependence of the long-suffering Armenian people.103 The immediate postwar euphoria had given way to a much more som­ ber mood in Italy in February 1920, when the Royal Government of King Victor Emmanuel informed the Armenian government and Avetis Aha­ ronian that it was prepared to receive an Armenian representative in Rome. Aharonian quickly nominated Mikayel Varandian (Hovhannisian), and like notification was given by the Armenian foreign ministry in March.104 Varandian was well known among socialist circles in Italy and was already serving unofficially in the country. From his office-residence 102 See Hovannisian, Republic, II, pp. 20—39. 103Tamatian, op. cit., pp. 124—136. 104 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, Italian mission to Khatisian, Feb. 3, 1920, File 10/10, Khatisian to Aharonian, March 10, 1920, and File 233/132, Aharonian to Khati­ sian, Feb. 16, and to Ambassador of Italy, Feb. 17, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/460, pp. 11-13; Hairenik, May 29:1, 1920. Chief of the Royal Italian mission in the Caucasus, Colonel Melchiade Gabba, was replaced by Luigi Mercatelli in June 1920. His represen­ tative in Armenia was Lieutenant (Marchese) Nicola degli Albize.

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in the Hotel Regina, Varandian reported to Erevan on his meetings with Prime Minister Nitti and Foreign Minister Sforza and the often differing positions of the Allied Powers regarding the Turkish peace settlement. The Italian press, he wrote, was sympathetic to Turkey but was not op­ posed to Armenian claims (in contrast with its open hostility to and condemnation of Greek pretensions). Sforza and his foreign ministry officials assured Varandian that, even though Georgia might be awarded nominal sovereignty over Batum, the port would operate under inter­ national guarantees and Armenia would have its own facilities there. The Italians were also interested in trade and markets and welcomed Ar­ menia’s intention to dispatch a commercial agent to Rome for the pur­ chase of trucks, other equipment, and manufactured goods.105 The Armenian community of Italy was made up mainly of merchants and traders in Milan, where industrialist Garbis Dilsizian was named to serve 21s honorary vice-consul, and of the Mekhitarist brotherhood in Venice, which led the way in propagating Armenian history and culture in France and Italy. Varandian utilized his socialist contacts to cultivate political relations with the Italian government and worked with his Me­ khitarist connections to seek the continued sympathy and assistance of the Vatican. In November the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pro­ posed upgrading its representation in Rome to that of a legation. The next month the Italian government indicated its assent to the proposal and to the appointment of Varandian as envoy extraordinary and min­ ister plenipotentiary, but developments in the Armenian republic left the issue in suspense.106 In Great Britain, Armenian representatives enjoyed a semiofficial status by virtue of the fact that they were called upon to sign documents and obligations relating to the receipt of and future payment for relief supplies and war matériel. The War Office received Major General Ga­ briel Korganian as a visiting foreign military attaché, and the Foreign Office often permitted Armenian spokesmen to avail themselves of the telegraphic and radio communications from London over Constanti­ nople to Batum or Tiflis. James A. Malcolm represented Boghos Nubar 105 For materials on Armenian-Italian relations and Varandian’s reports in 1920, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 346/3, H. H. HromiNerkayatsutschutiunev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t., and Armenia Archives, files 200/1/460 and 200/1/531. For the life and works of Varandian, see Khosrov Tiutiunjian, “Mikayel Varandian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XIV (Feb.March 1936), pp. 88-98, 110—113; Avo [Tumayan], ed., Heghapokhakan Alpom, I, no. 6 (1957)> PP- 169—175; [Armenian Revolutionary Federation], Hushapatum H. H. Dashnaktsutian, 1890-1950, ed. S. Vratzian (Boston, 1950), pp. 444—448; Gabriel Lazian, Hegha­ pokhakan demker (mtavorakanner ev haidukner) (Cairo, 1945), pp. 261—273. 106 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, Ohandjanian to Foreign Minister of Italy, Nov. 1, 1920, and File 115/14, Varandian to Minister-President of Armenia, Dec. 1, 1920; Ar­ menia Archives, 200/1/278, p. 88, and 200/1/460, pp. 46-48; FO 371/4965, E15248/ 134/58.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

and the Armenian National Delegation in London and sometimes acted on behalf of both Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian as the agent of the Delegation of Integral Armenia. Recognition of the Armenian republic by the Allied Powers in January 1920 and the shaping of the Turkish treaty during the London and San Remo conferences from February through April made the Armenians believe that a request for the establishment of formal diplomatic rela­ tions with Great Britain might be timely. Internal Armenian politics added to the sensitiveness of the issue. The mercantile communities of London and especially Manchester were closely aligned with Boghos Nubar, whose representative, James Malcolm, was well known and re­ garded as moderate and reasonable in the Foreign Office. Malcolm, who had played a significant role in the formulation of the Balfour Decla­ ration in 1917, aspired to be the Armenian minister in London, with H. Kamberian as vice-consul in Manchester.107 He was an outspoken critic of the Dashnaktsutiun, however, and was distrusted both by Aharonian and by those elements fiercely loyal to the Armenian republic. The Brit­ ish government would have preferred to treat with Malcolm but, because Avetis Aharonian represented the only recognized Armenian govern­ ment, was constrained to deal with less agreeable persons. On May 12, Aharonian invited Hovhannes Khan Massehian to rep­ resent Armenia before the Court of St. James. A native of Persia, Mas­ sehian had studied in Europe and was fluent in several languages, trans­ lating the works of Shakespeare and other literary figures into Persian and Armenian. He had served at the court of Shah Naser-ed-Din, had accompanied the crown prince to London for Queen Victoria’s jubilee and to St. Petersburg for Tsar Nicholas’s coronation, and had been ap­ pointed to various diplomatic positions in Tehran, Stockholm, London, and Berlin, where from 1906 to 1915 he was the Persian chargé d’affaires and then the minister plenipotentiary. Suspected of being pro-Allied, he was recalled in 1915 but remained in Paris and London for the duration of the war. He had refused various offers of employment until being ap­ proached to become the envoy of the Republic of Armenia in London.108 107 For Malcolm’s role in the Balfour Declaration, see the article written by him in 1944 and entitled “The Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Weizmann’s Contribution,” now in the British Museum, Cup.1247x.28. In the introduction to the article, Malcolm wrote: “My family, which is of Armenian stock, has been settled in Persia since before Elizabethan days. For two centuries at least it has been engaged in shipping and commerce in Bushire and was always closely identified with British interests in Persia and the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.” He added that his mother and father were mar­ ried aboard a British man-of-war by the British admiral and that he had arrived in England for schooling in 1881. The account of his activities relating to the Balfour Declaration is given in considerable detail in this source. 108 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, Lettres de créance, May 12, 1920, and Ar­ menian foreign ministry to Massehian, Aug. 11, 1920. In the May 8 session of the Dele­

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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Massehian was persona grata to all elements of the Armenian com­ munity. Malcolm and Kamberian, after meeting with Massehian, wrote to Aharonian that they were prepared to accept and support his nomi­ nee morally and financially. In return, Kamberian would serve in Man­ chester and have the right to issue passports and visas. Kamberian was enthusiastic and informed Aharonian that he would organize a com­ munity meeting in Manchester to establish a system of national dues in order to maintain a consulate in London. He asked to receive Armenian currency, stamps, and other symbolic items that could be sold or given as souvenirs in appreciation for contributions. In June, Massehian for­ mally accepted Aharonian’s invitation and oudined his own plans for an Armenian consulate. The Erevan government subsequently confirmed Massehian as minister plenipotentiary with the right to appoint addi­ tional consuls and diplomatic agents in Great Britain.109 In a letter to British Ambassador Lord Edward Derby in Paris on July 19, Aharonian formally nominated Hovhannes Khan Massehian as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.110 The selection of so highly qualified a representative caused some discomfort and embarrassment in the Foreign Office. Massehian was a veteran diplomat who would bring credit to the Armenian republic, yet Great Britain was not yet ready to extend de jure recognition to the unstable state, the final boundaries of which had still not been drawn. On a more practical level, it seemed unwise to accord Armenia special treatment without extending the same consideration to the other Transcaucasian republics. The internal cor­ respondence in the Foreign Office made it clear that continuation of unofficial representation, like that accorded to Georgian spokesman Da­ vid Ghambashidze, was in the best interest of His Majesty’s Government. Therefore, on August 13, Assistant Foreign SecretaryJ. A. C. Tilley wrote Aharonian that “I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government the time has not yet arrived for the official diplomatic representation of Armenia in this country.” The existing arrangement should continue.111 Aharonian re­ sponded by asking that a temporary diplomatic representative be ac­ cepted in London pending resolution of the question.112 He also wrote

gation of Integral Armenia, Massehian had accepted Malcolm as his immediate assistant. See Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm i-D. 109 For materials on the Armenian representation in Great Britain in 1920, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 334/4—336/6, H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune. 110 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135 and 334/4, Aharonian to Derby, July 19, 1920. See also File 236/135, Aharonian to Curzon, Aug. 6, 1920. *“ FO 371/4958, E9591/134/58 enclosure. 112 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Tilley, Aug. 21, 1920. See also Hairenik, Aug. 2:2, 1920.

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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Kamberian to state that, although Massehian’s nomination had fallen through for a variety of reasons, it was hoped that the Manchester com­ munity would fulfill its obligations and that Kamberian would continue to represent the Armenian republic there.113 Tilley’s letter to Aharonian drew a self-righteous reaction from an injured James Malcolm. On August 28 he wrote Aharonian to complain that, in an earlier meeting with Archbishop Khoren and Hovhannes Khan Massehian, he had been told that Massehian would not accept Aharonian’s nomination if Malcolm had any intention of assuming the post or if he withheld his full cooperation. Malcolm had responded that, because Aharonian would never tolerate him, he would endorse Mas­ sehian. The meeting had ended with the understanding that they would keep each other informed before taking any action. It was therefore surprising that without prior notice Massehian had accepted Aharo­ nian’s nomination and with Archbishop Khoren had made “wild plans” to establish an Armenian embassy. The Foreign Office, Malcolm contin­ ued, had asked him what he knew about Massehian’s nomination and wondered why Malcolm himself could not serve as an unofficial repre­ sentative with the authority to issue Armenian passports. “I didn’t want to go into details of your and your party’s attitude toward me although they seemed well aware of it.” As Malcolm was departing for Paris in a few days, “I shall come to call on you in my desire for national unity and work, not allowing personal or party feelings to affect the national in­ terest.”114 Thereafter, Malcolm continued to use his influence to have Kambe­ rian acknowledged as the Armenian consul. On October 7 he wrote Artavazd Hanemian, secretary-general of Aharonian’s delegation, that the Foreign Office had concurred in having an Armenian consul in Great Britain with the right to issue passports to Armenian subjects and that Kamberian had been personally approved. There was disturbing news, however, “that your Aharonian has said that unless Massehian Khan is accepted, Armenia will break relations with England.” This seemed so preposterous that “I have been asked to ascertain the status of Aharonian vis-à-vis the [Armenian] government.”115 In support of what Malcolm stated, on October 18 the Foreign Office wrote him that Lord Curzon had no objection to Kamberian’s serving as Armenian con­ sul.116 The next day, the Foreign Office itself transmitted a letter from Malcolm to Hanemian announcing the acceptance of Kamberian. At the same time, the Foreign Office added, as if in reproach, that, although 113 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Kamberian, Sept. 11, 1920. 114 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Malcolm to Aharonian, Aug. 28, 1920. 115 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Malcolm to Hanemian, Oct. 7, 1920. 1,6FO 371/4961, Ei2433/134/58 enclosure.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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it had suggested that Mr. Malcolm communicate the news directly to the Armenian government, he had refrained from doing so. The implication was obvious.117 A few days later, on October 25, Malcolm again complained to Hanemian that Aharonian was now denying ever having asked for inter­ cession to get Kamberian appointed. “This is untrue and were it not for the national interest and Mr. Kamberian’s honour, I would request an­ nulment of the arrangement. Your President is leaving a very bad im­ pression in British and American circles.”118 This observation seemed to be borne out in a message on October 28 from the Foreign Office to Aharonian stating that Lord Curzon believed exchanges of correspon­ dence would be faster if they were conveyed through James Malcolm, “unofficially recognized as the Armenian representative in London.”119 Avetis Aharonian was annoyed and insulted by the slight, and he blamed Malcolm. On November 3 he wrote the Foreign Office that James Malcolm had worked on certain projects but was not a represen­ tative of the Armenian republic. Major General Iakov (Hakob) G. Ba­ gratuni had already been nominated to serve as Armenia’s plenipoten­ tiary, and approval by His Majesty’s Government was requested.120 In seeking a representative that would be acceptable to the British Arme­ nian community and to the British government, Aharonian settled upon Bagratuni, who had collaborated closely with the British expeditionary force in the defense of Baku in 1918 and had now returned from the United States as the chief of the Armenian military mission. Bagratuni was an army man not involved in politics and could secure the cooper­ ation of Malcolm and Boghos Nubar Pasha. When Hanemian informed Malcolm in early October that General Bagratuni would be arriving in London for meetings in the Foreign Office, Malcolm replied that he would notify the Foreign Office and that Bagratuni might be the solution to the belabored issue of selecting an Armenian diplomatic represen­ tative.121 During his first week in London, October 18-25, Bagratuni used Mal­ colm’s good offices to meet with the staff of the War Office. Like other Armenian supplicants before him, Bagratuni put before Colonel W. H. Gribbon the military needs and potential of the Armenian army. He reported to Aharonian that at every turn, especially in his dealings with 117 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Malcolm to Hanemian, Oct. 9, 1920. 118 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Malcolm to Hanemian, Oct. 25, 1920. 119 FO 371/4962, £13464/134/58 enclosure; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, British Embassy, Paris, to Aharonian, Oct. 28, 1920. 120 FO 371/4962, Ei 3757/134/58, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 239/138, Aha­ ronian to Derby, Nov. 3, 1920. 121 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4.

414

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

the Foreign Office sind in an interview with Aneurin Williams of the British Armenia Committee, the question of James Malcolm had been raised. He had explained that Malcolm was an agent of Boghos Nubar, whereas he represented the Armenian government.122 Received by Sir John Tilley on October 25, Bagratuni asked for de jure recognition of Armenia, which continued to struggle against the enemies of the Allies and stood in the way of the realization of old German, Turkish, and now Soviet Russian schemes. As usual, the British official brought the inter­ view to an end with the request for an additional memorandum. In his meeting with the head of the Eastern division, Dwight Osborne, Bagra­ tuni noted his satisfaction with the acceptance of Kamberian as an acting consul, but he expressed surprise that the appointment had been made without the knowledge of the Armenian government or its delegation in Paris. When told Kamberian had been approved following a special appeal ofJames Malcolm, Bagratuni responded that, although Malcolm did not have the right to represent the Armenian government, it was willing to accept the appointment.123 On November 2, Bagratuni was pleased to receive a communication from Lord Curzon stating that it would be much easier to regulate the relations between the two countries once President Wilson had deter­ mined Armenia’s boundaries, but in the meantime His Majesty’s Gov­ ernment was prepared to enter into relations with authorized Armenian representatives.124 This communication was followed on November 12 by a letter from the Foreign Office stating that it had taken note of Bagratuni’s appointment as the unofficial representative of the Arme­ nian republic.125 Six days later in Paris, Ambassador Derby also informed Aharonian that Lord Curzon had concurred in the appointment of Ba­ gratuni and that correspondence for His Majesty’s Government should henceforth be addressed through him.126 Volunteers staffed Bagratuni’s office until December 1920, when Zhirair Misakian was sent by Aharonian to serve as his secretary. Misakian, brother of a prominent Dashnakist, subsequently accused Bagratuni of incompetence, characterizing his glowing reports and asserted accom­ plishments as grossly inflated. It would take him hours and even days to 122 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Bagratuni to Aharonian, Oct. 28, 1920. 123 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Bagratuni to Aharonian, Nov. 1, 1920. 124 FO 371/4962, E13255/E13812/134/58; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Bagratuni to Aharonian, Nov. 2, 1920. In the Foreign Office ledgers, Dwight Osborne wrote on November 9: “His [Aharonian’s] General seems quite honest & easy to get on with apart from his imperfect command of English & French, necessitating conversation in words of two syllables at most” (E13757/134/58). 125 FO 371/4962, Ei 3757/134/58; Rep. of Aim. Del. Archives, File 239/138, Papazian to Bagratuni, Nov. 15, 1920. 126 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Derby to Aharonian, Nov. 18, 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

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write a simple letter, Misakian complained. He failed to answer impor­ tant messages and calls, and he would not allow anyone to correct his crude and virtually illiterate English, French, and Armenian. The pom­ pous general made the simplest of functions, such as the signing of a visa, into a major affair, and he was extravagant beyond description.127 It was perhaps a sad commentary on the lack of Armenian experience in the craft of government that compromise came very hard and that the individuals most qualified and most respected by His Majesty’s Gov­ ernment did not represent the Republic of Armenia. As Paris was the headquarters of two Armenian delegations, there was no urgency to appoint a diplomatic representative in the French capital. Boghos Nubar and Avetis Aharonian frequentiy communicated with the French government. Significant changes had taken place in the Dele­ gation of the Republic of Armenia since its arrival in Paris. Mikayel Papadjanian, the Populist member, had withdrawn from participation and collaborated instead with Boghos Nubar, whereas Hamazasp Ohandjanian had returned to Erevan and become foreign minister and then prime minister. Aharonian remained the only plenipotentiary delegate until August 11, when the Armenian cabinet appointed Vahan Papazian to act as second delegate. General Gabriel Korganian continued to serve as military attaché, Grigor Sinapian and Movses Ajemian (Moisei S. Ajemov) as legal advisers, Artashes Enfiadjian as financial adviser, and Hakob Nevruz, Simon Asaturian, Tigran Chaiyan, and Zatik Khanzadian as technical advisers. It was noteworthy that both Sinapian and Nevruz were also members of the Armenian National Delegation headed by Boghos Nubar. In September, Artavazd Hanemian assumed the position of secretary-general from Simon Hakobian (Akopian), with Misak Cha­ zarían as assistant secretary.128 In May, Aharonian also appointed Tigran S. Mirzayants as diplomatic agent in Marseilles to issue passports and to deal with matters pertaining to the many Armenian refugees trying to make their way to the United States.129 Avetis Aharonian’s primary objective in Europe was accomplished with his signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920. Thereafter, Ohandjanian instructed the Paris delegation to complete its work by November 1 and to return to Erevan. If agents were needed to consult 127 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 337/7, H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, ig2i t., Misakian report, Oct. 1, 1921. 128 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, Lettre de créance (Papazian), Aug. 11, 1920, and File 237/136, Aharonian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 29, 1920. For materials on the Armenian representation in France in 1919—1920, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 319/1—321/3, H. H. Patvirakutiun evFransiakan Karavarutiune. 129 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134, Lettre de créance, May 17, 1920. Mirza­ yants’s father had previously served as the Persian consul at Marseilles. See Hairenik, June 30:2, 1920. See also Armenia Archives, 200/1/630, p. 1.

416

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

or work with various international bodies, individuals could be deputized for those specific duties. The government would soon make a decision about a permanent diplomatic representation in France.130 What was not stated in the summons was the underlying dissatisfaction in Erevan and within the upper echelons of the Dashnaktsutiun with many of Aha­ ronian’s decisions and actions. In announcing the liquidation of the Paris delegation, the government called upon all diplomatic posts hence­ forth to communicate directly with the foreign ministry in Erevan. In an effort to organize and regularize the missions abroad, the foreign min­ istry also asked for detailed reports of their activities, officials and staff, salaries and fees, procedures for issuing passports and visas, and other functions.131 Aharonian immediately protested the government’s directive, insist­ ing that the Paris delegation still had major work to accomplish. On October 28, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ohandjanian tele­ graphed that the matter had been placed before the Council of Minis­ ters, which had confirmed its earlier decision to recall the delegation and to establish a regular diplomatic mission in France.132 Meanwhile, Aharonian had already applied to the French government to accept an Armenian consul-general, in view of the de facto recognition that France had accorded the Armenian republic in January and the de jure recog­ nition that was implied in the Treaty of Sèvres.133 On October 8 the French foreign ministry consented to the nomination of a qualified con­ sul-general to represent the interests of the Armenian state.134 Aharonian followed up on October 29 by announcing that the Armenian govern­ ment had appointed Grégoire Sinabian (Grigor Sinapian) and asked that he be extended the necessary courtesies and assistance in the exe­ cution of his duties. As it happened, Sinapian was then in Constanti­ nople, and Aharonian telegraphed Ferdinand Tahtadjian to have him return to Paris as quickly as possible to begin his tenure as the consulgeneral of the Republic of Armenia.135 130 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Aharonian, Aug. 28, 1920. 131 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, circular, Aug. 27, 1920. On September 29, the Armenian cabinet adopted the statutes prepared by the foreign ministry on the ap­ pointment and functions of diplomatic representatives. At the same time, it confirmed and made allocations for a department of diasporan affairs within the foreign ministry. See Armenia Archives, 199/1/133, pt. I, p. 6, and 199/1/188, p. 216. 132 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Aharonian, Oct. 28, 1920. 133 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 10/10, 236/135, and 320/2. 134 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 320/2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France to Aha­ ronian, Oct. 8, 1920. 135 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/39 and File 239/138, Aharonian to President of the Council, Oct. 29, 1920. See also File 237/136, Aharonian to Sinapian, Aug. 25, 1920, File 239/138, Aharonian to Tahtadjian, Oct. 29, 1920, and File 243/142, Papazian to Tahtadjian, Dec. 2, 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

417

Asia and Africa

Thousands of Armenian refugees and exiles were scattered throughout the Near East, particularly in Syria and Mesopotamia (Iraq), areas of French and British predominance. There was also a sizable community in Egypt, as well as small mercantile colonies in the Sudan, Ethiopia (Abyssinia), and French Somaliland. As in the case of other diplomatic posts, most of the existing records have to do with the nomination or appointment of Armenian representatives and the deep divisions within the local communities based on both political and personal grounds. There is far less information on the operations and day-to-day activities of the unofficial diplomatic representatives, except for fund-raising cam­ paigns for the Armenian army and public meetings celebrating the an­ niversary of the Republic of Armenia. The local archives have disap­ peared, and the correspondence that was received and preserved by Aharonian’s delegation in Paris focuses on internal community issues rather than the actual roles played by the diplomatic agents. The Egyptian Armenian community, concentrated largely in Alexan­ dria and Cairo, was long-established and affluent. Egypt was the birth­ place of the Armenian General Benevolent Union under the patronage of Boghos Nubar Pasha, son of the country’s former chief minister, Nu­ bar Pasha. It also was the headquarters of the Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional Democrat) Party and home to the most cul­ turally distinguished expatriate Armenian community. During the world war, the various political factions and religious denominations had joined as the Armenian National Union to help outfit volunteers and assist refugees. After the war, it seemed the Egyptian Armenians would lead the way to pan-Armenian collaboration, as the Ramkavar Party ex­ plored the possibility of shipping surplus British war planes to the Ar­ menian republic and the Melkonian brothers willed their great wealth to the Armenian government. Allied recognition of the Armenian re­ public at the beginning of 1920 was cause for celebration throughout the community. That recognition also prompted Avetis Aharonian to write the British Foreign Office on February 10 with the request for an accredited Ar­ menian representative in Egypt.136 As the British were not yet prepared to acknowledge official Armenian envoys, J. A. C. Tilley replied a week later that such an appointment would be “premature” and that matters relating to Armenians in Egypt should be addressed directly to the For­ eign Office.137 Subsequentiy, on July 7 the Armenian foreign ministry 136 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 233/132, Aharonian to Curzon, Feb. 10, 1920. 137 FO 371/4949, E24/24/58, and Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 334/4, Tilley to Secretary of Armenian Delegation, Feb. 17, 1920.

418

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

appointed Khosrov Zohrab, who was the chairman of the Armenian Na­ tional Union of Cairo, to represent Armenia before the government of the sultan of Egypt. Ohandjanian informed Zohrab that, because of the ambiguities in British-Egyptian relations, he was addressing both gov­ ernments to accept an Armenian plenipotentiary.138 Zohrab, who was then in Constantinople, wrote to Aharonian on Au­ gust 27 that he was honored by the appointment and would perform to the best of his ability. As it was essential to secure the prior assent of the Egyptian government, however, he would remain in Constantinople for the time being in order to avoid possible embarrassment. Zohrab noted that the British excuse for deferring the appointment of an Armenian minister could not hold true following the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres and that as a result of the recent accord between Egyptian na­ tionalist leader Saad Zaghlul Pasha and British Colonial Secretary Lord Alfred Milner, Egypt was permitted to approve and receive diplomatic missions. Continued refusal to register the credentials of an Armenian minister would be an affront. Zohrab advised that because of the size of the Armenian community the diplomatic post should be that of a consulgeneral. In view of the fact that both Russian Armenian and Ottoman Armenian subjects had lost their nationality, they should be considered ipso jure Armenian citizens. The Treaty of Sèvres specifically extended to Ottoman Armenians the option of declaring themselves subjects of the Armenian republic.139 The high point of postwar community life in Egypt came at the time of former prime minister Khatisian’s inspiring visit in August, when rich and poor, lay and clergy, Ramkavar and Dashnakist, joined in an out­ pouring in support of the Independence Loan and Gold Fund. It was nonetheless disappointing that the British Foreign Office continued to withhold acceptance of an Armenian plenipotentiary. In December, Aharonian advised Zohrab to proceed to Cairo, by which time Armenian affairs had fallen into disarray. Many court cases involving Armenians had been suspended, and the Egyptian government had started to con­ script Armenian nationals in violation of the Treaty of Sèvres.140 More­ over, the tragic days through which the Armenian republic had passed brought to the surface old partisan divisions. The revocation of the Mel­ konian brothers’ will and reassignment of the estate to the Armenian 138 Armenia Archives, 200/1/587, pp. 9—12,31, and, for Zohrab’s reply, pp. 32—36; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 11/11, Lettre de créance, July 7,1920, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Zohrab, July 10, 1920, and File 236/135, Aharonian to Zohrab, Aug. 9, 1920; Hairenik, July 9:2, 1920. 139 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 401, H. H. Zhamanakavar NerkayatsutsichEgiptosi Medj, 1920-1921 t.t., Zohrab to Aharonian, Aug. 27, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/587, pp. 17-22. 140 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 243/142 and 401.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

4*9

General Benevolent Union was only one manifestation of the renewed competition. Political and international developments in 1921 were to eliminate the possibility that an accredited representative of the Arme­ nian republic could be appointed in Egypt. The small, prosperous communities of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia and Djibouti in French Somaliland engaged in fund-raising and other efforts to assist the distant Armenian army and, as elsewhere, were split between the adherents of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and its diverse opponents. The appointment of resident representatives in such areas was complicated not only because of ideological differences but also because the most likely candidates were merchants having vested inter­ ests. Yet these were the very persons who were well connected with local government officials and politicians and who could, because of their position, serve the Armenian republic without becoming a financial bur­ den.141 In February 1920, Aharonian designated Haik Pataban (Haig Patapan) as vice-consul in Addis Ababa and Matik Kevorkov (Gevorgian) as minister plenipotentiary to the Abyssinian government. Pataban was a long-time member of the Dashnaktsutiun, whereas Kevorkov, who held a monopoly on the importation of tobacco, was a nonpartisan with head­ quarters in Djibouti.142 But scarcely had news of Pataban’s appointment been announced than some sixty individuals, many of them members of the local branch of the Armenian General Benevolent Union, signed a petition begging Boghos Nubar to have the nomination withdrawn for the sake of the honor of the Armenian nation and republic. The colony felt slighted that it had not been consulted about the establishment of a mission. An Armenian consulate, the petitioners argued, was unnec­ essary, as the interests of the Armenian residents were being looked after by the Allied legations in Addis Ababa. Kevorkov wrote Aharonian that the opposition to Pataban stemmed from an incident in which he had insulted the Abyssinian government and been dragged through the streets by the local police. In view of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the white population, it was desirable that Armenia be represented by a lawyer, because cases between two whites were always tried under consular jurisdiction.143*14 Haik Pataban, however, maintained that the opposition to him was 141 For materials on the Armenian representation in Ethiopia, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, H. H. ZhamanakavorNerkayatsutschutiunHabeshstanum, igig—igsg t.t. 142 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 233/132, Feb. 9, 1920, and File 402, Lettres de Créance, Feb. 14, 1920, and Patapan’s reply, March 25, and Kevorkov’s reply, April 12, 1920. The appointments were confirmed by the Erevan government in April. See Armenia Archives, 200/1/578, pp. 1—3. 14S Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, Garikian to Boghos Nubar and Aharonian, March 22, 1920, and Kevorkov to Aharonian, April 24, 1920.

420

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

being orchestrated for political reasons by the Ramkavar Party. Esayi Garikian, the brother-in-law of party leader Vahan Malezian, had orga­ nized a protest meeting and telegraphed both Aharonian and Boghos Nubar in the belief that Nubar could influence the situation. Garikian had proclaimed that his campaign was aimed not only against Pataban but also against the party Dashnaktsutiun, which he labeled “Young Turk.’’ There had also been opposition to Kevorkov because of his neu­ tral stance, but this movement had now weakened, and it was hoped that things would work out.144 Pataban was supported by a segment of the community known as the Republic of Armenia Circle, which in April 1920 protested against the political machinations to undermine the two representatives. The accusations against Pataban were all politically mo­ tivated. His only fault was that he had been a member of the Dashnak­ tsutiun for more than two decades; he had an excellent knowledge of languages and would make an effective and credible representative of the Republic of Armenia.145 In his own letter to Aharonian on April 15, Pataban cautioned that there were many cases of outstanding litigation concerning Armenians and that no foreign mission was really interested in them. It would be wrong to leave Armenian matters in the hands of foreign missions, especially when Kevorkov was prepared to bear all the expenses of an Armenian legation in Addis Ababa.144 146 145 In his reports, Kevorkov explained that Armenian affairs had previ­ ously been handled by the Turkish and German missions, then by the Russian mission, and following the Bolshevik revolution by the French mission, which had a section for Armenian affairs headed by Artashes Peshtimaljian. Thanks to his tobacco monopoly, Kevorkov could afford to forgo a salary and would cover the costs of the consulate for one year. Implying that a consul other than Pataban would be desirable, he offered to pay such an official’s travel expenses from Djibouti to Addis Ababa and to provide him with a room and servant in the consulate. Kevorkov also requested detailed instructions regarding the code of law that should be used in litigation between two Armenians and between an Armenian and a foreigner, as well as information about the issuance of passports and visas. Among his first acts, Kevorkov transferred 50,000 francs to Paris for the purchase of airplanes for the Armenian army. In his letter of acknowledgment and appreciation, Aharonian also ex­ plained to Kevorkov that, because the Armenian republic had not yet drawn up its national code of laws, he should use his own judgment and 144 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, Patapan to Aharonian, March 2, April 9, 1920. 145 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, correspondence of March 3, 22, April 19, 24, 1920. On the community’s fundraising for the purchase of airplanes for Armenia, see Hairenik, April 30:2, May 1:5, 1920. 146 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, Patapan to Aharonian, April 15, 1920.

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follow local European usage in cases of litigation not involving the in­ digenous population.147 Some sympathizers of the Dashnaktsutiun wrote Aharonian that nei­ ther Kevorkov nor Pataban was suitable as a representative of the Ar­ menian republic and that the only solution would be to bring diplomatic agents from abroad. Kevorkov, after all, was a French citizen living in Djibouti. The French consulate had refused to recognize him or to allow him to serve as a representative of the Armenian government and in­ sisted it was charged with representing the affairs of the Armenian com­ munity. Either two new individuals should be appointed and sent from abroad or the present practice of allowing the French to look after Ar­ menian affairs should be continued.148 The local community, despite its reservations regarding Kevorkov and Pataban, displayed its loyalty to the Armenian republic through various public manifestations and fundraising campaigns.149 Throughout the existence of the Republic of Armenia, Ferdinand Tahtadjian served in Constantinople, not as an envoy to the sultan’s government but rather as Armenia’s representative to the Allied high commissions and other foreign missions. He helped transmit informa­ tion between Europe and the Republic and reported on the shipments of flour and supplies earmarked for Armenia. Tahtadjian was business­ like and unassuming, making no ostentation about his position. He sup­ plied American missions of inquiry and relief committees with relevant information and statistics about the Armenians and their aspirations and needs and facilitated the meeting of visiting Armenian dignitaries with various Allied political and military authorities.150 The large Armenian community of the Ottoman capital warmly wel­ comed officials of the Republic, and many Armenians proudly displayed the tricolor flag. But they shared the doubts and reservations of most Western Armenians about the Eastern Armenians and were concerned first and foremost about the resolution of the Armenian question in the former Ottoman Empire. They watched with deep apprehension as the 147 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, Kevorkov to Aharonian, April 24, 27, May 28, 1920, and File 235/134, Aharonian to Kevorkian, May 19, 1920. 148 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 402, Artashes Peshtimadjian to Aharonian, May 26, 1920, and Hagop Baghdasarian to Aharonian, July 26, 1920, and File 237/136, Aharonian to Peshtimadjian, Sept. 6, 1920. 149 The Armenian government tried to regulate matters by ruling that in Addis Ababa there should be only an honorary consul, who would be under the jurisdiction of the Armenian diplomatic representative in Egypt. See Armenia Archives, 200/1 /545, p. 54. Circumstances did not allow for implementation of the decision. 150 For materials relating to the Armenian representation in Constantinople, 1919-1921, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 740/10-76/3, H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Tajkastani Karavarutiun; Armenia Archives, files 200/1/259, 361, 415, 510, 556. See also Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-12, pp. 3132—3635.

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Turkish Nationalist movement took shape and strengthened, and, as before, they turned to their communal hierarchy for direction and pro­ tection. That hierarchy was headed by Patriarch Zaven (Eghiayan), who had returned from exile in Mosul, and by the Armenian National Assem­ bly, which was reinstituted after the war. The immediate postwar years were characterized by unprecedented cooperation and collaboration among the erstwhile feuding Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, and Prot­ estant communities and between them and the Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church. The stakes were very high, and the Christians, in view of their wartime experience, were now relying more than ever on the Western powers. It was with a mixture of anxiety and hope that thou­ sands of Constantinople Armenians gathered in various places on both shores of the Bosporus to celebrate the second anniversary of the Re­ public of Armenia in May 1920.151 In July 1919 the Armenian government appointed Arsen Kitur (Gidour) as its temporary representative for refugee affairs in Cilicia and Mesopotamia, granting him full power to study the situation of the de­ portees, assist in meeting their needs, and arrange for their return home or to Armenia. Khatisian requested that the Allied civil and military authorities extend their support to Kitur. A Western Armenian and Hnchakist intellectual, Kitur set out for Baghdad by way of Constanti­ nople, where Ferdinand Tahtadjian entrusted him with funds for relief. Many of the Armenian refugees in Mesopotamia were natives of the province of Van who had retreated southward to escape from the Turk­ ish armies. More than 15,000 Armenians and Assyrians were now con­ centrated at Bakuba, a tent city not far from Baghdad. They were assisted by the British military authorities and to some degree by the established Armenian community of Baghdad, but they were discontented in the desert environment, so different from their highlands and great lake, and impatiently waited for permission to return to Van and other parts of Western Armenia.152* The British officials allowed Kitur to engage in relief activities but would accord him no formal recognition. He was encumbered and an­ noyed, moreover, by the Armenian government’s failure to raise large sums of money for his work, and he complained that the Baghdad Ar­ menian relief committee was dominated by “aghas” who exploited the 151 See the memoirs of Patriarch Zaven [Eghiayan], Patriarkakan hushers: Vaveragirner ev vkayutiunner (Cairo, 1947), pp. 217—416. The May 28 celebrations of 1920 in Constanti­ nople are described in Kochndk Hayastani, XX (July 10, 1920), p. 929. 152 For materials on the Armenian representation in Mesopotamia, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 403, H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Iragum, 1920 I.; Armenia Archives, files 200/1/236 and 200/1/575. Kitur was appointed by the Armenian foreign minister on July 18, 1919. See also Arm. Nat. Del. Archives, microfilm C-i 1, pp. 1992 ff.; Hairenik, May 4:2, 1920.

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refugees and controlled the money allocated for direct aid.153 In re­ sponse to Ki tur’s repeated demands, Avetis Aharonian wrote him in May 1920 that because the government was apparently unable to provide funds some of the money collected in the United States was being sent to him; that renewed appeals had been submitted to the British Foreign Office to have the local British authorities recognize him; that Patriarch Zaven had ordered the dispersal of the existing refugee council and the formation of a new council to collaborate with Kitur; and that everything was being done to arrange for the repatriation of the refugees as soon as possible.154 In August, Kitur warned of rising tension between the refugees and the Arab nationalists, who had surrounded Bakuba. Through his good relations with the British military authorities, he had been able to have 2,000 Armenians and Assyrians armed. The refugees had defended themselves for eight days before the Baghdad government intervened to halt the fighting. Kitur had petitioned the British officials to transfer the Armenian refugees to a place known as Nahr Omar, on the Shat-alArab near the port of Basra. The British, he added, were now better disposed to have a permanent Armenian representative in Baghdad.155 Throughout the following months, the Armenian refugees found it impossible to repatriate to Van and elsewhere, even though the Treaty of Sèvres and President Wilson’s boundary decision awarded the region to the Armenian republic. Aharonian advised Kitur to return to Erevan to place his complaints before the government and to pursue the matter of having a permanent representative in Baghdad.156 At the same time, unfavorable reports regarding Kitur were reaching Erevan from the Mes­ opotamian refugee council. The complaints gave Ohandjanian the op­ portunity to have the welfare ministry appoint Levon Shaghoyan, a loyal Dashnakist and native of Van, to take charge of refugee affairs in Mes­ opotamia during the latter part of 1920, even though Arsen Kitur ap­ parently was never actually recalled or dismissed. Under Shaghoyan’s direction, a small number of the Bakuba refugees transferred to Erevan, but most of them had to move to Baghdad, Basra, Tehran, or more distant places to begin a new life.157 The only accredited Armenian representative in the Near East was 15SSee Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 403 passim; Armenia Archives, 200/1/575, P- 4See also Hairenik, March 13:2, May 7:4, July 15:1—2, Sept. 17:1, Oct. 1:1, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/575, PP- 1 x» 1$154 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134, Aharonian to Kitur, April 26, 1920, and File 403, Kitur to Aharonian, Oct. 13, 1920. 155 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Kitur to Aharonian, Aug. 19,1920; Armenia Archives, 200/1/575, pp. 8, 17—21. 156 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Kitur, Aug. 31, 1920. 157 See Armenia Archives, file 200/1/499 passim, and 200/1/575, pp. 1,17.

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Hovsep Arghutian (Prince Argutinskii-Dolgorukii), who was named min­ ister plenipotentiary to Persia at the end of 1919 and upon his arrival in Tehran on January 4,1920, was welcomed enthusiastically by the large Armenian community of the capital city. Arghutian subsequently ap­ pointed consular agents or liaisons in the various Armenian communi­ ties in Persia and tried to work with the already-existing Armenian ec­ clesiastical and community councils in places such as Isfahan-New Julfa, Hamadan, Kazvin, Maku, Tabriz, and Enzeli-Resht. The mission’s infor­ mation bureau distributed news throughout the Irano-Armenian and Indo-Armenian communities about developments relating to the Cau­ casus and the Armenian question and forwarded to Erevan news about the Near East and the Persian Armenian community, which numbered about 100,000 persons and figured among the largest and oldest of all the Armenian colonies.158 The records of the mission indicate that its main concerns pertained to the illegal passage of Turkish and Soviet armed forces over Persian territory; the reestablishment of communication, transportation, and commercial links between Armenia and Persia; the defense of the rights of citizens of the Armenian republic and the acknowledgment of former Russian and Ottoman subjects as Armenian citizens; the regulation of affairs between the mission and the various Armenian community or­ ganizations; and the relief of Armenian refugees. The mission had no means of immediate communication with Erevan and had to wait several weeks for replies to its inquiries and reports. The advance of the Ar­ menian armed forces as far as Shahtaght in the summer of 1920 made it a litde easier to contact Erevan over the Tabriz-Maku-Shahtaght route, but as long as the Tabrizjulfa-Erevan railroad remained closed and the telegraph wires unrepaired, there was no way to maintain rapid, reliable communication. Throughout 1920, Prince Arghutian laid before the Tehran govern­ ment hard evidence of violations of Persia’s neutrality by Turkish and Red Army forces passing over the Maku corridor between Bayazit and Nakhichevan. The sardar of Maku, Ikbal Soltane Khan, was accused of collaborating with the enemies of Armenia and welcoming Turkish gen­ erals and Soviet envoys with much fanfare. Furthermore, after the sovi­ etization of Azerbaijan, Nuri Pasha, together with several thousand Mu­ 158 For extensive materials relating to the Armenian representation in Persia, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 79/1 through 99Ô/23, H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Parskastanum; Armenia Archives, files 200/1 /354,499, 543. For Arghutian’s appointment and subsequent confirmation by Persian Prime Minister Vosuq ed-Dowleh, see 200/1 ƒ543. The Persian consul-general for the Transcaucasian republics was Assadullah Khan, who paid an official visit to Erevan in January 1920. See Hairenik, April 16:8, 1920. See also Samson, “Hayastani andranik despane Parskastanum,” Vem, II, 3-6 (1934), pp. 61—73, 96—103, 72—85, 73—85; Lazian, op. át., pp. 79—89.

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savat troops, crossed over Karadagh in northern Persia to Nakhichevan, making a hostile convergence against Armenia from east and west on Persian territory. Such violations of the country’s neutrality constituted a serious threat to the Armenian republic and created an intolerable situation. Arghutian tried to prod the government into action by drawing attention to the Pan-Turkic schemes, which included the detachment of Persian Azarbayjan and its incorporation into the new Turkic realm. He urged stringent measures to restrain the sardar of Maku and to prevent the movement of Turkish men and arms to Nakhichevan, where the Soviet-Turkish entente was being consummated by the mixture of Red Army and Turkish Nationalist detachments.159 For its part, the Persian government declared profusely its friendship for Armenia, extolled the centuries-long bond between the two neigh­ boring peoples, and expressed the hope that conditions would soon allow for closer political and economic relations. Inquiries were for­ warded to the sardar of Maku about Armenian complaints, with the pro forma admonition to preserve the international neutrality of Persia, but foreign ministry officials confided to Arghutian that the central govern­ ment had little control over the situation in the northern reaches of the country. The Persian authorities also made polite inquiries about reports of difficulties experienced by Persian subjects in Armenia. Following General Hovsepian’s military operations in the province of Kars in Jan­ uary 1920, it was reported to Tehran that a hundred Persian subjects had been deprived of their goods and properties and driven toward Tiflis along with other Muslims. It was now Arghutian’s turn to stress the tra­ ditional friendship between the two countries and to insist that the Ar­ menian government would never knowingly use force against Persian subjects. He was even more emphatic in his denials upon receipt of details from Erevan.160 During the Armenian offensive into the lower Araxes Valley in the summer of 1920, the Persian foreign ministry again tried to intercede. In a long meeting with Prince Arghutian in the Gulistan palace on July 18, Assistant Foreign Minister Fehim Dowleh, after a cordial exchange of compliments, stated that the inhabitants of Nakhichevan were peti­ tioning for protection through the sardar of Maku and the authorities at Tabriz. As these people were former Persian subjects and overwhelm­ ingly Shia, the government could not remain indifferent to their appeal. In no way did it wish to strain relations with Armenia; it only desired to suggest a suspension of military operations until a settlement had been 159 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 80/2, 89/11, and 90/12. 160 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 88/10; Armenia Archives, files 200/1/371 and 200/ 1/430 passim. See also FO 371/4954, E2426/134/58, Wardrop to FO, Feb. 26, 1920.

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announced by the Allied Powers or an agreement was reached between the people of Nakhichevan and the Armenian government. Arghutian politely expressed surprise that the subject was even being raised, in view of the blatant violation of Persian territory by the Turkish and Soviet armies, which were trying to drive a wedge between Armenia and Persia by occupying the strategic Karabagh-Zangezur-Nakhichevan corridor. As the Persian government could not control the frontiers, the intimation that Armenia should desist from exercising its right to reclaim Nakhiche­ van, an inalienable part of the Republic of Armenia, seemed particularly odd. Fehim Dowleh admitted that Turkey posed a serious mutual threat, but he hoped that the Armenians would stay their offensive for at least a few days. Hovsep Arghutian agreed to forward the request to Erevan but reminded the Persian official that because the rebels in Nakhichevan had cut and disrupted the telegraph lines, the swiftest communication possible with Erevan would take a fortnight.161 The regulation of affairs between the Armenian mission and Armenian community organs in Persia was a highly sensitive issue. As a Christian minority, the Armenians had gained considerable communal autonomy, including their own civil judicial system. Local practice varied from place to place based on a combination of law and tradition. In trying to tie the community councils with the Armenian mission, Arghutian was also obliged to protect the interests of citizens of the Armenian republic in cases of litigation involving Persian Armenians and in official dealings with government agencies. In the fall of 1920, the mission’s legal section issued regulations for the establishment of consular courts at Tabriz and Tehran. These were courts of the first instance, with final jurisdiction in cases involving penalties of a maximum of 300 rubles or incarceration for two weeks. The Tabriz tribunal would be presided over by the con­ sular representative and include two other citizens of the Armenian re­ public or, in the absence of individuals so qualified, Armenians who were subjects of other states. The minister plenipotentiary in Tehran would preside over an appellate board, which would have to confirm all judg­ ments more severe than those within the jurisdiction of the primary courts. At the same time, the mission attempted to have the Persian government and Allied legations recognize as Armenian citizens those former Russian and Ottoman subjects who had so opted.162 Though such persons holding Armenian passports were sometimes able to secure visas for foreign travel, by and large the policy of the shah’s government was to maintain the status quo pending implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres, which made provision for legal changes in citizenship. 161 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 89/11. 162 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 996/23.

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In cooperation with the Armenian community councils, Arghutian tried to coordinate refugee relief and enlist the support of the British military authorities and American relief agencies. Most Armenian refu­ gees arrived from Petrovsk, Baku, and other areas of the Caucasus oc­ cupied by the Red Army; from the beleaguered Armenian setdements around Nakhichevan and Akulis; and from those areas of Persia, such as Khoi, Salmast, and Lake Urmia, which had stood in the path of the Turkish armies during the world war. Much of the burden of relief had fallen upon the prelate of Persian Azarbayjan, Bishop Nerses MelikTankian (Tangian). A powerful figure and patriot, Melik-Tankian served as an unofficial representative of the Armenian government at Tabriz until Arghutian appointed Mushegh Ter-Zakarian as consul in the fall of 1920.163 Because many Armenians had fled with the Assyrian popu­ lation to Mesopotamia during the war and were sheltered in the sprawl­ ing camp at Bakuba, Arghutian coordinated his actions with those of Arsen Kitur and Levon Shaghoyan. They were able to intercede with the British military authorities to delay implementation of a cost-saving plan that would have required the Bakuba refugees either to repatriate im­ mediately to Armenia or to settle on tracts of uncultivated land for a minimum of three years to develop the region’s agricultural resources. As repatriation was not practical until the Treaty of Sèvres was enforced and as the dispersal of the refugee population throughout Mesopotamia was politically unacceptable, agreement by the British authorities to maintain the Bakuba camp for a time longer was considered a favorable outcome.164 The mission’s diplomatic representative in Tabriz played an important dual role as a source of information and relay station between Tehran and Erevan. Mushegh Ter-Zakarian received reports from the priest Pet­ ros Vardapet in Maku, who detailed the movements of Turkish detach­ ments and Soviet missions and the maneuvers of Sardar Ikbal Soltane Khan.165 When the Armenian armed forces reached Shahtaght, the re­ sourceful sardar sent a delegation to General Shelkovnikian’s head­ quarters to profess his friendship for the Armenians, to explain that he had been given no choice but to tolerate the movement of Turkish ech­ elons across his territory, and to offer to sell Armenia grain and other 165 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 82/4 and 88/10. Ter-Zakarian was officially recog­ nized by the Persian government on October 30, 1920. See File 80/2. For Ter-Zakarian’s papers, see File 99V 23, Hayastani Hanrapetutian Tavrizi Hiupatos (Mushegh Ter Zakariani Arkhive), 1920 t. On the life and career of Melik-Tankian, see Avo, Heghapokhakan Alpom, VI, no. 3 (1965), pp. 66—87; S. Vratzian, Andzink nvirialk (Beirut, 1969), pp. 133—145; Hovak Stepanian, “Nerses Ark. Melik-Tangian,” Hairenik Amsagir, XXX (May 1952), pp. 46-62. 164 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 80/2; Armenia Archives, 200/1/575, pp. 2—3, 5. 165 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 96/18 and 99/21.

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goods.166 Such affirmations notwithstanding, Maku continued to be a key link in Soviet-Turkish collaboration. According to one report, a thirty-camel caravan transported field guns and other equipment from Nakhichevan to Bayazit for the Turkish Nationalists.167 The Tabriz con­ sulate also served as a link to Zangezur, where throughout much of 1920 Lieutenant Colonel Garegin Nzhdeh, virtually isolated, resisted attacks by Azerbaijani forces from the east and west and the Red Army from the north. In his reports and appeals over Tabriz to the government of Ar­ menia and to the Dashnaktsutiun’s Vrezhistan Central Committee of Persian Azarbayjan, Nzhdeh gave details of the military operations and the heroic feats of his heavily outnumbered men and made repeated appeals for reinforcements from Erevan or at least for funds with which to buy arms and ammunition from the Persian khans across the Araxes River from Zangezur.168 The reestablishment of direct communication and commercial links between Persia and Armenia was a primary objective of Prince Arghutian’s mission. The expulsion of the Armenian civil and military admin­ istration of Nakhichevan in the summer of 1919 had severed Armenia’s avenues of communication and transportation with Persia and the world beyond. In exchanges between Arghutian and the Tehran government, Persian officials gave assurances that they would cooperate in all reason­ able ways to reopen the Tabriz-Julfa-Nakhichevan-Erevan railroad and telegraph. In anticipation of such an eventuality and the development of commercial relations between the two countries, the Armenian mis­ sion in March 1920 appointed a commercial council of local merchants and intellectuals to assist in the preparation of plans and conventions relating to trade and transit. In his directives to the council, Arghutian noted Armenia’s importance for Persia as an avenue to Russia and Eu­ rope. He foresaw the creation of a central emporium of trade in Ar­ menia, where consumer goods from abroad could be stored or shipped to Persia and other lands. The likelihood of Armenia’s having direct access to Batum by way of a railroad from Kars and possession of ports on the Black Sea farther to the west opened unlimited possibilities. It was essential to create conditions that would win the confidence of the Persian government, traders, and merchants so that they would again turn to this relatively short northern route for international commerce with the West.169 166 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 96/18, Dr. Hovhannisian to Arghutian, Oct. 25,1920, and File 24/24, Bulletin no. 12, Sept. 1, 1920, also in Armenia Archives, 200/1/607, p. 33167 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, Files 80/2, 89/11, and 99/18. 168 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 96/18. 169 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 94/16.

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The commercial council met for three months and made a series of recommendations. Its investigation was hampered by a lack of statistics on prewar Armenian-Persian commerce, however, as Armenia had been divided between the Russian and Ottoman empires and no separate data had been kept on the volume of trade with the Armenian provinces. It was presumed that the direct exchange of goods had not been great, in view of the fact that both countries were agrarian and produced similar crops and were at about the same level of economic development. Nev­ ertheless, Armenia would soon play an essential role as intermediary for the transit traffic and trade in and out of Persia. Although economic protectionism might assist a number of newly organizing Armenian en­ terprises, the committee was unanimous in recommending low tariffs, duties, and transit fees to attract the flow of goods over the Armenian railway system, from which the country could profit greatly. Pending the full regulation of affairs between Armenia and Persia, there should be provisional trade agreements that would meet the immediate needs of both countries.170 The Armenian mission’s intense efforts to restore com­ munication and commerce seemed on the verge of fulfillment when the Armenian army reached the outskirts of Nakhichevan in July 1920, but the appearance of Red Army detachments there kept the realization of such plans in abeyance. The Armenian mission in Tehran and the con­ sulate at Tabriz continued to function throughout 1921 and became vital links in keeping the world apprised of efforts to resist the establish­ ment of Soviet rule in Armenia proper and in the highlands of Zangezur-Siunik.171 In the Far East, Grigor Dsamoian represented the Armenian republic first at Omsk and then at Irkutsk and Vladivostok. Both Turkish Arme­ nians and Russian Armenians had made their way across Siberia in search of safe haven until the swirl of war and revolution ran their course. Dsamoian was acknowledged as the unofficial Armenian envoy by the anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia and was active in a congress of Armenian representatives from Siberia and the Far East, held in Irkutsk in November 1919. He issued Armenian passports and visas to assist the refugees in their passage and encouraged the campaign of the small Armenian communities in Siberia and in Manchuria (namely, Harbin) to collect funds for the Armenian army. When he transferred to Vladi­ vostok in 1920, Dsamoian was accepted as the Armenian agent in that 170 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 94/16. 171 On November 27, 1920, the Armenian government wrote Arghutian that, for reasons of fiscal constraints, certain consulates would be entrusted to honorary consuls. Arghutian was instructed to return to Erevan. The course of events in Armenia did not allow for compliance. See File 80/2.

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port city, from which some refugees were able to sail to Japan and on­ ward to the United States.172 Consul Diana Agabek Abcar in Yokohama provided shelter and as­ sisted with the passage of Armenian refugees through Japan. A prolific writer, she published many pamphlets in English about the plight of the Armenian people and the obligation of humanity to assist in their revival. Japan extended de facto recognition to the Armenian republic in Jan­ uary 1920 and facilitated the relief activities and refugee services of Di­ ana Abcar. Throughout 1920, she attempted to disseminate information about the form of government, cabinet, territory, flag and coat of arms, and prospects of an ancient land reborn as the Republic of Armenia.173 South America

Of all the official and unofficial Armenian diplomatic representatives, there was none more energetic and optimistic than Dr. Etienne Brasil (Etian). A longtime resident of Rio de Janeiro, Brasil had earned a doc­ torate of philosophy and a diploma in pharmacy, founded a school of pharmacy, taught in the French lyceum, and tutored the children of many government officials and diplomats. He frequently represented members of the Armenian colony in official matters and in the courts of law. During the world war, he published a booklet in Portuguese about the Armenian people, O Povo Armenio, and in 1918 was instrumental in forming a society known as the Armenian Center for the purpose of establishing links with the homeland and winning Brazilian recognition of the Armenian republic.174 Dr. Brasil was able to gain the collaboration of one of the first Ar­ menian immigrants to Brazil and the chief architect of most of its rail­ ways, Dr. Mihran Latif. Born in Constantinople and educated in Bel­ gium, Latif was highly decorated and regarded as one of Brazil’s foremost citizens. In his correspondence with Boghos Nubar and espe­ cially with Avetis Aharonian, Etienne Brasil urged that Latif be ap­ pointed honorary consul-general, as his mansion was a virtual embassy and he had enormous influence with government officials, including

172 Armenia Archives, 200/1/610, p. 24, and 200/1/618, pp. 175—178; Hairenik, April 1:1—2, June 2:1—2, 4:1-2, July 17:3-4, 1920. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 73, H. H. Divanagitakan Nerkayatsutsich Heravor Arevelkum, igig t. 173 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 403a, H. H. Nerkayatsutschutiun Japoniayum, 19201922. See also File 243/142, Hanemian to Abcar, Dec. 16, 1920; Armenia Archives, 200/ 1/610, p. 2; US Archives, RG 59, 702,60194/original. 174 Biographical notes on Brasil are included in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Haravayin Amerikayi Petutiunnere, 1919-1927 t. See also Reverend Eznik Vardanian, Brazilio hai gaghute (Buenos Aires, 1948), pp. 65—68.

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President Epitácio Pessoa. Dr. Brasil’s enthusiasm was reflected in plans he prepared for the export of coffee, cocoa, tea, manganese, and other goods to Armenia and for favorable trade relations between the two countries. The governments and peoples of South America, he said, were full of friendship and sympathy for the Armenians.175 In the autumn of 1919, Aharonian’s delegation appointed Etienne Brasil its representative in Brazil and charged him with securing diplo­ matic and material support. In October he and another officer of the Armenian Center, Levon Apelian, were invited to the Palace du Catete, where President Pessoa expressed his warm sentiments for Armenia and promised to do everything possible for strong political and commercial relations. Reporting about this meeting in glowing terms, Brasil reiter­ ated to Aharonian the need for regular diplomatic representatives, as the Armenians were still technically subjects of the Ottoman Empire and therefore faced many legal difficulties. He was excited that the entire local colony was loyal to the Armenian republic, “which is our glory and center of hope.’’176 In December 1919, Dr. Brasil received his formal appointment as dip­ lomatic representative and redoubled his public relations efforts to make Armenia known to the Brazilian people and to secure official recogni­ tion of the Armenian republic. Meanwhile, in his correspondence with Paris, he urgently asked for information about Armenia’s independence day, national anthem, coat of arms, constitution, and president.177 The recognition of Armenia by the Allied Powers in January 1920 was cause for celebration throughout the Armenian communities of South Amer­ ica. Dr. Brasil was able to place many articles in the press calling for like action by the Brazilian government. He met with ambassadors and min­ isters of several other South American countries and received assurances of intercession with their respective governments. Brasil asked Aharo­ nian for credentials to serve as minister plenipotentiary for all of South America and for authority to appoint consuls where warranted and to engage in commercial negotiations. He again urged that Dr. Mihran Latif be named honorary consul-general.178 In February, Aharonian granted Dr. Brasil the mandate to represent Armenian interests through­ out South America. With these credentials, which arrived in Rio de Ja­

175 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, Sept. 16, Oct. 4, 1919. 176 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, Oct. 23, 1919. See also letter of Aug. 24, 1919. 177 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, Jan. 4, 10, 15, 1920. It was not until the summer of 1920 that the Armenian government adopted and distributed to its diplomatic posts abroad the Republic’s coat of arms. See Armenia Archives, 200/1/ 549» P- 32. 178 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, Feb. 4, 20, 27, 1920.

432

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

neiro in March, were various memorandums, pamphlets, books, and maps compiled by the Paris delegation.179 Throughout 1920, Etienne Brasil continued to work tirelessly to gain diplomatic recognition from the South American governments and to develop plans for the export of local products. He was certain that he could obtain credits from the governments of Brazil and Argentina. His influence with the Argentinian minister in Rio de Janeiro helped bring about the Buenos Aires government’s recognition of the Republic of Armenia at the beginning of May 1920.180 The second anniversary of the Armenian republic was celebrated with festivities in Rio, Sao Paulo, and Buenos Aires, where by 1920 more than 5,000 Armenians had setded. In his steady stream of letters to Paris, Dr. Brasil requested Armenian passports, documents, maps, books, and other materials to meet the enormous need and interest shown in South America. He believed that Brazil and Argentina—singly, jointly, or in collaboration with the United States—could furnish arms and muni­ tions, advisers and instructors, and credits to Armenia in return for mostfavored-nation commercial privileges. Meanwhile, he was enlisting the support of the ministers of Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay to gain rec­ ognition from their governments.181 Despite his enthusiasm, Brasil sometimes expressed annoyance with the tardiness and infrequency of communications from Paris, the lack of formal notice to the South American governments about his appoint­ ment, and the apparent unwillingness to name Dr. Latif honorary con­ sul. In June 1920 the Paris delegation wrote to explain that it did not want to appoint too many honorary consuls until Armenia’s status had been definitely determined and the Armenian question had been re­ solved by the forthcoming treaty of peace with Turkey. A month later, while replying to Brasil’s inquiries about Armenian currency, stamps, flag, and anthem, the secretary-general of the delegation reiterated that candidates should not be proposed too hastily—that is, before the con­ clusion of a definite peace treaty and international recognition of the Republic of Armenia. Brasil was instructed not to nominate persons who were subjects of foreign governments and was advised that the final word 179 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 233/132, Secretary-General to Brasil, March 8, 1920, and File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, March 25, 1920. 180 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, April 1,21, 28, May 23, 1920. Formal recognition of the Republic of Armenia was granted in decree number 46, dated May 3, 1920. See Republic of Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Guerre Europa (1914—1918), Caja 58, “Reconocimiento de nuevos estados por el Go­ bierno Argentino.” In his letter of May 3, 1920, Brasil stated that “yesterday” Argentina had recognized Armenia, whereas the date reported by the United States embassy in Buenos Aires is May 1, 1920. See US Archives, RG 59, 860J.01/250. 181 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, May 16, 29, June 22, 1920.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

433

in the naming of a consul or vice-consul was reserved for the government of the Armenian republic. For the time being, Latif could not be given a special honorary title.182 Dr. Brasil nonetheless continued to cultivate the ministers of Argen­ tina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. He was irritated when formal Brazilian recognition was delayed, apparently be­ cause of the reluctance of the foreign minister; ultimately, the direct intervention of President Pessoa was required to resolve the matter. In the interim, the government of Chile recognized the Armenian republic on August 15.183 In October, Brazil’s assistant foreign minister sum­ moned Dr. Brasil to show him the president’s personal instructions to recognize Armenia and to ask that the Armenian government change his title from diplomatic representative to chargé d’affaires or minister plenipotentiary. Until the receipt of such credentials, Etienne Brasil could not be officially recognized or enter into bilateral agreements. A telegram from Aharonian would suffice temporarily. Although the re­ sponse from Paris was long delayed, the government of Brazil formally extended diplomatic recognition on November 5, 1920. A few days later Dr. Brasil was received by President Pessoa, even though he still lacked the official credentials so often requested.184 Imparting his frustration over this dilatoriness, Brasil continued to offer useful suggestions to the Paris delegation. He gave information about the Brazilian and Argentinian ministers who were departing to participate in the Assembly of the League of Nations and reported that he had their assurances they would support the Armenian cause in the League. Brasil urged that they be received by the pro-Armenia groups or the Armenian colony of Geneva. Now that Armenia had been rec­ ognized by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (with Peru and Paraguay likely soon to follow), the time was ripe to appoint diplomatic agents or con­ suls. Brasil recommended Professor Levon Rumian for Manaos; Elian Naccache (Nakashian), the president of the Armenian General Benev­ olent Union, for Sao Paulo; Alejandro Manugian for Llay-Lay, Chile; Eduardo Hachikyan for Buenos Aires; and N. Julmunian for Montevi­ deo. In addition, Nubar Ohanian should serve in Rio, with Dikran Astor 182 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 235/134, Aharonian to Brasil, June 1,1920, File 236/ 135, Secretary-General to Brasil, July 21, 1920, and File 237/136, Aharonian to Brasil, Sept. 16, 1920. 183 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, June 23, 30, Aug. 23, Sept. 3, 9, Oct. 14, 1920. 184 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, Oct. 6, Nov. 7, 1920. The American embassy in Santiago reported that Chile recognized Armenia on November 4, whereas the British embassy in Rio de Janeiro gave the date as November 3. See US Ar­ chives, RG 59, 860J.01/356, Morgan to State Department, Nov. 5, 1920, and FO 371/ 4965, Ei5239/134/58, Childer to Foreign Office, Nov. 8, 1920.

434

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

as secretary of the legation and Agop Ajemian as interpreter, and Mihran Latif should become honorary consul-general. Dr. Brasil reported that there had been a gratifying response to the fund-raising campaign in South America. The support came from all segments of the community, as demonstrated by the fact that only one Armenian in all of Chile and one in Uruguay had refused to participate.185 From Paris, the Armenian delegation congratulated Dr. Brasil on his indefatigable efforts and the recognition by Brazil of the Armenian re­ public. As the Armenian government had now reserved to itself the right to make diplomatic appointments, however, Brasil’s recommendations would have to be forwarded to Erevan.186 Even with the postponements, the South American governments remained sympathetic. Imaginations were stimulated by the grand scheme of Etienne Brasil to have an influ­ ential honorary consul-general in Rio de Janeiro, himself as minister plenipotentiary, and consuls or vice-consuls in Manaos in Amazon state, Sao Paulo, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Llay-Lay, and eventually Lima and Asunción, and to cultivate profitable commercial relations. Yet these flights of optimism were dampened by the interminable delays in re­ ceiving the proper credentials, by the inability or unwillingness of the Paris delegation to follow up on suggestions and advice, and most im­ portant by the world’s reluctance to become committed to and involved in a country whose future was far less hopeful than the visions inspired by dedicated idealists such as Dr. Etienne Brasil.

The United States of America Garegin Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo) was the best known and most prominent diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia. Intel­ lectual, guerrilla organizer, former member of the Ottoman Parliament, and the only Western Armenian on the supreme Bureau of the Arme­ nian Revolutionary Federation, Pasdermadjian would undoubtedly have been a dominant force in the Armenian cabinet had he been in Erevan. Instead, he arrived in New York in October 1919 to guide Armenia’s diplomatic efforts in the United States. He was quickly co-opted by Va­ han Cardashian and the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia in efforts to gain direct military and economic aid for Armenia and to thwart all joint mandate schemes that would place Armenia in continued association with Turkey.187 185 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 400, Brasil to Aharonian, Nov. 7, 12, Dec. 5, 1920, and File 243/142, Aharonian to Brasil, Dec. 16, 1920. 186 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 140/39, Secretary-General to Brasil, Oct. 25, and Aharonian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erevan, Nov. 8, 1920. 187 For materials on the Armenian representation in the United States through 1920,

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

435

Pasdermadjian had no official status in the United States before the Department of State extended recognition to the Armenian republic in April 1920. He was, however, accepted informally and acknowledged as an Armenian spokesman by government and congressional leaders. Within the Armenian community, Armen Garo was a controversial figure because of his close association with the Dashnaktsutiun’s American Central Committee and his undisguised disdain for both the Armenian National Union headed by Mihran Sevasly and the Armenian National Delegation headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha. He tended to alienate Amer­ ican missionary leaders by his emphasis on direct American aid to Ar­ menia rather than a mandate. Nor was he much impressed with the Armenian republic’s economic and military missions under Hovhannes Kachaznuni and General Bagratuni, respectively. The economic mission had been a fiasco, he believed, because of Kachaznuni’s own ineptitude and the inability of his financial experts, Artashes Enfiadjian and Artem Piralian, to seize the initiative. He deplored the intrigue within and sur­ rounding the military mission, insisting that Bagratuni should show greater reserve and discipline and refrain from making unrealistic po­ litical statements.188 Possessed of a strong-willed personality, Pasdermadjian did not readily submit to directives from Avetis Aharonian, maintaining that he was an­ swerable to the Erevan government. When Aharonian asked that the proceeds of the fund-raising campaign in the United States be trans­ mitted to Paris, Pasdermadjian required confirmation from Erevan.189 In the end, much of the money was in fact sent to Europe, part of it to pay the London firm of Waterlow and Company for printing the colorful new treasury bills of the Republic of Armenia. Though the Armenianinscribed bills were distributed throughout the Armenian communities, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 379/1 through 385/7, H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich [or Nerkayatsutschutiun] ev Amerikian [or AmerikayiJ Karavarutiune. For biographical sketches of Pasdermadjian, see Avo, Heghapokhdkan Alpom, I, no. 6 (1957), pp. 162—168; Vratzian, op. át., pp. 87—118; Lazian, op. át., pp. 159—171. 188 por Pasdermadjian’s letter of appointment and credentials, see Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, and for notification to the Department of State, see US Archives, RG 59, 701.60)11/1, Aharonian to Lansing, with credentials, Sept. 29, 1920. For Pasderma­ djian’s views, see Archives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun), File 1408/28, H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, 1920. See also Rep. of Arm. Del. Ar­ chives, File 383/5, Pasdermadjian to Aharonian, Jan. 7, 1920. 189 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, Pasdermadjian to Aharonian, Feb. 19, 25, 1920, and Pasdermadjian to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erevan, April 6, 1920, File 235/ 134, Aharonian to Pasdermadjian, June 11, 1920, and File 236/135, Aharonian to Pas­ dermadjian, June 25, July 4, 1920, and Aharonian to Ohandjanian, Aug. 9, 1920. In Sep­ tember, Ohandjanian instructed Pasdermadjian to transfer funds from the United States to Paris to purchase Lebel rifles. Because of the developments in Armenia, this transaction apparently never took place. See File 273/172, H. H. Patvirakutiun: Ardzanagrutiunner, 1919~192Ot-

436

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

where they were bought up as souvenirs or used as gifts in exchange for hard-currency contributions, they were never placed into circulation in the Republic of Armenia. In his exchanges with the Department of State, Pasdermadjian re­ peatedly sought diplomatic recognition of the Armenian republic. When the Allies extended de facto recognition in January 1920, the United States took like action but then quietly withdrew its notification as having been in error. It was not until April 23 that recognition was formally granted. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby wrote Garegin Pasderma­ djian: Referring to communications heretofore received from you on the subject of the proposed recognition of your Government by the Government of the United States, I am pleased to inform you and through you, your Government that, by direction of the President, the Government of the United States recognizes, as of this date, the de facto Government of the Armenian Republic. This action is taken, however, with the understanding that this recognition in no way predetermines the territorial frontiers, which it is understood are matters for later delimitation.190

Secretary of State Colby received Pasdermadjian as Armenia’s pleni­ potentiary on May 6 and asked him to procure and submit official cre­ dentials. Armen Garo immediately telegraphed Aharonian to relay to Erevan his request for a letter expressing appreciation to President Wil­ son and naming him minister plenipotentiary and a second letter au­ thorizing him to appoint consuls.191 Meanwhile, Pasdermadjian wrote Colby on May 26 to nominate Krikor Chibouk as consul-general in New York and to request that, because of communications difficulties with Erevan, Chibouk be accepted temporarily pending formal notification from the Armenian government.192 Thereafter, on August 11 he named as diplomatic agents of the legation Matteos C. Ferrahian in Los Angeles, B. Z. Gaydzak in Detroit, and Manuel [Der] Manuelian in Boston.193 Pasdermadjian seemed to disregard Aharonian’s reminder that he, not Pasdermadjian, had been authorized by the government to make dip­ lomatic appointments and that therefore the names of nominees should be forwarded to Paris for confirmation. It was important, Aharonian advised, that these men have the appropriate qualifications and act in 190 US Archives, RG 59, 860J.cn/242a; Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, Colby to Pasdermadjian, April 23, and Pasdermadjian to Colby, April 27, 1920. 191 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5. The Armenian foreign ministry sent Pasder­ madjian new credentials on August 3, 1920. See Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 10/10, Ohandjanian to Pasdermadjian, Aug. 19, 1920. See also Hairenik, May 17:5, 1920. 192 US Archives, RG 59, 702.60J 11/original. The copy of this letter in Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, is dated May 24, 1920. l9S Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS ABROAD

437

an honorary capacity in order not to incur expenses on the account of the Armenian government.194 The enthusiasm generated within the Armenian community by the act of recognition strengthened Pasdermadjian’s position and secured the collaboration of the nonaligned elements of the community with the Dashnaktsutiun and the Social Democrat Hnchakian parties in the coastto-coast celebrations of the second anniversary of the independent Ar­ menian republic. Moreover, the community joined in a subscription campaign for the purchase of an Armenian legation building in Wash­ ington, D.C. The Armenian Legation Fund Committee opened its cam­ paign in September 1920 and received donations from all parts of the country and all segments of the community. The Republic of Armenia and its tricolor flag were to have a place on the diplomatic row of the capital of the United States of America. It was an exhilarating sight.195 Armenian refugees were among the first beneficiaries of United States recognition of Armenia. On June 1, Tigran Mirzayants reported to Aha­ ronian from Marseilles that many destitute refugees had congregated in the city seeking passage to America. Mirzayants issued them Armenian passports, but the United States consul would not grant visas without authorization from the embassy in Paris. Inquiries in the embassy led to a clarification of Armenia’s status and to a response to Aharonian on June 8 that all the American consuls in France were being instructed to visa Armenian passports as those of any other recognized state.196 Hun­ dreds of Armenians were able to secure passage to the United States thereafter. In September, Pasdermadjian wrote Secretary of State Colby that many Armenians had been caught up in the Bolshevik upheavals and were now stranded in Vladivostok and Harbin. Some of these people wanted to move to Armenia, but the American authorities were refusing to honor their Armenian passports (issued by Grigor Dsamoian) for tran­ sit travel across the United States. A month later, the State Department advised that the American consuls in Vladivostok and Harbin had been instructed to issue visas to bearers of valid Armenian passports who wished to return to their homeland via the United States.197 194 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 236/135, Aharonian to Pasdermadjian June 25,1920. 195 On the subscription campaign for an Armenian legation building, see Hairenik, Sept. 3,1920 ff. See also Armenian Legation Fund Committee (Despanatan Gnumi Kedronakan Handznakhumb), Haikakan despanatun Vashingtoni medj: Amerikahai gaghutin koghme nver Hayastani Hanrapetutian ( [Boston, 1920] ). The headquarters of the committee was in Phil­ adelphia, with Garegin (Karekin) A. Nuskhejian, chairman, Aram Jerrahian, vice chairman, Karapet (Garabed) Shahinian, secretary, Beniamin Torikian, assistant secretary, Frank N. Nahikian, treasurer. 196 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, U.S. Embassy to Aharonian, June 8, 1920. 197 Rep. of Arm. Del. Archives, File 383/5, Pasdermadjian to Colby, Sept. 27, and Norman H. Davis to Pasdermadjian, Oct. 22, 1920.

438

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Thus, with all the problems, personality clashes, and difficulties in securing official standing and status, Armenian consuls and agents were functioning nearly everywhere that sizable Armenian communities ex­ isted. The Armenian republic would have to demonstrate that it could survive and stabilize before some governments would be willing to ac­ cord formal status to its representatives and place them on the diplo­ matic register. But even in their quasi-official capacities, these men and women, spread from Helsinki to Addis Ababa and from London to Yo­ kohama and Rio de Janeiro, held out the prospect and enticement of things that could be if only, for a change, fate would smile upon the Armenian people and give long life to the Republic of Armenia.

Transliteration Key

Russian The Library of Congress system of transliteration has been used, but without diacritical marks and ligatures. The transliteration of several proper names varies slightly from this system.

Aa E6 Be rs Rà Ee Eë Mac 33 nu li ñü Kx J74 Mjk Hh Oo Un

a b v g d e e zb z i i i k 1 m n o p

Pp Ce Tm Yy 00 Xx Hu V« JBw

* s t u f kh ts ch sh shch 5» ” i/w y Bb 9 e 39 e lOn iu Xx ia

439

TRANSLITERATION KEY

440

Armenian The transliteration system is based on the phonetic values of Classical and Eastern Armenian. Diacritical marks are not used. The translitera­ tion of several proper names varies slightly from this system—thus Kachaznuni, not Kadjaznuni, and Alexandropol, not Aleksandropol.

U" SL Pp b g 7* 7 d bb e 5f z kt e Pp e t zh Z>A i kL 1 hip kh

**

ds k h Sb dz gh j ITS m ej hjyor—1 23 th n sh n* vo1 oro ch P

»2 ft- « U« ■i 4 $«

8ƒ hL

Pp 0o AJ

Diphthongs nt

—U, Vs

Uj

—ui,oy®oro2

hot

—faorytf

to J

—ai, ay8 or a2

¡"

—ia4 or ya4»8

A1

—iu

1 In initial position only. 2 The letter j is not transliterated in final position. 3 When followed by a vowel. 4 In Soviet Armenian orthography only. 5 When preceded by a vowel.

Jní —iu4

dj r s V t r ts V p k o f

Glossary of Place Names

Nearly all place names in the text appear in the form most widely used prior to 1921, as listed in the column on the left. Sites that have been renamed or given existing alternate forms are listed in the column on the right. Easily recognizable variants (e.g., Erzerum—Erzurum, and Korindzor—Kornidzor) are not included. Because of the present un­ certainty about the ultimate status of Mountainous Karabagh, names in that district are shown only as being within Mountainous Karabagh. Many place names are again being changed in the former Soviet Union, some to their original form.

Former Name

Subsequent Name(s) (Soviet and post-Soviet)

Ablah Achasu Adiaman (Erevan province) Aghamzalu Aghasibekli Aghbulagh (Akbulag) Aghdjakend, Nerkin (Lower) Aghdjakend, Verin (Upper) Aghkilise Aintab Aisori Akhta Aksibara (Aghsibara) Aksibara (Lower) Alagiaz Alashkert Alexandretta

Aigestan, Azerbaijan Achadjur, Armenia Garnhovit, Armenia Marmarashen, Armenia Aghaslu, Armenia Lusaghbiur, Armenia Shahumian, Azerbaijan Verishen, Azerbaijan Krashen, Armenia Gaziantep, Turkey Giulasar, Armenia Hrazdan, Armenia Voskepar, Armenia Askibara, Azerbaijan Aragads, Armenia Eleçkirt, Turkey Iskenderun, Turkey

441

442

Alexandropol

Alexandrovka Alikuchak Ali Mamed

Angelaut Angora Ani Arazdayan Arpa Astazur Baouk-Vedi Barana Basargechar Bash-Abaran Bash-Garni Bash-Norashen Bayazit Bazarchai Bazarchai River Blagodarnoe Bozburun, Mount Buniatlu Bzovd, Mount Bzovdal

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Leninakan; Giumri (Kumairi), Armenia Komosor, Turkey Kuchak, Armenia Almamed; Dvin Sovkhoz; Lusarat, Armenia Angeghakot, Armenia Ankara, Turkey Aniköy; Ocakh, Turkey Eraskh, Armenia Areni, Armenia Shvanidzor, Armenia

Vedi, Armenia Noyemberian, Armenia Vardenis, Armenia Abaran; Aparan, Armenia Garni, Armenia Ilichevsk; Sharur (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan Dogubayazit, Turkey Goraik, Armenia Barkushat River, Armenia Çakmak, Turkey Mount Erakh, Armenia Karmrakar, Mountainous Karabagh Mount Bazumtar, Armenia Bazum, Armenia

Charkhedj Constantinople

Kaiseri, Turkey Getashen; Chaikend, Azerbaijan Krasnoselsk (incorporated in), Armenia Avetaranots, Mountainous Karabagh Kuibishev; Haghardzin, Armenia Istanbul, Turkey

Darabas Darachichak Daralagiaz Dashushen Davalu

Darbas, Armenia Dsaghkadzor, Armenia Vayots Dzor; Vaik, Armenia Karashen, Mountainous Karabagh Ararat, Armenia

Caesarea Chaikend Chambarak

Chanakhchi

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

443

Dirakler Djatkran Djul Dokhkuz Dsegh Dvegh

Karnut, Armenia Vosketap, Armenia Artavan, Armenia Kanachut, Armenia Tumanian, Armenia Dovegh, Armenia

Ekaterinodar Ekaterinoslav Elenendorf Elenovka Elisavetpol Engidja (Erevan uezd) Engikend (Manasbek; Manasgiugh) Eritsatumb

Krasnodar, Russian Federation Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine Khanlar, Azerbaijan Sevan, Armenia Kirovabad; Ganja, Azerbaijan Norabats, Armenia Norashen; Manashen, Azerbaijan

Gallipoli Ganja (Gandzak) Gedjevan Geoigiumbet Germanis (Jermanis) Gerusy Ghalacha (Kalacha) Ghaltakhchi (Kaltakchi) Gharaghshlagh Ghregh (Krykh) Ghrghi Ghulali Ghushchi Giutkum Grkh-bulag

Çanakkale, Turkey Kirovabad; Ganja, Azerbaijan Kadjaran, Armenia Geghanist, Armenia Keolanlu, Armenia Goris, Armenia Berdavan, Armenia Hartagiugh, Armenia Dostlug; Hayanist, Armenia Dzoraget, Armenia Artsvaberd, Armenia Aigedzor, Armenia Tazagiugh; Tasik, Armenia Geghanush, Armenia Akunk, Armenia

Hadjin Haji-Eilas

Hajikend (Hajishen) Haji-Nazar Hamamlu

Saimbeyli, Turkey Ipakli; Masis Sovkhoz; Darakert, Armenia Kamo, Azerbaijan Kamo village, Armenia Spitak, Armenia

luva

Shahumian, Armenia

Jafarabad

Argavand, Armenia

Bardzravan, Armenia

444

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Jalal-oghli Jghin

Stepanavan, Armenia Geoljghin, Armenia

Karabaghlar (Erevan uezd) Karabulagh (Elisavetpol uezd) Karaburun Karadash (Kazakh uezd) Karakilisa (Alexandropol uezd) Karakilisa (Sisavan) Karakoyunlu (Kazakh uezd) Karalar Karanlukh, Nerkin (Lower) Kariagin Karkhun (Gharghun) Karvansarai Kavarachai River Kavtarlu Kerasund Keshishkend Khachaparakh Khamarlu (Ghamarlu) Khankend

Chimankend; Urtsadzor, Armenia Martunashen, Azerbaijan Karakert station, Armenia Sevkar, Armenia Kirovabad; Vanadzor, Armenia Sisian, Armenia Geolkend; Aigut, Armenia Aralez, Armenia Martuni, Armenia Fizuli, Azerbaijan Djrarat, Armenia Ijevan, Armenia Gavaraget River, Armenia Panik, Armenia Giresun, Turkey Mikoyan; Egheknadzor, Armenia Zahmat; Khachpar, Armenia Artashat, Armenia Stepanakert, Mountainous Karabagh Gai, Armenia Aknashen, Armenia Chorastan, Armenia Martuni, Mountainous Karabagh Karmrashen, Armenia Akyaka, Turkey Ghoshavank; Haikadzor, Armenia Mounts Geghmaghan and Tirinkatar Voskevan, Armenia Kotigegh; Shavarshavan; Koti, Armenia Sarahart, Armenia Tuzluca, Turkey Lernadzor, Armenia Dosdu; Barekamavan, Armenia Demurchi (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan

Khatunarkh, Nerkin (Lower) Khatunarkh, Verin (Upper) Khlatagh Khonashen Kirmizlu Kizil-Chakhchakh Kizilkilisa Kizil-Ziaret, Mount

Koshkotan (Ghoshghotan) Kotkend Kulidjan Kulp (Koghb) Kurdikend (Krdikend) Kurumsulu (Ghurumsulu) Kushchi-Demurchi

Lalkend (Lalakend)

Lalgegh; Vazashen, Armenia

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

445

Molla-Geokcha Molla-Musa Moseskend

Manashen, Azerbaijan Leninavan, Mountainous Karabagh Göle, Turkey Karmirgiugh; Krasnoselsk; Karmir, Armenia Maralik, Armenia Voskehask, Armenia Mosesgegh, Armenia

Nalband Nedjelu, Nerkin (Lower) Nedjelu, Verin (Upper) Nerkin Gharanlugh (Karanlukh) Nor-Bayazit (Novo-Bayazet) Novo-Mikhailovka Novo-Petrovka Novo-Selim

Shirakamut, Armenia Sayat Nova, Armenia Nizami, Armenia Martuni, Armenia Kamo, Armenia Mikhailovka, Armenia Agçalar, Turkey Selim, Turkey

Okhchi Ordaklu Ortakilisa

Voghchi, Armenia Ljashen, Armenia Mayisian, Armenia

Paravatumb

Petrovka Petrovsk Pokr Kapanak (Ghapanak) Prokhladnoe

Barabatum (incorporated in Ghapan), Armenia Hatsarat (incorporated in Kamo), Armenia Azizbekov; Zaritap, Armenia Leningrad; St. Petersburg, Russian Federation Kayah, Turkey Makhachkala, Russian Federation Hovit, Armenia Melikköy, Turkey

Ramis Rehanlu Romanovo Ruschuk

Urmis (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan Kalinin; Aigavan, Armenia Yenikóy, Turkey Ruse, Bulgaria

Salónica Sardarabad Seidkend

Thessalonica, Greece Hoktember, Armenia Shurakend, Armenia

Manasbek (Manasgiugh) Margushavan Merdenek Mikhailovka

Pashakend Pashalu Petrograd

446

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Shahali Sharifabad (Taza Karkhun) Sheki Shishkert Shorlu-Demurchi Shorlu-Mehmandar Shushikend Sis Sisian Smyrna Sogutli (Alexandropol uezd) Sultanbek Suluk

Vahagni, Armenia Araxes, Armenia Shaki, Armenia Lijk, Armenia Shorlu; Dashtavan, Armenia Hovtashat, Armenia Shosh, Mountainous Karabagh Kozan, Turkey Hatsavan, Armenia Izmir, Turkey Sarnaghbiur, Armenia Bardzruni, Armenia Azat, Azerbaijan

Tanagirmaz (Danagirmaz) Tauzkala Tauzkend Terter (Tartar) Tghna

Hovit; Nigavan, Armenia Berd, Armenia Tovuz, Armenia Mir Bashir; Tartar, Azerbaijan Chananab (Nakhichevan), Azerbaijan Tbilisi, Georgia Trabzon, Turkey Karmir Giugh, Mountainous Karabagh Stalingrad; Volgograd, Russian Federation

Tiflis Trebizond Trnavarz (Dmavaz) Tsaritsyn

Ulukhanlu Unit Uzunlar Uzuntala

Masis, Armenia Vorotan, Armenia Odzun, Armenia Honut; Aigehovit, Armenia

Vardashen (Nukhi uezd) Vladikavkaz

Vorontsovka

Oghuz, Azerbaijan Ordzhonikidze; Vladikavkaz, Russian Federation Kalinino; Tashir, Armenia

Zangu River Zarushat Zeitun Zeiva Zurzuna

Hrazdan River, Armenia Arpaçay, Turkey Sûleymanh, Turkey Davit Bek, Armenia Çildir, Turkey

Bibliography

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File 147/46. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 148/47. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t.: Tntesakan Hartser [R. of A. Delega­ tion, 1920: Economic Questions]. File 149/48. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 150/49. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 151/50. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 152/51. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 153/52. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 154/53Patuirakutiun, 1920 t.: Zanazan Grutiunner [R. of A. Delegation, 1920: Miscellaneous Writings]. File 155/54. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 156/55. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 1560/55«. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 157/56. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 158/57. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 159/58. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 160/59. H- Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 161/60. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 162/61. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 163/62. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 164/63. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 165/64. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 [R. of A. Delegation, 1921]. File 166/65. Haikakan Teghekatu Biuro Patuirakutian Kits, 1921 t. [Armenian Information Bureau Affiliated with the Delegation, 1921]. File 167/66. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1921 t. : Zanazan Grutiunner [R. of A. Dele­ gation, 1921 : Miscellaneous Writings]. File 168/67. H’ Patuirakutiun, 1921 t.: Zanazan Grutiunner [R. of A. Dele­ gation, 1921 : Miscellaneous Writings]. File 230/129. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (3 à 230), 1918—1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1918—1919]. File 231/130. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (231 à 500), 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1919]. File 2310/130«. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 1920]. File 232/131. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (501 à 1000), 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1919]. File 233/132. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (1001 à 1500), 1919—1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1919—1920]. File 234/133. H. H. Patuirakutiun, 1919—1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation, 19191920 (Reports of Major General Korganian)]. File 235/134. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (1501 à 1900), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 236/135. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (1901 à 2300), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 237/136. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (2301 à 2690), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 239/138. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (2691 à 2999), 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920]. File 241/140. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Azgayin Patuirakutiun [R. of A. Delegation: National Delegation]. File 242/141. H. H. Patuirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920—1921].

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File 243/142. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres (3000 0,3315), 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921]. File 244/143. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921]. File 245/144. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921 ]. File 246/145. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921]. File 247/146. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921]. File 248/147. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921]. File 249/148. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921]. File 250/149. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920-1921 ]. File 251/150. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920—1921]. File 252/151. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Copies des Lettres, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation: Copies of Letters, 1920—1921 ]. File 272/171. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Ardzanagrutiunner, 1919 t. [R. of A. Dele­ gation: Minutes, 1919]. File 273/172. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Ardzanagrutiunner, 1919—1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation: Minutes, 1919—1920]. File 274/173. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Ardzanagrutiunner, 1921 t. [R. of A. Dele­ gation: Minutes, 1921]. File 283/182. H. H. Patvirakutiun: Hayasemer [R. of A. Delegation: Armenophiles]. File 294/1. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1916 t. [National Delegation, 1916]. File 2940/10. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1917 t. [National Delegation, 1917]. File 295/2. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1918 t. [National Delegation, 1918]. File 296/3. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919 t. [National Delegation, 1919]. File 297/4. Azgojzn Patvirakutiun, 1919—1920 t.: Kilikia Ugharkvads Bzhshkakan Arakelutiun [National Delegation, 1919-1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia]. File 298/5. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919—1920 t.: Kilikia Ugharkvads Bzhshkakan Arakelutiun [National Delegation, 1919—1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia]. File 299/6. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919—1920 t.: Bzhshkakan Arakelutiun depi Kilikia [National Delegation, 1919—1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia]. File 300/7. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1919—1920 t.: Bzhshkakan Arakelutiun depi Kilikia [National Delegation, 1919—1920: Medical Mission to Cilicia]. File 301/8. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [National Delegation, 1920]. File 302/9. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1920 t. [National Delegation, 1920]. File 303/10. Azgayin Patvirakutiun, 1921 t. [National Delegation, 1921]. File 305 a. Amboghdjakan Hayastani Patvirakutiun Kilikiayum, 1919—19201. [Del­ egation of Integral Armenia in Cilicia, 1919—1920]. File 306/1. H. H. Patvirakutiune ev Andrkovkasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1919]. File 307/2. H. H. Patvirakutiune ev Andrkovkasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1920]. File 308/3. H. H. Patvirakutiune ev Andrkovkasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1921 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1921].

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File 309/4. H. H. Patvirakutiune eu Andrkoukasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1921 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1921]. File 310/5. H. H. Patvirakutiune eu Andrkovkasian Hanrapetutiunnere, 1921 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Transcaucasian Republics, 1921]. File 318. Andrkovkasi Asorinere, 1919—1922 t.t. [The Assyrians of Transcaucasia, 1919-1922]. File 318a. Krteri Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1918—1919 t. [The Kurdish Mission, 1918-1919]. File 319/1. H. H. Patvirakutiun eu Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1919]. File 320/2. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1920]. File 321/3. H. H. Patvirakutiun eu Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1920]. File 322/4. H. H. Patvirakutiun eu Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1920]. File 323/5. H. H. Patvirakutiun eu Fransiakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the French Government, 1921]. File 331/1. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1917 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1917]. File 332/2. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1918 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1918]. File 333/3Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1919]. File 334/4. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1920]. File 335/5. H. H Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1919—1920 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1919— 1920]. File 336/6. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1920]. File 337/7. H H Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1921]. File 338/8. H. H. Londoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Britanakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. London Mission and the British Government, 1921]. File 344/1. H. H. Hromi Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1918 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1918]. File 345/2. H H. Hromi Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1919]. File 346/3. H. H. Hromi Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1920]. File 347/4. H. H. Hromi Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Italakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Rome Mission and the Italian Government, 1921]. File 353. H. H. Berlini Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1918—1919 t. [R. of A. Berlin Mis­ sion, 1918-1919]. File 353a. H. H. Berlini Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919—1920 t. [R. of A. Berlin Mis­ sion, 1919-1920]. File 354/1. H. H. Atenki Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Hunakan Karavarutiune, 1919— 1920 t. [R. of A. Athens Mission and the Greek Government, 1919—1920]. File 355/2. H H Atenki Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Hunakan Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Athens Mission and the Greek Government, 1921].

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File 359a. H. H. Hiupatosakan GordserFransiayum, 1918—1928 t.t. [R. of A. Con­ sular Affairs in France, 1918—1928]. File 360/1. H. H. Sofiayi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921 t. [R. of A. Consulate General in Sofía, 1921]. File 361/2. H. H. Sofiayi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1922 t. [R. of A. Consulate General in Sofia, 1922]. File 364. H. H. Bukreshi Endhanur Hiupatosutiun, 1921—1929 t. [R. of A. Con­ sulate General in Bucharest, 1921—1929]. File 365. H H Viennayi Hiupatosutiun, 1920—1923 t. [R. of A. Vienna Consu­ late, 1920-1923]. File 366. H. H. Belgradi Hiupatosutiun, 1920-1921 t.t. [R. of A. Belgrade Con­ sulate, 1920—1921]. File 367. H. H. Zheneui Hiupatosutiun, 1919-1921 t.t. [R. of A. Geneva Con­ sulate, 1919—1921]. File 368/1. Beldjikakan Karavarutiun eu Briuseli Hiupatosutiun, 1919—1920 t.t. [The Belgian Government and the Brussels Consulate, 1919—1920]. File 369/2. Beldjikakan Karavarutiun eu Briuseli Hiupatosutiun, 1921—1922 t.t. [The Belgian Government and the Brussels Consulate, 1921—1922]. File 371. H. H. Patuirakutiun ev Khorhrdayin Rusastan, 1920—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and Soviet Russia, 1920-1921]. File 372. H. H. Patuirakutiun eu Khorhrdayin Rusastan, 1922—1923 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and Soviet Russia, 1922—1923]. File 373. H. H. Patuirakutiun ev RusakanNakhkinNerkayatsutsichner, 1919—1922 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Former Representatives of Russia, 19191922]. File 374. H. H. Patuirakutiun eu Finlandakan Karavarutiun, 19201922 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Finnish Government, 1920—1922]. File 375. H. H. Patuirakutiun ev Latuiayi Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919—1922 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Mission of Latvia, 1919-1922]. File 376. H. H. Patuirakutiun eu Lehastani Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1919—1921 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Mission of Poland, 1919—1921]. File 377. H. H. Patuirakutiun ev Chekhoslovakiayi Nerkayatsutschutiun, 1921 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the Mission of Czechoslovakia, 1921]. File 378. H. H. Patuirakutiun ev Evropakan Zanazan Petutiunneri Nerkayatsutschu­ tiun, 1919—1923 t.t. [R. of A. Delegation and Missions of Various European States, 1919-1923]. File 379/1. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev H. Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1917—1918 t.t. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the North Ameri­ can Government, 1917—1918]. File 380/2. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich eu H. Amerikayi Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the Government of North America, 1919]. File 381/3. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich eu H. Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1919 t. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the North American Gov­ ernment, 1919]. File 382/4. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutsich ev Amerikian Karavarutiune: Press Bureau, 1919 t. [R. of A. Washington Representative and the American Gov­ ernment: Press Bureau, 1919]. File 383/5. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Amerikayi Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the Government of America, 1920].

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File 384/6. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1920 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the American Government, 1920]. File 385/7. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun ev Amerikian Karavarutiune: Armenian Press Bureau, 1920 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the Amer­ ican Government: Armenian Press Bureau, 1920]. File 386/8. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the American Government, 1921]. File 387/9. H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun eu Amerikian Karavarutiune, 1921 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission and the American Government, 1921]. File 395/17« H. H. Vashingtoni Nerkayatsutschutiun: Hiupatosakan Grutiunner, 1920—1921 t. [R. of A. Washington Mission: Consular Correspondence, 1920-1921]. File 400. H. H. Patvirakutiun ev Haravayin Amerikayi Petutiunnere, 1919-1927 t. [R. of A. Delegation and the States of South America, 1919—1927]. File 401. H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Egiptosi Medj, 19201922 t.t. [R. of A. Temporary Representative in Egypt, 1920-1922]. File 402. H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutschutiun Habeshstanum, 1919—1923 t.t. [R. of A. Temporary Mission in Ethiopia, 1919-1923]. File 403. H. H. Zhamanakavor Nerkayatsutsich Iragum, 1920 t. [R. of A. Tem­ porary Representative in Iraq, 1920]. File 403a. H. H. Nerkayatsutschutiun Japoniayum, 1920—1922 t.t. [R. of A. Mis­ sion in Japan, 1920—1922]. File 404/1. Azgeri Dashnaktsutiune, 1918—1920 t.t. [The League of Nations, 1918-1920]. File 404a/1 a. Azgeri Dashnaktsutiune: Seuri Dashnagir, 1920 t. [The League of Nations: Treaty of Sèvres, 1920]. File 421/1. Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 1919 t. [Armenian Information Bu­ reau in Paris, 1919]. File 422/2. Hai Teghekatu Biuro Parizum, 1920 t. [Armenian Information Bu­ reau in Paris, 1920]. File 502. Azgayin Marminner: Azgayin Khorhurd, 1918 t. [National Bodies: Na­ tional Council, 1918]. File 503. Kamavorakan Gnder, 1914—1918 t. [Volunteer Regiments, 1914— 1918]. File 504. Azgayin Miutiun Kilikio eu Siurio, 1919—1924 t. [National Union of Cilicia and Syria, 1919—1924]. File 506. Azgayin Miutiun Egiptosi, 1916—1921 t. [National Union of Egypt, 1916-1921]. File 508. Azgayin Miutiun Bulghario, 1918—1921 t. [National Union of Bulgaria, 1918-1921]. File 509. Haikakan Miutiun Rumanio, 1918—1921 t. [Armenian Union of Ro­ mania, 1918—1921]. File 510. Hayots Azgayin Khorhurd Lehastanum, 1920—1931 t. [Armenian Na­ tional Council in Poland, 1920—1931]. File 515. Hayots Miatsial Enkerutiun Londoni, 1919 t. [Armenian United Asso­ ciation of London, 1919]. File 516. Amerikayi Hayots Azgayin Miutiun, 1919 t. [Armenian National Union of America, 1919]. File 526. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, 1919 t. Hunvar [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turkish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, January 1919].

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File 527. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan GazanutiunneriMasin, igigt.Petrvar [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turk­ ish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, February 1919]. File 528. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, igig t. Mart [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turk­ ish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, March 1919]. File 529. Hayastani Hanrapetutian Patvirakutiun: Rus Knnichneri Midjotsav Hartsaknnvads Vkaneri Tsutsmunknere Tajkakan Gazanutiunneri Masin, igig t. April [Republic of Armenia Delegation: Testimony of Witnesses of the Turk­ ish Brutalities, Taken by Russian Investigators, April 1919]. (The files that follow are part of the original archives of the Dashnaktsutiun.) File 1283/26. H. H. D. Arevmtian Evropayi Kedronakan Komite, igig [A. (Ar­ menian) R. (Revolutionary) F. (Federation) Central Committee of Western Europe, 1919]. File 1378/9. H. H. D. Germania, igi6-igso [A.R.F.: Germany, 1916-1920]. File 14060/260. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, igi8 [A.R.F. Central Committee of America, 1918]. File 14070/270. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, igig [A.R.F. Central Committee of America, 1919]. File 1408/28. H. H. D. Amerikayi Kedronakan Komite, ig2O [A.R.F. Central Committee of America, 1920]. File 1546/27. H. HD. g-rd Endhanur Zhoghov igig t. [A.R.F. 9th General Meeting, 1919]. File 1649. H. H. D.: Gharabagh [A.R.F.: Karabagh]. File 1650/1. H. H D.: Petrvarian Sharzhman Masin, ig2i t. [A.R.F.: About the February Movement, 1921]. File 1651/2. H H D.: Petrvarian Sharzhman Masin, ig2i t. [A.R.F.: About the February Movement, 1921]. File 1687/18. H HD. Erkrord Midjazgainakan, igig [A.R.F.: Second Inter­ national, 1919]. File 1688/19. EI. D-: Erkrord Midjazgainakan, ig2o [A.R.F.: Second Inter­ national, 1920]. Armenian National Delegation. Archives of the Armenian National Delegation. (Transferred in 1972 from Paris to the Armenian State Historical Archives, Ere­ van, with microfilm copies deposited in the Nubarian Library in Paris and at the international headquarters of the Armenian General Benevolent Union in New York).

Microfilm Roll C-i (pp. 1—2052: Delegation minutes, correspondence, and documents, refugee affairs, National Congress, Phil-Armenian Congress, Lausanne conferences, 1918—1924). C-2 (pp. 2053—4049: Delegation correspondence and memoranda, refugee affairs, League of Nations, Lausanne conferences, Cilicia, Armenian Na­ tional Home, 1922—1924). C-3 (pp. 4050-6203: History of Armenian Question, statistical data, Armenian orphans and refugees, delegation correspondence, 1921—1924). C-4 (pp. 6204—8277: Delegation correspondence, Paris Peace Conference, Allied policies, Armenian orphans and refugees, 1919—1924). C-5 (pp. 8278-10047: Armenian National Congress, news agency releases, 1919-1923).

460

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C-6 (pp. 10048—12019: News agency releases, 1922—1923). C-7 (pp. 12020—14208: Armenian Press Bureau, League of Nations and ref­ ugees, Cilicia, general correspondence, 1918-1925). C-8 (pp. 14209—15727: Armenophile societies, 1918—1924). C-9 (pp. 15728—17785: Near East Relief, Transcaucasian affairs, Armenian communities in Western Europe, 1920-1929). C-10 (pp. 17786—18594 and new series [n.s.] pp. 1-1214: Armenian com­ munities in Europe and Near East, conditions in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Cilicia, correspondence of Noradoungian, Tekeyan, Alpoyadjian, and others, 1919—1924). C-11 (pp. 1215—3131 n.s.: Conditions in Cilicia and Syria, Armenian com­ munities in Near East and United States, 1919-1922). C-12 (pp. 3132—5166 n.s.: Catholicosate of Cilicia, Patriarchates of Constan­ tinople and Jerusalem, Mekhitarist Brotherhood, Republic of Armenia Del­ egation, general correspondence, 1919—1924). C-13 (pp. 5167—6695 n.s.: Armenian Legion and Legion d’Orient, History of Armenian Question, Cilicia, National Home, correspondence of General Andranik, Patriarch Zaven, Gulbenkian, Melkonian, and others, 1919— 1925)D-i (pp. 1—2000: National Congress, general correspondence, memoranda, 1919-1924). D-2 (pp. 2001—3881: Peace conference, delegation minutes, correspondence, memoranda, 1920—1923). D-3 (pp. 3882—5902: Delegation committees, Allied policies, Turkish Nation­ alist foreign relations, Cilicia and the Armenian Legion, 1920—1924). D-4 (pp. 5903-8301: Conditions in Cilicia, National Home, delegation mem­ oranda, correspondence of Damadian, Sevasly, Esayan, Chobanian, and oth­ ers, 1920-1924). D-5 (pp. 8302—10143: Peace conferences, conditions in Cilicia, refugees, del­ egation correspondence, 1919—1923). D-6 (pp. 10144—12019: Conditions in Transcaucasia, Paris Peace Conference, delegation secretariat, Armenophile societies, Soviet-Turkish relations, So­ viet Armenia, League of Nations, general correspondence, 1919—1924). i-D (pp. 1—2050: Andonian’s history of Armenian Question and National Del­ egation, minutes of Delegation of Integral Armenia, minutes of National Delegation, Paris Peace Conference, Treaty of Sèvres, Armenians in the world war, 1915—1924). 2-D (pp. 2051—2320: Cilicia, National Home, refugee affairs, 1919—1923). France Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Quai d’Orsay), Paris. Guerre 1914—1918: Turquie. Cartons 887—889. Arménie: août 1914-mai 1918. Cartons 890—893. Légion d'Orient: septembre 1916-avril 1918. Cartons 894—895. Arméniens du Caucase: octobre 1917-avril 1918. Ministère d’Etat Chargé de la Défense Nationale. Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre. Service Historique (Château de Vincennes), Vincennes. Classe 16N. Commandement du Grand Quartier Générai T.O.E. 3ème Bureau E. File 3016 (Légion d’Orient). Files 3051-3052 (Turkish-Caucasus front, 1917-1919). Files 3060—3061 (Caucasus, Cilicia, etc., 1917—1919).

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Files 3152—3154 (Comptes-rendus des Armées Alliées en Orient, 1917— 1919)Files 3180—3187 (Caucasus: Turkish invasion of, massacres of Armenians in, conditions of refugees in, British occupation of, Armenian republic in, 1917-1919). Files 3194—3206 (Intelligence reports, correspondence, and documents relating to Turkey, Asia Minor, Transcaucasia, Armenians, Allied poli­ cies, 1915-1920). Classe 17N. Missions Militaires Françaises. Files 581—585 (Mission in South Russia, including numerous reports on the Caucasus, Armenian refugees, Pan-Islamic movements). Files 589—590 (Mission in the Caucasus). Classe 20N. Front Oriental Commandement des Armées Alliées en Orient (C.A.A.). 2ème Bureau. Files 139—144. Bulletins de renseignements, comptes-rendus, correspondance: Em­ pire Ottoman, Arménie, Caucase, etc. 1916-1919. Files 157—158. (Armenian survivors and conditions in Cilicia, Allied pol­ icies and rivalries, Soviet-Turkish relations, 1919—1921.) Files 166—170. Renseignements de la Marine, 1917—1921. File 171. Conférence des hauts-commissaires, 1919—1920. File 172. Correspondance et renseignements relatifs à l Armée du Levant, 1916— 1921. Files 173—175. Comptes-rendus et renseignements britanniques; renseignements divers, 1916-1922. Files 186—187. Caucase: Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan et Arménie, 1919—1921. Corps d’Occupation de Constantinople (C.O.C.), puis Corps d’Occupation Fran­ çaise de Constantinople (C.OF'.C.). 2ème Bureau. Files 1081—1084. Bulletins de renseignements journaliers et hebdomadaires: ren­ seignements politiques, économiques et militaires, 1920—1923. File 1085. Rapports mensuels concernant la politique intérieure et extérieure. . . , 1920-1923. File 1086/1. Renseignements sur la Turquie, la Géorgie, VArménie. . ., 1920— 192t. File 1088. Arméefrançaise du Levant. . . à la chute d'Aïntab, 21 février, 1921. File 1095. Renseignements de la Marine . . . Turquie, Russie méridionale, Cau­ case, Arménie. Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan, Syrie et Cilicie. . ., 1920—1923. File 1115. Télégrammes . . . Evénements de Cilicie et résistance à l'occupation française; renseignements sur le Kurdistan et l'Arménie, 1919—1923.

Republie of Georgia Archives of the Delegation to the Conference of Peace and of the Government in Exile. (Now deposited in Houghton Library, Harvard University). Boxes 1—2. The Russian Revolution and the Situation in the Caucasus prior to the Bolshevik Invasion. Box 3. The Caucasus and Turkey in 1918—1919. Boxes 4—7. The Transcaucasian Federation and Independent Georgia. Boxes 8—9. Independent Georgia: Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Boxes 10—12. Independent Georgia: Ministry of Finance, Trade, and Industry. Boxes 13—15. Independent Georgia: Ministry of Agriculture. Boxes 18. Independent Georgia: People's Guard.

462

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Box 19. Peace Conference in Trebizond; End of Transcaucasian Federation; Inde­ pendent Georgia and Its Relations with Turkey and Germany. Boxes 20-23. Georgia, English Military Command in Transcaucasia, Russian White Army. Box 24. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Boxes 25—30. Georgian Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris. Box 31. Georgian Diplomatic Representation in Paris. Box 32. Georgian Legation in Rome. Box 33. Georgian Legation in Berlin. Box 34. Georgian Legation in Constantinople. Box 35. Georgian Legation in Berne. Box 36. Interrelations among Georgia, Northern Caucasus, Ukraine, Poland, Bielorussia, Baltic, and Scandinavian Countries. Box 37. Georgia and Soviet Russia. Box 80. The Georgian and Foreign Press about Georgia. Great Britain Admiralty Office Archives. Public Record Office (London). Class 1. Admiralty and Secretarial Papers, 1660-1 g$4Cabinet Office Archives. Public Record Office. Class 21. Registered Files (igi6—ig$g). 153“154- Future of Syria, 1919. 158. Relations between France and Great Britain and Their Policy re Russian and Turkish Peace, 1919. 173. Trading Relations with Russia, 1920. 174. Smyrna, 1920. 177. Bolshevik Influence on Moslems, 1920. 184. Turkey: Peace Negotiations, 1920. Class 23. Cabinet: Minutes (igiô—iggg). 1—12. War Cabinet Minutes, W.C.’ Series, 1916-1919. 13-16. War Cabinet: A’Minutes, 1917-1919. 17. War Cabinet: X’ Minutes, 1918. 18—23. Cabinet Conclusions, 1919—1920. 37—38. Conclusions, 1919—1921. 40-44. Imperial War Cabinet: Minutes, 1917—1918. Class 24. Cabinet Memoranda (igi^—ig^g). 1—5. ‘G’War Series, 1915—1920. 6—88. ‘G.T.’ Series, 1917—1919. 92-117. ‘C.P. ’Series, 1919-1920. 143—145. War Cabinet: Eastern Reports, 1917—1919 154—155. Cabinet: Foreign Countries Reports, 1919—1922. Class 25. Supreme War Council (igiy—igig). 42. Turkey: Reports on Pan-Turanian Movement and on Turkey in Asia and Its Problems. 43. Turkey and South Russia: Reports on the Military and Strategical Situation. "¡2. Eastern and Central Asian Question. 104. Near East: Situation Report. 107. Near East: Situation Report. 118. The Ottoman Empire and Trans-Caucasia: Military Occupation. 120—126. Circulated Papers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

463

127. Miscellaneous Unnumbered Papers (including history ofSupreme War Coun­ cil). Class 27. Cabinet Committees: General Series (1915—1939). 24. Eastern Committee: Minutes of Meetings, 1918—1919. 25—39. Eastern Committee: Memoranda, 1918. Class 28. Allied (War) Conferences (1915—1920). 1—8. Anglo-French and Allied Conferences: ‘I.C.’ Series, 1915—1919. 9. Miscellaneous Papers, 1915—1920. Class 29. International Conferences (1916—1939). 1—6. ‘P’ (Peace) Series, 1916—1920. 7—22. War Cabinet: Paris (‘W.C.P.’Series), 1919—1920. 23—27. War Cabinet: Paris (*M* Series), 1919. 28. Peace Conference: British Empire Delegation, 1919—1922. 29—35. Pea 336» 342, 352, 354» 359’ 361’ 362, 366, 367, 386, 394, 396, 398, 409, 425; map of, 4, 28; Armenians in, 10, 16, 17; and Ar­ menian-Azerbaijani conflict, 121, 122, 125, 126, 130, 131, 139, 143 n. 78,152,159,160,164—166,168, 171; and sovietization of Azerbai­ jan, 179, 181, 182, 188, 202-205,

207; and Bolsheviks, 210, 252; Mer­ chants Bank of, 285 Tigranian, Alexandre, 17 Tigris River: map of, 28 Tikidjiev, A. I. (Hamazasp Tikidjian), 396 Tikor, Kaghisman okrug 277 Tilley, Sir John Anthony Cecil: and Turkey and Turks, 110; and Arme­ nian-Azerbaijani conflict, 127, 130; as British assistant foreign secretary, 127, 130, 329, 330, 332-334, 347, 348, 349, 411-412, 414, 417; and Batum, 355, 356 Tiloyan, Murad (Sako), 245, 246 Tinchenko, Lieutenant Colonel, 245 Tireboli (Tripoli), Trebizond vilayet, 27’ 33’ 35; maP of, 28 Tittoni, Tomasso, 51 Tiutunjian, Khosrov, 251 Togh, Shushi uezd, 195; map of, 146 Tokat, Sivas vilayet: map of, 28 Tomasian, Arshak, 235 Toniants (Toniev), Captain Ashot Ni­ kolaevich: as diplomatic represen­ tative, 395 Tonoyan, Abgar, 238 n. 74 Topchibashev, Ali Mardan: as head of Azerbaijani delegation in Paris, 56, 97’ 100 Torikian, Beniamin, 437 n. 195 Toromanian, Toros, 17, 277 Torosian, Sahak: as Dashnakist spokes­ man, 16, 189, 265 n. 18, 269 Tortum, Erzerum vilayet, 297; map of, 4’ 299 Toshian, Toros, as assistant agricul­ tural minister, 8 Tovmasian, A. T., 257 Transcaspia, 394 Transcaucasia, 2, 96, 259, 274, 281, 324» 325’ 327’ 332, 338’ 358’ 363’ 365’ 367’ 387’ 391’ 397’ 398» 4o8’ 411,424 n. 158,427; Commissariat of, 3, 269; Seim of, 3, 269; and Al­ lies, 32; boundaries in, 34, 57, 125, 127, 132; relations among repub­ lics of, 56, 113, 115, 117, 119, 123, !33’ x45’ T59’ 164-167, 170-172, 184,193, 208,396; delegates at San Remo conference, 97—99, 101; British chief commissioner in, 102, 123-126, 130, 164, 332, 343; rail­ way, 102, 105, 131, 357, 364; and Brest-Litovsk treaty, 103; and Red Army, 160, 196; and Council of Transcaucasian Republics (Sovet Zakavkazskikh Respublik), 171;

INDEX

Bolshevism in, 173, 176, 200-202, 207, 209, 210, 308, 332, 333, 335, 360, 361, 362, 366; and White Army, 339. See also Caucasus Transylvania, 390, 402 Trebizond, city and vilayet, 22, 23, 24, 26 n. 11, 27, 73, 75, 80, 373, 374, 380, 397, 404; map of, 28; San Remo decision regarding, 87; in peace treaty, 90; and Turkey and Turks, 109, 111 Tmavarz, Shushi uezd, 135, 136, 157; map of, 146 Tsghna, Nakhichevan uezd, 150 Tsitsikov, Tigran, 392 Tumanian, Hovhannes, 287 Tumanian, Levon, 189-191, 214 Tumanov, Prince Mikhail G., (Toumanoff, Tumanian), 398 Tumi, Shushi uezd, 147, 157, 158; map of, 146 Tumian, Harutiun, 158 Turian, Stepan, 271 Turkestan, 396 Turkey and Turks, 29, 31, 238, 286, 344, 345, 386, 405, 414; National­ ists, 5, 20,36-42,45-47,49» 69» 94» 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 173, 180, 185, 205, 297, 304, 308, 317, 328, 33b 354’ 357’ 368-372, 376, 377, 385, 404, 408, 422, 425, 428; con­ ferences and treaty relating to, 20— 35’ 43-46’ 57-70, 72-75, 78-80, 82, 86, 90-93, 96, 99, 104-112, 127-128, 259, 283, 284, 288, 305, 326, 328-329, 331, 353, 358, 360, 361, 365’ 375’ 377’ 380’ 385’ 4°3’ 408, 432; and Bolsheviks, 25 n. 11, 173, 174, 175, 177, 180, 183 n. 29, 187, 189, 194, 256, 308, 319, 322, 324» 325’ 327’ 367’ 424’ 428; and Armenians, 27, 48, 57—59, 61, 75— 77, 80-83, 84 n- 36, 86-87, 9°“93’ 111, 210, 212, 214, 219, 221, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 240, 246, 250, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 274, 275’ 279’ 286, 287, 290, 291, 293, 295_3X9 passim, 321-325, 328, 333’ 35L 375’ 381’ 384’ 389» 399’ 402,420,426-429,434; Grand Na­ tional Assembly of, 36, 106, 302, 304, 305; National Pact of, 36; and Cilicia, 44, 375-377, 384, 385; and Allied Powers, 45, 46, 105, 106, 316, 336, 369-374; and Great Brit­ ain, 47, 58, 59, 105-112, 303; and future of Batum, 55, 97, 104; and protection of minorities, 62—65,68,

529

79-81,91,92, 377; and war crimes, 66—69, 93; and Soviet Russia, 67, 302, 303, 308, 317, 328, 418, 424, 428; and Kurds, 94-96; and BrestLitovsk treaty, 103, 386; and Geor­ gia, 114, 201, 359, 360; and Azer­ baijan, 116—118, 138, 141, 154, x58’ 173-175» 177» 18°’ 183 n- 29’ 187, 189, 194; and Armenian-Azer­ baijani conflict, 117,119, 121-125, 130, 131, 138, 139, 141, 142, 153, 165, 168, 197; and Revolutionary Turkish Eastern Front Red Detach­ ment, 319. See also Ottoman Empire Turkiants, Consul Daniel, 397 Turkish Communist Party (firka), 177 Tuzla, Olti okrug, 300, 301; map of, 299

Ukraine, 203; mission in Transcauca­ sia, 393 n. 59; Armenians in, 394, 395’ 399 Ulia-Norashen, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 313; map of, 4, 311 Ulukhanlu, Erevan uezd, 290, 293, 322; map of, 294, 311 Union of Consumer Cooperatives of Armenia (Haikoop), 272—273 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 249 n. 105. See also Russia, Soviet United States of America, 135, 289, 376 n. 17; and Armenians, 5, 19, 20, 22, 24, 50, 71, 72, 75-79, 8183, 87-90, in.112’ 184» 219’ 229, 230, 248, 254, 259, 270, 272, 279, 283, 286, 305, 326, 338, 370, 371, 373’ 374’ 378-380, 398, 413-415, 432-436; and Marash massacre, 38, 40, 42; and Department of State, 72, 435, 436, 437; and League of Nations, 72; and Versailles Treaty, 72-73’ 326; Congress of, 73, 90 n. 50, 379; and Turkish peace treaty, 73-75, 82, 87, 90, 111, 112, 305; and San Remo conference, 94; and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, 139, *45’ *54’ !59; Armenians in, 375’ 378, 379’ 386, 423, 434-437 Uratadze, Grigorii Illarionovich, 204, 206 Urfa, town and sanjak, 36, 378 Urmia, Lake, 427; map of, 28 Uruguay, 432, 433, 434 Ussher, Dr. Clarence Douglas, 247 Ussufov, Azerbaijani officer in Kars, “9 Usubbekov (Yusufbayli), Nasib Bek: as Azerbaijani prime minister, 123,

530

INDEX

Usubbekov (Yusufbayli) (continued) 131, 139, 160, 101, 162, 169; and sovietization of Azerbaijan, 177, 181, 190 Uzuntala, Kazakh uezd, 164, 171, 244, 247 Vagharshapat, Etchmiadzin uezd, 14, 258, 293. See also Etchmiadzin Vagover, Olti okrug: map of, 120 Vanan (Ter-Grigorian), Bishop of Shu­ shi, 152 Vahideddin, Sultan Mehmed, 45 Valadian, Valad, 220, 230 Van, city and vilayet, 85 n. 38,316,348, 377, 423; map of, 4, 28; and Ar­ menian boundaries, 22, 52, 53, 54, 88, 286, 380; and San Remo con­ ference, 87; in peace treaty, 90 Van, Lake, 34, 107 Vanand, 17, 150, 265, 275, 278. See also Kars Vanetsi Avo (Avo of Van), khmbapet, 245 Vank, Jevanshir uezd, 136, 158, 198; map of, 146 Vansittart, Robert Gilbert, 25, 27, 29, SU 52. 53» 54« 56» 57» 62, 64, 90 n. 50; and future of Batum, 97, 99, 100, 102, 358—361; and Turkey and Turks, 110; and Armenians, 129 Varanda district (Mountainous Kara­ bagh) : and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, 133, 136, 137, 140, 141, 144, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 157, 158, 159, 191 Varandian, Mikayel (Hovhannisian), 404, 408—409 Vardan Zoravar (“General Vardan”) armored train, 218, 233, 310 Vardashen, Nukhi uezd, 162, 190 Varna, Bulgaria, 400, 401 Varshamian, Gevorg, 18, 251, 263 Vaskut (Baskot), Mount, 301 Vatican, 408—409 Vedibasar district, Erevan uezd, 132, 306-312, 314, 319, 321-322, 352; map of, 311 Vekilov, Mustafa: as Azerbaijani minis­ ter of internal affairs, 153, 155— 156, 166, 168 Vekilov, Riza Bek, 171 Velibekov, Bahadur Kasem oghli, 200 Velikanov, General Mikhail Dmitrie­ vich, 246 n. 96 Venezuela, 433 Venice, Italy, 288; Armenians in, 408409

Venizelos, Eleutherios Kyriakou: as Greek prime minister, 45, 57, 59; and Armenians, 76,79,80,85, 288, 404; and Turkey and Turks, 108, 110 Verin Karmir Aghbiur, Kazakh uezd, 246 Verishan (Verishen), Kars okrug, 301; map of, 299 Versailles., Treaty of, 5, 72-73 Veysel [Unûvar], Major: in SharurNakhichevan, 308, 310, 312, 313, 315-316, 318 Vezinkoy, Kars okrug: map of, 120, 299 Vezirov, Jamil, 182 Vickrey, Charles Vernon, 278 Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, 408 Victoria, Queen, 410 Vienna, Austria: Armenians in, 388390 Vladikars, Kars okrug: map of, 120, 299 Vladikavkaz, Terek oblast, 394, 395, 397 Vladivostok, Siberia, 429, 437 Volch’i Vorota (Wolves’ Gates), Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 306, 310, 312, 315; map of, 4, 311 Volga River, 394 Volunteer Army, 154, 327-328, 335, 358, 395. See also White Armies Vosmetsi Simon, khmbapet, 245 Vratzian, Simon: as minister of labor and agriculture, 155, 217, 223, 224; as minister of agriculture and state properties, 271—273 Wallachia (Romania), 399 Wardrop, Oliver: as British chief com­ missioner in Transcaucasia, 123, 124-126, 130, 164, 332 Warsaw, Poland, 391 Washington, D.C., 73, 80, 371, 437 Wegner, Armin T., 386 Westphalia, Germany, 387 White Armies, 208, 327, 339, 394“395 Williams, Aneurin: and British Arme­ nia Committee, 44, 249 n. 104, 340, 414 Williams, Edward S., 25 n. 11 Wilson, Field Marshal Henry Hughes: as Chief of Imperial General Staff, 32, 81, 86, 104 Wilson, President T. Woodrow: and Ar­ menians, 24, 72, 78, 83, 87—88, 90, 104, 111, 112, 259, 286, 305, 374, 379, 380, 414, 423, 436; and Turk­ ish treaty, 73, 74, 75, 82; principles of, 109-110

INDEX

Wrangel, General Baron Petr Niko­ laevich: as commander of White Ar­ mies, 203, 207-208, 327, 336, 394-395 Yaidji, Sharur-Daralagiaz uezd, 313; map of, 311 Yalam, Kuba uezd, 180 Yalamov, P. G., 320 Yalta, Crimea, 396 Yarrow, Ernest A., 278 Yazmajian, Onnik, 277 Yenikoy, Kaghisman okrug, 301; map of» 299 Yezidi(s), 29, 60 Yokohama, Japan, 430, 438 Yolian, Zakar, 196 n. 62, 265 Yoshida, L, 26 n. 12 Young Armenian Women’s Bureau, 277 Young Turks, 48, 66-68, 116, 138, 154, 177, 189, 308, 333, 408, 420 Yugoslavia, 386; Armenians in, 399400

Zablotsky, Professor Savich, 301 Zagazig, Egypt, 288 Zaghlul Pasha, Saad, 418 Zakarian, Nikolai (Nikoghos) S., 395 Zakarian, Petros, 267 Zakarian, Vahan, 387 Zakatal, town and okrug, 115,185, 204, 205, 206; map of, 28 Zangezur uezd, 113, 281, 307, 308, 315, 319, 429; and Armenian-Azer­ baijani conflict, 2, 116—118, 124, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133-136, 138, 139, 141-143, 147-151, 154-158, 164, 166, 185-187, 195-199, 201, 428; and Bolsheviks, 215, 216, 241, 247» 253; map of, 311 Zangibasar district, Erevan uezd, 3,

531

267; military action in, 290-296, 308-309, 314, 319-322; map of, 294» 311 Zarabkhana gold mines, Kaghisman okrug 281 Zarifian, Hovhannes, 17, 276 Zarushat (Zarishat) district, Kars okrug: map of, 4, 120; military operations in, 117-123, 222 Zavalishin, Sergei F., 270 Zavarian, Simon, 216 Zaven (Eghiayan), Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, 29, 44, 52, 127, 286, 373, 422, 423 Zaza, 29 Zeinalov, Zeinal Abdal: and ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict, 122—123,124125 Zeitun, Marash sanjak, 375, 385 Zeiva (Davit Bek), Zangezur uezd, 150 Zeki, Lieutenant, 297 Zelim Khan, khmbapet, 237 Zevin, Erzerum vilayet, 301; map of, 299 Zhordania, Noi Nikolaevich: as Geor­ gian prime minister (minister-pres­ ident), 115, 164, 200, 202, 207, 208 Zia, Captain Yusuf, 297 Zia Bek, 298 Zimi, Erevan uezd, 312; map of, 311 Zindjirlu, Erevan uezd, 312; map of, 311 Zionists, 89 n. 48 Zohrab, Khosrov, 418 Zohrabian (Zurabov), Arshak Gerasi­ movich, 386 Zohrabian, Luisparon, 274 Zorian, Rostom, 216 Zurzuna, Ardahan okrug, 279; map of, 120; and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, 117, 118, 121

Errata Volume I, printings 1-3 and Volume II, printing 1 VOLUME I

Page (line, note, or index)

For

Read

22(23), 35(9)» 42(6), 46°(39)> 538 (index) 80(15), 523(index)

Nazarabekian (Nazarabekov)

Nazarbekian (Nazarbekov)

Ardsakh

Artsakh

236(22), 532(index)

Colonel Halil

Captain Halil

396(6), 410(11), 414(22), 524(index)

Varlaam Avanesov

Varlam Avanesov

4°8(5)’ 538(index) 42o(n.n), 453(6), 525 (index)

Askenaz Mravian

Askanaz Mravian

Bahaeddin-Shakir

Behaeddin Shakir

448(n.i), 547(index)

Zavalashin

Sergei Zavalishin

492(24)

A. Babayan

A. Babalian

53o(index)

Elenovka, Erevan uezd

Elenovka, NovoBayazit uezd,

For

Read

68(32), 70(8), 105(32), 106(15), 183(20), 203(26), 225(26), 229(38), 349(4), 588 (index)

Colonel Halil

Captain Halil

94(23)» 593(index)

Joseph Marquart

Joseph Markwart

VOLUME II

Page (line, note, or index)

533

534

ERRATA

138(2), 139(1)

Insert line 1 from page 139 as line 2 of page 138

142(23), 492(1), 595 (index)

Emile de Nonancourt

Charles-Marie de Nonancourt

159 592(index)

Major Livingston

Lieutenant Colonel Livingston

252(14), 312 (17), 589 (index)

Bashkhi Ishkhanian

Bakhshi Ishkhanian

288(20), 594(index)

Hovhannes Melkonian

Dr. H. Melkonian

287(17), 58o(index)

Mesrop Bek Asratikian

Mesrop Bek Saratikian

309(10), 603 (index)

Zavalashin

Sergei Zavalishin

346(24), 599(index)

Archbishop Mesrop Smbatian

Bishop Mesrop Ter-Danielian

379(i 1,17,20), 567(*5)

Vartan Malcolm

Vartan Malcom

559(15) 586 (index)

A. Babayan

A. Babalian

Fuat Sabit

Fuad Sabit

photograph 17

Bishop Mesrop (Smbatian)

Bishop Mesrop Ter-Danielian