Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan: The Difficult Road to Western Integration, 1918-1920 0765640503, 9780765640505

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Note on translation
Introduction
1 The South Caucasus after the February 1917 revolution and the beginning of diplomatic struggles for the region
2 The Trabzon and Batum conferences: Azerbaijan’s first diplomatic steps toward independence
3 Declaration of independence and the first steps of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4 The diplomatic campaign for the liberation of Baku
5 Diplomatic activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of World War I and the Allied entry into Azerbaijan
6 Azerbaijani diplomacy during the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference
7 Expansion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference
8 Azerbaijan’s Diplomacy confronts the claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”
9 The Western mandate and efforts to approach France, Great Britain, and Italy
10 The growing interest of the United States in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan
11 Lobbying in the United States and the spread of national propaganda in Western Europe
12 Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allied powers at Versailles
13 Azerbaijan and the international situation on the eve of the occupation
14 Azerbaijani diplomacy and the April 1920 occupation
Conclusion
Bibliography
Plates
Index

Citation preview

Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan

As revolution swept over Russia and empires collapsed in the final days of World War I, Azerbaijan and neighboring Georgia and Armenia proclaimed their independence in May 1918. During the ensuing two years of struggle for independence, military endgames, and treaty negotiations, the diplomatic representatives of Azerbaijan struggled to gain international recognition and favourable resolution of the territorial sovereignty of the country. This brief but eventful episode came to an end when the Red Army entered Baku in late April 1920. Drawing on archival documents from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, the United States, France, and Great Britain, the accomplished historian, Jamil Hasanli, has produced a comprehensive and meticulously documented account of this littleknown period. He narrates the tumultuous path of the short-lived Azerbaijani state toward winning international recognition and reconstructs a vivid image of the Azeri political elite’s quest for nationhood after the collapse of the Russian colonial system, with a particular focus on the liberation of Baku from Bolshevik factions, relations with regional neighbors, and the arduous road to recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Paris Peace Conference. Providing a valuable insight into the past of the South Caucasus region and the dynamics of the post–World War I era, this book will be an essential addition to scholars and students of Central Asian Studies and the Caucasus, history, foreign policy, and political studies. Jamil Hasanli is a former professor of history at Baku State University and Khazar University, Azerbaijan. In 1993, he was advisor to the president of Azerbaijan and served two terms as a member of parliament of Azerbaijan from 2000 to 2010. He was also a history and public policy scholar of Woodrow Wilson International Center in 2011 and has published numerous books and articles.

Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus Books in this series are published in association with the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center at the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, USA, and the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm, Sweden, under the editorship of Svante Cornell.

1. Xinjiang China’s Muslim borderland Edited by S. Frederick Starr 2. Scholars’ Guide to Washington, D.C. for Central Asian and Caucasus Studies Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan Tigran Martirosyan, Silvia Maretti and S. Frederick Starr 3. The Guns of August 2008 Russia’s war in Georgia Edited by Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr 4. Ferghana Valley The heart of Central Asia Edited by S. Frederick Starr 5. Azerbaijan Since Independence Svante E. Cornell 6. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan The difficult road to Western integration, 1918–1920 Jamil Hasanli

Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan The difficult road to Western integration, 1918–1920 Jamil Hasanli

First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Jamil Hasanli The right of Jamil Hasanli to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data [Azärbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyätinin xarici siyasäti,1918-1920. English.] Foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan : the difficult road to western integration, 1918–1920/ by Jamil Hasanli.     pages cm – (Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus)   Translation of: Azärbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyätinin xarici siyasäti, ~   1918–1920.   Includes bibliographical references and index.   1. Azerbaijan – Foreign relations – 20th century. 2. Azerbaijan – Foreign   relations – Western countries. 3. Western countries – Foreign relations –   Azerbaijan. 4. Azerbaijan. Xarici işlər naziri – History – 20th century.   I. Title.   DK696.8.H3713 2015   327.4754009´041-dc23                2013003188 ISBN: 978-0-7656-4049-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-7656-4050-5 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-67012-6 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by HWA Text and Data Management, London

For my daughters, Turan and Gunel

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Contents

Note on translation Introduction

ix 1

1 The South Caucasus after the February 1917 revolution and the beginning of diplomatic struggles for the region

10

2 The Trabzon and Batum conferences: Azerbaijan’s first diplomatic steps toward independence

30

3 Declaration of independence and the first steps of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

65

4 The diplomatic campaign for the liberation of Baku

89

5 Diplomatic activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of World War I and the Allied entry into Azerbaijan

124

6 Azerbaijani diplomacy during the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference

158

7 Expansion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference 192 8 Azerbaijan’s Diplomacy confronts the claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”

219

9 The Western mandate and efforts to approach France, Great Britain, and Italy

254

viii Contents

10 The growing interest of the United States in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan

274

11 Lobbying in the United States and the spread of national propaganda in Western Europe

302

12 Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allied powers at Versailles

324

13 Azerbaijan and the international situation on the eve of the occupation

350

14 Azerbaijani diplomacy and the April 1920 occupation

373

Conclusion

394

Bibliography 402 Plates 416 Index 432

Note on translation

Many of the personal names cited in this book existed in multiple forms and, as a result, it can be easy to lose track of individuals who lived through this especially tumultuous time for a “crossroads of empires.” One factor is the variety of alphabets and transliteration systems involved, but the greater complication is that the people in this story moved from one cultural milieu to another, borders shifted, and political regimes changed. This is manifested in the way that Russianized name endings (-ev, -ov, -ski) were changed (or changed back) to Azerbaijani (-li, -olu/-oglu, -zade); Armenian (-ian); or Georgian (-eli, -idze, -shvili) forms. Another feature of Azerbaijani names in particular is the use of Turkic and Persian honorifics (aga, bey/bek, khan, mirza, pasha) and their incorporation into surnames. Every effort has been made to use consistent identifiers for individuals named in this book, generally by adopting the preponderant version. Readers are specially alerted that Nasib bey Usubbeyov, who played a prominent role in the events recounted here, is at least equally well known as Nasib bey Yusifbeyli. Geographic names have changed as well, the most notable examples here being Constantinople/Istanbul, Tiflis/Tbilisi, Elizavetpol/Ganja, and Alexandropol/ Gyumri. In imperial Russia, Azerbaijanis were referred to as Tatars or Turks. In recognition of the pitfalls of transliteration systems, the decision was made to cite sources listed in the chapter notes in their original published form, followed by the English translation in parentheses. Finally, it should be noted that all quotations that appear in this work have been translated or retranslated into English from the Azerbaijani text and are not transcribed from original sources unless indicated.

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Introduction

Despite its relatively small size, Azerbaijan, one of the most ancient countries in the world, has often found itself at the center of events due to its geographical location and strategic importance. East–West trade routes pass through its borders, and the destructive marches of great emperors and world conquerors have traversed its territory at different points in time. Azerbaijanis living in the vast territory stretching from the foothills of the Caucasus mountains to the Caspian Sea have been a target for great powers since ancient times—Achaemenid rulers and Roman legionnaires, Sassanid satraps and Arab warlords. Yet over the centuries, Azerbaijanis managed to create a unity at the crossroads of swords and diplomacy. The Azerbaijani khanates that formed in the eighteenth century after the collapse of the empire of Nadir Shah had their own administrative systems, defined borders, and regular armies as well as judicial systems regulating social relations, currencies facilitating economic relations, and governments embodying all the attributes of statehood. As separate states located between three great empires, they gradually entered into a system of international relations in the region. It was the edifying historical experience and bitter fate of the Azerbaijani khanates that led to the realization that the only solution for Azerbaijanis lay in achievement of the territorial integrity and unity of the nation. The Russian empire ventured into the Caucasus at the beginning of the nineteenth century, once again plunging Azerbaijan into the center of conflict. The tempered replies of Javad Khan, ruler of Ganja, to the peremptory messages of General Pavel Tsitsianov demanding submission to Russia and the heroism he displayed in battle fill the glorious early pages of the history of Azerbaijani diplomacy. An examination of this period draws our attention to an important fact: Wars between the various Azerbaijani khanates and Russia took place long before the events between Russia and Iran that went down in history as the Russo-Persian wars. Russian troops faced the resistance of Javad Khan before they fought a battle with any Iranian army. The Kurekchay treaty was signed by Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Shusha in 1805, many years before the Gulistan treaty of 1813 and the Turkmenchay treaty of 1828, signed between Russia and Iran, officially determined the fate of the Azerbaijani nation to be partitioned between the two. The Kurekchay treaty, as a complete diplomatic document stipulating

2  Introduction that the Garabagh khanate would become a Russian protectorate, recognized the khanate as a Muslim land.1 Both the Kurekchay treaty and the ensuing Order of the Russian Emperor mention the appointment of Mehdiqulu Agha as the ruler of Garabagh. As for Garabagh itself—its boundaries, highlands, and lowlands— Azerbaijanis were acknowledged as the ethnic group living on these lands and Islam as the local religion.2 The Kurekchay treaty signed by General Tsitsianov and the order issued by Alexander I were the first tangible diplomatic documents proving that Garabagh is the property of Muslim people of the region. In 1823, the Russian administration prepared the Description of Garabagh Province containing a population census and statistical information about the ethnic and religious structure of the region, documenting the presence of Muslims there.3 The composition of the populace of Garabagh province was confirmed in a series of works written in the nineteenth century by Russian researchers investigating Russian policy in the Caucasus as well as in other official publications describing Russian government policy.4 The end of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of a fundamental struggle to determine the history and fate of Azerbaijan. When armed resistance over a period of three decades did not bring about any measurable results, Azerbaijani realists decided to change the form and methods of struggle and to replace ageold concepts with a national idea. Thinkers such as Abbasgulu Agha Bakikhanov, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, and Hasan Bey Zardabi set new goals for the nation, arguing the importance of a shift from traditional, oriental, Muslim religious schools to schools with new methods of teaching. Followers of these great thinkers, men such as Ali Bey Huseynzade, Ahmad Bey Aghayev (Agaoglu), and Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov (Topchibashi), succeeded in effecting a transition from populism to nationalism. The turning of this philosophy of “national awakening” into a fully fledged way of thinking is connected with the personality of Mammad Emin Rasulzade. The Azerbaijan Republic, which appeared on the stage of world history in 1918, was a secular state, a logical result of the transition from Islamic populism to Turkish nationalism and a historic confirmation of the philosophy of “national awakening,” including the desire to be a distinct and unified nation. Not seeing the footprints of their nation among the nations of the world and suffering from this, the leading minds of Azerbaijan seized the first opportunity presented and succeeded in establishing the first Azerbaijan republic on May 28, 1918. This significant event was a great historical achievement for the Azerbaijani nation and their hope for a change in the political map of the world—a world where diplomatic conflicts were being resolved by cannonballs exploding on battlefields and the situation was becoming tenser from day to day. The Azerbaijan Republic survived for only twenty-three months. This is not a very long period of time, and yet the history created during those months, the steps taken in the sphere of diplomacy, and the political ramifications of important actions and policies introduced during that period changed the path of the nation. The independence announced on May 28, 1918, and the tricolored flag with crescent and star that was raised to the sky as a symbol of this independence were not only the

Introduction  3 logical result of a national struggle spanning the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but served as an ideological guide for the future of a new country, a strategy encompassing national targets and goals. The Azerbaijani republic of 1991 is the moral heir of the Azerbaijan republic of 1918–1920, and its revival can be directly traced to the diplomatic struggle and steps taken during those early years. The Azerbaijan Republic was formed at a time of intense diplomatic struggles that accompanied the end of World War I and attempts by Russia to restore the borders of its empire. This demanded from the young Azerbaijani republic great diplomatic skill and an ability to recognize turning points in world politics. Azerbaijani diplomacy managed to fulfill its duty during the two years of independence, and that duty was characterized by the combination of a love for freedom and a struggle for autonomy. Those who represented Azerbaijan in the international political arena gained acceptance in 1920 at Versailles, but postwar geopolitics prevented the Azerbaijani people from deriving the full benefit of their achievements. The Azerbaijan Republic ceased to exist in April 1920, not due to political processes or territorial conflicts within the country but due to the complicated conflicts taking place in world politics. In truth, the difficulty of integrating the new Caucasus republics, including Azerbaijan, into the international arena was related to the collapse of Russia, which was a member of the Entente, the winning bloc of countries in World War I. The victors did not anticipate the collapse of Russia, and their ruling circles were not ready to recognize the new republics that emerged from the ruins. Russia’s allies viewed Bolshevism as a temporary condition and did not lose hope that the country would restore its old borders. They therefore acted with extreme caution on all issues concerning this former world power. This was clearly demonstrated in the peace principles of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who was considered to be the architect of a new world and a friend of small nations. The fourteen independent republics that emerged after the collapse of the USSR some seven decades later were not included in the fourteen points proposed by Woodrow Wilson. In this light, the de facto recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan at Versailles was an important achievement of Azerbaijani diplomacy and a great victory on the part of the small group of Azerbaijani representatives at the Paris Peace Conference. Taking into consideration the complicated historical conditions of the time, the builders of the Azerbaijan Republic, who originated its foreign policy and defined the place of Azerbaijanis in world politics and geography, strove to create a modern republic based on democratic principles and the values of a secular state. Not only did they manage to reshape the world outlook of their countrymen, they managed to change the opinion of the world about Azerbaijan. At the first anniversary of the creation of the republic, Uzeyir Hajibeyli wrote in the official state newspaper Azerbaijan on May 28, 1919: “In the end, all that was required was to establish contact with those who thought that our existence was dangerous for the world, in order for them to realize that their views were false and erroneous.”5 Securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan was an important role to fulfill for the country’s diplomatic corps. One of the main

4  Introduction functions of the government and its diplomacy was related to the determination of national borders in the South Caucasus. Between 1918 and 1920, the territory of Azerbaijan, not including disputed territories, comprised nearly 97.3 thousand square kilometers; with the disputed territories, it was nearly 113.9 thousand square kilometers.6 After the sovietization of Azerbaijan, its territories started to diminish rapidly, and the total territory decreased to 86.6 thousand square kilometers. Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee Nariman Narimanov, who could not countenance the injustice that was taking place with the Bolshevik central government granting historically Azerbaijani lands to Armenia, wrote to Vladimir Ilich Lenin: “Territories that were not disputed under the rule of the Musavat government became the subject of disputes after the Soviet government came to power. Of course, the people see this and express their discontent.”7 Not long after the April revolution, in July 1920, those Bolsheviks who were considered influential in the Caucasus, including Nariman Narimanov along with member of the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) party Polikarp Mdivani; members of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) party Anastas Mikoyan and Viktor Naneyshvili; and members of the Military Council of the Eleventh Army Zh. Vesnik, M. Levandovski, and B. Mikhaylov, signed and sent to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party in Moscow a document in which they pointed out that, “During the rule of the Musavat government, the whole of Garabagh was part of Azerbaijan.”8 These documents are still of high political importance, especially so when considering the diplomatic struggle for the restoration of violated Azerbaijani borders and for the security of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. There is a movement at work today to distort the truth about the recent history of our country, a history well depicted in these diplomatic documents. * ** Early attempts were made to study the history of foreign policy of the Azerbaijan Republic and to investigate the diplomatic actions that took place during those times. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Adilkhan Ziyadkhanli, Rahim Bey Vakilov, Jeyhun Hajibeyli, Yusif Vazir Chemenzeminli, and others printed booklets and brochures that contain valuable information about the foreign policy of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.9 After its overthrow, public figures and members of the intelligentsia appealed to foreign countries and published relevant works in these countries about the diplomacy of the Republic. These works shed some light on a few dark spots in the history of Azerbaijani diplomacy from 1918 to 1920.10 The events of 1918–1920 were investigated by Soviet historians from an ideological point of view, and the foreign policy of the Azerbaijani government was presented in the light of Soviet ideology. Nevertheless, works written in the early years uncovered and brought to light many documents and materials.11 The diplomatic activity of Azerbaijan was also investigated by a number of Western researchers. In various publications issued abroad, consideration

Introduction  5 was given to the foreign policy of the Azerbaijani government during its brief independence.12 Turkish historians have devoted considerable attention to the diplomatic activity of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, the policy of the Ottoman empire toward the Caucasus at the end of World War I, certain aspects of international relations connected with Azerbaijan, and international aspects of the Armenian problem in the South Caucasus and Anatolia.13 After Azerbaijan regained its independence in 1991, there was renewed interest in the earlier history of the republic and the life and work of its first leaders. This history, including the foreign policy of the first Azerbaijani republic and its diplomatic activity, has been the subject of serious scholarly works as well as doctoral and candidate dissertations. These works are contributing to the creation of a full scientific and political picture of a history that was a closed topic for many years.14 Memoirs have been widely consulted in the research for this book, particularly with reference to the policies of the great powers toward Azerbaijan, the intense conflict among those countries over Baku at the end of the World War I, and recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence at the Paris Peace Conference, as recorded in the works of public figures, politicians, and diplomats and published at various times.15 For the purpose of researching the diplomatic activity of the Azerbaijan Republic and creating the fullest picture of the foreign policy it implemented in 1918–1920, the author has sought out archives in foreign countries. In order to accurately record and document the activity of the first Azerbaijani government and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its diplomatic representatives in neighboring countries and the members of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, the author has widely and extensively made use of the following: • • • • • • •

Documents and materials of the State Archive of Azerbaijan; The Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan; The Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan; The Russian State Archive of Social and Political History; The Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; The Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France; and Archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain and the U.S. Department of State.

The author thanks the employees of these various archives for their help and consideration. He is also deeply grateful to the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the members of the ministry’s editorial board for their advice and practical assistance. This book is an English translation of: Cəmil Həsənli. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin xarici siyasəti, 1918–1920. (Bakı: Garisma, 2009).

6  Introduction

Notes 1. Treaty between the Khan of Garabagh and the Russian Empire, On the Transfer of Power Over the Khanate to Russia of May 14, 1805. State Historical Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (SHAAR), fund (f.) 130, record (r.) 1, volume (v.) 14, pp. 245– 248; Акты Кавказской археографической комиссии. Архив Главно­го управления наместника Кавказа. Том II (Acts of the Caucasus Archaeographic Commission. Archive of Central Administration of the Caucasian Governor. Volume II). Tiflis,, 1868, p. 705. 2. Высочайшая грамота генерал-майора Мехтикули ага от сентября 1806 года. Акты Кавказской Археографической Комиссии. Архив Главного Управления Наместника Кав­каза. Томь III. Издан под редакциею председателя комиссии А.Д.Берже (Highest certificate of Major-General Mekhtikuli agha of September 1806. Acts of the Caucasus Archaeographic Commission. Archive of Central Administration of the Caucasian Governor. Volume III. Published under the editorship of the Chairman of the Commission A.D. Berzhe). Tiflis, 1869, pp. 336–337. 3. Описание Карабахской провинции, составленное в 1823 году, по распоряжению главноуправляющего в Грузии Ермолова, действительным статским советником Могилевским и полковником Ермоловым 2-м (Description of Garabagh Province established in 1823 by order of General-Governor of Georgia Yermolov, Acting State Counselor Mogilov, and Colonel Yermolov II). Tiflis, 1866, p. 415. 4. See: Гражданское управление Закавказьем от присоединения Грузии до наместничества великого князя Михаила Николаевича. Исторический очерк (Public Administration of Transcaucasia from integration of Georgia to governorship of Grand Duke Michael Nikolayevich. A Historical Essay). Tiflis, 1901, p. 525; В. А. Пот­то (V. A. Potto­), Кавказская война. Персидская война 1826–1828 гг. Том 3 (The Caucasian War. The Persian War of 1826–1828. v. 3). Tiflis, 1901; Н. И. Шавров (N. I. Shavrov), Новая угроза русскому делу в Закавказье: предстоящая распродажа Мугани инородцам (The new threat to Russian affairs in Transcaucasia: forthcoming sale of Mughan to foreigners). St. Petersburg, 1911. 5. Azerbaijan, May 28, 1919. 6. Адрес-календарь Азербайджанской Республики (Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1920, p. 50. 7. For more details, see Report of N. Narimanov to V. I. Lenin “On the Results of the Establishment of the Soviet Power in Azerbaijan.” 15.09.1921. Russian Social and Political History State Archive (RSPHSA), f.5, r.1, v.1219, p. 12; Letter of N. Narimanov to V .I. Lenin. Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan (APDPARA), f. 609, r.1, v. 71, p. 41; Letter of Shakhtatinski to V. I. Lenin, 20.09.1920. Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AFPRF), f. 1, r. 51, f. 321а, v. 54859, pp. 6–7. 8. Letter of Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoyan, Naneyshvili, Vesnik, Levandovski, and Mikhaylov to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party. 10.07.1920. APDPARA, f. 1, r. 44, v. 118, p. 25. 9. Ə.M. Topçubaşov (A.M. Topchubashov), Azərbaycanın təşəkkülü (Establishment of Azerbaijan). Istanbul, 1918; M.Ə. Rəsulzadə (M.E. Rasulzade), Azərbaycanın təşkilində Müsavat (The Musavat in the foundation of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1920; A. Ziyadxanlı (A.Ziyadkhanli), Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan). Baku, 1919; R. Vəkilov (R. Vekilov), “Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyətinin yaranma tarixi” (History of creation of the Azerbaijan Republic) Azərbaycan (newspaper Azerbaijan), May 28, 1919; Djeyhoun Bey Hadjibeyli, La premiera Republique musulmane: l’Azerbaidjan. Editions Ernest Leroux, v. XXXVI. Paris, 1919; Y.V. Cəmənzəminli (Y. V. Chemenzeminli), Biz kimik və nə istəyirik (Who are we and what do we want). Baku, 1919. 10. M.Ə. Rəsulzadə (M.E. Rasulzade), Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti (Azerbaijani Republic). Istanbul, 1923; М.Э. Расул-заде (M.E. Rasulzade), О пантура­низме. В связи

Introduction 7 с Кавказской проблемой (On Panturanism. The connection with the Caucasian problem). Paris, 1930; Mir Yaqub (Mir Yagub), Dünya siyasətində petrol (Petroleum in International Politics). Istanbul, 1928; Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933; M. Məm­məd­zadə (M. Mammadzade), Milli Azərbaycan hərəkatı (The Azerbaijani National Movement). Berlin, 1938. 11. Я. Ратгаузер (Y. Ratgauzer), Борьба за Советский Азербайджан (Struggle for the Soviet Azerbaijan). Baku, 1929; Я. Ратгаузер (Y. Ratgauzer), Революция и гражданская война в Баку, Часть I. 1917–1918. (Revolution and civil war in Baku, Part 1. 1917–1918). Baku, 1927; А. Раевский (A. Raevskiy), Английская интервенция и мусаватское правительство. (English Intervention ­­and the Musavat Government). Baku, 1927; А. Раевский (A. Raevskiy), Английские “друзья” и мусаватские “патриоты” (English “friends” and Musavat “patriots”). Baku, 1927; А. Раевский (A. Raevskiy), Мусаватское правительство на Версальской конференции. Донесения представителей азербайджанской мусаватской делегации (The Musavat Government at the Versailles Conference. Reports of the representatives of the Azerbaijani Musavat delegation). Baku, 1930; А. Стеклов (A. Steklov), Армия мусаватского Азербайджана (Army of the Musavat Azerbaijan). Baku, 1928; И. А. Гусейнов (I.A. Guseynov), Баку в захватнических планах английских империалистов в 1918 г. Труды Азерб. филиала ИМЭЛ. Т. XIII. (Baku in the aggression plans of the English imperialists in 1918 Works of the Azerbaijani Branch of the Marxism-Leninism Institute. Volume XIII). Baku, 1947; Z. İbrahimov (Z.Ibrahimov), İngilis-Amerikan müdaxiləçilərinə qarşı Azərbaycan xalqının mübarizəsi (Struggle of the Azerbaijani people against the Anglo-American interventionists). Baku, 1950; Е.А. Токаржевский (E.A. Tokarzhevskiy), Из истории иностранной интервенции и гражданской войны в Азербайджане (From the History of Foreign Intervention and Civil War in Azerbaijan). Baku, 1957; Б. Е. Штейн (B. E. Shtein.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (The “Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949; А. И. Базиянц (A. I. Baziyants), К вопросу о захватнической политике США в Азербайджане (1919–1920). Ученые записки Института востоковедения, Том XIX. (To the Question on the Aggression Policy of the USA in Azerbaijan (1919– 1920). Scientific records of the Institute of Oriental Studies. Volume XIX). Moscow, 1958. 12. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951; W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratof, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953; Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923. Cambridge, 1964; Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies. London, 1953; Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World. 1917–1958. Washington, DC, 1958; N. S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Russia. 1917–1923; New York, 1952; Alexandre Bennigsen and Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World. Chicago and London, 1979; Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921. London, 1968; Louis Fischer, “The War for Baku.” In Oil Imperialism. London, 1976; Ronald Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton and New York, 1972; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community. Cambridge, 1985; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995; Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian Collins, Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. Lanham, 1999; Audrey Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Stanford, 1992; Reginald Teague-Jones, The Spy Who Disappeared: Diary of a Secret Mission to Russian Central Asia in 1918. London, 1990; Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople. The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. London, 1994.

8  Introduction 13. A. Nimet Kurat, Birinci dünya savaşında Türkiye’de bulunan Alman generallerinin raporları (Reports of the German generals visiting Turkey during the First World War). Ankara, 1966; A. Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia). Ankara, 1970; H. Baykara, Azerbaycan İstiklal Mücadelesi Tarihi (History of Azerbaijan’s Struggle for Independence). Istanbul, 1975; N. Devlet, Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi (1905–1917) (History of the National Struggle of the Russian Turks [1905–1917]). Ankara, 1985; Mim Kemal Öke, Ermeni Meselesi (The Armenian Issue). Istanbul, 1986; A.Süslü, Ruslara göre Ermenilerin yaptıkları mezalim (Oppressions Committed by the Armenians Because of the Russians). Ankara, 1987; T. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası (The Azerbaijani Dossier). Ankara, 1990; Hüsamettin Yıldırım (H. Yildirim), Rus-Türk-Ermeni Münasebetleri (1914–1918) (Russian-Turkish-Armenian Relations [1914–1918]). Ankara, 1990; S. Tansel, Mondros’tan Mudanya’ya kadar. C. I, III, IV. (From Mondros to Mudania. Volumes I, III, IV). Istanbul, 1991; N. Yüceer, Birinci Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Ordusunun Azerbaycan ve Dağıstan Harekatı (Movement of the Ottoman Army to Azerbaijan and Dagestan during the First World War). Ankara, 1996; N. Erdağ (N. Erdagh), Milli mücadele döneminde Kafkas Cümhu­riy­yet­leri ile ilişkiler (1917–1921) (Relations with the Caucasian Republics in the Period of the Struggle for Independence [1917–1921]). Ankara, 1994; S. Kılıç (S. Kilich), Ermeni sorunu ve Almaniya-Türk ilişkileri Alman Arşiv Belgelerile (The Armenian Issue and German-Turkish Relations in the German Archive Documents). Istanbul, 2003; N. Mazıcı (N. Mazici), ABD’nin Guney Kafkasya Politikası Olarak Ermenistan Sorunu, 1919–1921 (The Armenian Issue in the Southern Caucasus Policy of the USA, 1919– 1921). Istanbul, 2005; Ömer Engin Lütem, “The Armenian Demands at Paris Peace Conference of 1919.” Review of Armenian Studies, No. 11–12, v. 4, 2007. 14. N. Nəsibzadə (N. Nasibzade), Azərbaycanın xarici siyasəti (Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1996; İ. Musayev, Azərbaycanın Naxçı­van və Zəngəzur bölgələrində siyasi vəziyyət və xarici dövlətlərin siyasəti (1917–1921-ci illər) (Political Situation and Policies of Foreign States in Nakhchivan and Zangezur Regions of Azerbaijan [1917–1921]). Baku, 1996; İ. Musayev (I. Musayev), Azərbaycanın xarici siyasəti (XX əsr) (Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan [XX Century]). Baku, 2001; M. Qası­mov (M. Gasimov), Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti (1914–1918-ci illər). II hissə (Policies of Great Powers toward Azerbaijan during the First World War (1914–1918). Part II). Baku, 2001; M. Qasımlı, E. Hüseynova (M. Gasimli, E. Huseynova), Azərbaycanın xarici işlər nazirləri (Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan). Baku, 2003; X. İbrahimli (K.Ibrahimli), Azərbaycan siyasi mühacirəti (Political immigrants of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1996; M. Süleymanov (M. Suleymanov), Azərbaycan ordusu (1918–1920) (The Azerbaijani Army [1918– 1920]). Baku, 1998); M. Süleymanov (M. Suleymanov), Qafqaz İslam ordusu və Azər­baycan (Caucasian Islamic Army and Azerbaijan). Baku, 1999; Azərbaycan tarixi. VII cilddə, V cild (The History of Azerbaijan. In 7 volumes, Volume V). Baku, 2001; Отв. ред. Н. Агамали­ева (N. Agamaliyeva, ed.), Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика (1918–1920 гг.) (The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic [1918–1920]). Baku, 1998; Р. С. Мустафазаде (R. S. Mustafazade), Две республики. Азербайджано-российские отноше­ния в 1918–1922 гг. (Two Republics. The Azerbaijani-Russian Relations during 1918–1922). Moscow, 2006; Сост. Р. Абуталыбов (R. Abutalibov, ed.), Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Сборник статей. (The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Collected Articles). Moscow, 2008; А. Балаев (A. Balayev), Мамед Эмин Расулзаде (1884– 1955) (Mammad Emin Rasulzade [1884–1955]). Moscow, 2009; С.М. Исхаков (S.M. Iskhakov), Российские мусульмане и революция (весна 1917 г. – лето 1918 г.) (S.M.Iskhakov. Russian Muslims and Revolution [spring 1917 – summer 1918]). Moscow, 2004; А. Гаджиев (A. Gadzhiev), Демократические республики Юго-Западного Кавказа (Карская и Аракс-Тюркская республики) (Democratic Republics of South-Western Caucasus [Kars and Arax-Turkish Respublics]). Baku,

Introduction  9 2004; П. Дарабади (P. Darabadi), Военные проблемы политичес­кой истории Азербайджана начала ХХ века (Military Issues of the Azerbaijani Political History in the beginning of the XX Century). Baku, 1991; С.З. Юсифзаде (S. Z. Yusifzade), Первая Азербай­джанская республика: история, события, факты англоазербайджанских отно­шений (The First Azerbaijani Republic: history, events, facts of English-Azerbaijani relations). Baku, 1998. 15. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (Independence of Georgia in International Politics). Paris, 1924; Б. Бай­ков (B. Baykov), Воспоминания о революции в Закавказье (1917–1920 гг.) (Recollections of the Revolution in Transcaucasia [1917–1920]). Berlin, 1922; А. И. Дени­кин (A. I. Denikin­), Очерки русской смуты (Stories of the Russian Discord). Moscow, 1991; П. Н. Милюков (P. N. Milyukov), Воспоминания (Memoirs). Мoscow, 1991; Д. Ллойд Джордж (D. Lloyd George), Военные мемуары. Т. I–VI (Wartime Memoirs. Volumes I-VI). Мoscow, 1934–1938; Д. Ллойд Джордж (D. Lloyd George), Правда о мирных договорах, T. 2 (The Truth about Peace Treaties. Volume 2). Мoscow, 1957; У. Черчиль (W. Churchill), Мировой кризис (The World Crisis). Moscow, 1932; Нитти Франческо. (Nitti Francesco), Вырождение Европы.( La decadenza dell’Europa). Moscow and Petrograd, 1923; М. Кемаль (M. Kemal), Воспоминания президента Турецкой республики (Memoirs of the President of the Turkish Republic). Moscow, 1924; Э. Людендорф (E. Ludendorff), Мои воспоминания о войне Т. 2 (My Memoirs of the War, vol. 2). Moscow, 1924; Major-General L.C.Dunsterville. The Adventures of Dunsterforce. Edward Arnold, London, 1920; A. Rowlinson, Adventures in the New East, 1918–1922, London & New York, 1923; Haydar Bammate, Le Caucase et la revolution Russe. Paris, 1929; Записки Джемал паши (1903–1919) (Notes of Jemal Pasha [1903–1919]). Tiflis, 1923; K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (Our Independence War). Istanbul, 1988; S. İzzet, Büyük Harpte (1918) 15. Piyade Tümeninin Azerbaycan ve Şimali Kafkasiyadakı Hareket ve Muharibeleri (Movements and Battles of the 15th Infantry Brigade in Azerbaijan and North Caucasus during the Great War [1918]). Istanbul, 1936.

1 The South Caucasus after the February 1917 revolution and the beginning of diplomatic struggles for the region

By the time Azerbaijan declared its independence on May 28, 1918, the South Caucasus was already on the agenda of world politics. Toward the end of World War I, with increased demand by the warring countries for fuel, the competition for oil had made Baku a center of attraction for rival military blocs. The shifting tides on the Caucasus front and the political shocks of the Russian revolution of 1917 were felt in the South Caucasus as a whole and in Azerbaijan in particular. The military, political, and diplomatic ordeals taking place in the region made a lasting imprint on Azerbaijani leaders, who were drawn into political processes of vital importance for the fate of the country. Leading political figures of Azerbaijan gathered considerable diplomatic experience at the peace conferences in Trabzon and Batum at a time when the situation in the South Caucasus was volatile. World War I brought Russia unforeseen disaster. Along with the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy in Russia, the revolution of February 1917 was a blow to the Russian empire, spawning national liberation movements in that “prison of nations.” The overthrow of the monarchy sped up the political processes taking place in the South Caucasus. One of the first steps of the Provisional Government that was formed after the revolution was the creation of a special institution to govern the South Caucasus. On March 9, the Special Transcaucasian Committee (OZAKOM) was created to govern the region. Its members were drawn from the State Duma, and it was chaired by the Russian Constitutional Democrat Vasily A. Kharlamov, a Cossack. The Committee consisted of the Social Federalist Kita Abashidze succeeded by Menshevik Akaki I. Chkhenkeli from Georgia, Azerbaijani Constitutional Democrat Mammad Yusif Jafarov (who later occupied the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the fourth cabinet of the government of the Azerbijan Republic), and Armenian Constitutional Democrat Mikayel M. Papajanov (Papajanian). The Special Committee was directly subordinate to the Provisional Government. As this institution was created for the management of civil issues, it did not have legislative authority. Due to its limitations, the Committee was overwhelmed by events. The growing trend of the Transcaucasian nations toward autonomy and political freedom, inspired by the February revolution, along with the legalization of the activity of numerous national parties and organizations as well as increased

The February 1917 revolution  11 interest on the part of the international community, seriously complicated matters for the government of the South Caucasus. Azerbaijanis were expecting a lot from the February revolution, which had resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy. Intellectuals of the country, who had taken an active part in the national movement and its political activity since the turn of the century, welcomed the upheaval. The journal Molla Nasreddin depicted the revolution as good fortune for the Azerbaijani nation.1 According to Mammad Emin Rasulzade, “the revolution of 1917 would give freedom to condemned classes and independence to condemned nations.” 2 As soon as news of the revolution reached Baku, different national groups, the council of oil producers, and other organizations joined to create an Executive Committee of Social Organizations to govern the city, chaired by right-wing Menshevik L. L. Bych. Mammad Hasan Hajinski and Mammad Emin Rasulzade represented the Azerbaijani population. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks, now legal after the February revolution, were becoming increasingly active, but only nine of fifty-two members of the newly formed Baku Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, elected on the March 6 by some 52,000 workers and employees, were members of the Bolshevik party.3 Although the first meeting of the Soviet was chaired by Menshevik G. Ayolla, on March 8, Bolshevik Stepan Shaumian, returning from exile, was elected chairman. Soon thereafter, he had to hand over his post to the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Sako Saakian.4 On March 27, representatives of Muslim organizations and societies in various localities met in Baku to form the Muslim National Council with a temporary executive committee chaired by lawyer Mammad Hasan Hajinski, who later became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic. The Musavat (Equality) party, founded in Baku in 1911 by Mammad Emin Rasulzade, had the greatest weight in the Council, and it soon emerged as the all-Azerbaijani party. In the election to the Baku Soviet held in October 1917, the Musavat party collected nearly 40 percent of all the votes cast: 9,617 votes of some 25,000. Despite the fact that the elections were held at a time considered to be favorable for them, the Bolsheviks gathered only 3,823 votes, while the SocialistRevolutionaries received 6,305, Mensheviks 687, and Dashnaks (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) 528.5 The October elections demonstrated which party was the strongest. This success was due to the fact that the Muslim masses were being attracted to political processes and to the demands of national organizations to grant Muslims full political rights. The idea of national and territorial independence was discussed for the first time at the Congress of Caucasian Muslims held in Baku on April 15–20, 1917. The Musavat party and the Turkic Federalist party founded in Ganja (then called Elizavetpol) under the leadership of Nasib Bey Usubbeyov (Yusifbeyli) and Hasan Bey Aghayev after the February revolution emerged as the dominant political organizations. After long debates, the congress passed the following resolution on the national issue: “The federal democratic republic is to be recognized as the best structure for securing the interests of Muslim nations within the Russian state system.”6

12  The February 1917 revolution The Baku congress stipulated the protection of national schools by the state, the opening of a university in the mother tongue of Azerbaijani citizens, the enlargement of the Special Transcaucasian Committee to include Muslims, a census of the Muslim population, and the marshaling of the military potential of the Muslim population in view of the imminent danger.7 An argument between Turks who were in favor of territorial autonomy and Islamists and Socialists who were in favor of national cultural autonomy lasted for 10 days after the conclusion of the congress and continued at the All-Russian Congress of Muslims held in Moscow on May 1, 1917. At the Moscow congress, Socialists justified their objection to territorial autonomy by stating that it would undo the achievements of the revolution and that within a framework of national cultural autonomy, the Russian central government would act as the guarantor of the protection of the rights of Muslims. On May 3, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, in his main address to the congress, explained the importance of demanding territorial autonomy and backed his words with strong arguments. To those who stressed the Islamic factor as the crucial one, he noted that many Turkic nations had already realized that “first of all, they are Turks, and then they are Muslims.” Rasulzade stated that the question must be put in the following way: What is a nation? I am sure that such characteristics as unity of language, historical relations, and traditions create a nation. Sometimes, when Turkic Tatars are asked about their nationality, they say they are Muslims. However, this is an incorrect viewpoint. Christians do not exist in one nation; neither do Muslims. There must be a place for Turks, Persians, and Arabs in the large house of the Muslim faith.8 Rasulzade, who has been labeled a pan-Turkist in both Soviet and foreign literature, noted in his speech to the congress that the Turkic nations differed greatly from one another. Despite the strong opposition of the proponents of cultural-national autonomy, the idea of territorial autonomy, proposed by Rasulzade, was accepted with 446 votes in favor versus 271 against.9 After the victory of the idea of territorial autonomy at the Moscow Congress of Russian Muslims, the party of Turkic Federalists and the Musavat party decided to merge due to the similarity of their aims and purposes. After preparations in May–June, at the first congress held in Baku on June 20, the merger was completed, and a joint central committee was created. The central committee of the Turkic Federalist Musavat party included Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Rahim Bey Vakilov, Khudadat Bey Rafibeyov (Rafibeyli), Nasib Usubbeyov, Jafar Bey Rustambeyov, Hasan Bey Aghayev, and Mirza Fatali Akhundov. Hence, the enlarged Musavat party became a strong power not only in Baku but in the whole of Azerbaijan. After the first congress, the Turkic Federalist Musavat party quickly dispatched a delegation to Tashkent. The members participated in meetings held in numerous cities of Turkistan and played an important role in the process of the formation of the Federalist party there.10

The February 1917 revolution  13 Intellectuals of Azerbaijan who did not join any political party nevertheless considered it important to preserve and protect the achievements of the February revolution. During the revolt led by General Lavr Kornilov against the Provisional Government, leaflets were distributed bearing the signature of Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov and expressing the solidarity of the Muslims of the South Caucasus with the Russian revolution. Topchubashov was elected chairman of the Muslim National Council in Baku, and Fatali Khan Khoyski, who was also a member, was sent on an official trip to Petrograd to participate in a discussion concerning elections to the Constituent Assembly. When the revolution of October 1917 occurred, it raised the hopes of the nations that had been subjects of the Russian empire. These hopes for independence were for the most part nourished by the declarations made by the Bolsheviks in the early days of their coming to power. A peace decree and a Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia were to provide a guarantee that the nations of the former empire would be free to secede and create independent republics. However, quite soon it became clear that these documents were merely propaganda. As Walter Kolarz noted in Russia and Her Colonies, the October revolution, instead of putting an end to Russian colonialism, revived it.11 While the October events were under way in Petrograd, the Musavat party convened its first congress, which lasted for 5 days. The congress defined the tactical and strategic direction of the national territorial autonomy of Azerbaijan in view of the existing conditions.12 Mammad Emin Rasulzade was elected as the chairman of the central committee of the party. On November 11, a meeting of political organizations of the South Caucasus was held in Tiflis (today’s Tbilisi). The leader of the Georgian Mensheviks, Noe Jordania, gave a long speech in which he said that, for the last 100 years, the South Caucasus had lived shoulder-to-shoulder with Russia and considered itself “an integral part of the Russian state.” Now a catastrophe had occurred. The connection with Russia was lost, and the South Caucasus was on its own. “We need to get up on our feet, either to save ourselves or be destroyed in the whirlpool of anarchy.” Jordania proposed the creation of an independent local government to save the South Caucasus from disaster. It was decided that, until the governance issue was resolved by the Constituent Assembly, a South Caucasian Commissariat would be created to govern the region. On November 15, the structure of the newly formed government was announced. It was chaired by Georgian Menshevik Evgeni P. Gegechkori, and all three South Caucasian nations were represented in the Commissariat. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was headed by Akaki I. Chkhenkeli; the Military Ministry by D. Donskoy; the Ministry of Education by Fatali Khan Khoyski; the Ministry of Justice by S. Alekseyev-Meskheyev; the Ministry of Trade and Industry by Mammad Yusif Jafarov; the Ministry of Roads by Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov; the Ministry for the Control of Law by Khalil Bey Khasmammadov; the Ministry of Agriculture, State Property, and Religious Affairs by Anatoly Neruchev; the Ministry of Finance by Kristefore Karchikian; the Ministry of Public Health and Protection by Hamazasp Ohanjanian; and the Food Ministry by A. Ter-Gazarov. The ministries

14  The February 1917 revolution of Labor and Foreign Affairs of the newly formed government were under the authority of Gegechkori himself.13 Compared with the interim committee, the Commissariat was another step toward independence. However, local executive bodies of the new government were too weak to stabilize the situation, as the various parties created their own national factions of the three South Caucasian nations and regions represented in the Commissariat. In November, the Azerbaijani national faction was created under leadership of Mammad Emin Rasulzade. Resolutions to be passed by the Commissariat were first discussed in the meetings of the various factions, and then the final decisions were taken. Until the Constituent  Assembly was formed, the government, which announced itself as being a provisional body, put forth as its primary duty the preservation of the postwar territorial integrity of the South Caucasus and the management of internal conflicts. On November 26, 2 weeks after the creation of the Commissariat, elections to the Constituent Assembly took place. As a result of elections, Georgian Mensheviks obtained eleven seats, the Musavat party ten, Dashnaks nine, and the bloc of Muslim Socialists two, while the Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Union (Ittihad) party obtained one each.14 This was an obvious confirmation of the fact that Bolsheviks did not have a social base in Transcaucasia, where they polled only 4.4 percent in the Transcaucasia election district.15 It became clear in the course of elections that the vast majority of Azerbaijani Turks supported the idea of territorial autonomy, for which the Musavat party was fighting. Interest by the West in the South Caucasus rose after the events of October. Due to the appeal of the Bolsheviks, who offered a peace decree to the warring countries, the Caucasian battlefront received increased attention from the Entente. The representatives of the major powers in the South Caucasus—the consul of the United States F. Willoughby Smith, British general Offley Shore, French colonel Pierre Chardigny, and others—were observing the events in the region with great attention and reporting back to their countries about the events taking place. The American consul in Tiflis, in a telegram to the Department of State, reminded the United States that the majority of the local population in the South Caucasus, along with the army, refused to embrace the Bolsheviks. Smith expressed doubt that the allies would be able last more than 5 days without the financial assistance necessary for their survival.16 In a letter to Washington, Smith suggested recognizing the South Caucasian Commissariat de facto and sending $10 million to Tiflis (now Tbilisi) for the purpose of the struggle against Bolshevism.17 In a second telegram, sent 9 days later, he stated that Baku was in the hands of Bolsheviks but that the majority of the South Caucasus population did not recognize the Bolsheviks and their leaders. The U.S. government was still uncertain of what course to follow after the breakup of Russia, and so it did not consider it necessary to provide financial assistance to the South Caucasian Commissariat. Secretary of State Robert Lansing was commissioned to inform Smith that he, as American consul, would have no authority to recognize the South Caucasian government until the events occurring in Russia had stabilized. Contrary to the position of the United States, the French, British, and Italian leaders considered it feasible to protect the movement in the South Caucasus. This

The February 1917 revolution  15 was driven by their worries that German-Turkish forces would enter Baku. In the event that German-Austrian forces were provided with fuel, the situation of the Allies on the Western front would be jeopardized.18 From the beginning, the factions disagreed over the foreign policy of the South Caucasian Commissariat, and these disagreements deepened as time went on. The Muslim faction considered it important to pass a declaration announcing the government’s total independence. The Georgian faction considered it necessary to be content with the resolution of a number of internal matters. The Armenian faction did not have a unanimous standpoint either on the issue of the proclamation of independence or on the peace issue. At the time of the creation of the South Caucasian Commissariat, the Russian army on the Caucasus front found itself in a difficult situation and, by now, it was impossible to continue the war with Turkey.19 While the Russian army was paralyzed, the army of the Commissariat did not exist. If Soviet Russia came to an agreement with the Central European countries on a ceasefire, this would also give reason to cease military operations in Caucasus. The Muslim factions were opposed to the war with Turkey; the Georgians saw no danger in reaching an agreement; the Armenians were worried about how things would turn out because of the massacre they had conducted in Turkey at the beginning of the war.20 In general, the decision of the Commissariat to start negotiations with Turkey must be regarded as the first important step of its independent foreign policy. In November 1917, during the commission of Enver Pasha, the commander of the Third Turkish army at the Caucasus front, Vehib Pasha, appealed to General Mikhail Przhevalsky, the commander of the Caucasian front, with a request to conclude an armistice. The South Caucasian Commissariat, after discussing the proposal, agreed to the armistice on the condition that Turkish armed forces would not change their positions and not further provoke the Entente.21 On November 21, General Przhevalsky informed the Turkish headquarters concerning the decision of the Commissariat. A few days later a small group of representatives consisting of A. Smirnov, Viktor Tevzaya, General Vishinsky, and Arshak Jamalian (a Dashnak) arrived in Erzincan and, on December 5, agreed to an armistice consisting of fourteen articles, which was then signed.22 According to the conditions of the armistice, the articles were compulsory for both parties until a peace treaty was concluded. If one party unilaterally chose to break the armistice, it was their obligation to inform the other party of military operations fourteen days in advance of their commencement. Otherwise, the armistice would remain in force until the signing of the peace treaty. On that same day, the line of demarcation was to be determined between the parties. They were not to allow their armies to be quartered strategically; in particular, the Turkish army was not to be led from the Caucasus front to Mesopotamia. It was noted in the armistice that, in the event a general armistice was signed between Russia and Central European countries, the articles of this agreement would be compulsory for the Caucasus as well. Even military operations between the countries’ ships fighting on the Black Sea were stopped. In addition to the armistice agreement, on the same day in Erzincan, a statement about the line of demarcation was signed.23

16  The February 1917 revolution The Erzincan armistice was signed not with the Petrograd government but with the South Caucasian Commissariat; thus, in an indirect way, the Ottoman central headquarters recognized the South Caucasian Commissariat as a government.24 With the signing of the armistice agreement in Erzincan, Russian military forces started to withdraw from the Caucasus front. For Russia, this front collapsed. The commissar of the Caucasian Military Headquarters, D. Donskoy, decided to form an army that would include Georgian, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Ukrainian, and Russian national corps. The South Caucasian Commissariat feared that the Russian army would stay in the Caucasus and come under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda, creating a danger for the Commissariat. Bolshevik propagandists were setting the soldiers of the army at the Caucasus front against the officers, telling them that unless the revolution deepened, the people would not see any peace, land, or bread.25 Elections to new regional military soviets were held at the second congress of the Caucasus army, and fifty-two Bolsheviks were elected as members. Grigory Korganov, who later served as military commissar of the Baku Commune, was elected chairman of the soviet. The fact that the army was becoming more and more Bolshevik gave rise to concerns. For this reason, on December 19, 1917, the government ordered the withdrawal of the Russian army from the Caucasus. According to this order, Caucasian military units could be kept only in the form of national corps. As a first step, by order of the central headquarters on December 26, the Armenian military corps was created. It included three infantry divisions, one cavalry subdivision, and several territorial regiments. But soon these corps deteriorated into uncontrolled groups that engaged in a pogrom against the Muslim population of the South Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. In fact, the urgent creation of a national corps was connected to the fact that Russian soldiers returning from the front were terrorizing and robbing the local population. The creation of an army on national grounds resulted in the formation of the commissariat’s military soviet of nationalities. The military soviet was the only government structure that tried to prevent robbery and looting by the deserters from Russian military forces returning from the front. It was easy to organize Georgian and Armenian national corps, along with a complement of officers, as they had already served in the Russian army in the Caucasus as voluntary military units. But the Armenian and Georgian national corps created for protection from Turkey often contributed to and participated in internal national conflicts. Some Armenian military units, led by shady speculators and militant nationalists, launched terrorist operations against Azerbaijanis in the region. Such was Andranik’s division, which achieved notoriety for the barbarism of its conduct against the Muslim population.26 Progressive political figures of Azerbaijan had already experienced this danger at the beginning of 1917 and, therefore, after the February revolution, they appealed to the Provisional Government to create a national army. However, they did not get a positive answer. After certain events that took place in the fall of 1917, the Muslim national faction took important steps toward the creation of a national army.

The February 1917 revolution  17 Initiated by national factions, meetings of Muslim military men attended by progressive, intelligent Azerbaijanis were held in Ganja, Baku, Lenkeran, and Tiflis. The creation of military units faced many difficulties. Complements of officers necessary to organize and lead the army were insufficient and weapons and military supplies nonexistent. The base of the Azerbaijani national military corps was made up by the Tatar cavalry regiment of the legendary “Muslim Division” transferred from Petrograd. However, revolution and disorder had an impact on this division as well; many talented military men left the regiment. General Ali Agha Shikhlinski took the command. Officers released from the Caucasus front, and especially Muslims, were being recruited to the national military units. In the fall of 1917, the Baku cadet school was started as a place to prepare officers. The greatest obstacle to overcome, one not experienced by Armenians and Georgians, was the fact that the main industrial city of Azerbaijan, Baku had, since the fall of 1917, been under the control of the Bolsheviks, who strongly resisted the creation of national military units. Another advantage of the Christian populations of the South Caucasus lay in the fact that consuls and military representatives of the Entente countries in Tiflis were interested in the creation of Armenian and Georgian military units and gave them support. The primary goal of this assistance was to keep the Turkish army on the Caucasus front and prevent it from mobilizing against the British army in Mesopotamia. In fact, the idea of creating national corps in the Caucasus came from the British. They considered it possible to prevent the German-Turkish bloc from advancing toward Baku by means of national units created from the remainders of the Armenian, Georgian, and Russian armies. The head of the British mission to Tiflis, Brigadier General Offley Shore, was responsible for the creation of the national corps. Ranald MacDonell, a former employee of the secret service of the British Foreign Office, who had worked as a vice-consul in Baku for about 7 years and was acquainted with local customs and languages, was dispatched from Tehran to Tiflis in order to observe what was taking place in the Caucasus. Not long afterward, he was joined by another secret service agent, Captain Edward Noel, who knew the Russian and Persian languages. In October 1917, MacDonell learned for the first time that a large part of the Russian army had already left the Caucasus front. However, Armenian units of the army remained on the front line. In view of these conditions, the British decided that they would create a division drawn from representatives of Armenian, Assyrian, Russian, Greek, and other nations to prevent an advance of the Turks on the front line. MacDonell opined that there were no hopes to be pinned on Georgians. Their infantry forces favored the Bolsheviks, and their cavalry detachments announced that they would not protect their regions. In order to support these military units financially, a resolution was passed to allocate finances and transfer them through Russian central headquarters. The British chose this option because they wanted to avoid unnecessary rumors about “English assistance.” Nevertheless, as MacDonell observed, Armenians managed to create an impression that the British were protecting them alone. Armenian divisions on the Caucasus front received British financial assistance through

18  The February 1917 revolution Russian central headquarters in the amount of 1 million rubles. Russian volunteers, meanwhile, obtained 200,000 rubles. Moreover, the government in Tiflis was lent 4 million. At the time, the British consul Patrick Stevens, on the instructions of the British Foreign Office, stated that the British government intended to render assistance to Armenians by all possible means. He wrote that the Armenians were the only force accepting British assistance and were using it very skillfully for propaganda purposes against the Caucasian population, especially in Baku and Ganja.27 It did not take long before the British realized that the Armenians had created new problems for them. MacDonell wrote that in Tiflis, the Armenians and some of the general populace were under the impression that the British mission was created to help Armenians and they were considering this as a great victory. This was aggravating the already negative impression about the British among Muslims, making it impossible to find a common language with them.28 Taking this into consideration, the more experienced Englishmen who understood strategy and were familiar with the customs and peoples of the Near East, especially Muslims, started approaching the Azerbaijani issue with caution. In December 1917, Edward Noel wrote to Percy Cox, the British representative in Tehran, that England should create a joint bloc of local Azerbaijani Muslims and the Muslims of India and Mesopotamia and place them against the pro-German groups of Turkey and Iran. He thought that if the British could accomplish this, the population of the Azerbaijani province of Iran would want to join the Caucasian Federation and be freed from dependence on Iran. This could be a strong factor in the resolution of the Iranian problem.29 The idea of the independence of Iranian Azerbaijan and its gradual annexation to the South Caucasus had already appeared in diplomatic correspondence in 1908–1909. The Russian charge d’affaires in Tehran, Vladimir F. Minorsky, in his letters to Paul M. Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, and Mikhail I. Tereshchenko, who had replaced him in this position, wrote that “Azerbaijani autonomy” had previously been called for on many occasions during Muslim congresses held in Russia and, according to widespread rumors, in Tabriz (in Iranian Azerbaijan) as well. What could be the results of this political tendency? According to Minorsky, the benefits to themselves concerning the unification of Azerbaijani Turks and their self-government were clear. This national group was the strongest and the healthiest force in the government body of Iran. For Russia, separation of the Azerbaijanis from Iran would mean that Azerbaijan would become more fully part of the South Caucasus.30 At the end of 1917, the retreat of the Russian army and the withdrawal from the Caucasian front line had turned into a serious problem. Armed Russian soldiers, hungry and miserable, looted the regions they passed through. The South Caucasian Commissariat did not allow these uncontrolled forces into Tiflis and ordered Russian soldiers to be sent off from Garayazi Station without entering the city. In January 1918, a bloody conflict with heavy casualties took place at Shamkhor Station between Russian soldiers and government forces. Stepan Shaumian made an attempt to relate the events that took place from the ninth

The February 1917 revolution  19 to the twelfth of January to counterrevolutionary activity by the Musavat party. However, the actual situation was very different. Having taken into consideration that the Russian army, moving toward Baku, would serve the Bolsheviks, or at least would provide them arms and military supplies, the South Caucasian Commissariat considered it necessary to disarm them, and it passed a resolution ordering the disarmament of Russian soldiers. The Azerbaijani population was suffering the most from the return of the Russian army. Vladimir Stankevich, in his work The Fate of the Peoples of Russia, wrote that the retreating Russian army, angry and defeated, was robbing and pillaging the Muslim population.31 According to reports, 200 Muslim villages were destroyed in the course of this operation. Boris Baykov, a Russian Kadet who lived in Baku for about 20 years, noted in his memoirs published in Berlin in 1922 that, “except for Muslim villages, none of the settlements of other nationalities were touched.”32 Responding to this situation, the Minister of Internal Affairs, N. Ramishvili, ordered Russian soldiers to be held at the Shamkhor Station. In addition to this, there was a letter dated January 6, 1918, from Noe Jordania about the disarmament of the Russian soldiers returning from the front.33 By decree of the South Caucasian government, Captain Abkhazov was put in charge of disarming Russian soldiers at the Shamkhor Station. When the soldiers refused to give up their arms, a violent confrontation took place and, as a result, forces were killed or wounded on both sides. Azerbaijanis took an active part in these events, as they were the ones suffering the most from the return of the Russian army. It was logical that Azerbaijanis, along with Armenians and Georgians, carried out the order of the government, as they did not want the large number of weapons to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and particularly the Baku Soviet, who aimed to take possession of the whole of Azerbaijan. If this were to happen, it would pose a serious danger for the national interests and autonomy of Muslims. Furthermore, the Muslim population was restive over the fact that Georgia and Armenia had been provided with arms; they also wanted to have arms in order to defend themselves. They were discontented with the policy of the Commissariat, which they felt had discriminated against them. Aslan Bey Safikurdski noted that “while Armenians and Georgians, the little brothers in the South Caucasus, were given weapons, Muslims, the big brother, were not given arms.”34 Prominent Azerbaijani political figures in Ganja, father and son Alakbar and Khudadat Bey Rafibeyov, along with Jafar Rustambeyov and Aslan Bey Safikurdski, played an important role in the suspension of the Shamkhor conflict. The famous surgeon Khudadat Bey Rafibeyov took responsibility for the treatment of wounded Russian soldiers. In order to prevent a slaughter, on January 11, the above-named persons held negotiations with the leaders of the Russian army at the station. In addition, members of the South Transcaucasian Seim (Parliament)—Fatali Khan Khoyski, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, and Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov—signed an appeal to the Muslim population, which proved very important for the termination of the conflict. In order to cool down the passion of about 10,000 people who

20  The February 1917 revolution had gathered by the railroad, the parties signed a protocol. It is important to take into consideration that many of the fatalities were from among the Azerbaijani population. According to the protocol, the leadership echelon took on the responsibility to provide the Muslim corps with weapons and supplies sufficient for one military battery from Tiflis in the near future.35 During the negotiations, Safikurdski informed the leadership about the telegram from Jordania concerning the disarmament of the army.36 The disarming of the army at Shamkhor and other nearby railroad stations was placed under the leadership of a Georgian colonel, Duke L. Magalov. Soon, Noe Ramishvili was blamed for the Shamkhor events at the Regional Soviet in Tiflis. How many Russian soldiers and officers were killed at Shamkhor? There are conflicting reports about this. Seizing on the events in Shamkhor, Bolsheviks in Baku, in order to use the events against the Muslims, artificially exaggerated the number of those wounded and killed. When Stepan Shaumian gave his first statement, he said that during the Shamkhor events several thousand soldiers were killed or wounded.37 From the 1920s until the late 1980s, Soviet historians supported this account provided by Shaumian in the Bakinskii rabochii (Baku Worker) newspaper. In a book by A. Stavrovsky published in 1925, it was claimed that about 2,000 soldiers were killed. Starting in the 1950s, Azerbaijani Soviet historians indicated that more than 1,000 soldiers were killed in Shamkhor. Foreign authors Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian Collins, based on literature published in Azerbaijan, indicated that it was more than 1,000.38 Firuz Kazemzadeh indicated several hundred,39 and Ronald Grigor Suny, 1,000 persons killed.40 However, a document titled “Description of the events that took place on the ninth to the thirteenth of January 1918 on the Aghstafa–Hajigabul part of the Transcaucasian railway” was prepared by the members of the mission to the All-Caucasian Country Food Committee who witnessed the Shamkhor events, together with the leadership of the echelon. The mission had decided to deliver an eyewitness report of the events that had occurred to the Soviet of Working People’s and Soldiers’ Deputies and to the Municipal Duma, as soon as they reached Baku. A report was necessary, because false rumors were spreading throughout the city.41 In fact, in the conflict that took place, 53 passengers of the echelon died and 212 were wounded.42 A calculated propaganda campaign was started by the Baku Soviet around the events in Shamkhor for several reasons: first, to accuse the South Caucasian government for its role in the events and to prepare public opinion for the sovietization of the region; second, to excite the rage of the Russian army returning from the front against the local population, in this way securing their service to the Baku Soviet, and to complete the process of the occupation of Azerbaijan in the name of sovietization; third, taking advantage of these events, to disarm and decimate the Muslim population in Baku under the guise of a struggle against the counterrevolution. In reality, it was to accomplish a cleansing of the city of a Muslim “counterrevolution.” B. Baykov wrote that one of the military units brought the bodies of their dead comrades to Baku and buried them in the Baku cemetery. Socialist organizations carried out the burial with a lot of noise, which frightened the local population. In the parts of the city where Azerbaijanis lived,

The February 1917 revolution  21 an alarm was expected, although fortunately, this did not happen. The mood was very tense in the city, and a slaughter of Azerbaijanis was expected. 43 The propaganda campaign that was started around the Shamkhor events deepened the conflicts between Musavatists and Bolsheviks. The struggle of Musavat for the autonomy of Azerbaijan worried Shaumian and the Bolsheviks. The Bakinskii rabochii newspaper wrote, “The autonomy of Azerbaijan is the autonomy of the Turkish bourgeoisie. Neither the Russian bourgeoisie nor Russian democracy agrees to this autonomy. As a result, Musavatists who want Azerbaijani autonomy will reap only ruin.”44 When the Russian Soviet of People’s Commissars appointed Shaumian as the Envoy Extraordinary for the Caucasus to fight against the autonomy of Azerbaijan, he was commissioned to carry out the decree of December 29, 1917, on the autonomy of “Turkish Armenia,” which had been prepared by Josef Stalin. The decree recognized the full independence and sovereignty of the Armenian nation in “Turkish Armenia,” which had been occupied by the Russian army. Other items were the creation of militias to protect the population of “Turkish Armenia” and their property once the Russian army withdrew from the territory; the unimpeded repatriation of Armenians who had emigrated from “Turkish Armenia”; and the creation of a provisional administration of a democratically elected Armenian national deputies’ council. Stepan Shaumian was commissioned by the decree to render all necessary assistance to the population of “Turkish Armenia” in the execution of its articles.45 This decree had negative consequences, leading to the intensification of national conflicts in the South Caucasus, and ethnic conflicts as well. The Bolsheviks had hoped to demonstrate that they were the “protectors of Armenians,” continuing the policy of tsarist Russia.46 By the same token, the decree of December 29 (new style: January 11) led toward the creation of “Great Armenia”; but even larger goals were behind this decree. The December 29 decree proposed the creation of an Armenian majority on Turkic lands by way of a referendum. In reality, however, what was being proposed was the creation of an Armenian puppet state under the patronage of Russia, paving the way for the annexation by Bolshevik Russia of Turkic lands. But the situation in the South Caucasus was not favorable for the execution of this decree. Two months later, L. Karakhan, Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, sent a telegram from Brest-Litovsk in which he stated that Soviet Russia had recognized the annexation of Kars, Batum, and Ardakhan to Turkey, and this meant a repudiation of the “Turkish Armenia” decree. There was also a clash of opinions among Armenian political circles in relation to the decree. In an abstract of the report “On the Caucasian Issue” sent by an active participant of events in the Caucasus, Anastas Mikoyan, to Lenin, Mikoyan admitted that the decree of Soviet Russia about the independence of Turkish Armenia had been a big mistake, as it did not bring about any positive results and set the Muslim population not only of Turkey but of all the Caucasus against it.47 Since the middle of 1917, the Turks had been following events in Russia with great attention. At the beginning of 1918, Turkey had included the South

22  The February 1917 revolution Caucasus into the sphere of its foreign policy. As the armistice of Erzincan was temporary, Turkey initiated peace negotiations with the government of the South Caucasus in January 1918. On January 14, in a letter sent by Turkish headquarters to General Odishelidze, it was stated that Enver Pasha wanted to know how to establish relations with the “independent Caucasian government” in order to sign a peace treaty. In the same letter, Vehib Pasha stated that he considered it possible to send a representative mission to Tiflis.48 Two days later, Vehib Pasha sent another letter to Odishelidze. In that letter, the Turkish government invited the South Caucasian Commissariat to the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and promised that it would do its best for the recognition of the new state. This could have been a step on the path toward the independence of the South Caucasus. The political results of this offer were important, regardless of the subjective intentions of Turkey. Undoubtedly, after the collapse of the Russian empire, Turkey wanted to see the South Caucasus as an independent state under its influence. This state could play the role of a buffer in an area where Russia and Turkey had been confronting each other for about a century and become an obstacle for Russia on its way to Asian Turkey. For these reasons, Turkey did not confine itself only to recognizing the South Caucasian Commissariat; it also wanted to achieve its recognition by the European Central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria) and Russia by inviting it to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. Thus, in early 1918, due to the situation created by Soviet Russia, conditions were favorable for exerting diplomatic pressure on the Bolshevik government to recognize the South Caucasian Commissariat. Turkish leaders were worried that the Entente would penetrate the region as the Russian army withdrew from the South Caucasus. A newly formed independent state of the South Caucasus, they thought, no matter what form it would take, would be many times more convenient for Turkey than for Russia. Therefore, the Turkish government promised the South Caucasian Commissariat its recognition by the participant counties of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. Vehib Pasha stated on behalf of the Ottoman state, Acting within my authority, I consider it an honor to inform you that the representatives of the Central states, gathered in Brest-Litovsk, will protect the recognition of the independence of the South Caucasian government with all their strength. You can be assured of your success and can send your plenipotentiary representatives to Brest-Litovsk.49 The South Caucasian government was not inclined to cooperate with Turkey, although the composition of the government was not harmonious. The Georgian and particularly the Armenian faction of the Commissariat opposed cooperation with Turkey. Moreover, the majority in the Commissariat considered Bolshevism as a temporary condition and did not lose hope that an indivisible, democratic Russia would regroup as a result of the February revolution.50 Armenians, regardless of the party or organization they belonged to, were against collaboration with Turkey. From the first days of the October coup, their thinking was “better

The February 1917 revolution  23 Bolsheviks than Turks, as the former are in any case Russians.”51 The signing of a decree on “Turkish Armenia” played an important role in the forming of this idea. In the course of discussions, the Muslim representatives of the South Caucasian government considered it possible to accept the offer from Turkey. In January, Azerbaijani representatives, government members Khadadat Bey Malik-Aslanov, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, and Mammad Hasan Hajinski, took part in the discussions of the peace issue. The chairman of the Commissariat, Evgeni Gegechkori, related the impossibility of starting the peace negotiations without considering the importance for all the nations of the Russian empire to discuss this issue and the necessity to obtain confirmation from the Constituent Assembly. His suggestion to wait for the Assembly meant refusing the offer from Turkey.52 Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov noted in his speech that the newly created governments within Russian territory did not have any interest in the South Caucasus. Therefore, he stated that it was crucial to announce the independence of the South Caucasus and start peace talks without waiting for the opinion of the newly formed governments. In the end, the government did not manage to come to a consensus and “considered it suitable to ask Turkey for three weeks’ time.”53 This idea did not decide the matter, however, as in the course of events, hopes for the Constituent Assembly disappeared, and it became clear that the Bolshevik government had no intention of discussing this issue with anybody. The situation in the South Caucasus was becoming more and more complicated. Armenian troops, which replaced the Russian army, were committing a series of crimes against the local Turkish population. Vehib Pasha appealed to Odishelidze and Przhevalskiy, reminding them of crimes committed against the Muslim population when some people were burned alive. Mass killings of Muslims during the month of January gravely concerned the Turkish Command.54 The brutalities committed by Armenian military forces originated in the conviction that “Turks have no power in the Caucasus.” A. Jamalian, who took part in the Erzincan negotiations, stated, “They did not come across a single Turkish soldier along all of the demarcation line, all of them having fled from hunger and cold.”55 Taking advantage of this situation, Andranik Torosovich Ozanian, who at the end of 1917 was given the military rank of general-major by the Commissariat, incited the Armenians by making a statement urging them to stand firm against the Turks.56 Confident that they would not be punished, Dashnak military units started brutalizing the Turkish population under the wild claim of “creating an Armenian state from sea to sea.” During the next meeting dedicated to the signing of peace, General Odishelidze admitted that these brutal acts had been committed. When M. Y. Jafarov, who took part in the meeting, asked General Lebedinsky what actions would be taken against those who killed Muslims and burned their homes, the commander claimed that the killings that took place at Rize and Trabzon and the burning of homes were carried out by soldiers of the Russian army units returning from the front.57 The general saw the solution to this problem in bilateral negotiations, starting at the peace conference. On January 29, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gegechkori informed Ukraine and the South-East Alliance about the peace proposal from

24  The February 1917 revolution Turkey and invited them to Tiflis on February 14 to prepare common policies.58 However, these countries did not accept the invitation as this issue did not concern them. In addition, Ukraine strongly desired to take part in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations with the help of Germany. Hesitation on the part of the South Caucasian government brought Turkey into action. On February 12, the Turkish Command once again reminded them of the brutalities Armenians were committing and stated that the Turkish army could not stand by and witness the killings of Muslims. Vehib Pasha ordered his army to attack. When it came down to a real war situation, Armenian military units that had distinguished themselves in the slaughter of local populations demonstrated their inability to fight. Andranik, responsible for defending Erzurum, could not protect the Armenian army from mass desertion.59 Colonel Morel (former military attaché of Russia in Tokyo), the head of the Erzincan regiment, ordered it to retreat. The Armenian and a small number of Georgian military forces retreated for 11 days.60 Although Armenians outnumbered Turks, they surrendered Erzurum without striking a blow.61 Some attempts have been made to grossly misinterpret the events of February 1918 in new literature published recently in Russia. Some Russian authors silence the fact that Turkish commanders were forced to start military operations in response to the brutalities committed by Armenian armed groups, writing that “the attacks of the Turkish army were accompanied by the terrible slaughter of the Armenian population.”62 The South Caucasian Commissariat could not come to a firm decision on its attitude toward the military operations. Finally, a decision was taken to discuss this issue at the South Transcaucasian parliament to be convened on February 23 (February 10), and the Turkish Command was informed of that decision. After the first debates of the new higher government body were over, the Georgian faction suggested calling it the Seim, taking the name from the Polish parliamentary structure, which was separate from the Russian empire. In the last days of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks of Transcaucasia supported a similar idea.63 However, in February 1918, the Bolsheviks started to strongly oppose the creation of a Seim, which would be another step toward independence. The suggestion by the Mensheviks to create a Seim was met by objections from the Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.64 The opinion of the Azerbaijani faction was decisive in this situation. By supporting the idea of a Seim, the Azerbaijani faction supported the creation of parliamentary governance for the South Caucasus. In the Seim that was formed by representatives of those parties that took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, ten political parties came to be represented: Mensheviks, Musavatists, Dashnaks, Constitutional Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social Federalists, National Democrats, Union party, Muslim Socialists, and members of the Hummet (Endeavor) party. For the most part, the parties consisted of representatives of the three Caucasian nations. The number of representatives elected to the Constituent Assembly was as follows: Mensheviks obtained thirty-three seats, Musavat thirty seats, Dashnaks twenty-seven seats, and Socialist-Revolutionaries five seats in the Seim.65 The Muslim Socialist bloc obtained seven, Hummet four, and the Union party three

The February 1917 revolution  25 deputy seats.66 Overall, the Musavat party gathered 63 percent of the votes from among Muslims living in Transcaucasia.67 This victory signaled that Musavat had become a strong political force in the Caucasus. In the newly formed Muslim faction of the South Transcaucasian Seim, the Musavat party was represented by Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, Fatali Khan Khoyski, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Hasan Bey Aghayev, Khosrov Pasha Bey Sultanov, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Mir Hidayet Seidov, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, Gazi Ahmad Mammadbeyov, Aslan Bey Gardashov, Jafar Bey Rustambeyov, Javad MalikYeganov, Mustafa Mahmudov, Mehdi Bey Hajibabayev, Haji Molla Salim Akhundzade, Mehdi Bey Hajinski, Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov, Museyib Akhidjanov, Lutfali Bey Behbudov, Firudin Bey Kocharli, Ibragim Agha Vakilov, Hamid Bey Shakhtakhtinski, Rahim Bey Vakilov, Alasgar Bey Mahmudov, Yusif Afandi Afandizade, Mirza Jalal Yusifzade, Mammad Rza Vakilov, and Islam Bey Gabulov; the Muslim Socialist Bloc was represented by Ibrahim Bey Heydarov, Ali Khan Kantemirov, Aslan Bey Safikurdski, Ahmad Jovdat Pepinov, Baghir Rzayev, Jamo Hajinski, and Mahammad Maharramov; the Union party was represented by Sultan Majid Ganizade, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, and Heybatgulu Mammadbeyov; and the Hummet party was represented by Jafar Akhundov, Ibrahim Abilov, Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, and Samadagha Aghamalioglu.68 These individuals played a significant role in the future fate of Azerbaijan and carried on their shoulders the weight of complicated political processes. The first issue discussed in Seim after its creation was the start of peace talks with Turkey. The Trabzon discussions were the first time that Azerbaijani representatives to the Seim entered the diplomatic arena. On February 23, Vehib Pasha accepted the offer of the South Caucasian government to start peace talks. On the same day, a joint meeting of the South Caucasian Commissariat and the Seim was held. At the meeting, a letter from Vehib Pasha was read in which he stated that the Ottoman Empire was ready to start peace negotiations in Tiflis or Batum. Many Seim members were against holding the negotiations in those cities. Fatali Khan Khoyski, in his speech on behalf of Azerbaijani representatives, stated that the start of peace talks by the government would demonstrate its desire to be independent and stressed the importance of beginning without delay. In his opinion, the location of the conference was not important. Istanbul and Trabzon were suggested as suitable locations and, at the last moment, the decision was made to hold the talks in Trabzon. On March 1, a special committee consisting of all the parties and national groups of the Seim attempted to define the principles on which a peace with Turkey would be based.69 Member of the Seim Alexander Khatisian expressed the opinion of Armenians who had lost hope in Russia, stating: “After the separation of the Transcaucasia from Russia neighbourly relations between the Armenia and Turkey are have become possible.”70 He made a statement suggesting that autonomy should be granted to Armenians within the borders of the six provinces of Turkey. Khatisian even stated that it could be possible for the South Caucasian republic to be annexed to a Turkish federation. This idea stemmed from concerns about the future of the

26  The February 1917 revolution Armenian and Georgian factions of the Seim. In their opinion, if Germany reached an agreement with Russia, it would gather its forces on the Western front and would soon defeat the forces of the Allies. In that case, Turkey would not only retain its boundaries, it would become an influential and authoritative power in the whole region. The Azerbaijani faction, while refusing to take part in military operations against Turkey, also expressed its objection to the South Caucasus entering the Turkish federation in any form.71 Therefore, at that meeting, all factions supported peace with Turkey based on the following proposals: 1 2 3 4

the Seim is a competent body with full authority to sign a peace agreement; the Seim considers the signing of the final peace agreement with Turkey its main responsibility; the peace agreement with Turkey must be based on restoring the borders of 1914; and representatives of the South Caucasian republic will strive for the sovereignty of Eastern Anatolia and the autonomy of Turkish Armenia within the Turkish state.72

A member of the Seim from the party of Constitutional Democrats, Yuli F. Semyonov, suggested inviting the Allies to the peace conference. However, this was impossible. Neither the English nor the French would agree to sit at the bargaining table with Turkey, nor would Turkey come to the conference under such conditions. Semyonov, expressing his objection to the second point of the proposals, showed that the final peace agreement would be prepared at the AllEurope peace conference. All three nations of the South Caucasus were represented in the delegation selected for participation in the negotiations. Akaki Chkhenkeli was heading the delegation. From the Azerbaijani faction of the Seim, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, Ibrahim Bey Heydarov, and Akbar Agha Sheykhulsilamov were included in the delegation leaving for the Trabzon conference.73 At the same time, Mammad Emin Rasulzade and Ahamad Pepinov were part of the delegation and were responsible for controlling the overall process of negotiations and directing it. Three political figures who were part of the delegation—Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, and Akbar Agha Sheykhulsilamov—also represented the republic later at the Paris Peace Conference. *** All in all, the situation in the South Caucasus after the 1917 Russian revolution was highly complicated; the warring countries’ struggle over the region took open form, and the attempts of the opposing military blocs to assert control over the Caucasus intensified. During World War I and the times of strained military, political, and diplomatic conflicts, the main responsibility of Azerbaijani political circles was to define a foreign policy in accordance with national interests. The Trabzon and Batum conferences held in the spring of 1917 were part of this important task.

The February 1917 revolution  27

Notes 1. Molla Nəsrəddin (Molla Nasraddin), No. 5, 1917. 2. M. Ə. Rəsulzadə (M. E. Rasulzade), Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti (Azerbaijani Republic). Baku, 1990, p. 26. 3. Баку (Baku), March 9, 1917. 4. Cурен Шаумян (Suren Shaumian), “Бакинская коммуна 1918 года.” Пролетарская революция (“Baku Commune of 1918.” Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya). No. 12, 1926, p. 71. 5. Каспий (Kaspiy), October 25, 1917. 6. State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f. 970, r. 1, v. 18, p. 3. 7. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) (Azerbaijani Republic [1918–1920]). Baku, 1998, p. 39. 8. Ihsan Ilgar, Rusiya’da Birinci müslüman Kongresi tutanakları (Minutes of the First Muslim Congress in Russia). Ankara, 1990, pp. 164–165. 9. С. М. Исхаков (S. M. Iskhakov), Российские мусульмане и революция (весна 1917 г. – лето 1918 г.) (S.M. Iskhakov. Russian Muslims and Revolution [spring 1917– summer 1918]). Moscow, 2004, p. 176. 10. Ibid. 11. Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies. London, 1953, p. 7. 12. Программные документы мусульманских политических партий. 1917–1920 гг. (Policy Documents of Muslim Political Parties. 1917–1920). Oxford, 1985, pp. 13– 15. 13. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии (Documents and Materials on Foreign Policy of the Caucasus and Georgia). Tiflis, 1919, p. 7. 14. C. Беленький и А. Манвелов (S. Belenkiy and A. Manvelov), Революция 1917 года в Азербайджане (Revolution of 1917 in Azerbaijan). Baku, 1927, p. 219. 15. Л. М. Спирин (L. M. Spirin), “Итоги выборов во Всероссийское Учредительное Собрание в 1917 г.” История СССР (“Results of the Elections to the All-Union Constituent Assembly in 1917.” Istoriya SSSR). No. 2, 1988, p. 96. 16. Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, v. II Washington, 1932, p. 581. 17. Е. Токаржевский (E. Tokarzhevskiy), Из истории иностранных интервенций и гражданской войны в Азербайджане (On the History of Foreign Intervention and Civil War in Azerbaijan). Baku, 1957, p. 39. 18. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953, p. 458. 19. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 30. 20. Жорж де Малевил (Georges de Maleville), Армянская трагедия 1915 года (The Armenian Tragedy of 1915). Baku, 1990, pp. 66–98. 21. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 11–12. 22. Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia). Ankara, 1990, pp. 332– 333. 23. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1957, pp. 53–57. 24. Mim Kemal Öke, Ermeni Meselesi (The Armenian Issue). Istanbul, 1986, p. 158. 25. Г. В. Хачапуридзе (G. V. Khachapuridze), Борьба грузинского народа за установление Советской власти (Struggle of the Georgian People for Establishment of the Soviet Power). Moscow, 1956, p. 78. 26. Russian Newest History State Archive (RNHSA), f. 5, r. 33, v. 221, p. 37. 27. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, p. 68.

28  The February 1917 revolution 28. Ibid., p. 69. 29. Ibid. 30. C. М. Алиев (S. M. Aliyev), История Ирана. ХХ век (History of Iran. XX century). Moscow, 2004, pp. 90–91. 31. В. Станкевич (V. Stankevich), Судьба народов России (The Fate of the Peoples of Russia). Berlin, 1921, p. 245. 32. Б. Бай­ков (B. Baykov), Воспоминания о революции в Закавказье (1917–1920 гг.) (Recollections of the Revolution in Transcaucasia [1917–1920]). Berlin, 1922, p. 114. 33. C. Е. Сеф (S. E. Sef), Борьба за Октябрь в Закавказье (Struggle for October in the Caucasus). Tiflis, 1932, p. 74. 34. Description of the events which occurred on January 9–13, 1918 in AghstafaHajigabul part of the Transcaucasian railway. January, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 86, p. 22. 35. Ibid., pp. 26–27. 36. Ibid., p. 22. 37. С. Г. Шаумян (S. G. Shaumian), Статьи и речи 1917–1918 гг. (Articles and Speeches, 1917–1918). Baku, 1929, p. 99. 38. Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian Collins, Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. Lanham, 1999, p. 116. 39. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 82. 40. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton, 1972, p. 199. 41. Description of the events that occurred on January 9–13, 1918, in the Aghstafa– Hajigabul section of the Transcaucasian railway. January, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 86, p. 25. 42. Ibid., p. 26. 43. Бай­ков, Воспоминания о революции в Закавказье, p. 114. 44. Translation from Turkish of the book “The Azerbaijani Republic. 1918–1920” written by M. E. Rasulzade; with a preface “One Thought” written by Ali Huseynzade). 1923. SA AR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 198, p. 29. 45. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I, pp. 74–75. 46. T. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası (The Azerbaijani Dossier). Ankara, 1990, p. 75. 47. Thesis of the Report “On Caucasian Issue” sent to V. Lenin by A. Mikoyan, Member of the Caucasus Regional Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party. December, 1919. RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 1, v. 1202, p. 9. 48. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 24–25. 49. Ibid., p. 52. 50. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 31. 51. Бай­ков, Воспоминания о революции в Закавказье, p. 191. 52. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 465. 53. Öke, Ermeni Meselesi, p. 158. 54. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 41–46. 55. Лео (Leo), Из прошлого (From the Past). Erivan, 1921, p. 17. 56. From V. Stepakov and T. Kuprikov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 25.06.1965. RNHSA, f. 5, r. 33, v. 221, p. 43; О.Минасян (O. Minasian), “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года.” Историк-Марксист (“Foreign Policy of the Transcaucasian Counterrevolution in the First Part of 1918.” Istorik –Marxist). 1938, v. VI, p. 59. 57. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 54. 58. Ibid., pp. 36–37. 59. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 86. 60. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 462. 61. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 87.

The February 1917 revolution  29 62. Системная история международных отношений. Том I. События 1918–1945 годов (Systemic History of International Relations. Volume I. Events of 1918–1945). Moscow, 2007, p. 117. 63. Беленький и Манвелов, Революция 1917 года в Азербайджане, p. 28. 64. Пролетарская революция (Proletarskaya revolyutsiya), No. 5, 1924, p. 15. 65. Ю. Семенов (Y. Semyonov), “Закавказская республика.” Возрождение, (“The Transcaucasian Republic.” Vozrozhdeniye). Paris, 1949, p. 122. 66. M.V. Mehmetzade, Milli Azerbaycan hareketi (The Azerbaijani National Movement). Ankara, 1991, p. 67. 67. Serge Zenkovsky. Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. Cambridge, 1960, p. 257. 68. Адрес-календарь Азербайджанской Республики (Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1920, pp. 8–9. 69. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 466. 70. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 89. 71. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 121. 72. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 83–84. 73. Azərbaycan tarixi. V cild. (Azerbaijani History. Volume V). Baku, 2001, p. 296.

2 The Trabzon and Batum conferences Azerbaijan’s first diplomatic steps toward independence

On the eve of the Trabzon conference, the separate factions of the Seim discussed their responsibilities and defined their positions with regard to the peace. The Azerbaijani faction organized a meeting on this issue; the Muslim National Council had prepared an analysis of the events occurring within and around Azerbaijan. Of concern to the Azerbaijanis were the concentration of Armenian forces in Baku after their return from the Caucasian borders; the danger to Baku as a result of the movement of British forces in the Middle East in the direction of northern Iran and the southern Caspian Sea; and the activity of Germans in the Caucasus and their intention to seize Baku oil. The Muslim faction considered it necessary to sign a peace agreement with Turkey without delay and stabilize the situation in the South Caucasus. The delegation members who were supposed to go to Trabzon met on February  28. The Armenian representatives, invoking the right of nations to define their sovereignty, demanded autonomy for “Turkish Armenia” and expressed the idea that the Turkish government should withdraw its claims to Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. Ibrahim Bey Heydarov, representing the Muslim Socialist bloc, considered this to be an intervention into Turkey’s internal affairs and stated that the South Caucasus nations could define their sovereignty only on the condition of doing so within the borders of Transcaucasia. In response to those who were blaming Turkey for breaking the Erzincan agreement, Mammad Emin Rasulzade argued that the Turks likewise had a right to blame them for breaking the agreement.1 Two days before, Fatali Khan Khoyski had spoken bluntly at the meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim, and there was a serious divergence of opinions between him and Evgeni Gegechkori.2 In the course of the discussions, Georgian representative Giorgi B. Gvazava proposed informing the Germans about the peace conference. However, Azerbaijani representatives were against this, and Akaki Chkhenkeli was arguably right in stating that the delegation did not have a mandate to do this. He expressed concerns about military preparations by Turkey and the difficulties of living in a constant state of war. Khalil Khasmammadov said that “when the Turks cross the border, we need to think about whether or not to declare war, and whether the whole population of the South Caucasus or only part of it will declare war.” In the opinion of Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, the peace delegates should

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  31 have recommended that the Seim declare the independence of South Caucasus. “As long as independence is not declared,” he said, “we will have no results from negotiations.”3 The ensuing events showed that Mehdiyev was right. A telegram from Lev Karakhan, the Russian Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Secretary for Soviet Russia at the Brest peace negotiations, which was received before the representatives of the Transcaucasian Seim set off for Trabzon, greatly complicated the situation.4 The telegram stated: “We decided to sign the agreement under discussion. The most difficult condition of the February 21 (March 3) agreement is the separation of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum from Russia in the name of sovereignty.”5 One day later, Soviet Russia signed the BrestLitovsk agreement and, in doing so, officially repudiated the decrees on “Turkish Armenia” signed by Lenin and Stalin two months previously. The agreement stipulated that Russia would do everything to evacuate southern Anatolia and return it to Turkey. Russian troops would be withdrawn from the Ardahan, Kars, and Batum provinces. Russia would not intervene in the formation of new state and judicial relations. With respect to Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, the border line that had existed before the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 would be restored.6 Several foreign authors, when writing about the Brest agreement, mention the decrees on “Turkish Armenia” as being intended not for constructive but for propagandistic aims. On this view, the Soviet of People’s Commissars signed the decree on “Turkish Armenia” while at the same time creating conditions for Turkey’s seizure of these lands by moving out the Russian troops.7 Armenian plans to capture the southern provinces of Turkey and Soviet Russia’s plans to create a “Turkish Armenia” were scuttled by the Brest agreement. Although some Armenian communities in Petrograd and other cities expressed their dissatisfaction, this did not have any effect.8 According to the agreement, Soviet Russia did not just confirm the transfer of Kars, Batum, and Ardahan to Turkey but, on the basis of an additional agreement between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Turkey, Russia promised to disarm and disband the Armenian volunteer units from the territories occupied by Russian forces during the war and from the Russian borders.9 The second paragraph of the additional agreement gave Muslim citizens of Russia the right to appeal to Turkey freely on the condition that they take their property with them. However, one cannot agree with the conclusion of Richard Hovannisian that Soviet Russia signed the Brest agreement for the sake of “world revolution,” that is, to gain the sympathy of the Islamic world.10 Despite the urgings of Turkey and their promises to provide assistance, the government of the South Caucasus had refused to participate in the peace negotiations and announce its independence and so was now in a bad position. After receiving a telegram from Lev Karakhan, the government of the South Caucasus, in telegrams sent to Petrograd, London, Washington, Rome, Tokyo, Istanbul, Berlin, Vienna, and Kiev, immediately expressed its objection to the Bolsheviks’ actions in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. The telegrams stated that “The government of the South Caucasus considers invalid any agreement on Transcaucasia and its borders signed without its participation.”11 But it was too

32  The Trabzon and Batum conferences late. Before the start of the Trabzon conference, Vehib Pasha demanded that the commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Caucasus, General Lebedinsky, clear Ardahan, Kars, and Batum of Russian troops in accord with the Brest-Litovsk agreement. One cannot agree with the opinion of Soviet author A. Kadishev, who considered Turkey’s demand to be an intervention because “the population of the above-named regions mainly consisted of Armenians and Georgians.”12 Population censuses showed that the population of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum consisted mainly of Turkic people: 56 percent of the 730 thousand people living in the South-West Caucasus at that time were Turkic; 26 percent were Armenians; 3 percent Georgians; and 15 percent Russians. The rest were Greeks, Gypsies, and representatives of other nationalities. Considering the regions separately, 70 percent of the population of Batum was Turkish, 12.5 percent Armenian, and 7 percent Georgian; 49.5 percent of the population of Kars was Turkish, 29 percent Armenian, 0.3 percent Georgian, and 19.3 percent Russian.13 In Akhalsikh, 73.5 percent of the population was Turkish, 12.5 percent Armenian, and 8.8 percent Georgian.14 According to Russian sources, 51.9 percent of Ardahan’s population of 89,000 was Turkish, 20 percent Kurdish, 17.2 percent Russian and Greek, 7.5 percent Yezidis, and 2.9 percent Armenian.15 Considering the majority Turkic population in these regions, Turkey agreed to carry out a survey among the population on the basis of the Brest agreement. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff wrote of the Brest peace agreement that the way events developed left the Christian minorities of these regions (Kars, Batum, and Ardahan) in a bad position.16 The government and parliament of the South Caucasus were not declaring independence but, at the same time, did not want to side with the agreement signed by Soviet Russia. This contradiction was one of the most difficult problems that representatives of the South Caucasus faced at the Trabzon conference. The representatives of the South Caucasus arrived in Trabzon on March 8 and waited for the Turkish representatives on board the King Karl, on which they had traveled from Batum, until March 12.17 The conference officially opened on March 14. The head of Turkish delegation, Rauf Bey (Husayin Rauf Orbay), said at the beginning of the conference that the chairmanship would be given to heads of both delegations in turn. However, the representatives of the South Caucasus rejected this proposal. In his opening speech, Orbay stated that Turkey wanted to sign a long-term peace agreement with the South Caucasus on the basis of friendly relations. From day one of the conference, Turkish representatives asked questions about the form of government and political and administrative structure of the newly formed republic in the Caucasus. The Turks were interested in the question of whether this delegation represented an independent state or a part of Russia.18 Representatives of the South Caucasus tried to convince the Turkish representatives by arguing “We can say that the South Caucasus is independent.” On this point, Firuz Kazemzadeh remarked, “As though there were from the standpoint of international law such a thing as ‘almost-independence.’”19 At the conference, representatives of Transcaucasia protested against the paragraphs of the Brest agreement that concerned the Caucasus.20 The Turks said that, if the South Caucasus had interests in the Brest agreement, then it had to

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  33 establish itself on principles that met international legal standards and to take steps to be recognized by other countries. The government of the South Caucasus could not reject the principles of international law, whether it was recognized or not.21 In its telegram dated January 23, however, the government showed an unwillingness to participate in the Brest agreement and stated that it was a constituent part of Russia. Turkish representatives opposed the rejection of the Brest agreement.22 Their opinion was that the government of the South Caucasus should separate from Russia and announce its independence as soon as possible, if it wanted to become a subject of international law.23 In that case, Turkey would be ready to build friendly neighbor relations with the South Caucasus. Turkish representatives at the Trabzon conference mentioned the necessity of official determination of the form of governance of the South Caucasus, its borders, its official language and religion, as well as its attitude toward the Ottoman Empire. Representatives of Transcaucasia addressed the meeting with a special declaration concerning the questions listed above in which it was stated: The form of governance of the South Caucasian republic is being determined by the Transcaucasian Seim and we have reason to think that we will form a federal democratic republic. The South Caucasus includes Baku, Elizavetpol, Erivan, Tiflis, and Kutaisi provinces, Batum and Kars regions, Zagatala and Sukhumi districts. The problem of Dagestan and provinces situated on the shores of the Black Sea remains unsolved until they send their representatives to the Seim. The official language is still Russian, but the Georgian, Armenian, and Turkish languages are supposed to be official languages, according to the constitution that is being prepared. Freedom of conscience is in force in the South Caucasus; the constitution will undoubtedly separate state power from the church and the supremacy of the Orthodox Church will be eliminated.24 The insistence of the South Caucasus representatives on their claims to Kars and Batum, their refusal to recognize the terms of the Brest agreement, and several other questions under dispute deepened the conflict between the sides. Turkey’s interest in negotiations was weakened by the Seim’s unwillingness to announce its independence. Akaki Chkhenkeli confessed, that, “Considering it objectively, Turkey is interested in the independence of the South Caucasus because the independence of the South Caucasus means the safety of Turkey’s northern borders.”25 The leader of the Ottoman delegation, Rauf Bey, stated that representatives of Turkey were rejecting the declaration of the South Caucasian representatives because it interfered in Turkey’s internal affairs. In his opinion, the ideas expressed in the declaration did not comply with a friendly-neighbor policy. Official recognition of the South Caucasus government by Turkey was possible only if this government rejected its territorial claims on Kars, Batum, and Ardahan provinces on the basis of a special agreement.26 It would not contradict the obligations of Russia and Turkey, because Russia had accepted the right of its nations to sovereignty. The international agreement signed at Brest-Litovsk gave grounds

34  The Trabzon and Batum conferences for the Ottoman Empire to lay down a new order in these three regions; at the same time, the Ottoman government was ready to establish favorable economic relations between these regions and the regions of the Caucasus.27 There was no unity among the representatives of the South Caucasus. Every idea put forward was not suited to the interests of one or another side. A. Chkhenkeli stated correctly: “The difficulty of our position is connected with the republic of the South Caucasus not being formed yet and to the fact that our delegation does not insist on its claims firmly. We have come here without any preparation. There is not enough unity within the Seim itself to let us defend our position firmly.”28 In his opinion, the only way out was to let each nation determine its own position and ways of resolving the problems it faced. Chkhenkeli said, “I know that much time is needed for this, but I repeat: this is the only way out. Please pay attention to the fact that the ideas proposed by us today satisfy one nation but do not meet the needs of another, and ideas that satisfy the second nation do not suit the third nation’s needs.”29 That is why Chkhenkeli concluded that it was no use to stay in Trabzon. One group of representatives wanted to go back to Tiflis, another group supported the idea of going to Istanbul to negotiate with the government of the Ottoman Empire. The negotiations were temporarily halted by mutual agreement; during the announced break, the sides were to receive appropriate directives after consultations with the governments they represented. The South Caucasus delegation decided to send its three members to Tiflis to give a report to the Seim. Soon thereafter, Ibrahim Heydarov, Georgy Lashishvili, and Hovhannes Kachaznuni arrived in Tiflis and, on March 22, reported to the Seim on the Trabzon negotiations.30 Two problems were on the agenda of the meeting organized by the Seim: first, the declaration of the independence of the South Caucasus and, second, changes in the terms of the previously signed peace agreement. At that moment, Vehib Pasha ordered that the disputed territories of the South Caucasus be cleared. Intense discussions in the Seim on this issue showed that disagreement among the Trancaucasian nations was strong. While the Armenians and Georgians urged that the Turkish claims be rejected and war begun with Turkey, the Muslim faction proposed reaching an agreement with Turkey on the basis of mutual compromise. During the discussions, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev stated on behalf of the Muslim faction that it would not support the continuation of the negotiations if the independence of the South Caucasus was not announced. He noted that, normally, peace negotiations are held not by members of the Seim but by the minister of foreign affairs of a sovereign government.31 Discussion of territorial problems led to a situation in which the Georgians agreed to make concessions about Kars and Ardahan, on the condition of keeping Batum; the Armenians agreed to make concessions on Batum and Ajaria but did not want to give away Kars. The Azerbaijani faction was of the opinion that the government should fulfill its obligations according to the Brest-Litovsk agreement and give away Kars and Ardahan, because the majority of the population of these provinces was Turkish. They also thought that Ajaria should either become an independent Muslim republic as a part of the South Caucasus or, if this was impossible,

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  35 should unite with Turkey. They also felt that Batum should stay within the South Caucasus, because the Black Sea port was an important outlet to other countries. The foreign political and commercial interests of Azerbaijan were taken into account mainly on this issue. According to Tadeusz Swietochowski, the idea of Batum staying within the South Caucasus was related to the oil industry only, and Khalil Khasmammadov defended this proposal on behalf of the Muslim faction.32 In fact, this idea was espoused by the entire Azerbaijani faction. Fatali Khan Khoyski also mentioned the Batum issue in his speech at the Seim meeting of March 26. Reiterating the position of the Azerbaijani faction, he said that Batum was the only outlet to the sea for the South Caucasus (because Baku, on the Caspian, was in the hands of Bolsheviks) and that the South Caucasus could not manage without it.33 Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, a member of government who was sent to Trabzon, stated in his report to the Seim on April 1, “We must under no circumstances give Batum away.”34 The Azerbaijani and Georgian factions were of the same opinion concerning the problem of Batum, because Batum would be an unimportant and remote city for Turkey, whereas for the South Caucasus it was the only route to foreign countries and a vitally important city. As Noe Jordania told a meeting of the Seim on Batum “Batum is as important for the South Caucasus as Petrograd is important for Russia and Izmir is for Turkey.”35 In his speech, Jordania flatly demanded rejection of the Brest agreement. He stated, “We did not carry out such a great revolution to go from one type of slavery to another.”36 Jordania called on the Seim to reject Turkey’s claims. Fatali Khan Khoyski gave a wide-ranging speech on behalf of the Azerbaijani faction. He stated that the attitude toward peace negotiations was a vitally important issue for the South Caucasus. A war would create serious consequences for the region and worsen the situation, which was already unstable. In regard to relations with Turkey, he said: We can see logical consistency in Turkey’s actions. The government of Turkey has regarded us as an independent state on several occasions and it can be said that it tried to make us accept this idea. The government of Turkey proposed that the Transcaucasian government send its representatives to Brest-Litovsk in order to hold negotiations. Due to various considerations, the government of Transcaucasia could not do that at that moment. The government of Turkey appealed to the government of Transcaucasia several times asking it to announce its sovereignty, but no positive answer was received. At the previous meeting of the Seim this issue was explicitly put on the agenda, but we did not respond to it clearly. And if Turkey now considers us as a part of Russia and proposes that we fulfill the terms of the agreement signed with Russia, it is impossible not to see the logic in this action.37 Khoyski blamed the government for being inconsistent, because in one case it considered itself a part of Russia, in another case it refused to recognize the agreement signed by Russia. But the “reasonable statement”38 of Khoyski, which reflected reality, faced resistance from Socialist-Revolutionary Ivan

36  The Trabzon and Batum conferences Lordkipanidze, Constitutional Democrat Yuli Semyonov, and the Armenian faction while Menshevik Evgeni Gegechkori supported these ideas. However, no decision was reached. The South Caucasus then had two options: confirm the articles of the Brest agreement including those concerning the Caucasus and proclaim its independence or continue the war. While discussions were being held in Trabzon and Tiflis, the Turkish army began to establish Turkey’s claims under the Brest agreement. Ardahan was captured on March 19, and Armenian troops were disarmed.39 The local population, which had been terrorized by the Armenian troops, supported Turkey in the military operations. Armenian representatives in the Seim and in the government, who had remained silent while Armenian troops used force against Turkish populations at every opportunity, now tried to blame the Musavat party for betrayal in connection with the attitude of the Muslim population. The position on the issue of war and peace became clearer at the joint meeting of government members and leaders of the Seim on March 25. Hovhannes Kachaznuni, representing Armenia at the Trabzon negotiations, informed the participants that Turkey considered the declaration of the independence of the South Caucasus a necessity. It needed a state that would play the role of buffer between Turkey and Russia. Those speaking on behalf of the Azerbaijani faction clearly stated that they considered the declaration of independence of the South Caucasus inevitable and thus demanded it. In spite of the fact that Azerbaijani representatives participating in the discussions belonged to different political parties, none agreed to fight against Turkey. They stated that the Azerbaijani people would not fight against the Turks if war began. Khalil Khasmammadov said, If you do not fulfill Turkey’s demands, war is inevitable, and we cannot participate in a war against Turkey. If the Armenian and Georgian people feel they have enough power and strength, then let them take the responsibility on themselves and risk beginning a war with Turkey. No Muslim people will take part in this war. Akbar Sheykhulislamov, a member of the Hummet party, thought that the Muslim population would be neutral if a war against Turkey began.40 No final decision was reached at this meeting, but three issues were made clear: First, the government of the South Caucasus began to understand that its position was very critical; second, Akaki Chkhenkeli was given extraordinary powers to expedite the development of events at the Trabzon negotiations; and third, the Seim tried to deal with the issue of receiving aid from the Entente against Turkey. But unlike in the autumn of 1917, in the spring of 1918 neither Great Britain and France nor the United States was able to render actual assistance to the government of the South Caucasus. U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, in a telegram to Consul F. Willoughby Smith in Tiflis, stated that the United States was unable to actively support military operations in the Caucasus.41 A joint meeting of all Muslim factions of the Seim and representatives of the Mountain People of the North Caucasus took place in the Tiflis palace on March 25.

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  37 Along with members of the Muslim factions, Zubayir Temirkhanov, Mahammad Gazi Dibirov, Heydar Bammatov, and Abdul Mejid (Tapa) Chermoyev, representing the North Caucasus, and Liianov representing Ingushetia also participated in the meeting, where Mammad Yusif Jafarov was the chairman and Rahim Bey Vakilov the secretary. The idea of the North Caucasus joining the Transcaucasian state was broadly discussed at the meeting. Heydar Bammatov, who spoke first, explained that the people living in the highlands were in a difficult position because of the danger connected with the arrival of Russians, and he spoke of the unraveling of the political situation in the North Caucasus. He also described negotiations with Armenian and Georgian representatives held one day earlier in which Armenians were not of the same opinion as their neighbors in the face of external danger. In spite of this, he advocated patience in relation to the Armenian problem. He expressed confidence in the rapid resolution of the issues between the nations of the Caucasus in repelling the Great Russian–Bolshevik danger. Nasib Bey Usubbeyov noted that he valued the notion of the South Caucasian Turks and the Mountain People of the North Caucasus as a single Muslim family and their desire to join the Transcaucasian state. To explore annexation of the Mountain People to the Transcaucasian government, a special committee was created that included three representatives of the Mountain People and three representatives of the South Caucasian Turks.42 A meeting of the entire Muslim faction heard a report by Akbar Sheykhulislamov, a member of the peace delegation who had just returned from Trabzon, and discussed the activity of the Muslim parties. Members of the Muslim faction stated that they supported the idea of accepting the terms of the Brest agreement. The idea of sending a member of the Seim, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, to Trabzon with this assignment was accepted. 43 Worrying news from Baku about bloodshed organized by the combined efforts of Armenian and Bolshevik forces worsened the situation of the Seim and the progress of peace negotiations. The Seim was informed about the events in Baku on April 2. Noe Ramishvili, a member of the Seim, evaluated these as the beginning of a Bolshevik attack on Tiflis and Bolshevik seizure of power in the South Caucasus. Shaken by the March bloodshed, the representatives of the Muslim faction demanded that immediate measures be taken against the Bolsheviks in Baku; otherwise, as they stated, the Muslim faction would boycott the Seim. The bloodshed perpetrated on Muslims during the “March days” in Baku, organized by the Baku Soviet and the Dashnaks, and the bloodshed organized in April in Baku province with the aim of seizing authority in Azerbaijan expressed the real attitude of Russia and the Bolsheviks toward Azerbaijan. That is why, in general, these events should not be considered simply as an attempt by the Baku Bolsheviks to seize authority in Azerbaijan but rather as a component part of an aggressive policy conducted by Soviet Russia. The subsequent development of events showed that this conclusion was correct. Although the ethnic bloodletting that occurred in March and April in Baku province gave the impression of a local event, from the point of view of Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire, these were events of international importance. The Bolsheviks were hoping to upset the social balance of the national forces. Stepan Shaumian mentioned the aims

38  The Trabzon and Batum conferences pursued in the March bloodshed in a more overt form only after the Bolsheviks had carried it out and had committed atrocities against the Muslim population by fire and sword. If the “counterrevolution” had won, he wrote, Baku would have been proclaimed the capital of Azerbaijan and “Transcaucasia would have been lost for Russia.”44 We should note that the Baku Soviet and the Russian Bolshevik central government had disagreements in relation to the issue of autonomy, which was being defended by vast masses of the Azerbaijani population. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, in a letter sent before the March events to Stepan Shaumian and Prokopy (“Alyosha”) Japaridze, said that if the Muslims required autonomy, they should be given this autonomy.45 But Shaumian interpreted the natural desire of Azerbaijanis to become autonomous as the “wish of Azerbaijani chauvinists” to make Baku the “capital of an Azerbaijani khanate.”46 Shaumian, who had been responsible for the implementation of the decree on “Turkish Armenia” at the beginning of 1918, treated the Muslims who “succumbed to the illusion of making Baku the capital of Azerbaijan”47 in a totally different manner, as was evident in the observation that “the name Azerbaijan his mouth had the ring of a term of derision.”48 The American scholar Tadeusz Swietochowski notes that the Bolsheviks treated the Dashnaks kindly, and the Armenians reciprocated.49 In such conditions, the Baku Soviet discerned a favorable time and began to act. At the meeting of the Baku Soviet on March 15, Shaumian made a report on the “Situation in the South Caucasus” and stated, “The Baku Soviet should be the first and main basis for the civil war in the South Caucasus.”50 Secret agreements about clearing the town of its original owners and attacking the Muslim population were reached between the Armenians in the Baku Soviet and the Dashnaks and other Armenian nationalist organizations. Deliberate preparations preceded the Baku tragedy that resulted in the murder of twelve thousand Muslims as “counterrevolutionaries.”51 Shortly thereafter, the same thing happened in Shamakha: 7,000 Muslims were killed in a short period of time, including 1,653 women and 965 children.52 One of the first important steps of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the newly created Azerbaijan Republic would be the idea of creating an extraordinary investigation committee to investigate the Muslim bloodshed carried out by Bolshevik-Armenian forces in the spring of 1918. The European mass media, influenced by Armenia, presented the barbarities committed by the Armenians in Azerbaijan in a totally different light. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan therefore decided to investigate this issue at a governmental level. The first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, wrote in his report to the government on July 15, It is known that irresponsible Armenian nationalist troops on Azerbaijani territory have been executing terrible acts of savagery against the peaceful Muslim population in the name of Bolshevism for more than four months. At the same time, the organizers of these troops are sending false information

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  39 to European countries, in order to influence public opinion to take their side. For this reason, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately created the Extraordinary Investigation Committee. In the opinion of M. H. Hajinski, it was necessary to first, keep account of all cases of violence; second, define the conditions of such cases; and third, identify who was guilty and calculate the damage. He said in his report that “The organization to be created must be similar to the Extraordinary Investigation Committee and its materials must be published first in European languages (Russian, French, German, and Turkish) and widely distributed.”53 The extraordinary investigation committee was created according to government decree on August 31. The committee quickly gathered a large quantity of materials about crimes committed in the entire province of Baku. A small portion of these materials was used at the Paris Peace Conference by Azerbaijani representatives in 1919. They cited the materials in their published articles and pamphlets. Some were reflected in a set of materials published in French in Istanbul in 1919 and consisting of seventy-three pages, titled “Papers about the savagery of Armenians toward the Muslim population.”54 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent some of the materials collected by the extraordinary investigation committee, which consisted mainly of non-Azerbaijanis, to Azerbaijani representatives in Paris.55 During that period, Ranald MacDonell, employed by the British Mission in Baku, confirmed the fact that Armenians were actively participating in the March events. He wrote that Armenians had made a historic error in joining with the Bolsheviks against the Muslims and that the responsibility for that decision lay with the Dashnaktsutyun organization.56 The slaughter of Muslims in Baku province intensified the conflicts in the Seim and influenced the negotiations with Turkey. At the time of the events in Baku City (March–April 1918), Armenians also carried out similar actions around Erzurum. Three thousand Turkish inhabitants were slaughtered in the village of Yashilyayla, near Erzurum. The brutal crimes in Erzurum were perpetrated under the leadership of the Armenians Andranik, Muradian, and Dolukhanov.57 These bandit groups retreated under pressure from the Turkish army, destroying Muslim villages along their way and killing the local population. The group with Andranik was particularly active in these brutal deeds. Due to the gravity of the crimes committed by Andranik, he is remembered by Azerbaijanis and Turks population as a symbol of atrocity.58 The March–April massacres in the province of Baku and the atrocities committed against the Turkish population of Erzurum and other eastern provinces of Turkey were closely related, and they further complicated negotiations with Turkey. Positions on war and peace issues were being debated by factions of the Seim. Although after long negotiations on April 5, the representatives of the South Caucasus supported the idea of compromising over Kars and part of Ardahan, they refused to recognize the lawfulness of the Brest agreement. On April 6, the Turkish side, tired of repetition of the same solutions at the bargaining table, issued an ultimatum to the Transcaucasian representatives demanding that they

40  The Trabzon and Batum conferences provide an answer within forty-eight hours to the question of whether or not they accepted the Brest-Litovsk agreement. It was stipulated in the ultimatum that, if the South Caucasus wanted to reach an agreement with Turkey, it must proclaim its independence; only then could the diplomatic negotiations be continued.59 On April 7, Akaki Chkhenkeli informed Tiflis about the ultimatum. Making reference to the anarchy in the country and the collapse of the front, he called for acceptance of the Brest agreement, except for the Batum part, and for an immediate proclamation of independence. At the same time, he wrote to Noe Jordania, the chairman of the Georgian National Council, “We are in a crisis situation, the level of the army is lower than critical, the Turks were allowed to get very close to Batum, the railroad near Chakvi will be cut off. If Batum is taken, we will have to think about the future of Georgia.”60 Chkhenkeli demanded from the Seim and the Georgian National Council the authority to accept the Brest-Litovsk agreement while retaining Batum port. The Armenian representatives to Trabzon, Alexander Khatisian and Hovhannes Kachaznuni, realized that their previous suggestions had lost their importance in relation to the Brest-Litovsk agreement, so they tried to conduct secret negotiations with Turkey. For this purpose, Armenians led by Khatisian met with the head of the Turkish delegation, Rauf Bey. The Armenian representatives informed him that there were 400,000 Armenians who had fled from the Ottomans and were quartered in the Caucasus. If the Ottoman government allowed these people to return to Ottoman lands, the Armenians would not protest the Turks’ keeping Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. However, the proposal of the Armenians was not accepted. In these circumstances, Kachaznuni considered the Brest agreement the “lesser of two evils” and suggested accepting it, including the part on Batum.61 The Armenians discussed giving Batum to the Turks in order to frustrate the Georgians, who did not stand firm on the issue of Kars. The Azerbaijani representative, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, stated that, since the Brest agreement was an international legal act, the Turkish actions must be accepted. “The advancement of the Turkish army must be considered as legitimate for the purpose of restoring legal order. Russia fulfilled its side and withdrew its army from the region. Now, Turkey considers nationalist acts in the region to be those of partisans and is clearing the territory of partisan groups.”62 The acceptance of the Brest agreement was now an indisputable fact. Akaki Chkhenkeli, who had had some doubts during earlier discussions, came to the same opinion, and when the time of the ultimatum was up, he informed the representatives of the Ottoman empire, without waiting for the answer from Tiflis: “The Transcaucasian peace delegation, in answer to the letter of 6 April 1918 from Ottoman representatives, informs them that it accepts the Brest-Litovsk agreement and is ready to continue negotiations on the basis of the Brest-Litovsk agreement.”63 Later, a series of Armenian political figures and authors accused not only Musavat but the Georgian Mensheviks led by Chkhenkeli of betraying the Armenian nation by recognizing the Brest agreement. A. G. Babakhanian (Leo) wrote in his memoirs published in 1921, “You know, the main goal of Chkhenkeli was to stop the Turkish attack on Batum. . . . Later it became clear

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  41 that the Mensheviks were siding with Turks at the expense of Armenians.”64 But Chkhenkeli’s decision to accept the ultimatum was moot. Swietochowski correctly notes that on April 10, when Chkhenkeli accepted the Brest agreement, the Ottomans had already occupied all the territories they were demanding except for Batum.65 The Turkish command informed the commandant of Batum of a ceasefire immediately upon receiving Chkhenkeli’s message. Several days later, the Turks demanded that everyone clear the city and that the borders of 1877 should be restored. In Tiflis, events were moving in a somewhat different direction. As soon as the ultimatum about Batum was received, an extraordinary meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim was called. Evgeni Gegechkori, Irakli Tsereteli, Khachatur Karchikian, Yuli Semyonov, and others considered resistance to be very important and demanded in their statements that war be declared on Turkey. A call to war was echoed in the statements of the Armenian and Georgian representatives of the Seim. On April 13 (March 31), a joint meeting of the entire Muslim faction was held. There was no unity in their attitude toward war with Turkey. Members of the Hummet party changed their previous position and stated that they supported the Georgian Mensheviks on this issue. Although the Muslim Socialist bloc supported the idea of war, it did not express its opinion since the members wanted to act independently within the Seim.66 The Musavat party members, the Neutral group, and the Consolidation party members, whose opinions in this situation were similar, passed a joint resolution against the war. The resolution stated that war with Turkey would be disastrous for the democracy and internal life of the South Caucasus, and therefore the Musavat party, the Neutral group, and the Consolidation party would not take responsibility for it. Jafar Rustambeyov, a member of the Seim, was assigned to make a statement on this resolution. As it was noted, all the non-Muslim parties at the Seim meeting were in favor of war. Rustambeyov relayed the resolution of Musavat, the Neutral group, and the Consolidation party members and explained that events had put Muslim democracy in a unique situation, stating that “We cannot actively participate in this war and take this terrible responsibility upon ourselves.” He added, “First, because Muslims have not been subject to compulsory military service, and second, because of the religious ties between us and the Turks, the active participation of Muslims in military operations against Turkey is not possible.”67 Although the Armenians and Georgians brought up the age-old struggle between Shia Azerbaijanis and Sunni Turks over religious issues, this did not have an important impact. Events would prove that the leaders of the Azerbaijani factions took a correct stand on this question. War with Turkey, especially after the March events in Baku, could bring woeful consequences. As Firuz Kazemzadeh wrote, “the Azerbaijanis had no cause to fear the coming of the Turks.” On the contrary, with Turkish help they hoped to win Baku from the Soviets and to avenge the blood they had so recently shed in the city.68 The antiwar views of the Azerbaijani parties did not succeed in changing the standpoint of the Seim, which on April 13 passed a resolution on war with Turkey.

42  The Trabzon and Batum conferences Martial law was proclaimed in the city. A military board with extraordinary powers was created, and an appeal was issued to all the peoples of the South Caucasus to protect their “fatherland” by taking up weapons. Irakli Tsereteli and others stated, in an obvious allusion to Azerbaijanis, that “as long as there is no betrayal from the rear,” the Transcaucasian forces would be capable of resisting the Ottomans.69 Of course, there was no basis for such an assertion. Akaki Chkhenkeli, who was close to the front line and directly observed the situation there, could see very well that the Transcaucasian army was weak and falling apart and was not strong enough to resist an attack by Turkey. The situation in the South Caucasus became increasingly tense and this strengthened the pro-Russian tendency. Even during the meeting of the Seim, the Mensheviks demonstrated their loyalty to Russia and appealed to the Russian proletariat with a manifesto stating that “Transcaucasia rejected the Brest-Litovsk agreement because accepting it would mean separation from Russia.” Along with the Mensheviks, the Hummet party members signed an appeal to the Russian proletariat, and this caused serious conflicts among Muslim factions at a time when there were thousands of Muslims killed at the hands of Bolshevik-Armenian groups in Baku. It has been shown that the Hummet party members who aligned with the Bolsheviks were acting in the interest of the Georgian nation and against national interests, and there was no unity among Hummet party members on this issue of alignment. Some of them said, “In case there is no independence and the Bolsheviks come from the north, we will resist them and will move in support of Turkey; but if real democracy comes from the north, we will join them against Turkey.”70 In response to all these mixed views, Mammad Emin Rasulzade stated, “We are against the return of Transcaucasia in any form to Russia and we will fight against this with weapons in hand. We believe in our strength and in difficult times can ask for help from the southwest” [that is, from Turkey–J. H.].71 The passing of the declaration of war and the strengthening interest in Russia were also connected to other factors. Several days before the declaration of war was passed, a telegram was received from the central committee of the Black Sea naval forces, which gave notice that they had issued an order to send military vessels to protect Batum.72 On the eve of Batum’s occupation (on April 12), the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Russia sent a note to Germany signed by Georgy V. Chicherin and Lev Karakhan asking that pressure be exerted on Turkey to prevent it from attacking the South Caucasus. The note stated, “Russia had superiority on the Turkish front; it was obliged to give up Ardahan, Kars, and Batum because Germany was an ally of Turkey.”73 In the course of events, it became clear that this note was aimed at speeding up the spread of German influence on the South Caucasus. On April 27, Germany forced the Ottoman government to sign a secret agreement about the division of the South Caucasus into spheres of influence: Georgia and Armenia would fall into the sphere of influence of Berlin and Azerbaijan into the sphere of influence of Istanbul. 74 At the meeting of April 13, chairman of the Government and Military Minister Evgeni P. Gegechkori, Minister of Foreign Affairs Noe V. Ramishvili, and Minister of Finance Khachatur Karchikian were chosen for the military

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  43 board to rule during martial law and the activity of the Seim was frozen for a two-week period.75 Azerbaijan was not represented in the triumvirate. This was because the Azerbaijani faction was against the war and, more important, in order to isolate it from the events. The Azerbaijani faction could not remain neutral on these matters. On the same day, April 13, a meeting of the Muslim faction was called, where Jafar Rustambeyov described the decisions taken by the Seim. Under the current circumstances, it was very important for the Muslim faction to consider its responsibilities. Heybatgulu Mammadbeyov, who spoke at the meeting, stated that the government and the Seim were violating the rights of Muslims and, in such a case, it was not possible to work with the Armenians and Georgians. He suggested withdrawing from the Seim and joining with Chechen and Ingush representatives of the North Caucasus to consider the future.76 Mammad Yusif Jafarov advised deferring such a decision until the peace delegation had returned from Trabzon but also said that Muslims would not put up with all government power being concentrated in the hands of the military board at a time of tense national relations. Hasan Bey Aghayev suggested that the powers granted to the military board first needed to be specified and that, in the meantime, the Seim should continue functioning. After a series of speeches, the meeting adopted a decision to protest the suspension of the Seim’s activity and to insist that the powers given to the military board should be clearly specified and it must report to the government or the Muslim ministers would leave the government.77 The day after the war decree was accepted, Evgeni Gegechkori, in a secret telegram to Akaki Chkhenkeli, informed him that he must stop negotiations and leave Trabzon immediately.78 This news frustrated the Azerbaijani representatives in Trabzon. Mammad Hasan Hajinski considered the decision of the Transcaucasian Seim as a violation of the peace and called it a “a scandal unequaled in the history of international relations.” Angered by the situation, he stated that “he had a mandate from his party to go to Istanbul to take the final steps toward the conclusion of peace which is indispensable for us.”79 Chkhenkeli, who was not in favor of war, did not fully terminate the negotiations but informed the Turkish representatives in a proper manner that the delegation must leave for Tiflis that same day in order to get instructions from the South Caucasus government.80 Chkhenkeli thought that upon his return to Tiflis, he would be able to distance the government from the war venture. He was concerned that war would intensify national conflicts in the South Caucasus. In his view, “war will endanger not only the independence of Transcaucasia, but also its unity.” Chkhenkeli, who correctly evaluated the situation, “feared the war as much as he feared fire.”81 In order not to terminate negotiations, it was decided that several members of the delegation would stay in Trabzon. From Azerbaijan, Mammad Hasan Hajinski and Ahmad Pepinov; a presidium member of the Georgian National Council, Grigory Veshapeli; and North Caucasus representatives Heydar Bammatov and Tapa Chermoyev, who had traveled to Tiflis and from there to Trabzon for the purpose of joining the Transcaucasian union, all stayed in Trabzon.82 However,

44  The Trabzon and Batum conferences the delegation members did not gather again, and the Trabzon conference stopped functioning. The situation in the region became quite tense. Efforts by Chkhenkeli in the Georgian National Council to prevent the war did not bring about any results, as the capture of Batum by the Turks alarmed the Georgians and swayed them to support the war. Armenian representatives returning from Trabzon spoke about the negotiations at the meeting of the Armenian National Council in Alexandropol (Gyumri). Hovhannes Kachaznuni gave a long speech, pointing out that the Armenians did not have strength to fight and urging that the peace terms be accepted and the war ended. Kachaznuni hoped that by exerting pressure, it would be possible to get the Seim to reconsider its decision. However, his proposals met with hostile opposition from Armenian National Council members. The majority of the meeting participants voted for a continuation of the war. It was decided that members of the Council would go to various locations and conduct explanatory work for the purpose of mobilization; however, none of them did so. “Nobody was interested in the work of the Council; everyone was occupied with trade, evading the mobilization. . . . The Dashnaks themselves seized rich government reserves and were trading weapons.”83 The war between the South Caucasus government and Turkey lasted for only eight days. On April 15, news of the capture of Batum was officially announced in Istanbul. After forty years, Turkey had regained Batum, with the assistance of the Ajarian population. The battle over Kars lasted longer. When the Turks had occupied most of the intended territories, and did not want to take any more losses, they put forward a peace proposal on April 22. In a telegram sent to Akaki Chkhenkeli, Vehib Pasha blamed the South Caucasus for the termination of negotiations and informed him that the issue of peace depended on the South Caucasus.84 The Seim accepted the offer to start peace talks. In fact, the South Caucasus government was relieved by this offer, as it turned out that waging a war was more difficult than declaring it. Serious dissatisfaction had arisen among the members of the Muslim faction because of the war and among the members of the Georgian faction because of the apparent defeat. On April 20, there was an urgent joint meeting of representatives of all parties including the Azerbaijani faction of the Seim, with the exception of the Hummet party members. Issues such as the government’s indifference with regard to the events in Baku, the absence of serious measures against the terror and despotism of the Bolsheviks, the ties between the Dashnaks and the Bolsheviks in Baku, and the presence of the same inclination among the Georgian Mensheviks were discussed during the meeting. It was reported that “Commander Prince Magalov is sending extremely anxious telegrams every day, asking that armored bandoliers, guns, balls, machine-guns, and cartridges be sent, but the government attaches no importance to it and is taking no practical measures to send anything.”85 Nasib Bey Usubbeyov put forward an ultimatum to the government and the Mensheviks to achieve the independence of the South Caucasus. Khalil Khasmammadov correctly noted that at that time there was no government in Transcaucasia and that, instead, there was an Armenian and Georgian dictatorship of Gegechkori, Karchikian, and Ramishvili. Mammad Emin Rasulzade spoke with Seim member

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  45 Akaki Chkhenkeli, who supported a declaration of independence. After long discussions, they agreed that the representatives of the leading parties should be informed that the Muslim faction of the Seim was convinced that the South Caucasus should declare independence; otherwise, the faction would have to discuss the possibility of declaring the independence of Azerbaijan.86 The Seim met that same day, April 20—that is, two days before receiving the offer to start talks with Turkey. All the leading parties, except for the SocialistRevolutionaries and the Constitutional Democrats, were in favor of accepting all the Turkish demands and declaring independence. The decision taken at the meeting of the Azerbaijani faction was announced in the Seim. The Georgian faction was ready to accept the Turkish claims only on the condition of territorial integrity, including retention of the Batum port. Some of the Left SocialistRevolutionaries suggested holding negotiations with the Bolsheviks of Baku and the South Caucasus about fighting together against Turkey. The situation in the country and the defeat at the front soon eliminated any doubts for the Mensheviks, however. Several days later, the Mensheviks announced that it was not good for the country to continue the war and started supporting the idea of its immediate termination and a declaration of the independence of the South Caucasus. The Armenian faction, which had just returned from the Gyumri conference and passed a resolution to continue the war, was left in an isolated position. They remained silent during the discussions of the Brest agreement and the issue of independence.87 Finally, the declaration of the independence of the South Caucasus had become real. Representatives who had stayed in Trabzon were not passive during this time. Soon after the negotiations were terminated, Enver Pasha had visited Trabzon and Batum and was received by the representatives in Trabzon.88 Mammad Hasan Hajinski informed Enver Pasha that ending the hostility in Georgian–Turkish relations depended on resolution of the Batum problem. He made some attempts to retain Batum for the Georgians but without success. Noting that Turkey’s claim on Batum had been recognized by the Russian government, he stated that if the Georgians did not get carried away by Armenian politics and did not have a hostile attitude toward Turkey, Turkey would wish to see Georgia as an independent country and consider it a reliable neighbor. 89 The Azerbaijani representatives wanted to sound out the views of Enver Pasha on such issues as the political structure of the South Caucasus and the future bilateral relations of the fraternal Azerbaijani Turks and Ottoman Turks. Enver Pasha said that Akhalsikh and Akhalkelek, which were Muslim districts, should join Turkey, as they had long wished to do. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia could create a federation or a confederation with Turkey; they would continue having a common Seim and would exist in close union with Turkey. Enver Pasha also noted that, if it proved impossible to create a common Transcaucasian state, an independent Azerbaijan bordering Turkey could enter into a closer union with the Ottoman Empire, as close as the union of Austria and Hungary. He added that Turkey had already decided to take serious steps in the direction of providing aid to Azerbaijan. Hajinski relayed to the Muslim faction the news that Nuri Pasha,

46  The Trabzon and Batum conferences brother of Enver Pasha and Military Minister of the Ottoman Empire, would soon arrive in Azerbaijan, by way of Iran, with 300 military instructors, and that they were probably on the way from Tabriz to Araz at the time.90 However, the discussions of the Muslim faction of the Seim on this issue showed that Azerbaijani political leaders favored creating an independent Azerbaijani state with close relations to the Ottoman Empire, and were far from the idea of turning Azerbaijan into the Hungary of Turkey. During the negotiations, Hajinski inquired what position Turkey would take in the case that Armenia created an independent state. In answer to this question, Enver Pasha noted that “if the Armenian nation did not get swayed by the policies of the English and the Russians and would put an end to provocative actions, Turkey was not opposed to the creation of an independent Armenian state.”91 In his report to the Seim faction on the negotiations, Hajinski noted that the head of the Turkish delegation to the Trabzon negotiations, Rauf Bey, and the commander of Caucasian front, Vehib Pasha, who was very familiar with the events, had different opinions from that of Enver Pasha; they were proponents of intervening in the internal affairs of the South Caucasus for the purpose of establishing peace in the region. Azerbaijani representatives, who found themselves distanced from the events and, most of all, from the government at a time of rule by the military board and continuing warfare, conducted negotiations with a German representative in the region regarding the situation in the South Caucasus. Seim members Fatali Khan Khoyski and Khalil Bey Khasmammadov met with G. Schreider, former consul of Germany in Iran and a professor at Tiflis University, who pursued the political interests of Germany in the east and was close to German political circles. The main topics discussed were the political aspects of building the South Caucasus and its alignment. When touching upon the issue of orientation toward Central European countries, he pointed out that Azerbaijan favored the GermanTurkish bloc and that Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria did not play an important role in the relationships with the South Caucasus, and he noted, “In the issue of orientation, the opinion of South Caucasian Turks is clear and concise—this is a German-Turkish orientation. Our beliefs are firm and even in the case that any of our neighbors do not agree, they will not change, and this may even lead to the secession of Azerbaijan.”92 In answer to the question about the possibility of inviting a foreign power to the country for the purpose of restoring order in the event of anarchy, Schreider stated that if this foreign power was the Turkish army, this would be possible. Schreider acknowledged that events taking place in the world hinged on the struggle between Germany and England and that Germany would not allow Russia to return to Transcaucasia or allow England to strengthen its influence there. He even suggested that representatives of the South Caucasian Turks come with him to Berlin to hold negotiations directly with Germany. However, Azerbaijani representatives did not think it necessary to contact Germany without Turkey being aware of it.93 Members of the delegation who stayed in Trabzon, especially Mammad Hasan Hajinski, played an important role in the preparation of a new peace proposal. On

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  47 the eve of the meeting of the Seim, the Muslim faction got together and resolved to back Akaki Chkhenkeli, who supported the announcement of independence and holding negotiations. It was also noted during the discussions that the Menshevik leaders did not have a firm stand, as they were often changing their opinion. Fatali Khan Khoyski observed that Irakli Tsereteli would say something in the morning and then change his mind in the afternoon, while another representative of the Mensheviks, Noe Ramishvili, would affirm something in the evening but, by morning of the next day, he would act differently.94 It was decided that on two issues it was necessary to stand firm: to protect the steps taken by the peace delegation and to protect control over the determination of borders.95 It was agreed that in the case one of these two points was lacking, they would put forth their own proposal. Finally, on April 22, as soon as the offer by Turkey was received, a historic meeting of the Seim was called, chaired by Nikolai Chkheidze. Three important issues were on the agenda of the meeting: (1) the independence of the South Caucasus; (2) the report by Akaki Chkhenkeli about the Trabzon negotiations; and (3) the formation of a government. The Menshevik David Oniashvili gave a speech on the first issue, in which he stated that in the present situation, the orientation toward Russia was a reactionary orientation. Reaction and anarchy in Russia, which put the work of socialism in danger, were causing the South Caucasus to search for a new direction. He stated that it had become necessary to separate from Russia. Bolshevism in Russia had lost its content as an idea and had turned into a reactionary movement, and this was a danger for the work of socialism not only in Russia but all over the world. Oniashvili stated that the declaration of an independent South Caucasian federal republic had become a political necessity.96 Mammad Emin Rasulzade was the first to support Oniashvili’s speech and spoke brilliantly. This was not surprising, as independence was being announced at the request of the Musavat party and the Muslim faction of the Seim. Rasulzade argued that the South Caucasus must not be sacrificed to Russia, which promised them only reaction instead of the achievements of the Great Russian revolution. The South Caucasus had to be independent. This had become a necessity. If they wanted the newborn child of the South Caucasus to survive, they first had to accept its independence as a conscious choice and not the result of fear, so that independence would draw the nations of the South Caucasus closer together. Rasulzade noted that the South Caucasian nations were languishing under the burden of despotism, fighting together against it, and sharing the same aspirations and ideals. They had hoped for a democratic Russia in the place of despotic Russia, a Russia that would be free for all nations without discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs, where those nations could feel equal and not be discriminated against by their “stepmother.”97 Grigol Georgadze, Mikayel Tumanian (Tumanov), Hovhannes Kachaznuni, and others gave addresses about the declaration of independence at the Seim meeting. It became known that all the Seim factions supported the declaration of independence. After a long period of hesitation, late at night on April 22, 1918, the Seim proclaimed the Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Federative Republic by a majority vote.98 It was decided that a commission would be established that

48  The Trabzon and Batum conferences would prepare a constitution for the newly formed republic. The proclamation of independence was an important victory, primarily by the Azerbaijani faction and the Musavat party.99 Tadeusz Swietochowski concluded that, once the Georgians decided to support the idea of independence, in agreement with the Azerbaijanis, the Armenians were forced to go along.100 The proclamation of the South Caucasus as an independent republic was an important step on the way to becoming a subject of international relations. The declaration of independence completed the process of the political, military, and diplomatic separation of the South Caucasus from Russia and was an important event on the way to the announcement of independence by the Azerbaijanis and the other South Caucasian nations. But on April 25, the Bolsheviks took the government of Baku into their own hands, so a significant part of Azerbaijani territory was left outside the control of the Transcaucasian federation. 101 At the April 22 meeting of the Seim, Akaki Chkhenkeli gave a speech, and the government directed to continue peace talks in order to sign a peace treaty. During the Seim meeting, Socialist-Revolutionary Ivan Lordkipanidze suggested conducting negotiations not only with Turkey but with its allies in order to obtain an international guarantee of independence. On April 23, the day after the meeting, Akaki Chkhenkeli informed Vehib Pasha that the Transcaucasian republic, which had proclaimed its independence, accepted all of Turkey’s claims and was ready to continue negotiations on the basis of the Brest agreement. He requested that the negotiations be continued in Batum. Chkhenkeli ordered an immediate ceasefire on the Batum and Kars fronts and that the cities should be cleared of troops immediately. On April 26, the Seim ratified the structure of the independent Transcaucasian government and listened to the declaration of the government. The structure of the new government gave Azerbaijanis an important role in the governance of the South Caucasus. In the cabinet formed by Akaki Chkhenkeli, who was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Fatali Khan Khoyski occupied the position of Minister of Justice; Nasib Bey Usubbeyov Minister of Public Education; Khudadat Malik-Aslanov Minister of Roads; Mammad Hasan Hajinski Minister of Trade and Industry; and Ibrahim Heydarov the State Supervisor.102 Akaki Chkhenkeli presented the government structure at the request of Nikolai Chkheidze, chairman of the Seim. The important role of Azerbaijanis in the South Caucasian government was a reflection of the fact that their faction’s statements on certain crucial issues coincided with Chkhenkeli’s own views, as well as of the important role that Azerbaijani political figures had played in the proclamation of the independence of the South Caucasus. The newspaper Borba, the organ of the Menshevik Central Committee, wrote about the new government cabinet: “The resignation of the cabinet of Gegechkori and the new cabinet headed by Chkhenkeli were important victories for the Musavat party.”103 After presenting his cabinet, Chkhenkeli made a statement on the main duties of the government, namely, the preparation of a constitution, determination of the borders of the republic, an armistice, the struggle against anarchy and counterrevolution, and land reform.104 The chairman of the Azerbaijani faction, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, proposed that two vital

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  49 problems should be added to the program of the prime minister: the liberation of Baku from the rule of the foreign agents, who called themselves the extraordinary commissars of Transcaucasia, and the establishment of relations with Dagestan, which wished to join the Transcaucasian federation.105 On April 28, the newly formed Transcaucasian Independent Democratic Federal Republic was recognized by the Ottoman Empire. Even before the start of negotiations, Chkhenkeli’s order to surrender Kars incensed the Armenian military units. The issue presented the new cabinet with its first crisis. When the return of Kars to Turkey was announced, the Armenian faction started to leave the room and directed representatives to leave the government. Noe Jordania, who did not much sympathize with Chkhekeli, saved the government from this crisis. He told the Armenians that they would “destroy the Transcaucasian federation by their actions.”106 After this, the Armenians returned to their seats. Of course, fear of isolation played a certain role as well. General Nazarbegov (Tovmas Nazarbekian), who was heading the defense of Kars, informed Dashnak leader Kachaznuni that it was impossible to defend Kars due to a shortage of troops. The Armenians had already started retreating from Erzurum. While cursing Armenian leaders for the shameful defeat, Andranik (Ozanian), leader of the gangs of looters that committed bloody crimes in the eastern provinces of Turkey, acknowledged that Armenian soldiers did not want to go to the front.107 The “defenders” of Kars and the armed Armenians leaving the city were taking revenge by committing acts of terror and violence against the local population on their way. At a meeting of the Muslim faction, Seim member Ali Khan Kantemirov provided extensive information about the Kars events and the atrocities committed there by armed Armenian troops. From Kars, the wave of violence moved to Erivan province.108 Within a short period of time, 82 Muslim villages were burned in Kars province and 211 villages in Erivan province. The population was either killed or driven from their native lands.109 The number of refugees from Erivan province exceeded 80,000.110 Atrocities committed by Armenians in Kars province were described not only by Armenians but by the Greeks who deserted Kars: Armed Armenian refugees retreating from the Turkish army wiped Muslim villages off the face of earth, laid everything to waste with fire and sword, and committed acts of savagery and calamities beyond the imagination. The ‘victorious’ Armenian army, to display its military trophies, stuck infant children on the end of their bayonets and lined the roads with naked Muslim women. A man had to have a heart of stone to be able to listen to the moaning of women and children, who were going out of their minds from these hellish tortures, and to the hopeless wailing of the elderly. A string of 82 villages was subjected to unimaginable disaster.111 According to this document, the atrocities committed by the troops of General Areshov and Captain Mosesian in Kars province were reminiscent of the tragedy

50  The Trabzon and Batum conferences of early 1915. Now the whole of Kars province resembled a giant cemetery, with every tombstone providing eternal testimony of atrocities, brutalities, and the immorality of Armenian barbarians who had lost their humanity. The atrocities committed in Kars and Erivan provinces were discussed twice during the meetings of the Muslim faction of the Seim. It was clear that the Armenian army was deliberately cleansing Muslims from Erivan province with the goal of Armenian autonomy. The decision was made to conduct talks with the newly formed government of Akaki Chkhenkeli about the danger to the lives of the Muslim population in Erivan province and to make the following demands of the Seim: • • • • •

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be charged with sending a special commission to help the Muslims; all Muslim refugees must be returned to their lands; the Ministry of Food must be ordered to deliver immediate assistance; Armenian military units that commit violence must be discharged; and the number and conditions of Muslim refugees must be determined, and additional help must be rendered to them.

As a result of intensive efforts by the Azerbaijani faction, the Transcaucasian government created a commission to investigate this issue and, as a start, allocated 1 million manats to cover the basic needs of the refugees.112 The Turkish government agreed to hold peace talks in Batum and, taking into consideration the particular importance of these talks, sent a more authoritative delegation to Batum, headed by Halil Bey (Menteshe) and escorted by the commander of the Caucasus front, Vehib Pasha. The Minister of Navigation, Jamal Pasha, also came to Batum to participate in the opening of the peace conference. The Transcaucasian delegation participating in the peace conference consisted of forty-five persons.113 The large number was an indication of the complexity of the political situation in the South Caucasus. Every national faction in the Seim and every political party within each faction wanted to be represented in the delegation. This resulted not so much from a desire to see Batum or participate in the conference but from a lack of trust between the parties. Notwithstanding the large number of representatives, the delegation included six key members. These were Mammad Emin Rasuzlade and Mammad Hasan Hajinski on the part of Azerbaijan, Akaki Chkhenkeli and Niko Nikoladze on the part of Georgia, and Hovhannes Kachaznuni and Alexander Khatisian on the part of Armenia.114 The difference of the Batum conference from the Trabzon conference was in the great respect shown for it. Representatives of the Union of the Peoples of the North Caucasus were participating in the Batum conference in accordance with the desires of Germany and Turkey. The German representation was led by General Otto von Lossow, representative of the Imperial High Command to the Turkish government. On the eve of the Batum conference, the desire of Germans and Georgians to draw closer strengthened. The Georgians secretly sent a delegation to Berlin and informed Germany that they wanted to be under its patronage.115

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  51 This offer created the perfect conditions for Germany to spread its influence in the South Caucasus. The former German Consul in Tiflis, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, and a Middle East expert and junior diplomat, Otto von Wesendonck, were part of the delegation.116 The participation of the German delegation in the conference gave it particular importance. In addition to this, the representatives of the Union of the Peoples of the North Caucasus, including Heydar Bammatov, Tapa Chermoyev, Zubayir Temirkhanov, and Seim member Ali Khan Kantemirov, came to Batum. Incidentally, after they unofficially took part in the Trabzon conference, they went on to Istanbul with Rauf Bey and there informed Turkey and the Central powers about their proclamation of an independent republic.117 Turkey and Germany readily agreed to the participation of the Mountain Republic in the conference, although Soviet Russia objected. The Batum conference commenced on May 11 and had just one meeting. Halil Bey gave an opening speech on behalf of the Turkish delegation and explained the demands of Turkey. In brief, the main point of his speech was that, as blood had been shed between the two countries after the Brest-Litovsk agreement, the conditions of the agreement could not be considered a basis for the present negotiations. A draft of an agreement “about peace and friendship between the Ottoman empire and the South Caucasian confederated republic” was presented to the Transcaucasian delegation for discussion. In this draft, Turkey demanded new territories in compensation for sacrifices made on the battlefields. The new territories claimed by Turkey included the Akhalsikh and Akhalkelek regions of Tiflis province, parts of Gumru and Echmiedzin, and the Kars-AlexandropolJulfa railroad. Until the war ended, Turkey would have the right to use the south Caucasian railroad network to carry out military operations against the British.118 Akaki Chkhenkeli opposed the new territorial claims and insisted that the negotiations be based on the Brest agreement. The Turkish proposal infringed upon Georgian and Armenian interests. Azerbaijan, however, was not losing anything with this draft. On the contrary, the indifferent attitude of the South Caucasian government with regard to the Baku Soviet and the atrocities committed against the Muslim population of Erivan province increased the inclination of the Azerbaijani delegation toward Turkey. 119 The proclamation of independence did not change the internal and foreign policy of the South Caucasus. The Seim had no program to pull Transcaucasia out of crisis. Conflicts between the parties did not diminish but, on the contrary, deepened. National tensions became inescapable problems. The Turkic population of not only Erivan province but of Baku and Elizavetpol provinces was being terrorized. The latest reports showed that terrible anarchy reigned throughout the South Caucasus. One village was attacking the other one, a civil war was getting under way, and everywhere people were being robbed and killed. Anarchy was engulfing the whole of the South Caucasus.120 While Vehib Pasha was liberating Kars, he spoke of sending the Turkish army to cleanse Baku of the foreigners and save the Muslims.121 In May, the situation had deteriorated so much that representatives from different parts of Azerbaijan wanted to go to Batum and ask Turkey for help. On May 13, a joint meeting of representatives from the districts

52  The Trabzon and Batum conferences of Elizavetpol province and the Muslim faction of the Seim decided that there was no need for them to go to Batum one by one, as Seim members Mammad Emin Rasulzade and Mammad Hasan Hajinski were already there. However, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Nasib Usubbeyov, and Khalil Bey Khasmammadov would be sent on an official visit to Batum and to Istanbul to press the appeal for help from Turkey.122 Also at this time, Muslim representatives from Georgian territories with Turkic inhabitants and from the North Caucasus appealed to the Ottoman Empire with a desire to unite with Turkey. Von Lossow, the German representative at the Batum conference, wrote, “The nimbus of Turkey among the uneducated Muslim masses is rising every day since the fall of Batum and Kars, which Turkish propaganda depicts as great vicories.”123 All of this had a positive impact on Turkey’s position at the Batum conference. After considering the draft presented by Turkey, the Transcaucasian representatives presented Halil Bey with the following four proposals: • • • •

the agreement must be signed not between Turkey and the South Caucasus but between the Quadruple Alliance and the South Caucasus; all agreements related to the war must be the object of a special convention; building of economic relations between Turkey and the South Caucasus must be confirmed by bilateral agreements; and the nonparticipation of Austrian and Bulgarian representatives would not hinder the signing of an agreement—they could join at a later stage.124

These proposals were a diplomatic maneuver to involve Germany, and there was a contradiction between the first and the fourth items. Halil Bey raised objections to the proposal and informed Akaki Chkhenkeli that the Turks would not agree to stipulations about countries signing or not signing the agreement, as this was the internal business of their alliance.125 On May 14, Halil Bey presented a note to the Transcaucasian delegation requesting permission for Turkish troops to stop the British army from moving in the direction of Baku, south of the Caspian Sea. It said that all front commanders were ordered not to trouble the local population as long as no weapons were used against the army on the territory of the South Caucasus.126 In turn, Azerbaijani representatives demanded consent for the Turkish army to enter the territory of Transcaucasia in order to prevent the Baku Soviet from advancing in the direction of Ganja. Turkey was aware of the intentions of Germany to advance from the territory of Azerbaijan into Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India for the purpose of striking the positions of enemy countries there.127 As the tense situation in the South Caucasus had different impacts on the interests of the parties, the divergence of opinion among the delegations in Batum was widening. Turkey’s interest in the eastern Caucasus was not only in opposition to the British but in opposition to the plans of Germany. If the German representative in Batum, von Lossow, was quietly following the negotiations and sometimes acting as a mediator among the parties, Baron Kress von Kressenstein, who came to Tiflis after defeat in Palestine, was far from a friendly ally in his relation to

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  53 the Turks. Within Georgian governmental circles, he was trying to find ways to foil the Turks’ designs on Baku. Meanwhile, the Georgians considered this mediator to be their only rescue.128 Thus, yesterday’s allies turned into today’s competitors with respect to the Caucasus. The only missing factor was that the Germans, who added Ukraine and the northern shores of the Black Sea to their sphere of influence, did not have a military force in the South Caucasus. Kress von Kressenstein thought that if Georgian military units could be fielded under the German flag, it would put the Turks in a difficult position. For this, von Kressenstein was ready to mobilize even ordinary members of the diplomatic mission and anyone from military captives to residents of Helenendorf (Goygol) who had German nationality.129 Germany may have been the ally of the Ottoman government, but it wanted by any means to block Enver Pasha’s ambitions in the East.130 The Armenians, too, aspired to German protection, but the Germans were not interested in protecting Armenians; what they wanted was Baku. Baku oil had become essential to the Germans, and they knew very well that if the city fell into the hands of either the British or the Turks, the Germans would not get the oil.131 General Erich Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs of the war of 1914–1918: “We could expect to get oil from Baku only if we took it ourselves.”132 The conflicts that arose during the Batum negotiations reinforced the inclination of the Azerbaijani representatives toward Turkey and that of the Georgian and Armenian representatives toward Germany. This is why, starting from the middle of May, Azerbaijani representatives began establishing secret relations with Turkey, while the Armenians and Georgians did the same with Germany. The Armenians and Georgians were well aware of the tensions between Germany and Turkey. In order to draw Germany’s attention to the movement of the Turkish army, on May 15 Akaki Chkhenkeli sent a note of protest, not only to Turkey but to its three allies.133 Von Lossow and the other German representatives, who were attending the negotiations as observers, became active from the middle of May, and a number of their suggestions met with approval from the Armenian and Georgian delegates. The Germans defended Turkey’s demand to be able to transport military troops on the South Caucasian railroad but argued that control over the railroad should be given to a joint commission consisting of German, Turkish, and Transcaucasian representatives and not solely to the Turks. The Germans also suggested that the agreement based on the Brest treaty should be signed in Batum and other agreements signed in Istanbul with the participation of representatives of the Quadruple Alliance.134 The Turks accepted neither of these proposals, and the Germans, in order not to strain relations with the Turks, did not insist and offered to mediate a further course of negotiations. Discussion of the letter from von Lossow on the issue of mediation demonstrated the divergence of opinions among representatives of the South Caucasus. The Azerbaijanis thought that this could only be possible if Turkey and Germany came to an agreement on the issue; hence, they objected to the idea of German mediation. In the course of discussions, however, it became clear that the issue of mediation had been agreed upon between the Germans and the Georgians beforehand. At the initiative of the Georgians, Seim member Bernstein had to acquaint von Lossow with the situation

54  The Trabzon and Batum conferences in the South Caucasus and, for this purpose, an ethnographic map of the region was presented to von Lossow.135 Despite the objections of Azerbaijani representatives, the Transcaucasian delegation decided to use the Germans as mediators. However, Halil Bey, who learned of this decision from the Azerbaijanis, protested against German mediation. Even when the Germans stated that this protest would cause a rupture in GermanTurkish relations, it was to no avail. The Turks well knew that Germany was in no position to break relations with Turkey. Therefore, von Lossow retreated under Turkish opposition, hoping that a more favorable opportunity for “mediation” would occur in the future. As Mir Yagub Mehdiyev summed up the position of Azerbaijanis at the Batum negotiations: Germany needed Azerbaijani oil and Turkish cotton and was searching for a way to secure access to them. The Muslim peoples of the Caucasus favored the Turks over the Germans; they were afraid of Germans colonizing them. Thus, the Muslim representatives in Batum regarded the Germans coldly and placed great trust and hope in the Turks.136 A German plan to engage Russia in the Batum negotiations was unsuccessful. Quietly, the Germans were negotiating with the Russian government to get Baku oil. During the latter half of May, the German ambassador to Moscow, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, attempted to draw Soviet Russia to the Batum conference, asserting that this would not mean recognizing the Transcaucasian government.137 Russia gave an equivocal response, saying that it needed to be involved in the Batum negotiations but that Russia anticipated that a national movement would rise up against the Transcaucasian government and that the Soviet government would not accept any documents signed by a government that Russia did not recognize.138 The fact that Russia refused to recognize the Transcaucasian government strengthened the South Caucasus representatives’ opposition to inviting Russia to the negotiations. In the end, although it was initially agreed to hold a meeting in Kiev between German representatives to the South Caucasus and Russia, that meeting did not take place.139 Russia’s position was related to the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in Baku. The creation of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars on April 25 and the establishment of the Baku Commune marked a successful end to the struggle of the Bolsheviks since March to seize power. When the Transcaucasian Seim discussed the subject of relations with the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars, the Muslim faction announced that unless the government took action to liberate Baku from the Bolsheviks, they would leave the Seim. Forced to act, the Seim sent a weak military detachment of Azerbaijanis and Georgians to Baku, but this action was unsuccessful. The Baku Soviet, which aimed to spread its rule over the Baku region by the end of April, continued its policy of slaughtering the Muslim population in the districts. The Transcaucasian Seim could not prevent this violence, for the Seim did not have a regular army. “The only course for Azerbaijan was to ask the Ottoman army for help.”140

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  55 After learning about the events taking place in Baku, the German ambassador in Istanbul, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, noted that the events in Baku “were more an Armenian movement than Bolshevik politics.”141 The Armenian faction did not vote when the Seim was deliberating its relationship toward the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars; instead it announced neutrality on this issue. This was certainly due not to the Dashnaks’ support for the revolution but to the fact that the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars was headed by Stepan Shaumian and Armenians occupied key positions, which served their interests. However, the leader of the Dashnaks, who felt that the sentiment in favor of asking Turkey for help was growing because the Seim was powerless in this situation, offered the Muslim representatives his willingness to change his “neutral” attitude toward the Baku Soviet under certain conditions. What was proposed was a trade. If the Azerbaijanis guaranteed the participation of the Dashnaks in the future governance of Baku and allowed Armenian armed forces to be quartered in Baku, then the Dashnaks would agree to move against the Baku Soviet. The Muslim faction flatly refused to accept this deal. Seim member F. K. Khoyski stated in his extraordinary declaration to a joint meeting of the Muslim faction of the Seim, Responsible Dashnaktsutsyun party representatives in the Armenian faction of the Seim have stated that they would undertake an obligation to abolish the Baku Soviet under the condition that the government in Baku would not be formed from Muslims alone, but as an international government, and that Armenian armed forces would be kept in Baku. Khoyski stated that he did not reject this proposal out of hand for practical reasons. Seim member Nasib Usubbeyov said that the Dashnaks’ insincere proposal was attributable not to a desire to live as friendly neighbors but to the fact that the Turkish army was approaching Azerbaijan. Seim member Khalil Khasmammadov stated that the government in Baku must be indivisible, that the government in Baku and eastern Transcaucasia in general should belong to Muslims, and that even if they temporarily lost Baku, they should do everything to recover it in full and forever. There was no other way: It was all or nothing. A decision consisting of two articles was accepted at the meeting: (1) Governance of Baku must be given to Muslims and (2) Muslim military units must enter Baku to protect this government while Armenian military units must be disarmed and removed from the city.142 Obviously, however, Azerbaijan, being part of the Seim, faced serious difficulties in implementing these decisions. Only a foreign power could block Soviet Russia, in the guise of the Baku Soviet, from controlling the whole of Azerbaijan. At a meeting of the Muslim faction of the Seim, held at the end of May, Nasib Usubbeyov noted that, On our own, we cannot eliminate the terrible anarchy which has enveloped not only Azerbaijan, but the whole of South Caucasus. In the East, the Bolsheviks have joined with our century-long enemy and their attack has

56  The Trabzon and Batum conferences worsened everything and brought disasters and calamities to the Turkic people. In view of this situation, we do not have any other choice than to ask a foreign power to intervene. While I am a strong proponent of our independence, I have to consult on this issue first of all. Looking into the face of catastrophe, we have to be sure that the foreign power that will intervene is Turkey, our friend and brother. Perhaps our neighbors will not like this. However, we have no alternative. They are powerless in the face of the terrible anarchy, just as we are…. We cannot stay in a sick bed just for somebody else’s sake. The time has come for our delegation to go to Batum and, on behalf of eastern Transcaucasia, ask the Ottoman state for help.… With this, the independent governance of Azerbaijan will never be forgotten.143 It was the violence that the Baku Soviet committed against the Muslim population, the policy of ethnic massacres carried out in the name of “civil war,” and the murder of people based on their nationality that totally destroyed any trust among the population in the Soviet idea. News of the events in Azerbaijan in March and April had reached Turkey. The head of the Turkish delegation to the Batum conference, Halil Bey, stated in his memorandum, presented on May 26, 1918, to the head of Caucasian delegation: As it is known to his Excellency, the situation in the Caucasus is critical and confused, and it requires resolution. Thousands of Turkic and Muslim people in Baku and its surroundings are moaning in the bloody clutches of crude bandits, who call themselves revolutionaries. This disaster, for which there is no hope of a settlement and which is threatening the poor people, is growing from day to day. The situation of the Muslim and Turkic populations of other regions of the Caucasus is not good either, as they are subject to aggression by innumerable brigand groups. Your Excellency, please take into consideration that any government that deserves to carry the name would not allow such crimes committed in neighboring territories to go unpunished; please also consider that the position of the Ottoman empire is not good in the face of the anarchy that is destroying the Caucasus. That is because the anarchy disturbs the law and order of the population, which is of the same race and religion as the population of the Ottoman empire. At the same time, as a requirement of the common front, the Ottoman empire is constrained to sending its army to other fronts through the Caucasus. And this requires putting an end to the current situation.144 Starting from the middle of May, not only the Azerbaijani faction but the Georgian faction decided that a foreign power must intervene. The Menshevik newspaper Ertoba wrote, “Anarchy is destroying us. The Bolsheviks are continually organizing rebellions against us here and there. Therefore, our nation will quickly come to an agreement with a foreign sovereign if that foreign power restores order to the country.”145

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  57 On May 14, the Georgian faction held a secret meeting where it was decided that General von Lossow should appeal to the German government asking for the guardianship of Georgia. In fact, during this meeting, the Georgian representatives who had gone to Berlin received the agreement of the German government to bring Georgia under its protection.146 The Georgian National Council therefore needed to make this agreement official. It decided the following: 1 2 3 4

to inform the head of the German peace delegation, General von Lossow, that the Georgian National Council wishes for Germany to protect Georgia in political and international issues; to ask General von Lossow to ensure that the German army continues moving from the North Caucasus to the Turkish borders and to sign an agreement with them to protect Georgia from foreign threat; to ask General von Lossow to organize the return of Georgian captives in Germany; and to ask General von Lossow to order German military captives and officers in Georgia to stay there and organize themselves into military units so that the Georgian government can use these units in the struggle against anarchy and restoration of internal law and order.147

A commission was created, headed by Menshevik leader Noe Jordania, to conduct secret negotiations with General von Lossow. Clearly, the Georgians had already begun moving toward separation by sending Georgian representatives to Berlin on the eve of the Batum conference and by the actions of the Georgian National Council 3 days after the opening of the conference. This was a time when Georgia was still part of the Transcaucasian federation and had not yet announced its independence. General von Lossow informed them that Germany would undertake guardianship of Georgia on the condition that Georgia would leave the Transcaucasian federation and announce its independence. In the course of negotiations, Germany obtained the right to use the Georgian portion of the South Caucasian railroad and the natural resources of Georgia. In return, Germany pledged to ensure that the independence of Georgia would be recognized by Soviet Russia.148 Of the three delegations that came to the Batum conference, the Armenians were in the most difficult position. The bargain made between the Georgians and the Germans worried them. Hovhannes Kachaznuni, who found out about the agreement between Georgia and Germany in a meeting with Noe Jordania, told him, “So, Noe Nikolaevich, you betrayed us.” To this Jordania gave a short answer: “We are saving ourselves.”149 On May 22, the Georgian representation had come to a final decision on declaring independence. In a telegram sent to the president of the Georgian National Council, Akaki Chkhenkeli wrote, A delay in announcing independence could bring unexpected results. The Germans did not attempt to become mediators. We are left with only one option—to present an independent Georgia, protected by Germany,

58  The Trabzon and Batum conferences against the Turkish intervention. Count Schulenburg would be the German representative to the Georgian government. He is ready to sign a certain temporary agreement between Georgia and Germany.150 According to a secret agreement signed on May 25, which was not yet announced, Germany was, as a first step, to send 5,000 and then 112,000 soldiers to Georgia.151 On May 25, General von Lossow, in his last letter to the South Caucasus representatives, stated that, according to the information he had, the Transcaucasian federation was about to fall apart. Pointing out that he had authority to conduct negotiations only with the Transcaucasian federation, in the present situation, he had to leave for Berlin to obtain instructions from his government. Thus, the departure of von Lossow from Batum sped up the crisis. Noe Jordania, who returned to Tiflis from Batum on May 25, reported to the Menshevik conference about the course of peace negotiations and raised the issue of Georgia leaving the Transcaucasian federation and announcing its independence. The Georgians had already realized this idea during the secret negotiations with von Lossow. 152 Azerbaijani representatives in Batum, who wanted to preserve at least a partial federation, made a suggestion to the Georgians to create a state with them, without the Armenians. However, the Georgians informed them that they wanted to create a separate state of their own. On the day the Azerbaijani faction learned this news, it held two meetings—one in the morning and one in the evening. In the morning meeting, it was reported that, according to trusted sources, the Georgian faction, together with Georgian representatives in Batum, was holding secret negotiations about Georgia seceding and declaring its independence. It was decided that because the issue was all but decided, the Muslim faction of the Seim had to be prepared for this. The faction decided during the meeting that, if Georgia separated and announced its independence, then Azerbaijan must announce its independence as well. 153 During the evening meeting, the duties of the Azerbaijani faction in the event of Georgia’s secession were discussed. The meeting was chaired by Fatali Khan Khoyski, and sixteen Seim members were present. As soon as the meeting was opened, Khoyski was assigned to visit the chairman of the Transcaucasian Seim, Nikolai Chkheidze, learn the agenda of the meeting scheduled for the next day, and establish direct contact with Azerbaijani representatives in Batum. After the departure of Khoyski, Khalil Khasmammadov temporarily chaired the meeting and reported on the situation in the country. He noted that there was no real unity in the Transcaucasian government, that no assistance was being rendered to the Azerbaijani Turks, and that the Mensheviks were not taking any effective measures against the Bolsheviks who were moving toward Kurdemir.154 Soon Khoyski returned with the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks, the chairman of the Transcaucasian Seim, Nikolai Chkheidze, and Seim members Irakli Tsereteli and Evgeni Gegechkori. Tsereteli told the meeting of the Azerbaijani faction that the Georgian faction of the Seim felt that it had become impossible to unite the Caucasian nations under the slogan of independence and

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  59 that breakup of the South Caucasus was inevitable. The absence of unity had become especially clear in the course of negotiations with Turkey, which was why they were now compelled to declare the independence of Georgia. Chkheidze stated that he regretted that the nations of the South Caucasus were separating. Khoyski responded to them on behalf of the Azerbaijani faction. In his opinion, the nations of the South Caucasus were tied closely together because of their interests, and their separation was not so easy. However, if this was the will of the Georgian nation, they were in no position to hinder it, and in consideration of this new situation, the Azerbaijani Turks had no other choice than to make an appropriate decision. Khoyski also reported on a conversation with Seim member Kristefore Karchikian, who had said that if the Georgians separated, the Armenians would also declare independence. After fully discussing the situation, the Muslim faction of the Seim reached a decision that, “if Georgia announced its independence, then Azerbaijan would do the same.”155 *** All in all, Azerbaijani diplomacy went through a difficult and conflictual period in the spring of 1918 on the path to the declaration of independence. It was the breakup of the Transcaucasian Seim, strangled by the political crisis, that prompted Azerbaijan to announce its independence.

Notes 1. C. Аркомед (S. Arkomed), Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России (Materials on the History of Secession of Transcaucasia from Russia). Tiflis, 1923, p. 31. 2. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии (Documents and Materials on Foreign Policy of the Caucasus and Georgia). Tiflis, 1919, pp. 98–106. 3. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, pp. 31–32. 4. Report of the delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim on the course of the peace negotiations with Turkey. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, pp. 1–2. 5. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 85. 6. Ю.Ключников и А. Сабанин (Y. Klyuchnikov and A. Sabanin), Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях (International politics of the newest time in the agreements, notes and declarations). Moscow, 1926, pp. 123–127. 7. Richard Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia. Berkeley–Los Ángeles–London, 1971, p. 20. 8. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 92. 9. See Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993, pp. 123–124; Richard Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley, 1967, pp. 97–100. 10. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, p. 21. 11. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 85. 12. А. Б. Кадишев (A. B. Kadishev), Интервенция и гражданская война в Закавказье (Intervention and Civil War in the Caucasus). Moscow, 1960, p. 46. 13. Settlement of the Population in the Provinces of Erivan. 01.01.1916. SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, v. 42, p. 34.

60  The Trabzon and Batum conferences 14. B. Shahtakhtinski to V. Lenin “On the Disputed Territories in the Caucasus Republics.” 01.03.1921. RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 1, v. 2796, p. 4. 15. Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AFPRF), f. 4, r. 39, f. 232, v. 53001, p. 79. 16. W. E. D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953, p. 463. 17. Report of the Delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim on the Course of the Peace Negotiations with Turkey. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, p. 2. 18. Ibid., p. 3. 19. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 95. 20. Report of the Delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim on the Course of the Peace Negotiations with Turkey. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, p. 4. 21. Insan Berkuk, “Böyük Harpta Şimali Kafkasya’dakı faaliyetlerimiz ve 15. firkanın hareketi ve muharebeleri.” Askeri mecmua (“Our Activities in the Great War in North Caucasus and Actions and Wars of 15th Brigade.” Askeri mecmua, 1934, No. 35. 22. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 110. 23. Report of the Delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim on the Course of the Peace Negotiations with Turkey. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, p. 6. 24. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, p. 37. 25. Ibid., p. 39. 26. Report of the Delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim on the Course of the Peace Negotiations with Turkey. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, p. 7. 27. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, pp. 45–46. 28. Z. Ibrahimov, Sosialist inqilabı uğrunda Azərbaycan zəhmətkeşlərinin mübarizəsi (Struggle of the Azerbaijani Workers for the Socialist Revolution). Baku, 1957, p. 300. 29. O. Минасян (O.Minasian), “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года.” Историк-Марксист (“Foreign Policy of the Transcaucasian Counter-Revolution in the First Part of 1918.” Istorik –Marxist). 1938, v. VI, p. 66. 30. Report of the Delegation of the Transcaucasian Seim on the Course of the Peace Negotiations with Turkey. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, p. 7. 31. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 145. 32. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 123. 33. Минасян, “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года,” p. 70. 34. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, p. 68. 35. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 94. 36. Ibid., p. 95. 37. Ibid., p. 99. 38. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 94. 39. A. Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia). Ankara, 1990, p. 469. 40. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, p. 55. 41. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relation of the United States, 1918, Russia, v. VII, p. 263. 42. Minutes of all meetings held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim and the Representatives of North Caucasian Mountain People. 25.03.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, pp. 3–4. 43. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 26.03.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 4. 44. C. Г. Шаумян (S.G. Shaumian), Избранные произведения. Том II. (1915–1918 гг.) (Selected Works. Volume II. [1915–1918]). Baku, 1978, pp. 245–246. 45. Ю. А .Ратгаузер (Y.A. Ratgauzer), Революция и гражданская война в Баку, Часть I. 1917–1918. (Revolution and civil war in Baku, Part 1. 1917–1918). Baku, 1927, p. 140.

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  61 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

Шаумян, Избранные произведения, p. 257. Ibid., p. 191. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 114. Ibid. Шаумян, Избранные произведения, p. 189. Report of A. E. Kluge, member of the Extraordinary Investigation Committee, to A. Khasmammadov, Chairman of the Committee, on the bloodshed committed against the Muslim population of Baku city. July, 1919. APDPAARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 27, p. 18. For detailed information on the massacre of the Turkish-Azerbaijani population committed in Baku in March, 1918, see S. Rustamova-Tohidi, Mart 1918 v Baku. Azerbaydzhanskie pogromy v dokumentakh (March of 1918 in Baku. Azerbaijani Pogroms in the Documents). Baku, 2009. Decision of the Extraordinary Investigation Committee. 28.07.1919. SAAR, f. 1061, r. 1, v. 108, p. 7. Report of M. H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, on the necessity of establishment of a committee for carrying out investigation of the massacre committed against the Muslim population. 15.07.1918. SAAR, f. 1061, r. 1, v. 95, pp. 1–2. Documents Relatifs aux Autrocites Commises par les Armenies sur la Population Musulmane. Constantinopol, 1919, p. 73. Claims of the Peace Delegation of Caucasian Azerbaijan. Paris, 1919, pp. 17–21. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, p. 70. Enver Konukcu, Ermenilerin Yeşilyayladakı Türk soykırımı (11–12 mart 1918) (Massacre of Turks Committed by Armenians in Yeshilyayla [March 11–12, 1918]). Ankara, 1990, pp. 19–22. From V. Stepakov and T. Kuprikov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 25.06.1965. RNHSA, f. 5, r. 33, v. 221, p. 35. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 472. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, pp. 66-67. Minutes of the meeting held by Muslim Faction of the Seim. 03.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 10. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, p. 63. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 160. Лео (Leo), Из прошлого (From the Past). Erivan, 1921, p. 33. Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, p. 123. Minutes of the meeting held by Muslim Faction of the Seim. 31.03.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 6. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 178. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 100. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 174. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by All Muslim Factions of the Seim. 06.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 15. Ibid., p. 17. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 115. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1957, pp. 240–241. Системная история международных отношений. Том I. События 1918–1945 годов (Systematic History of International Relations. Volume I. Events of 1918–1945). Moscow, 2007, p. 117. Адрес-календарь Азербайджанской Республики (Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1920, p. 6. Minutes of the meeting held by Muslim Faction of the Seim. 13.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 8.

62  The Trabzon and Batum conferences 77. Ibid., p. 9. 78. Minutes of the meeting held by Muslim Faction of the Seim. 16.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 10. 79. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 124. 80. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Transcaucasian Seim. 01.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 31. 81. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, p. 39. 82. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Transcaucasian Seim. 01.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 31. 83. Лео, Из прошлого, p. 39. 84. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 199. 85. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 20.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 20. 86. Ibid., p. 22. 87. Минасян, “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года,” p. 74. 88. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Transcaucasian Seim. 01.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 31. 89. Ibid., p. 32. 90. Ibid., p. 33. 91. Ibid. 92. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 17.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 12. 93. Ibid., p. 13. 94. Ibid., p. 25. 95. Ibid. 96. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 203. 97. Ibid., p. 205. 98. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995, p. 66. 99. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 106. 100. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 125. 101. Ibid., p. 68. 102. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 299. 103. Борьба (Borba), April 27, 1918. 104. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp.230– 231. 105. Ibid., pp. 233–234. 106. Минасян, “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года,” p. 76. 107. Konukcu, Ermenilerin Yeşilyayladakı Türk soykırımı, p. 18. 108. Mim Kemal Öke, Ermeni Meselesi (The Armenian Issue). Istanbul, 1986, p. 160. 109. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 28.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 29. 110. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 23.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 26. 111. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 28.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, pp. 28–29. 112. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 23.04.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 27. 113. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 464. 114. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 125. 115. Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, Türk İnkilabı Tarihi. Cilt III (History of the Turkish Revolution. Volume III). Ankara, 1983, p. 165.

The Trabzon and Batum conferences  63 116. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918–1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 38. 117. Аркомед, Материалы по истории отпадения Закавказья от России, p. 92. 118. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 468. 119. T. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası (The Azerbaijani Dossier). Ankara, 1990, p. 83. 120. Адрес-календарь Азербайджанской Республики, pp. 12–13. 121. Возрождение (Vozrozhdeniye), May 16, 1918. 122. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 13.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, pp. 39-40. 123. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 126. 124. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 286–289. 125. Ibid., pp. 272–273. 126. Ibid., pp. 269–270. 127. R. Hətəmov (R. Hatamov), Almaniya-Osmanlı münasibətlərində Azərbaycan amili (1917–1918-ci illər) Namizədlik dissertasiyasının avtoreferatı (The Azerbaijani Factor in German-Ottoman Relations, 1917–1918). Author’s Presentation of the Ph.D. Dissertation. Baku, 2005, p. 18. 128. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 470. 129. Ibid., p. 470. 130. Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu (Tevfik Biyiklioghlu), “Mondros Mütarikesinin Evliye-i selase ile ilgili Yeni vesikalar.” Bulleten (“New Documents on Mondros Ceasefire.” Bulletin). October 1957, volume XXI, p. 571. 131. Öke, Ermeni meselesi, p. 162. 132. Э́ рих Людендорф (Erich Ludendorff.), Мои воспоминания о войне 1914–1918 годов. Том II (My war memories, 1914-1918. Volume II). Moscow, 1924, p. 219. 133. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 278. 134. Минасян, “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года,” p. 78. 135. Bayur, Türk İnkilabı Tarihi, p. 198. 136. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933, p. 110. 137. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 291. 138. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 476. 139. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 110. 140. H. Baykara, Azerbaycan İstiklal Mücadelesi Tarihi (History of Azerbaijan’s Struggle for Independence). Istanbul, 1975, p. 256. 141. Letter of M. E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M. H. Hajinski, Minister of the Foreign Affairs. 19.07.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 31, p. 2. 142. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Seim. 06.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 37. 143. M. B. Mehmetzade, Milli Azerbaycan hareketi. Milli Azerbaycan “Müsavat” Halk Fırkası tarihi (The National Azerbaijani Movement. History of the National Azerbaijani People’s Party “Musavat”). Ankara, 1991, pp. 86–87. 144. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası, pp. 83–84. 145. Г. В. Хачапуридзе (G. V. Khachapuridze), Борьба грузинского народа за установление Советской власти (Struggle of the Georgian People for Establishment of the Soviet Power). Moscow, 1956, p. 133. 146. Baykara, Azerbaycan İstiklal Mücadelesi Tarihi, pp. 257–258. 147. Минасян, “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года,” p. 83. 148. Bayur, Türk İnkilabi Tarihı, pp. 204–205. 149. Минасян, “Внешняя политика закавказской контрреволюции в первой половине 1918 года,” p. 83. 150. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 59.

64  The Trabzon and Batum conferences 1 51. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası, p. 84. 152. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 57. 153. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by all Muslim Factions of the Transcaucasian Seim. 25.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 43. 154. Ibid., p. 43a. 155. Ibid., pp. 43–45.

3 Declaration of independence and the first steps of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The last meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim was held on May 26, 1918. In a speech, Irakli Tsereteli blamed the Azerbaijani faction for the dissolution of the Transcaucasian federation. He charged that the Azerbaijani faction as well as the Muslim population of the South Caucasus had refused to fight against Turkey, that it had sent its representatives to the Trabzon conference with no intention of negotiating, and that it had sent propagandists into the regions to persuade them to side with Turkey.1 Shafi Bey Rustambeyov, who was responsible for answering Tsereteli, said that the arguments of the Georgian representatives who had decided to secede from the Transcaucasian federation were false. In any case, if the Georgians did not want to cooperate, then Azerbaijan would not object to the dissolution of the Seim. Giorgi Gvazava, a Georgian Nationalist Democrat, found a better way to resolve the disagreements. He said: “Gentlemen, let us stop arguing. Today we choose to dissolve the Seim, so let us do so in a friendly manner. We are meeting as friends, let us separate the same way.”2 Thus, after Georgia’s statement about its secession, the Transcaucasian Seim decided to dissolve itself. The National Council of Georgia announced the independence of the Republic of Georgia on May 26 and formed a government cabinet with Noe Ramishvili as its head.3 The new government’s first political step in the international arena was the signing of an agreement with Germany that had been prepared beforehand. The Georgian government accepted Germany’s guardianship.4 The representatives of the Azerbaijani faction in the Seim organized a special meeting to discuss the critical political situation related to the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Seim. Participants in the meeting listened to the report of Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, who had just returned from the Batum conference. Nasib Bey Usubbeyov gave a detailed report about the development of events in Batum, about the Turkish–German disagreements, and about the importance of negotiations with Turkey being continued. He said that in the opinion of Turkish representatives in Batum, the best guarantee of prosperity in the Caucasus would be the solidarity and unity of its nationalities. It would be necessary for Azerbaijan to make some territorial concessions to the Armenians in order to achieve this.5 Taking into consideration the seriousness of the situation, the participants in the meeting decided to take the responsibility of

66  Declaration of independence governing Azerbaijan upon their shoulders and proclaimed the Provisional National Council of Azerbaijan. Mammad Emin Rasulzade was elected to the post of chairman of the National Council by the majority in a secret vote. All except the Union party supported his candidature. Hasan Bey Aghayev and Mir Hidayet Seyidov were elected as vice-chairmen; Mustafa Mahmudov and Rahim Bey Vakilov were elected as secretaries. After this, a legislative body consisting of nine members was created along party lines for the purpose of governing in different cities. Fatali Khan Khoyski was unanimously elected chairman of this legislative body. The first meeting of the Azerbaijani National Council was held on May 28. Twenty-six people participated in the meeting, and three items were on the agenda: (1) information presented by Hasan Bey Aghayev about the latest events in Ganja; (2) reading of the letter and telegram of Mammad Emin Rasulzade from Batum; and (3) the position of Azerbaijan related to the announcement of the independence of Georgia and dissolution of the Seim. Hasan Bey Aghayev spoke on the first topic and explained that two or three Turkish officers had come to Ganja. He stated firmly that the arrival of the officers in Ganja was not connected with the definition of future political life in Azerbaijan. He added that the Turks were not pursuing any aggressive aims toward Azerbaijan; on the contrary, they were interested in the independence of Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus.6 A May 26 report by Halil Bey Menteshe had described the Turkic population of the South Caucasus being violated everywhere and “especially in Baku, where thousands of people were suffering from merciless brigands.”7 It was imperative that Turks should not leave these people in the hands of revolutionary gangs. Negotiations had been held on this subject between Azerbaijani and Turkish representatives in Batum.8 The most important issues discussed at the meeting held on May 28 were the dissolution of the Seim and the situation of Azerbaijan in relation to the announcement of the independence of Georgia. Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, a member of the National Council, argued for the necessity of an announcement of the independence of the Azerbaijani Republic. Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, Mir Hidayet Seyidov, and other members of the National Council supported this idea. Fatali Khan Khoyski suggested to the National Council that it would be better not to proclaim the independence of Azerbaijan until some pressing problems were resolved. He also proposed that the Council be content with the creation of a competent Azerbaijani government that would be able to hold negotiations with foreign countries. After extensive discussions on this subject, the National Council passed a decree on the announcement of independence (supported by twenty-four votes; two members, Sultan Majid Ganiyev and Jafar Akhundov, abstained) and passed the historic act proclaiming the independence of Azerbaijan. The declaration of independence consisted of six articles.9 With the occurrence of the Great Russian revolution, the division of the state into separate parts was a direct political result of the departure of the Russian

Declaration of independence  67 army from the Transcaucasus. The Nations of Transcaucasia took their fate into their own hands and established the Federated People’s Republic of Transcaucasia. For the sake of political development, the Georgian nation considered it necessary to leave the Federated People’s Republic and to create the Independent Georgian People’s Republic. The political situation created by the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and the unprecedented anarchy which currently exists in the country suggests that Azerbaijan, which constitutes the southeastern part of the Transcaucasus, should create a separate governance structure in order to manage both internal and external difficulties. Based on this, the Azerbaijani Muslim National Council announces to the whole nation, that 1 2 3 4 5 6

as of today, Azerbaijan, which constitutes southeastern Transcaucasia, and has the right to national governance, is a genuine independent state; the form of governance of the independent Azerbaijani state is established as a people’s republic; the “Azerbaijan Republic” insists on building good relationships with all nations and states; the “Azerbaijan Republic” guarantees citizenship and legal rights for all those who live within its territory, regardless of their nationality, religion, social position, beliefs, or gender; the “Azerbaijan Republic” provides many opportunities for unrestricted development of all nations living within the territory of the republic; and until the Constituent Assembly is formed, a provisional government consisting of the National Council and the Council of Nations, elected on territorial basis, will govern Azerbaijan.10

All members of the National Council who attended the meeting and had heard the declaration of independence rose to their feet. After the announcement of the declaration of independence, the National Council assigned Fatali Khan Khoyski to form the official Azerbaijani Government. After a 1-hour break, the meeting of the National Council continued for the purpose of hearing a statement about the formation of the new government. Khoyski presented the composition of the first Azerbaijani Provisional Government: Chairman of the Ministerial Council and Minister of Internal Affairs: Fatali Khan Khoyski; Military Minister: Khosrov Bey Sultanov; Minister of Public Education and Finance: Nasib Bey Usubbeyov; Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mammad Hasan Hajinski; Minister of Post, Telegraph, and Roads: Khudadat Bey Melik-Aslanov; Minister of Agriculture and Labor: Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov; Minister of Justice: Khalil Bey Khasmammadov; Minister of Trade and Industry: Mammad Yusif Jafarov; and Minister of State Supervision: Jamo Bey Hajinski. 11 The National Council of Azerbaijan carried out a great historical mission for the Azerbaijani nation by doing this. Whereas the majority of Muslim states were founded on a religious basis, the Azerbaijan Republic became the first Turkic

68  Declaration of independence state built on a universal basis. The founding of the Azerbaijani national state was a historic event in the destiny of the nation. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote, “The National Council of Azerbaijan, by publishing the Declaration dated May 28, 1918, confirmed the existence of the Azerbaijani nation in a political sense. Thus, the word ‘Azerbaijan’ was understood not only in a geographical, linguistic, and ethnographic, but also in political sense.”12 In Soviet historiography, as viewed later by some historians, the fact of national independence was approached from an unscientific, biased, and classbased standpoint and was presented as serving only the interests of beys, khans, landowners, and the bourgeoisie. This view held sway for many years. Only a year later, however, Mammad Emin Rasulzade stated in his article devoted to independence day and published in the Istiqlal (Independence) newspaper dated May 31, By celebrating independence day with sincerity, Azerbaijanis showed to the whole world that they have not abandoned the ideal of independence and will tell all the truth, that independence does not belong to khans, beys and aghas only, but is the whole Turkic nation’s most sacred national ideal. 13 Because of a number of its features, the formation of the Azerbaijani republic in May 1918 was a part of the larger political, diplomatic, and military processes taking place in Russia, the South Caucasus, and the entire world. The creation of the Azerbaijani republic, together with other republics, was an event of international importance following the collapse of the Russian empire. Mammad Hasan Hajinski served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first and second government cabinets formed by Fatali Khan Khoyski, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs in the history of the Azerbaijan Republic. After its formation on May 28, the government of the Azerbaijani republic temporarily stayed in Tiflis but could not assume relevant operations because of the geographical location being so far removed from the country itself. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to manage some issues, including issues regarding personnel, and the first steps to create functional departments were taken. The Azerbaijan Republic became active in the foreign political arena and was determined to enter the sphere of intergovernmental relationships from the day of its formation. The first step of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan was to inform the Ottoman Minister of Justice in Batum and the chairman of the Turkish National Council, Halil Bey, who headed the Turkish peace negotiations—or, as he was called in the document, “the free leader of the Ottoman representative group”—about the formation of the National Council of Azerbaijan and its government cabinet, with Fatali Khan Khoyski as chairman.14 Notification about the formation of the republic, signed by the chairman, Fatali Khan Khoyski, was relayed by radio-telegraph to the ministries of foreign affairs of all countries on May 30. The notification was sent to Istanbul, Berlin, Warsaw, Vienna, Paris, London, Rome, Washington, Sofia, Bucharest, Teheran, Madrid, the Hague, Moscow, Stockholm, Kiev, Christania (Oslo), and Copenhagen. “Due

Declaration of independence  69 to the difficulty of providing this information to the capitals of foreign countries from Tiflis,” Khoyski wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajinski, I am sending Russian and French versions of the telegram to you for broadcasting directly from Batum to Istanbul and for broadcast from Istanbul using radio. You can sign the telegram yourself as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Add to the end of French version that the temporary residence of the Government will be Elizavetpol [Ganja].15 Khoyski informed Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajinski that Nasib Bey Usubbeyov and Khosrov Bey Sultanov had set off for Ganja to notify and prepare the population of the city. He added that they had stopped all discussions with Armenia. Khoyski wrote, “They have accepted the ultimatum and the ceasefire. We have made a concession to them; we gave them Erivan.” In general, the entrance of the newly created republic into the arena of intergovernmental relationships met with great difficulties. However, the necessity of this was profoundly understood. The way out of the complicated situation was in using the potential of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajinski, in his telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, showed that issues of governmental importance made the creation of intergovernmental relations with European countries necessary. The Azerbaijani republic, which had just declared its independence, was meeting with difficulties in opening its representations in European capitals. “Is the Ottoman Empire willing to play the role of intermediary between Azerbaijan and Europe according to international standards by means of its embassies in European capitals, including Moscow?”16 On this subject, we should note that Turkish representations in different countries later widely advertised the fact of the formation of the Azerbaijani republic. At the Batum negotiations, begun by the Transcaucasian government and continued by the newly created republics, each put forward their articles of peace. It was necessary to define the borders of the newly created republics after the announcement of their independence. The Armenian republic was in the most complicated situation. Armenian representatives who applied to the Azerbaijani government for help before the signature of an agreement were met favorably. The chairman of the National Council of Azerbaijan, Fatali Khan Khoyski, informed the National Council about negotiations with the Armenian National Council held on May 29. He stated that the Armenians needed a political center for the formation of an Armenian federation, because Alexandropol (Gyumri) was still in Turkey’s hands. Only Erivan (Yerevan) could become such a political center; hence, it was prudent to give the city to Armenia. While addressing the meeting about this subject, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, and Mahammad Maharramov evaluated the concession of Erivan to Armenia as an inevitable misfortune. The National Council agreed to give Erivan to the Armenians.17 Two days later, members of the National Council of Erivan—Mir Hidayet Seyidov, Baghir Rzayev, and

70  Declaration of independence Nariman Narimanov—rejected the concession, but the meeting of the National Council of Azerbaijan held on April 1 did not accept this rejection.18 Thus, the National Council decided to send a representative group consisting of Mir Hidayet Seyidov, Baghir Rzayev, and Mamad Yusif Jafarov to Erivan in order to resolve problems related to the conceding of Erivan to the Armenians. After this, the meeting discussed the Elizavetpol province issue. Nasib Bey Usubbeyov and Shafi Bey Rustambeyov, who had returned from Ganja, presented information on this subject. At the meeting, it was decided to send Usubbeyov to Batum in order to inform the Azerbaijani representatives about the situation in the entire country.19 Negotiations between Azerbaijani and Armenian representatives in Batum on the subject of borders were held, and both sides reached an agreement. Azerbaijan would allow the creation of an Armenian state within the borders of “Alexandropol province” on the condition that Armenians abandon their claims to part of Elizavetpol province (Garabagh).20 In return, Azerbaijani representatives promised to help them secure signature of an agreement with Turkey. Opinions within Turkish political circles about the creation of an Armenian state in the South Caucasus and about historically Azerbaijani territories being given to Armenians in order to let them create their own state were not unanimous. Prime Minister Talaat Pasha and Minister of War Enver Pasha, who were defining the foreign policy of Turkey at the end of World War I, did not favor the creation of an Armenian state in the South Caucasus. They considered that the creation would result in a weak country that would not be powerful enough to survive.21 Halil Bey and Vehib Pasha, representatives of Turkey at the Batum negotiations, considered the concession of historically Azerbaijani territories to Armenians inevitable and, with that end in view, they advised the Azerbaijani representatives to recognize the existence of Armenia at the international level and to make certain compromises.22 When Halil Bey, who was in Batum, informed Enver Pasha about the territorial compromises, he opposed these. In his telegram to Vehib Pasha, sent on May 27, he wrote, As can be understood from the telegram of Halil Bey, the Armenians, as a concession for those lands returned to us, want to obtain a part of the territories belonging to the Muslims of the South Caucasus, and Muslims would agree to this. I think that this is totally wrong. If today, a small Armenia, populated by five or six hundred thousand people and having sufficient territory, were to exist, then in the future this state would come to have a population of millions of people formed on the basis of American Armenians returning here. This will create a Bulgaria in the East, and this country would be a more harmful enemy for us than Russia. Enver Pasha preferred that the territories occupied by the Armenians, and in the first place Erivan province, where the majority of the population was Muslim, should be free of Armenians. He wrote,

Declaration of independence  71 If this situation, which is the most suitable for our benefit, does not take place, then it would be unavoidable to let the Armenians remain. In that case, it is necessary that they be allowed there in small numbers only. Only in that case could the well-being of our state and the present and future well-being of the Caucasian Muslims evade danger.23 In a reply to the telegram of Enver Pasha, Vehib Pasha wrote on May 29, 1918, “We cannot completely do away with the Armenians. In any case, we need to and have to let them exist.”24 On the same day, Enver Pasha sent instructions to Batum, stating that the Ottoman government must have a direct border with the state that has Ganja as its capital. In his opinion, this border must pass north of Garakilse and through Nakhchivan. All these issues were in one way or another reflected in the signing of the Peace and Friendship agreement reached by all three republics on June 4 as a direct result of the Batum negotiations. A treaty of friendship between the government of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijani republic was signed on that same day. The agreement was signed by the Minister of Justice, Halil Bey Menteshe, and the Commander in Chief of the South Caucasus, Ferik Mehmet Vehib Pasha, from the Turkish side and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, and the Chairman of the National Council, Fatali Khan Khoyski, from the Azerbaijani side. This was the first agreement the Azerbaijani republic signed with a foreign state. Its preamble was telling: “The Government of the Ottoman Empire and the Government of the newly created Azerbaijan Republic mutually agree to the establishment of friendly relations on political, juridical, economic, and intellectual grounds.”25 The first article of the agreement stated that constant peace and a bond of friendship are established between the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijani republic. The second article related to the subject of the definition of the borders between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. According to this article, Azerbaijan was a state that had wide borders shared with Turkey. According to the third article of the agreement, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia would sign a protocol defining the boundaries between themselves in the near future, after which they would inform the Ottoman government. This protocol, in turn, would become a part of the above-named agreement. According to the fourth article, which was the most important for Azerbaijan, the Ottoman government took upon itself the responsibility of rendering military assistance to the Azerbaijani republic for strengthening security and peace and providing for the safety of the country if needed. According to the fifth article, the government of Azerbaijan took upon itself the responsibility of disarming and banishing the armed brigand groups located within the territories near its borders. The sixth article outlined the duties of the sides in relation to transit of rail freightage. The seventh article concerned the preparation of a consular convention, trade agreement, and other official papers. The eighth article was about free entry and exit, the ninth article about postal and telegraph relations between the countries until Azerbaijan’s integration into the international postal

72  Declaration of independence and telegraph union, and the tenth article related to the Brest-Litovsk agreement, which was not in opposition to the current agreement, being valid for the both sides. The last (eleventh) article was about the confirmation of the agreement and about the confirmed contents of the agreement being discussed in Istanbul.26 Together with positively enhancing the international significance of the Government of Azerbaijan, the agreement signed with the Ottoman Empire played the role of an important guarantee of the existence of the Azerbaijani Turkic nation. Inclusion into the agreement of an article concerning military assistance in fact meant that the Armenian troops that had engaged in violent acts in Upper Garabagh would be eliminated and Baku would be cleared of all enemies, resulting in law and order being restored in the city. 27 Soviet historians writing about relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey in 1918–1920 passed over this agreement with silence or presented it as predatory. This incorrect standpoint was characteristic during that period. As distinct from the Soviet writers, Tadeusz Swietochowski, who approached this subject from an objective standpoint, wrote about the separate agreements on “peace and friendship” that the three states separately signed with Turkey on June 4. He observed that Armenia lost 4,000 square kilometers of its territories, and Georgia had to clear two of its regions, but for Azerbaijan the word “friendship” in the Azerbaijani-Turkish agreement had special meaning. Azerbaijan not only was to keep all its territories but, according to the fourth article of the agreement, the Ottoman Empire gave a guarantee for military assistance and for the restoration of safety and social tranquility and a guarantee for the liberation of Baku and for curbing the aggression of Armenian forces in the Upper Garabagh region as well.28 It was the opinion of Firuz Kazimzadeh that as a result of the June 4 agreement, “Azerbaijan lost nothing but hoped to gain Baku with Ottoman help.”29 However, we should also note that Swietochowski, who was influenced by Soviet sources, wrote that, according to the agreement, Azerbaijan was not recognized as an independent state.30 This incorrect view of the Azerbaijani– Turkish agreement was held by Ronald Grigor Suny as well.31 A number of Russian researchers have in recent years perpetuated this fallacy.32 Many sources have been consulted for a more correct evaluation of this document. What have these sources revealed? First, in the theory and practice of international relations, sides who do not recognize each other as independent states cannot sign an agreement about friendly relations with regard to political, juridical, and economic affairs. Investigation of the contents of the agreement and its consequences proves that the view that Azerbaijan did not possess sovereignty at that time is groundless. Second, there would be no need to establish constant peace and a bond of friendship (as was stated in the first article of the agreement) between two sides not recognizing each other as independent states. Third, the history of international relations considers the fact of giving assistance to a side that is not recognized as an independent state an act of aggression or occupation. Fourth, the agreement became an official and binding document from the moment of its signature and became the diplomatic, juridical, military, and political basis

Declaration of independence  73 for the liberation of Baku and for the guarantee of the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. The governments of the states who signed the agreement went on to use the articles it contained as basis for their diplomatic activity. We should also note that, together with not accepting the “non-recognition” consideration, Turkey gained certain privileges by signing the June agreement, such as agreements on a BakuBatum oil pipeline and the South Caucasus railroad as well as other protocols signed in addition to June fourth agreement. As a result of the Batum conference, Turkey signed an agreement on “peace and friendship” with Georgia and Armenia on the fourth of June and thus recognized their independence. According to the agreement signed with Georgia, the transfer of Kars, Batum, and Ardahan as well as Akhaltsich and Akhalkalak to Turkey was confirmed. However, Turkey softened the requests on June 11 and agreed to give Abastuman and Askur back to Georgia.33 Armenia accepted the terms of BrestLitovsk by signing the June agreement; Echmiadzin and Alexandropol were given to Turkey; and Turkey was allowed to use the Alexandropol–Julfa railway as well. The Armenian border would now be located near Erivan. Only 6 kilometers of railway were left at the disposal of Armenia. According to the Batum agreement, the Armenian republic was a state of the South Caucasus with a territory of 10,000 square kilometers.34 Hovhannes Kachaznuni, Alexander Khatisian, and Mikayel Papajanian signed the agreement from the Armenian side. According to the Batum agreement, the Georgian and Armenian republics were now obliged to guarantee safety and free development to the Muslim population living in their territories and to create conditions for the provision of education in native languages and for the free and unhindered observance of religious customs and ceremonies. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov wrote that the only problem that currently occupies the attention of the government of the Azerbaijan Republic is the recognition of independence of the republics by other countries and, especially, by the Allies. Here it is important to mention the noble acts of the Ottoman empire toward Azerbaijan and other South Caucasian republics. The Ottoman government was the first to recognize all three republics—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.35 Two more agreements were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey, in addition to the agreement on Peace and Friendship, in Batum on that same day. Issues of trade, entry and exit, and customs in the boundary zone were covered according to the first agreement.36 Additional temporary agreements were required to define the initial agreement more precisely. According to the first article of the agreement, consisting of six points, the Azerbaijani government took upon itself the responsibility to move the officers and the officials of the countries fighting against Turkey and its allies out of their territory immediately. Moreover, the Azerbaijani government was not to employ the officers of the countries fighting against the Axis powers in the military service sector during the period of military operations.

74  Declaration of independence The second article defined the rules of use of Azerbaijani railways. According to this article, the Ottoman military commandant’s office acquired a right to use Azerbaijani railways for military purposes. Problems related to the railways would be resolved by a common committee drawn from both countries. The Azerbaijani republic would protect the railways by means of its own resources. If the Azerbaijani government could not do this, the Turkish army should take this mission upon itself. Finally, the Ottoman military commandant’s office would not make use of the national railways of Azerbaijan except when it was necessary to transport the army.37 Both sides also came to an agreement concerning the construction of an oil pipeline, with each side responsible for that part of the pipeline which fell within its territory. The signing of this agreement positively influenced the oil industry of Azerbaijan and ensured its entrance into the foreign market.38 At the same time, the Turkish side achieved a major strategic aim put forward at both the Trabzon and Batum conferences: transporting Baku oil to Batum port. The second article of the agreement was signed between four states—the Ottoman Empire, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—and concerned railway issues. The agreement stated that railway transport means, which were the property of the former Russian state, would be divided within territorial boundaries.39 According to the May 28 agreement, the Germans acquired the right to use Georgian railways together with Turkey. After becoming Georgia’s guardian and receiving the privilege to freely use its railways, Germany made an important step regarding Baku oil. After entering Georgia, Germany had tried to spoil the plans of Turkey to capture Baku. George Lenczowski, an American historian, wrote that the Germans did not want to concede a province rich with oil to Turks under any circumstances, and that is why German agents were giving far-reaching promises to Tiflis.40 Soviet Russia and Iran were uneasy about the announcement of independence by the Azerbaijani republic. Naming the newly created republic located within uncertain borders the “Azerbaijan Republic” made official circles in Iran suspect the Azerbaijani republic of trying to assimilate part of Iran under the name “South Azerbaijan” with assistance from Turkey. The signing of a friendly agreement between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman Empire deepened these doubts. The fact that Tehran began calling the Azerbaijani government “Caucasian Azerbaijan” in various foreign correspondences showed their unease. The Ottomans, even if not overtly, were still expecting relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, both its northern and its southern parts, to deepen. 41 Azerbaijani representatives in Batum decided to ask for Ottoman assistance on the basis of the fourth article of the agreement. After they had received detailed information from the representative of the National Council, Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, and from representatives who had come from other districts, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, the chairman of the National Council, and Mammad Hasan Hajinski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, held negotiations with Turkish representatives. The purpose of these negotiations was to inquire about military assistance to Azerbaijan. They asked the Ottoman government to send an army to Azerbaijan as prescribed by the agreement.42

Declaration of independence  75 Hajinski, who had just returned from Batum, provided detailed information about the peace negotiations, the request for assistance, and the diplomatic papers that were signed to the meeting of the National Council held on June 13 in Tiflis. It became clear from his report that the peace agreement signed in Batum would be discussed with representatives of Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria. Hajinski stated that Azerbaijani representatives would be sent to Istanbul.43 Rasulzade wrote, Azerbaijan has difficulties, cannot overcome these difficulties by itself, and therefore needs help from Turkey. Azerbaijani representatives explained the situation to the Turks, both verbally and in writing, during their meetings in Trabzon and Batum. This time, we, on behalf of the Azerbaijani National Council, and Mammad Hasan Bey on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as stipulated in the fourth article of the agreement, asked the Turkish government for help. The Turkish delegation, fulfilling the hopes of all Azerbaijani peoples, gave us a reassuring answer. In relation to this issue, we should note that military assistance rendered to Azerbaijan on the basis of special invitation and intergovernmental agreement did not constitute a foreign military intervention. The opinion of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Fatali Khan Khoyski, on this issue was the same: According to one of the articles of the peace agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey must provide us with soldiers when our state requires them to protect its rights. And when we find ourselves in a difficult situation, we resort to this option. The Turks fulfilled their promises and duties. Of course, issues were very slowly resolved without the army and power. It was not possible for us to ask some other foreign nation or state for help due to certain conditions, and if we appealed to them, no help would be forthcoming, and therefore, we appealed to Turkey, a country of the same people and religion as ourselves.44 The Ottoman Empire, which had accepted the appeal of Azerbaijani representatives, wanted to send an army to Azerbaijan in a manner that would not result in rejection by Germany. With this in mind, the government of Turkey decided to create an “Army of Islam” consisting of the Ottoman army and Azerbaijani volunteers. In the opinion of Enver Pasha, it would be possible to eliminate German resistance by proceeding this way.45 In fact, Enver Pasha began forming the Army of Islam of the Caucasus beginning in May of 1918. Prime Minister Talaat Pasha submitted the question of rendering assistance to Azerbaijan for discussion by the government cabinet and passed a resolution after receiving information about the situation from Azerbaijani representatives who had come to Istanbul. According to the resolution, a special committee for choosing officers who would go to Azerbaijan was created.46 The committee initially chose twenty officers. Nuri Pasha immediately set off for Mosul in order to appoint the members of the team. There he chose 149 officers, and 488 sergeants

76  Declaration of independence and soldiers from the Sixth Army, to send to Azerbaijan. This little detachment set off at the beginning of April 1918. Other officers and soldiers chosen would be sent to Azerbaijan shortly thereafter.47 Enver Pasha signed the order concerning the formation of the Army of Islam of the Caucasus on April 5. Nuri Pasha, who had started moving from Mosul on April 8, reached Tabriz on May 9 and, after crossing the Araz River on May 20, started to move in the direction of Ganja.48 He and his troops were already in Yevlakh on May 24. Turkish military forces were approaching Ganja at the beginning of June. One complement of Turkish troops, after passing Kars and Gyumri, was moving in direction of Garakilsa-Dilijan-Gazakh and Aghstafa while another was moving in toward south Azerbaijan and Garabagh.49 The fifth division, which was led by Mursal Pasha and was one of the best divisions of the Turkish army, entered Ganja at the beginning of June. The Azerbaijani population greeted the division, which consisted of 257 officers and 5,575 soldiers, with great delight.50 Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver Pasha, the new commander-in-chief of Turkish troops in the Caucasus, came to Ganja together with his staff. As the American historian Tadeusz Swietochowski wrote, “The population greeted the Ottoman soldiers warmly.”51 The movement of Turkish troops in the direction of Ganja meant significant unease for Soviet Russia and for the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars, which wanted to spread its authority over the whole of Azerbaijan. Vladimir Lenin wrote in his telegram sent to Stepan Shaumian at the end of May, “The international position of Baku is complicated. I advise you to try to join Noe Jordania.”52 Acting on this instruction, Shaumian contacted Georgia and, specifically, Jordania on the sixth of June on behalf of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars. They suggested a proposal to render assistance to the Soviet government for defending the independence of the South Caucasus from Turkish attacks. The letter outlined that if the Georgian government would not let Turkish troops cross its territories to reach Azerbaijan, Georgia would be given independence after the authority of the Soviet of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR had been established in the South Caucasus.53 Germany put pressure on Georgia in relation to this issue as well, and the Georgian government was not willing to let Turkish troops cross its territories toward Azerbaijan in order to try to appease both parties. Therefore, the Turkish troops moving from Borchali to Azerbaijan came face to face with German-Georgian forces on June 10. Germany and Turkey had faced all the difficulties of the Great War as allies, but now they stood against each other in the Caucasus. As a result of this military operation, which was not much more than a token, the Turkish army repulsed the German-Georgian troops led by General Kress von Kressenstein and captured a considerable number of soldiers. As a result of this skirmish, German central headquarters sent a threatening telegram to the Ottoman government about the withdrawal of its military units from Turkey and the Middle East and demanded an immediate release of the captives.54 Although all captives were released, the German-Georgian troops could not stop the movement of the Turkish army in the direction of Ganja and, subsequently, to Baku. This event, however, changed the

Declaration of independence 77 local attitude toward the Azerbaijani government, which was still based in Tiflis. The government understood that it was now impossible to stay in Georgia, and it moved to Ganja on June 16. At the same time, the Baku Bolsheviks and Armenians, who had captured control of the city, communicated with Gyumri-Garakilse Armenians and told them that they would render any assistance in order to stop the movement of the Turkish army through Azerbaijan.55 The Baku Bolsheviks and Armenians accelerated their measures of military preparation with this end in view. These preparations on the part of the Baku Soviet and the start of troop movements at the beginning of June necessitated the quick concentration of Ottoman troops in Ganja. Commenting on the strategies devised by the Ottoman empire for the liberation of Baku, Enver Pasha wrote to Vehib Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the Caucasus, “I have sent to the region military units necessary for clearing Baku and its surroundings of Bolsheviks and I will send reinforcements if needed.”56 After 18 days of activity in Tiflis, the National Council and the government moved to Ganja. At this time, representatives of different circles from all the regions of Azerbaijan began to gather there. The reactionary part of this group of people, who, for the most part, lacked an international vision were dissatisfied with the National Council and the government being made up of democratic individuals with a revolutionary frame of mind. Some Islamic circles that supported the annexation of Azerbaijan to Turkey began a campaign against the National Council and managed to win over Nuri Pasha to their side. At his arrival in Azerbaijan, Nuri Pasha said he would treat the government with respect and that he would not intervene in its internal affairs. Although he stated that the Turks had come for the purpose of defending Azerbaijan and not to govern it, one would have to conclude that Nuri Pasha had been influenced by clerical circles during the June crisis. Nuri Pasha, under the influence of the annexationists and reactionary circles, was feeling more sympathetic toward the conservative and Islamic Union party members rather than the leftists and Musavatists. He wanted to dismiss the government and the National Council and give their authority to a new government that would be formed according to the will of the Pasha. This “government” would be constituted by the former serfs of the Russian tsars and by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. The attitude of Nuri Pasha to the National Council was connected to the fact that he considered it a product of the Russian revolution. By the middle of June, the cabinet was in crisis as the Turkish military representation accused the Khoyski government of being treasonous. In order to relieve the situation, a delegation consisting of the chairman of the National Council, Mammad Emin Rasulzade; Prime Minister Khan Khoyski; and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski asked to meet with Nuri Pasha. On behalf of the National Council and the government, they congratulated Nuri Pasha as the commander of the Army of Islam. Nuri Pasha then protested that “he was a soldier, did not know politics, therefore it was necessary that they meet and speak with the political adviser of the army, Ahmad Bey Aghaoglu [Aghayev].”57 The cold attitude displayed toward the National Council during the meeting deepened the crisis. In fact, the fate of Azerbaijani independence hung in the balance.

78  Declaration of independence On the suggestion of Nuri Pasha, Ahmad Bey Aghayev discussed important issues of the political life of Azerbaijan during the meeting. In the course of discussions, Ahmad Bey stated that the National Council was to be dismissed and a new government created on the orders of Nuri Pasha. The Azerbaijani representatives rejected this with determination and stated that such an action would in international relations be considered an occupation of Azerbaijan. Due to the strong resistance of the Azerbaijani representatives, the Turkish Command agreed that the new government would be formed by the National Council, and then the National Council would pass its authority to the newly formed government and then subsequently dismiss itself.58 In this tense situation, only the resolute stand taken by the National Council, led by Mammad Emin Rasulzade, could ward off this threat to Azerbaijani independence. Rasulzade wrote, “Unless we find some legal way out there will be the danger of the black reactionaries taking over power.”59 One year later, remembering this event, Rasulzade wrote, They tell us that we should not criticize the Turks, as they came here not to govern us, but to protect our nation as soldiers. This is true. However, it is also true, that there are beys and aghas among us who demand Turkish rule here.60 On June 17, the seventh session of the National Council started under taut and threatening conditions. The Socialist bloc and Hummet party members declared that they were leaving the National Council. The chair of the meeting, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, reported on the outcome of negotiations with Ahmad Aghayev and stated that it was important to find a solution to this situation. In his speech, Rasulzade gave a comprehensive account of the crisis in which Azerbaijan found itself, the reasons for the crisis, and the positive attitude of the Azerbaijani democrats to the Russian (February) revolution. Rasulzade suggested the dismissal of the National Council and noted the following: “Perhaps this was not good news. However, given the current situation, we must accept it. If we do not find a solution, there is a danger that the government could fall into the hands of reactionaries.” Further, he stated, The fact that this institution, representing at least one part of the People’s Representation in Ganja, the temporary capital of Azerbaijan, is affecting the scene of events in such a way, is certainly a step back for democracy and a victory for reactionary powers. This is a defeat of progressive and open-minded people, and shows the strengthening of darker, authoritarian influences. Such a situation creates an impression that the principles of the Russian revolution have failed. Nevertheless, gentlemen, let us not be fooled by the seeming features, let us not be depressed. Whatever is said, the Great Russian revolution is not defeated…. Azerbaijan will greatly benefit from the positive influence of ideas formed following the Russian revolution. I have no doubts that political and individual freedom is much greater in independent

Declaration of independence  79 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan loving and which will power.61

than in despotic Russia. Also, I want to say, gentlemen, that is luckier than Georgia, which is considered the most freedomrevolutionary in the Caucasus. That is because here the power intervene in our internal affairs is not an alien power, it is our

During the meeting of the National Council, there were those who were skeptical about the actions of the Turkish military delegation and those who were saying that hopes for military assistance from Turkey were empty. There were also those in the Ottoman government who did not agree with Nuri Pasha and were against Turkish intervention in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan. Vehib Pasha wrote in a letter to the Azerbaijani government that the Turkish army came to Azerbaijan in accordance with a specific agreement, upon the request of the independent Azerbaijani government, and that the army must follow the orders of that government. At the meeting of the National Council held on June 17, Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, who was defending Mammad Emin Rasulzade, spoke in relation to the crisis in the country: It is clear that his Excellency Pasha and the Ottoman Empire support the idea of protecting Azerbaijanis’ independence and creating a government for themselves. It is also clear that they would not want to intervene into our affairs. However, the Pasha is surrounded by certain suspicious persons and we must use the rights we have in our hands against these persons. If we hold on firmly to this right and do not compromise, we will harm the international position of Azerbaijan. This would not be patriotic as we are in a difficult situation. Therefore, I suggest that we accept the resignation of the Cabinet and that our Chief be commissioned to charge a person he trusts to form the new government. We must pass all the authority to the newly formed government under the condition that it protects and stays loyal to all the liberties we have achieved. The new government will rule the country and convene the Constituent Assembly in the nearest future. It will not voluntarily surrender this right to anyone, preserves it as the most valuable thing and only surrenders it in the face of power and the sword. I must declare that I will be the first one to rise against the aggressor who would ever try to interfere with our freedom.62 Finally, on behalf of the National Council and the government cabinet, Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski stated the following: After Georgia separated from the South Caucasus, our country was left without a government and without a ruler. Therefore, we had to form the provisional government. Now that we are operating within the land of our birth, I and my comrades tender our resignation. I hope that you will accept our request and will forgive us for our shortcomings.63

80  Declaration of independence Two resolutions were passed as a result of the ensuing discussions. The first resolution concerned the rights and duties of the provisional government. This resolution stated that the provisional government would not possess the rights to cancel state independence and certain political freedoms that had been achieved, to change agrarian or any similar legislation, and that it had to convene a Constituent Assembly within no more than 6 months. The provisional government had full rights to manage any other issues. The second resolution concerned the dismissal of the Azerbaijani National Council. Having taken into consideration the difficult internal and foreign situation of Azerbaijan, the National Council relinquishes all governmental power and authority created under the leadership of Fatali Khan Khoyski and commissions the new government not to compromise its authority to anyone except the Constituent Assembly that soon will be convened. 64 All in all, considering that the “June crisis” resulted in the temporary suspension of the activity of the National Council, it had fulfilled its main task. It was possible to preserve the state independence of Azerbaijan, from both a political and a diplomatic point of view. On the evening of June 17, the second government, led by Fatali Khan Khoyski, was created. The government cabinet consisted of twelve members, including six members from the old government and six new ministers. The ministers were assigned portfolios in the following way in the newly formed government. Khoyski headed the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Justice; Mammad Hasan Hajinski, the Ministry of Foreign affairs; Behbud Khan Javanshir, the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Khudadet Bey Malik-Aslanov, the Ministry of Roads; Abdulali Bey Amirjanov, the Ministry of Finance; Khosrov Pasha Bey Sultanov, the Ministry of Agriculture; Nasib Bey Ussubbeyov, the Ministry of Public Education; Agha Ashurov, the Ministry of Trade and Industry; and Khudadat Rafibeyov, the Ministry of Public Health and Protection. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, and Musa Bey Rafiyev were included in the new government cabinet as ministers without portfolio. Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov was temporarily assigned the leadership of the Ministry of Post and Telegraph and Agha Ashurov the Ministry of Agriculture, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski was assigned the leadership of the Ministry of Supervision. As soon as the crisis of the government had passed, on June 19, Nuri Pasha headed for the front on a special train. On that same day, 600 Azerbaijani volunteers were sent to the front line.65 On June 23, considering the tense situation, the government declared martial law throughout the country.66 To counter the attempts of the German representation in Tiflis to impede the advancement of the Army of Islam toward Baku, because of their desire to obtain control of Baku oil, the commander of the Eastern Army, Vehib Pasha, wrote in a telegram to Nuri Pasha that no other army except the Ottoman army should be allowed on Azerbaijani territory.67

Declaration of independence  81 The newly formed Army of Islam was commissioned to prepare an action plan in relation to the martial law decreed by the Ministry of Internal affairs. The Army of Islam was formed from the Ottoman Fifth Infantry Division and the Muslim National Corps headed by General Ali Agha Shikhlinski. In total, the Army of Islam led by Nuri Pasha consisted of 18,000 people. Six thousand were regular Turkish army soldiers, and about 12,000 were soldiers from Azerbaijani military units who had not been trained but still managed to create an impression of a national army.68 Turkey preferred that Azerbaijan form its own army, due to the financial difficulties which the Ottoman empire was facing. Enver Pasha stated that it cost Turkey 50,000 liras or 1 million manats to keep an army in Azerbaijan.69 The second government cabinet, opposed by leftists who were against the independence of Azerbaijan and especially by Bolsheviks, as a “June reaction,” became active in politics starting from the latter part of June. From the point of view of international politics, the National Council had taken an important step before dismissing itself. The agreement signed with the Ottoman empire on the fourth of June was met with “great support and applause” in the meeting of the National Council, and the ratified documents were presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey by the Azerbaijani government on June 2. After the second government cabinet of the Azerbaijan Republic was created on June 26, it issued a decree that in every ministry, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position of deputy minister was to be created to ease the work of the ministries.70 On June 30, it was decided that all ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should add a clerical office that would include a secretary, manager, two clerks, and one courier.71 It was acknowledged that it was difficult for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to operate efficiently due to its onerous workload. At the meeting of the government, Mammad Hasan Hajinski suggested increasing the number of the ministry’s employees, but this issue was not pursued until the liberation of Baku. At the time, when the Army of Islam was moving toward Baku, the main duty of the Ministry of Foreign affairs was to facilitate the liberation of the country’s capital from a diplomatic point of view, especially concerning the safety of foreigners. It should be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan fulfilled its duty heroically and with dignity. One of the first steps to be taken by the new government was to select the members of a diplomatic delegation to be sent by the Central states (Germany, AustriaHungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria) and the Caucasian states (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Union of Mountaineers) to the Istanbul conference and to ratify documents. Taking into consideration the importance of this conference in the life of Azerbaijan, it was decided that the diplomatic delegation would consist of three persons—Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, and Aslan Bey Safikurdski. Alongside them, four advisors and technical employees would participate. The government gave them authority to conduct negotiations on political, economic, financial, and military issues with the representatives of the participating countries—Turkey, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, and the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus—and to sign agreements with them.

82  Declaration of independence In addition, the government granted this diplomatic delegation authority to enter into all types of secret political and military agreements with the Ottoman empire. This authority also extended to the North Caucasus republic.72 The American scholar Swietochowski assessed this step as an estrangement of the forces supporting total independence for Azerbaijan. He argued that Ottoman government circles invited several political figures from Azerbaijan, Rasulzade among them, to lengthy negotiations in Turkey in order to marginalize them.73 Probing investigation of documents and materials with regard to this issue allows us to dismiss Swietochowski’s interpretation. First of all, the Istanbul conference was not initiated by Turkey; it was initiated by Germany and Georgia. Second, no one knew how long the negotiations would last. Third, as many hopes were placed in this conference on the path to recognition of independence, it was crucial that a prominent political figure such as Mammad Emin Rasulzade, well known in Turkish political circles, who had signed the Batum agreement, should head the delegation. In addition to this, when the idea to hold a conference in Istanbul was first suggested, the “June crisis” had not yet occurred and, at that time, there was no attempt to distance anyone from Azerbaijan. The delegation that left Azerbaijan for Turkey arrived in Istanbul on June 24. Upon their arrival, the Azerbaijani representatives presented a letter to Enver Pasha stressing the importance of preserving the independence of Azerbaijan.74 In this letter, it was stated that the politics of Turkey required that Azerbaijan remain independent and strong. The political situation in Azerbaijan and the tragic events taking place in Baku province were reflected in the letter. Azerbaijani representatives raised the issue of equal treatment of the Caucasian nations by Turkey before its allies, especially Germany. The letter touched upon the separate negotiations of Armenians and Georgians with the Germans and the desire of Armenians to act on their territorial claims with their help. With regard to the events taking place in Baku province, the Azerbaijani representatives considered it important that Turkey quicken the process of providing help. They reminded the Ottoman representatives that the mixed and complicated situation in the region put the Turks of the South Caucasus in danger. Members of the Azerbaijani peace delegation wrote, Armenians have committed atrocities such as have never been seen against the Muslims of South Caucasus, as they had in Turkey, and therefore it is impossible to speak of them without anger and fury. We know that Turkey, like any other state, does not base its state policy on feelings. However, we have on many occasions reported to his Highness about the crisis in which the Muslims of the South Caucasus find themselves. Lack of military power, weapons, law and order, and organization have put us in a helpless situation. Baku province and southern parts of Erivan province fell into the hands of Armenians and Armenian Bolshevik brigands and were mercilessly destroyed. Baku, the financial and cultural center of Muslims, fell into the hands of Bolsheviks and was desecrated with astonishing speed. We ask you humbly to free the city. Every day brings us more distress and suffering. If

Declaration of independence  83 we wait another week, there will not be any oil left in the South Caucasus, and in the absence of oil, the railroad which you wish to make use of will stop working. All the intellectuals and capitalists who were arrested by the Bolsheviks will be killed. We ask you to send military support without delay. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote the following to Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski about the first meeting held in Istanbul: On June 24 we arrived in Istanbul and were put up in Pera Palace. One day later we were received by Talaat Pasha. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Enver Pasha, Halil Bey, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and others were also there. We also attended the reception of German Ambassador Bernstorff. Enver Pasha suggested that we announce the boundaries of our territories. We are asking the government to do this immediately, and if they do not, we will prepare the declaration ourselves. All representatives are here. Bernstorff accepted us politely, inquired about the structure of the government, the National Council, and political parties. He also inquired whether or not we have an army and how we are fighting against Bolsheviks to regain Baku. He also asked whether we consider the determination of our borders during the conference important. I replied that we are hoping to solve this issue among ourselves and hope to inform the allies about the outcome. We are thinking that the conference will not start before the Ramadan holiday.75 Georgia was the first to suggest the idea of a conference. Two days after the signing of the Batum agreement, the Georgian government, in a note submitted to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put forward the idea of holding a conference with the Quadruple Alliance on the basis of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty for the purpose of building relations. In an answer to this note, Germany sent a reply on the ninth of June in which it expressed support for the idea of a conference. However, they considered it suitable to involve in this conference not only Georgia but all the new republics of the Caucasus.76 Due to pragmatic considerations, the Germans suggested holding the conference in Istanbul. In his statement in the Reichstag on June 24, Foreign Minister Richard von Kuhlmann stated that the Quadruple Alliance members were ready to hold a conference about the Caucasian problem. The Germans had an interest in holding a conference in Istanbul. As their Georgian influence was not very strong, it was impossible to penetrate the Caucasus or Turkey or to advance toward Baku. Therefore, the Germans decided to pursue their goals by diplomatic means.77 Germany, which was the initiator of the conference, invited its allies and extended an invitation to the Caucasian republics though Turkey. Representatives who came to the conference in the middle of July held a series of bilateral meetings and a number of secret meetings. Turkey wanted to finish its work in the Caucasus before the opening of the conference in order to strengthen its influence on and to achieve the solidarity of, the Muslim population.78 Representatives of the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus were also invited at the request of Turkey.

84  Declaration of independence In the course of bilateral negotiations, a tense struggle for influence began between Germany and Turkey. Georgians were supporting Germany while Azerbaijanis supported Turkey. Armenia initially hesitated to take sides, but soon the Armenian representatives started a strong pro-Turkish campaign. The head of the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, in a letter sent on June 19 to Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski, wrote that “this pro-Turkish campaign had at its aim a plan to enlarge the territories of Armenia at the expense of both ourselves and of Turkey.”79 Territorial claims presented by the Armenians to Enver Pasha are offered as proof of this. The territorial request specifically mentioned that Surmeli, Nakhchivan, Ordubad, Akhalkelek, Echmiedzin, Erivan (province), Borchali, Gazakh, Garabagh, and Zangezur regions were to be given to Armenia. They supported their claims by presenting the population of these areas as being 70 percent Armenian.80 The exaggerated territorial claims that Armenia presented at the Istanbul conference did not reflect reality. For example, in the Garayazi district, 89 percent of the population were Muslim and 11 percent were Russians as well as some representatives of other nations. In Zangezur region, which Armenians demanded most of all, 123,095 Muslims and 99,257 Armenians were registered.81 In the Sharur-Dereleyez region, which Armenia claimed, of 90,250 inhabitants, according to the documents of the Russian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, 67.5 percent were Muslim. In Nakhchivan, whose population comprised 131,142 inhabitants, 60 percent were Muslims, and in Surmeli region, with a population of 104,791, 70 percent were Muslims.82 Azerbaijani representatives in Istanbul presented a document about the borders of the republic to both Turkish and German representatives. This document showed the territories included in the Azerbaijan republic and their borders, including the whole of Baku province (Baku city, Baku region, Javad, Goychay, Shamakhi, Guba, and the Lenkeran regions); Ganja province (Ganja, Javanshir, Sheki, Eresh, Garabagh, Jebrayil, Zengezur, and the Gazakh regions); Erivan province (Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, and the Yeni Beyazid regions); Tiflis province (Borchali, the Sighnakh regions, and a part of the Tiflis region), and the Zaqatala region. 83 Azerbaijani representatives, based on the map they composed, presented the idea of a corridor that would be opened between Turkey and Azerbaijan through Borchali.84 This project made it clear to Germany that the Azerbaijani government, helped and protected by Turkey, was not planning to compromise Baku province, currently in the hands of Bolsheviks to anyone. After conducting a series of bilateral negotiations, German representatives came to the conclusion that the solution of the Baku problem lay not with the Transcaucasian republics but with Moscow.85 The creation of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars and the full protection granted them by Soviet Russia led to such a conclusion. Therefore, Germany proposed inviting the representatives of Soviet Russia to the Istanbul conference. Turkey totally opposed this. As a consequence, from the beginning of June, Germany started conducting secret negotiations with Russians over Baku. Not satisfied with this, they took another secret step for the purpose of advancing toward Baku from the north.

Declaration of independence  85 Ukrainian hetman and Don Cossack chieftain Petr Krasnov met with Kaiser Wilhelm II in Spa. In the course of the negotiations, it was decided to use Cossack forces against the Turkish and British forces in the struggle for Baku.86 Rumors about negotiations conducted by Germany with the forces of Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian hetman, and the Don Cossacks, all originating secretly from Turkey, strengthened the anti-German mood of the Ottoman empire. *** All in all, the liberation of Baku was being tested from many different sources. In order to emerge as a victor, the Azerbaijani government and its foreign affairs institution had to seize all opportunities and mobilize all diplomatic abilities. Political processes taking place in Azerbaijan, and the complicated international conflicts taking place around it, would all be subordinated to just one purpose— the liberation of Baku.

Notes 1. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии (Documents and Materials on Foreign Policy of the Caucasus and Georgia). Tiflis, 1919, pp. 317– 325. 2. Ibid., pp. 317–325. 3. Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, Türk İnkilabı Tarihi. Cilt III (History of the Turkish Revolution. Volume III). Ankara, 1983, p. 205. 4. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 332– 336. 5. Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Muslim Members of the Transcaucasian Seim. 27.05.1918. State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 46. 6. Minutes of the Meeting #2 held by the Muslim National Council. 28.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 49. 7. T. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası (The Azerbaijani Dossier). Ankara, 1990, p. 85. 8. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 61. 9. Minutes of the Meeting #2 held by the Muslim National Council. 28.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 50. 10. Act on the Independence of Azerbaijan. 28.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 4, pp. 1–2. 11. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti Hökumətinin qanun və binagüzarlıqları məcmuəsi (Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic). 1919, No. 1, p. 6. 12. İstiklal (Istiklal), May 28, 1933. 13. İstiklal (Istiklal), May 31, 1919. 14. Letter of M. H. Hajinski, Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Khalil Mentesh, Head of the Peace Delegation. 29.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 4, p. 6. 15. Instruction of Fatali Khan Khoyski to M. H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Sending Radiogram on Declaration of Azerbaijan’s Independence. 29.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 4, pp. 1–2. 16. Telegram of M. H. Hajinski, Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ahmed Nasim Bey, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Requesting the Turkish Embassies to Represent Azerbaijan in European Capitals. 30.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 5, p. 14.

86  Declaration of independence 17. Minutes of the Meeting #3 held by the Azerbaijani National Council. 29.05.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 51. 18. Minutes of the Meeting #4 held by the Azerbaijani National Council. 01.06.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 55. 19. Ibid., p. 54. 20. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 1, p. 47; Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 57. 21. A. Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia). Ankara, 1990, pp. 661–662. 22. V. Qafarov (V. Gafarov), Şimali Azərbaycan məsələsi Rusiya-Türkiyə münasibətlərində (1917–1922-ci illər). Ph.D. dissertasiyasının əlyazması. (North Azerbaijan Issue in the Russian-Turkish Relations (1917–1922). Manuscript of the Ph.D. dissertation). Baku, 2009, pp. 70–71. 23. Ibid., pp. 69–70. 24. Ibid., p. 71. 25. Friendship Agreement between the Government of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Republic. 04.06.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 2, v. 88, p. 1. 26. Ibid., pp. 1–3. 27. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, pp. 662–669. 28. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995, p. 69. 29. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 127. 30. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 69. 31. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton, 1972, pp. 287–288. 32. Р. Мустафазаде (R. Mustafazade), Две республики. Азербайджано-российские отношения в 1918–1922 гг. (Two Republics. Azerbaijani-Russian Relations in 1918–1922). Moscow, 2006, p. 113; М. Волхонский, В. Муханов (M. Volkhonskiy, V. Mukhanov), По следам Азербайджанской Демократической Республики (Following Traces of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic). Moscow, 2007, p. 127. 33. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, pp. 343–349. 34. Richard Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley, 1967, pp. 190–194; İ. Parmaksızoğlu (I. Parmaksizoghlu), Ermeni Komitelerinin İhtilal Hareketleri ve Besledikleri Emeller (Revolt Movements and Actions of Armenian Committees). Ankara, 1981, p. 133. 35. Ə. M. Topçubaşov (A. M. Topchubashov), “Azərbaycanın təşəkkülü.” Azərbaycan EAnın Xəbərləri. Tarix, fəlsəfə və hüquq seriyası. (“Establishment of Azerbaijan.” News of the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences. History, Philosophy and Law series). 1990, No. 3, p. 133. 36. On Special Trade Concessions applied in Frontier Zones. 04.06.1918. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 17, p. 8. 37. Agreement concluded as the Annex to the Friendship Agreement between Turkey and the Azerbaijani Republic. 04.06.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 47, pp. 5–6. 38. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии, p. 364. 39. Ibid., p. 365. 40. George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: A Study in Big Power Rivalry, 1918– 1948. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 17. 41. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 71. 42. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 530. 43. Minutes of the Meeting # 6 held by the Azerbaijani National Council. 13.06.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 6, p. 1. 44. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild (Parliament of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic (1918–1920) (stenographic reports). Volume 1). Baku, 1998, p. 39.

Declaration of independence  87 45. Mim Kemal Öke, Ermeni Meselesi (The Armenian Issue). Istanbul, 1986, p. 164. 46. N. Şeyxzamanlı (N. Sheykhzamanli), Azərbaycan istiqlal mücadiləsi xatirələri (Memoirs of Azerbaijan’s Independence Struggle). Baku, 1997, pp. 68–71. 47. M. Süleymanov, Qafqaz İslam Ordusu və Azərbaycan (The Caucasiam Army of Islam and Azerbaijan). Baku, 1999, p. 104. 48. Ibid., p. 106. 49. K. Rüştü (K. Rushtu), Böyük Harpte Bakü yollarında (On the way to Baku during the Great War). Istanbul, 1934, p. 24. 50. N. Nəsibzadə (N. Nasibzade), Azərbaycanın xarici siyasəti (1918–1920) (Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan) [1918–1920)]. Baku, 1996, p. 63. 51. T.Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, p.131. 52. V. I. Lenin, Azərbaycan haqqında (About Azerbaijan). Baku, 1970, p. 126. 53. Возрождение (Vozrozhdenie), June 19, 1918. 54. W. E. D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953, p. 479. 55. Sünbül, Azerbaycan Dosyası, p. 84. 56. Qafarov, Şimali Azərbaycan məsələsi Rusiya-Türkiyə münasibətlərində, pp. 85–86. 57. Minutes of the Closed Meeting held by the Azerbaijani National Council in the Administrative Building of Ganja city. 17.06.1918. SAAR, f. 970, .r1, v. 1, p. 48. 58. H. Baykara (H. Baykara), Azərbaycan istiqlal mübarizəsi tarixi (History of Azerbaijan’s Struggle for Independence). Baku, 1992, p. 240. 59. T.Swietochowski. Russian Azerbaijan, p.132. 60. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), May 29, 1919. 61. Minutes of Meeting held by the National Council. 17.06.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 3, pp. 12–15. 62. Minutes of the Meeting #7 held by the Azerbaijani National Council. 17.06.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 1, p. 58. 63. Ibid., p. 57. 64. Zaqafqaziya Seiminin müsəlman fraksiyası və Azərbaycan Milli Şurasının iclaslarının protokolu (Minutes of the Meetings held by Muslim Faction of the Transcaucasian Seim and the Azerbaijani National Council). Baku, 2006, pp. 151– 152. 65. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti. (1918–1920) (Azerbaijan Republic [1918–1920]). Baku, 1998, p. 105. 66. Адрес-календарь Азербайджанской Республики (Address-calendar of the Republic of Azerbaijan). Baku, 1920, p. 22. 67. Qafarov, Şimali Azərbaycan məsələsi Rusiya-Türkiyə münasibətlərində, p. 87. 68. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 480. 69. Letter of M. E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M. H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 19.07.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 31, p. 3. 70. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti hökumət qanun və binaküzarlıqları məcmuəsi, p. 25. 71. Ibid., p. 37. 72. Resolution of the Council of Ministers on Sending Delegation to Istanbul for Participating at the International Conference. 18.06.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 138, pp. 3–5. 73. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 71. 74. Letter of M. E. Rasulzade, K. Khasmammadov, and A. Safikurdski to Enver Pasha, Minister of War of Turkey. June, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 7, p. 4. 75. Letter of M. E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M. H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 28.06.1918. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 7, pp. 52–53. 76. Avalov, Nezavisimost Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoy politike, p. 98. 77. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 480. 78. Avalov, Nezavisimost Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoy politike, p. 100.

88  Declaration of independence 79. Letter of M. E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M. H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 19.07.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r.10, v. 31, p. 4. 80. Ibid., pp. 20–21. 81. On the Disputed Territories between the Caucasus Republics. 01.03.1921. RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 1, v. 2796, p. 4. 82. Report prepared on the basis of information of January 1, 1916 of the Province Administrations. 28.02.1921. AFPRF, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, v. 5300, p. 80. 83. Topçubaşov, Azərbaycanın təşəkkülü, p. 122. 84. Letter of M. E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M. H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 15.09.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 31, p. 27. 85. Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 481. 86. Ibid.

4 The diplomatic campaign for the liberation of Baku

The internal and external situation of Azerbaijan in the summer of 1918 made the liberation of Baku city an urgent matter. Toward the end of World War I, Baku had become an object of struggle between the Ottoman empire, Germany, England, and Soviet Russia. As the Russian White Guard General Anton Denikin phrased it, Baku’s oil plagued the minds and souls of European and Asian political leaders. While the Baku issue and the events occurring within the city should be approached from a domestic political standpoint, Baku was also a pawn in the world war. The military and diplomatic standoffs between Germany, Turkey, Soviet Russia, and England, and the confrontation between the Quadruple Alliance and the Entente states, propelled Baku into the fray. For all these reasons, the liberation of Baku was imperative. The march for Baku had started in the early spring. Both the Ottoman army led by Nuri Pasha and the British army wanted to reach Baku before the Germans reached it by way of Georgia.1 The intrigues surrounding Baku have a place not only in the history of the war but also in world history. Peter Hopkirk, an officer in the British Intelligence Service working in the Middle East, wrote: “At the end of the last century Baku had been one of the wealthiest cities on earth. The discovery of vast oil fields in this remote corner of the Tsar’s empire had brought entrepreneurs and adventurers of every nationality rushing to the spot. Experts calculated that Baku had enough oil to heat and illuminate the entire world. So sodden was it with the stuff that one had only to toss a match into the Caspian off Baku for the sea to catch fire for several minutes … . For a few short years the town became a Klondike where huge fortunes were made and gambled away overnight. Baku’s new rich, some of them barely literate, built themselves palaces of great opulence on the seafront.”2 At one point, Baku’s oil fields produced more oil than all of the United States. When Azerbaijan declared its independence in May, the Baku Soviet of Worker’s Deputies and its executive body, the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars, did not recognize the newly established national government and declared war against it by all available means—political, economic, military and diplomatic. The Bakinskii rabochii newspaper published articles denying the Azerbaijani people’s right to selfdetermination and wrote defamatory articles that spurred ethnic hatred toward the Azerbaijanis. In March 1918, ethnic violence directed against Azerbaijani Muslims in Shamakhi and other outlying districts was orchestrated by the Baku Soviet and

90  The liberation of Baku Armenian militias. The organization of a so-called Armenian army heightened apprehension among the Muslim parliamentarians of the Transcaucasian Seim and reinforced their willingness to turn to Turkey for protection. In their march toward Ganja, as well as through their unlawful activities, the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars put further strain on an already fraught political situation in the South Caucasus. Almost all political and economic issues were settled by the barrel of the gun during the time the Baku Commune was in power. Before the newly established Azerbaijani government moved to Ganja, the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars incited civil unrest and began preparations to attack Ganja. On June 2, Josef Stalin, while visiting the city of Tsaritsyn (today: Volgograd), issued a command ordering the commissars headed by Stepan Shaumian to occupy Ganja. On June 5, Arsen Amirian, a former Dashnak who turned Bolshevik as a result of the revolution, evoked the Paris Commune slogan “Long live the civil war!” in his article “On the Lessons of History,” published in Bakinskii rabochii. “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “the mistakes made by the Paris Commune are once more repeated by our Baku Soviet … . Instead of attacking the Versailles of the Caucasus and arresting all the leaders of counterrevolution, we give them an opportunity to gather, strengthen, and establish alliances with foreign enemies. This was a disastrous and an unforgivable mistake. But, ‘let us let bygones be bygones,’ as it seems that we are at an advantage. We do not need protection, we need to attack by all means, and I say again and again that we should attack. There is no other way out.”3 A day after this article was published, the Baku Commune’s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, Grigory N. Korganov, ordered an attack on Ganja. The purpose of the attack was to destroy Ganja, the cradle of Azerbaijani independence. A telegram sent by Vladimir Lenin in mid-May played a role in the Commune’s aggression. Lenin wrote to Stepan Shaumian: We are pleased with your resolute and decisive policy. Try to blend that policy with careful diplomacy, which is undoubtedly required by the difficult situation, and then we shall win … . Thus far we are being saved only by contradictions, conflicts, and struggles among the imperialists. To be able to take advantage of these conflicts, we need to understand the art of diplomacy.4 When Ganja was attacked, the Commune used the “art of diplomacy” to enter into an agreement with Noe Jordania against the Azerbaijan Republic. In reality, the plan of the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1918 included occupation not only of Ganja, but also of Tiflis. The soldiers of the former Caucasus front amassed at Tiflis and were prepared to enter it while the Red Army moved from Baku. The Georgian Mensheviks, sensing the danger, implored the Russian Mensheviks to help thwart the attack. An appeal by the Georgian Menshevik Irakli Tsereteli to Georgy Plekhanov and Julius Martov was published in newspapers. He asked for assistance to prevent the bloodshed that would arise should the Bolsheviks march.5 The Russian Mensheviks, meanwhile, thought that the idea of marching toward Tiflis had been ordered by Josef Stalin and not by Vladimir Lenin. Stalin

The liberation of Baku  91 wanted to strengthen his positions in the South Caucasus. Meanwhile, the main Menshevik press launched a vigorous campaign against Stalin.6 Menshevik representatives sent to Baku tried to persuade Shaumian, who was on the march to Tiflis, that Lenin himself should recognize the new national states of the Caucasus, lest the course of events should serve only to strengthen Stalin’s political clout in the region. It was hoped that Menshevik intervention would stop Shaumian’s march toward Tiflis, but the Extraordinary Commissar of the Caucasus remained adamant about marching toward Ganja. On June 12, Shaumian informed Lenin and Stalin by telegraph about the impending attack of Baku military units on Ganja. Simultaneously, massacres against Muslim populations in the regions began. In territories where war broke out, the Muslim population was subject to plundering by the Baku Soviet army, made up of 70 percent Armenians.7 Sometime later Shaumian, who took part in those military operations, acknowledged the atrocities committed against the local Turkic population by the command staff of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars— also made up mainly of Armenians.8 On May 22, the Soviet Russian representative Korganov wrote a report to the Soviet of People’s Commissars. He indicated that the Baku Commune’s army was 18,000 strong and most of the soldiers were Armenians, with only a few Muslims and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. He stated in his report that “the Armenian peasants and the city democrats are willing to support a unitary Russian republic and Soviet power.”9 On June 18, Korganov reported to the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars that the situation at the front was favoring the side of the Bolsheviks and the “enemy” had taken numerous casualties. He said that, according to information provided by brigadier commander Hamazasp Srvandztyan, the “enemy” had launched an attack in Garamaryam village, where it was met with fierce resistance and retreated in a cowardly fashion. Hamazasp indicated that the casualties only numbered five dead and 49 wounded, while the “enemy” had about 400 casualties.10 Ronald Grigor Suny, the American author of The Baku Commune, 1917–1918, came to an astute conclusion about the alliance between Stepan Shaumian and the Dashnaks. He understood that “the Bolsheviks could not control the local government and defend the city without Dashnak troops and the acquiescence of the Socialist Revolutionaries.”11 This conclusion is further reinforced by the communiqué that was sent to the military-naval commissar of Soviet Russia, Lev Trotsky, by Boris Sheboldaev, who was at that time deputy-head of the Baku district. He wrote: “The armed forces of the Baku Commune, including officers, consist mostly of Armenians. On June 10, when the brigades and corps headquarters of the Commune army were established, it was evident that the corps commander (ex-colonel) S. Ghazarian, the chief of staff (ex-colonel of the headquarters) Z. Avetisian, and others were Dashnaks at heart. The command staff of the army was worthless and most of the Armenian officers were Dashnaks; this army will be loyal to Soviet rule as long as the ‘Russian influence’ remains, but if the British gain the upper hand, it will be difficult to gauge what the response of the army would be. Considering that 60–70 per cent of the army is Armenian, surprises can be expected.”12 The overall command of the army was in the hands of colonels Avetisian and Ghazarian, both known anti-Muslim activists. There was also Hamazasp

92  The liberation of Baku (Srvandztyan), who had fought as a guerrilla leader against the Turks and whom any Muslim was an enemy simply because he was Muslim.13 Accordingly, Armenian soldiers wantonly robbed, plundered, and committed acts of violence against the Muslim population on their way to Ganja and during attacks on Ganja.14 Ronald Grigor Suny noted that when the Red Army moved out from Baku toward Eizavetpol, they marched through the villages of Azerbaijani who were seldom friendly and were awaiting their Muslim brothers, the Turks.15 The Left Socialist-Revolutionary Grigory Petrov, who had been sent to Baku to help the Baku Bolsheviks, wrote of the barbarism he witnessed that was committed against the Muslims at Shamakhi, stating in his telegram to the Soviet Commissars of Baku: “I do not know whether I struggle for the sacred Soviet goal or I am among a gang of thieves.” Petrov was in fact senior to Stepan Shaumian and he was sent to Baku as the Extraordinary Military Commissar for Caucasus Affairs, but it was said that he never put on airs and treated Shaumian as his equal.16 By the end of June, the march of the Commune forces toward Ganja was halted at Goychay and four days of intensive fighting between June 27 and July 1 decided the fate at the front. The defeat of the Commune forces at Goychay saw many deserters from the Bolshevik army in the face of the ferocious actions of the Muslim army heading in the direction of Baku. Toward the end of July the Army of Islam reached the Baku suburbs and, in order to strengthen its numbers, Azerbaijani men born between 1894 and 1899 were drafted for military service on July 11. The draft significantly increased the number of Azerbaijanis in the Army of Islam; an influx of Russian supplies of weapons and other military supplies at the end of June did not have a great effect on the situation because of the Army of Islam’s greater numbers. On July 20, the city of Shamakhi, which also was of strategic importance, was liberated on the way to Baku. This delay in the liberation of Baku by the Army of Islam increased the tension in the diplomatic struggle looming around Baku. In early July 1918 a report was prepared by the German Consulate to Constantinople (as Istanbul was still known in international diplomatic usage) which stated, “If we enter into negotiations with the Bolsheviks, then we could easily seize Baku, its oil fields and its reserves. However, if the Bolsheviks are forced to leave the city, they will set fire to the fields, and in this case neither we nor the Turks would be able to make use of the oil.”17 This concern was also expressed by German Ambassador Bernstorff during a meeting with Mammad Emin Rasulzade, in which he stated that if Baku was attacked by the Army of Islam, the Bolsheviks would destroy the city and set fire to the oil fields.18 It was reasonable to expect that the Bolsheviks could retaliate in this way, seeing that their actions from the beginning were based on a political gamble, as well as the fact that a directive to do this in the event of a defeat had been ordered by the Bolshevik central government. On June 23, 1918, Stepan Shaumian wrote to Vladimir Lenin, “If we cannot seize Baku, then we shall do as you instructed.” Mammad Emin Rasulzade, who was in Istanbul, wrote of his anxieties about the diplomatic struggle on the “Baku issue” to Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski: “The premise of the Germans is that if Baku is taken militarily, then the Bolsheviks

The liberation of Baku  93 will set fire to the oil fields and all oil reserves. Everyone understands that oil is as necessary as water to the Alliance at war. For that reason, the Germans want a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the Baku issue. We have learned through personal channels that there is a special agreement between the Germans and Bolsheviks about the oil. We would like to bring to your attention that the oil issue is more of a Turkish–German issue than it is an Azerbaijani–German issue. According to the Batum agreement the remaining oil belongs to Turkey. It seems that the Turks want to use the Germans in exchange for oil.”19 The Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars, after not receiving effective military support from Russia, hoped for the diplomatic support of Moscow and for the assistance of Lazar Bicherakhov, the leader of one of the Cossack military units in Iran, in case the situation worsened. The intervention of Soviet Russia, through the Germans, had delayed the Azerbaijani government’s entry into Baku. Recognizing its inability to prevent the Azerbaijani–Turkish attack, the Soviets wanted to hold on to Baku by diplomatic means, based on agreements made with Germany in 1918. As noted, the situation at the Western front and generally in the course of the war had significantly increased Germany’s interest in Baku. During the negotiations at a conference in June at Istanbul, Germany decided that it wanted Baku’s oil and would use Russia to get it, seeing that nothing had materialized from the joint efforts of Turkey and Azerbaijan. In Tiflis in June, the Germans had offered to dispatch a light military contingent to help Turkish-Azerbaijani military units to capture Baku, but “the Azerbaijani government was against this German proposal.”20 This response led Germany to begin negotiations with Russia, and its diplomatic quest for Baku began with an intervention by the ambassador of Soviet Russia to Berlin, Adolf Joffe. As the Army of Islam was beginning its march toward Baku, Joffe submitted a letter of protest to Germany, charging that they had violated the terms of the BrestLitovsk agreement and asking them to intervene to halt the Ottoman army.21 Although Germany emphatically claimed that it had no intentions of occupying Azerbaijan, it decided for its benefit, in case their proposal to the Soviets were to fail, to intervene in curtailing the Turkish attack. An initial agreement had been reached between the Germans and the Soviets at the end of June, as evidenced by a telegram sent by Lenin to Stalin on June 30. The telegram stated: “Today, on June 30, information was received from Joffe in Berlin that [German Foreign Minister] Kuhlmann had a preliminary conversation with Joffe. From this conversation it is evident that the Germans agree to compel the Turks to cease hostilities beyond the Brest frontier, having established a precise demarcation line. They promise not to allow the Turks into Baku, but they want to receive oil. Joffe replied that we would strictly adhere to Brest, but that we agree with the principle of give and take. Pay the greatest attention to this information and try pass it on to Shaumian as soon as possible, for this is the opportunity to hold on to Baku. Some oil, of course, we shall give.”22 Under tremendous pressure from the Germans, as well as the intervention of General Erich Ludendorff, Turkish military operations were temporarily suspended. As all the correspondences of Enver Pasha were under the control of

94  The liberation of Baku German advisors serving in the Turkish army, his official order was to halt the march toward Baku.23 On July 1, the day when the fighting in Goychay ended in victory for the Army of Islam, Enver Pasha, in a response sent to the commander of the Army of Islam requesting reinforcements, stated that there would be no need; he reiterated that it was not the Army of Islam’s duty to attack Baku, but to gather its forces and prevent an attack by the Bolsheviks headed toward Ganja.24 Enver Pasha sent the same order to the Eastern Army Group: “I kindly ask you not to send forces to Nuri Pasha without my consent and to recall the forces sent to Nuri Pasha. Nuri Pasha should gather his forces and prevent the movement of the Bolsheviks.”25 Enver Pasha, acting on the anxiety of the Germans about the prospect of the Bolsheviks’ setting fire to the Baku oil fields, warned the Army of Islam command not to attack without his consent.26 This move satisfied Russia and a letter was dispatched to Shaumian concerning the German–Russian agreement of July 8 on Baku: “Our policy here is to make the Germans accept South Caucasus issues as the internal affairs of Russia; Soviet Russia nourishes the hope of German diplomatic support in its suggestion that Turkish-Azerbaijani troops should retreat under their pressure.” Thus, Stalin advised Shaumian not to move beyond Elizavetpol in order not to encounter the Germans and not to infringe on Georgia, whose independence had been recognized by Germany. He wrote that it was best to compromise with the Germans in the Georgian matter, but that “we should only compromise if the Germans guarantee not to intervene in Armenian and Azerbaijani issues.”27 In reality, the orders and telegrams of Enver Pasha regarding the cessation of attacks were merely a ruse to deceive the Germans. Unbeknownst to the Germans, an order sent through secret channels directed the 38th infantry battalion and one gunnery division to join Nuri Pasha via Gazakh.28 Although Enver Pasha demanded the cessation of the move toward Baku in one official order, another encrypted order was sent that called for soldiers, weapons, and military supplies needed for the Army of Islam to be dispatched immediately to attack and liberate Baku. He also ordered an attack on the German military units that were poised to prevent their movement toward Baku.29 At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski wrote to Mammad Emin Rasulzade in Istanbul to urge that Turkey increase the volume of military support in order to liberate Baku quickly. In a letter he sent on July 22, he wrote: “Our condition at the front is not encouraging. We cannot move forward. The Bolsheviks are showing strong resistance and they possess a lot of weapons. They have an army consisting of 30,000 soldiers. (I shall send you a more detailed telegram.) I ask you to implore Enver Pasha to send one more division, otherwise everything will be lost. We shall not be able to occupy Baku and Turkey will lose its prestige. If you want to know, it has already lost its prestige.” He added: “If it is possible, Turkey should compel Germany to allow the army into Baku and not interfere in our affairs. If it is impossible, then discuss this issue between yourselves.”30 The agreement between Germany and Russia was the mitigating factor for the start of military operations at the end of July and the move of the Army of Islam toward Baku. German headquarters, fearing successful military operations

The liberation of Baku  95 of Turkish troops in Azerbaijan, began to engage the matter in the early days of August. On August 4, General Erich Ludendorff told Enver Pasha that if they did not cease with hostilities in Azerbaijan, they would recall the German officers serving in the Ottoman headquarters. He wrote: “I could not tolerate the danger of new war with Russia provoked by the Turkish authorities in blatant contradiction to the terms of the treaty.”31 Russia too, and not only Germany, tried to influence Turkey through diplomatic means. On August 8, Georgy V. Chicherin met with Ghalib Kemali, the ambassador of Turkey to Moscow, and demanded that the Turks halt their march toward Baku, charging that the Ottoman empire was in violation of the terms of the Brest-Litovsk agreement. The Turkish ambassador disagreed and responded that the Turkish army was merely responding to the atrocities being committed by Armenian forces against the Muslims of Azerbaijan. The ambassador argued that according to the Brest-Litovsk agreement, those marauding Armenian gangs should have been disarmed by Russia. According to Kemali, it was because of Russia’s default of its treaty obligations that Turkey had to protect the Azerbaijani population and the citizens of Turkey.32 During the continuing German–Russian negotiations held in Berlin and in Moscow, the defeat of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars at the front further strained the state of affairs in Baku. The question of how to defend the city or whom to surrender it to was the main issue on the agenda. It was then that they decided to accept Major-General Lazar Bicherakhov’s support. It was well known that when the Russian army in Iran disbanded in 1918, only the Cossack detachment commanded by Bicherakhov had remained militarily active on the Iranian front. According to the American author Firuz Kazemzadeh, Bicherakhov was “a typical Russian imperialist.”33 He hated the Bolsheviks and his main purpose in his move toward the Caucasus was to destroy Baku. He also wanted to prevent the Azerbaijan republic from liberating Baku with the help of Ottoman forces. On June 6, Chelyapin, a Bolshevik, wrote to Stepan Shaumian, to report that Bicherakhov, who had close ties with the British, had shifted alliances and that to prove it, he had divulged confidential British plans to the Baku Soviet. Thus, the tsarist colonel Bicherakhov, who was infamous for his barbarity in Iran, was now headed to Baku as a defender of the revolution. While Bicherakhov was assuming command of the Red Army, his brother Georgy was leading an anti-Soviet mutiny in Terek. In a letter addressed to Lenin dated June 23, Shaumian stated that Bicherakhov had undertaken a noble duty, which was to defend their right flank and to move toward Kakheti through Shamakhi–Goychay, and was now on the way to rally the North Caucasians in Ossetia. The move had so impressed him, that he thought when it came to negotiations that were now underway with Tiflis, he ought to think seriously, before coming to any decision. He said “it should be considered that the partial settlement of the issue would not satisfy Bicherakhov as he may tell his unit to head home through Tiflis. After the settlement of the matter concerning Bicherakhov, they need not pay heed to the British.”34 The collaboration of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars with Bicherakhov was affirmed in a letter dated June 23 sent by Boris Sheboldaev to Lev Trotsky.

96  The liberation of Baku In it, he wrote that “Bicherakhov’s unit has started moving from Enzeli and has now reached the Alat station, and, following new recruitment measures, they will leave for the front with 1,500 people armed with bayonets. Their four airplanes and three armored cars were manned by the British. The possibility of a British occupation remains open, but on principle, we firmly expressed our desire to not allow the British to enter our territories. Although Bicherakhov is commander of an army that is now active, a formal appointment is still needed, so that his aim of increasing the number of new recruits to his unit may be realized while moving toward Tiflis along the old Shamakhi and Signak roads.”35 In reality, the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars and its head, Stepan Shaumian, were ready to cooperate with anybody, regardless of political beliefs, in their battle against the Army of Islam. In July of that year Andranik, a man who was famous for his cruelty against the Muslim population and who was defeated by the Turkish army, committed heinous crimes in occupied territories, particularly in Nakhchivan, which Andranik occupied only briefly. In a letter he sent to Shaumian, he stated: “I unconditionally follow the terms of the Brest-Litovsk agreement. Presently, I and my unit declare Nakhchivan province an integral part of the Russian federation. I implore you to inform all parties concerned that my unit and I are under orders from the Russian central government. We shall do our best to thwart the Turkish army at Nakhchivan province. We look forward to your answer and order.”36 Shaumian promptly replied by saying, “I have received your telegram and I shall submit the letter in its entirety to the central government in Moscow. I congratulate a famous hero such as you. If Mr. Hovhannes Kachaznuni and others were like you, then the Armenians would have not faced so much tragedy. Send my best regards to all your heroic soldiers fighting under our flag, as well as to the masses who suffered doubly, from Turkish bayonets and traitorous leaders. In spite of numerous difficulties, you did not lower the revolutionary flag.”37 Andranik, after receiving the telegram, took inspiration from it and did his best to move toward Baku by way of Zangezur and Garabagh. Lazar Bicharakhov’s unit arrived in Alat on July 5 via the Caspian Sea. On July 7 he accepted the appointment as commander of the right flank of the Baku defense unit. Upon realizing that he was losing at the front, however, Bicherakhov did not fight; at the end of July, he withdrew his unit from the frontlines and retreated toward the west.38 It can be surmised that when Bicherakhov entered into this arena, he had his own plans as well. He was thought to have made an alliance with the Dashnaks and the Armenian National Council in order to occupy Tiflis and then establish a military government in the South Caucasus. In 1919, when a search was conducted in the Armenian church in Baku, they found Bicherakhov’s journals, which showed his complicity with the leaders of the National Council and the Dashnak party as well as with the British in Iran.39 At the end of July, the situation in Baku worsened. The Baku Soviet’s record of violence against the Muslim population had the effect of isolating Baku from its outlying districts. In a mass meeting of non-Muslim workers held in Baku on July 24, the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and Dashnak leaders approved and seconded a decision to invite the British to Baku in order to defend it from

The liberation of Baku  97 the attack of the Army of Islam. On July 25, an emergency meeting of the Baku Soviet was convened and Stepan Shaumian reported on the political and military situation in Baku. He rejected the proposal of inviting British troops and read the contents of a telegram received from the Soviet central government. The telegram, signed by Josef Stalin, read: “On behalf of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People’s Commissars, I demand that all Baku soviets and the army and fleet submit themselves to the will of the all-Russian workers and peasants. In accordance with the decision of the Congress of Soviets, I demand that the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars quickly implement an independent international policy and struggle decisively against the foreign capitalist agents, and not hesitate to arrest even their own members.”40 The policy of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars was sharply criticized by Shaumian and some others who asserted that the Baku Soviet, which had its own commissars for foreign affairs, should deal with the issue independently and not rely on Russia. The Bolsheviks were then blamed for starting the conflicts. The aim of stopping the Azerbaijani and Turkish troops, who were on the threshold of Baku, gripped the Baku Soviet. The speakers at the meeting argued that if Russia was unable to provide any support to Baku, then it was necessary to invite the British. After a series of arguments and debates, in the end, by a vote of 259 to 236, the Baku Soviet resolved to turn to the British for help and to establish a coalition government. At this point, the Bolshevik faction was forced to pull back. Shaumian bitterly declared that he and his remaining supporters would have no part in this plan and that they would withdraw forthwith from the Soviet of People’s Commissars. Shaumian persisted in imploring Lenin and Stalin to send troops “to save Baku for Russia.”41 In response, Lenin said, “We shall take measures to send troops, but we cannot say when.”42 Lenin knew about the role the Dashnaks played in the containment of Baku and wrote likewise in the telegram: “Any action of the Dashnaks against the decision of the Congress of Soviets and the Soviet central government will be considered one of betrayal.”43 Soon after that telegram, Russia increased its diplomatic activities with Germany and Turkey. Ambassador Adolf Joffe, who conducted negotiations with the Germans on this issue, sent an urgent telegram to Georgy V. Chicherin stating that “Istanbul was convinced by Germany to fall back.”44 Then, on July 25, Chicherin informed Joffe that German and Turkish armies were attacking Baku and that the city faced imminent danger.45 For a moment, it seemed as though the Bolshevik central government had received incorrect information about the situation in Azerbaijan. German troops were not involved in the liberation of Baku. Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of Defense, stated that Germany wanted to occupy Baku, but did not have enough forces in the Caucasus to realize this goal. In a telegram sent to Ambassador Joffe on July 29, Chicherin wrote that the only way to save Soviet power in Baku was for the Turkish army to stand down.46 The content of Chicherin’s telegram, as well as the Soviet letter sent in the middle of August to Germany’s Consul General in Moscow, Herbert Hauschild, was about the Turkish attack. The letter reported that the Turkish army had already reached Alat on July 22 and Bilajary Station on July 28. By July 31, the Turks

98  The liberation of Baku had already occupied the Shikh heights as well as Bibi-Heybat. To counter this, propaganda leaflets were disseminated among the Muslim population in the hope of turning them against the Turkish Army of Islam. The leaflet read “We are not wild animals. We have come to save you from wild animals.” The announcement from Russia alarmed Germany, whose concern was that if Baku was occupied by the Turks, they would have possession of its resources, although Baku oil was necessary not only for Soviet Russia, but also for countries that would negotiate economic agreements with Russia.47 The Germans wanted to persuade the Russians that the information on the Turks’ attack on Baku was erroneous. A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Busche, said during his meeting with Adolf Joffe, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, that reports from Istanbul and Tiflis indicated that the Turks would not move forward and occupy Baku, but that if the information from Russia was true, and if the Turks did not make good of their promise, then the Germans would make them make good on their promise.48 Joffe wrote, in a communiqué to Moscow on August 1, that “The head of a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany who had just returned from German headquarters sent me a telegram that was dated July 30. The telegram belonged to a German ambassador in Istanbul with the name of Count von Bernstorff. The telegram stated that the ambassador had met with Enver Pasha and deputy-head Talaat Pasha and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasim Bey regarding the situation in Baku and they approved and sent an order for Nuri Pasha to stand down and halt the Turkish army’s march to Baku.”49 The Germany Embassy in Istanbul insisted that “the news about the move of the Turkish army toward Baku was baseless, and that if there was such an attack, it could only be insubordination on the part of Nuri Pasha and the Azerbaijani volunteers.”50 The Azerbaijani government, meanwhile, made efforts to liberate Baku through peaceful dialogue and negotiations. On July 24, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski wrote to Mammad Emin Rasulzade that he had left for the Baku frontline in order to hold negotiations with the Bolsheviks about the surrender of the city. Hajinski continued: The situation on the Baku frontlines is in our favor. Though it is a fact that our soldiers could not make much progress along the railway lines, they managed to move up to Karrar Station. However, we have been told that the Bolsheviks are in low spirits. The Baku newspapers we bought from Kurdamir and Salian dated July 18 wrote of disagreements between the Bolsheviks and other parties (at the same time among the right-wing Dashnaks, though I do not believe it). Actually, these disagreements have become a matter of nationality. Armenian Bolsheviks behave like barbarians in territories they themselves occupy and it is the Russians that are against those actions. There is talk at the Kurdamir front about 800 Russians who had laid down their arms and abandoned the front as a sign of protest against Armenian barbarism (they gathered Muslims in a mosque and burnt them, murdered women and children, committing indescribably heinous acts). They were arrested

The liberation of Baku  99 in Baku and now are incarcerated on Nargin Island. The Armenians have called for a general mobilization of troops. The Russians protested against it and do not want to fight. The Muslims are also in agreement on this matter. The Shamakhi–Baku route from Shamakhi to Ganja has been occupied by us. Armenian units are frenzied and are headed toward Baku, so fighting is expected on the outskirts of Baku.51 On July 31, Prime Minister Khoyski wrote to Rasulzade: “Two days ago, Mammad Hasan went to the front and this evening I am also leaving. Our army has reached Baku and occupied Gobu, Khirdalan, and Sumgayit, and along the railway the army is now between Hajigabul and Alat. If there is no unforeseen disaster, we will occupy Baku.”52 Then Khoyski gave instructions and wrote: “I will send you the map where Azerbaijani borders have been drawn. If the Armenians file a claim for Garabagh, you should do your best not to make concessions regarding parts of Erivan and Gazakh provinces. I should also tell you that the Armenians are relentless, they kill Muslims left and right, they destroy villages even in places where they had resided the other day, and they pillaged and ravaged several Muslim villages in Bayazid province. Their General Andranik Ozanian assembled his army along the borders of Erivan and Elizavetpol and is now going in the direction of Zangezur and is about to reach Gorus. At present, we cannot make decisive moves, as we are totally immersed in matters regarding Baku. If fortune smiles upon us and this operation is successful, we shall put a stop to activities of the Dashnaks as well.” When it came to the issue of internal policies, he said there had been no progress in relations and things were not going as well as they had hoped but that they should be patient. Khoyski said to wait and see. In spite of everything, “I still think that there will be a chance to turn things in the right direction.” In closing, he told Rasulzade about talking to the people of Zagatala, Borchaly, and Garayazy and how they had expressed their desire to be a part of Azerbaijan. “The statistics of these territories,” he reported, were: “80,000 live in Borchaly province and 50,000 are Muslims, 30,000 in Garayazy and all are Muslims, and, lastly, 95 percent of the 100,000 in the Zagatala district are Muslims. We should do our best to incorporate these territories in favor of our Azerbaijan.”53 Bolshevik power for the most part relied on the Armenians but they tried to portray their resistance against the Army of Islam as a clash of classes. In its address to the people of Baku, the Soviet of People’s Commissars talked of their struggles not only against the Turkish army, but also against a number of militant beys and khans in Ganja.54 On July 28, at a meeting held in the Mailov theatre, the Left-Socialist Revolutionary Mir Hasan Vazirov said that the oppressed Muslim peasants had for centuries been dependent on Russia and were now allied with the Soviets. He stated that thousands of Muslim peasants joined the Red Army in defense of great Russia.55 But Vazirov’s announcement was far from the reality and indeed, the situation was entirely different. On July 28, the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars issued a decree drafting all men born between the years 1883 and

100  The liberation of Baku 1892 to serve in the military. The Muslim population of the villages, which were under the rule of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars, was then deployed to the front by force. We may assume that soldiers sent to the front defected to the Army of Islam, which had put up a blockade around Baku. The Soviet of People’s Commissars issued a special decree which prohibited the inhabitants of Mashtagha, Buzovna, Surakhany, Shuvalan, and Merdakan villages from relocating due to the threat of war. The plan was to establish small partisan militant regiments against the Muslims in those districts that were in support of the Army of Islam’s move to liberate Baku.56 Bolshevik Lev Lazarevich Blyumin, who worked in Balakhany during those days, wrote in his memoirs: “The Muslim population saw the Bolsheviks as thieves and robbers. When the Turks attacked Baku, the Muslims joined them. They received the Turks as their saviors from the tyrannical Bolsheviks.”57 The Muslims that the socialist Hummet sent to the front likewise joined the Turkish army.58 On July 30, one of the leaders of the Commune’s army, Colonel Avetisian, informed the Baku Soviet that resistance was futile. On the same day the leaders of the Armenian National Council visited the Soviet of People’s Commissars and demanded the resignation of the Bolsheviks. Outvoted, on July 31, the commissars left Baku for Astrakhan on the ship Ardahan. On August 1, a new regime called the Central Caspian Dictatorship was established. The new government was composed of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, the Armenian National Council, and the Dashnaks. It also included the officers of the Caspian fleet, namely Pechenkin, Tyushkov, Bushev, Lemleyn, and Yermakov. The Socialist-Revolutionaries included Lev Umansky and Abram Velunts, the Mensheviks G. Ayolla and Mikhail A. Sadovsky, and the Dashnak party was represented by A. Arakelian and Melik Yolchiyan. Like the previous government, the Central Caspian government did not include any Azerbaijanis and consisted wholly of foreigners. After its establishment, it addressed the Christian population of Baku, saying, “You are not alone in the struggle against the Turks. The Allied powers will help in the near future.”59 Soon thereafter, the government decided to arrest the members of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars as well as Bolsheviks who were trying to escape from Baku. A conference was held following the repatriation and subsequent arrest of the commissars. The committees in the conference charged that the commissars not only abandoned their posts, they also abandoned the front at a time when it put the residents of Baku in the greatest peril. They also said that the commissars took food, military supplies, and weapons that were vital for the city’s defense. The conference charged the commissars with treason and deemed them the people’s enemies.60 The overthrow of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars was regarded a significant event by the Azerbaijani government, because this event resulted in Germany and Austria opting to give up all matters concerning Baku. Fatali Khan Khoyski wrote to Mammad Emin Rasulzade about this event: “I would like to inform you that the Bolsheviks have been overthrown in Baku. Their representatives have been arrested. Some of the oil fields and the entire Absheron peninsula are now in our hands. We are sure that in the near future the city will

The liberation of Baku  101 surrender. The heads of the German and Austrian missions repeatedly assured us that they recognize Baku as an integral part and capital of Azerbaijan. They even expressed their desire to help us in the transport of the army.”61 Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajinski wrote to Rasulzade in Istanbul: The present situation at the Baku front is that our army has reached the city from three directions. The Muslim cemetery, Sallekhana, and the Armenian village [Ermanikand] have been blocked. In all the villages and summer cottages communication with Baku has been cut off and they freely negotiate with us now. I was personally at the front. Your soldiers are alive, but a slight mishap occurred just as we entered the city and we had to retreat. The Bolshevik government has now been overthrown in Baku; Shaumian and the others have been arrested and they have been replaced by Mensheviks and Dashnaks as well as by Russians and Jews. They have large forces. I have reported this issue to Halil Pasha. The deployment of one more division from Batum is urgently required. In this case, it is possible that the Turks might surrender Abastuman and Askhuru to the Georgians. Halil Pasha asked Enver Pasha about it. You should also begin moving in this direction or Baku could be lost. The enemy possesses a lot of cannons and airplanes. If we do not have heavy artillery, the enemies could destroy and burn the city after occupying Baku.62 Enver Pasha issued an order to the Turkish forces and on August 2 and 3, both the Azerbaijani and Turkish armies entered the city from different directions. Under this onslaught, the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries forgot their political differences and allied against the Turks, whom they considered a common enemy, proving once again that the main point was not a war of the classes, but one of nationality. Upon the orders of Stepan Shaumian, Grigory Petrov’s regiment seized the defensive position at Gurd Gapisy. On that day, the allied Bolsheviks and Central Caspians delayed the advancement of the Turks toward Baku. The Dashnak Arakelian sent a public message of thanks to the Bolshevik Petrov on behalf of the Central Caspian government.63 After assuming power, one of the first moves of the Central Caspian Dictatorship was to hasten the arrival in Baku of the British, who were in Enzeli at the time. On the first days of August, Socialist-Revolutionary Lev Umansky asked for patience at a meeting held in Baku, stating that Allied support would be arriving in Baku in two days’ time. He then gave assurance that if the Turks entered the city, its inhabitants would be saved from disaster by the arrival of the British.64 The Armenian National Council and Dashnak leaders had already established contact with Major General Lionel Dunsterville, the commander of British military units in Iran, in June. The British for their part were seriously concerned about the gains the Turks had made in the battle for Baku. A seizing of Baku’s oil by the German–Turkish bloc, not to mention Nuri Pasha’s quest to advance the Ottomans toward Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India did not sit well with the British. The British had been privy to correspondence between

102  The liberation of Baku Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Emir of Afghanistan, Habibulla Khan. The news about the victories of the Army of Islam propagated in Iran and Afghanistan by the Turks made the British nervous.65 The general plan of the British was to prevent the advancing march of the Turks eastward by stopping them from moving toward Baku. This was a premeditated action by the British to get a firm hold in Central Asia. For this purpose, British Major-General Wilfred Malleson was appointed head of the British mission in Central Asia in June 1918. Meanwhile, Major-General Lionel Dunsterville was waiting for the right moment to land his forces in Baku. In April 1918, a representative of the Baku Armenian National Council, Doctor Araratian, went to Hamadan to engage in secret negotiations with Dunsterville about the possibility of landing forces in Baku.66 That is why, on June 19, Chelyapin, who was visiting Gilan, wrote to Shaumian, saying that the Dashnaks were in contact with the British and that they were doing their best to involve the British in Baku by all means.67 In the middle of June, before the British finally arrived at the shores of the Caspian and found the conditions suitable to land in Baku, the Armenian National Council sent its representative Ter-Ghukasian to Enzeli to meet with Major General Dunsterville, the commander of the British Army in Iran, about inviting the British to Baku.68 The planned invitation by the Armenian National Council was also affirmed by Colonel Alfred Rawlinson, who was serving in the Dunsterville army at that time. In his memoir Adventures in the Near East, 1918–1922, he wrote that after the Armenians had ejected the Bolsheviks from Baku, they appealed to the British for support and that, under the circumstances, Dunsterville wanted to help them.69 The developing situation in Baku was followed attentively by the British. The British Consul in Baku, Major Aeneas Ranald MacDonell frequently updated Dunsterville about the situation. Dunsterville wrote that: “I was now in touch with Baku by almost daily messengers, and our friends the Social Revolutionaries seemed to be able to bring of shortly the coup-d’étal which was to throw out the Bolsheviks, establish a new form of government and invite British assistance.”70 The developments in Baku had created favorable conditions for the Entente to occupy the Caucasus, beginning with Baku. Since early 1918, the Entente countries had seen the Caucasus as a base for active military operations. Their primary goal was to occupy important oil-rich regions.71 For this purpose, they needed to mobilize armed forces to be used in Southern Iran and the Caucasus. The British headquarters in Baghdad did not want to allow Germans and Turks to enter the Caucasus. As far back as December 23, 1917, England and France had signed an agreement that partitioned the southern part of Russia between themselves. According to Article 3 of the agreement prepared by Georges Clemenceau, Stephen Pichon, and Marshal Ferdinand Foch on behalf of France, and with Lord Alfred Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, and other British military figures for the British, the French were to occupy Bessarabia, Ukraine, and the Crimea, and the British were to occupy the Caucasus. In order to implement this plan, the British first had to occupy Baku and take control of the Baku-Batum railway.72 As David Lloyd George noted in his memoirs, the fate of the war was not yet clear by the spring of 1918. It was for

The liberation of Baku  103 that reason that the Allied powers wanted to prevent use of Baku’s oil fields by the Central powers.73 On January 1918, a special expeditionary unit was established in Mesopotamia under the leadership of Major-General Lionel Dunsterville. Called the “Dunsterforce” by London, its main purpose was to prevent the movement of German and Turkish troops toward Afghanistan and India.74 The unit set out for the port of Enzeli by way of Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Qazvin after crossing the Mesopotamian-Iranian border.75 In early 1918, the British thought that it was possible to counteract the Turkish–German intervention by raising an army of South Caucasians. Given the urgency of the situation, the British quickly mobilized and managed to arrive on the southern shores of the Caspian Sea on February 17.76 As Mir Yagub Mehdiyev described the competition for Baku in his book Oil in International Politics, “The British lion arrived swiftly, for it did not want the German eagle to land on Baku’s oil fields.”77 The political situation in the South Caucasus changed rapidly during the early part of 1918. Christian elements were afraid of the Turkish onslaught, and Armenian politicians, “both in Tiflis and Baku, furtively tried to established contact with the British in the hopes of asking them for assistance.”78 After learning of the situation, the British sent General Offley Shore to Tiflis to report about the situation, in order to gauge whether or not units in the South Caucasus should be activated. Upon his return to Hamadan, he reported that there was a strong German presence in the South Caucasus which was deemed an unfavorable situation for the Allied powers. He also gave several reasons that would prevent the movement of the British to Tiflis, one of which was the presence of Mirza Kuchek Khan in Gilan province. Mirza had rebelled against the Iranian government and bore resentment and hostility toward the British. Second, the port of Enzeli was under the control of people who were allied with the Bolsheviks. Third, the port of Baku, where the British wanted to land, was occupied by the Bolsheviks. Dunsterville therefore remained in Iran until the middle of August 1918, waiting for a more favorable opportunity to leave for the South Caucasus.79 It can be made mentioned that, although the British considered the Bolsheviks an “impediment,” the fact is that that some Bolsheviks cooperated with the British. Colonel Rawlinson stated in his memoirs that the Baku Bolsheviks had provided them with plenty of petrol for their vehicles instead of having it sent from Baghdad.80 The covert support of Baku Bolsheviks to the British was a known fact, such that Stepan Shaumian and Prokopy Japaridze sent telegrams to Petrovsk, Yekaterinador, Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, Saratov, Moscow, and to Vladimir Lenin himself asking to verify that fact.81 During the early days of August 1918, the favorable conditions the British had been waiting for had arisen; and the Central Caspian government, with the five directors, three fleet officers, and two sailors, arrested the Bolsheviks and the few Germans who were living in the city and sent word to the British forces requesting help.82 A special agent of the British intelligence service in the Middle East, Peter Hopkirk, wrote that “General Dunsterville’s long-awaited moment had finally arrived. … His staff officers hurriedly commandeered suitable vessels for shipping Dunsterforce, as it was officially called, to Baku. … The race to try to save Baku and its precious oilfields from falling into Enver’s hands was on at last.”83 On

104  The liberation of Baku August 4, the first British regiment led by Colonel Stokes arrived in Baku. They numbered not more than 240 people.84 Between August 9 and 17, British military forces entered Baku with three battalions, one trench mortar battery and some tanks.85 As Hopkirk described the scene in Baku, “on August 17, 1918, the British disembarked in its sleepy port, only the ghosts of this once opulent past remained. In the aftermath of the war and the revolution, Baku must have looked much like Shanghai after the Communist takeover, though the decline of Baku had begun long before the arrival of the Bolsheviks.” Harsh working conditions in the oil fields led to a number of strikes that had had an impact on the level of oil production. The industry was developing in a one-sided manner. Ethnic conflicts and the repression measures of the tsarist Russia dealt a heavy blow to the development of the oil industry. Oil industrialists considered it useless to invest in new technology. The war had isolated Baku from the world market and the city depended on its domestic market. All these factors led to the occupation of Baku by revolutionists. It allowed for the short-lived term of the Baku Soviet under the leadership of Stepan Shaumian and was soon thereafter replaced by the Central Caspian Dictatorship.86 There are varying accounts as to how many soldiers of the British army entered Baku. However, by comparing different sources and from the memoirs of Major General Dunsterville, who led the operation, it may be concluded that the number of British troops that entered Baku in August was around one thousand. On August 17, Dunsterville and his troops were greeted with open arms by the Christian population of the city, in particular the Armenians who were then terrified of the impending Turkish onslaught.87 Despite their elation, the Christian population of the city was dismayed about the small size of the British force, as they had been led to believe that the number would be around twenty to thirty thousand. The British pledged not only to protect the tired defenders of the city, but also to free the South Caucasus from the Turks.88 At a joint meeting between the British commander and the Central Caspian leaders on August 5, the British expressed their own dissatisfaction with the small number of troops in the Central Caspian army and how poorly trained they were. They said that it would be impossible to defend Baku with such a force. It was then that Menshevik Sadovsky asked the British officer sarcastically “And where is the great army you promised Abram Velunts and Ter-Agaian?” Dunsterville’s representative replied that England had never promised and never would promise that kind of a support to anyone, anywhere. It would be ridiculous to think that the British army could be moved there from Mesopotamia. Velunts observed that England valued its reputation highly, and that if the British came to Baku they would not leave the city so easily.89 To calm the Christian population of the city, the word was put out that another British contingent would arrive in Baku in the near future to fortify and equip the Central Caspian army. To raise the morale of the Central Caspian soldiers, a message from Lionel Dunsterville, who was still in Enzeli, was read. He said that on the basis of agreements with the Allied powers and at the request of the people of Baku, the British government was to send reinforcements and supplies to the besieged city. He said that in the struggle against the Turks and the Germans, the British army would ally themselves with the Central Caspian government and Lazar

The liberation of Baku  105 Bicherakhov. In closing, Dunsterville congratulated the “heroic defenders” of the city and said that if everyone were to fight against the enemy, then victory would come soon.90 On August 8, Captain Reginald Teague-Jones read Dunsterville’s declaration at a joint meeting of the Dictatorship and the British, in an attempt to inspire his partners.91 One unit of the small British contingent went to the front, mainly to oversee the technical installation of a communication system, while the rest stayed in the city to conduct military training. Though the power of the Central Caspian Dictatorship was formally in the hands of the officers and sailors of the Caspian fleet, the real power was held by the Armenian National Council, the Dashnaksutyun party, and other Armenian parties and organizations. They led the defense of the city against the AzerbaijaniTurkish attack. On the first days of August, in an order signed by the commissar R. Bekzadian and the secretary of the commissariat Ghukasian for the mobilization of troops in Baku and the regions, it was stated that all housing offices should submit the exact number and registration of the men in the city to the central mobilization department.92 According to the American historian Sarkis Atamian, prior to the arrival of the Dunsterville army in Baku, the city was defended by seven or eight thousand Armenian soldiers.93 In Peter Hopkirk’s account, the British arrived to find the front line “virtually undefended, with a Turkish thrust expected the following day. Clearly the local commanders and their troops were looking to the British to take over the fighting for them.” Dunsterville wrote later, that they were expecting “ship after ship” to pour out British troops onto the quayside. When the tiny advance party of the Hampshire regiment had disembarked, they had been bitterly disappointed.94 Dunsterville’s assessment of the military forces of the Central Caspian Dictatorship was woeful. He wrote: “Supposedly manning the city’s defenses were 10,000, largely half-hearted, local volunteers. Of these, 3,000 were Russians and 7,000 Armenians. All had rifles, but few had received any proper military training. Most of them felt that they had already risked their lives enough, while some of them were even holding talks with the enemy. As for those Muslims remaining in Baku after the recent massacre, most if not all of them were ready to welcome the Turks and therefore presented a potentially dangerous fifth column, or enemy within.”95 Anticipating the arrival of the Army of Islam, the Central Caspian Dictatorship, and in particular the Armenians, who occupied high posts in the Baku administration, held the populace hostage by various means. After the arrival of the British, General Lazar Bicherakhov once more appeared on the political stage. He sent a telegram on August 3, in Russian and in Armenian, which was printed as a poster in bold capital letters and spread across the whole city. The telegram stated that the old government had had its hands tied in its struggle against the enemy. Now, Bicherakhov, together with Central Caspian forces and the British, had organized the army and was ready to take down the enemy. On that very day, August 2, the Army of Islam had liberated Bileceri Station, which complicated the picture, since Bicherakhov had said that he was the victor. Though this first “victory” was a deception, the British pinned their hopes on Bicherakhov. He was very famous among the Christian youth of Baku, such that they had taken to wearing the same hairstyle as he did. The British thought that if Bicherakhov

106  The liberation of Baku returned to Baku, the city’s youth would be inspired to join the “heroic” army.96 In the tales spread about him in the city, Bicherakhov was called the “little Napoleon.”97 In a telegram, Bicherakhov expressed that he was ready to take the place of the “defenders” of the city and wrote that “now all of Russia has pinned their hopes on the defenders of Baku.”98 However, the Cossack attacks were short-lived. Despite the rhetoric in his telegram, Bicherakhov knew full well that he did not stand a chance against the Army of Islam, and without warning instructed his regiment to retreat by railway in the direction of Derbent.99 On August 8, he passed through Khachmaz and on August 12, he occupied Derbent and proceeded toward Petrovsk. Then, on August 15, Bicherakhov announced that he was moving south again in order to clear Derbent and Petrovsk of Bolsheviks, and then onward to provide support to Baku from Russia. He promised that he would return from the South Caucasus with 10,000 soldiers and sacks of grain. Bicherakhov concluded that the arrival of the British in Baku did not pose any threat to Russia. Though the Turks had surrounded the city, they could not occupy it.100 Meanwhile, at the front, about a thousand Cossacks, along with forces loyal to the Bolsheviks, made it impossible for the Central Caspian government to hold power. On August 3, Mursal Pasha, the commander of Ottoman army at the Southern front, sent a letter to the head of the Armenian National Council of Baku, stating: “the Ottoman army is carrying out military operations to liberate Baku. If you surrender without a fight, the rights of all citizens regardless of race and religion will be guaranteed.” He added that, should the Armenians wish to leave Baku for Armenia, no obstacle would be encountered. However, he warned, “if you show resistance, since there is no doubt that the city will be occupied, you will bear full responsibility for the bloodshed and damage that will ensue. In the event you are ready to surrender the city, send your representative with your response.”101 The Armenian National Council and Central Caspian representatives, after the reading of the letter, decided not to respond to Mursal Pasha’s ultimatum, in the hope of getting support from the British and General Lazar Bicherkhanov. This silence meant the continuation of military operations. In early August, the Army of Islam tightened the ring of blockades around Baku. On the 10th day of the month, villages in Absheron revolted against the Central Caspian Dictatorship and Mashtaga village was liberated by a regiment of the Army of Islam.102 On August 8, the August 3 ultimatum from Mursal Pasha was published in the Dictatorship’s newspaper.103 It gave hope to the small number of Turks who remained in the city after the bloody March events. The overthrow of Baku Bolsheviks in the summer of 1918 and the entry of the British temporarily alleviated the diplomatic pressure being applied by the Germans, which was previously taken quite seriously. Earlier in July, Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski, saying, the Baku issue was settled for us in our favor. Undoubtedly, we should provide the Germans with some economic concessions. We asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs [of Turkey] whether we need to take reciprocal steps in relation to the Germans in this or some other way. He stated that there

The liberation of Baku  107 is no need at the present, and in case it is needed we will be informed. Enver Pasha asked me to inform you [M.H. Hajinski] that they sent fresh regiments in addition to the existing division and that Nuri Pasha said that the force is sufficient. In cases where urgent mobilization of the local forces is needed, the officer of the headquarters will be visiting there on Friday. According to the agreement concluded between the Germans and the Turks, Nuri Pasha was issued a directive related to the attack on Baku.104 However, as German–Russian negotiations intensified, the diplomatic stance of Berlin toward Azerbaijan did not continue for long. In the middle of August, according to information sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Istanbul representative’s office, it became clear that the Germans were once more attempting to prevent the movement of the Turks toward Baku. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote: On the 17th day of the month, I visited Enver Pasha and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I personally met with Talaat Pasha a day ago. The issue is that the Germans are not in favor of the movement of the Turkish army toward the Caucasus, and if truth on the matter be told, they want to halt the advance toward Baku. They fear that the Bolsheviks will destroy the bridges and burn the oil fields when they retreat, just as the British did when they left Romania. That is why the Germans prefer to settle the issue peacefully. Even some time ago, they supported the recognition of the independence of Baku with its outlying districts, including Shamakhi and Salian. The Turks protested against this declaration and, finally, according to both Enver and Talaat Pasha, they came to an agreement.105 The same information was also relayed by Enver Pasha to Nuri Pasha on the 10th day of the month. Initially, everything began when negotiations with Germany bore no fruitful result and they insisted on following the Brest-Litovsk treaty, apart from not suspending the peace with the Russians. Enver Pasha wrote that, “though the Germans do not want to participate in talks on leaving Baku to Azerbaijanis, we firmly expressed our opinion that the Azerbaijani government, to be established in the near future, cannot exist without Baku.”106 On August 7, the chief representative of the Azerbaijani government in Istanbul, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, wrote to Mammad Hasan Hajinski about the issue of hastening the liberation of Baku, as a defeat of Germany at the Western front might alter the international situation drastically. Rasulzade, who followed the course of the events closely and was witness to their political repercussions, said in his letter: “Baku should be liberated by any means necessary. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in dire straits. The advance of Baku should be on behalf of Azerbaijan and it should be occupied by the Azerbaijani government. Anything else would be a calamity.” After studying and analyzing world events, Rasulzade advised the Azerbaijani government: “we should occupy Baku and everybody should accept that fact. Then events will take on a different shape. The Bolsheviks may threaten war, but I think that they will not fight.”107

108  The liberation of Baku In response, Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski asked Rasulzade to increase his diplomatic efforts in Istanbul for the liberation of Baku: The Baku issue, which is the main point, has not been settled yet and we do not know whether it will be settled in the near future. You must work tirelessly to settle this issue in Istanbul as soon as possible; otherwise it will be for naught. Already, the British, with more than 2,000 men, fully equipped, have arrived in Baku. The situation becomes graver with every passing day. Andranik’s army has occupied a part of Zangezur province and separated Shusha province from us and is now advancing toward Baku. We can do nothing without settling this issue.108 On August 31, in another letter to Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Khoyski reported that the Ottoman military force was causing offense to the young Azerbaijani administration and interfering with the efforts of the Azerbaijani government, and local officials were complaining about this. “It is important that we set the boundaries and limits in our relations with Turkey in a positive manner. Otherwise, this bilateral or multilateral power-sharing will ruin everything. It is my opinion that governance should be entirely in the hands of the Azerbaijani government and not subject to the interference our administration is experiencing today. The Turkish military should make known to the government their preferences and intentions and the government will take care of these things for them.”109 The Army of Islam was also privy to the rumors about the arrival of large contingents of the British army in Baku to begin its final military operations to liberate the city. Like Bicherakhov, General Dunsterville recognized that the government that had invited the British was a puppet regime and that defense of the city was futile. After spending several days in the city and familiarizing himself with the situation, Dunsterville left for Derbent on August 20, in order to have Bicherakhov recalled. However, as unknown ships were docked at the port, he hesitated to go ashore and he returned to Baku on August 23.110 As a way out of the situation, he tried to bring together Baku Turks and Armenians, but the gulf between the two nationalities was too deep, and Dunsterville was aware that 80,000 Baku Turks were impatiently awaiting the Turkish army’s arrival.111 According to a third plan, he wanted to incite rebellion among Erivan’s Armenians against the Turkish army with the help of Baku Armenians. The Turkish command headed by Nuri Pasha, who knew of the plan, issued an order on August 10 dispatching military units to various locations.112 From the onset, conflicts raged between the Central Caspian Dictatorship and the British.113 On one hand, the leaders of the Dictatorship were disappointed at the insubstantial support Britain had apportioned to them; and on the other hand, the British abhorred the ineffectiveness of the local army. Seeing no opportunity, Dunsterville decided to have his men retreat from the city by September 1. Meanwhile the Central Caspian government issued an order to fire at any ship that left port.114 Major-General Dunsterville thus became a de facto captive of the Dictatorship, before military operations had even started, and, frankly, he was looking forward to the Turkish attack.

The liberation of Baku  109 On August 26, the Turkish army began moving toward Baku from Binagadi. The British unit located at this position suffered serious casualties. On August 31, Binagadi, Digah and Mahammadli were liberated.115 Dunsterville, who observed the desertion of Armenian soldiers, wrote that “these revolutionists and their supporters were not good at anything except speaking at the meetings of their committees. When dispatched to the battlefield, their battalions again held meetings, and when the situation worsened, they left the battlefield and ran back toward the city.” He wrote: “It now became an urgent question as to whether I could justify myself in allowing more lives to be risked in a cause that seemed beyond all hope.”116 On August 31, in a letter to the Baku Dictatorship, Dunsterville stated that continuing the defense of the city would mean the sacrifice of time and people’s lives. In his judgment, no power could save Baku from the Turks in this instance.117 The local population—that is, the Azerbaijanis—saw the government that was protecting them from the Turks as the enemy.118 On September 1, Dunsterville received a stern warning from the leaders of Central Caspian Dictatorship. It said that the British army could leave Baku with the local army only after the evacuation of the civilian population from the city. On September 4, Dunsterville received another letter from the leaders of the Dictatorship that was severely criticial of his actions. It said that after the overthrow of the Baku Commune, Moscow offered to provide support for the protection of the city against the Turks, but that they had forgone that offer in the hopes of receiving British help instead. They acknowledged the folly of their decision as they did not receive the support they expected. They demanded that Dunsterville dispatch an army from Iran or Baghdad that would be capable of defending the city. On September 5, with their cannonfire raining on the center of the city, the Turkish army once more laid down an ultimatum for the surrender of Baku. As accusations between the Dictatorship and the British command were hurled left and right, Dunsterville paid no heed to the Central Caspian ultimatum. On August 22, the Georgian Social-Democrat Isidore Ramishvili suggested to members of the Central Caspian government Ayolla and Velunts the possibility of having Germany mediate between the Dictatorship and the Turks. Initially, the leaders of the Central Caspian government were hesitant, but after becoming convinced that Dunsterville would not fight, the head of the Dictatorship, Tyushkov, sent a radiogram to Tiflis on September 2 expressing his readiness to accept the offer for mediation. He asked Ramishvili to visit Baku.119 But in the end, the German mediation offer came to nothing. Its failure can be attributed to the fact of Germany’s sympathy for the Turks and their eagerness to provide support for the liberation of Baku at the request of the Azerbaijani government. Ramishvili informed the Central Caspian Dictatorship that it was not going to be possible to resolve the situation through mediation, and that the Azerbaijani government was staunch and unwavering with regard to Baku. Ramishvili wrote: “There is no doubt that Azerbaijanis are more adamant to be in Baku than the Turks are on the Azerbaijani issue.”120 The dual stance of Germany on the Azerbaijani issue irritated Turkey. On one hand, German politicians wanted Soviet Russia to occupy Baku, lacking confidence that Germany would get access to the oil reserves it needed if the

110  The liberation of Baku Turks took the city. On the other hand, the overthrow of the Bolsheviks in Baku put Soviet Russia in a difficult situation, as it was now Russia that needed Germany’s diplomatic support. Nevertheless, the arrival of the Azerbaijani and Turkish troops in the outskirts of Baku brought their positions closer. The arrival of the British in Baku had altered the situation. Soviet Russia wanted to retake the Absheron peninsula, which had a bounty of oil. At the end of August, during negotiations in Berlin, Germany agreed to try to hold off the advance of the Turks toward Baku on the condition that Soviet Russia would drive the British from Baku. In his telegram of August 23 sent to Fyodor I. Kolesov, Vladimir Lenin stated, “the Germans give their assurance not to attack Baku, provided that we should do away with the British.”121 Finally, the German–Russian negotiations, which lasted for about three months in Berlin, resulted in the signing of another agreement, dated August 27, in addition to the Brest-Litovsk agreements, which was kept secret from Turkey. A number of writers refer to this August 27 agreement as the Baku agreement. The agreement consisted of eight chapters and seventeen articles which encompassed the territories of the Ukraine, Crimea, the shores of the Black Sea, and the South Caucasus. It outlined the privileges of Germany in some areas as well as its policy on confiscated military resources among other issues.122 The sixth chapter of the agreement concerned the Caucasus. According to the thirteenth article, Russia accepted Germany’s recognition of the state of Georgia, while the fourteenth article, which directly involved Azerbaijan, stated that Germany would not provide military support to any third-party state beyond the territories of Georgia in the Caucasus. It also would not allow the military forces of any third-party state in the Caucasus to cross the territories from the mouth of the Kura River to the town of Petropavlovsk, along the borders of Shamakhi province to Ayrioba village, along the borders of Baku, Shamakhi, and Guba provinces, and from the northern borders of Baku to the sea. It also stated that Russia would increase the extraction and production of oil in Baku and would supply Germany with a quarter of the oil produced every month, on condition that its quantity would not fall below an amount to be specified and agreed upon in the near future.123 The agreement had been signed by the ambassador of Russia in Berlin, Adolf Joffe, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the side of Germany, Secretary of the Foreign Affairs office, Retired Rear Admiral Paul von Hinze, and the Director of the Foreign Affairs Office Johannes Krige. The part of the agreement that concerned the Caucasus directly affected the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Germany, by entering into a clandestine agreement with Soviet Russia, did not take into consideration the position of Austria and Hungary, and also betrayed the Ottoman empire. The third state that was forgotten in the agreement was Turkey, which had already gone past the demarcation line specified in the German–Russian agreement. During the last days of August, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II held a meeting with the Austro-Hungarian emperor and Prince Boris of Bulgaria at the German headquarters to discuss the agreement signed with Soviet Russia.124 The displeasure of Turkey against Germany grew all the more, as it was not invited to the meeting. Though the agreement of August 27 had been signed in secret, its subject matter

The liberation of Baku  111 was not kept secret. During the last days of August, the Turkish press reported about it continuously. The newspaper Iqdam wrote about the agreement on the first day of September, stating that “the outcome of the talks between Germany and Russia caused tremendous anxiety … . Shall we ask our German friends a question? Turkey bore a heavy load on its shoulders and its forces were larger than theirs. If Turkey thought only about its own benefit during those last battles, and in any event would reap great rewards from the oil, would it be fair if it sacrificed the peace agreement with Russia?”125 Mammad Emin Rasulzade, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation visiting Istanbul, told the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 1 with great distress that, “according to information I have received from Berlin, an additional agreement has been signed between the Bolsheviks and Germany. The Bolsheviks only recognized the independence of Georgia among the Caucasus states, and the Germans did not reject the wishes of Russia to keep Baku and its oil districts, instead opting to take a share of the oil that was to be produced in Baku. This news was a shock to everyone and the newspapers all published the news. Talaat Pasha is going to visit Berlin. It is necessary to occupy Baku by all means.”126 The Azerbaijani delegation, without waiting for instruction from the Azerbaijani government, began their diplomatic crusade against the agreement that had been directed against the new republic. The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs prepared an appeal to the Embassy of Turkey in Germany. The appeal called for the ambassador to give notice to his country that the agreement signed with the Russians ran contrary to the vital interest of Azerbaijan, and was cause for dissatisfaction as well as deep sadness of the people and its government.127 On August 20, to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman empire, the Azerbaijani government appointed one of its most prominent figures, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, as an extraordinary ambassador to the Ottoman capital and granted him all authority and rights as a diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan.128 A letter sent to the head of the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul stated that in the event of an international conference in that city, Topchubashov had the right to take part at the conference as a full member of the Azerbaijani delegation.129 Topchubashov left Ganja on August 23 and had to stop in Tiflis for several days. There, he held meetings with the officials of the Georgian government as well as with the representative of the Ottoman delegation, Abdul Karim Pasha. On September 7, he arrived in Batum and had to wait for two weeks, as there was no ship available. It was there that Topchubashov heard the news of the liberation of Baku, as well as the news of the German–Russian agreement. On September 16, the commander of Batum congratulated him on the liberation of Baku.130 Deciding to do something about the agreement of August 27, Topchubashov resolved to visit the capitals of various Central states. Therefore, in a letter dated September 15 that was addressed to Fatali Khan Khoyski, Topchubashov asked to be sent an addendum to his mandate that would authorize him to enter into negotiations not only with Turkey, but also with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. He also asked that the new mandate be backdated to the date of his appointment. He added: “there is no available ship and that is why I must stay

112  The liberation of Baku here for five more days. Deliver the mandate via special courier. Let the courier give the mandate to Mahmud Bey Efendiyev [the consul in Batum] in my absence, and he will send it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul.”131 There was great need for such a revision in Topchubashov’s mandate. According to Turkish official circles, the visit of Sadr-Azam Talaat Pasha to Berlin was expected and Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov wanted to go to Berlin with him. But given the difficulties, he arrived in Istanbul at the end of September. It was only shortly before Topchubashov’s arrival that the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul took significant action on the matter. In early September, the Azerbaijani delegation was welcomed by Talaat Pasha. During negotiations held on the eve of Talaat Pasha’s trip to Berlin, the position of Germany concerning Baku and the need to quickly liberate Baku were discussed. After arriving in Berlin, Talaat Pasha demanded that Germany terminate its August 27 agreement with Russia. On September 12, the Azerbaijani delegation submitted a letter of protest to the German Embassy in the Ottoman capital. A copy of the letter was also sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, to the embassies of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as to the diplomatic consulates of neutral countries. The letter, which was signed by Mammad Emin Rasulzade and sent to the Ambassador of Germany, Count Waldburg, on behalf of the Azerbaijani government, said: I hereby bring to your notice, in accordance with the instructions by our government, that we are greatly saddened and astonished by the agreement concluded between Germany and Soviet Russia concerning the city of Baku. The Azerbaijani population, referring to the slogan “every nation has the right to self-determination,” which was declared by the Russian government and approved and seconded in the Brest-Litovsk treaty, has broken the chains of bondage and declared its independence. The concluded agreement ensures the occupation by Russian power, again, of Baku, which is the capital of Azerbaijan and its scientific, cultural, economic and political center. After substantiating the fact that Baku was a part of Azerbaijan from historic, ethnographic, and economic standpoints, the letter continued: From the scientific and cultural standpoint, Baku is an integral part of Azerbaijan. It is the venue for political, economic, and public organizations, educational, charitable and intellectual institutions. For these reasons, the Azerbaijani population, which has never given up on the idea of independence in their own native country, will not give up the desire to return to Baku. This issue is not only a territorial matter for Azerbaijan, it has now become a matter of life and death for its people. … Accordingly, I would like to give notice to the government of Germany that the said Russian–German agreement, which allows for the occupation of Baku by Russia, endangers the interests of Azerbaijan and its right to self-rule. In view of that, the national government and the Azerbaijani people express with great distress that Azerbaijan should

The liberation of Baku  113 not be deprived of a center which holds a vital interest for them and hope that their unconditional right to this city will be taken into consideration by the government of Germany.132 The head of the Azerbaijani consulate in Istanbul informed Mammad Hasan Hajinski, the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the letter and the situation that had arisen between both states. In an urgent telegram he stated: “We submitted the letter on the basis of a power of attorney issued by you. We would like to inform you about this. If you issue a command for Colonel Kress von Kressenstein to depart, then act according to the letter submitted to the Germans in Istanbul.” The Azerbaijani delegation submitted the letter to Germany after consultations held with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman empire.133 Reviewing the situation that had arisen in the beginning of September, Mammad Emin Rasulzade observed that the Germans were tired while the interest of the British was increasing day-by-day. That is why the presence of the British in Baku made the situation difficult. He wrote to Mammad Hasan Hajinski, saying, “If we do not occupy Baku, then everything will come to an end. Farewell to Azerbaijan. Even after occupation, we are facing a number of diplomatic difficulties. In order to meet this challenge, we should mobilize the army beforehand. Turkish public opinion and various political circles are deeply anxious about this issue as well.”134 The changing international scenario in favor of the Entente in the beginning of September weakened the German interest in the agreement of August 27. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote from Istanbul that the time of regarding Germany as the victor had passed. Serious difficulties had arisen in Austria. The situation in Turkey had become serious as well. Bulgaria was on the brink of defeat. The hopes Germany had placed in Soviet Russia were not yet realized. It has become obvious that Soviet Russia was not able to drive the British out of Baku. After the agreement of August 27, Germany had believed that the Bolsheviks would be able to expel the British from Baku. During negotiations held in the Germany Embassy at Constantinople on September 2, German Ambassador Bernstorff said, “the Bolsheviks will fight for Baku.”135 The movement of the Bolsheviks from the South Caucasus toward Baku was blocked by Georgia and the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus. Even the Georgian government, which was a German protectorate, had established relations with the British remaining in Baku as well as with the Central Caspian Dictatorship, which was under British control.136 The return of the Georgian delegation to Tiflis, with only two people remaining in Istanbul, was in conjunction with the establishment of relations with the British.137 The changing situation in the South Caucasus resulted in the Germans losing interest in Georgia. The rapidly changing situation prompted Germany to defend Baku for the British “against a third state.” On the other hand, the strengthening of the British in Baku resulted in the establishment of an Eastern front. That was the primary reason for the sudden shift in German interest. By the beginning of September, the Germans understood the mistakes they had made in relation to the Baku issue and they expressed their apologies to the South Caucasus delegations

114  The liberation of Baku during negotiations in Berlin.138 The insistence of Turkey and Azerbaijan played a significant role in the annulment of the agreement of August 27 entered into by Germany. It was for that reason that German headquarters thought of making “contributions” toward the liberation of Baku in the form of two German brigades dispatched to the South Caucasus. General Hindenburg informed the Ottoman state about the deployment of two German brigades to the South Caucasus. The Armenians’ proposal also played a role in the issue. The Armenians, facing a desperate situation, in the middle of July had called on the British to occupy Baku.139 The Azerbaijani military, with the help of Turkey, was able to repulse the small British force. However, the presence of German military units posed a new and burdensome problem. There was growing concern that the oil fields of Absheron, from which the Central Caspian forces and the British had been driven out, were now in danger of being taken over by Germany.140 In the middle of September, final preparations for the liberation of Baku by the Army of Islam were underway. The stance that Germany had adopted toward Azerbaijan prompted the latter to suspend the Azerbaijan–Germany agreement on German colonies on the eve of its signing. The agreement stated that alongside their primary duties, the German consulate and diplomatic offices to be established in the Republic of Azerbaijan would safeguard the interests of the German community, which included many with Russian and Azerbaijani citizenship. Pursuant to Article 2 of the agreement, the Azerbaijani government was to undertake measures for the protection of the population and property of the German colonies from criminal elements. The establishment of a local militia was allowed and German officers and soldiers coming from Germany could be assigned to the German colonies for protection. The colonies were granted the freedom of religion, traditions and customs. The Azerbaijani government withheld citizenship from Germans who wished to return to Germany and had declared themselves not subject to the laws of the Russian government on February 2 and December 13, 1915.141 Though this agreement concerning the rights and freedoms of the German colonies was never signed, the Azerbaijani government nevertheless undertook those obligations to the German population living in Azerbaijan without the need of an agreement. Germany, for its part, had taken steps in relation to Azerbaijan and its plan for independence, the British presence in Baku, as well as the aggressive stance of Soviet Russia, that had made it necessary for Azerbaijan to establish close ties with Turkey. The political atmosphere was so strained and treacherous that for Azerbaijan to hope to receive military, political, and diplomatic support from any state other than Turkey was purely wishful thinking. From this point of view, the Azerbaijani delegations operated successfully within Turkish political circles while at the same time trying to secure the recognition of Azerbaijani independence by other states. The complete declaration of independence of Azerbaijan was circulated to all the embassies in Istanbul.142 There were also plans to send delegations to the capitals of various states, as well as neutral states in the near future in order to discuss the recognition of Azerbaijani independence. The Azerbaijani declaration of independence was received with mixed reactions by

The liberation of Baku  115 foreign consulates and embassies in Istanbul. Mammad Emin Rasulzade stated in a telegram he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan at the beginning of September: “We have sent a copy of the declaration to the Iranian consulate. The consul put it back into the envelope and returned the document to us. The Iranian consulate stated in writing that they do not recognize the independence of a state called Azerbaijan. I found out from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they sent a letter stating that Azerbaijan is an integral part of Iran, hence its opposition to recognizing its independence. The consul, who had recently returned from Berlin, is himself from the dynasty of the Gachars and for that reason he is against the Turks. He is also a supporter of the Anglophile cabinet in Tehran. Despite our being old acquaintances, I do not wish to see him, owing to his offensive actions.”143 The position Iran adopted against the Azerbaijan republic continued until the summer of 1919. It stemmed from a fear of the increasingly influential notion of uniting what was once South Azerbaijan into a single Azerbaijani state with the assistance of Turkey. This position of the Iranian government only served to strengthen Azerbaijan’s leanings toward Turkey. On September 6, 1918, the Azerbaijani delegation visiting Istanbul was invited to an investiture ceremony held by Sultan Mehmet VI, the ruling monarch at that time. The sultan’s reception had a positive effect on the status of Azerbaijan in the international arena, as the Azerbaijani delegation consisting of Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov and Aslan Bey Safikurdski was introduced first to the Sultan by Enver Pasha. Rasulzade, on his part, congratulated Mehmet VI on behalf of the Republic of Azerbaijan and said that that the Azerbaijani people, who for a century had been in servitude, had only its brother Turkey to rely on for the protection of its independence and freedom. The Sultan replied: “I consider these good wishes of our dear Azerbaijan a happy occasion in my life. To ensure the independence and freedom of a Turkic and Muslim government that has thrown off the yoke of bondage is the most sacred duty of my government. I hope that Azerbaijan will find the strength to fight against and be victorious over our common enemies. Give all Azerbaijani brothers my regards.”144 Rasulzade related to the Azerbaijani government how proud they all felt upon hearing the words of the Sultan spoken to Enver Pasha, “these minutes are the happiest ones of my life.”145 In October, the Sultan received Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Azerbaijan in Istanbul. During their discussion, Topchubashov told the Sultan: “Your Majesty, when you recently received the Azerbaijani delegation of a small Turkic state, you said with great pride that the Azerbaijanis are ‘my dear children.’ We Azerbaijanis will always remember this moment with sincere joy.” Topchubashov added that, however many enemies Azerbaijan has, the Azerbaijanis will never fear them because they have a great friend in Turkey. “Not friend, but brother” interjected the Sultan. The Sultan said that all Turks were the brothers of the Azerbaijanis and this bond of brotherhood should last forever. “We also consider you a real brother and this sentiment will endure in the future. As the delegation of Azerbaijan, you should be able to gauge the situation correctly. But you should not be pessimistic. This is a period of transition. I believe that all the Muslim world, and, in particular,

116  The liberation of Baku the Ottoman and Azerbaijani Turks, will be witness to an improvement in their situations soon. Events like these happening now have happened in the past as well, so people should not be pessimistic and should believe in the future. I believe that the Azerbaijanis will strive hard for their future. Rest assured, the Ottoman Turks will not hesitate to give you assistance.”146 The Azerbaijani delegation, in its letters and telegrams sent from Istanbul in the autumn of 1918, stressed the changes in its political situation and the urgency to liberate Baku, which was being pressed by strong military and diplomatic opposition amidst rapidly evolving conditions. During his meeting with the Azerbaijani delegation, Enver Pasha stated that the arrival of the British in Baku had defeated the purpose of Germany’s desire to liberate the capital of Azerbaijan. After intense military and diplomatic preparation in the summer and autumn of 1918, the advance toward Baku began on September 15. On that day, British military forces hastily departed the city.147 This action by Dunsterville so angered the leaders of Central Caspian Dictatorship that they fired at the departing ships as they left port. That sudden departure marked the end of the adventures of General Dunsterville in the South Caucasus. For his abandonment of Baku, he was stripped of his rank, dismissed from service, and his army disbanded. The reason for such a harsh penalty was that, in his haste to retreat, the General failed to follow a top secret directive issued by the Ministry of Defense, which was to destroy the oil pipes and set explosions at oil depots of the city.148 That same evening, a division of the Armenian regiment under the leadership of “military minister” General Jacques Bagratuni escaped from the front heading for Enzeli. The leaders of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars who were arrested by the Central Caspian Dictatorship were released with the help of Anastas I. Mikoyan and other Central Caspian officials, and they too left Baku that night.149 On September 15, Azerbaijani army units entered Baku. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote about the liberation, saying: “After six months, fortune has smiled upon the population. Baku is once more in the hands of its true inhabitants on such a glorious day as the Gurban Bayrami (Day of Sacrifice) holiday. The liberation of Baku evokes the same feeling for the population as for the person whose head is between the grip of the scaffold of a guillotine and is set free.”150 Those who had defended Baku under the name of the “people’s forces” ran to the ports and were the first to board.151 The Armenians fled on account of their culpability for the events that had occurred in March. Fortunately, the arrival of the Azerbaijani government on September 17 prevented more massacres. Soon after, Fatali Khan Khoyski presented a report of the government in relation to these massacres at the opening session of the Azerbaijani Parliament: Though it is true that some events transpired during the occupation of the city, the government will not conceal it nor condone this action as correct. It is true that many people suffered, but would the government have been able to prevent events like that from happening? I think that reasonable people must acknowledge that no government can have control over these events. Muslims were killed, their rights violated, and the city was occupied after

The liberation of Baku  117 a three-month siege. Was it possible to prevent such an event when soldiers entered the city amidst a livid populace? Notwithstanding the fact that the government entered the city only after three days, and everything happened before arrival of the government in the city, no further incidents have occurred since. Upon arrival in the city, the government undertook measures, hanged and shot hundreds of Muslims and established order. The report stated that the Azerbaijani government expressed to the population of the city and its suburbs that all citizens living in Azerbaijan had equal rights regardless of their race or religion. The government would equally protect the lives, property, and rights of all its citizens. Thieves, murderers, and lawbreakers would be punished according to the laws and the severest sentence would be death. The declaration, signed by Khoyski, was a serious move in order to bring order where anarchy and chaos reigned in a city that had long suffered from internal conflicts and misrule, owing to the reckless policies of the Bolsheviks and then the Central Caspian Dictatorship. However, in response to the inquiry and a subsequent fact-finding of the Emergency Investigation Commission of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the March massacre in Baku and the bloody acts committed by Armenians in the provinces, various Armenian organizations launched new campaigns against Turkey and Azerbaijan, clamoring for both nations to account for the killing of Armenians during the events in September.152 They likewise presented forged and mostly falsified documents that were collected and written based not on facts but on assumptions. Such documents were reportedly published in Tiflis in 1920 under dubious circumstances.153 After the liberation of the Azerbaijani capital, the Turkish troops under the command of Nuri Pasha, who had been lying in wait in the suburbs, entered Baku on September 18.154 The Azerbaijani population who were the genuine inhabitants of the city welcomed them openly as saviors. When the Ottoman troops entered the city, they said that they were taking part in the process of liberation of Baku upon the request of the Azerbaijani government. First, May 28, 1918, and now, a second crucial moment in the history of Azerbaijan: Baku had been liberated and the Azerbaijani government was finally able to move to the capital. This event was the result not only of the successful military alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also of the great victory of Azerbaijani diplomacy in its infancy. The liberation of Baku allowed for the Azerbaijani government to firmly establish its power in the country’s territory. Festivities were held in front of the building where the government held office and in attendance were the city’s populace as well as government leaders and guests. The members of the government delivered several congratulatory speeches to the crowd. When the subject came to the exile of the Central Caspian Dictatorship, which had relied mainly on the British, Fatali Khan Khoyski, head of the Cabinet of Ministers, had this to say: We, too, have the right to live independently. Neither tanks, hydroplanes, airplanes, gunboats, wire fences, mines and other military devices, nor any force of British and their defenders, could have prevented the flow of history.

118  The liberation of Baku The liberation of Baku, involving 50,000 troops and plans for attack by a fairly small contingent, should be a lesson for people who want to build their happiness upon the misfortune of others.155 Enver Pasha notified the Azerbaijani consulate in Istanbul about the liberation of Baku. Mammad Emin Rasulzade, in his letter from Istanbul to Fatali Khan Khoyski and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski, stated that the liberation of Baku had invigorated the people’s spirits. The liberation of Baku was celebrated twice in Turkey, owing to a chance event that was the Gurban Bayram celebration. Merrymakers used the holiday as another way to commemorate the liberation. *** The unrelenting struggle of the great powers for Baku’s oil reserves ended in the victory of Azerbaijan itself with the help of Turkey. The victory of the Azerbaijani government in the military, political, and diplomatic arena ensured Baku’s place as the capital of the republic for all time.

Notes 1. А.И. Деникин (A.I. Denikin), Очерки русской смуты (Stories of the Russian Turmoil). Moscow, 1991, p. 35. 2. Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople. The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. London, 1994, pp. 331. 3. Бакинский рабочий (Bakinskiy rabochiy), June 5, 1918. 4. V.I. Lenin, ƏTK. 50-ci cild. (Complete Collection of Works. Volume 50), pp. 81–82. 5. Кавказский листок (Kavkazskiy listok), April 3, 1918. 6. Новая жизнь (Novaya zhizn), April 19, 1918. 7. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 137; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 130. 8. Report of Suren Shaumian at the Meeting of the Azerbaijani Group at the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolsheviks) Party. 11.07.1927. RSPHSA, f. 84, r. 3, v. 283, p. 53. 9. From Grigory Korganov to the Russian Soviet of People’s Commissars. 22.05.1918. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 3, v. 55, pp. 2–5. 10. From G. Korganov to S. Shaumian. 18.06.1918. APDPARA, Copy fund, record No. 374, p. 20. 11. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton, 1972, p. 322. 12. From B. Sheboldayev to L. Trotski. 23.06.1918. APDPARA, Copy fund, record No. 371, pp. 1–4. 13. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 130. 14. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 137. 15. Suny, The Baku Commune, p. 323. 16. Report of Suren Shaumian at the Meeting of the Azerbaijani Group at the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolsheviks) Party. 11.07.1927. RSPHSA, f. 84, r. 3, v. 283, p. 57.

The liberation of Baku  119 17. Г.В. Пипия (G.V. Pipiya), Политика Германии в Закавказье в 1918 году. Сборник документов. (Policy of Germany in Transcaucasia in 1918. Collection of documents). Tbilisi, 1971, pp. 58–59. 18. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 19.07.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 31, p. 2. 19. Ibid. 20. Ə.M. Topçubaşov (A.M.Topchubashov), “Azərbaycanın təşəkkülü.” Azərbaycan EA-nın Xəbərləri. Tarix, fəlsəfə və hüquq seriyası. (“Establishment of Azerbaijan.” Bulletin of the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences. History, Philosophy and Law series). 1990, No. 3, p. 133. 21. Документы по истории гражданской войны в СССР. Том I (Documents on the History of Civil War in the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1940, p. 381. 22. V.I. Lenin, Azərbaycan haqqında (About Azerbaijan). Baku, 1970, p. 131. 23. M. Süleymanov, Qafqaz İslam Ordusu və Azərbaycan (The Caucasus Islamic Army and Azerbaijan). Baku, 1999, p. 215. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi Kafkas Cebhesi 3-cü Ordu Hareketi. Cilt II (Movement of the Turkish 3rd Army in the Caucasus Front during the First World War, Volume II). Ankara, 1993, p. 563. 27. Документы по истории гражданской войны в СССР, pp. 289–290. 28. Süleymanov, Qafqaz İslam Ordusu və Azərbaycan, p. 215. 29. N. Yüceer, Birinci Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Ordusunun Azerbaycan ve Dağıstan Harekatı (Movement of the Ottoman Army to Azerbaijan and Dagestan during the First World War). Ankara, 1996, p. 65. 30. Report of M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M.E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul. 22.07.1918. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 7, p. 44. 31. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 134. 32. A. Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia). Ankara, 1990, p. 547. 33. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 33. 34. C.Г. Шаумян (S.G. Shaumian), Избранные произведения (Selected Works). Baku, 1978, p. 383. 35. From B. Sheboldayev to L. Trotski. 23.06.1918. APDPARA, Copy fund, record No. 371, p. 3. 36. From V. Avetisian and S. Aghaian to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 1965. RNHSA, f. 5, r. 33, v. 221, p. 43. 37. Бакинский рабочий (Bakinskiy rabochiy), July 20, 1918. 38. Suny, The Baku Commune, p. 317. 39. Я. Ратгаузер (Y. Ratgauzer), Революция и гражданская война в Баку, Часть I. 1917–1918. (Revolution and civil war in Baku, Part 1. 1917–1918). Baku, 1927, p. 197. 40. Шаумян, Избранные произведения, pp. 412–413. 41. Ibid., p. 422. 42. Lenin, About Azerbaijan, p. 138. 43. Ibid. 44. Cурен Шаумян (Suren Shaumian), Бакинская Коммуна (The Baku Commune). Baku, 1927, pp. 38–39. 45. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1957, p. 410. 46. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 545. 47. Документы внешней политики СССР, pp. 428–431. 48. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, pp. 545–546. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid.

120  The liberation of Baku 51. Report of M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M.E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul. 24.07.1918. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 7, pp. 41–42. 52. Urgent Diplomatic Information of F.K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to M.E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul. 31.07.1918. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 7, p. 37. 53. Ibid., pp. 37–38. 54. Известия Бакинского Совета (News of the Baku Soviet), July 30, 1918. 55. Ibid. 56. Памяти 26-и (Memory of the 26). Baku, 1922, p. 165. 57. Recollections of Revolutionary Events of 1917–1918 in Baku and Azerbaijan. From Blyumin’s Memoirs. 1922. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 2, v. 20, pp. 18–19. 58. Recollections of the Red Army in Baku in 1917–1920. No date shown. ARCSAPPSM, f.276, r.2, v.22, p. 90. 59. Бюллетень Центрокаспия (Byulleten Tsentrokaspiya), August 3, 1918. 60. А. Дубнер (A. Dubner) Бакинский пролетариат в годы революции (1917–1920 гг.) (The Baku Proletariat during the Years of Revolution [1917–1920]). Baku, 1931, p. 95. 61. Cipher telegram of F.K. Khovski to M.E. Rasulzade on Overthrow of the Bolshevik Power in Baku. 11.09.1918. APDPARA, f.277, r.2, v. 8, p. 8. 62. Cipher telegram of M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 20.09.1918. APDPARA, f.277, r.2, v.8, pp. 13–16. 63. Шаумян, Бакинская Коммуна, p. 55. 64. Бюллетень Центрокаспия (Byulleten Tsentrokaspiya), August 2, 1918. 65. Wilfred Malleson. “Twenty Six Commissars.” From an English magazine of March 1933. ARCSAPPSM, f.303, r.1a, v.31, pp. 6–7. 66. Major-General L.C.Dunsterville. The Adventures of Dunsterforce. Edward Arnold, London, 1920, p. 115. 67. Ратгаузер, Революция и гражданская война в Баку, p. 197. 68. Б. Байков (B.Baykov), Воспоминания о революции в Закавказье (1917–1920 гг.) (Recollections of the Revolution in Transcaucasia [1917–1920]). Berlin, 1922, p. 129. 69. Alfred Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, 1918–1922. London-New York., 1923, p. 69. 70. Dunsterville. The Adventures of Dunsterforce, p.182. 71. The New York Times, July 14, 1918. 72. У. Черчилль (W. Churchill), Мировой кризис (The World Crisis). Moscow, 1932, p. 105. 73. Д. Ллойд Джордж (D. Lloyd George), Военные мемуары. Том VI (Wartime Memoirs. Volume VI). Moscow, 1937, p. 97. 74. N.S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Russia. 1917–1923. New York, 1952, p. 143. 75. George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: A Study in Great Powers Rivalry, 1918–1948. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968, p. 98. 76. Ллойд Джордж, Военные мемуары, p. 98. 77. M. Mehdizadə (M. Mehdizade), Beynəlmiləl siyasətdə petrol (Petroleum in International Politics). Baku, 1994, pp. 10–11. 78. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, p. 17. 79. Ibid., p. 18. 80. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p. 70. 81. From S. Shaumian and A. Japaridze to Petrovsk, Yekaternador, Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, and Moscow, personally to V. Lenin. 21.06.1918. APDPARA, Copy fund, document No. 370, p. 21. 82. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Russia, p. 143. 83. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, p. 330 (verbatim).

The liberation of Baku  121 84. Recollections of Revolutionary Events of 1917–1918 in Baku and Azerbaijan. From Blyumin’s Memoirs. 1922. APDPARA, f.276, r.2, v.20, p. 20. 85. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE) de France (Archives Diplomatique) Correspondanse politique et commerciale, 1914–1940 Série  “Z” Europe 1918– 1940 Sous-Serie USSR Europe—Russie service russe d’information et d’edudes (S.R.I.E.) XLI Caucase—Azerbaidjan (1918–1920). Direction des Affaires Polotiques et Commerciales Caucase Republique d’Azerbaidjan Evenements Annees 1918–1919. Vol.832, folio 2. 86. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, p. 331 (verbatim). 87. Hamid Sultanov. Establishment of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, July days, collapse of the Soviet, Invitation of the English, and the Centrocaspian Dictatorship. 16.10.1923. APDPARA, f.276, r.2, v.128, pp. 2–3. 88. Бюллетень Центрокаспия (Byulleten Tsentrokaspiya), August 6, 1918. 89. Памяти 26-и, p. 55. 90. Бюллетень Центрокаспия (Byulleten Tsentrokaspiya), August 9, 1918. 91. Ibid. 92. APDPARA, f.276, r.7, v.256, p. 1. 93. Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community :The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict. New York, 1955, p. 207. 94. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, p. 333 (verbatim). 95. Ibid. 96. Recollections of the Red Army in Baku in 1917–1920. No date shown. APDPARA, f.276, r.2, v.22, p. 90. 97. Report of Stepan Shaumian at the Meeting of the Azerbaijani Group at the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolsheviks) Party. 11.07.1927. RSPHSA, f.84, r.3, v.283, p. 61. 98. Памяти 26-и, p. 165. 99. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953, p. 492. 100. Бюллетень Центрокаспия (Byulleten Tsentrokaspiya), August 16, 1918. 101. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), September 15, 1919. 102. Brief Chronicle of Events from the End of the Baku Commune to Tragic Death of “The 26s.” No date shown. APDPARA, f.303, r.1a, v.14, p. 3ş. 103. Бюллетень Центрокаспия (Byulleten Tsentrokaspiya), August 8, 1918. 104. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation, in Istanbul to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. July, 1918. APDPARA. f.277, r.2, v. 7, p. 151. 105. Ibid. 106. Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, Türk İnkilabı Tarihi. Cilt III (History of the Turkish Revolution. Volume III). Ankara, 1983, p. 225. 107. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 07.08.1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v. 154, p. 9. 108. Urgent Diplomatic Information of F.K.Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to M.E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul. 23.08.1918. APDPARA, f.277, r.2, v.7, p. 22. 109. Ibid., p. 23. 110. Денстервиль, Британский империализм в Баку и Персии, p. 220. 111. Ibid., p. 208. 112. APDPARA, f.276, r.9, v.132, p. 14. 113. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p. 84. 114. Dunsterville. The Adventures of Dunsterforce, p. 267. 115. APDPARA, f.303, r.1a, v.14, p. 6. 116. Dunsterville. The Adventures of Dunsterforce, p. 252. 117. Allen and Muratof, Caucasian Battlefields, p. 495.

122  The liberation of Baku 118. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Russia, pp. 143–144. 1 19. Документы и материалы по внешней политике Закавказья и Грузии (Documents and Materials on Foreign Policy of the Caucasus and Georgia). Tiflis, 1919, pp. 440– 441. 120. Ibid., p. 443. 121. Lenin, About Azerbaijan, p. 140. 122. Документы внешней политики СССР, pp. 437–445. 123. Ibid., pp. 443–444. 124. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 02.09.1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v. 31, p. 11. 125. İkdam, September 2, 1918. 126. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 01.09.1918. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v. 16, p. 2. 127. From the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the German Embassy. September, 1918. ARCSAPPSM, f.277, r.2, v.8, p. 60. 128. The mandate of A.M. Topchibasheff. 23.08.1918. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 8. Le Centre d’études des mondes russe, caucasien et centreeuropéen (CERCEC) l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS, Paris), p. 8. 129. Report of F.K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to M.E. Rasulzade, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul. 23.08.1918. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v.138, p. 2. 130. Letter of A.M. Topchubashov, Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F.K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v.34, p .5. 131. Ibid., p. 4. 132. Note of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to Count Waldburg, Ambassador of the German Imperial Government to Turkey. 12.09.1918. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v.8, pp. 8–9. 133. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 01.09.1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v. 154, p. 16. 134. Ibid. 135. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 02.09.1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v.154, p. 10. 136. Документы внешней политики СССР, p. 478. 137. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 02.09.1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v. 154, p. 16. 138. Ibid., p. 11. 139. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 19.07.1918. SAAR, f.894, r.10, v. 31, p. 4. 140. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 138. 141. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v.29, pp. 1–3. 142. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), November 12, 1918. 143. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 01.09.1918. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v. 30, p. 1. 144. Letter of M.E. Rasulzade, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Istanbul, to M.H. Hajinski, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 06.09.1918. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v. 30, p. 1. 145. Ibid. 146. Notes of A.M. Topchubashov on the conversation with the Turkish Sultan at the State Reception. 10.01.1918. SAAR, f.970, r.1, v.158, p. 1.

The liberation of Baku  123 147. Les Anglais battus à Bakou. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique, vol.832, folio 3. 148. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, p. 70. 149. For more details, see: Testimonial Evidence of A.I. Mikoyan on the Funtikov case. 20.03.1926. RSPHSA, f.84, r.3, v.283, p. 40. 150. M.Ə. Rəsulzadə (M.E. Rasulzade), Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti (Azerbaijani Republic). Baku, 1990, pp. 42–43. 151. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p. 92. 152. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, vol. 832, folio 10, folio 12. 153. See: Б. Ишханян (B. Ishkhanian), Великие ужасы в гор. Баку. Анкетное исследование сентябрских событий 1918 г. Издание анкетной комиссии при Бакинском Армянском Национальном Совете. (Great Horror in Baku city. Survey of the September events of 1918. Publication of the Survey Commission of the Armenian National Council of Baku). Tiflis, 1920. 154. See: Colonel Chardigny, à Ministre Guerre-Paris. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de France, Archives Diplomatique, vol. 832, folio 6. 155. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), September 19, 1918.

5 Diplomatic activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of World War I and the Allied entry into Azerbaijan As soon as the Azerbaijani government moved to Baku, its first step was to establish order in the city and set up a functioning council of ministers. After settling in Baku, the government newspaper Azerbaijan, which continued its publication in the capital, published the interim addresses of ministries and offices in early October.1 The office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was first housed in several rooms of the Metropol Hotel, after which it moved to a magnificent residence located on Sahil Street.2 At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on October 16, 1918, the staffing table was reviewed, and the bureaucratic red tape between people and the government was minimized.3 The mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to devise and realize the foreign policy of the government. It was considered one of the most important ministries of the republic, as its core function was to advance the country’s interests abroad through the conduct and management of its foreign relations. As the efforts of the government had been geared toward the goal of liberating Baku, which was accomplished during the summer and autumn of 1918, the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be determined only after the Council of Ministers had moved to Baku. According to the Statute on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry’s responsibilities were as follows: to establish relations with foreign governments on political, economic, social, cultural, and legal matters; to promote and protect the interest of Azerbaijani nationals and businesses in foreign countries; to influence, strengthen, and develop industrial and commercial relations of Azerbaijan with other countries; to protect the dignity and property of Azerbaijanis living abroad; to help protect the borders of Azerbaijan through the issuance of visas to foreign nationals and authenticating documents and ensuring that all their legal requirements are met. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was divided into central and external departments according to their respective functions. The Central Office included the Ministry Council, Clerical Office, and a department to oversee both the internal (staffing and accounting) and external affairs of the ministry. The external agencies include embassies, consulates-general, representations at international organizations, consulates, and consular agencies. The ministry was headed by the minister and, under him, a deputy minister and a counselor. The deputy minister would assume the minister’s position in his absence. The office had a director, a deputy director,

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  125 two officials for special missions, departments of diplomatic and economic affairs, and registration as well as translation services and archives. The Diplomatic Department was responsible for preparing letters upon the minister’s instructions; undertaking issues regarding recognition of the republic’s government and the mutual recognition of diplomatic representatives, consuls, and agencies; dealing with issues related to boundary disputes; diplomatic correspondence, including secret and ciphered documents; taking responsibility for the ministry’s properties both in the country and abroad; and preparing estimates of expenditures, although accounting issues were the responsibility of the Economic Department.4 The General Department, in addition to registration issues, was responsible for the receipt and dispatch of correspondence and oversight of courier expeditions. The Translation Department was responsible for translations and proofreading of translations of various documents and legal acts composed in different foreign languages. Immediately after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started its work in Baku in September 1918, the Ministry of Archives was created, where various correspondences of the ministry, diplomatic documents and legal acts pertaining to Baku’s liberation were quickly systematized and put in their respective order. The government’s resolution on state languages, dated June 27, initiated steps toward switching to Turkish in correspondence. The first initiatives in sending diplomatic delegations to neighboring countries were carried out even while there was ongoing fighting for the city of Baku. Mammad Yusif Jafarov, who was well known in the South Caucasus, was named as the government’s diplomatic representative to Georgia. During his tenure, he played an important role in the development of political, economic, and diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as in the solution of boundary disputes between the two countries, and he also strived for the protection of the rights of the Muslim population in the country where he was posted. On the eve of entering Baku, the government decided on September 12 to send plenipotentiary diplomatic representatives to Germany, Ukraine, Iran, and Armenia.5 On September 14, the authority of the Armenian diplomatic representative, Tigran Bekzadian, was recognized.6 In October 1918, the diplomatic delegation of the Republic of Georgia, with Nikolai Kartsivadze as its head, started its activity in Baku. On October 6, 1918, the government decided to establish a commission that set out to inform European capitals about Azerbaijan’s independence. In late August, Ali Mardan Bey Topchupashov was appointed Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Istanbul by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was given the task to start forming the structure of the missions in European capitals.7 Despite numerous disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Armenian infringements on the rights of Azerbaijanis, the appointment of a diplomatic representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Armenia was announced on October 22. Teymur Bey Makinski, Deputy Minister of Justice, was appointed the diplomatic representative to Armenia.8 The Council of Ministers passed a resolution about establishing diplomatic relations with the Crimean government on October 23, 1918 and put the Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of this task.9

126  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan Mammad Bey (Suleyman Bey) Sulkevich, the prime minister of the Crimean government, had asked Fatali Khan Khoyski about establishing relations in his letter in early November. The letter stated that the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to Ukraine had met with representatives of the Crimean government in Kiev, and they had discussed the possibility of forging a mutual relationship between the Azerbaijani and Crimean governments. In his letter General Sulkevich noted that, although Azerbaijan was a Caspian basin country, it still had an interest in the Black Sea.10 In consideration of this request, Mir Yusif Vazirov (Chamanzaminli), who was appointed diplomatic representative to Ukraine, represented the Republic of Azerbaijan in Crimea as well.11 At a planned meeting of the Caucasian republics in Tiflis in mid-November, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, the diplomatic representative of the Georgian government, and Dr. Mustafa Vakilov were appointed Azerbaijani delegates to the Transcaucasian commission on November 11.12 The Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, seeing the importance of Batum, appointed Dr. Mahmud Bey Efendiyev the Azerbaijani representative in Batum on November 10.13 In order to establish diplomatic relations with the surrounding newly established states, the following were appointed Azerbaijani representatives: Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev to the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus, Dr. Jafar Bey Rustambeyov to Kuban, and Akbar Agha Sadigov to the TransCaspian government.14 After the Azerbaijani government moved from Ganja to Baku, Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli, who was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, became one of the most important people in the ministry from the start of September 1918. Ziyadkhanli was the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in late December until the government was formed, owing to the fact that Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, who had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs from early October 1918, was not in Baku at the time. Topchubashov played an important role in the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the government’s move to Baku and in establishing the foreign policy of Azerbaijan during the crisis in the autumn of 1918. It was after the government’s move to Baku that, in a short span of time, the machinery of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs was shaped and the foundation of its diplomatic relations with foreign countries was laid down. The most serious challenge for Azerbaijani diplomacy at the time was to establish relations with foreign countries that were beneficial for Azerbaijani interests within the context of the unstable international relations at the end of World War I. As soon as the capital moved to Baku, Germany sent a military and commercial representative, and Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic representatives arrived in the last part of September. The German representatives intended to use the difficult economic situation of Azerbaijan to get advantageous concessions in the oil industry and the cotton trade. In response to their demands, however, the national government adopted the slogan “Azerbaijan is for Azerbaijanis” and started protecting the independence of Azerbaijan in all spheres.15 Even the Turkish military, which had played an enormous role in the liberation of Baku, withdrew from interfering in the internal affairs of the Azerbaijani government,

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  127 though such interference had been readily observed during the June crisis. With regard to Ottoman–Azerbaijani relations after the liberation of Baku, Tadeusz Swietochowski wrote that the Ottoman general was now careful to avoid any appearance of interfering in Azerbaijan affairs, and he routinely referred all matters other than the military ones to the local authorities.16 This change on the part of the Turkish government was related to the major steps the Azerbaijani government was taking. Nevertheless, relations between the two fraternal nations did begin to grow tense with the liberation of Baku. During a visit to Berlin that began on September 6, one of the main purposes of Turkish Prime Minister Talaat Pasha was to discuss issues related to Azerbaijan and in particular to make the Germans rescind the agreement they had signed with Russia on August 27. Talaat Pasha left for Berlin on September 5 after the conference of the Central powers in Vienna, where he had had quite intense discussions with both German officials and the Russian ambassador to Berlin. During his meeting with German representatives Paul von Hintze and Otto von Lossow, Talaat Pasha expressed his anxiety regarding the agreement on the Caucasus that had been signed with Russia without informing Turkey. In return, the German representatives accused Turkey of violating their commitment not to attack Baku.17 On September 10, Talaat Pasha presented a memorandum to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the situation in the South Caucasus and the Brest-Litovsk treaty, pointing out that 85 percent of Baku’s population was Muslim and that geographically Baku belonged to Azerbaijan. It was stated in the memorandum that it would be impossible to create a strong Azerbaijan capable of surviving without Baku. Also, taking into consideration Russia’s ongoing hostile actions toward Turkey, the idea was to establish a state in the North and South Caucasus for its Muslim inhabitants. Talaat Pasha wanted Germany to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan (including Baku), Georgia, and Armenia as well as the North Caucasus, the borders of which were to be determined separately.18 On September 11, Dr. Kriege from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed the policies laid out in the Turkish memorandum with the Russian ambassador. The representative of Soviet Russia noted that Moscow did not recognize the agreements signed between the South Caucasian countries and Turkey but also added that although he could consider the establishment of a Caucasian state between Russia and Turkey and the creation of buffer states consisting of independent Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, they decisively rejected the formation of one state that included the Muslims of the North and South Caucasus. On September 12, after Germany was made aware of Ambassador Adolf Joffe’s stance, it decided to support only the stipulations put forth by Soviet Russia and said that they saw no basis under international law to recognize the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the German government said that if the circumstances warranted, Germany was ready to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan, inclusive of the city of Baku, and in return would demand the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the borders determined by the August 27 agreement.19

128  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan During the most serious stage of the negotiation, Talaat Pasha received a telegram from Istanbul announcing Baku’s liberation, which further strengthened the position of Turkey. Now they intended to offer Germany some economic concessions in return for recognizing the independence of the Caucasian governments. The liberation of Baku shattered the resolute position of German officials toward Azerbaijan. It was obvious from the new agreement presented to Talaat Pasha on September 18 that Turkish troops were not intended to remain in Azerbaijan any longer. The Turkish promise regarding this issue was affirmed in the German–Ottoman protocol of seven articles signed in September. It was on this occasion that Germany officially denounced the August 27 treaty and stated the desire to recognize the country of Azerbaijan. It was also noted that, as a first step, Germany would soon open a consulate in Baku. Furthermore, Germany promised that Soviet Russia would also recognize the independence of Azerbaijan if the Ottomans withdrew their military forces from Azerbaijan and Armenia.20 Turkey, in return, was to undertake the commitment to influence Azerbaijan in granting concessions to Germany in matters involving oil and in protecting the rights of German people living in Azerbaijan. A day after the German-Ottoman protocol was signed, Talaat Pasha received the Georgian delegates who were in Berlin. During negotiations at the Adlon Hotel, the Turkish Grand Vizier stressed the importance of improving relations between Turkey and Georgia. He noted, We should eliminate all problems together … . We should stand firm in the Caucasus. Russia’s Ambassador Joffe told me today that although they had agreed to Germany’s recognition of the independence of Georgia, for their part Russia itself has not recognized it. As you see, we should be allies.21 The Ottoman Empire considered South Caucasian solidarity against the Bolshevik invasion as the main guarantee of Turkish security and the Caucasian states’ existence. Along with Georgian delegates, Talaat Pasha also met in Berlin with Armenians A. Zurabian and A. Ohanian. They exchanged views on an allCaucasian solidarity. As soon as Georgy Chicherin received the news of Baku’s liberation, he wrote a long telegram addressed to the German government on September 19. It stated that the liberation of Baku, “one of the main cities of the Russian republic,” caused severe protests in Soviet Russia. The RSFSR People’s Foreign Affairs Commissariat’s letter to Turkey dated September 20 stated that the liberation of Baku with the help of a “bandit Tatar detachment” was considered an invasion of the territory of Soviet Russia.22 That is why Soviet Russia denounced the section of the Brest treaty on matters pertaining to Turkey. This gave grounds to think that the part of the Brest treaty that was of concern was on the subject of Baku. If the problem had to do with adherence to the terms of the agreement, then Soviet Russia could have raised the problem earlier, at the beginning of May, when Turkish troops were still taking part in several military operations. But that was no longer the case. Conversely, the Brest treaty was in force in the Caucasus

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  129 when Transcaucasia considered itself a part of Russia. The fact that the South Caucasian Seim declared its independence and that a number of the Caucasian peoples had declared independence and formed national republics meant that the Brest treaty had already lost its validity for them. Third, the fact that Soviet Russia allowed Germany to recognize the independence of Georgia, according to the agreement dated August 27, already meant the termination of the Brest treaty’s section concerning the Caucasus. Herbert Hauschild, the German consul general in Moscow, received a letter from Soviet Russia on September 21 stating that they regarded Baku’s liberation by Turkish troops and Germany’s non-compliance with its treaty commitments to be violations of the terms of the agreement dated August 27.23 The letter that Soviet Russia had addressed to Turkey was published in the Izvestiya newspaper on September 21. As the Turkish ambassador was not in Moscow at the time, it was decided to deliver the letter to Istanbul via the Ottoman embassy in Berlin. But Talaat Pasha was at that time in Berlin, thus prompting the start of negotiations about the Caucasus in the letter sent to Turkish government. At the same time, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia had instructed Adolf Joffe in Berlin to meet with Talaat Pasha and Turkish Foreign Minister Nasimi Ahmad Bey in order to “achieve Baku’s surrender to Soviets.”24 Joffe received instructions from Moscow to delay the official presentation of the September 20 letter to Turkish officials. However, Talaat Pasha and Nasimi Ahmad Bey were already aware of the contents of the letter. During the TurkeyRussia negotiations that began in Berlin on September 21, Talaat Pasha noted that the Baku problem could be solved only through peaceful means and that his government did not have any intentions of annexation. This stance by Talaat Pasha was demonstrated on September 22 as well when the negotiations were continued. The Turkish Grand Vizier also said that Turkey had no intention to annex Russian territory and that the Turkish troops in the Caucasus would immediately be withdrawn.25 Despite Talaat Pasha’s loyalty, it was clear from Joffe’s words that Russia would not give up Baku oil to the Azerbaijanis even if Russia did recognize the independence of Azerbaijan.26 During the last discussion, on September 24, before leaving Berlin, Joffe again demanded Baku’s surrender to the Soviet government. Talaat Pasha noted that Turkey could not commit to giving Russia any territory because Turkey had no claim to interfere with the internal affairs of the nations of the Caucasus.27 Talaat Pasha left Berlin for Istanbul the same day, and Rufat Pasha, Turkey’s ambassador to Germany, was charged with continuing negotiations with Russia. Talaat Pasha, who received Ali Mardan Topchubashov on October 2, informed him about the Berlin negotiations and noted that he had done his best for Azerbaijani interests. He noted that at that time neither AustriaHungary nor Germany was ready to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and that, as the Russian ambassador had indicated during the negotiations, the “Caucasian countries had only established independent states under pressure from Turkey.” Joffe stated that Russia would not “tolerate” Muslim peasants’ being oppressed by the landowners and the rich and noted that “Muslims [in the Caucasus] were Shiites and Turks were Sunnites.” Talaat Pasha rejected this

130  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan argument, saying, “Look at me. I am a Turk and I am Shiite.” Topchubashov, who had listened to this, added, “If I were there with you in Berlin I would tell Joffe, ‘I am a Caucasian Muslim and I am Sunni.’” Topchubashov informed Talaat Pasha about this situation, noting that it was traditional Russian policy to take advantage of religious differences in Azerbaijan and more generally between Muslims. He said that the current government in Russia was pursuing the same policy and that the Bolsheviks had demonstrated their antagonism toward Muslims by their actions in Baku.28 In early October, the Turkish ambassador to Germany, Rufat Pasha, presented Soviet ambassador Joffe with a protocol to be signed between Russia and Turkey in order to normalize the military situation. According to that protocol, Soviet Russia should recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and make commitments to not interfere militarily or any other way. Upon agreement on these terms, Turkey would commit to withdrawing its forces within the borders determined by the Brest treaty. In early October, the Soviets were hesitant to give an answer to these terms as negotiations were under way. Bulgaria’s signing of the capitulation act in Saloniki on September 29 influenced Soviet Russia’s decision, and the ambassador in Berlin was given instructions to sign the protocol with Turkey. Soviet Russia sensed that the allies would be defeated soon and thus sent a letter to Rufat Pasha, the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, on October 3 that suggested that Turkey withdraw its troops back to the borders as determined in the Brest treaty, that the territories evacuated by Turkish troops should be returned to Russia, that a special international commission should be created to calculate the material losses for the violation of the terms of the Brest treaty and, last, that the two sides should ask the German empire to be the guarantor of these commitments and to monitor the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty.29 Ambassador Joffe, who was constantly informing Moscow about the course of the negotiations carried out in Berlin, received a telegram on October 7 signed by Vladimir Lenin and Yakov Sverdlov that read, We do not agree to sign the protocol with Turkey, unless they agree to our suggestion about returning Baku to us. Without this stipulation we may conclude that there had been a secret agreement signed with the Entente about giving Baku to the Entente.30 But that theory was groundless. Later, when secret agreements signed among the military groups were revealed, it was learned that Turkey had never had secret discussions or signed a secret agreement with the Entente about Baku until the Mondros treaty. On October 10, RSFSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin addressed another letter to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterating earlier Soviet demands. The arguments of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were rejected. The letter included demands for Baku and even the whole of the South Caucasus, excluding Georgia, whose independence had been recognized by Germany.31 The Turkish–Russian negotiations were never concluded, and the protocol was not signed.

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  131 The idea to send Azerbaijani representatives from Istanbul to European capitals was an important initiative, as it was essential to be on top of the frequently changing political process and international situation. Mammad Emin Rasulzade noted in an urgent telegram from Istanbul to Fatali Khan Khoyski: “The political spectrum has totally changed. Peace was suggested upon Wilson’s fourteen points. There will not be any conference. Armenians demand Garabagh. It is important to urgently call the National Council and start the dissemination in Europe.”32 However, neighboring Georgia and Armenia had already sent their representatives to Berlin in August. Those delegates closely monitored the course of negotiations and, when they had sensed that the Central powers were going to be defeated, they established non-formal relations with diplomatic representatives of the United States, England, and France in the capitals of Norway and Sweden.33 Zurab Avalov (Avalishvili) had met the British and French Ambassadors in Oslo. Sir Mansfield K. Finley, Great Britain’s Ambassador to Norway received him and was thoroughly briefed about the situation in the South Caucasus.34 The British Ambassador was quite interested in Baku and considered that Germany moved toward Baku upon Turkish instigation. But Avalov reiterated that Germany was allied with Russia on this issue. He said that “The Turkish-Azerbaijani solidarity is based on Turkish solidarity.”35 Armenian and Georgian representatives in Norway met with U.S. plenipotentiary representative Arthur Schofield in Oslo and presented him a memorandum about their declarations of independence. This step had its consequences. In September, two of the most authoritative political figures of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt and Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge, delivered speeches favoring an independent Armenian state. According to the resolution prepared by Senator Lodge, an independent Armenia should comprise not only territories of Russia and “Turkish Armenia” but Cilicia, a part of southern Azerbaijan, and other territories. Senator William King had earlier prepared a similar speech about Armenia and presented it to the Senate for discussion. The negotiations carried out in European capitals by Armenian and Georgian representatives with diplomatic representatives of the Entente countries in the autumn of 1918 had positive results with regard to their status after the defeat of the Central powers. Azerbaijani representatives in Istanbul and especially the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to Istanbul, Ali Mardan Topchubashov, considered it important to send a special delegation to various European capitals. The Azerbaijani government had been busy fighting for Baku for the last 4 months and had been unable to do anything in that direction. It was for this reason that Topchubashov, on his own initiative, created a small delegation headed by Ali Bey Huseynzade, which was to be sent to the neutral country of Switzerland. There, they were to meet with diplomatic representatives of foreign countries and visit Holland, Italy, and France. But the delegates were not issued visas by the Entente countries and could not pursue the tasks assigned to them. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, who was preparing to visit Berlin and Vienna, concluded several meetings with Turkish officials in Istanbul throughout the month of October. But, as Turkey was in crisis on the eve of the defeat and there had

132  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan been three cabinet changes in Turkey within the last 3 months, it was not possible to establish stable relations between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman government. Topchubashov wrote in his letter to the head of the Azerbaijani government on November 14 that this is the third cabinet to be formed here since my visit; Izzet Pasha’s cabinet, which was formed after Talaat Pasha’s cabinet, has now been dissolved; the former diplomat Tevfik Pasha formed a new cabinet with Minister of Foreign Affairs Mustafa Rashid Pasha several days ago. Hardly having had an opportunity to open relations with that cabinet, a new one is being formed now.36 On October 2, after returning to Istanbul, Talaat Pasha was the first to receive the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of Azerbaijan. Earlier he had received Mammad Emin. Rasulzade, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, and Aslan Bey Safikurdski, who were also in Istanbul. During the negotiations, Talaat Pasha noted that he supported Azerbaijani interests but that the situation had grown very difficult. He stated that only one wish of theirs had been realized—that wish being the collapse of the Russian empire, “That proved to be a very good result for us, for you and for both the Caucasian and Russian people.” To take advantage of this, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians should forget about minor conflicts and problems and establish friendly relations. Talaat Pasha said that such relations should be established post haste. “But, of course, the newly established countries should make concessions of about five or six villages that were in dispute. Only in such circumstances would we support the Caucasian states at the peace conference.”37 During the meeting, Talaat Pasha remarked that he had always dreamed of the independence of Azerbaijan. Ali Mardan Topchubashov expressed his gratitude to Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha on behalf of the Azerbaijani government for his efforts toward assisting Azerbaijani interests and for the participation of Turkish soldiers in the liberation of Baku. He mentioned that, since the day Azerbaijan established relations with its neighboring countries, the Azerbaijan republic was always guided by the principles of friendship, but he also noted that it had certain difficulties. He thought that though it was possible to go on well with the Georgians, it was hard to say the same about the Armenians. The sincerity of our Muslim population is well-known. And it is enough to show recent actions of Armenians. They have as many orientations as the number of countries. They express their love and faith to you in Istanbul and to Germans in Berlin. It is for that reason why our government decided to send me to the Austro-Hungarian and German capitals as ambassador extraordinaire.38 On the same day of October 2, Topchubashov was received by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Nasimi Ahmad Bey. He presented the Mandate as the

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  133 Extraordinary Ambassador granted to him by the Azerbaijani government to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman government and informed him about the Republic of Azerbaijan. The mandate authorized him to represent Azerbaijan in Istanbul, Berlin, and Vienna as well as carry out negotiations with Armenian and Georgian representatives. Nasimi Ahmad Bey mentioned that he had recently talked about Topchubashov’s mission and Azerbaijan to the Grand Vizier: “We may hope now that good times are starting for you and for the Azerbaijanis and now you can establish your statehood.”39 During the negotiations, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed the importance of eliminating conflicts between Caucasian countries and determining boundaries by mutual agreement. He noted that things had changed in the world, that the Istanbul conference would not take place, and that it was important to maintain peace and stability as well as friendly relations in the Caucasus. Nasimi Ahmad Bey suggested that “You should start with it as soon as possible so that you have time to prepare for the conference. Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians should go there with a common dream.” Though the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to working with Armenians, Ali Mardan Topchubashov substantiated the impossibility of working together with them. He made mention that the Armenians have a big appetite and they want to satisfy themselves at the expense of others, and first of all the Azerbaijanis. Propaganda against Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis is carried out in almost every country. They spread misinformation about us saying that our nation is not capable of establishing statehood and is unable to co-exist in peace with neighboring nationalities and as a consequence to that they have soiled our reputation. Topchubashov continued by saying “that is why it is so important for us to have representatives in the capitals of Europe.” The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs likewise agreed to his statements. Noting a conversation he had with Azerbaijani representatives who arrived for the Istanbul conference, Nasimi Ahmad Bey told them that during the meetings that it was a very good idea when abroad to familiarize others with Azerbaijan.40 On October 3, Enver Pasha, the Minister of the Ottoman Military, received the Azerbaijani Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador. At the reception of the Military Ministry, Topchubashov met Halil Bey, the Justice Minister, who was the head of the delegation during the Batum negotiations. They exchanged views on border problems and mutual relations of the Caucasian countries. During negotiations at the Military Ministry, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov expressed his gratitude to Enver Pasha for the creation of the Azerbaijani army, for the care and assistance they gave for the liberation of Baku, as well as appreciation for Nuri Pasha, the Military Minister’s brother, who had commanded the Army of Islam in battle. The staffing and preparation of important personnel for the Azerbaijani army as well as questions relating to arms and military supply equipment were discussed during the meetings. Enver Pasha praised the

134  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan Azerbaijani representatives’ visit to several European capitals and stated that it was important to send representatives not only to Berlin and Vienna but to neutral countries such as Switzerland and Holland in order to keep in contact with the embassies of the belligerent countries. Such visits would it make possible the spread of Azerbaijani independence by way of newspapers and other media in those countries. Enver Pasha further stated that it is essential to stay in Switzerland until a general agreement is achieved and visit Berlin and other centers. If you can not stay there for a long time then you can send one of your representatives there. But it would be better if you had an entire Azerbaijani delegation in Geneva and Lausanne.41 But the difficulties of the World War had intensified the crisis in the government of Turkey. Changes in the government in Germany in early October affected the Ottoman state as well. The cabinet headed by Talaat Pasha was dissolved on October 8, and Izzet Pasha formed a new cabinet on October 19; he was trying to adjust Turkish policy to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points. In mid-October, pro-British leanings had strengthened in the Turkish political arena. The previous cabinet, especially Enver Pasha, was the main target of the press; he was criticized and “blamed for all the sins.” There even was a publication that asked, “Why did he bind Azerbaijan to Turkey?” However, the existing Cabinet was not in a strong position either. In his letter to chairman of the Azerbaijani government, Ali Mardan Topchubashov wrote that “the current cabinet acknowledges its weaknesses.”42 The weakness of the new cabinet showed itself in negotiations between Topchubashov and the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister. The new chairman, Izzet Pasha, received the Azerbaijani Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador on October 21. Topchubashov congratulated the new cabinet, informed the chairman about Azerbaijan, carried out negotiations, and updated him on the current situation. Izzet Pasha noted that the situation had become very critical. Yes, time goes by very fast; everything changes, not with every passing day, but with every passing hour. Look what was there yesterday and see what we have today. Yesterday, we were in such conditions that we felt fine, but now … we are defeated. We need to act together now, in order to protect our interests. It is not a secret that we love Azerbaijan and we have done our best by it now.43 The Azerbaijani representatives showed their gratitude for the help from the Turks and expressed hope that the new cabinet would pursue the same policy toward Azerbaijan. In response, Izzet Pasha confirmed that the older brother would always help the little one and said, taking into consideration the objective realities, “You see that the situation changes; our position and the position of our allies are also sharply changing. That is the reason why today, we do not have the right to say anything, but Wilson and his supporters do.”44 After lengthy

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  135 discussions, an agreement was reached. Ali Mardan Topchubashov informed the Azerbaijani government that the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey would remain the same. Chairman Izzet Pasha gave an order on October 24 to withdraw Turkish troops from the Caucasus, in accordance with the boundaries determined by the Brest Treaty. This command obviously showed that Turkey was on the eve of the admission of defeat. On October 27, Topchubashov met with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nabi Mehmed Bey. A range of important directives in the scope of Azerbaijani and Turkish relationships were discussed during the meeting, and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey would not change. The Azerbaijani side expressed their assurance that they would be able to receive military supplies from Turkey necessary to reinforce the Azerbaijani army. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned that Ottoman troops might be compelled to withdraw from Azerbaijan under pressure from the Allies. But Nabi Mehmed Bey also said that it was possible for the Turkish officers and soldiers to voluntarily stay within the ranks of the Azerbaijani army and serve there. Nabi Bey also announced during the discussions that they would appoint a diplomatic representative to Azerbaijan if Turkish troops were withdrawn from the territory. The Garabagh issue and propaganda that the Armenian representatives carried out in the Istanbul conference were also touched upon during the discussions. Topchubashov showed that the territories that the Armenians were claiming for themselves, namely Shusha, Javanshir, Jabrayil, and Zangezur districts of Ganja province, were in fact Azerbaijani territories and that the government had the right to send troops to those districts in order to establish the peace, which had been disturbed by criminals such as Andranik. He stated, “Contrary to what the Armenians claim, I want to say that those are our troops and they have been sent to their own territories.”45 Armenian representatives in Istanbul received a telegram from Arshak Jamalian, their permanent representative to Tiflis, that they were aware of Azerbaijani troops being sent to Garabagh. Avetis Aharonian, the head of the Armenian delegation, had sent a letter addressed to Topchubashov that did not touch upon the crimes Andranik had committed in Garabagh but noted that the deployment of Azerbaijani troops to Garabagh was a hindrance to the peaceful solution of the problem.46 A similar letter was addressed and sent to German and Austria-Hungarian embassies as well. But the German approach toward the Armenians was not very cordial; even though they did abide by Armenian demands, they were not keen on Armenia’s dreams to dominate in the region.47 Furthermore, the Armenian plenipotentiary representative to Tiflis had addressed the head of the German diplomatic staff, Kress von Kressenstein. But Kress von Kressenstein told him that he could not help him and had recommended to him to meet Abdul Karim Pasha, the Ottoman representative in Georgia. Abdul Karim Pasha then informed him that the issue did not concern Turkey and suggested that Jamalian meet with Mammad Yusif Jafarov, the Azerbaijani representative in Tiflis.48 On October 18, the plenipotentiary representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan was received at the Turkish Ministry of Education in Istanbul. Owing

136  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan to the Minister’s absence due to illness, the discussions about AzerbaijaniTurkish relations were instead carried out with the deputy minister. They first touched upon the issue of inviting teachers from Turkey, as was suggested by Ahmad Bey Aghayev and Mammad Emin Rasulzade in the summer of 1918. The Turkish side informed them that the issue was being followed up by the Turkish Ministry of Education and that the initiative of the Azerbaijani side would soon be realized.49 During the meeting, the problem of sending Azerbaijani students to Turkey for purposes of education and the problem of their return to Azerbaijan after graduation were also discussed. Ali Mardan Topchubashov was to create an “Azerbaijani Press Bureau” in Istanbul with the help of the Turkish Education and Culture Ministries and progressive intellectuals.50 Soon after, this bureau played an enormous role in the collection and spread of information about Azerbaijan. In the latter part of the day, on October 28, the Azerbaijani Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador met with the newly elected Sheikh-ul Islam, an authoritative figure among Shiites, who was from the Caucasus. He had left Inakh village near Gunyub aul of Dagestan for Turkey to receive an education there and had remained in Turkey since. For this reason, the Sheikh-ul Islam asked several questions about the situation in the Caucasus, about the AzerbaijaniDagestan relationship, and about Azerbaijani students’ attitudes toward religion. He also touched upon the most important problems of the Shariat. Topchubashov thoroughly briefed him about the situation in Azerbaijan, about the moral harm that the 100-year-long Russian colonization had caused, and about how Caucasian religious figures had turned into a tool in the hands of the Russian administration. The Sheikh-ul Islam was also informed of how the enemies of the Muslims took advantage of the dispute between Sunni and Shia, and he was pleased to hear that this dispute had been eradicated in Azerbaijan. He noted, I am so happy to hear this. It is for sure that this difference should not separate Muslims who believe in one God and the Koran. We had suffered so much from this … Thanks be to God, that the people in the Caucasus understand this problem. Topchubashov said that division of Muslims was traditional Russian policy, and he mentioned the will of Peter I as an example. Peter I had advised his heirs to pit Persians and Turks against one another on the grounds of the Sunni and Shia dispute and to always bribe the Muftis and Sheikhs-ul-islam with gold. He added that, even today, the Bolshevik government tried to get its hands on power by those means. Islam and national language problems were discussed during the meeting. The idea of certain religious figures, saying that “All Muslims should speak Arabic,” was criticized. Those religious figures considered that the Ottomans had ruined themselves by declaring Turkish the state language. In this regard, the Sheikh-ul Islam expressed, “It is impossible. Every nation does and should love its native language. Neither Turks, nor other nationalities should neglect their native language.”51 This statement said in 1918 is still observed in our days.

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  137 The meetings and diplomatic dialogues that Ali Mardan Topchubashov conducted in Istanbul during October had positively affected the international status of the Azerbaijan Republic. The changing situation and the dissolution of the cabinet in the Ottoman government was the cause for the extraordinary ambassador’s delay to his forthcoming visit to Berlin and Vienna. He deemed that there was no need for that visit any more. In his letter to the head of the Azerbaijani government, Topchubashov asked for an urgent mandate to start negotiations with diplomatic representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and other countries. A critical situation was forming around Azerbaijan. The situation in the region at the end of the war was evaluated in a memorandum of the intelligence division of the British Foreign Office titled “The Political Situation in the South Caucasus,” dated October 28, 1918, as follows: The question of Azerbaijan remains unresolved because of the Turkish defeat. The existence of Georgia and Armenia is important in order to cut Azerbaijani relations with Turkey and Iran and to create a barrier between them. It is thus important to create an obstacle between Azerbaijan and Turkey; if Eastern Caucasian Turks and [Iranian] Azerbaijanis bond with Turkey, the latter will gain influence over northern Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. If Istanbul and the Dardanelle Straits are opened, it would be easier to retain control over the three countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia). It will not be difficult to agree with the three countries to form a federation with their participation, after they eliminate the difficulties arising from the war and then a Trans-Caucasian federation consisting of the three countries will be created. But the main difficulty is that the above mentioned federation cannot be created without eradicating ethnic enmity and endless altercations among those countries. Only the long-lasting natural evolution of their political and cultural processes may be referred as the federation principle here.52 In the autumn of 1918, the German–Turkish bloc was defeated in World War I. On October 30, Turkey had to agree to the harsh terms of the Mondros (Mudros) armistice. This defeat dealt a tragic blow to the Azerbaijan Republic. On October 27, before the armistice was signed, Ali Mardan Topchubashov had met the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Nabi Bey, postponed his Vienna and Berlin visits, and expressed his desire to go to Lemnos (Sakkiz) Island, where the Entente representatives were holding peace negotiations. But the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs told him that the negotiations would soon end and asked him to wait.53 The Mondros armistice, which imposed extremely hard terms not only for Turkey, but for the Republic of Azerbaijan, was signed after 3 days. In accordance to the eleventh article of the armistice, Turkish troops should depart Azerbaijan and the Trans-Caucasus. Ottoman dispatches in Azerbaijan were forwarded an ultimatum to leave Baku within a week and Azerbaijan within a month. The commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army, Nuri Pasha, at the last moment expressed his desired to enlist in the Azerbaijani military and tried to

138  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan stay in Baku, as had been agreed during the negotiations in Istanbul.54 But all was futile, because the ultimatum of the Allies was firm. According to Article 15 of the Armistice, the Allies would assume control over the Trans-Caucasian Railway, which had been previously controlled by Turkey in accordance with the Batum agreement. The Allies then had the right to take over Batum and to demand that Turkey should not resist the Allies occupying Baku.55 According to Article 24, the Allies had the right to assume control over six Armenian provinces in Turkey whenever disorder and unrest would take place. This article pitted Armenians against Turkey and in turn was meant to provoke the former. In early November, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian and German governments signed the acknowledgments of defeat, Soviet Russia renounced the Brest treaty, which meant that Armenia and Georgia could again claim Gars, Batum, and Adrian. The annulment of the Brest agreement also meant the annulment of the August 27 accord. However, since this agreement was signed secretly between Germany and Russia, it was reason for Soviet Russia not to include that portion in the AllRussian Central Executive Committee resolution. By the end of October, the Azerbaijani representatives in Turkey had lost hope for the recognition of the independence of the republics by the Central powers and returned to Baku, as it was obvious that the conference would not materialize. Khalil Bey Khasmammadov was the last one to leave Istanbul on November 1. Overall, however, the visit of Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, and Aslan Bey Safikuridski to Istanbul was not entirely in vain. As the World War ended, Azerbaijan was beset by a string of difficulties, not least of which was the Mondros armistice, which called for the Allied occupation of Baku. The Azerbaijani government and its diplomatic delegate to the Ottoman state could not remain indifferent to the harsh terms of the armistice agreement. Rauf Bey, who signed the armistice from Turkish side, was the same person who had earlier carried out the Trabzon negotiations and was a minister of the navy in the Izzet Pasha cabinet. The terms of the Mondros armistice were officially announced on November 3. The Azerbaijani Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador wrote that he met with Rauf Bey that same evening.56 Ali Mardan Topchubashov resented the fact that articles on Baku and the Azerbaijani railway were included in the armistice without the participation of a representative from Azerbaijan. Delegate Rauf Bey, for his part, tried not to discuss the subject of Baku but, at the Allies’ insistence, as Turkish troops were already there, and they had compelled the Ottomans to include and adopt those terms, as asked by Rauf Bey: “What could we do; they won, we were defeated.” Rauf Bey considered it vital that the states of the Entente should recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. He informed Topchubashov that Allied delegates would soon be arriving in Istanbul and that it was essential to negotiate with them.57 Topchubashov forwarded the letter of protest to Deputy Minister Rashid Hikmet on November 4, with regard to the Mondros armistice terms concerning Azerbaijan. It was noted in the letter that, although the Ottoman state recognized the Republic of Azerbaijan, the incorporation of Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan into the armistice’s articles ran contrary to international law and regulations,

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  139 and it only served as a symbol of Azerbaijani occupation by the British. He said, “Although I do not consider that it serves the interests of the Ottoman state, I hereby submit our protest to this article.”58 It was noted in the letter that it would be better if the articles of the armistice concerning the Caucasus and especially on Azerbaijan’s inclusion be best explained to the Azerbaijani government. Hikmet Bey noted during the discussions that the Ottoman state could not give the Entente states a city that did not in fact belong to Turkey. According to the Mondros armistice, Turkey should not object to Baku’s occupation. As an experienced lawyer, Ali Mardan Topchubashov gave his opinion and comments on the article, which was tantamount to saying “Go and take Baku.”59 With regard to Article 5 of the Mondros armistice section concerning the Caucasus, it was noted in the letter that the railways of the Republic of Azerbaijan could never be subject to this article. “Concession of the railways which exclusively belong to the Republic of Azerbaijan is incompatible with the regulations of international law.” According to the agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and the Ottoman government with regard to railways, the Ottoman government had the right to use the railways only for military purposes. In other instances, the Ottoman government had no legal tie with Azerbaijani railways. At the end of the letter, it showed that the Azerbaijani government considered it essential to facilitate negotiations on issues concerning Azerbaijani interests derived from the Mondros armistice either via the Ottoman government or directly with the Allies. For this reason, I ask the Ottoman government to convey its message to Azerbaijan through me. If it [the Ottoman government] does not want Azerbaijan to be a plaything of destiny, we ask you to prepare a platform for negotiations and suggest forthcoming ideas.60 On November 5, Ali Mardan Topchubashov met with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Nabi Mehmed Bey. Nabi Bey noted that Turkey had no other choice but to sign the Mondros armistice. He said that if Turkey would sign the agreement, 15 days later the Allies would take over Istanbul. At the same time, he was notified that, aside from Baku, the British would enter Batum as well as the entire South Caucasus.61 In regard to the attitude to the procedures, the diplomatic representation of Azerbaijan wrote to the Azerbaijani government, in a letter dated November 15, According to the terms of the signed agreement, Turkey has undertaken the commitments on the following: Firstly, Turkey should not in any way hinder Entente troops in their occupation of Baku; Secondly, Turkey should transfer the rights of control over the South Caucasus to the Entente; And, thirdly, Turkey should withdraw its troops from the South Caucasus upon the Entente’s demand. I have presented a written protest about the first two articles to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 4. And I have asked them to hurry with the appointment of a diplomatic delegate to Azerbaijan in

140  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan written form. Such letters of protest will be presented to Entente delegates as well as soon as they arrive here. At the closing of the letter, Topchubashov was asking to give him the authorization in order to be able to hold negotiations with all diplomatic delegates in Istanbul about all issues concerned.62 Turkey was for a long time represented by the Caucasian Army’s consul for political affairs when it came to the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan. When the issue about the Ottoman troops withdrawing from Azerbaijan arose, the Turkish government, in early November, noted in response to Topchubashov’s appeal dated October 27 that a Turkish mission would be established in Azerbaijan soon.63 In his letter to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Topchubashov was asking to receive the Turkish delegates in high regard and keep in touch with them. But the issue was again brought on the agenda in late November. It was not possible to send Turkish diplomatic delegates to Baku, as it was occupied by the British. In his reply to the letter of the Azerbaijani government, the newly appointed Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, Mustafa Rashid Pasha, explained the Turkish point of view concerning the Mondros armistice, signed between the Entente and the Ottoman Empire, with regard to sections or articles concerning Azerbaijan. In relation to Baku, the Ottoman government insisted that it never had authority over Baku and therefore had no power to give Baku to the Entente. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Ottoman Empire will be withdrawing its military forces from the city, further stating that the withdrawal “does not mean the infringement of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s rights on Baku.” According to the terms of the Mondros treaty dated October 30, Turkey had to call all of its military troops back from the South Caucasus. Without a doubt, it also referred to Ottoman troops in Azerbaijan. As regards the railways issue, it was noted that, according to the armistice, the Ottoman government had to come to a compromise, not with the railway itself but the right of control over some of its parts. “As for the appeal to come to an agreement between the British government and yours, the Ottoman government will utilize the first opportunity to see to your request.”64 Although the Azerbaijani government was disappointed with the Ottoman government because of the Mondros armistice articles concerning Azerbaijan, they bade farewell to the Turkish delegates with deep respect and esteem in a manner similar to how they had greeted Turkish troops despite their defeat in World War I. On Sunday, November 10, the Azerbaijani government organized a banquet in Nuri Pasha’s honor. Four hundred people were invited to the banquet. Well-known intellectuals and political figures, industrialists, leaders of political parties and societies, and leaders of the Azerbaijani army were in attendance. Fatali Khan Khoyski, who was the first to speak at the event, said the following: In the battlefields of Azerbaijan, our Turkish brothers’ blood has mingled with ours. We are relatives by our origins and the intermingling of our blood has made this relationship even stronger. The blood shed for the independence

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  141 of Azerbaijan is the guarantee of friendship, as well an indestructible tie that binds the Ottomans and the Azeri Turks.65 In another speech, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, the head of the Musavat party, who had just returned from Istanbul, said that a year ago, intense discussions were held over the question of the self-determination of Muslims. Baku “Socialists,” with Stepan Shaumian as their head, considered it an impossibility for Azerbaijani Muslims, and did everything they could to block the self-determination of Muslims, and other Caucasian nationalities encountered the same resistance. They threatened to reduce Azerbaijan to ruins if the Azerbaijani Turks acted on their ideas. “Now, Azerbaijani Turks have been able to claim their right with the help of their blood brothers.”66 Ahmad Bey Aghayev noted in his speech at the event: There were times when it was considered almost a crime if Azerbaijani Turks talked about their brother, the Ottoman Turks, during the tsarist regime. When Bolshevik Russia proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Nations, they stated that they would affirm self-determination only on their terms.67 Nuri Pasha also gave a speech on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s Caucasian headquarters. He said that he had done what had to be done and was ready to do his best for Azerbaijan. In closing, he said, “The interest of our fraternal Azerbaijani Turks is sacred for every Turk … . If there will be more need for sacrifice for the independence of Azerbaijan, we are ready for it.”68 On the same day, November 10, Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski and Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli, who was responsible for foreign affairs, sent a telegram addressed to the most influential political figure at that time, the leader of the postwar reorganization, Woodrow Wilson, the president of the United States of America. The United States had become the most influential state during the last stages of the World War I. In the telegram to President Wilson was a request to help the Azerbaijanis in their quest for the recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan by the world powers. They implored him, “Before addressing the European powers, the Azerbaijani people and government, in the hope to gain assistance and achieve recognition, turn to you, as a defender of small nations, relying on your humanitarian principles.”69 The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to Istanbul, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, recommended hastening the beginning of negotiations with the British in Rasht and Enzeli in a letter dated October 31 to Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski.70 As a consequence of that letter, an Azerbaijani delegation consisting of Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, Ahmad Bey Aghayev, and Musa Bey Rafiyev left for Enzeli in early November 1918 and started negotiations with the headquarters of the British North Persia Force.71 General Lionel Dunsterville’s army, known as the Dunsterforce, left Enzeli 3 days after they left Baku on September 15. General William Thomson was appointed commander to the newly created North Persia Force. Negotiations did

142  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan not come easy with the general. First, he refused to recognize the existence of a state bearing the name Azerbaijan. But after long grueling arguments, the British general stated, What we know is that there is no republic established out of will of the Azerbaijani people, although there is a government formed owing to Turkish instigations. If there is a claim to the contrary, we will assess the entire situation and come up with a decision.72 General Thomson added that “the Allies are coming not to destroy, but to build.”73 At the end of the negotiations, General Thomson declared that Baku had to be purged of both Azerbaijani and Turkish troops by 10 a.m. on November 17, when control over Baku and its oil resources would be handed over to the British; that the rest of the country would remain under the control of the Azerbaijani government and its army; that Azerbaijan would not be officially recognized, but that representatives of England, France, and the United States would establish a de facto relationship with its government, and that all offices and organizations would be maintained with minor changes. Thomson himself would be the governor-general of Baku, and the British would head the city police force. The city duma would resume its activities. Azerbaijan would take part at the Paris Peace Conference, in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Lazar Bicherakhov and his troops would enter Baku along with the British army and, last, armed Armenians would not be allowed to enter the city.74 The Azerbaijani representatives in Enzeli notified the chairman of the Council of Ministers in Baku via telegraph, stating that, The representative of the Allies’ army wants to contact the Azerbaijani government. All government and public offices as well as organizations will maintain the status quo. The only difference is that General Thomson will hold the post of governor-general in Baku and one of the British will be in charge of the Baku police department.75 Despite the difficulties the Azerbaijani delegates experienced in Enzeli during the negotiations, significant discussions were held, and concessions were made. The Azerbaijani delegates had a lengthy and significant exchange of views with General Thomson on some important aspects of the situation in Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus in general. The most important was that the general assured the delegates that Azerbaijan would participate at the Paris Peace Conference and that Armenian military forces would not be able to set foot in Baku. On November 14, another meeting was held with the British. Great Britain’s consul in Iran, Havelock, received the representatives of the Lenkaran district, Teymur Bey Bayramalibeyov, Akhund Molla Ali Taghizade, and Yusif Garibzade. Teymur Bey informed the British consul about the crimes that Avetisian’s armed forces had perpetrated in the name of the Commune and presented him with documents attesting to this fact. Teymur Bey noted that the British entrance

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  143 into Azerbaijan could once again activate those forces. The consul further stated that negotiations on these issues were being carried out with Azerbaijani representatives in Enzeli and that he would convey the Lankarani people’s wishes to British headquarters.76 In his letter from Istanbul, Ali Mardan Topchubashov evaluated the opening of the National Council as the first priority. On November 16, the National Council, which had been reorganized during the June crisis, was in session once again in response to the situation that had arisen. An appeal to various states around the world about the recognition of Azerbaijani independence was passed in the meeting. Later that day, the chairman of the National Council sent a telegram addressed to General William Thomson, stating that it had been decided that the Azerbaijani government did not pose any objection to Allied troops entering Baku under his command the next day, November 17. The telegram further stated that “the Azerbaijani government would not consider the Allied entry an infringement on Azerbaijani independence and sovereignty and, last, that the government expressed their desire to meet once again in order to redefine relations after the negotiations to be held in Enzeli with Azerbaijani representatives.”77 In reply, General Thomson gave his assurance that he was ready to cooperate with the Azerbaijani government in accordance with certain terms. On November 17, British troops, most of them soldiers of Indian descent, entered Baku in accordance with the terms of the Mondros armistice.78 Interior Minister Behbud Khan Javanshir; acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli; and several other officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as representatives of various national organizations participated in the reception ceremony, which was held at Baku Bay.79 Ziyadkhanli, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, greeted Thomson with a speech, saying: With the mandate of the Azerbaijani government, I am currently acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and have been authorized to greet you. Thus, on behalf of our government, I welcome you as commander in chief and representative of the Allies on the occasion of your arrival in our capital. It is evident that after the chaos and bloodshed of war, nations will now enter a new phase. Young Azerbaijani Turks and the people at large will now begin living in a peaceful and independent state after escaping the disasters of the world war. Our nation is confident and hopeful that their civilized European and American brothers will exercise their humanity in recognition of brotherhood and mutual prosperity.80 General Thomson’s response was hopeful. He announced, I congratulate you on the occasion of the end of the world war. As a commander of the united French, British, and American powers, I notify you that we have come here in accordance with the agreement signed with Turkey, to replace the Ottoman troops that had been defending your territories up until now. We do not intend to interfere in your internal affairs either today or

144  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan tomorrow. I hope that everything will change for the better in an atmosphere of cooperation.81 On the same day, the Christian population of the city enthusiastically greeted the entry of Bicherakhov’s army into Baku. The majority of his army consisted of Armenians. Despite the speech Thomson made at Baku Bay, Thomson and Bicherakhov differed in their positions. The latter adhered to discussions with Thomson on the basis of the 1914 boundaries of Russia. As soon as they entered the city, Bicherakhov’s troops paid no heed to the Azerbaijani national government and launched propaganda about its collapse. Once Bicherakhov had arrived, the Russian and Armenian national councils in Baku decided that there was no state of Azerbaijan but only Russia. They called for the overthrow of the Azerbaijani government and for it to be replaced with the Central Caspian Directorate, with Lazar Bicherakhov as its head.82 On the evening of November 17, members of the Russian National Council—M. Podshibyakin, Y. Smirnov, B. Baykov, and A. Leontovich—were received by General Thomson. This meeting furthered the anxiety already felt by the Azerbaijani government. During the meeting, the members of the Russian National Council acted as if they had authority over Azerbaijan. On behalf of the Russian and Armenian national councils, they rejected the government Thomson was supposed to organize. They took the view that, if Christians held positions in the Azerbaijani government, recognition by the Allies would come more quickly. Boris Baykov, a Russian Kadet who was also a member of the Russian National Council, wrote in his memoirs, We could not disregard the fact that the achievement of recognition of the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the European powers would be the highest point in Azerbaijan’s destiny. But by participating in the government and the Parliament of Azerbaijan, we, the Russian National Council, would give credibility to those who were trying to achieve recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan, something that, for our part, we did not want to do. It is important to mention that the Armenian representatives shared our opinion absolutely.83 Clearly, the members of the Russian National Council wanted to uphold the idea of an indivisible Russia that included Azerbaijan, until the Paris Peace Conference’s stance toward the newly established states became known. Firuz Kazimzadeh noted that the South Caucasus was considered one of the Transcaucasia was Russian provinces and they had no intention of recognizing the right of Azerbaijanis to national self-determination.84 In closing, Thomson had to remind the members of the Russian National Council that that Russia no longer existed. An official notification to the Azerbaijani government of the Entente troops’ entry to Baku was published on November 18. It said that the Allied troops would only be in charge of the country’s military affairs and, by mutual agreement,

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  145 would not interfere with the internal affairs of the country and its capital. All governmental bodies would continue with their activities, and the question of the self-determination of the peoples of Russia would be resolved at an international peace congress. The notice said, We do not yet know what the final decision of the Parliament of Azerbaijan will be with regard to political self-determination; but the current difficult situation demands that Azerbaijani political leadership maintain order in the country. We hope that the Allied army’s entry into Baku will not trample on the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijani people.85 After several days of residing in Baku and closely monitoring the situation, General Thomson was learning that the Russian National Council members’ view that Azerbaijan was nothing but a dream fabricated by several hundred political usurpers was far from the truth. He stated that the British government held deep respect for the Azerbaijani government and its prime minister, that Fatali Khan Khoyski was one of the ablest men in Baku, and that his government would be the only significant government in the country until the formation of the new coalition government.86 In November 1918, Thomson wrote about Khoyski, the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers, in a letter addressed to London, He is a very intelligent man and a lawyer, and with his skills, it is possible for him to create an ideal of statehood better than any ever seen in the Caucasus … . when I met him, he also mentioned the Armenian betrayal with sadness.87 General Thomson’s stance disappointed the members of the Russian National Council, who had pinned their hopes on the Allies in the expectation of reviving the old imperialist traditions. On November 23, Thomson met the members of the Armenian National Council. A certain Bishop Bagrat presented him with documents on behalf of Armenians living in Baku, consisting of eleven pages about falsified events that had taken place in Baku prior to the arrival of the British. In it, they claimed that about 20,000 Armenians were killed during the liberation of Baku.88 This number was so exaggerated that even Armenian authors who were writing about the events taking place in Baku had doubts about it. Bishop Bagrat also dismissed the declaration made by the Azerbaijani government upon their entry into Baku about the protection of all citizens regardless of their nationality as “diplomatic tact.” The Armenian bishop underlined the events of September while ignoring what had happened in Baku earlier in the year, in March. He presented the general with a proposal containing four recommendations detailing reinstatement of certain privileges lost by the Armenians in Baku, namely by the unconditional release of thousands of Armenians arrested in connection to the March events (Interior Minister Behbud Agha Javanshir stated that the prisoners would be released once their innocence was proven); the repatriation of Armenians who had left for Iran and Krasnovodsk before the winter; the return

146  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan of Armenian properties confiscated by the Azerbaijani government and Turkish commanders; and guarantees for the security of Armenians living outside Baku.89 In addition to those demands, the Armenian National Council of Baku presented General Thomson with Armenian claims on Garabagh, a mountainous part of the Elizavetpol province. The information that Bishop Bagrat presented to General Thomson essentially differed from what the he had presented to the prime minister of the Azerbaijani government, Fatali Khan Khoyski, as well as the commander of the Army of Islam, Nuri Pasha, a month prior to meeting the general.90 Upon reflection, Thomson was not favorable to the Armenian proposal. Reporting to London about the meetings that had transpired in Baku from November 17 to 24, Thomson noted that everyone despised the Armenians for their treachery, whether with the Bolsheviks or now with their apparent leanings toward the British. He dismissed their recommendations and informed London that We have to be resolute toward the Russians and Tatars [i.e., Azerbaijanis], if we want to do something beneficial. The educated Russian has apparently fallen short of favor and influence owing to their crazed impartiality, despite the fact that they are more amicable with Azerbaijanis than the Armenians. 91 In Garabagh, Andranik had risen to prominence after the withdrawal of the Ottomans. It was hoped by the Armenian government that, with the arrival of the British in Baku, a perfect opportunity had presented itself for Armenian aspirations to Garabagh and Zangezur. But General Thomson, acting on Khoyski’s letter to him of December 1 describing the heinous acts perpetrated by Andranik in the Jabrayil district, demanded that Andranik cease all aggression against the Azerbaijanis there. Upon inquiry, the British governor-general learned that Garabagh and Zangezur were part of Azerbaijan, and he appointed Khosrov Bey Sultanov, who was well known in the two districts, as governor. The Armenians objected to this move, as they realized that they were not able to utilize the British occupation of Azerbaijan to their advantage, either as a means of advancement or as a tool for revenge. The Armenians did not understand that the resolution of the problem would be as a result of the peace conference and not of military aggression.92 In a telegram sent by Thomson to Armenian leaders in Ganja, Gazakh, and Javanshir districts in early December, he directed them to bring a stop to all violence and looting in those regions. Armenians were ordered to remain peacefully in their homes; if found in violation of this order, they would be held responsible for the consequences.93 Some historians hold that General Thomson’s allegiance to the Azerbaijani government was based on the fact that the British army that had occupied Baku consisted mostly of Indian Muslims.94 This argument is not persuasive, as those Indians were part of the British army and Thomson, in his first speech, knowing little of the situation, never mentioned the word “Azerbaijan.” It was only later, when he was abreast of the facts, that he assessed his position on the matter at hand. This was discussed by Uyezir Hajibeyli, who wrote,

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  147 No more than a little acquaintance is needed for those who considered us savages knowing nothing but barbarity, a danger to the civilized world, to come to a realization that this belief does not hold true. It was with great surprise that the British understood, after spending several days with us, that there was no need to feel like a hunter confronting a wild animal.95 The National Council (parliament) worked tirelessly to prevent crises during the hardest times of the Republic of Azerbaijan. And yet, another crisis occurred. It was imperative to establish a parliamentary style of government in order to forge ties with European democracies. On November 16, a day before the British came to Baku, the National Council reviewed this matter and passed a law that was adopted on November 19. A parliament and an electoral law were essential for the future of Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani politicians were able to come up with solutions for difficult situations. For example, the date for holding elections was not determined, due to an unfavorable situation and inadequate infrastructure. The National Council took it upon itself to reorganize the system and passed a decree whereby all people as well as political parties in Azerbaijan were assured the right to stand for election.96 Its structure was expanded as more representatives, according to the administrative division of various regions, were called for, with one parliamentary delegate for a population of 24,000, as well as representatives for minorities. It was decided that the Azerbaijani Parliament should consist of 120 parliamentarians, which, in accordance with the ethnic structure of the populace, meant that Azerbaijanis would hold eighty seats, Armenians, twenty-one, and Russians, ten. One seat was reserved for each of the representatives from the Jewish, German, Georgian, and Polish communities, and three seats were reserved for a chosen delegate from the Trade Union Council and the Oil Industrialists Union, respectively.97 All the peoples of Azerbaijan, regardless of gender, were ensured the right of suffrage; indeed, Azerbaijan was the first state to give women the right to vote. The National Council also introduced a policy of secularism. The Parliament would be the ruling power in the country, decide its destiny, organize the government, and defend the interests of Azerbaijan.98 It was proposed that the new Azerbaijani Parliament would hold its inaugural session on December 3. Some wanted to postpone the opening until December 7, due to technical problems. However, in reality, it was the British who stopped the Parliament’s opening on December 3. Colonel Claude B. Stokes from British headquarters called on Colonel Alfred Rawlinson to contact the chairman of the Council of Ministers and notify him that “the Parliament was not to convene until a coalition government had been recognized by the Allies.”99 The National Council could not remain indifferent to the dismissive attitude of the British headquarters and, after continuous wrangling, the Parliament convened on December 7. It was a very important and momentous occasion for the domestic and international aspects of the country. Ninety-six of 120 parliamentarians were in attendance, due to a boycott by some Armenian representatives. Colonel G. K. Cockerill, the representative of the military forces of the Allies; the Consul General

148  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan of Iran, Saadulvazir; Persian financial agent Vakilulmulk; the representative of the North Caucasus chairman of government, “Tapa” Chermoyev, and the plenipotentiary representative of Union of Mountain Peoples to Azerbaijan, A. Kantemirov; as well as the representative of Georgia, Korchevadze, and others also took part in the opening. Mammad Emin Rasulzade, the chairman of the National Council, opened the first meeting of the Parliament with a short speech, giving a comprehensive analysis of the events that had transpired after February 1917 with the following words: We want Russia’s happiness. We love the Russian people, but we also cherish our independence. There can never be happiness through the imposition of force. For happiness and freedom is in independence. And for this reason, gentlemen, the National Council has raised this three-colored flag, which represents Azerbaijan, and this flag, the symbol of Turkic sovereignty, Islamic culture, and modern European power, will always fly above us. This flag, once raised, will never come down again. Rasulzade also expressed his faith in the formation of a just world order and touched upon some important aspects of international policy. Expressing hope for the democratization of international politics, he said, I believe in the conscience of mankind, the conscientious mankind that will never give up with what has been achieved at the expense of millions of people. The idea of a ‘League of Nations’ is being supported by everybody today. This gives me hope. … On behalf of the representatives of the powers in Baku, General Thomson has officially announced that Caucasian issues will be resolved at the Peace Conference. The Republic of Azerbaijan will endure, if we do our best to be resolute, to demonstrate strength and determination in the defense and protection of our future and our independence.100 Generally, the Musavat party leadership preferred the continuance of the principles of Caucasian federalism in order to provide better external security. Mammad Emin Rasulzade hoped to establish full relations with the League of Nations, to be set up in accordance with the last of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points. But the existing situation called for the establishment of close regional relationships with other South Caucasian republics and Dagestan. In his closing, Rasulzade said, Today, all the party’s desires, personal inclinations and all those kinds of things seems insignificant in comparison to the Motherland and nation. All that should be given up and only the feelings of concern for the Motherland and nation should be held in the highest regard.101 Soon after, Rasulzade informed everyone that the election of the chairman of the Parliament was one of the important matters to be discussed. After serious

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  149 discussions, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Representative to Turkey and Minister of Foreign Affairs, was appointed chairman of the Parliament, while Hasan Bey Aghayev was appointed First Deputy Chairman and Rahim Bey Vakilov Secretary. Topchubashov, who was not affiliated with any political party, was a huge political figure in his own right. He was a great diplomat in his time and a democratic intellectual with a broad outlook on issues. American historian Firuz Kazemzadeh described him as “Ali Mardan Bek Topchibashov, who was elected President of the Parliament, was a well educated lawyer, tolerant in his views, and not narrow nationalist.”102 One of the main tasks of the Parliament was the formation of a new government. Therefore, Hasan Bey Aghayev, who chaired the activity of the Parliament, called for the head of the government, Fatali Khan Khoyski, to take the floor for his intended speech to the Parliament. Khoyski first reported on the internal and external policy of the government, and then presented an in-depth analysis of the most critical moments the government had experienced, evaluating every event objectively. Although the Ottoman Empire had been defeated in the war and an Allied representative was participating in the Parliament, in Khoyski’s impartial assessment of the British-Turkish conflict as well as the Ottoman army’s activities in Azerbaijan, he considered that those activities did not threaten to the independence of Azerbaijan. He mentioned that there is a chapter in an agreement we had signed with Turkey, wherein Turkey is obligated to dispatch soldiers in the event Azerbaijan needs it for its defense. Our government exercised this option and Turkey was merely fulfilling its commitments. With the assistance of our neighbor, things that were impossible to achieve can be accomplished. It was impossible to turn to some other entity and even if we asked for it, it would be to no avail. It was natural for us to ask Turkey as they were our brothers and they are also one with our faith.103 Khoyski further said, The Turkish Command entered our territories upon our invitation to protect our borders, put an end to internal strife and prevent brute external interventions. On one hand, we wished to protect our sovereignty and, on the other hand, we had to resort to the Turkish army for help. It was for that reason that we had to protect ourselves from external intervention and not offend those who protected our physical existence at the expense of many casualties. As regards the foreign policy of the government of Azerbaijan, Khoyski noted that the state of Azerbaijan’s foreign affairs reminded him of a thin wooden boat floating among rocks in the darkness that could be bashed against the rocks by the waves and be pummeled into pieces any minute. He said that their duty was to navigate this boat through those rocks.104 With regard to the Allies’ entrance into Baku, as well as British policy, Khoyski said,

150  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan England is a nation with the oldest civil and legal autonomy. There are more Muslims under British rule than under any other state. They fight shoulder-toshoulder with the British. It shows that the British do not violate their rights and do not offend them. Certainly there cannot be any enmity between us. Therefore, the National Council concurred when the three powers wanted to send their soldiers to Azerbaijan in order to maintain and defend the peace. So far, we have not witnessed any case of abuse or any violation of the rights and independence of the nation and to the existence of Azerbaijan. With our consent, the Allies came and it is evident that there is no harm and no violation of rights. They also do not interfere in the internal affairs of our nation.105 Later, Khoyski addressed the Union of Mountain Peoples and the Georgian and Armenian republics and said that his term had expired and he was now turning power over to the Parliament. In closing, he said, “Although there were lapses and shortcomings in the activities of the government, its guiding star was the slogan ‘The right, independence and freedom of the Nation.’”106 After Khoyski’s speech, the Parliament moved to form the new government. Once again, Fatali Khan Khoyski was elected to be in charge of this task. The composition of the government was announced on December 26. Upon the insistence of the British, the composition of the coalition government included three ministerial seats for the Russians and two for the Armenians, although the Armenians refused to accept the seats. The following people held positions in the new government: Fatali Khan Khoyski, head of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Samad Bey Mehmandarov, Minister of Military Affairs; Mirza Asadullayev, Minister of Trade and Industry; I. Protasyev, Minister of Finance; K. Lizgar, Minister of Food; Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov, Minister of Transportation; Aslan Bey Safikurdski, Minister of Post, Telegraph and Labor; Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Minister of State Control, M. Makinski, Minister of Justice; Khosrov Pasha Bey Sultanov, Minister of Agriculture; Rustam Khan Khoyski, Minister of Patronage; and Yevsei Gindes, Minister of People’s Health. Fatali Khan Khoyski thus became the third Minister of Foreign Affairs after Mammad Hasan Hajinski and Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov. The first order of duty of the newly organized government was to be recognized as a state by the Allied Command. According to Firuz Kazimzadeh, the Russians in Baku tried their best to portray the new Azerbaijani government as a nationalist and separatist state, but parliamentary elections and constitutional procedures of the Khoyski cabinet assured the British that they were dealing with representative government.107 On December 28, 2 days after the formation of the new government, the representative of the Allies in Baku, General Thomson, notified them of the British desire to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. Thomson’s declaration stated that the coalition government formed under Khoyski’s leadership was the only legal entity for all Azerbaijani territories and that the Allied Command will provide total support to this government.108 General George Milne, general commander of British forces in the Balkans and the Caucasus, confirmed Thomson’s declaration during his visit to Baku and announced that the government of Great Britain

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  151 recognized the Khoyski government as the only legal entity in the entire country.109 During a reception for the Azerbaijani government, he said, I came here as a representative of the great allied nations. Our purpose is to establish peace and justice in this country. The victory of the Allies grants justice and legality to the right of any nation’s will for self-determination. This matter will be declared during the Peace Conference. Thank you for the warm greeting. I am sure that our troops will be accepted and assisted. We will do our best for the development of trade and culture in your country.110 During negotiations with Khoyski, General Milne mentioned that the British government recognized the Azerbaijani government and the sovereignty of its borders. He further stated that the Allied command would give assistance to the government concerning all matters, as the British point of view was to support any nation’s desire for self-determination. He added that British representatives would support this notion at the Paris Peace Conference and declared that the Allied command would not interfere with the internal affairs of governments in Transcaucasia. He stated that the sole purpose of the Allies was to help to maintain tranquility and peace in these countries.111 It can be established that this was not only General Milne’s opinion but that of several others as well. In December 1918, the South Caucasus question had been the topic of discussion on many occasions during government meetings. Lord Curzon considered that stability was needed in the South Caucasus, otherwise, anarchy, disorder, or Bolshevism could hamper British policy in the region. During the first few days, in order to avoid a confrontation with another ally, namely France, the British made concessions to France regarding Armenia, which was against the terms of the agreement signed on December 9, 1917 because of French interests in Armenia. So on December 9, 1918, Lord Curzon announced during a cabinet meeting that Armenia should be given to France, owing to the fact that there was no one who wanted to be in contact with those unlikable people except France.112 After his visit to Baku, the commander of the British army in the Balkans, General George Milne, notified the chairman of the general command about the destructive role of the Armenians in the South Caucasus and especially in Baku. In his analysis, the Armenian poor had joined up with the Bolsheviks and were supporting Russian claims in Azerbaijan for no other reason than to exact revenge on the Azerbaijanis.113 The British occupied Batum and Tiflis by December and stayed in the Caucasus until the summer of 1919. Although the British were trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani government willfully and slowly strived for independence while holding off further intervention. Winston Churchill wrote in his memoir published in 1932 that with the help of 20,000 British men in the South Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan should now be absolutely independent and those independent states should stand firm against the intervention of Bolsheviks to Iran and Turkey.114 On December 28, the first order of business in the Parliament was to determine the structure and status of the delegation to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference.

152  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov learned about the establishment of the new cabinet and the delegation to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference from the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari, who had just arrived in Istanbul from Baku and was planning to leave for Paris from Istanbul. Khan told Topchubashov that he had been chosen to head the delegation to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference. He also informed him of the dissolution of the old government in which he was meant to be the head of the government, but instead Fatali Khan Khoyski agreed to be the prime minister. He also stated that, from what he had heard, the British behaved tactfully and did not interfere in internal affairs of the government.115 Along with the efforts of progressive-minded political figures in Azerbaijan, the difficult situation that had arisen as a result of the Allied entry in Baku was not only eliminated but, through diplomatic efforts, Azerbaijani democracy had been achieved, albeit through de facto recognition by the Allied command. The commander of British forces in the Balkans, General Milne, wrote to London in the beginning of 1919 that the Azerbaijani territories included the Baku and Elizavetpol provinces, Zagatala district, and part of Erivan province. “Azerbaijan” was the name of a region in northern Iran, and it had been given to the country, he said, on the suggestion of the Turks and the pan-Islamist Musavat party. The Azerbaijanis in Iran still spoke the Azerbaijani Turkish language, and most of the population was Muslim. Milne added that, in November 1918, after Azerbaijan was again occupied by the British, the Azerbaijani government had been given approval to resume its former activities. He wrote that administrative power was mostly in the hands of Muslims, the original inhabitants of Baku. He mentioned that the Russians were bitter about the relations the British had established with the Azerbaijanis and that, from their point of view, Britain aimed to take sole control over Azerbaijan and of Baku’s vast oil reserves. He noted that there were strong anti-British sentiments among the Russians. Finally Milne acknowledged in his letter that the Muslim community of Baku did not greet the British with open arms.116 *** The first diplomatic steps of the Republic of Azerbaijan showed that Azerbaijan had become a subject in international law and international relations. As diplomatic activities of the newly established republic centered primarily on the protection of Azerbaijani independence, the maintenance of this newfound independence under difficult circumstances was the pivotal point in the history of Azerbaijani diplomacy. The rich natural resources as well as the strategic geography of Azerbaijan had turned it into the object of struggle between imperialist groups and Soviet Russia. The ambitions of Soviet Russia in Azerbaijan were most likely related more to simple “economics” than to ideology. It was because of this that the liberation of Baku from foreign powers was an moment of international importance and that what happened in Azerbaijan from the political and diplomatic points of view was not so much part of domestic affairs but rather of an international historical process.

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  153 The defeat of the Central powers proved detrimental to the situation of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the international arena. During the negotiations held in Istanbul and Berlin, it was expected that the independence of the Azerbaijan Republic was going to be recognized by the Central powers. But their defeat resulted in the entry of Entente powers into Baku on the basis of international agreements between the victors and the defeated. The entry of the Entente powers into Baku was a serious threat to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Local non-Muslim organizations tried to put an end to the independence of Azerbaijan and to restore Russian imperialism in Azerbaijan by collaborating as Russia’s allies. However, Azerbaijani politicians and the leadership of the national government, through clever diplomatic skills and the capability to find the way out of a critical situation, saved the existence of the republic. The national government was recognized de facto by the Allied command as the sole legal government in Azerbaijan. In December 1918, Azerbaijan formed a parliamentary republican form of government, which politically raised the bar, bringing Azerbaijan up to par with other progressive countries and later, from a diplomatic point of view, served its de facto recognition by the forces that would decide the fate of the world.

Notes

1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), October 8, 1918. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), November 5, 1918. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), October 19, 1918. Resolution on Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic. 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, v. 35, p. 15. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика (The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. Foreign Policy). Baku, 1998, p. 71. Decision on Recognition of the Armenian Diplomatic Delegate in Azerbaijan. 14.09.1918. SAAR, f.100, r. 2, v. 7, p. 45. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Законодательные акты (1918–1920). (The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. Legislative Acts [1918–1920]). Baku, 1998, p. 240. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), October 2, 1918. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, p. 89. Letter of General M.A. Sulkevich, Prime-Minister of Crimean government, to F.K.Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. November, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 40, p. 1. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 3, 1918. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 11, 1918. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 10, 1918. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, pp. 156, 195–196. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), December 9, 1918. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 140. A. Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Turkey and Russia). Ankara, 1990, p. 517.

154  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan 18. Ibid., p. 519; for more details see M. Qasımov (M. Gasimov), Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti. II hissə (Azerbaijan Policy of the Great Powers during the First World War. Part II). Baku, 2001, pp. 271–281. 19. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 523. 20. See: Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 140. 21. З. Авалов (Z.Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, pp. 122–123. 22. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1957, pp. 491–492. 23. Ibid., pp. 492–493. 24. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 525. 25. Ibid., pp. 554–555. 26. Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, Türk İnkilabı Tarihi. Cilt III (History of the Turkish Revolution. Volume III). Ankara, 1983, p. 246. 27. Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, p. 555. 28. Notes of Conversation held between A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, and Talaat Pasha, Turkish PrimeMinister. 02.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, pp. 1–2. 29. Документы внешней политики СССР, p. 510. 30. V.I. Lenin, Azərbaycan haqqında (About Azerbaijan). Baku, 1970, p. 151. 31. Документы внешней политики СССР, p. 516; Qasımov, Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti, p. 279. 32. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. October, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 5, p. 2. 33. Avalov, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 115–116. 34. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 161. 35. Avalov, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 118. 36. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 14.11.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, p. 18. 37. Notes of conversation held between A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, and Talaat Pasha, Turkish PrimeMinister. 02.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, pp. 2–3. 38. Ibid., p. 3. 39. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Nasimi Ahmad Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 02.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, p. 4. 40. Ibid., p. 5. 41. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Enver Pasha, Turkish Minister of War. 03.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, p. 8. 42. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski. 31.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, pp. 12–13. 43. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Izzet Pasha, the newly appointed Turkish Prime Minister. 21.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, p. 8. 44. Ibid., p. 9. 45. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Nabi Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 27.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, pp. 10–12.

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  155 46. Letter of A. Aharonian, Chairman of the Armenian Representative Office in Istanbul to A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic. 1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, p. 7. 47. Appeal of A. Aharonian, Chairman of the Armenian Representative Office in Istanbul to the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Turkey. October, 1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 31, p. 4. 48. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 17, pp. 44–46. 49. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Turkish Deputy Minister of Education. 28.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, pp. 13–14. 50. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski. 31.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, p. 15. 51. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with the new Turkish Sheikh-ul Islam. 28.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, pp. 17–18. 52. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, pp. 111–112; M. Qasımlı (M. Gasimli), Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti. III hissə (Azerbaijan Policy of the Great Powers during the First World War. Part III). Baku, 2004, p. 417. 53. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Nabi Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 27.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 150, p. 11. 54. Süleyman İzzet, Büyük Harpte (1918) 15. Piyade Tümeninin Azerbaycan ve Şimali Kafkasiyadakı Hareket ve Muharibeleri (Movements and Battles of the 15th Infantry Brigade in Azerbaijan and North Caucasus during the Great War [1918]). Istanbul, 1936, p. 140. 55. Ю. В. Ключников и А. Сабанин (Y. V. Klyuchnikov i A. Sabanin), Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях. Часть II (International Politics of the Contemporary Time in Agreements, Notes and Declarations. Part II). Moscow, 1926, p. 188. 56. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski. 14.11.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, p. 18. 57. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Rauf Bey, Minister of Navigation of Turkey. 03.11.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, pp. 1–2. 58. Note of Protest of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in relation to the articles of Mondros armistice concerning Azerbaijan. 04.11.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 2. 59. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Deputy Minister Rashid Hikmet Bey, 04.1011918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 4. 60. Note of Protest of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in relation to the articles of Mondros armistice concerning Azerbaijan. 04.11.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 2. 61. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Nabi Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 05.11.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 8. 62. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski. 15.11.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 20. 63. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Rashid Hikmet Bey, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 04.11.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 5.

156  The Allied entry into Azerbaijan 64. Letter of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mustafa Rashid Bey to A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic. November 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 14. 65. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 12, 1918. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. 28 may 1918. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti istiqlalının birinci sənei dövriyyəsi (May 28, 1918. The First Anniversary of the Independence of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic). Baku, 1919, p. 12. 70. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski. 31.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, p. 17. 71. A. Ziyadxanlı (A. Ziyadkhanli), Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan). Baku, 1919, p. 59. 72. M. B. Mehmetzade, Milli Azerbaycan hareketi. Milli Azerbaycan “Müsavat” Halk Fırkası tarihi (The National Azerbaijani Movement. History of the National Azerbaijani People’s Party “Musavat”). Ankara, 1991, p. 99. 73. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 18, 1918. 74. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 15. 75. Ziyadxanlı, Azərbaycan, p. 41. 76. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 17, 1918. 77. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, p. 105. 78. Les troupes anglo-russes sont à Bakou. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 14. 79. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 18, 1918. 80. Ziyadxanlı, Azərbaycan, pp. 60–61. 81. 28 may 1918. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti istiqlalının birinci sənei dövriyyəsi, pp. 13–14. 82. Б. Байков (B. Baykov), Воспоминания о революции в Закавказье (1917–1920 гг.) (Recollections of the Revolution in Transcaucasia [1917–1920]). Berlin, 1922, p. 147. 83. Ibid., p. 151. 84. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 166. 85. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), November 19, 1918. 86. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 142. 87. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain, p. 77; Qasımlı, Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti. III hissə, p. 437. 88. Appeal of Bishop Bagrat on behalf of the Armenian National Council of Baku to General-Major Thomson, Commander of the Allied Army. 23.10.1918. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 3, p. 72. 89. Ibid., pp. 73–79. 90. A Monsieur le Ministre-Président de la République d’Azerbaïdjan—Fataly Han Hoïsky. Le présent mémoire du rapport, traduit en allemand, a été transmis au Commandant de l’Armée musulmane de Caucase Noury Pacha. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère( MAE) de France (Archives Diplomatique) Correspondanse politique et commerciale, 1914–1940 Série  “Z” Europe 1918–1940 Sous-Serie USSR RussiaCaucase (Azerbaidjan). Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales 11 janvier 1919—31 mars 1920. v. 638, f. 1. 91. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain, p. 75. 92. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 143. 93. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), December 3, 1918. 94. Richard H.Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921. London, 1968, pp. 78–79. 95. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), May 28, 1919. 96. Law on Establishment of the Azerbaijani Parliament. 19.11.1918. SAAR, f. 895, r. 10, v. 2, p. 23.

The Allied entry into Azerbaijan  157 97. Ibid., p. 24. 98. To All Azerbaijani Citizens. 28.11.1918. SAAR, f. 895, r. 1, v. 25, p. 2. 99. From Colonel Stokes to Major Rawlinson. 03.12.1918. SAAR. f. 895, r. 1, v. 11, p. 2. 100. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild. (Parliament of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic (1918–1920) (stenographic reports). Volume 1). Baku, 1998, pp. 33–35. 101. Ibid., p. 36. 102. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 166. 103. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild, p. 39. 104. Ibid., p. 41. 105. Ibid., p. 43. 106. Ibid., p. 44. 107. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 167. 108. Наше время (Nashe vremya), December 30, 1918. 109. 28 may 1918. Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti istiqlalının birinci sənei dövriyyəsi, p. 18. 110. Ziyadxanlı, Azərbaycan, p. 63. 111. Ibid., p. 64. 112. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, p. 73. 113. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain, p. 238; see: Qasımlı, Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti. III hissə, (Policies of Great Powers toward Azerbaijan during the First World War. Part III), p. 460. 114. У. Черчилль (W. Churchill), Мировой кризис (The World Crisis). Moscow, 1932, p. 106. 115. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Mushavir-ul Mamalek Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 09.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 58. 116. See: Qasımlı, Birinci dünya müharibəsi illərində böyük dövlətlərin Azərbaycan siyasəti. III hissə, (Policies of Great Powers toward Azerbaijan during the First World War. Part III), pp. 455–459.

6 Azerbaijani diplomacy during the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference

In the autumn of 1918, it was clear that the Allies had won the war and the Central power countries were conceding, one after another. By the end of November, preparations were under way for an international peace conference, to be held in Paris, that would officially announce the victors, decide the postwar situation, and resolve disputes. The main organizers of the Paris Peace Conference were France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, and Japan. All organizational issues were to be resolved within this limited circle, and deciding on questions concerning the participating countries and working principles posed numerous problems. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau held that all matters should first be presented to the five states before being discussed by other parties to the conference. “If a new war erupts,” he said, “Germany won’t invade Cuba or Honduras, but France, and France will have to fight back.”1 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was against resolving the issues in such a limited fashion. The British did not object to Clemenceau’s proposal, but they insisted on the participation of small nations at the conference. After long discussions and based upon a document prepared by the French and adopted on January 12, 1919, the countries that were to participate in the conference were divided into four categories. The first category comprised the countries that fought in the war. Those countries were to take part in all activities and in all commissions of the peace conference. The second category consisted of countries that had fought for domestic interests. Those countries would take part in the discussions of the issues exclusively concerning them. The third category comprised countries that had severed relations with the Central powers during the war. The delegates of those countries would also be able to take part only in the meetings concerning problems specific to them. The last category comprised neutral countries and newly independent countries. Those countries could take part in discussions concerning only themselves and only with the invitation of the one of the states of the first category. They could present their wishes and proposals to the meeting either orally or in written form. Nothing was said about the regulations for Germany and its allies. The main purpose of the conference was to prepare peace treaties to be signed between the Entente states and the Central powers, but it was obvious that “the Russia question” would be a major topic on the conference’s agenda. The states

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  159 that had been newly created from the territories of the dismantled Russian empire had great expectations for the conference. The Azerbaijan Republic had declared its independence and had pinned its hopes on the conference: its recognition by world powers as an equal member of international organizations would uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic. The delegates of the Azerbaijani government had heard numerous hopeful pledges about participation in the peace conference during negotiations with Allied commander Major-General William Thomson in Enzeli in November.2 After the entry of Entente troops into Baku, Thomson, along with the regional commander, George Milne, had on numerous occasions indicated that the Azerbaijan Republic would participate in the Paris Peace Conference. As the two figures were official representatives of the Entente states in the region, their statements were considered as an invitation to the Azerbaijan Republic to participate in the conference. General Thomson, upon receiving official instructions, had said in a written statement to the Azerbaijani government that all disputes would be resolved during the peace conference.3 Preparing for the peace conference was considered the most important task with regard to the international situation. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, extraordinary and plenipotentiary delegate for the Azerbaijan Republic in Istanbul, had already begun this work during the months of October and December 1918. In a letter to Fatali Khan Khoyski on October 31, 1918, Topchubashov recommended careful preparation for the conference and immediate selection of delegates, who should be well briefed, lest the country send an unprepared and impromptu delegation. He continued, saying, We must all work more intensively and productively on these matters and be ready to face challenges, egos, and reversals of fortune. We should not engage in fortune-telling to see what we should expect; from now on whatever happens will not be worse than what has already happened. We just need to allocate our strength appropriately so that each person stands in his own place and believes in his power. When the issue concerns our people’s destiny there cannot and should not be any other thoughts of a personal nature.4 Topchubashov, who had sent a letter of protest to the Ottoman government objecting to Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Mondros armistice, forwarded a copy of the same letter and prepared a memorandum on behalf of the Azerbaijan Republic for presentation to military delegates of the Allied countries who came to Constantinople (Istanbul) in mid-November. Topchubashov met with British delegates there and sought more information about the peace conference. In a letter of November 20, 1918, Topchubashov notified the cabinet about his meeting with Colonel Temple the day before and mentioned that the peace conference would be held in Paris in 2 or 3 months.5 After negotiations with the British, it seemed that the South Caucasus countries would send a collective delegation and the Azerbaijan Republic would have sufficient representation there. This idea of having one delegation from South Caucasus countries to the peace conference

160  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference was discussed during negotiations held at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early October. This, they agreed, could help in the resolution of small disputes and in the recognition of their independence. Topchubashov therefore considered that it was important to be in contact with Armenian and Georgian delegates and to strengthen relations with them in preparation for the conference. On December 16, 1918, Topchubashov sent a letter to the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers in which he reiterated the need to unite as one delegation representing the Caucasus so as to show solidarity and in order not to fall under Russian oppression again. He said that the only way to gain recognition of the independence of all the Caucasian states would be through the joint actions of Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and Armenians, regardless of their differences in national and political ideologies; what was imperative now was their independence and everyone’s participation and effort at the peace conference. Topchubashov then proposed to form a South Caucasus confederated delegation in order to win the confidence of the Paris Peace Conference. He wrote, “In my opinion, this is the best way for now.”6 He prepared a memorandum to be presented to the Entente diplomatic representatives in Istanbul, taking into consideration the interests of all three nations, and sent copies of the memorandum to Armenian and Georgian representatives.7 The memorandum was also forwarded to French, British, American, Italian, Greek, and Japanese diplomatic representatives with whom the Azerbaijan Republic considered it possible to mediate alongside their Armenian and Georgian counterparts as one confederation.8 The memorandum presented at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey for the diplomatic delegates of the Entente countries was translated into English and French and sent to Stockholm, Paris, Geneva, London, and New York. The French version of the memorandum was headlined by the foreign press representatives, and the Turkish version of the memorandum was published with a circulation of 750 copies in Istanbul.9 In itself, the memorandum proved quite a serious document. Not only did it detail the political, economic, cultural, ethnic, and national problems relating to Azerbaijan but it was written to show the necessity of disseminating information and ensuring the subsequent recognition of the young republic. In addition, interesting information about Azerbaijan as well as numerous facts and statistics pertaining to the geography, demographics, and legal administration of the Caucasus were incorporated into the document. Issues such as the founding of the Azerbaijan Republic, the reforms it carried out in a short span of time, and the tragic events that had taken place in Baku during March 1918 were also mentioned in the memorandum. Most notably it contained a comprehensive historical and current review of the Garabagh problem. In his memorandum, Topchubashov showed that the Azerbaijan Republic had the right and authority to exist as an independent state and that the Azerbaijani Turks stood by their hope of international recognition as a modern republic. In December 1918, Topchubashov addressed a letter to the Grand Vizier Ahmad Tevfik Pasha informing him of his intention to return to Baku to prepare Azerbaijani delegates for the Paris Peace Conference and their respective mandates. He requested the necessary documents for himself and his mission to return to

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  161 Baku (including the following people: representative of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs Salim Bey Behbudov, and Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov’s two secretaries, Mustafa Bey Vakilov and Ali Mardan Bey’s son Rashid Bey Topchubashov).10 However, his letter was never sent, because the opening of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 had already been announced. Therefore, they contacted the Azerbaijani government via diplomatic courier and meetings were carried out in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. By mid-December 1918, he sent the secretary of the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Delegation, Mustafa Bey Vakilov, to Azerbaijan in order to set a clear plan of action.11 The need to meet with the representatives of the Entente countries in Istanbul made it essential for Topchubashov to stay there. During November and December 1918, he held several productive meetings with Turkish governmental bodies and Allied representatives. He conducted discussions with Rauf Bey (who had headed the Turkish delegation to the Mondros negotiations) on November 3; with Rashid Hikmet Bey, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on November 4; with Minister of Foreign Affairs Nabi Bey on November 5; with Minister for Finance Huseyn Javid Bey on November 8; with Ukraine delegate Sukovchin on November 15; with Turkey’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs Mustafa Rashid Bey, Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha, and England’s diplomatic representative Temple on November 16 and 18; with Turkish Minister for Finance Abdulrahman Bey, and Military Minister Abdulla Pasha on November 25; with Russian representative Paul Milyukov on December 7; with U.S. representative Brown on December 23; and with the Italian Kingdom’s Count Sforza on December 31, 1918.12 The situation in the world and in Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war was discussed at these meetings. The newly established Azerbaijani parliament issued an appeal to the people and to the parliaments of the world as well as to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who was considered the architect of the postwar world order, asking for recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence as a parliamentary republic. The preparations for the Paris Peace Conference were an important matter for discussion at the early parliamentary sessions, including the fact that Georgian and Armenian representatives had already started spreading propaganda in Europe in favor of their countries. The newspaper Azerbaijan had published an article about the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference on December 21, 1918, posing the following questions: What do we see in relation to Azerbaijan? Who will support its interests in Paris or London? Which foreign “press” does it have? Who will create public opinion about Azerbaijan in Western Europe and America?13 The answers to these questions indicated that it was imperative to send representatives to Western European countries and to the United States to look after Azerbaijani interests, to cultivate an impartial yet favorable public opinion about Azerbaijan, to disseminate information about the government of Azerbaijan and the real reasons for the state’s push for independence and subsequent fight for democracy, and to conduct negotiations. According to the agenda prepared by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic delegation to be sent to Europe and the United States was to have four duties: First, to conduct negotiations with delegates

162  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference of the Allied countries (Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy) as well as with neutral countries (Switzerland and Holland), to achieve recognition of Azerbaijan as a sovereign state, and to obtain Azerbaijani representation at the Paris Peace Conference on an equal footing with all other participants; second, to meet with eminent public figures, leaders of the socialist movement, and the heads of international organizations, in order to draw attention to Azerbaijan; third, to create a favorable public opinion toward Azerbaijan, to promote to the media the potential role of Azerbaijan in world society; and fourth, to promote trade by facilitating commercial relations with local trading and industrial circles and to collect important data about their resources and the like.14 It was proposed that the delegation should go to Rome, then Paris via Istanbul and travel from the capitals of neutral states as well as from London and Washington. The Azerbaijani government considered this of vital importance and so allotted 2.5 million manats to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of forming a delegation to Europe and the United States. This delegation should furnish the European and American communities with historical, ethnographic, and statistical materials related to Azerbaijan.15 It was firmly believed that this could and should facilitate the recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan. The government wanted to send a delegation to Paris to represent the Azerbaijan Republic at the peace conference and to fulfill the directives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the December 26, 1918, parliamentary session, Fatali Khan Khoyski gave a speech about the government’s programs and mentioned issues concerning progress in the preparation of delegates for the international peace conference. “Above all other duties,” he said, the government is duty-bound to protect and prize our independence as the apple of our eyes. This independence does not mean that we should build a wall between Azerbaijan and other states. Obviously, an independent Azerbaijani state will endeavor to establish relations with other states, with the states established in the territory of the former Russia, and with Russia itself. Regarding Azerbaijani expectations for the international peace conference, he said, Our independence will be acknowledged and recognized at the peace conference. We hope that the rights of a nation that was zealous for liberty after the American declaration was announced to the world will not be trampled on by democratic Britain and France at the coming peace conference. At the peace conference, with delegates from various governments taking part, our voice will be heard on the world stage. The prime minister considered that the main duty of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was to establish peace with neighboring countries and to resolve disputes peacefully and that, representing the policies of the new government, the Ministry

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  163 of Foreign Affairs should establish political and commercial contacts and guarantee peace. “But guaranteeing peace does not mean that the government will not have armed forces. Every state should have forces to defend it. We need to have a force against foreign enemies who wish to attack our independence.”16 On December 28, 1918, the cabinet confirmed the delegation to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference. The delegation was headed by Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, and Mammad Hasan Hajinski was appointed as deputy. Two parliamentarians, Ahmad Bey Aghayev and Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, were included in the delegation. Parliamentary members Mir Yagub Mehdiyev and Mahammad Maharramov and the editor of the newspaper Azerbaijan were appointed as consultants. According to a letter of authority signed by Fatali Khan Khoyski as the head of government and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the delegation not only was to participate in the international peace conference but had the authority to sign any agreement of a political, economic, or financial nature with any nation on behalf of Azerbaijan. The delegation would then be tasked to choose the staff they needed for the conference. Incidentally, in the absence of Topchubashov, who was not in Baku, Hajinski was to lead the delegation until their arrival in Istanbul. The delegation and their staff were issued identification cards and documents necessary to them in early January. In order to make their visit to Paris easier, the Allied commander, General Thomson, gave them reference letters bearing his signature.17 Likewise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allotted 150,000 manats to the deputy head of the delegation, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, and 2.5 million manats to send the delegation to Europe and America.18 Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the Azerbaijani extraordinary delegate to Tiflis, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, regarding the composition of the Azerbaijani delegation to be sent to Europe: temporary chairman of the delegation, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, and delegation members Ahmad Bey Aghayev, Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, Jeyhun Hajibeyli, and Mahammad Maharramov.19 After the Azerbaijani delegates arrived in Tiflis, it became evident that the planned joint delegation representing all the South Caucasus republics would not materialize, and it was decided that each state should send its own delegation. However, during negotiations with E. Gegochkori in Tiflis, it was agreed that both Azerbaijan and Georgia would participate jointly. Since Armenia considered itself as part of the Entente, they refused to cooperate with the Georgians or Azerbaijanis. After a series of brief meetings, the Azerbaijani delegates left for Istanbul on January 8, 1919, together with the delegates of the republics of Dagestan and Georgia. Mammad Yusif Jafarov in Tiflis informed the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this.20 At that time, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli, had sent an urgent message to Topchubashov, the head of the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, notifying him that before the fate of the Caucasian people was resolved at the peace conference, they should raise questions about the protection of Muslim regions in Erivan province, an integral part of Azerbaijan, as well as protection for the Muslim population of Batum, Kars, and Akhalsikh and the maintenance of the “status quo” in those territories.

164  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference The urgent communiqué said that Armenian armed forces had killed Muslims in Erivan province and were attempting to ethnically purge Muslims from those territories. Ziyadkhanli wrote, we should raise the question of support before the delegates of the European countries in Istanbul and Paris so that they will instruct Allied troops in the Caucasus to send their military forces to those territories, to protect the lives of the civilian population there.21 Some members of the Georgian delegation were already in European countries several months ahead of the conference. By September, when the defeat of the Central powers was clear, the Georgian representative in Berlin, Zurab Avalov (Avalishvili), had traveled from Berlin to Istanbul by order of the (Menshevik) Georgian government to meet with the diplomatic representatives of France, England, Switzerland, and other countries.22 And in November, after Germany’s defeat, Avalov was urgently sent to London and Paris while Mikheil Tsereteli was sent to Scandinavia and Akaki Chkhenkeli to Switzerland.23 Georgian delegates Avalov and David Gambashidze, who arrived in England in December, had fruitful negotiations in London and, on the way to Britain, they met the future High Commissioner for Transcaucasia, Oliver Wardrop, in Bergen, Norway, where they received assurances of support from him. For the sake of impartiality, it should be noted that although Azerbaijan had no representatives in London, the Georgian delegates sent to the Versailles conference headed by Nikolai Chkheidze backed Azerbaijani interests as well and had notified others on behalf of both countries that the South Caucasus would remain “united and indivisible” outside Russian control. After immense efforts of the Georgian delegates in London, Sir Louis Mallet of the Foreign Office issued a letter on December 31, 1918, notifying them that England sympathized with the declaration of the Georgian republic and was ready to raise the matter about the recognition of its independence at the peace conference.24 Hence, on the eve of the visit to Paris, the Georgians greatly improved the situation for Azerbaijan as they were acting in tandem with the Azerbaijani delegation on many issues. On January 11, 1919, Azerbaijani delegates met with the delegates of the Armenian republic in Batum and, on January 13, several meetings were held with Georgian delegates as well. The Georgian delegates held that “the Armenians will continue poisoning our lives until they get as many territories as satisfies them.” The Georgians proposed that Armenia’s territorial claims should be met at the expense of Turkey and that an independent Armenian republic should establish itself in the territory of Turkey. Taking into consideration the importance of this issue for Azerbaijan, Mammad Hasan Hajinski sent a telegram to establish Azerbaijan’s stance on this issue. After familiarizing himself with the situation, he considered that “it was possible to make minor concessions about the issue concerning the autonomy of Turkish Armenia.”25 With full knowledge of the situation in Batum, the Azerbaijani delegates held several meetings with the representatives of local Muslims in the area.

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  165 The Ottomans’ sudden withdrawal from Batum and the entry of the British had put the Muslim population of Batum and Kars in a difficult situation, and the Georgians took advantage of this by distributing propaganda in their favor. During negotiations with prominent persons in Ajaria, the Azerbaijani delegates proposed that they establish their own state together with Kars, Surmeli, and others. It was suggested that the Azerbaijani consul in Batum, Mahmud Bey Efendiyev, might be able to render them assistance in this regard. In a telegram to Fatali Khan Khoyski dated January 17, 1919, Hajinski wrote, “In case our proposal is accepted, we should create favorable conditions for our consul in Batum; without demanding any accounting we should allocate about 200,000 manat to him for propaganda. Only Mahmud Bey Efendiyev should be privy to this.”26 In January, Efendiyev prepared an estimate of expenditures for 1919 and sent it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to strengthen the activity of the consulate. He then asked to appoint Aziz Bey Gadimbeyov to the position of secretary at the consulate and put Safvat Aghayev in charge of the clerical work. Mahmud Bey Efendiyev mentioned that he knew both of them as patriotic and faithful to their nation and as persons of high moral standing.27 In his telegram addressed from Batum to the head of government and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hajinski broached two more subjects: the strengthening of the delegation to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference and financial issues. He wrote, Fatali Khan, the farther we move away from Baku the more we feel the weakness of our delegation. Our neighbors have included twelve very influential and famous members in their delegation and their consultants are highly skilled in assisting their delegations. We should take into consideration that they have their own people and their own committees both in Paris and in London. You should seriously think about strengthening the delegation. He also pointed out that the staffing of the Azerbaijani delegation was not yet officially organized. From Hajinski’s message, it was obvious that the Azerbaijani delegation had very little financial support in comparison to its neighboring countries. A large sum was needed in order to carry out the planned work in Western Europe. Hajinski wrote, “They say that it is impossible to do anything there [Paris] without money.” The Armenian delegates had a budget of 10 million and the Georgian delegation, 5 million manats,28 while the Azerbaijani delegation had only 2.5 million manats.29 On January 18, 1919, the Azerbaijani, Georgian, and North Caucasian delegation left for Istanbul from Batum. By the time they arrived at Istanbul, Ali Mardan Topchubashov had managed to carry out numerous important tasks. The Turkish press reported that he would head the Azerbaijani delegation to Paris. The newspaper Zaman wrote on January 12, “A. M. Topchubashov has been appointed as the chairman of the delegation to participate at the Paris Peace Conference from Baku. Therefore, instead of returning to his motherland, Ali Mardan Bey will leave for Paris.” The article described Topchubashov and his 4-month-long mission in Istanbul. It mentioned his graduating from the St. Petersburg University

166  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference and his reputation as one of the most famous lawyers of Russia who for 30 years has been staunchly defending the political rights of Russian Turks against tsarist persecution and violence. Despite the situation in Istanbul, Ali Mardan Bey did the numerous tasks assigned to him.30 Among these tasks was a meeting in early January with the delegates of the Allied and neutral countries. Topchubashov had given them the Azerbaijan Republic’s letter of protest in regard to the Mondros agreement and held negotiations with Iranian and Russian diplomats. He was then received by the Turkish Sultan.31 On January 6, 1919, Topchubashov met with the diplomatic representative of the United States in Constantinople, Lewis Heck, and had asked him to facilitate the realization of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points by including Azerbaijan in the conference and recognizing of the independence of Azerbaijan.32 On January 10, 1919, he met with Dutch representative van der Does de Willebois. During the meeting, Willebois touched upon the memorandum Topchubashov had sent and noted that he had found a lot of interesting information about the Caucasus and Azerbaijan. He said, “I see that you have a very rich country and therefore you can live on your own. You have a lot of oil and cotton but not enough railways.” At the end of the conversation Willebois mentioned to him that big changes were supposed to take place on the European map.33 This assumption was based on the future establishment of new states in Europe and in the territory of the former Russian empire against the backdrop of changes resulting from the war. By December 30, 1918, Topchubashov had presented the memorandum he prepared on the current situation of Azerbaijan to the Swedish ambassador to Turkey, Per Anckarsvärd. Under their arrangement with the Swedish ambassador, the diplomatic representatives of the great powers in Stockholm should also receive this memorandum. Anckarsvärd wrote to Topchubashov on January 12, 1919, saying, “I have sent the memorandum you gave me on December 30 about the current situation of Azerbaijan to Stockholm and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of the King of Sweden.”34 Concurrently, the British deputy high commissioner in Istanbul, Richard Webb, also notified Topchubashov to the same effect, stating that the memorandum dated December 30, 1918, was delivered to the representatives of Her Majesty’s government.35 On January 5 and 6, 1919, Topchubshov met with Sergei Sazonov, who represented the Kolchak and Denikin governments, at the Pera Palace Hotel in Istanbul, where foreign delegations were accommodated. Sazonov was a famous Russian diplomat who had served in the foreign ministry since 1883. He had been posted to Great Britain, the United States, and the Vatican for diplomatic missions, had headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian empire from 1909 to 1916, and had played a significant role in the creation of the Entente.36 Personally, Sazonov did not favor the idea of the breakup of the Russian empire and the establishment of the new states. Exactly a month earlier, on December 7, 1918, Topchubashov had had a similar meeting with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Paul Milyukov. During detailed discussion of the complicated events in Russia, Milyukov, whom Topchubashov knew from their party activities during the first Russian revolution, avoided expressing his outlook toward the

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  167 non-Russian populace, noting that the main problem at that time was the liberation of Russia from the Bolsheviks. “Russia will be saved if the Bolsheviks leave the stage,” he said. In response to Ali Mardan Bey’s question about the establishment of three independent South Caucasian republics, each with its own government and army, Milyukov replied, I understand that your people should secede and from that point of view the establishment of your republics is only natural and you should take this step. All the same, it is impossible to deny that Germany and its Eastern policy have played a role in the establishment of your republics. In response to Milyukov’s sarcasm, Topchubashov mentioned that the nations’ fates had already been determined, as with Azerbaijan.37 These initial discussions made clear that Milyukov and Sazonov would struggle for the premise of a “united and indivisible Russia” at the Paris Peace Conference. Topchubashov told them that Azerbaijan had established its independence from Russia and would not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, We Azerbaijanis are not enemies of the Russians and we wish them to build their lives on Bolshevism, Socialism, or even Monarchy, or whatever they desire; however, Azerbaijanis and other Caucasians, excluding the Terek and Kuban Cossacks, cannot be one with Russia any longer. … Their differences in mores, way of life, and especially their sociopolitical outlook is of greater importance. There have always been serious problems and incompatibilities in those areas. The previous regime has not taken this fact into consideration. That was the biggest mistake the Russians made and one that has turned us into a backward and miserable nation while God has gifted us with an innate talent and love for labor. If you want us to remain under Russia’s sovereignty, that means it is our destiny to remain miserable, for our people have veered away from the Bolshevism, cloaked as extreme socialism that is deeply rooted in Russian provinces and encompasses all of Central Russia. If they again bond us to such a nation, we will remain backward and our backwardness will soon impede your development and everyone will then lead a meaningless life. The Azerbaijanis are about five to six million people. According to Wilson’s principles, they have the right to live independently and we will always strive for independence as we will also strive for a life together with our neighbors.38 Sazonov was already familiar with Topchubashov’s ideas about secession, independence and, in the case of necessity, establishing a Caucasian confederation together with neighboring states. “The Muslim Tatars [i.e. Azerbaijanis],” he said, “have already buried Russia and have planted a big cross on it.” Topchubashov rejected the statement by saying that, on the contrary, Azerbaijanis’ yearning to be independent would make things easier for a future Russia made up of the Russian population and provinces. The Azerbaijanis wished happiness to Russia and

168  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference wished to live in peace with their neighbors—the Georgians and Armenians—in a federal republic like the Swiss confederation. Sazonov, who had vast political experience, said that that was unlikely, owing to the many differences between Caucasians, especially with Armenians, who he said would not form a single entity with the Azerbaijanis. Citing the numerous bloody conflicts in the Caucasus between Muslim “Tatars” and Christian Armenians, Sazonov said that it was possible to forget wars but one could not say the same about the slaughter that took place in September in Baku, where Armenians slaughtered Tatars and viceversa, as well as earlier bloody events. He spoke of hearing a lot of talk among Caucasian Muslims about their inclination toward Russia and their desire not to separate from it. In response, Ali Mardan Bey reminded him that, first of all, it was Russia that had moved away from Azerbaijan and not the other way around.39 During these discussions Sazonov promised that Russia would soon be restored, that people’s rights would be recognized, and that there would be a “wellgoverned Russia.” He debunked the myth of Bolshevism, claiming that it was not even an ideology but was simple profiteering destruction of others’ properties for self-interest. “A handful of the stupid cannot seize Russia,” he said. Sazonov’s stance was a clear reflection of Great Russian chauvinism formed throughout many decades. It was interesting that the old Russian diplomat supported the independence of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman people and indicated that after they rid themselves of Bolshevism, the Russian empire would be restored to its former glory with the same borders and territories, except Poland. At this point, Topchubashov’s conversation with Sazonov becomes interesting. The following are excerpts from the conversation: Sazonov: As I see it, Russia’s fault lies only in its attitude toward Poland. We have been unjust to them and we have to correct this historical mistake. I have always supported this view, at risk to my position. As for other nations, our conscience is clear, and as soon as we get rid of the Bolsheviks we will welcome back the people who wanted to secede from Russia [points with his forefinger]. Topchubashov: Then you will set your Cossacks on us again like you did a hundred years ago? And what are we to do? We are used to it. Sazonov: [interrupting] I do not know how it will happen. What I know is that first of all the Allies would not agree that the Caucasus would leave Russia. Believe me, the Georgians and the Armenians will tell you that. Here their interests overlap with those of Russia and all of the Caucasian people. Topchubashov: You think so? Sazonov: I am sure that the Caucasian people are not capable of living independently. Please tell me, can these stupid sheep, the Georgians, establish their own state? Their leaders Chkheidze or Chkhenkeli or their idol Tsereteli may be able to destroy Russia, but they are hardly able to build anything. The Armenians on the other hand are a more interesting nation in comparison.

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  169 And you Azerbaijanis do not want to part with Russia, although you claim the contrary. As for Ukraine, its establishment is nothing else but efforts of the Germans and Austrians, who for a long time have been trying to create a state in the South of Russia … . Topchubashov: Then which nations do you think are capable of living independently? Sazonov: Well, Serbs, Czechs. The Serbians played such a beautiful role in this war. This is what I understand, you see. Topchubashov: What role? Sazonov: [did not answer the question] And the Czechs? Do you see what kind of determination and persistence they have? Just like the Austro-Hungarian nation in general. And this Turkey is a dead country, a dead nation; I think the Turks understand this themselves … Topchubashov: On the contrary, the Turkish nation can survive and it has the grounds to think so. But I am more interested in your thoughts about the Caucasus. Well, you allowed yourself to express your opinion about Georgians. Once you go to Paris, surely you will meet the Georgian and Armenian delegates there … Sazonov: Why should I meet with them? I hope I will not have to, and besides, I think and I am sure that none of them will be allowed to take part in the peace conference. Topchubashov: In that case, none of the Caucasian people’s independence will be recognized. Then what were Wilson’s Fourteen Points for? Sazonov: Wilson’s principles are merely ideology. If you notice, he does not say anything new. He has just systemized theories that are difficult to put to practice in real life. Believe me, those fourteen points will not play a decisive role.40 On January 7, 1919, a day after speaking with Sazonov, Topchubashov had a similar conversation with a Russian delegate, V. I. Savitsky, whom he had known from Tiflis. Savitsky’s father, I. K. Savitsky, had been the deputy chairman of the Tiflis District Court for a long time, and now V. I. Savitsky was leaving for Paris on Denikin’s mandate, as his legal advisor for economic issues. Like Sazonov, he also claimed that the independence of newly established republics would not be recognized, for cultural, economic, geographic, and other reasons. Savitsky talked about the Entente’s attitude toward new states that were indebted to Russia—and, in fact, those debts were later used as leverage by Russian diplomats to threaten Entente states. He noted that The 65–68 billion [rubles] debt to Russia cannot be disregarded. How will they pay off these debts? Where are they going to get the money for that? Will

170  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference they choose to benefit from a united Russia or would they prefer to have one creditor pay their debts rather than to have dozens of new states, each poorer than the other?41 Thus, from that time on, a difficult challenge lay ahead for the diplomatic representatives of the White Guard governments as they waited for Azerbaijan and other newly established republics at the Paris Peace Conference. On January 9, 1919, Topchubashov met with the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari Mosawer-al-Mamalek, This meeting was one of significant importance. As previously discussed, Iran was not happy about the establishment of an independent Azerbaijani republic. There was an opportunity to lessen Iranian hostility on this issue during the negotiations in Istanbul. Topchubashov wrote to the head of the Azerbaijani cabinet about the meeting with Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari: I hesitated a bit regarding the meeting with Iranian delegates as well as with Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mosawer-al-Mamalek. Their deliberate isolation from everybody in the hall [of the Pera Palace Hotel, where other delegates were hosted], as well as their cold reply to M. Mirzayev, whom I sent to speak to them (the minister’s son, a student of law, told Mirzayev “We do not speak Turkish”), as well as my conversations with an Iranian delegate, demonstrated the Iranian government’s discontent. All these hostilities kept me from going ahead; then, by sheer coincidence, Seyid Hasan from Tabriz, who was going to visit the Iranian minister, promised that he would let me know, but he did not keep his word. Nevertheless, I sent my secretary, Rahim Bey, whom I had told to give my business card to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as I considered this relation non-standard. Upon Rahim Bey’s return, he notified me that Mosawer-al-Mamalek had asked for me to visit him. I immediately went to his place and met the poet Huseyn Danesh Bey, who I think was Azerbaijani by blood. Surprisingly, he greeted me warmly almost before I had the chance to introduce myself, and he said with a big smile, “You see, we are old acquaintances. I was your guest together with former diplomatic representative Mosawer-al-Mamalek in Baku at your home. I still remember that pleasant ambiance of Muslim intellectuals who gathered at your home.”42 By the time the delegation left for Istanbul, serious disagreements had occurred between Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had stayed in Baku for 2 days, and Nasib Bey Usubbeyov together with Ahmad Bey Aghayev. The dispute concerned Iran’s baseless claims to Azerbaijan. Ansari considered Azerbaijan as having been under the Iranian shah’s control, but Aghayev, armed with historical fact and evidence, showed him that the Azerbaijani people had lived independently for hundreds of years. Azerbaijan had already heard that, based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the Iranian government had demanded the restoration of the borders that existed before the 1813 Gulustan

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  171 treaty with Russia. In order to clarify the issue, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatali Khan Khoyski addressed a letter to the Iranian consul in Baku and asked whether there was such a demand. Khoyski said that if the story were untrue, then a retraction should be published by the Iranian consul in the newspapers. When the consul informed Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari, who was in Baku at that time, about the letter that the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent to him, his Iranian counterpart replied that no demand existed and instructed him to refute this.43 However, it was discovered later that, indeed, such demands were made in the memorandum that Iran presented to Paris Peace Conference. During negotiations, Topchubashov told Iran that it was pointless to hold a negative attitude toward Azerbaijan. He added that “Our independence will be beneficial not only for us but also for Iran, especially at this time. I hope that your delegation and especially you will support our independence.” The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that he supported Azerbaijani independence, and he gave his word that they would assist Azerbaijan in this issue. He even reminded Ali Mardan Bey of an incident, saying, You are famous not only in the Caucasus but also in Iran. Do you remember when the Iranian government invited you to Tehran for the organization of the tasks of the Court? You always defended Muslim interests and I promise you for the sake of the interests of the Muslim population, that we Iranians sincerely wish Azerbaijan happiness and we will also be happy for its independence.44 On January 11 and 15, 1919, Topchubashov had two more meetings with the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ansari reiterated Iran’s recognition of the independence of the Caucasian republics and, most of all, Azerbaijan and that those republics could rely on Iran to help them defend themselves against Russia in the future. The head of the Azerbaijani government drew pleasure from that statement and added that some time earlier, an Iranian delegate had insinuated that Azerbaijan was established at the behest of Turks intent on separating Iranian Azerbaijan from Iran. Ansari admitted that there had been a misunderstanding in regard to the name “Azerbaijan,” and added, I think that you made a mistake. As you know, that is the name of one of our territories with the capital of Tabriz. In any case, how are you going to maintain your independence? You see, your neighbors, Armenia and Georgia, consider you as their enemy and the Entente countries will hesitate to support you because of Turkey. Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari also mentioned that he was skeptical of the possibility of establishing a confederation with the Armenians and the Georgians, that it would be difficult for Azerbaijanis to get along with Armenia: “They now have strong backing and they will not consent to form a federation together with you, as they are striving to establish their own kingdom now.” Ali Mardan Bey replied that

172  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference they could try, but they would not be able achieve this. During a discussion about “historical rights,” the Iranian hinted that they, too, had claims for Azerbaijan. Topchubashov then said that other, more essential “historical rights” could be evoked to counter Iranian “historical rights.” At the end of the negotiations the Iranian minister made mention of some facts. At present time, we should not forget what has happened in the past, and we Muslims especially should unite. Because in reality, when will we understand that, in the end, all the blows will strike us? Look at what has been done to Turkey; that state will hardly recover again. All hopes are lost. If we do not show solidarity, we will all be sentenced to death. Especially in the Caucasus, first the Russians then the Georgians and soon the Armenians will eat you and then us up alive. Despite the enmity and hostility among themselves, they all are Christians. Therefore we need to have trust in each other; but we do not have this now.45 On January 16, 1919, Topchubashov received the head of the Armenian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, chairman of the National Council Avetis Aharonian. Aharonian informed Topchubashov about the events that had taken place in the South Caucasus lately, especially about the Armenian-Georgian war and Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, and told Topchubashov that an alliance with the Georgians was improbable. He stressed that after the war started for the territory of Lori, Armenians were persecuted in Tiflis and that the majority of such instances happened in just Tiflis. He explained that the Georgians suspected the Armenians of having claims to Tiflis. But we do not have any claims for Tiflis. We leave this city to the Georgians. I said the same in Tiflis. We decided that we would leave everything there and take Armenians out of Tiflis, after which Tiflis will turn into an all-Georgian village and will be ruined. In regard to relations with Azerbaijan, Aharonian said that a lot of questions remained unresolved, that Armenians, especially prominent ones, could not go to Baku, and that conflicts sometimes took place between Armenians and Muslims on the section of the Transcaucasian railway that belonged to Azerbaijan. Aharonian said that, as long as Fatali Khan Khoyksi was the head of the government, Armenians would maintain poor relations with Azerbaijan, owing to the fact that the Armenians blamed Khoyski for the murder of Armenians and violence against them when Baku was liberated; they believed that Khoyski could have prevented this. In spite of that, Aharonian said that he was in support of the parameters of the relations. As for the issue of the Caucasian federation, he stated that it was a complicated question that would be answered eventually. The answer came from Akaki Chkhenkeli, who stated, “We cannot think about a federation until we strengthen our republics separately.” Topchubashov expressed dismay at how the problem was interpreted and the ongoing clashes between Caucasian peoples.46

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  173 Upon the arrival of the Azerbaijani delegation on January 20, 1919, Hajinski’s temporary post as chairman came to an end, and he turned over the portfolio of important documents related to the peace conference to Topchubashov. On January 22, 1919, the first meeting of the Azerbaijani delegation took place at Topchubashov’s apartment. They reviewed a range of issues.47 First on the agenda was the addition of new personnel to the delegation, and they finally confirmed the members of the delegation as the following: Ali Mardan Topchubashov, head of the delegation; Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Ahmad Bey Aghayev, and Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, members of the delegation; Mahammad Maharramov, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, and Jeyhun Hajibeyli, consultants; Ali Bey Huseynzade and V. Marchevski, assistants; Safvat Bey Malikov and Alakbar Bey Topchubashov, secretaries; A. Gafarov, translator from Azerbaijani to French; G. Gafarova, translator from Azerbaijani to English; H. Mammadov, translator from French to Turkish; and finally Rashid Bey Topchubashov, personal secretary of the chairman. Responsibilities were divided into three sections: the political and national, the economic and commercial, and propaganda and information. Ali Mardan Topchubashov, Ahmad Bey Aghayev, Ali Bey Huseynzade, Mahammad Maharramov, Sevhet Malikov, and Heydargulu Mammadov were included in the section on political issues. The second section, the economic-commercial section, included Mammad Hasan Hajinski, V. Marchevski, Akbar Aga Sheykhulislamov, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, Ali Mardan Topchubashov, and A. Gafarov. The third section included Ali Mardan Topchubashov, Ahmad Bey Aghayev, Jeyhun Hajibeyli, G. Gafarova, and Ali Bey Huseynzade. Each member of the delegation was given an assignment. Topchubashov was to head issues related to political and national matters and issue memoranda. Hajinski was in charge of economic and financial matters, while Huseynzade was responsible for the preparation of historical-ethnographic and literary materials and Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov for statistics and the preparation of borders and maps. Mahammad Maharramov dealt with national economy and agriculture, and Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, with trade and industry. Ahmad Bey Aghayev was responsible for political publications and Jeyhun Hajibeyli for matters relating to information. S. Malikov was to assist the chairman while V. Marchevski became assistant to Hajinski and Huseynzade to Topchubashov, respectively.48 There was also a division of duties concerning the internal affairs of the delegation. Topchubashov was responsible for arranging the meetings of the delegation as well as its sections and commissions and keeping control over all bodies and expenses. Hajinski was the deputy chairman and treasurer. Huseynzade was the secretary responsible for the compilation of the summary of protocols in French. Mahammad Maharramov was to write documents in Azerbaijani and Ali Akbar Topchubashov in Russian. Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov was responsible for keeping the records of the delegation while M. Malikov was to have control over financial accounts, and Savhat Malikov was in charge of the clerical division. During their first days in Istanbul, the Azerbaijani delegates prepared a number of important documents, compiled the schedule of activities, and determined the

174  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference main issues to be reviewed. The documents detailed aspects of socioeconomic life, politics, political parties, and national, religious, and cultural issues. On January 27, 1919, Hajinski sent a letter asking Fatali Khan Khoyski to strengthen the delegation with the addition of some eminent political figures as well as a number of specialists from Baku. He wrote, “Fatali Khan, I urge you to once more think about strengthening the delegation, as almost everyone has sent their most prominent and influential men there [Paris]. You see, it is a difficult fight ahead.” The fact that Ahmad Bey Aghayev fell ill, and the Armenians started a campaign against him in the Allied press, and stories about Ali Bey Huseynzade’s not being allowed to enter Paris aggravated the situation. As soon as the Azerbaijani delegation arrived in Istanbul, the next day most of the newspapers published in French, and especially Renaissance, a newspaper the Armenians published in French, printed an article portraying Aghayev as a journalist who had written against the Allies and spoken against the Entente in the Turkish parliament. The strong sentiments against Aghayev drew the attention of the Allied countries’ delegates in Istanbul. Despite Topchubashov and Hajinski’s efforts to demonstrate Aghayev’s origins in Garabagh and the significance of his being in the Azerbaijani parliament’s delegation and in spite of General Thomson’s letter of reference, they could not overcome the suspicions generated by the negative publicity. The British and French representatives in Istanbul made it clear that the Azerbaijani delegation should not take its member Aghayev to Paris; that he was an undesirable person because as a Turkish journalist and parliamentarian he had written and spoken out against them. On January 27, 1919, Hajinski wrote to Baku that a serious smear campaign had started against Aghayev and that the British were against his going to Paris. “Whatever the case, it is obvious that he cannot go there.”49 In March, in the first comprehensive report to Baku, Topchubashov noted that Aghayev was being blamed for all the faults of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress and especially the cabinet of Talaat Pasha and Enver Pasha. Not satisfied with this, Renaissance branded the whole Azerbaijani delegation “indisérable.”50 The Armenian propaganda campaign in Europe and America repeatedly implied either that a state by the name of Azerbaijan did not exist or else implicated Azerbaijan with a defeated Turkey that had fought against the Entente. They managed to have Aghayev arrested together with the members of the Committee of Union and Progress and exiled to Malta, a British protectorate. Tadeusz Swietochowski considers this event the Allies’ first act of disrespect toward Azerbaijan.51 During their stay in Istanbul, the Azerbaijani delegation assisted Aghayev’s poverty-stricken family with the sum of 150 Turkish liras per month. Ali Bey Huseynzade, a staff member of the Azerbaijani delegation, was arrested in Istanbul together with Aghayev.52 Despite his release from prison, he was not issued a visa to Paris. The Armenians’ covert propaganda was directed not only against the Azerbaijanis but the delegates of Georgia and the Union of the Mountain Peoples. Renaissance wrote about Nikolai Chkheidze and Irakli Tsereteli, who were leaving for Paris, that as members of the Petrograd Soviet, they were going to France in order to spread Bolshevism in Europe in the spirit of socialism.53 The propaganda of the Armenians and the newly established White

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  175 Russian government had an impact. The French government, apparently swayed by these libels, resorted to various pretexts in order to not let the Azerbaijani delegation into Paris and, as a result, the Azerbaijani delegates had to wait for 3 months in Istanbul. The Paris Peace Conference opened at the Palace of Versailles on January 18, 1919. More than 1,000 delegates had come to the conference, and more than 150 journalists were accredited. President Raymond Poincaré of France opened the conference with a short congratulatory speech. As prime minister of France, Georges Clemenceau was chosen to be president of the conference. According to the agreement made beforehand, Robert Lansing (United States), David Lloyd George (United Kingdom), Vittorio Orlando (Italy), and Saionji Kinmochi (Japan) were elected as vice presidents, but a triumvirate emerged consisting of Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson. The so-called Council of Ten were U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Stephen J.-M. Pichon from France, Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando and Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino from Italy, and ambassadors Makino Nobuaki and Chinda Sutemi from Japan. Many issues were on the agenda of the conference, but the “Russia question” took center stage. The question whether to invite Russia to the conference was a topic of discussions that began in November 1918. Lloyd George sent a letter to Georges Clemenceau notifying him that he supported Soviet Russia’s participation at the conference, but Balfour, Lord Curzon, and Clemenceau objected to this at the inter-Allied meeting. Lloyd George pointed out that Russia spanned two-thirds of Europe and a large portion of Asia, and like it or not, it would be impossible to resolve the problems of 200 million people without involving Russia.54 He supported the idea of inviting the White Guard government as well as the newly established states to the conference along with Russia.55 Clemenceau argued that the peace to be established now had nothing to do with Russia. On January 12, 1919, at the meeting of the Council of Ten, a resolution was passed upon the suggestion of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephen Pichon, moving not to officially invite Russia to the conference. Sergei Sazonov, Prince Georgy Lvov, Paul Milyukov, and other representative would be allowed to participate in the conference as consultants and advisers. The “Russia question” was again discussed at the meeting of the Council of Ten on January 22, 1919. They adopted President Wilson’s appeal to all the warring parties in Russia to end military operations. It called on the White Guard government and the newly established states to meet for discussions on the Princes’ Islands in the Sea of Marmara, close to Istanbul, by February 15, 1919.56 Representatives of France, Britain, the United States, and Italy were to take part in the conference.57 Ironically, Lloyd George was the author of this project, although for certain reasons it was Woodrow Wilson who introduced it. Late in January 1919, British officers in Istanbul left for Princes’ Islands in order to prepare for the “Russia conference.” Unbeknownst to them, the islands had long

176  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference been neglected, and there was no venue at which to hold the conference. It was evident that no one had bothered to look at the place before suggesting it as the meeting site. During the war, a nearby island had been used by the Turks to abandon dogs with infectious illnesses. At first the dogs ate each other but eventually all died of hunger. The dogs’ bones had turned white with time and were reminiscent of snowy hills on the island. Winston Churchill wrote that the events that had taken place had not yet been forgotten on those inhospitable islands.58 All of the newly established states from the former Russian empire, excluding Poland and Finland, had received invitations to the conference to be held on the Princes’ Islands. It was not easy to identify the main points of the conference at first, and not all of the invitees had agreed to attend. With a response sent via radio to Great Britain, France, Italy, United States, and Japan on February 4, 1919, Soviet Russia announced that it was ready to participate in the conference.59 The Baltic states agreed to take part in the conference with the condition that their independence would be recognized and that the conference would be limited only to peace talks with Soviet Russia. Not a single South Caucasus republic agreed to participate in the conference although the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Mountain Peoples, Heydar Bammatov, relayed their acceptance of the invitation to a U.S. representative in Bern.60 Despite the pressure by British and French representatives in Istanbul, Azerbaijan and Georgia gave notice on January 28, 1919, that they would not take part in the conference on Princes’ Islands. It was their opinion that the conference should discuss only disputable questions of recognition and not restoration of the unity of the Russian people. According to both countries, there was no need to sit at a table with representatives of Bolshevik Russia or the former Russia to take part in the conference when they were fighting for the recognition of the independence of their own republics. Mammad Hasan Hajinski wrote to the chairman of the Azerbaijani government, “We consider it impossible” to take part in this conference.61 On February 8, 1919, Georgian delegates in Paris (the main part of the Georgian delegation was in Istanbul, but some who were in European capitals when the members of the delegation were named were able to go to Paris earlier) appealed in writing to U.S. delegates at the peace conference that their issue should be resolved separately from that of Russia and that recognition of Georgia’s independence be put on the conference agenda.62 The Ukrainian representative in Paris, Grigoriy Sidorenko, notified Clemenceau in writing that his government could not take part in the conference.63 The Paris representatives of the White Guard governments in Siberia, Arkhangelsk, and southern Russia, who were in close contact with French politicians, rejected Wilson’s and Lloyd George’s initiatives; they did not want to have discussions with the Bolsheviks.64 Russian émigrés, political figures, and former Russian diplomats who spread across Europe after the Bolshevik revolution had no interest in talking with the Bolsheviks as they hoped to restore the old Russia to its former glory. This sentiment was reflected in a statement that Russian political figures presented to French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon on January 30, 1919. They gave assurances that a genuine people’s government would be established in Russia;

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  177 that religious restrictions and curtailments on civilian freedoms would be eliminated; that economic reforms would be carried out; that the agrarian problem would be soon be resolved; that the centralized administration would be abolished and that “finally a new Russia would pursue a new policy toward the non-Russian population of Russia.”65 With that in mind, the Russian delegates in Paris—Sergei Sazonov, Prince Lvov, Nikolai Tchaikovsky, Vasily Maklakov, and others—persuaded the French that nothing pertaining to recognition of newly established states should be open for discussion and that only the all-Russia issue should be on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference. The Russian delegates themselves did not want to go to Princes’ Islands because they did not want to recognize those newly established republics or have any kind of negotiations with them. On February 12, 1919, Sazonov and Tchaikovsky appealed to the General Secretariat of the Versailles conference, saying, “At the present time there is no way to have a productive exchange of views with the Bolsheviks, it is an impossibility.”66 Thus, the idea of a Russian conference did not succeed, and the attitude of the would-be participants of the conference revealed the depth of the conflict between the newly established states and the two sides representing Russia and the political forces in Russia. The plan of conducting a conference for Russia and the newly established states was thus axed.67 Similarly, the Bullitt Mission had little success. William C. Bullitt, an attaché to the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference who was secretly dispatched to Bolshevik Russia, brought back a proposal that, among other things, the states established in the territory of the former Russia should be recognized as legitimate governments in the territories they now held. Azerbaijan was mentioned in the proposal along with other new states.68 On February 13, 1919, the news broke that two Georgian delegates, Nikolai Chkheidze and Irakli Tsereteli, had been issued visas for Paris, while other delegations were still waiting. This matter was explained in different ways in Istanbul. According to one source, the two had been given visas as “Russian public figures,” while others opined that French socialists asked to let them go to Paris for their services to the socialist movement, and another theory suggested that the issuance was achieved with the help of close friends of Tsereteli’s sister, who was married to a Frenchman. But in reality, it was through the efforts of the other Georgian delegates, Zurab Avalov (Avalishvili) and David Gambashidze, who were already in Paris, that they obtained their visas. In January in London, where they met with French Ambassador Paul Cambon, they discussed the issue of the Georgian delegates’ visas and requested his help. After the Versailles conference opened, they also addressed the Conference Secretariat. They were reminded that because of Georgia’s cooperation with Germany and Turkey, Chkheidze and Tsereteli had lost credibility and that nobody had a clear picture about the Georgian question: The Georgians did not have stable relations with Russia and their other neighbors, Georgia displayed an ambivalent stance regarding its debts to Russia, and finally they had serious conflicts with Armenians and Azerbaijanis. But in the end, visas were issued to the two Georgian delegates, and they were able to leave Istanbul for Paris.69

178  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference On February 14, 1919, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov went to the French embassy in Istanbul and notified them that their disrespectful attitude had offended the Azerbaijani delegation. The French consul said they did not know when two persons from the Azerbaijani delegation would be able to secure visas to go to Paris. In a telegram to the chairman of Azerbaijani government dated February 22, 1919, Topchubashov reported, “Unfortunately, we have not been able to leave for Paris yet; we are waiting for our visas.”70 Eventually it became evident that the delay in issuance of the visas was due to political maneuvering. Topchubashov wrote in a telegram on March 5, Initially it seemed so easy to us; we were thinking that we might be hindered by obstacles like not finding a vacant seat on a steamer that seldom headed to Paris via Marseille. But twice I met and had discussions with the British and French representatives while some of our delegates even visited the British headquarters and our translators were sent on official journey to their place, and finally I personally visited British headquarters, and then was it made clear that despite our efforts, the delays in our journey to Paris were fraught with political reasons.71 While the Azerbaijani delegates were still in Istanbul, Armenian and Iranian delegates put forward territorial claims in Paris that were against the interests of Azerbaijan. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to the “historical rights” of Iran and made a statement claiming that the territories stretching from Derbent in the Caucasus and the Aral Sea to the northern Middle East and part of the Turkish territories had belonged to Iran in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and demanded restitution to Iran of territory covering 578,000 square kilometers.72 The Armenians conversely took advantage of the Allies’ warm attitude toward them and started a campaign based on territorial claims against its neighboring nations. In bilateral meetings and in the sympathetic press, they began introducing the idea of a “Greater Armenia,” and their initial targets for this were Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Upper Garabagh. They were incensed when, in January 1919, the Allied commander in Baku, General Thomson, confirmed that Upper Garabagh and Zangezur were under Azerbaijani administration and that he had appointed Khosrov Bey Sultanov as governor-general of those territories. After familiarizing himself with the demographics of the region, Thomson decided that deportation and resettlement would be necessary albeit on a smaller scale. For example, “the Armenian enclave in Garabagh cannot remain, nor can the hostile Mussulman sit round the SW [southwest –J.H.] of Erivan as at present.”73 In a letter to London on February 6, 1919, after his visit to Baku, General George Milne informed them of the brutality the Armenians had perpetrated in Garabagh: “Before we occupied Baku, two Turkish regiments were defending Shusha from Andranik’s army.” But now Armenians had poured into the city and were killing Muslims while the Azerbaijani government was trying to keep order.74 As the Armenians tried to shift from the aggressive tactics they had employed in Zangezur and Upper Garabagh to a diplomatic stage, the Azerbaijani Minister

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  179 of Foreign Affairs had to take steps to counter them. For that purpose, the information department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an article titled “Garabagh” in the official government newspaper Azerbaijan that was written by A. S. Shepotov, one of the information department’s aides. Shepotov wrote about the crucial moments of Garabagh’s history and how the Armenian character evolved rapidly starting from the 1820s and 1830s. He recounted that after the annexation of Garabagh by the Russian empire, the territory was incorporated in the “Transcaucasian Muslim Provinces” in 1844 and was later divided into four districts with a single administrative body when Ganja province was established. According to the statistics of 1917, Shepotov showed that 170,000 Armenians and 415,000 Turks lived in Garabagh. The Turks’ historical claims to Garabagh were indisputable because Turks had lived in Garabagh for more than nine centuries. The recent Armenian claims to Garabagh were not grounded in history but were concoctions by leaders of the Dashnak party. He suggested that the Dashnaks were trying to stake a claim to a historically inseparable part of Azerbaijan to make up for the loss of Borchali.75 The article was used by the Azerbaijani delegates abroad in their information campaign. To avert further violence by the Armenians and the Volunteer Army, Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski had sent a letter addressed to General Thomson in mid-February 1919 wherein he wrote, According to sources, events have taken place in Baku recently that are unacceptable in terms of state interests and the government’s legitimacy. Members of the Volunteer Army, namely Przhevalsky and Erdeli, are mobilizing in Baku and in the regions. They distribute arms among those people who have chosen to volunteer and train them. In other words, they have started to prepare for something of a military nature. Meanwhile, someone named Hamazasp, who introduced himself as an Armenian civilian but whose past actions involved the killing of Azerbaijani Muslims, is registering all the Armenians who have the right to bear arms, assembling them, arming them, and organizing them into armed units. Some mixed Russian–Armenian military forces have now occupied barracks in the old city close to gates of the Duma Square where Muslims live. Fear and anxiety is at its highest peak among the Muslim population of Baku. Such activities not only violate the sovereignty of the state but also have caused the people and the parliament to criticize the government for inaction. I am sure you will agree that such situation is intolerable for the government. There is no country, no state where militias can be organized so blatantly to go up against an existing government.76 Fatali Khan demanded the cessation of these aggressive activities, the disbanding of the Volunteer Army, and the expulsion of Hamazasp and his collaborators from the borders of Azerbaijan. This letter sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also delivered to the Azerbaijani peace delegation, still awaiting their visas in Istanbul.

180  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference All the while that neighboring states were making territorial claims, the Azerbaijani delegation was waiting for visas in Istanbul. Tadeusz Swietochowski wrote in respect of the difficult situation facing the Azerbaijani delegation that their position was weak against the backdrop of active Armenophile movement in the West and the Georgian Mensheviks’ connections with the international socialist movement.77 Still, in comparison with the pro-Armenian stance of French, the British attitude toward Azerbaijan was promising, thanks to certain British interests in the country. As Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov pointed out to the assistant High Commissioner in Istanbul, Admiral Richard Webb, Great Britain should take an interest in the independent existence of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani state is a reliable shield to protect your interests in Iran against the Northern threat. Our geographical position is the main guarantee for the recognition of our independence. I and many others in my country believe that the interests of Azerbaijan and Great Britain are one. The Admiral replied, “Maintain the status quo and wait for resolution at the Paris Peace Conference. Since they have not officially recognized you, those meetings will be taken up in a different forum.”78 Admiral Webb promised that he would help Azerbaijani delegates to get to the Paris Peace Conference, but the meetings that were held with British representatives saw little progress. Despite the notice that arrived from London on March 6, 1919, stating that the His Majesty’s Government did not object to the Azerbaijani delegates’ participation at the Paris Peace Conference and that they needed only to receive visas from the French government,79 no positive news was heard from the French consulate. Apart from Azerbaijanis, the delegates of Don, Kuban, and the Union of the Mountain Peoples as well as part of the delegations of Ukraine and Georgia were still in Istanbul. It was decided by the delegations to cooperate on a number of issues and especially on the issue of securing visas in order to go to Paris.80 A joint memorandum was prepared by Topchubashov on behalf of the delegates of Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Don, Kuban, and the Union of the Mountain Peoples. Chikhladze, who was replacing Chkheidze in the Georgian delegation, did not sign the memorandum as he had no authority to sign anything of a political nature. The memorandum stated: Nations living in the former Russian Empire have declared their independence one after another and established their independent governments since the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917. The people of Ukraine, the Don, the Kuban, the Mountain Peoples, and Azerbaijanis have sacrificed their sons in the fight for independence and they are ready to do everything necessary to protect their independence in the future. In their just fight, these nations rely on the humanitarian principles declared by President Wilson. They see their salvation in the material and moral support of the Treaty countries. We newly independent countries pin great hopes on the Paris Peace Conference. Therefore the parliaments and governments of the countries who have signed

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  181 this memorandum urgently established delegations, gave them necessary authorizations, and dispatched them to the peace conference. These delegations understand their responsibilities and therefore they wanted to get to Paris in time. But unfortunately our delegations have been waiting in Istanbul for visas for more than a month. In this situation the delegates of Ukraine, the Don, the Kuban, the Union of the Mountain Peoples, and Azerbaijan appeal to the delegates of the Treaty countries in Istanbul to help facilitate their journey to Paris.81 The memorandum was signed by the chairmen of the delegations and presented to Admiral Webb, who promised that he would discuss the matter. The delegates also visited the Italian and American missions on March 5, 1919. The chauvinist stance of the Russian émigrés played a considerable role in the stubbornness of French bureaucracy. Topchubashov wrote to Baku with heartache, “Not only do they not admit us to the conference, but we are grouped with ‘the defeated’— Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks—and not even permitted to enter Paris. We will express our sentiments once we arrive at the conference.”82 While the delegates of the new republics were waiting in Istanbul, a special commission of thirty people was formed by decision of the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles in order to investigate the political-economic situation in the South of Russia. American Benjamin B. Moore headed this mission. One of its directives was to investigate the situation in the Caucasus. On March 3, 1919, Topchubashov and Hajinski met with Moore, who had stopped over in Istanbul, and exchanged views on a number of important issues. During the conversation, Moore wanted to learn more about Azerbaijan and posed the following questions: • • • • • •

Are you sure that Azerbaijan could exist independently from a political and economic standpoint? Do you have enough resources and moral backing for that? Could you establish a federation or confederation in the Caucasus or South Caucasus? If a Russian federation is created, would Azerbaijan wish to join it? Would you consider accepting the influence of another state on your own? Would you consider guaranteeing permanent or temporary neutrality of Azerbaijan at the present time?83

Topchubashov was able to respond to the first two questions with the memorandum he had prepared for presentation at the peace conference, so he answered in the affirmative. On the question of creating a Transcaucasian federation or confederation, Topchubashov stated that he had doubts about its feasibility at the present time because the treaty countries were hesitant to deal with the realities the region was facing, aside from their support for the endless claims of Armenians, who wanted to create a Greater Armenia at the expense of Turkish and Azerbaijani territories. As for his stance toward a Russian

182  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference federation, Topchubashov clearly stated that regardless of any government in Russia, Azerbaijan had declared its independence and formed its parliament and government and would never rejoin Russia. In response to Moore’s question about a country that might offer its patronage to Azerbaijan, Topchubashov answered that Azerbaijan would be willing to accept U.S. patronage provided the United States did not demand any material compensation from Azerbaijan and would base its patronage on President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.84 On the question of neutrality, he stated that it depended on the stability in the South Caucasus. He told Moore that if there was no threat against Azerbaijan from abroad and its independence was recognized by the great powers, then it would declare its permanent neutrality. Taking into consideration that the diplomatic mission would head to Baku, the Azerbaijani delegates sent written information about some of Moore’s questions to the Azerbaijani government.85 Regarding its representation at the Paris Peace Conference, the Azerbaijani delegation decided to appeal to the chairman of the conference in writing. A letter had been drafted by March 21, 1919, signed by the chairman of the delegation, Topchubashov, and the secretary, Maharramov, and sent to Paris.86 It stated that the Azerbaijan Republic had declared its independence back on May 28, 1918, with its capital at Baku, a population of 4 million, and about 100,000 kilometers in territory. It also stated that the country was governed under the guidance of a parliament by a government with fourteen ministries organized from representatives of the population of the republic and that the parliament had assembled a special delegation of six persons from various government ministries to represent and protect the interests of the republic at the peace conference. Upon leaving Baku, this delegation received assurances from the Allied commander General Thomson, and its members were given appropriate references. The Azerbaijani delegates had arrived in Istanbul on January 20, 1919, and despite their tireless efforts for 2 months, they had been waiting for visas to go to Paris. By this time, Georgian and North Caucasian delegates had been issued visas and begun defending the interests of their countries in Paris. However, the economic, territorial, border, and other important issues related to their interests could not be solved without the participation of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis had fought tenaciously against the Bolsheviks for their independence for half a year, and they required impartial treatment. They pinned their hopes on Wilson’s great principles and believed that their voices would be heard. At the end of the letter, the chairman of the conference was asked to help Azerbaijani delegates to secure visas for Paris and take equal part at the conference along with other newly independent states.87 Copies of the appeal were sent at the same time to the heads of the American, British, French, and Italian governments.88 From the correspondence of the members of the peace delegation, it became clear that by mid-March the representatives of the French government had not initially objected to Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Akbar Agha Sheykulislamov, and Jeyhun Hajibeyli visiting Paris.89 But the name of the head of the delegation, Ali Mardan Topchubashov, was not included in the list, and the Azerbaijani

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  183 delegates considered it inappropriate to go to Paris without him. The reasons for his not being admitted to go to Paris were not clear. They again appealed to the representatives of the Allies in Istanbul. The response of U.S Commissioner Lewis Heck to this appeal was positive, saying that “the American delegation had no objection to their presence at the conference, provided they obtained the necessary permission to enter France from the appropriate French authorities.”90 They received the same reply from the representative of the visa section of the Italian Commission, Serezoli, on March 29, 1919.91 That being the case, it seems that the matter lay solely on the French. On March 15, 1919, the French High Commissioner, Colonel Foulon, had issued visas for some of the Azerbaijani delegates,92 but on March 25, 1919, the deputy chairman of the High Commission said that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not issued visas to the other delegates for reasons unexplained.93 Topchubashov wrote to the Azerbaijani government on March 29, After receiving a negative answer from Paris, Azerbaijani delegates Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Jeyhun Hajibeyli, and Mahammad Maharramov visited the British and asked them to help us secure visas to go to Paris or to let them go to London if they are not allowed to go to Paris.94 On March 28, Topchubashov was received by the General Commander of the Allied Army of the East, the famous French General Louis Franchet d’Espèrey, who listened attentively to the chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation, said that he would help them, and promised to notify them about the result via the French representative who was also a participant at the conversation. The general kept his word. A day later, in a letter, he notified the Azerbaijani delegation to go to the French envoy Jupé and that two or three of them would be given visas.95 Topchubashov writes, according to General Franchet d’Espèrey’s instructions dated March 29, I visited the French diplomatic envoy Jupé on March 31. I learned that three of us were admitted to go to Paris. For the third time, the envoy demanded a list of the delegation. Three days later we were notified by Jupé’s office that Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Mahammad Maharramov, and Jeyhun Hajibeyli had been issued visas. The French embassy was notified that it was not expedient to select various members of the delegation to go to Paris and not the delegation.96 As can be seen from the documentation, it becomes clear that the French government was not issuing a visa to the head of the delegation because of the influence of Armenian propaganda. Hajinski wrote to the Azerbaijani representatives in Tiflis on March 30, They first launched a campaign against Ahmad Bey Aghayev and now they want to dishonor Ali Mardan Topchubashov; they insist that he should not

184  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference be allowed to go to Paris. The French are doing all this. We had received written notifications both from the British and the Americans that they do not object to our going to Paris and participating at the conference with the whole entourage. By late March, the issue of removing Topchubashov as head of the delegation was raised. Hajinski wrote back that none of the delegates in Istanbul wanted to undertake the responsibility to replace Ali Mardan Bey. In his opinion, it would be good to include in the delegation Mammad Yusif Jafarov and Khalil Khasmammadov, who were more or less familiar with the issues at hand. He wrote, “I am afraid to suggest Fatali Khan, because, as he is the head of the Azerbaijani government, they will blame him for the Armenian slaughter and start discrediting him.”97 The Azerbaijani consul in Batum confirmed news that the Allies did not want to let Ali Mardan Bey go to Paris because of Armenian intrigues. Mahmud Bey Efendiyev wrote, According to the information I have gathered, at the time when we need them most, our prominent figures like Ali Mardan Bey and Ahmad Bey are being discredited as a result of Armenian efforts with the foreigners who will decide our fate. After Ahmad Bey, the Allied press in Istanbul and especially the French newspapers started slandering this honorable Azerbaijani patriot in order to discredit him.98 The campaign against Aghayev and Topchubashov was not accidental: The Armenians knew very well that those men were intellectuals with a fiery democratic spirit, possessed a broad outlook, and best knew the national question in Garabagh. They had both participated in the peace negotiations held in 1906 in Tiflis after the events of 1905. As for the reaction the Armenians and the pro-Armenian Russian press had generated in relation to the events in the eastern provinces of Turkey in 1915, Topchubashov himself had been to the provinces and had shown that the Armenian propaganda served certain interests. Now, by carrying out a campaign against two outstanding political figures and creating a misimpression about them in Western political circles, the Armenians wanted to weaken the Azerbaijani delegation in terms of power, honor, and intellect. After the argument at the French embassy, Hajinski wrote in a telegram to Baku, “The French will not issue visas to our delegates to go to Paris.” The Azerbaijani government became very anxious at this turn of events. In a telegram sent via British headquarters in Istanbul on March 30, 1919, Khoyski asked to be informed about the situation and the date when the delegation would be departing. Likewise, the Azerbaijani delegation was instructed that they should achieve independence for the South-West Caucasian Republic established in Batum and Gars provinces and also General Denikin’s withdrawal from the Mountain Republic. The telegram read: “Defend Garabagh, Nakhchivan, and Surmeli against Armenian, and Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalak, and Borchali against Georgian claims.”99 In early

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  185 April when the delegation was convinced that all of them would not go to Paris, they had a change of heart and agreed to visas for three members. On April 7, 1919, the following telegram was sent: To Baku—To Fatali Khan Khoyski, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijani Republic. The rest of the delegation has not been issued visas. They only issued visas for Hajinski, Jeyhun, and Maharramov. I have to stay here. The rest of the delegates should try to go to London. If you want to send new people here, try to secure the visas in Paris. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation.100 Not losing hope, the Azerbaijani delegates knocked on every door, to be able to go to Paris and defend Azerbaijani rights and interests. It was decided at a meeting of the delegation to appeal to the chairman of the peace conference and the presidents and prime ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy via telegram. The text prepared by April 8, 1919, stated the following: Mr. Chairman, It is my honor to inform you that the delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, consisting of the head of the delegation and five other members, left Baku in early January, arrived in Istanbul on January 20, and is delayed in Istanbul as they have not received visas to go to Paris. Please take into consideration that Azerbaijan’s neighbors in the Caucasus, namely the Armenians, Georgians, and the delegates of the North Caucasus, are already in Paris to represent their nations. Mr. Chairman, the Azerbaijani peace envoy asks you to help them in securing their admission to come to Paris and participate at the peace conference.101 The same day, the same letter was sent to the extraordinary and plenipotentiary French representative in Istanbul. The only difference was that it included a protest stating that the reasons for not issuing visas to the Azerbaijani delegation were groundless and that impeding the participation of the delegation, which had authorization from its parliament and government, was contrary to international law. Following that, the consular department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed them that the non-issuance of visas to the Azerbaijani delegation to Paris was not related to their particular case but due to bureaucracy and groundless obstacles related to the departure of the three delegates who were permitted by General Franchet d’Espèrey to go to Paris. The fact that only three delegates were given visas to go to Paris demonstrates how the French undermined and showed disrespect toward the parliament and government of Azerbaijan.102 During negotiations held at the British delegate’s office, it became evident that they did not want to allow Topchubashov go to Paris either, but instead agreed to send Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov and Mir Yagub Mehdiyev only. On April 12, 1919, in response to the letter sent on April 8, the French stated that they issued visas to only three delegates. Finally, the Azerbaijanis concluded that they should split up the delegation. It was agreed that Hajinski, Maharramov, and Hajibeyli

186  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference would go to Paris103 and Sheykhulislamov and Mehdiyev to London and that Topchubashov would stay in Istanbul along with the secretariat, consultants, and technical staff of the delegation. It was agreed that each person should act not on behalf of the delegation but only as its member. The three who were able to go to Paris were instructed to do their best to secure visas for the rest of the delegates to attend the conference.104 After considering Topchubashov’s telegrams, the government of Azerbaijan appointed Hajinski to head the delegation. On April 17, 1919, an urgent radiogram was sent to Topchubashov stating that the delegates should try to get to Paris as soon as possible. It likewise told Topchubashov that in the event that he was unable to attend the conference, he should appoint Hajinski to head the delegation and that they would try to straighten things out regarding the arrival of the other members of the delegation.105 Surprisingly, on April 14, 1919, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson raised the Caucasus question at the conference and the Azerbaijani delegates were urgently summoned to Paris.106 The call was related to U.S. Secretary of State Lansing’s receipt of a summary report on Azerbaijan and especially Baku’s vast oil reserves, which piqued the Americans’ interest in the Caucasus.107 Secretary Lansing sent a letter to French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon, requesting the issuance of visas to the Azerbaijani delegates.108 Finally, after a long series of discussions, the entire delegation, except for staff members, was issued the necessary visas to go to Paris. On April 22, 1919, the delegates left Istanbul and arrived in Italy via ship and finally, on May 7, 1919, they departed from Rome to Paris by train.109 *** The three-month struggle of the Azerbaijani delegates in Istanbul ended in a great success for Azerbaijani diplomacy despite all the many obstacles it had to confront during that time. Headed by Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, the delegates at last reached the Paris Peace Conference. The delegates of the newly independent state would represent Azerbaijan at the peace conference that was to determine the outcome of World War I. It was a new beginning, opening the door to new horizons of Azerbaijani diplomacy and the introduction of a new state to the powers that were at that moment determining the fate of the world.

Notes 1. Стэннарт Бекер (Stannard Baker), Вудро Вильсон. Мировая война. Версальский мир. (Woodrow Wilson. World War. Versailles Peace). Moscow, 1923, p. 204. 2. А. Раевский (A. Raevskiy), Английская интервенция и мусаватское правительство. (English Intervention and the United Statesvat Government). Baku, 1927, p. 33. 3. State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f. 970, r. 3, v. 4, p. 6. 4. Letter of A.M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F.K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers. 31.10.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 34, p. 17.

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  187 5. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers. 20.11.1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 21. 6. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers. 16.12.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 3. 7. Memorandum submitted by A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the officials of the Entente States in Istanbul. November, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 108, pp. 1–27. 8. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to diplomatic delegations of France, England, America, Italy, Greece and Japan in Istanbul. December, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, p. 25. 9. Дипломатические беседы А.М. Топчубашева Стамбуле (записи чрезвычайного посланника и полномочного министра Азербайджанской республики). 1918– 1919 гг. (Diplomatic Conversations of A.M. Topchubashov in Istanbul. (Notes of Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic. 1918–1919). Baku, 1994, p. 143. 10. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, to Ahmad Tevfik Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister. December, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 25. 11. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers. 16.12.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 3. 12. Дипломатические беседы А.М.Топчубашева Стамбуле, pp. 33–38. 13. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), December 21, 1918. 14. Ibid. 15. Resolution of the Council of Ministers on Allocation of Funds for the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with sending Extraordinary Delegation to Europe and America. November, 1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 147, p. 34. 16. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild. (Parliament of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic (1918–1920) (stenographic reports). Volume 1). Baku, 1998, pp. 122–123. 17. From Commander of the British Troops in Baku, General W. Thomson, to the Military Attaché, British Embassy, Paris. 03.01.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton n° 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 19. 18. Power of Attorney Issued to the Azerbaijani Delegation for Participation at the Paris Peace Conference. 04.01.1919. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 22, p. 18. 19. From Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Y. Jafarov, Azerbaijani extraordinary delegate to Tiflis. 04.01.1919. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 22, p. 19. 20. Correspondence related to sending the Azerbaijani Peace Delegation to Europe. January, 1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 147, p. 34. 21. Ibid. 22. Diplomatic Information of A. Ziyadkhanli, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to A. M. Topchubashov, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. January 1918. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 22, p. 40. 23. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 138. 24. Ibid., p. 153. 25. Ibid., pp. 163–164. 26. Telegram of M. H. Hajinski to F. Khan Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic. 13.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 1. 27. Letter of M. Efendiyev, Consul of the Azerbaijan Republic in Batum, concerning Cost Estimate Documentation of the Consulate for 1919. 15.01.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 43, p. 1.

188  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 28. Telegram of M. H. Hajinski to F. Khan Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic. 17.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 5. 29. Ibid., p. 6. 30. Information published in Zaman newspaper on reception of A. M. Topchubashov by Turkish Sultan. 12.01.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 158, p. 3. 31. Ibid., p. 3. 32. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Diplomatic Representative of America Mr. Heck. 06.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10. v. 151, p. 45. 33. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with van der Does de Willebois, Dutch Representative in Turkey. 10.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10. v. 151, pp. 52–53. 34. Letter of the Swedish Representative in Turkey S. Anckarsvärd to A.M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, 12.01.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 37, p. 1. 35. Letter of British High Commissioner in Istanbul R. Webb to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic. January, 1918. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 139, p. 2. 36. Дипломатический словарь. Том Ш (Diplomatic Dictionary. Volume III). Moscow, 1986, pp. 6–7. 37. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, with P. N. Milyukov, Ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Provisional Government. 07.12.1918. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 42. 38. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with S.D. Sazonov, Ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire. 06.02.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 42. 39. Ibid., pp. 39–41. 40. Ibid., p. 42–44. 41. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with V. I. Savitsky, representative of the Volunteer Army in Paris. 07.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, p. 44. 42. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 09.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, pp. 50–51. 43. Ibid., p. 59. 44. Ibid., p. 51. 45. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with Ali-Qoli Khan Ansari, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 11–15.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, pp. 54–55, 58–59. 46. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, with A. Aharonian, Chairman of the Armenian National Council and Head of the Armenian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. 16.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 151, pp. 60–62. 47. А. Раевский (A. Raevskiy), Мусаватское правительство на Версальской конференции. Донесения представителей азербайджанской мусаватской делегации (The Musava Government at the Versailles Conference. Reports of the representatives of the Azerbaijani Musavat delegation). Baku, 1930, p. 25. 48. Minutes of the Meeting held by the Azerbaijani Delegation leaving for the Paris Peace Conference. 22.01.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 147, pp. 1–3. 49. Ibid., p. 3. 50. Раевский (Raevskiy), Мусаватское правительство на Версальской конференции, p. 26. 51. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 154.

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  189 52. Letter of M. H. Hajinski to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 27.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 9. 53. Раевский (Raevskiy), Мусаватское правительство на Версальской конференции, p. 25. 54. Д. Ллойд Джордж (D. Lloyd George), Правда о мирных договорах (The Truth about Peace Treaties). Moscow, 1957, pp. 278–279. 55. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 178. 56. Ю. В. Ключников и А. Сабанин (Y. V. Klyuchnikov i A. Sabanin), Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях (International Politics of the Contemporary Time in Agreements, Notes and Declarations). Moscow, 1926, pp. 219–120. 57. Letter of M. H. Hajinski to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 27.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 3. 58. У. Черчилль (W. Churchill), Мировой кризис (The World Crisis). Moscow, 1932, p. 108. 59. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1957, p. 58. 60. Foreign Relations of the United States. Russia. 1919, pp. 43–44. 61. Letter of M. H. Hajinski to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 27.01.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 3. 62. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 181. 63. Foreign Relations of the United States. Russia, 1919, p. 54. 64. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 182. 65. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 64, pp. 12–17. 66. Б. Е. Штейн (B. E. Shtein.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (“Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949, p. 107. 67. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933, p. 119. 68. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том II (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume II). Moscow, 1958, p. 92. 69. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, pp. 180–187. 70. Telegram of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 22.02.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 42. 71. Раевский (Raevskiy), Мусаватское правительство на Версальской конференции, p. 25. 72. История дипломатии (History of Diplomacy). Moscow, 1945, p. 33. 73. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995, p. 76. 74. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archival Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, p. 237. 75. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), February 11, 1919. 76. Fətəli Xan Xoyski. Həyat və fəaliyyəti (sənəd və materiallar) (Fatali khan Khoyski. Life and Activity [documents and materials]). Baku,1998, pp. 48–49. 77. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 154. 78. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 29.03.1919. SAAR, MDA, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 9. 79. From Lieutenant Colonel General Staff “I,” British Saloniki Force to A. M. Topchibasheff. 06.03.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 25. 80. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 152, p. 7.

190  Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 81. Memorandum of the Delegations from the Ukraine, Don, Kuban, Northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan to Paris Peace Conference and the Representatives of the Allies in Istanbul. March, 1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 147, pp. 65–67. 82. Report of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 05.05.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 152, p. 16. 83. Letter of Benjamin B. Moore to the Chairman of the Azerbaijani Peace Delegation. 03.03.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 21. 84. Раевский (Raevskiy), Мусаватское правительство на Версальской конференции, p. 29. 85. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 68, p. 21. 86. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff, Secrétaire Mahomed Maheramoff—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix. Constantinople, le 21 mars 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 9. 87. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic at Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Peace Conference. 21.03.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 11. 88. See Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff, Secrétaire Mahomed Maheramoff—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. (La même lettre a été envoyé à M. Clemenceau).Constantinople, le 21 mars 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 40. 89. Report of A. M. Topchubashov to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers. 17.03.1919.SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 11. 90. Letter of American Commissioner Heck to A. M. Topchubashov. 27.03.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 29. 91. Letter of Serezoline, Representative of the Italian Commission, to A. M. Topchubashov. 29.03.1919. 06.03.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 30. 92. Letter of Colonel Foulon to A.M. Topchubashov. 15.03.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 27. 93. Letter of I. Seon, Deputy Chairman of the High Commissioner to A. M. Topchubashov. 25.03.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 28. 94. Report of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 05.05.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 66, p. 11. 95. See Letter of A. M. Topchbasheff to General Franchet d’Espèrey 12/13.03.1918. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 67– 68. 96. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 4. 97. Letter of M. H. Hajinski to M. Y. Jafarov. 30.03.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 141, p. 6. 98. Letter of M. Efendiyev, Consul of the Azerbaijan Republic in Batum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 03.04.1919.SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 141, p. 6. 99. Telegram of F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, to A. M. Topchubashov, 30.03.1919. SAAR, f. 970, s.1, v. 141, p. 10. 100. Telegram of A. M. Topchubashov to F.K. Khoyski, Chairman of Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, 07.04.1919. SAAR, f. 894, s. 10, v. 70, p. 2.

Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference  191 101. Telegram of A. M. Topchubashov to Chairman of Peace Conference and Heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. 08.04.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 140, p. 11. 102. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov to Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of France in Istanbul. 08.04.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 140, pp. 6–8. 103. Letter of I. Seon, Deputy Chairman of the High Commissioner, to A. M. Topchubashov 12.04.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 8. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 31. 104. Minutes of the Meeting held by the Azerbaijani Peace Delegation. 12.04.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 5. 105. Radiogram of A. M. Topchubashov to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic. 17.04.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 70, p. 1. 106. Azərbaycan SSR EA Tarix institutunun əsərləri. XIII cild. (Works of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan SSR. Volume XIII). Baku, 1958, p. 345. 107. Gouvernement d’Azerbaïdjan. Lettre du 14 avril 1919 à M. Lansing Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, la Commission américaine auprès de la Conférence de la Paix, au sujet de fournitures de pétrole au Gouvernement des Soviets. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 52. 108. R. Lansing (American peace delegation)—His Excellency M. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 24. 109. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 70, p. 3.

7 Expansion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference

At the beginning of 1919, the foreign and domestic position of Azerbaijan remained worrisome, but the relocation of the government to Baku in the wake of its liberation and the beginning of its state-building activities raised confidence both within the country and on the part of the Allied military command staff temporarily quartered in Azerbaijan. The November crisis had been overcome, and a parliamentary system of rule shaped the country’s political landscape. Russian and Armenian deputies, under a variety of pretexts, mainly political in nature, initially abstained from attending the Azerbaijani parliament but gradually began to participate in the work of the assembly. The representatives of the Russian National Council, inspired by the arrival of the Allies in November 1918, argued that Azerbaijan was a constituent part of Russia and that “we do not have any right to recognize either the independence of Azerbaijan or its parliament without acknowledging the will of Russia.”1 It nevertheless decided to participate in the work of parliament on January 30, 1919, thus coming to terms with the existence of Azerbaijan as an independent state. “Inspired” by this move of the Russians, the Armenian National Council, realizing the futility of denying the existence of an Azerbaijani state, expressed its desire to participate in the parliament in a letter to the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Fatali Khan Khoyski, on February 9, 1919. In response to these requests, the Azerbaijani government made recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence a precondition for participation. Having accepted these conditions, the Russian and Armenian National Council members were granted representation. The Azerbaijani parliament began its activities in February 1919. Despite the fact that the representation of national minorities created certain problems, the government managed the issue with patience and determination. But political difficulties were not confined to these groups. The leftist and Islamist parties represented in the parliament often created governmental crises without regard for the domestic situation, and this had the effect of causing difficulties for the country’s integration into the international community. A three-part paper presented by the Union (Ittihad ) faction at the eleventh session of the parliament on January 28 was an example of this. The paper demanded an investigation of oil profiteering and pilfering of wheat products and textiles by H. Z. Taghiyev’s factory.2 Acting on reports from a number of ministers, Prime

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  193 Minister Khoyski clarified some issues. Delivering a speech in parliament on February 5, he said, You know all too well that Azerbaijan’s independence is under threat every second. It is a time not only of cloth and calico, but also a time when Azerbaijan itself could simply disappear, our independence could vanish. In such tense times, can we measure the government’s work by the length of the cloth coming from Taghiyev’s factory? You know that our government has five or six meetings every week. We usually work until 2 a.m. Lately, we have been so overextended that it has been impossible to turn to this investigation. Our foreign policy situation has been so tense that we have been unable to deal with other issues on the agenda. If some calamity happens to Azerbaijan, then what do we need cloth, calico, and oil for?3 Despite Khoyski’s speech and efforts by the Musavat party, it was impossible to avert a governmental crisis. The prime minister issued a declaration on February 25 asking for approval of his resignation due to health problems. The task of forming a new government fell to Nasib Bey Usubbeyov (Yusifbeyli). After long deliberations, on April 14 Usubbeyov presented to parliament the members of the fourth cabinet. Among those approved for the new government were chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs Nasib Bey Usubbeyov; Minister of Finances Ali Agha Hasanov; Minister of Trade and Industry Agha Aminov; Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammed Yusif Jafarov; Post and Telegraph Minister Jamo Bey Hajinski; Minister of Justice and Labor Aslan Bey Safikurdski; Minister of Defense Samad Bey Mehmandarov; Minister of Procurement Valerian Klenovskiy; Minister of Health Abraham Dostakov; Minister of Education and Religious Faith Rashid Khan Gaplanov; Minister of Agriculture Aslan Bey Gardashov; Minister without portfolio Kh. Amaspour; and Comptroller Nariman Bey Narimanbeyov (Narimanbeyli). Prime Minister Usubbeyov outlined the government’s program in a speech on April 14. Concerning foreign policy issues, he said, We resolutely hope that Azerbaijani Turks will become part of the world of civilized nations in the near future … . We are confident that the command staff of great and democratic England, which witnessed first-hand the determination of our nation, will relay its impression in an unbiased and unexaggerated manner to the world court gathered in Paris. Touching upon the events in Mugan, Borchali, and Erivan, Usubbeyov stated that Lenkaran region was an inalienable part of Azerbaijan yet was under the control of foreigners. One hundred thousand citizens of Azerbaijan were under the threat of aggression targeting their lives, heritage, and honor. There were many who yearned for those parts of Azerbaijan located in Tiflis and Erivan provinces. Speaking about events in the North Caucasus, Usubbeyov said that

194  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference the North Caucasus is the motherland of Azerbaijanis, and Azerbaijan is the shelter and native land for our fellow co-religionists. You are well aware that Denikin’s armies have rendered crimson-red the snow-white mountains of our brave and audacious co-religionists, and that they intend to subjugate once again both them and us.4 Some forces tried to use the silence of the prime minister concerning Garabagh in his governmental speech as an opportunity to criticize him. Usubbeyov confronted them by saying, In my declaration, I have touched upon all those matters and points that are contentious. There is a range of indisputable issues on which the government is already free to formulate its position. If Erivan, Lenkaran, and Tiflis were mentioned it is because they belong to these contentious issues. There is no such contention regarding Garabagh. That is why I deemed it excessive to refer to a matter that is indisputable. Taking the floor, the leader of the Musavat faction, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, defended the position of Usubbeyov, saying, The Lenkaran issue is on the agenda because it is not under our control and we cannot at this time exert sovereignty there. Then there is the Borchali issue in Tiflis province, which is also outside of our governmental control. There are numerous issues regarding parts of Erivan province. Because the government has not been able to exert influence in these places, our territories remain under foreign control. However, Garabagh is not in such an unresolved state. A governor-general has been appointed to the region. We have our own jurisdiction, which to some extent has even acquired an international character. Inquiries about the Garabagh issue are inappropriate when we consider that our priority is the control of Erivan province, and Erivan cannot be reached without passing through the Garabagh mountains. For us and the government, the Garabagh problem does not exist just as the Baku problem does not exist. Therefore, we reject any proposals that refer to Garabagh.5 The new prime minister of Azerbaijan, Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, was born in 1881 in Ganja. At the beginning of the twentieth century, he began studying in the Department of Law at the University of Odessa. In 1907, he was employed by Tarjuman, a newspaper owned by the famous intellectual, Ismail Bey Gaspirali. In Crimea, Usubbeyov married Gaspirali’s daughter Shafiga Soltan, and in 1908 he moved to Turkey. In 1909, he returned to Ganja. Having founded the Turkic Federalist party in Ganja in the wake of the February revolution, Usubbeyov was an active participant at the Baku Congress of Caucasian Muslims in April 1917 and the Moscow Congress of Russian Muslims in May of the same year. Rasulzade subsequently wrote of him that “The honor of formulating the idea of Azerbaijan as a political entity belongs to the late Nasib Bey.”6

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  195 Foreigners who visited Azerbaijan and met with Prime Minister Usubbeyov thought highly of him. Sir Oliver Wardrop, appointed as the British High Commissioner to the Caucasus in the autumn of 1919, wrote in a report to London on October 2, after a visit to Baku, Sir Usubbeyov is a broad-minded person, highly educated, witty, dedicated to liberal ideas, outspoken, humble, a very goal-oriented and courteous person … . The ideas of the prime minister are not religious ones, but are of a national character. He hates Bolshevism. If there is something that he is genuinely interested in, it is the independence of his country. His team and cabinet can serve as a role model for some European countries … . They manage their affairs very well and as worthy persons, they first of all strive to occupy their proper place in the new world.7 Mammad Yusif Jafarov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had already been engaged in diplomatic service for a considerable length of time. Prior to his appointment, he was Azerbaijan’s diplomatic representative in Tiflis. One of the most learned and gifted persons of his time, he possessed a breadth of mind and had a good record while serving in Georgia. He led diplomatic talks with representatives of neighboring countries as well as European countries and Turkey in order to secure Azerbaijan’s political and economic interests. He also represented Azerbaijan at the Transcaucasia conference held in Tiflis. Wardrop, the Tiflis-based British High Commissioner who visited Baku in the autumn of 1919, summed up his impressions from the meeting with Jafarov in a ciphered telegram to London with the following words: M. Y. Jafarov, a member of the Kadet party in the former State Duma of Russia and simultaneously the leader of the Muslim faction, played an important part during the period of war and revolutions in the history of Russia and the South Caucasus. He is an adroit and renowned speaker.8 Upon starting work as the Minister of Foreign Affairs on April 14, 1919, Jafarov undertook a broad range of changes both within the central apparatus of the ministry and in diplomatic representations abroad. In Order No. 2 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on April 15, the ministry staff and heads of diplomatic missions were approved in their respective positions. The new appointments were Yusif Vazirov to Ukraine, Poland, and Crimea; Mahmud Bey Efendiyev to Batum; Mammad Khan Tekinski to Armenia; Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev to the Mountain Republic; and Jafar Bey Rustambeyov to the Kuban People’s Republic. Akbar Agha Sadikhov was to continue his diplomatic work in Ashgabat.9 After Jafarov’s return to Baku, Fariz Bey Vakilov, his aide, took over the management of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Tiflis. From the first days of his tenure, Vakilov reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs his intention to bring to the attention of the Allied command the question of an immediate release of Muslim civilians captured by Armenians in March 1919.

196  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference In his talks with General William Henry Beach, Vakilov requested that the British Army headquarters take action against this Armenian hostility, and he protested the unsealing by the British Army headquarters of diplomatic correspondence sent from Batum to Baku by the head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov.10 In order to improve the efficiency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jafarov also tried to introduce a number of structural reforms. With this in mind, he ordered on May 18, 1919, that reports be prepared on daily developments and copies disseminated to diplomatic representatives. The order said, It is proposed that the director of the Clerical Office issue a resolution about the preparation of ministerial briefings on daily developments and their dissemination to diplomatic representatives, embassies, and consulates of the republic. Likewise, all diplomatic representatives and consulates of the republic should prepare and send to the ministry similar daily reports on politics and affairs of state of the countries to which they are accredited.11 On July 9, 1919, on Jafarov’s initiative, a provisional staff list of the Clerical Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was prepared. The Clerical Office was to be divided into diplomatic, administrative, and procurement departments. In the new statute, the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs departments were clearly defined for the very first time. The diplomatic department was to be headed by the secretary of the ministry. It would write diplomatic correspondence, protest notes, and responses to be addressed to foreign states at the order of the minister; write letters on behalf of the government; and provide for the translation of various acts and documents into foreign languages and Turkish (the language of the Azerbaijani state) as well as secret communications and ciphering work. The administrative department was to correspond with central and local offices; streamline the documentation of foreigners coming to the republic and Azerbaijani citizens traveling abroad; check the profile of staff members working in all of the branches of the ministry; familiarize itself with draft legislation going to the parliament from various offices of the republic; prepare draft legislation on behalf of the ministry; and develop reports for the ministry’s decision makers concerning various issues.12 After the structural reforms, the staff list of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consisted of sixty employees. This included the minister, deputy minister, advisor, four clerical employees, eleven employees of the diplomatic department, ten employees of the information department, ten employees of the administrative department, five employees of the procurement department, seventeen archivists, a translator, and various administrators.13 According to the statute, the collegial organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani republic was the council, consisting of the minister, deputy minister, and advisors. Department heads were invited to the council to give reports on the areas under their supervision. The council was to discuss and decide the most pressing issues in the responsibility of the ministry. For instance, every person applying to the ministry with the intention

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  197 of serving in a diplomatic post had to be scrutinized by the council. Anyone employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was required to have a command of French and be acquainted with the basics of international law. By Order No. 27 signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov on August 12, 1919, departments for cartography and statistics were added to the ministry. These departments, together with the information department, were merged with the Clerical Office of the ministry in September 1919. By the order of the minister, it was decided that all of the outgoing information from the ministry could be issued only by the Information Bureau upon the endorsement of the head of chancellery; issuing political information without the permission of the minister was prohibited.14 An official library, to be housed in the Information Bureau, was to have eight sections, embracing jurisprudence, geography, history, ethnography, culture, industry, research, and revolutionary literature. In the history section of the library, a bibliography concerning the history of Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Turkey, the Caucasus, and Islam was to be gathered for use in diplomatic talks and correspondence.15 Books and articles, subscription newspapers and journals, memos developed on the basis of information acquired through a variety of channels, and books and brochures were sent to Azerbaijan’s diplomatic missions located abroad. Also, on the basis of this information, the issue of a periodical, News of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, was planned. It was to include the orders of the ministry, resolutions of the government concerning foreign policy, chronicles of foreign events, articles analyzing developments in the Caucasus, and worldwide press reviews. The journal was to be published once a month with no fewer than four pages.16 Jafarov raised with the government the question of creating new diplomatic representations in Istanbul and Tehran. In March 1919, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned to the issue of sending a delegation with full plenipotentiary status headed by Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli to Tehran. This mission was authorized by the Azerbaijani government to negotiate the opening of diplomatic representation of Iran in Baku and Ganja and likewise the representation of Azerbaijan in Tehran, Tabriz, Rasht, and Meshed. A framework for the signing of treaties concerning trade, postal and telegraph service, customs, water, the development of railroad and automobile route connections, as well as joint measures concerning the border were also to be negotiated. In the first half of 1919, a range of states had opened their diplomatic representations in Azerbaijan. On February 5, the leadership of the Caucasus Swiss National Council, located in Tiflis, proposed in a letter to Bern to appoint a Swiss diplomatic representative to Baku. They proposed Robert de Ria, already present in Baku, as a candidate for this position.17 On February 8, the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, in a letter to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed the desire to open a Ukraine consulate in Azerbaijan. In response to this request, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to the appointment of Ivan Kraskovsky as a diplomatic representative in Baku, and the head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission presented his credentials to the head of the Azerbaijani government.18 On February 19 Colonel Kargateli

198  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference was appointed the military attaché of the Georgian government in Azerbaijan. In Tiflis, Azerbaijan’s diplomatic representation was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Mammad Bey Aliyev. On March 9, the government newspaper Azerbaijan reported on the arrival of the diplomatic mission of the Araz-Turk republic in Baku. The newspaper reported: “The mission has among its number a famous poet and playwright, well known by the citizens of Baku for his educational activities, Huseyn Javid.”19 On March 22, 1919, at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers granted recognition to the Lithuanian consulate, and Vincas Mickevicius began his tenure as the consul of Lithuania in Baku.20 On April 19, the representative of the South-West Caucasus Republic, V. Ryumin, conveyed the message of his government to the head of the Council of Ministers Usubbeyov about his appointment to diplomatic service in the Republic of Azerbaijan.21 On February 21, 1919, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia turned his attention to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Mountain Republic and the convening of a Caucasus conference to discuss issues related to railway communication, problems in the areas of postal and telegraph communications, and customs as well as financial and goods exchange among the neighboring countries. The Azerbaijani government accepted this invitation and on March 5 proposed six additional issues for discussion at the conference. These were the following: 1 2 3 4 5 6

a mutual recognition of independence by the states participating in the conference and dissemination of news of this solemn act to the entire world; joint participation in the peace conference and coordination among these republics directed to the defense of their independence; measures in the area of the prevention of aggression directed against the independence of the new states in the Caucasus region; resolution of border and territorial disputes on the basis of agreements and the use of arbitration in case agreement is not met; the desirability and necessity of the participation of the South-West Caucasus Republic as the fifth republic in the meeting of four; and discussion of the sensitive issue of refugees.

The Azerbaijani government proposed that the conference should be held in Baku, but in case some of the participants objected, the government would not oppose holding the conference in Tiflis.22 Except for the fifth item, Georgia agreed to the inclusion of the proposed issues on the agenda of the conference. The Azerbaijani government did not insist on the South-West Caucasus Republic issue in order not to disrupt the progress of the conference. Headed by former prime minister Fatali Khan Khoyski, the Azerbaijani delegation went to Tiflis and, on April 25, the conference began work. Six committees were formed during the course of the conference. From Azerbaijan, representatives Khalil Bey Khasmammedov and Mustafa Vakilov were on the territorial committee; A. Samoylov and Fariz Bey Vakilov, railroad and postal; Nariman Bey Narimanbeyov and Farrukh Vazirov, financial-economic; Khoyski, Jafarov, and S. A. Vonsovich,

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  199 the political committee, and Dr. Mammad Rza Vakilov and Lieutenant Colonel Mammad Bey Aliyev, the committee on refugees.23 Among the important consequences of the Caucasus conference were the clarification of the principles according to which territorial and border issues had to be solved, the issuing of common bonds, migration rules for the nomadic population, and agreement on a range of financial and economic issues. While in Tiflis, the head of the Azerbaijani mission, Fatali Khan Khoyski, on May 5 met and discussed a range of issues with the Allied commander in Baku, General William Thomson, who was in Georgia. First, the parties discussed some contentious points concerning the railroad, and Khoyski explained the policy of the Azerbaijani government in this regard. Later, General Thomson expressed in the official government newspaper Azerbaijan his concerns regarding the proliferation of protests against Denikin’s army, which was supported by Great Britain. General Thomson said that the publication of these protests, directed to the formation of military groups against the Volunteer Army in a government newspaper, created a negative impression on the British command staff and strengthened Bolshevism against which the Allies were fighting. While agreeing in principle with Thomson’s argument, Fatali Khan pointed out that Denikin’s plans were ambiguous. Denikin’s army had tried to deprive the Mountain Peoples of their independence and, after defeating them, would possibly threaten Azerbaijan by advancing their armies farther. General Thomson knew that Denikin’s army did not intend to advance farther south. As for the independence of Azerbaijan, according to the general, Azerbaijan needed to understand the British position on this. He said that their attitude was benevolent and that the British government defended the independence of Azerbaijan. As for Dagestan, the general argued that Dagestan, being closely attached to Azerbaijan in economic, topographic, and other conditions, should be united with Azerbaijan.24 Of course, this idea did not originate with General Thomson but rather came mainly from Dagestan. On April 15, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to the Mountain Republic, Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev, from Teymur-Khan-Shura (today: Buynaksk), wrote to Baku that the issue of the incorporation of Dagestan into Azerbaijan was being seriously discussed. Upon the request of a number of public figures, I have written you [Jafarov] a ciphered telegram and requested your agreement. The ground is propitious, four out of ten districts have already expressed their desire for unification, and the rest wish it implicitly. Local people are working exclusively in this direction. The former deputy defense minister, General Khalilov, will visit Baku to pursue this issue. Please be prompt regarding this situation. In case the unofficial declaration of General Rawlinson is unjustified and the Volunteer Army advances south, Dagestan does not have any reliable defense to depend on. Therefore, let me speak with the government about sending one Azerbaijani regiment to Teymur-Khan-Shura. The fate of Azerbaijan depends on the reliable defense of Dagestan. Keeping a close eye on the situation here

200  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference suggests that the army will be received with joy and the events will take their due course subsequently.25 Actually, the work of the Caucasus conference was halted in June 1919 due mainly to the southern advance of the Volunteer Army and its assault on Dagestan. Denikin’s incursion into Dagestan threatened the Republic of Azerbaijan and to some extent Georgia. On this basis, an entente between the two republics started in the summer of 1919 and increased their level of strategic cooperation. In view of the deterioration of the situation in the Caucasus region, the fact that Azerbaijani representatives had managed to gain access to the Paris conference raised the government’s hopes that integration into the free world was a real possibility. Upon their arrival in France, the Azerbaijani delegates settled first in Gare Saint Lazare and later in the Hotel Claridge and then launched their activities. In Paris, Topchubashov informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France about the staff and address of the delegation.26 Topchubashov, Agayev, and Hajibeyli prepared a booklet titled Memorandum of the Caucasus Republic of Azerbaijan to the Paris Peace Conference for publication in both of the working languages of the conference, French and English. Topchubashov reported on their work: Because of our total engagement in preparing this memorandum to present to the peace conference, we temporarily do not allocate time to the less important issues, such as visits to the representatives of various states and delegations. Currently all of the members of the delegation are engaged in this, and we hope that the memorandum will be prepared and presented to everybody everywhere, and later published for wider dissemination.27 A high-quality color map was included in the memorandum. It had been prepared on the basis of the documents presented by the delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan and was edited by the French geographer J. Fauré.28 In addition to the memorandum, the members of the delegation worked to prepare two more documents, titled The Ethnic and Anthropological Composition of the Population of Caucasian Azerbaijan29 and The Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaijan.30 These documents were intended to help the rest of the world to understand the actual situation in Azerbaijan. The manuscripts of both documents were prepared by June 1, 1919, and the materials were sent to the participants in the peace conference. Later, the documents were published in the form of a booklet. From the first days of their arrival in Paris, the Azerbaijani representatives closely monitored the political climate of the French capital. Because of the harshness of the peace conditions put before the defeated nations, the policy of the Entente was met with opposition in many European capitals. In the spring of 1919, a strong wave of strikes began in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and other states. The leaders of the socialist parties in various countries expressed their strong disapproval of the unrestrained demands of the Entente and the work

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  201 of the conference more generally. Against the backdrop of a deteriorating political situation in Europe, Topchubashov was correct to say that all of the meetings, negotiations, and to put it straightforwardly, the interests of the newly emerged states, such as Azerbaijan, could not be a central issue for the representatives of the Entente.31 It became obvious that the great powers were primarily interested in the settlement of the Russian question. Only after this was it expected that the numerous mutual disputes among new republics formed after the dissolution of the Russian empire would become a matter for discussion. A variety of different representatives of Russia gathered in Paris, including the White Guard government as well as other political parties. Almost all of the ambassadors who had previously represented the Russian empire in various countries came to Versailles. While they had a variety of disagreements, they were all unanimous in supporting a “united and indivisible Russia.” The report sent by the Azerbaijani delegation to its government read: Despite fundamental differences in political vision, the Russians all support the idea of a “united and indivisible Russia.” This is their slogan. Hiding behind such ideas as a federation of democratic republics and a constitutional convention, they are, unfortunately, deciding the fates of the various constituent parts, and the relations between the parts, of a future Russia that will reclaim its deserved place among the great nations of the globe. Native and adopted children of Russia are gathered here to think about the reestablishment of Russia in these terms, in defiance of all of the “alien peoples” that have forgotten Russia’s past generosity. However, these alien peoples, current representatives of the states that which have proclaimed their independence, do not want to hear about a “united and indivisible Russia.” That is why ten days previously [at the end of May], all of the delegations of states that seceded from the former Russia, including the delegation of Azerbaijan, one after another vehemently protested when the Paris press began discussing the possibility of recognizing the Kolchak government’s jurisdiction over the whole territory of the former Russia. The most active supporter of the idea of a “united and indivisible Russia” among the Entente powers is its former ally France. It seems that the other Allied powers do not wish for this kind of Russia, only England behaves as if she has no objections to its existence.32 France’s position on the Russian question was not accidental. The interest of the French in the restoration of the former Russian empire was based on the need to recover their arrears. Being by character a form of rentier capitalism, the French empire had 1,500,000 investors who were seeking the return of their capital.33 For their part, by realizing the idea of “united and indivisible Russia,” French political circles were keen to re-establish their traditional ally against a “conflict-prone” Germany lying in the center of Europe. During May, the representatives of Azerbaijan met with the delegations of Poland, Georgia, the Mountain Republic, Armenia, and Iran. As a result of

202  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference the meetings, it was decided to form a political-economic union of Caucasian republics. The Georgians and the Mountaineers agreed to unite with Azerbaijan in this formation. The Armenians were invited, too, but they argued that they could participate in the Caucasus confederation only after the creation of a united Armenia merging Turkish Armenia and Caucasian Armenia. On May 23, Azerbaijani representatives met in Paris with the British delegate Louis Mallet. During the talks, the parties exchanged opinions concerning the political, military and economic situation in the South Caucasus and discussed a range of important issues concerning the status of Allied troops stationed in Azerbaijan. Since the beginning of 1919, the Azerbaijani government struggled to close down the British gubernatorial post in Baku. The head of the Azerbaijani delegation, Topchubashov, was instructed to accomplish this goal. A telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Topchubashov read: It is necessary to achieve the elimination of the British governor-general in Baku at any cost. Otherwise, there appears to be a dual power, which is intolerable from an administrative point of view. Also, let me request that you obtain a guarantee of non-interference of the British command into our financial affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even planned to send a note of protest to European states and the United States concerning this violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan and to publish in the European media an article portraying it as interference in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan.34 During the talks, Louis Mallet promised to assist the Azerbaijani delegates concerning the issues discussed. During this period, Great Britain held secret consultations with its allies about withdrawing its troops from the Caucasus region, although it did not share the content of these discussions with Azerbaijan. This was one of the reasons for the growing interest of the U.S. representatives in Azerbaijan, although the British did not intend to withdraw immediately; they needed to stay in Azerbaijan and Georgia to control the Baku-Batum railroad. The question of an American mandate over the South Caucasus was discussed in various commissions of the Peace Conference during April. On May 5, during the meeting of the Council of Four, the United States proposed to send its troops to Armenia. President Woodrow Wilson did not oppose the idea.35 Lloyd George, in his memoir titled The Truth About the Peace Treaties, indicated that while discussion of the U.S. mandate over one of the German colonies in Africa was under way, President Wilson expressed his attitude that the Filipinos were still a headache for the United States and America did not want to engage in a new experiment with the administration of Africa’s black tribes, that America had enough to care about the administration of a not-insignificant number of black people within its own borders. However, when the issue of the mandate over Armenia and the straits was on the agenda, the president’s reaction to this project was extremely positive.36 On May 14, a resolution concerning an American mandate over Armenia and Istanbul was

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  203 adopted, although the delineation of the borders of the territory under this mandate was kept open.37 For a time, the mandate territory was thought to include the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits and “the unified territory of Turkish, Persian, and Russian Armenia from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.”38 This corresponded both with the demands of Armenians delivered to the conference and the draft resolution proposed to the Senate by Henry Cabot Lodge. The peace conference received two alternative proposals for discussion concerning the U.S. mandate over Armenia. According to the first proposal, the United States would be given a mandate over the whole of Turkey and Armenia, while the second proposal envisioned an American mandate only over Armenia and Cilicia. In the case of the latter, this mandate would also cover Azerbaijan and Georgia until the final resolution of the Russian question. Later, however, being wary of growing U.S. influence in the region, the Allied powers thought to confine the American mandate only to Armenia. Lloyd George had observed that the division of Turkey among the Allied powers on the basis of mandates could have undesirable consequences including continuation of the war between Turkey and the Allies. His statement reflected the lack of either desire or capacity on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States to wage war again. As far back as May 2, on the initiative of President Wilson, the issue of the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, was discussed for the first time at a meeting of the Council of Four consisting of the government heads of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy.39 The discussions of mandates over the straits and the Caucasus had raised the interest of the U.S. leadership in meeting with representatives of the Caucasus republics and clarifying the views of the newly founded Caucasus states concerning this issue. With this aim in mind, President Wilson received Azerbaijani representatives at the end of May. The Azerbaijani delegation attached huge importance to this meeting. It coincided with an historic date for the Azerbaijani representatives, May 28, the first anniversary of Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence. On the morning of May 28, a member of the U.S. delegation, American diplomat Henry Morgenthau, received Topchubashov. During the war period, he had served as the U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and, since 1919, he had been deputy director of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East.40 During the negotiations, the parties discussed a number of important points to be covered during the meeting between Wilson and the Azerbaijani representatives in the afternoon. Taking into consideration the rich natural resources and industrial potential of Azerbaijan, Morgenthau noted the possibility of channeling U.S. capital into Azerbaijan and providing financial aid to the Azerbaijani government.41 On the afternoon of May 28, the Azerbaijani delegation was received by the president. Topchubashov wrote: “The reception of our delegation by President W. Wilson should be regarded as an important event, because he does not usually receive delegations as do the leaders of other Entente states.”42 During the meeting, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation, Topchubashov, told Wilson that

204  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference he was happy, on behalf of the Azerbaijani delegation, to meet the president of Great America. We, coming from the distant Caucasus, from Azerbaijan, situated a few thousand miles away from here, express our gratitude to you for the free and independent life of our people. Mr. President, as a representative of powerful America, we turn to you and ask you to receive information about our country and our people. We have often encountered false, forged, and distorted information about Azerbaijan in the European and American media. True, we are not yet well known, and we are in Europe for the first time now, but we assure you that we have got everything that it takes to live as an independent state. We hope that the conference will listen to us and that we will be allowed into the League of Nations.43 At the end of his speech, Topchubashov said, We declare that we will not recognize Kolchak or Denikin, or any other forces that have the aim of restoring a government within the borders of the former Russian empire. We recognize and will recognize only Azerbaijan in our parliament and in our government.44 Topchubashov mentioned to President Wilson the possibility of creating a confederation of Caucasian peoples—the Azerbaijanis, the Armenians, the Georgians, and the Mountaineers—and the memorandum of the representatives of the Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan was presented to the American president.45 The memorandum given to President Wilson had a short historical-political format. After a survey of developments under way in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, the memorandum contained the demands of the Azerbaijani delegation to the U.S. president as one of the leaders of the Versailles conference. The memorandum described the creation of the independent republic by the National Council expressing the will of the Azerbaijani people, on May 28, 1918, following the Bolshevik revolution in central Russia. It also noted that not only the Azerbaijanis but Armenians, Russians, Poles, and Jews living within the borders of the republic were represented in the parliament. Discussing material aid of Azerbaijan to Allies during World War I, the document stated that, although Azerbaijan’s people were free from military conscription, its citizens fought for the Allies within the Russian empire in volunteer units under the command of General Jamshid Khan Nakhchivanski. More than 200 officers from Azerbaijan, including General Samad Bey Mehmandarov, Ali Agha Shikhlinski, and Ibrahim Agha Usubov, distinguished themselves by their courage and valor. The memorandum also described the participation of Azerbaijan in attending to the medical needs of Entente armies, putting its hospitals and various medical institutions at their disposal. It recalled their fight against intruding Bolshevik gangs alien to the spirit of the Azerbaijani nation and the substantial losses suffered in this fight. While

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  205 discussing the geographic and ethnographic relationship of Azerbaijan and Russia, the document said, If the geographic position of our country is considered, it can be easily seen that it belongs to a different group than Russia. The Caucasus mountains separate them geographically and ethnographically. Our nation has nothing in common with the Slavic peoples of Russia. At the end of the memorandum, it was noted that the Azerbaijani people resolutely hoped that the United States, through the activities of its delegates and its patronage as the herald of international peace and security and as mediator of all international conflicts, would ensure that its national aspirations would be satisfied.46 During the meeting, the demands of the Azerbaijani delegation were passed to President Wilson, consisting of six-points: 1 2 3 4 5 6

the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence; the application of Wilson’s fourteen principles to Azerbaijan; admission of Azerbaijani representatives to the peace conference; admission of Azerbaijan as a member of the League of Nations; allocation of military aid to Azerbaijan by the U.S. War Department; and opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and Azerbaijan.47

During the talks, Topchubashov guaranteed a gradual repayment of Azerbaijan’s share of the debts owed by tsarist Russia in return for the United States accepting these demands. During the talks, Wilson expressed his satisfaction to see the Azerbaijani representatives and to be informed first-hand about Azerbaijan. Keeping the issue of recognition of Azerbaijani independence open, he said, I am glad, gentlemen, to have met you and heard your claims, but the question of the independence of your country cannot be settled before the Russian question is settled. Please, send your memoranda to the peace conference and I shall study them. I trust your claims will be valid. I shall always be happy to hear from you when you have further information, to communicate to me.48 During the talks, the Azerbaijani representatives were informed about the dispatching of a special American mission to the Caucasus to study the situation in the field. However, this mission did not reach Baku until much later, in October 1919. Wilson’s ambivalent position regarding Azerbaijan was determined by a range of factors. First, many authors argue that Wilson was a political figure with strong sympathy toward Armenians and that the Armenian emissaries had provided him with a substantial amount of false information about the processes under way in the Caucasus. Second, while the day of the meeting was a special one for Azerbaijani representatives, in general the period was not one favoring newly created republics. Thus, in the spring of 1919 the mobilization of the White Guard

206  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference generals—Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and others—had raised the hopes of the Allied leadership, including Wilson, for the restoration of Russia. Third, two days before meeting with Azerbaijani representatives, on May 26, during a meeting of the Council of Four, a note concerning the recognition of the Kolchak government was signed by Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, and Saionji and secretly sent to Kolchak. However, despite all this, the reception of the Azerbaijani delegates by Wilson bore an important political significance, as it was hoped that other leaders of the peace conference would follow suit. Topchubashov wrote in a memo sent to the Azerbaijani government, A number of steps taken by us give hope that our delegation will be received by the president of the peace conference [Georges Clemenceau], as well as the heads of the governments of Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Now I have information that Balfour and Orlando will receive us.49 The reception of Azerbaijani representatives by President Wilson is not viewed from a single perspective either by Soviet Azerbaijani or by foreign historians. Without explaining the political significance of this fact, and without a proper analysis of the demands placed before the American president, authors sometimes arrive at a false conclusion that the Musavat representatives were attempting to transform Azerbaijan into an American “colony.” Among foreign historians, Tadeusz Swietochowski explains most convincingly the still undefined position of President Wilson toward Azerbaijan during the meeting in May 1919. According to him, the Allies did not want to tie their hands in their future relations with Russia by recognizing separatist governments.50 That was why the American president did not say anything encouraging to the representatives of Azerbaijan. 51 The reception of Azerbaijani delegates by Wilson was reported by radio on May 31, and the French media at Batum also confirmed the news.52 At that time, the first anniversary of independence was being solemnly celebrated in Azerbaijan. In his speech to the holiday session of parliament, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, while expressing great hopes for the peace conference, said, The independence of Azerbaijan is an established reality. I am expecting the final verdict of the peace conference with complete equanimity. I cannot even imagine that the representatives of the most civilized nations of the world will stand aloof to the wishes and aspirations of Azerbaijani Turks. Otherwise, I would have scruples about their civilized status compared with that of the Azerbaijani Turks, who are striving to realize such a sacred right as the determination of their destiny and future, and would be justified in criticizing the great civilized nations for fanaticism and religious confrontation.53 Despite all the undecided points, for the Azerbaijani representatives who had waited for 3 months in Istanbul to get visas, their reception by the American president was an important development. The vague answers of the president

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  207 did not discourage the Azerbaijani representatives. American historian Firuz Kazemzadeh writes that the Azerbaijani representatives, not having won the heart of the American president, delivered their official demands to the conference.54 During the talks on May 28, President Wilson had advised the Azerbaijani delegation to hand their demands to the secretariat of the peace conference. As mentioned earlier, the official demands were prepared in English and French and were compiled in a fifty-page booklet that was published in June. Even before publication of this booklet, the demands were delivered to the secretariat of the peace conference in writing. The inclusion of detailed information of an historical, ethnographic, economic, and political character in the demands was deemed necessary because of the lack of information about Azerbaijan among the participants of the conference or the proliferation of distorted information. The national interests of Azerbaijan stood behind every point of this document, developed as a result of the hard work of the Azerbaijani representatives. The first part of the fourteen-section Memorandum of the Representatives of the Caucasian Azerbaijanis to the Paris Peace Conference55 was titled “Origin of Azerbaijan. The Independent Khanates and Their Decline.” In this section, a short history of the ethnogenesis of the Azerbaijani nation, its formation, ancient geographic boundaries, the creation of independent khanates, and their occupation by the Russian empire was presented to the peace conference participants as well as the European and American public. It said, The south-eastern region of the Caucasus, or, properly speaking, Transcaucasia, as far as the shore of the Caspian Sea, has been since time immemorial peopled by tribes partly Turkish, partly Tartar. These tribes, as well as Iranian elements, were, over the course of time, mixed with the Turks, a people more numerous, stronger, and more energetic. Owing to this intermixture, the natives of this part of the Caucasus were called Turks of Azerbaijan, or merely Azerbaijanis, from the name of the country in which they lived.56 The document showed that the southern part of Azerbaijan had been incorporated into Iran by force, while the rest of the country lay within the geographic confines of the Caucasus and retained its political independence for a long period, in the form of independent khanates, beginning from the seventeenth century. After the incorporation of Georgia into Russia, the security of the Azerbaijani khanates was seriously jeopardized. The Azerbaijani khanates fought for a long time with Russia for their freedom and independence. The memorandum says, The history of Azerbaijan is full of heroic episodes in which the small khanates, taking up arms, marched eagerly against Russian troops and bravely defended their liberty, reddening their native soil with the blood of their sons. They defended this liberty successfully until the beginning and even the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. At that time, however, the strength of the khanates gradually waned and they were finally annexed

208  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference to Russia by main force—the khanates of Garabagh, Ganja, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Guba, Baku, and Talish in 1813; those of Erivan and Nakhchivan in 1828.57 The memorandum noted that upon occupying Azerbaijan, Russian governmental organs redrew the map of the country by forcefully applying colonial rules to divide it into territories with the aim of Russifying them. Then they plundered its riches and did not restrain themselves from perpetrating atrocities in pursuit of their aims. The Russian government did not even abstain from changing the names of the inhabitants of the annexed khanates. In spite of the ethnography, language, and literature of the country, they were given the names of Caucasian Tatars, Mussulmans of the Caucasus, Caucasian Mussulmans, or simply Mussulmans.58 The second section of the memorandum was titled “The Native Population of Azerbaijan. Its Relation to the Former Russian Empire.” The greater oppression of the Azerbaijanis relative to other peoples of the Caucasus; the long ban placed on national schooling, native language, press freedom, and national charity organizations; and the hatred and distrust of Muslim public figures by Russian bureaucrats are reflected in this section of the memorandum. While showing how religion was an instrument of policy within the Russian empire, the document states: Showing exaggerated respect for the Russian Church and its priests, the Russian government showed contempt for the Mussulman clergy, whose high dignitaries—such as the Mufti or the Sheik-ul-Islam—were chosen by the government from among the most ignorant, frequently illiterate priests, who were miserably paid. The property of the mosques was submitted to the jurisdiction of the Russian functionaries. It was strictly forbidden to erect any mosque without the assent of the Orthodox clergy. In short, while the Russians accused the Mohammedans of being fanatics, they showed themselves far more fanatical than the Mussulmans.59 The third section, titled “The Transcaucasian Seim and Government. Their Weakness and Fall. The Republic of Azerbaijan Proclaimed,” embraced the issues of the emergence of various state institutions in the South Caucasus, their foreign and domestic policy, and the internal contradictions within the Seim that led to its subsequent disintegration.60 The fourth section, titled “The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its Capital, the Town of Baku,” stated: Immediately after the proclamation of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, the National Council formed its government comprising 12 ministers, natives of the country who had studied in universities and technical

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  209 schools in Russia and abroad. The first act of the Azerbaijani Government (residing at Elizabethpol-Ganja) was to rid the town of Baku and its environs of the Bolsheviks who had taken possession of this region in March 1918.61 This section provided in-depth discussion of Baku, its status as the capital of Azerbaijan, and the location of the intellectual elite of the Republic in Baku. While demonstrating the lack of any legal grounds for the secret agreement signed between Germany and Soviet Russia in August 1918 concerning Baku, the document showed that the choice of Baku as Azerbaijan’s economic, intellectual, religious, and political center—to put it straightforwardly, as its capital—was not accidental. The future of the new Azerbaijani state was so closely tied to Baku that the very existence of the republic without this city was impossible to imagine.62 According to the memorandum, the rich oil reserves in the Baku region were the primary income of the Azerbaijani republic; the government held a monopoly on their production and sale. The memorandum said that despite the fact that the volume of oil production outweighed local needs and the fact that the Azerbaijani state preferred to sell this extra production on a treaty basis to countries that lacked fuel by signing contracts, the republic could not agree to the exploitation of Baku oil deposits through the direct intervention of foreign companies. “Foreign exploitation would mean suicide of the Republic.”63 The pronounced emphasis on Baku as the capital of Azerbaijan, apart from its economic and political significance, was driven in part by Armenian propagandists. In the European and American media, they presented Baku as a Russian city having no relation to Azerbaijan. From events occurring in Paris, it soon became obvious that the Armenian delegates, with the assistance of the French, were striving to put Baku and Batum under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations as supposedly cosmopolitan cities. They expressed their views about this project to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.64 These adventurist plans were discarded by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the Dashnaks did not hide their ambitious claims to Baku, Tiflis, Istanbul, and other cities. One article, published in 1919 in the Akhshatavor newspaper in Armenia, the translation of which was republished in the Bakinskaya zhizn (Baku Life) newspaper in June of the same year, reflects very obviously the desires of the Armenians. The newspaper read, Orlando demands Fiume [a port city in Croatia] for Italy. This demand is absolutely fair. Italy needs Fiume … . Italy has won the war and therefore should gain anything it demands … . We too won the war. It is unclear why we get such a small share from our victory … . Our neighbors did not fight the Turks and the Germans. But we did fight, and therefore we should get not a Fiume, but two Fiumes … . To be plain, two cities play the role of Fiume for us: Baku and Tiflis. Baku should belong to us at least for the reason that Azerbaijan has its own capital, Ganja. Our right to Baku is certainly clear. We do not even mention our historic rights to this city. We seized Baku in March [1919], and therefore it should remain with us.65

210  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference Of course, the Dashnak press, reflecting the aspirations of the official Armenian circles, could not limit itself to these two cities and, as noted earlier, had more grandiose demands to make at the Paris Peace Conference. Akhshatavor wrote regarding these demands, We have to be outspoken. In addition to the cities, we also need other districts. We need Tiflis, Borchali, Akhalkalak, Akhaltsikh from Georgia, and all of the districts of Baku region and Garabagh from Azerbaijan. When the world conference gives us Iranian and Turkish districts, including Istanbul, we will gain access to the Persian [Gulf], the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.66 Such articles, replete with nonsensical demands, often appeared in the European and American media too. The fifth section of the memorandum was titled “The Fight of the Azerbaijanis Against the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevist and Armenian Attacks.” In this section, the full scope of the massacre of Muslims in March 1918 in Baku, and later in the spring throughout Azerbaijan, was exposed in stark detail. The document read: In that bloodthirsty episode that had such fatal consequences for the Mussulmans, the principal part was played by the Armenians, who were then at Baku, clustering as elsewhere round their nationalist party (Dashnaktsutyun) … . The truth is that the Armenians under the cover of Bolshevism rushed on the Mussulmans and massacred during some frightful days more than 12,000 people, many of whom were old men, women, and children. Future historians will certainly not pass over, but even now we may affirm that the Armenians of other regions would not approve of the conduct of their fellow countrymen in Baku.67 Touching upon the intentions of those perpetrating these events, the authors of the memorandum noted: The result was that most Azerbaijanis left Baku and the petroleum fields, there being no other way to escape from the cruelties and savage deeds of the Armenian Nationalists (Bolsheviks). It was a part of the nationalist plan of the latter—to rid the town of its rightful owners, the Azerbaijanis, and thereby to come into possession of its natural wealth and to reign there as master! Indeed, this plan existed in spite of its folly, it was carried into effect.68 The sixth and seventh sections of the memorandum discussed the struggle of the Azerbaijani nation against Bolshevik and Armenian aggression; crimes perpetrated by Dashnaks in cooperation with Bolsheviks in Baku, Shamakhi, and other places; and also the liberation of Baku. It said, More than 12,000 Mohammedans were victims of blood thirsty deeds of March 18–21 [March 30–April 1 by the current calendar]. Arson had

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  211 destroyed intellectual and political centers of great importance from a moral point of view, such as The People’s House, the House of the Mussulman Benevolent Society, the seat of all political parties, and the offices of the Mussulman newspapers, Kaspii published in Russian, and Atchigzess, in Azerbaijani. The most eminent Mussulman political men were arrested and imprisoned. But the most fatal result was the rise of the Bolshevist power in Baku and in the country round.69 The work of reconstructing areas destroyed by Bolsheviks and Armenian troops, the entrance of the Allied armies in Baku, and the establishment of the Azerbaijani parliament and its work were highlighted in the eighth section.70 The most important sections of the memorandum were those dealing with the borders and population of the Azerbaijan Republic. Because the territorial claims presented to the conference by Armenians, Georgians, and Iranians related directly to Azerbaijan, it was necessary to give the leaders of the conference a clear idea of the territorial borders of Azerbaijan. The territory of Caucasian Azerbaijan was outlined in the memorandum and presented to the conference in the following order according to its former districts and their local administrations: 1 2

3 4 5 6 7

the whole Government of Baku, with the town Baku and its region, consisting of the districts of Baku, Javad, Goychay, Shamakhi, Guba, and Lenkaran; the Government of Elizavetpol (Ganja) consisting of districts of Elizavetpol (Ganja), Javad, Nukha, Aresh, Shusha, Jabrail, Zangezur and Gazakh, the mountainous part of which is the subject of discussion between Azerbaijan and Armenian Republic; the Government of Erivan, with the district of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli and parts of the district of Yeni Bayazed, Echmiadzin, Erivan, and Alexandropol. the Government of Tiflis, certain parts of the districts of Borchali, Tiflis, Sighnakh; the district of Zagatala; in the region of Dagestan, a part of the territory containing the regions of Kur and Samur, as well as a part of the district Kaytagi-Tabassaran with the town of Derbent; and in the above-named Government of Erivan and Tiflis, as well as district Zagatala, there are territories, frequently inconsiderable in area, the possession of which is claimed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Northern Caucasus.71

In the memorandum, it was noted that the Republic of Azerbaijan attached special importance to the integration of the Akhaltsikh district in Tiflis province and Batum and especially Kars provinces into its territory. The document said that the inhabitants of these territories, especially the ones living in the surrounding areas of Kars, belong to the same ethnic group as the Azerbaijanis. Their religion, customs, and habits, their way of life and mores are similar to the ones

212  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference of Azerbaijan’s other regions. Based on these conditions, the repeated appeals of the Muslim population of these regions to the government of Azerbaijan for the incorporation of the Kars region into the territory of the republic are understandable. Upon the retreat of the Turkish army from the country, and the disbanding of the local government and parliament by the Allied representatives, the division of these territories between Armenia (Kars) and Georgia (Ardahan) led to an increase in the number of such appeals. The government of Azerbaijan perceives this division as arbitrary, resolutely protests against this injustice and the disruption it causes to the local population, and declares that the inhabitants of the aforementioned territories unequivocally deny the jurisdiction of neighboring republics over them. As mentioned above, the population of Batum and Kars provinces repeatedly appealed to the government of Azerbaijan with a proposal to include those territories within the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan. These facts led the Azerbaijanis to declare that the population of Batum and Kars as well as Akhaltsikh district should define their destiny as they see fit, but the creation of an independent republic in this territory would be the best solution of the problem, and would channel the problems related to the interests and positions of the region in a positive direction.72 It is obvious from the memorandum presented to the peace conference that the territory under the indisputable control of the Azerbaijan Republic amounted to 83,278 square versts (94,137 square kilometers). This constituted 39 percent of the entire territory of the Caucasus region, amounting to 217,408 square versts (247,376 square kilometers).73 The twelfth section, titled “Azerbaijan Has a Right to Independent Political Existence. Relations with the Caucasus Republics,” addressed in depth the following questions that animated many at the Versailles conference: 1 2

How will Azerbaijan, until recently a part of the Russian empire, regard the past and present obligations of Russia? What must be its relations with its neighbors, the other Caucasian republics?74

Concerning the first question, it was noted that, notwithstanding century-long pains and bitterness, Azerbaijan wished happiness on the Russians … within their own country, in their own territories, their new state. As for Azerbaijan, it no longer wished to be a constituent part of Russia; it recognized only its parliament and its state.75 The attitude toward Russian debts was an issue affecting the interests of almost all of the states and shaping the political climate of the peace conference. The memorandum read concerning this issue: “The young Azerbaijani republic undertakes to pay a part of the debts of the former Russia, in the proportion that will befall her after a just repartition and according to the conditions drawn up by the financial commission of the peace conference.”76 Regarding the second question—dealing with relations with neighboring republics—the commitment of the diplomatic delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the memorandum presented in Istanbul to the plenipotentiary Commissioner of the Entente as far back as November 1918, was reiterated. Along with other issues, the memorandum reflected the wish of the Republic

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  213 of Azerbaijan to enter into amicable relations, based on a common perspective, with its ancient neighbors—the Armenians, the Georgians, and the Mountain Peoples—who had created their own republics. The Azerbaijani peace delegation especially emphasized that all of the Caucasian peoples were united by a common interest in various spheres, especially in the economic field.77 The thirteenth section was titled “The League of Nations. Attitude of the Azerbaijanis. Appeal to the Turks in the Fight Against the Bolsheviks,” and it reflected the desire of the Azerbaijan Republic to enter the League of Nations. The memorandum said, We sincerely welcome in the name of Azerbaijanis its conception and organization, not doubting that the Azerbaijanis shall have a place in it among the other nations, in order to collaborate with the peaceful work of the nations and to be able to contribute in the measure of our abilities to attain the noble and generous aim of the League of Nations for the welfare of humanity. We are certain that we too, Azerbaijanis, shall find in the international organ of high morality and justice … the material and personal power necessary for an independent political existence. 78 The memorandum attached great significance to the propagation of unbiased information about the Azerbaijani nation among the peoples of the world. According to its authors, while one of the reasons for the scarcity of information about Azerbaijan was Russian domination, another reason had to be found with the Azerbaijanis themselves. The document said that one notable characteristic of the Azerbaijanis was their boundless modesty, which kept them from any step that might be taken to promote themselves. “The Azerbaijanis are not accustomed to advertise themselves and to proclaim aloud urbi et orbi their pains and misfortunes, of which they had more than their share.” They experience all these sorrows and disasters within, without much publicity, entreating the rest of the world with humble appeals to nations and states. This state of affairs should be regarded as pitiful, for this very peculiarity of the Azerbaijani character had become a source of many of their tragedies and had prevented the nation from showing its national character with completeness. It had created conditions for the spread of false information about Azerbaijan in the European and American media, driven by fantasies, incompetence, and in the majority of cases by animosity and a wish to harm Azerbaijan, thinking that would be useful to their own nation.79 The final, fourteenth section of the memorandum reflected information about the delegation of Azerbaijan, its hopes and demands.80 The document finished with Azerbaijan’s demands to the peace conference. In this part, the delegation of Azerbaijan, relying on the moral support of the peace conference and the Entente Cordiale, demanded 1

The physical, economic, and political deliverance of the Caucasus and especially of Azerbaijan, absolutely separated from the social and political

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2

life of Russia, which is alien to us, and from the anarchy which we have just spoken of. We rely on that support. The recognition of the states which de facto already exist in the Caucasus and one of which is the independent Republic of Azerbaijan. We dare end this memorandum by the affirmation that the material and moral qualities of our people, the moral gifts as precious as the love of work and study, the fondness of legal order and loyalty to the principles of the States are already a guaranteed for the independent existence of Azerbaijan under the form of an independent republic. For these reasons, the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan begs to lay before the Peace Conference the following claims: The Peace Conference approves of the separation of Caucasian Azerbaijan from the former Russian empire. Azerbaijan shall be an absolutely independent state under the name of the Azerbaijan Republic, within the above-described limits shown in the annexed map. The representatives of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan shall be admitted to the work of the Peace Conference and Commission. The Azerbaijan Republic shall be admitted among the members “League of Nations,” under the high protection of which this Republic wishes to be placed like the other States.81

The demands of the Azerbaijani representatives became the subject of heated discussions in Paris. Just like the demands of Iran, Armenia, and Georgia, Azerbaijan’s demands too were regarded as exaggerated. In particular, the question of transferring Kars and Batum to Azerbaijan was not regarded as realistic. Tadeusz Swietochowski observes “nor did the Azerbaijani government distinguish itself by the modesty of its claims . . . These demands aimed at establishing a unified state of all of the Muslims of Trancaucasia regardless of geographic contiguity, with its capital in Baku”82 However, the Azerbaijani representatives saw the solution not in the incorporation of these provinces “in one common state with the capital in Baku” but in the creation in these provinces of an independent state in the form of republic, according to the will of the local population. *** The Azerbaijani representatives, during the first months of their stay in Paris, closely watched the political flow of events at Versailles, waiting for a proper moment when they could join it. In a political memo sent to the Azerbaijani government, Topchubashov wrote, It is true that we have arrived here later than other delegations, but we are catching a time of interesting events, capable of producing unexpected results. Whether our turn will come soon is unknown at this point; however, we will stand in a position to defend the interests of dear Azerbaijan till the end.83 Shortly after writing these words, the Azerbaijani representatives in Paris and the republican government within the country had to face the claims of “indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia,” directed against the independence of the state that

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  215 they represented. The refutation of these groundless claims was the primary aim of Azerbaijani diplomacy in the summer of 1919.

Notes 1. Единая Россия (Yedinaya Rossiya), December 17, 1918. 2. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild. (Parliament of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic (1918–1920) (stenographic reports). Volume 1). Baku, 1998, pp. 213–226. 3. Ibid., pp. 263–264. 4. Ibid., pp. 444–445. 5. Shorthand Record of the 29th Meeting of the Azerbaijani Parliament. 14.04.1919. SAAR, f. 895, r. 1, v. 82, pp. 70–71. 6. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti ensiklopediyası. II cild (Encyclopedia of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Volume II). Baku, 2005, p. 441. 7. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, pp. 188–194. 8. Ibid., p. 188. 9. Extract from the order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Appointment of the Heads of Diplomatic Missions. 15.04.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, v. 157, pp. 1–2. 10. Information of F. Vakilov, Deputy Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Georgia to M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 31.03.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 54, p. 2. 11. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика (The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. Foreign Policy). Baku, 1998, p. 223. 12. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, v. 80, pp. 33–34. 13. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, v. 132, pp. 7–69. 14. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, p. 20; v. 121, p. 31. 15. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 209, p. 1. 16. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v.103, pp. 12–13. 17. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, pp. 150– 151. 18. Ibid., p. 151. 19. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), March 9, 1919. 20. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, pp. 186– 187. 21. Ibid., p. 206. 22. Fətəli Xan Xoyski. Həyat və fəaliyyəti (sənəd və materiallar) (Fatali Khan Khoyski. Life and Activity [documents and materials]). Baku,1998, pp. 50–51. 23. Minutes of the Meeting held by the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Transcaucasian Conference. 03.05.1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 47, pp. 5–6. 24. Information of M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 07.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 60, pp. 2–3. 25. Information of A. Hagverdiyev, the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in the Republic of Mountain Peoples, to M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15.04.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 59, p. 15–16. 26. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M.Toptchibacheff—Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Service des Affaires Russes. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 27–28. 27. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 08–10.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 143, p. 9. 28. Tarix (Tarikh), February 23, 1991.

216  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference 29. Délégation Azerbaïdjanienne à la Conférence de la Paix. Composition Anthropologique et Ethnique de la Population de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Classé 1er juin 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 44–52. 30. Délégation de l’Azerbaïdjan à la Conférence de la Paix à Paris. Situation économique et financière de la République de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Classé 1er juin 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 29–43. 31. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to Paris Peace Conference, to Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 08–10.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 143, p. 3. 32. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 33. В.П. Смирнов (V. P. Smirnov), Новейшая история Франции (Contemporary History of France). Moscow, 1979, p. 43. 34. Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation to Paris Peace Conference. 14.03.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 141, pp. 9–12. 35. Г. Никольсон (H. Nicolson), Как делался мир в 1919 г. (How was peace achieved in 1919). Moscow, 1945, p. 257. 36. Д. Ллойд Джордж (D. Lloyd George), Правда о мирных договорах (The Truth About the Peace Treaties). Moscow, 1957, p. 389. 37. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, v. V, p. 622. 38. Архив полковника Хауза (Archive of Colonel House). Moscow, 1944, p. 220. 39. Б.Е. Штейн (B. E. Shtein.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (“Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949, p. 346. 40. Who’s Who in America? Vol. 2. Chicago, 1950, p. 383. 41. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to Paris Peace Conference, with H. Morgenthau, Member of the U.S. Delegation. 28.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 11. 42. Report of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to Paris Peace Conference, to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, on the Reception of W. Wilson, President of the USA. 28.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 143, p. 7. 43. Conversation of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to Paris Peace Conference, with W. Wilson, President of the USA. 28.05.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 29. 44. Ibid., p. 30. 45. Memoire adresse par la Delegation a la Conference de la Paix de Republque de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase A M. le President Wilson. Paris, Le 28 mai 1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 19–21; Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan, 1919, 1 Septembre, No: 1, pp. 6–7. 46. Memoire adresse par la Delegation a la Conference de la Paix de Republque de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase A M. le President Wilson. Paris, Le 28 mai 1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 21. 47. Memoire adresse par la Delegation a la Conference de la Paix de Republque de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase A M. le President Wilson. Paris, Le 28 mai 1919.Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan, 1919, 1 Septembre, No. 1, p. 7. 48. Discours du President Woodrow Wilson. Le 28 mai 1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 32–33. 49. А. М. Топчибашев (A. M. Topchubashov), Письма из Парижа (Letters from Paris). Baku, 1998, pp. 38–39. 50. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 156. 51. Ibid., p. 154. 52. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 168, p. 2.

Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference  217 53. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), May 30, 1919. 54. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 267. 55. La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919; Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris. Paris: Imp. Robinet – Houtain, 1919.Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 2, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 1–54. 56. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 5; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 3. 57. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 7; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 5. 58. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 7; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 6. 59. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 10; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 8–9. 60. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 11–14; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 10–13. 61. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 14; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 14. 62. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 15–16; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 15. 63. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 16; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 15–16. 64. Kazemzade, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 202. 65. Бакинская жизнь (Bakinskaya zhizn), June 4, 1919. 66. Ibid. 67. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 18–19; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 18–19. 68. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 20–21; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 21. 69. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 22; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 22. 70. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 24–26; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 24–26. 71. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 27–28; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 27–28. 72. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 29–30; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 28–29. 73. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 30–31; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 30–31. 74. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 38; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 38–39.

218  Diplomatic initiatives at the peace conference 75. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 41; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 40. 76. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 41; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 41. 77. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 42; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 41; SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 108, p. 18. 78. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 43–44; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 43–44. 79. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan Presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 44–45.; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 44–45. 80. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, pp. 47–48; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, pp. 46–47. 81. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, p. 49; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase, p. 51. 82. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 155. 83. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 40.

8 Azerbaijan’s Diplomacy confronts the claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”

On May 28, 1919, Azerbaijan solemnly celebrated the first anniversary of its declaration of independence. The press featured articles about the importance of independence and its role in the destiny of the nation. At a special session of Parliament, the acting chairman, Hasan Bey Aghayev, made a brief congratulatory speech: Dear visitors! One year ago, on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijani National Council was homeless, like a bird whose nest had been destroyed. Our independence was proclaimed in the Orient Hotel in Tiflis, two days after Georgia declared independence. The Azerbaijani National Council expected that this event would be a source of happiness for the Azerbaijani people. Was that reality, or was it an illusion? If we consider the life of independent Azerbaijan during the last year, we can see the National Council’s hopes and its expectations for the nation as a reality. Concerning the threat posed from the north by the Volunteer Army, Aghayev said that Azerbaijanis were “ready to defend their independence, ready to offer their life, property, and blood, not fearing enemies or threats from any side.”1 Aghayev’s speech was followed by remarks from the heads of the different factions represented in the Parliament. Mammad Emin Rasulzade described the enthusiasm that had captured the entire city on Independence Day: Today, the independence of Azerbaijan is especially precious because there is an external threat to our independence, a danger from the outside. But we observe the sincere emotions ascending from the soul of the nation, and we know that they are stronger than any fire, any weapon. Down with the vile hands that are grabbing for our independence!2 The newspaper Azerbaijan published an article by Uzeyir Hajibeyli titled “One Year” that chronicled the turning points in the year-long history of the independence of Azerbaijan. Alluding to the maligning of Azerbaijani Turks to foreigners, Hajibeyli wrote that, once the Allied forces entered Baku, the

220  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” Europeans were personally impressed and admitted that their negative opinions of Azerbaijanis had been wrong.3 Azerbaijan’s euphoria in connection with the Independence Day celebrations was tempered by the danger of Denikin’s Volunteer Army and news of the capture of Petrovsk (Makhachkala) and Derbent. As Rasulzade observed in the parliamentary session held on May 26, “Dagestan is the gateway to Azerbaijan.”4 The idea of an “indivisible Russia,” sustained by the activities of General Anton Denikin and Admiral Alexander Kolchak, had an influence over Allied policy. Russian forces appearing in different colors were attempting to gain diplomatic support and political trust at Versailles. In early June, the press reported that on May 26, the heads of the Entente states and the prime minister of Japan had addressed a note to Admiral Kolchak concerning recognition of the government at Omsk as the Russian government in toto. The Allied position was prompted by Kolchak’s recent military successes. The majority of the heads of state gathered in Paris hoped for a rapid victory of Kolchak, Denikin, and other White Guard generals and the decisive defeat of Soviet forces. The question of relations with Russia was being actively discussed by the Council of the Four. At their session on May 20, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had suggested sending a new appeal to the Russian groups. A member of the English delegation, Phillip Kerr, was entrusted with preparing the text. On May 23, the Council of the Four discussed the “Russian question” twice. During the morning session, a brief exchange of views was carried out, and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France noted that the government of Japan had expressed a desire to address the Allies regarding recognition of the government at Omsk. It was his opinion that the Allies should not have left the initiative on this question to Japan. During the day session, the text prepared by Kerr was read by Wilson and discussed. On May 26, the text was signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Wilson, and Saionji and was sent to Kolchak. The accompanying message specified that the Allies and their partners were seeking to introduce clarity into the “Russian question” and that they were far from intending to interfere with the internal affairs of Russia. The Allies linked their dispatch of troops to Russia to the necessity of rescuing the Czechoslovak Legions from both the Germans and the Bolsheviks.5 What the Allies and their partners wanted was the prompt restoration of peace, law, and order in Russia. They were confident that the Russian people would put their internal affairs in order, settle the disputes that had arisen within the former Russian empire amicably by means of a legitimately elected State Duma (parliament), and establish relations with neighboring states through the mediation of the League of Nations. The Allies also wished to clarify Admiral Kolchak’s position on a number of issues before they could offer their support to the government at Omsk, namely: 1 2 3

the Constituent Assembly would be convened after the capture of Moscow; free elections to the municipal duma, zemstvo, and other self-government institutions would be held; Admiral Kolchak would not undertake to restore the special privilege of any class or estate or way of life destroyed by revolution;

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  221 4 5

6 7 8

the independence of Finland and Poland would be recognized; if boundary and other questions could not be settled by agreements, those questions would be resolved through the intermediary of the League of Nations; if mutual relations between Russia and the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasus, and the Trans-Caspian are not settled amicably, then the situation would be resolved according to the advice of the League of Nations, and the Russian government would recognize the current autonomy of those territories de facto; the authority of the peace conference to decide the future destiny of the Romanian part of Bessarabia would be recognized; as soon as a government was created on a democratic basis, Russia would be included in the League of Nations; and the declaration of Admiral Kolchak dated November 27, 1918, regarding Russian debts would be confirmed.6

On June 4, Admiral Kolchak responded to the Allies and said that he accepted the conditions laid out in the note dated May 26. He said that it would be possible to refer disputes regarding the Baltic, Caucasian, and trans-Caspian regions to discussion by the League of Nations and to ensure the autonomy of “the national groups.”7 After receiving this satisfactory answer from Kolchak, on June 12, the Supreme Council of the Entente states declared that it recognized the government at Omsk within the above-stated conditions and would render it comprehensive assistance.8 This note was published in the press on June 13. Thus, the new republics that had sent envoys to Paris for the purpose of obtaining recognition of their own independence now faced a very serious turn of events. The note of June 12, signed by the heads of state in the Council of the Four, meant de facto recognition of Kolchak’s government within the former Russia, except for Poland and Finland. The Allied states opened some communications with it, sent representatives, and declared their intention of providing the government at Omsk with military, political, economic, and financial help. The Azerbaijani delegation was among the first of the representatives of the new republics in Paris to object to recognition of the Kolchak government as an all-Russia government. In spite of the fact that the sessions of the Council of the Four devoted to this question were held privately, the Parisian press already reflected the general attitude. There was reason to expect that the White Guard governments would soon be recognized by the Allies. Therefore, on May 31, the chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, submitted a statement on behalf of the delegation to the effect that recognition of Kolchak’s government in the former territory of the Russian empire seriously infringed the vital interests of Caucasian Azerbaijan and the other new republics that had separated from Russia. It stated that the people of Azerbaijan, who had sacrificed more than 10,000 lives for their independence, would not recognize a restored government operating on the territory of Russia, under any name, and that the territory of Caucasian Azerbaijan should not be under the purview of the future Russian government.9 A number of the thoughts put forward in the statement

222  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” were reflected in the note of protest that was sent on June 5 and addressed to the chairman of the peace conference and the prime ministers of the Allied states.10 In the statement, recognition of the government of Omsk within the former Russian empire was protested, and the final secession of Azerbaijan from the empire was affirmed. It said that the Azerbaijani government had fought for half a year to clear the territory of Bolsheviks and had lost lives and property in the struggle. It was also noted that Azerbaijan had been a part of the Russian state for more than 100 years and that it was alien to the Azerbaijani people and had left deep scars on the destiny of the people. At the end of the note, the Azerbaijan delegation declared that, “irrespective of what government might be recognized in Russia, Azerbaijan recognizes only its own parliament and government and should not be included in the borders of Russia.”11 The recognition of Kolchak’s government was disturbing not only to the Azerbaijani delegation but to the majority of the delegations of new states that had come to Paris. The newly created republics held a number of sessions in order to prepare a note of protest to the Allies and the chairman of the peace conference. The delegations of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasia, White Russia (Belarus), and Ukraine decided to sign the statement: It was signed by Ali Mardan Topchubashov on behalf of the Azerbaijani delegation; Jaan Poska on behalf of the Estonian delegation; Nikolai Chkheidze on behalf of the Georgian delegation; Zigfrids Meierovics on behalf of the Latvian delegation; Abdul Mejid Chermoyev on behalf of the delegation of North Caucasia; Antoine de Loutkevitch on behalf of the Belorussian delegation; and Hryhoriy Sydorenko on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation. The statement read: The republics of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasia, White Russia, and Ukraine were formed and exist by the free will of the people of these states. The constitutions of these republics are in the process of drafting, and reciprocal relations with neighboring states are in process of settlement, and will be determined by their respective constituent assemblies, which have already been or will be elected on the basis of universal suffrage. The decisions of the organs of governmental power in Russia, whatever they may be, cannot, therefore, apply in the slightest degree to the sovereign states, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasia, White Russia, and the Ukraine. The seven republics that signed the document reiterated their request for prompt recognition of their political independence by the great powers.12 The June 17 statement was delivered to U.S. President Wilson the following day, June 18, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Latvian government, Zigfrids Meierovics.13 The Caucasian delegations twice, on June 15 and 18, discussed this question at the Hotel Claridge, where the Azerbaijani delegation was located. Representatives of the republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus participated in the first session, Azerbaijan and the Mountain Republic in the second.14 Both sessions discussed the serious threat that Kolchak and Denikin

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  223 posed to the Caucasian republics and the necessity of restoring the status quo ante, the situation that existed prior to the occupation of the Mountain Republic. As Armenians were conducting confidential communications with the White Guard governments, they did not join the statement of the “seven” and did not sign the note of protest of the Caucasian republics.15 On June 23, on behalf of the republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and North Caucasia, the note of protest consisting of seven articles was sent to the chairman of the peace conference. The difference between this note and the two previous documents (dated June 5 and 7) signed by the head of Azerbaijani delegation was that in this one, the Caucasian republics viewed the processes taking place in Russia from the standpoint of their destiny and protested the threat that Denikin, like Kolchak, posed to them. Referring to the correspondence of the Council of Four with Admiral Kolchak concerning recognition of the autonomy of these republics under the Russian government, the note stated that the great powers should consider the Caucasian republics as independent and politically sovereign, for only then would it be possible for them to conclude an agreement with Russia about their future relations. Recognition of the independence of Caucasian states was the main precondition for establishing relations with Russia. The note also declared, The representatives of Caucasian republics on behalf of their governments reiterate that the Caucasian nations that have declared their independence, have protected it at the cost of heavy sacrifices, and will adamantly defend our intention to remain independent. The Caucasian republics will never agree to a new union with Russia.16 Considering these circumstances, the Caucasian signatories came to see their future in the creation of a union of Caucasian states under the protection of the League of Nations. Representatives of the Entente states in Paris were informed that the idea of an all-Caucasus confederation was being discussed by the republics at a conference in Tiflis and by the representatives of the republics in Paris. The sixth article of the protest noted that the activities of Denikin’s Volunteer Army were preventing the Caucasus republics from resuming peaceful life. The army had become a looming threat for the South Caucasus, and it occupied a large part of the North Caucasus. The note called on the great powers to make the Volunteer Army pull out of the occupied territories and respect the rights of the Caucasian nations.17 Finally, the Allies were informed that all questions relating to the Caucasus republics must be agreed with the governments of the corresponding republics or with their representatives in Paris. For this purpose, offers to set up a special Committee of Caucasus Affairs similar to the Baltic Committee were submitted to the secretariat of the peace conference. On June 28, representatives of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, North Caucasia, and Poland sent one more appeal to the head of the peace conference. This appeal was signed by J. Poska, N. Koestner, and K. Pusta on behalf of the Estonian delegation; J. Seskis and F. Cielens on behalf of the Lithuanians and B. Krizanowski as the representative of Lithuanian Poles; N. Chkheidze, I. Tsereteli,

224  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” K. Gvarchaladze, and J. Gobechiya on behalf of Georgia; A. Chermoyev and H. Bammatov on behalf of the Mountain Republic; and A. Sheykhulislamov and M. Maharramov on behalf of Azerbaijan. As the independence of Poland had already been recognized, the representatives of Poland prepared the document with particular reference to Polish territories remaining in Russia. The appeal stated, Now, the occupation of the Ciscaucasia Republic by the troops of General Denikin and the threatening attitude of these troops towards the Republics of Georgia [Azerbaijan – J.H.] seem on the contrary to be inspired by the avowed plan of the Russian reactionaries, who wish to bring back under their yoke the independent national state newly formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire. The document emphasized that Denikin’s attacks were made possible by the financial and military assistance of the Allies. They proclaim that in view of sincere application of the right of selfdetermination it is necessary to maintain the territorial integrity of the states at present existing in the Caucasus, while waiting for the establishment of a definitive regime which will be instituted, not by Russian Constituent (Assembly), but by the Peace Congress, acting according to the will of the population, expressed by the national assemblies of the new states. The appeal ended with a demand that the Allies put a stop to Denikin’s aggression and promote the free development of nations.18 The statement and the note of protest that were prepared with such great effort and submitted separately to the representatives of the Allies provoked no reaction. Topchubashov wrote, Neither the conference nor the Allies responded to these protests. Meanwhile, Kolchak’s government and the Volunteer Army were vigorously supported. After victory over the Bolsheviks the Allies hope to recreate a united Russia. In these bold hopes, they overlook a contradiction: in striving for this aim, they sacrifice the liberty and independence of smaller nations whose rights and interests they have been protecting. The Allies considered the complete destruction of the Mountain Republic so carelessly that we actually have pity on them, and that is why we cannot look upon our future without anxiety.19 The alarming news received from the Caucasus made it clear that the representatives of the Caucasus republics in Paris had to unite and cooperate. They had observed that the Allies were not unanimous in their attitudes toward Russia. As Topchubashov wrote, “Some of them (Italy and France) actively wish for the creation of a unitary Russia, while others (England and the United States) seem to go along with the idea.”20 Even the British and American representatives, however, neglected to consult with the new republics about recognition of the

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  225 Omsk government. Yet even while they refused to discuss the independence of the new republics, some representatives of the Allies supported their independence struggles. As reported to the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, “True, during private meetings with their representatives they have treated us kindly and expressed appreciation of our efforts to be independent. We hear the same from individual deputies and representatives of economic institutions and other organizations.”21 In the spring of 1919, the situation in the North Caucasus was unsettled. Occupation of the Mountain Republic by Denikin’s Volunteer Army greatly concerned Azerbaijan and Georgia. Azerbaijani representatives in Paris told Sir Louis Mallet that the Volunteer Army, “instead of fighting the Bolsheviks, was turning the weapons it got from the Allies against the local civilian population, and after occupying the Republic of North Caucasia it would attack our lands.”22 Considering the circumstances, the representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Mountain Republic began negotiations on concluding a political and economic alliance. On May 30, representatives of Azerbaijan and the Mountain Republic met at Abdul Mejid Chermoyev’s place to discuss setting up a Caucasian confederation.23 In connection with suggestions by the Georgians that questions of disputed territories should be submitted to arbitration, it was thought that the conflicts between these republics were not too deep and that they could be solved in situ. In addition, the representatives of Azerbaijan added that, if a confederation were to be created, each republic should keep its political independence. This issue was also discussed at the meeting of three delegations on June 15. Despite the fact that complete agreement was not reached, the three representatives did decide to cooperate politically, as the Denikin threat and the movement of the Volunteer Army in the North Caucasus could have grave consequences for all the nations in the region. Georgian representative Zurab Avalov (Avalishvili) pointed out that, since the Entente countries were supplying Denikin’s army with weapons and ammunition, they were unlikely to demand that the forces should withdraw from the North Caucasus. In his opinion, the Caucasus republics “must themselves think about getting rid of this threat.”24 A report sent to the delegation by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs spelled out the danger to the new republics, including Azerbaijan, from the Denikin forces fighting for a “united and indivisible Russia.”25 Military aggression had escalated into armed conflict with Georgia over the territories of Tuapse, Sochi, and Sukhumi on the Black Sea. In February 1919, negotiations between the Mountain Republic and Denikin were not crowned with success. The latter insisted that the Volunteer Army was fighting Bolshevism, but Bolshevism existed to the north, not in the south. The Republic of North Caucasia had declared independence in the beginning of May 1918, created its parliament in May 1919, and had been recognized by the Allied command in Baku. On November 27, 1918, General William Thomson said that the North Caucasus government would be recognized as the only legitimate government there until the fate of the Caucasus was decided at the international peace conference and that Denikin’s Volunteer Army would not be allowed to enter the territory of the Mountain Republic.26

226  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” Now, however, General Thomson avoided responding directly to the request of the government of the Mountain Republic. The Allies’ mission in Teymur-KhanShura under the direction of Colonel Rawlinson returned to Baku after Denikin’s attack. Although the two British battalions in Petrovsk were supposed to prevent Denikin’s Volunteer Army from entering Dagestan,27 in truth they viewed the army’s movement to the south with indifference. The government of Azerbaijan took a number of urgent measures with respect to the military and political activities of Denikin volunteers within the country. A letter of February 15, 1919, was addressed to General Thomson concerning attempts by representatives of the Volunteer Army and the Armenians to create military units. Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski made an extraordinary announcement to the Parliament of Azerbaijan regarding the Denikin threat. He noted that factions, including Armenians, in support of Denikin were being secretly armed, that such activities humiliated the dignity of the government, and that it was urgently necessary to prevent such activities. Khoyski said, General Przhevalsky has named himself as an army commander and, together with Hamazasp, recruits volunteers. General Przhevalsky supplies former Russian soldiers with weapons and Hamazasp gives Armenians weapons, and they have winter camps in the Icheri Sheher [Old Town of Baku] and near Tazah Pir and Salyan barracks. This has alarmed the population. The government has been aware of this from the start, and has tried to find out the identity and motivations of the perpetrators.28 The prime minister delivered the letter addressed to Thomson to the members of the Parliament along with the response of the British command. Following this, ships from the Russian navy’s Caspian fleet that had dropped anchor in Baku were disarmed and placed under the control of the government. The government made propaganda outreach to the Molokans living in the territory of Azerbaijan and tried to put an end to recruiting activities for Denikin’s army. On the demand of Khoyski, General Przhevalsky was forced to leave the territory of Azerbaijan. The activities of Lazar Bicherakhov’s Cossack detachment, which was supported by the British, were forbidden in Azerbaijan. Bicherakhov was the main tool of Denikin’s policy in Azerbaijan. As far back as January he had created a Caucasus Caspian government in order to overthrow the legal government. The British were aware of this adventurist plan and wished to solve this problem discreetly, so they invited Bicherakhov to London on a pretext. As soon as he left Baku, the government of Azerbaijan ordered Bicherakhov’s detachments to leave Azerbaijan within 24 hours. When General Erdeli, who was replacing Bicherakhov, protested to General Thomson, he said that the army of Bicherakhov had discredited itself and represented a danger to law and order.29 The British, both in discussions with the government of Azerbaijan and in correspondence and statements, had promised that the Volunteer Army would never enter Dagestan. However, the advance of Denikin toward Derbent proved

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  227 the unreliability of these promises. In May, during negotiations carried out by a diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan, Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev, in Derbent, the Denikin forces agreed not to advance further south.30 At the end of May, however, alarming news was received about the occupation of Derbent by part of the Volunteer Army, which caused tremendous anxiety in Azerbaijan. On May 21 Colonel Lazarev at British command notified Prime Minister Nasib Usubbeyov that the command of the Army of South Russia did not have any aggressive intentions toward Azerbaijan and recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. However, it was also noted that after Russia was liberated from Bolsheviks, the question of the new republics on the territories of the former empire would be considered at the Constituent Assembly or the supreme governmental body to which the anti-Bolshevik forces would transfer authority.31 Usubbeyov informed the Azerbaijani Parliament about this letter at the session held on June 5, and the text of the letter and its translation into Azerbaijani was read to members of the Parliament. The prime minister also read a telegram from Erdeli, the commander of the Volunteer Army, which was sent to Colonel Lazarev from Yekaterinburg on June 18. It said, “If the government of Azerbaijan does not attack us, I will ensure that our forces will not cross the Zagatala Caucasus mountains and the Gizilburun line.” Usubbeyov told the members of Parliament that he had discussed the telegram with the British command and notified them that he intended to make all necessary preparations for the purpose of defense.32 The government of Azerbaijan’s attitude to the Volunteer Army was unequivocal. Prime Minister Usubbeyov had already told the Parliament as far back as June 26 that Denikin could “cross the borders of Azerbaijan only over our dead bodies.”33 On June 5, during the parliamentary debate, Mammad Emin Rasulzade proposed granting the government emergency powers. Under these powers, a general mobilization should be declared, stringent laws applied, and funds allocated from the treasury for preparatory measures against the enemy, with an accounting to be submitted later. Accordingly, on June 5, the Parliament of Azerbaijan set up the State Committee for Defense. The members were Nasib Bey Usubbeyov, who was leading the new government; Khudadat Bey MelikAslanov, Minister of Roads; Aslan Bey Safikurdski, Minister of Justice; Samad Bey Mehmandarov, Minister of War; and Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. On June 11, the State Committee for Defense declared a state of martial law over the entire territory of Azerbaijan. At the beginning of June, Usubbeyov, in a telegram sent to Denikin and British General George Norton Cory, who was protecting him, demanded that they force Denikin’s volunteers to leave Dagestan in 5 days. At the same time, the government of Georgia expressed its protest to the British command regarding actions of the Volunteer Army. Even when the British command intervened, however, the Volunteer Army refused to leave Derbent. Instead, they drew a new line of demarcation along Samur river and the northern border of Zagatala. When the government of Azerbaijan protested again, the British replied that “the southern demarcation line drawn by Denikin does not correspond to the directive of the British government.”34 They promised to inform London about it. To calm

228  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” the situation, Denikin wrote a letter stating that he recognized the independence of Azerbaijan until such time as the central supreme government of Russia was restored.35 But the government of Azerbaijan no longer believed such promises. As Firuz Kazemzadeh noted, the Azerbaijanis well understood that Denikin’s ultimate goal was to reclaim Azerbaijan and other parts of the former Russian empire.36 Voluntary national defense detachments were urgently raised and deployed, along with regular army units, in the north of Azerbaijan and along Samur River. The attitude of the government of Azerbaijan, which had long been accused of “cooperation” with Denikin and the White Guard army, was explained in a letter that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli sent to Jafar Bey Rustambeyov, the authorized diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to the government of Kuban: The opinion of our government is this: irrespective of who it is, Bolshevik or Menshevik, Denikin’s volunteers, etc., anyone who encroaches on the independence of Azerbaijan is our enemy. … Our attitude toward the Volunteer Army is this: it has been decided once and for all that Volunteer Army units should not be allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and that Volunteer Army units located in Dagestan should be removed and the army of Azerbaijan should occupy Dagestan up to the demarcation line.37 The demarcation line indicated in this letter was the one defined in January 1919 in negotiations between British command and Denikin’s forces. British General Briggs, at Denikin’s quarters, organized a meeting between Denikin and Rustambeyov in an attempt to establish relations between the government of Azerbaijan and the Volunteer Army. Although Denikin agreed, the government of Azerbaijan refused this offer.38 The firm stand of the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia against Denikin’s movement southward produced an effect. General Briggs received a telegram from London saying that the British government was not pleased about Denikin’s appointment of General Liakhov to the position of governor-general of the Mountain region and that Denikin’s army was there only “for the purpose of struggle against Bolshevism.” If Denikin persisted in ways that were unacceptable to Great Britain, then His Majesty’s government would refuse to aid him further and would discontinue the current assistance.39 The transfer by the British of part of the Caspian navy to the Volunteer Army on the eve of the British departure from Azerbaijan provoked further protests from the government of Azerbaijan. In a note of protest submitted to British command on August 3, the government of Azerbaijan characterized this action as a danger to the sovereignty of the republic and a sign of disrespect. Although General Thomson again connected such actions to Denikin’s struggle against the Bolsheviks, the heads of the government nevertheless viewed this diplomatic folly as a blow directed against the security of Azerbaijan.

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  229 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a report on the situation to the republic’s delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, noting that the threat from Denikin had strengthened cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia. At the Caucasus conference in April 1919, this issue and many others were discussed. The Armenian participants at the conference avoided direct comment regarding Denikin, but the danger from the north troubled Azerbaijan and Georgian in equal measure and they declared their solidarity on this question. In the Workers’ Soviet of Tiflis, Gegechkori stated that they, together with the proletariat of Baku, would win a decisive victory over the aggressor and that they would not lay down arms until they had crushed the tsarist general.40 The ambivalent position of the Armenian republic, by contrast, is attributable, on the one hand, to its location behind the front line, as opposed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and, on the other hand, to the fact that the Armenians had their own plans in connection with Denikin, as documented in a book by I. Shakhdin published in Tiflis in 1931.41 The book referred to a secret agreement between the Volunteer Army and the Republic of Armenia according to which Armenia was to assist Denikin’s forces in attacking Azerbaijan and Georgia.42 This would create favorable conditions for solving by force the territorial claims of Armenia against Azerbaijan and Georgia. The coincidence of Denikin’s and Armenia’s aims was confirmed later by Anastas Mikoyan, who wrote, “Only the government of Armenia surrendered to Denikin and declared its ‘neutrality.’ At that time their sympathy was on the side of Denikin, who was gaining strength day by day.”43 The effective cooperation of the representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris with representatives of Georgia and the Mountain Republic during the spring and summer of 1919 played a significant role in creating Caucasian solidarity on various international issues. It strengthened their resistance to the Denikin threat. The Allies’ recognition of the Kolchak government had the same effect of strengthening the solidarity of the new states created on the territory of the former Russian empire in confronting the threat of a “united and indivisible Russia.” The representatives of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference did not take a step backward from their struggle for recognition of the republic’s independence and protection of its territorial integrity. They attempted by every means to repulse the claims of “Great Armenia,” which were being defended by the heads of European states and were clearly directed against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Denikin’s disregard of the second demarcation line defined by the British on June 11 and his advance south of Petrovsk further strengthened the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the two republics decided to sign a military agreement for their mutual defense. For this purpose, they also appealed to the government of Armenia, which, for reasons that later became clear, declined to join the military defense pact that Azerbaijan and Georgia signed on June 16. According to the agreement, which was for a 3-year period, in the case of aggression by any state against the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan or Georgia, the parties to the agreement were to provide military assistance to each other. The agreement stipulated as follows:

230  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” 1

the parties to the agreement bear responsibility to deploy all armed forces in case of any aggression or danger to the territorial integrity and independence of one or both parties stipulated in the agreement; 2 if any of the neighboring states attack one or both parties stipulated in the agreement in order to solve border conflicts by force during military operations started according to the previous article, then this state is defined as a combatant; 3 the agreement has a strongly defensive nature; if one of the parties on its own initiative declares war or starts military operations without prior consent, then the other party to the agreement is not obliged to participate in these operations; 4 parties in the agreement are obliged to solve all border conflicts occurring between them by means of agreements and arbitration; in this case, an accepted decision is considered as a final and obligatory decision for both parties; 5 the agreement is for a duration of three years; one year prior to termination of this period, the parties have a right to express their preference for its prolongation or its termination; 6 the parties to the agreement bear responsibility jointly to carry out diplomatic negotiations directed to the protection of the sovereign rights and independence of these states; 7 the parties to the agreement are obliged not to conclude a separatist treaty; 8 the parties to the agreement bear responsibility not to conclude a military agreement with other states without prior notification of their ally; 9 in the event that a federation will be created wherein both parties will join before termination of the period stipulated in the article 5, and this federation ensures the integrity of borders of all states and both parties to the agreement enter, then this agreement loses its effect; and 10 after the official announcement of this agreement, Armenia has two weeks in which it may join the agreement.44 In their notification about the agreement submitted to Paris Peace Conference, the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia underscored that it was “solely for the purpose of defense.”45 Pursuant to the agreement of June 16, the parties signed a military technical agreement, and the defense ministries of Azerbaijan and Georgia established a joint military council. The chairman of the military council was I. Z. Odishelidze, and its members were General Ali Agha Shikhlinski, General Mammad Bey Sulkevich (Sulkiewicz), and General Ivane Kutateladze. The military council was to review the scope of military operations and the capacity of the enemy, work out a defense plan, monitor the preparedness of both republics’ armies, and develop a strategic position.46 At first, the attitude of the British command toward the Azerbaijan-Georgia defense pact was negative, but that later changed when a representative of the Azerbaijan Republic, Aziz Bey Tahirbeyov, on mission to Istanbul, met with

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  231 General George Milne, the commander-in-chief of British forces in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and told him about Denikin’s movements. Milne told Tahirbeyov that Denikin was moving southward without his consent and that he had not been aware of this action. Tahirbeyov sent a radiogram to Usubbeyov to report that Milne had not agreed to Denikin’s actions.47 The representatives of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference were informed about the occupation of Dagestan by Denikin’s army and its movement to the south and that Azerbaijan and Georgia had agreed on a joint plan of action.48 The firm policy of the government of Azerbaijan toward the Mountain Republic and the Volunteer Army and cooperation with Georgia was met with satisfaction by the republic’s delegation in Paris.49 The representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Mountain Republic were endeavoring to convince European governments and the members of the Supreme Council of the necessity of keeping the Volunteer Army out of the South Caucasus. In a statement that the representatives of the three republics submitted to the Supreme Council, they indicated that the Volunteer Army, which was supported by the Allies, should be reminded that it had been established to struggle against Bolshevism and not against Caucasian nations and that it should withdraw from the occupied territories and respect the rights of the Caucasian republics. For this purpose, the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia also approached European Social Democrats. In the beginning of July, on the initiative of one of the members of the Society for Protection of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the French Socialist leader Albert Thomas, a note of protest against Denikin’s occupation of territory in the South Caucasus, disbandment of the government and parliament of the Mountain Republic, and endangerment of the Republic of Azerbaijan was submitted personally by Thomas to the foreign ministers of the states of the Entente. The note was signed by Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov and Mahammad Maharramov as representatives of Azerbaijan.50 In early June, representatives of Georgia had met Edward M. (Colonel) House, the advisor to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, and discussed the necessity of preventing the movement of Denikin to the south.51 The chairman of the Azerbaijan delegation, Ali Mardan Topchubashov, had already warned Sir Louis Mallet that the Volunteer Army was turning the weapons it had obtained from the Allies against the local civilian populations instead of the Bolsheviks and that, after occupying the North Caucasus, it would invade the territory of Azerbaijan. Mallet stated that Denikin could not cross the border and that Azerbaijan and Georgia were free from danger.52 On the situation in the Mountain Republic, he suggested that Topchubashov should meet with James Simpson, a member of the British delegation who was considered an expert on the East as well as the Caucasus. Topchubashov met with Simpson that same day. They discussed Azerbaijan’s population, territory, political structure, government and parliament, and its relations with Armenia and with various political forces in Russia. Simpson observed that the Mountain Republic was not a homogeneous nation and, for that reason, would not be able to create a state.53 Concerning Dagestan, which was part of the Mountain Republic, Simpson remarked: “Dagestan is yours and Denikin will not cross your borders.” He added that Oliver

232  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” Wardrop was being sent to conduct training for the Volunteer Army and British representatives.54 When Georgia and Azerbaijan informed the peace conference about the June 16 agreement, they indicated that the pact was not directed against Armenia and that the third party specified in the agreement did not mean Armenia.55 The expected withdrawal of the Allies from the Caucasus, especially the British, had caused great anxiety in the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia and their representatives in Paris. As long as British forces were in the Caucasus, generals Milne and Thomson could guarantee that Azerbaijan and Georgia would not be attacked by Denikin. Now, the departure of British forces from the Caucasus was going to afford the Volunteer Army, the White Guards, and the Russian delegation in Paris a favorable opportunity to annex the Caucasus to Russia. The government at Omsk, now recognized by the Entente powers, had joined the Russian delegation and the Russian “Political Conference” in Paris. The Russian delegation included former ambassadors, diplomats, and political émigrés, such as Lvov, Tchaikovsky, Sazonov, Maklakov, Savinkov and others. They were not unified. Sergei Sazonov, representing Kolchak and Denikin, did not support the others on most issues; moreover, there was hostility between the representatives of new republics and the Russian delegation, so they rarely met. Topchubashov wrote about the haughty Russian émigrés: We do not communicate with any of them, even with the Russians living here. None of them can hide their rage and unhappiness at our extraordinary efforts for our independence. They have been casting blame on everyone, particularly the Georgians. And they are spreading stories about us, insinuating that the slogan of Independent Azerbaijan was put forward only by intellectuals, and that Azerbaijanis love Russia so much that they do not want to separate from it. In any event these “advocates” all cling to the idea of a great united and indivisible Russia and they impudently, shamelessly assert that they will not give up a single arshin of Russia’s ancestral lands to anyone except Poland. They believe that all other territories must remain part of Russia, and even some parts of Polish territory, such as eastern Galicia, Chelm province, and Volhynia, should belong to Russia. Despite the fact that the major powers have recognized the independence of Finland and have established diplomatic relations with it, these “representatives” of Russia do not wish to accept these facts. Mr Denikin utterly rejects them.56 The increasingly vociferous Russian émigrés and their reactionary attitudes toward the new republics drove the representatives of Azerbaijan to be even more active in protecting the independence of the republic. On August 19 and 24, a letter was sent to the chairman of the peace conference and to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, and on September 9, another appeal was addressed to the chairman of the conference.57 The August 24 letter noted that General Denikin, ignoring the demarcation line set down by the Allies, had occupied the whole of Dagestan including Derbent and that the part of the Caspian fleet that the British command

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  233 had transferred to Denikin now threatened the maritime boundaries of Azerbaijan.58 Topchubashov wrote that the Volunteer Army could now threaten Azerbaijan from the Caspian. It could land forces on Azerbaijani shores and attack the coast and even the capital city Baku from the sea.59 The letter requested that Prime Minister Lloyd George or Foreign Secretary Balfour receive the representatives of Azerbaijan in order to discuss the Volunteer Army, relations between Great Britain and Azerbaijan, and the situation of the South Caucasus in general. They also asked to be received by French Prime Minister Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Pichon. However, they had no success. Topchubashov reported to the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan that the leaders of the Entente countries were avoiding meeting us directly. I wrote specially to Mr Clemenceau, Mr Pichon, Mr Balfour, and others. Others have reminded them about it repeatedly. In a letter received from Balfour (through his secretary) we were informed that he had not had the opportunity to receive us because he was very busy. So he apologized. Balfour always sends his thanks for each letter received from the delegation and the copies of letters and memoranda submitted to the conference. The secretariat of the peace conference does the same. In a word, they are waiting for something.60 On September 3, the representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris received a telegram from Foreign Minister Mammad Yusif Jafarov on August 26. The telegram reported that Denikin did not respect the demarcation line defined by the British and the Volunteer Army did not intend to leave Derbent, which was supposed to be united with Azerbaijan by agreement with the Allies. It also noted that Denikin’s forces were being transported to nearby Azerbaijani territory by means of the Caspian fleet.61 On August 29, the Azerbaijani delegation applied as a body to the management of the conference62 and, on September 9, Ali Mardan Topchubashov addressed an appeal to the chairman of the conference describing the threat that Denikin was presenting with the Allies’ direct assistance. Three significant demands were put before the peace conference: 1 2 3

The Volunteer Army must not violate the demarcation line established by the Allied command in respect of Dagestan province; the Volunteer Army must leave Derbent in as short a time as possible; and the vessels of the Caspian fleet that were turned over to the Volunteer Army must be returned to the government of Azerbaijan.63

However, the representatives of Azerbaijan would continue to experience frustration in Paris until late 1919, when the Allies began to realize that the governments created by Kolchak, Denikin, and other Russian generals were neither strong nor reliable and finally began to recognize the independence of the Caucasian republics. In the summer of 1919, the major powers at the peace conference were preoccupied with disagreements over the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and Austro-German and German-Japanese relations; the

234  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” problems of the smaller nations were all but forgotten. The Parisian press was whipping itself into a frenzy with articles predicting that Germany would not meet its obligations. Meanwhile, the economic crisis in the European countries, currency devaluations, coal shortages, election campaigns in France and England, and U.S. dissatisfaction with European affairs diminished interest in the peace conference to a significant degree. The surprise Romanian attack on Hungary and the Italian seizure of Fiume, which the powers had intended to grant to Yugoslavia, weakened the authority of the peace conference. It even seemed possible that the work of the conference might be suspended. Of the leaders who had participated in the opening of the conference, only Clemenceau still held his position. Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando, Tittoni, Lansing, Makino, and others had left Paris and were replaced by subordinates. Under the circumstances, there was a reluctance to take up the Russian question, which was considered extremely problematic. The Parisian press even published stories that the peace conference was going to leave the Russian and Turkish questions to the new League of Nations. Topchubashov, who was observing these developments closely, wrote to his government: “We can make so bold as to say that this conference should not be called a peace conference.”64 In discussions with representatives of the Allies, he said, the most specific questions received only vague answers. And this was not a matter of politeness. “It is impossible to believe that the Allies do not have a certain opinion regarding the future of Russia and the territories that have separated from it.”65 The League of Nations, which was supposed to play a significant role in the destiny of smaller nations, at first did not meet expectations. Founded on the basis of Wilson’s Fourteen Points project, the League was meeting with strong resistance from Britain and France as well as the U.S. Senate. Topchubashov wrote that the League was like “a stillborn child, and it is unknown by whom and how and when it will be resuscitated. It seems as if France, Italy, and England have forgotten it.”66 In spite of this complicated situation, the representatives of Azerbaijan continued to request that recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan be put on the conference agenda. A statement submitted to the leadership of the conference on September 19 affirmed that the whole nation of Azerbaijan deeply believes in its own future and cherishes the hope that its own material strength and spirit will allow it to live independently under the supreme protection of the League of Nations, in conditions of peaceful coexistence with neighboring nations. 67 The statement also indicated that Caucasian Azerbaijan henceforth expected to be known as the “Republic of Azerbaijan.” Along with the statement, various historical, political, and ethnographic documents as well as maps of the republic were submitted to the conference. Another serious issue of concern to the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris was their relations with the Armenian representatives. The Armenians thought of themselves as “the small ally of the big allies.”68 They hoped that the Paris

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  235 Peace Conference would solve all their problems and they dreamed of creating a “Great Armenia” reaching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Armenia was demanding not only six provinces of Anatolia but also Cilicia and even part of Iranian Azerbaijan, although Iran had not participated in the war. Their groundless claims were supported by Paris, London, and especially Washington.69 According to one newspaper story, British General Beach, newly arrived in Alexandropol from Tabriz, had supposedly congratulated the Armenians on their independence and announced at a banquet given in his honor that the rightful borders of independent Armenia would stretch from sea to sea. This would be a surprise to the neighbors, Azerbaijan and Georgia, whose independence would not be recognized by the Entente, for they were to be incorporated within a united Russia. When this story appeared in the newspaper Sakartvelo and was republished in the newspaper Georgia, a representative of the British command came to the editorial office to deny that the general had said such things and to demand the publication of a retraction. It was subsequently determined that the Armenians had distorted General Beach’s remarks, and the newspaper Georgia had to publish a disclaimer on July 3.70 Proposals for creation of a “Great Armenia” stretching from sea to sea were the main subject of Armenian propaganda throughout the South Caucasus, Europe, and the United States after the war. To pursue these claims, the Armenians sent to Paris not one but two delegations. The first, representing the Armenian diaspora, was headed by Boghos Nubarian (Nubar Pasha), who was well known in Western political circles and especially in France. The second, representing the Republic of Armenia, was headed by the chairman of the Armenian National Council, Avetis Aharonian, who had recently led the Armenian delegation at the Istanbul conference. Nevertheless, Armenia, like the other Caucasian states, was not included on the list of officially invited conference delegations. On January 30, 1919, the Times of London published a letter that Boghos Nubarian had sent to the editor but which was clearly directed to the leaders of the Entente: Sir, the name of Armenia is not on the list of the nations admitted to the Peace Conference. Our sorrow and our disappointment are deep beyond expression. Armenians naturally expected their demand for admission to the Conference to be conceded, after all they had done for the common cause. [The letter continued] The unspeakable suffering and the dreadful losses that have befallen the Armenians by reason of their faithfulness to the Allies are now fully known. But I must emphasize the fact unhappily known to few, that ever since the beginning of the war the Armenians fought by the side of the Allies on all fronts.71 Boghos Nubarian went on to practically attribute the Entente’s victory in the Middle East entirely to the Armenians. All this was to make the case that Armenia should have been invited to the peace conference as an equal member of the Entente and should be recognized as independent.

236  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” President Wilson promised to support admission of the Armenian representatives to the conference. As British diplomat Harold Nicolson noted in his diary, the United States was preparing to seek a mandate over Armenia.72 On January 30, Lloyd George told the Council of Ten that Britain could not maintain its army in Turkey and the South Caucasus “forever” and that the United States should take over Armenia.73 President Wilson proposed that the Armenians should be invited to present their program for the future Armenia at a meeting of the Council of Ten on February 26.74 Avetis Aharonian addressed the Council of Ten with claims to a wide territory and groundless moral pretensions. He said that, prior to the war of 1914–1918, in addition to the Armenians populations of Turkey and Iran, approximately 2 million Armenians lived in the South Caucasus, half in such big cities as Tiflis, Batum, and Baku, and a million or more in Erivan, Kars, Shusha, and Alexandropol, in tight-knit communities going back 2,000 to 3,000 years. Taking advantage of the lack of information on the part of the Council of Ten, Aharonian falsified history in his own way. He claimed that Azerbaijanis and Kurds had allied with Turkey, covertly assembled forces, and done everything to impede the Armenians and that their Georgian cousins and coreligionists had felt no obligation to come to their aid. Surrounded by enemies and without the promised assistance from the Allies, he declared, the Armenians had courageously blocked the way of Turkish ambitions for the Caucasus and, despite their losses, they had not lost faith in the Allied states.75 With such fabrications, Aharonian was attempting to justify the Armenians’ exaggerated territorial claims and gain the Allies’ support for the plans for a “Great Armenia.” Among the Armenians, there was a significant difference of opinions concerning territorial claims. The representative of the diaspora, who had close relations with the Catholics, intended to take Cilicia as well. One of the best known of the diaspora representatives, Jean Loris-Melikov, afterward wrote that Sergei Sazonov had inveigled the Armenians to make claims against Cilicia. It is quite possible that Sazonov was thinking that Russia would soon be restored and would occupy Armenia together with Cilicia.76 Nevertheless, the representative of the Republic of Armenia, Khatisian, advised against any mention of Cilicia. It is interesting that a resolution for an independent Armenia submitted by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the Senate included the identical demands for a “Great Armenia” that were submitted by Armenians to the peace conference. At the Council of Ten, Boghos Nubarian had submitted the following territorial claims as agreed between the two Armenian delegations at the peace conference. The demands included some territories where Armenians had never lived: • •

First: The seven vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Harpoot, Sivas, Erzurum, and Trabzon excluding there from the regions situated to the south of Tigris and to the west of the Ordu-Sivas line; Second: The four Cilician sanjak, i.e.: Marash, Khozan (Sis), Djebel-Berket, and Adana including Alexandretta;

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  237 •

Third: All the territory of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus, comprising the province of Erivan, the southern part of the former Government of Tiflis, the southwest part of the former Government Elizavetpol, the province of Kars, except the region north of Ardahan.77

In addition, the Armenians put forward indemnity claims equal to 19,130,982,000 French francs. As Firuz Kazemzadeh noted, “Fantastic as these figures were, the Armenians hoped to receive the money.”78 The Armenians’ territorial claims exceeded anything that had been demanded even by the victorious members of the Entente. Lloyd George stated that the Armenians wished for too much. They demand territories from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea based on the tsarist Armenia that had once existed but, unfortunately, Armenians made up only a small percentage of the population there.79 Prime Minister Hovhannes Kachaznuni of Armenia, a founder of the Dashnaksutyun party, wrote in 1923 that, Neither the Armenian government nor the leadership of the Dashnaksutyun party could have concocted such an absurd project. On the contrary, according to the directive, our delegation went to Paris with quite reasonable demands corresponding to our aims … . In Paris our delegation became captive of the mood of our Diaspora … . Besides, it seemed that the United States would not accept the mandate of small Armenia but would accept the mandate of Great Armenia “from sea to sea.” Thus, we did not express our own will during the resolution of the most significant issues, we did not act as we wished, we did not go our own way, but allowed others to lead us.80 In addition to the Armenian Dashnaks, the position of the Armenian Communists is of significant interest. Anastas I. Mikoyan, the senior Communist leader, wrote, Armenian chauvinists, relying on the assistance of imperialistic allies and the encouragement of General Denikin, are nourishing the sweet fantasy of a criminal idea of creating a “Great Armenia” consisting of seven provinces within historical boundaries from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The existence of no Armenians on this territory, which consists overwhelmingly of Muslims, does not bother them. The idea of “Great Armenia” was based not on the will of the majority of the population but would be established by clearing the territory of “foreigners,” “criminal elements,” and Muslims. In Mikoyan’s opinion the idea of creating such a “hell” was being fed by imperialists who intended to plunder Turkey through their agents.81 The Armenian representatives hardly participated in the discussions of the Caucasian republics or of the new republics created within the boundaries of former Russia. They were expecting that, for them, the Paris conference “would clear up everything, would solve everything.”82 Paris, to the Armenians, was a

238  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” feast. They held many meetings and sessions; invited dozens of journalists, writers, senators, and former ministers; and made lengthy speeches about Armenians and Armenia. “The Armenian delegates followed Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, reminding them every minute of the ‘debt they owed’ Armenia.”83 Such behavior irritated the conference organizers, and gradually the Armenians started to lose their “friends.” Especially after the national movement in Anatolia gained strength, the great powers began to approach Armenian plans on the division of Turkey with caution. The exaggerated demands they submitted to the peace conference played no less a role in swaying the Allies from the Armenians. Jean Loris-Melikov wrote that, at the beginning of the conference, the Armenians had been warmly received by everyone whereas the Georgians were met coldly. However, the Georgians soon charmed the Europeans and won their affections, while the Armenians lost their welcome. Too many exaggerated demands and the manner of their submission created a situation in which most people avoided them.84 The intentions of Armenian representatives in Paris to expand their territories into Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia encountered serious resistance from the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations acting together. The Armenians tried to mobilize not only the European governments but the Socialist and Social Democratic movements against Georgia and Azerbaijan and were using the press for these purposes. Mikayel Varandian, well known in socialist circles in Europe, complained at a socialist meeting in May 1919 that the Georgians and Azerbaijanis were oppressing the civilian Armenian population. Thanks to the efforts of Georgian socialists well known in Europe and members of Azerbaijani socialist parties Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov and Mahammad Maharramov, it was possible to correct this slander. At the discussion of Varandian’s complaint, Arthur Henderson, Ramsay MacDonald, Camille Huysmans, and others were in attendance.85 The Dashnaks realized that the Allies were postponing resolution of the Armenian question, and so they decided to use the delay for their benefit. On May 28, 1919, celebrating the first anniversary of independence, they issued a statement on annexation of seven provinces of Turkey to Armenia and the creation of the unitary state of Armenia.86 This was at a time when Turkey, as a defeated state and could not react properly, and the movement of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was still in its infancy. The May 28 statement suggested that Armenia was being restored entirely, that the Armenian nation was being given complete freedom in a united and independent Armenia, and that all the conditions for its progress were being created. The Armenian nation was depicted as sole owner of a united country, and the parliament of Armenia as a legislative body that expressed the will of all the Armenian people.87 News of the statement was sent from Erivan to the Armenian representatives in Paris, who thereafter began to work in concert.88 Zurab Avalov, the representative of the Georgian delegation in Paris, wrote that the Republic of Armenia had moved beyond purely Caucasian policy to enter the Turkish question in the statement on annexation.89 The same was said by the head of the delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference,

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  239 Avetis Aharonian, in conversations with Chkheidze and Topchubashov: “You have only limited Caucasian interests, whereas our concerns are to protect the whole Armenian nation, a united Armenia.”90 In summer 1919, Andranik, who was responsible for atrocities against Muslims in Turkey as well as in Azerbaijan and had been expelled from the territory of Azerbaijan at the insistence of the British command, arrived in France. On June 15, it was received by French President Raymond Poincaré through the mediation of Boghos Nubarian. At the time, the Armenian press in Europe and the United States was attempting to introduce Andranik into society and elite political circles as the “Armenian Garibaldi.” At the presidential reception, Andranik expressed his dissatisfaction with the position of the Allies regarding the Garabagh question, reiterating that “Armenians rely on the Allies.” He told Poincaré that Armenians had fought with the Entente against Turkey and Germany, for the “sacred cause” of the Allies, with 180,000 Armenian volunteers in the Russian army and 15,000 in Europe. “We did this to contribute to the great struggle of France and its allies for the establishment of justice.”91 In a telegram, he called on the United States to intervene in the resolution of the “Armenian question”: “We are a very ancient nation. Armenians suffered more losses for liberation than any of the other belligerents … . We hope that our losses given for the Allies will not be in vain.”92 The representatives of Azerbaijan suffered from the effects of this classic demagogy and manipulation of public opinion. Topchubashov wrote to Baku that The activities of Armenian intellectuals in the heart of Europe for more than half a century, the enormous financial resources at their disposal, their skills of movement on all fronts and in attracting people to their side, along with their American compatriots, have stirred up wide sympathy for Armenians, especially lately. These great advantages obscure the negative aspects of the Armenians.93 Whenever representatives of the Entente powers, under the influence of Armenian propaganda, met with the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia, they would advise them to live with the Armenians in conditions of peace. Avetis Aharonian sent the chairman of the peace conference a special letter and a new memorandum on behalf of the two Armenian delegations. The memorandum had also been published in the French Journal de Debats. The letter stated that Russia, by signing the Brest treaty and transferring Gars and Andahan to Turkey, had strained relations and put Armenia in a difficult situation. In order to resolve these issues, Armenia should be allowed to participate in the conference on an equal basis with the newly created states of Poland and Czechoslovakia.94 The memorandum was primarily directed against Turkey and Azerbaijan, as the Allies were being asked to force Turks and Azerbaijanis to quit all Armenian territories.95 The great victory in the East had not lasted long, according to the text. Due to efforts to by the proponents of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, it said, enemy elements were raising their heads and resuming their activities. It asserted demagogically that Turks and Azerbaijanis could not forgive the Armenian people

240  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” for sympathizing with the Allies, and so they would savagely attack Armenians to punish them. The intention behind this memorandum was to provoke the Allies. By publishing it in a French magazine, the Armenians were spreading throughout Europe the word that Turks and Tatars rejoiced that the armistice agreement did not change anything in the life of the Armenian people and that “Turkish Armenia” still belonged to its previous owner. This was said by the same organization which a few months earlier had shouted that Armenia would not accept anything except “unconditional liberation.”96 The Allies were also informed about the alleged killing of Armenians in Cilicia. The representatives of Azerbaijan issued a special statement in connection with this claim, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic sent the government of Armenia a letter of protest. The ministry was instructed by relevant order of the government to make an inquiry of the Allied headquarters in Baku, the diplomatic representatives of Azerbaijan in Armenia and Georgia, and the representative of Armenia in Azerbaijan. At a meeting in early June, Usubbeyov had spoken about the Armenian memorandum and assigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to investigate the issue. According to the second article of the resolution of the meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned to make a speech at the parliament regarding 10 million manats set aside for correct and comprehensive treatment in Europe of the actual state of the South Caucasian Muslims. In the third article of the resolution of the meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ordered to set up a joint committee consisting of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Europeans to investigate and deliver to public attention the state of Muslims that lived in Armenia.97 The diplomatic representative to Armenia Mammad Khan Tekinski was informed about it in a ciphered telegram dated June 4.98 On June 10, Tekinski was instructed via a ciphered telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secretly collect statistical information in Erivan and Kars provinces about losses of the Muslim population, damages to their properties, and people killed and taken captive, specifying their first and last names, age, place of residence and gender using representatives of destroyed villages and to submit them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.99 According to the instructions and with the assistance of Tekinski, the Muslim National Council of Erivan immediately prepared information for the great states of Europe and the United States about the unbearable state of Azerbaijanis who lived in Erivan province and sent it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered this information through the representatives of Azerbaijan in Versailles to the representatives of European states and the United States in Paris. The report stated that if one does not count the conflict territories, the number of Azerbaijani population comprised half the population of Armenia. However, this population had no fundamental rights. It stated, “Armenian gangs of armed robbers had been attacking Muslims in cities, provinces and villages even in Erivan, the capital city of Armenia, every evening three or four Muslim houses were destroyed and sacked, and its inhabitants killed.”100 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan indicated that the whole of Europe and the United States was aware of the alleged Armenian slaughter, but they did not know that in the South part of

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  241 Erivan province alone, hundreds of Muslim villages were destroyed, and 150,000 Muslim refugees who had been ousted to Azerbaijan were left homeless and without food. Europe and the United States had to know that all of these acts were committed by Armenians.101 The list of Muslim villages emptied by Armenians was attached to the report. The report ended: It is clear that if this situation continues, Muslims living in Erivan are sentenced to death. So all Muslims which live in Armenia apply to you for justice, fairness and humaneness and ask to take into consideration the plight of Muslims living in Armenia, rise to protect their rights and assist them.102 These crimes were of such an ugly nature that even certain circles among the Armenians protested against these tragic events. The Socialist Revolutionary faction of the parliament of Armenia in his response to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiry asked, Mr. Minister is aware that during last the three weeks certain Tatar villages of such provinces as Erivan, Echmiadzin and Surmeli … have been exposed to robberies and executions and “are being cleansed” of their Tatar population. The local government not only protects but itself participates in these robberies and plunders … . If all of this is known to the Minister of Internal Affairs, then what measures are being undertaken for preventing this violence and disorder?103 Armenian representatives in Paris imputed crimes committed in Garabagh by Armenians to Azerbaijanis and thereby attempted to discredit the Azerbaijan Republic and its representatives in Versailles before the representatives of the Allies.104 In 1919–1920, the British journalist Robert Scotland Liddell wrote from the conflict zone in the Caucasus, Armenia always searches for conflict and when achieved, it names its own agitation an “instrument of pressure” but actually turns it into a proper instrument of punishment. The rule of Dashnaks is the misfortune of Armenia. This terrorist revolutionary organisation has deliberately been inciting Armenians to attack Azerbaijanis for many years. Causing significant damage to Muslims they speak to the whole world about “long-suffering Armenians” and try to get its sympathy. Dead Armenians are very valuable to the Dashnaks. If it is possible to use them properly, then they could bring many benefits to their agitation activities.105 The government of Armenia used the diversion committed in Garabagh in the summer of 1919 to disgrace Khosrov Bey Sultanov, the Governor General of Garabagh. Their representatives in Paris widely used agitation campaigns proving that Armenians who ostensibly were not protected by the Allies were killed and ousted by Azerbaijanis. Briefly touching this matter, it should be noted that on

242  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” June 4 and 5, events that occurred in Garabagh had been committed according to a direct plan of the National Council of Armenia. The British command, after finding out about activities of this Council directed to breaching the stability between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Garabagh, had promised in April to expel its members from borders of Garabagh. In the beginning of June, it became clear that the National Council of Armenia had secretly brought arms into the Armenian part of Shusha. They were to block the Azerbaijani population from walking up to the summer pastures in the Zangezur mountains. In this instance, Khosrov Bey Sultanov, to ensure security on the roads where people were traveling from place to place, sent soldiers of the Azerbaijani army to the dangerous places and at the same time arrested the members of the National Council of Armenia and gave an order to exile them from Garabagh. In response, on June 4, armed Armenians opened fire on Azerbaijani soldiers, and three soldiers were killed. After such actions, Sultanov began to act in order to establish law and order in Shusha and neighboring villages and as the first step achieved banishment of the members of the National Council of Armenia from the borders of Azerbaijan. Representatives of the British command escorted by Azerbaijani officers banished the members of the National Council of Armenia from Shusha.106 During skirmishes there were the casualties on both sides. On June 6, peace was achieved in Shusha. In connection with these happenings, Armenians of Shusha wrote a letter of apology to Sultanov and stated, Dear Khosrov Bey, allow us to apologize to you and in your person to Muslim people of Shusha in connection with the committed act. We are very disturbed by the violence committed against your soldiers by hooligans who named themselves as Armenians, and this rightly caused disturbance to your army and officers.107 While local Armenians viewed the June event in such a manner, the government of Armenia and Armenian representatives in Versailles had a completely different opinion. The government of Armenia in its note sent to the government of Azerbaijan demanded that Sultanov and the Azerbaijani army withdraw from Garabagh. However, this demand was refused in the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan delivered to the government of Erivan via Mammad Khan Tekinski, the diplomatic representative in Armenia. The telegram sent on June 18 said: Inform the government of Armenia that according to the resolution of the government of Azerbaijan dated January 15, 1919, Sultanov was assigned as Governor General of Shusha, Javanshir and Jabrayil provinces being the integral part of Azerbaijan. On April 3, the Allied command officially recognized this person. Therefore all protests of the government of the Republic of Armenia regarding the activities of Sultanov or the location Azerbaijani army in Garabagh are considered as an attempt to interfere with the internal affairs of Azerbaijan and are not subject to discussion. With respect to a disturbance in the region of Shusha, due to the considered

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  243 decisions taken by the governor general, law and order is restored and life resumes its normal course.108 In order to prove the groundlessness of the agitation campaign started by the government of Armenia against Sultanov in connection with the events in Shusha, a parliamentary committee was set up to investigate his activities, and it became clear that Sultanov was not a guilty party in the event. Armenians committed this diversion to discredit Sultanov before the British command.109 In general, the government of Azerbaijan held that in order to study the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an international investigation committee should be set up. This question had also been raised by representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris. To this end, the government of Azerbaijan applied to the government of Armenia. Though Armenians at first gave their consent to the setting up of the international investigation committee, they later disclaimed this idea on various pretexts.110 Nevertheless, due to the decisive position and purposeful policy of the government of Azerbaijan in summer of 1919, the sovereign rights of the republic were restored in Garabagh. A report sent to the representatives in Paris stated, “The Garabagh question had been solved once and for all … . At the Armenian congress the representatives of Garabagh Armenians concluded an agreement on recognizing the power of the government of Azerbaijan with Governor General Khosrov Bey Sultanov.”111 In general, Sulatnov performed great services toward the restoration of sovereign rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Upper Garabagh, in Zangezur, and in other places included in the plans of Armenians. It was no mere chance that Armenians had been carrying out strong agitation against him not only in the South Caucasus but in Europe and the United States. At that same time, the Molokan revolt in Mughan and Lenkaran organized against the national government was also quelled. The foreign minister of Azerbaijan sent a telegram to Topchubashov about both events. In the telegram presented to the chairman of the conference by Topchubashov, it was indicated that the city of Lenkaran and the province of Lenkaran is cleared of Bolsheviks and the power of the government of Azerbaijan has been restored. The representatives of the Armenian population of Garabagh have accepted a resolution on submission of this population to the government of Azerbaijan.112 In spite of the haughty position of Armenian representatives in Versailles regarding issues of the South Caucasus, the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia preferred to offer a cooperative motion of joint defense instead of cutting off relations with Armenia. Actually, recognition of the independence of all three Caucasian republics wholly depended on their cooperation. Still, it was very difficult to involve Armenians in Caucasian cooperation. As far back as June, after the disintegration of the Mountain Republic, the representatives of Azerbaijan launched an initiative to address a statement to the conference on sending a special committee to the Caucasus. In order to discuss these issues, a joint committee consisting of Hajinski and Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan), Avalov and

244  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” Gvarjaladze (Georgia), and Bammatov and Khazarakov (the Mountain Republic) was set up. Armenians were also invited to the discussion, but they refused to participate in this committee. At the beginning of June, Topchubashov had sent letters to the heads of the delegations of Georgia, Armenia, and the Mountain Republic suggesting that it was time to appeal to the conference to set up a special committee on Caucasian affairs within the structure of the Paris Peace Conference. The conference had already set up such a committee with respect to the Baltics. So Topchubashov, on August 4, invited heads of delegations to discuss this issue. All the chairmen arrived for the discussion except for the head of the delegation of the Republic of Armenia, Avetis Aharonian; he sent Dr. Hamo Ohanjanian on his behalf.113 In fact, Ohanjanian arrived at the meeting as an observer because he had not obtained authorization to express the opinion of his delegation regarding the issue under discussion. At the meeting, both Georgians and representatives of the Mountain Republic supported the suggestion of Topchubashov. In the event, Armenians were given some time to express their opinion. On August 13, Chkheidze, Topchubashov, and Chermoyev held a joint meeting with Armenian representatives Aharonian, Papajanov, and Kachaznuni in order to clarify the attitude of the Armenians to this issue. At the meeting devoted to the joint appeal to the conference in connection with setting up the special committee on Caucasian affairs, Armenian representatives indicated the necessity of elucidating three questions according to their interests. 1 2 3

What is your [the representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Mountain Republic] attitude to a united Armenia, in other words to Caucasian and Turkish Armenia? Do you admit that all boundary and territorial issues must be solved decisively and solely there, at the Paris Peace Conference? Do you consider it necessary to apply immediately to the conference to prevent the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus?114

Kachaznuni declared, These are very important questions for us and it is very difficult for us to accept a decision about making a joint appeal to the conference concerning a committee before coming to an agreement with you. Moreover, it must be defined what activities this committee will undertake, in other words what issues it will discuss. If we don’t agree on these issues, we not only refuse to sign a joint appeal but, on the contrary, will prevent the setting up of this committee. Another representative of the Armenian delegation, Papajanov, taking great interest in the notion of “Great Armenia” said, We are not alone, we are closely coupled with our compatriots in Turkey. It is very important for us to find out your attitude to our unification. We

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  245 acknowledge the existence of an independent Azerbaijan and an independent Georgia. How about you? Do you acknowledge the existence of a united Armenia? It is very important for us and our Turkish compatriots from the moral point of view.115 The member of the delegation of Azerbaijan, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, wrote in connection with the Armenians’ claims, The leadership of Armenia … was relying on a solution of the Armenian question from outside the Caucasus, with the assistance of powerful and victorious countries … was dreaming about expanding the territory of Armenia at the expense of territories in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Statesmen of Armenia dreamt about expanding the territory of Armenia from one sea to another and in no way did they want to connect the destiny of their homeland with the destiny of the Caucasian republics … . Simply, the Armenian nationalists and heads of state had such a ridiculous and unreal illusion as to inflate the territory of actually existing Armenia to an imaginary historical size that never belonged to it.116 Chkheidze and Topchubashov agreed only with the third question, that is to say, with continued presence of British troops in the Caucasus put forward by Armenians. In connection with other issues, it was noted that consultations would be held with the members of the delegations. On August 14, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations held a joint meeting, chaired by Topchubashov, to discuss the issues raised by the Armenians. All members of the delegation of Azerbaijan, and Chkheidze, Gobechiya, Avalov, and Gvarjaladze from the Georgian side participated in the meeting. After Topchubashov brought up the Armenian suggestions, Chkheidze and Gvarjaladze were the first to speak. They noted that the Armenian representatives wished to use the question of cooperation in the issue of Caucasian committee in their interests. They had succeeded in persuading European society to accept the idea of a “United Armenia” through protracted and comprehensive agitation. Gvarjaladze said, Of course, we, the representation of Georgia, as democrats, could not agree with the ruling of an Armenian minority in six provinces in which the Georgian nation was in the majority. From this point of view it is impossible to recognize the independence of an Armenia that is artificially united with Turkish Armenia.117 Gvarjaladze offered to recognize the independence only of that Republic of Armenia where the right of self-determination was not in contradiction with the democratic principles and interests of its neighbors. Speakers at the meeting indicated that the issue of “Turkish Armenia” was an international issue and that the peace conference had to solve this problem directly. In the speakers’ opinion, the intervention of the Caucasian republics into an issue that was in the authority

246  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” of the peace conference could result in harmful consequences. Chkheidze even noted: “We cannot sacrifice our relations with someone because of ‘United Armenia,’ least of all with Turkey. With respect to other issues put forward by the Armenians, in that case we had to put forward our counter-suggestions, for instance, the issue of attitude to Denikin.” Jeyhun Hajibeyli suggested that from all points of view including justice and self-determination, the suggestion about recognition of a “United Armenia” had to be rejected. Georgian representative Zurab Avalov also supported this proposal, saying that we do not have to mix our issue with the “Turkish Armenia” issue, otherwise the committee which had to solve our problem would have to be engaged in the issue of Turkish Armenia. Probably on the one hand our influence will provoke the solution of this issue, but on the other hand our issue will be separated from the Russian issue and included into the same row as the Asian issue. In Mahammad Maharramov’s opinion, any discussion about United Armenia was premature. He noted that if there is a Turkish Armenia issue and if sometime it would be solved, then Caucasian Armenia would consider its current decision.118 Neither Georgian nor Azerbaijani representatives supported the recognition of independence of an abstract state named as “United Armenia.” They only indicated that it was possible to preserve the status quo in the Caucasus and stated that it concerned Armenia as well. The second suggestion of the Armenians in connection with the solution of the conflicts regarding territorial issues by the Paris Peace Conference also caused serious discussion at the meeting. On this issue, the suggestion of Maharramov, member of the delegation of Azerbaijan, was accepted as the decision of the meeting. In his speech, Maharramov indicated that the solution of territorial conflicts by the Paris Peace Conference was not profitable for us because the influence of Armenians among the participants at the conference was very strong. In connection with this issue, he suggested to accept an article of the June 16 agreement signed between Azerbaijan and Georgia as the basis. That article specified that the parties would solve territorial conflicts between themselves, and only in case of argument would they do it through arbitration. The third suggestion—on the continued presence of the British in the Caucasus as put forward by the Armenians—was supported by both Georgians and Azerbaijanis. At the meeting, it was noted that the continued presence of the British was more important for Azerbaijan and Georgia than for Armenia.119 However, the Armenian representatives were also very interested in the British remaining in the Caucasus. In case the British left the Caucasus, the Armenians were wary of their neighbors. In spite of much dissatisfaction, the presence of British troops in the Caucasus was considered as the guarantee of the security and independence of Armenia. With respect to the status of the Caucasus committee that the Armenians were interested in, Topchubashov indicated that first of all there should be made a joint appeal to the peace conference on the creation of such a committee, and then its status and authorities could be defined.

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  247 The next day, after the discussion of the demands put forward by Armenians, on August 15, at the building of the delegation of Azerbaijan, a joint meeting of the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and the Mountain Republic was held, devoted to the above-noted issues and chaired by Topchubashov. Topchubashov recalled the meeting in this manner: Opening the meeting I greeted the participants and expressed my gratefulness to all representations for their participation at the first general meeting. Then I gave information about the programme of the meeting and announced the three aforementioned issues which had been discussed beforehand by the separate representations. To my and Mr Chkheidze’s great surprise (as Armenians had raised these issues in our presence), Mr. Aharonian and then Papajanov (Kazachnuni had not arrived; he was replaced by Ohanjanian) stated that they had not put forward these issues to discuss, but only as a result of our conversation (on August 13) and it would be better to discuss the issue of appealing to the peace conference about maintaining Allied troops as urgent. A strange situation arose, however; in order not to spoil the relations, we agreed with the suggestion of the Armenians and it was accepted by all except the representatives of the Mountain Republic. It was decided to call one more meeting in connection with other issues and discuss the appeal concerning troops. The Armenians themselves were asking about it. Unfortunately, editing and preparing the appeal took too much time.120 The chairmen of the delegations got together three times on August 28 to edit the appeal and reach a settlement. In addition, the text of the appeal was also discussed on August 23 at a joint meeting of the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia connected the remaining Allied troops with the external threat, especially with Denikin’s threat, while the Armenians wished to draw the attention of the management of the peace conference to an internal threat—in other words, to the alleged threat that could arise from Azerbaijanis and Georgians. Finally, the representative of Georgia, Zurab Avalov, prepared a new project and submitted it for discussion at the meeting held on August 23. In this project, neither external nor internal threats were touched on; it was simply indicated that the continued presence of Allied troops in the Caucasus was considered necessary until the peace conference solved the destiny of the Caucasus.121 The appeal addressed to the chairman of the Supreme Council, Georges Clemenceau, was signed with a few amendments by the chairmen of the three representations and, on August 28, was submitted to the peace conference. It was stated therein, We, the chairmen of the representations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, undersigned, consider it an honor to inform you that the withdrawal of Allied troops from the Caucasus would be fraught with unwanted consequences. So we, the undersigned, request that withdrawal of the troops be halted until the recognition of independence of the above-named republics. 122

248  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” After this appeal, the Caucasian representatives in Paris made additional constructive steps. As is known, at that period mainly Socialist and Social Democratic parties demanded the withdrawal of the foreign troops from the former Russian territories. Therefore, the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks, well-known throughout Europe, Chkheidze and Tsereteli, asked the British Labour Party not to demand the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus.123 ***

The effective cooperation of the representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris with representatives from Georgia and the Mountain Republic during spring and summer of 1919 played a significant role in creating Caucasian solidarity in relation to various international issues. It strengthened the resistance of these republics against Denikin’s threat. The declaration of the Allies about recognition of the government of Kolchak also strengthened the solidarity of the new states created on the territory of the former Russian empire. The representatives of Azerbaijan in Versailles had to wage a tense struggle against the threat of a “united and indivisible Russia.” In spite of the protest of the allied states, the representatives of Azerbaijan did not take a step backward from their struggle for the recognition of their independence; they repeatedly made requests to the peace conference, the Supreme Council, and the heads of the Entente states regarding their rights in connection with the interests of the republic, especially in connection with the protection of its territorial integrity. In the pages of the Azerbaijan Information Newsletter that began publication in Paris in September 1919, information was periodically printed about deportations and executions committed by Armenian armed gangs in Erivan, Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Garabagh as well as official documents about Denikin’s threat.124 The delegation of Azerbaijan used all means at its disposal to repel the claims of “Great Armenia” that were defended by the heads of European states and governments and directly aimed against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Notes 1. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild. (Parliament of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic (1918–1920) (stenographic reports). Volume 1). Baku, 1998, pp. 626–627. 2. Ibid., p. 629. 3. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan) May 28, 1919. 4. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar), p. 614. 5. Ю. В. Ключников и А. Сабанин (Y. V. Klyuchnikov i A. Sabanin), Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях. Часть II (International Politics of the Contemporary Time in Agreements, Notes and Declarations. Part II). Moscow, 1926, p. 248. 6. Б. Е. Штейн (B. E. Shtein.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (“Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949, pp. 237–238.

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  249 7. Ключников и Сабанин, Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях, p. 250. 8. Штейн, “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции, p. 245. 9. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic in Paris, to the Chairman of the Peace Conference. 31.05.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardanbey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 36–38. 10. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff—Son Excellence, Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix. Le 5 juin 1919.Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 72. 11. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic in Paris, to the Chairman of the Peace Conference. 31.05.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardanbey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 37. 12. Declaration of the Azerbaijani, Estonian, Georgian, Latvian, North Caucasian, Belorussian and Ukrainian Delegations in Paris. 17.06.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardanbey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 80; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Russia, 1919, pp. 380–381. 13. Штейн, “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции, p. 244. 14. Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasian Delegations in Paris. 15–18.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 181–186. 15. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 195. 16. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the Chairman of the Council of Four. 20–23.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 143, pp. 64–66; For more details, see В. И. Адамия (V. I. Adamiya), Из истории Английской интервенции в Грузии (1918–1921 гг.) (From the History of English Intervention in Georgia [1918–1921]). Sukhumi, 1961, p. 122. 17. Appeal of the delegations of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Mountain People to the Head of the Paris Peace Conference. 23.06.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 67–69. 18. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Russia, 1919, pp. 766– 767. 19. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22– 25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 11. 20. Ibid., p. 10. 21. Ibid., p. 10. 22. Ibid., p. 11. 23. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Republic of Mountaineer Delegations in Paris. 30.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 165. 24. Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Northern Caucasian Delegations in Paris. 15–18.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 181–183. 25. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic sent to the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. June, 1919. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 13, pp. 51–66. 26. SAAR, f. 970, r. 3, v. 5, p. 1. 27. “О событиях на Кавказе и в Средней Азии. Донесение генерала Джорджа Мильна.” Каспийский Транзит. В двух томах, Т. I. (“On the Events in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Report of General George Milne.” Kaspiyskiy Transit. In two volumes, Vol.1). Moscow, 1996, p. 329. 28. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar), p. 285.

250  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” 29. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 242. 30. Information of A. Hagverdiyev, Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in the Union of Mountain Peoples, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May, 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 5, p. 1. 31. Appeal of Colonel Lazarev to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with regard to the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence. 21.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 4.48, p. 15. 32. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar), pp. 670–671. 33. Ibid., p. 614. 34. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 4, p. 13. 35. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 13, p. 54. 36. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 246. 37. Urgent Diplomatic Telegram sent by A. Ziyadkhanli, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, to S. Rustambeyov, Diplomatic Representative in Kuban Government. 26.06.1919. SAAR f. 970, r. 1, v. 89, p. 38. 38. RSA, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 13, p. 61. 39. Е. С. Лукомский (Y. S. Lukomskiy), “Деникин и Антанта.” Революция и гражданская война в описаниях белогвардейцев. Деникин—Юденич—Врангель. (“Denikin and the Entente.” Revolution and Civil War in the Descriptions of White Guards. Denikin—Yudenich—Wrangel). Moscow, 1927, p. 92. 40. A. Mikoyan. On the Caucasus Issue. 1920. RSPHSA, f. 298, r. 1, v. 116, p. 2. 41. See И. Шахдин (I. Shakhdin), Дашнакцутюн на службе русской белогвардейшины и английского командования на Кавказе (Dashnaksutyun in the service of Russian White Guards and English Command in the Caucasus). Tiflis, 1931. 42. Заря (Zarya), May 25, 1919. 43. A. Mikoyan. On the Caucasus Issue. 1920. RSPHSA, f. 298, r. 1, v. 116, pp. 2–3. 44. Military-Defense Treaty between the Georgian Republic and Azerbaijan Republic. 16.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 64, p. 15. 45. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 210. 46. Military-Technical Treaty between the Azerbaijan Republic and Georgian Republic. 16.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 64, p. 18. 47. Radiogram from A. Tahirbeyov to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic. 18.07.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 70, p. 5. 48. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 13, p. 55. 49. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22– 25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 70, p. 5. 50. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 79. 51. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 199. 52. А. М. Топчибашев (A. M. Topchubashov), Письма из Парижа (Letters from Paris). Baku, 1998, p. 55. 53. Ibid., p. 56. 54. Ibid., p. 55. 55. Le Président de la Délégation Géorgienne N. Tcheidzé, Le Président de la Délégation de l’Azerbaïdjan A. M. Toptchibacheff—Transmis par le Secrétariat Général de la Conférence de la Paix. Le 24 juillet 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 82; Copie Convention entre les Républiques de Géorgie et d’Azerbaïdjan. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 87. 56. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 22– 25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 21–22.

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  251 57. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, pp. 71–72. 58. La Délégation de Paix de l’Azerbaïdjan. Le Président, Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff. Membres  : Mamad Hassan Gadjinsky, Agber Cheik-Ul-Islamoff. Conseillers  : Mir Yagoub Mir Mehtieff, Mamed Magueramoff—Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix, le 24 août 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 95. 59. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, to A. Balfour, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain. 10.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p .92. 60. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 59. 61. Telegram of M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to A. M. Topchubashov. 26.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 3, v. 4, p. 99. 62. La Délégation de Paix de l’Azerbaïdjan. Le Président, Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff. Membres  : Mamad Hassan Gadjinsky, Agber Cheik-Ul-Islamoff. Conseillers  : Mir Yagoub Mir Mehtieff Mamed Magueramoff—Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix, le 29 Août 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 71–72. 63. Protestation présenté par la Délégation Azerbaïdjanienne à Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix à Paris, à propos des actions éminemment agressives de l’Armée Volontaire contre la République azerbaïdjanienne. Le 12 septembre 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 103– 106. 64. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22– 25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 22. 65. Ibid., p. 12. 66. Ibid., p. 13. 67. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Versailles Conference. 16.09.1919. SAAR f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 49. 68. Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community. New York, 1955, p. 234. 69. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 255. 70. Грузия (Gruziya), July 3, 1919. 71. Armenian Allegations: Myth and Reality. Handbook of Facts and Documents. Washington, 1987, pp. 115–116. 72. Г. Никольсон (H. Nicolson), Как делался мир в 1919 г. (How peace was achieved in 1919). Moscow, 1945, p. 182. 73. Д. Ллойд Джордж (D. Lloyd George), Правда о мирных договорах (The Truth about Peace Treaties). Moscow, 1957, p. 389. 74. Papers Relating of the Foreign Relation of the United States. Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. IV, p. 157. 75. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. IV, pp. 147–149. 76. J. Loris-Melikof, La Revolution Russe et less Nouvelles Republiques Transcaucasiennes. Paris, 1920, p. 159. 77. The Armenian Question Before the Peace Conference. Paris, 1919, pp.8–9. 78. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, pp. 257. 79. Ibid., p. 258. 80. О. В. Качазнуни (O. V. Kachaznuni), Дашнакцутюн больше делать нечего (Dashnaktsutyun has nothing more to do). Baku, 1990, p. 44. 81. A. Mikoyan. Theses on the Caucasus Issue. December, 1919. RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 1, v. 1202, p. 8. 82. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 210. 83. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 257.

252  The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia” 84. Loris-Melikof, La Revolution Russe et less Nouvelles Republiques Transcaucasiennes, pp. 157–159. 85. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 213. 86. Atamian, The Armenian Community, p. 214. 87. Ibid., p. 215. 88. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22– 25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 23. 89. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 211. 90. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22– 25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 23. 91. Голос Армения (Golos Armeniya), December 2, 1990. 92. Ibid. 93. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 65. 94. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 259. 95. Ibid., p. 261. 96. Ibid. 97. Order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Republic on Establishment of International Investigation Commission for Investigation of Violence Actions Committed against the Muslim Population in Erivan Province. 07.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, v. 157, pp. 4–5. 98. Directive sent by A. Ziyadkhanli, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. K. Tekinski, Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia. 04.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 65, p. 38. 99. Urgent Diplomatic Telegram sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. K. Tekinski, Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia. 04.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 65, p. 49. 100. The List of the Destroyed Muslim Villages of Erivan Province which was Brought to the Notice of the Great Powers of Europe and America. 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 144, p. 66. 101. Establishment of Special Agitation Department under the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic. 04.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 216, p. 1. 102. Ibid. 103. Report Submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic by the Information Department. 22.04.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 184, pp. 16–17. 104. For more details on Disruptive Actions of the Armenians in Garabagh, see Tofiq Köçərli (Tofig Kocharli), Qarabağ: yalan və həqiqət (Lie and Truth). Baku, 1998. 105. Robert Scotland Liddell, “War with the Muslims. The Armenians Restart Attack.” 30.01.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 81, pp. 9–10. 106. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), June 18, 1919. 107. On Shusha Events. 17.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 65, p. 71. 108. Urgent Diplomatic Telegram sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. K. Tekinski, Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia. 18.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 65, p. 76. 109. Telegram of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic to A. M. Topchubashov. August, 1919. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 13, p. 57. 110. For more details on the Azerbaijani-Armenian relations during 1918–1920 and the conflict between these republics, see I. Musayev, Azərbaycanın Naxçıvan və Zəngəzur bölgələrində siyasi vəziyyət və xarici dövlətlərin siyasəti (1917–1921-ci illər) (Political Situation and Policies of Foreign States in Nakhchivan and Zangezur Regions of Azerbaijan [1917–1921]). Baku, 1996.

The claims of “Indivisible Russia” and “Great Armenia”  253 111. Telegram of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. August, 1919. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 20, p. 3. 112. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of Peace Conference. 09.09.1919. SAAR, f. 920, r. 1, v. 142, p. 77. 113. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 66. 114. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Georgian Delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. 14.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 221. 115. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 66. 116. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933, p. 132. 117. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Georgian Delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. 14.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 219. 118. Ibid., pp. 219–221. 119. Ibid., p. 220. 120. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 67. 121. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Georgian Delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. 14.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 227. 122. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Allied States, George Clemenceau. 28.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 45. 123. Адамия, Из истории Английской интервенции в Грузии, p. 123. 124. See Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 1 Septembre, No: 1, pp. 2–4; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No: 2, pp. 1–4; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No: 3, pp. 1–6; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 18 November, No: 4, pp. 3–4; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 15 December, No: 5, pp. 1–3.

9 The Western mandate and efforts to approach France, Great Britain, and Italy

As they carefully followed the major directions of international politics at the Paris Peace Conference, Azerbaijan’s diplomats sought ways to integrate the young republic into the free world. Danger approached from the north in different hues; both White and Red Russia, with their status quo ante position on the former borders of the empire, stimulated an increasingly dominant Western orientation to the foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Although the region was barely noticed in the political circles of many European countries, there were some military and diplomatic representatives who visited the Caucasus and immediately recognized the evidence of viability. The rich natural resources of Azerbaijan, which surprised Western representatives, in some cases became the major catalyst for their interest in diplomacy. Various missions sent by the peace conference to the region clearly expressed it in their reports. Reports about the natural resources of Azerbaijan reached not only European capitals but even the United States on the other side of the world. If from the middle of 1919 the search for allies by the government of Azerbaijan and its delegates to the Paris Peace Conference entailed approaches to the free world, this was also due to the presence of the new Russia, which was different in form but similar in essence to the old Russia. Considering the complicated international situation created after World War I, in which not only the defeated but the winners were exhausted, the question of whom to rely on, from whom to expect support, remained before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its fullest severity. In his report sent to the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, Ali Mardan Topchubashov wrote, Peace delegates from all the republics formerly in the territory of old Russia were for the most part under the same threat as we were. Under such conditions it was natural to look for assistance and support. But where and from whom? The right to independence for our nation was unquestionable. We talked about it everywhere we could and wrote to everyone. Our confirmation of independence was not enough. Other nations had to know more about whom we were, organized and existing independently, searching not only for allies, but guardians and protectors, trying to determine our way with support from powerful nations but always determined to retain our importance and value.

The Western mandate  255 Our delegates had repeatedly discussed this issue in Istanbul and here it was more important than ever. On which nation should we rely to determine our future?1 Until the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the only ally that Azerbaijan could unconditionally rely on was Turkey. The international political situation underwent a fundamental change after the end of that war. The state that could support and grant protection might be France, Britain, the United States, or Italy. But it was not easy to find one that could or would undertake the weight of that task. Britain was under no obligation to withdraw from the Caucasus. In spite of the fact that Caucasian states and their delegates in Paris requested the British to remain, they did not stay. Protection of the Caucasian states by France was also a slight possibility. Though business circles had strong interest in the Caucasus, the loyalty of Clemenceau’s government to the idea of a “united and indivisible Russia” was much stronger. Only France, of all the great nations having strong influence in the peace conference, was against recognizing the independence of the newly established republics. Like other states, the French government had sent representatives to the Caucasus in mid-1919. The delegate sent to study the situation was Jean Loris-Melikov, who was of Armenian descent. He was the nephew of Count Loris-Melikov, a member of the Armenian national delegation and the representative of the Republic of Armenia in Paris. Jean Loris-Melikov had studied with Topchubashov. In 1905–1906 in St. Petersburg, he worked for the newspaper Strana (Country) along with the wellknown Russian publicist Maxim Kovalevsky. He then migrated to France and accepted French citizenship. He was a close friend of Georges Clemenceau, then prime minister. Before leaving for the Caucasus, he visited Topchubashov twice and met with him and Mammad Hasan Hajinski. During talks, it was revealed that the major purpose of the French government in sending Loris-Melikov to the Caucasus was to explore the possibility of establishing a federative republic including all the Caucasian nations and to analyze the political situation there. Topchubashov wrote about the sentiments of Loris-Melikov: He viewed everything as a Frenchman and was a supporter of a “united and indivisible Russia” at heart. According to him, he was not a nationalist and therefore did not appreciate steps taken by the delegation of Armenia. As he said, he did not meet with those delegates. In short, although he did not appear to be a practical politician, he had confidence in his success. He did not believe in independently established Caucasian republics; more exactly, he did not want to believe, and he considered it much more efficient to establish a Great Russia.2 After details related by Topchubashov, it was almost certain what proposal Loris-Melikov, traveling by the route Istanbul-Batum-Tiflis-Erivan-Baku-North Caucasus, would give to the French government. Despite the economic interests of France in the Caucasus, the government could not be expected to take an objective position toward those republics at that time.

256  The Western mandate Due to the need for fuel, the French war ministry negotiated with the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris for the purchase of kerosene.3 Such negotiations were also held in the South Caucasus. As a result of these meetings, an agreement on transportation of purchased oil products from Batum to Marseille was achieved.4 The most interested party in the recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia by France was the “Franco-Caucasus” committee formed within the Ligue Navale Française.5 Anatole de Monzie, chairman of the committee, a member of the French parliament and a former minister of trade, attached great importance to relations with Caucasian republics, especially with Azerbaijan. According to him, being a Muslim country, Azerbaijan could play an important role in relations with the entire Muslim world. Another member of the committee, Labri, stated the importance of the defense of nations separated from Russia in a meeting held with Azerbaijan and Georgian delegates on August 27. Mahammad Maharramov, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, and Jeyhun Hajibeyli from the Azerbaijan delegation and Joseph Gobechiya, Prince Soumbatoff (Sumbatashvili), and Prince Avalov (Zurab Avalishvili) from Georgia were involved in the activities of the Franco-Caucasus Committee.6 In the meeting of the committee held on August 27, de Monzie agreed to make a speech to the French parliament on behalf of Azerbaijan and Georgia. On August 28, heads of the delegations of Azerbaijan and Georgia met with Labri to discuss the form and nature of the parliamentary speech that de Monzie was to give.7 Along with this speech, he would request information from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the official position of France regarding the Caucasus republics, especially Azerbaijan and Georgia, as follows: “What is the attitude of the French government to the recognition of the republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia, established according to the unanimous will of their people and each having a constitution, parliament, and army?” In response to the request, Stéphen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, answered in writing that the French government did not recognize Caucasian republics de jure. Pichon associated this non-recognition with the fact that their situation was not considered consolidated and stable. Meanwhile, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned his goodwill to the Caucasian nations, the admittance of their delegates to Paris, as well as the presence of French representatives in Baku, Batum, and Tiflis. In the last paragraph of his response, Pichon indicated that it was difficult for the French government to make agreements with Caucasian governments at a time when roads were destroyed and the financial systems disordered. At the same time, however, France had already adopted decisions to establish post-telegraph communications with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The government supported the development of trade relations with these republics to the extent possible.8 It was obvious that, despite the actual existence of Azerbaijan and Georgia, the French government did not want to recognize them either de jure or de facto. It was likewise clear from Pichon’s response that the French government intended to establish trade and economic relations with Azerbaijan. This, however, was not enough from Azerbaijan’s point of view to ensure security. Despite serious efforts of the Franco-Caucasus Committee, the French government had no intention to support the Caucasian mandate.9

The Western mandate  257 The government of Azerbaijan in turn did not show a positive attitude to the arrival of France in the Caucasus. Political circles in Azerbaijan already knew about the postwar efforts of the French government to defend the Armenians. The French government leaned toward a pro-Armenian policy, but the British High Commissioner in the South Caucasus advised his country that it would be more appropriate for His Majesty’s government to defend Azerbaijan.10 The reports received from Paris showed that non-recognition of Caucasian republics from the political and juridical points of view was connected with a negative attitude of French ruling circles toward these republics. In the spring of 1919, when the European media wrote about the possibility of sending French and Greek troops to the South Caucasus, the diplomatic representative of the Azerbaijani government in Tiflis visited General William Thomson on April 7 to clarify the matter. Mammad Yusif Jafarov told him that the presence of unfriendly forces, especially Greeks, would be undesirable. The mandates of Great Britain and Italy to the Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, were interconnected. More exactly, the Italians’ involvement was closely connected with the desire of Great Britain to leave. As mentioned previously, as far back as November 1918, when British troops entered Baku, they announced that they had come only temporarily, meaning until the political issues in the region would be settled at the Peace Conference. But 3 months after the British troops arrived, in February 1919, the government of David Lloyd George decided to withdraw troops from Baku as soon as possible.11 On leaving the Caucasus, however, Great Britain wanted neither the Americans nor the French to unilaterally consolidate their position in the region. Remarks by U.S. and French representatives at the Paris Peace Conference in February and March 1919 clearly reflected their interests in the Caucasus. Aware of these tendencies, Britain was the first to propose the idea of involving Italy. In fact, replacement of Britain by Italy would not upset the existing balance of forces in the Middle East. Moreover, it could lessen the dissatisfaction of Italy with the peace conference. Secret negotiations between Great Britain and Italy concerning the Caucasus at that time brought to light the political and economic interests of Vittorio Orlando’s government. Like other European leaders, Orlando was pro-Armenian. Even in a speech he gave on November 18, at the end of the war, he expressed solidarity with other European leaders and announced that they would defend the independence of Armenia. He said: “Say to the Armenians that I make their cause my cause.”12 The negotiations held between Great Britain and Italy resulted in the signing of a preliminary agreement between their general staffs on March 24. According to the terms of the secret agreement, the positions of the British troops in the South Caucasus would be turned over to the Italian army. The Italians were to deploy sufficient troops to the area through the port of Batum. Armenia’s claim to reach the Mediterranean sea by means of the territories of eastern Anatolia and Cilicia would serve to consolidate of the policy of Orlando’s government, which wanted to convert that sea into an “Italian lake.” Premier Minister Italy was determined that “despite the solid opposition of the other powers Italy would assert her ‘just

258  The Western mandate rights,’ which he insisted had been guaranteed by the secret wartime agreements of Allies.”13 But in this initial period, the political circles of Britain were not unanimous. Lord Curzon, who was known as an expert on the Caucasus, indicated in a letter to Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour dated March 25 that to send troops to the Caucasus was not in the “national interest” of Italy, that they would not be able to stand against advancing Bolshevism. He wrote that the Italians have no political influence among the Caucasian nations and after we leave the region they, in dealing with the already existing problems, may not be able to find a way out, which in turn could contribute to a worsening situation.14 But Lord Curzon’s advice was ignored and, on April 9, the British Military Council approved a secret treaty signed between Great Britain and Italy on March 24.15 On May 10, the British command informed the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia about the decision to withdraw troops from the South Caucasus.16 This decision surprised General William Thomson, commander of the Allied troops in Baku, who understood the political consequences that could arise. General Thomson had left England in 1915, served on different fronts during the war, and yearned to return to his homeland but, as a military man closely familiar with the local situation, was against the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus, especially from Azerbaijan. Thomson considered withdrawal of British forces from the was “an act of perfidy” perpetrated on the newly born republics.17 However, General Thomson delivered the decision of his government to the government of Azerbaijan on May 10 and, at the same time, mentioned that British troops leaving Azerbaijan would be replaced by Italian troops.18 In the telegram sent to the government of Azerbaijan on behalf of the Paris Peace Conference, General Thomson wrote, I should inform you that British troops will be replaced by Italian troops. Military staff consisting of Italian officers have already arrived in Georgia … . This replacement is of a purely military character and does not imply political settlement of the problem. This step does not indicate the final decision of the peace conference, and the decision of the conference regarding the republics of the South Caucasus is still awaited. At the same time, he informed the local government that he was leaving the Caucasus for England and that Major General George Norton Cory would replace him.19 In this early period, the governments of both Azerbaijan and Georgia were against the withdrawal of British troops from these republics and their replacement with Italians. After receiving the telegram from General Thomson, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, visited Tiflis to meet with the commander of Allied forces. Jafarov told him that replacing English troops with Italian troops was undesirable and noted that it could result in unexpected consequences. But referring to the fact that the decision was made by the Paris Peace Conference, General Thomson stated that it was impossible

The Western mandate  259 to change it. In view of the ever-growing northern danger daily becoming more acute, the government of Azerbaijan was forced to find a common understanding with Italy and try to use her as a shield.20 With the departure of the British from the Caucasus, thus began the state of complete independence for the Azerbaijan republic.21 On May 10, 1919, one military corps from Italy entered Batum. On May 16, the Italian mission under the leadership of the Prince of Savoy and shortly thereafter, on May 22, a group of military experts under the leadership of Colonel Melchiorre Gabba came to Baku. The Italian leadership held talks with the prime minister of the government of Azerbaijan, the minister of foreign affairs, and with some other ministers regarding economic interests. Two important issues came to the fore, the first being that, in the event of British troops leaving the Caucasus, the government of Azerbaijan expressed her desire that Italy should defend the country against foreign menace, particularly at that time the threat from Denikin. In this regard, Colonel Gabba promised the government of Azerbaijan to provide assistance in the consolidation of its defensive capacity. In order to realize this promise, the Italian mission commenced by studying the needs of Azerbaijan in regard to security issues. Captain Oldani visited Shusha and Shaki to prepare the living quarters for the Italian troops coming to Azerbaijan. Italian military specialists started surveying the armaments and the military supply needs of the Azerbaijani army. According to British General Briggs, the arrival of the Italians was not considered an important event in the South Caucasus. However, other information suggested that the Italians were not capable of controlling the region; they did not have sufficient political influence, financial resources, or historical experience considered necessary to carry out that mission.22 Second, regardless of the desires of the governments of the South Caucasus, the interest of Italy in the region was aroused much more from a desire to satisfy her own economic needs than concern to defend these republics. As Firuz Kazemzadeh noted, Italy was looking to make a fast profit.23 In fact, after the war was over, one of the major tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy was to “search for raw materials.” Italy had already proposed that the international distribution of raw materials should be a major duty of the League of Nations.24 Even though the idea encountered strong resistance, the interest of Italy in the coal of Georgia and the oil of Azerbaijan had increased. Cotton, silk, and wool were other products of interest. Prior to the arrival of the political mission to the Caucasus, representatives of different trade and industry circles of Italy had already started to search for raw material for themselves—for example, through the Russian-Italian Society of the Black Sea.25 After getting acquainted with Azerbaijan, Colonel Gabba was so impressed with the country’s economic resources that he discussed with a number of ministries in Baku the possibility for Italian workers to migrate to Azerbaijan and work there.26 In the beginning of June, Colonel Gabba was called to Rome to discuss the issue of sending Italian troops to the Caucasus. The Italian government listened

260  The Western mandate to Gabba’s report on Azerbaijan and Georgia and expressed its support for sending troops there. Later, on June 28, the government of Great Britain officially informed the Paris Peace Conference of the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus and generally from the territory of the former Russian empire.27 The Allies then officially decided to replace British troops with Italian troops, and an application to place the area under an Italian mandate was obtained. As Italian missions sent to the Caucasus returned with encouraging responses, Orlando’s government willingly agreed with this decision. Italians contacted delegates of both the Azerbaijan and Georgian republics in Versailles to find out their response to sending Italian troops. On June 13, the former representative of the Colonel Gabba’s corps, Valeri, met with Topchubashov. He stated that the government of Italy supported sending troops to the Caucasus. Valeri stated, If we send in an army, it would not be for the purpose of occupation and policing; it should only serve cultural and economic purposes. But the matter is that, at present, we are not capable of undertaking such a heavy task, and I have come here to learn your views on the matter.28 It was clear during the talks that the Italians intended to obtain an invitation or agreement from these republics to enter the Caucasus. In part, this intention arose from the necessity for the Italian government to prove itself before the Italian people and parliament. But, as the situation was ambiguous at the time of the meeting and Great Britain had not yet officially informed the peace conference about their leaving, Topchubashov did not give a clear answer to the Italian delegate. On June 15, at a meeting held together with Georgian and Mountain Republic delegates in the residence of the Azerbaijan delegation, it was decided to thoroughly study the withdrawal of English troops and their replacement with Italian forces. It was clear from the request given by the Americans that the issue had not yet been discussed in the Supreme War Council at Versailles.29 By the end of June, Topchubashov and İrakli G. Tsereteli met with Louis Mallet, one of the leaders of the delegation of Great Britain. Confirming the decision to leave, he explained that the troops serving in the Caucasus were needed in other places. Regarding the arrival of Italians, the British delegate said that nothing would change; that the Italians would continue the work begun by the British.30 In response to Topchubashov’s question about the threat that Denikin posed, Mallet said that Denikin would not advance on Azerbaijan or Georgia, because the command of the Volunteer Army had received such direction from British High Commissioner Wardrop, recently departed for the Caucasus.31 Azerbaijani delegates widely discussed these issues with Professor James Simpson, advisor to the delegation of Great Britain, dealing with the affairs of former Russia. As mentioned above, Great Britain submitted her decision to withdraw to the peace conference on June 28. After receiving this information, the Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Mountain Republic delegates found it possible to get close to

The Western mandate  261 the Italians. However, the political situation in Italy changed, and Orlando’s government had resigned. In Rome, the newly formed government of Francesco Nitti suspended the dispatch of troops as its first step. On June 28, in his next meeting with Topchubashov, Valeri, the Italian representative, confirmed the Nitti government’s hesitation regarding the issue of the Caucasus.32 At the same time, he restated the strong economic interest of Italy. On July 7, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Mountain Republic delegates met with the Italian military attaché, who specified the Caucasus intentions of his government this way: 1 2 3 4

5 6

Italy would follow only economic, not political purposes; Italy intended to get a mandate of the League of Nation for governing the Caucasus only by the consent of those republics; Italy would stay not more than 3–5 years; during this period, the Caucasian republics should form a confederation and consolidate that confederation; the Caucasian nations would themselves determine their future; if during that period a Russian Federative Republic were to be established, then a Caucasian confederation might enter the Russian federation, in which case Italy would leave; Italy would fight neither Denikin nor anybody else; and the Caucasus would have its own army, and Italy, in turn, would assist it.33

On August 5 and 6, in the joint meeting of Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Mountain Republic delegates, this issue was thoroughly discussed. Difficulties were connected with the failure of Italy to send troops to the Caucasus. By the end of June, when Captain Oldani, member of the Italian mission, was dealing with the preparation of barracks for the Italian army in Ganja, Shusha, Skaki, and other locations and the 12th Corps of the Italian army including two infantry divisions was about to leave for the Caucasus, the head of the Italian mission in the South Caucasus delivered a message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan that clearly stated that Italy would not send troops to replace the British troops. However, the government of Italy declared its wish to cooperate with Azerbaijan in trade, finance, industry, and other fields. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy promised that it would take an active part in discussions recently started in the Paris Peace Conference, especially relating to matters of benefit to Azerbaijan.34 A telegram of the same content was also sent by Colonel Gabba, head of the Italian mission in the South Caucasus, to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov. During the discussions of these issues, A. Tahirov, special envoy to the Allied command and delegate to Paris, held meetings in Rome with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. When Tahirov asked whether Italy would send troops to Azerbaijan, an Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official named Maioni showed some papers to him and said that in his meeting in Paris with delegates of Italy, Topchubashov had announced the undesirability of sending the Italian army to Azerbaijan. As Topchubashov had stated in his declaration that the people would be opposed to this step, Maioni wanted to know whether

262  The Western mandate that approach was Topchubashov’s personal opinion, or were the Azerbaijani people and the government really against sending Italian troops to Azerbaijan. In fact, the Italian side had already made the decision not to send troops to the Caucasus; moreover, Maioni referred to remarks made by Topchubashov that it was unnecessary to send Italian troops when British troops were still there. When those ideas were suggested by delegates of Azerbaijan as well as Georgia, the official announcement of the withdrawal of British forces had not yet been made. But after the British government had applied to the peace conference to leave, the political situation of the republics of the South Caucasus was radically changed. Tahirov explained to Maioni that he could judge the attitude of Azerbaijan people and government to Italy based on the attitude shown to the Italian mission under the leadership of Colonel Gabba while in Azerbaijan. Citing the state reception organized by the government of Azerbaijan in honor of that mission, Tahirov added that the government and people would be glad to welcome the Italian army. The issues were discussed at the meeting with the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Count Sforza. After the decision of the government of Italy was made known, the issue was posed in a different form by Count Carlo Sforza, then exercising the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in succession to Sidney Sonnino. Count Sforza asked what the attitude of the people and government would be in case Italy would send to Azerbaijan not the army but only instructors and military specialists qualified in all fields. In response, Tahirov said that it would be very desirable to send Italian military supplies to the Azerbaijani army. Then Count Sforza suggested that he prepare a written application for the military supplies required by the Azerbaijani army that would be considered by the Italian side. In accordance with that suggestion, Tahirov submitted in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy the needs of the Azerbaijani army regarding airplanes, hydroplanes, artillery pieces and other armaments, explosives, armed and passenger vehicles and trucks, as well as instructors who would train local soldiers in the use of them. Finally, in his third meeting with Azerbaijan delegates, Italian official Maioni, on behalf of his government, declared that it would not be possible to send an army but that all military supplies necessary for the Azerbaijani army would be sent. He stated that the security of Azerbaijan would be defended by Italy. He advised Tahirov to return to Baku and bring a written warrant from his government for the purchase of the military supplies they wanted as well as to inform the Italian mission in the Caucasus. The Azerbaijan government was asked to delegate military specialists to Rome to take delivery of the military supplies.35 According to these agreements, the government of Azerbaijan subsequently communicated to the Italian side its intention to send to Rome a delegation under the leadership of General Ibrahim Aga Usubov for the purchase of armament and military supplies. In his letter of September 6, 1919, to Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Gabba, head of the Italian mission in the Caucasus, wrote about the interest of the government of Italy in the visit of the said delegation to Italy. He suggested sending the documents of those delegates to the consulate of Italy in Tiflis to get visas.36 After relevant documentation, in November–

The Western mandate  263 December 1919, the Azerbaijani military delegation under Usubov’s leadership was dispatched to Rome. In his other letter sent to Jafarov, on October 14, Colonel Gabba wrote about the opening of a commercial marine route between Italy and the Caucasus. He advised that a ship leaving port in Trieste would arrive at the ports of Batum and Poti twice a month.37 In another letter sent to Jafarov, Colonel Gabba announced that Dr. Felix Calimani, delegated by the government of Italy to study the possibility of emigration of Italian workers to the South Caucasus, would come to Baku to assess the condition of labor resources in Azerbaijan. He requested assistance for Dr. Calimani in this respect to organize meetings with members of the government and to provide him with statistical information about the economic life of the country.38 But all these were future events. The sudden cancellation of the sending of troops by the government of Italy in the summer of 1919 created many difficulties for the new republics facing danger from the north. On August 1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy informed the British Embassy in Rome that Nitti’s government would not send troops to the Caucasus. This fact was corroborated by an official declaration on August 5. Adoption of this decision by Nitti after being informed of the withdrawal of British troops put Azerbaijan and Georgia into a difficult situation. Conversely, analysis of the socio-political and economic conditions of Italy in that period supports a conclusion that sending a military expedition to the Caucasus could have created serious problems for Italy. Compared to Orlando (the head of the previous government), Francesco Nitti was much more realistic. He noted that after the end of the war, the Italian heads of state had adopted two absurd decisions—to occupy Izmir and to send a military expedition to Georgia. In his view, these steps could lead to war with Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other, and that would mean the economic destruction of Italy. Later he wrote, “As Prime Minister of Italy, I personally blocked the dispatch of a military expedition to Georgia [i.e., the South Caucasus] in the summer of 1919.”39 Contrary to Orlando, Nitti considered appeals to establish “Great Armenia,” especially to divide Turkey, as a project of the Entente states. He stated that everybody voiced support for President Wilson’s “Great Armenia” project; that neither Britain nor France nor Italy was willing to assume the burden of such an undertaking, which could be achieved only by a great army; and that the U.S. Senate acted against Wilson’s wishes in this regard. He added that providing for the existence of “Little Armenia” would not require the concocting of legends about “Great Armenia.”40 Regarding the unjust attitude of Entente states toward Turkey, Nitti said that those states could always conjure up a “wild image” of Turks toward their neighbors; however, in his view, “Turks were not cruel and tyrannical by nature. However, they were surrounded by Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, who generally lived not by agriculture and industry but by commerce, business, and money lending.”41 The refusal by Nitti’s government to send troops to the Caucasus on August 5 caused a sharp revival of the Armenian issue. This issue was discussed in a joint meeting of delegates of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Mountain Republic. Chairing the meeting, Topchubashov noted that “though independence of our republics is

264  The Western mandate our greatest desire, we cannot exist without political support and military aid from outside, at least for the present.” Analyzing the situation around the Caucasian republics, he said, “In this case, we have to look around and search for support.” Within the course of discussions, certain suggestions were made as a way out. Individual delegates specified that Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives to the Paris Peace Conference should apply to the League of Nations and that the state of the Caucasus mandate should be defined by them. Hajinski made a suggestion that, in terms of capacity and opportunity, only Great Britain among the considered states could perform the mission and, therefore, it was better to ask Great Britain to take up the mandate of Azerbaijan. In his speech at the meeting, he argued on the grounds that Caucasian republics, including Azerbaijan, should have no orientation except toward Great Britain.42 Georgian delegates also supported that suggestion. But taking into account the conflict of interests of powerful states in the region, it was mentioned at that meeting that such a request to Britain should be made in such way that other states would not be offended. Therefore, in the course of discussions, agreement was reached that first of all the opinion of the political circles of Great Britain regarding that issue should be learned and then an application made to the League of Nations. Based on the key role of Great Britain in the League of Nations, the possibility of realizing admittance could be expected. Unfortunately, these expectations did not become reality. On August 4, by the decision of the government of Azerbaijan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov applied to General Digby Inglis Shuttleworth with a request to keep British troops in Azerbaijan under certain conditions. Jafarov wrote, According to official information received by our government, British troops will leave Azerbaijan in mid-August. In view of this fact, the government of Azerbaijan has decided to request the British government to temporarily keep British troops in Azerbaijan. If the British government expresses its agreement in principle to keeping troops in Azerbaijan, its terms could be prepared through mutual agreement.43 Despite the efforts of the government of Azerbaijan and its delegates in Paris, British troops left the Caucasus at the end of August. The report by Georgian delegate David Gambashidze on the international situation of the republic, sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan to the Azerbaijani delegates in Paris, showed that the last British troops left the territory of Azerbaijan at the end of August.44 On the eve of leaving Azerbaijan, on August 23, on behalf of Allied command, General Shuttleworth addressed the population of Baku with a valedictory speech. The speech said, Taking advantage of this opportunity, we apologize to the people of Azerbaijan, especially Baku, on behalf of the British troops who must leave. We deeply regret that we say goodbye to our numerous friends and acquaintances and

The Western mandate  265 heartily wish them peace and happiness. All military personnel of the British army will keep with them the best memories of the days they spent here.45 Regarding the period from November 1918 to August 1919 during which British troops stayed in Baku, it should be mentioned that though Allied troops entered Baku in 1918 with the intention of occupation, the policy they carried out in Azerbaijan was not that of an occupation. Analysis of the events relating to that period affords grounds to state that, although British troops entered Baku according to the conditions of the Mondros treaty signed in October 1918, they left Azerbaijan in August 1919 as a friend. In his book Azerbaijan, published in Baku in 1919, Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli wrote, The attitude and relations of the Allies which appeared from early on created a mutual respect between us. As a result of numerous events it became evident that when representatives of civilized nations came to our country, they saw the reality and understood the true nature of public and political life in Azerbaijan. Life here flows with the consent of the people. I say boldly and with hope that the more we are in contact with that great and civilized nation, the more our friendship will be consolidated, and we shall be able to disseminate more information about our true state.46 The existence of British troops in Baku was important not only for defense against the Denikin threat but at the same time for establishing peace and stability among the Caucasian republics. We could agree with the statement of Winston Churchill that “the British division surrounding the entire Caucasus from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea was the only guarantor of peace among the rival nations of the Caucasus—Armenians, Georgians, Tatars [Azerbaijanis], Mountaineers and Russians.” The British War Secretary declared that, “we are in the Caucasus to help small states not against Russia, but against anarchy.”47 In his research, Richard Ullman, who tried to objectively evaluate Britain’s policy toward the South Caucasus, confirms that opinion.48 On the occasion of the departure of British troops from Baku, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan gave a ceremonial banquet in honor of General George Norton Cory and other high-ranking officers. In his speech at the banquet, General Cory stated that the activities of the government of Azerbaijan, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working in such a difficult period were a marvel to all. When leaving Baku, the British transferred the city, port, radio stations of the military forces, military supply of the troops, and warships to the government.49 On August 4, Jafarov applied to General Shuttleworth, commander of British troops in Baku, in connection with this matter. He requested him to give that part of the fleet under British command to the government of Azerbaijan in order to defend the coastal territories, especially Baku, the capital of the country, against any danger from the Caspian Sea.50 In his second letter to General Shuttleworth, dated August 8, responding to the request of the British command, Jafarov wrote

266  The Western mandate that as the government of Azerbaijan was interested in keeping stability and order in the country, those warships would be used against Bolsheviks and in defense of coastal waters. Jafarov wrote, The government of the republic assumes that if the Allied command should decide to disarm the Caspian fleet after the elimination of Bolsheviks in Astrakhan, Zakaspi, and other neighboring territories, then as soon as the danger to the coastlines of Azerbaijan and her capital has passed, Azerbaijan shall comply. At present the decision of the British government to leave Azerbaijan and her capital will expose her Caspian coastline directly to external danger. For this reason my government requests once again that the Allies leave part of their warships in the Caspian Sea to the Azerbaijani army.51 Jafarov’s efforts succeeded and in the end, the British command gave a large part of the fleet in the Caspian Sea to the Azerbaijani government. On the basis of the warships given by the British, the Azerbaijani navy was founded. That important step later caused difficulties with the armed forces in South Russia commanded by Denikin. In a note received from Vice Admiral Gerasimov of the Marine Fleet of the Volunteer Army, Azerbaijan was instructed to liquidate the Caspian fleet. The note said, According to Article 8 of the Turkmenchay treaty between Russia and Iran dated February 10, 1828, only Iran and Russia have the right to keep a commercial fleet in the Caspian Sea. The Marine Administration of the High Command of the South Russian Armed Forces considers it necessary to declare that it will not allow military and commercial ships of Azerbaijan to sail under any flag except Russian.52 Discussing that groundless note in its meeting, the Azerbaijan State Defense Committee ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to respond to the delegate of the High Command of the South Russian Armed Forces in a letter containing the following: 1 2

The treaty signed between Russia and Iran may be binding only for Russia and Iran, but it has nothing to do with newly established states. The Republic of Azerbaijan situated on the coast of the Caspian Sea has marine ports and trade ships, and these ships shall sail under the Azerbaijani flag.53 At the same time, the State Defense Committee considers such demands by the command of the Volunteer Army as an act against the sovereign rights of Azerbaijan and has ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to address a protest note regarding this issue before the High Commissioners and diplomatic representatives of the Allies in the South Caucasus.

Regarding that issue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan submitted a protest note to the missions of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy in the

The Western mandate  267 South Caucasus. At the same time, the ministry sent instructions to the diplomatic representatives of the republic in Tiflis, Paris, and Kuban to take all possible steps using diplomatic means to repulse the aggressive aims of the Volunteer Army against the newly acquired military fleet of Azerbaijan. Jafar Bey Rustambeyov, diplomatic representative to the government of Kuban, was instructed to meet General Denikin regarding the note from Vice Admiral Aleksandr M. Gerasimov and bring to his attention the fact that Azerbaijan did not sign the Turkmenchay treaty and therefore the terms of that treaty were not binding on Azerbaijan. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, if ships could sail only under the Russian flag under the provisions of the Turkmenchay treaty, then ships sailing in the Caspian Sea under a British flag would also be considered inadmissible. Therefore, through Rustambeyov, the foreign ministry brought to the attention of General Denikin that the government of Azerbaijan, having its own national fleet, could not agree to have its ships sail under the flag of another state.54 The departure of Allied troops from the Caucasus had somehow not been anticipated by the new republics and their delegates in Versailles. In Topchubashov’s meeting with British delegates, it was clear that the withdrawal of British troops had already been decided. He wrote that we were confident that the British troops would stay in Baku. We were wrong. And not only we, but also the delegates of other Transcaucasian republics, Georgia and Armenia. In individual meetings with the British delegates we could learn nothing but the fact that the recall of troops by the British government was already decided. In such a situation we, the Georgians, and the Armenians met together and decided to apply with a request to the peace conference and the Allies separately, to keep troops in the Caucasus until the settlement of the fate of the republics.55 The result was the request of August 28, signed by the delegates of all three republics. The government of Great Britain sent its political mission under the leadership of Oliver Wardrop to the South Caucasus in connection with the withdrawal of British troops. It was Eyre Crowe, British delegate to the conference, who delivered the decision of British Foreign Secretary Balfour to the delegation of Azerbaijan on July 25. Crowe wrote, I received instruction from Mr. Balfour, Foreign Secretary, that His Majesty’s Government intended to send a mission under the leadership of Wardrop to the South Caucasus. Mr. Wardrop was selected for this mission as he is familiar with the South Caucasus and has worked for a long time in His Majesty’s diplomatic service. We hope that he will leave by the end of this month. Mr. Wardrop shall inform His Majesty’s Government about the situation in the South Caucasus, but this appointment shall not be deemed recognition of the government of Azerbaijan by His Majesty’s Government.56

268  The Western mandate Prior to leaving for the Caucasus, Wardrop met with delegates of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in Paris. In his report to Nasib Usubbeyov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan, Topchubashov wrote about that meeting, We met here with the British mission to be sent to the Caucasus: we received prior notification of his visit. Balfour informed us of Mr. Wardrop’s arrival. He came along with his secretaries to meet us; one of them, Mr. White, spoke well in our language and Russian, as he had previously served in Tabriz and Odessa. Mr. Wardrop made a good impression; he declared his goodwill and asked us to make efforts to ensure that all the nations of the Caucasus live in peace and stability. He spoke to Georgians in Georgian, met with Armenians, and left for the Caucasus that day.57 As the completion of the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus drew near, at the end of August, a mission consisting of White, Malligan, Grandy, and one more person under the leadership of Mr. Wardrop came to Tiflis. The decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on appointment of Mr. Wardrop as British High Commissioner to the South Caucasus was delivered to the government of Azerbaijan on August 22.58 Thus, a new stage for Azerbaijan, a new and fundamentally different Caucasus, began. After starting his work in Tiflis, on September 27, Wardrop left for Baku accompanied by White, the member of the British mission; Fariz Bey Vakilov, diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to Georgia; and G. Alshibaya, diplomatic representative of Georgia to Azerbaijan. On September 28, he was met at Baku railway station by Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other official persons. During his visit, Wardrop met with Nasib Usubbeyov, Prime Minister; Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov, Minister of Roads; General Ali Agha Shikhlinski, Deputy Defense Minister; Mammad Sadikh Aghabeyov, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; and other officials. In his report on his visit to Baku sent to London on October 2, Wardrop wrote, The people and government of this country hold Great Britain in high esteem, unlike any other. The prime minister’s position is quite firm. If we would help them, they will cooperate with Britain. I have a high opinion of the frankness of Mr. Usubbeyov and his ability to control the policy of his country. We both have strong hope in the future development of our relations. During his visit to Baku, the British High Commissioner was fully informed about the brutalities committed by Armenians in Azerbaijan and the entire South Caucasus. In his report sent to London, he wrote, “Azerbaijanis have reported that with help of Bolsheviks, local Armenians have killed a great number of the Muslim population.” According to them, Shaumian was a “false Bolshevik.” In his report, Wardrop added that just recently Armenians had destroyed sixty Muslim villages in New Bayazit, Alexandropol, and Erivan provinces. The

The Western mandate  269 British High Commissioner mentioned his visit to Ganja, the second biggest city of Azerbaijan, when returning from Baku, where he was ceremonially met by Khudadat Bey Rafibeyov, governor general of the city. He wrote, “The railway station was completely covered with green satin and with carpets, while national flags were hanging everywhere.”59 Disruptive forces inside and outside Azerbaijan begun to spread rumors that Azerbaijan was being ruled by British troops and that after they left, the Azerbaijan government would not be capable of ruling the country, leading to Armenian and Russian massacres. From this point of view, the material prepared for the British newspapers by military journalist Robert Scotland Liddell, who was in Azerbaijan, was very interesting and specific. He wrote, “The South Caucasus is a hotbed of rumors. Rumors here spread like wind through the hills. Most of the rumors are concocted in Moscow and then released into circulation.” Regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Azerbaijan, Scotland Liddell wrote that there was no need for the British troops to be in Baku. Azerbaijan was able to govern herself. I came here and speaking frankly, was deeply impressed with what I saw. During the four weeks I was here interesting changes happened. I came to see the disorder I was told about, but I did not see that. Instead I saw complete order. I was told that I would see streets full of blood and terrible scenes. Instead, I saw peace and stability. I was told that I would see a demoralized crowd instead of an army, but I saw a strong army with good discipline, consisting of young and courageous people. Indeed, I saw a peace that has never existed in Baku since the beginning of the war … Order does not exist in Baku alone; these recent changes have occurred throughout the whole republic. The situation in Garabagh has changed to mutual peace. Armenians and Tatars [Azerbaijanis] reached an agreement. Bolsheviks in Lenkaran have been defeated by the Tatar [Azerbaijani] army. They handed over all their arms and military supplies to the government of Azerbaijan and people have requested to be granted Azerbaijani nationality by the government … . Without doubt, all this proves that Azerbaijan is not afraid of disturbances and Bolsheviks. The state of Azerbaijan has already become a real example for the other nations of the South Caucasus.60 Besides the internal situation described by Scotland Liddell, the international position of Azerbaijan was also stabilized to some degree. Relations with neighboring Georgia developed, based on the treaty of June 16, and previous uncertainty with Iran changed to practical cooperation. In his response to the letter of the Iranian consul in Baku dated October 7, Nasib Usubbeyov wrote that it was necessary to sign relevant agreements between Iran and Azerbaijan on trade, post and telegraph, customs, and other issues. He noted that the government of Azerbaijan, in turn, was willing to establish friendly and warm relations with Iran and her people.61 On September 21, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan recognized Golovani as temporary Vice Consul of the Ukrainian People’s Republic.62 On September 22, F. D. Sheikh Ali Useynov was appointed as consul of the Republic of Azerbaijan in

270  The Western mandate Crimea.63 Two days later, Khosrov Pasha Bey Sultanov was sent to Rostov as the consular agent of the Azerbaijan Republic.64 Consular offices of Finland and Poland opened in Baku. At the same time, in his report sent to Usubbeyov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Topchubashov sent details about his meeting with Roman Dmowski, head of the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference; as well as Ignacy Paderewski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland; and an official from the Eastern Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the establishment of relations with delegates of Estonia, Latvia, Belorussia, and Ukraine. In addition, he wrote, We have contacts with a number of American Jews. They informed us about a propaganda campaign launched by Armenians alleging mass killings in September 1918 and advised us that it was necessary to send a number of people to the United States in order to prove the groundlessness of this propaganda campaign.65 Yusif Vazirov, appointed as the diplomatic representative in Turkey, started work in Istanbul and was received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Azerbaijani representatives coming to Turkey wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan that “Turkey was in an awfully bad condition. Many political circles here had hopes for the strengthening of Azerbaijan and said that Azerbaijan could have great influence on the independence movement in Turkey.”66 *** Besides the British mission headed by Oliver Wardrop, business relations based on mutual confidence were being established among the government of Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a French mission headed by Major de Nonancourt; an American mission headed by Colonel William Nafew Haskell; and an Italian mission headed by Colonel Melchiorre Gabba. Analysis of relations with Western states and protection issues show that, considering all the states, only the protection of Great Britain over the Caucasian republics with consent of the Paris Peace Conference was possible. It could be an effective step for the economic and political development of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and a guarantor of peace and stability in the region. Only the protection of Great Britain could save these republics from external danger: Denikin’s Volunteer Army and Bolshevik Russia. As for other countries, neither the United States nor France nor Italy was capable of overcoming the above-mentioned problems. But by the end of 1919, any military and political protection of the republics of the South Caucasus through any protectorate system began to lose importance from a practical point of view. Beginning in autumn 1919, the international situation started to change in favor of the new republics. The period of uncertainty from the beginning of 1919 until the end of that year during which the delegates of Azerbaijan were under extreme pressure was about to end. Analysis of the issue of becoming a Western protectorate shows that the republic really needed protection from only one of the powerful and economically

The Western mandate  271 developed states at that time. Compared with other Western states, France was hesitant in her interests in the Caucasus as well as in Azerbaijan. Having obtained some of the colonial territories of Germany and Turkey, France approached the colonies of the Russian empire with utmost caution. As a rule, French politicians supported the idea of “united and indivisible Russia.” Conversely, France did not have strong armed forces in the region and surrounding territories. Italy also had strong economic interests in Azerbaijan, but Italy had no resources to protect the mandated territory against external aggression. Fear of facing Russia and Turkey in the future prevented Italy from taking such a step. The Italian mandate was not effective for the Azerbaijan republic. In that period, Great Britain was the only state that had every opportunity to take the mandate of the Caucasus as well as Azerbaijan. The strong armed forces of Great Britain in the region, its powerful economic potential in defense against external aggression, and its political influence in the whole world could have played an important role in the progress and fate of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Notes 1. А. М. Топчибашев (A.M. Topchubashov), Письма из Парижа (Letters from Paris). Baku, 1998, p. 61. 2. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22–25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 31. 3. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 157, p. 24. 4. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 114, f. 115. 5. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 93, f. 95. 6. Comite France-Caucase, Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 18 Novembre, No. 4, p. 3. 7. Minutes of the Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Georgian Delegations. 28.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 230–231. 8. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22–25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 45. 9. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No. 2, p. 5. 10. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series. Volunme I. London, 1947, pp. 578–580. 11. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 156. 12. Richard Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia. Berkley-Los Angeles-London, 1971, p. 272. 13. Ibid., p. 306. 14. Г. Никольсон (H. Nicolson), Как делался мир в 1919 г. (How Peace Was Achieved in 1919). Moscow, 1945, p. 268. 15. Documents on British Foreign policy, p. 229. 16. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 36, p. 43. 17. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 156. 18. Telegram of General Thomson to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 10.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 54, p. 11.

272  The Western mandate 19. Information of the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Tiflis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May, 1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 38, p. 49. 20. N. Nəsibzadə (N. Nasibzade), Azərbaycanın xarici siyasəti (1918–1920) (Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan [1918–1920]) Baku, 1996, p. 80. 21. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 81. 22. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, p. 157. 23. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 228. 24. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 221. 25. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 13, p. 13. 26. Борьба за победу социалистической революции в Азербайджане. Документы и материалы. (Struggle for the Victory of Socialist Revolution in Azerbaijan. Documents and Materials). Baku, 1967, pp. 321–322. 27. Б. Е. Штейн (B. E. Shtein.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (“Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949, p. 332. 28. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 08.09.07.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 17. 29. Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Republic of Mountaineers Delegations in the Paris Peace Conference. 15.06.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 181–184. 30. А. М. Топчибашев (A. M. Topchubashov), Письма из Парижа, p. 46. 31. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No: 3, p. 7; Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22–25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 19. 32. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 94, p. 8. 33. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 22–25.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 21–22. 34. From the Head of the Italian Mission to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31.07.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 86, p. 17. 35. Written information sent to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers on the visit of A. Tahirov, the Azerbaijani Representative under the Command of the Allied States to Istanbul and Rome. 06.08.1919. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 22, pp. 103–105. 36. Э. Э. Исмаилов (E. E. Ismailov), Георгиевские кавалеры-азербайджанцы (The Azerbaijani Chevaliers of the Cross of St. George). Moscow, 2005, p. 201. 37. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика (The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic Foreign Policy). Baku, 1998, p. 375. 38. Ibid., p. 418. 39. Нитти Франческо. (Nitti Francesco), Вырождение Европы. (La decadenza dell’Europa). Moscow and Petrograd, 1923, p. 105. 40. Ibid., p. 109. 41. Ibid. 42. Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Republic of Mountaineers Delegations in Paris. 16.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 205–212. 43. Official letter sent by M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to General D. Shuttleworth. 04.08.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 86, p. 20. 44. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 20, p. 2.

The Western mandate  273 45. Parting Words of General Shuttleworth to Baku Population. 23.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 144, p. 9. 46. A. Ziyadxanlı (A. Ziyadkhanli), Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan). Baku, 1919, p. 61. 47. У. Черчилль (W. Churchill), Мировой кризис (The World Crisis). Moscow, 1932, p. 247; Charles King. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of Caucasus. Oxford University Press, 2008, p.170. 48. Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921. London, 1968, p. 337. 49. Banquet d’adieu des Anglais. 24.08.1919. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 17 Janvier, No: 7, p. 2. 50. Official letter sent by M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to General D. Shuttleworth. 04.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 60, p. 9. 51. Official letter sent by M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to General D. Shuttleworth. 08.08.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 86, p. 30. 52. Mission Militaire Française au Caucase. Extrait “d’Obnovlenie” (Reproduit d’Azerbaïdjan le 29 octobre 1919). Correspondance entre l’Armée volontaire et le Gouvernement d’Azerbaïdjan au sujet de la flotte de la Caspienne, Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 125; Note of Gerasimov, Vice-Admiral of Navigation Office under the General Headquarter of the Armed Forces in South Russia. 17.10.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 196, p. 3. 53. Mission Militaire Française au Caucase. Extrait “d’Obnovlenie” (Reproduit d’Azerbaïdjan le 29 octobre 1919).Correspondance entre l’Armée volontaire et le Gouvernement d’Azerbaïdjan au sujet de la flotte de la Caspienne, Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v.638, f. 125; Excerpt from the Resolution of the State Defence Committee. 21.10.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 196, p. 4. 54. Instruction given by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs to J. B. Rustambeyov, Diplomatic Representative at the General Headquarter of the South Russian Armed Forces. October, 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 196, p. 5. 55. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, pp. 59–60. 56. Letter of Crown, Member of the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, to A. M. Topchubashov. 25.07.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 46; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No: 3, p. 7. 57. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, pp. 68–69. 58. SAAR, f. 970, r. 3, v. 4, p. 30. 59. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Archive Documents of Great Britain. Baku, 2009, pp. 187–194. 60. Robert Scotland Liddell, “Azerbaijan. Having No Confidence in Anything. The English Leave Baku.” 08.09.1919. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 82, pp. 1–10. 61. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, pp. 363– 364. 62. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), September 21, 1919. 63. Order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Appointment of S. A.Useynov as Consular Agent in the Crimea. 22.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 2, v. 120, p. 52. 64. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), September 24, 1919. 65. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, pp. 50–51. 66. Report of Y. Vazirov, Diplomatic Representative in Turkey, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 22, p. 28.

10 The growing interest of the United States in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan

After World War I, the United States emerged as the most powerful state on the world stage. During the aftermath, the United States became the financial and economic center of the world. Its entry into the conflict in 1917 and its subsequent participation in the victory of the Entente increased the political influence of the United States and strengthened its role in deciding the destiny of the world. The United States achieved this status as a superpower in the new postwar world system, and its president, Woodrow Wilson, became famous as the architect of the peace and a friend of small nations. The United States came to the Paris Peace Conference with Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which he had declared in January 1918. The compilation of these peace principles embodied the coming of the United States to superpower status. The world Wilson envisaged would be based on principle, not power; on law, not interest –for both victor and vanquished.1 Although the collapse of the Russian empire and recognition of the new states established in its territory were not mentioned in Wilson’s principles, after the start of the peace conference, the Caucasus region began to attract U.S. interest. That is why the United States, and not only European countries, became a candidate for the Caucasus mandate. Unlike Great Britain, France, and Italy, the United States sought to obtain a mandate for the Black Sea straits, Istanbul, and the Caucasus as a whole. At a May meeting of the Council of Four, an American mandate over the straits and Armenia had been suggested. In talks with Deputy Secretary of State Frank L. Polk and Henry Morgenthau, who had worked for many years in the Near East, it became clear that Azerbaijani representatives would agree to U.S. patronage on the condition that the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of the republic. Following Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” the Americans would remain neutral.2 Americans also held similar talks with Georgians.3 Georgian representatives headed by Nikolai Chkheidze met with the president’s advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, on June 11, 1919, and agreed on a U.S. mandate over Georgia. Thereafter, American representatives in Paris took this issue to a meeting of the Council of Four.4 U.S. representatives Herbert Hoover (later to become president of the United States) and former ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau suggested at a meeting of the Council of Four on June 28, 1919, that General James Harbord was

The growing interest of the United States  275 the best candidate to be the U.S. High Commissioner with wide powers in Armenia. If General Harbord would refuse to take this position for any reason, then Colonel William Nafew Haskell was the next best choice.5 American representatives had consulted with President Wilson and discussed this issue several times between June 28 and July 4, 1919. U.S. representatives debated their suggestions at a meeting held on July 2, 1919, with participation from Secretary of State Lansing and U.S. delegation members in Versailles—White, Bliss, and Hoover—and considered the appointment of Colonel Haskell as High Commissioner to Armenia. At the Paris Peace Conference, William H. Buckler, advisor for the American representation on Asia Minor and the Caucasus, was charged with the preparation of a presentation, according to Hoover’s memorandum, to be presented at a meeting of the Council of Ten that would be held on the July 5. At that meeting, the Council appointed Colonel Haskell as the High Commissioner to Armenia on the basis of the American presentation. It was mentioned in the decision that Colonel Haskell would be appointed as a High Commissioner to Armenia on behalf of the United States, England, France, and Italy, and at the same time he would be responsible for all the measures related to the assistance of Armenia. All the representatives of the United States, England, France and Italy in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Istanbul had to cooperate with Colonel Haskell and assist him.6 It was decided at the same meeting that General Harbord should to go to Erivan with the purpose of preparing repatriation, and prepare a general report on military and economic issues. Robert Lansing informed Washington by telegraph about these decisions on the same day. He wrote that Haskell would act as the representative of the State Department, that he would need assistance in assembling people, and that his activity would be determined by the American Committee for Relief in the Near East. This committee was headed by Hoover, who came out with the memorandum on the U.S. mandate over Armenia. Haskell was appointed as chairman of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East in the Caucasus, and branches of the committee were to be opened in Baku and Shusha. But the aim was not to help Azerbaijanis who fled their homes as a result of atrocities by Armenian troops but to support Armenians in the aforementioned towns. Hoover, the director of American Committee for Relief in the Near East, advised the leaders of the peace conference on the difficulties of transporting food and aid from Armenia to Georgia. He wrote, The Relief Committee, along with various Allied state bodies, has been working for months to prevent the famine covered up by Russian Armenia. Fifty thousand tons of food have been stockpiled. The only way to transport this cargo from the Batum sea port to Armenia runs through the territory of Georgia. The railway is partly under the control of the British army. Despite the protestations by Allied representatives, Georgians demand part of the food and have regularly obstructed the transportation of foodstuffs. Traffic on the railway was suspended for between four and five days.

276  The growing interest of the United States The situation in Armenia is indescribable. People have been eating corpses for sixty days. Food convoys in the last two months have made the situation better, but the food reserve has never been in excess of ten days. We are trying to cooperate with the Republic of Georgia, but there is no need to set up a food reserve there. I will not mention the negotiations between Georgia and our representatives. It suffices to note that their treatment of starving people is an atrocity. Finally, I have to add that our transport route has already been inactive for more than a week. I understand that this issue does not appertain to the authority of the Allied armed forces, but I have placed information about the obligations of Georgia before the Supreme Council. To my mind it would be better, if the Council sent an appropriate telegram to Georgia and if Georgian representatives in Paris could be influenced. I suggest that the contents of telegram read as follows: The Council is aware that Georgians are hindering the transportation of food to poor starving people [Armenians]. The Council cannot ignore these actions. It is an act of injustice against all mankind and all the people living there. The Council expects Georgia not only to secure the transportation of cargo by railway, but also to apply the lowest customs tariff to these cargoes. The Council awaits a reply from the Georgian government.7 Hoover was also the main organizer of telegrams against Azerbaijan and Turkey which Admiral Mark Bristol, the High Commissioner of the United States in Istanbul sent to U.S. President Wilson in Versailles. Bristol, without having a clear description of Garabagh, wrote in his letter that Turks and Tatars [Azerbaijanis] had occupied Garabagh, a territory of Russian Armenia. If Britain did not give an order concerning the departure of Turks and Tatars from the entire territory of Russian Armenia including the Garabagh, they would not be able continue assistance.8 It is clear from the contents that Armenians were involved in the preparation of these documents. Hoover wanted to be appointed High Commissioner of the United States to Armenia, and so he described the situation in the Caucasus in dark colors. This was demonstrated in the documents of the Versailles Supreme Council. The Council asked Hoover to prepare a letter to be addressed to the peace conference and President Wilson. It was to be presented on behalf of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy to give the representative to Armenia the authority of a temporary High Commissioner and become the appointed representative of the above-mentioned states.9 Colonel Haskell came to the Caucasus in summer of 1919. His headquarters were located in Erivan. At a meeting with the representatives of the Armenian state, Haskell declared that the peace conference had given him the authority to protect Armenia and Armenians regardless of where they lived (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey). It was for this reason he was called the “Allied High Commissioner” by decision of the Paris Peace Conference.10 Haskell mentioned the desperate situation in Armenia in his first communiqué to the conference at

The growing interest of the United States  277 the end of July. Taking advantage of Haskell’s mission, Armenians began to lay territorial claims against their neighbors. Haskell also complained about the Georgian state in his letter of August 5, 1919, regarding interference with the transportation of aid to Armenia through its territory. American representatives in Versailles discussed this issue on August 13 and, according to Haskell’s and Hoover’s accounts, decided that they would not tolerate the situation. Once again, the conference discussed the situation in the South Caucasus at the end of August, based on Haskell’s information. Haskell asked to send U.S. cavalry corps or an unmounted brigade to Armenia to settle things.11 President Wilson sent threatening demands to the Turkish sultan based on information sent by Haskell after he had been appointed High Commissioner to Armenia. U.S. High Commissioner in Istanbul Admiral Bristol presented these demands to the prime minister of Turkey on August 23, 1919. The influence of Armenia was clearly seen in the wording of the message, which stated that President Wilson was advising the Turkish state that, if aggression and slaughter against Armenians in the Caucasus and other places by Turks, Kurds, and other Muslims were not stopped, the president would remove from the peace agreement Article 12 that embraces the sovereignty of Turkey, a step that could lead to the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire. If Turks wanted to protect their sovereignty in any part of the empire, then they had to prove that they not only intended to stop the participation of their people in the aforementioned crimes but that they were willing to do so. For Turkey to assert that it was powerless to prevent such incidents would not be accepted.12 Such demands and appeals encouraged Armenians to act more aggressively against Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Gradually they began to imagine themselves as an orphaned child that had been adopted by the United States and was now preparing to claim a large inheritance. Haskell’s appointment as the Allied High Commissioner also influenced the elision of Azerbaijan and Turkey in America’s Caucasus policy. It was in this situation that Armenians now wanted to exercise their territorial claims against Azerbaijan by means of the United States. Haskell, making a speech in the Dashnak parliament, stated that he supported the territorial claims of Armenia. This time Armenians wanted to solve the problems of Nakhchivan and SharurDereleyez, not Garabagh and Zangezur. Haskell mentioned in his speech that if leaders of the Azerbaijani state would not accept the claims of Armenians, then they would have to take “personal responsibility” for this issue.13 Colonel James Rhea was appointed the commissioner of the High Commission in Azerbaijan as one of Colonel Haskell’s officials. At the same time, an official of the American Consulate in Tiflis, John Randolph, was also sent to Baku as a vice-consul.14 Colonel Haskell came to Baku on August 28, 1919, after spending some time in Erivan. He had numerous meetings with Prime Minister Nasib Usubbayev, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Yusif Jafarov, and other members of the Cabinet of Ministers. On September 1, Haskell declared his plan on territorial issues embracing the interests of Armenia. According to this plan, the American

278  The growing interest of the United States High Commissioner considered Garabagh and Zangezur as inseparable parts of Azerbaijan. But instead of this, Haskell suggested that a neutral zone had to be established in Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez districts, which were situated in the south in Erivan province.15 This neutral zone was to be similar to the British neutral zone in Batum. It was planned that the neutral zone would consist of Nakhchivan and SharurDereleyez territories. The establishment of this plan would be overseen by an American representative. Both Americans and Armenians had their own intentions for this plan. The Americans could not bring enough troops to the Caucasus at this point, so they wanted to establish a neutral zone in Nakhchivan and SharurDereleyez, which, from a strategic viewpoint, would strengthen their positions there. The strategic position of Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez after World War I was very attractive to the United States in moving from isolationism to a wider internationalism. From this area, it would easily be possible to influence not only Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, and Turkey but the whole of the Near and Middle East. After Turkish troops left Azerbaijan, the Dashnak state in 1918 wanted to cleanse Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez and the Echmiadzin districts and Kars region of all Muslims and to establish the authority of the Armenian state in these territories. But the strong resistance of the Muslim people living in these areas prevented the implementation of this plan. Although Britain gave the governance of Nakhchivan temporarily to Armenia, the Dashnak state could not implement this decision because the majority of the population in Nakhchivan were Azeri Turks.16 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Khoyski, at his meeting with General William Thomson in Tiflis in May 1919, objected sharply to the temporary granting of Nakhchivan to Armenia by the Allied central headquarters. He stated that Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and Sharur-Dereleyez were ancient Azerbaijani lands.17 The Armenian state pushed for the establishment of a neutral zone in these territories as an American project, because at that moment it could not establish its authority by means of arms. The Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez neutral zones being led by an American representative would have all the necessary facilities for the uniting of these territories to Armenia in the future. It is true that in his conversations with the heads of the Azerbaijani state, Thomson tried to make it known that he was not the “advocate of the Armenians,”18 but the project he presented to the Azerbaijani government on Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez served to facilitate the awarding of these territories to Armenia in the future.19 After the Turks left the Caucasus, the South-West Republic was established at Kars, including the Kars and Batum regions and the Akhalsikh and Akhalkalak districts of Tiflis province. Cildirli Esat Bey headed the parliament established in January 1919, and the government was headed by Cihangiroglu Ibrahim Bey.20 British Governor-General Temperley recognized the Azerbaijan republic and the Turkish South-West Caucasus Republic almost immediately. The South-West Republic established an army consisting of 8,000 men to counter the aggression of neighboring states. The independent Turkish republic, 40,000 kilometers in area and having a population of 1,763,148, existed for only 6 months. The South-

The growing interest of the United States  279 Western Caucasus Republic, established on the principle of the rights of nations to self-determination, was dismissed by the Allied Commander in Chief, General Thomson, in April 1919.21 Before discussing Haskell’s involvement, it should be mentioned that the representatives of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference had also struggled against the intentions of the Armenian state to include in its territory the ancient Azerbaijani lands of Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez and the Turkish SouthWestern Caucasus Republic and against acts of violence done by Dashnaks in these territories. Ali Mardan Topchubashov presented a special protest note regarding this to the chairman of the peace conference on the August 19.22 It was mentioned in the note that, although the Azerbaijani delegation was waiting impatiently for the day when it would be able to address the conference on recognition of the republic, significant events were occurring in the country, and areas that were under the authority of the peace conference were being interfered with. The territory of the Caucasus and Azerbaijan was being changed by force, and its population was being driven to flee from their homes. The Azerbaijani peace delegation had been informed from its country that the Kars region, Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, and the Surmeli districts of Erivan province and part of the Erivan district were being incorporated into the Republic of Armenia.23 The protest note drew attention to the fact that all these territories had been occupied by Turkey and so were under their control until an agreement was reached. Included in that note were details outlining that the British had arrested the heads of the South-West Caucasus Republic’s parliament and government along with eleven ministers and had exiled them to Malta. Though British headquarters had promised Minister of Foreign Affairs Khoyski that they would maintain the South-West Caucasus Republic until the fate of this territory was decided at the Paris Peace Conference, Armenians and subsequently Georgians, citing the protection of refugees as an excuse, entered Kars on April 30, 1919. The Republic of Azerbaijan sharply protested the occupation of Kars and the crimes that were committed there to the Armenian and Georgian republics as well as the headquarters of the British army in the Caucasus.24 Azerbaijani representatives wrote, “The Republic of Azerbaijan cannot and must not regard indifferently nor take the position of an onlooker on the bitter destiny of the Kars region.” It was mentioned in the note that 60 percent of the population of Kars were Muslims sharing a common ancestry with Azerbaijanis. But only 23.4 percent of the population were Armenians.25 Armenians wanted to change the national composition of the population in Kars under the guise of returning refugees. The second part of the note was about events in Nakhchivan and SharurDereleyez. Here it was stated that the Azerbaijani state could not be reconciled to giving part of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, and Surmeli districts in Erivan to Armenia. It was stated in the note to the heads of Allied states that Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles support the protest note on the Nakhchivan district that was presented to the Allied headquarters by the Azerbaijan government. It was made clear to the peace conference that turning over part of Nakhchivan,

280  The growing interest of the United States Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli, and Erivan districts to the control of Armenia was an obvious violation of the rights of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The representatives of the powerful states were warned that the adoption of such an act would result in constant conflict in the region. It was stated in the note that looking at the numbers comprising the national composition of the population of these territories was enough to consider them the territory of Azerbaijan. Representatives of the Allies in Versailles were shown that 62.5 percent of the population living in Nakchivan were Azeris as compared to an Armenian population of only 36.7 percent; 72.3 percent Azeri to 27.1 percent Armenians in Sharur-Dereleyez; 68 percent Azeris, to 30.4 percent Armenians in Surmeli; and 60.2 percent Azeris as compared with 37.4 percent Armenians living in Erivan district. It should be mentioned concerning the last district that the numbers above reflect the population in the entire region. But 90 percent of the population in Vedibasar and Milistan areas were Azeri.26 It was also noted that the population at that time was formed after Russia penetrated the Caucasus and moved Armenians from neighboring area into the Nakhchivan and Erivan regions. When Russia came to Azerbaijan, 49,875 Muslims and 20,073 Armenians lived in Erivan; 17,138 Muslims and 2,690 Armenians lived in the Nakhchivan region.27 The populations of these districts, through the National Council established in 1918, made a decision in each village to come under the control of the Azerbaijan republic and sent this request to the Azeri government. This request also included five Armenian villages in Ordubad that asked to come under the control of the Republic of Azerbaijan.28 Armenians used different ways to falsify numbers regarding the composition of the population in order to decrease the number of Muslims recorded in these regions. After World War I, as mentioned in documents sent to Moscow, their goal was to succeed by substituting the names of the Turkic population with different ethnic names. A document sent by Armenia to Moscow notes that 59 percent of the population were Turks, 11 percent were Kurds, and 30 percent were Armenians. Statistically, the breakdown goes like this: 58,496 Turks (64.8 percent), 29,165 Armenians (32.3 percent), 2,589 other nationalities (2.9 percent) from a total population of 90,250 in Sharur-Dereleyez.29 The Armenian state often employed ethnic cleansing, deportation, and executions as ways to change the makeup of the population in its favor. When the Sovietization process began in the South Caucasus, Red Army commanders Todorski and Sviridov wrote to Grigory K. Orjonikidze, who at the time was the Soviet Governor-General of the Caucasus: Sharur, the breadbasket of Araz, in which most of the population along the Araz river from Ulukhanli station to Nakhchivan are Muslims, has now become a valley of death where the only inhabitants are rotting corpses. The whole population of Sharur was destroyed by the army of the Armenian state, the rest of them were banished to Turkey and their properties were robbed by Mauserists [i.e., armed gangs] who now guard Ngden’s country seat. Mankind has never before seen such savageries.30

The growing interest of the United States  281 In a widely distributed report prepared by a French mission to the Caucasus in December 1918 and sent to Paris, it was noted that most of population mentioned in the territories were Muslims.31 Taking into consideration the bloody events occurring in the region, the protest note ended by asking the Allies to resolve two main issues: (1) to remove all the armed forces except for Allied troops from the borders of the Kars region and to organize its government appropriate to the local people’s will until its fate was decided, and (2) to keep some parts of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli, and Erivan within the Republic of Azerbaijan.32 In addition to presenting their protest note to the peace conference, the Azerbaijani delegates forwarded it to all the representatives of the Allies in Paris. Lord Curzon, who was interested in the events occurring in Kars and was sent as High Commissioner to the Caucasus, blamed Armenia for the events that had occurred in Kars, having learned of the facts through Oliver Wardrop. The head of Armenian delegation in Paris, Avetis Aharonian, requested in a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately to meet with Wardrop in Tiflis.33 Armenia did not stay indifferent to Lord Curzon’s attitude. Dashnak A. Sagatelian in his article “Entente, Bolshevism, and Muslimism,” published in the Information Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insinuated that Lord Curzon’s supportive attitude of Muslims and his condemnation of Armenians was related with his having been the Viceroy of India in the past. Armenians likewise attributed Lord Curzon’s policy concerning Afghanistan to favoritism toward Muslims.34 Although the Allies were supportive of Armenia in these areas, the population of these districts did not become subordinate to the Armenian government. In spite of the attempts of the Dashnak state to spread its authority by force of arms, a tactic that resulted in people fleeing their homes in several Muslim villages, in general this policy failed. Beginning in 1919, Armenians who could not spread their authority by force of arms in Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, and Surmeli wanted to succeed through American diplomacy. Colonel William Haskell’s appointment as the commissioner to Armenia by the peace conference created suitable possibilities for the Armenian state to occupy the above-mentioned districts of Erivan province. This time a new plan for establishing an American neutral zone consisting of Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez was suggested, as British headquarters were forced to concede that the experiment of giving Nakhchivan and Sharur to the rule of the Armenian state had failed. Haskell’s project consisted of twenty articles and was presented to the Azerbaijani government on September 1, 1919. In fact, it demonstrated that Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez were considered to be part of Azerbaijan. Some of the articles provided as follows: 1 2

Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez were to be included in the neutral zone established by the United States, with authority in the neutral zone belonging to the governor general appointed by Colonel Haskell; local authority would belong to the Azerbaijanis except in the areas where Armenians made up the majority of population (as defined by the United States); the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments had to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone;

282  The growing interest of the United States 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12

13 14

the troops of any party could enter only with the permission of the American governor; the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments must remove from the neutral zone any agents of theirs spreading propaganda among local people and any sympathizers; both parties would have to grant amnesty to the people arrested for crimes committed before the September 1, 1919; local bureaucrats would be appointed by the American governor, and the governor would have the right to change any bureaucrat within the neutral zone; the Azerbaijani government would use its influence to calm Azerbaijanis in the neutral zone and Erivan region, and the Armenian government would use its influence to calm Armenians in the neutral zone and in the Zangezur region; the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments would guarantee the inviolability of the life and property of both Azerbaijani and Armenian people living in their territories; the right of control over the railways within the neutral zone would be passed to the American governor; the Azerbaijani government would not hinder the delivery of aid to Shusha and Gorus by the American Committee for Relief in the Near East; the Azerbaijani government had to agree to the return of Armenian refugees to their homes and to provide assistance; the Azerbaijani population of Boyuk Vedi must be moved away from the neutral zone under the observation of the governor general, and all necessary facilities were to be offered to them in order to be able to take all their possessions with them; the Baku–Julfa railway under construction at the time would stay under the authority of Azerbaijan; and during the rule of the American governor, needed material and supplies would be provided by local taxes and any additional funds required would be provided by the Azerbaijani government.35

It was clear from these points that a project of this kind could not have come from the Americans; rather it was an Armenian project announced in the name of William Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner. On September 27, Haskell dispatched an amendment to the project consisting of twelve articles. This was to soften the stance taken in the first twenty articles, which were not accepted by the Azerbaijani government.36 The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Haskell on September 29 that his government was not against establishing a special neutral zone in the Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez districts but objected to some of the proposed terms.37 Related to this issue was a project prepared by the Azerbaijani government in late September and sent to Colonel Haskell. The project consisted of twelve articles and in part stipulated

The growing interest of the United States  283 1

a temporary special neutral zone would be established in Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez districts; 2 the governor general would be appointed by Colonel Haskell and chosen from among American citizens; 3 these districts were to be ruled by local councils that were to be elected by equal franchise and confidential ballot; 4 all the authority in the province—administrative works, courts, railways and roads, post and telegraph, public education, and others—would come under the authority of these councils with general oversight being coordinated by the governor general; 5 executive power could be appointed by a council but would have to be representative of the majority nation; 6 freedom of speech, conscience, and press and inviolability of personal rights and property must be announced for the entire neutral zone; 7 the budget of the neutral zone was required to be discussed in the Azerbaijani parliament with any shortfalls to be added from the budget of Azerbaijan; 8 Azerbaijan’s currency must be adopted as an official currency; 9 the governor general would have to invite two advisors from Azerbaijan and introduce proper order before elections could be held; 10 the section of the Baku–Julfa railway that crossed the neutral zone would be given to the Azerbaijani government; and 11 the population of the neutral zone must be disarmed; an amnesty would be held in the entire territory.38 However, the project prepared by Azerbaijani government was not accepted by Haskell. In the middle of September, Haskell received representatives Ali Sabri Kasimov and Alasgarov from Nakhchivan and Sharur-Ordubad and informed them that an engineer from the U.S. Army, Colonel Edmund Daley, had been appointed as the governor and would begin his activities on October 23, 1919. Ali Sabri Kasimov presented demands to Haskell on behalf of the Nakhchivan population consisting of ten articles prepared by representatives of the area. In the ten articles, it was stated that the population of Nakhchivan would not accept the deployment of Armenian troops to the region, that they would not become subordinate to the Armenian government, and that if necessary, people would protect their independence by means of force.39 After Turkish forces left Nakhchivan, inhabitants of this region had already had to resort to force to protect themselves from Armenia. The Azerbaijani government supported by all possible means the struggle for the independence of the Muslim districts of Erivan province. Armenians blamed their failure to occupy the region on the presence of Turkish soldiers as a way of irritating both the British and the Americans. Mammad Khan Tekinski, who was the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Armenia, played a great role in the successful resistance of Muslims in the district. If the Allies would not interfere, the people of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, and Surmeli districts were capable of defending themselves from Armenian

284  The growing interest of the United States attacks. On July 11, Tekinski notified the Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs that an attack by the Armenian army had been thwarted in Boyuk Vedi, that a considerable number of Armenian soldiers had been brought to Erivan, and that there were more than 200 dead. Muslims confiscated two artillery pieces and eight machine guns. Armenia took this loss quite poorly. They tried to convince the British mission that their failure was the result of the participation of Turkish soldiers in the battle. However, it was determined that at that time there was not a single Turkish soldier in these villages.40 Haskell feared a popular rebellion and used diplomacy to deal with the situation because there was no American army in Armenia and the Armenian army was unable to carry out American initiatives. He promised the Muslim population in the neutral zone that their rights would be taken into consideration at the Paris Peace Conference.41 In his letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Haskell stated in early October that he would soon go to Paris and that, if the Azerbaijani government would help to calm people in the territories and support the American plan on the establishment of a neutral zone, he promised that he in turn would raise the question of the recognition of Azerbaijan before the conference.42 With this aim, other members of the American mission, Colonel James Alexander Ulio and Major Parker C. Kalloch, asked the Azerbaijani government in written form to send to the American High Commissioner statistical information on Azerbaijan together with maps, in the form of a memorandum consisting of two copies for the purpose of being included with the report that was being prepared for the peace conference. The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote in his note to Haskell that the Azerbaijani government could agree to American rule of this territory as a neutral zone only as long as it was considered to be an inseparable part of Azerbaijan. Mammad Yusif Jafarov stated in his note to Colonel Haskell that the Azerbaijani people hoped that the fair principles appropriate to the rights of nations as declared by President Wilson would be protected by Haskell while at the peace conference. In this letter, it was stipulated that the rights established by Azerbaijani people in Erivan were also to be protected by William Haskell before peace conference.43 The American mission also wanted to link the Denikin threat to the aim of establishing a neutral zone. Haskell replied to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that until the establishment of a neutral zone in Nakhchivan and Sharur-Dereleyez, no step would be made by him on Denikin or any other issues.44 After Haskell had been advised that his project would cause unrest not only in Nakhchivan but in all the Muslim districts of Erivan province, the Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles were informed by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the situation in Erivan province had reached rebellion levels. The Boyuk Vedi rebellion in this territory spread widely and resulted in the utter destruction of Armenian forces, causing the Armenian army to withdraw to Erivan.45 Further information was supplied that the people from Kagizman and Echmiadzin districts who had been attacked by Armenians also joined the movement of Muslims in Sharur-Dereleyez. The people of Erivan were restive. Reprisals inflicted on the peaceful population of Erivan resulted in protests by

The growing interest of the United States  285 the Azerbaijani people and in political circles as well. The government could not stay indifferent to such violent actions and the appeals of the Muslim population for rescue. Consequently the Azerbaijani government sent a protest note to the Armenian government in September as it had done in August, protesting against the violence that Armenians perpetrated against the Muslims of Erivan province.46 After Colonel Haskell was asked to go to Paris, his advisor, Colonel James C. Rhea, came to Baku to discuss the neutral zone issue. Two weeks before this, a representative of the U.S. Embassy in Istanbul, Major Doyle, also came to the capital of Azerbaijan.47 During the negotiations, Major Doyle suggested that the Azerbaijani government select a representative to go with him to Erivan and Nakhchivan in order to solve the neutral zone problem. The Americans wanted to demonstrate to local people that Azerbaijan supported the establishment of such a zone. But the government refused, stating that it could not mislead the people and could not participate in the establishment of principles that the people had not accepted. Colonel Rhea was told that if the people would agree with the terms suggested by the Americans—and the Azerbaijani government knew that the people in the Muslim settlements of Erivan province were opposed to the establishment of neutral zones—the government would not hinder the establishment of such a zone. It was noted in a government message to Paris that Colonel Rhea was displeased with the response and had to return to Nakhchivan alone.48 James Rhea came to Nakhchivan on October 24 and presented American High Commissioner William Haskell’s statement on the establishment of a neutral zone before the Muslim National Council. It was said in the statement Taking into account the violation of peace by armed clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, the endangering of life and property of people, the claims of Azerbaijan and Armenia for this territory, the pending decision about Azerbaijan and Armenia on Sharur and Nakhchivan by the peace conference, the absence of mutual agreement of Azerbaijan and Armenia as to how to rule this territory, and the wishes of Armenia and Azerbaijan to establish peace in this territory, I, William N. Haskell, guided by the authority given to me by the peace conference, as the High Commissioner of the United States of America, France, Great Britain, and Italy, declare the establishment of an Allied-ruled zone under the governor’s authority in Sharur and Nakhchivan regions and under Edmund L. Daley of the United States Army’s Corps of Engineers, who is now appointed as governor of this zone.49 James Rhea, standing in for Haskell, then signed a decree consisting of two articles on the establishment of an American zone in Sharur and Nakhchivan and Colonel Daley’s appointment as governor. Rhea, however, had to change this decision due to the persistence of the Nakhchivan National Council and the population of Nakhchivan. Colonel Daley remained not as governor general but as the representative of the American High

286  The growing interest of the United States Commissioner in Nakhchivan. A member of the Nakhchivan National Council, S. Jamilinski, wrote to Mamad Khan Tekinski, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to Armenia, concerning October 26 and related details of James Rhea’s visit to Nakhchivan. He said that he himself, Halil Bey, Kalbali Khan, D. Mamedov, and others held talks with him for 2 days. James Rhea agreed to keep Colonel Daley here not as governor general but as the representative of either the peace conference or the United States. This representative will not interfere in our administrative work and will work in the direction of the establishment of reconciliation between us and Armenia as well as providing assistance for our refugees.50 Jamilinski noted that it became clear during the talks that the question of establishing a specially governed zone here by the Allies was postponed, but some felt the Americans were sympathetic to the idea of uniting this region with Azerbaijan. James Rhea and other American representatives during their visit to Nakhchivan understood that it was impossible to detach the territory intended for a neutral zone from Azerbaijan. The arrival of U.S. officers to complement Daley’s command in November resulted in unrest by the population of Sharur and Nakhchivan, and Daley had to call the officers back to Erivan.51 The Americans left Sharur and Nakhchivan entirely in January 1920. During the period of the American mission in the Caucasus, an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was signed on November 23 in Tiflis. Not just the Americans but the British as well had initiated the cessation of military operations, hoping to reach an agreement between the two republics. With this aim, British High Commissioner Wardrop sent a telegram to the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments.52 But the Americans mediated at the last moment and secured the agreement. The parties affirmed that they would work to stop ongoing clashes and not use arms any more. Both governments agreed on opening the road running through Zangezur for the activity of civilians, and the parties undertook the obligations that they had to solve all disputable issues, even questions regarding their mutual borders, through peaceful agreements. The third paragraph of this agreement made it possible for Americans to play the role of judicial arbitrators in the case of disagreements between the parties. It mentioned there that if the parties would not be able to solve any problem by peaceful means through the court of arbitration, a neutral person would have to be selected, and the decision of this court would be considered obligatory by all parties. Colonel Rhea of the American army was appointed as the neutral person according to the agreement. According to the fourth paragraph of the agreement, the parties had to send without delay representatives in equal number to Baku and Tiflis and hold conferences to discuss disputable questions. The agreement entered into force from the moment it was signed.53 The agreement was signed by Nasib Usubbeyov, the chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, and Alexander Khatisian, the chairman of Armenian Council of Ministers. James Rhea from the United States

The growing interest of the United States  287 and the Minister of Foreign affairs and temporary president Evgeni P. Gegechkori of the Republic of Georgia also signed the agreement.54 The Americans felt that the agreement would strengthen the solidarity of the Caucasian republics and their resistance against the Denikin danger. On November 22, 1919, in Tiflis, Usubbeyov and Colonel Rhea conferred about the Denikin danger. Rhea said that he did not believe that Denikin was in any position to attack because he already had too much on his hands. But Usubbeyov advised him that it was the character of the Russians always to do something quite contrary to what every human being expects them to do. We know the Russians better than any foreigner; we have been born and educated here and we know their spirit. There is no one so given to adventures and risky undertakings.55 Haskell was highly pleased about the agreement signed between Azerbaijanis and Armenians with the participation of the United States and Georgia, as he reported in a telegram to the heads of the Paris Peace Conference. He had been concerned that, if Denikin were to attack Azerbaijan from Dagestan, this in turn might cause Azerbaijan to seek help from Turkey.56 The French military mission in Tiflis sent a telegram to Paris on November 24 stating that the agreement would bring peace to the South Caucasus.57 The temporary silence created by the agreement did not last long, however, because the differences between the parties were too great, and the Americans left the Caucasus shortly thereafter. The last conference held in December ended bitterly. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, Armenian military units attacked Zangezur and destroyed several Muslim villages; bloody events resulting in the death of 300 people took place in the Dereleyez region.58 In answer to the sharp note sent by the Azerbaijan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, on November 29, Armenians stated that these operations were directed to prevent an attack orchestrated by Turkish officer Halil Bey, and they did not have any information about the number of casualties. The Armenians stated that they were following the provisions of agreement signed on November 23.59 In response to this treatment by the government of Armenia, Azerbaijan drew the attention of the Allied representative in the Caucasus to the bloodshed. Prime Minister Usubbeyov wrote to Haskell on December 8, 1919, In accordance with the agreement signed on November 23 in Tiflis, Azerbaijan called its army in Zangezur to withdraw and now there is not a single soldier there. Taking advantage of the unarmed condition of the local people, Armenian military units armed with artillery and machine guns began to kill Muslim civilians and plunder their properties. What a pity my anxiety at the Tiflis conference turned out to be justified. Therefore, I ask you to send a commission consisting of American officers to Zangezur within five days in order to confiscate the artillery and machine guns possessed by Armenian troops. If this action is not implemented, Azerbaijan cannot take the position of an onlooker while innocent people are subjected to bloodshed and atrocities.60

288  The growing interest of the United States Haskell wrote on December 11 to Foreign Minister Mammad Yusif Jafarov that he received his December 8 telegram and gave it to the Armenian government with an appendix stating that, if the charges of Azerbaijan were found to be true, it would be a strong blow to the future of Armenia.61 Haskell, who was invited to the peace conference to report on the situation in the South Caucasus in early November 1919, wrote a letter to Topchubashov and met Azerbaijani representatives. He did not touch on the question of the establishment of a Nakhchivan neutral zone in his interviews in Paris, as he was of the opinion that the only solution to the problems facing the South Caucasus was for one country to take the mandate of the entire territory. Topchubashov wrote to the Azerbaijani government about his meeting with Colonel Haskell in Paris, Mr. Haskell said praising words about the order he saw. He was very pleased with his reception in Baku. He liked our simple people, who are peaceloving and in general not enemies of the Armenian people; if there were no politicians, Armenians, too, would live in peace … . Answering our questions, the Colonel emphasized that all the people in the Caucasus can live together and prosper economically. In order to begin, however, they need the help of one powerful government to stabilize their financial situation. In several years each nation could be free from the mandate and live independently. Your Azerbaijan should be free from patronage.62 It is necessary to mention that when Colonel Haskell was sent to the Caucasus, he was given instructions from U.S. official circles and President Wilson to help the Armenians. But 3 months of observation in the Caucasus were revealing. The most important was Haskell’s admission that Armenians were not “the only suffering nation.” He mentioned in his talks with Topchubashov and Maharramov that Americans spoke only about Armenians because they thought them the only suffering people of the Caucasus. The U.S. missions to Turkey and the Caucasus had provided very useful insights for many Americans, he said, as they witnessed that not all Armenians were good and not all Turks were bad. All the nations of the Caucasus had good and bad people in them. In conclusion, Haskell stated that “it would be possible to unite these countries under a common mandate … but America will not accept this mandate.”63 However, in a meeting with Georgian representatives on November 5, he said that “I cannot say whether America will take the mandate or not; that is the diplomats’ work. My duty is to solve practical problems and to help people here.”64 Diplomats heard Haskell’s report on November 14 in Versailles. Haskell’s coming to the meeting of the Supreme Council was unexpected for many people. During the discussions, it became clear that Haskell had not been invited by the Supreme Council but by the Americans. American representative Frank Lyon Polk stated that Haskell would be leaving the next day, so it would be interesting to hear his information on Armenia before the Supreme Council. The meeting participants agreed to hear Haskell’s report unwillingly, as this issue was not on the agenda, and Haskell made a long speech about giving the Caucasus to the United

The growing interest of the United States  289 States on a political basis. He mentioned that the economy was in a terrible state. Haskell considered the patronage of a powerful government such as the United States as a way of resolving problems in the region. Mentioning the difficulty of the existing political situation, Haskell stated that Armenia did not want to join the alliance of Azerbaijan and Georgia and was perpetually on the brink of the war with them. There were territorial disputes between these three countries. He said, “He had been entrusted by the Supreme Council with representing it in Armenia, but he could not efficiently carry out the necessary work as long as Georgia and Azerbaijan remained without his jurisdiction.”65 After Haskell’s suggestion, it became known that the Americans had a special reason for his abrupt departure from the Caucasus and subsequently the placing of this issue before the Supreme Council, even though it had not been on the agenda. Haskell, who was to give information only about Armenia, gave information about Azerbaijan and Georgia, too, and this caused misunderstandings among the participants of the meeting. Polk explained that Haskell had to have official status in Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to execute the tasks of the Supreme Council in an effective way. Polk brought a sense of urgency to the situation by stating that the Colonel would leave the next day. But the experienced Georges Clemenceau, who headed the meeting, understood that prolonging discussion of this issue was of use only to the Americans, thanked Haskell for “the presentation of the question and at this point Colonel Haskell left the room.”66 The British knew that the Americans would raise this question again, so they prepared well for the next meeting. Polk raised the question of Armenia based on Haskell’s information and asked about making “a little” adjustment to the resolution of Supreme Council on July 5, 1919. Concerning Haskell’s appointment as High Commissioner to Armenia he asked that the words “Azerbaijan and Georgia” be added after “Armenia.”67 So the introduction of a resolution on July 5 was to read like this after the suggested amendment: “U.S. Colonel W. H. Haskell is appointed High Commissioner to Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan by the Supreme Council on behalf of the United States, England, France, and Italy.” Noting the surprise of the meeting participants, Polk added, “I would like to make this recommendation to the Council, but I do not insist on its adoption.”68 Indeed, it was American industrialists interested in Azerbaijan oil who were behind this suggestion. British historian Elizabeth Monroe wrote that the United States was in a delirium over oil when the mandates were apportioned.69 The suggestion of the American representative was met with sharp protest by the representative from England, Eyre Crowe. He said that the questions raised by Polk had been sent to the British government for further scrutiny. Britain was not against Haskell’s authority over Azerbaijan and Armenia as the head of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, but Crowe mentioned that Polk’s new suggestion was beyond the authority already given to Haskell. Crowe bluntly stated that if Great Britain did not agree to the activity of American Committee for Relief in the Near East without his consent, they were not going to recognize Colonel Haskell as the Allied High Commissioner in the Caucasus.70 So it was decided that the representatives of the Haskell mission could work only

290  The growing interest of the United States in Azerbaijan and Georgia in relation to the work of the relief committee, and they could not interfere in political, economic, or any other issues in those two republics. This suggestion of the British was supported by the Italians and French. So the initiative raised by the Americans in reference to Haskell’s authority over Azerbaijan was foiled due to the resistance of the British. A Russian scholar touching on this issue mentioned mistakenly that since November 15, 1919, Colonel Haskell had been officially appointed as the High Commissioner for the whole of the South Caucasus.71 Actually, as mentioned above, Haskell’s authority was affirmed on July 5. He was permitted to work only in Azerbaijan and Georgia. A forty-man staff was assembled in mid-November. Colonel Haskell, Colonel Rhea, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Wyatt, Captain S. Saunders, and Captain Morris Hewsik were included in its administration.72 Later, a waning of American interest in the Caucasus mandate was evidenced following a report by the Harbord mission to the president. After being dispatched to examine the situation, General James Harbord expressed his negative opinion of the U.S. mandate in his report to President Wilson. Wilson decided to send a special American mission to the Caucasus to study political, military, geographic, economic, administrative, and other issues in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Asia Minor. Since 1919, America had regarded the Caucasus with interest and the question of the Caucasus mandate was discussed in political circles in the United States.73 According to a report about the meeting held on the June 12, 1919, with representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Mountain Republic it was apparent that the Americans intended to send a special delegation to study the situation in early June. Heydar Bammatov, the representative of the Mountain Republic, stated at the same meeting that one of the American representatives in Paris had tried to persuade him to ask the peace conference to send a special commission to the Caucasus. The Americans wanted to present the situation in the Caucasus as being very dangerous, thus making it urgent to send a deputation to prevent bloodshed and bring order to interethnic relations. If the Caucasian republics went to the peace conference with this appeal, American representatives stated that they would support this idea in a meeting of the Supreme Council. But neither Azerbaijani nor Georgian representatives would support such an appeal. As a matter of fact, a step such as this would make more difficult the recognition of the Caucasian republics and would create a negative opinion about them to the effect that their governments could not prevent bloodshed in their countries. Topchubashov put this fact before them. Mammad Hasan Hajinski, who took part in the discussions, said, There is some political struggle over the Caucasus between different countries: yesterday the Italians expressed their interest to us, today it is the Americans, tomorrow who knows? It is necessary to approach friendly advice very carefully, otherwise we could become a toy in the hands of any group. It seems to me that the Americans want to declare that there is bloodshed in the Caucasus and it is expected to increase, so that a commission will be sent

The growing interest of the United States  291 there immediately. That means that we ourselves cannot live in the Caucasus without bloodshed and the British headquarters was unable to reconcile us. How would the Britain regard that? As a matter of fact it would strain our relationship with them.74 Participants of the meeting were against the appeal to the conference, but the sending of a commission consisting of civilians was considered possible. The Americans sent a special mission to the Caucasus on their own behalf, not on behalf of the peace conference, as they were not satisfied with the decision reached. The head of the U.S. delegation at Versailles, Frank Lyon Polk, addressed the representatives of the Caucasian republics in Paris in mid-August and informed them about the Harbord mission.75 It was mentioned in a letter sent to Azerbaijani representatives on August 13 that General Harbord, accompanied by twelve officers, would soon arrive. Azerbaijani representatives were asked to inform their government about this and render assistance to General Harbord to allow him to fulfill his duty. At the end of the letter, it was stated that the sending of this mission had to be recognized by Azerbaijan as well as the other Caucasian republics.76 After this, Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles met with the commissioner of the Harbord mission, Colonel Rhea, and provided him with necessary materials. Topchubashov wrote, I met Colonel Rhea several times … he is head of the mission in Azerbaijan. I provided him with necessary materials and thoroughly informed him about the region. It became clear that the conference and the United States of America will not declare its stance in regard to the Caucasus until it finishes its work. It is expected that the mission will be there for three months. Rhea, Hajinski, and I visited the chief of the American mission, Colonel Lodge. Lodge promised to help and said that he would give instructions to include one of our representatives on the committee. You must take advantage of it.77 General James Harbord was a well-known personality in the political circles of the United States. He had been chief of staff in General Pershing’s army. He fought in Europe against Germany and headed the process of bringing the U.S. Army back from Europe after the war was over.78 Harbord was appointed as the head of the special mission for 3 months. The mission left Brest in France in late August and reached Istanbul on September 2. Harbord met with the ambassadors of England, France, and Italy as well as the Swedish ambassador, who was protecting the interests of the United States in the Near East, and continued on his way taking the route passing through Istanbul, Cilicia, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Kharput, Sivas, Erzincan, Kars, Erivan, Tiflis, Baku, and Batum. The mission kept their American counterparts informed of the meetings it held, the events it observed, as well the places it stopped. General Harbord met Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Sivas in mid-September. Harbord was especially interested in Kemal’s Caucasus policy, and their talks would last from 3 to 4 hours. Mustafa Kemal Pasha stated during the meeting: “We entertain

292  The growing interest of the United States no unfriendly dispositions toward the Armenian Republic of which Erivan is the center.”79 But Mustafa Kemal Pasha told Harbord that, in addition to the atrocities against Muslims by the Armenian government in its own territory, it instigated Armenians in other places and even intervened on the border with Turkey. He thought that the “refraining from going to the assistance of the unfortunate Mussulmen population in Armenia and from collaborating with the Mussulmen of Azerbaijan, we consider it indispensable to confine our action and aims to the task of insuring the future existence and welfare of the Fatherland and Nation, within the borders already defined.”80 Mustafa Kemal Pasha approached the question of the American mandate to Anatolia carefully and considered it acceptable only for economic aid and as long as Wilson’s “fourteen points” would be strictly followed.81 The report presented to Harbord within that meeting reflected that Armenians killed 3,000 Turkish civilians in Erzurum on March 11–12, 1918.82 The governor general of Erzurum, Zakir Efendi, showed General Harbord the places of the slaughter of Muslims by Armenians and the mass graves.83 Harbord’s convoy started from Sivas to Erzincan and Erzurum, moving along the old Russian-Turkish borders before reaching Kars. Harbord wrote to Istanbul that great kindness was shown by the Turks along the route and that few Armenians were living in those territories. He mentioned that he often met nomadic Muslim caravans driven into exile by Armenians. Thousands of displaced Muslim families tried to persuade Harbord that “they had been victims of murder and oppression.” Harbord wrote to representatives of the allies in Istanbul on September 28 about the terrible situation he saw in the eastern provinces of Turkey, which had been pillaged by the Armenians, and the most terrible event that they saw while passing through Turkey was the cleansing of areas of their inhabitants, these territories now being uninhabited. There was no one living in many of the cities through which the mission passed, and the settlements had been razed. According to General Harbord, it was as if there was no life in these parts of Turkey except the towns on the coasts of the Mediterranean and Black Seas. He wrote, “As if all the Ottoman Empire is exhausted”84 But neither General Harbord, nor any of the other members of the mission included in their report any details based on the disasters that they witnessed with their own eyes in eastern Anatolia. A professor at the University of Louisville, Justin McCarthy, was correct in his claim that the mission was not interested in exposing the truth. He concluded that the later comments of mission members showed that the questions they had posed to the Turks were not aimed at unraveling the events that had happened in eastern Anatolia beginning 1914. Instead, questions were asked to elicit the factors hindering the establishment of an independent Armenian government in eastern Anatolia. McCarthy wrote in connection with the final recommendation of the mission that the Americans had made their decision long ago and, in their “expert opinion,” it was determined from the beginning that the Turks had to be found guilty. Harbord’s last report was ready even before the departure of the mission and was based on materials supplied by Armenians. Most of the report was dedicated to issues that the mission had not studied. If a dead Turk was mentioned in this report, it was referred to as a consequence of military life, but the death of

The growing interest of the United States  293 Armenians was recorded as the result of massacre.85 The flaws of this report are made more obvious in the deliberate “losing” of Captain Emory Niles’s and Arthur Sutherland’s information, which was not included. During 3 months, these two officers visited on horseback all the villages of Van and Bitlis that suffered the most from Armenian actions. The information gathered by them did not fit with Harbord’s intentions. Justin McCarthy, who found these “lost” materials many years later, noted that most of Niles’s observations were contrary to Harbord’s. Captain Niles’s information was the most neutral of all the American investigators’ reports from eastern Anatolia after the war; only Niles and his partner Arthur Sutherland approached the truth. They conducted interviews with people, made observations, and visited villages in search of the truth. They asked the local people what happened to them during the war. Some of the information was obtained from Caucasian refugees who were “living history,” and this information was enough to make suspect the claims of Armenians concerning the Armenian-Turkish wars. The facts gathered by Niles and Sutherland differed from others in that they came to the Caucasus to find dead Armenians but found only dead Muslims everywhere.86 Emory Niles’s and Arthur Sutherland’s “lost” reports brought to light just how subjective in character are the claims of Armenian genocide. Reports of attempted destruction of the Armenian race were shocking to Americans when published in New York in 1918 by the U.S. Ambassador to Istanbul from 1913 to 1916, Henry Morgenthau, but they were unsubstantiated, being founded on information given only by Armenians.87 After Erivan and Tiflis, Harbord, as the head of the American mission, came to Baku on October 5, being accompanied by three generals and fifteen specialists. The American mission had come to collect information in Azerbaijan as it had already done in Georgia and Armenia. Some of the information they hoped to find dealt with the local attitude to the mandate, the political-financial system, trade, health, population, natural resources, geography, post and telegraph services, and military issues to name a few. General Harbord, who was at Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev’s, also held talks with Prime Minister Nasib Usubbeyov, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Minister of Roads, Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov, and other officials.88 Harbord was given a broad but detailed briefing about the Azerbaijani parliament and government, the situation of public education, the legal system and the activity of the courts, administration forms for the provinces, and especially the electoral system, which he was very interested in.89 Colonel Hill and others from the mission team were in Bibi-Heybat, Black City, and other industrial areas around Baku. The official state newspaper Azerbaijan notified its readers that talks with the American mission revealed that Harbord was pleased with the economic and political situation of the Azerbaijan Republic and said that the independence of Azerbaijan would soon be recognized by the peace conference.90 Harbord stated repeatedly the necessity of ironing out the differences between Azerbaijan and Armenia, expressed his satisfaction on the order existing in Azerbaijan and especially the discipline of Azerbaijani soldiers, and viewed all these things as indicators of Azerbaijan’s readiness for independence. The general said that he

294  The growing interest of the United States was hopeful the peace conference would take into consideration all the wishes and desires of the Azerbaijani people.91 The Armenian population of the city and their national organizations took advantage of Harbord’s short visit to Baku. Concentrating on Harbord’s visits to Tiflis and Baku, Armenian national organizations and Armenian churches in both cities presented General Harbord with documents relaying Armenian demands. Armenian representatives who met with Harbord in Istanbul informed the diplomatic representative in Baku, Tigran A. Bekzadian, on September 18, through the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that General Harbord was interested to know whether Armenian industrialists, merchants, and engineers-technicians living in other places would come to Armenia in the event of the establishment of an independent and free Armenia. Bekzadian was recruited to persuade Harbord that Armenian industrialists, merchants, and specialists in all sectors would flock to Armenia if an independent “Great Armenia” was established.92 Armenians living in Baku followed these recommendations and presented Harbord an appeal on behalf of the Armenian population of Baku. It said: If the Armenian republic is politically recognized as a result of the humanist policy of the American people and its statesmen, we solemnly pledge on behalf of the Baku Armenian Society that we shall do our best for the prosperity of our historical native land.93 The appeal was made to appear as if everything in Azerbaijan belonged to Armenians, and most interesting was the fact that the name “Azerbaijan” was not used. Baku Armenians told Harbord that Armenians living in Central Asia, Grozny, Vladikavkaz, and other places would help Armenia with what wealth they had. The appeal ended, “Inform your state that Baku Armenians have not broken off relations with their motherland, as have many Armenians living abroad, they live with its joy and sadness and are ready to spend all the power they have for its prosperity.”94 Included was a falsified description of events that had occurred in 1918–1919, which was presented to the American Mission by Baku Armenians. Along with mentioning the Armenians’ claims of fighting for “the holy work” of the Entente, information was presented to the effect that Turkish soldiers and officers were living in places where Muslims lived as they had before the Ottoman army left the South Caucasus and were continuing to struggle against Armenia by getting aid from the Turkish and Azerbaijani governments. Even more absurd ideas were presented to sway the Americans. For example, that by occupying Garabagh and Zangezur regions, Azerbaijan was taking the first step in the uniting of Araz and the South-West Caucasus Republic to its territory and wanted to establish an allMuslim state that would stretch from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and be in alliance with Turkey. According to Armenia, this was occurring because they believed the Allies were waiting for the decision of the peace conference on disputed territories, and during this waiting period “the Azerbaijani government violated the instructions of the peace conference by causing the rebellion of Muslims together with Turks in the territory of Armenia” who then went on to

The growing interest of the United States  295 occupy historical Armenian “lands.” The situation of Garabagh Armenians who were subjugated to the Azerbaijani government95 was presented in dire terms by Baku Armenians. They detailed how their fellow Armenians had their ties cut with the Republic of Armenia and were deprived of military supplies.96 The Armenian community in Baku presented Harbord many documents focusing on Armenia’s historical and ethnic right to Garabagh, Zangezur, Nakhchivan, Sharur, and Kars.97 On the October 8, the Harbord mission would leave Batum for Paris directly from Baku. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Yusif Jafarov accompanied Harbord to Batum and outlined clearly to him several necessary issues of the republic’s internal and external policy. Americans organized a banquet aboard the George Washington in Batum to mark the arrival of the Azerbaijan Minister of Foreign Affairs. The banquet included Georgians in the Azerbaijani consulate and was held in James G. Harbord’s honor. In Batum during talks with Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives, the Americans especially emphasized the work done by the Azerbaijani government, by capable and efficient men who had overcome many obstacles.98 General Harbord took special note that Azerbaijan’s peaceloving foreign policy had instilled a favorable opinion in him.99 Before leaving Batum, General Harbord sent a letter of gratitude to Nasib Usubbeyov for the pleasant impressions he had received during his visit. Harbord wrote, I and the officers in my mission take along our best memories of your people and country and it is our sincere hope that the negative view held by some countries of the world that was created by your neighbors will not hinder your prosperity.100 The mission arrived in Paris on October 16 and presented a report on their visit to the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State in Versailles, Frank L. Polk, and a little later to the U.S. State Department and Senate.101 The brief thrust of Harbord’s report was that none of the three republics were sound from a Western point of view. To his mind, the economic and financial systems in Caucasus were badly damaged. He stated that the “Red danger,” the danger of Bolshevism, was strong in Georgia, there was a shortage of local administrative personnel in Azerbaijan, and Armenia remained in ruins. The political direction of all three republics was defined thus by Harbord: “Russian Armenia would to-day probably vote a mandate to Russia if that power were reconstituted. Georgia recalls its ancient independence and was never thoroughly reconciled to Russia rule. Azerbaijan, Tartar and Moslem feels a double tie to Turkey and distrusts the Christian, but the intelligent people realize that outside control is inevitable and even necessary to their relations with Christain countries and that Turkey is beyond consideration.”102 It was Harbord’s view that the Caucasus had to be united under a single mandate, but to give the mandate only to Armenia would cause problems. He realized very well as a military officer that not two or even four regiments, but an army in excess of 60,000 men would be needed to establish peace in the region.103 In autumn 1919, the American army was preparing to leave Europe.

296  The growing interest of the United States The situation of the Turks in Armenia, which was one of the most important tasks of Harbord’s mission, was presented in a more complicated form. Even Georgian representative Z. Avalov wrote, “Sometimes it seems that you have been sent to undermine the idea of the American mandate over Armenia.”104 General Harbord informed the political circles of the United States in his report that Turks were in the majority in the areas that were considered for Armenian occupation. Even if all Armenian refugees who fled their homes returned back to those territories, Turks would still make up the majority of the population.105 Harbord also noted that, on a personal basis, many American missionaries preferred Turks to Armenians.106 Harbord presented fourteen arguments in favor of and thirteen against the American mandate. But as the first fourteen arguments were weak, it was easy to argue against the implementation of an American mandate to Armenia with the last thirteen. According to Harbord “the taking of a mandate in this region would bring the United States into the politics of the Old World, contrary to our traditional policy of keeping free of affairs in the Eastern Hemisphere.”107 After studying the Armenian issue deeply, Harbord came to the conclusion that “without visiting the Near East it is not possible for an American to realize even faintly the respect, faith, and affection with which our country is regarded throughout that region.”108 Topchubashov tried to meet with Harbord during the time he stopped in Paris, but he could not. Ali Mardan Bey wrote, The head of American mission to the Caucasus, General Harbord, passed through Paris and returned back to America a week ago. He stayed here only for two days. I sent a messenger twice to him to settle on a time to meet. His secretary answered that the general would be glad to meet and he would let them know the time of meeting himself. What a pity that we could not see him. It was reported in newspapers [Le Temps] that on General Harbord’s arrival President Wilson personally led discussions on Caucasian issues. It was thought that the mandate over Armenia was not the way to proceed, based on the information presented.109 The report prepared by General Harbord on the results of his mission leads one to conclude that he was in favor of uniting the South Caucasus and Istanbul under a common mandate but was against the United States taking on this mandate. The Harbord mission brought to an end the interest of the United States in the Caucasus; it also mentioned the unsupportive attitude of Armenia, which became known in political circles of the United States. *** A thorough analysis of information and documents shows that though the United States had strong military, political, economic, and strategic interests in the Caucasus, it was not able to defend the Caucasian republics from the growing northern danger in an effective way. Conversely, after World War I, the European allies were not only reluctant to allow United States involvement in the Caucasus but were even

The growing interest of the United States  297 more jealous of its inroads into the Near East. The United States had to await the end of World War II in order to strengthen its influence in this region.

Notes 1. Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster, 1994, pp. 225–226. 2. For more details, see: Jamil Hassanov (Hasanli), “Azerbaijani-American Relations in 1918–1920: A Page in Their History.” Caspian Crossroads, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Spring– Summer 1996, pp. 1–9. 3. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 226. 4. Г. Гамбашидзе (G. Gambashidze), Из истории политики США в отношении Грузии (History of the U.S. Policy with respect to Georgia). Tbilisi, 1960, p. 37. 5. В. И. Адамия (V. I. Adamiya), Из истории Английской интервенции в Грузии (1918–1921 гг.) (From the History of English Intervention in Georgia [1918–1921]). Sukhumi, 1961, p. 127. 6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. VII, p. 28. 7. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. X, pp. 482–483. 8. Ibid., p. 532. 9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. VI, p. 741. 10. Гамбашидзе, Из истории политики США в отношении Грузии, p. 38. 11. Ibid., p. 42. 12. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. VII, p. 858. 13. М. И. Найдель and Ю. В. Согомонов (M. I. Naydel and Y. V.Sogomonov), “К истории интервенции США в Закавказье,” История СССР (“On the Intervention of the USA in the Caucasus,” Istoriya SSSR). 1961, No.3, p. 35. 14. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 20, p. 2. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Information of M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers on the Results of the Negotiations held with W. Thomson, Commander-in-Chief of the Allies in Baku. 07.05.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 60, p. 3. 18. Борьба (Borba), August 28–September 2, 1919. 19. The Project of W. Haskell, the American Supreme Commissioner in Armenia, on Establishment of the American Governorship-General in Nakhchivan and SharurDereleyez. 01.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 93, pp. 3–4. 20. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 27, p. 7. 21. Note of Protest Submitted by A. M. Topchubashov to the Representatives of the Peace Conference of Allies against uniting Kars Province to the Armenian Republic and giving Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli provinces, a part of territory of Erivan province to Armenia. 19.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 58; La Question de Nakhitchevan. Note Presentee A le Conference de la Paix Par la Delegation de L’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No: 2, p. 2. 22. La Question de Nakhitchevan. Note Presentee a le Conference de La Paix Par La Delegation de L’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No. 2, pp. 1–4.

298  The growing interest of the United States 23. Note of Protest Submitted by A. M. Topchubashov to the Representatives of the Peace Conference of Allies against uniting Kars Province to the Armenian Republic and giving Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli provinces, a part of territory of Erivan province to Armenia. 19.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 56; La Question de Nakhitchevan. Note Presentee a le Conference de La Paix Par La Delegation de L’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No: 2, p. 1; For more details, see I.Musayev, Azərbaycanın Naxçıvan və Zəngəzur bölgələrində siyasi vəziyyət və xarici dövlətlərin siyasəti (1917–1921-ci illər) (Political Situation and Policies of Foreign States in Nakhchivan and Zangezur Regions of Azerbaijan [1917–1921]). Baku, 1996. 24. Note of M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to General-Major G. N. Cory, Commander of the British Forces in the Caucasus. 30.04.1919. SAAR, f. 2898, r. 1, v. 6, p. 2. 25. Note of Protest Submitted by A. M. Topchubashov to the Representatives of the Peace Conference of Allies against uniting Kars Province to the Armenian Republic and giving Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli provinces, a part of territory of Erivan province to Armenia. 19.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 58); La Question de Nakhitchevan. Note Presentee a le Conference de La Paix Par La Delegation de L’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No. 2, p. 2. 26. Note of Protest Submitted by A. M. Topchubashov to the Representatives of the Peace Conference of Allies against uniting Kars Province to the Armenian Republic and giving Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez, Surmeli provinces, a part of territory of Erivan province to Armenia. 19.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 60–61; La Question de Nakhitchevan. Note Presentee a le Conference de La Paix Par La Delegation de L’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No. 2, p. 3. 27. Гражданское управление Закавказьем от присоединения Грузии до наместничества Великого князя Михаила Николаевича. Исторический очерки (Civil Administration of the Caucasus from unification of Georgia to rule of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich. Historical sketches).Tiflis, 1901, p. 229. 28. Letters of Temporary Governor-General of Nakhchivan, Ordubad, Sharur-Dereleyez and Vedibazar provinces, to the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia. October-December, 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 104, pp. 2–95. 29. Armenia until the last Armenian-Turkish War. 28.02.1921. RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 1, v. 2797, p. 22. 30. Ideological Situation during Zangezur Operation. July, 1921. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 13, v. 75, p. 2. 31. Considérations générales sur l’organisation du Caucase en cantons. Annexe No. 1 au rapport No. 1 du 10 décembre 1918. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 19. 32. La Question de Nakhitchevan. Note Presentee a le Conference de La Paix Par La Delegation de l’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No. 2, pp. 3–4. 33. Letter of A. Aharonian, Head of the Armenian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. September, 1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 29, p. 6. 34. Copy of the Report “Entente, Bolshevism and Islam” presented by A.Sagatelian, the Representative of the Armenian Republic in Azerbaijan. 1920. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 38, p. 2. 35. The Project of W. Haskell, the American Supreme Commissioner in Armenia, on Establishment of the American Governorship-General in Nakhchivan and SharurDereleyez. 27.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 93, pp. 3–5. 36. Ibid., p. 6.

The growing interest of the United States  299 37. Letter of M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, to W. Haskell, the American Supreme Commissioner in Transcaucasia. 29.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 93, p. 9. 38. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), October 23, 1919. 39. Ibid. 40. Ciphered telegram of M. K. Tekinski, the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia, to M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 11.07.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 54, p. 52. 41. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 213, p. 9. 42. Telegram of W. Haskell, Supreme Commissioner of the Allied States in Transcaucasia, to M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 93, p. 9. 43. Note of M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to W. Haskell, Supreme Commissioner of the Allied States in Transcaucasia. 04.10.1919. APDPARA, f. 277, r. 2, v. 18, p. 18. 44. Telegram of W. Haskell, Supreme Commissioner of the Allied States in Transcaucasia, to M. Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 26.10.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 93, p. 7. 45. Information of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Azerbaijani Delegation in Versailles. October, 1919. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 20, p. 2. 46. La situation de la population musulmane dans la Republique d’Armenie. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No. 3, pp. 4–6; Note of M. Y. Jafarov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Armenian Republic. 22.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 184, pp. 16–17); Note de l’Azerbaidjan a l’Armenie. 22 septembre 1919. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 15 Decembre, No. 5, pp. 1–2. 47. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), September 23, 1919. 48. Information of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Azerbaijani Delegation in Versailles. October, 1919. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 20, p. 7. 49. Azərbaycan arxivi (Azerbaijan Arkhivi), 1988, No. 1–2, p. 153. 50. Information of S. Jamillinski, acting Governor-General of Nakhchivan, to A. Hagverdiyev, the Azerbaijani Diplomatic Representative in Armenia on Reception of Power of Attorney of the USA in Nakhchivan by Colonel Daley. 26.10.1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 57, p. 12. 51. Q. Mədətov (G. Madatov), Naxçıvanda Sovet hakimiyyətinin qələbəsi və Naxçıvan MSSR-in yaradılması (Victory of the Soviet Power in Nakhchivan and Establishment of Nakhchivan Autonomous SSR). Baku, 1958, pp. 59–60. 52. Telegram of O. Wardrop, the British Supreme Commissioner in Tiflis to the Azerbaijani and Armenian Governments. 16.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 144, p. 50. 53. Treaty between the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenian Republic. 23.11.1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 29, pp. 1–2. 54. Entente conclue entre le Président Khatissov, Représentant le Gouvernement de l’Arménie, et le Président Oussoubekov, Représentant le Gouvernement d’Azerbaïdjan. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 140. 55. Note on the Conference held in the Office of the Allied High Commissioner between Prime Minister Usubbeyov of Azerbaijan and Colonel Rhea. 22.11.1919. Foreign Policy of Democratic Republic of the Azerbaijan. Documents. Baku, 2009, p. 13. 56. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace conference. 1919, vol. IX. U.S. Government Printing office. Washington, 1946, pp. 606–607; Télégramme de Constantinople en date du 1° décembre 1919, adressé par le Colonel Haskell. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 148  ; Délégation Américaine Télégramme de Constantinople en date du 1er décembre 1919, adressé par le Colonel Haskell. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 127; Commission américaine pour la

300  The growing interest of the United States 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

négociation de la paix Paris, le 5 décembre 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 130. Le Commandant de Nonancourt, Chef P. I. de la Mission Militaire Française au Caucase, à Monsieur le Ministre de la Guerre, Etat-Major de l’Armée—2ème Bureau. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 142. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), December 3, 1919. Response Note of the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs. December, 1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 112, p. 20. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика (The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. Foreign Policy). Baku, 1998, p. 452. Information of W. Haskell, the Allied Supreme Commissioner in Transcaucasia to M.Y. Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 11.12.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 95, p. 22. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, pp. 11–12. Ibid., p. 13. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 228. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace conference, v. IX, p. 167. Ibid., p. 168. Адамия, Из истории Английской интервенции в Грузии, p. 129. Гамбашидзе, Из истории политики США в отношении Грузии, p. 47. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914–1956. London, 1963, p. 102. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace conference, vol. IX, p. 180. Б. Е. Штейн (B. E. Shtein.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (“Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949, p. 346. Information of the Commission for Support to the Middle East under Supervision of USA to the Secretary of Diplomatic Mission of the Azerbaijan Republic in Georgia. 12.11.1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 111, pp. 154–155. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 228. Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Republic of Mountaineers Delegations in the Paris Peace Conference. 12.06.1919.SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 176–177. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No. 3, p. 7. Letter of F. Polk, Head of the US Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, to A. M. Topchubashov. 13.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 46. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 69. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), September 19, 1919. Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. by Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord. U.S. Army. Washington, Goverment Printing Office,1920, p. 33. Ibid., p. 35. Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland on American Investigation of Eastern Anatolia after World War I.” XI. Türk Tarih konqresi, cilt V (11th Congress of Turkish History, volume V). Ankara, 1994, p. 1820. Enver Konukcu, Ermenilerin Yeşilyayladakı Türk soykırımı (11–12 mart 1918) (Massacre of Turks Committed by Armenians in Yeshilyayla [March 11–12, 1918]). Ankara, 1990, p. 36. Enver Konukcu, “Erzurum tarihi,” Erzurum (“History of Erzurum,” Erzurum). Ankara, 1986, p. 14.

The growing interest of the United States  301 84. Copy of the Letter sent by General Harbord to the Supreme Commissioner of the Allied States in Istanbul. 28.09.1919. APDPARA, f. 276, p. 9, v. 26, p. 27. 85. McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland,” pp. 1819–1820. 86. Ibid., p. 1821–1822. 87. Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. New York, 1918. For more details, see Heath W. Lowry, The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. Istanbul, 1990. 88. L’Azerbaidjan et la mission americaine. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Janvier, No. 6, pp. 2–3. 89. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика, pp. 366– 367. 90. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), October 7, 1919. 91. Azərbaycan arxivi, 1988, No. 1–2, pp. 147–148. 92. Letter of the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to T. Bekzadian, Diplomatic Representative in Baku. 18.09.1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 26, p. 26. 93. Letter of the Armenian Population of Baku to General James Harbord. October, 1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 26, p. 29. 94. Letter of the Armenian Population of Baku to General James Harbord. October, 1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 26, p. 38. 95. See Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No. 3, p. 8. 96. Report on the Events which Happened in 1918–1919 in Baku, submitted by the Armenian Organizations to General Harbord. October, 1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 26, p. 41. 97. Ibid. pp. 42–48. 98. L’Azerbaidjan et la mission americaine. Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Janvier, No. 6, pp. 2–3. 99. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 20, p. 4. 100. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), October 21, 1919. 101. Conditions in the Near East, p. 44. 102. Ibid., p. 14. 103. Найдель and Согомонов, “К истории интервенции США в Закавказье,” p. 33. 104. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 231. 105. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933, p. 126. 106. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 231. 107. Conditions in the Near East, p. 26. 108. Ibid., 28; Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 126. 109. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov to F. K. Khoyski, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 06–10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 11.

11 Lobbying in the United States and the spread of national propaganda in Western Europe

From autumn 1919, the international situation began to change for the newly established republic. The defining factor during this period was the defeat of Russian White Guard forces. The defeat of General Nikolai Yudenich and Admiral Alexander Kolchak, along with the hopeless struggle of Anton Denikin, had finally quashed the ideal of a “united and indivisible Russia.” This circumstance was welcomed within the Entente’s political circles that saw the establishment of a unified Russia under the Bolsheviks as a serious threat to Europe. Any plans for cooperation with Germany were exhausted as a result of the harsh conditions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Russia for its part received more leeway as, prompted by the Entente states, attempts were made to make peace with the newly established republics. On August 31, 1919, the Soviet government entered into peace negotiations with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland, which had for a long time been expecting recognition by the Entente states. The Treaty of Versailles and the Paris Peace Conference were regarded negatively by the U.S. Senate as well as by some of the Allies. The treaty caused bitter resentment between the Allied powers, and new dimensions emerged in international relations. Both the treaty and the conference required the Azerbaijani government, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its delegation in Paris to adapt its foreign policy to the emerging international situation, and that raised the possibility of establishing bilateral relations with the United States. The Republic of Azerbaijan and its delegation in Paris put in their best efforts to establish economic and political relations with the United States. The U.S. economy had emerged stronger after World War I, and politically the United States had become one of the countries that defined world policy and the new world order. During the initial postwar years, the United States assumed the role of chief banker of the world. U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing described the United States as an economic and future political sovereign of the world. President Woodrow Wilson was recognized as the main architect of the new postwar world order, the defender of the newly established states, and friend of minorities. Yet during the Paris Peace Conference, he displayed a cold disposition toward the Caucasus republics that yearned for recognition while he welcomed Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and other new states. Although the

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  303 right of “self-determination” was one of the Fourteen Points that Wilson declared in January 1918, the phrase did not seem applicable to minorities in the Russian empire; the sudden emergence of “breakaway” republics on the territory of the old empire was, for Wilson, absolutely preposterous. In reality, the U.S. president and political circles and the American public were more or less ignorant of the situation of these newly emerging republics. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov realized this and undertook the task of publicizing Azerbaijan and the Republic of Georgia to the U.S. mainstream. On September 26, Topchubashov, in order to familiarize President Wilson with the political aspects of Azerbaijan, sent a letter and various documents to the latter through Walter Chandler, a member of United States House of Representatives. In his letter, he reminisced about Wilson’s presence during the reception held by the Azerbaijani delegation commemorating the first anniversary of Azerbaijani independence on May 28, 1919. He stated that the meeting had been a memorable event for them and that We consider you as a contemporary apostle who proclaimed the great gospel of Peace. Liberty and friendly relations between the nations, especially small nations, who were called to life, national and political self determination by your principles. As representatives of one of such people, the Azerbaijani people, we gained from you attention to our words, the certainty that our nation will find in great America and you Mr. President, defenders and supporters in its sacred cause of the defence of its liberty and independence.1 Taking into consideration President Wilson’s scant knowledge about Azerbaijan, Topchubashov included a copy of the Declaration of Independence of Azerbaijan, an economic map showing the borders and the economic and financial situation of Azerbaijan, as well as a paper outlining the national-ethnic composition of the Azerbaijani population together with an ethnographic map.2 There was another reason why it was necessary to extend relations with the United States. Another cause for concern was the establishment by diaspora Armenians of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia in the United States. This committee not only publicized the newfound independence of Armenia but also attempted to put both Azerbaijan and Georgia in a bad light. It was, therefore, considered necessary and important to rally the U.S. public around Azerbaijan, to counteract bad impressions created by Armenian propaganda, and to better inform U.S. political circles that needed to see the country from a broader perspective. It was for this purpose that, in September 1919, Topchubashov, with the participation of representative from the Baltic states, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, acquired the services, in two agreements, of an American lawyer, former New York congressman Walter Chandler, in relation to the Paris Peace Conference.3 Chandler, according to the first agreement, was appointed as an advisor for legal affairs and in that capacity undertook to defend and protect the independence and interests of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The duration of the agreement ran for 3 months, and Chandler was compensated with $5,000 for his services, of which half was paid upon the signing of the agreement and the balance to be

304  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda paid not later than December 1, 1919. It was mutually agreed by the parties that the agreement came into force from the moment of signing. The Azerbaijani side guaranteed parliamentary approval of the agreement. In addition to this contract, the parties developed a second agreement that had a longer duration and began on October 4. One of Chandler’s obligations under the second agreement was to launch a propaganda campaign in the United States in behalf of Azerbaijan.4 The preface of the second agreement stated, In accordance with this agreement the chairman of the parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan and head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Conference, Topchubashov, by the power issued to him by the Republic of Azerbaijan, agrees to engage the services provided by Mr. Walter M. Chandler, a resident of New York City, in his capacity as a legal advisor, to engage in propaganda for the protection and interests of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan in the United States of America. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the signed agreement, Topchubashov is obliged to pay Chandler [US]$50,000 for services rendered as soon as the United States of America recognizes the independence of Azerbaijan. The agreement also stated that in the event the United States failed to recognize the sovereignty of Azerbaijan as an independent nation, no compensation would be given to Chandler by the Azerbaijani party. Upon the endorsement and subsequent approval of the agreement by the Azerbaijani parliament, the agreement came into force with the signing by Topchubashov and Chandler, respectively, and was finally stamped with the seal of the Azerbaijani government.5 The Republic of Georgia for its part entered into a similar agreement with Chandler. Subsequently, Topchubashov wrote in a letter addressed to the Azerbaijani government, In respect to agreement with the U.S. lawyer Chandler, I should also make mention that this lawyer also represents Estlandia [Estonia], Lithuania, and Letonia [Latvia], as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is necessary for us to take such action, as we need somebody to work for the protection our interests in the United States.6 After Chandler’s subsequent return to the United States, Topchubashov met with Henry Morgenthau Jr., a member of the U.S. delegation who also was in attendance in Paris and was shortly leaving for Washington. Topchubashov asked Morgenthau whether he could offer assistance to Chandler, whom he knew well. Morgenthau agreed and advised Topchubashov that “It would serve Azerbaijan well to have its own representative office in the United States.” During the conversation, Morgenthau expressed that the United States was a friend to all minorities. We are pleased to provide all of you with assistance, but we cannot settle everything within the bounds of international policy. I have seen from your document that Azerbaijan is a rich country and will be

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  305 able to live independently. You are much welcome in the United States and perhaps you can find the capital for your resources here.7 It was for certain that the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris took the latter part of Morgenthau’s words to heart. With the aim of establishing economic relations with the United States, Max Rabinoff, an American businessman, was retained as advisor to the Azerbaijan delegation for financial affairs, and soon a service agreement was signed with him. The agreement called for Rabinoff to organize the purchase of oil from Azerbaijan by prospective companies in line with current world prices, to present Azerbaijan to U.S. financial institutions that could give the country the credit it needed, and to purchase goods manufactured in the United States on behalf of Azerbaijan.8 In turn, Rabinoff obtained a 3 percent commission on these operations. The engagement of Rabinoff was discussed during joint meetings held on August 23 and September 18 by the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations.9 The term of service for Rabinoff was a 6-month period with the option of an extension upon request of the parties. As soon as Rabinoff arrived in the United States, P. I. Thomas, a director of the Standard Oil Company of New York, contacted Rabinoff and expressed his desire to engage in long-term agreements on purchasing oil from Baku. Thomas had already opened negotiations on oil purchases in Baku in June, 1919. In his telegram dated November 1, Rabinoff informed Topchubashov about the new prospect and asked for consent to conduct negotiations with the Standard Oil Company,10 to which soon after a preliminary purchase of £12 million sterling of kerosene was made by the company. Subsequently, an agreement was signed between Thomas and the Minister of Railway Communications, Khudadat Bey Melik-Aslanov, on July, 1919. The agreement called for Azerbaijan to produce 6 million pounds of kerosene sold at $34 per ton for the Standard Oil Company until January 31, 1920.11 In return, Azerbaijan purchased 40,000 tons of grain at $2.50 per poods [16.38 kg] from the United States.12 In the United States, both Chandler and Rabinoff asked the Republic of Azerbaijan to send a member of the Azerbaijani delegation, Mahammad Maharramov, to the United States on a diplomatic mission in order to clarify several political, economic, and legal matters.13 For that reason, Abbas Bey Atamalibeyov, a member of the Socialist party and the Azerbaijani parliament, was sent to Versailles, on the orders of Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Yusif Jafarov, to replace his colleague Maharramov, who was bound for the United States.14 The head of the delegation, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov, for his part was against the idea of having proxies. He wrote, To automatically substitute a person with another without taking into consideration whether it is feasible for the proxy to be subject to the undertaking of another is not tolerable. It was understandable why the addition of a new person to the composition of the delegation was not favored by some. The simple difficulty lies in the smooth transition when necessary changes in work-related matters are needed and the proxy is entitled to make those changes without full knowledge of the event preceding their reassignment. Furthermore, decisions of the party relating to such changes should be

306  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda announced beforehand. Certainly, I am not against temporary replacement. But, I should note, however, that the delegation consists of individuals from different party affiliations who came together today for the interest of a united Azerbaijan, and it is this interest that has prevailed so far among the parties. 15 Finally, the representatives of the Socialist party in Versailles came to an agreement on this issue. Abbas Atamalibeyov, who arrived in Paris on October 9, was added to the Azerbaijani delegation and took over as secretary. He replaced Hajinski, a member of the delegation in Paris who temporarily had to return to Baku. Maharramov remained as part of the delegation as a staff member. On October 18, Walter Chandler from the United States sent Topchubashov his initial repor. He wrote that launching a lobbying campaign in the United States for Georgia and Azerbaijan was difficult, mainly because they were unfamiliar to Americans and neither country had a diaspora like the Ukrainians, Latvians, and Armenians. Chandler further noted that “the main obstacle in getting the president [Wilson] on our side is his protracted illness. Since the recognition of the independence of another country depends on a decision made by the executive body of our government, everything should start with the president.” Chandler stated that he would undoubtedly meet with the president after he recovered and would forward Topchubashov’s letter to Wilson along with materials pertaining to Azerbaijan. He said that he had been distributing materials given to him by the Azerbaijani delegation among U.S. senators. He said that when the president returned to work, “I shall forward the Azerbaijani Declaration of Independence to the Senate and Congress.” He also affirmed that he was doing his best in order for Topchubashov and Georgian representative Avalov to come to the United States.16 In a letter to Chandler, Topchubashov informed him about the atmosphere prevailing at the conference in relation to the Caucasus and the perception of Azerbaijan as well as detailed information about Denikin and other matters. Topchubashov met with a member of the U.S. delegation, William H. Buckler, who introduced him to Henry Morgenthau. Buckler asked a number of questions about the situation prevailing in the Caucasus. One particular bit of information pertaining to the Armenians in the Caucasus piqued Buckler’s interest. At the end of the conversation he thanked Topchubashov, adding, “We have known your neighbor for a while and we do not think of them as angels.”17 Notwithstanding Buckler’s words, it was known that the Armenians pretended to be “angels” on the other side of the ocean. The chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia in the United States, ex-ambassador of the United States of America to Berlin, James W. Gerard, long implored the United States to save the “long-suffering Armenians” by all means and to save the “Christian temples.” On September 28, this appeal was disseminated to all U.S. cities with the message “The Armenians are in danger of extermination.” A telegram that was received from representatives of the Armenian republic said that Armenia was sending a final plea for Christian America to save them. It said that if Armenians perished, then the Christian church would be marred forever.

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  307 We kindly ask you to send a telegram, write letters to the president of the United States of America, and urge him to take reasonable measures to save Armenia. We ask every man and woman to write a telegram to the president and to the senators of their state and call upon them to take urgent measures to save Armenia. Our executive committee knows that the president has the power to provide assistance and he is obliged to help. Armenia is on the verge of ruin and the final word rests with the United States. Chandler sent the appeal to Topchubashov with a message that it was necessary to establish such committees and appeals in the struggle for recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia.18 When Armenian representatives Hovhannes Kachaznuni, Artashes Enfiajian, and Artem Piralian visited the United States, James W. Gerard’s committee invited all the members of the House of Representatives including Walter Chandler to attend a breakfast given in honor of an ex-prime minister of Armenia. To all intents and purposes, this was a form of propaganda. Chandler sent copies of the letter and the invitation to Topchubashov. Kachaznuni told the U.S. politicians in attendance at the reception, “If you supply Armenia with weapons, then you can be assured that the Turks, Kurds, and Tatars will not dare to break the Armenian people’s peace and tranquility.”19 After listening to Kachaznuni, Warren G. Harding, a guest at the reception and soon to be elected U.S. president, introduced a resolution in the U.S. Senate expressing sympathy for the Armenians’ “plight.” The resolution consisted of four articles that were drafted on the basis of Gerard’s report. The resolution called for the federal government to recognize the Armenian republic; to provide enough food, weapons, and military supplies to Armenia to maintain an army of 30,000 soldiers; to allow Armenians living in the United States to establish a reserve division of 10,000 men; and to organize an Armenian reserve division of 10,000 men in Istanbul and Bulgaria and send these reserve troops to Armenia; to affirm U.S. support for Armenian independence as well as the establishment of an Armenian state encompassing the “Armenian provinces” of eastern Anatolia and Cilicia.20 In his letter of November 1, Chandler noted that Christians in the United States attached a great deal of importance to the Armenian question. Any Senator or Congressman that I have met shares the same opinion: Azerbaijanis should not be given too much attention because they are Turks, Tatars, and Muslims. I tried to explain that Azerbaijan was engaged in a military alliance with Georgia, a Christian nation, and that both states had recently signed a mutual defense pact which the Armenians were also invited to join.21 In a written reply to Chandler’s letter, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations in Paris agreed to his proposal “to establish a propaganda committee without running into controversy with the Armenians.”22 On November 3, Rabinoff sent a letter to the Azerbaijani delegation stating that he had accomplished a lot of work and had goods amounting to $15 million en route to Azerbaijan. In regard to the

308  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda credit the Republic of Azerbaijan requested, Rabinoff stated that the difficulty in securing the required amount was that the U.S. financial institutions were hesitant to give credit to an unknown country. Rabinoff wanted to accomplish this through an intermediary country. Rabinoff told Topchubashov that he was leaving for Paris on December 5 and that he would accompany a large group of businessmen to Baku.23 It is worth mentioning that the most important contribution Rabinoff made in the United States was the establishment of the American-Caucasus Chamber of Commerce. It was an association that would play a key role in commercial and economic relations with Azerbaijan. The conventional approach of the United States toward the newly established states within the former Russian empire was emphasized in Chandler’s letter to Topchubashov on November 10. He wrote that upon raising the matter of recognizing Azerbaijani independence before the State Department, it was evident that the United States was awaiting the outcome of the Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich campaigns. Chandler said that the defeat of the Russian White Guard had begun to shift the U.S. State Department’s attitude toward the new republics to a more lukewarm stance. In their response to Chandler’s inquiry about the recognition of the independence of the newly established republics, the State Department replied that they were not opposed to recognizing the independence of minorities but that the time was inopportune because the U.S. government had not come to a settlement regarding the Russian question. One more matter was that they were waiting to see how Admiral Kolchak was faring. The letter also stated that the United States would provide support to Russia including Azerbaijan in the near future, through presidential mandates. Chandler also assured them, saying that the minorities had already waited for several months for the recognition of their independence, and now they had to wait for the absolute defeat of Kolchak and Denikin.24 With the imminent defeat of the Russian White Guard in the autumn of 1919, Azerbaijan became a source of great interest not only in U.S. political circles but also in Britain, France, and Italy. A Franco-Caucasus Committee headed by Anatole de Monzie held a conference on October 4 that was exclusively for the Caucasus states, including Azerbaijan and Georgia, with the participation of French business groups.25 The French press did not shy from reporting about the Caucasus. Jeyhun Hajibeyli and Mahammad Maharramov from the Azerbaijani delegation were interviewed during the conference. In the middle of October, the representative of the French Ministry of Trade and Industry visited Baku accompanied by the French military attaché.26 During negotiations with Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mammad Yusif Jafarov, they expressed the French government’s interest in the economic and political situation of Azerbaijan as well as their desire to establish friendly relations with Azerbaijan. The head of the French diplomatic mission stated that the French community and government were misinformed about the current situation in Azerbaijan. They pledged that they would inform the French government about their observations during their visit to Azerbaijan.27 Next to come to Azerbaijan was an Italian mission headed by I. Enrico. Soon after, an agreement was signed

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  309 between the Azerbaijani delegation and the Cosmos Company, one of the largest companies in Britain. The company was tasked to provide for the transport and sale of Azerbaijani raw materials from the ports of the Black Sea to Europe.28 The telegraph and telephone company of France dispatched a considerable amount of equipment to Azerbaijan and sent its engineers in order to introduce world-class post and telegraph services and to install a radio station in Ganja that would link up with a radio station located at the Eiffel Tower in Paris. In accordance with an agreement with the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris on November of 1919, Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov transmitted a telegram to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan from the radio station at the Eiffel Tower to the Ganja radio station. The telegram read, “I congratulate you for the first Azerbaijani radio station, which will play an important role in the economic and cultural development of our dear land.”29 A moment after the signing of an agreement with France regarding post and telegraph related matters, Topchubashov filed an application for membership with the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union in Bern, Switzerland. In the autumn of 1919, the delegations from both Azerbaijan and Georgia addressed and submitted appeals on September 17 to the chairman of the peace conference as well as the members of the Supreme Council in the hopes of speeding up matters regarding the Caucasus. A similar appeal was also filed with the representatives of the Entente that participated in the conference on September 20 regarding the creation of a special commission to tackle issues relating to the Caucasus.30 The request called for an in-depth analysis of the events that occurred in Azerbaijan and Georgia and the Caucasus in general. It stated that the problems of the South Caucasus should each be settled independently, without delay, and not be incorporated into the Russia question. It also pointed out that since the Caucasus possessed vast raw material resources essential to both European and U.S. markets, the development of post and telegraph services to support commercial activity was urgently needed. The appeal likewise offered to settle all of those issues through the “formation of a special commission on Caucasus issues at the peace conference.”31 In the autumn of 1919, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations discussed issues pertaining to both their countries and the Caucasus, after which they decided to submit a letter addressed to the Supreme Council. After the drafting of the joint letter by the Azerbaijani delegation, it was additionally signed by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Kuban, South Caucasus, and Georgia. Belarus and Armenia rejected the letter. Armenian representative Dr. Hamazasp Ohanjanian stated, “If the matter at hand is the recognition of independence, then the Armenian representative will not sign it because according to the Treaty of Versailles, Armenia has already been recognized.” He added, “If there comes a need to choose between the Turks or Denikin, they will prefer the latter.”32 The representatives of the eight republics signed the letter and submitted it to the chairman of the peace conference, Georges Clemenceau, on October 8. This jointly signed letter was the second to be submitted by the newly established republics after the initial jointly signed letter of protest was submitted in June. The letter emphasized that the newly established

310  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda republics were in serious need of material and moral—but primarily military— support. For that reason, it was important and imperative that recognition be accorded to them as emerging international entities. The political aims of different factions in the Russian opposition were taken up for review, and they came to the conclusion that the Bolsheviks wanted to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat within the old Russian empire, and the intransigent forces among the Russian White Guard generals wanted to establish a military dictatorship within that same territory and to restore the glory of the former Russia, which for some was considered a prison of peoples. For the newly established republics, the ways of achieving their causes may have been different, but the aim and premise of these states were in consensus. The letter clearly stated that the forces fighting in Russia were willing to lay down their arms at the first sign that the newly established democratic republics would have a good chance at being recognized. The new republics realized that only the support of the Entente states could save them from the aggression of the Bolsheviks and the forces loyal to old Russia. Yet, in spite of their repeated requests, the Entente had not provided them with any support. On the contrary, this muchcoveted support was provided to Kolchak and Denikin, who did not relent in their assault against the newly established republics although supposedly they were fighting against Bolshevism. Notwithstanding their efforts, the last phase of the war showed that it was impossible to restore Russia within its old boundaries wthout ignoring the spirit of freedom of the people.33 The letter stated, In the interest of peace, humanity, and progress, the international settlement of our states’ issues should not be delayed and they should not be settled in conjunction with Russian issues. The need for international recognition is essential. We have been isolated from the international financial community and have been prevented from availing ourselves of credit from financial institutions as well as being participants in the regulation of the economic and financial situations.34 The letter was brought to the attention of the peace conference as well as the Supreme Council, which was chaired by French foreign minister Stéphen Pichon and whose members were the foreign ministers of the Entente states. A copy of the letter was published in the French newspaper Le Temps on October 12.35 It is noteworthy that through such publications, French media attitudes began to change in favor of the new republics that previously bore the brunt of negative publicity generated by the press. Soon after the letter was published, on October 29, matters concerning the South Caucasus region were finally heard at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of an appeal filed by the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations. The director of the French committee, Paul Bourdarie, wrote in a letter sent to the chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation, The request of the Azerbaijani and Georgian Republics on the de facto and de jure recognition of the existence of your governments was endorsed at the

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  311 meeting of the French committee.36 Taking into consideration the growing economic interest of France in these republics, the committee has asked the Clemenceau government to urgently send diplomatic representation to Azerbaijan and Georgia.37 In the middle of October 1919, the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris undertook two further essential steps to help in efforts toward recognition. One of these steps was meetings held with Aga Khan III,38 imam of the Ismailis and one of the leaders of the Indian Muslims, on September 30. The Aga Khan left London for Paris and met with the Azerbaijani delegation. Topchubashov gave him detailed information regarding the efforts made toward the independence of Azerbaijan along with a copy of the documents they had filed with the Paris Peace Conference. The Aga Khan for his part promised to talk with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George about Azerbaijan and to present him the documents that were given to him by the Azerbaijani delegation. Coincidentally, when the Aga Khan returned to London, the Azerbaijani delegation in Paris received a letter of congratulations from the Central Muslim Society. The Central Muslim Society which was founded in 1886 wished the Azerbaijani delegation to Versailles success in achieving recognition of the independence of the Azerbaijanis whom they considered their brothers.39 On October 25, the general secretary of the Central Muslim Society, Mirza Hashim Isfahani, along with Indian-Azerbaijani representatives met in Paris for a joint meeting with the Azerbaijani delegation.40 Also present at the meeting was Firuz Mirza Nosrat-edDowleh Farman Farmaian, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs who was in Paris owing to the visit of the Iranian Shah to London. Both the representatives of the Central Muslim Society and the Iranian foreign minister emphasized the importance of Azerbaijan’s existence as a nation and the significance of providing support to the new nation. The Iranian foreign minister reaffirmed his vow to Caucasus Azerbaijan owing to their common interest and averred that Iran did not request anything in return from this support. Firuz Mirza stated, Our representatives should act in cooperation. I have the opportunity to call the attention of England’s leaders to your cause. Together our speeches will either help you or us. There is no other way except mutual cooperation and for this purpose we should establish an Azerbaijani-Iranian commission that has equal rights for both parties.41 This proposal along with Iran’s warm and potentially advantageous relations fundamentally differed from their position during the summer of 1919, when Iran had made territorial claims against Azerbaijan.42 It can be supposed that Iran now seemed interested in the existence of an independent Azerbaijani state. Earlier, in July 1919, Yusif Vazir Chamanzaminli, a notable Azeri writer and public figure, wrote in the newspaper Azerbaijan, Iran was one of the countries that were affected by the Great Russian thunderstorm. This country for many years has been wishing to implement

312  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda state reforms but Russian propaganda has prevented this from the outset. There was no affair in Iran that was free from Russian maneuverings. It was because of this that poor Iran was not able to achieve the development and progress it has desired. Now Russia has fallen and the state of Azerbaijan, which lies between Russia and Iran, has finally declared its independence. The armies of the Caucasus are holding their ground and standing firm against the Russian terror. Iran likewise can breathe freely because from any angle, the independence and blissful existence of Iran is favorable to us. The naming of our state “Azerbaijan” led to a disagreement, although there is no dispute over the fact that Tabriz province, or Iranian Azerbaijan, indeed belongs to Iran. We never did, do not, and will not think of infringing on Iran’s rights as only the bond of brotherhood with our neighbors will guarantee our common progress and tranquility.43 Articles and separate statements such as this that were published in official state media dispelled the earlier doubts Iran had about the Republic of Azerbaijan. Within a short span of time, the Azerbaijan-Iran joint commission was established in Paris. Azerbaijani representatives Mir Yagub Mehdiyev and Jeyhun Hajibeyli met with Iranian representatives who had just arrived in Paris.44 After several days of discussion on November 1, the commission prepared a treaty on Iran–Azerbaijan partnership which consisted of four articles. Article 1: Notwithstanding the establishment of any form and structure of its state, Caucasian Azerbaijan has finally seceded from Russia with borders specified in the documents and maps submitted by the Azerbaijani delegation to the Peace Conference; Article 2: The Republic of Azerbaijan, an independent and democratic republic located in the area indicated on the map of the Caucasus, shall be recognized with its President elected on the basis of law, approved by the Azerbaijani Parliament, with the city of Baku as its capital; Article 3: The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan by mutual agreement of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Iran shall establish political and economic relations with its neighbor, the state of Iran. In order to achieve the purposes specified in the first and second article, the Republic of Azerbaijan needs genuine support from the United Kingdom and Iran by recognizing the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and by providing security, assuring political, cultural and economic development, as well as military defense to protect Azerbaijan from any forms of aggression; Article 4: These four articles are related to each other and shall be confirmed by the Azerbaijani delegation.45 After this agreement was signed, the Azerbaijani delegation met with the British government through the Iranian government and presented matters of concern. Topchubashov wrote to Baku regarding the treaty prepared by the Iranian delegation,

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  313 Certainly, we have to take into account the present situation of Iran and at the same time the agreement concluded between Iran and England on August 9, and it is our opinion that if this treaty is ratified, then we should expect good results. As you can see from the context of the articles, we should protect our independence aggressively.46 The Azerbaijani representatives considered the treaty concluded between Britain and Iran on August 9, 1919, as “a chance for a roundabout way of slipping back under the British shield.”47 The Anglo-Iranian treaty, signed in Tehran on August 9, accorded priority to Britain.48 However, the Iranian public that protested against the Anglo-Iranian treaty was under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda. From Iran’s point of view, the treaty with Britain served its purpose. In the first paragraph of the treaty, the government of Great Britain expressed adherence to the territorial integrity and independence of Iran. The rest of the articles stipulated a range of activities to increase the defensive capabilities of the Iranian army. The fourth article and addendum to the agreement granted Iran a long-term credit in the amount of £2 million sterling.49 From the standpoint of Iranian security, the August 9 treaty was politically significant on many counts. It was generally known that since 1918, the threat of Bolshevism had heightened, and the Soviet Republic of Gilan was an example.50 It was known that the Russian fleet controlled the Caspian Sea. and a direct confrontation at sea with the Russians would be perilous for Iran. Having a powerful state such as Britain allied with Iran proved to be a great advantage for Iranian security. Conversely, this treaty likewise conformed to British interests. By staunchly supporting Iran politically, financially, and militarily, Britain effectively strengthened its hold over its colonies in the Middle East and additionally provided an effective deterrent against Bolshevism, which posed a threat to British policy. By allying itself with Iran, the Azerbaijani delegation supposed that “Azerbaijan receive assistance support from Britain.”51 This was the only way for Azerbaijan to defend itself against Denikin and the Bolshevik threat, as it was not able to prevent the departure of British troops in the Caucasus during the summer of 1919. The pact between Iran and Azerbaijan that was signed in Paris was the beginning of productive economic relations and cooperation between the two countries. From March to April 1920, bilateral agreements on political relations, trade, communication (post and telegraph), diplomatic issues, and other matters were signed between Azerbaijan and Iran. Iran was also one of the first countries that recognized the de facto status of the Republic of Azerbaijan.52 The further development of relations such as the cooperation of the Azerbaijani representatives with the representatives of Iran in Paris in the autumn of 1919 was a testament to one of the most triumphant steps taken by the Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. The autumn of 1919 brought changes in the international circumstances in favor of the newly established republics. The Azerbaijani representatives were engaged not only in the political and economic aspects of Azerbaijan but at the same time in widespread dissemination activities as well. In spite of great financial

314  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda difficulty, the Azerbaijani representatives at Versailles were able to achieve much work with minimal resources. Their selfless work included the publication of a series of books dedicated to Azerbaijan’s history, population, economy, natural resources, and politics. The books were written, compiled, and published in both English and Azerbaijani and for the first time attained significant media exposure in Europe. This marked a milestone for Azerbaijan on the eve of the recognition of Azerbaijani independence. Azerbaijan’s public relations campaign abroad was a shining moment for the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the middle of 1919, a special committee was tasked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to gather materials about Russian policies in the South Caucasus. This committee strived to strengthen the rationale of Azerbaijani independence with materials that exposed the menace of Russian colonization. It was not difficult to attract greater publicity in the East, where Azerbaijan was well known, nor was it problematic to distribute materials published in Azerbaijani and Russian to neighboring countries. Three thousand copies of the book Azerbaijan: Its History, Culture, and Government, by Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli, published in 1919 in Baku, were distributed by the Azerbaijani consulate in Iran within a short period of time.53 By contrast, it was difficult to generate publicity campaigns in Western countries where Azerbaijan was less known or not at all known. For that reason, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed and adopted a special strategy relating to the manner in which campaigns were to be carried out in countries across Europe. Initially, a large boon for the campaign was the presence of the Azerbaijani delegation in Versailles, but the actual dissemination across Europe was the main goal, and public opinion was also to be formed. The strategy called for the Azerbaijani representatives to garner public support in order to achieve results in cases where the opinion of neutral states would favor Azerbaijan. For this reason, a special committee was tasked to gather materials for the delegation participating at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. One main factor that necessitated the intensive campaigns in European countries stemmed from the fact that the Armenian propaganda machine falsified facts concerning Azerbaijan’s national relations and its socioeconomic and political situation. Armenia attempted to discredit and move against Azerbaijan’s petition for international recognition as an independent state, arguing that it lagged behind in the fields of policy making, culture, and economy. Aiming to counter and stop the black propaganda, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued two essential directives: first, to refute falsified materials in circulation that were opposed to Azerbaijan and second, to establish a media resource or propaganda center whose aim was to publicize Azerbaijan.54 The center aimed to publish and distribute a minimum of one newspaper, complete with illustrations, to European countries, mainly in Switzerland. Its goal was to publish and distribute materials about Azerbaijan’s history, culture, literature, society, and government. In addition, newspapers and periodicals dedicated to the protection of Azerbaijani interests were to be published and distributed. The center would also affiliate itself with various political parties and organizations in Western countries. It would hold public lectures and meetings with the intention of conveying “the real Azerbaijan” to the

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  315 public. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs embarked on the task of sending a special diplomatic mission to Switzerland and submitted it to the parliament for ratification. The decision to choose Switzerland among the other neutral countries was not random. A report prepared for the parliament by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that at that time, Switzerland played a major role in world affairs and policy owing to its geography and political significance among the neutral countries. It was now possible for the states of the Caucasus to implement more independent and successful policies through Switzerland. The report also emphasized that it was impossible to develop propaganda without coming out against the policies of aligned states such as Britain, France, Italy, Germany, or Austria and stressed that it would be of no use to effect those kind of activities in Copenhagen, Brussels, or Madrid. Switzerland, conversely, had adopted the attitude of impartiality toward belligerent and neutral states, and most international policies were propagated there. With all that taken into account, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs deemed it necessary to send a diplomatic mission to Switzerland as well as periodically to publish an Azerbaijani newsletter in Geneva and, if possible, employ the Swiss press to support Azerbaijani interests.55 The Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles lauded the establishment of an Azerbaijani resource center in Switzerland. It was a good proposal considering that the League of Nations would probably be based in Geneva. The Azerbaijani representatives established ties with L’Europe Orientale, a periodical that was published in English and French. L’Europe Orientale agreed to publish articles about Azerbaijan with an initial run of 20,000 copies. Topchubashov wrote to the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers about affiliation with L’Europe Orientale, This agency will be very useful for us in the future; in particular, they will help us establish our center before the League of Nations in Geneva. The matter is not only about our affiliation with this news agency, but our plans to establish this kind of resource center in Geneva and that this center will eventually protect all the newly established republics in the former Russian territory. It is necessary to provide assistance to this endeavor and establish it in Geneva post haste.56 Topchubashov, in a letter to Baku on November 10, 1919, wrote, “For the first time, the press writes more about Azerbaijan than ever before. At least now we have gained sympathy among some members of the press.”57 After experiencing difficulties in the spring and autumn of 1919, journals such as L’Europe Orientale, L’image, and Les Peuples Libres and newspapers such as Le Temps, Revue du Monde Musulman, La Revue Contemporaine, Humanité, Le Dépeche Colonial, Les Dernières Nouvelles, La Croix, and others published in different languages in Europe featured attention-grabbing articles about Azerbaijan. In order to promote Azerbaijan, Topchubashov agreed with the editor of L’image to devote one special issue to Azerbaijan, and they both agreed that it would come out in November. Topchubashov wrote,

316  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda I chose November for Azerbaijan, but looking though the photos, it became clear that the edition would look faded. The lack of photos of our army makes it difficult for us. We don’t have [General] Mehmandarov’s photo, or others. Other issues are teeming with war photos showing troubled times, but it is also way to show the military prowess and defensive capabilities of a country. 58 Taking this into account, Topchubashov decided to move the publication’s release from the month of November to January of the next year (1920) and wrote to Baku asking them urgently to send photographs of the Kura valley, Azerbaijani cotton fields, Besh-Barmag Mountain, Caspian coast, oil wells, Baku landscapes and cityscapes, and a map of Absheron. It was decided that the photo-collage would appear on the front and back cover of the journal. He likewise asked for photos having historical, political, economic, and cultural significance: of educational institutions in Baku and Ganja, ancient monuments in Azerbaijani villages, well-known Azerbaijani public, cultural, and military figures such as Samad Bey Mehmandarov, Ali Agha Shikhlinski, and Ibrahim Bey Usubov, the Azerbaijani military parade on the first anniversary of the liberation of Baku, as well as sessions of the parliament. After the photographs had been gathered, L’image in its January 1920 issue published articles about Azerbaijani history, culture, government, and economy. The issue published most of the photographs sent from Baku. Soon thereafter, journals such as the Journal de Genève published in Geneva and Les Peuples Libres published in Lausanne featured articles about Azerbaijan by French author G. Brocher. The same articles were also translated and published in English. From Azerbaijan’s standpoint, the article published in the Journal de Genève titled “Le Droit d’Auto-Disposition et la Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase” was very significant. The article began with U.S. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, a nation’s right to self-determination, and Wilson’s emphasis of its importance. Every nation is physically, intellectually, morally, and religiously distinctive; each nation has the right to determine its fate; nations should possess the economic, natural, and financial resources to sustain themselves. Nations should be able to defend themselves from military aggression and colonization.59 Brocher noted the biased nature of some articles, asserting that most of the recognized independent states of Scandinavia, Western Europe, and Latin America shared the same origin, religious beliefs, and language. Their independence was universally recognized. Brocher noted that some nations, despite meeting the five conditions set by Wilson, experienced delays in the recognition of their independence. He went on to say, We see that Azerbaijan possesses all the requirements that are necessary for self-determination. I say this as an observer and a Frenchman who has visited and studied the entire Caucasus. I give voice to the protection of this nation whose right to self-determination until now has been denied and I deeply believe that their demands are fair.

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  317 Brocher explained to the readers in Europe who were misinformed about Azerbaijan that due attention should be given to Azerbaijan as a country with the potential to contribute its natural resources, geography, and intellect to humanity. He wrote, “It is the central point of trade as it lies between Europe, Iran, and Central Asia. Religiously, although the Russian church oppressed the religious freedom of the Muslims, Azerbaijanis have shown tolerance of other religious faiths.”60 Brocher likewise addressed the public about their misguided sympathy toward Armenians owing to malicious disinformation published in several issues of journals in English and French. He added, “As a Protestant, I can say that foreign traders who are familiar with the Azerbaijanis’ sense of morality place more confidence in them than in Armenians.”61 Brocher wrote about the political situation in Azerbaijan and how, after the declaration of its independence and expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the country, Azerbaijan had rapidly democratized and quickly established its parliament. He especially mentioned that by granting women’s suffrage, Azerbaijan took its place among the leading countries in the world from the political standpoint. The article stated that during a year and a half of strikes in educational institutions, the new Azerbaijani government urged its people to further their education. Brocher went on to write about Azerbaijan’s economic opportunities: “There is no other country in the world which is endowed with vast natural resources such as Azerbaijan. The lands are rich with oil and the revenues obtained from its oil greatly surpass the expenses of the state.”62 Moreover, the article brought to attention the rich agricultural resources of Azerbaijan, namely viticulture, grain and tea production, and the abundance of iron, copper, and manganese. The journal spoke imploringly for an influx of foreign capital and foreign mining companies in order to sell Azerbaijani resources to the world market.63 In another article, Brocher defended the possibility of Azerbaijan’s independence. He wrote in praise of the Azerbaijani army, with its 50,000 welltrained soldiers and demonstrated heroism in the Russian-German war, and which, under the leadership of its able commanders, was ready to defend its motherland from aggression. Brocher wrote that the Azerbaijani’s desire for freedom and independence should not be taken for granted. He related that no other people bore intense persecution and humiliation as the Azerbaijanis had. He mentioned how the publication of books and newspapers in their mother tongue was banned until 1906 and how numerous rights were curtailed because of the war in 1914. He also compared Azerbaijan with former Russian colonies such as Poland and Finland, whose independence had been recognized by the peace conference. Brocher wrote that Poland was promised independence by the German Kaiser and even fought against the Allied powers, while Azerbaijani volunteers who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Allies were not given due recognition. According to him, Poland had never suffered from Russian oppression as had Azerbaijan. Moreover, unlike the Azerbaijani language, Polish was part of the Slavic language group and was similar to Russian. In his article, Brocher came into a conclusion that “every people wishing for their independence has the right to be independent. Azerbaijan has already proven that it wants to be independent and is able to defend

318  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda its independence, therefore an independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan should be given recognition by the peace conference.”64 On October 23, 1919, in an interview with the newspaper Corriere della Sera, an Italian businessman named Corsi who had visited Azerbaijan and Georgia talked about the struggle of the Republic of Azerbaijan for independence. He said that the independence of both republics should be recognized by the peace conference quickly—that both republics were deserving of recognition. Corsi was the first European to touch upon the sensitive matter of Turkey. He stated that “Azerbaijan’s alliance with Turkey should not be a hindrance to its recognition. Although these people have the same language and ethnic origin, they should be approached as an individual nation.” Corsi recalled politicians in Europe as saying that if it proved impossible to repel General Denikin’s attacks, those republics might enter into an alliance with the Bolsheviks against a common enemy. Europe should be able to gauge the horrible consequences that would ensue if Bolshevism were to triumph in the Caucasus. If Bolshevism were to prevail, the way to Turkey and Iran would be opened.65 Apart from the propaganda work in the European media, Azerbaijani representatives in Versailles published an Information Newsletter about Azerbaijan in September for the participants of the Paris Peace Conference and the French, British, and American public as well other countries.66 These information newsletters consisted of eight pages of official documents, diplomatic writings and memos, a summary of the media materials in Western countries about the Republic, and chronicles of Azerbaijani political and economic life.67 The editor of this periodical was well-known French Orientalist and friend of the Azerbaijani people Lucien Bouvier. Four issues of the newsletter were published in 1919, and the remaining seven issues were published until April 1920.68 Topchubashov wrote about the publication of the newsletter in November 1919, First of all, we will continue with the publication of the newsletter, three issues have already been published, the fourth will be published soon. We will distribute these newsletters as a reference point here as well as in England and America. At the same time, we will circulate memoranda, economic and ethnographic booklets, and maps indicating the location of the population as well as diagrams in French and in English.69 With this in mind, the more comprehensive book, Memorandum of the Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan to the Paris Peace Conference, was published in English and French.70 In 1919, the book Azerbaijan: The First Muslim Republic, written by Jeyhun Bey Hajibeyli, was published in Paris.71 At that time, he also wrote articles related to the events occurring in the South Caucasus in the newspaper Revue du Monde Musulman. In the first part of the book Azerbaijan: The First Muslim Republic, Hajibeyli mentioned to readers that, due to the injustice of history, the Azerbaijanis had become a divided people. He wrote, “There are two Azerbaijans: TabrizAzerbaijan, located in Iran, whose population observes the culture of Iran and

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  319 belongs to the Shiite sect of Islam; and Baku-Azerbaijan, located in the South Caucasus.” Separately, Hajibeyli also wrote of the widespread discussion about the “Armenian issue” that had arisen as a result of rumors in the media of Europe. He wrote that Christians were not the only victims of the tyrannical policy implemented by the Russians in the South Caucasus; others, mainly the Azerbaijanis of Baku, Ganja, and Garabagh, all suffered from this tyranny.72 A map of the Azerbaijani borders can be found in the first page of the book. A separate booklet on the ethnic composition of the Azerbaijani population written by the member of the delegation, Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, in French, likewise piqued the interest of readers.73 It was distributed among the delegates at the peace conference and was circulated in the United States as well. This booklet was based on sound sources, and the content was credible. It presented detailed information regarding various religions and the national-ethnic composition of the population of the South Caucasus. A table published at the end of the booklet indicated that 75.41 percent of the Azerbaijani population was of Turkic origin. The religious and national composition of the South Caucasus and the Azerbaijani population were also shown with charts, colored diagrams, and geographical illustrations.74 A booklet about Azerbaijani politics and economics was prepared by Mammad Hasan Hajinski.75 The booklet, titled The Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaijan, described the disasters caused by the war and Bolshevik destruction, the rehabilitation of Azerbaijan’s economy, the establishment of free trade, the restoration of the railway and waterways, and the elimination of bureaucratic impediments to trade between Azerbaijan and Western Europe, among other things. The booklet stated that The difficulties faced by Azerbaijan are only the manifestation of a shortterm crisis. A brief glance at the figures will make anyone understand that this country has the potential to become a powerful economic center. A country possessing inexhaustible resources has every opportunity. Resources such as oil are produced in unlimited volumes; … inexhaustible aquatic resources, caviar production, vast forests, rice and cotton plantations, wool, mining industries, and so forth, are indicators of unlimited opportunities. Azerbaijan is strategically situated for trade. It lies between Europe and Russia, Europe and Iran, Russia and Central Asia. Finally, it has a hardy population who carry in their hearts the traditions handed down from their forefathers, namely, the tradition of hospitality and willingness to receive foreigners.76 The booklet Azerbaijan in Figures, which was prepared by the members of the Azerbaijani delegation and published in Paris, provided European business organizations with data about the economy of the republic. This booklet was based on statistics sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and informed European readers about the state budget of the republic, its income and expenditures, and the economic indicators of the country.77 These books, booklets, and articles that were written and published in Paris by the representatives of the Azerbaijani delegation during 1919–1920 are still significant today for their historical value.

320  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda On the eve of the recognition of Azerbaijan by the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles, these publications gave detailed information about Azerbaijan to Western and European political circles, public figures, and the public. The documents, references, statistical information, and photographs sent to Paris by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a significant role in the preparation of materials. The richness of facts about Azerbaijan made these publications more interesting and at the same time boosted the confidence of the Azerbaijanis themselves. The November 12 issue of the newspaper Azerbaijan read, A number of booklets published by the Azerbaijani representatives in English and French caught the attention of people in Europe. The wide array of booklets range from the political and economic situation of the new republic, interesting information about the demographics and ethnicity of the Azerbaijani population, the ancient past and history up to the establishment of an independent state and its future goals.78 Subsequent to the books and booklets published in Paris in 1919, a number of articles published by different European press agencies for the first time gave Western readers detailed information about Azerbaijan, its population, economy, culture, and government. All these were significant steps taken in order to integrate a newly independent Azerbaijan with the world.

Notes 1. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Delegation to the Paris Peace conference to W. Wilson, President of the United States. 26.09.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, II. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 14. 2. Ibid., p. 15. 3. Third session of the Sixty-Fifth Congress of the United States, vol. 57, part 5, p. 39. 4. Contract No.1. September 1919, SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 131–132. 5. State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 133–134; Jamil Hassanov (Hasanli), “Azerbaijani-American Relations in 1918–1920: A Page in Their History,” p. 7. 6. А. М. Топчибашев (A. M. Topchubashov), Письма из Парижа (Letters from Paris). Baku, 1998, p. 72. 7. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic at the Paris Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06– 10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 10. 8. Letter of Max Rabinoff to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference. 22.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 116–117. 9. Minutes of Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Georgian Peace Delegations. 28.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 228–229; Minutes of Joint Meeting held by the Azerbaijani and Georgian Peace Delegations. 18.08.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 235–236. 10. Letter of Max Rabinoff, to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference. 01.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 57.

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  321 11. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), July 6, 1919. 12. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), December 9, 1919. 13. Letter of Max Rabinoff to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the Paris Peace Conference. 01.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 57. 14. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 89. 15. Letter of A.M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06–10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 19. 16. Letter of Walter Chandler to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, 18.10.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, pp. 53–54. 17. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06–10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 11. 18. Letter of Walter Chandler to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the Paris Peace Conference, 01.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 59. 19. Ibid., pp. 58–59. 20. Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), January 1, 1920. 21. Letter of Walter Chandler to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, 01.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 56. 22. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 10. 23. Letter of Max Rabinoff to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic, to the Paris Peace Conference. 03.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, pp. 79–80. 24. Letter of Walter Chandler to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, 10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 80. 25. Comite France-Caucase. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 18 Novembre, No: 4, p. 5; On French-Caucasian Comittee, 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 91. 26. Télégramme Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères A Mission Militaire Française Tiflis. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v.638, f. 93, f. 95. 27. Rapport sur le mouvement commercial de la province de l’Azerbaïdjan pendant l’année Yount Il 1298. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 96–f. 101; Азербайджан (Azerbaijan), October 17, 1919. 28. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, pp. 128–130. 29. Telegram transmitted by A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic from the Radio Station at the Eiffel Tower. November, 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 109. 30. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff—Son Excellence, Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix.Lle 17 septembre 1919. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 107–108. 31. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov and N. S. Chkheidze to the Chairman of the Peace Conference. 17.09.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 102. 32. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06–10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, p. 2. 33. Note remise le 8 octobre, par les representants de nouveaux Etats a M. Georges Clemenceau, president du Conseil supreme interallie a la Conference de la Paix. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 18 Novembre, No. 4, pp. 1–3.

322  Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda 34. Note of A. M. Topchubashov (Azerbaijan), A. M. Chermoyev (Republic of Mountaineers), S. R. Pusta (Estonia), N. S. Chkheidze (Georgia), L. Bıch (Kuban), I. Seskis (Latvia), F. Narushevich (Lithuania) to Georges Clemenceau, Chairman of the Peace Conference. 08.10.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 13, pp. 8–9. 35. See Le Temps, 12 octobre, 1919. 36. Une lettre de M. Bourdarie. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 15 Decembre, No. 5, p. 3. 37. Letter of Paul Bourdarie to A. M.Topchubashov. 29.10.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 5, p. 8. 38. L’Azerbaidjan et l’Aga Khan.Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 17 Janvier, No. 7, p. 3. 39. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 93. 40. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic in Paris, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. 06–10.11. .1919.SAAR f. 894, r. 10, v. 94, p. 21). 41. SAAR, f.894, r. 10, v. 94, p. 21. 42. Azerbaijan, June 7, 1919. 43. Azerbaijan, July 11, 1919. 44. Топчибашев, Письма из Парижа, p. 94. 45. Ibid., pp. 94–95. 46. Ibid., pp. 95–96. 47. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 157. 48. For more details, see С. М. Алиев (S. M. Aliyev), История Ирана. XX век (History of Iran. XX Century), pp. 97–98. 49. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, pp. 118–120. 50. For more details on the Gilan Soviet Republic see M. A. Pertsis, Bashful Intervention: About the Soviet Intervention to Iran and Bukhara in 1920–1921. Moscow, 1999; S. Rüstəmova-Tohidi (S. Rustamova-Tohidi), Kominternin Şərq siyasəti və İran. 1919– 1943. (The Eastern Policy of the Comintern and Iran. 1919–1943). Baku, 2001. 51. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 158. 52. See The Caucasian Extraordinary Delegation: Papers on Discussions and Agreements of the Delegation sent to the Caucasus under the leadership of Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaee (1919–1920). Teheran, Political and International Investigation Center, 2000. 53. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 203, pp. 3–4. 54. SAAR, f. 2905, r. 1, v. 21, p. 7. 55. Ibid., pp. 8–10. 56. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06– 10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, pp. 8–9. 57. G. Borcher. Le Droit d’Auto-Disposition et la Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase. 1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 1. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 298–299. 58. Ibid., p. 299. 59. Ibid., p. 300. 60. Ibid., p. 301. 61. Ibid., pp. 301–302. 62. Ibid., p. 303. 63. Ibid., pp. 304–305. 64. Ibid., pp. 305–306. 65. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), November 5, 1919. 66. For more details on publications related to the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in the foreign countries see V. Quliyev (V. Guliyev), “Azərbaycan Demokratik

Lobbying and the spread of national propaganda  323

67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

Respublikası xarici mənbələrdə,” Azərbaycan Demokratik Respublikası (“The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic in Foreign Sources,” The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic). Baku, 1992, pp. 47–62. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), November 5, 1919. See Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 1 Septembre, No. 1, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 8 Septembre, No. 2, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 13 Octobre, No. 3, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 18 November, No. 4, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 15 December, No. 5, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Janvier, No. 6, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 17 Janvier, No. 7, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Fevrier, No. 8, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Mars, No. 10, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Mars, No. 11, pp. 1–8; Bulletin d’Information d L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Avril, No. 12, pp. 1–8. Letter of A.M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 29.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 142, p. 7. Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris. Paris, 1919; La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919. La premiera Republique musulmane: l’Azerbaidjan. Editions Ernest Leroux, vol. XXXVI, Paris, 1919. La premiera Republique musulmane: l’Azerbaidjan, p. 5. Composition antropologique et ethnique de la population de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919. For more details, see Archive of diplomatic documents of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Composition Anthropologique et Ethnique de la Population de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase.Classé 1er juin 1919 Délégation Azerbaïdjanienne à la Conférence de la Paix, Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v.638, f. 45–52. Composition Anthropologique et Ethnique de la Population de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Classé 1er juin 1919 Délégation Azerbaïdjanienne à la Conférence de la Paix. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique,v. 638, f. 52. Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaijan. Paris, 1919, 22 p; For more details, see Archive of diplomatic documents of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Situation économique et financière de la République de l’Azerbaïdjan du Caucase. Classé 1er juin 1919 Délégation de l’Azerbaïdjan à la Conférence de la Paix à Paris. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v.638, f. 30–43. Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaijan. Paris, 1919, p. 8. L’Azerbaidjan en chiffres. Paris, 1919. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), November 12, 1919.

12 Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allied powers at Versailles

The fate of the new republics established upon the ruins of the former Russian empire was first addressed by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in his speech before Parliament on November 17, 1919. This speech reflected events taking place in Russia, particularly Kolchak’s defeat and Denikin’s retreat beginning in October 1919. Heavily funded, armed, and diplomatically protected by Britain and other Allies, Denikin’s volunteers surrendered Orel on October 20, Voronezh shortly after that, and Novokhopersk on November 12, 1919. By the end of 1919, it became clear that the White Guard’s aim to save Russia from Communist occupation was unattainable. Yudenich’s attempt to seize Petrograd failed, Kolchak was driven far into Siberia, and Denikin was retreating to the south and surrendering more and more cities. However, for Azerbaijan and Georgia, who had existed under the threat of being attacked by Denikin, the defeat of his army was now posing a new more terrible threat. Tadeusz Swietochowski correctly notes that the republics of the South Caucasus did not rejoice at Denikin’s defeat, as he and his men were giving way to a much stronger enemy in the form of the exultant Bolsheviks.1 These complications did not mean that all of Azerbaijan and Georgia were waging a secret battle against Soviet Russia in an alliance with Denikin. Bolshevik leader Lenin’s inclusion of Azerbaijan and Georgia on a list of “fourteen different states” that launched a joint “attack” with Denikin against Soviet Russia had no basis.2 The concern of Western countries, in particular Great Britain after Denikin’s defeat and, beginning in late 1919, Britain’s growing interest in the South Caucasus all stemmed from their fear of Bolshevism spreading to the Near and Middle East. Swietochowski was right in his assertion that if the Bolsheviks were allowed to cross the Caucasus mountains, there would be a realistic possibility of the revolution spreading to Persia, Turkey, and the rest of the Middle East.3 Prime Minister Lloyd George’s mention of both Azerbaijan and Georgia in his November 17 speech before the House of Commons was linked to that particular concern. In his speech, Lloyd George analyzed the situation in Russia and noted that the aims of the disparate people of Russia were still unclear. As for the Russians, he continued, they were a difficult nation. There was never a time when outside attempts to bring them to their senses had been successful. According to him, the Bolshevik machine was dragged forward by terror and pillage.4 Lloyd

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  325 George saw the strength of Bolsheviks in the peasantry. He drew an analogy with the eighteenth-century French revolution where the Jacobins were able to unite the people under the slogan “The Revolution is in Danger,” which meant that the lands granted to the peasants by the revolution were in danger. There was no doubt that, in the minds of Russian peasants, this was how the revolution was perceived. Lloyd George believed that anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia were numerous. Among those forces, he mentioned the Baltic countries, Finland, and Poland; Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in the Caucasus; and Kolchak, Petlyura. and Denikin in Russia proper. At the same time, the British prime minister posed an interesting question: Why could they not unite? The canny politician offered a good answer: Because their fundamental interests differed from one another.5 According to him, the main goals of Kolchak and Denikin were, first, to overthrow the Bolsheviks and restore the old regime and, second, to preserve Russia’s territorial integrity. While the anti-Bolshevik movements agreed on the former, they were enemies with regard to the latter. He said, Estonians do not want an indivisible Russia, for Lithuanians it is poisonous; I am not certain about Ukrainians … . If we look at the other states, Denikin says Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia are part of Russia. Uniting them with Russia is the cornerstone of his policy, whereas the new republics will not hear of this. They are fighting for independence … . In uniting against Bolshevism, they are making it a condition for us to secure their independence, as well as to provide them with money and ammunition.6 Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the main problem was in the varying interests of Russia’s anti-Bolshevik movements. On one hand, the White Guardists were fighting for the old, powerful, united and indivisible Russia, while on the other, anti-Bolshevik movements were defending their national independence. In his speech, Lloyd George implicitly advocated aiding the nation-states struggling for independence, specifically Azerbaijan and Georgia. British political circles and Lloyd George in particular had a change of opinion for the better about Azerbaijan, thanks to articles by Robert Scotland Liddell published in The Morning Post in September and in Tariq on November 11.7 In his first article, Liddell informed his British readers that their impressions of Azerbaijan were far from the truth. He considered Azerbaijan the first republic in the South Caucasus to be able to exist independently.8 With regard to the Armenians creating a stir over Garabagh in Great Britain and other countries, Liddell believed that due to its geographic location, the Garabagh should belong to Azerbaijan.9 As for the Armenian-Azeri ethnic conflict in the South Caucasus, the British reporter wrote, Neither in Russia nor in the Caucasus is it possible to encounter a man who would have a good opinion of Armenians. Russians, Tatars [Azeris], and Georgians abhor them and do not to wish to have anything to do with them. Whether this is true or not, I cannot say, but it is obvious that Armenians have

326  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence brought their neighbours’ hate upon themselves. With this, their propaganda in the West is so powerful that Europe and the whole world are on their side. With respect to Azeris, Liddell wrote that in certain characteristics “Tatars are superior to Armenians.” He believed if it were not for the Armenians’ subversive activities, it would be possible for the two peoples to live side by side in peace. 10 Lloyd George’s November 17 speech to Parliament and his references to the “Russian question” two times in November as well as a letter sent to Topchubashov in mid-November by the chairman of the League of Nations Division for Colonial and Foreign affairs, Paul Bourdarie, caused a sensation in the European media.11 Specifically, the White émigré media in Paris received the news with hostility. In his letter to the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers, Topchubashov wrote, British Prime Minister Lloyd George’s speech before the House of Commons on November 17 is now a fact. The head of the British government mentioned Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia twice as countries that are not willing to reunite with Russia. This speech caused great uproar and all-round interest. If November 17 were not a day off for publishers [i.e., a day when newspapers were not printed], some literature regarding that speech would be compiled by now … . Russian elements, especially their left wing, are unhappy.12 On November 29, a member of that same left wing, E. Staliski, commented extensively on Lloyd George’s speech in the weekly French-language newspaper for Russian émigrés, Pour la Russie. Staliski believed Britain’s attitude toward Russia was twofold. On the one hand, it defended the Russian generals that were fighting Bolshevism for the sake of a “united and indivisible Russia” while, on the other hand, it encouraged the newly formed states to fight for their independence. In the words of Lord Beaconsfield (i.e., former British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli), “a great and powerful Russia is a threat to Britain.” With that quote, Lloyd George indirectly expressed his own opinion so that it would not cause anxiety among Paris-based Russian political circles. Staliski bitterly noted that Lloyd George did not wish to recall that international relations had drastically changed since the times of Beaconsfield. On the contrary, all of his arguments were meant to prove the impossibility of reuniting Russia with its seceded parts. Lloyd George’s recent speech leads us to believe that he leans toward calling for Russia’s disintegration.13 British politicians believed that in order to save Europe and Asia from the Bolshevik threat, it was necessary to localize Bolshevik Russia and to surround it by newly formed states subordinate to Britain. Thus, the Bolshevik threat would be significantly weakened. Pour la Russie wrote, “Localizing Bolshevism is an infantile dream. Surrounding it by small, weak, ill-organized states as a sanitary cordon would not be able to last long.” This article demonstrated that Russian émigrés did not wish to let go of their old attitudes toward the peoples of Russia.

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  327 According to them, a strong Russia could guarantee free development of the people in its “Eastern provinces.” They even claimed that “Russian democracy would never think of uniting these people with Russia against their will.” Rather, Staliski said, “these people would not survive without Russia.”14 “Russian democrats” who often appealed to the interests of the Russians of the former empire displayed a dismissive attitude toward the nations who had proclaimed their independence. This in turn caused a protest from representatives of the new states in Paris. As the Western countries’ interest in the new republics began to grow, Russian politicians proposed to hold a gathering similar to the conference that had been planned to be held on Princes’ Islands in January 1919. The latter was meant to bring together existing Russian political powers and representatives of the new republics. Despite the harsh realities of the beginning of 1919, the representatives of the new republics refused to participate in the Princes’ Islands gathering. They once again rejected a proposal by the Russian émigrés to hold such a conference in late 1919. By the end of that year, the implementation of that plan was already impossible. The European media now openly defended the newly established states, in particular, the republics of the Caucasus. Topchubashov explained the positive change in the media and political opinion of Azerbaijan and Georgia thus: The defeat of Yudenich and Kolchak, Denikin’s hopeless state, the Allies’ refusal to supply them with money, provisions, and weapons, Germany’s plans for warmer relations with Russia, the Baltic states’ attempts to make peace with the Bolsheviks, the negative attitude of the majority of U.S. senators toward the peace conference and specifically, the Versailles Peace Treaty—in general, all these are inspiring and reassuring of positive developments for small nations. Given the situation, Lloyd George’s speech was not in vain. There is no doubt that the favorable change in media and public opinion is related to the aforementioned events.15 After a meeting with American Deputy Secretary of State Frank Polk in Paris at the end of November, Lloyd George’s attitude to the states formed from the former territories of Russia became clearer. During talks with Americans, Lloyd George openly stated that there was no need to help Kolchak and Denikin, that their defeat was fast approaching, and that the weapons and ammunition sent to them were falling into the Red Army’s hands. Lloyd George went on to inform Polk that a unified Bolshevik Russia would pose a considerable threat to Europe. Therefore, he proposed that “Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and Finland, and possibly even Siberia, should be independent.”16 On November 29, Polk informed Secretary of State Robert Lansing of this conversation. To clarify Great Britain’s attitude toward Azerbaijan and Georgia, in early December, the British Foreign Office through its High Commissioner for the South Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop, notified chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Nasib Usubbeyov that the British government would protect Azerbaijan’s independence

328  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence and on the whole was sympathetic to the new republic.17 Usubbeyov passed this information on to Tigran Bekzadian, Hovsep Arghutian (Argutinski-Dolgorukov), and Martiros Harutiunian, the Armenian representatives at the December 14 Armenian–Azerbaijani conference in Baku.18 Great Britain’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence caused serious concerns among the Armenians. After receiving this information, Armenian political circles and media intensified their anti-British sentiment. The Hayastan Ashkhatvor newspaper reported that the British reproached Armenia for forgetting about economic and social problems and being exceedingly preoccupied with politics. According to the newspaper, by doing this, the British were trying to convince Europe and the international community that Armenians were unable to govern themselves. The newspaper said, “Those who reproach us must remember that Armenians from Garabagh, Zangezur, Sharur, Nakhchivan, and Kars will become a monolithic power only upon reuniting with their motherland.” Armenian political circles regarded the British assessment of the Armenian question as “a vague and preposterous problem,” a betrayal of the Alliance. Armenian publicists linked Khosrov Bey Sultanov’s restoration of Azerbaijan’s dominion in Garabagh to the British and accused Britain of planning to create “a mini-Turkey” in Azerbaijan. It was alleged that all this was contradicting the speeches in Armenia’s defense in the House of Commons and the House of Lords and the promises made to them. The Dashnak media eventually came to the following conclusion: It is with great regret that the Armenian people realize their hopes have not been justified and that our long-standing pro-British policies have not produced any results. Now we must think of ourselves, and our only way to salvation is through believing in our own power. 19 By popularizing these views in Europe, the Armenians were blaming Britain for carrying out its own policies in the Caucasus separately from the Allies. Among the general public, they were spreading fear of the creation of a “miniTurkey” under the guise of Azerbaijan’s independence, aimed at “annihilating” the Christian culture of the Caucasus. By doing this, they attempted to create obstacles to the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allies. Britain’s interest in recognizing Azerbaijan brought Armenian and Russian representatives to Paris together. Russian émigrés were trying to convince Russia’s “stepchildren,” the new states’ representatives, that a “united and indivisible Russian” would be the best way to become a free and democratic state. Topchubashov recalled his meeting with a Russian ex-socialist named Tchaikovsky: Remaining loyal to his ideal of democracy and socialism, Mister Tchaikovsky was waiting for Kolchak’s and Denikin’s “victory” in order to organize an AllRussian Founders Assembly. In it he saw Russia’s salvation and the return of seceded territories back into its arms … . He invited me for breakfast and who should I see there? Ajamov, a former member of the Rostov municipal duma and an Armenian from Nakhchivan. He was working in all directions

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  329 (he said so himself), helping Armenians with “advice” and at the same time, being one of the rescuers of the Russian state … . Russians are currently thankful to Armenians for their moral support. He even indicated that they are not participating in any anti-Russian activity. As a loyal Russian citizen, Ajamov’s views demonstrate that Armenians do not regard Denikin and Kolchak as their enemies. 20 At a meeting organized in London in December for the prime ministers of the Entente countries, issues around the South Caucasus were not discussed separately but within the context of the Russian question. The heads of the major states expressed their regret at the defeat of the Russian generals. They hesitated to accept Britain’s position but themselves had no clear plan for further action. They considered reconciling Denikin with Azerbaijan and Georgia and organizing a joint defence strategy for them. By doing this, they wanted to solidify defense strategies for anti-Bolshevik forces. To this end, they decided to delegate a British member of Parliament named Halford MacKinder to the Caucasus.21 However, MacKinder’s mission failed, as there were too many disagreements among the sides to be reconciled. Azerbaijan and Georgia vehemently refused to form a bloc with Denikin. Denikin, in turn, considered it unacceptable for these states to participate in the negotiations as independent countries. Taking into consideration the change on the international scene favorable to the newly formed republics in November–December of 1919, the Azerbaijani representatives at Versailles prepared a memorandum on the admission of Azerbaijan to the League of Nations and submitted it to the Secretariat of the League in December. A similar memorandum was submitted to the League by the Georgian representatives. In order to examine Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s appeals, a special committee chaired by Chilean representative Antonio Nunez was established. After reviewing the materials and the current situation, the Azerbaijani issue was sent to the third committee of the League of Nations to be discussed along with the issues of Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Costa Rica. The third committee was headed by Fridtjof Nansen of Norway. Other members were Ionescu (Romania), Millen (Austria), Palasios (Spain), Polits (Greece), Spalojković (Serbia), and Qian Qiai Fu (China). The committee paid special attention to the following issues: 1 2 3 4

Does the country recommending another country for admission to the League of Nations recognize it de facto and de jure? Does the country being considered for admission to the League of Nations possess permanent borders and a stable government? Is the country governed freely? What is the country’s position on international obligations and the League’s decision on disarmament?

Because the South Caucasus republics had not been recognized de jure and their territorial disagreements still sought a resolution, the process of admitting

330  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence them to the League of Nations was temporarily halted.22 On January 8, 1920, when the initial discussions of the League of Nations in Geneva took place, Azerbaijan was represented by Mahammad Maharramov and Abbas Atamalibeyov.23 In early January of 1920, Britain’s High Commissioner for the South Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop, telegraphed the Allies and Britain almost every day. He informed them that Denikin’s army was retreating to the south chased by Bolshevik forces. Wardrop recommended immediate recognition of the South Caucasus republics as well as the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus in order to strengthen their position. He wrote that if Britain did not take active measures, the Caucasus republics would have to reach an agreement with the Bolsheviks.24 On January 2, 1920, the RSFSR People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Georgy V. Chicherin, sent a note to the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia in which he called for entering into a military alliance against the Volunteer Army. However, this offer was not based on good intentions. The propagandistic aim behind it was to weaken the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The victory over the Volunteer Army and the overall success of the Soviet forces in the Russian civil war gradually strengthened Russia’s position. Military triumph, in turn, increased diplomatic pressure on neighboring states and created favorable conditions for Bolshevik propaganda. In Azerbaijan’s case, this pressure manifested itself in an exchange of diplomatic notes lasting from January to April 1920. Waging war on Denikin at the behest of Soviet Russia at the time of Armenia’s aggression against Azerbaijan could have led to terrible consequences, but Chicherin was demanding that the Azerbaijani government promptly enter the war.25 He wrote, Due to the heroic efforts of Russian workers and peasants, the Red Army defeated Yudenich and Kolchak and is striking crushing blows to Denikin’s White Guard gangs that are chaotically retreating towards Rostov-on-Don. In order to speed up the destruction of the White Guard armies in the Russian South and to strike a final blow to the counter-revolutionary monarchy, the RSFSR government is offering to start negotiations with Azerbaijan for a military agreement. The Soviet government would like to stress that the southern counter-revolution is not considered to be the enemy of the Soviet republic alone but all the smaller peoples of the former Russian empire as well. Denikin is the enemy not just of Russian, but of Georgian and Azerbaijani workers and peasants alike. We hope that the workers and peasants of Georgia and Azerbaijan recognize their enemy. We also hope that they are looking forward to removing the White Guard shield between Soviet Russia and the Caucasus and to restoring ties between people who once lived within the same borders. At this point, it is necessary to hasten the thrust and to join the military strike of Russian workers and peasants coming from the north. We believe that is it not too late. We are addressing our call for a battle against Denikin to the Azerbaijani government and people. The real understanding of Azerbaijan’s interests and the socio-political benefits of its working class would compel Azerbaijan to accept our offer.26

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  331 Upon receiving Chicherin’s note on January 6, Nasib Usubbeyov called an emergency meeting of the Azerbaijan State Defence Committee. At the gathering, he mentioned a proposal made by then–foreign minister of Azerbaijan, Fatali Khan Khoyski, at a meeting organized by Usubbeyov in December 1919. The proposal was to sign a military pact with Soviet Russia and Georgia. After the speech, the members made a decision consisting of two points: 1

2

to request that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reply to Soviet Russia after discussing Soviet Russia’s offer with Georgia; the Azerbaijan republic is ready to engage in negotiations with Soviet Russia as a free and independent state in order to establish mutual relations; and regarding relations with the Entente, to clarify Great Britain’s attitude toward recent political developments and to make appropriate use of British influence.27

On January 6, Khoyski discussed Chicherin’s note and the Azerbaijani foreign ministry’s reply to Soviet Russia with a British representative in Baku, Colonel Claude Stokes. That evening, Stokes headed to the British High Commission in Tiflis. On January 7, in his telegram to the Azerbaijani representative in Tiflis, Fariz Bey Vakilov, the Azerbaijani foreign minister inquired about Georgia’s and the British High Commission’s take on Russia’s note. The telegram said, Yesterday I received a telegram from Soviet Russia offering to start negotiations to sign a military pact against Denikin as did the Georgian government. Please meet with Gegechkori as soon as possible and find out the Georgian government’s opinion and further actions on the matter. Our government believes that with regard to this issue, the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia must act in a close alliance with each other. We currently consider it apt to agree to start negotiations in order to establish mutual relations between the Caucasus republics and Soviet Russia. Meet with Wardrop immediately and find out Britain’s attitude. Be sure to inquire how and in which ways Britain can assist us in the nearest future.28 During Vakilov’s meeting with the Georgian foreign minister, Khoyski’s plan was approved. Negotiations aimed at establishing mutual relations with Soviet Russia were seen as possible. Concerning a war against Denikin, it was noted that it was unacceptable for Azerbaijan and Georgia to be drawn to the Russian civil war. During a meeting with Oliver Wardrop, the British High Commissioner talked about the Entente’s intention to recognize Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence shortly and to assist these republics in their defense policy. At the same time, Wardrop submitted a detailed report to the British Foreign Office on the situation in the Caucasus after the note from Soviet Russia. On January 12, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Soviet Russia that the Georgian government was ready to start talks in order to establish peaceful relations. However, it would not intervene in the civil war, which was a Russian internal

332  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence affair.29 Two days later, Azerbaijani foreign minister Khoyski said in his response to Chicherin that despite Denikin’s posing a long-term threat to Azerbaijan and the existence of a defense pact between Azerbaijan and Georgia against him, they considered the situation to be Russia’s internal affair; meanwhile, Azerbaijan was ready to start talks in order to establish peaceful relations with Soviet Russia. In his January 14 radiogram, Khoyski said, In response to your January 2 radio telegram that I received on January 6, I am informing you as follows: In the course of historical events, the people of Azerbaijan have gained freedom and independence at the cost of enormous losses and difficulties. It founded a state based on democratic principles. Established on the basis of people’s self-determination, the Azerbaijan republic insists that every nation has the right to define its fate and existence. Following its self-determination, Azerbaijan has never allowed foreign interference in its affairs and adheres to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other nations. Proceeding from this inviolable principle, the government of Azerbaijan considers it unacceptable to interfere in the ways the people of Russia define their fate. As a neutral state, the Azerbaijan republic is determined to protect its freedom and independence from foreign aggression. For this reason the government of Azerbaijan has been battling the tsarist General Denikin who has encroached on the independence of Azerbaijani people. In order for the battle to be successful, Azerbaijan has established a defense alliance with the government of Georgia. This political programme is prioritized by the government of Azerbaijan, and it stipulates peaceful relations between Azerbaijan and other nations. From this point of view, Azerbaijan respects the principles of independence of both states and expresses its readiness to establish peaceful relations between the people of Russia and Azerbaijan.30 It was obvious that the Azerbaijani side considered it necessary for Soviet Russia to formally recognize Azerbaijan’s independence. Only this step could guarantee protection of Azerbaijan’s national freedom. High Commissioner Oliver Wardrop was also notified of the content of the note sent to Chicherin.31 Azerbaijan’s point of view did not satisfy Soviet Russia. At the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Politburo congress on January 17–18, Khoyski’s response and the overall attitude to the government of Azerbaijan were discussed. After Chicherin’s report, at Lenin’s request, the congress made a decision in the spirit of intervention in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan. The decision stated, The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is advised to implement restraining and distrustful policies against the government of Azerbaijan, as it refused our offer to carry out joint operations against Denikin and serves the British forces that are fighting us in the Caspian Sea. While respecting the right of working masses of each nation to define its fate, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs must protest such behavior on the part of the Azerbaijani government.32

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  333 In light of the Bolshevik threat, the situation in the Caucasus compelled the Entente to consider carefully and take concrete measures. Western political circles acknowledged that the Soviet army’s advance into the South Caucasus would help spread Bolshevik ideology to Iran and Turkey, causing upheaval in the entire Near and Middle East. Therefore, most European politicians believed that in order to oppose Bolshevik attacks, it was necessary to strengthen Azerbaijan and Georgia and to provide them with a means of defense. However, due to the newly formed principles of international relations, aiding unrecognized states could cause the aiding party serious liability issues. Conversely, in the harsh reality of the first days of 1920, the principle of “a united and indivisible Russia,” which was an obstacle to the recognition of these republics, lost its purpose and had not justified the hopes of its advocates. Given such a rapid development of events, the recognition of Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence became an urgent matter. For this purpose, Great Britain suggested that the Paris Peace Conference Allied Powers Congress be called on January 10. British, French, and Italian heads of state, foreign ministers, American and Japanese delegates, and ambassadors to France participated in the congress. Issues around the South Caucasus were thoroughly discussed at the congress held at the Quai D’Orsay. The British prime minister addressed the situation. He expressed his concern with regard to the Bolsheviks moving along the Caspian shore. If they defeated Denikin and seized control over the Caspian Sea, it would be possible for the Turks to unite with them (here he meant the national movement headed by Mustafa Kemal that had emerged in Turkey). At that juncture, the Caucasus states would find themselves in a hopeless situation. Therefore, Lloyd George proposed feasible ways to supply these states with weapons and ammunition.33 Following his suggestion, the Allied powers requested that military experts propose ways of providing assistance to the South Caucasus republics. French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau agreed with Lloyd George’s suggestion and noted that the British delegates who had experience in Caucasian matters prepare a memorandum concerning aid to the republics. The congress called for an examination of possibilities for providing military aid to the Caucasus in the battle against Bolshevism. The experts were then to report to them along with the British delegates to the Allied powers.34 In the afternoon, the Allied powers’ congress continued without the presence of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Nitti, being now conducted by the foreign ministers. On British foreign minister Lord Curzon’s initiative, they discussed the political side of the South Caucasus agenda. In his statement, Curzon informed his colleagues that Lloyd George planned to bring up the question of recognizing the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia before the Allied powers congress. He added that the Armenian question was to be resolved as part of the Turkish question. After a long discussion, the foreign ministers came to the conclusion that Azerbaijan and Georgia were facing a triple threat. First, Bolshevik Russian troops were moving into the south. Second, Denikin’s retreating army could make an incursion into these republics. Third, the Kemalists could invade these republics upon an agreement with Russia.35

334  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence Due to the critical nature of the situation, the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia had appealed to the Entente for help.36 After informing the audience about those requests, Curzon proposed to immediately recognize Azerbaijan and Georgia de facto. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev later wrote, describing the situation of the time, “The atmosphere of the conference at Versailles enabled the recognition of autonomous countries. A push toward it was all that was needed, and that push was made at the peace conference by British foreign minister Lord Curzon.”37 According to Curzon, Britain had established closer ties with the South Caucasus republics as its troops were the first to enter the region after the Mondros armistice was signed. One day later, on January 11, 1920, the Allied powers at Curzon’s recommendation made a decision in substance that the Allied states recognize the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as “de facto” governments.38 Thus, Azerbaijan’s independence was de facto recognized by the Paris Peace Conference on January 11, 1920. The representatives of the United States and Japan had agreed to consult such an important issue with their respective governments before making any statements. Shortly afterward, on February 7, Japan also concurred with the Allied powers’ decision.39 The United States, however, officially refused to do so. This decision of the United States stemmed from various reasons. First, the American government was concerned with the growing British influence in the South Caucasus. Second, at the final stage of the peace conference, serious disagreements emerged between the United States and its European allies. On January 13, the American ambassador to France, Hugh Campbell Wallace, informed authorities in Washington that Great Britain and France had de facto recognized the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia and were considering providing the latter with military aid. At the same time, the Allied powers’ decision was given to the French ambassador to the United States to inform the American government. The document stated that the Allies have recognized the independence of the neighbors of Russia, to list of which has just been added Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and that in the eventuality that the Bolsheviks would refuse to make peace with with these states and would attempt to infringe on the independence of the said communities by force, the Allies would accord these states the fullest support in their power. The Allied Governments are very desirous of knowing wether the Government of the United States is disposed to concur in this policy40 On January 24, the French embassy to the United States received a reply signed by Deputy Secretary of State Polk stating that the United States agreed with Britain’s and France’s initiative to assist the Caucasus states but regarded the recognition of their independence as the first step toward Russia’s disintegration.41 On January 12, theAllies’Joint Military Committee submitted its recommendations to the Allied power delegates in Versailles. The document was signed by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, General Charles Sackville-West, and Ugo Cavallero. It stated that, if Bolshevism cannot be stemmed, it will be able to spread to dangerous regions

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  335 such as the Caucasus. Therefore it is important to review once again the possibilities of creating obstacles to prevent its spread to these regions. Taking into consideration the lack of stability in the local governments and the unfitness of their military units, these obstacles should first be created by European armies. This task can be undertaken by two well-equipped divisions. In time, as local military forces will have undergone training and can then be harnessed to these operations, the number of the European troops in the Caucasus could be reduced. “Beyond financial and material provision, this organization of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed). It would be advisable, therefore, to under take it without delay.”42 The experts believed that until a defense barrier could be set up, the plan to provide the Caucasus with military supplies should be fulfilled under certain conditions and that the Allied fleet in the Caspian Sea should control the situation. According to experts, if the Allied states agreed with the foregoing suggestions, it would be possible to explore ways of assisting the Caucasus states. On the same day, British delegates prepared a similar document. They believed the Bolsheviks had failed to fulfill their dream of destroying Europe. Therefore, they had started talks with Muslims and began moving eastward. Denikin’s inevitable defeat would form a dangerous corridor in the South Caucasus, which the Allies were trying to save from both ends. It was now necessary to prevent the two forces (Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey) from uniting. The British believed an attack on Georgia would lead to negative consequences for the Allies. If Georgians could enjoy assistance from the Allies, they could secure their borders. The document suggested that political, military, financial, and logistical aid to Georgia and Azerbaijan was important.43 After the Versailles decision of the Allied powers, on January 15, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates were invited to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ali Mardan Topchubashov and Mahammad Maharramov and the Georgian representatives Irakli Tsereteli and Zurab Avalov were greeted by the secretary general of the ministry, Jules Cambon, British delegate Philip Kerr, and Italian delegate Marquis della Torretta. Cambon presented the official decision of the Paris Peace Conference participants to recognize Azerbaijan’s de facto independence, to Topchubashov.44 He congratulated the delegates, saying that as recognized states, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be able to address important matters to the peace conference from now on.45 Mehdiyev wrote in this regard, Monsieur Cambon stated that Azerbaijan and Georgia had been recognized as independent states in accordance with international legal norms. These two states had now been empowered to engage in direct relations with the Allied powers, addressing their needs and demanding their legal rights and equal membership at congresses. In addition, Cambon informed them that recognition of these countries’ governments should simultaneously be accompanied with the recognition of their secession from Russia. It could be concluded that from that point on, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be considered sovereign states.46

336  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence Afterward, when Cambon asked the delegates “to address any concerns,” Topchubashov on behalf of Azerbaijan presented basic facts about the state system of his country, expressed his gratitude for its recognition, and noted that Azerbaijan was expecting aid and the de jure recognition of its independence from the major states. After the Allied powers’ decision was handed to the Azerbaijani delegation, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs wired a telegram to France’s diplomatic representatives and High Commissioners abroad and informed them of Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s recognition.47 After the information about the Allied powers’ decision spread, the Azerbaijani representatives began receiving congratulatory telegrams from many diplomatic missions, societies, and unions. Congratulatory telegrams were received from representatives of Georgia, Estonia, Iran, India, and other states; the Ukrainian bureau in Lausanne; the Franco–Caucasus Committee; from Mr. Pittard, the chairman of the Geneva-based league of states that had seceded from the Russian empire; and others.48 On January 15, in the afternoon, the military experts in Versailles discussed the issue of military assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia. To participate in the discussion of this matter, Britain’s War Secretary Winston Churchill, chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Henry Wilson, First Lord Walter Long, First Sea Lord David Beatty, and others arrived in Paris.49 The military expert congress and the invitation of high-ranking British military staff to Paris began to spark rumors. French radio reported that 10,000 British troops were on their way to Baku. According to the report, Lloyd George had allegedly asked Clemenceau to increase French military presence in Germany so that the German-based British troops could be relocated to Baku. However, all these were merely rumors. By the time of the April events, no British troops or even British military advisors had been sent either to Baku or Tiflis. A large number of articles and reports were published in French, British, Italian, American, and other Western newspapers with regard to the recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia’s independence. In the second half of January, the newspapers Le Temps, La France, La Croix, Bonsoir, L’Ordre Publique, L’Echo de Paris, L’Echo de France, L’Eclair, La Justice, Daily Chronicle, La Patrie, New York Herald, New York Times, Chicago Tribune, La France militaire, La democratie nouvelle, La Bataille, L’Action Française, L’Evenement, Le Petit Parisien, La Lanterne, L’Information, L’Effort national, L’Homme libre, La Montagne, and La Gazette de Lausanne and the magazines Le Journal de Genève, Le Journal du Peuple, Le Journal des Debats, and Le Journal d’Orient heralded the recognition of Azerbaijan and Georgia by the Allied powers as a great development. The congress of military experts continued on until January 16 with Clemenceau acting as chairman. He asked Cambon, who had met with the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates the previous day, to report on the current situation in the South Caucasus. Cambon informed the participants about the republics’ urgent financial, military, and other needs and their fitness for self-defense. He noted that the representatives of both republics had asked for political, military, and

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  337 financial assistance. Initially, they feared Denikin, but the Volunteer Army had now weakened. From his previous talks with the representatives, Philip Kerr had determined that Georgia was ready to mobilize 50,000 men and Azerbaijan was ready to mobilize 100,000 men. This information, in turn, was presented to Clemenceau. However, neither Cambon’s nor Kerr’s report satisfied Clemenceau; he doubted the numbers. In Lloyd George’s view, however, the republics had well-trained combat-ready units, mainly consisting of Tatars (i.e., Azeri Turks). Cambon added that both armies had been established on the basis of the old tsarist army and the national guard. Each republic possessed enough soldiers to defend the front line; only weapons and ammunition were in short supply. The republics addressed this particular issue to the Allies. Cambon also noted that the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives wanted the independence of the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus to be de facto recognized as well. In particular, the Azerbaijanis believed that if the Bolsheviks pursued Denikin, the Volunteer Army might retreat to Derbent, which would place Baku under the threat of occupation. The occupation of Baku, in turn, would place the entire Caspian basin in danger. Lloyd George thought recognition of the Daghestan would be a clever move, one that Muslims would regard positively. He also noted that, although the Allies possessed enough weapons and provisions, the problem was to deliver them to the region. Clemenceau said that most of the weapons sent to Denikin had fallen into the hands of Bolsheviks. After long discussions, it was finally decided that Field Marshal Henry Wilson would continue discussions the next day in the presence of the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates.50 On January 17, a joint meeting was held at the Claridge Hotel where Azerbaijani representatives were staying. The meeting was chaired by Field Marshal Wilson and involved Admiral Beatty, a representative of the British Foreign Office named Robert Vansittart, and the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates. The main goal of the meeting was to clarify what specific material aid could be rendered to Azerbaijan and Georgia in case of a Bolshevik incursion. The issue of sending Allied troops to the Caucasus was not discussed; the participants touched only upon the issue of military and logistical assistance. When Admiral Beatty asked whether Azerbaijan could defend its portion of the Caspian shore single-handedly, Topchubashov replied in the negative.51 On January 19, 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference, the Allied powers discussed the issues surrounding the South Caucasus in detail. The meeting was attended by heads of state. By that time, the Azerbaijani delegation was represented at the Paris Peace Conference in a body. The gathering was attended by prominent figures including Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Nitti, Cambon, Mazzi, Curzon, Churchill, Foch, Beatty, Wilson, and others.52 At the gathering, according to the request of the Allied powers made on January 10, the memorandum prepared by British representatives was presented. The memorandum stipulated the following measures: 1

Azerbaijan and Georgia shall be recognized (this point had already been implemented).

338  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence 2 3 4 5

Weapons and ammunition on their way to Denikin shall be delivered to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Azerbaijan and Georgia shall be provided with additional supplies, financial, and military (weapons and ammunition) resources. Additional measures aimed at strengthening the defence of Baku and Batum shall be taken. Caspian Sea defense shall be secured, and no Bolshevik troops or fleet shall be allowed into the Caspian. Denikin’s fleet shall be transferred back to Allied command. In the event that this is impossible, the fleet shall be sunk.53

Marshal Foch presented the report by the military expert group. The longest debate arose around the issue of transporting aid. Foch, who headed the group, considered it essential to send several military divisions to the South Caucasus. Field Marshal Wilson supported Foch by adding that if Britain did not show initiative in controlling the Caspian Sea, it would be impossible to save the South Caucasus. Defense Secretary Churchill agreed with Wilson and stated that if Britain failed to control the Caspian, all the weapons shipped to the Transcaucasia would be lost to the Bolsheviks.54 Lloyd George vehemently protested the military experts’ proposal on the grounds that they had not taken politics into consideration. He asked Marshal Foch, if the South Caucasus cannot be saved without sending troops there, and if the aid sent there will be lost, then it would be logical to deny any assistance. “We have already been asked to send materials to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient.”55 Foch was right in believing that the Caucasus could be saved from Bolshevik aggression by admitting troops. The military experts saw the solution in sending troops to the region, while Lloyd George and his following insisted on providing the republics only with weapons and ammunition, and he wanted to clarify whether the republics could make rational use of this assistance or would lose it to the Bolsheviks as had Denikin. The chairman of the conference, Georges Clemenceau, addressed the following questions to the military experts: what forces directly threatened these countries and, regarding Lloyd George’s comment, would the assistance provided by the Allies be used efficiently?56 Lord Curzon informed him that he had talked with representatives of the Caucasus republics who were currently in the waiting room. They were extremely concerned about a Bolshevik attack. They were certain that if weapons and ammunition were delivered on time, the threat could be alleviated. Otherwise, the fall of their governments would be inevitable. Lord Curzon said a decision could not be made without consulting them. Clemenceau agreed with this idea and decided that the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives should be heard.57 After delegates from the Caucasus joined the gathering, Clemenceau said to them, Gentlemen, the conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan, food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevik attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  339 if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective, but we want to know the present states of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make matters worse. As appointed representative, Irakli Tsereteli spoke on behalf of both delegations. He noted that Georgia and Azerbaijan were in serious need of the Allies’ help. Tsereteli said, We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks, but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolshevik might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves. To Clemenceau’s question “I am to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?” Tsereteli replied that this would be the best kind of aid, Bolsheviks would attack the Caucasus sooner or later. He noted, The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately… When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. To-day, our people see their independence recognized and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevik invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognize our independence. Georges Clemenceau asked Tsereteli: “You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?” Tsereteli replied: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the Entente were to help us, Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognize our independence and give up their attempts. To Lloyd George’s question, “How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?” Mahammad Maharramov, an advisor to the Azerbaijani delegates, informed him that, if weapons and ammunition were shipped, Azerbaijan would be able to mobilize 100,000 men. To Lloyd George’s question, “Have you the troops at the

340  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence moment?” Maharramov replied: “We have a little army, in the command of a native Azerbaijani general, about a 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined; but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms.” When Lloyd George asked Tsereteli the same question, Tsereteli said his country possessed 15,000 well-trained troops divided into sixteen battalions. If they were provided with equipment, they could mobilize 50,000 people in 2 weeks. Lord Curzon from the floor addressed a question to the Azerbaijani representatives: “Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers in Azerbaijan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?” Maharramov said, to fight the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, the population had asked Turkey for help. At the time, the Turkish army had liberated the Caucasus. A certain number of its officers were in fact former residents of Azerbaijan and Dagestan. After the Turks left the Caucasus, there had been no more than fifty Turkish officers remaining in Azerbaijan. They were originally from the region, and the Azerbaijanis were certain they would fight the Bolsheviks for freedom along with the entire nation.58 Topchubashov, who also spoke at the conference, noted that Azerbaijan had no foul intentions with regard to the Bolsheviks or Denikin. It did not intend to intervene in Russia’s internal affairs. However, in order to defend itself from the two threats, it was ready to use all means possible, most important, through efficient use of the aid provided by the Allies. According to Topchubashov, the British fleet at Enzeli could provide enormous help by protecting Baku. He also urged the Allies to recognize the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus, which could serve as a buffer zone between the army advancing from the north and the South Caucasus republics.59 After Topchubashov’s speech, Lloyd George inquired about the reasons for Denikin’s potential attack on Dagestan. Tsereteli said that Denikin viewed Dagestan and the South Caucasus alike as provinces of Russia. Nitti wanted to know whether the recognition of the Caucasus states could create an atmosphere of resistance against the Bolsheviks. Tsereteli gave an affirmative answer and added that if the recognition became de jure, the strength of the resistance would significantly increase. Maharramov joined the discussion by stating that Azerbaijan was against the dividing of Denikin’s fleet. In light of Denikin’s failure, there had been a positive shift toward Bolshevism observed among the sailors. They were likely to side with the Bolsheviks, creating a threat to Baku and the entire South Caucasus. Lloyd George wondered whether Baku could be defended upon the arrival of weapons from Europe and how many soldiers could be mobilized for that purpose. Maharramov said that Baku already possessed a strong garrison. When Clemenceau wanted to clarify the size of the garrison, Maharramov mentioned the number 7,000. The remainder of the discussion continued without the participation of the Caucasus representatives.60 At this stage of the conference, Churchill asked Foch if the Caucasus defense was to be viewed as an independent matter or as part of the general matter of anti-Bolshevik defense. Marshal Foch said he viewed it as the latter. When Churchill asked whether Denikin or the Bolsheviks constituted a worse threat to

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  341 the Caucasus, Ferdinand Foch stressed that the Bolsheviks were more threatening. He added that first and foremost, the Bolshevik advance into the south should be prevented and the newly established states should be strengthened. He suggested the creation of a union of East European and South Caucasus states aimed at resisting Bolshevism. After Marshal Foch’s remark, the discussions continued without the participation of the military experts.61 During the gathering, Lord Curzon explained the reasons for Azerbaijan and Georgia’s independence being recognized ahead of Armenia’s. He said, I assume responsibility for the proposal to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia. I did not propose so for Armenia because I did not see Armenia’s recognition as a reasonable step until a peace treaty with Turkey was signed. Despite this, however, today there is basis for Armenia’s recognition as well. Modern Armenia with its capital in Erivan is located on the Russian frontier, similar to Georgia and Azerbaijan. In addition, the Armenian nation pledges to fight Bolshevism along with the other South Caucasus states. I hope that this recognition would not create obstacles in the recognition of Armenia’s borders upon signing a peace treaty with Turkey. Clemenceau put the question of Armenia’s de facto recognition to a vote and it gained enough support. Afterward, Lloyd George notified the participants that the U.S. government was considering providing Armenian with $25 million worth of financial assistance. He believed it would be more appropriate to divide this amount among the Caucasus states. Concerning sending troops to the Caucasus, Lloyd George said, “Marshal Foch outlined the necessity to send three military divisions to the Caucasus. It is absolutely clear that the British government will not be able to send these divisions.” Clemenceau immediately added that neither would the French government. Nitti also noted that his government would not be able to send any troops either. This exchange of ideas thus ended. In his concluding remark, Lloyd George stressed the importance of aiding the South Caucasus republics by sending them weapons, ammunition, and supplies without delay. As for sending troops to Azerbaijan and Georgia, he confessed this was impossible. The South Caucasus republics were to take measures to strengthen their armed forces themselves. Special attention was to be paid to measures for Baku’s defense. Lloyd George defended Topchubashov’s idea of recognizing the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus.62 At the same time, he openly noted that the Bolsheviks were interested only in Baku. As for the threat of the transported weapons eventually falling in the Bolsheviks’ hands, Lloyd George said the Bolsheviks had already obtained weapons in great amounts. Their possession of 25,000 or 50,000 small arms did not affect the situation much. In conclusion, with regard to the discussed issues, the Allied powers issued a four-article decision: 1

That the Government of the Armenian State should be recognized as a de facto Government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudiced the question of the eventual frontiers of that State;

342  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence 2 3 4

That the Allied Governments are not prepared to send to the Transcaucasian States the three divisions contemplated by the Inter-Allied Military Council; To accept the principle of sending to the Transcaucasian States arms, munitions, and if possible, food; That Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson are requested to consider of what these supplies should consist, and the means for their dispatch.63

This meeting was the final one not just of the Paris Peace Conference but of the political career of France’s Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. When Clemenceau died in 1929, Topchubashov as the head of the Azerbaijani delegation at the peace conference expressed his deep condolences to the French government. He emphasized Clemenceau’s important role and services in the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence. In his statement, he wrote, “The death of one of France’s greatest political leaders Georges Clemenceau deeply saddened us. We Azerbaijanis will always remember that the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized under Clemenceau’s chairmanship.”64 After the decision was passed, Italian Prime Minister Nitti notified the conference that Italy could not officially send military materials to the Caucasus republics, as the Italian parliament had passed a decree stipulating noninterference with Russia’s internal affairs. However, under pressure from Lloyd George and Clemenceau, Nitti agreed to send weapons and ammunition to the Caucasus republics through unofficial channels. As a follow-up to Nitti’s remark, Lloyd George stated as he was closing the meeting that, unlike the situations with Kolchak and Denikin, aiding the de facto recognized Azerbaijan and Georgia would not be considered intervening in Russia’s internal affairs.65 Thus, in January 1920, the recognition of the Azerbaijan republic from a political point of view at the Paris Peace Conference and in the course of rapidly developing events should be considered a successful diplomatic act on the part of the Azerbaijani representatives headed by Topchubashov.66 In his letter from Paris to Nasib Usubbeyov, then head of the Azerbaijani government, he described the recognition of its independence that had cost Azerbaijan privation and hardships thus: There is nothing as mutable and elastic as politics. This is why its ebbs and flows are always unpredictable. But we are now stepping into an epoch where our hopes of being free and independent are growing bigger and are being put into effect. We never lost our hope—even at times most disadvantageous for the peoples of former Russia and even at times when our efforts were seen as vain. Therefore, we act in ways that can lead our people to freedom, and finally, we believe in achieving independence regardless of its costs. With this we must not forget the struggle of other small nations, nations that struggled not for half a year, not for a year, but for decades and longer, for many, many years; those who worked in the name of liberty and obtained it at the cost of great personal and material sacrifice. We have not abandoned and will not abandon this valuable happiness for we do not know anything

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  343 that would match it. We want everyone, our entire nation, to understand that in these months, in these days, we will be tested to prove worthy of living a free socio-political and economic life.67 The Azerbaijani government was notified of the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allied powers through Britain’s diplomatic representative in the Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop. In his January 12 telegram sent to Baku from Tiflis, he wrote, I have the honour to inform you that Lord Curzon authorises me to inform you, the Azerbaijan government, that he yesterday in Paris took the initiative in recommending immediate de facto recognition of the republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Supreme Council of the Allies accepted this unanimously.68 The news of the de facto recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence sent by the Azerbaijani representatives in Paris reached the government shortly afterward.69 On January 18, the head of the Azerbaijani military mission to Italy, General Usubov, sent a telegram to the head of the Azerbaijani government and the defense minister informing them that on January 17, the Italian foreign ministry had handed him the decision concerning Azerbaijan’s recognition.70 On January 12, upon receiving Oliver Wardrop’s telegram, the government called an emergency meeting. Special events were planned to celebrate this important development, the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Paris Peace Conference. On January 13, the government officially released the information and, on January 14, a decree on carrying out celebrations throughout Azerbaijan was issued. Rallies and demonstrations took place in the capital city. The government decided to hold a military parade and to organize a ceremonial gathering at the Azerbaijani parliament. January 14 was declared a holiday in all of Azerbaijan.71 On January 14, a message was issued from Prime Minister Usubbeyov “To the Citizens of Azerbaijan.” It said, Citizens! On the 28th of May of the year 1918, Azerbaijan was proclaimed independent by the decision and determination of its people. In the course of fierce battles and calamities there emerged a republic. Under many disturbances and disasters, the whole country suffered from enmity and sabotage. A nation that has determined its destiny and realized its sacred right soon put an end to the disturbances and successfully built the basis for statehood. Despite obstacles on our way to putting our ideals in practice, Azerbaijan has been successful at overcoming its many ordeals with honor. A nation that has proven itself worthy of an independent life and selfadministration has solemnly succeeded in establishing and maintaining a free and democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani independence has been regarded favorably by a vote of the Allied powers. Azerbaijan’s rightful inclusion in the family of Western nations is the brightest day in its history. From this day on, as we progress spiritually and morally, we will undoubtedly

344  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence be demonstrating the power of our nation’s spirit from day to day. Whatever hindrance or evil we face, the government believes in its citizens’ unanimous vigilance for the sake of a free and independent motherland. Long live the independent Azerbaijani nation!72 On January 14, at 10 a.m., celebrations began in Baku. At 12 p.m. the ceremonial session of the parliament was opened. Apart from members of parliament, diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Georgia, Estonia, and Poland participated. Hasan Bey Aghayev, who chaired the session, opened it by giving the floor to Fatali Khan Khoyski who had once again been appointed foreign minister on December 24, 1919. One of those who carried the burden of proclaiming Azerbaijan’s independence and struggling for its recognition by the major states, Khoyski said in his short congratulatory speech, The Azerbaijani nation proclaimed its independence on May 28, 1918. But it was not enough to simply proclaim it. It was important to prove to the whole world that we deserve an independent life. And in the past year and a half, the Azerbaijani people have proven to Europe that it can live independently and govern itself independently. Europe has believed in the living capacity of the Azerbaijani people and considered it necessary to recognize its independence. When Azerbaijan’s first government was organized, I was at its head. And now I feel very delighted to inform you about our republic’s recognition.73 Hasan Bey Aghayev mentioned in his speech that the Entente had recognized Azerbaijan’s independence after 19 months of its existence. This is not just our joy; this is the joy of the entire Turkic race. It was necessary to prove that we are worthy of independent existence. Europe has believed in our nation’s capability as seen through its representatives in our country and it has recognized our independence. We have achieved this at the cost of many sacrifices.74 Afterward, he read congratulatory telegrams sent by the National Assembly of Georgia, the Armenian government, the Muslim National Council of Georgia, the German Council of the Caucasus, the Poles living in Azerbaijan, the Norwegian consul, the Crimean Tatars living in Azerbaijan, and others.75 Congratulatory speeches were delivered by Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Aslan Bey Safikurdski, Samad Agha Aghamalioglu, M. A. Guchman, S. A. Vonsovich, A. Malkhazian, and V. Bakaradze. The Azerbaijani delegates to Paris translated the full content of Rasulzade’s fiery congratulatory speech at the historical session and published it in the information bulletin.76 At the end of the session, Minister of Justice Khalil Bey Khasmammadov read the government’s decision to declare amnesty on the account of the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence.77 After the ceremonial session of parliament, Khoyski organized a reception that was attended by Prime Minister Usubbeyov, Deputy Chairman

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  345 of the parliament Aghayev, all ministers and members of parliament, and foreign missions to Baku. Khoyski delivered a congratulatory speech on this historic event in the life of Azerbaijanis.78 Independence festivities were also held in Ganja. The Azerbaijan newspaper reported, On January 13, an unofficial piece of news reached Ganja with regard to the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allied powers at Versailles. Everyone was greeting each other with congratulations. Late in the day, an official telegram was received by the chief lawyer and the entire town cheered … . January 14 was an eventful day in Ganja. At one o’clock, an emergency meeting was called at the Ganja municipal office … . The governor general of Ganja, Khudadat Bey Rafibeyov, read an official telegram from the government first in Russian, then in Turkish. The happy telegram of affirmation was received with a storm of applause. After the deputy chairman of the municipality gave an opening speech, congratulations were delivered by Javad Akhundzade, Aslan Bey Safikurdski, Mashadi Yusif Farzkhanov, Vali Khuluflu, and our beloved author Mr. Firudin Bey Kocharli.79 Many articles were published in Azerbaijani newspapers with regard to the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence. On January 14, the official state newspaper Azerbaijan reported that starting on that day; the people of Azerbaijan and Georgia were admitted into the global family.80 The Istiglal (Independence) magazine published on January 18 said, A long-awaited celebration has come. A great event has taken place. Since the year before, the entire nation’s great battle of many ordeals has resulted in success. Our republic’s independence has been recognized by Europe, and not just by Europe, but perhaps by all major states that are determining the world’s fate … . Due to the times in which we are living, we cannot quite organize celebrations on an appropriate scale … . Let us picture ourselves fifty years from today: it may well be that we will be envied as a nation that was blessed to have emerged at such a glorious time. Yes, we can pride ourselves for celebrating this milestone at a time of great anxiety and courage.81 The recognition of independence by the world’s leading nations enabled Azeris to believe in their power and increased their hope for a better tomorrow. Concerning the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Allied powers at the Paris Peace Conference, Rasulzade wrote, Stripped of civil and political rights, not allowed anywhere near the government, an Oriental nation that languished from tyranny used the first opportunity to manifest itself as an example of decency by creating a cultured society counter to all hardships. Due to this manifestation, the Azerbaijan republic attracted the attention of the Allies and the world and entered the international process. The January 11 session of the Allied powers recognized

346  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence the de facto independence of the Azerbaijan republic. From the republics established on the ruins of the Russian empire, Azerbaijan became the first Islamic one that gained Europe’s trust. This new Turkic state was the only Turkic republic in the whole Islamic world. Such a great and rewarding event is historic for both Azerbaijan and the entire Turkic world.82 *** Thus, in addition to May 28 and September 15, 1918, a third great event had taken place in Azerbaijan’s fate and history. The recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Paris Peace Conference opened unlimited opportunities for Azerbaijan’s integration into the international community and a wide network of cooperation. For this purpose, on January 29, 1920, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation, Topchubashov, and the head of the Georgian delegation, Nikolai Chkheidze, made a joint statement about their countries’ efforts to defend themselves against Bolshevism.83 On February 19, both delegation heads sent a special letter to the U.S. ambassador in Paris urging Washington to concur with the Allied powers’ decision to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia.84 However, at that time, the United States was still undergoing a bitter transition from isolationism to internationalism, a process going back to the final stages of World War I. Woodrow Wilson, who is considered the initiator of that transition, met with much opposition from advocates of isolationism.

Notes 1. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 159. 2. Ленинский сборник, XXIV (Collection of Lenin’s Works, XXIV), p. 197. 3. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, p. 159. 4. Speech of D. Lloyd George at the Commons Chamber.17.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 29. 5. Ibid., pp. 30–31. 6. Ibid., p. 31. 7. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), December 14, 1919. 8. See: Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 17 Janvier, no. 7, pp. 1–2. 9. Scotland Liddell, “The Armenian-Tatar (Azerbaijani—J.H.) Treaty. Peace Establishment in Garabagh. 1919.” SAAR, f. 894, r. 1, v. 103, p. 10. 10. Ibid., pp. 11–13. 11. Une lettre de Bourdarie, Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1919, 15 Decembre, no. 5, p. 3. 12. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 29.11.– 02.12.1919.SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, pp. 8–9. 13. Pour la Russie, Novembre 29, 1919. 14. Ibid. 15. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 29.11.02.12.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, pp. 16–17. 16. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the USA, Russia, 1919, p. 126.

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  347 17. Meetings with the Representatives of Foreign States during Zangezur Events. 1919. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 12, p. 47. 18. Conference Armeno-Azerbaidjanienne.14–21.12.1919. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp.786–827; Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, pp. 1–2. 19. The British Policy in Southern Caucasus from the Dashnaks’ standpoint. 1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 62, pp. 19–20. 20. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06– 10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, pp. 14–15. 21. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 240. 22. C. Həsənov (J. Hasanov), “Ağ ləkə” lərin qara kölgəsi. (Black Shade of “White Spots”). Baku, 1991, pp. 91–92. 23. Une nouvelle Ligue en Suisse. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Fevrier, No. 8, p. 1. 24. Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921. London, 1968, p. 322. 25. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Mars, No. 10, p. 1. 26. Radiogram of G. Chicherin, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Azerbaijani People. 06.01.1920. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 86, p. 1. 27. Excerpt from the Journal of Resolutions Adopted by the State Defence Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic. 06.01.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 112, p. 8. 28. Urgent diplomatic information sent by F. K. Khoyski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to F. Vekilov, the Azerbaijani Representative in Georgia. 07.01.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 112, p. 1a. 29. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 240. 30. See: Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Mars, No. 10, p. 2; Radiogram of F. K. Khoyski, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Russia. 14.01.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 112, p. 7. 31. F. Vekilov, the Azerbaijani Representative in Georgia, to O. Wardrop. 14.01.1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 69, p. 33. 32. V. I. Lenin, ƏTK. 50-ci cild. (Complete Collection of Works. Volume 50), p. 57. 33. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference, vol. IX, p. 851. 34. Ibid., pp. 837–838. 35. Ibid., p. 953. 36. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 240. 37. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. IX, pp. 985–959; Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933, p. 121. 38. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, vol. IX, p. 959; Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 17 Janvier, No. 7, p. 1. 39. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), February 15, 1920. 40. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. IX, pp. 925–926. 41. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1920, vol. III, U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 1947, p. 703. 42. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919, vol. IX, p. 902. 43. Ibid., pp. 903–904.

348  Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence 44. Audition des Delegues de l’Azerbeidjan et de la Georgie. Proces—Verbal. Séance du jeudi 15 janvier 1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, III. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 17–18. 45. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 241. 46. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 122. 47. Reconnaissance des Gouvernements de Géorgie et d’Azerbaïdjan Le 22 janvier 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 183. 48. See Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 4, III. CERCEC, EHESS; Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Fevrier, No. 8, p. 2. 49. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, pp. 243–244. 50. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, vol. IX, p. 866. 51. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 245. 52. La reconnaissance de l’independance de l’Azerbaidjan et de la Georgie. Bulletin d’Information de l’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Fevrier, No. 8, pp. 1–2. 53. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, vol. IX, pp. 903–904. 54. Ibid., p. 903. 55. Ibid., p. 891. 56. Ibid., p. 893. 57. Ibid., p. 891. 58. Ibid., pp. 892–896. 59. Ibid., pp. 901–902. 60. Ibid., pp. 892–895. 61. Ibid., pp. 897–898. 62. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 123. 63. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, vol. IX, p. 902. 64. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A.M. Toptchibacheff—Le Cabinet a envoyé carte 29 novembre 1929. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, (MAE) Archives Diplomatique, Correspondance politique et commerciale, 1914–1940 Série “Z” Europe 1918–1940 Sous-Série URSS RussieCaucase (Azerbaïdjan) Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales 1 avril 1920—31 décembre 1929, v. 639, f. 307. 65. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series. Volume II. London, 1948, p. 924. 66. See Letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference. 16.01.1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6, I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 851– 853; Telegram of General I. Usubov from Italy to A. M. Topchibasheff. 03.02.1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. I. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 854– 855. 67. Letter of A. M. Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 06.10.11.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 146, pp. 27–28. 68. Information of Wardrop, the British Supreme Commissioner in Tiflis, to F. Vekilov, Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Georgia. 12.01.1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 6, I. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 447. 69. Urgent Diplomatic Information of A. M. Topchubashov to N. Usubbeyov. 12.01.1920. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 69, p. 18. 70. Telegram of General I. Usubov to N. Usubbeyov. 18.01.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 157, p. 48. 71. Celebration de l’independence de la Republique d’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, pp. 4–5.

Recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence  349 72. Aux Citoyens de l’Azerbaidjan. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, p. 4; İstiklal, Janvar 18, 1920. 73. Au Parlement. Seance solennalle du 14 Janvier. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, pp. 5–6; Shorthand record of the Grand Meeting of the Parliament held on January 14. 14.01.1920. SAAR, f. 895, r. 1, v. 259, p. 3. 74. Ibid., p. 6. 75. Au Parlement.Seance solennalle du 14 Janvier. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, p. 6. 76. Au Parlement.Seance solennalle du 14 Janvier. Discours de M.Rassoul-Zade. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Fevrier, No. 9, pp. 6–7. 77. Shorthand record of the Grand Meeting of the Parliament held on January 14. 14.01.1920. SAAR, f. 895, r. 1, v. 259, p. 16. 78. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), January 16, 1920. 79. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), January 22, 1920. 80. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), January 14, 1920. 81. İstiklal (Istiklal), January 18, 1920. 82. M. Ə. Rəsulzadə (M. E. Rasulzade), Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyəti (Azerbaijani Republic). Baku, 1990, p. 57. 83. La defense de l’ Azerbaidjan et de la Georgie. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 1 Fevrier, No. 8, pp. 2–3. 84. La reconnaissance des Republiques Transcaucasiennes. Bulletin d’Information de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1920, 15 Mars, No. 11, p. 1.

13 Azerbaijan and the international situation on the eve of the occupation

The Allied powers’ determination that the only way they could assist Azerbaijan and Georgia was to provide them with weapons paved the way for the Bolshevik invasion. The Bolsheviks had managed to defeat Kolchak, Denikin, and other White Guard recipients of aid from the Allies. What was needed to defend the Caucasus was for the Allies to send troops to the region. Analysis of the political situation after Denikin’s defeat, the strengthening of Soviet Russia, and Armenian violence against Azerbaijanis at the beginning of 1920 leads to the conclusion that the Allies’ January 19 decision to supply Azerbaijan and Georgia with weapons only provoked the Bolsheviks to initiate steps toward invading the region. Documents from the Allies’ meeting indicate that a group of experts and professional military personnel headed by Marshal Ferdinand Foch considered it essential to send troops to Azerbaijan and Georgia. It was not until British Prime Minister David Lloyd George assumed leadership that pressure from politicians resulted in an incomplete decision. The dispatch of troops to Azerbaijan and Georgia had seemed so likely that for 2 weeks, Paris newspapers were reporting on a forthcoming military landing in the Caucasus. On January 31, Le Temps published statements by the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives disclaiming these plans.1 Beginning in the autumn of 1919, Soviet Russia closely observed developments in the Entente’s plans to send troops to Azerbaijan and Georgia. On January 26, the RSFSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs representative in Copenhagen, Maxim M. Litvinov, who had been engaged in negotiations with his British counterpart James O’Grady, sent a telegram to Georgy V. Chicherin informing him that Great Britain had dispelled rumors about an upcoming largescale landing of its troops in the Caucasus.2 British historian E. H. Carr believed, and rightfully so, that the fine words said in Paris about the South Caucasus came to have no impact on the situation. Without foreign assistance and without an agreement regulating the relations between them, the independent states of the South Caucasus could not survive.3 The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Ministry of Defense compiled a memorandum about Azerbaijan’s defense strategy and the needs of the Azerbaijani army and sent it to the Allied group of experts at the end of January. Along with stressing the historical importance of the recognition

The eve of the occupation  351 of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, the document stipulated that unless Azerbaijan was equipped with modern and capable defense systems, all the previous achievements would be to no avail. The document pointed out that Azerbaijan was in need of political, moral, military, strategic, financial, and economic support from the Allies in order to strengthen its ability to defend itself. Considering that the enemy was most likely to attack from the north and the Caspian Sea, it was suggested that Denikin’s shrinking Volunteer Army should be moved out of Dagestan and that the Dagestanis should be assisted in their struggle. For its part, Azerbaijan declared its readiness to provide assistance to the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus.4 The strengthening of Dagestan might have played an important role in Azerbaijan’s defense. As for defense measures in the Caspian Sea, the document proposed that the navy controlled by Denikin be immediately disarmed and handed over to Azerbaijani authorities. Should this be impossible, the government of Azerbaijan would not protest the transfer of those warships to any Allied state. As a result of Denikin’s fast-approaching defeat, the chances of the Bolsheviks capturing these ships were becoming high. One of Denikin’s ships, the Orlenok, had already experienced a Bolshevik mutiny. In order to control the Caspian Sea, transfer of Denikin’s strategic naval base in Astrabad either to Iran or to the British military was deemed necessary, according to the memorandum. Concerning strictly military aid, it was noted that all the demands of the Azerbaijani army for increasing its combat readiness and fighting capacity must be taken into consideration. In order to stabilize the country’s financial and economic life, integrate it into the global market, and allow it to engage in the international exchange of goods with Europe and America, Azerbaijan required a credit within the range of 40–50 million rubles.5 The Azerbaijani government was looking to obtain part of this amount as a payoff of the 8,405,471 rubles that it had lent the British military command.6 Azerbaijan addressed the issue of this sum as well as of the return of the expensive goods granted to General Lazar Bicherakhov, via the British, to the British government. However, at the beginning of February, despite admitting that Great Britain was indeed Azerbaijan’s debtor, British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon stated that the loan obtained from the Bank of Azerbaijan along with the oil products had been used for the needs of the British military in charge of protecting the people of Azerbaijan.7 With regard to the goods that were in Bicherakhov’s possession, the British government agreed to have them returned on the condition that Azerbaijan would undertake to repay “its share” of tsarist Russia’s prewar debt.8 After the April events, negotiations over these issues were left unfinished. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum, the Azerbaijani government declared its willingness to exchange 200 million poods of petroleum (1 pood = 16.38 kg) and 20 million poods of crude oil that were at its disposal for 1.5–2 million poods of grain, 1 million poods of sugar, indispensable agricultural equipment, manufactured goods, as much medicaments and medical equipment as the government was able to purchase, and forrailway repair, 100 steam engines, 2,000 cisterns, and 500 boxcars. In addition, as outlined in the memorandum, the development of the country’s economy depended on resolving the questions

352  The eve of the occupation around the city of Batum, which was vital for Azerbaijan. It was brought to the Allies’ attention that as far as Batum was concerned, Azerbaijan’s claims on Batum city and the Batum port should be taken into consideration. As a first step, Azerbaijan expected to be granted the right to make free use of the port.9 The recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty at Versailles raised international interest in the country. Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and other states established consulates in Baku. At the end of January, Azerbaijan signed an economic treaty with the American Committee for Relief in the Near East that stipulated that Azerbaijan was to provide the committee with crude oil and fuel oil in exchange for American flour. According to the agreement, the price for a ton of flour was to be $210; a ton of fuel oil would cost $20, and a ton of crude oil would cost $35.10 The treaty was signed by William N. Haskell for the committee and the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Georgia, Faris Bey Vakilov. On January 26, a similar agreement was signed between Azerbaijan and the British diplomatic representation. According to the agreement, Azerbaijan was to supply the British military in Batum with fuel oil.11 Great Britain was to purchase the fuel oil in stable currency essential for Azerbaijan’s economy as well as in exchange for military supplies. The agreements signed between Azerbaijan and the representatives of the United States and Great Britain captured the attention of the Italians. The Italian commissioner to the Caucasus, Melchiorre Gabba, was concerned that the British and the Americans were purchasing oil for their own needs and preventing the Azerbaijani government from selling it to other countries. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev wrote with regard to Italy’s attitude toward the Caucasus, “The recognition of the Caucasus republics by the Allied powers increased Italy’s willingness to establish relations with the political units that emerged at Russia’s borders. Italian officials expressed their intention to maintain continuous ties with those states.”12 In February, an Italian economic commission of thirty-five people headed by senators Conti and Volpi and influenced by Italy’s industrial and financial circles visited Azerbaijan.13 Industrialist Conti was one of the main manufacturers to provide the Azerbaijani army with weapons and uniforms. General Usubov had met with him in Rome and had discussed the issue of weapons and uniform supply. At the beginning of 1920, a number of agreements between Azerbaijan and Italy were signed by Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov in Italy and Abdulali Bey Amirjanov in Batum. According to these agreements, Azerbaijan was to purchase from Italy six high-speed boats, ninety-two naval artillery pieces, thirty-four cannons with 135,000 shells for the land forces, twelve hydroplanes, four airplanes, five tanks, twenty armored vehicles, 10,000 pairs of jackboots, 70,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 overcoats, and other items.14 As early as the end of 1919, the Italian government was engaged in negotiations over importing 1,000 tons of petroleum from Azerbaijan. Colonel Gabba addressed a request to Prime Minister Nasib Usubbeyov. In his reply to Colonel Gabba, Usubbeyov informed him that Azerbaijan was able to transport 3,000 tons of petroleum and fuel oil to Batum for the Italian government every month. At the same time, the prime minister reminded Colonel Gabba that the price for

The eve of the occupation  353 petroleum was $35 per ton and the price for fuel oil was $25 per ton.15 At the beginning of 1920, representatives of the Italian government and of various firms signed documents in which they agreed to purchase petroleum and petroleum products, cotton, wool, silk, and other products from Azerbaijan. Italy’s economic interest in Azerbaijan was in accordance with the state program of Nitti and Tittoni’s government—the successor to Orlando and Sanino’s government—to secure access to raw materials. Lloyd George described Nitti’s government as one that concentrated on the internal development of the country and maximum trade expansion.16 Due to Italy’s great economic interest in Azerbaijan, it was the first major state that established a diplomatic mission in Baku. The advisor to the Azerbaijani house of representatives, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, was right in believing that the recognition of the Caucasus republics by the Allied powers, “along with being of great historical importance to the peoples of the Caucasus and the whole Near East, at the same time offered great opportunities for European politicians and large industrial countries.”17 At the beginning of 1920, it was clear that Azerbaijan was engaged in largescale international political and economic relations, its international isolation being replaced by international cooperation. The defeat of Denikin’s Volunteer Army on February 11, 1920, enabled Azerbaijan to breathe again. Multiple ties began to be established with neighboring Georgia and Iran. Back in December, a joint Azerbaijani-Iranian conference was held, and a number of draft treaties were prepared. An Iranian mission led by Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaee carried on productive talks with Azerbaijani officials. In early January, a diplomatic mission from Azerbaijan headed by Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli was sent to Tehran.18 On January 14 and 30, during the Azerbaijani-Iranian conference sessions, issues of transportation were thoroughly discussed, and an agreement on customs duties for transported goods was reached. Talks conducted in Tehran and Baku at the end of 1919 were extremely fruitful. On March 20, on the eve of Novruz, an eleven-point customs agreement,19 a nine-point trade agreement,20 an eighteenpoint agreement on telegraph communications,21 a nineteen-point agreement on postal communications,22 a twenty-five-point agreement on the execution of court orders,23 a seventeen-point consular relations agreement24 and, last, a treaty of friendship between the Azerbaijan republic and the Shah’s government of Iran were signed—a major achievement for Azerbaijani diplomacy.25 In the first article of the treaty, the Iranian government solemnly announced the recognition of the Caucasus Azerbaijan republic’s de jure independence. According to the second article of the treaty, both parties were determined to develop strong friendly and economic ties. The third article compelled Azerbaijan to send a permanent diplomatic representative to Tehran and Iran to send its representative to Baku. The treaty was signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatali Khan Khoyski, Minister of Justice Khalil Bey Khasmammadov, and Minister of Roads Khudadat Bey Malik-Aslanov on behalf of Azerbaijan and by the envoy extraordinaire Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaee on behalf of Iran. According to the treaty of March 20, 1920, Iran became the first major state to recognize Azerbaijan’s de jure independence. Shortly after, an Azerbaijani embassy began functioning in

354  The eve of the occupation Tehran. On April 1, an Azerbaijani general-consulate in Tabriz, a consulate in Rasht, a vice-consulate in Mashhad, and consular agencies in Khoy and Ahar were established.26 An Azerbaijani consulate in Enzeli had been functioning since February. On February 1, Mahammad Bey Khalilov was appointed vice-consul to Enzeli.27 Included in those with an interest in the newly formed states, Lithuania and Poland expressed willingness to establish ties with Azerbaijan. The Polish consulate in Tiflis established a vice-consulate in Baku and sent a member of Poland’s mission to the Caucasus with Stefan Rylski as a consular agent. In the beginning of January, the Polish diplomatic representative in the Caucasus, Waclaw Ostrowski, visited Baku. In his talks with Azerbaijani officials, he made statements about the necessity of creating a united bloc for protecting states that had seceded from the Russian empire.28 It emerged that the idea of a collective protection agreement for the newly formed republics had been proposed back in mid-January during the meeting of the Allied powers military experts; on January 19, British Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill had stressed the importance of creating a defense zone stretching from Poland and Finland to Azerbaijan. Clemenceau, Foch, and Wilson among others agreed with Churchill on this matter. The issue of defense against Bolshevism was discussed at Versailles and at other bilateral negotiations. In the decision of the conference, it was made clear that should Azerbaijan or Georgia face a foreign incursion, the Allied powers guaranteed financial assistance to the breached state. Both Nikolai Chkheidze and Ali MardanTopchubashov spoke at the conference and afterward to the Paris media stating that their republics had no intention of interfering in Russia’s internal affairs or serving as a base for launching attacks against it.29 Topchubashov further noted that Azerbaijan together with Georgia was looking merely to defend itself from Bolshevism.30 Thus, the opinion of certain historians that the Entente and the United States worked jointly to engage Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in an anti-Soviet crusade against Russia is contrary to the objective truth.31 As part of their defense strategies against Bolshevism, the great powers assigned a special role to Poland. In addition to the collective defense of the newly formed states, Poland was to become a massive shield against the spread of Bolshevism into Europe. As a result, Poland enjoyed considerable political, economic, and military support from the United States and European countries. Beginning in early 1920, Poland received military supplies worth $1.7 million from the United States alone.32 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stanislaw Patek discussed measures for increasing his country’s ability to defend itself during talks in Paris and London. It was even reported that in the spring of 1920, Great Britain urged Poland to attack Soviet Russia in order to distract the latter from moving its troops to the Caucasus.33 At that point, however, Poland and the newly established Little Entente were under heavier influence from France than from Great Britain. The Polish envoy to Baku, Waclaw Ostrowski, considered it essential to form a defense bloc to protect the new states not only from Soviet Russia but from the White Guard generals. According to the plan, the bloc was to include Poland,

The eve of the occupation  355 Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Romania’s inclusion in the bloc was also seen as necessary. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs appreciated that industrially developed Poland with its 1 million troops could head this bloc.34 However, after events in the Caucasus and the escalation of the Soviet–Polish War, the negotiations were abandoned. Poland also had economic interests in Azerbaijan. In early February 1920, the Polish diplomatic mission in Tiflis informed the Azerbaijani mission that Poland was ready to provide 600 tons of manufactured goods, glass, and iron products in exchange for raw materials, mainly cotton and wool. On February 4, in a telegram sent from Tiflis, Azerbaijani diplomats requested a statement of guarantee from the Azerbaijani government for the safe transportation of imported goods to Azerbaijan via Georgia and of goods exported to Poland via Georgia to the Black Sea.35 After the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence, the republic’s representatives in Paris intensified their activity. Despite the official ending of the peace conference on January 21, the Azerbaijani delegation continued to fulfill its mission in Europe. In the spring of 1920, it was planned to hold a separate conference of the newly formed republics in Switzerland. Along with preparing for this, the Azerbaijani envoys took an active part in the FebruaryMarch conference in London and the April conference in San Remo held by the organizers of the Paris Peace Conference in 1920. In order to participate in the Allied powers’ meeting in the United Kingdom, the Azerbaijani delegates traveled to London. Prior to departing, Ali Mardan Topchubashov wrote, The British believe that we deserve attention as a nation capable of living an independent political life. This is favorable for us. Now the importance of visiting London is clearer, and we will do so shortly. Moreover, this will not be simply a visit but a long-term stay, for the conference around Russian matters will apparently be held in London. Despite the settlement of these issues being advantageous to us, we are still maintaining the necessary connections both here [in Paris] and in London.36 Although Russian affairs were discussed at the London session in late February 1920, no final decision was made. On February 24, the conference passed a memorandum on the Allies’ political stance with regard to Russia. It was noted that unless Bolshevik violence ceased, it would be impossible to create diplomatic relations with the Soviet government. However, the memorandum mentioned the possibility of establishing trade between Russia and Europe. A suggestion was made to the League of Nations to delegate a special commission to Russia to assess the real situation there. All this was a manifestation of a rapprochement between the United Kingdom and Russia that was starting to take place in early 1920. Even prior to the session, during negotiations in Copenhagen on January 11, Russia and Great Britain signed an agreement on the exchange of captured troops. According to the agreement, the British were obliged to assist captive Russian soldiers in returning to their homeland not just from Britain but from

356  The eve of the occupation all member states of the Entente. During the Copenhagen negotiations, Russia managed to obtain large amounts of medicaments, food supplies, and grain from Great Britain. On January 16, the Entente allowed the Allied and neutral states to exchange goods with Russia.37 At the London conference, it was suggested that the newly recognized states maintain peaceful relations with Soviet Russia. The countries still at war with Russia were urged to end military actions. However the Allies also stated that in case Soviet Russia attacked the new states and violated their recognized borders, the Entente would seek to assist the attacked countries using all possible means. Evidently all these warnings were declarative in nature. Concrete measures for strengthening self-defense capability depended more on bilateral relations than on a cooperative defense plan. Azerbaijan and Georgia pinned their hopes on Britain’s aid alone to defend them from Bolshevik aggression. Other states simply did not possess enough resources to fulfill this mission. In the development of trade relations between Britain and Soviet Russia, one of the goals of the former was to play a role in softening relations between Soviet Russia and the Caucasus states and afterward in mediating the process of establishing peaceful neighborly relations between them.38 However, it was rather unrealistic to hope for this without first strengthening Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s defenses. While it is true that the British envoys had discussed plans for sending military aid to Azerbaijan, these talks had had no measurable results. Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatali Khan Khoyski wrote to Topchubashov about the threat at the northern border, The situation we face, in light of the approaching Red Army forces is to clarify the questions around military assistance from the British. I am conducting negotiations with Wardrop through Colonel Claude Stokes in this regard. From what is known, Wardrop is addressing this issue to London and is waiting for further instructions from there. On your part, you must undertake steps in this direction.39 It is noteworthy that in March 1920, the British and French envoys to Azerbaijan began to compile a report on the needs of the Azerbaijani army and navy fleet.40 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Mammad Khan Tekinski added his list of what the Azerbaijani army required as well as what equipment was needed for the Baku port. At the same time, the British government considered it important to put an end to all conflicts between the Caucasus republics and peoples for the sake of increasing their ability to defend themselves. For this purpose, on February 23, 1920 representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia met at Oliver Wardrop’s apartment in Tiflis. At this meeting, attended by a French delegate, Azerbaijan was represented by its diplomatic envoys to Georgia and Armenia, Faris Bey Vakilov and Aburrahim Bey Hagverdiyev, while Armenia was represented by Parliament member Vahan Papazian and an Armenian representative in Tiflis, Arshak Jamalian.

The eve of the occupation  357 In his opening statement, the British representative strongly recommended that the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia be resolved. Hagverdiyev proposed that a national council be formed to assume power in Garabagh, Nakhchivan, and Zangezur until the border dispute was solved. Afterward, he mentioned the importance of calling a peace conference to discuss all disputable issues. Until then, each side should remove its troops and agitators from these territories. The British and French delegates supported the plan for calling a conference. However, the Armenian representatives disagreed with every point of Hagverdiyev’s proposal and instead suggested that the power in the disputed lands be temporarily transferred to the Allies. The Azerbaijani delegates found this offer unacceptable.41 In an attempt to expedite the solution of the territorial disputes and to broaden economic and political relations of the South Caucasus states, the British delegates addressed themselves to the governments of the three republics. On March 5, in his letter to the Azerbaijani government, Oliver Wardrop wrote that His Majesty’s Government hoped that the republics of the South Caucasus would establish the closest political and economic relations. Keeping in mind that the South Caucasus border disputes were supposed to be discussed at the forthcoming London and San Remo conferences, Wardrop requested that the Azerbaijani government send a special report to the British representative’s office outlining Azerbaijan’s territorial claims and to support the latter by historical and ethnographic evidence. He noted that early negotiations between the Caucasus states and their being able to resolve certain issues would be beneficial. According to Wardrop, the conference would only solve the issues on which the South Caucasus republics could not agree.42 Discussions over the Russian question at the London conference and the events taking place in the South Caucasus lead one to believe that the British government was interested in, and was taking steps toward, protecting the Caucasus republics from Bolshevik aggression and stabilizing interethnic relations in the region. One of the essential issues for Azerbaijan at the London conference was the discussion of the peace treaty with Turkey. Already dissatisfied with the Treaty of Versailles, the United States protested against Great Britain’s and France’s taking the initiative in drafting a peace treaty with Turkey without consulting the Americans. Bainbridge Colby, who in February of 1920 had succeeded Robert Lansing as Secretary of State, reminded the Allied powers that the United States had contributed greatly to the defeat of Turkey’s ally Germany and hence should actively participate in drafting a peace treaty with Turkey. As for the issue of Constantinople (Istanbul), Colby accused the Allies of inconsistencies. He noted that the process of excluding Turkey from Europe had to be completed and that Constantinople should be placed under American control.43 After the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus, however, British political circles understood the harsh consequences of the Ottoman partition and did not want the Americans to become involved in the region. Winston Churchill believed that in preparing a treaty plan, the future possibility of Turkey’s viewing Britain as a friendly nation should be taken into consideration.44 Lord George Curzon believed in the

358  The eve of the occupation necessity of breaking Ottoman power and creating a Christian Armenian state along the borders of Turkey and other Islamic countries of the East. Lloyd George wanted the Turkish question to be handled with great caution. The discussion of a peace treaty with Turkey raised another wave of interest toward the republics of the South Caucasus. This was not unexpected, as all of them had common borders with Turkey and not with Russia. Armenia was particularly vigilant with respect to the London conference. A peace treaty with Turkey would determine Armenia’s status and borders. To clarify the issue, the conference ordered the creation of a joint committee, including representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The Armenians demanded that all of the Vilayet of Trabzon and the eastern vilayets of Asia Minor be granted to them. At their London meeting, foreign ministers of the Entente worked out a proposal for Turkey to cede Erzurum to Armenia. It was noted in the proposal that Erzurum was of great strategic importance and leaving it within Turkey would threaten the existence of an independent Armenia. The London meeting of foreign ministers concluded that transferring Erzurum to Armenia and providing the latter with access to the sea was a desirable plan. According to them, for the sake of ensuring peace and stability and preventing pan-Islamist and pan-Turkic movements, Turkey should be separated from the other Islamic countries by a Christian Armenian state.45 When discussed at the London conference, this proposal, designed under the supervision of Lord Curzon, was described by Lloyd George as a dangerous one. Overall there was no consensus in British political circles with regard to attitudes toward Turkey and Russia. Some believed in the need to preserve Turkey’s territorial integrity and to divide Russia. Others preferred the idea of restoring Russia to its original borders and annihilating Turkey.46 Lord Curzon’s idea of granting eastern Anatolian vilayets to Armenia was a component of the plan of annihilation. Lloyd George noted that Armenians were surrounded by Azerbaijanis, Turks, and Kurds living in the region. It would, therefore, be naive to promise Armenians vast territories given that they were already struggling to preserve the little piece of land they now populated. Lloyd George believed that propagating the idea of broadening Armenia’s territory was dangerous in that it could lead the Allies to take hasty steps and to incite Turks to seek vengeance. The Italian prime minister agreed with Lloyd George’s opinion and added that Erzurum was a rather dangerous gift. It was also mentioned that the idea of transferring Erzurum to Armenia had no basis, as Armenians did not constitute the majority there. Lord Curzon noted that a negative decision by the Allied powers would constitute a major blow to Armenian hopes.47 However, the conference did not produce a final decision, and the question of Armenia’s borders was adjourned until the San Remo conference. Lord Curzon’s point of view stemmed more from his fear of Turkey’s gaining strength than from his sympathy for Armenia. In fact, he was far from considering Armenians a “longsuffering” nation. In March 1920, while speaking before the British House of Commons, Curzon criticized the widely held view of Armenians as “a pure and innocent eight-year-old girl.” He added that by their recent behavior, Armenians had beyond question proven their “bloody-minded nature.”48

The eve of the occupation  359 While these questions were being discussed, the Azerbaijani delegates in Paris were publishing information bulletins. The chairman of the Kars national council, A. Zeynalov, sent anxious telegrams to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Allies’ representatives in Tiflis about the savageries carried out by the Armenians in Kars. The bulletin also published two notes that Foreign Minister Khoyski had sent to the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.49 Khoyski also informed the head of the French military mission in the Caucasus, E. de Nonancourt, about Armenian atrocities in Kars, Zangezur, and Erivan.50 To readers, these documents gave a clear impression of the violent actions implemented by the Armenians in Kars. It is noteworthy that the Georgian delegates also presented a memorandum to the Allied powers proposing the granting of the Vilayet of Trabzon to Georgia. The Georgians viewed the Vilayet of Trabzon as an extension of the Batum district at the shore of the Black Sea. The Azerbaijani envoys to London noted that the plan included Muslim-populated territories in Armenia and viewed this move as unjust and undesirable for the local Muslim population.51 One of the issues that caused serious discussions at the London conference was that of Batum. The Azerbaijani delegates presented the conference with a memorandum laying claims to Batum. The document stated that Batum was Azerbaijan’s only passageway to European and American markets.52 The Georgian and Armenian delegates also presented to the conference their respective memoranda regarding the city.53 Kammerer, a French member of the committee dealing with the issue of Batum, stated that none of the new Caucasus states should be denied access to the sea through the port. He noted that the Batum port was the main transit point for the export of petroleum products from Baku. On March 1, in their note to the Allied powers, the Georgian representatives demanded the inclusion of Batum in Georgia and expressed their readiness to guarantee Azerbaijan and Armenia free access to Batum upon signing an agreement. According to the Allies’ plan, Batum was to be divided into three parts. Two parts were to be granted to Georgia and Armenia, respectively, and the city of Batum was to become a free city that could be unrestrictedly used by all members of the League of Nations. This plan faced objections from the Georgian side. The Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates in London came to a mutual agreement that the partition of Batum was unreasonable for either republic. Azerbaijan did not object to the inclusion of Batum in Georgia, as long as Georgia took the guarantee of Azerbaijan’s economic interests in Batum upon itself.54 On the basis of a mutual agreement, both parties presented a joint appeal to the Allied Powers outlining the preceding points. The Georgian delegates placed great importance on this appeal about the issue of Batum. However at the last minute, arguments over the Kars issue arose and became an obstacle in the submission of the appeal to the Allied powers. At the London conference, foreign ministers of the Entente had proposed to include the Kars Oblast in Armenia. According to the Azerbaijanis’ point of view, if Kars was to be taken away from Turkey, it would be reasonable to incorporate it in Georgia rather than in Armenia. Thus, the Azerbaijani delegates

360  The eve of the occupation agreed to sign the appeal on Batum on the condition that Georgia would demand the Kars Oblast from the Allied powers.55 The Georgians refused to comply. As a result of Armenia’s baseless claims, the London conference did not confirm the status quo in the South Caucasus. The head of the Armenian delegation, Avetis Aharonian, suggested that since border disputes could not be resolved locally, they should be resolved in Europe with the help of the Allies. Neither the Azerbaijanis nor the Georgians agreed with this proposal. The Azerbaijani delegates said the Dashnak government had deliberately complicated the situation on the disputed lands in order to convince the Europeans of the impossibility of a self-dependent solution to this problem. The Armenians knew well that the situation at the conference was favorable to them. The Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations both decided to object to the settlement of the South Caucasus border disputes in either Paris or London and to insist that these disputes be solved locally. The delegations agreed on the Georgians’ proposition to telegraph the capitals of all three republics calling for the creation of an arbitration committee aiming at settling all border disputes. Should this fail to produce positive results, the discussion over the border issues would be taken to Europe.56 At the London conference, just as at the Paris conference, there were serious disagreements between the Azerbaijani and Armenian representatives. In particular, fear of the growing power of the Kemalist movement prompted the Armenians to mislead the European politicians into believing that Turkey and Azerbaijan had secretly signed a military pact. The March 20 edition of Britain’s The Times reported an alleged signing of a secret military pact between Turkey and Azerbaijan, a rumor perhaps having Armenian roots.57 It is interesting that the report was published on the day Armenians revolted in the Garabagh. An agreement signed in Istanbul by Azerbaijani General Karimov and Ottoman official Cevat Pasha in February 1920 fell into the hands of the French military mission and raised even more suspicion.58 On March 20, Armenians initiated military operations against the Muslim population at the borders of Kars and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani diplomat in Iran, Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli, wrote in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, From March 20 on, I have been receiving telegrams from Nakhchivan and various parts of Iran about organized attacks of Armenian military units on Nakhchivan and Ordubad. I was informed in these telegrams that Iranian Armenians are also participating in these attacks. Gunfire is causing significant damage. The local population is heroically defending their lands but is asking for timely assistance. As for the participation of Iranian Armenians in these activities, I have addressed this issue to the Iranian government. Likewise, I have informed the embassies of Britain, the United States, and France in Tehran about Armenian attacks in these regions. 59 To convince the European community about the existence of a secret Turkish– Azerbaijani military pact, the Armenians were spreading information about Nuri Pasha (who had captained the capture of Baku in 1918) allegedly hiding

The eve of the occupation  361 in Garabagh. This information was addressed to European political circles via the French military mission.60 Even though Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Khoyski sent a note to the Armenian government dismissing it as a rumor, the Armenians skillfully made use of the diversion to artificially complicate the situation. One of the primary goals of spreading these rumors was to strip Azerbaijan of assistance from the Allies. Topchubashov refuted these claims in his note to the ambassadors of the Allied states.61 He was selflessly struggling to gain assistance from the Allies in light of the crisis swirling around the republic. Specifically, he was carefully watching the threat from the north, of which he had been kept thoroughly informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the spread of the information about a Turkish-Azerbaijani secret military agreement, Armenian delegates in Paris said they could no longer trust Azerbaijan. They stated that the treaty signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia in Tiflis in November 1919 was now null and void.62 According to the March 20 report in The Times, the Armenian revolt in Garabagh, the military operations against Nakhchivan and Ordubad, and the Armenians’ simultaneous repudiation of the November 1919 agreement all stemmed from the same root. Discussions over the South Caucasus at the London conference were left incomplete, and the issue was adjourned until the conference in San Remo. The Azerbaijani delegates to London organized a conference on the history and economy of Azerbaijan on March 3 at the Walter Jones School in London, where Professor Montberand gave the audience an informative lecture on Azerbaijan.63 After returning to Paris, the Azerbaijani delegates published a broad report on the conference organized in London in the local information bulletins. The recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence and the events taking place at the London Conference created the necessity to send Azerbaijani diplomatic missions to European countries and the United States. This question was at the center of attention of the Azerbaijani politicians even prior to their being officially recognized. Back on January 7, the government had made a decision to send diplomatic missions to Western Europe, the United States, Poland, and the new states established at the borders of the Russian empire. After the recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence by the Paris Peace Conference, it was time to establish diplomatic relations with the European countries and the United States. On March 5, the government drafted a plan to send six diplomatic representatives to Europe and America and submitted it to the Parliament. At the same time, it proposed to abolish Azerbaijani representation at the Paris Peace Conference, now ended. The draft document included the following points: 1 2 3

as of April 1, the establishment of Azerbaijani diplomatic missions in France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy, the United States, and Poland; the abolition of the Azerbaijani representation at the Paris Peace Conference formed on the basis of the December 28, 1918, decree and commencing upon the arrival of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in France; and the allocation of £88,320 sterling beginning on April 1 for the functioning of the aforementioned six diplomatic missions.64

362  The eve of the occupation With the exception of the one in Poland, each mission was to consist of four workers: a diplomatic representative, an advising economic expert, a secretary, and an interpreter. The mission sent to Poland was also meant to represent Azerbaijan’s political and economic interests in Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Estonia, and Finland and was, therefore, to include six workers. In order to facilitate communication with all six missions, each of them was to be assigned its own diplomatic courier.65 The draft decree was discussed in the Azerbaijani Parliament on April 15, later than expected. Parliamentarian Mukhtar Afandizade read the draft to the Parliament. Foreign Minister Khoyski clarified certain points. He said, We certainly wish that our missions could exist in every country of the world. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan is unable to send diplomats to all countries. Therefore the government has come to the decision to limit itself to sending missions to the most influential countries. First and foremost, missions are to be established in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. These are the countries that play a decisive role not just in Europe but all across the world. In addition, it is planned to send a mission to Switzerland. The processes taking place in this small country sometimes affect global politics. Therefore the government considers it essential to establish a mission there. Finally, another mission will be established in Poland. The duty of this mission is to create strong ties between Azerbaijan and countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Estonia, Romania, and others. This mission obviously has a heavier task; consequently we have decided to increase the number of its members by two.66 At the same time, Khoyski informed the Parliament that these missions would be temporary and would function for 6 months, during which time the government would target more precisely where to send its permanent diplomatic representatives. Aliheydar Garayev, a member of the Hummet faction, spoke before the Parliament and criticized the plan for not envisaging the establishment of a mission in Soviet Russia. He said, I would like to know why Soviet Russia is not on the list of countries with which our government wants to establish friendly relations. Why is it that with sending diplomatic missions to all the imperialist states you are forgetting our true friend?67 Garayev’s speech caused objections in the audience chamber. In his sharp answer to Garayev, Khoyski said, I do not know if the speaker is truly addressing the issue at hand or he is just rabble rousing. We were asked why we do not want to establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia. We have always adhered and will adhere to the idea of being close with the Great Russian nation. If there is no friendship, this is not through a fault of our own. We have expressed our readiness to

The eve of the occupation  363 start talks to establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia three times. Until now our proposals have received no attention. The speaker should not blame us. If he wishes for friendly relations between us and Soviet Russia, he must encourage those sharing his views [Soviet Russia] to attend the talks. It is not we who should be receiving instructions but those who have been hindering these issues. Regarding the discussion of the draft, Aslan Bey Safikurdski and Gara Bey Garabeyli stated on behalf of their factions that they had not received copies and thus were unable to discuss it. Representatives of both parties—Hummet (socialist) and Union (Islamic)—called to adjourn the discussion until the next session. Agha Aminov who spoke on behalf of the Musavat party, informed Parliament that his faction did not object to an adjournment.68 Four days later, on April 19, the Parliament passed the decision to form diplomatic missions in Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, Switzerland, Poland (accredited in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine, and Romania), Germany, and Russia.69 On April 17, the RSFSR deputy foreign minister, Lev M. Karakhan, sent a telegram in which he said Soviet Russia was prepared to establish economic ties with Azerbaijan. A tentative group of negotiators delegated to Russia included Agha Aminov (head of mission), R. Rzayev, Rahim Vakilov, and M. Malikov.70 On April 21, an Azerbaijani delegation consisting of civil servant Parviz Mirza and members of Parliament Rahim Vakilov and Ahmad Pepinov departed for the North Caucasus to establish mutual ties between Azerbaijan and the Dagestani authorities.71 At the advent of the April 1920 crisis, Azerbaijan’s isolation from the world had already been overcome, and the country had begun to receive worldwide recognition at the diplomatic level. Azerbaijan maintained diplomatic relations with Georgia (represented by Fariz bey Vakilov), Armenia (represented by A. Hagverdiyev), Iran (represented by Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli), and Turkey (represented by Yusif Vazir Chamanzaminli). The Azerbaijani consulate in Batum was headed by M. Afandiyev, and the diplomatic agency in Turkestan was headed by A. Sadikhov.72 Foreign diplomatic missions, in turn, were also functioning in Azerbaijan. Diplomatic missions and representatives of Great Britain, Belgium, Greece, Armenia, Georgia, Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, Iran, Poland, the United States, Ukraine, Finland, France, Switzerland, and Sweden had already begun to operate. Japan had expressed its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan.73 Even prior to sending diplomatic missions to European countries, the Azerbaijani Peace Delegation headed by Topchubashov participated in international events organized by the Allied Powers. After the London Conference, the Allies met in San Remo, Italy on April 19–26 to discuss the remainder of issues pending since the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference in San Remo, France was represented by Millerand, Britain by Lloyd George, Italy by Nitti, and Japan by Matsiu. The American representatives participated in the conference as observers.74 Representatives of Greece and Belgium attended only discussions pertaining to their interests. Issues of interest to the Azerbaijani delegation such as

364  The eve of the occupation the issue of Batum, the issue of oil, the first draft version of the peace treaty with Turkey, Turkish-Armenian borders, borders within the South Caucasus, as well as the Russian question and the issue of providing assistance to the South Caucasus republics were intended for discussion at the conference. Before the conference took place, Great Britain sent its Foreign Office representative Robert Vansittart to Paris. His task was to conduct consultations with the Caucasus republics and specifically to achieve unanimity on certain issues before the San Remo conference. On April 13, at the Hotel Campbell, where the British envoy was staying, a meeting took place involving Nikolai Chkheidze, Ali Mardan Topchubashov, Boghos Nubarian, and Avetis Aharonian. Vansittart said he had come to Paris to fulfill his duty of discussing some common issues in a friendly manner. He added that the Allied Powers saw no future for the South Caucasus republics as they were refusing to come to an agreement for the sake of stability. As proof, he noted that each South Caucasus republic envisioned a different status for Batum. Having read the memorandum submitted to him in London by Topchubashov, he assessed the ideas therein to be the work of a skilled politician.75 The Azerbaijani government believed that the development of trade relations between the republics and the West through free transit via Georgia should be regulated by Article 89 of the Versailles treaty. Just as the treaty guaranteed Czechoslovakia access to the sea through Hamburg, Poland access through Danzig, and Serbia access through Thessaloniki as was stipulated by the Bucharest treaty, Azerbaijan’s access should also be guaranteed by Article 89 of the Versailles treaty.76 In addition to this, Topchubashov proposed in his memorandum to the British Foreign Office that the disputed regions be governed collectively by the South Caucasus republics.77 Topchubashov’s proposal caused disagreements with the Armenians and the Georgians. The Armenians completely overruled Azerbaijan’s claims on Batum. The Georgians demanded unilateral control over the port on the condition that the other republics would be able to freely utilize it. Vansittart told the Georgians that he had little hope for the Allies’ recognition of Georgia’s sovereignty over Batum.78 This opinion was based on the fact that Batum had been under the British control and was a haven for the White Guardists who had fled from the Bolsheviks. Later, Noe Jordania wrote, “The port and its vicinity were practically given over to the White Guardists. Despite our friend Wardrop being Britain’s representative in Georgia, many obstacles were being created for us with regard to Batum.”79 On April 15 and 16, the three delegations discussed the Batum issue among themselves and in the presence of the British envoy. The British envoy openly stated that the primary obstacle for the export of weapons from the Allies to the South Caucasus republics was their inability to solve their disagreements. He said the Allies feared that the exported weaponry might be used by the South Caucasus republics against one another.80 Despite Vansittart’s serious attempts, the Caucasus republics did not come to an agreement on the Batum question or other issues. All three delegations departed for San Remo to speak before the conference. On the second day of

The eve of the occupation  365 the conference, the issue of creating a 40,000-troop defense establishment for Armenia and transferring the republic’s mandate to Norway was discussed. After Norway refused to accept Armenia’s mandate, this task was offered to the United States. In the course of the conference, despite the U.S. recognition of Armenia’s de facto independence on April 23, the question of a mandate proved to be a timeconsuming one. After undergoing lengthy discussions, on June 1, Congress voted down the administration’s proposal concerning the Armenian mandate. In his detailed report titled There Is Nothing Left to Do for Dashnaktsutyun, published in Bucharest in 1923, Hovhannes Kachaznuni wrote, “The Senate of the United States of America refused to assume a mandate over Armenia; a mandate on which we were pinning so many hopes.”81 Winston Churchill also noted that the solemn promises given by the great powers with regard to the Armenian question died on the vine. No country was willing to accept the mandate over Armenia. Politicians from Britain, Italy, the United States, and France considered it and simply shook their heads. On March 12, 1920, the Allied powers offered this mandate to the League of Nations. Already out of resources and power, the League wisely refused it.82 The discussion of the Armenian question on April 20 at the San Remo conference increased the Armenians’ haughty attitude toward their neighbors. In order to turn discussions on the South Caucasus borders to their account in Europe, the Armenians deliberately fomented trouble in the region and maneuvered in order to have the issue discussed by the Allied powers. In March, the Armenians disturbed the situation in the Garabagh by initiating a revolt. The French representative in Tiflis sent a telegram to Paris in which he stated that the Garabagh question could not be settled locally and that the Entente should take the most serious measures to find an answer to this quandary.83 Subsequently, the United States proposed at the San Remo conference that Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia be defined by the Entente. The conference, however, did not agree with this proposal. Lloyd George insisted that there was no necessity in concentrating on this issue. Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia should be defined in accordance with a consensus reached by these three republics.84 The question of creating a “greater Armenia” on the territories of Turkey and other Islamic states was once again put on the table in San Remo. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson addressed his suggestions with regard to the creation of such a state to the conference’s chairman, Francesco Nitti. Even though the proposal was overall favored by participants at the conference, it was aborted at the last minute. Nitti wrote concerning this, In the spring of 1920, when I chaired the San Remo conference, I received a fiery letter from Wilson. There he called for the creation of “greater Armenia” by the Entente which would include the Erzurum region (where Armenians are hardly encountered) and Trabzon, which would guarantee its access to the sea. The letter was filled with reproach and criticism. To establish the kind of Armenia that President Wilson envisioned would first require that all the Turks and Russians be driven away from there. Who would take this responsibility? I

366  The eve of the occupation consulted about this issue with Marshal Foch, General Badolier, Field Marshal Wilson, and other military experts. Everyone favored Field Marshal Wilson’s opinion and aims, but neither Britain, nor France, nor Italy agreed to accept the heavy task of assuming Armenia’s protectorate … . This meant signing up for a war with Turks and then with Russians. Even the well-respected and neutral Norway refused to accept Armenia’s protectorate.85 Only Lord Curzon insisted that if Erzurum and Trabzon were given to Armenia, the Armenians would be able to protect their borders on their own. To convince Lloyd George, Nitti, and Millerand, he invited the Armenian representatives Boghos Nubarian and Avetis Aharonian to participate in the Allied powers’ discussions. Francesco Nitti addressed the following to Nubarian: does Armenia want to have Erzurum incorporated in it? Is it ready to defend its potential new borders? Does Boghos Nubar Pasha account for the prospect of Armenia finding itself in need of creating a new army and financial resources to be able to defend itself? Lloyd George added another question: does Pasha account for Armenia having to capture Erzurum from the Turks?86 Nubarian responded to all these questions by saying that the Armenians were able to capture Erzurum and to fortify their positions there. He noted that Armenia had 15,000 troops at its disposal and could easily increase their number to 40,000. In addition to this, he disclosed that an Armenian legion of 10,000 troops was ready to arrive from the United States to help.87 Later, Lloyd George asked Nubarian whether there had been a time in the past 50 to 100 years when Armenians constituted the majority in the Vilayet of Erzurum. Nubarian gave a positive response. The exacting British Prime Minister, however, wished to know whether Nubarian could substantiate his claim by providing numbers.88 In spite of their confidence, neither Nubarian nor the other Armenian representative, Aharonian, could base their claims on any statistics. Lloyd George and Nitti were not convinced by the Armenians’ responses concerning these and other issues. After examining the Armenians’ military capabilities, military experts informed the San Remo conference that the Allied powers had decided against sending troops to Armenia and that the latter must rely on its own power. As a result, it could not hope to capture Turkish Armenia and Erzurum.89 The Entente’s military experts had been closely observing the processes taking place in Anatolia and knew well that after the French and the Americans isolated Turkey from Europe and Britain and cut its access to the Black Sea, Turkey concentrated all of its military power in Erzurum.90 Representatives of the great powers understood at the last minute that creating an Armenian state within Turkish borders would not be an easy task. French diplomat Cambon, who had spent much of his career in Turkey, said he knew well what the goals of the Armenians were. He informed the heads of Western countries of the impossibility of creating an Armenian state within the Ottoman Empire. Cambon wrote: Unlike Bulgarians and Greeks, Armenians will be unable to form a state that would have natural borders. The peoples among whom they live would never

The eve of the occupation  367 agree on the seizure of their lands by Armenians and on being oppressed in their own homeland. Armenians have been scattered all across Turkey and live among Muslims even in Armenia proper.91 Cambon noted that there were no grounds for establishing an Armenian state in Turkey. His explanations played a great role in the cautious approach of Lloyd George, Nitti, and Millerand to the Armenian question. After the military experts delivered their opinion, Lloyd George said he could not assume responsibility for creating a greater Armenian state. He added that he had had consultations with Balfour, who had been involved in these matters, and that Balfour completely agreed with him. Lloyd George believed the creation of “greater Armenia” would set a precedent that would lead to undesirable consequences in India and all around the world.92 Lloyd George’s opinion sank the Armenians’ vision of establishing themselves in Turkish territory. Later, Kachaznuni, one of the Dashnak leaders, confessed that meaningless and exaggerated claims were bound to lead to bitter disappointment.93 In order to wear Turkey down, the Allies were ready to use the Arab factor in addition to the Armenian factor. Unlike the case of Christian solidarity, here the goal was to set disagreements among Muslims and annihilate Turkey, which was viewed as a threat to Europe, by using Arabs. Italian Prime Minister Nitti, who participated in all three conferences, noted that fascinating ideas were brought forward in Paris, London, and San Remo. Some spoke of Arabs being more cultured and educated than Turks and of Turks having in fact adopted Arab religion. They thought an Arab national awakening alone would suffice to deal with Turkey. Why should the Islamic world be subordinated not to the Caliph of Hijaz, from where the Prophet came, but to a Caliph of Constantinople which came on the scene just a few centuries ago and grew powerful through use of violence? The very purpose of the Entente was to annihilate the defeated countries. 94 To this end, the Entente proposed to form Arab states that would replace Turkey and the Caliphate. According to this project, Arabia was to be divided into eight independent and semi-independent states; Kurdistan was to be given autonomy and to attain independence. The plan stipulated the transferring of religious authority to the city of Hijaz under the governance of Hussein Ibn Ali. Lord Curzon and others viewed it as being Hussein Ibn Ali’s duty to replace the Sultan as a religious authority figure. Discussions around the issue of Batum continued in San Remo. On April 23, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates submitted a joint memorandum on the matter to the conference secretariat. On April 24, British envoys discussed the issue with representatives of all three Caucasus republics at Hotel Raul. Lord Curzon attempted to fulfill Armenia’s claims on Batum. The Armenians demanded from the Georgians that part of the Batum port come under their control along with the right to build a railroad from Armenia to Batum, and consider the railroad to be an

368  The eve of the occupation integral part of Armenia.95 The British insisted on allowing Armenia access to the Sea through the Batum port and presented it as Lord Curzon’s personal request; Nikolai Chkheidze refused to make any concessions. He stated that although Lord Curzon had great influence on the Allied powers, Georgia’s opinion and the wishes of the local population also had to be taken into consideration. After Chkheidze’s speech, Topchubashov noted that the wishes of Batum’s Muslim population also deserved attention.96 The Allies declared Batum a free port. At Lloyd George’s request, one French and one Italian regiment were sent there in order to represent the League of Nations. Azerbaijan preserved its right to make free use of the port. Talks on the “Russian question” that had been initiated in Copenhagen were intended to continue.97 As for protective measures and assistance to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in case of foreign intervention, the Allies stated on the last day of the conference that the republics of the South Caucasus would receive aid from them only after reaching peace and solidarity among themselves.98 Azerbaijan became the first victim of the San Remo conference’s decision. Even before they made their way back to Paris from Italy, the Azerbaijani delegation learned of Azerbaijan’s occupation by Soviet Russia’s Eleventh Red Army on April 28 and of the fall of the Azerbaijani government. *** The San Remo conference could have led to positive results for the republics of the Caucasus. However, despite the Allies’ serious attempts, the republics failed to eliminate disagreements that could still have been settled among themselves. Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, a participant of the San Remo conference, wrote: The solidarity of all people of the South Caucasus would have been essential at the advent of the San Remo conference where various issues of great interest to the people of these lands, specifically the talks about oil transport, were supposed to be discussed. If solidarity had been, or could be achieved, then with Britain’s help, the questions concerning the Caucasus could have been reviewed and military and moral assistance would have been possible. The next step would have been admitting the republics of the South Caucasus to the League of Nations, and the immediate strengthening of their ties with the world. At the time, the Bolsheviks were insecure and indecisive. In view of such favorable circumstances, there was an opening to increase the influence of the small republics of the South Caucasus … . Unfortunately, mistakes were made, and the representatives of the peoples could not demonstrate enough organization and foresight. 99 One after the other, each of the three republics was occupied by the Bolsheviks. In April 1920, Azerbaijan became the first one to face the Bolshevik threat from the north.

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Notes 1. Le Temps, January 31, 1920. 2. Документы внешней политики СССР. Том I (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. Volume I). Moscow, 1957, p. 331. 3. Эдвард Карр (Edward Carr), Большевикская революция 1917–1923 гг. (The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917–1923). Moscow, 1990, p. 275. 4. Memorandum on Recognition of the Independence of the Azerbaijan Republic by European Great Powers. January 1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 228, p. 1. 5. Ibid., pp. 3–4. 6. From the Office of the Ministry of Finance. 26.04.1919. SAAR, f. 84, r. 1, v. 434, p. 19. 7. Борьба за победу социалистической революции в Азербайджане. Документы и материалы. (Struggle for the Victory of Socialist Revolution in Azerbaijan. Documents and Materials). Baku, 1967, p. 401. 8. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 226. 9. Memorandum on Recognition of the Independence of the Azerbaijan Republic by European Great Powers. January, 1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 228, p. 4. 10. Agreement between the Azerbaijani Government and the American Committee for Support to the Middle East. 26.01.1920. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 69, pp. 55–57. 11. Agreement signed with the Azerbaijani Government for sending black oil to the English Command in Batum. 26.01.1920. SAAR, f. 24, r. 1, v. 547, p. 3. 12. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase. Paris, 1933, p. 124. 13. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 69, p. 39. 14. А. Стеклов (A. Steklov), Армия мусаватского Азербайджана (Army of the Musavat Azerbaijan). Baku, 1928, pp. 62–65. 15. Letter of N. Usubbeyov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic, to Colonel Gabba. 1919. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 69, p. 54. 16. Д. Ллойд Джордж (D .Lloyd George), Правда о мирных договорах (The Truth about Peace Treaties). Moscow, 1957, p. 409. 17. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 128. 18. Report on International Relations of the Azerbaijan Republic. 20.01.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 128, p. 7. 19. Customs Agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 132, pp. 21–22. 20. Convention Commerciale et Douanière Conclue entre la République d’Azerbaïdjan (Caucase) et le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 89; Commercial Agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 132, pp. 23–24. 21. Accord Télégraphiqueentre la République d’Azerbaïdjan (Caucase) et l’Empire de Perse. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 82; Telegraph Agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 137, pp. 44–48. 22. Convention Pour l’échange de colis postaux entre la République d’Azerbaïdjan et l’Empire Persan. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 15; Agreement on Postal Relations between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 131, pp. 69–73. 23. Agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran on Execution of the Judicial Decisions. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 130, pp. 2–7. 24. Consulate Agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 128, pp. 78–90. 25. Friendship Agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and Iran. 20.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 137, pp. 27–28.

370  The eve of the occupation 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52.

SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 221, p. 30. Вестник правительства (Vestnik pravitelstva), April 17, 1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 128, p. 7. Le defense de l’Azerbaidjan et de la Georgie. Le 29 Janvier 1920. Bulletin D’informations L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1 Fevrier 1920, No. 8, pp. 2–3. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), April 3, 1920. See Ф. Д. Волков (F. D. Volkov), Тайны Уайтхола и Даунинг стрит (The Secrets of Whitehall and Downing Street). Moscow, 1980, p. 114. Документы внешней политики СССР, p. 560. М. Павлович (M. Pavlovich), Советская Россия и капиталистическая Англия (Soviet Russia and Capitalist England). Moscow, 1925, p. 32. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 128, p. 7. Treaty between the Azerbaijan Republic and Georgia. 08.03.1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 26, p. 9. Letter of A. M.Topchubashov, Head of the Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 02.12.1919. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 145, p. 17. История Дипломатии. T.III (History of Diplomacy. Volume III). Moscow, 1945, p. 74. З. Авалов (Z. Avalov), Независимость Грузии в международной политике (1918– 1921) (Independence of Georgia in International Politics [1918–1921]). Paris, 1924, p. 251. А. Раевский (A. Raevskiy), Английская интервенция и мусаватское правительство. (English Intervention and the Musavat Government). Baku, 1927, p. 169. See Inventaire du materiel necessaire a la flotte de guerre de la republque de L’Azerbeidjan et au port militaire de Bakou. Le 15 mars 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 644, f. 12–14; Le Marechal Foch, President du Comite Militaire Allie de Versailles a Monsieur le President du Conseil Ministre des Affaires Estrangeres. 13.04.1920. Ministere des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 644, f. 18. Meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian Delegations in Tiflis. 23.10.1920. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 1, p. 36. Letter of O. Wardrop, the British Supreme Commissioner in Tiflis, to F. Vekilov, Diplonatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Georgia. 05.03.1920. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 69, p. 93. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the US, 1920, vol. VIII, p. 750. У. Черчилль (W.Churchill), Мировой кризис (The World Crisis). Moscow, 1932, p. 108. Ллойд Джордж, Правда о мирных договорах, pp. 425–427. Н. Жордания (N. Zhordaniya), Моя жизнь (My Life). Stanford, 1968, p. 106. Ллойд Джордж, Правда о мирных договорах, pp. 427–428. Enver Konukcu, Ermenilerin Yeşilyayladakı Türk soykırımı (11–12 mart 1918) (Massacre of Turks Committed by Armenians in Yeshilyayla [March 11–12, 1918]). Ankara, 1990, p. 37; Tan, March 12, 1920. Bulletin D’informations. L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1 avril 1920, No. 12, pp. 1–4. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Khoisky—Copie d’un télégramme de Bakou au Commandant de Nonancourt, Chef de la Mission Militaire Française. Le 30 mars 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 233. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 262. A Memorandum of the Azerbaijani delegation claims to Batum. 30.03.1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, II. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 254–256.

The eve of the occupation  371 53. A Memorandum of the Georgian delegation claims to Batum. March 1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, II. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 260–263. 54. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 262. 55. See Report from Mir Jacoub Mehtiyef at the London Conference to A.M. Topchbashi. March 1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, II. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 237–242. 56. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 263. 57. Turkish intrigues in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan enmeshed. Pan-Turanian danger.The Times, March 20, 1920; Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, II. CERCEC, EHESS, p. 245. 58. P.O. Le Chef d’Etat-Major Général Illisible—Le Général Franchet d’Esperey, Commandant en Chef les Armées en Orient, à Monsieur le Ministre de la Guerre, Copie pour : A.E., Mal Foch. Le 14 février 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 193–194. 59. Report of A. Ziyadkhanli, Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Iran, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 1920. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 127, p. 2. 60. Secret Télégramme chiffré Constantinople, Général Mangin à Guerre. Le 5 Mars 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 217. 61. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985, p. 162. 62. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 263. 63. Une Conference sur l’Azerbaidjan devant les Etudiants anglais. Bulletin D’informations L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 15 Mars 1920, No.11, p. 5. 64. Draft Law on “Establishment of Diplomatic Mission of the Azerbaijan Republic in Western Europe and America and Liquidation of the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.” 05.03.1920. SAAR, f. 70, r., v.21, p. 3. 65. Ibid., p. 6. 66. Shorthand record of the Meeting of the Azerbaijani Parliament. 15.04.1920. SAAR, f. 895, r., v. 294, p. 6. 67. Ibid., p. 12. 68. Ibid., p. 15. 69. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), April 28, 1920; SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 224, p. 4. 70. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 224, p. 4. 71. Ibid., p. 5. 72. H. aykara, Azerbaycan İstiklal Mücadelesi Tarihi (History of Azerbaijan’s Struggle for Independence). Istanbul, 1975, p. 284. 73. Адрес-Календарь Азербайджанской Республики (Address-Calendar of the Azerbaijani Republic). Baku, 1920, pp. 7–8. 74. История дипломатии (History of Diplomacy). Moscow, 1945, p. 210. 75. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, pp. 265–266. 76. SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, v. 42, p. 35. 77. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 133. 78. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 266. 79. Жордания, Моя жизнь, p. 106. 80. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 268. 81. О. В. Качазнуни (O. V. Kachaznuni), Дашнакцутюн больше делать нечего (Dashnaktsutyun has nothing more to do). Baku, 1990, p. 45. 82. Черчилль (W.Churchill), Мировой кризис, p. 278. 83. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 4; APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 15, p. 29. 84. Ллойд Джордж, Правда о мирных договорах, p. 443. 85 Нитти, Франческо. (Nitti, Francesco), Вырождение Европы. (La decadenza dell’Europa). Moscow and Petrograd,1923, p. 107.

372  The eve of the occupation Ллойд Джордж, Правда о мирных договорах, p. 434. Ibid., p. 435. Ibid., p. 437. Ibid., p. 438. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 22, p. 28. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 71. Ллойд Джордж, Правда о мирных договорах, p. 438. Качазнуни, Дашнакцутюн больше делать нечего, p. 44. Нитти, Вырождение Европы, pp. 106–107. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, p. 134. Авалов, Независимость Грузии в международной политике, p. 279. Дипломатический словарь. Т. III (Diplomatic Dictionary. Volume III). Moscow, 1986, p. 13. 98. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 157, p. 88. 99. Mir-Yacoub, Le Probleme du Caucase, pp. 137–138. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

14 Azerbaijani diplomacy and the April 1920 occupation

Soon after the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized by the Entente states, a second note was received on January 23, 1920, from the RSFSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgy V. Chicherin. In comparison with the first note, the second was of a more aggressive character. Fatali Khan Khoyski’s first reciprocal note, dated January 14, was discussed in Chicherin’s note. Azerbaijan’s struggle against the Denikin threat was ignored. Soviet Russia viewed the note from the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs as tantamount to a refusal to fight against the Volunteer Army, and the refusal of the Azerbaijani government to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia was seen as abetting White Guard forces.1 In fact, the Soviet government had not legally recognized the Caucasian states, unlike Poland, Finland and the Baltic countries. Meanwhile, Denikin’s temporary government had recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. Therefore, in the reciprocal note sent by Khoyski to Chicherin on February 1, 1920, he considered it important for Soviet Russia to concretely, openly, and clearly express their opinion about recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan.2 In fact, Soviet Russia used this situation as a pretext to intensify pressure on Azerbaijan. As the Red Army moved south, this pressure intensified and turned into an open propaganda campaign against the sovereign state. In a speech made by Vladimir Lenin on February 2, 1920, on the work of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People’s Commissars, he noted, We have proposed that Georgia and Azerbaijan sign an agreement with us against Denikin. They deviate from this proposal on the pretext that they do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Let’s see what the Georgian and Azerbaijani workers’ and peasants’ opinion will be on this matter.3 The exchange of notes at the end of February and the beginning of March 1920 was more or less of the same content. The difference was only in the fact that the Red Army had already approached the borders of Azerbaijan, and various opinions were forming about the impending danger. The Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party, established in February 1920 upon Moscow’s instructions, tried to use the situation to overthrow the government. When the Commissariat of

374  The April 1920 occupation Foreign Affairs discussed the question of recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence in February, it was due to the Muslim Bolsheviks of Baku that it did not adopt a positive decision and refused to recognize the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan.4 In July 1919, the questions of “recognition of the Hummet party in the provincial legislature as the Azerbaijani Communist party and recognition of Azerbaijan as an independent Soviet Republic” had been discussed at the Political and Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, and although there was a move to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan, this was quickly withdrawn at the insistence of the Bolsheviks.5 Soviet Russia’s stance toward Azerbaijan was related to economic rather than political factors. By spring 1920, the civil war had more or less come to an end, and there arose the difficult task of restoring the collapsed economy. Restoration of the economy depended first and foremost on oil. It had been impossible to occupy Baku while the civil war was in progress. Whatever their purposes, Denikin’s volunteers in the North Caucasus and the puppet Caspian government had served as barriers to Soviet Russia’s march on Baku. However, after victories against the White Guard forces in the spring of 1920, the situation changed in Soviet Russia’s favor. In fact, behind the diplomatic confrontations of January 1920 lay the intention of getting access to Baku’s oil. In a telegram sent to the revolutionary military soviet of the Caucasian front in March, the issue regarding the occupation of Baku was clearly alluded to by Lenin: “Occupation of Baku is very, very important to us. Try your best in statements to be diplomatic, and absolutely convince them that a strong local Soviet government is being prepared … . Arrange the issue about bringing in troops with a general commander.”6 There is a copy of this telegram along with the original text at the Russian State Socio-Political Archives. On the copy of the telegram, Grigory K. Orjonikidze wrote, “This telegram refers to the period of preparing an attack on Baku. The operation has been prepared.”7After Lenin’s telegram, preparations began for the occupation of Azerbaijan, and troops were assembled on the border. Trotsky wrote to Stalin, who was in Kharkov on March 21, I sent a question to Tukhachevsky to this effect. After we occupy Novorossiisk and Grozny, it will be possible for us to take three infantry and three mounted detachments there. We will give you additional troops after the action begins. Please tell us: do you think it is possible to carry out the operation to take and seize Baku? I want to add that it would be good to come to an agreement with Georgia by reassuring them and promising them oil.8 On the eve of the occupation of Azerbaijan, in order to neutralize Georgia, the Bolsheviks secretly conveyed this idea to Noe Jordania through Georgian Communists, along with a promise that Lenin would agree to recognize the independence of Georgia, something that the Georgian leadership had sought in early 1920. When the Georgian leaders received this proposal, they secretly

The April 1920 occupation  375 dispatched Grigol Uratadze to Moscow. During the negotiations there, it was agreed that Georgia would drive out foreign troops from its territory, and Soviet Russia in its turn would recognize its independence. Consequently, a cooperation treaty was signed between Russia and Georgia for this purpose.9 The treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, was signed on May 7, 1920, in Moscow by Lev M. Karakhan (Karakhanian) from the Soviet foreign ministry and Uratadze from Georgia.10 Concerning Azerbaijan, the Russian Bolshevik government did not intend to resort to open invasion, believing that it would be possible to overthrow the state with the help of local Communists. For this purpose, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was provided with a large supply of weapons and ammunition as well as material support in 1920. At this time of heightened Bolshevik activity, the Armenians started a revolt against the Azerbaijani government in Upper Garabagh on March 20. Later, it became clear that the origins of this revolt were linked to Moscow. The intention was to weaken the defense of Baku while danger from the north was growing. As Chicherin had written to Lenin, “applying force against Azerbaijan would set our friends against us on an international level. Lansbury [George Lansbury, one of the leaders of the British Labour Party and owner of the Daily Herald newspaper] and people like him are sympathetic to the Azerbaijanis.” He continued, “Our good friend Kenworthy writes passionate articles about ‘little independent Azerbaijan.’ We should not give them grounds to take us for imperialists.”11 However, the Azerbaijani Communist party, with its limited social base, did not have enough strength to overthrow the government. As the storm gathered, various destructive forces organized events in the country, each more serious than the one before. On the eve of Soviet Russia’s attack, Armenian representatives offered assistance in overthrowing the Azerbaijani government in return for territorial compromises.12 Undoubtedly, the Armenian revolt in Garabagh, realized in mid-March according to plan, and the involvement of the Azerbaijani army in Garabagh were an inseparable part of the invasion organized beforehand. The reason for organizing a revolt in the Upper Garabagh in March 1920 and the invasion of Gazakh and Nakhchivan was to draw Azerbaijani troops away from Baku. When Dashnak bands attacked the Khankandi garrison, troops were urgently dispatched to Upper Garabagh from Baku and the Dagestan border— the 5th Baku Infantry, the 1st Javanshir and 4th Guba Infantry, and the Shirvan, Aghdash, and Ganja infantry regiments. Military operations in Garabagh and Gazakh continued until the end of April. In fact, the aims of the Garabagh revolt and Gazakh sabotage were achieved; forces were bogged down in this region, and the ground was prepared for the Eleventh Red Army to enter Baku unopposed. Although they completely crushed Dashnak troops at Asgaran and in military operations around Gazakh, Azerbaijani military forces did not arrive in Baku in time to repulse the Bolshevik invasion. There remained only about 2,000 soldiers in Baku at that time, and they were defending state offices in the city. Baku was defenseless against the danger from the north. Georgian General Giorgi I. Kvinitadze noted, after touring the defenses of Baku and the Samur

376  The April 1920 occupation line of defense, that although some defenses were prepared, the main part of the Azerbaijani army was involved in the war with Armenians. He wrote, It became clear to me that Azerbaijan had not intensively prepared for the war against the Bolsheviks. It took a matter of one or two days to occupy Baku. There was only one battalion at the Samur lines defending a stretch of fifteen or twenty versts. The rest of the Azerbaijani army was in the south; they were fighting against Armenians there.13 Moscow pinned great hopes on the Muslim Communists in executing the plan. Y. E. Rudzutak, a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, wrote in a telegram addressed to Lenin, Rykov, and Chicherin, “The situation is intense in Baku with regard to Armenian–Tatar relations. The government relies on Tatars. We can overthrow it only with the assistance of Muslims; therefore we should not appoint a single Armenian for this task.”14 As it appears, the lead-up to the April invasion had started long before. Internal and external contingencies for the invasion were included in military, political, and diplomatic plans early in 1920. Certain external powers were also involved in this issue. In order to shake the formidable British defense system, anti-English propaganda was disseminated in Iran, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, and the portrayal of the national struggle in Anatolia as a fight against the Entente was skillfully executed. All the measures taken on the eve of the invasion were directed to driving the British away from the borders of Azerbaijan. For this purpose, special instructions were given to the Caucasian regional committee of the Russian Communist party, and many Bolshevik emissaries were sent to Iran. Iran’s bolshevization was planned for the future. Britain’s High Commissioner in Tiflis, Oliver Wardrop, notified the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan in Georgia, Fariz Bey Vakilov, on January 13, 1920, that they had observed Bolshevik emissaries moving to Iran through Azerbaijani territory. Recently, the British government had been receiving reports on the intensification of this movement. The high commissioner considered it important to take measures quickly against this danger.15 Thanks to the efforts of the Bolsheviks in Iran, there was a meeting of Iranian “democrats” held in Isfahan in January 1920. It was noted in the resolution adopted by the meeting that regardless of regime, a strong Russia was necessary for the independence of Iran. The meeting also decided to stir the people against the Anglo-Iranian agreement of August 9, 1919, and against the anti-Russian Vosuq od-Dowleh government. In early 1920, anti-British movements became active in Azerbaijan. Soviet Russia was able to take advantage of the Jangali movement, which had arisen in Gilan during the years 1918 to 1920. In the spring of 1920, Bolsheviks spread to Gilan hoping to recruit Mirza Kuchek Khan to their cause and, with this help, to expand the struggle against Britain and sovietize Iran starting from the Caspian coast. He felt that the fact that the British navy had established itself south of the Caspian Sea could seriously hinder the sovietization of Azerbaijan. The agents of Soviet Russia prepared the entire plan of the Gilan movement.16 In order to prevent British influence in Iran, the Russians wanted

The April 1920 occupation  377 to overthrow Ahmad Shah, who frequently visited London, and to establish a new pro-Russian state. For this purpose, special attention was paid to the Jangali movement in Gilan. Letters by Mirza Kuchek, leader of the movement, to Polikarp Mdivani were relayed to Lenin. In those letters, Kuchek Khan wrote, “I rely on Soviet Russia’s army and I hope they will help the Iranian people in their fight for freedom.” On the eve of the April events, Soviet Russia was successful in driving the English out of the Caspian shore regions with the assistance of the Jangali movement and Bolsheviks secretly sent to Gilan. The Azerbaijani representative to Iran stated in a notification of March 1920 that, as a result of Bolshevik propaganda, Kuchek Khan had turned into a serious threat to the Iran government.17 However, it was not possible to spread the Jangali movement all over Iran, since the leaders of the movement—Mirza Kuchek Khan, Ehsanulla Khan, and Khali Gurban—were Gilak, Baha’i, and Kurdish, respectively. Kuchek Khan soon understood that he had been deceived and started to break away from the Communists. The second big force Soviet Russia used in order to drive the English away from the Azerbaijani borders was Cossacks. During tsarist times, the Cossacks had been an important tool for expanding the Russian presence in Iran. Cossacks were subject not to the Iranian government but to a Viceroy of the Caucasus. In the situation that had arisen, they refused to obey the Iranian military officials. Although there had been cooperation between the British and the Cossacks with regard to certain earlier problems, after the treaty signed on August 9, 1919, the Cossack military forces, which consisted mainly of Russians, could not tolerate the increasing influence of Russia’s old rival Britain in Iran. Although Vosuq od-Dowleh had resolved to dismiss Cossack troops and make them obey the British-influenced government, Russian officers in Iran under Colonel Vsevolod Staroselsky resisted the ending of “pure Russian heritage” in Iran. Russian officers very well understood that if those troops were annihilated or put under British supervision, the “Russian spirit would forever disappear in Iran.”18 It was announced that if there was an attempt to disarm the Cossack regiment’s 10,000 men, they would fight. The British and the government had to withdraw. Another important event that took place on the eve of the April invasion was the Tabriz revolt. Probably under the leadership of Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani, an extensive anti-British movement started in South Azerbaijan in February and March of 1920. Red flags were raised at several meetings and gatherings.19 The fact that a strong revolt of an anti-British nature started in Tabriz on April 7, 20 days prior to occupation of the Republic of Azerbaijan should not be considered accidental. The Bolsheviks took advantage of the discontent of the Iranian people against Britain. This was reflected in the report of the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative to Iran sent in March 1920. Bolshevik emissaries sent from Russia, Hummet and “agitators,” as well as Armenians who had formerly been subjects of Russia played exceptional roles in instigating the movement against Britain in South Azerbaijan and driving the British away. Nariman Narimanov, Mirza Davud Huseynov, and letters sent by Soviet Russia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly confirmed this fact soon after the April events when Bolsheviks

378  The April 1920 occupation were sent to Iran. During the period under review, Russia’s Iran policy was determined by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Lev M. Karakhan. He was the principal organizer in sending Armenians under falsified names and surnames as Bolsheviks to South Azerbaijan. Interesting moments can be found in the note Karakhan sent to the Iranian government on June 26, 1919, in regard to the Iran policy of Soviet Russia. This note as well as an appeal to Iranian workers dated August 29 significantly influenced the events that took place in South Azerbaijan. In general, there are many documents that confirm the Bolsheviks’ secret influence on the national independence movement in South Azerbaijan. The misapprehensions that Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani held in relation to the Republic of Azerbaijan, his envy of the independent Azerbaijan in the north, and the fact that he gave the state he established in South Azerbaijan not the name “Azerbaijan” but “Azadistan” is mostly related to this. Ali Azeri, the author of a monograph of several volumes on the Sheikh Khiyabani movement, and Iranian historian Seyid Ahmad Kasravi, whose many ideas we do not share, also confirm this.20 The anti-British movement in South Azerbaijan stirred attention in the Republic of Azerbaijan on the eve of the April occupation. One of the issues that needs clarification concerning the April 1920 occupation of Azerbaijan is the Turkish factor. Certainly, we should consider these issues from the point of view of Turkey, which was engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Entente powers after World War I. Although Turkey and Russia temporarily shared the same interests in the fight against the Entente and especially the United Kingdom, contradicting the policy of the Azerbaijani national government, it is baseless to claim that the nationalist movement in Turkey was opposed to Azerbaijani independence. Turkish activities in the Caucasus and the negotiations it carried out with the Caucasian regional committee of the Russian Communist party were basically related to the secret paramilitary “Karakol” organization established in 1920. Documents confirm that the organization succumbed to Russia’s influence. The Karakol organization sent its representative, Baha Sait, to the Caucasus and authorized him to carry out negotiations and sign various agreements. As a result of negotiations carried out in the autumn of 1919, the Karakol organization and Caucasian regional committee of the Russian Communist party signed a secret agreement consisting of sixteen articles on January 11, 1920, the very day when the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized by the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles.21 The treaty was signed between Shalva Z. Eliava on behalf of Russia and Baha Sait on behalf of the Turkish “temporary revolutionary government” represented by the Karakol organization. The treaty was aimed against Britain. It covered issues of cooperation in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Near and Middle East, such that the Russian Soviet government and the Turkish revolutionary movement had entered into a treaty of mutual assistance. The main purpose of this alliance was to stir the Muslim world—Iran, Afghanistan, Arabia, Egypt, and India—against Britain. For all these purposes, the RSFSR was to assist Turkey by means of money, arms, military advice, and so on. Article 12 of the treaty related to the Caucasus and especially Azerbaijan. It indicated that the three Caucasian republics pursuing

The April 1920 occupation  379 pro-Western policies—Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—were hindering Soviet Russia and the Turkish temporary revolutionary government in their fight against imperialism. The Karakol organization undertook the obligation to assist Communist parties and organizations in the Caucasus, to overthrow existing pro-Western regimes, and to bring to power the forces that had signed the treaty against Britain. Karakol undertook the commitment to use its influence among the Turkish population and various people in order to overthrow the government of Azerbaijan. The sides agreed that the Azerbaijani government should be formed at the decision of an assembly of national “workers” and without pressure from outside.22 Soviet Russia used the January 11, 1920, treaty as a means of pressure against Britain. Yet in January, the Georgian government had advised High Commissioner Wardrop in Tiflis about it. On behalf of the Georgian government, Evgeny Gegechkori noted, The Bolsheviks turned toward the East after the socialist movement was successful in the West. We have information that in order to stir the Muslim world against Britain, the Bolsheviks and Turkey have signed an agreement. [Kaiser] Wilhelm was not able to achieve this, but Lenin acts as the head of the Muslim East now.23 In early 1920, the fact that Turkic-Tatar peoples of Russia and Siberia supported Turkey made Britain and Russia worry. At an assembly of the representatives of those nations, an appeal to the Versailles Supreme Council was adopted that noted, We—representatives of Turkish-Tatar people of the Volga and Ural—hope that the Supreme Council will solve the Turkish issue unmistakably in favor of Turks. The Turan population of 80 million cannot be indifferent to the disintegration of Turkey. The Entente should reckon with the Turkish world if it wants a stable peace in Europe. If the Turkish people have not yet forgotten the European injustice of former centuries, then they will never forget the pain of the twentieth century, which is the century of justice and equality.24 It was unfounded fears of a Turan empire that led Great Britain to withdraw from the “Russia issue.” Blackmailing Britain with the January 11, 1920, treaty, Soviet Russia notified them that it would renounce the agreement with the Karakol organization if Britain made a commitment not to interfere in the “Russian issue.” Commissar Chicherin wrote to the Caucasian regional committee of the Russian Communist Party addressing Shalva Eliava, We do not create any union on defense or attack with the Young Turks; it is obvious that this ties our hands in the issue regarding the agreement with England; we do not want to provoke Turkish imperialism; we should not let inveterate imperialist Turkish military men like Nuri Pasha into Muslim

380  The April 1920 occupation districts of the Caucasus; pan Islamism introduced as half-communism is as much threat for us as an anti-revolutionary power, for we will have to fight against it, if not today then tomorrow; it would be a big mistake to sign a treaty with the Young Turks on creating a union; this union should be replaced with indefinite treaties in future.25 In March, after this radiogram, negotiations were started between Leonid Krasin, who was leading the Centro-Soyuz mission in Copenhagen and London, and Britain. Unlike Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, Prime Minister Lloyd George was against doing business with Russia. Noe Jordania, former prime minister of the Republic of Georgia, recalled in his book published in Paris: “It is not a secret to the world that it was British Prime Minister Lloyd George who led Soviet Russia to occupy the territories of the South Caucasian republics. Chicherin has revealed the secret and the whole world already sensed what that secret was.” In fact, in signing the trade agreement with the Soviets, Lloyd George guaranteed to them “non-interference in Transcaucasia.”26 Much later, in 1950, Mammad Emin Rasulzade confirmed this fact in a speech he made at Ankara People’s House. He said that the British withdrawal from the Caucasus had encouraged the Bolsheviks to attack the Caucasus. At the same time, Lloyd George had notified Soviet Commissar of Foreign Trade Krasin, who was visiting London, that His Majesty’s Government would not interfere in Caucasian issues. Thus, Soviet Russia attacked after getting an international guarantee on the occupation of Azerbaijan. On the eve of the occupation, almost all foreign powers that could have supported Azerbaijan had been neutralized. Along with the foreign threat, the resignation of the government in late March also played a role in aggravating the crisis, although the old cabinet was continuing its activity, as a new one had not been formed yet. Red Army troops gathering on the borders of Azerbaijan in mid-April greatly worried the Azerbaijani government. On April 15, Khan Khoyski wrote in his telegram to Chicherin, The Azerbaijani people had hoped that the threat from the north had ended with the cleansing of Denikinists from Dagestan. The Azerbaijani people declared their independence and that of our Mountain brothers and are prepared to coexist on friendly terms with the Russian people. However, we observe Soviet military forces gathering at the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan as well as the Derbent region and Dagestan’s borders. The Azerbaijani government is unaware of the Soviet government’s purpose and thus asks to be informed of the reason for dispatching Soviet troops to the above-mentioned areas.27 Two days later, a telegram was received from Deputy RSFSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs Karakhan saying that Soviet Russia was ready for negotiations on commercial and economic relations. This was mainly for tactical reasons. It was impossible to deploy the Azerbaijani army to the northern border of Azerbaijan as military operations were continuing in Garabagh and in regions along the border with Armenia. On April 16, 1920, the Armenian diplomatic

The April 1920 occupation  381 representative to Baku, Harutiunian, noted in the ciphered telegram to the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Khoyski advises us to disregard the threat from the north and the difficult state of the country; they cannot drive their troops out of Garabagh yet because they are not sure about a new attack from the direction of Zangezur.”28 On April 18, the chairman of the Guba district informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs via telegram about military preparations of Soviet troops gathered on the Azerbaijani border.29 It was stated in Directive No. 490, which the Caucasian Front Command sent to the Eleventh Army commanders and the Volga–Caspian navy on April 21 that the main force of Azerbaijan was occupied in the west of the country. The Eleventh Army and Volga-Caspian navy were ordered, over the signatures of Tukhachevsky, Orjonikidze, and Zakharov, to cross Azerbaijani borders on April 27 and implement the Yalama-Baku operation within 5 days. A second directive, sent at 3:30 a.m. on April 21, stated that all members of the Azerbaijani government were to be arrested and that the Eleventh Army should capture the Kurdamir railway station to prevent their escape from Baku to Ganja.30 On April 23, there was a change made to this directive, and a new order was given—that the last task of the Eleventh Army was to occupy not just the province of Baku but the whole of Azerbaijan.31 On the same day, Orjonikidze characterized the situation that had arisen around Azerbaijan and Baku in the telegram he sent to Chicherin, I received your telegram when I arrived in Petrovsk. In general, we pursue a policy here, but this policy is supported by decisive power. Personally, in my opinion, your answer to Azerbaijan is absolutely correct but I request you to delay the attack. The situation in Baku can now be characterized as follows: Unionists, Socialists, and other parties have left the cabinet and the Usubbeyov government consists of only Musavat members now … . It would be impossible to enter Baku and declare the Soviet government there without shedding blood. Narimanov is very much needed in Baku. I beg you humbly to send him here tomorrow.32 On April 24, in a telegram addressed to Lenin and Chicherin, Orjonikidze wrote, notifying them of the importance of dictating terms to Azerbaijan, “Everything needed for connecting our activity with your policies will be carried out.”33 On April 26, the head of the Armenian government came up with a request to sign an armistice, but it was too late. The fate of Azerbaijan had already been determined in Moscow. Bolsheviks were spreading diversion inside the country, closely relating their activity to the Eleventh Red Army Command and especially with Orjonikidze from the revolutionary military soviet. “Azerbaijani” Bolsheviks with Anastas I. Mikoyan at the head took an active part in realizing the Eleventh Red Army plans to occupy Azerbaijan and in arranging a date for carrying out the occupation. The Eleventh Army had already crossed Azerbaijan’s borders by April 26; Guba and Gusar were occupied on April 27.34 As the main military forces were located on the west front, the Samur border troops’ resistance to the Eleventh Red Army onslaught resulted in heavy losses. An urgent telegram from Defense

382  The April 1920 occupation Minister Samad Bey Mehmandarov, sent on April 27 to the west front, where troops were detached, did not have significant results. He noted, “Bolsheviks have attacked the Yalama position; they have moved further and occupied Khudat; the situation is critical. I order you to immediately send battalions from Gazakh and Ganja to Gizilburun with 500 armed soldiers in each battalion.”35 On April 27, the Azerbaijani government sent urgent notification to representatives of the Allies in Tiflis—Count Damien de Martel, Colonel Melchiiorre Gabba, and Harry Charles Luke—on Soviet Russia’s invasion into the republic and the violation of Azerbaijani borders. The Azerbaijani government asked the representatives of the Allies to influence the Armenian government to not attack Azerbaijan, for the government intended to withdraw its troops from Garabagh and regions bordering Armenia because of the invasion.36 The representatives of the Allies immediately contacted the Armenian Government. On April 28, the Armenian government sent notice that their troops would not move further from the point they were and would not attack Azerbaijan. They put forward several terms against this.37 However, it was too late. On April 28, Baku had already been occupied; Russian troops had arrived in Kurdamir and Yevlakh. By the time the Soviet Army had approached Baku, relying on Eleventh Army troops stopped at Bilajari station, Azerbaijani Bolsheviks had presented the Republican parliament an ultimatum on behalf of the Baku bureau of the Caucasian regional committee of the Russian Communist Party and Workers Conference, on April 27 at 4 p.m., with a demand to surrender power. On April 27, the ultimatum was presented to parliament with the signature of Chingiz Ildirim, commander of the Red Navy of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic, which had not yet been established. It was noted in the ultimatum, The Red Navy of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic proposes you surrender power to the Azerbaijani Worker-Peasant government with Comrade Nariman Narimanov in charge immediately. In that case, the Red Navy would guarantee to protect peace and stability for the entire population of Baku regardless of their nationality. An answer should be given two hours after receiving this document, otherwise we will open fire.38 It should be noted that earlier in the spring of 1920, some time before these events, a divergence of opinions occurred between the parliament and the government of Azerbaijan. As the threat from the north became real, discord became aggravated between Minister of Foreign Affairs Khoyski’s group, who supported a firm stance against Soviet Russia, and the Minister of Internal Affairs Mammad Hasan Hajinski, who pursued a policy of compromise. The Khoyski supporters’ demand that Hajinski’s supporters should be dropped from the government was not carried out right away, and Hajinski still held a position in the government as Minister of Trade and Industry. When he was asked to form a new government, he delayed under various pretexts and then invited the Bolsheviks to form a coalition government. At the last minute, the Bolsheviks refused to join the government.39 Along with all the aforementioned issues, this

The April 1920 occupation  383 government crisis of April 1920 prepared the ground for the Eleventh Red Army to enter Baku. Discord within the government intensified the discord between political parties in the parliament. This was vividly demonstrated in the last urgent meeting of the parliament. A high-ranking member of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, General Giorgi Kvinitadze, who was visiting Baku at that time, wrote in his memoirs that there were basically three inclinations among Azerbaijani intellectuals in April 1920. The main group of intellectuals was pro-Turkey in its inclination; the second group preferred total independence; and the third and smallest group of intellectuals was supporting the idea of joining Russia under any flag. Support for this approach had strengthened after Denikin’s defeat and the Bolsheviks maneuvers on the Azerbaijani border.40 Mammad Emin Rasulzade was in the chair at the last meeting of parliament, which took place on April 27, 1920. During heated discussions, the socialist faction and factions close to them supported the demand to turn over power to the Bolsheviks. Rasulzade said in the speech he made that evening at the parliament, Brothers! There is an ultimatum before us. It deals with surrender. But brothers, what does surrender mean? For whom are we to we withdraw from our position? They tell us that there is a Turkish commander by the name of Necati in charge of the army that has crossed our borders. I suppose that this aggressive army coming from Russia is on its way to rescue Turkey in its lifeand-death struggle. Brothers! Turkey is the savior of Azerbaijan. It is a sacred country that has promoted the aims of our nation. We will with pleasure join the power that goes to its rescue. That is, on the condition that this power does not trample on our freedom, our independence. However, brothers, the power that crosses our borders without our consent is not our friend but is our enemy. The propaganda we are hearing is the propaganda of an enemy. They are deceiving us. It is a lie; the power coming here is a Russian army. What it wants is to reestablish the borders of 1914. The invading army that enters our country on the pretext of rescuing Anatolia will not want to leave here again. It is not necessary to surrender the government to the Bolsheviks and accept the ultimatum in order to come to an agreement with Russia. We reject his ultimatum with great hatred … . If parliament, which has decided to defend our independence like the apple of its eye, accepts this ultimatum, it will mean voluntarily surrendering the government to the enemy that pretends to be a friend. We are here by the nation’s will and desire, and only force and the bayonet will remove us from here. 41 Regardless of Rasulzade’s and Shafi Bey Rustambeyov’s objections, the meeting made the decision to turn over power peacefully to Bolsheviks. The government stopped its activity. Rasulzade said, Alas, we forgot to say “Bravo!” We had proclaimed that “The flag once raised will never fall!” But we have exchanged the flag of independence for a red piece of fabric because of our fear for our lives and our property.42

384  The April 1920 occupation At the decision of the Azerbaijani parliament about surrendering power, a message was sent: After discussing your letter dated April 27 and comparing it with the current situation, the commission we have selected accepts your proposal along with the following: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

total maintenance of the independence of Azerbaijan ruled by Soviet government; the government that the Azerbaijani Communist party forms will be a temporary body; without any external pressure, the Azerbaijani parliament will maintain an Azerbaijani style of governance with representation from workers, peasants, and soldiers; employees at governmental offices will maintain their posts (only officials will be replaced); the newly established Communist government will ensure life and property for the [former] members of the government and parliament; measures should be taken in order that the Red Army does not enter Baku by force; and the new government will fight against any external interference that tramples on the independence of Azerbaijan.

Taking all these things into consideration, the Azerbaijani parliament by a majority of votes makes the decision to pass power over to the Muslim Communists, for they have declared that they would fulfill these commitments.43 Just several hours later, in violation of this agreement, the Eleventh Red Army, which had approached the Bilajari position on the pretext of going on to Anatolia, entered Baku. Subsequently, the new government officially appealed to the Soviet government on April 29, 1920, at 2 p.m., to send Red Army troops to provide real assistance. According to the appeal, The Temporary Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan, which is unable to defend itself against the pressure of external and internal joint antirevolutionary bandit groups, proposes that the government of the Russian Soviet Republic sign a Union of Brotherhood and send Red Army troops to provide real support in the joint struggle against world imperialism.44 Of course, the requested army was already in Baku and had forgotten all about Anatolia. In the end, the Bolsheviks failed to fulfill any article of the signed agreement. Thus, an important event in the history of Azerbaijan, its 23-monthlong independence, ended, and Azerbaijan was again occupied by Russia. From the correspondence of Bolshevik emissaries, it becomes clear that the promises given by the Muslim Communists in regard to maintaining the independence of Azerbaijan were declarative only, and it was not in their authority to ensure this.

The April 1920 occupation  385 This becomes obvious from the telegram Stalin sent to Chicherin, in Moscow, when the invasion of Azerbaijan started on April 27, 1920. He wrote, You are absolutely right about Comrade Orjonikidze pursuing a unique policy. In my opinion it could be explained by the fact that he (as well as we) had been given instructions by Comrade Lenin that totally contradict the realities in Azerbaijan. That is, earlier we had hoped for a revolt in Baku, which had no chance. In regard to conversations about the independence of Azerbaijan, Stalin wrote, “It seems to me that (supposed) future independence may be perceived as a declaration alone, without any serious practical importance.”45 On April 28, 1920, the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist party informed Lenin via telegram of the proclamation of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. On April 29, Lenin declared at a Russia-wide assembly of workers of the glassporcelain industry, The news we received from Baku yesterday shows that the situation is getting better for Soviet Russia. We know that our industry was out of fuel and now we have received news that the Baku proletariat has taken power and overthrown the Azerbaijani government. This means that we now have an economic base to enliven our whole industry … . Thus, our transport and industry will get help from the Baku oil fields. 46 They did not need to wait long for this “help.” On May 4, Orjonikidze and Sergei M. Kirov informed Lenin that the fields and the merchant navy were absolutely secure. “Oil product resources are 300 million poods, daily production is 20 million poods. For now 1.5 million poods is sent to Astrakhan. The quantity of the product sent thus depends on Astrakhan.”47 After Baku’s occupation was complete at the end of the April, Orjonikidze and Kirov described the occupation of Azerbaijan to Lenin in a telegram dated May 4 in the following way: Our army, which was aware of the demands the Azerbaijani Communist Committee would present to the government on the night of April 28 about surrendering power to the Communists, crossed Azerbaijani borders on April 26. Our armored train was in Khachmaz at that time. After a short consultation, the government turned over power to the Azerbaijani and Baku Revolutionary Committee, consisting exclusively of Muslims. The independent Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic was declared. The first step of the revolutionary committee was to appeal to Soviet Russia for military aid, with the purpose of organizing a military alliance. Our army entered the city without resistance. Two hours after power was given to the Communists, our armored train with an infantry battalion came to Baku.48

386  The April 1920 occupation Lenin was notified via telegram that within a short period everything that had happened in Azerbaijan would take place in Georgia as well. Therefore, the authors of the telegram recommended not carrying out any negotiations with Georgia.49 Finally, Orjonikidze, who had humbly asked Chicherin in the telegram dated April 23 to urgently send Nariman Narimanov, now wrote Lenin that the Soviet of People’s Commissars should not give Narimanov any authority.50 On May 7, 1920, Orjonikidze and Kirov wrote to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin in a telegram that the time was right for invasion, as the Georgians were fighting among themselves. What had been done in Azerbaijan would be repeated in Georgia with minor changes. In any case, if Georgia was not occupied, Azerbaijani Muslims might be angered, although the Azerbaijani government was ready to make peace by whatever means necessary.51 Apparently, the Bolsheviks evaluated the occupation of Azerbaijan as the occupation of the entire South Caucasus, as the occupation of Baku was important politically. On May 3, Orjonikidze observed, Occupation of the Azerbaijani capital is not politically insignificant in that it serves as a lesson to “states, newly established” on the fringes of Soviet Russia and some other anti-revolutionaries. The bourgeois diplomats of Europe thought they could defend themselves against the “Bolshevist threat” with the help of those states.52 Examination of the events shows that revolutionary conditions did not exist in Azerbaijan in April 1920 nor did any revolution take place. What happened in reality was just the following: contrary to international relations and international law, a sovereign state recognized by countries of the world was occupied by force as a result of foreign invasion. The Bolsheviks seized power. Mikhail Pervukhin, a Bolshevik who had entered Baku together with the Eleventh Army, wrote in his memoirs, “In the morning of April 28, people were unaware of what was happening in the streets. They asked soldiers, ‘Ivan, please at least tell us what has happened, who has seized power? Our local Bolsheviks or foreigners?’”53 An active participant in those events, Hamid Sultanov, would acknowledge later that Soviet power was brought to Azerbaijan by the bayonets of the Eleventh Red Army. In a speech he made in October 1920 at the Azerbaijani Communist Party’s Second Assembly, Sultanov said that the Central Committee had given no instructions to any worker or peasant about overthrowing the government. He said, I took an active part in overthrowing the government. Therefore, we knew that our dear comrades did not stand behind us but a red bayonet in Yalama. When presenting the demands to the government, I did not rely on the Central Committee. I knew that even if not today, then tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, the red bayonet would be here. If they killed my friends and me during this period, then Baku workers would remain here and take Soviet power readily. And just as we expected, we took Soviet power readily; they brought it to us readily.54

The April 1920 occupation  387 The first step of the Bolsheviks who seized power in Azerbaijan was to arrest diplomatic representatives of foreign states to Baku.55 In total, 400 foreigners were arrested in Baku.56 According to an account by the British High Representative to the South Caucasus, Harry Charles Luke, thirty-two British naval officers with the First Sea Lord Bruce Fraser in charge, en route to Enzeli, arrived at Baku on exactly April 28 and were arrested by the Bolsheviks the same day. In early April, Luke, who had succeeded Oliver Wardrop as the British High Commissioner in the South Caucasus, sent a telegram to Istanbul to the “Black Sea Army” stressing the importance of sending British naval officers to Enzeli. This step was taken in order to strengthen the defense of the Enzeli port from the possible threat of a Bolshevik buildup on the Caspian Sea. Accordingly, thirty-two British naval officers and men were urgently sent to Enzeli via the Istanbul-Tiflis-Baku route. They were later released in a prisoner exchange.57 A number of Western historians rightly note that there was a historical parallel between the Caucasus occupation by tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia.58 Firuz Kazimzadeh wrote that though the title and external independence of the country remained, Azerbaijan was again swallowed up by Russia in a short span of time.59 Kazimzadeh explained in a speech he gave in May 1979 at a joint conference of the U.S. International Communication Agency with the Wilson Center and Kennan Institute, “When the Red Army took over the Transcaucasian republics one after another in 1920 and 1921, Moscow disguised its rule, signing treaties with the Bolshevik ‘governments’ of the newly reconquered nations.” But in fact, “Transcaucasia was ruled as a colony of Moscow.”60 American scholar Richard Pipes described the advance of the Eleventh Army on Baku and the “conquest” of Azerbaijan. 61 Western historians W. E. D. Allen, Paul Muratoff, Hugh SetonWatson, Ivar Spector, Walter Kolarz, S. Enders Wimbush, Alexandre Bennigsen, Ronald G. Suny, Tadeusz Swietochowski, and others were of the same opinion.62 Azerbaijani delegates returning to Paris from the San Remo conference at the end of the April learned about Baku’s occupation from the French press. As soon as Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov received this news, he appealed to the French Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help him to send an urgent radiogram to the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers. Topchubashov told the French officials that he was sure to receive an answer to the radiogram.63 With the assistance of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Topchubashov sent a radiogram to the chairman of Azerbaijani Council of Ministers on May 3, 1920, stating as follows: “It has been two days since newspapers issued important information received from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani delegates returning from San Remo are unaware of what has happened . We humbly request that you inform the delegation about the events that have taken place there.”64 At the same time, without delay, the Azerbaijani delegates notified the Supreme Council of the Allied countries, the French, British, U.S., and Italian governments, and the foreign embassies in Paris about Azerbaijan being occupied by the military forces of Soviet Russia. Azerbaijani representatives hoped that the Peace Conference would help Azerbaijan to restore its independence.65 Notes and appeals of a similar content were repeatedly sent to the League of Nations and the leading states determining

388  The April 1920 occupation world policy.66 It was stated in the appeal that the Azerbaijani Republic expressed the will of the Azerbaijani-Turkish nation and this state, recognized by the Allies, was capable of existing. However, in April 1920, Russian Bolsheviks occupied Azerbaijan, and the Red Army invaded the country after an unequal battle...We do not think that you will stay indifferent to the sufferings of the small Azerbaijani nation, which struggles for life and independent development of nations on the basis of peace and justice. It is our hope that the League of Nations will turn its eyes to this part of the world and provide moral assistance to the Azerbaijani nation and its just demands.67 On June 30, 1920, Topchubashov had presented a note of objection to the chairman of the Versailles Supreme Council concerning Soviet Commissar Leonid Krasin’s statement about the possibility of paying Russia’s debts to Western countries by giving Baku oil to them as concession.68 Later a, similar note was sent to congresses at Spa, London, Genoa, The Hague, Lausanne, and Stresa. For example, the note presented to Spa conference on July 4, 1920, stated, The Azerbaijani delegation to the Peace Conference would like to draw the conference’s attention to the occupation of Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia … . De-facto recognition of Azerbaijani independence by the Versailles Supreme Council caused enthusiasm in the Azerbaijani people. This recognition had given the people hope that a new period had started for this newly established state … . Nevertheless, shortly after this recognition, our country was occupied by the Bolsheviks … . In the situation that has arisen, the key to resolving this problem is in the hands of the Allied states, the Peace Conference and the League of Nations.69 Copies of this appeal were forwarded to the heads of various delegations represented at the Spa conference. A letter that Topchubashov sent to the head of the French delegation stated, “We address this Appeal to you as an expression of the deep belief we hold that the French delegation at the Conference will consider this extremely important issue for Azerbaijan.”70 However, all this had no effect. Furthermore, when several states including the United States tried to use the fact of the occupation by Soviet Russia to defend the idea of a “united and indivisible Russia” and the independence of Armenia, Topchubashov had to send the following scathing telegram to U.S. Ambassador to Paris on August 16, 1920. On behalf of the Azerbaijan Republic’s delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, I have the honor, Mr. Ambassador, to pass to you a declaration addressing your government. European newspapers already published the full text of the note that the US State Department sent to the Italian government. This note deals with Polish-Russian issues but at the same time touches upon vital interests of the Azerbaijan Republic. For this reason, the delegation of the

The April 1920 occupation  389 Azerbaijan Republic to the Paris Peace Conference could not remain indifferent to this note and was forced to draw the US government’s attention to some aspects of the note regarding Azerbaijan. The authors of the note, in displaying a great sympathy for the Russian people, see an excellent future of this people in Russia’s integrity and inseparability, except for the territories that it will allot to the Armenian state. Given that the Azerbaijani people have separated from the Russian state no matter what future form of this state will be and that on May 28, 1918 took a decision to establish the Azerbaijan Republic, the Azerbaijani delegation can no way agree with the concept of the note regarding Russia’s future. The decision of our people is a result of almost a century-long dominance of Russians in the Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, when a nation having absolutely no rights consisting of 4.5 million people remained under the Russian yoke and under quite a strange culture. Our delegation submitted to the Peace Conference, as well as to the government of the United States political reports evidently illustrating the sad conditions of the population of Azerbaijan after Russia’s century-long rule here. Following the breakdown of the Russian Empire, Azerbaijanis, like other nations of the Caucasus, declared their independence. We had to suffer great losses on this path, and today the struggle with Bolsheviks still continues. These victims were sacrificed for the sake of independent future of Azerbaijan because Azerbaijanis differ from Slavs in terms of either race or religion or language. Neither their traditions nor spiritual, intellectual life has anything in common with the Russians. If the US State Department’s note, referring to a threat of Armenia’s forceful seizure as an argument, recognizes its right to independence, then let us also declare that in years when the Caucasus was under Russian occupation, only the Moslem population of Azerbaijani Khanates and Dagestan fought the Russian occupation for more than half of a century. Meanwhile, Caucasian Armenians never waged a war against Russians. However, we wish either the small Armenian people or the Russian multi-million people all the good. We simply want to note that the small Azerbaijani people also need to be aided and defended by large peoples and that Azerbaijanis deserve a greater attention and justice. In addition, the Azerbaijani nation was twice – in 1918 and since April 1920 – subjected to a harsh occupation by Bolsheviks, against whom it currently wages a bloody fight, without any help from outside. Our small nation has lost almost 200,000 people, four cities and hundreds of settlements. Countless amounts of money and goods have been stolen; the Caspian fleet has been confiscated, while the country’s key wealth – the Baku oil industry – has been destroyed. Despite the small size of the country and the large number of victims, the Azerbaijani nation has been inspired by the de-facto recognition of the Azerbaijan Republic by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and dreams of a future free life. The Azerbaijani delegation would like to believe that the great American state and its prominent president, the main herald of the nations’ right to self-determination Woodrow Wilson will recognize that this right is also attributable to the Azerbaijani nation that has already realized this right. Azerbaijan is prepared for new victims on this path. Appealing to the

390  The April 1920 occupation freedom-loving people of America, its democratic community, the Azerbaijani delegation would like to pass to you this declaration in connection with the US State Department’s note and declare that the Azerbaijani people will never join the Russian state regardless of the form of its rule and will continue to live as the free Azerbaijan Republic, maintaining economic relations with all countries, including to-be Russia.71 This attitude toward the restoration of the 1914 borders of Russia was characteristic of other Western countries as well. The Entente countries’ response to Azerbaijan’s appeals was, as usual, silence concerning the occupation of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks. The participation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, recognized by the Paris Peace Conference, in international relations ended with the April invasion and its delegates in Paris became among the first Azerbaijani immigrants to Paris.

Notes 1. Troisième note de Tchitcherine au minister des Affaires Etrangeres de l’Azerbaidjan, Khan Khoisky. Bulletin D’informations de L’Azerbaidjan. Paris, 1 April 1920, p. 5–6; For more details on the exchange of notes in January of 1920 and relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, see Р. Мустафазаде (R. Mustafazade), Две республики. Азербайджано-российские отношения в 1918–1922 гг. (Two Republics. Azerbaijani-Russian Relations in 1918–1922). Moscow, 2006, pp. 14–105. 2. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), February 11, 1920. 3. V. I. Lenin, Azərbaycan haqqında (About Azerbaijan). Baku, 1970, p. 163. 4. See N. Nəsibzadə (N. Nasibzade), Azərbaycanın xarici siyasəti (1918–1920) (Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan [1918–1920]). Baku, 1996, pp. 230–251. 5. Excerpt from the Minutes of the Meeting held by Political and Organizational Bureau of CC of RC (B) P. 19.07.1919. APDPARA, f. 1, r. 44, v. 118, p. 6. 6. Telegram sent by V. I. Lenin to G. Orjonikidze on Occupation of Baku. 17.03.1920. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 13, v. 1, p. 1. 7. Ibid., p. 1. 8. Б. Краснов, В. Дайнес (B. Krasnov, V. Daynes), Неизвестный Троцкий. Красный Бонапарт (Unknown Trosky. Red Bonapart). Moscow, 2000, pp. 366–367. 9. Н. Жордания (N. Zhordaniya), Моя жизнь (My Life). Stanford, 1968, p. 105–106. 10. See Traité entre la Géorgie et la Russie. Le 7 mai 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 172–176. 11. Note from Chicherin to Lenin. March, 1920. APDPARA, f.09, r., v. 71, p. 65; For more information about Lansbury see From Mir Jacoub Mehtieff to A. M.Topchbashi. March 1920. Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, carton no. 7, II. CERCEC, EHESS, pp. 274–276. 12. N. Nəsibzadə (N. Nasibzade), Azərbaycanın xarici siyasəti (1918–1920) (Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan [1918–1920)]. Baku, 1996, p. 39. 13. Г. И. Квинитадзе (G. I. Kvinitadze), Мои воспоминания в годы независимости Грузии. 1917–1921. (My memories of the years of independence of Georgia. 1917– 1921). Paris, 1985, p. 164. 14. Мустафазаде, Две республики ,p. 97. 15. Letter of Oliver Wardrop, the British Supreme Commissioner in Tiflis to F.Vekilov, Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Georgia. 13.01.1920. SAAR, f. 897, r. 1, v. 62, p. 15.

The April 1920 occupation  391 16. Declaration of the Iranian Provisional Government. 07.09.1921. SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, v. 172, p. 133. 17. Letter of Sadikhov, Deputy Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Iran to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 06.03.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 141, p. 3. 18. Information of A. Ziyadkhanli, Diplomatic Representative of the Azerbaijan Republic in Iran to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12.04.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 141, pp. 40–41. 19. See Новый Восток (Noviy Vostok), 1922, No. 2, p. 268. 20. A. Kasravi, History of Azerbaijani Independence (in Persian). Teheran, 1351, p. 10. 21. See S. Tansel, Mondros’tan Mudanya’ya kadar. Cilt 3 (From Mondros to Mudana. Volume 3). Istanbul, 1991, pp. 248–249. 22. On the Turkish Rebellious Movement. 1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 145, pp. 6–8. 23. Information of Y. Gegechkori to Wardrop, the British Supreme Commissioner in Tiflis. 06.01.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 135, p. 48. 24. Resolution of Milli Mejlis (Parliament) of Turkish-Tatar Peoples of Central Russia and Siberia. 24.01.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 92, p. 30. 25. Directive of Chicherin to S. Eliavan. 29.02.1920. SAAR, f. 894, r. 10, v. 145, p. 15. 26. Н. Жордания (N. Zhordaniya), Наши разногласия (Our Disagreements). Paris, 1928, p. 45; The Soviet Union and Turkey. National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, RG 59, Box: 4010, NND 7600050, Doc. 761.67 / 12–1045. 27. Azərbaycan (Azerbaijan), April 20, 1920. 28. Telegram of Harutiunian, Diplomatic Representative of the Armenian Republic, to the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 16.04.1920. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 15, p. 29. 29. Ibid., p. 29. 30. Directive from Tukhachevsky, Orjonikidze and Zakharov to XI Army Command 21.04.1920. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 8, v. 1, p. 79. 31. Интернациональная помощь XI армии в борьбе за победу Советской власти в Азербайджане. Документы и материалы. 1920–1921 гг. (The International Support of XI Army in the Struggle for Victory of the Soviet Power in Azerbaijan. Documents and Materials. 1920–1921). Baku, 1989, p. 19. 32. Telegram of G. Orjonikidze to V. I. Lenin and G. V. Chicherin on the situation in Baku. 23.04.1920. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 13, v. 6, p. 1. 33. Telegram of G. Orjonikidze to V. I. Lenin and G. V. Chicherin on Necessity to Dictation of the Azerbaijani Peace Terms. 24.04.1920. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 13, v. 7, p. 1. 34. See Е. Токаржевский (E. Tokarzhevskiy), Из истории иностранных интервенций и гражданской войны в Азербайджане (On the History of Foreign Intervention and Civil War in Azerbaijan). Baku, 1957. 35. А. Стеклов (A. Steklov), Армия мусаватского Азербайджана (Army of the Musavat Azerbaijan). Baku, 1928, p. 43. 36. Le 28 avril 1920 Télégramme à chiffrer No. 28–29 Haut Commissaire Français Constantinople Pour Diplomatie Communiquer Amiral. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 12; Urgent Diplomatic Information of the Azerbaijani Government to Graf de Martel, Colonel Gabba and L. Luke. 27.04.1920. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 15, p. 43. 37. Telegram of Tumanian, Diplomatic Representative of the Armenian Republic in Georgia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 29.04.1920. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 9, v. 15, p. 45. 38. Ultimatum of Chingiz Ildirim to the Azerbaijani Parliament. 28.04.1920. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 27, v. 313, p. 20. 39. SAAR, f. 970, r. 1, v. 224, p. 5. 40. Квинитадзе, Мои воспоминания в годы независимости Грузии, p. 162. 41. C. Həsənov (J. Hasanov), “Ağ ləkə” lərin qara kölgəsi. (Black Shade of “White Spots”). Baku, 1991, pp. 95–96.

392  The April 1920 occupation 42. M. Ə. Rəsulzadə (M. E. Rasulzade), Əsrimizin Səyavuşu (Siyavush of Our Century). Baku, 1991, p. 55. 43. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti (1918–1920) Parlamenti (stenoqrafik hesabatlar). I cild. (Parliament of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic (1918–1920) (stenographic reports). Volume 1). Baku, 1998; Le 29 avril 1920 Télégramme à chiffrer № 30 Haut Commissaire Français Constantinople. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 13. 44. Telegram to the Soviet Government on Sending Army. 29.04.1920. State Archive of the Russian Federation (SA RF), f. 130, r. 4, v. 496, p. 25. 45. Telegram of I.Stalin to Moscow. 27.04.1920. APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, v. 2a, p. 4. 46. Lenin, Azərbaycan haqqında, p. 168. 47. Telegram of G.K. Orjonikidze and S.M. Kirov to V.I.Lenin. 04.05.1920. RSPHSA, f. 850, r. 13, v. 12, p. 100. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., p. 101. 51. Telegram of G. K. Orjonikidze and S. M. Kirov to V. I. Lenin, Stalin and G. V. Chicherin. 07.05.1920. RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 245, v. 1, p. 100. 52. Telegram of G. K. Orjonikidze to Vladikavkaz. 04.05.1920. RSPHSA, f. 85, r. 13, v. 10, p. 2. 53. Recollections of Revolutionary Events in Baku and Azerbaijan in 1917–1918. From Pervukhin’s memoirs. APDPARA, f. 276, r. 2, v. 20, p. 72. 54. Shorthand record of the 2nd Congress of the Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party. October, 1920. APDPARA, f. 1, r. 1, v. 8, p. 280. 55. Commissariat de la République Française au Caucase. Monsieur de Martel Commissaire français au Caucase à Son Excellence Monsieur Millerand Président du Conseil Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Le 24 mai 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 77. 56. Information Renseignements sur Bakou. Le 25 août 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 158. 57. See Harry Luke, Cities and Men. Oxford, 1953, pp. 101–104; D. de Martel—Affaires Etrangères Télégramme à l’arrivée Duplicata, Tiflis par Constantinople, le 28 mai 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 101. 58. W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratof, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turko-Caucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953, p. 500. 59. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951, p. 284. 60. See Советский Азербайджан: мифы и действительности (The Soviet Azerbaijan: Myths and Realities), p. 25. 61. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923. Cambridge, 1964, p. 227. 62. See Allen and Muratof, Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies. London, 1953; Ivor Spector, The Soviet Union and the Moslem World. 1917–1958. Washington, DC, 1958; Alexandre Bennigsen and Enders Wimbush, Moslem National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World. Chicago and London, 1979; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton, 1972; Hugh Seton-Watson, The New Imperialism. London, 1961; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995; Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian Collins, Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. Lanham, 1999.

The April 1920 occupation  393 63. Président du Parlement, Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M. Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française. Le 3 mai 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 20. 64. Président Délégation Topchibacheff—Président Conseil des Ministres République Azerbaïdjanienne. Le 3 mai 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 21. 65. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 285. 66. League of Nations from the President of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic. Bibliothèque de documentation international contemproraine (BDIC, Nanterre), Paris, pp. 1–2. 67. League of Nations from the President of the Peace Delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic. Bibliothèque de documentation international contemproraine (BDIC, Nanterre), Paris, p. 3. 68. A.Toptchibacheff Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan— Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix. Le 30 juin 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 135. 69. Monsieur le Président de la Conférence de la Paix à Spa. Le 4 juillet 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 124–132. 70. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan—A M. le Président de la Délégation de la République française à la Conférence de Spa. Le 7 juillet 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 133. 71. Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, Document No. 8856.

Conclusion

Examination of the two-year-long diplomatic activity of the Azerbaijan Republic has shown that the main goals of its government and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs were to define foreign policy in favor of the interests of the Azerbaijani people, to carry out that policy in a complex international situation, and to achieve recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the international community. The main aims of Azerbaijani diplomacy in those years were to protect the independence of Azerbaijan, to enter the international relations system, and eventually to become an equal partner of the West and the leading state in the region. Azerbaijani diplomacy developed from an orientation toward Turkey in the first years of independence to de facto recognition by the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles and from complex relations with several states to full cooperation and even strategic partnership. Since time immemorial, Azerbaijan’s geographical location has brought it into world politics as a center of trade and commerce and a meeting point for East and West, North and South. Over the centuries, Azerbaijani diplomacy has played a significant role in the regulation of the complex international situation in the region and in the establishment of multilateral relations with European countries. This has furnished Azerbaijan with rich experience from the point of view of history of international relations and in terms of the spiritual wealth of the people. The spread of national democratic ideas over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries precipitated moves to liberate the country from colonial oppression and gave birth to the idea of an independent Azerbaijan. As a forerunner in the national movements of the Near and Middle East in the early twentieth century and having successfully completed the historical transition from Muslim nationalism to Turkic nationalism, Azerbaijan was able to incorporate three distinct political trajectories into its nation-building project. The Azerbaijani state was built upon the precepts of Turkism regarding the question of national identity, with Islam as its religious orientation and Western principles as the foundation for the state. The Republic of Azerbaijan built its foreign policy on the synthesis of these three precepts. Along with its historical experience, the demands of the contemporary (and radically changing) world were effectively taken into account in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy was based not on pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism but on a realistic

Conclusion  395 and healthy attitude embracing the universal values of Eastern spirituality and Western culture. The main purpose of Azerbaijani diplomacy was the establishment of peace based on the equality of nations and mutually beneficial cooperation in inter-governmental relations. Experience of the years 1918–1920 showed that characteristic features of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy were not regional disputes or international antagonism (clandestine or open use of force in pursuit of national goals) but mutual respect (non-interference in the internal affairs of states); resolution of disputes by negotiations (respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state); and the intensification of cultural connections with other nations of the world. Azerbaijan’s commitment to the idea of the sovereignty of the peoples of the Caucasus emerged as a logical concomitant of its dedication to these important principles. Political figures in Azerbaijan showed that the national dispute in the Caucasus was not of a local nature but was a legacy of Russian colonial oppression and that Azerbaijani statesmen equated the independence of the Caucasian people to their peaceful coexistence. Ali Mardan Bey Topchubashov had written a year before Azerbaijani independence was declared, The policy of the Russian government toward the non-Russian people of Russia is one of dividing them and setting them against each other. The conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis could be explained precisely by this harmful policy, a policy of hatred toward human beings.1 The experience of the years 1918–1920 showed that despite various conflicts, the most reliable guarantee of lasting peace and stable development and prosperity in the region lay in peaceful coexistence, a unity of political and economic interests, and regional cooperation in all spheres. The republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan epitomized such cooperation in 1919 by putting aside minor disputes and signing a military accord against the Denikin threat. Those states that determined world policy (the Big Four of the Paris Peace Conference) also supported the idea of a military-political union between those two republics of the South Caucasus. However, the destructive stance of Armenia did not allow for the realization of a “Caucasian homeland.” On the one hand, it impeded international recognition of the South Caucasian republics and, on the other hand, it created fertile ground for those republics to be occupied by Soviet Russia. Elsewhere, the solidarity of the Baltic states was the main reason for their historical progress and national independence. Mammad Emin Rasulzade wrote later, “Not only Azerbaijan, but also those other Caucasian republics that shared the same fate never had the opportunity to use the chance they had.”2 Within the period under examination, one can divide the Republic of Azerbaijan’s participation in the international system into three distinct periods: the period of Turkish orientation (May–October 1918); the period of Western orientation (November 1918–January 1920) and the period of struggle to forge broad international cooperation. The first period, from May to October 1918, was the most difficult. Like the other two South Caucasian republics, Azerbaijan faced

396  Conclusion a very difficult situation on the path to the recognition of its independence. The expansionist policy of Bolshevik Russia carried out in relation to Azerbaijan by the Soviet of People’s Commissars had tragic consequences; various foreign powers took advantage of the situation, and a result was the mass killing of Azerbaijanis by a Bolshevik-Armenian coalition in the spring of 1918. The Bolsheviks seized power while stepping over dead bodies. Touching upon the many sacrifices Azerbaijan had made in its struggle against the Bolsheviks, Topchubashov wrote in his letter to the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles on June 30, 1920, that 12,000 Azerbaijanis had been killed in March 1918.3 By declaring the independence of the country during such a period, Azerbaijani statesmen made a historic impact on the fate of the nation they represented. If Azerbaijani territories were occupied by Russia in the form of separate khanates, then, regardless of the tribulations of a century-long oppression, Azerbaijan now left the empire with the idea of one nation, one state, and one motherland. That was a significant historical step, and the question of Azerbaijan’s independence quickly became internationalized. Discussing the significance of this event, Rasulzade wrote, By announcing the Declaration of May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijani National Council determined the existence of the Azerbaijani nation in the political sense of the word. That is, the word “Azerbaijan” was not merely a geographical, ethnographic, and linguistic signifier, but gained political meaning. Starting from this date, the whole world heard about the fight of a Turkic nation for its existence and independence; the question of Azerbaijan gained international significance and increased importance in comparison to other nations.4 A thorough examination of political processes taking place in Azerbaijan and the world during this period bring us to the conclusion that the Turkish orientation in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy at the end of World War I developed from the objective realities of that period. In order to defend the country from Soviet Russia’s aggression, Armenian plunders, and the various plans of external forces against Azerbaijan, the only possible diplomatic step was for the newly established government to request military support from the Ottoman empire (in accordance with the treaty of June 4, 1918). As a result of that diplomatic move, Baku—the target of rival parties at the end of World War I—was freed from foreign control and became the capital of the republic, forever to remain its national, cultural, historical, political, and economic center. This national event was the greatest success of Azerbaijani diplomacy during that difficult international situation. The defeat of the German-Ottoman alliance during World War I adversely affected the international position of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the young state became an object of attention to the great powers that had signed the Armistice of Mondros. Despite the protests of the Azerbaijani government and its diplomatic delegation in Istanbul, the Azerbaijan Republic had to bear the difficult burden of conditions arising from the Mondros armistice. Azerbaijan became

Conclusion  397 the subject of international relations law because of the influence of its strategic location and natural resources on world politics. With the end of World War I, the Turkish-German orientation of Azerbaijani diplomacy also ended. As a result of World War I, the second period of Azerbaijani diplomacy began with the entry of the Allies into Baku with the purpose of occupying it in accordance with the terms of the Mondros armistice. The distinguishing feature of this period was the strengthening of Azerbaijan’s pro-Western orientation. Although antiAzerbaijani powers also became active with the entry of the Allies into Baku in November 1918, the ambitions of those who wanted to reestablish imperial governance were not realized. The Allied command recognized the Azerbaijani government as the only legal power capable of existing on the territory of the republic.5 The recognition of the Azerbaijani government by the Allied command was a significant diplomatic success for Azerbaijani foreign policy during that critical situation. The newly independent republics were very optimistic about the Paris Peace Conference, which they hoped would regulate relations between Caucasus states by granting recognition of their independence. Appealing to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and the international community of states, the National Council of Azerbaijan reoriented itself in November 1918 and demonstrated its desire to take part in postwar international relations. Admittance of Azerbaijani representatives to Paris, their reception by President Wilson and other influential figures, their presentation of numerous notes, memoranda, and appeals to leaders of the Paris Peace Conference and its various commissions expanded views about Azerbaijan and demonstrated its will to enter the political processes of the world. Azerbaijani representatives in Paris faced major difficulties in attempting to counter the negative attitude that Russian political émigrés and Armenian propagandists had created against Azerbaijan. Disregarding the serious efforts of anti-Azerbaijani forces, various foreign missions to the Caucasus confirmed the Azerbaijani government’s devotion to the democratic principles it declared and its desire to coexist in peace and friendship with its neighbors, as well as the fact that Azerbaijan was the only republic capable of independently existing in the Caucasus. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjunction with Azerbaijani diplomacy played a vital role in gaining acceptance of this great truth. During the period under examination, the most serious threat to Azerbaijan was from the north, from Russia. Two warring factions in Russia—the Bolsheviks and Denikin’s Volunteer Army—were equally dangerous for Azerbaijan. They shared the aim of restoring the borders of the collapsed Russian empire to those of 1914. During this period, the Volunteer Army did not openly dare to attack Azerbaijan or Georgia; both were protected by the British. Regardless of the intentions of the Denikin’s followers, the long-term presence of the Volunteer Army between Russia and the newly independent republics delayed the Bolshevik invasion into those countries. The careful approach of the Republic of Azerbaijan in relation to Denikin’s volunteers and the diplomatic manner of opposing Russian White Guard forces were related to objective evaluation of the current situation and existing realities. Regardless of the difference in colors, the stance of the Republic

398  Conclusion of Azerbaijan toward White and Red Russia was based on the independence of the nation and the sovereignty of the republic. The resolute stance that the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained in the face of the “northern threat” to the independence of the country was as follows: “Whoever—Bolshevik, Menshevik, Denikin supporter or other—shows ill-will towards the independence of Azerbaijan is its enemy.”6 This principled stance during the years 1918–1920 was the primary focus of Azerbaijani diplomacy in relation to foreign states and foreign powers. Although the shift in favor of the newly independent state of Azerbaijan was related to processes going on in Russia and Western countries and changes to the international context generally, the primary factor in this turning point of the Republic was due to the devotion of the Azerbaijani government, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its diplomatic corps to independence. No difficulty encountered in the torturous paths of world politics could shake the faith in freedom and independence of the Azerbaijani government and its representatives at the Paris Peace Conference. Finally, after great difficulties, the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles de facto recognized the independence of the Azerbaijani republic on January 11, 1920. This recognition was an important event, not only for Azerbaijan but for the Near and Middle East countries as well as the Turkish and Islamic world. The Azerbaijani state was the first Turkic and Muslim republic to be officially recognized by Western countries and accepted in Western public opinion. Recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan by the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles was the greatest victory of Azerbaijani diplomacy in the international relations of this turbulent postwar period. Those who attained this victory created a bright example of service to their motherland and devotion to independence for their descendants. The third period, beginning in January 1920, was characterized by the fight of the Azerbaijani republic to engage in extensive international and intergovernmental relations. During this period, Azerbaijani representatives had taken part in the London and San Remo conferences of the Allied Supreme Council and had attempted to join the League of Nations and other international organizations; more than twenty consulates were opened in Azerbaijan. Negotiations conducted with Iran starting at the end of 1919 led to Iran’s recognition of the de jure independence of Azerbaijan in March 1920 and an entire set of treaties and agreements regulating all aspects of the relations between the two states. In April 1920, the Azerbaijani parliament adopted a legal project for opening six embassies in Europe and America. According to this law and intergovernmental agreement, the Azerbaijani government was to send diplomatic missions to London, Paris, Geneva, Rome, Warsaw, and Washington. Authorized representatives of Azerbaijan had already started their activity in Iran, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, the Mountain Republic, Ukraine, Crimea, Central Asia, and other neighboring countries. In early 1920, the republican government had some form of diplomatic representation in almost all of the large cities of South Azerbaijan. Just at the time when the Republic of Azerbaijan’s international status was stabilized, its independence was recognized by the world, and it had entered broad

Conclusion  399 international cooperation, it became a target for invasion by Soviet Russia. Contrary to the most elementary standards of international relations and international law, the independent, sovereign Republic of Azerbaijan was occupied by Red Army forces. Examination of documents and materials related to this event irrefutably shows that the overthrow of the Azerbaijani government was not related to local “revolutionary events” but was a part of a worldwide historical process. Russia, the only defeated member of the Entente, had collapsed, and the powers defining the world order were not prepared for this collapse. The difficulty faced by the newly independent states in joining the international system and their ultimate occupation by the Bolsheviks was the logical outcome of the Allies’ cautious approach to their former ally. Famous statesmen and political figures of Azerbaijan—Ali Mardan Topchubashov, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Fatali Khan Khoyski, Nasib Usubbeyov (Yusifbeyli), Mammad Hasan Hajinski, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Akbar Agha Sheikhulislamov, Jeyhun Hajibeyli, Mir Yagub Mehdiyev, Mahammad Maharramov, Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli—and others played an active part in the conceiving and implementing the diplomacy of the first Republic of Azerbaijan. Thanks to the diplomatic skills of these figures, who carried the heavy burden of Azerbaijani independence on their shoulders in that complex international situation, the Republic of Azerbaijan was able to join a universal historical process. Owing to them, Azerbaijan attained a position on the world stage on a political plane and was able to unite across party lines to strive for the higher cause of the fate of their people and their national interest. The lives of these people and their ability to give political content to the ideals of independence are some of the brightest pages of our nation’s history. After the invasion of April 1920, the members of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference found themselves among the first group of political émigrés to Europe, and they continued their political activity. As chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament, Topchubashov took part in the meetings of the League of Nations held in Geneva from 1920 to 1923 and, in appeals addressed to the leadership of the League, requested that the international community help Azerbaijan to free itself from the Bolshevik invasion.7 As the head of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, he repeatedly addressed the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Treaty of Versailles in the years 1920 and 1921.8 In a letter addressed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Topchubashov informed him about the Bolshevik terror in the country and asked for support from the French government against the invasion by Soviet Russia.9 In a note he presented to the London conference of the Allied Supreme Council in 1921, he asked for support for Azerbaijan, the independence of which had already been recognized by the Versailles Supreme Council, against the Bolshevik aggression.10 Participating at the Genoa conference on restoration of the European economy and at the Lausanne conference of 1923 on the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, he included on the agenda the issue of the occupation of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks. Representatives of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Peace Conference met with representatives of France and other countries

400  Conclusion and informed them in detail about the tragic outcomes of the Bolshevik invasion in Azerbaijan.11 As the historical experience of the years 1918–1920 still retains its importance today in the background of present-day realities, the diplomatic activity of the Republic of Azerbaijan is treated as a national spiritual treasury, and the historical experience of those statesmen who carried out Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is still of great contemporary value. As a testament to the importance of this period, on the eightieth jubilee of the Azerbaijan Republic in 1998, documents covering the activities of the parliament, government, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1918 and 1920 were published.12 Many qualitative changes have occurred in world politics over the century since the establishment of the Azerbaijan Republic, and the tendency to democratization has increased. It took two years after its establishment in 1918 for the Republic of Azerbaijan to be internationally recognized de facto but, in the 1990s, this process was completed within several weeks. Today, the Republic of Azerbaijan has joined a civilized international system, has become an equal member of the family of world nations, and holds its deserved position in the world as a center of important transnational projects. Thus, the tasks of Azerbaijani diplomacy during the period of the first Republic—engaging in global affairs, becoming an equal member of international organizations, joining the family of world nations—have now been realized. Guided by historical tradition and values, Azerbaijan has become one of the independent countries in the South Caucasus due to its modern international relationships. This is a tremendous historical achievement for the Azerbaijani nation in the past 25 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Notes 1. Каспий (Kaspii), April 18, 1917. 2. İstiklal (Istiklal), May 28, 1933. 3. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. Toptchibacheff— Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix. Le 30 juin 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 135. 4. İstiklal, May 28, 1933. 5. Le Commandant des troupes alliées à Bakou Général-Major V.N. Thomson Bakou, le 28 décembre 1918. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 832, f. 42. 6. Urgent Diplomatic Information of A. Ziyadkhanli, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic to J. Rustambeyov, Diplomatic Representative in Kuban Government. 26.06.1919. State Archive of Azerbaijan Republic (SAAR), f. 970, r. 1, v. 89, p. 38. 7. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence M. Paul Hymans, Président de la Première Assemblée Générale de la Société des Nations, Genève. Le 7 décembre 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 185– 186 ; Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Sir Eric Drummond, K. C. M. G., C. B., Secrétaire général de la Ligue des Nations, à Genève. Le 4 septembre 1921. Ministère des Affaires

Conclusion  401

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 233–234  ; Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan Ali Mardan Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Sir Eric Drummond, Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations. Le 1er février 1923. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 279. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. Toptchibacheff— Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême de la Conférence de la Paix. Le 30 juin 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 135; Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M.Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême des Alliés Paris. Le 20 janvier 1921. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 194 ; Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M. Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême des Alliés.Le 26 mars 1921. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 638, f. 15 bis. Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M. Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministre et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française. Le 8 octobre 1920. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 165. Cachet de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan—A Son Excellence Monsieur le Président du Conseil Suprême des Alliés à Londres. Le 17 février 1921. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 198. Secrétaire Général de la Délégation  de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. Atamalibekov—Au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française. Le 7 juillet 1922. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 257;  Visite de M. Djeyhoun Bey Hadjibeyli, Membre de la Mission diplomatique de la République d’Azerbaïdjan, à M. de Peretti. Le 20 juillet 1923. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 285 ; Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M. Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Monsieur Raymond Poincaré, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française. Le 23 août 1923. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 287; Président de la Délégation de Paix de la République d’Azerbaïdjan A. M. Toptchibacheff—A Son Excellence Monsieur Edouard Herriot Président du Conseil de la République Française Quai d’Orsay Paris. Le 17 juin 1924. Ministère des Affaires Etrangère de France, Archives Diplomatique, v. 639, f. 291. Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика. Внешняя политика (The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. Foreign Policy). Baku, 1998.

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414  Bibliography Шпилкова, В.И. (Shpilkova, V.I.), Империалистическая политика США в отношении Турции (1914–1920) (Imperialist Policy of the USA towards Turkey [1914–1920]). Moscow, 1960 Штейн, Б.Е. (Shtein, B.E.), “Русский вопрос” на Парижской мирной конференции (1919–1920 гг.) (“Russian Question” at the Paris Peace Conference [1919–1920]). Moscow, 1949 Юсифзаде, С.З. (Yusifzade, S.Z.), Первая Азербайджанская республика: история, события, факты англо-азербайджанских отношений (The First Azerbaijani Republic: History, Events, Facts of the English-Azerbaijani Relations). Baku, 1998

Western publications Allen, W.E.D. and Muratof, P. Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the TurcoCaucasian Border (1828–1921). Cambridge, 1953 Alstadt, A., The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. Stanford, CA, 1992 Sakis, A. The Armenian Community:The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict. New York, 1955 Haydar, B., Le Caucase et la revolution Russe. Paris, 1929 Bechofer, C.E., In Denikin’s Russia and the Caucasus, 1919–1920. London, 1921 Bennigsen, A. and Wimbush, E., Moslem National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World. Chicago, IL, 1979 Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaijan presented to the Peace Conference in Paris. Paris, 1919 Claims of Persia before the Conference of the Preliminaries of Peace at Paris. Paris, 1919 Composition antropologique et ethnique de la population de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919 Delegation Georgienne à la Conference de la paix, Memoire presenté à la Conference de la Paix. Paris, 1919 Dunsterville, Major-General L.C., The Adventures of the Dunsterforce, London, 1920. Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaijan. Paris, 1919 Evans, L., United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914–1924. Baltimore, MD, 1965 Fatemi, N.S., Diplomatic History of Russia. 1917–1923. New York, 1952 Fischer, Louis, Oil Imperialism. London, 1976 Fourniau, Vincent, “Deux Langues, Trois Pays, Pour Quelle Société Plurielle”, Journal of Azerbaijani Studies, Vol.1, No. 2, 1998 Hadjibeyli, Djeyhoun Bey, La premiera Republique musulmane: l’Azerbaidjan. Volume XXXVI. Paris, 1919 Harbord, James, “American mission to Armenia”, International Conciliation, No. 151, June 1920 Hasanli, J., “Spring 1918: Armenian Terrorism and the Turko-Moslem Genocide in Azerbaijan”, Journal of Azerbaijani Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 157–64, 1998–Vol. 2, No. 1, 52–62,1999 Hassanov, Jamil, “Azerbaijani-American Relations in 1918–1920: A page in Their History”, Caspian Crossroads, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Spring-Summer 1996 Hopkirk, Peter, On Secret Service East of Constantinople. The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. London, 1994 Hovannisian, R., The Republic of Armenia. Berkeley, CA, 1971,

Bibliography  415 Hovannisian, R., Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley, CA, 1967 Hovannisian, R., “The Allies and Armenia, 1915–1918”, Journal of Contemporary History, 111 (January), 145–168, 1968 Jaeschke, G., “Die Republik Aserbeidschan”, Die Welt des Islams, XXIII, 1941, No. 1–2 Kayaloff, Jacques., The Fall of Baku. Bergenfield, NY, 1976 Kazemzadeh, Firuz., The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921). New York, 1951 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, New York, 1994. Kolarz, Walter, Russia and Her Colonies. London, 1953 L’Azerbaidjan en chiffres. Paris, 1919 La Republique de l’Azerbaidjan du Caucase. Paris, 1919 Le 28 Mai 1919. Paris, 1919 Lenczowski, G., Russia and the West in Iran. New York, 1968 Lowry Heath, W., The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. Istanbul, 1990 Luke, H., Cities and Men. Oxford, 1953 MacDonell, R., And Nothings Long. London, 1938 McCarthy, Justin, Muslims and Minorities. New York, 1983 McCarthy, Justin, “The Anatolian Armenians, 1912–1922”, Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912–1926). Istanbul, 1984 McCarthy, Justin, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland on American Investigation of Eastern Anatolia after World War I.” XI. Türk Tarih konqresi, cilt V (11th Congress of Turkish History, Volume V). Ankara, 1994 Mir-Yacoub, Le Problème du Caucase. Paris, 1933 Mandelstam, André, La Societe des Nations et les puissances devant le problème armenien. Paris, 1926 Monroe, Elizabeth, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East. 1914–1956. London, 1963 Nansen, F., Armenia and the Near East. London, 1928 Pipes, R., The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923. Cambridge, 1964 Rasul-zade, M.E., Azerbajdzan w walce o niepodleglosc. Warsaw, 1938 Rowlinson, A., Adventures in the Near East, 1918–1922. London, 1923 Seton-Watson, H., The New Imperialism. London, 1961 Shissler, A. Holly, Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey. London, 2003 Sonyel, S., The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia. Ankara, 2000 Spector, I., The Soviet Union and the Moslem World. 1917–1958. Washington, DC, 1958 Suny, R., The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Princeton, NJ, 1972 Swietochowski, T., Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in Moslem Community. Cambridge, 1985 Swietochowski, T., Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York, 1995 Swietochowski,T. and Collins, B., Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. Lanham, MD, 1999 Teague-Jones, R., The Spy Who Disappeared: Diary of a Secret Mission to Russian Central Asia in 1918. London, 1990 Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Edited by R. Suny. Ann Arbor, MI, 1983 Ullman, R., Anglo-Soviet Relations. 1917–1921. London, 1968 Zenkovsky, S., Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. Cambridge, 1960

Plate 1  Chairman of the Azerbaijani National Council Mammed Emin Rasulzade

Plate 2  Speaker of the Parliament the Republic of Azerbaijan Ali Mardan bey Topchibashov

Plate 3  The First Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) the Republic of Azerbaijan Fatali khan Khoyski

Plate 4  The First Minister of Foreign Affairs the Republic of Azerbaijan Mammed Hasan Hajinski

Plate 5.  Massacre of the Muslim people of Baku by a Bolshevik-Dashnak armed band. Baku, March, 1918

Plate 6  High Command of the Turkish Army in Ganja, June 1918

Plate 7  M.E.Rasulzade opening the first session of the Azerbaijanian Parliament. Baku, December 7, 1918

Plate 8  The statesmen of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 1919

Plate 9  Session of the IV Government Cabinet the Republic of Azerbaijan. April, 1919

Plate 10  Minister of Foreign Affairs in the IV Government Cabinet the Republic of Azerbaijan Mammed Yusif Jafarov

Plate 11  A group of Azerbaijanian students, sent by the goverment of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Western states

Plate 12  Meeting of the Azerbaijani delegation at the Hôtel Claridge: left to right: Abbas bey Atamalibeyov, Mammed Maharramov, Ali Mardan bey Topchubashov, Akbar Agha Sheykhulislamov, Jeyhun bey Hajibeyov and Mir Yacoub Mehdiyev. Paris, 1919.

Plate 13  The map presented by the Azerbaijani Delegation of the Paris Peace Conference. June, 1919

Plate 14  The October issue of the newsletter, published by the Azerbaijani Delegation in Paris. 1919

Plate 15  The first Russian National Government. 1917

Plate 16  Ambassador of Germany to Soviet Russia P. von Kerner with members of Russian delegation Yakov Ganetsky and Maxim Litvinov after signing of the peace treaty on March 3, 1918, in Brest Litovsk

Plate 17  Official guard meets General Denikin station Rostov-on-Don, 1919

Plate 18  Military and government officials of the Ottoman Empire: Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha and Jamal Pasha

Plate 19  Ali Mardan bey Topchubashov in his office in Paris

Plate 20  Members of the government and the parliament of Azerbaijan with foreign representatives after the audience, held at the Foreign Ministry on the recognition of the independence of Azerbaijan the Paris Peace Conference. January 1920

Plate 21  Parade Army of the Republic of Azerbaijan Baku, October 29, 1919

Plate 22  The commanders and members of the Political Council of the XI Red Army after the seizure of Baku pose in front of an armored train

Plate 23  A delegation from the Republic of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference: from left to right: M. Maharramov M. Mehdiyev A.M. Topchibashov, Paris, 1920

Index

Aghayev, A. (Agaoglu): Azerbaijani diplomacy 136, 141; declaration of independence 78; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 170, 173–4, 183 Aghayev, H.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 344; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 66, 149; post February 1917 revolution 11–12, 25; Russia and Armenia 219; Trabzon and Batum conferences 43 Aharonian, A.: Azerbaijani diplomacy 135, 172; eve of occupation 360, 364, 366; Russia and Armenia 235–6, 239, 244, 247; United States interest 281 Akhundov, Mirza Fatali 2, 12 Aliyev, M. 198, 199 Allied countries (Great Britain, United States, France, Italy) 159, 162, 174, 387 Allied Powers Congress 333 Allied Supreme Council 398, 399 Allied troops: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 337; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 143, 144, 202; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 164; Russia and Armenia 219, 232, 239, 247; United States interest 281; Western mandate 258, 265, 267 American Committee for Relief in the Near East 203, 275, 282, 289–90, 352 American Committee for the Independence of Armenia 303, 306 American missions: Azerbaijani diplomacy 181, 205; United States interest in Azerbaijan 284, 286, 290–1, 293, 296; Western mandate 270 Anatolia 5; April 1920 occupation 376, 383–4; eve of occupation 358, 366; post February 1917 revolution 16, 26; Russia and Armenia 235, 238; Trabzon

and Batum conferences 31; and the United States 292–3, 307; Western mandate 257 Andranik (Ozanian): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 135, 146; Azerbaijani diplomacy 178, 239; liberation of Baku 96, 99, 108; post February 1917 revolution 16, 23–4; Trabzon and Batum conferences 39, 49 Anglo-Iranian treaty 313, 376 Ansari, A-Q.K. 170–1 anti-British movement 152, 328, 376, 377–8 Ardahan province: Azerbaijani diplomacy 212, 237; declaration of independence 73; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30–4, 36, 39–40, 42 Armenia: clashes 23–4, 50, 178, 268, 280, 292, 359; factions 15, 22, 36, 45, 49, 55; genocide claims 293; issues 17–18, 37, 263, 296, 319; land claims 146, 179, 360 see also Armenian delegates; Armenian National Council; Armenian propaganda Armenian-Azerbaijani conference 328 Armenian delegates: Azerbaijani diplomacy 165, 169, 172; eve of occupation 359–60, 361; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 135, 209; Russia and Armenia 235–6, 238–9, 244; United States interest 281 Armenian National Council: declaration of independence 69; liberation of Baku 96, 100–2, 105–6; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 145–6, 192; Russia and Armenia 235; Trabzon and Batum conferences 44 Armenian propaganda: Azerbaijani diplomacy 174, 183–4, 235, 239, 241– 2; lobbying in the United States 303,

Index  433 314; post February 1917 revolution 18; Western mandate 270 Atamalibeyov, A. 305–6, 330 Avalishvili, Z. see Avalov, Z. (Avalishvili) Avalov, Z. (Avalishvili): Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 335; Azerbaijani diplomacy 131, 164, 177; Russia and Armenia 225, 238, 243, 245–7; United States 296, 306; Western mandate 256 Ayolla, Grigory 11, 100, 109 Azerbaijan-Georgia agreement 229–31 Azerbaijan in Figures 319 Azerbaijan Information Newsletter 248 Azerbaijan (newspaper) 3; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 345; Azerbaijani diplomacy 161, 163, 179, 219; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 124, 198, 199; United States 293, 311–12, 320 Azerbaijani autonomy 18, 21 Azerbaijani delegates 5; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 134, 141–2; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 335–7; eve of occupation 359–60, 367; liberation of Baku 84, 111, 113, 114–16; lobbying in the United States 305, 307, 309–10; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 196, 198, 200–7, 213–14; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 160, 163–5, 173–5, 178–80, 182–6; Russia and Armenia 221–3, 233–4, 238; Trabzon and Batum 51; Western mandate 256 Azerbaijani faction: Batum conference 48, 50, 56, 58–9; declaration of independence 65; post February 1917 revolution 24, 26; Trabzon conference 30, 34–6, 41, 43–5 Azerbaijani-German agreement 114 Azerbaijani-German issue 93 Azerbaijani-Iranian conference 311, 353 Azerbaijani issue 18, 94, 119, 329 Azerbaijani National Council: conclusions 396, 397; declaration of independence 66–70, 75, 80; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 147–50, 208–9; Russia and Armenia 219 Azerbaijani Parliament: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 343; April 1920 occupation 384; conclusions 398, 399; eve of occupation 362; liberation of Baku 116; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 147–50, 192,

211; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 161, 174; Russia and Armenia 227; United States 283, 293, 304, 305, 312 Azerbaijani-Turkish agreement 72–5 Bakikhanov, Abbasgulu Agha 2 Bakinskii rabochii (newspaper) 20, 21, 89, 90 Baku: Baku-Batum oil pipeline 73–4; Bolsheviks 37, 77, 92, 103, 106; Congress (April 1917) 11–12, 194; province 37, 39, 82, 84 see also Baku oil; Baku Soviet Baku oil: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 129; April 1920 occupation 374, 385, 388–9; declaration of independence 74, 80; liberation of Baku 89, 93–4, 98, 101, 103, 118; lobbying in the United States 305; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 209–10; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30, 53–4 Baku Soviet: declaration of independence 76–7, 84; liberation of Baku 89–91, 93, 95–7, 99–100, 104, 116; post February 1917 revolution 11, 19–20; Trabzon and Batum conferences 37–8, 51–2, 54–6 Balfour, A. 175, 206, 232–3, 267–8, 358, 367 Bammatov, H.: Azerbaijani diplomacy 176, 224, 244; Trabzon and Batum conferences 37, 43, 51; United States interest 290 Batum 30–64; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 138–9, 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 338; Azerbaijani diplomacy 163–5, 184, 236; declaration of independence 65–6, 68–71, 73–5, 82–3; eve of occupation 352, 359–60, 363–4, 367–8; liberation of Baku 93, 101–2, 111–12; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 133, 195–6, 202, 206, 209, 211–12, 214; post February 1917 revolution 10, 21, 25–6; United States interest 275, 278, 291, 295; Western mandate 255–7, 259, 263 Batum conference: Azerbaijani diplomacy 30, 50–2, 54, 56–7; declaration of independence 65, 73–4; post February 1917 revolution 26 Batum province: Azerbaijani diplomacy 211–12, 237; declaration of

434  Index independence 73; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30–4, 36, 39–40, 42 Baykov, B. 19, 20, 144 Beach, General W.H. 196, 235 Bernstorff, Johann Heinrich von 55, 83. 92, 95, 113 Bicherakhov, L.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 142, 144; eve of occupation 351; liberation of Baku 93, 95–6, 105–6, 108; Russia and Armenia 226 bilateral negotiations 23, 84, 354 Bolsheviks 4; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 128, 130, 136, 141, 146, 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324–7, 329– 30, 332–3, 335, 337–41; April 1920 occupation 373–8, 379–80, 381–3, 384, 386–8, 389–90; Azerbaijani diplomacy 204, 209–11, 213; Batum conference 44–5, 48, 54–6, 58; conclusions 396, 397–8, 399–400; declaration of independence 77, 82–4; eve of occupation 350–1, 355–7, 364, 368; February revolution (1917) 11, 13–14, 16–17, 19–21, 23–4; liberation of Baku 90–5, 97–104, 106–7, 109, 111, 113, 117; lobbying in the United States 302, 310, 313, 317–19; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 167–8, 176–7, 180, 182; Russia and Armenia 220, 222, 224–5, 227–8, 231, 243; Trabzon conference 31, 37–9, 42; Western mandate 266, 268–9, 270 Bourdarie, P. 310, 326 Brest-Litovsk agreement: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 127, 128–9, 138; declaration of independence 72, 73, 83; liberation of Baku 93, 95–6, 107, 110, 112; post February 1917 revolution 21–2, 24; Trabzon and Batum conferences 31–3, 34, 35, 40, 42, 51 Britain see Great Britain British missions: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 329; liberation of Baku 102; post February 1917 revolution 17–18; Trabzon and Batum conferences 39; and United States 284, 308–9; Western mandate 268, 270 Brocher, G. 316–17 Buckler, W.H. 275, 306 Cambon, J. 335–7, 366–7 Caucasus mandate 264, 274, 290 Caucasian Islamic Army: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 133, 146; declaration

of independence 75–6, 77, 80–1; liberation of Baku 92–4, 96–100, 102, 105–6, 108, 114 Central Caspian Dictatorship 100, 101, 104–6, 108–9, 113, 116–17 Central powers (Germany, AustriaHungary, Bulgaria): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 127, 131, 138, 153; Azerbaijani diplomacy 158, 164; liberation of Baku 103; post February 1917 revolution 22; Trabzon and Batum conferences 51 Chandler, W. 303–8 Chermoyev, Abdul Mejid (Tapa) 37, 43, 51, 148, 225 Chicherin, G.V.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 128, 130; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 330, 332; April 1920 occupation 373, 375–6, 379–81, 385, 386; liberation of Baku 95, 97; Russia and Armenia 250; Trabzon and Batum conferences 42 Chkheidze, N.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 346; Azerbaijani diplomacy 164, 168, 174, 177, 180; eve of occupation 354, 364, 368; Russia and Armenia 222, 223, 239, 244–8; Trabzon and Batum conferences 47, 48, 58–9; United States interest 274 Chkhenkeli, A.I.: Azerbaijani diplomacy 164, 168, 172; Batum conference 42, 43–5, 47–9, 50–3, 57; post February 1917 revolution 10, 13, 26; Trabzon conference 30, 33–4, 36, 40–1 Christian populations 17, 100, 104, 144 Churchill, W.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 336, 337–8, 340; Azerbaijani diplomacy 176; eve of occupation 354, 357, 365; Western mandate 265 Cilicia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 131, 203; Russia and Armenia 235, 236, 240; and United States 291, 307; Western mandate 257 Clemenceau, G.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 333, 336–9, 340–2; Azerbaijani diplomacy 158, 175–6; eve of occupation 354; liberation of Baku 102; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 206; Russia and Armenia 220, 233–4, 238, 247; United States 289, 309, 311; Western mandate 255 Clerical Office (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 194, 196–7

Index  435 Congress of Caucasian Muslims 11–12, 194 Copenhagen negotiations 355–6, 368, 380 Cory, General G.N. 227, 258, 265 Cossack forces: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 93, 95, 106; April 1920 occupation 377; Azerbaijani diplomacy 167–8, 226; declaration of independence 85 Council of Five 221, 223 Council of Four 202, 203, 206, 274 Council of Ministers: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 124, 125–6, 142, 145, 147, 150; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 326; April 1920 occupation 387; Azerbaijani diplomacy 160, 185, 225, 233; declaration of independence 75, 80; Ministry of Foreign Affairs expansion 192–3, 198, 206; and United States 286, 309, 315; Western mandate 254, 265, 268, 270 Council of Ten 175, 236, 275 Crimea 102, 110, 125–6, 194, 195, 270 Crowe, E. 267, 289 Curzon, G.N.,Marquis (Lord Curzon): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 333–4, 337, 338, 340, 341, 343; April 1920 occupation 380; Azerbaijani diplomacy 175; eve of occupation 351, 357–8, 367–8; United States interest 281; Western mandate 258 Dagestan: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 136, 148; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 340; Azerbaijani diplomacy 163, 375, 380, 389; eve of occupation 351, 363; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 199–200, 211; Russia and Armenia 220, 226, 227–8, 231, 232, 233; Trabzon and Batum conferences 33, 49; United States interest 287 Daley, Colonel E.L. 283, 285–6 Dashnaksutyun party 105, 237 Denikin, General A.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324–5, 327, 328–33, 335, 337–40, 342; April 1920 occupation 373–4, 380, 383; Azerbaijani diplomacy 166, 169, 184; conclusions 395, 397–8; eve of occupation 350–1, 353; liberation of Baku 89; lobbying in the United States 302, 306, 308, 309–10, 313, 318; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 194, 199–200, 204, 206; Russia and Armenia 220, 222–9, 231–3, 237, 246–8; United States interest 284, 287;

Western mandate 259, 260–1, 265–7, 270 Diplomatic Department 125, 196 diplomatic missions: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 336; Azerbaijani diplomacy 166, 182; conclusions 398; eve of occupation 353, 355, 361–3; lobbying in the United States 305, 308, 315; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 140, 195, 197–8; Trabzon and Batum conferences 53 Dunsterforce 103, 141 Dunsterville, Major General L.C. 101–5, 108–9, 116, 141 Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaijan 200, 319 Efendiyev, Mahmud Bey 112, 126, 165, 184, 195 Elizavetpol (later Ganja): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 146, 152; declaration of independence 69, 70; February revolution (1917) 11; liberation of Baku 94, 99; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 211; Russia and Armenia 237; Trabzon and Batum conferences 33, 51–2 Entente: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 130–1, 137, 138–40, 144, 153; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 329, 331, 333, 334, 339, 344; April 1920 occupation 373, 376, 378–9, 390; Azerbaijani diplomacy 158–61, 163, 166, 169, 171, 174; conclusions 399; eve of occupation 350, 354, 356, 358– 9, 365–7; liberation of Baku 89, 102, 113; lobbying in the United States 302, 309–10; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 200–1, 203–4, 212, 213; post February 1917 revolution 14–15, 17, 22; Russia and Armenia 220–1, 223, 225, 231–3, 235, 237, 239, 248; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36; United States interest 274, 281, 294; Western mandate 263 Enver Pasha: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 133–4; Azerbaijani diplomacy 174; declaration of independence 70–1, 75, 75–7, 81–4; liberation of Baku 93–5, 97–8, 101, 107, 115–16, 118; post February 1917 revolution 15, 22; Trabzon and Batum conferences 45–6, 53 Enzeli: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 340; Azerbaijani diplomacy 141–3,

436  Index 159; liberation of Baku 96, 101–4, 116; occupation 354, 387 Equality party see Musavat (Equality) party Erivan province: Azerbaijani diplomacy 152, 163–4; declaration of independence 70, 82, 84; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 192, 194; Russia and Armenia 237, 240–1; Trabzon and Batum conferences 33, 49–51; United States interest 278–9, 281, 283, 284–5; Western mandate 268 Erivan clash 240–1 Erzincan 15–16, 22–3, 24, 30, 291–2 Ethnic and Anthropological Composition of the Population of Caucasian Azerbaijan 200 ethnic cleansing 20, 50, 240–1, 278, 280, 292, 380 ethnicity: composition 2, 147, 200, 211, 303, 318–20, 319; conflict 21, 104, 134, 137, 295, 325, 357; relations 160, 290; violence 37, 56, 89, 163–4, 210–11, 280 see also ethnic cleansing ethnography: Azerbaijani diplomacy 162, 173; conclusions 396; declaration of independence 68; eve of occupation 357; liberation of Baku 112; lobbying in the United States 303, 318; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 197, 205, 207–8; Russia and Armenia 234; Trabzon and Batum conferences 54 falsifications: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 145; liberation of Baku 117; occupation 360, 378; Russia and Armenia 236; and United States 294, 314 February revolution (1917) 10–27; Azerbaijani diplomacy 166, 194; declaration of independence 78; South Caucasus 10–11, 13, 16, 22 Federalist party 11–12, 194 First World War see World War I Foch, Marshal F.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 334, 338, 340–2; eve of occupation 350, 354, 366; liberation of Baku 102 Fourteen Points (Wilson) 3; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 134, 148; preparations for the conference 166, 169–70, 182; Russia and Armenia 234; United States 292, 303, 316; Western mandate 274

France 5; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 137, 142, 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 333, 334, 336, 342; conclusion 399; eve of occupation 354, 357–8, 360, 361–3, 365–6; liberation of Baku 102; lobbying in the United States 308–9, 311, 315; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 200–1, 203; preparations for the conference 158, 162, 164, 174–6, 183, 185; Russia and Armenia 220, 224, 234–5, 239; Trabzon conference 36; United States interest 274–6, 285, 289, 291; Western mandate 255–7, 263, 270–1 Franchet d’Esperey, General L. 183, 185 Franco-Caucasus Committee 256, 308, 336 French missions 270, 281, 308–9 Gabba, Colonel M. 259–60, 261–3, 270, 352, 382 Gambashidze, D. 164, 177, 264 Ganja (earlier Elizavetpol): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 135, 146; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 345; April 1920 occupation 375, 381–2; declaration of independence 66, 69–71, 76–8, 84; February revolution (1917) 11, 17, 18, 19; liberation of Baku 90–2, 94, 99, 111; lobbying and propaganda 309, 316, 319; Paris Peace Conference 179, 194, 197, 208–9, 211; Trabzon and Batum conferences 52; Western mandate 261, 269 Gaplanov, R. K. 193 Garabagh regions 2, 4; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 135, 146; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 325, 328; April 1920 occupation 375, 380–1, 382; declaration of independence 70, 72, 76, 84; eve of occupation 357, 360–1, 365; liberation of Baku 96, 99; lobbying in the United States 319; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 194, 208, 210; preparations for the conference 160, 174, 178–9, 184; Russia and Armenia 239, 241–3, 248; United States interest 276, 277–8, 294–5; Western mandate 269 Garabeyli, Gara Bey 363 Garayev, A. 362 Gardashov, Aslan Bey, 25, 193 Gegechkori, E.P.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 331; April 1920 occupation 379; post February 1917 revolution

Index  437 13–14, 23; Russia and Armenia 229; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30, 36, 41, 42–3, 44, 48, 58; United States interest 287 genocide reports 293 Georgian delegates: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 128; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 335–7; eve of occupation 346, 359–60, 367; lobbying in the United States 305, 309–10; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 160, 164–5, 176– 7, 180; Russia and Armenia 222, 238, 245; Tiflis (now Tbilisi) 113; Trabzon and Batum conferences 53; Western mandate 256, 264 see also Georgian independence; Georgian National Council, Georgian independence 57–9, 66 Georgian National Council, 40, 43–4, 57, 65, 344 Gerard, J.W. 306–7 German-Georgian troops 76 German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 83, 127 German-Ottoman protocol 128, 396 German-Russian negotiations 94–5, 107, 110–11 German-Turkish bloc 15, 17, 46, 54, 101, 137 Gilan province 102–3, 313, 376–7 “Great Armenia”: Azerbaijani diplomacy 178, 181, 219–48, 229, 235–44, 248; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 214; post February 1917 revolution 21; United States interest 294; Western mandate 263 Great Britain 5; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 137, 142, 150; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324–5, 327–8, 331, 333–4, 344; April 1920 occupation 379; eve of occupation 350–2, 354, 355–6, 357–8, 361, 363–4; lobbying in the United States 313; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 202–3, 206; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 162, 166, 176, 180, 185; Russia and Armenia 228, 233; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36; United States interest 274, 276, 285, 289; Western mandate 257–8, 260, 264, 266–8, 270–1 see also British missions

Hagverdiyev, A. 126, 195, 199, 227, 356–7, 363 Hajibeyli, J. 4; conclusion 399; lobbying in the United States 308, 312, 318–19; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 200; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 173, 182–3, 185; Russia and Armenia 246; Western mandate 256 Hajibeyli, U. 3, 146–7, 219 Hajinski, Jamo Bey, 25, 67, 193 Hajinski, Mehdi Bey 25 Hajinski, M.H.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 150; April 1920 occupation 382; conclusion 399; declaration of independence 67–9, 71, 74–5, 77, 80–1, 83–4; liberation of Baku 92, 94, 98, 101, 106–7, 113, 118; post February 1917 revolution 11–12, 23, 26; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163–5, 173–4, 176, 181, 182, 183–6; Russia and Armenia 243; Trabzon and Batum conferences 37–9, 43, 45–6, 48, 50, 52; United States 290–1, 306, 319; Western mandate 255, 264 Halil Bey (Menteshe): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 133; declaration of independence 66, 68, 70–1, 83; Trabzon and Batum conferences 50–2, 54, 56; United States interest 286–7 Harbord, General J.G. 274–5, 290–6 Haskell, Colonel W.N. 270, 275, 276–9, 281–5, 287–90, 352 Hauschild, H. 97, 129 Heck, L. 166, 183 Heydarov, Ibrahim Bey 25, 26, 30, 34, 48 Hoover, H. (later U.S. president) 274–7 Hopkirk, P. 89, 103–4, 105 Hummet (Endeavor) party 25, 36, 41–2, 44, 78, 374 Huseynzade, A. 131, 173–4 indivisible Russia 219–48; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 144; April 1920 occupation 388; and Armenia 220–9, 232, 248; eve of occupation 325–6, 328, 333; lobbying in the United States 302; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 201, 214; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 167; Western mandate 255, 271 Information Bureau 197

438  Index Information Newsletter about Azerbaijan 318 international law: April 1920 occupation 386; conclusions 399; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 127, 138–9, 152, 197; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 185; Trabzon and Batum conferences 32–3 Iranian-Azerbaijani pact 313 Iranian delegates 170–1, 178, 312 Islam 2; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 148, 152; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 346; April 1920 occupation 380; conclusions 394, 398; declaration of independence 75–6, 77–8, 80–1, 83; eve of occupation 358, 363, 365, 367; liberation of Baku 92–4, 96–100, 102, 105–6, 108; lobbying in the United States 319; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 192, 197; post February 1917 revolution 12; Russia and Armenia 239; Trabzon and Batum conferences 31 see also Army of Islam; Muslim National Council; Muslim population; Mussulmen; Shiite Muslims; Sunni Muslims Italian missions 259–62, 270, 308–9 Italy: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 137; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 342–3; eve of occupation 352–3, 358, 361–3, 365–6, 368; lobbying in the United States 308, 315; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 200, 203, 206, 209; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 158, 162, 175–6, 185–6; Russia and Armenia 224, 234; United States interest 275–6, 285, 289, 291; Western mandate 255, 257–63, 266, 270–1 see also Italian missions Izzet Pasha 132, 134–5, 138 Jafarov, M.Y.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 125–6, 135; conclusions 399; declaration of independence 67, 69–70; lobbying in the United States 305, 308; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 193, 195–9; post February 1917 revolution 10, 13, 23, 25; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 184; Russia and Armenia 227, 233; Trabzon and Batum conferences 37, 43, 52; United States interest 277, 284, 287–8, 293, 295; Western mandate 257, 258, 261, 262–3, 264–6, 268 Jamal Pasha 50

Jamalian, A. 15, 23, 135, 356 Jangali movement 376–7 Javanshir, B.K. 80, 143, 145 Joffe, A. 93, 97–8, 110, 127, 128, 129–30 Jordania, N.: April 1920 occupation 380; declaration of independence 76; eve of occupation 364, 374; liberation of Baku 90; post February 1917 revolution 13, 19–20; Trabzon and Batum conferences 35, 40, 49, 57–8 June crisis 77, 80, 82, 127, 143 Kachaznuni, H.: declaration of independence 73; eve of occupation 365, 367; liberation of Baku 96; lobbying in the United States 307; Russia and Armenia 237, 244, 247; Trabzon and Batum conferences 34, 36, 40, 44, 47, 49–50, 57 Kantemirov, A.K. 25, 49, 51 Karakhan, L.M. (Karakhanian): April 1920 occupation 375, 378, 380; eve of occupation 363; post February 1917 revolution 21; Trabzon and Batum conferences 31, 42 Karakol organization 378–9 Kars province: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 328; declaration of independence 73, 76; eve of occupation 359–60; February revolution (1917) 21; Paris Peace Conference 163, 165, 211– 12, 214; Russia and Armenia 236–7, 240; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30–4, 39–40, 42, 44, 48–52, 49–50; United States interest 278–9, 281, 291–2, 295 Kazemzadeh, F.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 144, 149, 150; April 1920 occupation 387; declaration of independence 72; liberation of Baku 95; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 207; post February 1917 revolution 20; Russia and Armenia 228, 237; Trabzon and Batum conferences 32, 41; Western mandate 259 Kerr, P. 220, 335, 337 Khasmammadov, K.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 132, 138; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 344; Batum conference 46, 52, 55, 58; declaration of independence 66, 67, 69, 80, 81; eve of occupation 353; liberation of Baku 115; post February 1917 revolution 13, 19, 25–6; preparations for the Paris Peace

Index  439 Conference 184; Trabzon conference 30, 35–6, 40, 44 Khatisian, A. 25, 40, 50, 73, 236, 286 Khiyabani, Sheikh M.377–8 Khoyski, F.K.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 131, 140–1, 145–6, 149–52; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 331–2, 344–5; April 1920 occupation 373, 380–2; conclusions 399; declaration of independence 66–9, 71, 75, 77, 79–80; eve of occupation 353, 356, 359, 361–2; liberation of Baku 99–100, 107–8, 111, 116–18; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 192–3, 198–9; post February 1917 revolution 13, 19, 25; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 159, 162–3, 171–2, 174, 179, 184–5; Russia and Armenia 226, 237; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30, 35, 46–8, 55, 58–9; United States interest 278, 279 Kirov, S.M. 385–6 Kolarz, W. 13, 387 Kolchak, Admiral A.V.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324–5, 327, 328–30, 342; eve of occupation 350; lobbying in the United States 302, 308, 310; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 201, 204, 206; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 166; Russia and Armenia 220–4, 233, 248 Korganov, G.N. 16, 90–1 Lansing, R.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 327; Azerbaijani diplomacy 175, 186, 234; eve of occupation 357; lobbying in the United States 302; post February 1917 revolution 14; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36; United States interest 275 League of Nations: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 148; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 326, 329–30; April 1920 occupation 387–8; conclusions 398–9; eve of occupation 355, 359, 365, 368; lobbying in the United States 315; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 204–5, 209, 213–14; Russia and Armenia 220–1, 223–4; Western mandate 259, 264 Lenin, V.I.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 130; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324, 332; April 1920 occupation 373, 374–6, 377, 379, 381, 385–6; declaration of independence 76;

liberation of Baku 90–1, 92–3, 95, 97, 103, 110; post February 1917 revolution 21; Trabzon and Batum conferences 31 Lenkaran region 142, 193–4, 211, 243, 269 Liddell, R.S. 241, 269, 325–6 Lloyd George, D.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324–7, 333, 336–8, 339–42; April 1920 occupation 380; Azerbaijani diplomacy 202–3, 206; eve of occupation 350, 353, 358, 363, 365–8; liberation of Baku 102; lobbying in the United States 311; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 175–6; Russia and Armenia 220, 233–4, 236–8; Western mandate 257 Lodge, H.C. 131, 203, 236 London conference 356, 357–61, 363, 399 Loris-Melikov, J. 236, 238, 255 lost reports 293 Luke, H.C. 382, 387 MacDonell, R. 17–18, 39, 102 Maharramov, M.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 330, 335, 339–40; conclusions 399; declaration of independence 69; lobbying in the United States 305–6, 308; post February 1917 revolution 25; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 173–4, 182–3, 185; Russia and Armenia 224, 231, 238, 246; United States interest 288; Western mandate 256 Malik-Aslanov, Khudadat Bey 14, 19, 23, 25, 48, 80, 150, 268, 293, 352, 353 Mallet, L. 164, 202, 225, 231, 260 Mammadbeyov, H. 25, 43 McCarthy, J. 292–3 Mehdiyev, M.Y.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 334, 335; conclusions 399; eve of occupation 352–3, 368; liberation of Baku 103; lobbying in the United States 312; post February 1917 revolution 25–6; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 173, 185–6; Russia and Armenia 243, 245; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30–1, 34, 54; Western mandate 256 Mehmandarov, General Samad Bey 150, 193, 204, 227, 316, 382

440  Index Mehmed Nabi Bey see Nabi Mehmed Bey Mehmet VI, Vahideddin (Sultan) 115 Memorandum of the Caucasus Republic of Azerbaijan to the Paris Peace Conference 200, 204–5, 207–14, 318 Menshevik party: conclusions 398; liberation of Baku 90–1, 96, 100–1, 104; post February 1917 revolution 10–11, 13–14, 24; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 164, 180; Russia and Armenia 228, 248; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36, 40–2, 44–5, 47–8, 56–8 Menteshe, H. see Halil Bey (Menteshe) Mesopotamia 15, 17, 18, 103, 104 Mikoyan, A.I. 21, 116, 229, 237, 381 Milne, General G. 150–2, 159, 178, 231–2 Milyukov, P.N. 18, 161, 166–7, 175 Minorsky, V.F. 18 Mirza Kuchek Khan 103, 376–7 Mondros (Mudros) armistice: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 130, 137–40, 143; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 334; conclusions 396–7; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 159, 161, 166; Western mandate 265 de Monzie, Anatole, 256, 308 Morgenthau, H. 203, 274, 293, 304–5, 306 Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 330, 337, 340–1; conclusions 398; declaration of independence 81, 83; eve of occupation 351; liberation of Baku 113; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 195, 198–9, 201; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 184; Russia and Armenia 222–6, 229, 231, 243–4, 247–8; Trabzon and Batum conferences 51; United States interest 290; Western mandate 260–1, 263 Mudros see Mondros (Mudros) armistice Mursal Pasha 76, 106 Musavat (Equality) party 4; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 141, 148, 152; declaration of independence 77; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 193–4, 206; occupation 363, 381; post February 1917 revolution 11–14, 19, 21, 24–5; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36, 40–1, 47–8

Muslim National Council 30, 67, 240, 285, 344 Muslim National Council (Azerbaijan) 11, 13 Muslim populations: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 125, 132; declaration of independence 65, 70, 73, 83; eve of occupation 359–60, 368; liberation of Baku 91–2, 96, 98, 100; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 127, 212; post February 1917 revolution 12, 16, 19–21, 23; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 165, 171, 179; Russia and Armenia 240; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36, 38–9, 50–1, 54, 56; United States interest 284–5; Western mandate 268 Muslim Tatars (Azerbaijanis): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 146; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 325–6, 337, 344; April 1920 occupation 376; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 167–8; United States 276, 307; Western mandate 265, 269 Mussulmen 178, 208, 210–11, 292 Mustafa Kemal Pasha 238, 291–2 Nabi Mehmed Bey 135, 137, 139 Nakhchivan region: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 328; April 1920 occupation 375; declaration of independence 71, 84; eve of occupation 357, 360–1; liberation of Baku 96; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 208, 211; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 178, 184; Russia and Armenia 248; United States interest 277–83, 284–6, 288, 295 Narimanov, N. 4, 70, 377, 381, 382, 386 Nasimi Ahmad Bey 129, 132–3 National Council of Armenia. 242 National Council of Georgia 40, 43–4, 57, 65, 344 neutral zones 278, 281–6, 288 Niles, Captain E. 292–3 Nitti, F.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 333, 337, 340–2; eve of occupation 353, 363, 365–7; Western mandate 261, 263 Noel, E. 17–18 North Caucasus: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 127, 148; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 330, 337, 340–1; Azerbaijani diplomacy 185, 193–4; declaration of independence 81–2, 83; liberation of Baku 113;

Index  441 occupation 351, 363, 374; Russia and Armenia 222–3, 225, 231; Trabzon and Batum conferences 36–7, 43, 50–2, 57; Western mandate 255 Norway 131, 164, 329, 365, 366 Nosrat-ed- Dowleh III, F.M.F.F. 311 notes of protest: April 1920 occupation 388; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 196, 202; Russia and Armenia 222–3, 224, 228, 231; Trabzon and Batum conferences 53; United States interest 279, 281, 285, 287; Western mandate 266 Nubarian, B. (Nubar Pasha) 235, 236, 239, 364, 366 Nuri Pasha 45, 379; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 133, 137, 140–1, 146; April 1920 occupation 379; declaration of independence 75–6, 77–8, 79, 80–1; eve of occupation 360; liberation of Baku 89, 94, 98, 101, 107–8, 117; Trabzon and Batum conferences 45 Odishelidze, I.Z. 22, 23, 230 oil: fields 89, 92–4, 100, 103–4, 107, 114, 385; industries 35, 74, 104, 126, 147, 389; pipelines 73–4; trade 305 see also Baku oil Orjonikidze, G.K. 280, 374, 381, 385–6 Orlando, V. 175, 206, 257, 263 Ottoman-Azerbaijani relations 127 Ottoman Empire: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 128, 140–1, 149; conclusions 399; declaration of independence 67, 71–2, 74–5; eve of occupation 366; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 203; post February 1917 revolution 25; Trabzon and Batum conferences 33–4, 37, 45–6, 49, 52, 56; United States interest 277, 292 OZAKOM (Special Transcaucasian Committee) 10, 12 Ozanian, A.T. see Andranik (Ozanian) Paris Peace Conference (1919) 158–86, 192–215, 324–46; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 327, 329, 334–6; April 1920 occupation 378–9, 388; eve of occupation 352, 354; lobbying in the United States 305–6, 311, 314–15, 318; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 204, 212, 214; representatives 240–3, 248, 260, 267; Russia and Armenia 220; United States interest 275–7, 279–80,

284, 288, 291, 295 see also League of Nations; Treaty of Versailles Paris Peace Conference Allied Powers Congress 333 Peace and Friendship agreement (June 4, 1918) 51, 71–3 Pepinov, A.J. 25, 26, 43, 363 Pichon, S. 102, 175–6, 186, 233, 256, 310 Poland: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 325, 344; April 1920 occupation 373; eve of occupation 354–5, 361–4; lobbying in the United States 302, 317; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 195, 201; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 168, 176; Russia and Armenia 221, 223–4, 232, 239; Western mandate 270 Polk, F.L. 274, 288–9, 291, 295, 327, 334 postal services 71, 197–8, 309, 353 Princes’ Islands 175–6, 177, 327 propaganda: Armenian 135, 174, 183–4, 270, 303, 326; Azerbaijani 173, 302–20, 304, 307–8, 314–15, 318; Bolshevik 312–13, 339, 373, 376–7; February revolution (1917) 13, 16, 18, 20–1; Georgian and Armenian 161, 165; Russia and Armenia 226, 235, 239; Russian 98, 144, 330, 383; Turkish 52; United States interest 282 protest notes see notes of protest Przhevalsky, General M. 15, 179, 226 Quadruple Alliance 52–3, 83, 89 Rabinoff, M. 305, 307–8 Rafibeyov (Rafibeyli), Khudadat Bey 12, 19, 80, 269, 345 Rafiyev, Musa Bey 80, 141 railroads see railways railways: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 138–40; Azerbaijani diplomacy 197–9, 202, 381; declaration of independence 73–4, 83; eve of occupation 351, 367; liberation of Baku 98–9, 102, 106; lobbying in the United States 305, 319; post February 1917 revolution 20; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 166, 172; Trabzon and Batum conferences 40, 51, 53, 57; United States interest 275–6, 282–3; Western mandate 268–9 Ramishvili, I. 109 Ramishvili, N. 19–20, 37, 42, 44, 47, 65

442  Index Rasulzade, M.E.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131–2, 136, 138, 141, 148; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 344–5; April 1920 occupation 380, 383; conclusions 395–6, 399; declaration of independence 66, 68, 74–5, 77–9, 81–4; liberation of Baku 92, 94, 98–101, 106–8, 111–13, 115–16, 118; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 194; post February 1917 revolution 11–14, 25–6; Russia and Armenia 219–20, 227; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30, 42, 44, 47, 48, 52 Rauf Bey (Husayin Rauf Orbay) 32, 40, 46, 51, 161 raw materials 259, 309, 353, 355 Rawlinson, Colonel A. 102, 103, 147, 199, 226 Red Army: April 1920 occupation 373, 375, 380–1, 383–4, 386–8; conclusion 399; eve of occupation 356, 368; liberation of Baku 90, 92, 95, 99; recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence 327, 330; United States interest 280 see also White Guards Red Navy 382 religious differences 41, 129–30, 136 Republic of Georgia 65, 125, 276, 287, 303–4, 380 Rhea, Colonel J.C. 277, 285–7, 290, 291 right to self-determination: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 141–2, 144–5, 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 332; April 1920 occupation 389; liberation of Baku 89, 112; Russia and Armenia 245–6; United States 279, 303, 316 Rize 23 RSFSR see Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Rufat Pasha 129–30 Russia and Her Colonies (Kolarz) 13 Russian Armenia 179, 203, 275–6, 295, 325 Russian delegates 169, 177, 232 Russian National Council 144–5, 192 Russian policies 2, 130, 136, 314 Russian question: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 326, 329; Azerbaijani diplomacy 158, 175, 234; eve of occupation 357, 364, 368; lobbying in the United States 308, 309;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 201, 203, 205 Russian revolution (October 1917): declaration of independence 66, 77, 78; South Caucasus 10, 13, 26; Trabzon and Batum conferences 47 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 128, 130; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 330; April 1920 occupation 373, 378, 380; declaration of independence 76; eve of occupation 350, 363; Trabzon and Batum conferences 31 Rustambeyov, J.: Azerbaijani diplomacy 195, 228; post February 1917 revolution 12, 19, 25; Trabzon and Batum conferences 41, 43; Western mandate 267 Rustambeyov, S. 65, 70, 126, 263 Sadovsky, M. 100, 104 Safikurdski, A.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 132, 150; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 344–5; Azerbaijani diplomacy 193, 227; declaration of independence 81; eve of occupation 363; liberation of Baku 115; post February 1917 revolution 19–20, 25 San Remo conference 357–8, 361, 364–6, 368, 387, 398 Savitsky, V.I. 169 Sazonov, S. 166–9, 175, 177, 232, 236 Seidov, M.H. 25 Seim (Parliament): Azerbaijani diplomacy 90, 129, 208; Batum conference 43–6, 47–52, 53, 54–5, 58–9; declaration of independence 65–6; post February 1917 revolution 19, 24–6; Trabzon conference 30–1, 33–7, 39, 40, 41–2 self determination see right to selfdetermination Semyonov, Y.F. 26, 36, 41 Sforza, Count C. 161, 262 Shakhtakhtinski, Hamid Bey 25 Shamkhor Station 18–19, 20 Sharur-Dereleyez region 84, 211, 277–83, 284 Shaumian, Stepan Georgievich: Azerbaijani diplomacy 90–7, 101–4, 141; declaration of independence 76; post February 1917 revolution 11, 18, 20–1; Trabzon and Batum conferences 37–8, 55; Western mandate 268

Index  443 Sheikh-ul Islam (pre-eminent Islamic scholar, religious leader of Caucasuc Muslims) 77, 83, 136 Sheykhulislamov, A. A. 25, 36, 66, 69, 163, 173, 224, 231, 238 Shia Muslims see Shiite Muslims Shiite Muslims 41, 129–30, 136 Shikhlinski, A.A. 17, 81, 204, 230, 268, 316 Shore, General O. 14, 17, 103 Shuttleworth, General D.I. 264, 265 South Caucasian Commissariat 13, 14–16, 18–19, 22, 24–5 Special Transcaucasian Committee (OZAKOM) 10, 12 Stalin, J.: April 1920 occupation 374, 385–6; liberation of Baku 90–1, 93–4, 97; South Caucasus 21; Trabzon and Batum conferences 31 Staliski, E. 326–7 Standard Oil 305 statistics: Armenia 280, 366; Azerbaijan 160, 162, 173, 263, 284, 319–20; Erivan and Kars 240; Garabagh province 2, 179; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 197; Zagatala, Borchaly, and Garayazy 99 Stokes, Colonel C.B. 104, 147, 331, 356 Sulkevich, General M.A. (Sulkiewicz) 126, 230 Sultanov, K.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 328; Azerbaijani diplomacy 146, 150, 178, 241–3; South Caucasus 25; Trabzon and Batum conferences 67, 69, 80; Western mandate 270 Sunni Muslims 41, 129–30, 136 Suny, R.G. 20, 72, 91–2 Sutherland, A. 293 Swietochowski, T.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 127; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324; April 1920 occupation 387; declaration of independence 72, 76, 82; Paris Peace Conference 174, 180, 206, 214; post February 1917 revolution 20; Trabzon and Batum conferences 35, 38, 41, 48 Switzerland: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 134; Azerbaijani diplomacy 162, 164; eve of occupation 352, 355, 361–3; lobbying in the United States 309, 314–15 Tabatabaee, S.Z. 353 Taghiyev, H.Z. 192–3, 293

Tahirov, A. 261–2 Talaat Pasha: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 127–30, 132, 134; declaration of independence 70, 75, 83; liberation of Baku 98, 107, 111–12 Tbilisi see Tiflis (now Tbilisi) Tchaikovsky, N. 177, 232, 328 Tekinski, M.K. 195, 240, 242, 283–4, 286 telegraph services: declaration of independence 71–2; eve of occupation 353; lobbying in the United States 309, 313; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 197–8; United States interest 283, 293; Western mandate 256, 269 Tevfik Pasha 132, 160–1 Thomson, General W.: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 141–6, 148, 150; Azerbaijani diplomacy 159, 163, 174, 178–9, 182; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 199; Russia and Armenia 225–6, 228, 232; United States interest 278–9; Western mandate 257–8 Tiflis (now Tbilisi): Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 135, 151; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 331, 336, 343; April 1920 occupation 376, 379, 382, 387; Batum conference 43, 46, 51, 52, 58; declaration of independence 68–9, 74–5, 77, 80, 84; eve of occupation 354, 355, 356, 359, 361, 365; liberation of Baku 90–1, 93, 95–6, 98, 103, 109, 111, 113, 117; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 193–5, 197–9, 209–11; post February 1917 revolution 13–14, 17–18, 20, 22, 24–5; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 163, 169, 172, 183–4; Russia and Armenia 219, 223, 229; Trabzon conference 33–4, 36–7, 40–1; United States interest 277– 8, 281, 286–7, 291, 293–4; Western mandate 236–7, 255–8, 262, 267, 268 Topchibashi, A.M. see Topchubashov, A.M. (Topchibashi) Topchubashov, A.M. (Topchibashi) 2, 4; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 129–30, 131–41, 149–50, 152; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 326–8, 335–6, 337, 340–2, 346; April 1920 occupation 387–8; conclusions 395–6, 399; declaration of independence 73, 80; eve of occupation 354–6, 361, 363–4, 368; liberation of Baku 111–12, 115; lobbying in the United States 303–9, 311, 312, 315–16, 318; Ministry

444  Index of Foreign Affairs 196, 200–1, 202–6, 214; post February 1917 revolution 13, 25; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 159–61, 163, 165–74, 178, 180–6; Russia and Armenia 221–2, 224, 231–4, 239, 243–7; United States interest 279, 288, 290–1, 296; Western mandate 254–5, 260–3, 267–8, 270 Trabzon 30–64; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 138; Azerbaijani diplomacy 236; declaration of independence 74–5; eve of occupation 358–9, 365–6; post February 1917 revolution 10, 23, 25–6 Trabzon conference 26, 32–3, 44, 50–1, 65, 74 Transcaucasian Muslim Provinces 179 Transcaucasian Seim see Seim (Parliament) Treaty of Versailles 3; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 345; April 1920 occupation 378–9; Azerbaijani diplomacy 175, 177, 181; conclusions 394, 396, 398, 399; eve of occupation 357, 364; lobbying in the United States 302, 309, 314, 320; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 201 see also Paris Peace Conference Trotsky, L. 91, 95, 374 Tsereteli, I.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 335, 339; declaration of independence 65; liberation of Baku 90; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 174, 177; Trabzon and Batum conferences 41–2, 47, 58 Turkic Federalist party 11–12, 194 “Turkish Armenia”: Azerbaijani diplomacy 131, 164, 202; eve of occupation 364, 366; post February 1917 revolution 21, 23, 26; Russia and Armenia 240, 244, 245–6; Trabzon and Batum conferences 30–1, 38 Turkish-German issues 65, 93, 103, 397 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 69, 130, 160 Turkish National Council 68 Turkmenchay treaty 1, 266–7 Umansky, L.100, 101 United Kingdom see Great Britain Upper Garabagh 72, 178, 243, 375 Usubbeyov, Nasib Bey (Yusifbeyli): Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 327–8, 331, 342–3, 344; April 1920 occupation 381; Azerbaijani diplomacy 141,

170; conclusions 399; declaration of independence 65–7, 69–70, 74, 79; eve of occupation 352; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 193–5, 198, 206; post February 1917 revolution 11–12, 25; Russia and Armenia 227, 231, 240; Trabzon and Batum conferences 35, 37, 44, 48, 52, 55; United States interest 286–7, 293, 295; Western mandate 268, 269–70 Usubov, General I.A. 204 262–3, 316, 343, 352 Vakilov, F.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 331; April 1920 occupation 376; eve of occupation 352, 356, 363; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 195–6, 198; Western mandate 268 Vakilov, M.R. 25, 199 Vakilov, Mustafa Bey 126, 165, 198 Vakilov, Rahim Bey 4, 12, 25, 37, 66, 149, 363 Vansittart, R. 337, 364 Vazirov, Y. 126, 195, 198, 270 Vehib Pasha: declaration of independence 70–1, 77, 79, 80; post February 1917 revolution 15, 22–5; Trabzon and Batum conferences 32, 34, 44, 46, 48, 50–1 Velunts, A.100, 104, 109 Versailles conference see Paris Peace Conference Volunteer Army (Denikin): Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 330, 337; April 1920 occupation 373; Azerbaijani diplomacy 179, 199–200, 219–20, 223–9, 231–3; conclusions 397; eve of occupation 351, 353; Western mandate 260, 266–7, 270 von Kressenstein, K. 52–3, 76, 113, 135 von Lossow, O. 50, 52–4, 57–8, 127 Wardrop, O.: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 327, 330, 331–2, 343; April 1920 occupation 376, 379, 387; Azerbaijani diplomacy 164, 195, 232; eve of occupation 356–7, 364; United States interest 281, 286; Western mandate 260, 267–8, 270 Webb, Admiral R. 166, 180–1 White Guard government (Russia) 170–1, 175–6, 201, 221, 223 White Guards: Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 324–5, 330; April 1920 occupation 373–4; Azerbaijani

Index  445 diplomacy 205; conclusions 397; eve of occupation 350, 354, 364; liberation of Baku 89; lobbying in the United States 302, 308, 310; Russia and Armenia 220, 228, 232 see also Red Army; White Guard government (Russia) White Russia (Belarus) 222 Wilhelm II 85, 102, 110, 379 Wilson, H., 336, 337 Wilson, T. Woodrow, 28th U.S. president 3; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 131, 134, 141, 148; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 346; April 1920 occupation 389; Azerbaijani diplomacy 158, 161, 166–7, 169–70; conclusions 397; eve of occupation 365–6; lobbying in the United States 302–3, 306, 316; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 202–7; Paris Peace Conference 175–6, 180, 182, 186; Russia and Armenia 220, 222, 231, 234, 236, 238; United States interest 274–7, 288, 290, 292, 296; Western mandate 263 World War I 3, 5, 124–56; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 346; April 1920 occupation 378; conclusions 396–7; declaration of independence 70; liberation of Baku 89; lobbying in the United States 302; Ministry

of Foreign Affairs 204; post February 1917 revolution 10, 26; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 186; United States interest 274, 278, 280, 296; Western mandate 254–5 World War II 297 Yudenich, General N. 206, 302, 308, 324, 327, 330 Yusifbeyli, N. see Usubbeyov, Nasib Bey (Yusifbeyli) Zangezur regions: Allied entry into Azerbaijan 135, 146; Allied recognition of Azerbaijan 328; April 1920 occupation 381; declaration of independence 84; eve of occupation 357, 359; liberation of Baku 99, 108; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 211; preparations for the Paris Peace Conference 178; Russia and Armenia 242–3, 248; United States interest 277–8, 282, 286–7, 294–5 Zardabi, Hasan Bey 2 Ziyadkhanli, A. 4; Allied entry into Azerbaijan 126, 141, 143; Azerbaijani diplomacy 163–4, 197, 228; conclusions 399; eve of occupation 353, 360, 363; lobbying in the United States 314; Western mandate 265