The Politics of Football 1032147784, 9781032147789

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1 Governance in football
Chapter 2 Culture in football
Chapter 3 Violence in football
Chapter 4 Nationalism in football
Chapter 5 Discrimination in football
Chapter 6 World affairs in football
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Critical Research in Football

THE POLITICS OF FOOTBALL Christos Kassimeris

The Politics of Football

This book examines the deep connections between football and politics and explains what those relationships can tell us about sport and wider society. With the game occupying a preeminent place on the world sporting stage, this book argues that the political signifcance of football has never been greater. The book explores the politics of football governance and the international organisations that run the game, as well as the interaction of footballing authorities with government at all levels. It shows how football clubs and supporter groups have leaned left (such as FC Sankt Pauli) or right (such as SS Lazio) and have been signifcant voices in secessionist debates and the promotion of religious identities and ethno-centrism. It also addresses how fascist and communist regimes have used football to project political ideology. The book also considers key contemporary political issues in football, such as surveillance, discrimination, and human rights. This is fascinating reading for anybody with an interest in football, in the politics or sociology of sport, in international relations, government, or political ideology, or in the intersection of politics and culture. Christos Kassimeris is Professor of Political Science in the School of Humanities, Social and Education Sciences at the European University Cyprus.

Critical Research in Football

Series Editors: Pete Millward, Liverpool John Moores University, UK Jamie Cleland, University of Southern Australia Dan Parnell, University of Liverpool, UK Stacey Pope, Durham University, UK Paul Widdop, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK

The Critical Research in Football book series was launched in 2017 to showcase the inter- and multi-disciplinary breadth of debate relating to ‘football’. The series defnes ‘football’ as broader than association football, with research on rugby, Gaelic and gridiron codes also featured. Including monographs, edited collections, short books and textbooks, books in the series are written and/or edited by leading experts in the feld whilst consciously also affording space to emerging voices in the area, and are designed to appeal to students, postgraduate students and scholars who are interested in the range of disciplines in which critical research in football connects. The series is published in association with the Football Collective, @FB_Collective. Available in this series: The UEFA European Football Championships Politics, Media Spectacle and Social Change Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen and Renan Petersen-Wagner Football Fandom, Sexualities and Activism A Cultural Relational Sociology Peter Millward Football in the Nordic Countries Practices, Equality and Influence Edited by Mihaly Szerovay, Arto Nevala and Hannu Itkonen The Politics of Football Christos Kassimeris https://www.routledge.com/Critical-Research-in-Football/book-series/ CFSFC

The Politics of Football

Christos Kassimeris

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Christos Kassimeris The right of Christos Kassimeris to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kassimeris, Christos, 1974- author. Title: The politics of football/Christos Kassimeris. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2024. | Series: Critical research in football | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2023012792 | ISBN 9781032147789 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032147802 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003241034 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Soccer–Political aspects. | Nationalism and sports. | Sports and state. | Violence in sports. | Racism in sports. | Soccer–Social aspects. Classification: LCC GV943.23 .K37 2024 | DDC 796.334–dc23/eng/20230509 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023012792 ISBN: 978-1-032-14778-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-14780-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-24103-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Introduction

1

1

Governance in football

7

2

Culture in football

36

3

Violence in football

63

4

Nationalism in football

88

5

Discrimination in football

117

6

World affairs in football

146

Conclusion

177

Bibliography Index

183 197

Introduction

Politics is all about the state, government, and power; the power of a government to make decisions that affect entire states. Whether in the hands of one (monarchy), a few (oligarchy) or many (democracy/ochlocracy), power relates to the political structure of a state and the essential decision-making apparatus that governs the state. Hence, politics is, more generally, closely associated with political institutions, political parties, and the political affairs of the international community. Through a multitude of political institutions catering to the needs of the state, governments make laws, raise taxes, and even wage wars to safeguard their self-interest. When restricted to the actual exercise of political power, therefore, politics is all about governance. And just as governance is about making rules and proposing options, politics is about defning the exact content and context of those rules and options. In its more expanded usage, however, politics interfere in all sections of human life, much like Aristotle theorised that humans are by nature political animals, and thus, politics is no longer confned to the interactions between states alone. It is precisely in this respect that this book examines the politics of football. The politics of football is a recurring topic of conversation among football fans, as decisions made by international governing bodies, national associations, organising bodies of domestic leagues, and clubs are often discussed within a political context. FIFA’s decision to grant Saudi Arabia sponsorship of the 2023 Women’s World Cup, the Premier League’s lack of scrutiny over Roman Abramovich’s takeover of Chelsea Football Club, or Athletic Club Bilbao’s persistence in their Basque-only policy are prime examples of politics meddling with football. Fans, too, become highly political in supporting one team over another, with Società Sportiva Lazio considered as Benito Mussolini’s favourite football club, while Unione Sportiva Livorno is based in the city that gave birth to Italy’s communist party. Likewise, in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Turkey, in February 2023, Turkish football fans demanded that the government resign. To ‘play politics,’ as per the phrase, is to exercise power for the sole purpose of advancing certain political interests – a phrase redolent with negative connotations, no doubt.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-1

2

Introduction

Similarly, the politics of football, or else playing politics with football, is best illustrated in the decision of the football players in England to take the knee to denounce racial inequality, at the same time as the British government failed to openly support the players, with a member of the cabinet describing the act as ‘gesture politics.’ Further, the Europa Conference League match between Fotbal Club Sheriff Tiraspol and Partizan Belgrade took place behind closed doors due to national security reasons, since the government of Moldova feared that Russia was planning to use agents under the guise of football fans to stage a coup. That the Football Association of Moldova received a letter from the Security and Intelligence Service of Moldova outlining how the match posed a danger to the statehood of the Republic of Moldova is the epitome of playing politics with football. The politics of football is accurately refected in various felds of political science for football-related matters every so often relate to governance, international relations, human rights, discrimination, violence, political philosophy, and nationalism. Social sciences have long studied sport, in general, and football, more precisely. Traditionally a feld for sociological research, the increased commercial value of football could not possibly be ignored, therefore, also attracting the attention of scholars researching the economic dimension of the game. However, political science was more recently involved in the study of the popular game. In the past, sport was rarely considered politicised enough to warrant any critical research in political science. Even though certain popular sports have the capacity to attract the attention of large crowds, the preoccupation of political science with the concept of power rendered the mass phenomena that are sports events insignifcant, given the perceived lack of association between sport and politics. Especially in the case of mega events, such as the Olympic Games or the World Cup in football, the absence of political science is evident and, most certainly, disappointingly unjustifed. Recent technological advancements, however, have propelled both the development and prominence of sport. In football, the concept of power has always been present, though perhaps unnoticed. The power relations between fans, clubs, national teams, associations, and international governing bodies are probably not an inviting feld of research for political science, but when examined in the same context with state institutions, government practices, and law enforcement, the concept of power inevitably necessitates a political reading. Initially, research on sport and politics was more narrowly focused on felds of political science relating to policymaking, ideology, and international relations, just as they were often country specifc. Developing a wider framework of power, nonetheless, enabled political science to expand its research interests in sport on subjects pertaining to nationalism, activism, discrimination, violence, human rights, security, peace, and even confict resolution. The present study, too, endeavours to enrich the political science literature on sport by means of examining political manifestations in football. To this

Introduction

3

end, the frst chapter focuses on matters pertaining to governance. While good governance in football corresponds to the positive nature of the game and the space it occupies within society, bad governance defects our attention to issues relating to corruption and elitism. To assess the state of governance in world football, the frst part of the chapter examines the structure of the International Federation of Association Football (Fédération Internationale de Football Association – FIFA), the game’s international governing body, to evaluate whether FIFA adheres to democratic principles. Within the same context, the second part of the chapter discusses the impact of the breakaway European Super League against the more democratic model of football in Germany and recent developments in English football. The second chapter addresses matters pertaining to culture and identity, two terms that have long attracted the attention of scholars devoted to the study of both political science and football. In the context of political science, political culture has gained considerable signifcance over the years for it examines those perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of the citizenry that help construct a certain political reality. As well, football culture is about the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of football fans, thus allowing suffcient room to examine the culture of the popular game against the theoretical background of political culture. Likewise, identity – an integral part of culture, also signifcant in the study of political science – is assessed here too, political identity and identity politics to be more precise, to determine the signifcance of both politics and identity in the game of football. Football violence, hooliganism, or else the ‘English disease,’ concerns a disturbing phenomenon prevalent in almost every society that has embraced the otherwise popular game. Ever since the early 1980s, violence in and around football stadiums constitutes a recurring source of political attention that has transpired into legislation, policing tactics, crowd management practices, and, more recently, novel surveillance technologies. This chapter examines the origins of organised ‘ultras’ groups and their relationship with club, politicians, and the state as a result of the increasingly politicised nature of the game of football and the emergence of youth subcultures. The variations that characterise the nature of hooliganism in different settings at national and international level is an indication of the complexity in addressing the phenomenon that is violence in football. Football not only has the capacity to reinforce national identity, but it has also contextualised popular culture in the most colourful way available. The expansion of football, once organised and regulated in England, coincided with the process of nation-building, and thus the game was developed in parallel with the re-emergence of nationalism in Europe and across the European powers’ colonies abroad. Football games between local rivals transpired into short-lived skirmishes between neighbouring communities, just as matches involving national teams were dominated by national anthems and fags, with football facilitating the promotion of a distinct sense of identity.

4

Introduction

Throughout the 20th century, football endured the oppression of fascist and communist regimes, fought wars of independence against imperial powers, and even came to a standstill to mourn the demise of a monarch. Hence, this chapter examines football against the background of nationalism. The ffth chapter is devoted to discrimination in football. Football often is a clear refection of society, tackling the same issues and phenomena that have long troubled societies across the world. Governing society and football are similar since they are both governed by centralised institutions; therefore, the elimination of discrimination from society and football share a common point of departure. Yet tackling anti-social phenomena such as discrimination in football necessitates a separate approach that differs considerably from the measures adopted by society. The ill response from football’s governing bodies at national and international level has allowed much room for speculation, given the fnancial dimension of what is a highly proftable product in football. Perhaps addressing disturbing phenomena is less signifcant than safeguarding the economic interests of a rather lucrative industry, thus the reason football’s governing bodies have achieved so little in confronting the challenge that is discrimination. The connection between football and politics is not limited to domestic issues, but it expands over the domain of external affairs as well. Traditionally, two of the issues that dominate the feld of International Relations relate to confict and the issue of human rights. Hence, Chapter 6 is divided into two parts; the frst part relates to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and examines the impact of the war on football in the two warring states, while the second part focuses on the human rights violations by the state of Qatar, host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the response of some of the competing nations and the international community. Football became political the moment it was institutionalised at national and international level. While crediting the English for organising football and institutionalising it by setting up The Football Association, the French paved the ground for internationalising the popular game. FIFA was originally founded in Paris, with Robert Guérin one of its founding members and frst president of the international governing body; Jules Rimet proposed the idea of the World Cup and had the original trophy awarded to the winning national team named after him; the main headquarters of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), too, were in Paris; Gabriel Hanot put forward the idea of the European Cup, the predecessor of the UEFA Champions League; and, fnally, the European Championship was the brainchild of Henri Delaunay, also the frst general secretary of UEFA. Interestingly, the pioneers behind the idea of European integration and architects of the superstructure that today is the European Union, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, were also French nationals. Today, football and politics are so intertwined that several football clubs are owned by states, including the highly successful Manchester City

Introduction

5

Football Club in England and Paris Saint-Germain Football Club in France. Manchester City FC became a state-owned football club in 2008, when the emirate of Abu Dhabi purchased the club. The new trend of state-owned football clubs continued with Qatar’s acquisition of Paris Saint-Germain FC (soon after the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup had been secured) and was succeeded, more recently, with Saudi Arabia’s takeover of Newcastle Football Club. These are, currently, the only three states that own a football club; three Gulf states embroiled in a regional rivalry until not so long ago. Their diplomatic ties were only recently restored, after Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (together with Bahrain and Egypt) accused Qatar in 2017 of sponsoring terrorism. Since the economies of all three are driven by oil and gas, it is their political rivalry over regional hegemony that has nowadays transpired into the realm of football, thus subjugating any such football club to a mere sportswashing instrument that allows a state to pursue its economic interests despite allegations of human rights violations. In England, an independent regulator – proposed by a fan-led review and approved by the British government – will block football clubs from joining breakaway competitions such as the European Super League; provide fnancial stability to clubs and a fairer distribution of wealth; empower fans over matters relating to a club’s cultural heritage, such as the badge; and have new owners and directors take a more stringent test to determine their suitability. Despite its obvious merits, nevertheless, the independent regulator includes no provisions on the issue of human rights or state ownership of football clubs. Any such issues remain a matter for the Foreign Offce to assess for they concern foreign policy issues. The impact of politics on football cannot be emphasised enough. Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, once stated that a “single United Kingdom team using the best players from each [England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland] would be even more formidable” (World Cup According to Character, The Los Angeles Times, June 29, 1986). What was probably perceived as an ignorant American writing nonsense about the English game of football was, nevertheless, reiterated more than 20 years ago when Jack Straw, then UK Home Secretary, suggested that all four nations combine their football expertise into one national football team. Although his remark was entirely dismissed, what the four national football associations clearly failed to foresee was Gareth Bale (Wales) receiving the ball from Andrew Robertson (Scotland) before crossing it to meet the header of Harry Kane (England) in Germany’s defeat at the World Cup Final. Then again, perhaps the idea of the Home Nations joining forces to win a trophy that all four would have to share is beyond imagination, an apolitical notion altogether. A unitary state comprising four countries – incidentally, the same four that frst founded football associations – it is certain that should the UK ever feld a single national football team, the term ‘national’ would gain newfound political signifcance.

6

Introduction

Likewise, the impact of football on politics has also been signifcant. Football has been instrumental in forging national identity, facilitating international relations, and even serving political propaganda. Football clubs leaning to political Left (e.g., Sunderland AFC, AS Livorno Calcio, FC Sankt Pauli, Celtic FC, and Olympique de Marseille) or Right (e.g., SS Lazio, Rangers FC, Real Madrid CF, and Chelsea FC), expressing religious identity (Northern Ireland and Scotland), serving independence movements (e.g., FC Barcelona, Athletic Bilbao), and promoting ethno-centrism (e.g., Israel, Belgium, and former Yugoslavia), all underline the role of football in politics. At national level, too, the infamous ‘football wars’ between El Salvador and Honduras and in the former Yugoslavia, Israel’s ban from the Asian Football Federation, Iran defeating the United States at the 1998 FIFA World Cup, and the 2004 AFC Asian Cup fnal between China and Japan clearly indicate that political tension is often channelled through football. Despite the many academic articles examining various aspects of politics and football, few books of similar content are available, since other relevant publications are usually country specifc; therefore, the present volume should have a profound impact on international scholarship in the feld of political science, though it should also appeal to the non-scholarly football enthusiast.

Chapter 1

Governance in football

Introduction The idea behind a world government has its origins in ancient civilisations in China, Greece, India, and Rome. It was revisited during the times of Medieval Europe and, later, the period of Enlightenment, before it was better articulated when the United Nations (UN) were founded in the aftermath of the two world wars that took place in the frst half of the twentieth century. Even though the two world wars claimed 60–70 million lives, perhaps many more, humanity witnessed no peace as the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated world affairs during the second half of the century. National self-interest brought about the collapse of the League of Nations (the UN’s predecessor) and then caused the United Nations’ paralysis for almost half a century. Evidently, nationalism and supranationalism cannot coexist and, therefore, humanity was never well prepared for a world government. Today, the argument for a world government has resurfaced in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, rising populism, inequality, climate change, and, more recently, the nuclear threat that Russia’s war in Ukraine poses to humanity. In the case of football, the potential for world government is interpreted in terms of the popular game’s world governing body, the International Federation of Association Football (Fédération Internationale de Football Association – FIFA). FIFA was founded on May 21, 1904, by six European national associations (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) and Madrid Football Club (in the absence of a national football association in Spain), yet it nowadays represents a staggering 211 national football associations, thus exceeding the United Nations’ 193 member states. Over the years, FIFA has become an infuential voice in the international community’s social, political, and economic affairs, particularly ever since competing for the right of hosting the World Cup gained immense popularity among states in the post-war period. Hence, this chapter examines matters relating to football governance, and just as good governance in football refects the positive nature of the game, bad governance points to issues

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-2

8

Governance in football

relating to corruption and elitism. To assess the state of governance in world football, the frst part of this chapter will assess the political structure of FIFA to ascertain whether the world governing body of football adheres to democratic principles. Likewise, the second part of the chapter examines the impact of the breakaway European Super League on the game against the more democratic model of football in Germany and relevant recent developments in English football. Governance Government is essential for it provides order and stability. Even though some may point to matters pertaining to injustice, inequality, abuse of power, and corruption, returning to a state of nature, a stateless world, is not an option for without government only chaos would survive. The legitimacy of government is suffcient to enjoy relative stability and long periods of peace. Without government, the realists would argue the world would be in a state of anarchy. Just as Realism focuses on state competition for power in order to secure survival in an international system ruled by anarchy, Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) proposed that individuals, too, strive to survive in a state of nature. Human nature was a central feature of his philosophy, as is a major component of Realism in international relations theory. While humans are not inherently evil, human nature is driven by self-interest (same as states) and, therefore, in the absence of a government that would safeguard our security, competition for survival will turn one human against another. And since even the weakest can overcome the strongest when anarchy reigns, the need for a social contract becomes imperative for tasking a government with the protection of its citizens. Peace may encourage states to collaborate, Hobbes argued, but a world government is not entirely necessary but for a few states to form a coalition. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract, 1762), too, dismissed the need for a world government and proposed, instead, that proper government should suffce for the establishment of perpetual peace, while also stressing that a world of intertwined corrupted states is a threat to world peace. Similarly, Immanuel Kant (Perpetual Peace, 1795) argued that a world of independent states is preferred over a world government, for the latter will eventually crush the interests of the former and lead humankind to world monarchy. Kant did highlight the merits of an international state, a world republic as he called it, and even considered it an inevitable end in human history but stressed that the transfer of powers from the state to a world government could result in world tyranny. Contemporary international relations theorists such as Kenneth Waltz (Theory of International Politics, 1979) also refute the need for a world government. Overall, good governance at state level is clearly favoured over a world government, unless, of course, a world government can deliver good governance universally.

Governance in football

9

Governance refers to how governments and related (political) institutions interact with one another and how their policies and practices impact citizens and societies at large. It relates to the political power and political authority of governments and institutions and how these are defned, exercised, and checked, as well as to the rights and obligations of the citizens. Within a democracy, the decision-making process and the legal framework within which a government operates are of paramount importance. Governance is the everlasting process of managing common affairs. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defned governance as “the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development […] as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.”1 Likewise, the United Nations Development Programme defned governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.2 The two documents also stipulated a set of principles for good governance, namely, accountability, consensus orientation, effectiveness and effciency, equity, participation, responsiveness, rule of law, vision, and transparency. The concept of governance in political science serves to examine the mode of operation of contemporary international organisations against the background of the state’s more traditional, if not archaic, political institutions, agencies, and practices. Most sporting organisations, particularly football governing bodies, share an affnity for democratic procedures, inclusive policies and practices, and a constantly expansive perception of membership and participation – at least in theory. Football fans, in their turn, expect that the notion of fair play is respected and adhered to. Yet the football-for-proft venture of the Premier League in England or UEFA’s Champions League in Europe, for example, have rendered football’s governing bodies – at all levels – less responsive, less accountable, and less transparent, therefore, no longer representing the ethos of the community they came to signify through the cultural affliation with their locality. Expensive player transfers, highpriced matchday tickets, and increased dependence on foreign investment have nowadays transformed neighbourhood clubs into multinational corporations of gigantic proportions, just as Manchester City Football Club became the frst club in the history of the popular game to assemble a €1 billion squad, closely followed by Paris Saint-Germain Football Club and Real Madrid Club de Fútbol. A hostage to commercialism, football is today distanced from those ideals inherent to the sport until not so long ago, like health, education, personal development, and, above all, community values.

10

Governance in football

Football promotes openness, participation, and social inclusion, thus refning society’s norms and regulations. Bad governance in football has exposed the popular game, as clubs go into administration or become insolvent at the same time as its governing bodies ignore human rights violations and allow the organisation of prestigious tournaments by inappropriate hosts (see Chapter 6). Good governance in football is therefore imperative, though probably unattainable, for the top-down approach in managing the game leaves little room for grassroots change. National football associations, for instance, utilise public money and should, therefore, enhance their accountability vis-à-vis the tax-paying citizen by means of correlating investment in facilities and infrastructure to athlete performance and results on the pitch. Good governance in football depends much on reform. In England, the government launched the Fan Led Review of Football Governance to explore ways of improving the governance, ownership and fnancial sustainability of clubs in English football, building on the strengths of the football pyramid. This was a manifesto commitment in response to the collapse of Bury, a club founded in 1885. Further crises have followed with COVID-19 laying bare the fragile nature of many clubs’ fnances and the failed attempt to set up a European Super League in April 2021.3 The review recommended, and the government endorsed, the setting up of an independent regulator. The theory of governance dictates that ‘good governance’ is evaluated by means of employing criteria denoting democracy and openness. The quality of democratic institutions and procedures, in particular, had already gained signifcance in the evolution of the political systems of developing countries and former communist states in Eastern Europe. In established Western democracies, ‘good governance’ has gained symbolic signifcance in that these societies are governed by principles relating to the rule of law and human rights. Fédération Internationale de Football Association In the case of football, FIFA is the game’s world governing body. Football’s body politic is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights. Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, language, religion, political opinion or any other opinion, wealth, birth or any other status, sexual orientation or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion. FIFA remains

Governance in football

11

neutral in matters of politics and religion. Exceptions may be made with regard to matters affected by FIFA’s statutory objectives.4 (emphasis added) In terms of membership, FIFA claims 211 national associations, as opposed to the 193 member states of the United Nations. Any football association responsible for organising and supervising football in a country qualifes to become a member association of FIFA, though only one association may be recognised as a member association in any given country; nevertheless, “An association in a region which has not yet gained independence may, with the authorisation of the member association in the country on which it is dependent, also apply for admission to FIFA.”5 At the request of the Council, the Congress may decide to expel a member association, in which case The presence of an absolute majority (more than 50%) of the member associations eligible to vote at the Congress is necessary for an expulsion of a member association to be valid, and the motion for expulsion must be adopted by a three-quarter majority of the valid votes cast.6 It is noteworthy that FIFA may, in exceptional circumstances, authorise a confederation to grant membership to an association that belongs geographically to another continent and is not affliated to the confederation on that continent. The opinion of the confederation concerned geographically shall be obtained.7 The Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) published in June 2022 the Fourth Review of International Federation Governance to assess the governance standards of 33 international federations. The review was carried out in the form of a self-assessment questionnaire divided over fve sections – transparency, integrity, democracy, development, and control mechanisms – each one section consisting of ten indicators and a maximum score of 50 (200 in total). The review fails to detail the scores of the individual international federations, but the offcial webpage of FIFA proudly states that football’s world governing body scored 175 or more.8 According to the ASOIF review, “A score of 175 represents an average of 3.5 out of 4 for all 50 indicators,” not to mention that those international federations that scored as high as FIFA belong to “an exclusive group.”9 As high an average as 3.5 out of 4 over 50 indicators grouped in fve sections certainly warrants some discussion over FIFA’s governance standards. One obvious limitation to this discussion is the absence of the actual data; nevertheless, since the mean score for all international federations is available, the following hypotheses should not be far from reality.

12

Governance in football

Table 1.1 Transparency Indicator

Topic

Mean (33 IFs)

2.1 2.2

Statutes, rules, and regulations Explanation of organisational structures, including staff, elected officials, committee structures, and other relevant decisionmaking groups Vision, mission, values, and strategic objectives A list of all national member federations with basic information for each Details of elected officials with biographical info Annual activity reports, including institutional information, and main event reports Annual financial reports following external audit Allowances and financial benefits of elected officials and senior executives General Assembly agenda with relevant documents (before) and minutes (after) with procedure for members to add items to agenda A summary of reports/decisions taken during Executive Board and Commission meetings and all other important decisions of IF

3.85 3.88

2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10

3.36 3.48 3.76 3.06 3.64 3.12 3.73 3.70

The transparency section included the following indicators/topics: The mean for all 33 international federations provided a score above 3.0 in all indicators, and in the case of six indicators a score higher than 3.5 was achieved. The review argues that Transparency was the highest-scoring of the fve sections in the questionnaire. Several of the top-scoring International Federations (IFs) posted close to the maximum score in this section, recording 39 out of 40. In addition, six of the 11 indicators across the whole questionnaire with an average score of more than 3.5 out of 4 were in the Transparency section.10 Since FIFA was amongst those federations that scored consistently high in all sections of the questionnaire, it should be safe to assume that the score of football’s world governing body was close to the maximum, particularly, when considering the mean for all 33 international federations. The integrity section included the following indicators/topics: The mean for all 33 international federations provided a score above 3.0 in six indicators, while for the remaining four indicators the lowest scored below 2.0. These four indicators (3.5 Establish confdential reporting mechanisms for ‘whistle blowers’ with protection scheme for individuals

Governance in football

13

Table 1.2 Integrity Indicator

Topic

Mean (33 IFs)

3.1

Has a unit or officer in charge of ensuring the IF abides by the IOC Code of Ethics and/or the IF’s own Code of Ethics Has a unit or officer in charge of ensuring the IF abides by the World Anti-Doping Code Complies with the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions Conflict of interest policy identifying actual, potential, and perceived conflicts with exclusion of members with an actual conflict from decision-making Establish confidential reporting mechanisms for ‘whistle blowers’ with protection scheme for individuals coming forward Provide for appropriate investigation of threats to sport integrity (competition manipulation, gambling-related or other) Make public decisions of disciplinary bodies and related sanctions, as well as pending cases, to the extent permitted by regulations Appropriate gender balance in Executive Board or equivalent Programmes or policies in place to foster greater diversity of backgrounds in composition of Executive Board and committees Programmes or policies in place regarding safeguarding from harassment and abuse

3.09

3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10

3.67 3.15 3.18 2.64 3.00 3.33 2.48 1.94 2.85

coming forward; 3.8 Appropriate gender balance in Executive Board or equivalent; 3.9 Programmes or policies in place to foster greater diversity of backgrounds in composition of Executive Board and committees; and 3.10 Programmes or policies in place regarding safeguarding from harassment and abuse) concern, predominantly, females and non-white males. How FIFA may have performed in this section will be discussed in other chapters. The democracy section included the following indicators/topics: The mean for all 33 international federations provided a score above 3.0 in six indicators, while for the remaining four indicators the lowest scored below 2.0. These four indicators (4.4 Make public all open positions for elections and non-staff appointments including the process for candidates and full details of the roles, job descriptions, application deadlines and assessment; 4.5 Establishment and publication of eligibility rules for candidates for election, together with due diligence assessment; 4.6 Term limits for elected offcials; and 4.8 Provide support to

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Governance in football

Table 1.3 Democracy Indicator

Topic

Mean (33 IFs)

4.1

Election of the President and a majority of members of all executive bodies Clear policies/rules on campaigning to ensure election candidates can campaign on balanced footing, including opportunity for candidates to present their visions/ programmes Election process with secret ballot under a clear procedure/ regulation Make public all open positions for elections and non-staff appointments, including the process for candidates and full details of the roles, job descriptions, application deadlines and assessment Establishment and publication of eligibility rules for candidates for election, together with due diligence assessment Term limits for elected officials Provide for the representation of key stakeholders (e.g., “active” athletes as defined in the Olympic Charter) in governing bodies Provide support to help enhance the governance of IF member associations Actively monitor the governance compliance of IF member associations with Statutes, Code of Ethics and other rules Ensuring equal opportunities for members to participate in General Assemblies

3.76

4.2

4.3 4.4

4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10

3.67

3.55 2.73

2.67 1.85 3.36 2.91 3.18 3.58

help enhance the governance of IF member associations) are intricately related to FIFA’s potential to achieve good governance and are discussed in more detail below. In sum, the review states that “The most common rule was a limit of three terms of four years for the president and other elected offcials,” also applicable to the case of FIFA, yet “the secondlowest scoring indicator across the assessment”11 related to indicator (4.6) Term limits for elected offcials. The development section included the following indicators/topics: The mean for all 33 international federations provided a score above 3.0 in four indicators, while the remaining six indicators scored between 2.30 and 2.97. Even though “All International Federations (IFs) bar one achieved a score of at least 3,” this section included “two of the fve lowest-scoring indicators overall.”12 Indicators (5.3) Monitoring/audit process of the use of distributed funds and (5.8) Legacy programmes to assist communities in which events are hosted only scored 2.30, since only 12 and 14 federations, respectively, managed scores of 3 or 4 in the

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Table 1.4 Development Indicator

Topic

Mean (33 IFs)

5.1

Clear policy and process in place to determine transparent allocation of resources in declared development objectives Information published on redistribution/support activity for main stakeholders, including financial figures Monitoring/audit process of the use of distributed funds Respect principles of sustainable development and regard for the environment Existence of social responsibility policy and participation programmes targeting hard-to-reach areas Education programmes (topics other than integrity) and assistance to coaches, judges, referees, and athletes Put in place integrity awareness/education programmes Legacy programmes to assist communities in which events are hosted Anti-discrimination policies covering a range of characteristics IF dedicates appropriate resources to the Paralympic/disability discipline(s) in the sport (Note: for sports that have no Paralympic or disability discipline, the mean score for the rest of the questionnaire will be awarded for this question)

3.09

5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10

2.76 2.30 2.94 3.06 3.70 3.15 2.30 2.97 2.91

two indicators. Regardless, FIFA must have scored well, otherwise an average of 175 out of 200 would not have been feasible. The control mechanisms section included the following indicators/topics: The mean for all 33 international federations provided a score above 3.0 in fve indicators, while for the remaining half the lowest indicator scored below 2.0. This section “had the joint-lowest median score at 28 out of 40.”13 Indicator (6.2) Establish an internal audit committee that is independent from the IF decision-making body received the lowest score across the whole assessment. For the record, the review stated that “Some of the Swiss-based IFs ft the criteria (thresholds for balance sheet, turnover and staff numbers) for a Swiss Ordinary audit,”14 and since FIFA is registered in the Commercial Register of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland, we may well assume that it fts this category of international federations. FIFA governance Governing FIFA are the members of the Council (the President included), standing committees, independent committees, and the Secretary General. An annual member associations conference is hosted by FIFA, as per the Statutes, with the president of each member association serving as an ex offcio member. This annual meeting takes place “with a particular focus on:

16

Governance in football

Table 1.5 Control mechanisms Indicator

Topic

Mean (33 IFs)

6.1

Establish an internal ethics committee with independent representation Establish an internal audit committee that is independent from the IF decision-making body Adopt policies and processes for internal financial controls (e.g., budgeting, separation of duties, dual approvals for payments, IFRS/GAAP audit standard) Implement a risk management programme Adopt policies and procedures which comply with competition law/anti-trust legislation in eligibility of athletes and sanctioning of events Observe open tenders for major commercial and procurement contracts (other than events) Decisions made can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms with a final right of appeal to Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Due diligence and effective risk management in bidding requirements, presentation, assessment and allocation of main events Awarding of main events follows an open and transparent process Compliant with applicable laws regarding data protection (such as General Data Protection Regulation) and takes measures to ensure IT security

3.12

6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10

1.82 3.30 2.61 3.06 2.52 3.06 2.91 2.67 3.03

a) Football development, b) Competitions, c) Governance, d) Laws of the Game, e) Integrity of the game, f) Diversity, g) Women’s football, h) Social responsibility.”15 The main function of the Council is that of a strategic and, generally, oversight body. The Council’s role is to defne “FIFA’s mission, strategic direction, policies and values,” its duties including setting global strategies for football; overseeing the activities of the standing committees and the general secretariat; appointing/dismissing chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the standing committees, except for members of the Governance Committee; proposing for election to the Congress chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee, the Appeal Committee, the Audit and Compliance Committee, and the Governance Committee, while ensuring “appropriate gender distribution”; appointing/dismissing the Secretary General upon the President’s proposal; defning the standards, policies and procedures on commercial contracts, football development grants, operational costs, and all other business- or fnance-related matters; approving the budget prepared by the Finance Committee before it is submitted to the Congress for approval,

Governance in football

17

accounts and annual audited fnancial statements, the annual report that is submitted to the Congress for approval; deciding “on the place and dates of the fnal competitions of FIFA tournaments and the number of teams taking part from each confederation”; designating the three FIFA representatives for attending the general assembly of The IFAB, in addition to the President, and “is entitled to direct how the representatives of FIFA shall vote in The IFAB”; supporting “the full participation of women at all levels of football, including in governance and technical roles”; and, fnally, approving and issuing FIFA regulations.16 The Council meets at least three times a year, all meetings are confdential, and when “a vote is needed on any matter, a majority of the valid votes cast is required for a decision to be adopted. Each member of the Council has one vote. As a rule, votes of the Council shall be conducted openly.”17 The Council consists of 37 members: 1 President, elected by the Congress, 8 vice-presidents, and 28 other members. The 8 vicepresidents and 28 members are allocated to confederations as follows: AFC (1 vice-president and 6 members), CAF (1 vice-president and 6 members), Concacaf (1 vice-president and 4 members), CONMEBOL (1 vice-president and 4 members), OFC (1 vice-president and 2 members), and UEFA (3 vicepresidents and 6 members). Each confederation president is a vice-president ex offcio of the Council. In general, No more than one representative from the same member association may serve on the Council simultaneously, unless one of the two representatives is a designated female representative, in which case the maximum of two representatives of the same member association applies. A member of the Council may serve for no more than three terms of offce (whether consecutive or not).18 The FIFA President shall be, and thus contribute to FIFA being, a vanguard for promoting the following principles, rights and values in particular: a) Integrity, ethics and fair play; b) Human rights and humanitarian values; c) Nondiscrimination, gender equality, equal treatment in general, and the stance against racism; d) Solidarity and mutual respect in football as well as in society in general; e) Promoting friendly and peaceful relations within FIFA as well as in society in general for humanitarian reasons.19 The President’s duties include proposing “the guidelines for FIFA’s overall strategy to the Council”; overseeing “together with the Council, the implementation of the guidelines for FIFA’s overall strategy”; preparing “the business of the Council and the Congress,” proposing “the appointment or dismissal of the Secretary General”; and engaging “the members of the Executive Offce of the President and terminates their employment.”20

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Governance in football

Evidently, the controversy surrounding the awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar is not compatible with the President’s duty of promoting the principles, rights, and values mentioned above (see following chapters). The general secretariat operates as the executive and administrative body. The Secretary General is FIFA’s chief executive offcer, heads the Management Board, and reports to the Council, decides on executive and administrative matters and issues implementing regulations, policies, directives, and procedures. Other duties include managing the FIFA general secretariat; proposing “targets for the various divisions in accordance with FIFA’s overall strategy as determined by the Council”; approving “the organisational structures in each division at the proposal of the respective director”; implementing “the rulings and decisions passed by the FIFA bodies, in particular decisions passed by the Congress and the Council”; preparing “the administration and organisation of the Congress”; appointing/dismissing FIFA directors; approving “proposals from the directors of the various divisions regarding the appointment or revocation thereof of a deputy”; deciding “on the signing powers of members of FIFA bodies and employees for the purpose of concluding legal transactions and signing correspondence as an addition to these regulations”; “facilitates relations with the confederations and member associations”; and, fnally, is “responsible for compiling the minutes for the meetings of the Congress, the Council, the standing committees and the ad-hoc committees.”21 The FIFA Congress is a legislative body. Each member association holds one vote and is represented by its delegates that belong to the member association they represent and are appointed by the appropriate body of that member association. Those Confederation delegates that may participate in the Congress have the status of observers and thus no voting rights. A Congress may either be an Ordinary or an Extraordinary Congress. The Ordinary Congress is held annually, whereas an Extraordinary Congress may be called by the Council at any time, provided that “one-ffth of the member associations make such a request in writing. The request shall specify the items for the agenda.”22 Its main task is to function as FIFA’s supreme legislative body. The standing committees include the Finance Committee, Development Committee, Organising Committee for FIFA Competitions, Football Stakeholders Committee, Member Associations Committee, Referees Committee, and Medical Committee. FIFA’s standing committees operate like parliamentary committees in that they may work with other committees to deal with specifc problems. If necessary, the committees may set up working groups to conduct specifc tasks or examine specifc issues. Such working groups may include experts who are not members of the committees. The results of such working groups should then be fed back to the respective committee. The committees may call upon specialists at any time to address any urgent and/or special business in accordance with the applicable procurement guidelines.23

Governance in football

19

When “a vote is needed on any matter, a majority of the valid votes cast is required for the decision to be adopted. Each member of the committee has one vote. Votes are conducted openly. Voting by secret ballot is prohibited.”24 The chairpersons of committees report to the Council. One of the most signifcant committees, the Governance Committee comprises at least 3, with a maximum of 12, members elected by the Congress. Its primary duties include advising and assisting the Council on governance matters. The main powers of the Governance Committee are: a) To monitor material changes to FIFA’s governance or governancerelated regulations as well as the introduction of material new regulations and propose material amendments to FIFA regulations as well as the introduction of new material regulations; b) To deal with any other issues relating to FIFA governance matters; c) To advise on social responsibility, human rights, environmental protection and gender equality matters in connection with FIFA and its activities.25 The Governance Committee is also tasked with duties pertaining to election procedures, such as the supervision of the administrative process, the proper application of the Statutes, and assessing a candidate’s suitability for the position. As regards other committees, the Finance Committee decides on FIFA’s “strategy regarding fnancial and asset management and advise the Council on these matters”;26 the Development Committee deals with development programmes; the Football Stakeholders Committee “shall advise and assist the Council on all matters relating to football, particularly the structure of the game, as well as on all technical matters”;27 the Member Associations “shall deal with relations between FIFA and its member associations as well as the member associations’ compliance with the FIFA Statutes and draw up proposals for optimum cooperation”;28 the Players’ Status Committee “shall set up and monitor compliance with the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and determine the status of players for various FIFA competitions”;29 and, fnally, the Referees Committee shall implement and interpret the Laws of the Game and may propose amendments to the Laws of the Game to the Council. It shall appoint the referees and assistant referees for matches in competitions organised by FIFA and shall advise and assist the Council on all matters relating to refereeing, referees and assistant referees.30 Finally, FIFA’s judicial bodies are the Disciplinary Committee, the Ethics Committee, and the Appeal Committee; their “composition, powers and responsibilities as well as the proceedings of the FIFA judicial bodies are set forth in the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA Disciplinary Code, and the FIFA Code of

20

Governance in football

Ethics.”31 The composition of all judicial bodies is decided by the Congress. More specifcally, The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and other members of the judicial bodies shall be elected by the Congress and shall not be members of any other FIFA body. Their terms shall last four years, beginning at the end of the Congress which has elected them. The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and other members of the judicial bodies may only be relieved of their duties by the Congress. The chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the judicial bodies may each serve a maximum of three terms (whether consecutive or not).32 Most signifcantly, perhaps, “FIFA recognises the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) with headquarters in Lausanne (Switzerland) to resolve disputes between FIFA, member associations, confederations, leagues, clubs, players, offcials, football agents and match agents.” The Court of Arbitration for Sport, nevertheless, does not deal with appeals arising from: (a) violations of the Laws of the Game; (b) suspensions of up to four matches or up to three months (with the exception of doping decisions); (c) decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognised under the rules of an association or confederation may be made.33 The election of the FIFA President “shall be conducted in accordance with the fundamental principles of FIFA as laid down in the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA Code of Ethics and the FIFA Code of Conduct, such as democracy, separation of powers, transparency and openness.”34 A candidacy for the position may only be proposed by member associations, together with statements of support from at least fve member associations, and must meet the following criteria: a) The candidate shall have played an active role in association football (e.g. as a player or an offcial within FIFA, a confederation or an association, etc.) for two of the last fve years before being proposed as a candidate and must pass an eligibility check carried out by the Review Committee (cf. art. 27 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes); b) The candidate shall have been proposed by a member association in accordance with art. 27 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes and art. 49 of these regulations; c) The candidate shall present declarations of support from at least fve member associations (cf. art. 27 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes). Being proposed as a candidate by a member association shall be understood as a declaration of support. Each member association may only present a declaration of support for one person. If a member association presents declarations of

Governance in football

21

support for more than one person, all of its declarations shall become invalid; d) The candidate shall pass the eligibility check conducted by the Review Committee.35 The President is elected for a term of offce of four years by the Congress in the year following a FIFA World Cup. Elections are held by secret ballot, regardless of the number of candidates, and each member association has one vote. The electoral outcome is decided by simple majority on the occasion of two or fewer candidates; otherwise “two-thirds of the votes of the member associations present and eligible to vote are necessary in the frst ballot. As from the second ballot, whoever obtains the lowest number of votes is eliminated until only two candidates are left.”36 FIFA’s organisation and structure resembles much that of a democratic state seeking to legitimise authority and power through representation. The sheer volume of FIFA’s member associations, when compared to other international organisations, could help justify the exercising of authority and power through the lens of representative democracy. The principles of representative democracy are made applicable to FIFA by FIFA itself. No doubt, this appropriation has been made to provide a basis for the justifcation of its regulatory powers: as “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government”, the will of the participants in football is to be the basis of the authority of FIFA. In this way, the nature and quality of FIFA’s representative democracy is of fundamental importance to its claim to authority.37 FIFA claims the authority and power to regulate over confederations, national associations, players, and offcials, even though only the national football associations are members of FIFA. Since only national associations have the right to vote, FIFA only qualifes as a democratic institution in respect of its membership; exercising authority and power over non-members, therefore, is a serious challenge to its democratic values. Further, the ‘one-associationone-vote’ democratic principle may also be questioned, despite the merits of political equality among all national associations, given the fact that not all national associations have had the same impact on the development of the game; most certainly, not all have had the same performance in international competitions, and not all have the same size in terms of registered clubs and players, infrastructure, and resources. That said, allocating more votes to the more ‘successful’ national associations is not an option since it would not improve FIFA’s democratic standing, for it would allow a small number of members more infuence and, ultimately, corruption and abuse of power would, of course, disturb FIFA’s decision-making procedures. Another unlikely option would be a formula echoing the principle of degressive

22

Governance in football

proportionality, such as the allocation of seats to each member state of the European Union for the election of Members of the European Parliament, since the vast number of less infuential national football associations could form a formidable block – unable to follow the kind of progress witnessed in the more advanced football nations – and obstruct the proper development of the game. Since altering the voting process and power of different national associations horizontally is not an option, perhaps a vertical step towards the upper echelons of FIFA would allow more opportunities for enhancing FIFA’s democratic credentials. As FIFA depends on the very national associations that comprise it, particularly when seeking to legitimise its authority and power, perhaps the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union would allow enough room to better refect those principles of representative democracy that FIFA is so keen to project. Enhancing democracy within football’s governing bodies, more generally and not only focusing on the structure of FIFA, would better serve the interests of all stakeholders and, therefore, reduce those dissenting voices demanding more radical reforms by means of threatening to set up breakaway leagues such as the European Super League in Europe. The European Super League The initial proposal for a European Super League gained support from six English football clubs (Arsenal Football Club, Chelsea Football Club, Liverpool Football Club, Manchester City Football Club, Manchester United Football Club, and Tottenham Hotspur Football Club), three Italian football clubs (Associazione Calcio Milan, Football Club Internazionale Milano, and Juventus Football Club), and three Spanish football clubs (Club Atlético de Madrid, Futbol Club Barcelona, and Real Madrid Club de Fútbol). The press release announcing the creation of the new league stated: Twelve of Europe’s leading football clubs have today come together to announce they have agreed to establish a new mid-week competition, the Super League, governed by its Founding Clubs. AC Milan, Arsenal FC, Atlético de Madrid, Chelsea FC, FC Barcelona, FC Internazionale Milano, Juventus FC, Liverpool FC, Manchester City, Manchester United, Real Madrid CF and Tottenham Hotspur have all joined as Founding Clubs. It is anticipated that a further three clubs will join ahead of the inaugural season, which is intended to commence as soon as practicable. Going forward, the Founding Clubs look forward to holding discussions with UEFA and FIFA to work together in partnership to deliver the best outcomes for the new League and for football as a whole. The formation of the Super League comes at a time when the global pandemic has accelerated the instability in the existing European football economic model. Further, for a number of years, the Founding Clubs

Governance in football

23

have had the objective of improving the quality and intensity of existing European competitions throughout each season, and of creating a format for top clubs and players to compete on a regular basis. The pandemic has shown that a strategic vision and a sustainable commercial approach are required to enhance value and support for the beneft of the entire European football pyramid. In recent months extensive dialogue has taken place with football stakeholders regarding the future format of European competitions. The Founding Clubs believe the solutions proposed following these talks do not solve fundamental issues, including the need to provide higher-quality matches and additional fnancial resources for the overall football pyramid. […] As soon as practicable after the start of the men’s competition, a corresponding women’s league will also be launched, helping to advance and develop the women’s game. The new annual tournament will provide signifcantly greater economic growth and support for European football via a long-term commitment to uncapped solidarity payments which will grow in line with league revenues. These solidarity payments will be substantially higher than those generated by the current European competition and are expected to be in excess of €10 billion during the course of the initial commitment period of the Clubs. In addition, the competition will be built on a sustainable fnancial foundation with all Founding Clubs signing up to a spending framework. In exchange for their commitment, Founding Clubs will receive an amount of €3.5 billion solely to support their infrastructure investment plans and to offset the impact of the COVID pandemic.38 All in all, there would be 20 participating football clubs, including 15 Founding Clubs and a qualifying mechanism for a further 5 teams to qualify annually based on achievements in the prior season. In response, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) issued a joint statement with the relevant English, Italian and Spanish football leagues stating that “The clubs concerned will be banned from playing in any other competition at domestic, European or world level, and their players could be denied the opportunity to represent their national teams. We thank those clubs in other countries, especially the French and German clubs, who have refused to sign up to this. We call on all lovers of football, supporters and politicians, to join us in fghting against such a project if it were to be announced. This persistent self-interest of a few has been going on for too long. Enough is enough.” French President Emmanuel Macron declared his opposition, as per a statement released by the Élysée Palace, “The President of the Republic welcomes the position of French clubs to refuse to participate in a European football

24

Governance in football

Super League project threatening the principle of solidarity and sporting merit.” Similarly, English Prime Minister Boris Johnson stated, “Plans for a European Super League would be very damaging for football and we support football authorities in taking action. They would strike at the heart of the domestic game, and will concern fans across the country. The clubs involved must answer to their fans and the wider footballing community before taking any further steps.”39 The Premier League also issued a statement, The Premier League condemns any proposal that attacks the principles of open competition and sporting merit which are at the heart of the domestic and European football pyramid. Fans of any club in England and across Europe can currently dream that their team may climb to the top and play against the best. We believe that the concept of a European Super League would destroy this dream. The Premier League is proud to run a competitive and compelling football competition that has made it the most widely watched league in the world. Our success has enabled us to make an unrivalled fnancial contribution to the domestic football pyramid. A European Super League will undermine the appeal of the whole game, and have a deeply damaging impact on the immediate and future prospects of the Premier League and its member clubs, and all those in football who rely on our funding and solidarity to prosper. We will work with fans, The FA, EFL, PFA and LMA, as well as other stakeholders, at home and abroad, to defend the integrity and future prospects of English football in the best interests of the game.40 The Guardian, a British daily newspaper, brought to light an unpublished document only available in the hidden code of The Superleague website. The document revealed that the European Super League would produce the necessary grounds for “a sustainable and competitive environment for the whole football pyramid” and exposed the overconfdence, if not arrogance, of its founders, stressing that Unanimity of view is rarely the case where fundamental change is involved. We welcome this debate as sport is all about passion and differences of opinion are an essential part of being a fan. But in the end, we are confdent that when fans are welcomed back into the stadiums and the frst Super League matches are played, fans will enjoy the greatest competition club football has ever seen. Emphasising the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the everaccelerating developments in technology, it stressed that The value of live media rights is stagnating or declining as some of our competitions fail to meet the needs of fans and new generations seek

Governance in football

25

entertainment in ways which didn’t exist 10 years ago. The weaknesses in the foundations of football have been known for many years, Covid simply exposed their severity and none of the game’s stakeholders have come up with a solution. Inaction is no longer an option. The document also highlighted four guiding principles of the breakaway league: “Our aim is to deliver to fans the best football possible while providing access for qualifying clubs to ensure the vibrancy of the competition and to maintain a strong commitment to the principle of sporting merit,” with “affordable ticket prices,” and “reinvestment into the football pyramid via ongoing and substantial solidarity payments.” Those “Super League solidarity payments will grow automatically with overall league revenues and will be more than three times higher than payments coming from the current European championship.” Furthermore, “The new Super League has been designed around the principle of maintaining strong and vibrant local leagues and we will continue to compete each weekend in our national competitions as we always have.” And, fnally, The Super League ownership and governance structure is designed to allow us to rapidly adopt and incorporate new ideas into the competition. Whether it’s changes in live match distribution formats, technology-enhanced rule implementation or player development, we can no longer rely on external bodies to drive progress in these areas. Ultimately, the document revealed, It is a new format that will sustain the drama, passion and most importantly, the unpredictability that is the lifeblood of our sport. We believe it will be the most dynamic and competitive sports league in the world. At its heart, this is a comprehensive solution to the critical issues facing the sport. It starts with the fans of the game, giving them what they want and deserve; the best players and the world’s top clubs competing with each other throughout the year.41 Both the European Super League and the Guardian’s discovery reveal the strong sense of elitism of the 12 football clubs involved, for the ambitious project disregarded the values of the popular game, while also failing to take into account the likely response from UEFA, national associations, other clubs, and fans. Within 48 hours, the ambitious European Super League plan collapsed. Boris Johnson threatened to take legislative action against the six breakaway Premier League clubs, Emmanuel Macron publicly supported Paris Saint-Germain’s decision not to join, while Germany’s top two clubs, Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund, reportedly dismissed the idea. Though it

26

Governance in football

seems as if fans mobilised politicians across Europe to denounce the breakaway league, it was the Super League founders’ ill organisation who failed to realise that taking away the popular game from the fans – particularly amidst a global pandemic that had already forced fans away from physically attending football matches – contextualised the emerging threat. In Britain, the government even considered amending legislation such as the Broadcasting Act 1996, which allows the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport the power to draw up a list of sporting events of national interest. This means that the broadcast rights to these events must be offered to the main free-to-air terrestrial broad-casters on “fair and reasonable terms.”42 The governments of Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, too, pledged their support to national leagues and UEFA. FIFA, however, seemingly held a very different view of developments in European football. Certain European Super League documents, copies of which were reviewed by The New York Times, refer to the need for the Super League founders to strike an agreement with an entity obliquely labelled W01 but easily identifable as FIFA, soccer’s global governing body. That agreement, the documents said, was “an essential condition for the implementation of the SL project.” Probably, W01 stood for football’s world governing body, or else World Number One. FIFA publicly condemned the European Super League, yet it appears that it had at least prior knowledge in private meetings with club offcials. Evidently, The Super League’s discussions with FIFA began in 2019. They were led by a group known as A22, a consortium of advisers headed by the Spainbased fnanciers Anas Laghrari and John Hahn and charged with putting together the Super League project. A22 offcials held meetings with some of Infantino’s closest aides, including FIFA’s deputy secretary general, Mattias Grafstrom.43 Eager to gain FIFA’s support, A22 suggested that FIFA set up an annual World Cup designed for clubs with the participation of the majority of the European Super League permanent members (clubs) with all revenue ending up in FIFA accounts (at an estimated $1 billion per year). FIFA had previously warned that it would ban players from national teams should they take part in an unsanctioned football league, thus the need to gain its approval. That FIFA had expanded the number of teams participating in the World

Governance in football

27

Cup and the Club World Cup was an indication perhaps of FIFA’s economic ambitions and interests. Such was FIFA’s position that JPMorgan Chase, an American investment bank, agreed to fnance the European Super League. On January 21, 2021, only a few months before the announcement of the European Super League on April 18, a joint statement by FIFA and the six regional confederations read: In light of recent media speculation about the creation of a closed European “Super League” by some European clubs, FIFA and the six confederations (AFC, CAF, Concacaf, CONMEBOL, OFC and UEFA) once again would like to reiterate and strongly emphasise that such a competition would not be recognised by either FIFA or the respective confederation. Any club or player involved in such a competition would as a consequence not be allowed to participate in any competition organised by FIFA or their respective confederation. As per the FIFA and confederations statutes, all competitions should be organised or recognised by the relevant body at their respective level, by FIFA at the global level and by the confederations at the continental level. In this respect, the confederations recognise the FIFA Club World Cup, in its current and new format, as the only worldwide club competition while FIFA recognises the club competitions organised by the confederations as the only club continental competitions. The universal principles of sporting merit, solidarity, promotion and relegation, and subsidiarity are the foundation of the football pyramid that ensures football’s global success and are, as such, enshrined in the FIFA and confederation statutes. Football has a long and successful history thanks to these principles. Participation in global and continental competitions should always be won on the pitch.44 Yet FIFA’s condemnation of the European Super League sent mixed messages: In view of several media requests and as already stated several times, FIFA wishes to clarify that it stands frm in favour of solidarity in football and an equitable redistribution model which can help develop football as a sport, particularly at global level, since the development of global football is the primary mission of FIFA. In our view, and in accordance with our statutes, any football competition, whether national, regional or global, should always refect the core principles of solidarity, inclusivity, integrity and equitable fnancial redistribution. Moreover, the governing bodies of football should employ all lawful, sporting and diplomatic means to ensure this remains the case. Against this background, FIFA can only express its disapproval to a “closed European breakaway league” outside of the international football structures and not respecting the aforementioned principles.

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Governance in football

FIFA always stands for unity in world football and calls on all parties involved in heated discussions to engage in calm, constructive and balanced dialogue for the good of the game and in the spirit of solidarity and fair play. FIFA will, of course, do whatever is necessary to contribute to a harmonised way forward in the overall interests of football.45 FIFA was against a ‘closed competition,’ yet the European Super League was about 15 permanent members and 5 new clubs qualifying for elite football every season – an open competition. Interestingly, a ‘closed competition’ is the usual format for national leagues in the United States, with Manchester United being owned by the Glazer family, Liverpool partly owned by the American investor John Henry, and Arsenal owned by the American realestate tycoon Stan Kroenke. Soon after, Chelsea would change hands from Roman Abramovich to a consortium led by Los Angeles Dodgers part-owner Todd Boehly, backed by investment frm Clearlake Capital. The European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education adopted a report by 29 votes to 1 and 1 abstention, stressing that, MEPs want the EU to shape the European sports culture in accordance with EU values of solidarity, sustainability, inclusiveness, open competition, and fairness. MEPs express strong opposition to “breakaway competitions that undermine these standards and endanger the stability of the overall sports ecosystem”. Respect of values in sports MEPs are asking for a balance to be struck between professional sport’s commercial interests with its social functions, to be achieved by strengthening links between the grassroots level and elite sport. For instance, sports federations should establish a solidarity mechanism to channel funds into amateur and grassroots sport. MEPs also want to tackle gender inequality in sports, in particular when it comes to pay and equal representation on the boards of sports organisations, and want European media to ensure more equal coverage of men’s and women’s sporting events. Countries whose governments repeatedly violate fundamental rights and values should no longer be able to host major sporting events. Member states and sports federations should also take into account human rights and democracy when choosing sponsors for sporting events.46 A month later the European Parliament voiced its concerns offcially, with 597 votes to 36 and 55 abstentions, stating, MEPs say they want European sporting culture to be aligned with EU values of solidarity, sustainability, inclusiveness for all, open competition, sporting merit and fairness. Parliament strongly opposes “breakaway

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competitions” that undermine these principles and endanger the stability of the overall sports ecosystem. Building the European model from bottom up MEPs want a balance to be struck between professional sport’s commercial interests and its social functions, by strengthening the links between grassroots and elite sport. They call for more fnancial redistribution between professional and grassroots sport and propose the creation of a solidarity mechanism by sports federations to ensure adequate funding of amateur and grassroots sport. Parliament wants the Commission and member states to do their utmost to encourage physical activity among EU citizens, especially young people of all backgrounds, by increasing the number of hours allotted to physical education and activities in schools and via the use of role models and sport ambassadors. Ensuring safe and equal sport MEPs also want to address gender inequality and harassment in sports, in particular when it comes to pay and equal representation on the boards of sports organisations, and they want European media to give more coverage to a wider range of sports and in particular women’s and youth sports. Today’s text also demands the safeguarding of children from abuse and harassment in sports including by providing access to help, advice, and timely protection. Furthermore, national sports federations should level premium payments for female and male athletes, following the example of the Football Association of Ireland, according to Parliament. Uphold human rights and democratic principles The resolution urges public authorities, sports federations and organisations to uphold human rights and democratic principles in all of their actions, especially when awarding countries host status for major sporting events, and in their choice of sponsors. MEPs insist countries whose governments repeatedly violate fundamental rights and values should no longer be able to host major sporting events.47 That the European Parliament dismissed the elitist approach to sport of a dozen European football clubs is hardly surprising, for the announcement of the European Super League was not compatible with the ethos and values of the European Union. In essence, the European Super League was clearly prepared to violate three of European football’s guiding principles: First, the different levels of the domestic game are connected to each other through the logic of promotion and relegation, meaning that the

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teams performing worst in a given league will have to compete one tier lower in the subsequent year, and the other way around. Second, a level of fnancial redistribution is built into the competition both between clubs participating in the same competition and between the higher and lower tiers of the football pyramid; this is to prevent stratifcation and enhance competition. Third, the teams that fnish in the top positions of the domestic league qualify for European football, in which the best teams of each of the associated national leagues compete against each other. The number of places available for European football varies from one national league to another, depending on the performances of the clubs from those leagues in European competitions in the previous years. European football itself, is, once again, hierarchically organised, with the UEFA Champions League being the top tier for which only the best teams qualify, followed by the Europa League and the Conference League.48 What is surprising, nevertheless, is the fact that among those 12 clubs some were no longer part of the European football elite. At the time, Tottenham Hotspur, undeniably the worst performer of all, last won a league title in 1961, a domestic cup in 1991, and a continental competition in 1984. Likewise, AC Milan last won a league title in 2011, a domestic cup in 2003, and a continental competition in 2007; Arsenal last won a league title in 2004 and a continental competition in 1994; Internazionale Milano last won a league title in 2010, a domestic cup in 2011, and a continental competition in 2010; Liverpool last won a league title in 2020, after a 30-year drought, and a domestic cup in 2006; and Manchester United last won a league title in 2013. Only the remaining half of the clubs that promoted elitism in European football performed more consistently in their domestic league, cup competitions, and continental football, therefore, raising serious questions about the integrity of the European Super League project and the interests of the clubs involved. As a fnal note, during the 2022–2023 UEFA Champions League competition, Barcelona and Juventus failed to qualify for the round of 16 and were relegated to the Europa League instead, while Atlético Madrid was eliminated from all European competitions after having fnished bottom of Group B. European football, and world football more generally, necessitate more democracy. The German model of football genuinely offers a decent point of departure for football’s reform. The statutes of the Deutsche Fußball Liga, German Football League, stipulate under Section 8 (Acquisition and end of membership) paragraph 3 that: A Corporation can only acquire a license for the Leagues and therefore membership of DFL e.V. if an association has a majority share in the Corporation, has its own football department and has qualifed to participate in a League at the time in which the Corporation applies for a license

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for the frst time. The association (‘Parent Association’, ‘Mutterverein’) must be legally independent within the meaning of section 8 No. 2. The Parent Association is deemed to have a majority share in the corporation (‘Corporation’) if it has over 50% of the votes plus at least another share of votes in the assembly of the shareholders.49 The so-called ‘50+1 rule’ was introduced in 1998 aiming to transfer majority control to fans ensuring that 50% of the voting shares, plus one, be held by the parent club. Other than the greater involvement of fans in the operation of clubs, the application of this rule has protected the interests of German football clubs from disputable foreign owners and, most importantly to the fans, affordable match tickets. Critics of the ‘50+1 rule’ argue that discouraging foreign investment has rendered German clubs less competitive in continental competitions; however, the Bundeskartellamt, the independent competition authority,  not only concluded in 2021 that the ‘50+1 rule’ did not violate competition law but also condemned any exemptions from the rule. As already mentioned, the Fan Led Review of Football Governance in England was launched in response to three crises, two of which were directly related to football – the collapse of Bury Football Club and the European Super League. Chapter 5 (Corporate Governance) of the review notes Communication as one of the fve principles a Football Code should be based on and recommended that “Clubs shall be transparent and accountable, engaging effectively with stakeholders and nurturing internal democracy.”50 In terms of Improving Club Supporter Engagement Standards, Chapter 7 (Improving Supporter Engagement) of the review suggested that clubs should set up Shadow Boards to allow for effective consultation and increased transparency, consisting of 5–12 members “appointed according to a democratic process.”51 Chapter 8 (Protecting Club Heritage) of the review stated that “It should be a licence condition that all licenced clubs should include within their articles of association a Golden Share requiring democratic consent to proposed actions relating to identifed heritage items.” The Golden Share should be held by a fan representative body that must “operate on a democratic one-member-one-vote basis”;52 therefore, “any decision to consent (or not) to a proposal relating to Golden Share items should be subject to a democratic fan vote.”53 Regrettably, the 162-page long document only mentioned these many times the word ‘democracy’ or any of its derivatives. Focusing more on the fnancial aspects of football’s future reform, the Government Response to the Fan Led Review of Football Governance (April 2022) makes no specifc reference to the need to democratise the game of football, though it stresses the signifcance of diversity, equality, and inclusion, also highlighted by the Review. An interesting issue to raise here is the fact that the current Premier League’s Owners’ and Directors’ Test – applied to prospective owners and directors, who are then subject to a review on a seasonal basis – does not refer to human rights.54

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Perhaps in England, and most other nations around the world without much doubt, football is no longer associated with the concept of democracy. When Oliver Dowden, Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, was stating that “Season after season, year after year, football fans demonstrate unwavering loyalty and passion by sticking by their clubs. But their loyalty is being abused by a small number of individuals who wield an incredible amount of power and infuence,”55 he was, in fact, saying that those few individuals chairing clubs at the very top of the game’s pyramid had turned the governing of football into an autocracy. On one occasion, such an individual was later sanctioned by the government in Westminster for his links to Vladimir Putin’s government in Russia. All in all, the impact of the European Super League could have irreparable consequences for the national football leagues in Europe, as well as European competitions, since it would irreversibly affect the competitive balance, with ESL clubs each earning hundreds of millions more on a yearly basis than their domestic competitors, and, in addition, lower the income from the sale of domestic broadcasting rights. On the European level, it would deprive competitions from some of their most successful teams, and affect the public interest as well as revenue generation.56 Indeed, a European Super League would have devastated football. Conclusion The International Football Association Board argued that they “serve the entire global football community, voice its views and amend the Laws of the Game accordingly, in a democratic way”57 (emphasis added). Comprising the fve founding members (The Football Association, the Football Association of Wales, the Irish Football Association, and the Scottish Football Association) and FIFA, the International Football Association Board “is the universal decision-making body for the Laws of the Game of association football,” “has no political or religious affliation,”58 and “is committed to respecting and promoting the protection of all internationally recognised human rights.”59 The democratic character of football becomes more evident in the opening paragraph of the Laws of the Game: Football is the greatest sport on earth. It is played on every continent, in every country and at many different levels. The fact that the Laws of the Game are the same for all football throughout the world, from the FIFA World Cup through to a game between young children in a remote village, is a considerable strength which must continue to be harnessed for

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the good of football everywhere. Football must have Laws which keep the game fair.60 The apparent simplicity of the game in combination with the universality of the rules that defne it render the association of democracy with football imperative. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln’s famous saying on democracy, “football is the game of the people, by the people, for the people,” and, therefore, warrants all the principles inherent in democracy – transparency, accountability, and equality. Yet football’s governing bodies, despite electing their top offcials, are anything but democratic. The opening line of the 2016 FIFA Reform Committee’s report states, “FIFA is currently going through the worst crisis of its history. […] in order to restore confdence in FIFA, signifcant modifcations to its institutional structure and operational processes are necessary […] to make the organisation more transparent and accountable.”61 The committee comprised representatives from the six regional confederations and was headed by an independent chairman, François Carrard, former director-general of the International Olympic Committee. Stressing the need for “serious organisational and cultural reform,”62 the report noted that the election of the President and FIFA Council Member should be limited to three terms of four years for a maximum of 12 years, whether consecutive or not, and highlighted the signifcance of “the Statutes of FIFA members and of the Confederations” to include “provisions in order to guarantee, amongst other matters, […] respect for the principles of representative democracy.”63 The Reform Committee also stated that “a key element in the overall reform process concerns a wider level of ‘participation’ in FIFA at all levels. Wider participation promotes both democracy and transparency and will also help FIFA to modernize itself and to face future challenges.”64 Although the reform process was launched at the 2016 FIFA Congress, the Reform Committee was convinced that “FIFA has a long road ahead”; indeed, a mere update of the relevant FIFA Statutes would not suffce for instilling the principles of good governance and democracy. Notes 1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Participatory Development and Good Governance, Paris: OECD, 1995, 14. 2 United Nations Development Programme, Governance for Sustainable Human Development, UNDP Policy Document, New York, 1997, 5. 3 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Policy Paper, Government Response to the Fan-Led Review of Football Governance, https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/government-response-to-the-fan-led-review-of-football -governance/government-response-to-the-fan-led-review-of-football-governance, 25 April 2022.

34 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Governance in football FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 11. FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 15. FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 19. FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 23. FIFA, FIFA again among the International Federations with the Best Governance Standards, https://www.ffa.com/about-ffa/organisation/news/ffa-again-among -the-international-federations-with-the-best-governance, 28 June 2022. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Fourth Review of International Federation Governance, June 2022, 19. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Fourth Review of International Federation Governance, June 2022, 28. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Fourth Review of International Federation Governance, June 2022, 32. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Fourth Review of International Federation Governance, June 2022, 34. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Fourth Review of International Federation Governance, June 2022, 36. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Fourth Review of International Federation Governance, June 2022, 37. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 7. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 8–10. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 11. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 59. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 13–14. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 14. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 16–17. FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 28. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 21. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 23. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 25. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 27. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 32. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 33. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 35. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 36. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 46. FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 52. FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 58. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 48. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 51. FIFA, FIFA Governance Regulations, 2020, 55. Lloyd Freeburn, “The Fiction of Democracy in FIFA’s Governance of Football and the Case of Football Federation Australia,” The International Sports Law Journal, 19: 2, 184–204, 2019, 187. The Super League, Leading European, Football Clubs Announce New Super League Competition, Press Release, https://thesuperleague.com/press.html, 19 April 2021. France24, Twelve European Football Clubs Launch Super League Despite Wave of Criticism, https://www.france24.com/en/sport/20210418-twelve-major-european-football-clubs-launch-plans-to-join-super-league, 19 April 2021. Premier League, Premier League Condemns European Super League Proposal, https://www.premierleague.com/news/2109307?sf245072445=1, 18 April 2021.

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41 The Guardian, Revealed: Unpublished Super League Document Justifying Breakaway, by Sean Ingle, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2021/apr/19 /revealed-unpublished-super-league-document-justifying-breakaway, 19 April 2021. 42 Ali Walker, David M. Herszenhorn, and Emilio Casalicchio, The Fall and Fall of Football’s Super League, https://www.politico.eu/article/european-super-league -football-collapse-inside-story-boris-johnson-emmanuel-macron/, 23 April 2021. 43 The New York Times, The Super League Thought It Had a Silent Partner: FIFA, by Tariq Panja, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/sports/soccer/super -league-ffa-infantino.html, 20 May 2021. 44 FIFA, Statement by FIFA and the Six Confederations, https://www.ffa.com/ about-ffa/associations/news/statement-by-ffa-and-the-six-confederations, 21 January 2021. 45 FIFA, FIFA Statement, https://www.ffa.com/about-ffa/organisation/media -releases/ffa-statement-x3487, 19 April 2021. 46 European Parliament, MEPs Oppose “Breakaway Competitions” and Call for Values-Based EU Sports Model, Press Releases, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ news/en/press-room/20211025IPR15717/meps-oppose-breakaway-competitions -and-call-for-values-based-eu-sports-model, 26 October 2021. 47 European Parliament, MEPs Ask for Values-Based EU Sports Model and Oppose “Breakaway Competitions”, Press Releases, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ news/en/press-room/20211118IPR17621/meps-ask-for-values-based-eu-sports -model-and-oppose-breakaway-competitions, 23 November 2021. 48 Floris De Witte, and Jan Zglinski, “The Idea of Europe in Football,” European Law Open, 1: 2, 286–315, 2022, 288. 49 Deutsche Fußball Liga e.V., Statutes, Statutes of DFL Deutsche Fußball Liga e.V. effective as of 21 August 2019, https://media.df.de/sites/2/2020/03/Statutes-of -DFL-Deutsche-Fu%C3%9Fball-Liga-e.V.-effective-as-of-21-August-2019.pdf. 50 Tracey Crouch, Fan Led Review of Football Governance, November 2021, 79. 51 Tracey Crouch, Fan Led Review of Football Governance, November 2021, 93. 52 Tracey Crouch, Fan Led Review of Football Governance, November 2021, 101. 53 Tracey Crouch, Fan Led Review of Football Governance, November 2021, 102. 54 John Woodhouse, Research Briefng, Football Governance: Time for Change? House of Commons Library, 12 May 2022, 9. 55 Tracey Crouch, Fan Led Review of Football Governance, November 2021, 13. 56 Floris De Witte, and Jan Zglinski, “The Idea of Europe in Football,” European Law Open, 1: 2, 286–315, 2022, 289. 57 IFAB, The IFAB background, https://www.theifab.com/background/. 58 IFAB, The IFAB Statutes, Version 6–13 June 2022, 2. 59 IFAB, The IFAB Statutes, Version 6–13 June 2022, 11. 60 IFAB, Laws of the Game 2022/23, 2022, 11. 61 FIFA, 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, 1. 62 FIFA, 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, 4. 63 FIFA, 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, 8. 64 FIFA, 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Report, 2 December 2015, 9.

Chapter 2

Culture in football

Introduction Culture helps shape a distinct sense of perception among members of a particular group. The role of a state’s institutions is instrumental in shaping culture, therefore, those controlling such institutions not only have the power to distinguish between insiders (Us) and outsiders (Them, the Other), but also to decide on how insiders are socialised as per society’s norms and values. Culture is not a product of the shared experiences of all group members in their entirety, not even most group members. Historically, culture has more often been constructed by the group’s elite members – those in positions of power – and the intelligentsia, all predominantly male, before it is communicated through everyday dialogue and interaction among group members. It is through this internal form of dialogue and interaction that culture is continually negotiated and transmitted anew among group members, without unwarranted intervention from external factors. Against this background, the culture of football is examined herein through the lens of political culture. Football culture has long attracted the attention of scholars, yet it continues to evade an acceptable defnition. The universality of the popular game suggests that football has been ingrained in culture, but the many different cultural settings across the world clearly indicate that the game of football maintains multiple different characteristics from one nation to another. The degree of violence witnessed in South American football, for example, contradicts the more festive atmosphere of North American football, just as the two North American national associations are the only two governing bodies referring to the game as soccer. Such cultural differences are very likely to impact on identity too, thus the need to examine football’s culture and identity within the context of political science. Hence, this chapter explores matters relating to culture and identity, two interrelated terms that have long attracted the attention of scholars devoted to the study of both political science and football. Within political science, political culture has gained signifcance over the years for it assesses those perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of the citizenry that help construct a certain political reality. Football culture,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-3

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by the same token, is about the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of football fans, thus allowing suffcient room to examine the culture of the popular game against the theoretical background of political culture. Within this context, identity in political science and football are also discussed here in order to establish their signifcance in the game of football. The culture of politics (and football) Political culture The political morals, attitudes, and principles shared among group members defne the relationship between citizens and state and, therefore, determine how power and authority are exercised. Likewise, how people living together are governed is established through the process of political socialisation, thus constantly generating politically defned cultural perceptions pertaining not only to power and authority, but also their legality and authenticity. Political socialisation, generally, defnes those ideas that dominate the political perceptions of the citizenry. The role of citizens, the people designated to decision-making processes, what purpose government serves and how it operates are all integral to political socialisation. In turn, the main themes of political socialisation aim at preserving the prevailing structure of power and hierarchy of authority, or else the political culture. Through political socialisation, citizens acquire all pertinent political values and beliefs inherent in the political system under which society operates. It is a never-ending process transferring a political system’s ideals to every citizen who, in turn, becomes affliated with political institutions and conventions, thus integrating with the political culture of the society. Preserving the signifcance of political socialisation are the family and surrounding social environment, education, the media, religion, and, of course, political parties and similar agents. As society is in a constant state of fux, the process of political socialisation must absorb all necessary adaptations for political culture to retain its signifcance and maintain political stability. In the absence of a durable political culture, however, revolutions may occur to challenge the existing status quo. The main functions of a political system concern the input and output processes. The input process relates to how citizens communicate their needs and interests to the government and how the latter responds through policymaking. The output process, on the other hand, denotes the functions of government agencies and related political institutions assigned with the role of implementing the government’s decisions. Hence, the role of citizens, whether active or passive, is instrumental in the formulation of government policies and the well-functioning of the political system. However, political culture is not concerned with politics as such, but with how citizens perceive politics. It is a state of mind, an internalised perception of political affairs, refected in political activities and events. Shaping political culture are history, the workings of government, the mode of economy, and the political realities dictating

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society’s norms. For this reason, different countries maintain different political systems and institutions that have developed equally different political cultures and just as adopting another country’s political system and institutions should not suggest that they will function in the very same manner, the political culture of one nation may be wholly incompatible to that of another for it refects political history. Besides, political culture cannot be inherited, it is constructed through a particular learning process where the citizen internalises political values and beliefs. What is also important is the fact that the political culture of those in leadership positions may vary signifcantly when compared to the political culture of the rest of society. Political culture “is potentially a powerful, unifying concept of political science.”1 The concept of political culture was frst employed by Gabriel Almond (1956), defned as the “particular pattern of orientations to political action,” before it was properly developed by Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture (1963) to serve as a valuable tool for understanding the intricate relationship between people and political systems, though limited to the examination of mass political opinion. A slight departure from the original defnition, Almond and Vera stated that “The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation,”2 such objects including traditions, historical memories, and symbols. The two authors promoted the idea that a civic culture – whereby politically aware and informed citizens interact with one another, as well as with politicians, while also participating in most facets of political life, certainly voting in elections – has the necessary properties to advance liberal democracy. Robert Putnam’s The Beliefs of Politicians (1973), on the other hand, investigated the signifcance of elite political opinion and the infuence of professional politicians over the construction and consumption of political beliefs. Putnam argued that “Some people are much more interested, much more involved, and much more infuential in public affairs than their fellows”; therefore, elite political culture is defned as “the set of politically relevant beliefs, values, and habits of the leaders of a political system.”3 In the context of mass political culture, Almond and Verba classifed political culture into three types, namely, participant political culture, subject political culture, and parochial political culture. In a participant political culture, citizens are aware of their political rights and duties, have an active role in all political matters, and are active members of the political system, thus enhancing the participatory nature of politics, especially in democracy. This type of political culture is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes: in other words, to both the input and output aspects of the political system. Individual members of the participant

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polity may be favourably or unfavourably oriented to the various classes of political objects. They tend to be oriented toward an “activist” role of the self in the polity.4 Participant political culture denotes a high degree of citizen involvement in political affairs. Naturally, any such involvement would necessitate an equally high degree of political awareness, or else participation would not be feasible. Yet its most signifcant characteristic is the citizens’ propensity to develop a strong sense of political acuteness that helps them question government decisions – obviously restricted to democracy alone. In the context of football, this type of culture was refected in the European Super League debacle, when the announcement of twelve football clubs planning to set up a privileged breakaway league was halted by fan demonstrations (see previous chapter). In England, Italy, and Spain, thousands of fans supporting the football clubs involved protested the European Super League and staged demonstrations, forcing most club owners to withdraw from the competition and apologise for failing to consider the fans and football’s precarious position amidst the pandemic. Today, only Juventus Football Club, Futbol Club Barcelona, and Real Madrid Club de Fútbol continue to support the idea of a European Super League. In a subject of political culture, citizens maintain their signifcant role and are aware of how the political system operates, yet their participation is more limited – certainly not as active as in the participant political culture – and are prepared to accept most state decisions without necessarily challenging them. In the second type of political culture there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifcally input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero. The subject is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general level, and toward the output, administrative, or “downward fow” side of the political system; it is essentially a passive relationship.5 This type of political culture refers to citizens that are familiar with the political system and the mechanics of the government. Yet their participation in politics is limited for they remain passive, subject, towards government decisions. Subject political culture usually refects how authoritarian regimes operate, since government decisions are rarely challenged or disputed by the general public. In terms of football, this type of culture refects the relationship between football’s world governing body and the member associations in FIFA’s decision to award Qatar the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Allegations of

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corruption and bribery were cleared by FIFA’s independent ethics adjudicator in November 2014, nonetheless, it cannot be overlooked that of the 22 Fifa executive committee members who voted on that fateful day 12 years ago, with two other offcials already suspended at the time after a newspaper expose that alleged the pair had asked for cash in return for World Cup votes, most have since been accused, banned or indicted over allegations of corruption and wrongdoing. As recently as 2020 – as part of the FBI’s vast corruption probe into the governing body – US prosecutors accused three former senior Fifa offcials of receiving bribes for voting in favour of Qatar.6 National football associations should have challenged Qatar’s bid over issues relating to human rights, but decided against voicing any concerns – only recently were such issues raised (see Chapter 6). Finally, in a parochial political culture citizens have little political awareness, are almost indifferent to political affairs, and express no interest in participating in politics. This type of political culture implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing from the political system. […] Even larger-scale and more differentiated polities, however, may have predominantly parochial culture. But relatively pure parochialism is likely to occur in simpler traditional systems where political specialization is minimal. Parochialism in more differentiated political systems is likely to be affective and normative rather than cognitive.7 Indifferent to political affairs and lacking any sense of political participation, citizens are distanced from the political system and, therefore, have no expectations. While rare for a democracy, this type of political culture is witnessed in rural communities, particularly, when geographically located away from the capital, or else the centre of power. In the case of football, this type of culture refects the disturbing phenomenon of hooliganism, as fans inclined to violence demonstrate little sympathy for the game’s socio-cultural qualities and prefer instead to articulate their anti-social behaviour through aggressive behaviour. At the same time, despite the fact that hooliganism has damaged the reputation of football, state and football’s authorities appear reluctant, if not complicit, in tackling football violence with effect. In terms of elite culture in football, on the other hand, the world governing body that is FIFA has long been accused of corruption in awarding international tournaments to inappropriate hosts, a lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making, and indifference in tackling social issues such as racism, sexism, and homophobia. More interested in generating proft, perhaps, FIFA has never seriously become engaged with the anti-social

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phenomena that blemish football fearful of attracting unwelcome attention to the ugly side of the popular game and jeopardise fnancial returns from its prestigious competitions. FIFA’s letter to the 32 competing nations in the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar (see Chapter 6) is clear evidence that the world governing body has no intention of employing football as a tool to address social and political issues across the world. Taking the moral high ground in remaining “neutral in matters of politics,”8 despite the “many challenges and diffculties of a political nature all around the world,” FIFA requested that football is not “dragged into every ideological or political battle that exists” for “No one people or culture or nation is ‘better’ than any other,”9 thus effectively dismissing all claims relating to human rights violations at the host country of Qatar, while also making reference to the perceived cultural imperialism demonstrated by a number of Western states participating in the World Cup. Symbols in political science (and football) Another conceptual scheme denoting political culture relates to political symbolism. The pioneering work of Thurman Arnold (The Symbols of Government, 1962) and Murray Edelman (The Symbolic Uses of Politics, 1964), among others, introduced the analysis of symbols into political science and, therefore, facilitated the quest for defning political culture from a different perspective. Questioning “What is it about political culture that is inherently ‘cultural’,” Lowell Dittmer’s answer was “political symbolism.”10 The study of symbols in political science, or else political symbolism, Dittmer argued, is best “understood as a semiological system” (original emphasis), for “political culture is a system of political symbols.”11 Symbols, as an expression of culture, are subject to the necessary decoding for revealing all meanings for “If symbols had one meaning, social scientists would not have to interpret them and politicians could not fght over them.”12 Interestingly, “most anthropologists distinguish symbols from signs. Both symbols and signs communicate information through images, words, and behaviours. Signs, however, have only one possible meaning, whereas symbols, by defnition, convey multiple levels of meaning at the same time.”13 In line with the discussion on heraldry (see Chapter 4), therefore, an analysis on symbolism is imperative. As Pål Kolstø argues, “Symbol politics is more about politics than about symbols.”14 Yet any assessment of a symbol ought to be properly contextualised for The meaning of symbols is arbitrary. That is, the meaning of a particular symbol is culturally assigned rather than inherent in the symbol. Still, there is a kind of apparently logical association between a symbol and its referent, the thing it represents.15 Given the signifcance of power in political science, an association between power and symbols is essential in establishing a pattern of orientation with

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political culture. Émile Durkheim noted that “symbolic systems defne the source of power. For Durkheim, power arises from social forces, the invisible power of social groups to compel, coerce, and shape the destinies of their members.”16 Along similar lines, Talcott Parsons argued that leading a community to common goals implies the following: establishing the goals; making them known; sharing them within the community (mainly through symbolic mediation); choosing means, rules, and intermediate goals; designating a leader or a leading group; obliging everyone in the community to follow it; negotiating and possibly fghting with foreigners; and so on. Each of these activities requires the construction and communication of shared meanings.17 That symbols have the capacity to communicate meanings, nevertheless, is a clear indication that symbols also have the properties to “exclude as well as include. The same symbols that promote multiple levels of communication and a sense of community within a group can send a powerful message of exclusion to outsiders. In many cases, that can lead to violence.”18 Likewise, “Symbols mark group boundaries. Whenever it is necessary for one group or subgroup to live in close association with another, symbols can be covert means of asserting the status of one’s group vis-à-vis outsiders,”19 just as symbols “help subgroups to defne their own identity.”20 This discussion allows much room to examine football’s most signifcant symbol of all – the crest. The crest of The Football Association, founded in 1863 and based in England, is dominated by three lions, thus clearly signifying the greatness of Richard the Lionheart. Evidently, Richard’s heraldic red shield incorporated three golden lions to represent the kingdom of England. As such, this shield still appears on the Royal arms today (alongside Scottish and Irish emblems) which, since 1603, have been supported by a crowned lion and a unicorn. Given its origins, history and current use on the monarch’s arms, the English lion must be read politically as connotative of royalty in addition to its more overt communication of the qualities of power, bravery and courage. In a sporting context, too, the king of the beasts is often associated with English football. It has long been the emblem of the FA, for instance, and, as such, appears in triplicate on the shirts of the England national team. It is not altogether surprising, then, that the patriotic, royalist symbol of the lion should be so extensively employed as a metaphor by football journalists reporting the England team’s exploits.21 While hosting the 1996 UEFA European Championship, the ‘Three Lions’ song was released to celebrate the fact that ‘football’s coming home’ after

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‘thirty years of hurt’ since the 1966 FIFA World Cup was last hosted in England. During the 1996 UEFA European Championship, England fans waved an old fag in a new way. Until 1996, England fans had always used the red-and-white-and-blue Union Jack while the red-on-white fag of St. George was tainted by association with the far right. Now the English – as opposed to the British – took to St. George with relish.22 Interestingly, looking back to the crowd at the 1966 World Cup, barely any St. George crosses can be seen as the stands appear to be waving British Union fags. As late as Italia ’90 the balance between the two fags is half and half. But from 1997, as the devolution plans of the New Labour government took shape and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland all acquired a signifcant level of political autonomy, the Englishness of the football team rose in importance.23 Across the Atlantic Ocean, the crest of the US Soccer Federation refects the history of the American nation in its national colours. The crest is decorated with thirteen vertical stripes (seven red and six white stripes) representing the founding colonies, with the initials ‘USA’ (bold, in blue) on top of the stripes. According to the book Our Flag, published in 1988 by the House of Representatives, Charles Thompson, Secretary of the Continental Congress, reporting to Congress on the Seal, stated: “The colours of the pales (the vertical stripes) are those used in the fag of the United States of America; White signifes purity and innocence, Red, hardiness & valour, and Blue, the colour of the Chief (the broad band above the stripes) signifes vigilance, perseverance & justice.”24 Founded in 1913 as the United States Football Association, the original crest displayed the same number of vertical stripes in red and white, underneath a blue background that featured an equal number of white stars, thus denoting the fag of America, adopted on June 14, 1777. At club level, a common political symbol decorating the crest of several clubs playing football behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern European countries is the renowned ‘red star’ emblem. Featuring on the crests of Fotbal Club Steaua Bucureşti (Romania), CSKA Moscow (Russia), CSKA Sofa (Bulgaria), Fudbalski Klub Partizan and Fudbalski Klub Crvena Zvezda, better known as Red Star Belgrade (Serbia), and Klubi Futboll Partizani Tirana (Albania), to name a few, the red star has been a symbol of the Communist Party in Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The red star featured

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on the coat of arms of the former Soviet Union, as well as on the coat of arms of all its socialist republics. In Western Europe, Red Star Football Club is one of France’s oldest football clubs. Based in Paris, the club was founded as Red Star Club Français in 1897 by the legendary Jules Rimet, former president of both FIFA and the French Football Federation, and the one who inspired the World Cup. Clearly preceding the Bolshevik Revolution by a decade, the club’s crest was by no means inspired by the political events in Russia. Yet the club has always represented the local working class of the Saint-Ouen suburb in the north of Paris. The club’s connection with the left wing was cemented after Nazis executed former player Rino Della Negra during the second world war. Della Negra – a son of Italian immigrants who never played a competitive game for Red Star – was wounded and captured by the Germans in 1944 during an attack by the French Resistance. A member of the Manouchian Group – a network of communist freedom fghters named after the poet and activist Missak Manouchian–his fnal note to his brother contained the words: “Hello and goodbye to Red Star.” His story of struggle and ultimate sacrifce has become hugely symbolic to the club’s left-leaning fanbase.25 Today, Left-wing politicians nostalgic for Red Star’s heyday have long hoped that the team might bounce back and provide an alternative to PSG. Their aspirations for the club overlap with local political intrigue. Last year, a centre-right candidate snatched Saint-Ouen’s town hall, ending more than 50 years of communist rule.26 The signifcance of symbolism cannot be overestimated in the context of football. Borrowing from various accounts narrating football’s cultural manifestations will help develop a sound framework relating to football’s symbolic properties. “Football clubs are transformed into symbolic representatives in the everyday life of fans. Football clubs become a signifer and an extension of fans in their respective lifeworlds. Yet clubs are spaces not only for projection, but also of refection,” since “the club functions as both screen and mirror at the same time, throwing back the fan’s self-projection.”27 Indeed, a football club is “perceived – implicitly or explicitly – as an ideal metaphor for the collective universe in which one participates, and functions symbolically as an interweaving of the, often contradictory, projects proper to one’s life in society,”28 while “the football team thus presents itself as a symbol with a very high degree of hermeneutic plasticity, onto which individuals project, as a function of their life history, the most varied images of the ideal organisation of collective life.”29 Separating fans supporting different football clubs

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are “the outlandish outfts decorated by the colours of their favourite football team as identifable markers of a community of worshippers,”30 just as “the humble football shirt, one worn strictly by those on the feld, has certainly acquired iconic status.”31 Ultimately, football culture is local and municipal and for a supporter, whether or not he lives in the city of the team, the team colours are the most important symbol of his football faith, dominating any other symbol or cultural meaning such as nation, class or political party.32 All in all, The immediate or televised participation in football events, the communication of football knowledge and identifcation with a team, as well as playing the game – and in the case of youth, the dream of becoming a professional footballer – play an important role for millions of people across the globe, almost independently of where they live and in whatever conditions they live in. This makes football represent one of the central cultural and symbolic forms/expressions of modernity.33 Military terminology The game’s terminology, as employed by coaches, players, fans, journalists, and academics, often denotes a strong sense of militarism. Terms such as attack and defence, or captain, reserves, and scout are all used widely by the military. Even the infamous offside rule has its origins in military history, As an extension of that concept of “distance” it became a nineteenthcentury military reference to men who had strayed into no man’s land in battle, in advance of the front line of attack. Such soldiers were therefore effectively hors de combat, on the wrong side. Its adopted football sense is exactly the same.34 The ‘guard of honour,’ performed by a club’s players to welcome the league’s champions onto the feld, is a military practice reserved for honouring the soldiers that fall in war. Likewise, the ‘kop,’ part of the stands in stadiums across Britain, refers to the Battle of Spion Kop during the Second Boer War. From a different perspective, political (or politicised) symbols denoting militarism or referring to militant organisations have often been displayed by football fans in stadiums to express their political identity. In Europe, more dominant is the presence of symbols relating to Nazi Germany: the Swastika (offcial emblem of the National Socialist Party of Germany), Celtic Cross (a neo-Nazi symbol), the Ku Klux Klan emblem (a white cross in a red circle and a drop of blood in the epicentre), triskele (an angular design similar to the

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Swastika but with three arms), right white fst (symbol of the international white power movement), Cogwheel (symbol of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, a paramilitary organisation), hammer & sword (a symbol of the Hitler Youth in Nazi Germany), hammerskins (two crossed hammers symbolising the white working man), SS-Totenkopf Skull (symbol of the SS units during the Second World War), Reichskriegsfagge (war fag of both the German Empire and the German army during the times of National Socialism), Reichsadler (the Nazi Eagle), Confederate fag (of the American Civil War), a plethora of runes, and letter and number codes (e.g., 14 – the 14 words of the neoNazi slogan of David Lane, ‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children’; 18 and 88 – numbers matching letters of the alphabet (A and H) and thus representing Adolf Hitler and Heil Hitler). Country-specifc symbols include the: Bulgarian National Union, Bulgarian Nationalist Party, and Bulgarian National Resistance; Ustasha (symbol of the Croatian fascist movement); National Front, British National Party, and English Defence League; National Democratic Party of Germany, Die Identitären, and German Defence League; Golden Dawn (far-right party in Greece); Greater Hungary map, Kach or Kahane Chai, and Lehava (far-right parties in Israel); Tricolour Flame, Forza Nuova, and CasaPound (neo-fascism in Italy); Hand and Sword (symbol of the Falanga fascist organisation in Poland) and Toporzel (symbol of the fascist organisation Zadruga in Poland); Slavic Union (neo-Nazi paramilitary organisation in Russia), Soprotivlenie (far-right youth movement in Russia), Russian National Unity (a Russian paramilitary neo-Nazi organisation), and Wotan Jugend (neo-Nazi network in Russia); Chetniks (Serbian paramilitary nationalist movement); Alianza Nacional (national socialist party in Spain), Division Azul (Spanish volunteers who served in the armed forces of Nazi Germany), Falange (fascist organisation in Spain); and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and Waffen SS Galizien (symbol of the Nazi SS Volunteer Division Galizien fghting in Ukraine).35 The politics of identity The frst two articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights state: Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.36 Despite the much acclaimed universality of human rights, it is evident that even in the most advanced democracies of the world not everyone is equal or else there would be no room for the #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, or the

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civil rights movement. Social movements are, by defnition, designed to foster equality where dominant groups habitually oppress those marginalised due to their perceived superior identity. The multiple characteristics that defne a person – whether assumed or developed – relate to class, gender, national, personal, racial, religious, sexual, and social identities. Society, the state, and government institutions, however, cannot afford to cater to the needs of this many diverse identities, perhaps, they never intended to, since the more dominant groups continue to lend support to the political establishment. A clash of identities in modern society, therefore, has always been inevitable. Identity signifes who we are, but also who we think we are, as it is continuously developed with several factors affecting its formation. Experiences, perceptions, and observations help defne identity and, at the same time, illustrate the complexity of defning it. In political science, epitomising the complex nature of identity are political identity and identity politics. Political identity Instrumental in developing a political identity, as with political culture, is political socialisation. Starting from a very young age, children are slowly but surely introduced to politics, just as the American Psychological Association offers advice on how to talk to them about elections since they may need their parents’ “guidance to effectively manage their emotions, cope with friends who think differently than they do, and respond to comments they disagree with or fnd upsetting.”37 Political socialisation introduces one to a whole array of values, norms, and morals – consistent with political culture – that help develop appropriate beliefs and behaviours. It is the process whereby individuals come to comprehend the politically institutionalised framework of the surrounding community and how it is organised. Infuenced by a collection of perceptions derived from one’s own gender, nationality, race, religion, sexual orientation, and social status, political identity shapes the world around and determines whether a person qualifes for one group or another, thus triggering conficts in society as the many distinct political identities form movements that cause political mobilisation. To a certain extent, the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘political identity’ are quite similar in that they deliver answers to the same questions, nevertheless, the latter proposes an exclusively political perspective. As a concept, political identity is “associated with developmental and social psychology and appears in the developmental psychology literature as the creation of a self-concept and presentation of that concept to the outside world”38 and is focused on the individual and his or her internalization of a sense of self; political identity does take into account social interactions of the individual: the focus is on how individuals create their understanding of

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themselves and redefne themselves according to expectations from the outside world.39 Often dictated by the inherent characteristics of a certain community, political identity may either foster unity within a group of people or generate division, depending on the degree of the community’s homogeneity. Political identity is, predominantly, affected by politics and is, therefore, instrumental in political participation. In essence, The changing character of political affliations, societal cleavages and representative politics has given rise to a number of questions concerning political identity. […] political identity is not confned to institutionalized politics, but should rather cover a wider range of understandings of the political self.40 Depending on the context, political identity may gain more signifcance over other identities. For one, “party identity may become especially salient during the electoral period, when people discuss a politically sensitive issue, or when we confront ourselves with people who belong to different parties.” Apart from the context, “a given identity may also be more ‘chronically’ salient to the individual; this means that a given identity may be especially relevant to the individual’s self-defnition. As compared to other kinds of identity, political identity seems to be especially characterized by the need for expressing the group’s values in public and, more generally, for acting together in order to gain further consensus around these values.”41 Ultimately, it is political participation that defnes political identity for it refects political ideology, as formed (or experienced) through the process of political socialisation. When politically contextualised, Ideological identity is characterized by the highest degree of abstractedness. When people identify themselves with left-wing or right-wing people, they state their inclusion within a social category that is diffcult to visualize, with wide and ill-defned boundaries, including a large number of heterogeneous individuals. At the same time, such an abstract category of identifcation is likely to be perceived as more stable over time and less subject to transformations as compared to a more concrete category, such as a political party. In fact, ideological identity has been shown to be especially salient after a political schism, when a previous existing party splits into two or more new parties. In these changed circumstances, stressing one’s ideological identity has the function of safeguarding a certain degree of continuity with the past, to keep a balance in one’s own identity.42 Following Talcott Parsons’s approach to defning community, “a community is that collectivity the members of which share a common territorial area as

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their base of operations for daily activities,”43 the concept of territory benefts much from the realm of football. In football, most “clubs are named emblematically after a particular ‘place,’ and thus have the kind of affective tie to a specifc locality that one fnds in more traditional and localist societies.”44 In football culture, the locale gains immense signifcance when dominated by the presence of a stadium, often viewed as “a constructed space of social interaction in which team identity is constantly redefned and reinforced. Due to the structural constraint of the stadium, those elements come to the fore which are relevant in relation to the given opponent.”45 Football stadiums become quasi-religious sites, important in their own right but also as metaphors for the political territory which is regarded as being in need of defence. These stadia are, therefore, of vital importance in the production of certain identities and in the process of cultural resistance.46 However, This is not to suggest that the symbolic home that a stadium provides to its fans is a phantasm or a mirage (original emphasis). Rather, it is the arena for the embodiment of particular forms of social life, that have their own routines and cultural modes of expression. In short the football stadium provides one context in which local identity can be ritually defned, regardless of the changes taking place in its immediate environment and patterns of migration.47 In this context, the vehicle that is football becomes “one of the most powerful in terms of identity formation and reinforcement,”48 also considered “as a place of local patriotism.”49 Evidently, One of the driving forces behind football’s growing popularity was each club’s development of an identity that drew in supporters. Interest soared when fans came to view a club as “theirs,” so clubs did everything they could to create a bond between fans and players. Teams consciously created identities and introduced colours, fags and other symbols so that they stood for something within their local community. They cast themselves as the representatives of regions, cities, neighbourhoods and social classes.50 In Udo Merkel’s words, While in the past the bond had been emotional and personal, and club life an integral part of the local community celebrating coherence and

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solidarity, the modern era increasingly needed synthetic symbols, such as fags, kits, badges or scarves to display support and closeness and to bridge the growing distance between team and fans.51 In England, the Football Fandom report, commissioned by Sky Sports ahead of the 2021–2022 football season, revealed a range of new fan cultures and identities. The report stressed that “one-club supporters made up almost a third of those surveyed,” but also that “a number of football fans are now more dedicated to the game itself rather than to a particular team.” New types of football fans include the Lifer, “considered the ‘traditional’ football fan”; Statto, “more likely than the other subcultures to focus on the prematch build-up”; Expressionist, “Modern football culture has seeped into fashion, music and how we connect with each other. Expressionists thrive off this merging of football and lifestyle”; Socialiser, “focus on the way football brings people together. This subculture connects more with family and friends during the season and they are the frst to make plans for big games”; and Game Changer, “Driven by the social impact of the football for the greater good, Game Changers are likely to have seen or experienced frst-hand the power the game has to change mindsets.” Interestingly, the report also revealed that “an overwhelming 70 per cent of people feel footballers have helped the nation get talking about discrimination, while 63 per cent believe they have a better understanding of social and economic issues because of their love of football.”52 Lifers tend to be older (42%), their age ranging from 35 to 54 years old, are predominantly male (68%), 55% are season-ticket holders, and 72% following the same football club as their families. Statto fans are more likely to talk about football (46%), are 2.5 times more likely to follow pre-match information, with 28% betting on matches. The Expressionists are more likely to be younger fans (53%), below the age of 35, are more interested in the commercial brands that surround the game, and more likely to ‘follow’ football players on social media platforms. Socialisers are least likely to spend on football merchandise, are interested in the personal lives of football players, with 34% not following the same football club as their families. Finally, Game Changer fans are predominantly female (74%), more likely not to miss a big match (28%), with 86% claiming that more diversity in football could help overcome barriers in society.53 Identity politics The many different groups that constitute society, in essence, also structure it along race, gender, ethnicity, religion, culture, sexual orientation, and social status, to name a few identities, yet disparities only emerge when any such identity provides suffcient cause for separating the politically privileged from the disadvantaged, the dominant from the inferior, and the oppressor from the oppressed. Identity politics, in other words, becomes more meaningful

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in a divided society. To confront the politics of the politically privileged, oppressed social groups opt for protesting through relevant movements campaigning for equality and against injustice. In identity politics, ‘identity’ refers to shared political experiences of oppression, restricted access to proper representation, and the deprivation of basic rights that condemn a social group to political inferiority. In many ways a controversial term, identity politics is better defned not on the political properties that characterise the oppressed group but on the refection of the dominant group it has come to challenge its political authority. Confronting the authority of the dominant group’s position and the established political hierarchy, nevertheless, may allow room to reassert its dominance as it seeks to dismiss any claims of injustice. At the same time, the oppressed group risks further downgrading its status due to emphasising its vulnerability while also presenting itself as a victim of political circumstances. Indeed, “marginalization forms the basis for the culture of identity groups,” just as “advocating for rights based on marginalized cultural identities will only lead to the increased social regulation of those groups by dominant groups that control the state.”54 It is the ensuing mobilisation that describes the essence of identity politics, while also highlighting the complexity in properly defning the term. Despite certain similarities, the different interpretations help underline the complexity of the term: politics in which groups of people having a particular racial, religious, ethnic, social, or cultural identity tend to promote their own specifc interests or concerns without regard to the interests or concerns of any larger political group;55 political beliefs and systems that place a lot of importance on the group to which people see themselves as belonging to, especially according to their race, gender (= whether they are male, female, or a different gender), or sexual orientation (= whether they are attracted to people of the same or a different gender);56 political activity aimed at promoting the welfare of a particular social group to which you see yourself as belonging;57 political positions that are based on the social groups that people see themselves as belonging to, for example based on religion, race or social background, rather than on traditional political parties;58 also commonly referred to as the politics of identity or identity-based politics, is a phrase that is widely used in the social sciences and humanities to describe the deployment of the category of identity as a tool to frame political claims, promote political ideologies, or stimulate and orientate social and political action, usually in a larger context of inequality or injustice and with the aim of asserting group distinctiveness and belonging and gaining power and recognition.59

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Identity politics, therefore, is associated with political activities and movements promoting equality based exclusively on the shared experiences of injustice. Aiming at further inclusion and an improved political status, successful political movements concern those marginalised groups that weaponise themselves with instruments of empowerment highlighting their common identity rather than shared experiences of inequality and focus on achieving better representation and recognition, as well as producing a positive community image, instead of merely upsetting political order. Identity politics, frmly rooted in political science, is based on power-related narratives and group dynamics and, therefore, considers the concept of power and the use of power by groups to overcome marginalization. For political scientists, power relations are a focus of how political groups interact with one another, with government, and within themselves. Hoover notes that reducing identity to power is a reductionist view of understanding identity (1997, 7). Identity politics focuses on the socially constructed identity rather than the internalization of an identity. Scholars in identity politics view identity as something that is forced on the individual from the society at large and is represented by those external attributes of race, gender, and ethnicity. Identity politics does not take into account the process by which one develops an identity but the outcome of identity for study of political purposes. Whereas political identity theorists consider the process of human development within the individual, those who study identity politics focus on the social construction and deconstruction of identity as a political concept.60 In the case of football, matters relating to identity and mobilisation differ little from movements focusing on political issues. SV Austria Salzburg was founded in 1933 and witnessed several mergers with other clubs during its otherwise uneventful course in history, before the club’s rise to prominence in the 1990s (second-placed in the league in 1992 and 1993, winning the league championship in 1994, 1995, and 1997). Then, in 2005 Austrian company Red Bull GmbH took over the club. Echoing practices of fascist and communist regimes of the past (see Chapter 4), the company changed the club’s name, crest, and colours. The company’s authoritarian stance prompted an immediate reaction from the club’s fans: In protest at Red Bull’s changing of the team name to Red Bull Salzburg, replacing its traditional kit colours of violet and white to Red Bull’s corporate red, white and blue, and “repackaging” the matchday experience with corporate-type entertainment (including laser shows and onfeld celebrity appearances) an action group was set up by a number of long established supporters’ clubs under the title Initiative Violett-Weiß (Violet-White) in order to push for the restoration of the original identity

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of the club. A series of demands were placed before the new owners: clear recognition of the history of Austria Salzburg in the club’s literature; a home kit in traditional violet and white colours; the retraction of all blanket stadium bans; and an ongoing dialogue between Red Bull and traditional supporters’ clubs. Despite the company’s attempts to curb dissent, the campaign received support from the terraces across Europe. As well as gaining ultra support from across the board in Austria at such clubs as Sturm Graz, Wacker Innsbruck, SK Rapid Wien; Austria Wien; support for the Initiative Violett-Weiß was given further afeld. In Germany, ultra groups displayed banners in solidarity, as did clubs in Holland, Romania, Switzerland, Italy, Croatia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Belgium. The ultra groups message was unequivocal in its rejection of what was viewed as an aggressive takeover of a social and community hub by a force viewing football only as a means for furthering commodifcation. The banners on display to support the Initiative Violett-Weiß read: “Fuck Red Bull”, “Red Bullshit”, “Tradition and Heart – Not For Commerce”, “Smash Red Bull”, “Solidarity With Salzburg”, “With Austria Salzburg – Against Modern Football”.61 When the fans failed to alter the course of events, they registered the club’s old name and crest and entered the club into Austria’s lower football leagues. In Italy, Political sentiment in the stadium is often crude and sometimes vacuous, not unlike a great deal of political discourse. Sometimes displays in the stadium are irresponsible and incendiary, and should be opposed by civil society, but the problem is that many of the measures used to stamp out or weed out the troublemakers (variants of this refrain are used worldwide to justify increased security and oppression) violate the civil rights of citizens and compromise democratic ideals. How can one set restrictions, a priori, that can stop an abuse of the public space before it happens without stamping out the festive and convivial atmosphere that is a strong pull to the stadium in the frst place?62 Football in Italy is often associated with political ideology, such as the leftleaning fans of Unione Sportiva Livorno and the right-leaning fans of Società Sportiva Lazio. As some fans engaged in extremist politics, violent clashes between rival groups became routine (see Chapter 3). Yet the antagonism and violence that arose between rival fan groups was gradually redirected towards the common enemies of the police and the

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state itself. The mistrust between fans and the police has a long history and mirrors more general themes of endemic distrust in Italy. Perhaps the frst tragedy in the Italian football stadium occurred in Salerno in April of 1963. A controversial decision by the referee led the home fans to invade the pitch causing general chaos. The police rushed to the centre of the pitch, and one offcer fred three shots into the air. One of these bullets apparently hit Giuseppe Plaitano in the head and killed him. The offcial investigation found that Plaitano died of a heart attack even though witnesses reported blood fowing from his temple. The offcial autopsy was mysteriously lost and the investigation was abandoned. Major newspapers in Italy now report, as fact, that Plaitano was killed by one of the offcer’s bullets, and that the investigation was a poor attempt at a cover-up.63 German club FC St. Pauli is quite an interesting case study. The club plays its football at the Millerntor-Stadion located in the Sankt Pauli area of the city of Hamburg, better known for its red-light district and its strong support of Die Linke (The Left, a democratic socialist political party). Already From 1986 allegiances were forged between activists and the football club, its players and supporters, in protests and civil unrest in support of local squatter’s rights. In time, protests outside the ground spread inside as fans campaigned successfully against club commercialism using “tactics learnt in street politics”. The focus of campaigns grew to encompass a variety of other leftist causes, with matches regularly accompanied by political protests.64 Fans occupying the terraces of the Millerntor Stadium have been famous for broadcasting political messages that highlight the confict between fan culture and commerce more explicitly than those of any other fan group. But it was not only the explicit rejection of the increasing commercialization of football that caught the public’s attention: fans also raised banners addressing wider political issues such as racism, sexism, homophobia, militarism, and the re-emergence of neo-fascist groups in Germany. St Pauli fans organized a number of political rallies criticizing local rightwing politicians, budget cuts, police suppression and the opening of a shop selling Nazi memorabilia. It is this combination of political activism and football fandom that has made this small club well known outside Hamburg.65 Indeed, “According to various estimates, FC St. Pauli currently has about 20 million fans and supporters worldwide, 11 million of whom are in

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Germany.”66 The skull and crossbones symbol of the club’s fans has gained international appeal, even though Club executives initially did not recognise the symbol’s marketing potential, which allowed some supporters to open an independent fan shop in 1989 that became an instant hit. Several years later, the penny fnally dropped at board level and St. Pauli bought the symbol’s license outright. It is now an unmistakable part of the fabric of the club’s identity.67 Today, the club’s social projects concern refugees, the homeless, and other disadvantaged people, thus resonating with the permanently displayed sign in the stadium that reads Kein mensch ist illegal, no one is illegal, an antiracist group in Germany supporting migrants without a residence permit. Likewise, Ultras Dynamo, supporters of Dynamo Dresden, also have a similar anti-establishment stance, often displaying banners that read ACAB (All Cops Are Bastards). Except for vilifying the police, however, Ultras Dynamo also target the German football association “due to the self-perception of having been punished unrightfully too often in the past.”68 In May 2013, demonstrators at Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey, were peacefully protesting the government’s plans to convert the park into a shopping centre when police attempted to forcefully subdue the gathered crowds. The image of a ‘lady in red’ being sprayed with tear gas, later identifed as Ceyda Sungur, an academic from Istanbul Technical University, became a symbol of resistance. On the occasion, like the events at Tahrir Square in Cairo (see Chapter 3), “Local football fans came to play an important part in the protests as the police ‘cracked down.’”69 More precisely, football fans constituted an important element as they helped popularize the movement by lending it their ways of making noise (chanting, slogans, the use of humour). They furthermore created an important onsite presence as they were used to physical battles and experienced in clashes with the police. As protesters pushed the police behind the barricades and self-governed Gezi Park and its neighbouring Taksim district in downtown Istanbul, football fans were saluted as heroes enabling this “victory”. Their involvement in the protests also resulted in a court battle, as Beşiktaş’s notorious Çarşı group leaders were briefy prosecuted for “attempting a coup d’état against the elected government”.70 On another case of defance, the players of the national football team of Iran declined to sing the national anthem before their 2022 FIFA World Cup match against England, in support of the anti-government protests in their home country, while Iranian fans on the stands booed the anthem and waved signs in Iran’s colours (though not the fag of the Islamic Republic) that read ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ – the main slogan of the protesters back home. The

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cause of the protests was the killing of Mahsa Aini, while in police custody, in September 2022 after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for failing to comply with the rules on head coverings. The Iran Human Rights group in Oslo claimed that more than 300 people have died since and over 15,000 arrested. In their second match against Wales the Iranian football players sung their national anthem, following criticism from their government; their fans, however, did not fail to protest against the autocratic government once more. Interestingly, prior to the match between that national football teams of the United States and Iran, posts of the US Soccer Federation on its social media accounts had the Islamic Republic’s emblem removed from its fag in support of the women’s rights in the country. Known as the symbol of Allah, the emblem consists of four curves and a sword between them and symbolises the Islamic saying ‘There is no god but Allah.’ In response, Iran demanded that FIFA reprimand the US Soccer Federation with a ten-match ban, as per the world governing body’s regulations: Any person who offends the dignity or integrity of a country, a person or group of people through contemptuous, discriminatory or derogatory words or actions (by any means whatsoever) on account of race, skin colour, ethnic, national or social origin, gender, disability, sexual orientation, language, religion, political opinion, wealth, birth or any other status or any other reason, shall be sanctioned with a suspension lasting at least ten matches or a specifc period, or any other appropriate disciplinary measure.71 Football Club United of Manchester That Football Club United of Manchester was set up in protest to Malcolm Glazer’s takeover of Manchester United is a statement often used to describe FC United. But while there is no doubt that FC would not have happened without the American invasion, it was the catalyst, the fnal straw, but not the sole reason. The material theft of a Manchester institution, forcibly taken from the people of Manchester, was the tip of a pyramid of destruction, with changing kick off times for the beneft of television, soulless all-seater stadia full of “new” supporters intent to sit back and watch rather than partake in the occasion, heavy handed stewarding and ridiculously priced tickets propping it all up. By May 2005 some supporters had had enough. The failure to prevent Glazer and repeat the successful repulsion of Rupert Murdoch in 1998 resurrected a “last resort” idea from that previous campaign and the FC United wheels were put in motion. A group of individuals determined to continue the fght formed a steering committee and FC United of Manchester was delivered. Critics of the idea argued

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that if supporters were disgruntled with the Premiership then why didn’t they go and support other local cash-strapped clubs instead of setting up their own? But that wouldn’t have been theirs would it? It wouldn’t have been United and it wouldn’t have been right to takeover another club after they had just been taken over themselves. Nor could they drift off in various directions and be lost to each other and maybe football forever. They wanted to maintain the momentum of the protest, to stick together, to sing United songs, to reminisce and bring back the good bits of the good old days. They wanted Our Club, Our Rules and they got just that, a member owned democratic, not-for-proft organisation created by Manchester United fans. A club accessible to all of the Greater Manchester community, dedicated to encouraging participation of youth whether it be playing or supporting and to providing affordable football for all.72 The background of FC United of Manchester, as per the club’s own website, is a perfect match for the theoretical framework of identity politics. It reveals a great deal of mobilisation and discontent expressed through protest against an American invasion. Subsequently, the material theft of an institution denied the local people their identity, thus prompting those marginalised fans to set up a club that would ‘feel’ like FC Manchester United, where they would wear the same colours, sing the same songs, all the while supporting a club they owned. Likewise, the club’s manifesto reads, FC United of Manchester is a new football club founded by disaffected and disenfranchised Manchester United supporters. Our aim is to create a sustainable club for the long term which is owned and democratically run by its members, which is accessible to all the communities of Manchester and one in which they can participate fully. […] FC United of Manchester is intended to create a football club which addresses the concerns which many Manchester United fans have had over the last decade or more with how the club and football have developed, culminating in the club’s takeover by Malcolm Glazer. We will follow the best traditions of Manchester United’s past by developing policies which encourage youth participation in terms of both playing and supporting. FC United of Manchester will be formed as a member-owned, democratic, and non-proft making entity.73 Once again, the club’s manifesto stresses the fans’ discontent regarding the takeover of Manchester United by the Glazer family. A clear indication of the fans’ powerlessness to prevent the club’s takeover; however, the manifesto of United of Manchester could not possibly fail to emphasise the signifcance of democracy. The relevant document outlining the elections policy of United of Manchester details all criteria relating to the election of board members.

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Elections take place during General Meetings, where members have the right to review each candidate’s profle, as well as submit a motion. The voting and counting procedure are also detailed in the same document. The document fails to mention, nevertheless, the duration of the term of offce and possible term limits for board members. Instead, this is mentioned in the Rules of FC United of Manchester, stating that board members serve for a period of two years. The Rules also stipulate the rights and powers of members, the duties and powers of the club board, chief executive, and executive board, fnancial aspects of the club, as well as a process for resolving any dispute arising from the content of the Rules. Safeguarding the club’s democratic nature is the rule limiting every member of the club to one ordinary share in the capital of the club. Conclusion Political culture, political identity, and identity politics are three closely interrelated concepts employed herein for the purpose of examining the more generic concepts of culture and identity in football. Political culture is the all-encompassing concept denoting perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of the citizenry, with regard to a political system, just as it is perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that formulate the culture of football. Likewise, political socialisation and political symbolism are also closely related to the fans’ process of socialisation, with regard to a football club, while symbols play an equally important role in the history of national football teams and football clubs alike. Within the same context, political identity and identity politics may both refect gender, nationality, race, religion, sexual orientation, and social status, yet the very essence of any given political identity may cause tension in society and, therefore, become an issue of identity politics. As evidenced above, as well as in other chapters here, in terms of football, too, the identity of both national football teams and football clubs determine to a great extent the identity of football fans, just as identity is often the main element defning a football rivalry, occasionally leading to violence. Fans mobilising against, and setting up clubs as a result of, hostile takeovers, clashing with other rival fans or the police, raised as supporters of a particular club, protesting the elitism of the European Super League, and participating in club-related policies and decision-making, as illustrated here and in other chapters, clearly reveal that culture and identity – as employed in political science scholarship – may well be deployed to examine related concepts in football. No doubt, the politicisation of football and footballisation of politics, through the lens of culture and identity, are two sides of the same coin concerning a strong correlation that certainly merits a more thorough investigation. Notes 1 Stephen Chilton, “Defning Political Culture,” The Western Political Quarterly, 41: 3, 419–445, 1988, 419.

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2 Gary Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London: Sage, 1963, 13. 3 Robert Putnam, “Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of ‘Ideology’,” The American Political Science Review, 65: 3, 1971, 651–681, 651. 4 Gary Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London: Sage, 1963, 18. 5 Gary Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London: Sage, 1963, 17. 6 BBC, “World Cup 2022: A Desert World Cup Blighted by a Dust-Storm of Controversy,” by Dan Roan, https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/63570556, 14 November 2022. 7 Gary Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London: Sage, 1963, 17. 8 FIFA, FIFA Statutes, 2022, 11. 9 Sky News, Let’s Focus on the Football! – FIFA Bosses Tell World Cup Teams Not to Lecture on Morality, by Rob Harris, https://news.sky.com/story/lets -focus-on-the-football-ffa-bosses-tell-world-cup-teams-not-to-lecture-on-morality-12737705, 4 November 2022. 10 Lowell Dittmer, “Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” World Politics, 29: 4, 552–583, 1977, 557. 11 Lowell Dittmer, “Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” World Politics, 29: 4, 552–583, 1977, 566. 12 Stephen Chilton, “Defning Political Culture,” The Western Political Quarterly, 41: 3, 419–445, 1988, 428. 13 Mari Womack, Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction, Walnut Creek and Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005, 3. 14 Pål Kolstø, “National Symbols as Signs of Unity and Division,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29: 4, 2006, 697. 15 Womack, Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction, Walnut Creek and Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005, 5. 16 Womack, Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction, Walnut Creek and Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005, 56. 17 Roland Posner, Klaus Robering, and Thomas Sebeok, Semiotics: A Handbook on the Sign-Theoretic Foundations of Nature and Culture, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997, 2922. 18 Womack, Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction, Walnut Creek and Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005, 77. 19 Womack, Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction, Walnut Creek and Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005, 134. 20 Womack, Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction, Walnut Creek and Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2005, 137. 21 Liz Crolley, and David Hand, Football, Europe and the Press, London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002, 28. 22 David Winner, Those Feet: An Intimate History of English Football, London: Bloomsbury, 2006, 86. 23 David Goldblatt, The Ball is Round: A Global History of Football, London: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Books, 2006, 736. 24 House of Representatives, Our Flag, 100th Congress, 2d Session, https://www .nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/fag/h_doc_100-247/sec11.htm, 7 September 1988. 25 The Guardian, Red Star: The Oldest, Hippest and Most Political Football Club in Paris, by Mark Godfrey, https://www.theguardian.com/football/in-bed-with

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33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Culture in football -maradona/2018/jan/20/red-star-football-club-paris-jules-rimet-david-bellion, 20 January 2018. France 24, French President’s Romance with ‘Communist’ Football Club, by Benjamin Dodman, https://www.france24.com/en/20150911-red-star-football -club-paris-saint-ouen-hollande-suburbs-immigration-psg, 12 September 2015. Cornel Sandvoss, A Game of Two Halves: Football, Television and Globalization, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 39. Christian Bromberger, Alain Hayot, and Jean-Marc Mariottini, “‘Allez l’O.M., Forza Juve’: The Passion for Football in Marseille and Turin,” in The Passion and the Fashion: Football fandom in the New Europe, ed. Steve Redhead, Aldershot: Avebury, 1993, 125–126. Christian Bromberger, Alain Hayot, and Jean-Marc Mariottini, “‘Allez l’O.M., Forza Juve’: The Passion for Football in Marseille and Turin,” in The Passion and the Fashion: Football fandom in the New Europe, ed. Steve Redhead, Aldershot: Avebury, 1993, 127. Peter Pericles Trifonas, Umberto Eco and Football, Icon Books and Totem Books, 2001, 37. Peter Seddon, Football Talk: The Language & Folklore of the World’s Greatest Game, London: Robson Books, 2004, 72. Alessandro Dal Lago, and Rocco De Biasi, “Italian Football Fans: Culture and Organization,” in Football, Violence and Social Identity, ed. Richard Giulianotti, Norman Bonney, and Mike Hepworth, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 75. Nina Clara Tiesler, and João Nuno Coelho, “Globalized Football at a Lusocentric Glance: Struggles with Markets and Migration, Traditions and Modernities, the Loss and the Beauty,” Soccer & Society, 8: 4, 2007, 420. Peter Seddon, Football Talk: The Language & Folklore of the World’s Greatest Game, London: Robson Books, 2004, 136. FARE, Global Guide to Discriminatory Practices in Football, 2018, 36–67. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, https://www.un .org/sites/un2.un.org/fles/2021/03/udhr.pdf. American Psychological Association, Talking to Children about the Election, https://www.apa.org/topics/politics/talking-children-election, 16 November 2016. Bobbi Gentry, Why Youth Vote: Identity, Inspirational Leaders and Independence, Bridgewater, VA: Springer, 2018, 19. Bobbi Gentry, Why Youth Vote: Identity, Inspirational Leaders and Independence, Bridgewater, VA: Springer, 2018, 20. Niels Noergaard Kristensen, “Political Identity, Democratic Empowerment, and Political Learning,” in Political Identity and Democratic Citizenship in Turbulent Times, ed. Niels Noergaard Kristensen, IGI Global, 2020, 19. Patrizia Catellani, Political Psychology, Overview, Editor(s): Charles D. Spielberger, Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology, Elsevier, 2004, 51–65, 57. Patrizia Catellani, Political Psychology, Overview, Editor(s): Charles D. Spielberger, Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology, Elsevier, 2004, 51–65, 58. Talcott Pasons, cited in Tony Blackshaw, “Contemporary Community Theory and Football,” Soccer & Society, 9: 3, 2008, 326. Richard Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology of the Global Game, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, 15. Miklós Hadas, “Football and Social Identity: The Case of Hungary in the Twentieth Century,” The Sports Historian, 20: 2, 2000, 44. Alan Bairner, and Peter Shirlow, “Territory, Politics and Soccer Fandom in Northern Ireland and Sweden,” Football Studies, 3: 1, 2000, 22.

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47 Les Back, Tim Crabbe, and John Solomos, The Changing Face of Football: Racism, Identity and Multiculture in the English Game, Oxford and New York: Berg, 2001, 43. 48 Alan Bairner, and Peter Shirlow, “Territory, Politics and Soccer Fandom in Northern Ireland and Sweden,” Football Studies, 3: 1, 2000, 5. 49 Mike Cronin, “Enshrined in Blood the Naming of Gaelic Athletic Association Grounds and Clubs,” The Sports Historian, 18: 1, 1998, 94. 50 Andrew McFarland, “Building a Mass Activity: Fandom, Class and Business in Early Spanish Football,” Soccer & Society, 8: 2, 2007, 215. 51 Udo Merkel, “Milestones in the Development of Football Fandom in Germany: Global Impacts on Local Contests,” Soccer & Society, 8: 2, 2007, 229. 52 Sky Sports, “Which Football Family Do You Belong To?” https://www.skysports.com/football/story-telling/11095/12378034/which-football-family-do-you -belong-to-take-our-quiz-to-fnd-out, 11 August 2021. 53 Sky Sports, “Football Fandom in 2021: Lifer? Statto? How UK Football Fan Culture Is Changing,” https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11095 /12378024/football-fandom-in-2021-lifer-statto-how-uk-football-fan-culture-is -changing, 11 August 2021. 54 Mary Bernstein, “Identity Politics,” Annual Review of Sociology, 31: 1, 47–74, 2005, 50. 55 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Identity Politics, https://www.merriam-webster .com/dictionary/identity%20politics. 56 Cambridge Dictionary, Identity Politics, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/identity-politics. 57 Collins Dictionary, Identity Politics, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/hi/dictionary/english/identity-politics. 58 Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, Identity Politics, https://www.oxfordlearnersdicti onaries.com/defnition/english/identity-politics?q=identity+politics. 59 Oxford Bibliographies, Identity Politics, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/ view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0106.xml. 60 Bobbi Gentry, Why Youth Vote: Identity, Inspirational Leaders and Independence, Bridgewater, VA: Springer, 2018, 20. 61 David Kennedy, “A Contextual Analysis of Europe’s Ultra Football Supporters Movement,” Soccer & Society, 14: 2, 132–153, 2013, 143. 62 Matthew Guschwan, “Fan Politics: Dissent and Control at the Stadium,” Soccer & Society, 17: 3, 388–402, 2016, 393. Emphasis in original. 63 Matthew Guschwan, “Fan Politics: Dissent and Control at the Stadium,” Soccer & Society, 17: 3, 388–402, 2016, 395. 64 Mick Totten, “Sport Activism and Political Praxis within the FC Sankt Pauli Fan Subculture,” Soccer & Society, 16: 4, 453–468, 2015, 5. 65 Udo Merkel, “Football Fans and Clubs in Germany: Conficts, Crises and Compromises,” Soccer & Society, 13: 3, 359–376, 2012, 367. 66 Carles Viñas, Natxo Parra, Deniz Naki, and Luke Stobart, “Global Expansion and the Fan Clubs in England, Scotland and Ireland,” in St. Pauli: Another Football Is Possible, London: Pluto Press, 191–195, 2020, 191. 67 Bundesliga, St. Pauli: German Football’s Cult Club Explained, https://www .bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/st-pauli-hamburg-cult-club-explained-max -kruse-reeperbahn-song-2-millerntor-475424.jsp, 2019. 68 Daniel Ziesche, “‘The East’ Strikes Back: Ultras Dynamo, Hyper-Stylization, and Regimes of Truth,” Sport in Society, 21: 6, 883–890, 2018, 892. 69 Matthew Guschwan, “Fan Politics: Dissent and Control at the Stadium,” Soccer & Society, 17: 3, 388–402, 2016, 399.

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70 Daǧhan Irak, “‘Shoot Some Pepper Gas at Me!’ Football Fans vs. Erdoğan: Organized Politicization or Reactive Politics?” Soccer & Society, 19: 3, 400–417, 2018, 400. 71 FIFA, Disciplinary Code, 2019, 13. 72 FCUM, History: A History of FC United of Manchester, https://fc-utd.co.uk/ history. 73 FCUM, The Manifesto: Who We Are and What We Mean, https://fc-utd.co.uk/ manifesto.

Chapter 3

Violence in football

Introduction Violence denotes the context within which force is used to achieve coercion and may be directed towards an individual, a community, or society at large. Apart from political oppression being one of the main sources of violence, social, biological, and psychological causes may also lead to violence. Economic matters, too, relating to poverty, unemployment, lack of access to resources and, generally, poor living conditions may also generate violence. Yet it is more often politics that has the power to divide for states are inherently violent. Political decisions favouring a dominant group or condemning a minority to subordination create those conditions necessary for promoting and maintaining favouritism and elitism contrasted with discrimination and isolation. The same political decisions that cause injustice, abuse, and exploitation, therefore, lead to social unrest, lawlessness, and, of course, violence. Violence in football is a social phenomenon that is affected by and infuences social, economic, political, and cultural issues. The kind of aggression that is, occasionally, witnessed in society often transpires into the realm of sport, and football more precisely. Hence, in identifying a possible remedy for eliminating violence from football, a more tangible approach should commence by addressing any such anti-social phenomena in society at large. The phenomenon of organised violence in football dates back to the end of the nineteenth century, early twentieth, in England and then spiralled over the rest of Europe and across the world. Also known as ‘hooliganism,’ violence in football is nowadays a worldwide phenomenon that commands the attention of not only clubs, players, fans, and football’s governing bodies, but also states, legislative bodies, and security agents. Football violence is an alarming phenomenon and, therefore, a recurring source of political attention that has transpired into legislation, policing tactics, crowd management practices and, more recently, novel surveillance technologies. This chapter explores the origins of organised ‘ultras’ groups and their association with clubs, politicians, and states. The many different characteristics of football

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-4

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violence are a clear indication of the sheer complexity in addressing any form of hooliganism. State monopoly on violence In Greek mythology, Goddess Bia personifes force, power, violence. Bia was sister of Nike (Greek for victory), Kratos (Greek for power and/or state), and Zelos (Greek for dedication). Resisting the temptation of employing Bia, Nike, Kratos, and Zelos for some sort of a mathematical equation that would help us understand how violence, victory, dedication, and power/state relate to one another, Bia and her three siblings assisted Zeus – the king of gods and ultimate source of power – in defeating the Titans, thus gaining his respect and favour. The four are often depicted as enforcers of Zeus’s orders, as in Hesiod’s Theogony, a poem describing the origins of the ancient Greek gods. Bia also features in Aeschylus’s famous tragedy Prometheus Bound, where Hephaestus was ordered by the gods to punish Prometheus for having given fre to humans. Early in the play, Hephasteus argues that an order from Zeus is suffcient for Kratos and Bia to fulfl their duties, but in his case, he fnds it diffcult to chain a fellow god to an ill-fortuned rock. Unlike the more compassionate Hephasteus, Kratos is depicted as vicious, favouring violence, and in support of Zeus’s oppressive tactics. Throughout the play, all dialogues involve Hephaestus, Kratos, Oceanus, Hermes, Prometheus, and Io; only Bia remains in silence, and silence is violence, we are taught to believe. According to the World Health Organization, violence is The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. The defnition provided by the World Health Organization emphasises intentionality and the impact of power-defned relationships: The inclusion of the word “power”, in addition to the phrase “use of physical force”, broadens the nature of a violent act and expands the conventional understanding of violence to include those acts that result from a power relationship, including threats and intimidation. The “use of power” also serves to include neglect or acts of omission, in addition to the more obvious violent acts of commission. Thus, “the use of physical force or power” should be understood to include neglect and all types of physical, sexual and psychological abuse.1 From a political viewpoint, it is the quality of the governing institutions and the legal framework protecting them that determine the degree of violence

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within a society, since a state that enforces laws is more likely to deter violence. States, of course, are also complicit in employing violence to advance their goals. The apartheid system in South Africa, for instance, is a classic example of a state using violence, structural violence for that matter, to enforce the marginalisation of a black population that was consistently denied basic rights. Structural violence, as exercised by the state, is more pervasive and systemic in that the state claims to be the sole source of legitimate force. It is defned as violence that is exerted through social and state structures that lead to the exclusion of entire groups due to specifc characteristics, such as gender, race, sexual orientation, income, social class, or ethnicity. Structural violence refects the inability to complete one’s integration to society due to oppressive political, social, and economic structures, instead forcing the individual to adhere to those stereotypes that serve the marginalisation of entire communities. Hence, structural violence is the most basic and fundamental form of violence for it refects political, social, and economic conditions in society, the predetermined structure of society, while also maintaining the prevailing balance of power that privileges some at the same time as it neglects others. Max Weber argued that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that “‘territory” is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifcally, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the “right” to use violence.2 He also added that “the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory.”3 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” The state and related agencies, such as the police force, are entrusted with the task of protecting our right to security and, in some cases, are required to use violence to protect us from it. It is an oxymoron, no doubt, but so is civil movements bringing about political reform and equipping marginalised communities with better access to rights at a cost of human lives, like the civil rights movement in the United States or the Arab Spring uprising more recently. Hooliganism Despite the many different practices and measures employed for tackling violence in football, particularly due to the equally many different manifestations

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of football hooliganism, two additional problems immediately arise when investigating any given incident relating to football violence. A frst problem, as Spaaij notes, is the fact that There is no precise defnition of “football hooliganism”. The phenomenon lacks a legal defnition and a precise demarcation of membership, and the concept is used to cover a variety of actions which take place in more or less directly football-related contexts. […] The label “football hooliganism” is, in fact, a construct of the media and politicians rather than a social scientifc concept. It is often used in a “cover-all” sense, in which various forms of minor and more serious “violence” are grouped together under the umbrella term ‘football hooliganism’ to refer to football fans who cause “harm” to society.4 Indeed, the absence of a clear, legal defnition is a serious obstacle while researching the phenomenon of football-related violence. A basic question that emerges is whether hooliganism should be restricted to include physically violent acts only. In this case, the psychological violence that is racist abuse, sexist slurs, and homophobic chants would be automatically disregarded, yet their psychological impact cannot be ignored. The second problem, while more of a practical issue, is equally signifcant and relates to the fact that One might assume that, since football violence is viewed as a threat to public safety and security, there would be a signifcant body of relevant statistics available from which one could accurately assess the scale and the seriousness of the phenomenon. Yet, this is not the case. To date, there are no reliable, standardized international data available on the extent and severity of football hooliganism. A number of nationally focused datasets have been developed; however, their comparability is limited due to their diverging defnitions of the crime.5 For a global phenomenon that has attracted as much attention over the past 60 years, the absence of any valid statistics is both problematic and puzzling. Governments and law enforcement agencies, with the aid of technology, have long developed a habit of collecting information and setting up databases when confronted with political turmoil or social unrest. Yet despite the loss of lives, injuries, and damage on public and private property, governments and law enforcement agencies seem indifferent to the challenging issue that is violence in football, even though they regularly denounce it as a rather disturbing phenomenon. Football governing bodies, too, related non-governmental organisations, clubs, fans, and, of course, the media have all condemned violence in the popular game; nevertheless, the lack of a uniform

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approach to hooliganism only raises further questions regarding the commitment of states to eliminating violence from football. Cleland and Cashmore remind us that Football violence, disorder and aggression amongst its participants are a tradition of the game and existed long before the introduction of the Football Association (FA) in 1863. For example, the advent of “folk” football from the fourteenth century led to frequent laws that sought to outlaw an activity that was seen as a social distraction encouraging violence.6 Perhaps, as the number of teams and leagues continued to grow, the formation of clubs in close proximity to one another led to fans developing a sense of territorial ownership and cultural identity that distinguished them from fans of rival clubs. A consequence of this was the beginning of the process where fans saw themselves as the so-called twelfth man because of the vicarious participative infuence they felt they had on the atmosphere and outcome of matches. For some fans, the passion and belonging that football elicited was refected in their participation in violent disorder as they sought to gain respect and social capital amongst their peers in confrontations based on social and cultural factors including divisions over class, local identity, religion and political views.7 Spaaij offers a typology for understanding the various dimensions of football hooligan identity focusing on six features: “excitement and pleasurable emotional arousal, hard masculinity, territorial identifcations, individual and collective management of reputation, a sense of solidarity and belonging, and representations of sovereignty and autonomy.”8 Of the six features proposed, hard masculinity and territorial identifcations would better serve our understanding of what hooliganism constitutes. Hard masculinity, for Spaaij, relates to physical prowess alone. The construction of a hard, heterosexual masculine identity, and the occasional use of violence, is what distinguishes hooligans from all other fans. Once established, hard masculinity is, then, usually displayed as the most signifcant part of territorial identifcations in that only hard, heterosexual fans are well equipped to defend home (i.e., the club’s stadium and, most importantly, the specifc section they occupy on the stands, as well as the surrounding environment). Similar to a state exercising authority over a specifc geographic territory, and using force to defend it, hooligans employ hard masculinity to defend their territory – more so, perhaps, than the average fan that would strive to escape violence. Hooligans, as violent as they come, are not merely looking for trouble in every given football match they attend; that much is a fact or else there would

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be football-related disturbances every single week at every football match. Perhaps hooligans assume a secondary position on the stands, second only to the more festive fans that celebrate their distinct club identity through elaborate displays, until they are called upon at times of emergency, as in combatting rival (violent) fans inside and outside the stadium or the police. Violence in football Following the Heysel Stadium disaster of May 1985, the Council of Europe responded a few months later with the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and In Particular at Football Matches in an attempt to urge European states to adopt those measures necessary for preventing and controlling violence in football. The European Convention stresses its concern on “violence and misbehaviour amongst spectators at sports events, and in particular at football matches, and the consequences thereof” and notes that “violence is a current social phenomenon with wide repercussions, whose origins lie mainly outside sport, and that sport is often the scene for outbreaks of violence.”9 The Council of Europe, in its Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events, however, notes that it is often overlooked that supporters are the principal victims of footballrelated violence and disorder and, on occasions, the counter measures employed. Experience shows that in some countries a cycle of confrontation is frmly established and that overcoming an ethos of mutual distrust can pose challenges for all concerned.10 It seems that violence in football, nevertheless, has always been commonplace. Early ball games in England were marred with violence among the participants and invited criticism from the authorities, as Edward II, Edward III, Henry V, Henry VII, Henry VII, and James I all imposed bans and fnes on those taking part. The Puritans were vehemently against ball games and asked for their prohibition due to the kind of unrest they often caused, though the most important reason was perhaps the fact that they usually took place on the Sabbath, better reserved for religious activities. No ball games took place on Sundays for some 300 years, until the Football Association succeeded in partially lifting the ban. Ball games in England were banned on more than 30 occasions from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century, as well as during the Hundred Years’ War between England and France from 1337 to 1453. The popular game was, once again, banned in 1608 in the wider Manchester area because of the number and frequency that windows were smashed by stray balls during games in the streets, just as the local authorities in Derby banned ball games after passing riot-related laws

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that made explicit reference to the game and the kind of disorder it typically caused wherever it was played. Hillsborough On April 15, 1989, 97 men, women, and children were killed ahead of the FA Cup semi-fnal between Liverpool Football Club and Nottingham Forest Football Club at Hillsborough Stadium. The original inquest verdict of 1991, in agreement with the South Yorkshire police narrative, held the Liverpool supporters responsible for the tragedy. The April 26, 2016, inquest, however, determined that the cause of the unlawful killing of those supporters was the gross negligence of the South Yorkshire police offcer in command, chief superintendent David Duckenfeld, while also absolving the victims of any responsibility, even though in a retrial that ended in November 2019 Duckenfeld was not found guilty of manslaughter. At a frst trial in April the same year, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The police false narrative suggested that Liverpool’s supporters had forced open a gate 15 minutes into the match. At 15:15 Duckenfeld informed Graham Kelly, the Football Association offcial, that Liverpool fans had rushed into the Leppings Lane stand. Duckenfeld gave Mr Kelly and others to think that there had been an inrush due to Liverpool fans forcing open a gate. This was not only untruthful. It set off a widely reported allegation against the supporters which caused grave offence and distress. It revived against football fans, and especially those from Liverpool, accusations of hooliganism.11 The same narrative was presented to the media ten minutes later, the BBC reporting live that non-ticket holders had forced their way into the stadium, therefore, accusing those same people that would soon die tragically.12 Although the South Yorkshire police chief constable Peter Wright admitted later the same day that the gate had not been forced open, since it was Duckenfeld who gave the order for the gate to be opened, the police false narrative still blamed the Liverpool supporters for arriving late, drunk, and with no tickets. The gate that Duckenfeld ordered open, nevertheless, led some 2,000 fans directly into the central part of the stand that was already crowded, whereas had those fans been directed instead to the sides of the stand the tragedy would have been averted. Lord Taylor’s interim report a few months later noted that it should have been clear in the control room where there was a view of the pens and of the crowd at the turnstiles that the tunnel had to be closed. If orders had been given to that effect when gate C was opened, the fans could have been directed to the empty areas of the wings and

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this disaster could still have been avoided. Failure to give that order was a blunder of the frst magnitude.13 The following excerpts are telling: One of the regrettable features of the football scene as it has developed is the enormous expenditure of money, time and effort in employing large numbers of police all over the country to guard against the sort of disorder and misbehaviour which have become endemic. Police management of a game of football has become a military operation. […] policing on 15 April broke down […], the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control.14 It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in what occurred. Mr Duckenfeld, under pressure of cross-examination, apologised for blaming the Liverpool fans for causing the deaths. But, that apart, the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens. It was argued that the fatal crush was not caused by the infux through gate C but was due to barrier 124a being defective. Such an unrealistic approach gives cause for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced.15 Despite Lord Taylor’s report clearly holding the South Yorkshire police responsible for the tragedy, the police false narrative continued unabated at all subsequent inquests and legal proceedings. Worse, when the fnal legal battle was concluded in May 2021, no one was held accountable for the unlawful killing of 97 people or, at least, the false narrative supported by the South Yorkshire police. In the 2021–2022 season, 2,198 football-related arrests were made due to public disorder (786), violent disorder (446), pitch incursion (313), alcohol offences (213), possession of pyrotechnics (179), throwing missiles (169), criminal damage (35), racist and indecent chanting (19), breach of banning order (16), ticket touting (13), and possession of an offensive weapon (9). Of the total 1,308 football banning orders in place at the end of the same season, 516 new banning orders were issued during the 2021–2022 season alone.16 Perhaps an indication of what was to follow in the 2021–2022 season were the events that unfolded before, during, and after the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship fnal between England and Italy at Wembley (the competition was postponed to the summer of 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic). The English Football Association commissioned Baroness Casey to investigate the events that marred the fnal match of the competition. Some of the key fndings of the review are:

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The behaviour of a large minority of England supporters was not just disgraceful, it recklessly endangered lives; There were a series of crowd “near misses” which could have led to signifcant injuries or even death; A loss of experienced stewards as a result of the pandemic left Wembley’s stewarding operation vulnerable when confronted with the most aggressive and disorderly crowd Wembley had ever seen; There was insuffcient enforcement of the ban on consuming alcohol on public transport in London; The policing of the fnal did not suffciently mitigate the risk of ticketless fans with offcers deployed too late in the day; There are a lack of enforcement mechanisms available to respond to and deter the kind of behaviour witnessed at Euro Sunday.17 Given the language, tone, and fndings of the review, perhaps one might expect a much higher number of arrests than the 39 made at the fnal match against Italy.18 Football disturbances, and disasters for that matter, in the post-Hillsborough era were addressed by all-seater stadiums, private security, and technological advances such as the CCTV. When football hooliganism was recognised as a disturbing social phenomenon in the 1960s, the authorities’ initial response was to segregate the terraces within the stadiums, thus reinforcing the anti-social identity of those youth sub-cultures that had only just emerged. It is noteworthy that “CCTV was introduced in football ahead of other areas in society – in much the same way that private sector policing made an early appearance in the sporting environment.”19 Indeed, CCTV might have both a deterrent effect and a positive role in identifying both hooligans and members of the police and security services who may have exceeded their remit. However even in the United Kingdom, which is the most heavily surveilled country in the EU, the ubiquitous presence of CCTV cameras does not dissuade football hooligans from threatening and anti-social behaviour.20 Italy Fans of Associazione Calcio Milan formed La Fossa dei Leoni (the Lion’s den) in 1968, yet fans of Unione Calcio Sampdoria were the frst to employ the name ‘ultra’ in 1971. By the end of the 1970s, several other fan groups were active across the country. The names of those groups often refected leftist ideologies (e.g., Collettivo Autonomo Viola, fan groups of Associazione Calcio Fiorentina) inspired by left-wing movements such as Lotta Continua (a leftist movement representing students and workers) and Autonomia Operaia (an autonomist movement), thus refecting the political division that characterised Italy at the time, as remnants of fascism were battling the emerging left. Interestingly, “The name ‘ultra’ was borrowed from radical leftist political

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groups of late 1960s Europe.”21 The political struggle of society was not limited to massive, violent student and working-class demonstrations in the streets but was also often displayed in football stadiums albeit in a non-violent fashion. When the sharp political contrast between left and right diminished in the 1980s, the more politicised fan groups gave way to novel youth sub-cultures that created a new sense of collective identity among fans. As fans became better organised, the ‘ultras’ emerged. Adhering to the concept of La Mentalitá (mentality), or else the proper state of mind of an ‘ultra,’ fans gradually became more committed to the club they supported, participated in choreographies, were ardent supporters of their distinct identity, travelled to away matches, and should prove willing to safeguard their ideals against the enemy, rival ‘ultras’ and the police. The ‘ultras’ occupied a specifc zone on the stands (curva, the curve), chanted, and behaved and dressed alike, therefore, developing a strong identity that distinguished them from other ‘ultra’ groups, though “party politics were the central organizing principle for the ultras fan clubs.”22 Coinciding with the times of political extremism, when the Red Brigades assassinated Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, the violence among ‘ultra’ groups, too, increased dramatically. When the political upheaval subsided in the early 1980s, the ‘ultras’ groups were less inclined to politics and more focused on the locality of the club as the focal point of connection among the fans of any given club. Regional rivalries, historical animosities, and the all-embracing north–south divide (the Mezzogiorno) emerged as the guiding principle for separating one ‘ultras’ group from another, just as violence helped serve the objectives of the divide. Regionalism in Italy was best described in the territorial aspirations of the Lega Nord party, aiming at the separation of the more prosperous north from the poorer south. By the time violence had become prevalent among ‘ultras’ groups, a split between violent and non-violent ‘ultras’ dominated Italian football. Overall, Through the decades, the antagonism and violence that arose between rival fan groups was gradually redirected towards the common enemies of the police and the state itself. The mistrust between fans and the police has a long history and mirrors more general themes of endemic distrust in Italy.23 After the 1985 Heysel Stadium disaster, where 39 fans – most supporting Juventus Football Club – were killed, the Italian club was again drawn against Liverpool Football Club in the quarterfnals of the UEFA Champions League in 2005. Inside the Anfeld Stadium, Liverpool supporters welcomed their Italian guests by forming a wall that read Amicizia (friendship), while the 22 football players stood in silence in the middle of the pitch to commemorate the victims. The visiting Juventus fans whistled in protest and turned their backs. In the return leg, the Juventus ‘ultras’ displayed their own

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message Memoria e amicizia (remembrance and friendship) and attacked the Liverpool fans. The football fan card (Tessera del tifoso), introduced in 2009 by the Ministry of the Interior, was expected to combat football violence but was considered controversial, for part of its design allowed the police to keep records on fans and was thus vehemently protested by fans. Through a series of laws, the state had sought to increase the control of fans and monitoring of stadiums. Fans were required to use their identifcation card for purchasing tickets to away games, as well as provide copies of their identifcation card to local police stations. Ineligible fans were those who received a football banning order (DASPO). The football fan card was the epitome of all measures aimed at controlling and identifying fans, since its use was compulsory for the purchase of seasonal tickets. To issue a football fan card, fans must meet stringent criteria and police must ensure that holders are not DASPO receivers and, following Article 9, have not been convicted (even for a non-fnal sentence) for football violence fve years preceding the submission of a card application form. Data on fans are managed and stored by football clubs. Article 9 has thus become crucial to the scheme.24 Those fans who protested the scheme could, instead, purchase a single match ticket. When the government stated that violence in football had declined as a result of the football fan card scheme, the fan card became compulsory for all football matches across the country. The sale of tickets took place through a club ticket offce linked to the national police database, and tickets to an away match were only available to fans residing within the same region the match was played to curb fan movement between different cities and regions. The football fan card was, eventually, replaced by the Fidelity Card – a more fan-friendly scheme, for it allowed card holders certain benefts and discounts; however, neither the criteria for obtaining a card nor the role of the police for obtaining tickets changed. Evidently, the many laws and decrees issued for the purpose of reducing violence in football also served the need to “to promote the construction of a specifc social group – football fans – as a threat to public order,” thus signifying “a change in the relationship between fans and the State; fans must identify themselves to avoid being framed as a danger whether this is justifed or not.”25 Yet the only decline witnessed concerns match attendance, not the levels of violence in Italian football. Spain The frst ‘ultras’ groups emerged in the mid-1980s and replaced the less significant – in football terms – concept of socio (member). Epitomising the political tension and division that described Spain some ten years after Francisco

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Franco’s death in 1975, certain ‘ultras’ groups echoed state-centrism and favoured fascism and violence, whereas other ‘ultras’ groups denounced fascism and violence altogether and supported leftist ideologies while also promoting their regional identity, particularly, in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Hosting the 1982 FIFA World Cup exposed the developing Spanish fandom to the more mature fan identities from England, Italy, and Latin America, thus side-lining the more traditional Spanish fan clubs (peñas) to allow room for a novel breed of football fans – the ‘ultras.’ The peñas were formed in the 1950s and played an important role in creating a sense of belonging and identity, much-needed national sentiments that had been fawed and oppressed during Franco’s long repressive regime. Yet this kind of fandom was less appropriate for the younger fans that often felt marginalised by both the senior members of society and, of course, the regime. Seeking a more active fandom, not necessarily relating to violence, hosting the World Cup was obviously an ‘educational’ experience for those younger fans that favoured a more passionate fandom. Active and passionate fandom included the use of large fags that the Italian ‘ultras’ groups still display inside stadiums, but when the Spanish police prohibited their use, the ‘ultras’ adopted English elements of fandom such as chanting, fares, and other football paraphernalia. While elaborate choreographies remained central to Spanish fandom, the use of violence started gaining ground too. The Ultras Sur, a section of Real Madrid Club de Fútbol supporters, were increasingly becoming involved in violent incidents already by the end of the 1980s. Clubs responded by hiring private security companies and banning those violent fans from the stadium but were mostly ineffective in combatting hooliganism. ‘Ultras’ groups initially enjoyed considerable support from the clubs, either because of commercial reasons or for the genuine support they offered at home and away matches. In return, the ‘ultras’ were offered free tickets, a specifc area of the stadium to congregate and exhibit their displays, and even fnancing their travel to away games. ‘Ultras’ were also signifcant in infuencing a club’s politics, particularly, ahead of presidential elections. Alliances between presidential candidates and ‘ultras’ groups often constitute and shape the political reality of a club, thus maintaining a close relationship between the supporters and the club’s leadership. By the early 1990s, ‘ultras’ groups had multiplied, and violence had peaked in Spanish football. Infuenced by neo-fascist and national socialist movements, ‘ultras’ groups became more homogeneous in the ideology they expressed, the dress code adopted, and a ftting behaviour at football matches. The country’s political division across the different regions that make up the Spanish nation offered fertile ground for more serious, and violent, conficts to emerge between rival clubs and their corresponding ‘ultras’ groups. The state responded by signing the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sporting Events (1987), implementing the Sports Law (1990) and the related Royal Decree (1992), while also setting up the National

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Commission against Violence at Sporting Events (Comisión Nacional Contra la Violencia en Espectáculos Deportivos). UEFA’s requirement for all-seater stadiums also contributed much in reducing football-related violence, and by the mid-1990s, there was a signifcant decline in physical violence among fans. The ‘ultras’ were gradually substituting the use of violence with even more elaborate choreographies and displays to channel their fanatical support for the club, eventually reaffrming their connection to the club at the same time as becoming more involved in campaigns and projects addressing social issues such as poverty and racism. At the turn of the century, the politicisation of the ‘ultras’ group infuenced relations among them and fostered three main ideological streams: ultras sympathetic to National Socialism or neo-fascism (Ultras Sur, Brigadas Blanquiazules, Boixos Nois, Supporters Gol Sur, et cetera); groups with a radical left-wing association (for example: Peña Mujika, Herri Norte Taldea, Indar Gorri, Brigadas Amarillas, Sang Culé Cor Català); and largely non-political groups (Gol Gran, Almogávers, Orgullo Vikingo, Peña Juvenil Españolista, Colectivo 1932, Symmachiarii). The political antagonism between radical left and right wing fan groups has long been the main source of confict and violence in the Spanish ultra movement. But largely as a result of the increased effcacy of police control, violent confrontations between rival fan groups have decreased signifcantly, instead transforming into more ritualized forms of aggression (mainly threats and gestures).26 Ultimately, the political rivalry and confrontation between fans is best described in el clasico, the match between Real Madrid Club de Fútbol and Futbol Club Barcelona. Scotland The experience of a fan subject to a range of both overt and covert surveillance may well be perceived as police harassment for the only purpose of criminalising a kind of behaviour. Though repealed in April 2018, the above refects the implementation of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act in 2012, which authorised the use of law enforcement tactics supported by increased surveillance and intelligence gathering. The Act was introduced in the aftermath of a match between Celtic Football Club and Rangers Football Club in an attempt to eliminate sectarianism and anti-social behaviour from Scottish football. Even more problematic was the recruitment of Covert Human Intelligence Sources – informants, in plain English – necessary for intelligence gathering since they were required to collect information on fellow fans and share it with the authorities. The recruitment of fans for covert and overt police tactics could only help disrupt relations between fans and police and, worse,

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among fans once an informant was exposed. Moreover, the use of informants, no matter the context, only points towards the intended criminalisation of a certain community. Since the Act was repealed, the state response to football violence shifted from enhanced police surveillance and enforcement to dialogue with the fans and clubs, thus improving the relationship between all pertinent actors. Scottish police improved communication with fans through the social media and developed a strategy that allowed them to become more engaged with football fans. As part of his research, Atkinson interviewed a number of police offcers who “acknowledged that more sophisticated dialogue-based approaches, facilitated by social media, are required to help to explain those police tactics that could be considered by football fans, and ultras in particular, as problematic.”27 The formation of ‘ultras’ groups in Scottish football is a recent phenomenon. By default associated with violence and far-right politics, ‘ultras’ groups attract the attention of youth, “a demographic group that has traditionally been considered ‘police property,’” just as “there has emerged a tendency in some policing quarters to view ultras as problematic, antisocial, potentially violent, and worthy of police attention. This police attention has included the use of covert informants against ultras.”28 Poland Organised support in Polish football became more prevalent in the early 1970s, when visiting European clubs, and fans most importantly, inspired the behaviour of Polish football fans, before local rivalries started shaping the code of conduct among fans in Poland. That certain clubs were closely associated with the government, police, or army allowed the authorities to “channel the movement by setting up offcial fan clubs which received state sponsorship for their activity, including organisation of social events and trips to away matches,” even though “the real fan movement was a grass-roots initiative in opposition to the political system of the day.”29 A decade later, the culture of English hooliganism permeated Polish fandom at the same time as opposition to the regime echoed on the stands with slogans like Solidarność (solidarity) and Precz z komuną (down the communists). Football violence increased after the fall of communism for the most part of the 1990s, as violent incidents in football increased by the year, until 1997, when the government implemented the Mass Events Security Act (Ustawa z dnia 22 sierpnia 1997 roku o bezpieczeństwie imprez masowych). The Act brought about a lasting decline in football violence, the most common incidents involving the (illegal) use of pyrotechnics. Evidently, legislation, along with the introduction of fan cards, improved security, and the use of enhanced surveillance contributed much to the elimination of criminal behaviour from football stadiums. Although football hooliganism in Poland moved away from the stadiums, hooligans started training in martial arts and took part in related

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tournaments, thus displaying a higher level of commitment that allows them admission to hooligan formations. Denmark Police offcers in Denmark are educated in crowd management through the Event Policing Training Programme, with the offcers attending the programme possessing the necessary social and communication skills that would allow them to engage in dialogue with the fans. Following the successful completion of the programme, the so-called ‘dialogue offcers’ wear a distinctive yellow vest during matchdays, to distinguish themselves from ordinary offcers, and work in either pairs or small units while escorting visiting fans. Dialogue offcers are certainly a positive shift from the dominant presence of police forces in formation, usually equipped with riot gear and dogs, that was often deployed to football stadiums. Dialogue offcers have helped facilitate a positive relationship between fans and police. Riot police are only deployed when necessary to de-escalate a confict, since their presence alone is suffcient for exacting the opposite result – when a less-than-unruly incident escalates into a serious incident due to the force (ab)used by riot police. Although “the use of coercive force by defnition will harm the relationship between police and crowd,” “the use of coercive force can complement the dialogue offcers’ work and vice versa and thereby help to reduce an escalating confict in a way that is accepted by the majority of the crowd.”30 In Denmark, Ultras are particularly passionate and committed fans who have given themselves the task of providing atmosphere in the stadiums in an organized way, and this experience-orientated will to support the team non-stop for 90 min both acoustically and visually seems to form the denominator which many ultra groupings have in common. The ultra subculture has an element of provocation, rivalry, self-profling, and differentiation from other ultras and other fan groups, but the predominant part of the Danish ultras are not violent.31 The police, nevertheless, considers the ‘ultras’ as risk fans (category B fans), since clashes between ‘ultras’ groups and the police have recently increased. Whereas hooligans are classifed as high-risk fans (category C fans), ‘ultras’ refrain from engaging in violent incidents and even remain apolitical but can be very vocal when questioning sport and club-related policies. The Council of the European Union, in Council Resolution C322/1, “‘concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved,” defnes a ‘Risk’ Supporter

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as “A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event,” while a ‘Non-risk’ Supporter is “A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event.”32 Joern and Havelund support that, While football hooligans see violence as a legitimate part of their fan behaviour, the attitudes towards violence are more complex in the case of the ultras. Does the violence from these fans arise because the opportunity presents itself, that is, because some others start it and the ultras choose to take part in the “fun”? On the basis of the collected empirical data, the answer is clearly no. It cannot be denied that there are radical ultras that exhibit this kind of behaviour. But for the majority of the ultras this is not the case. This must especially be seen in the light of these supporters’ attitude to violence. Violence is not seen as a form of expressive action, but as a stylized, ritualized and at times also instrumentalized action.33 Danish ‘ultras’ reject violence and, instead, prefer to project their aggression through elaborate acoustic and visual displays during matchdays. The Netherlands Violence in football was relatively low until the early 1970s, when the frst ‘sides’ emerged, as Throughout the history of Dutch professional football some inter-fan fghting has occurred, but this fghting does not seem to have involved more than uncommon, spontaneous outbursts of spectator violence. Early incidents of spectator violence usually took the form of missile throwing or assaults on players or the referee. Spectator disorderliness was only occasionally directed at rival supporters. Incidents were usually triggered by events on the pitch, such as a controversial refereeing decision or defeat.34 Inspired by English hooligans travelling to the Netherlands to support their clubs, football violence increased from the mid-1970s onwards. A frst serious incident took place in the second leg of the 1974 UEFA Cup fnal between Tottenham Hotspur Football Club and Feyenoord Rotterdam. The frst match had ended in a 2-2 draw, the Dutch side beating their English opponents 2-0 in the second match. With over 200 fans injured after English hooligans attacked home fans, Tottenham Hotspur received a six-year ban for all European competitions. The Dutch authorities responded with a range

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of security measures, including the segregation of home and away fans, the presence of strong police forces at high-risk matches, fences separating different sections of the stadium, while football clubs invested in private security. Later, clubs would also employ technology in the form of CCTV cameras to eliminate violence from inside the stadiums. They were largely successful, however, as football violence continued away from the stadium. Evidently, containment policies have had the unintended consequence of (partially) displacing inter-fan fghting away from the grounds. Hooligan groups may go to great lengths to circumvent pervasive offcial controls and confront their rivals at unexpected times and locations, either spontaneously or pre-planned.35 Egypt Al Ahlawi, the ‘ultras’ group of Al Ahly Sporting Club, were formed in 2007. Attesting to their identity, ‘Al Ahly’ is Arabic for ‘national,’ Al Ahlawi declared their support for the Palestinians during a match against arch-rivals Zamalek Sporting Club in 2009 before the police used force to suppress the illegal demonstration – demonstrations expressing solidarity with the Palestinians were banned by the Hosni Mubarak regime. Ever since, the Al Ahly ‘ultras’ would become engaged in a constant battle against the police, reaching a height during the Egyptian revolution, when popular protests forced Mubarak to resign from president in 2011. On January 25, 2011, thousands of demonstrators occupied the Tahrir Square in Cairo protesting the regime. Shielding the crowds from police assaults and Mubarak’s supporters were the Al Ahlawi fans, as the times “of confronting the police had made the ultras the optimal guards of the revolution.”36 The Al Ahlawi ‘ultras’ were particularly active during the street fghts against police forces on the Qasr al-Nile bridge, thus allowing the anti-Mubarak demonstrators the opportunity to take over the Tahrir Square. It appears that The skills and techniques of breaking through concentrated police forces to get into stadiums were demonstrated by the Ultras during the clashes of the Qasr al-Nile bridge, the main entrance to Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. It was the Ultras that broke through the lines of police forces that attempted to close the bridge to stop the demonstrators from reaching the Tahrir Square. Mubarak supporters had instigated the so-called Battle of Camels (Mawqi’at al-Jamal); “when paid thugs riding on camels and horses and armed with swords, long knives and chains, attacked the demonstrators in an attempt to disperse,”37 the demonstrators but the ‘ultras,’ once again, resisted the attack. The following year, Al Ahly were visiting Al Masry Sporting Club in Port

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Said on February 1, 2012. Believed to be Mubarak supporters, Al Masry fans attacked the visiting fans, while “the police stood by people were slaughtered by knives and machetes, and thrown down from the terraces.”38 On the occasion, 74 fans were killed and more than 500 injured in one of Africa’s worst stadium disasters: the Ahlawi Ultras have insisted that the massacre of Port Said was orchestrated as an act of revenge by police forces and the army against Ahlawi Ultras for their central role in the revolution. The Ahlawi Ultras based this accusation on the fact that the police forces, the Central Security Forces and the army, who were supposed to secure the match largely stood by and did nothing to stop the attacks. These accusations by the Ahlawi Ultras have largely been confrmed by the footage from television stations that covered the match.39 Argentina Violence in Argentinian football is closely associated with the barras bravas, ferce groups of the more militant supporters who also engage in all sorts of illegal activities. Epitomising violence in Argentinian football are “the chants which ring around Argentinian stadiums, we can trace the contours of a worldview in which engagement in violence is an effective method of improving social capital and a necessary demonstration of personal honour, aguante and masculine virtue,” since “aggression and violence emerge as compulsory actions to prove one’s masculine bona fdes and inoculate oneself from such degradation.”40 Violence in football dates back to the late 1920s, perhaps even earlier, as groups of violent fans, known as barras de hinchas, fought to defend the club’s honour and defeat their rival fans by means of capturing their fags, emblems, and banners. Within this context, football violence throughout the 1930s and 1940s was not politically motivated for it was directed only against players, match offcials, and rival fans, just as violence concerned clashes with fans from neighbouring clubs in claiming control and authority over a specifc area of the city. With the emergence of the barras bravas, nevertheless, “violence became more organized, more political and more lethal in its consequences.”41 In the 1950s and 1960s, the wellestablished connection between politics and football (see Chapter 4) rendered violence more political. Following the military coup of 1966, violence in football was not plain political; it was militarised in that the barras bravas maintained a strict structure and hierarchy, operated under the leadership of a group of more experienced fans, usually recruiting members at a young age. Recruitment retained a symbolic signifcance for the members ought to pass a series of tests that demonstrated their commitment and allegiance to the group’s cause. In fact,

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Most of the activity of the barras bravas can be explained in terms of political motivation. They have connections with those involved in the running of their club, for instance a particular candidate for club presidente who needs their support. They might also take part in political demonstrations on behalf of the club padrino. Occasionally political action takes precedence over fútbol. It is not unknown for gaps to appear on the terraces where the barras bravas usually stand. This means they are otherwise engaged on political business.42 For their involvement in political activities, the barras bravas gradually developed a particular interest in gaining fnancial support for travelling to away matches and free or subsidised tickets. Since the restoration of democracy in 1983, violence in football reached unparalleled heights as the barras bravas sought to exploit the power vacuum that had emerged, a struggling economy, and social unrest. That much was the infuence of the barras bravas that the national football association even attained their services, as leading barras bravas were provided with both match tickets and air fares in 1986 in order to maintain the backing and co-operation of the barras bravas, while at the same time ensuring vocal support for Argentina at the World Cup Finals in Mexico.43 The infuence of the barras bravas often went beyond the kind of violence that was directed against rival fans and clubs, since they never hesitated attacking their own players and club managers, particularly when the club was underperforming (Club Atlético River Plate manager Daniel Passarella was attacked in February 1993), their attacks always serving some cause. Evidently, Abusive chanting in the stadium is another barras activity to destroy an unwanted player on the pitch. Chants at fútbol matches have little or nothing to do with events on the pitch. If the barras bravas chant abuse at a player when his contract is due to be renewed, it makes it much easier for the presidente to lower the conditions of his contract or can even provide the club with an excuse to get rid of him.44 Yet more intricate is the relationship between the barras bravas and police, as “It is not unknown for barras bravas from different clubs to unite when faced with police hostility and to become temporary allies,” just as “the police have also been criticized for their lack of action, or apparent indifference. Their passivity in certain situations has been considered by some to indicate complicity.”45 As is often the case, the role of the police in oppressed societies, as malign agents of the state, and the abuse of power that is effortlessly

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displayed makes them a ‘legitimate’ target, thus politicising the kind of violence directed against them. Indonesia On October 1, 2022, about 135 people, including two police offcers, died after clashes broke out inside the Kanjuruhan stadium in Malang. Soon after the match between Arema Football Club and Persatuan Sepakbola Surabaya ended, some 3,000 fans – as per the police estimate – of the former stormed onto the pitch following their club’s defeat. In their attempt to force the fans away from the pitch and back onto the stands, the police fred tear gas. Images and videos from inside the stadium showed police in riot gear, equipped with shields and batons, fring an excessive amount of tear gas against the fans. As fans tried to fee, many were trampled or choked to death. FIFA President Gianni Infantino criticised the police authorities for fring tear gas, since the FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations clearly stipulate that no “‘crowd control gas’ shall be carried or used.”46 In their turn, “regional police had criticized the Indonesian Football Association for negligence in not informing security forces that the procedures at a soccer match for using tear gas are different from those at demonstrations.”47 President Joko Widodo and related authorities ordered an investigation into the tragedy, as well as a safety review into football matches, and requested that the Football Association of Indonesia suspend all matches until stadium safety and security was improved. Eventually, a report published by Indonesia’s human rights commission concluded that most deaths were caused by asphyxiation and that the police used excessive force. Peru Yet a most disturbing incident in South America took place on May 24, 1964, when Peru was playing a qualifying match against Argentina in Lima. A draw would probably suffce for Peru to qualify for the 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo; therefore, when the referee disallowed their equaliser moments before the fnal whistle, two fans invaded the pitch, presumably, to confront him. Both fans were apprehended, yet their obvious mistreatment prompted other fans on the stands to throw missiles against the police. When the police responded by fring tear gas against them, fans were forced to fee the stadium but met locked exits. The stampede that followed caused more than 300 deaths. Those who managed to escape were confronted by the police outside the stadium with certain eyewitness accounts reporting that gunshots were fred against the exiting fans. Judge Benjamin Castaneda, appointed to investigate the tragic events at the Estadio Nacional, failed to recover any bodies with gunshot wounds.

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A Soviet cover-up On October 20, 1982, Football Club Spartak Moscow played hosts to Dutch football team Haarlemsche Football Club Haarlem at the Lenin Stadium during the second round of the UEFA Cup. Freezing temperatures (−10 °C) kept most fans at home, as about 15,000 attended the game, thus prompting the stadium’s offcials to partially open several stands at the centre of the stadium. As it often happens, and with the local team winning 1-0, Spartak fans decided on leaving early to avoid the much larger crowds that would soon after be descending the icy steps on their way to the Lenin Hills underground station. When Spartak scored a second goal, while on their way out, several fans attempted to return to their seats and celebrate the goal but were obstructed by other fans heading for the exit. On one account, the stampede had begun a little earlier when a woman lost her shoe on the icy steps and attempted to retrieve it, thus obstructing the exit way. Dutch journalist Iwan Tol, and author of the Drama in het Lenin-stadion (2007), presents a different account in that the smaller-than-expected number of Spartak Moscow fans that attended the game was a unique opportunity for the Soviet authorities to confront those fans better known for their opposition to the regime (see Chapter 4) – locking the exit gates and making arrests, Tol presumed, was the Soviet state’s approach to disbanding those fans.48 The stampede that followed caused the death of 66 fans. The tragic incident took place at a time when the attention of the Soviet authorities was concentrated on their ailing president, Leonid Brezhnev; therefore, only the Moscow-based daily Vechernaya Moskva briefy mentioned the following day that an incident had occurred during the match injuring some fans. When the story resurfaced in 1989, owing to Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness), several different witnesses’ accounts suggested that the actual number of fatalities was closer to 350.49 Some of those claiming that the actual number of victims was much higher than 66 also supported the theory of a state cover-up and even argued that bodies were disposed at mass burial sites. While the second part of this conspiracy theory must be inaccurate, nonetheless, it is rather clear that the Soviet state did not wish to draw attention. The initial reporting of 66 victims, nevertheless, would still make it the worst sports disaster in the history of the Soviet Union and modern-day Russia. United States Football-related violence in the United States is not as prevalent, as no ‘ultras’ groups or hooligan frms have been established yet. The American Outlaws, a group of fans that grew out of the Sam’s Alliance in 2007, operate more than 200 chapters around the world with over 19,000 members. While their name (outlaws) denotes criminal activities, “the analysis concluded that members of the American Outlaws should not be considered a frm or soccer hooligans

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in the same manner as English or Brazilian soccer hooligans at this time.”50 Their website states that In a sea of American football, baseball, and NASCAR fans we felt we were “outlaws” of the sports world; supporting a sport that most people didn’t know much about or cared little about. We decided to take the moniker of the “outlaw” and be proud of it.51 Conclusion Over the years, hooliganism in football has taken many different shapes and forms in countries around the world, with violence always at the epicentre of every manifestation. Hooliganism exploded in British stadiums in the 1960s, the same decade Britain witnessed an explosion in music and fashion, the skinhead subculture and the British National Party, a growing distrust of the establishment, increased immigration, and, of course, England winning the 1966 FIFA World Cup. And just as the British had exported the popular game of football to the rest of the world several decades ago, the British were about to export a by-product of football that spread over Europe like a pandemic, the ‘English disease.’ Yet despite the fact that violence in football has long been considered a worldwide phenomenon, certain aspects of it continue to evade academic attention. The absence of an all-encompassing defnition of football hooliganism is telling. Various studies have attempted to relate hooliganism to a range of different causes of violence from the conventional such as unemployment, lack of education, alcohol consumption, and drug abuse, to the unconventional like the ever-growing signifcance of security during the Cold War division of Europe and its ideological impact on society. A more convenient explanation of the phenomenon would, of course, suggest that society forced the skinhead movement in England or the student movement in Italy to embrace violence, but any such approach would not possibly account for the roligans in Denmark or the Tartan Army in Scotland. While more credible, the same could be argued about the role of masculinity in hooliganism. Interestingly, hooliganism has survived state legislation, police tactics, surveillance techniques, as well as the measures adopted by football’s governing bodies, and continues to trouble societies. Perhaps violence in and around stadiums has been signifcantly reduced, owing to the above, but it has not been eradicated since rival hooligan groups nowadays meet at predetermined locations. Moreover, the case studies examined here clearly indicate that certain characteristics attributed to hooliganism are specifc to national, political, and cultural settings and not universal or even uniform. Likewise, football-related violence shares several features across the world; nevertheless, their causes appear to differ much from one setting to another. That violence in football often refects cultural and political motivations relating to

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identity should not suggest that the perpetrators come from a similar cultural or political background or that they share and express similar socio-economic concerns. Hence, the many similarities that describe football hooliganism are at the same time counter-balanced by as many differences related to the very same phenomenon. The only condition that remains constant regardless of the setting is when hooligans are viewed as potential foot soldiers, consumers, and voters. Notes 1 World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health, edited by Etienne G. Krug, Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi, and Rafael Lozano, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002, 5. 2 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, reprinted from Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 4. 3 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, reprinted from Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 8. 4 Ramón Spaaij, “Football Hooliganism as a Transnational Phenomenon: Past and Present Analysis: A Critique – More Specifcity and Less Generality,” International Journal of the History of Sport, 24: 4, 411–431, 2007, 412. 5 Joel Rookwood, and Ramón Spaaij, “Violence in Football (Soccer): Overview, Prevalence, and Risk Factors,” in The Wiley Handbook of Violence and Aggression, Vol. 3 Social Interventions, New York: Wiley, Peter Sturmey (ed.), 2017, 6. 6 Jamie Cleland, and Ellis Cashmore, “Football Fans’ Views of Violence in British Football: Evidence of a Sanitized and Gentrifed Culture,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 40: 2, 124–142, 2016, 124. 7 Jamie Cleland, and Ellis Cashmore, “Football Fans’ Views of Violence in British Football: Evidence of a Sanitized and Gentrifed Culture,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 40: 2, 124–142, 2016, 125. 8 Ramon Spaaij, “Men Like Us, Boys Like Them: Violence, Masculinity, and Collective Identity in Football Hooliganism,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 32: 4, 369–392, 2008, 375. 9 Council of Europe, European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and In Particular at Football Matches, 19 August 1985, 1. 10 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2015) 1 of the Standing Committee on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches and other Sports Events, European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in Particular at Football Matches, Standing Committee, 4 August 2015, 7. 11 Home Offce, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Inquiry by the RT HON Lord Justice Taylor, Interim Report, August 1989, 50. 12 The Guardian, The Great Betrayal: How the Hillsborough Families Were Failed by the Justice System, by David Conn, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2021/oct /21/the-great-betrayal-how-the-hillsborough-families-were-failed-by-the-justice -system, 21 October 2021. 13 Home Offce, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Inquiry by the RT HON Lord Justice Taylor, Interim Report, August 1989, 40. 14 Home Offce, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Inquiry by the RT HON Lord Justice Taylor, Interim Report, August 1989, 49.

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15 Home Offce, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Inquiry by the RT HON Lord Justice Taylor, Interim Report, August 1989, 50. 16 Home Offce, Official Statistics, Football-Related Arrests and Banning Orders, England and Wales: 2021 to 2022 Season, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/football-related-arrests-and-banning-orders-england-and-wales-2021-to -2022-season/football-related-arrests-and-banning-orders-england-and-wales -2021-to-2022-season, 22 September 2022. 17 The Baroness Casey Review, An Independent Review of Events Surrounding the UEFA Euro 2020 Final “Euro Sunday” at Wembley, December 2021. 18 Home Offce, Official Statistics, Football-Related Arrests and Banning Orders, England and Wales: 2020 to 2021 Season, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/football-related-arrests-and-banning-orders-england-and-wales-2020-to -2021-season/football-related-arrests-and-banning-orders-england-and-wales -2020-to-2021-season, 14 October 2021. 19 Jon Garland, and Michael Rowe, “The Hooligan’s Fear of the Penalty,” Soccer & Society, 1: 1, 144–157, 2000, 149. 20 European Parliament, Crowd Control Technologies: An Appraisal of Technologies for Political Control, Final Study, Luxembourg, June 2000, lviii. 21 Matthew Guschwan, “Riot in the Curve: Soccer Fans in Twenty-First Century Italy,” Soccer & Society, 8: 2, 250–266, 2007, 254. 22 Matthew Guschwan, “Riot in the Curve: Soccer Fans in Twenty-First Century Italy,” Soccer & Society, 8: 2, 250–266, 2007, 255. 23 Matthew Guschwan, “Fan Politics: Dissent and Control at the Stadium,” Soccer & Society, 17: 3, 388–402, 2016, 395. 24 Alberto Testa, “The All-Seeing Eye of State Surveillance in the Italian Football (Soccer) Terraces: The Case Study of the Football Fan Card,” Surveillance & Society 16: 1, 69–83, 2018, 76. 25 Alberto Testa, “The All-Seeing Eye of State Surveillance in the Italian Football (Soccer) Terraces: The Case Study of the Football Fan Card,” Surveillance & Society 16: 1, 69–83, 2018, 77. 26 Ramón Spaaij, and Carles Viñas, “Passion, Politics and Violence: A SocioHistorical Analysis of Spanish Ultras,” Soccer & Society, 6: 1, 79–96, 2005, 90. 27 Colin Atkinson, “‘Football Fans Are Not Thugs’: Communication and the Future of Fan Engagement in the Policing of Scottish Football,” Policing and Society, 32: 4, 472–488, 2022, 480. 28 Colin Atkinson, Maureen McBride, and Allan Moore, “Pitched! Informants and the Covert Policing of Football Fans in Scotland,” Policing and Society, 31: 7, 863–877, 2020, 873. 29 Radosław Kossakowski, “Where are the Hooligans? Dimensions of Football Fandom in Poland,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 52: 6, 693– 711, 2017, 3. 30 Rasmus Beedholm Laursen, “Danish Police Practice and National Football Fan Crowd Behaviour: Dialogue or Coercive Force?” Soccer & Society, 20: 2, 325– 340, 2019, 332. 31 Lise Joern, and Jonas Havelund, “Ultras in Denmark: The New Football Thugs?” Soccer & Society, 21: 1, 50–60, 2018, 50. 32 Council of the European Union, “Council Resolution, Concerning an Updated Handbook with Recommendations for International Police Cooperation and Measures to Prevent and Control Violence and Disturbances in Connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension,” in which at least one Member State is involved, Offcial Journal of the European Union, C 322/1, 29 December 2006, 18.

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33 Lise Joern, and Jonas Havelund, “Ultras in Denmark: The New Football Thugs?” Soccer & Society, 21: 1, 50–60, 2018, 54. 34 Ramón Spaaij, “Football Hooliganism in the Netherlands: Patterns of Continuity and Change,” Soccer & Society, 8: 2, 316–334, 2007, 318. 35 Ramón Spaaij, “Football Hooliganism in the Netherlands: Patterns of Continuity and Change,” Soccer & Society, 8: 2, 316–334, 2007, 324. 36 Dag Tuastad, “From Football Riot to Revolution: The Political Role of Football in the Arab World,” Soccer & Society, 15: 3, 376–388, 2014, 378. 37 Shawki El-Zatmah, “From Terso into Ultras: The 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the Radicalization of the Soccer’s Ultra-Fans,” Soccer & Society, 13: 5, 801–813, 2012, 808. 38 Dag Tuastad, “From Football Riot to Revolution: The Political Role of Football in the Arab World,” Soccer & Society, 15: 3, 376–388, 2014, 379. 39 Shawki El-Zatmah, “From Terso into Ultras: The 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the Radicalization of the Soccer’s Ultra-Fans,” Soccer & Society, 13: 5, 801–813, 2012, 808. 40 William Huddleston, “Kicking Off: Violence, Honour, Identity and Masculinity in Argentinian Football Chants,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 57: 1, 34–53, 2021, 49. 41 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 105. 42 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 108. 43 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 108. 44 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 111. 45 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 109. 46 FIFA, FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations, 2021, 32. 47 Deutsche Welle, Indonesia: 125 Killed after “Riots” at Football Match, https://www .dw.com/en/indonesia-125-killed-after-riots-at-football-match/a-63310088, 2 October 2022. 48 The Telegraph, The Dark, Hidden Horror of Russia’s Grand World Cup Centrepiece, by Sam Wallace, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-cup/2018/06/06/dark-hidden-horror-russias-grand-world-cup-centrepiece/, 6 June 2018. 49 The Guardian, Moscow’s Secret Tragedy – Hundreds of Fans Crushed to Death, by Jim Riorda, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2008/may/04/championsleague, 4 May 2008. 50 Mike Stocz, and Evan Frederick, “Is the Disease Spreading? A Case Study of the American Outlaws,” Soccer & Society, 20: 6, 836–847, 2019, 9. 51 American Outlaws, About the American Outlaws, https://theamericanoutlaws.com /about.

Chapter 4

Nationalism in football

Introduction Many studies have argued in support of football’s unique capacity to strengthen national identity and inspire national sentiments. The game of football was frst organised and regulated in Britain before its diffusion to other countries in continental Europe and further across the world. Football’s development coincided with the industrial revolution and, therefore, took place during the times of mass urbanisation, as people left the rural areas of the country looking for better living standards in cities and new employment opportunities at factories. It was also the time of nation-building and football would be soon representing entire communities, as the frst football clubs emerged, and even nations once national associations had formed. This chapter explores the impact of nationalism on football, for the popular game not only has the capacity to reinforce national identity, but it has also contextualised popular culture in the most colourful way available. The expansion of football, once organised and regulated in England, coincided with the process of nationbuilding and thus, the game was developed in parallel with the re-emergence of nationalism in Europe and across the European powers’ colonies abroad. Football games between local rivals transpired into short-lived skirmishes between neighbouring communities, just as matches involving national teams were dominated by national anthems and fags, with football facilitating the promotion of a distinct sense of identity. Throughout the twentieth century, football endured the oppression of fascist and communist regimes, fought wars of independence against imperial powers, and even came to a standstill to mourn the demise of the Queen of the United Kingdom. Nationalism Within a political context, nations are modern creations, though the concept of ethnicity dates back several hundreds of years. Political science understands a nation to be a group of people constituting a distinct political community that is clearly defned in terms of sovereignty. Historically, the nation

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-5

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deviates from its rigid political interpretation and is a construct of the liberal ideas that emerged around the period of Enlightenment. The French and American revolutions of the late eighteenth century, in particular, also attributed to nationalism its revolutionary viewpoint from which the right to selfdetermination would later emerge. Thus, nationalism focuses on the process whereby nations are awakened and mobilised to seek independence. It was the more liberal ideas of the time that brought about the ‘spring of nations’ in the second half of the nineteenth century, a time of political upheaval across Europe, when a wave of revolutions enthused the creation of nation-states and replaced old monarchies with the political system of democracy. Observing the historical development of nationalism and, subsequently, the nations’ attempt to secure independence and become states, the question of whether nationalism precedes nations, or the opposite, continues to trouble historians and theorists alike. When perceived as a political entity defned within the context of power, cultural traditions, myths, and related narratives probably do not suffce as evidence enough for the emergence of a nation. Aristotle, for one, would argue that nations predate nationalism, for man is a political animal best characterised by the inherent need that is the sense of belonging, whether to serve the need for survival or to associate. In the fnal quarter of the nineteenth century, the appeal of the Enlightenment declined enough to make room for political irrationalism to grow. The prominence of culture and biology were favoured over concepts denoting democracy and citizenship when defning a nation, and characteristics like common origins, language, religion, and purity of blood separated the notion of people from that of nation, as the latter became defned by political power. Nationalism became more aggressive and all-expansive, and national movements were governed by a strong sense of intolerance. New national identities were forged, not necessarily coinciding with the more traditional defnition of nation, as certain ethnic groups (e.g., Jews, Roma) were excluded and alienated from the new construct. Eventually, segregation would lead to discrimination and persecution since the political elite of the new nations demanded ethnic homogeneity. It is this form of ultra-nationalism that contextualised the necessary ideological framework in fascism that gave way to two world wars in the frst half of the twentieth century. Despite the multitude of defnitions available on nationalism, they all end up contextualised in one of three main theoretical perspectives. Primordialism argues that nations have always existed merely because history dictates so; modernism views nationalism as an ideology that brings people together; and ethno-symbolism offers a much different viewpoint arguing that nations are novel. Generally, a nation is “a named human population occupying an historic territory, and sharing myths, memories, a single public culture and common rights and duties for all members,”1 as Anthony Smith suggested. For a more concise description, one may well decide on employing

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Benedict Anderson’s defnition of the nation as “an imagined political community.”2 Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann, on the other hand, suggest that nations are a political construct. To Giddens, it is those symbols and beliefs that are frst generated and then reproduced by the elite that have been instrumental in constructing a nation. Governing a certain territory of land is also key to understanding the emergence of nations, particularly when the use of violence has contributed to defning a nation’s borders. Violence is also central to Mann’s argument for he understands the creation of nations as a political process whereby the use of military force has been of paramount signifcance. Unless, of course, you prefer the more ftting defnition of Eric Hobsbawm, who argued that “the identity of a nation of millions, seems more real as a team of eleven named people.”3 When Hobsbawm discussed the term ‘invention of tradition,’ nevertheless, he was advancing the notion that the cultural signifcance of ethnic symbols is exploited by the elite to preserve its power and authority, therefore, indicating that nations were formed and identifed via a political process. Even though Smith disputes the elite’s ability to manipulate a nation’s sentiments when constructing ethnic identity, he acknowledges that manipulating cultural icons often helps create a sense of belongingness. In politics, and political science, power is the all-important factor that helps defne authority, since exercising it separates the rulers from the ruled. Recognising one’s power, in terms of acknowledging it, is signifcant in that power-related disputes are usually avoided; in the context of identifying it, however, it is often more complex. To distinguish rulers of all sorts, governing institutions, military forces, and, more recently, corporations, employing visual symbols became imperative. Smith’s concept of ethno-symbolism is closely related to our approach here in that Ethnosymbolism underlines the continuity between premodern and modern forms of social cohesion, without overlooking the changes brought about by modernity. The persisting features in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols. This is a complex set of elements that Smith tends to use interchangeably, often without suffcient specifcation to allow critical analysis or easy application.4 Along the same lines, Pål Kolstø argues that Smith treats the symbols of the nation as part of the ethno-cultural heritage which modern nationalists can make use of to forge a national unity and identity. Not only symbols, but the myths, values, and memories of the group also fulfl the same function.5

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Moreover, National identity is not an innate quality in human beings, neither is it acquired naturally as one grows up. Like any other identity, national identity has to be learnt. Important instruments in any learning process are various kinds of audiovisual aids, and so also in the school of national identity construction. That is why national symbols—fags, coats of arms, national anthems—play such a crucial role in nationbuilding and nation-maintenance.6 Sport has the capacity to reinforce national identity, and football, in particular, “has provided the most important setting within popular culture in which symbols and discourses of national identity may be displayed and mediated through mass communication.”7 The United Nations’ understanding, too, is that Sport has the power to teach teamwork, to bind communities together and to support nation-building. Elite sport in particular has the power to provide a nation with a national identity and renewed national pride, and also to project a positive image to the international community.8 In international relations, secession denotes a territory aiming to break away from a parent state. Central to a state’s existence are both its recognition by other states and its capacity to govern over a given territory and population – also stated in the 1931 Montevideo Convention. For much of the Cold War, it is noteworthy, unilateral acts of secession were mostly unsuccessful merely because the international community, and international law for that matter, was not prepared to recognise any such act. One such occasion was the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983), following Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Once the Cold War ended, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation, for example, revived the scholarly debate on secession. Comparing to the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and, later, Kosovo’s secession produced the necessary grounds for more debate. Likewise, irredentism refers to the process of annexation of a territory from one parent state to another. Recognition, once again, is much needed for the new, enlarged state to function properly and maintain its international relations. Irredentism, in other words, concerns the annexation of, usually, adjacent territory only when ethnic, linguistic, and cultural connections are present. Distinct but closely related to separatism, irredentism is an expression of ethno-nationalism.

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Heraldry It is within the context of ethno-symbolism that heraldry serves us well here. Heraldry was invented to address the second dimension of recognition of power. While some believe the term is Anglo-Saxon for ‘army’ (here) and ‘strength’ (wald), it is also possible that it derives from ‘herault,’ Old French for ‘herald,’ the messenger or proclaimer who in medieval times often exercised the function of a diplomat. Merely by their appearance, their costumes bore witness to their membership of a group or sovereign power, so that they would be unmistakably recognized from the enemy camp.9 Banners, fags, and shields were widely used for communicating power and status, since their large, fat surface was more easily identifable. On the battlefeld, the emblems decorating shields separated friend from foe. Yet heraldry does not merely serve to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them,’ for it is a distinct form of art that has the capacity to illustrate the political, historical, and cultural background of the individual, house, or community an emblem represents. Cornel Sandvoss argues that Communities constructed through football fandom are imagined in a double sense. Firstly, they are imagined in content as individual fans claim membership of such a community drawing on their individual reading of the values and attributes that the members of the community are imagined to have in common. Secondly, such communities are imagined in structure in the sense in which Anderson describes nations as imagined communities. Anderson argues that the nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” Football fans are part of an imagined community, whose borders as much as content are imagined by every individual member.10 (original emphasis) The most signifcant heraldic design is the coat of arms, usually decorating a shield. The coat of arms often includes a crest, resting atop a helmet, thus denoting the bearer’s socio-political background. When a crown decorates a coat of arms, for example, it signifes royalty. The ‘supporters’ of the shield, always standing in an upright position, symbolise loyalty. The fnal piece of signifcance on a coat of arms is the badge, an object that highlights the innermost qualities of the bearer. Unfortunately, little was documented when heraldry was still developing into this abstract form of art, since the frst relevant publication dates back to the thirteenth century in Bartolo da

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Sassoferrato’s Treatise on Insignia and Arms (Tractatus de insigniis et armis). Soon after, the political entities that are states, cities, and towns were more accurately represented through a coat of arms. In fact, entire communities, nations, employed a coat of arms to succinctly display copious amounts of political, historical, and cultural properties on a single emblem. The coat of arms of the former Soviet Union, for example, featured the ideological symbols of communism, the hammer and sickle, with a globe on the background, positioned underneath the dominant red star, while the message at the bottom urged all workers to unite. Given the infuence of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe, football clubs adopting the red star as part of their emblem is certainly not surprising. The original badge of Steaua Bucharest featured a red star, as does the emblem of CSKA Moscow, CSKA Sofa, Fudbalski Klub Partizan Fudbalski Klub, Crvena Zvezda (also known as Red Star Belgrade), and Klubi Futboll Partizani Tirana. In Israel, all ‘Hapoel’ clubs (Hapoel Be’er Sheva, Hapoel Tel Aviv, Hapoel Petah Tikva, and Hapoel Ramat Gan) feature the hammer and sickle on their emblem to denote their leftist ideology. In a similar fashion, several Spanish football clubs were awarded royal status, real, by King Alfonso XIII. The original badge of Madrid Club de Fútbol, the most celebrated of all ‘Real’ clubs, only featured the club’s initials before adding a crown to its emblem and changing its name to Real Madrid Club de Fútbol. In terms of international football, most of the national football associations around the world have either adopted the national coat of arms and national fag or other national symbols to project their distinct identity through the game of football. Richard Giulianotti and Gerry Finn concur, stressing that By the outbreak of WWII, football internationals or national cup fnals had become crucial sites for the popular re-production of dominant forms of national identity. These fundamental, state-centered rituals came to conjoin the national fag, the national anthem, the nation’s top players and the nation’s VIPs. Football thus provides the pretext through which the ‘imagined community’ of fellow nationals may be reached and unifed.11 Once upon a time, emblematic banners commanded armies in battle; today, the same banners accompany national teams on the football pitch. Despite the multitude of football clubs sporting a badge that relates to their immediate community and surrounding environment, nevertheless, the emblem that best describes the connection between club and nation is that of Futbol Club Barcelona. Emphasising Catalan identity, the club’s emblem features the red cross of St. George, the patron saint of Catalonia, and the red and yellow colours of the senyera, the Catalan fag. More suitably, the club’s motto is més que un club (Catalan for ‘more than a club’). Evidently, the club

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is synonymous with the concept of Catalanism (Catalanisme), the movement in support of Catalan independence. Wolfram Pyta argued that “Region” as a cultural space needs a set of meaning carriers which act as regional trademarks and show affliation to a region. Football was predestined to adapt to regional traditions, because it heightened the impact of large cities in their metropolitan area. Such large cities provided services for a region; from the 1920s, sports in general and especially the fourishing sport of football formed a part of this. Football played an important role insofar as certain cities could be established as central locations. Football clubs were especially suited to acting as the fgurehead and focal point of a large city and its metropolitan area because the teams usually consisted of players born in that city or region who spoke in the local dialect and therefore achieved a high degree of identifcation.12 When Catalonia held a referendum for independence on October 1, 2017, ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court a month earlier, the club openly demonstrated its support in the following statement: In the wake of the events that have transpired in recent days and, especially, today, with regard to the current political situation in Catalonia, FC Barcelona, in remaining faithful to its historic commitment to the defense of the nation, to democracy, to freedom of speech, and to selfdetermination, condemns any act that may impede the free exercise of these rights. Therefore, FC Barcelona publicly expresses its support for all people, entities, and institutions that work to guarantee these rights. FC Barcelona, in holding the utmost respect for its diverse body of members, will continue to support the will of the majority of Catalan people, and will do so in a civil, peaceful and exemplary way.13 The above statement clearly revealed the club’s support of the referendum but made no direct reference in support of Catalan independence. While noting the club’s continuous role in defending the nation, the statement was so cautiously worded as to remain apolitical and, ultimately, failed to position itself in favour of independence. Fascism With economic decline and social unrest dominating the political landscape of Germany following defeat in the First World War and the Great Depression, Adolf Hitler’s rise to power was unsurprising. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party revived imperial aspirations for greatness and underlined the natural superiority of the German nation. The German Football Association

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(Deutscher Fußball-Bund), too, served the Nazi ideology proper, when it terminated the activities of football clubs associated with either communist or religious ideals, just as it banned all Jewish football players in 1933. Despite the fact that the Deutscher Fußball-Bund was seemingly immersed in Nazi ideology, It has been only since the turn of the century that historians have scrutinised the role played by football in the Third Reich. For half a century both the football authorities and the clubs were not too keen on opening their archives to researchers. Rather than exploring and discussing the facts, they preferred to refer to the very vague, often exonerating narratives that could be found in the occasional commemorative publication.14 Then, a few days before commemorating the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp, the Deutscher Fußball-Bund released on January 31, 2020, the following statement: Next Monday, when 75 years to the day will have passed since the liberation of the Auschwitz extermination camp, the ‘Remembrance Day in German Football’ will be held for the 16th time. From the beginning, the Holocaust Memorial Day has been promoted and supported by the German Football Association (DFB). This year, however, we feel a special responsibility, since in addition to the many Jewish victims, the more than 20,000 Sinti and Roma murdered in Auschwitz are also remembered. This is because former DFB President Felix Linnemann, who headed the association from 1925 to 1945, was directly involved in the registration of Sinti and Roma as head of the Hanover Criminal Investigation Department, which was the preliminary stage for their deportation to Auschwitz. Several hundred people are said to have been deported to the extermination camp on the basis of an order signed by Linnemann and killed there. This incomprehensible horror, this unprecedented suffering that has been inficted on people, hurts all the more because football, which today stands for understanding and diversity and against racism and discrimination, did not resist at that time. On the contrary: it was complicit. It is therefore our special duty to ensure that these crimes are never forgotten. Especially today, when not everyone in Germany wants to remember them. We owe this not only to the millions of victims, but also to future generations. It is exemplary and an important signal how Eintracht Frankfurt is facing up to this responsibility this weekend.15 No doubt, football in Germany had been complicit. The banning of Jews and the enlisting of young football players with the Hitler Youth were the tools that harnessed football in Nazi Germany. In the process of nationalising

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and nazifying the game, clubs were forced to change names, players were requested to give the fascist salute, and stadiums were decorated with banners featuring the all-important swastika. The crumbling Spanish Empire of the early twentieth century was the cause for the economic decline and social unrest that described Spain’s political landscape until the early 1920s, when General Miguel Primo de Rivera installed a dictatorship in 1923. The Second Spanish Republic (1931–1936), too, failed to bring about political stability, as consecutive elections between 1931 and 1936 only served to highlight Spain’s deep political division, until General Francisco Franco declared a state of war. Franco’s political ambitions projected a strong sense of militarism that infltrated Spanish society – football included. Similar to Nazi Germany, the Royal Spanish Football Federation (Real Federación Española de Fútbol) was subdued to the regime’s control, while football players were asked to give the fascist salute and sing the fascist anthem Cara dell Sol before shouting Arriba España! Viva Franco. According to the 1941 directives of the Home Offce Department for Press and Propaganda (Delegacion Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda), clubs were forced to change names to become more Hispanic (Football Club Barcelona became Club de Futbol de Barcelona), just as the cup competition (Copa del Rey, the King’s Cup) was renamed Copa del Generalísimo, the General’s Cup. The regime assumed control of the National Board of Sport (Delegación Nacional de Deportes) and, therefore, of the Royal Spanish Football Federation, with General José Moscardó Ituarte at its helm. Under his command, football training included military-focused gymnastics, biological records were kept for all players, all English football terminology was translated into Spanish, and Spain’s red shirt was replaced by the dark blue of the fascist party. Football stadiums in the Basque Country and Catalonia were the only places where the Spanish could protest the oppressive tactics of the regime and use the Basque and Catalan languages without fear of apprehension. Athletic Bilbao already refected an unyielding sense of nationalism, for they adopted, as early as 1919, a Basque-only policy in terms of player recruitment under the infuence of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasca). During Franco’s era, the Basque identity, in particular, was repressed as the local language, customs, and national symbols such as the Ikurrina (the offcial fag of the Basque Country) were all banned in public places. The Azzuri, Italy’s national football team, represent the nation in their iconic blue, azzurro in Italian, thus honouring the Royal House of Savoy. The signifcance of Italian nationalism is well refected in its impact on football, since the national association of football (Federazione Italiana Football) decided in 1908 to place all those football clubs featuring foreign players into a different, lower league and preferred that only all-Italian clubs competed for the championship. Similarly, the association was renamed the year after into Federazione Italiana del Giuoco del Calcio, thus making reference to

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the Italian version of football in the Florentine game of calcio. In essence, the mere reference to calcio “perpetuated the myth of a pre-existing native version of the game. It was a classic example of the acculturation process which almost always requires a phase of nationalisation to ensure the success of an imported cultural practice.”16 Under Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime, football players were asked to give the Roman salute before kick-off, clubs were forced to change names (Associazione Calcio Milan became Milano and Internazionale was renamed Ambrosiana, named after the patron saint of Milan), Jewish football players were banned, all English football terminology was translated into Italian, and massive football stadiums were constructed to refect the regime’s grandeur, such as the Stadio Mussolini in Turin and the Stadio del Littoriale in Bologna. To make football more competitive, the regime never hesitated merging local teams, as Palestra Gimnastica Libertas and Club Sportivo di Firenze merged to form Associazione Calcio Firenze Fiorentina, and L’Alba, La Fortitudo, and La Roman merged to form Associazione Sportiva Roma. Building local rivalries such as Torino Football Club v. Juventus Football Club, AC Milan v. Inter Milan, and Genoa Cricket and Football Club v. Unione Calcio Sampdoria also helped promote the military ethos of the regime. It was success at international level, however, that emphasised the superiority of fascism, when Italy was crowned world champion in 1934 and 1938 and achieved gold medals in the 1936 Olympic Games. Communism In Eastern Europe, football was employed to project the ideological superiority of communism over capitalism. Football was a team sport and, therefore, suitable for projecting the ethos of communism, the political importance of sport lay in its potential for demonstrating the superiority of communism over capitalism by winning more trophies. Football in Eastern Europe provided an opportunity for crystallizing nationalist sentiment. In communist years, national teams retained a prominent position in the hearts and minds of the nation and support for the national team could easily be construed as support for the regime. Main features of football in Eastern Europe were an ethos of good sportsmanship (demonstrating the moral pre-eminence of socialist man) and teamwork (confrming superiority of collectivism). National legends at this time were more likely to be teams rather than individuals.17 The great Hungarian national team of the 1950s, for instance, was the epitome of what Hungarian coach Guzstav Sebes described as “socialist football.”18 Success at international level, in particular, was of paramount importance to all communist regimes – more so to the Soviet Union. Yet success, such

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as Football Club Dynamo Kyiv winning the European Cup-Winners’ Cup in 1975, was a rare phenomenon. Throughout the Cold War period, Eastern European nations only succeeded in winning the European Championship twice and managed to win seven gold medals in Olympic football tournaments. The construction of massive stadiums (Bucharest’s 23 August Stadionul, 65,000 capacity; Budapest’s Nepstadion, 72,000; Chorzow’s Slaski Stadion, 70,000; Kiev’s Centralny Stadion, 100,000; Moscow’s Centralny Stadion, 100,000; Sofa’s Vasilij Levski Stadion, 55,000) was also central to the communist regimes’ objectives, as they increased employment while also operating as political arenas once completed. Football players had no professional status and were not allowed to transfer to Western Europe unless a player had both turned 30 and represented his country. They were, usually, paid by the organisation or institution that funded the club; Lokomotiv Moscow, for example, was funded by the rail workers’ union and Torpedo Moscow by a car manufacturer. Other clubs were sponsored by the army or the secret services and related state ministries, such as CSKA Moscow, CSKA Sofa, Dukla Prague, Honved Budapest, Steaua Bucharest, and Red Star Belgrade. They were particularly successful for they recruited the most promising and talented young players enrolled for military service. CSKA Sofa were crowned champions a record 27 times, Red Star Belgrade 16 times, Steaua Bucharest 14, Honved Budapest 12, and Dukla Prague 11 times. Ever since the collapse of communism, of all clubs sponsored by the army only Red Star Belgrade, CSKA Sofa, and Steaua Bucharest are still popular with fans. Dukla Prague, on the other hand, failed to maintain support and was dissolved in 1996. Every ‘Dynamo’ or ‘Dinamo’ club, based in Bucharest, Dresden, Kiev, Moscow, Prague, Sofa, Tbilisi, Tirana, and Zagreb, was supported by the secret services and they were all equally successful. The club in Tirana amassed 14 championships, Bucharest 13 times, Kiev 12, Moscow 11, and Dresden 8. Under the more oppressive regime in East Germany, Dynamo Berlin was the better team, as well as the team that Erich Mielke, Minister of State Security, supported. Interestingly, Mielke was also head of the Dynamo Sports Association and had the successful team of Dynamo Dresden relocate to Berlin in 1954 and change name. In Hungary, MTK was supported by the secret police, whereas arch-rivals Ferencvaros opposed the regime, its fans taking part in the 1956 Uprising. Likewise, Spartak Moscow, named after the slave who rebelled against the Roman Empire, also opposed the regime and never received any support from the Soviet political or military elite. Needless to say, merging clubs and changing names was also common to communist regimes, as Levski Sofa – named after the hero who fought against the Turks – was renamed Dynamo Sofa, Bohemians Prague changed to Spartak Stalingrad, Slavia Prague became Dynamo Prague, and Sparta Prague was renamed Spartak Sokolovo. Yugoslav football was representative of the multi-ethnic character of the country, drawing support from all ethnic groups. Football in Yugoslavia was a unifying force bringing together Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians,

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Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes, thus creating a diverse sporting environment of different ethnic groups that also practised different religions. The multi-ethnic composition of Yugoslavia in the post-war period was highlighted in the composition of the national team: Out of 34 footballers who wore the national team jersey in the period between 1945 and 1948, 22 were Croats (65%), 10 were Serbs (29%), one was ethnic Hungarian (3%) and one was Slovene (3%). If we compare the ethnic composition of the national team with the census of 1948, by which some 42% of Serbs and 24% of Croats lived in Yugoslavia, we can see a major disproportion.19 During the Second World War, however, the few clubs that remained active joined an Italian-sponsored league, a decision that condemned them to extinction as soon as the war came to an end. HNK Hajduk Split, on the other hand, opposed fascism, became synonymous with the Yugoslav resistance, the Partisans, and was the team Marshall Tito supported. When the Yugoslav Army requested that the club move to Belgrade, HNK Hajduk Split rejected; therefore, Partizan Belgrade was formed to represent the army. In the 1980s, the kind of political instability that characterised the country was refected in the four leading football clubs promoting national aspirations as Red Star fans (Delije) advanced Serb nationalism, Dinamo Zagreb fans (Bad Blue Boys) and Hajduk Split fans (Torcida) supported Croat national sentiments, FK Sarajevo fans (Horde Zla) advocated separatism, and FK Budućnost Podgorica fans (Varvari) were separated between those that advanced Serb nationalism and those that promoted the idea of an independent Montenegro. On May 13, 1990, Dinamo Zagreb were hosting Red Star when the Bad Blue Boys clashed with the Delije on the pitch of the Stadion Maksimir, their clashes marking the end of Yugoslav football and, soon after, the Yugoslav Federation. When war broke out, the Bad Blue Boys fought against the Delije, with a section of the latter forming a paramilitary group under the command of Željko Ražnatović or else Arkan. Algeria Failure to qualify for the FIFA World Cups of 1970, 1974, and 1978 prompted the state authorities to reform the sports sector and enhance the conditions under which football was organised in order to improve performance on the pitch. Perfectly aligned with the socialist ideology of the state, clubs were affliated with state-owned corporations, with players and coaches enjoying full-time employment status. More precisely, In 1977 Algerian football experienced radical reforms which changed the established structures inherited from the French Football Federation, and which had previously been organized under the 1901 (colonial) law

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related to sports associations and activities. All sports associations at different levels were subject to regulation by local authorities and national corporations. The reforms divided sports associations into two categories: a) élite clubs, known also as Associations Sportives de Performance (ASP), whose principal mission was to develop performance and enhance the level of football and other sports in Algeria; and b) Associations Sportives Communales (ASC), municipal sports associations playing at regional level. The reforms also altered the historical and regional names of some prestigious clubs, which were forced to adopt the names of those national corporations which provided their fnancial and human resources.20 Refecting the state’s slogan of ‘from the people to the people’ (Mina Echaabwa Ila Echaab), the sports authorities recruited prominent players from the French football league to increase their chances for qualifcation to the 1982 FIFA World Cup in Spain. While certainly skilful football players, Algeria wanted to emphasize the “Algerian” identities of these players, she only welcomed back a select of group of her sons to the motherland to play for her national team. Sons of Harkis (those who collaborated with France during the Algerian war of independence) were certainly not allowed to represent the country. In other words, a player’s parents’ position vis-à-vis the Algerian war determined whether he can qualify as a “citizen” and be trusted to represent and defend the fag.21 In the same socialist spirit, and after qualifcation was achieved, Algeria declined sponsorship offers by renowned athletic brands such as Adidas and Puma, favouring instead the national textile company Sonitex, just as the nation’s name was written in Arabic to emphasise their identity. Algerian president Houari Boumedienne was also the frst Arab head of state to use Arabic in 1974 in his address to the United Nations. Independence from France in 1963 had triggered a process of Arabisation in Algeria’s attempt to rid its past of colonial rule and honour its Islamic heritage. At the group stage of the 1982 FIFA World Cup in Spain, against all odds, Algeria defeated West Germany in the opening match and lost to Austria before defeating Chile too. Although Algeria collected as many points as West Germany and Austria, they were eliminated on account of goal difference, due to what was most probably a shame game between Austria and West Germany the day after Algeria had defeated Chile. West Germany defeated Austria by a single goal, which allowed both nations to qualify at the expense of Algeria. Evidently, Eberhard Stanjek, a commentator on a German television channel stated, “what is happening here is disgraceful and has nothing to do with football. You can say what you like, but not every end justifes the means.

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His Austrian counterpart went even further in expressing his indignation. He urged “viewers to turn off their sets and refused to speak for the last half-hour”.22 Regardless of the turn of events, Algerian authorities had every reason to celebrate the nation’s performance and highlight their national identity. It is certainly noteworthy that Algeria reached the 1982 FIFA World Cup under the leadership of Soviet coach Evgeni Rogov. Yet despite his enormous success, in a rather symbolic decision that promoted Algerian nationalism, leading the team in Spain were the Algerian coaches Mohieddine Khalef and Rachid Mekhlouf. Algeria’s National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale, FLN), formed in 1958 in Tunisia, frst recruited players from the Algerian diaspora in France to promote their struggle for independence, thus employing football as a tool of diplomacy. Players like Rachid Mekhlouf abandoned their professional career to join the national team of the unrecognised state that was Algeria at the time. During the 1970s and 1980s, once independence had been attained, the Algerian state maintained the practice of recruiting players from the Algerian diaspora in France to secure its ties with the Algerian community abroad. Algeria’s interests were later better served after The change in citizenship policy in France and the interruption of the French-Algerian treaty on labour migration had created a new dynamic among the Algerian community, or French of Algerian descent. The idea of a return to the country of origin prevalent among frst generation immigrants was no longer appropriate among second and third generations who were born in France and who became French citizens by birth, while their parents were in France on resident permits. Moreover, the parents had to apply for French citizenship following the frst and second Pasqua Law on immigration to drastically reduce the number of immigrants coming to France on family reunion and to control the access to social welfare and free healthcare for Algerian immigrants.23 In 2005, a new law in Algeria allowed women, too, to pass nationality onto their children and husbands retroactively. Interestingly, when the national team performed poorly, the dual citizenship of those players and their apparent lack of Algerian culture was blamed, but when performing well, as in the 2014 FIFA World Cup, their Algerian fghting spirit was praised. In 1956, the National Liberation Front ordered all clubs to suspend their sporting activities and urged their players to join the independence struggle against France. While players in the French football leagues were initially exempted, they were invited to serve Algeria’s cause two years later with ten

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prominent players responding to the call; they formed the ‘national’ football team of Algeria and won 14 successive matches against the national teams of Algeria’s future allies in the Arab world, China, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. Obviously, in giving the order for indigenous clubs to withdraw from the colonial leagues and to stop their sporting activities in 1956, and in requiring the return of professional players playing in French clubs to join the FLN team, the FLN transformed football into a tool of the pro-independence campaign.24 At the 1975 Mediterranean Games, hosted by Algeria, the home nation reached the football fnal against the former colonial ruler France. France was leading the score at half-time by a single goal and Chief of Staff Abdelmadjid Allahoum visited the team’s dressing room to inform the players that Algerian president Houari Boumedienne expected nothing less than victory. Some ten minutes before the fnal whistle, and while the score had not changed, Boumedienne reportedly left the stadium to avoid the embarrassment of having to hand gold medals to the French players. The players, somehow having noticed the president’s departure, found the necessary energy and motivation to score an equaliser, thus forcing Boumedienne to return to his seat and prepare for the extra time. The president’s risk was rewarded by Algeria’s winning goal, just as Algerian national identity was reinforced at the expense of the colonial ruler’s defeat. Iran When football arrived in Iran, there was no welcoming committee. The Iranians had already developed a strong affnity for their national sport of wrestling, whereas football was played almost exclusively by the local contingent of Europeans. Even when a certain idea of football started developing, the poor performance of the national team during a short tour of the Soviet Union was welcomed back home by a disapproving nation who took them to task on their return. A satirical magazine called Nahid (meaning, Venus) even had the audacity to depict them sardonically in a cartoon. Enraged by their reception, the players paid a visit to the offces of Nahid and registered their discontent by smashing up the headquarters of the magazine. Thus players and not fans perpetrated the frst act of “hooliganism” in the history of Iranian football!25 Toward the end of the frst half of the previous century, participation in the 1948 Summer Olympics became synonymous with modernisation; thus,

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the Iranian authorities decided on setting up a national Olympic Committee in 1947 and a national football association that same year. Football clubs were sponsored by the state and related agencies, just as the football players were also employed by those same entities. The names given to stadiums and competitions, too, were decided by politics to refect politics. Under the Shah, football’s premier league was named Takht-e Jamshid after the capital of the Achaemenid Empire, while its second division was named Parsagades after the frst capital of the Empire, and the stadium purposely built for the 1974 Asian Games was named Aryâmehr, Light of the Aryans. When the Islamic Revolution came to power, the frst division was initially renamed Jâm-e Qods (Jerusalem Cup) and then Jâm-e khalij-e Fârs (Persian Gulf Cup), while the Aryâmehr stadium changed to Âzâdi (Liberty). As football was fast becoming politicised, the frst politically motivated club rivalry emerged in the capital between Taj Tehran (today known as Esteghlal Football Club), supported by the regime, and Shahin Tehran, representing the capital’s intelligentsia. Shahin also enjoyed the support of those opposing the regime and was, therefore, dissolved in 1967 – later succeeded by what is nowadays a very popular football club, Persepolis. The new club maintained the character of its predecessor but was no longer perceived as a threat to the regime, since Princess Fatemeh Pahlavi was among its shareholders; the club is today owned by the Ministry of Sport and Youth. Having joined FIFA in 1948, the slow-paced development of football in Iran was hampered anew due to the Islamic Revolution (1978–1979) and the subsequent war against Iraq (1980–1988), with clubs forced to abandon the national league and play in regional leagues instead. A year after the Iran– Iraq war ended, a new national league was introduced, Azadegan, named after the release of the Iranian prisoners of war (‘Azadegan’ is Persian for liberated), and all football clubs were nationalised and attached to state ministries and agencies or state-owned companies. The issue of women’s presence at football matches was also reopened, as a decision to allow entry to stadiums in July 1994 was opposed by conservative and religious circles. On July 18, some 500 women, separated from the male fans, watched a game between the national sides of Bahrain and India, but when some misbehaved – as a few women approached the players asking for autographs – the state revoked its decision and the whole issue remains controversial ever since. As football was recovering in the 1990s from the austere political conditions of the past, Iran qualifed for the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France, widely perceived as a clear indication that Iran “rejoined the international community, and parallels were drawn between Jam-e jahani (World Cup) and Jame’eh-ye jahani (world society).”26 Fate dictated that Iran was drawn in the same group with the United States. Despite the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1953 overthrowing of the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and his replacement by the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relations between the two states were severed in

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April 1980 due to the Iranian takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. The match between Iran and the United States, therefore, was less sporting and more political, particularly, since the subsequent draw for the group’s matches decided that the United States would play at ‘home’ and Iran as the ‘away’ team, with FIFA’s regulations stipulating, The teams are led onto the pitch in two lines by the referees and assistant referees. […] The home team forms the line on the left and the away team on the right. […] During the march-in, the FIFA anthem is played until the teams have formed the line. The national anthem of each team is then played. […] The national anthem of the visiting team is played frst. After the anthems have been completed, the visiting team proceeds to shake hands with the referees and the home team.27 It appears that Ayatollah Khamenei has strictly forbidden the players of the team to approach the American players frst. This proves the still deep-rooted dislike of the most important people in Iran to the United States, although in no way such behaviour is perceived as a humiliation in sport, as the then Supreme Leader of Iran probably perceived it. However, through negotiations, Masoudi [the media offcer appointed by FIFA] managed to convince the FIFA authorities and the US Representation to approach the Iranian players, contrary to regulations.28 After the Iranians handed white fowers to their rivals in football, instead of the customary separate photo of each team, the 22 players were photographed all together in one single photo. Evidently, The Iran–United States match in 1998 is an example of how football, nationalism, and political ideology become entangled. Iran and the United States entered their 1998 match with precious little cultural exchange since the 1979 revolution and virtually no offcial political relations.29 The impact of state politics on football was frst demonstrated in the aftermath of Iran’s defeat against Qatar on November 7, 1997, when the Parliament summoned those responsible, the national coach Valdeir Vieira included, to account for the defeat. Tomislav Ivic replaced Vieira, but after losing 7-1 to Italian club Associazione Sportiva Roma only three weeks before the World Cup, he was replaced by Iranian coach – and, therefore, more suitable – Jalal Talebi. Likewise, following Iran’s poor performance during the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, the president of the Football Federation Islamic Republic of Iran was immediately dismissed by the government. Such

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political interference is prohibited by FIFA, as member associations must “be independent and avoid any form of political interference,”30 thus resulting in the temporary suspension of the Iranian Football Federation. The state also exercised signifcant control over the players and In October 2005, considering players’ freedom in their appearance, the Iranian Federation enjoined them to respect “Islamic values”, to wear neither clothes too body-tight, nor earrings, rings or necklaces and to keep up a well-groomed appearance by avoiding irregular beards, ponytails, or long hair. In fact, everything reminiscent of the Western look was banned. Their respect of religious customs was also subject to punctilious surveillance.31 More recently, two Iranians playing for Greek club Panionios, Ehsan Hajsaf and Masoud Shojaei, were banned from their national team for having played against Israeli club Maccabi Tel Aviv Sport Club in August 2017. Although the two footballers only played in the match that took place in Greece, as the two players had been omitted from the squad that travelled to Israel at their own request and in respect of Iran’s foreign policy agenda and non-recognition of the state of Israel, the Iranian Deputy Sports Minister Mohammad Reza Davarzani announced the players’ removal from the national team with immediate effect. Finally, the location of a venue suitable for hosting Iran’s matches against either Iraq or Saudi Arabia has also been a contentious issue given that “Until 2001, matches between Iraq and Iran were played on neutral ground: in Kuwait City in 1989, in Doha in 1993, in Dubai in 1996, and in Saïda in 2000,” just as “Strained relations with Saudi Arabia also resulted in disputes over the choice of playing feld locations. The teams meet in Oman, with Saudi Arabia refusing to send its representatives to Iran.”32 Needless to say, politics and football in Iran are interconnected. Argentina By the late 1880s–early 1890s, the frst clubs were formed by British railway workers, as the development of football preceded any sense of democracy in Argentina. “Universal male suffrage was not approved until 1912 and the frst democratic election took place in 1916,” just as the country’s frst political parties “borrowed the infrastructure of fútbol and its neighbourhoodbased clubs.” As club members (socios) elected the offcials, Party politics came to play a leading role in these club elections. There are four main elements in the organization of Argentine fútbol and it is the relationships between them that determine the role of politics in sport and sport in politics. The state (represented by politicians), the football

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association – Asociación de Fútbol Argentino (AFA from 1934), the football clubs and the fans are the key players in the political network. Other elements such as businesses, local communities and the mass media have a part to play. The links between the four main elements are complex. However, suffcient motivation has been present on the part of all the players to ensure the continuation of the structure into the twenty-frst century. In theory, Argentine fútbol operates a hierarchical structure that is common to many other institutions. The AFA is responsible for the running of fútbol and is answerable only to the state. The clubs, whose chairmen and directors double as politicians, are governed by the AFA’s structures and rules. Most of the club presidentes and dirigentes are associated with a political party. In many countries, the fans traditionally have little power in the formal structures of football; they are merely the masses that constitute the crowd and provide the gate money. However, in Argentina, because of the unique ties between politics and fútbol, the role of the fans is of utmost importance in the running of a club and to a politician’s career (to this day rival political lists appear in club elections).33 The intricate relationship between football and politics was frmly established by the 1930s and remains the same ever since. Politicians became involved in the administration of football clubs and club-related activities and attended matches in an attempt to engage with the public and attain the all-important recognition. Political networks were thus created, maintaining close links between politicians, clubs, and the local community. During presidential elections at clubs, for example, it was common practice for rival candidates from opposing political parties to run campaigns against their ideological adversary. The well-established connection between clubs and their local communities also proved fruitful for those businessmen that exploited the popularity of the game to not only advance their fnancial interest but also climb the hierarchical ladder in the community, aiming at greater involvement in politics. Ever since its foundation in 1934, presidents of the Argentine Football Association have maintained close relations with the state, just as staterelated administrators were appointed at the helm of the Argentine association during the times of dictatorial regimes. It is noteworthy that The typical presidente of the AFA has three characteristics: links with politics, a business career and an apprenticeship in fútbol which often involves the running of a club. Of the 29 AFA presidentes from 1934 to the present day, one-third have been appointed as government offcials during periods of state intervention. Many of the others who have been elected have either had links with political parties or held a position in government at some stage of their careers. Conversely, their political

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links meant that they held a relatively stable position as long as there was no change in the political power structure.34 The state connection with football, or rather the state’s intervention in football, was best exemplifed during the dictatorship of Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955). The Perónist regime invested time and effort to exploit sport as a political tool to promote national integration by means of socialising the younger generations and was especially interested in maintaining a positive image of the country abroad by employing football as its ambassador. For instance, “Sporting success was equated with Perónist success to such an extent that medals achieved under Perón were named medallas peronistas (Perónist medals). In return for state backing, the AFA supported Perón as a presidential candidate.”35 During the same time, the clubs’ relationship with the state was further strengthened and often facilitated by a padrino, a state offcial with signifcant infuence over the government whose prime interest in football was safeguarding the objectives of a club. Obviously, this connection between politics and football rendered football fans highly political, just as the “direct relationship between politicians and fan groups was to reach its apotheosis during the mature stage of the game’s development in the form of the barras bravas.”36 Argentina’s bids for hosting a FIFA World Cup were rejected on four occasions, before the world governing body of football decided to award the 1978 World Cup to the South American state. Perhaps the country’s political turmoil was a factor FIFA could not possibly overlook during the selection process, even though there was no other nation willing to host the 1978 World Cup and rival Argentina’s candidacy. Neither Peron’s regime nor the subsequent Revolución Libertadora enjoyed much support abroad to risk either FIFA’s reputation or the entire organisation of such a reputable international competition. Yet when FIFA awarded the 1978 World Cup to Argentina, little would have accounted for the imposition of General Jorge Videla’s dictatorship ten years later. The responsibility of hosting such an event was an enormous task for the regime, the ailing economy of the country allowing little room for manoeuvre. Hence, as soon as the military government came to power, the Ente Autárquico Mundial was formed to oversee the preparations; to support its activities, the regime committed 10% of the country’s national budget and considerable resources. Apparently, gaining legitimacy at home and abroad by exploiting the game’s popularity was of paramount signifcance to the regime. Central to the regime’s objectives, though not necessarily focusing on football alone, was the manipulation of the press; Far from being a simple propaganda campaign, the junta’s courtship of the press entailed reshaping the world’s image of Argentina as a brutal

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place characterized by economic ineptitude, while developing an ally that would encourage Argentinians to be patriotic during the World Cup. Unfortunately, no Argentinian government in the previous three decades had enjoyed a positive relationship with the press either at home or abroad. A two-pronged approach to the press developed during the 26 months between the time the military took control of the government and the time the World Cup began: the Argentinian press were carefully censored, while the needs of the foreign media outlets were catered to whenever possible.37 Organising the prestigious tournament, along with the national team performing well, would, ultimately, help the regime gain the all-important legitimacy and defect accusations of its human rights violations. In this case, “the World Cup not only meant heavy expenditures for the regime, but it was also an opportunity to renew certain aspects of the social consensus that initially allowed the coup.”38 At the opening ceremony, the main contrast between the political reality in Argentina and the spectacle that was international football was refected in the speech of General Videla, as he spoke of values like peace, friendship, and human relations, contrary to the mass killings, torture, and disappearance of those opposing his oppressive regime. That the defeated national football team of the Netherlands refused to attend the closing ceremony did not diminish the regime’s success, football or otherwise. The following year, Argentina – featuring a young Diego Maradona – also won the FIFA World Youth Championship. The day before the fnal, the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission opened an investigation against Argentina on possible state violations of human rights. The day after the fnal, motivated by the apparent interest of the international community into Argentina’s poor human rights record, families of those who had disappeared at the hands of the state gathered in the Plaza de Mayo in Central Buenos Aires to demonstrate and demand an explanation of what had happened to their loved ones. Utilizing the compliant media, the regime’s response was to invite people to go to the Plaza de Mayo to fete the victory of the youth team. Thus protest was conveniently masked by a celebration of national pride. The state found in fútbol a good friend yet again.39 Once again, football had successfully concealed the ills of politics. A queen’s death She was Britain’s longest-reigning monarch, whose rule spanned seven decades, when Buckingham Palace announced the demise of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II on September 8, 2022. As per the funeral plan, Operation London Bridge, a period of Lying-in-State for one day in St. Giles’ Cathedral,

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Edinburgh, and three days in Westminster Hall, London, preceded the State Funeral of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II at Westminster Abbey on September 19, following ten days of national commemoration. The queen succeeded King George VI in February 1952; her coronation was held at Westminster Abbey on June 2, 1953. Reportedly a fan of West Ham United Football Club, the last two international football matches Queen Elizabeth II attended were the 1966 FIFA World Cup fnal, when she presented the Jules Rimet trophy to England captain Bobby Moore, and the 1996 UEFA European Championship fnal, both held in England. With regard to major events, entertainment, and sports, the National Mourning Guidance on the demise of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II stipulated that There is no obligation to cancel or postpone events and sporting fxtures, or close entertainment venues during the National Mourning period. This is at the discretion of individual organisations. As a mark of respect, organisations might wish to consider cancelling or postponing events or closing venues on the day of the State Funeral. They are under no obligation to do so and this is entirely at the discretion of individual organisations. If sporting fxtures or events are planned for the day of the State Funeral, organisations may want to adjust the event timings so they do not clash with the timings of the funeral service and associated processions. As a mark of respect, and in keeping with the tone of National Mourning, organisers may wish to hold a period of silence and/or play the National Anthem at the start of events or sporting fxtures, and players may wish to wear black armbands.40 Even though cancelling or postponing football matches was not required, the Cabinet Offce proposed that sports organisations consider cancelling events on the day of the State Funeral as a mark of respect, thus prompting the Premier League to state: To honour her extraordinary life and contribution to the nation, and as a mark of respect, the weekend’s Premier League match round was postponed, in addition to Monday evening’s game. […] This is aligned with the approach that The FA and EFL will take with their competitions this weekend.41 The Football Supporters’ Association disapproved, however, suggesting instead that We believe football is at its fnest when bringing people together at times of huge national signifcance – be those moments of joy or moments of

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mourning. Our view, which we shared with the football authorities, is that most supporters would have liked to go to games this weekend and pay their respect to the Queen alongside their fellow fans. Not everyone will agree, so there was no perfect decision for the football authorities, but many supporters will feel this was an opportunity missed for football to pay its own special tributes.42 When King George VI passed away in 1952, on a Wednesday, his death coincided with the fourth-round matches of the FA Cup, yet no fxtures were cancelled. The following weekend’s matches, too, were played as scheduled. Players, match offcials, and fans paid their respects to the king as a minute’s silence was observed and the national anthem and ‘Abide with Me’ were sung before kick-off. Taking the decision to cancel all football fxtures was certainly diffcult, given the English football’s already-congested calendar made worse by the interruption of the FIFA World Cup. Not cancelling football fxtures would have enabled fans to participate in a collective act of remembrance by means of attending a football match. For a nation divided over culture, race, and even BREXIT, a decent opportunity to display solidarity was probably missed here. Yet memories from the previous summer, when the national football team of England was criticised for taking the knee, probably dictated otherwise – fans cannot be trusted. Besides, police resources were overstretched, particularly in London, as hundreds of thousands of people gathered to pay tribute to the queen during her Lying-in-State, with police personnel from all over the country reassigned to assist the Metropolitan Police in the capital. Ultimately, cancelling all football fxtures, grassroots games too, was a political decision dictated by issues pertaining to security, since the lack of adequate policing at matches, especially in London, was obviously never an option. Newcastle United Football Club In the early 1880s, Newcastle West End Football Club (est. 1882) and Newcastle East End Football Club (est. 1881) dominated the city’s football landscape for a decade, both competing in the Northern League, until the former dissolved in 1892 due to fnancial issues. Several of its players and staff joined their city rival and, soon after, Newcastle East End Football Club changed its name to Newcastle United Football Club to indicate its status as Newcastle’s only football club. The new club played football at Newcastle West End Football Club’s ground, in St. James’ Park, in the red and white stripes of Newcastle East End Football Club until 1904, when they changed to black and white because local rivals Sunderland Football Club sported the same colours.

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The club’s emblem resembles the coat of arms of Newcastle upon Tyne. The centrepiece in both emblems is a shield: the city’s is red and features three castles, whereas the club’s shield displays its black and white colours in vertical bars. In both cases, the shield is supported by two sea horses, relating to the once-signifcant port of the city. On top of the shield a lion emerges from a fourth castle bearing the fag of St. George. At the bottom of the city’s arms a banner reads Fortiter Defendit Triumphans, Triumphing by Brave Defence, added after the English civil war as a reminder of the times the Scottish forces of Cromwell laid siege to the city in 1644. The club’s emblem, instead, features in the same place as the name of the club – Newcastle United. The city’s name derives from a castle built in 1080 at the request of Robert Curthose, son of William the Conqueror, known as Novum Castellum, Latin for New Castle. Much of this history was effaced when the Public Investment Fund from Saudi Arabia, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, took over the club in 2021. Amnesty International described the takeover as “a blatant attempt by the government of Saudi Arabia to try to sportswash its abysmal human rights record by buying into the passion, prestige and pride of Tyneside football.”43 Fans of the club, nevertheless, clearly excited at the prospect of rivalling the fnancial power of English champions Manchester City Football Club, dressed up in traditional Arabic clothing at the club’s matches, thus forcing Newcastle United Football Club to release the following statement: Newcastle United is kindly asking supporters to refrain from wearing traditional Arabic clothing or Middle East-inspired head coverings at matches if they would not ordinarily wear such attire. A number of supporters have recently attended St. James’ Park wearing associated head coverings and robes, marking the takeover of the club by the Public Investment Fund (PIF), PCP Capital Partners and RB Sports & Media. No-one among the new ownership group was in any way offended by the attire of the fans who chose to celebrate in this way. It was a gesture that was acknowledged as positive and welcoming in its intent. However, there remains the possibility that dressing this way is culturally inappropriate and risks causing offence to others. All visitors to the club are, as always, encouraged to wear whatever is the norm for their own culture or religion, continuing to refect the broad and rich multicultural communities and groups from which the club proudly draws its support.44 Perhaps it was the fans’ sheer excitement over the new ownership group that prompted the latter to adopt the green and white colours of Saudi Arabia’s

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national football team – green is the colour of Islam – as the club’s away kit. The United Kingdom’s head of campaigns at Amnesty International stated: If it is true that Newcastle United is changing its away kit to match Saudi Arabia’s national colours, it exposes the power of the Saudi dollar and the kingdom’s determination to sportswash its brutal, blood-soaked human rights record. Despite all their assurances of a separation between the Saudi owners and the club this seems like clear evidence of the regime using Newcastle to portray a positive image.45 It is noteworthy that the US intelligence services implicated Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the 2018 assassination of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Fotbal Club Sheriff Tiraspol Bessarabia was part of the principality of Moldavia until 1812, when the Ottoman Empire handed the territory over to the Russian Empire. It remained part of the Russian Empire (later Soviet Union) until the end of the First World War, when it became part of Greater Romania, but it rejoined the Soviet Union before the Second World War to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940. After the Soviet Union disintegrated, Moldova became independent in 1991. Yet the year after, the breakaway region of Transdniestria (also Transnistria), a narrow strip of land on the southwestern border with Ukraine, declared independence, therefore, leading to a civil war between pro-Russian separatists and Moldova’s armed forces. Supporting the separatists were the Russian forces, stationed in the area since the 1950s, until the two warring sides agreed to a ceasefre in July 1992. Russia has maintained armed forces for peacekeeping purposes at Transdniestria ever since, even though the international community only recognises the region as part of Moldova. Russia’s infuence in the area cannot be emphasised enough, given that Alexander Lukashenko, president of Belarus, revealed by mistake in March 2022 Russian plans to deploy armed forces in Transdniestria during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the self-proclaimed government of Transdniestria has requested several times to join Russia. The dominant language in Transdniestria is Russian and more than a third of its population have Russian citizenship. Founded in 1997, Fotbal Club Sheriff Tiraspol became the frst club to represent Moldova in the UEFA Champions League during the 2021–2022 season. A highly successful club that has won 20 league titles and 11 cups, nevertheless, Fotbal Club Sheriff Tiraspol is based in Transdniestria and is sponsored by local company Sheriff – owned by Viktor Gushan, a former agent of KGB. The company maintains close relations with Obnovlenie, the ruling party in Transdniestria, and the regime in Russia. Given its degree of

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control over the local economy, the club has come to promote Transdniestria’s relations with Russia while also projecting nationalistic aspirations of the local political and economic elite. Playing in the UEFA Champions League against two of Europe’s top football clubs in Real Madrid Club de Fútbol and Football Club Internazionale Milano certainly helped promote their cause internationally. Conclusion Fascism and communism alike manipulated the game of football throughout the twentieth century. Renaming, merging, and even disbanding football clubs was common practice to both fascist and communist regimes, as was the exploitation of football at national level when the need to gain popular support or improve the country’s image abroad arose. The two extremes of the political spectrum imposed discriminatory policies that excluded foreign players, Jewish players, and non-Basque players to promote national identity. In both fascist and communist countries, the construction of massive stadiums served as political arenas suitable for advancing the regime’s political agenda and the personal ambitions of their leaders. Projecting either one political ideology, nevertheless, subjugated the game of football to a mere political tool, an integral part of the propaganda apparatus. Evidently, football demonstrated its capacity to both strengthen national identity and promote ethnic division. At the hands of oppressive regimes in Argentina and Iran, football was celebrated when supporting, inadvertently so, the regime’s ideals, just as it was condemned when rejecting them. Football has served the interests of several authoritarian regimes in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, and while its proper development in those countries might have been hampered by the state’s interventionist role, the game was never directly associated with their oppressive tactics and policies and thus retained its popularity. The game’s popularity was better refected in the National Mourning Guidance on the demise of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. Even though sports organisations were advised to cancel or postpone events, as a mark of respect, on the day of the State Funeral, there were many arguments in favour of making good use of the game of football as a vehicle of national mourning. With an average attendance of close to 40,000 spectators per game, observing a minute’s silence would have been as deafening as the fans later singing en masse the national anthem and ‘Abide with Me’ before kick-off. The political signifcance of football in the construction of national identity, the imagined community that is a club’s football fans, and the unique capacity of football to draw large crowds cannot be overlooked. Neither is its quality to infuse nationalism and, at the same time, transcend national boundaries to cater to the needs of globalisation. Football became political the moment it was nationalised (e.g., The Football Association) and

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then internationalised (e.g., FIFA). That the national football association of England is offcially named The Football Association only serves to emphasise the fact that it is, indeed, the oldest football association in the world.

Notes 1 Anthony Smith, National Identity, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991, 14. 2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 2006, 6. 3 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 4. 4 Daniele Conversi, “Mapping the Field: Theories of Nationalism and the EthnoSymbolic Approach,” in Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations, ed. Athena Leoussi, and Steven Grosby, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, 21. 5 Pål Kolstø, “National Symbols as Signs of Unity and Division,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29: 4, 678, 2006. 6 Pål Kolstø, “National Symbols as Signs of Unity and Division,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29: 4, 676, 2006. 7 Gerry Finn, and Richard Giulianotti, eds., Football Culture: Local Conficts, Global Visions, London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, 257. 8 United Nations Offce of Sport for Development and Peace, Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education 2005: Sport for a Better World, ed. Michael Kleiner, and Ingrid Beutler, 2006, 84. 9 Adrian Frutiger, Signs and Symbols: Their Design and Meaning, translated by Andrew Bluhm, Hereford: Studio Editions, 1989, 318. 10 Cornel Sandvoss, A Game of Two Halves: Football, Television and Globalization, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 92. 11 Richard Giulianotti, and Gerry Finn, “Epilogue: Old Visions, Old Issues—New Horizons, New Openings? Change, Continuity and other Contradictions in World Football,” in Football Culture: Local Conficts, Global Visions, ed. Gerry Finn, and Richard Giulianotti, London and Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, 258. 12 Wolfram Pyta, “German Football: A Cultural History,” in German Football: History, Culture, Society, ed. Alan Tomlinson, and Christopher Young, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, 5. 13 FC Barcelona, Offcial Communique from FC Barcelona, https://www.fcbarcelona.com/en/news/742650/offcial-communique-from-fc-barcelona, 20 September 2017. 14 Albrecht Sonntag, “Germany,” in The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, ed. Jean-Michel De Waele, Suzan Gibril, Ekaterina Gloriozova, and Ramón Spaaij, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 66. 15 Deutscher Fußball-Bund, “Keller zum Holocaust-Gedenktag: ‘Besondere Verantwortung’” (Keller on Holocaust Remembrance Day: ‘Special Responsibility’), https://www.dfb.de/news/detail/keller-zum-holocaust-gedenktag-besondere-verantwortung-212368/, 1 January 2020. 16 Fabien Archambault, “Italy,” in The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, ed. Jean-Michel De Waele, Suzan Gibril, Ekaterina Gloriozova, and Ramón Spaaij, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 106. 17 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, Football, Nationality, and the State, New York: Addison Wesley Longman Publishing Company, 1996, 88.

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18 Kevin Connolly, and Rab MacWilliam, Fields of Glory, Paths of Gold: The History of European Football, Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 2005, 60. 19 Dejan Zec, and Miloš Paunović, “Football’s Positive Infuence on Integration in Diverse Societies: The Case Study of Yugoslavia,” Soccer & Society 16: 2, 232–244, 2015, 238–239. 20 Mahfoud Amara, and Ian Henry, “Between Globalization and Local ‘Modernity’: The Diffusion and Modernization of Football in Algeria,” Soccer & Society, 5: 1, 1–26, 2004, 11–12. 21 Mahfoud Amara, and Youcef Bouandel, “Algeria and the FIFA World Cup: Between Political Legitimization and Regional Rivalry,” Soccer & Society, 23: 7, 735–746, 2022, 736. 22 Mahfoud Amara, and Youcef Bouandel, “Algeria and the FIFA World Cup: Between Political Legitimization and Regional Rivalry,” Soccer & Society, 23: 7, 735–746, 2022, 737. 23 Mahfoud Amara, and Youcef Bouandel, “Algeria and the FIFA World Cup: Between Political Legitimization and Regional Rivalry,” Soccer & Society, 23: 7, 735–746, 2022, 741. 24 Mahfoud Amara, and Ian Henry, “Between Globalization and Local ‘Modernity’: The Diffusion and Modernization of Football in Algeria,” Soccer & Society, 5: 1, 1–26, 2004, 8. 25 Babak Fozooni, “Religion, Politics and Class: Confict and Contestation in the Development of Football in Iran,” Soccer & Society, 5: 3, 356–370, 2004, 358. 26 Houchang E. Chehabi, “The Politics of Football in Iran,” Soccer & Society, 7: 2, 233–261, 2006, 251. 27 FIFA, Guidelines for FIFA Match Offcials, 2015, 24. 28 Mieszko Rajkiewicz, “Successes and Failures of Football Diplomacy: A Match between the USA and Iran as Part of the World Cup in 1998 and the PalestinianIsraeli Diplomatic Mission of the FIFA President,” Soccer & Society, 23: 6, 597– 608, 2022, 601. 29 Fernando Delgado, “The Fusing of Sport and Politics: Media Constructions of U.S. Versus Iran at France ’98,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 27: 3, 293– 307, 2003, 295. 30 FIFA, Statutes, 2022, 17. 31 Christian Bromberger, “Football and the Authoritarian Regime in Iran,” Soccer & Society, 21: 6, 692–698, 2020, 694. 32 Christian Bromberger, “Football and the Authoritarian Regime in Iran,” Soccer & Society, 21: 6, 692–698, 2020, 695. 33 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 99. 34 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 102. 35 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 103. 36 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 104. 37 Bill L. Smith, “The Argentinian Junta and the Press in the Run-Up to the 1978 World Cup,” Soccer & Society, 3: 1, 69–78, 2002, 69.

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38 Lívia Magalhães, “40 Years after Victory: Disputing Memories Over the 1978 World Cup in Argentina,” Soccer & Society, 21: 8, 904–917, 2020, 906. 39 Vic Duke, and Liz Crolley, “Fútbol, Politicians and the People: Populism and Politics in Argentina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport, 18: 3, 93–116, 2001, 114. 40 Cabinet Offce, The Demise of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II: National Mourning Guidance, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-demise -of-her-majesty-queen-elizabeth-ii-national-mourning-guidance/the-demise-of -her-majesty-queen-elizabeth-ii-national-mourning-guidance, 9 September 2022. 41 Premier League, Premier League Statement, Matchweek 7’s Fixtures Postponed as a Mark of Respect for Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, https://www.premierleague.com/news/2786560?&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&#!, 9 September 2022. 42 Football Supporters’ Association, Football Postpones Fixtures, https://thefsa.org .uk/news/football-postpones-fxtures/, 9 September 2022. 43 Amnesty International, Press Release: Newcastle United Deal was always ‘Blatant’ Saudi Sportswashing, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/newcastle-united-deal-was-always-blatant-saudi-sportswashing, 30 July 2020. 44 Newcastle United Football Club, Newcastle United Issues Guidance on Matchday Attire, https://www.nufc.co.uk/news/latest-news/newcastle-united-issues-guidance-on-matchday-attire/?njk, 20 October 2021. 45 The Guardian, Newcastle Kit Sharing Saudi Colours Would be Sportswashing, Amnesty Says, by Paul MacInnes, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022 /may/13/newcastle-kit-sharing-saudi-arabia-colours-sportswashing-amnesty, 13 May 2022.

Chapter 5

Discrimination in football

Introduction Discrimination is morally wrong and, therefore, legally prohibited by international human rights documents. While there is no universal defnition of discrimination available, since no human rights document provides us with one, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights only serves to identify in Article 2 the characteristics that institute the very basis of a variety of forms of discrimination, namely, “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,” with the same content and order of words repeated in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In spite of the lack of a proper defnition, discrimination is understood to encompass certain policies and practices, whether state-sponsored or not, that only help separate ‘us’ from ‘them’ – or else, a dominant group from other marginalised groups – for the sheer purpose of maintaining a long predetermined hierarchical order of the political, social, and economic structure in any given setting. Discrimination in football has many different shapes and forms, but it is more often articulated along the lines of homophobia, racism, and sexism. Perhaps the common denominator in all three types of discrimination is the perceived hegemony of (white) masculinity. The traditional stereotype of football as a ‘game for (white) men’ has long dominated the culture of football to an extent where anything not masculine enough is not only ridiculed but also, inevitably, dismissed. Equally disturbing, of course, is the fact that the response from football’s governing bodies at national and international level is fairly recent and, to this day, quite ineffective since the phenomena relating to homophobia, racism, and sexism persist. This chapter examines the response of football’s governing bodies to discrimination and addresses those phenomena that continue to tarnish the popular game. Football often is a clear refection of society, tackling the same issues and phenomena that have long troubled societies across the world. Governing society and football are similar since they are both governed by centralised institutions; therefore, the elimination of discrimination from society and that from football share

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-6

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a common point of departure. Yet tackling anti-social phenomena such as discrimination in football necessitates a separate approach that differs considerably from the measures adopted by society. Homophobia Political homophobia is not an unusual strategy for scapegoating certain sexual and gender communities, as the case of Russia clearly illustrates.1 Whatever prejudices may exist against any such community may well become a powerful tool infuencing society at large when placed within a particular political context or as a form of political rhetoric. While certainly not the cause of any of society’s ills, it is their perceived lack of power or, indeed, resistance that often renders such communities a ‘legitimate’ target for all those that aim to ‘cleanse’ society. Rallying conservative-minded support against what these communities represent may well serve to distract the public’s attention from a government’s own failures and, therefore, offer a unique opportunity to overpower part, at least, of society. While some view respect for gay rights as progress, others consider it an anathema, opting to support the gender-based and sexual-oriented norms that state and/or religion dictate instead. Any new identity contesting those norms is deemed antisocial, corrupt, and evil. And when any evil threatens society, the political apparatus will almost effortlessly gain overwhelming support from the lesstolerant electorate. If anything, the political debate over homosexuality has increased in volume on account of the multiple digital media available and, by extent, the anonymous digital publics that are so rarely apathetic when voicing their concerns is on offer. As with all else challenging stereotypes, homophobic policies serve to attract attention. Movements supporting LGBT rights have had a considerable contribution to legislative changes, such as hate crime, same-sex marriage, and adoption, by gaining an important insight into the workings of political structures and the channels available to policymaking, though more so in the Western world. Yet LGBT rights are not yet fully normalised into the political thinking of much of the international community, including the more advanced Western nations. Although LGBT rights movements have seemingly gained momentum over the past few decades, their opponents often employ political homophobia to curb the support that the former have gained. Politicians and public fgures resorting to hate rhetoric is nothing new or uncommon. Despite the many cultural, religious, and linguistic differences that characterise nations the world over, the use of political homophobia has rarely been unsuccessful no matter the setting. Ever since antiquity, the men who wrote history only spoke of great men, their great deeds, and the even greater legacy they left behind for other great men to inherit and follow devotedly. ‘Herstory,’ by contrast, became prevalent in the 1970s, certainly no earlier than the 1960s. Most Western democracies

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witnessed the frst women enter parliament in the early 1920s, as seats in the parliament seemed to be reserved exclusively for (usually well-off, white) men. The sense of political masculinity emanating from national politics was diffcult to ignore, so much so that it came to dominate the population of parliaments across all liberal democracies for decades. A hundred years later, UN Women would note that by late 2021 “only 25 per cent of all national parliamentarians are women.”2 Much like the under-representation of women in science (less than 30% worldwide), an alarming fact that allows much room for stereotypes such as ‘women are not interested in science’ or even ‘women are not suitable for science,’ politics is predominantly a masculine affair. Right-wing populist political discourse, in particular, not only emphasises the signifcance of strong male leadership, but it also dismisses anything remotely feminist and even disputes the essence of gender studies. Misogynist and sexist rhetoric, for example, often helps underline the importance of tradition and the perpetuance of stereotypical social norms such as gender-specifed roles in society. Despite female populist leaders like Marine Le Pen of the National Rally party in France, the leadership qualities ascribed to populism are more often than not masculine in nature and, therefore, more representative of male populist leaders such as Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin. Kathleen Starck and Birgit Sauer suggest that political masculinity encompasses any kind of masculinity that is constructed around, ascribed to and/or claimed by “political players”. These shall be individuals or groups of persons who are part of or associated with the “political domain”, i.e. professional politicians, party members, members of the military as well as citizens and members of political movements claiming or gaining political rights.3 While too broad a defnition to help identify with any accuracy one or two characteristics to establish the place of political masculinity within the political science domain, it allows much room to argue that anything masculine is political, predominantly, in patriarchal societies. Such an uncompromising argument would go well with the assumption that power is constantly reproduced through political masculinity. As for political homophobia, Meredith Weiss and Michael Bosia defne it as a purposeful [strategy], especially as practiced by state actors; as embedded in the scapegoating of an “other” that drives processes of state building and retrenchment; as the product of transnational infuence‐peddling and alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the complicated legacies of colonialism.4 Homophobia has already served political objectives in most parts of the world, including Europe (Hungary, Poland, and Russia), Africa (Egypt,

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Ghana, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria and Gambia), Latin America (Honduras), and Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia), where the notions of sexual orientation and gender identity are disputed, same-sex marriage is prohibited, the promotion of homosexuality is banned, and LGBT activists are arrested. Assuming that war is politics by other means, as the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz remarked in his famous work On War (1832), the men that declare wars to serve their ambitions – as well as national interests – should embody all those traits necessary for qualifying as ideal models of political masculinity. The populist Vladimir Putin who launched a war against Georgia (2008), annexed Crimea (2014), and invaded Ukraine (2022) is the defnitive alpha male that also rides horses shirtless, has a black belt in judo, hunts bears and, of course, plays football with FIFA President Gianni Infantino. In the United States, it seems that voters in 2008 were better prepared to have Barack Obama run the country, the frst black president to occupy the White House, than vote in favour of a female candidate. Eight years later, and after having elected Obama for a second term in offce, Hillary Clinton lost the 2016 presidential election to another populist alpha male, perhaps misogynistic too, in Donald Trump. Both Putin and Trump embody a masculine understanding of political power that denies women the opportunity to become more engaged in politics. Politics is a masculine institution in much of the world. Hegemonic masculinity Masculinity is a longstanding perception regarding the socially acceptable, and ‘healthy,’ development of a boy into a man. The socialisation of a male individual is dictated by society within the context of class, race, religion, and ethnicity; nevertheless, no matter the setting, it usually concentrates on predetermined notions relating to fatherhood, power, and aggression. Today, masculinity is nothing more than a stereotype that only serves to promote discrimination, since gender norms are no longer confned within the narrow concepts of masculinity and femininity alone. Masculinity has long supported the subordination of all women and the marginalisation of gay and nonwhite men, thus encouraging gender inequality in all its forms and shapes. Raewyn Connell’s work (1987) emphasises how hegemonic masculinity dictates the lower standing of women and that of less-than-privileged men in society. According to Connell, there are four types of masculinity: hegemonic masculinity, complicit masculinity, subordinated masculinity, and marginalised masculinity. The type of hegemonic masculinity refers to the alpha male and is associated with power and infuence. Less privileged men populate the second type, since they do not meet the criteria of the alpha males, but still beneft from the little power and infuence they have over subordinated and marginalised men. Subordinated men are often those whose sexuality does not conform with those social norms that credit heterosexuality, whereas

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marginalised men often represent non-white communities and men with disabilities. In politics, there is much room available for males that ft the hegemonic masculinity type, less so for men that only qualify for complicit masculinity, and even less for the remaining two types of masculinity. Like politics, sports commanding a higher degree of aggression and strength are obviously considered more masculine and, therefore, more suitable for boys and men to participate in. Despite its many virtues, sport has the capacity to promote and reinforce heterosexuality, thus discouraging gay men from openly expressing their homosexuality. Needless to say, the sexuality of boys and men engaging in less-than-masculine sports is questioned, almost similar to not participating in any sport. Not surprisingly, “the masculine culture of football harks back to the days of the sport’s codifcation and institutionalisation within the all-male environment of public schools in the middle of the 19th century.”5 The development and organisation of football coincided with the time of industrialisation and while it was frst played in public schools in England, the game was soon claimed by a working class that projected hardiness and aggression in and around factories. What’s more, hardship and violence in the new industrial setting left no room for male homosexuality. Despite the early association between masculinity and football, any sportrelated studies on masculinity were absent before the late 1980s, when Michael Messner, Donald Sabo and Brian Pronger frst concluded that “gay male athletes experienced an environment that was intimidating and highly homophobic.”6 The perception that football is “a globally recognized symbol of masculinity”7 is not mistaken, given than little over a dozen8 football players have ever revealed their homosexuality. The ‘Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States’ report, published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2009, acknowledges the fact that “homophobia exists in sport contexts and that this may be expressed in different ways – for instance, when homophobic language is used to ridicule opponents or referees” and adds that “LGBT persons are perceived to have few possibilities to be ‘out’ in sports due to risk of harassment, homophobia or rejection from fellow club members.”9 The report also stressed that Homophobic football slogans chanted by fans in order to ridicule the referee or the opposing team occur in almost every mainstream football event. In the United Kingdom, the example of a football player who during a match used homophobic verbal abuse against the referee is not atypical. In Italy, the NGOs Arcigay and Arcilesbica noted during interviews that anti-LGBT statements are routinely present in football fan culture, with neo-fascist groups represented in several fan clubs and hooligan groups. The country report for the United Kingdom contained no information on any openly gay professional footballers currently in

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Britain, but reportedly gay footballers have been advised to maintain a heterosexual image.10 Rainbow politics At some point during the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, postponed to the summer of 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Munich hosted the match between the national teams of Germany and Hungary, and the city council requested permission from UEFA to illuminate the Allianz Arena stadium in rainbow colours, only to meet UEFA’s rejection. UEFA was criticised for what was perceived as a political decision but responded by stating that Some people have interpreted UEFA’s decision to turn down the city of Munich’s request to illuminate the Munich stadium in rainbow colours for a EURO 2020 match as “political”. On the contrary, the request itself was political, linked to the Hungarian football team’s presence in the stadium for this evening’s match with Germany. For UEFA, the rainbow is not a political symbol, but a sign of our frm commitment to a more diverse and inclusive society.11 UEFA is an apolitical organisation for Article 44 of the UEFA Safety and Security Regulations states that “The promotion or announcement, by any means, of political messages or of any other political actions inside or in the immediate vicinity of the stadium is strictly prohibited before, during and after the match.”12 Inspiring UEFA’s statement into considering the request as political, nevertheless, is the fact that a few days earlier the Hungarian parliament had passed new legislation not only banning the portrayal of homosexuality to minors but also removing all references to homosexuality from the school curriculum. Perhaps the city of Munich considered the illumination of the stadium as a gesture of support towards the LGBT community in Hungary, which certainly qualifes as a political request. Peter Szijjarto, Hungary’s foreign minister, condemned the request, too, stating, “I fnd it harmful and dangerous to confuse politics with sport. Historical experience shows that. If anyone, the Germans know this for sure,”13 thus making an unmistakeable reference to the Nazi Olympics of 1936 in Berlin. Yet where UEFA is certainly mistaken is not considering the rainbow as a political symbol. The frst symbol to somewhat represent the gay community was a pink triangle that gay men, convicted of violating the Nazi criminal code, had to display on their clothing when condemned to life in the concentration camps. In 1977, Gilbert Baker, an artist, created the frst version of the Pride fag. Borrowing from the colours of the rainbow, the original Pride fag featured eight coloured stripes: pink for sex, red for life, orange for healing, yellow for

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sunlight, green for nature, turquoise for art, indigo for serenity, and violet for spirit. Due to a shortage of pink fabric, the 1978 version was reduced to seven stripes. When in 1979 it was decided that the fag should feature an even number of stripes, since turquoise became unavailable too, turquoise and indigo were combined and replaced by royal blue in what is today considered the most popular version of all. Then, in 2017, Philadelphia incorporated two additional stripes, black and brown, to represent the LGBTQ+ people of colour. Subsequent versions of the Pride fag include Daniel Quasar’s design (when he incorporated the transgender fag, made up of fve light blue, pink, and white stripes, created by Monica Helms in 1999) featuring a white-pink-light blue-brown-and-black chevron, named the Progress Pride Flag; an additional lavender stripe to represent diversity, added in 2017 by Baker; a red-blue-and-black chevron added a year later to represent the anticaste movement in India and leftist ideology; and, fnally, the 2021 design of Valentino Vecchietti that decorated the London 2022 Pride month, incorporating the purple circle and yellow background of the intersex fag into the Progress Pride Flag. There is little doubt that fags are political symbols radiating a unique sense of belonging that is so vital to nationalism and political movements alike. Philadelphia’s decision to add two more colours, for example, served well the purpose of representing marginalised communities. The persistence in enhancing the design and variety of colours decorating today’s Pride fag is an obvious indication that the original fag was probably not representative enough. Indeed, the original Pride fag was more representative of the gay and lesbian communities, a suitable banner raised by those institutions that paved the way for the gay and lesbian movements to promote their rights. While those movements aimed at political reform, nevertheless, they failed to consider those demands for equal treatment posed by the trans and intersex communities. The symbolic power of the original Pride fag, effortlessly depicted in decorating government buildings, schools, hospitals, and even private corporations, denoting both political correctness and some form of allegiance to the cause of the gay and lesbian communities was, perhaps, too infuential to ignore. It is the cultural politics of identity, in other words, that has come to rationalise the combination of the original Pride fag with the transgender and intersex fags into the Progress Pride Flag. Identity politics refers to the political action undertaken by a community in defence of its rights (see Chapter 2). When mobilised, marginalised communities form into political movements that manifest a shared understanding of injustice and seek better representation in pertinent institutions, governmental or otherwise. Political movements about gay and lesbian liberation from society’s conservative norms have always focused on the injustice suffered because of those communities’ distinct characteristics. Yet despite the success of those political movements in voicing concern and achieving relative political reform in several liberal democracies, it is quite possible that the interests of

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the transgender community, for example, are not best represented within the very same movements and institutions that have long served the ideal of the gay and lesbian communities. Coming out Adding his name to those few male football players that have publicly revealed their homosexuality, Josh Cavallo of Adelaide United Football Club in Australia decided on coming out as gay while still an active professional player at the age of 21. Today, I’m ready to speak about something personal that I’m fnally comfortable to talk about in my life. I am proud to publicly announce that I am gay. It’s been a journey to get to this point in my life, but I couldn’t be happier with my decision to come out. I have been fghting my sexuality for over six years now, and I’m glad I can put that to rest. For the people that know me personally, you’ll know I’m a private person. Growing up, I always felt the need to hide myself because I was ashamed. Ashamed I would never be able to do what I loved and be gay. Hiding who I truly am, to pursue a dream I always wished for as a kid, to play football and be treated equally, never felt like a reality. Being a gay closeted footballer, I’ve had to learn to mask my feelings in order to ft the mould of a professional footballer. Growing up being gay and playing football were just two worlds that hadn’t crossed paths before. I’ve lived my life assuming that this was a topic never to be spoken about. In football, you only have a small window to achieve greatness, and coming out publicly may have a negative impact on a career. As a gay footballer, I know there are other players living in silence. I want to help change this, to show that everyone is welcome in the game of football, and deserves the right to be their authentic self. It is astonishing to know that there are currently no gay professional footballers who are out and actively playing, not only in Australia, but around the world. Hopefully this will change in the near future. I hope that in sharing who I am, I can show others who identify as LGBTQ+ that they are welcome in the football community. As the game of football keeps expanding, I want to help evolve the game even further, and let other players in my situation feel that they’re not alone.14 No matter the number of times the above message was revised, edited, and proofread before it was shared online with the rest of the world, there are some conclusions to be drawn upon examining the text. Since power (and related themes) is central to political science, fear obviously denotes the

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lack of it. In his message to the world, the words ‘hide’ and ‘mask’ describe Cavallo’s emotions before coming out as gay. These are both signs of fear, but also an indication of shame, a word that Cavallo uses twice. One would assume that in a modern liberal democracy, a young man would have no reason to fear openly revealing his sexuality, yet football is often strongly perceived as a heteronormative sport. Following Cavallo’s example, Jake Daniels of Blackpool Football Club, in England, revealed publicly his homosexuality at the age of 17 in May 2022. Daniels is the frst professional male football player in England to come out as gay since Justin Fashanu in 1990. This season has been a fantastic one for me on the pitch. I’ve made my frst-team debut, scored 30 goals for the youth team, signed my frst professional contract and shared success with my team-mates, going on a great run in the FA Youth Cup and lifting the Lancashire FA Pro-Youth Cup. But off the pitch I’ve been hiding the real me and who I really am. I’ve known my whole life that I’m gay, and I now feel that I’m ready to come out and be myself. It’s a step into the unknown being one of the frst footballers in this country to reveal my sexuality, but I’ve been inspired by Josh Cavallo, Matt Morton and athletes from other sports, like Tom Daley, to have the courage and determination to drive change. In reaching this point, I’ve had some of the best support and advice from my family, my Club, my agent and Stonewall, who have all been incredibly pro-active in putting my interests and welfare frst. I have also confded in my team-mates in the youth team here at Blackpool, and they too have embraced the news and supported my decision to open up and tell people. I’ve hated lying my whole life and feeling the need to change to ft in. I want to be a role model myself by doing this. There are people out there in the same space as me that may not feel comfortable revealing their sexuality. I just want to tell them that you don’t have to change who you are, or how you should be, just to ft in. You being you, and being happy, is what matters most.15 Daniels, too, reveals similar emotions to Cavallo when he admits that he had long been in hiding. In his attempt to commend Daniels’ decision, Prime Minister Boris Johnson tweeted “Thank you for your bravery Jake, it would have taken huge courage to come out and you will be an inspiration to many both on and off the pitch”16 (emphasis added). While bravery is often rewarded, particularly in the military, surely such a quality cannot serve as a precondition for revealing one’s sexual identity in the twenty-frst century. Instead, it signifes modern society’s obsession with conservatism and the

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absence of the all-important political will to support a variety of different identities. It is for these reasons that the Gay Football Supporters Network was created in the United Kingdom, to provide “a safe and positive environment in which LGB&T people can watch and play football.”17 Creating a safe space, nevertheless, may only contribute to distancing the LGB&T community from society, at least in sporting terms. More recently, Zander Murray, too, playing for Gala Fairydean Rovers Football Club, decided to publicly reveal his homosexuality, thus becoming the frst senior Scottish football player to come out as gay. A few months earlier, two Scottish referees, Craig Napier and Lloyd Wilson, had also come out publicly as gay. The rather short list of football players that have publicly revealed their homosexuality today includes the Czech Republic international Jakub Jankto. Transgender football The Deutscher Fußball-Bund (German Football Association) has passed a regulation on the right to play for trans, inter and nonbinary people. The regulation will come into force in the 2022/2023 season and has been incorporated into the DFB game regulations, the DFB youth regulations and the DFB futsal regulations for amateur football. In essence, the regulation provides that players with the civil status entry “diverse” or “unspecifed” and players who have their gender matched can in future decide for themselves whether they are eligible to play for a women’s or men’s team. This also applies to transgender players, who can now switch at a self-determined time or initially remain in the team in which they have previously played.18 The decision of the German Football Association to allow transgender, intersex, and non-binary persons to decide on whether to play football in a men’s or women’s team ignores recent opposite decisions of other sporting bodies. In June 2022, the International Swimming Federation (Fédération internationale de natation – FINA) banned transgender women from competing, while the International Rugby League banned the participation of transgender players from women’s international matches. In defence of the new regulation, the German Football Association stated that the decision will promote inclusion, while also preventing discrimination, and is aligned with the growing number of people in Germany with the civil status entry ‘diverse’ that applies equally to people who play football, which is why establishing clear regulations became all the more important. […] The Berlin Football Association was the frst state association to introduce a corresponding

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rule in 2019 and it has been successfully implemented in practice since then.19 When former goalkeeper of Spain, and winner of multiple titles at club and national level, Iker Casillas tweeted, “I hope you will respect me: I am gay” for a joke on October 9, 2022, the signifcance of Cavallo and Daniels revealing their sexuality publicly was cancelled, just as the potential of another male football player coming out in the near future was effectively diminished to none. The fact that Carles Puyol, an equally accomplished former football player, commented, “It’s time to tell our story, Iker,” undersigned with a kiss emoji, serves as a reminder of the kind of covert phenomenon homophobia is in male football. Racism From Francois Bernier’s A New Division of the Earth (1684), through David Hume’s Of National Characters (1748), Immanuel Kant’s Of the Different Human Races  and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s On the Natural Variety of Mankind (both in 1775), to Charles Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1871), the concept and study of race was predominantly based on physical traits such as the size of skull, facial characteristics, skin colour and type of hair, often categorising humans along four or fve distinct species. Yet none of those thinkers ever openly supported the superiority of one race over another. Much like Aristotle had debated the perceived superiority of (ancient) Greeks and inferiority of Barbarians (non-Greeks) in his Politics, Houston Stewart Chamberlain argued – a little over two decades before Adolf Hitler’s rise to power – in favour of the idea of the purity of blood and blood heritage by means of separating Aryans from non-Aryans in his The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899). Even though racism had already had deep roots in European history, owing to the involvement of the Europeans in the slave trade between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was Nazi ideology that frst employed race as a political tool to persecute Jewish, Roma, and Slavic populations. Determining race, and racism by default, is one single decisive factor – the colour of skin. Since science dismissed defnitively all biology-based theories supporting racialism, there is no doubt that the terms ‘race’ and ‘racism’ have been constructed socially within a rigid cultural context. So successful a construct it was that racism today is synonymous to discrimination, thus encompassing almost every other form of prejudice. A lack of education and economic hardship often account for racist perceptions and discriminatory behaviours, particularly when social phenomena such as migration or unemployment are present. And when racism becomes prevalent in society, so does race-related violence, therefore, threatening democracy’s integrity and every notion pertaining to human and civil rights. Oppression, marginalisation,

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and insecurity, too, become more widespread, while the victims of racist abuse become socially, politically, and economically distanced from other (more dominant) groups in society. The racially segregated societies of the United States (from the late nineteenth century into the 1960s) and South Africa (from the early 1950s to the early 1990s) are profound examples of what racialised societies look like. Since political science focuses on matters pertaining to government, central to the study of all things political is power, which, in turn, relates frst to authority and then legitimacy. Once power is defned and distributed within a hierarchical society, those exercising it will favour the rich over the poor, the strong over the weak, man over woman, and white people over black – or non-white, for that matter – communities. Power and the authority that stems from it, and the all-important legitimacy that only serves to safeguard the former, altogether defne human relations within any given socio-political setting, ultimately deciding on who benefts from it. Hence, the concept of power gains further political signifcance when the group that exercises it has the privilege to racially defne itself more favourably in order to relegate all other groups to inferiority and deny them any access to benefts. Naturally, white supremacy or white privilege is where genuine political power rests, just as black communities are often condemned to discrimination and marginalisation. Critical race theory supports that racial power has become institutionalised by means of corrupting related legislation and policies. Critical race theorists are more concerned with the impact of white supremacism and aim to achieve racial parity at social, economic, and political level by studying those racist practices that maintain the discrimination and marginalisation of black communities. Taking the knee Football players in England had been taking the knee for almost a year to protest racial inequality in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing in Minneapolis, United States. The England national team, too, decided to carry out the same practice at every match before kick-off during the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, but the whole act divided those fans present in the stadium between supporters and critics. Home Secretary Priti Patel, too, not only failed to disapprove of those fans who criticised the players for taking the knee but also described the act as ‘gesture politics’ and insisted that people should learn from their past and not try to rewrite it. Just over a year later, the Premier League captains decided to stop taking the knee ahead of the 2022–2023 football season and perform it, instead, at the frst and fnal round of matches of the season, on Boxing Day, at the FA Cup and Carabao Cup fnals, and on matches dedicated to the ‘No Room For Racism’ campaign in October and March. Evidently, what was perceived as a political act – some even related it to Marxism – never became politicised enough

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to warrant some sort of judicial reform, for it was eventually relegated to a routine practice with no political impact. The history of the act dictates that Martin Luther King Jr. was campaigning on February 1, 1965, with fellow African Americans in Selma, Alabama, to register voters. The leader of the civil rights movement took the knee in prayer, to peacefully protest black voter suppression, before a considerable number of arrests were made for having marched without a permit to the Dallas County courthouse. A month later, a more brutal assault on civil rights marchers, again, in Selma, would pave the way for the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In terms of its political connotations, ‘taking the knee’ is the exact opposite of the more provocative and defant ‘standing tall’ act of behaviour. As in the case involving Martin Luther King Jr., taking the knee is more conciliatory in nature, a peace-making attempt rather, and quite possibly the very reason it failed to transpire into concrete political action. Taking the knee is not gesture politics, for it was never allowed any room to grow into a political act. Advocated by football’s governing bodies to preserve their reputation and implemented by anti-racism organisations as a refreshing new element of their campaigning, taking the knee was never supported through political or legal action by any government around the world. Whiteness During the 2021–2022 football season, only two clubs featured a black manager in Europe’s top fve leagues (Bundesliga in Germany, La Liga in Spain, Ligue 1 in France, Premier League in England, and Serie A in Italy) – Patrick Vieira of Crystal Palace Football Club and Antoine Kombouare of Football Club de Nantes. Across the Atlantic Ocean, Robin Fraser and Ezra Hendrickson were the only two black managers at Colorado Rapids and Chicago Fire Football Club, respectively, in a football league that has featured only fve black managers (Ruud Gullit, Denis Hamlett, Thierry Henry, Patrick Vieira, and Aron Winter) throughout its history. The Premier League, too, has only featured eight black managers since its inception in 1992 (Ruud Gullit, Chris Hughton, Paul Ince, Darren Moore, Chris Ramsey, Nuno Espirito Santo, Jean Tigana, and Patrick Vieira). Likewise, in the same football season, no black or Asian referee offciated a match in the Premier League or Championship. There were only four referees with ethnic minority background who only offciated matches in the fve divisions below. From a total of about 24,500 referees in England, some 200 offciated Premier League and Championship matches, with the vast majority of the remaining 24,300 referees offciating amateur league football. While the Football Association claimed that about 2,000 referees (8.2%) were minority ethnic, those numbers included white Irish and white Polish referees. Moreover, the 14-member committee of the Football Association responsible for the overall assessment of referees features no black or Asian

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and is “headed by David Elleray, a former referee who was sanctioned by the FA in 2014 after allegedly making racist comments to another offcial.”20 Evidently, no black or Asian referee has ever offciated the FA Cup fnal since the inaugural Challenge Cup fnal 150 years ago. The last time a black referee offciated a Premier League match was on May 11, 2008, at the match between Tottenham Hotspur Football Club and Liverpool Football Club in London. Overall, no black or Asian referee has offciated a Premier League match for more than a decade. The issue of ‘whiteness’ is signifcant here. The England team that won the 2022 UEFA European Women’s Football Championship only featured three black players, namely, Jess Carter, Nikita Parris, and Demi Stokes. In all six of their matches, an all-white starting 11 was selected by white head coach Carina Wiegman from the Netherlands and only Carter and Parris got some football as substitutes. Surely, one could argue in favour of more diversity, or else political correctness, to refect conditions in other sectors of society (see section on sexism below). The men’s team, on the other hand, is far more diverse, but certainly not as successful (not to mention the background of the three players blamed, unjustifably so, for losing in the 2020 UEFA European Championship fnal); therefore, I will resist the temptation of racialising just about anything for the purpose of advancing racial grievances while also rendering ‘white’ a faw in an all-white team. Yet ‘whiteness’ remains signifcant. Gary Lineker, despite his obvious whiteness, claimed he suffered racist abuse by fellow professional football players due to his darkish skin and even claimed that he is “as English as they come,”21 presumably relating his Englishness to whiteness. Identity politics is present here again, as whiteness – a recurring theme in right-wing politics – may only be defned against the background of other racial groups for no purpose other than making room for the concept of white supremacy. White supremacy is a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings.22 Whiteness is quite simply a political phenomenon, just as race is a political construct, refecting the dynamics of any predominantly white society. And just as white has long been a symbol of purity, and even superiority in the times of imperialism and, particularly, Nazism, whiteness was the driving force behind the colonisation of Africa and the slave trade. White is, no doubt, a dominant political identity that renders all other ethnic backgrounds inferior.

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Ethnic diversity The diversity of any given society could well be refected in the number of different nations players of a national football team could have represented instead. During the 2020 UEFA European Championship, the players comprising the national football teams of Belgium, England, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal – all former colonial powers – were quite diverse. In the case of England, half the squad could qualify for about half a dozen different national teams: Kyle Walker, Reece James, and Raheem Sterling (Jamaica), Harry Maguire (Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland), Declan Rice, Harry Kane, and Jack Grealish (Republic of Ireland), Bukayo Saka (Nigeria), Kalvin Phillips (Jamaica/Republic of Ireland), Jadon Sancho (Trinidad and Tobago), Marcus Rashford (West Indies), and Tyrone Mings (Barbados). Likewise, almost half the Netherlands national team featured players of African, Surinamese, and Caribbean heritage; just as more than half of the France national team included players of African descent and a couple from overseas departments; Germany was represented by players of African and Turkish heritage; just as Switzerland and Sweden both featured players of Balkan and African ancestry. Yet despite celebrating ethnic diversity, players of mixed nationality are often targeted with racist abuse and even held responsible when the national team fails the nation. Rashford, Sancho, and Saka were all racially abused after missing their penalty kick during the 2020 UEFA European Championship fnal in London, the French national team was ridiculed by the Front National after winning the 1998 FIFA World Cup at home because of the number of non-white players, criticism about Mesut Ozil’s poor performances with Germany was often accompanied by comments relating to his photograph with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Romelu Lukaku’s Congolese descent and Mario Balotelli’s African heritage surface when Belgium and Italy fail to win. Ethnic diversity is today widespread across many Western democracies either because of international migration and globalisation or as a result of colonialism. Relating directly to identity, political or otherwise, ethnic identity and, where discrimination is rampant, people with an ethnic minority background are less likely to participate in politics. When they do, it is usually in a more reactionary form, exactly because of discrimination, and tend to support parties supporting the interests of minorities. When compared to the majority (white) population, the politics of ethnicity would dictate that ethnic minority groups would pose a challenge to state authority and power. Yet political conditions in any predominantly white society usually contribute to the marginalisation of ethnic minority groups, therefore, curbing any sort of political resistance. The Black Lives Matter movement, for example, gained worldwide support from the public immediately after George Floyd’s killing, but was attacked as a Marxist organisation and, ultimately, failed to

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stimulate inasmuch a response from a government as to police reform or any sort of reform for that matter. Sexism Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (1996) developed the ‘ambivalent sexism theory’ acknowledging the presence of ‘hostile sexism’ and ‘benevolent sexism’ and even developed an  Ambivalent Sexism Inventory  designed to evaluate the two forms of sexism. They also proposed that “hostile and benevolent sexism have their roots in biological and social conditions that are common to human groups.”23 Hostile sexism views women as exceedingly emotional, ineffectual, and constantly striving to gain power from men, thus constituting a threat to man’s power in society. Benevolent sexism, on the other hand, characterises women as vulnerable, in need of male protection and, therefore, reassuring man’s power. Glick and Fiske also argue that man’s dominant standing in society is an expression of hostile sexism, just as portraying him as the guardian of women signifes benevolent sexism. Sexism maintains stereotypes that promote gender discrimination and inequality by means of portraying women as submissive (the weaker sex) and men as dominant. The ideal woman, therefore, cares for her man (and child/ren), is generally passive, and only has ambitions to pursue a career in a genderdefned occupation. The two authors stress that all cultures use physical differences between the sexes as a basis for making social distinctions, which are manifested as notions about gender identity. Developmentally, gender is one of the earliest and strongest forms of group identity to be internalized, and people are more likely to categorize others on the basis of gender than on the basis of race, age, or role.24 Gender socialisation dictating feminine characteristics is what prompted Simone de Beauvoir to argue that “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the fgure that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature.”25 Imposed by society, the process of constructing identities is based on social learning. Through social learning, men and women learn their position in society and, by extension, their relevant roles and duties – those of men are defned by power, whereas those of women are characterised by the lack of it. When women defy the norms and compete for power, nevertheless, men are not just sexist for, if genuinely threatened, they advance to misogyny. Misogyny is interpreted as hatred towards women and, as a political strategy, it not only targets women for it refers, more generally, to the inferiority

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of all things feminine. Hence, it is closely related to the concept of sexism. Whereas sexism is “the branch of patriarchal ideology that justifes and rationalizes a patriarchal social order,” misogyny is “the ‘law enforcement’ branch of patriarchal order, which has the overall function of policing and enforcing its governing norms and expectations.”26 Sexism has the capacity to maintain the patriarchal order in society, reinforce women’s social standing, and even reward them for not questioning or challenging male domination. Those women that defy social norms and, by default, male dominance, will become the target of misogyny. The most hideous form of misogyny is, no doubt, femicide. Jill Radford and Diana Russel, in their Femicide: The Politics of Women Killing (1992), defned femicide as the misogynous killing of women. In 2017, 87,000 women were intentionally killed.27 Misogyny, in other words, is the epitome of gender-based discrimination. From a legal perspective, Article 1 of the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) defnes gender discrimination as: Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other feld.28 Likewise, the Recommendation on Preventing and Combating Sexism, adopted by the Council of Europe on March 27, 2019, stipulates that sexism is: Any act, gesture, visual representation, spoken or written words, practice or behaviour based upon the idea that a person or a group of persons is inferior because of their sex, which occurs in the public or private sphere, whether online or offine, with the purpose or effect of: i. violating the inherent dignity or rights of a person or a group of persons; or ii. resulting in physical, sexual, psychological or socio-economic harm or suffering to a person or a group of persons; or iii. creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment; or iv. constituting a barrier to the autonomy and full realisation of human rights by a person or a group of persons; or v. maintaining and reinforcing gender stereotypes.29 The above is, perhaps, the most complete defnition on sexism available; nonetheless, it is the evidence below that supports the fact that sexism is nowadays prevalent in societies across the world. The STEM workforce is still male dominated across the world, just as women’s representation at boards of directors in the information technology

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industry is at 28%, with 17% managers, 21–22% Chief Financial Offcers (CFOs), and a mere 3% Chief Executive Offcers (CEOs) in 2021. In 2021, women in Canada accounted for 23.5% of the workforce in natural and applied sciences and 40.7% in the European Union (38.7% in 2011). Education, too, reveals gender gaps in information and communication technologies (20.7%) and in engineering, manufacturing, and construction (25.5%). In the United Kingdom, although women made up 56.8% of undergraduates, the percentage of those enrolled in engineering and technology was 18.6% and those in computing 17.7%. In the United States, the percentages of female students in the very same felds were 21.5 and 20.7, respectively, just as women in STEM professions accounted for a third of the workforce, 34%.30 The gender wage gap in OECD countries in 2019 was 12.5%. In Canada, full-time employed women earned in 2021 90.5% and 85.5% of what men earned based on average hourly wage rates and average weekly wage rates, respectively. The year before, women in the European Union earned on average 13% less than men based on gross hourly earnings (France 15.8%, Germany 18.3%, Netherlands 14.2%, Sweden 11.2%), just as in the United Kingdom the percentage amounted to 11.9. In the United States, women earned 83% less than men in 2020, in comparison to the much lower 60.2% in 1980.31 The percentage of women in senior management positions grew to 31% in 2021, with 90% of companies across the world having at least one woman in a senior management role and 26% of all CEOs and managing directors (compared to only 15% in 2019). Interestingly, Africa recorded the highest percentage of women in senior management roles (39%), followed by Southeast Asia (38%), Latin America (36%), the European Union (34%), North America (33%), and Asia Pacifc (28%). Yet a 2020 survey by Mercer, assessing data from more than 1,100 companies and organisations around the world, reveals that, by comparison, women in leadership roles remain a minority, since the majority is concentrated in lower ranking roles (executives 23%, senior managers 29%, managers 37%, professionals 42% and support staff 47%). In Australia, women accounted for 41% of all managers (CEOs 19.4%, heads of business 32.5%, key management personnel 34.5%, other executives 34.1%, senior managers 37.4%, and other managers 43.4%). The percentage of women in management was particularly low in India (10%), South Korea (8%), the Russian Federation (6%), and Pakistan (4%). Although Japan’s target was reaching 30% of women in management roles, the 2021 fgures suggest nothing more than a meagre 15%, even though women account for some 40% of the workforce (vice-presidents 7%, senior managers 11%, managers 19%). In the European Union, women constitute 46.3% of the workforce, but only a 35.3% occupy managerial positions (i.e., France 38.3%, Germany 30.1%, Italy 28.6%, Netherlands 25.5%, Norway 35.2%, Spain 33.9%, Sweden 43.8%, and Switzerland 33.1%) and among

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the largest publicly listed companies in the EU-27, women accounted for 20.2% of executives and 7.8% of CEOs. In the United Kingdom, across the FTSE 100, only 31 women were in executive roles in 27 different companies, including 8 CEOs. In Canada, men occupy more than 90% of senior managerial roles (C-level executive roles), as women accounted for 35.6% of all managers and 30.9% of senior managers (52 out of 533 executive offcers across Canada’s 100 largest publicly traded corporations and 20.5% of C-level positions on the S&P/TSX composite index). Likewise, in the United States, women accounted for 47% of the workforce and only 40.9% of managers.32 In the academia, men outnumber women in senior faculty positions in Australia, whereas the number of women in faculty positions is rising in Canada. Across Europe, women heavily populate junior positions with only a minority occupying senior academic ranks (i.e., France 21.9%, Germany 19.4%, Netherlands 18.7%, Sweden 25.4%, Switzerland 23.3%, and the United Kingdom 26.4%), just as only 21.7% were heads of higher education institutions in 2017. In the United Kingdom, female academics also earned some 15.1% less than their male colleagues. Finally, in the United States, too, women occupy lower ranked academic positions and are less likely to attain academic tenure and hold senior academic ranking positions and even though they held 49.7% of all tenure-track positions in 2018, those were eventually translated into 39.3% of tenured positions.33 As one might expect, there is hardly any equality in politics either. In late 2011 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the ‘Women and political participation’ resolution (RES/66/130), noting that women in every part of the world continue to be largely marginalized from the political sphere, often as a result of discriminatory laws, practices, attitudes and gender stereotypes, low levels of education, lack of access to health care and the disproportionate effect of poverty on women, thus stressing the signifcance of “empowering all women through education and training in government, public policy, economics, civics, information technology and science to ensure that they develop the knowledge and skills needed to make full contributions to society and the political process.”34 Ten years later, UN Women noted that “As of 1 September 2021, there are 26 women serving as Heads of State and/or Government in 24 countries. At the current rate, gender equality in the highest positions of power will not be reached for another 130 years.” Furthermore, since “Only 21 per cent of government ministers were women” and “only 14 countries having achieved 50 per cent or more women in cabinets,” an estimated “annual increase of just 0.52 percentage points, gender parity in ministerial positions will not be achieved before 2077.” Unsurprisingly, perhaps, “The fve most

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commonly held portfolios by women ministers are: Family/children/youth/ elderly/disabled; followed by Social affairs; Environment/natural resources/ energy; Employment/labour/vocational training, and Women affairs/gender equality.” Likewise, “Only 25 per cent of all national parliamentarians are women”; “Only four countries have 50 per cent or more women in parliament in single or lower houses: Rwanda with 61 per cent, Cuba with 53 per cent, Bolivia with 53 per cent, and the United Arab Emirates with 50 per cent”; “A further 19 countries have reached or surpassed 40 per cent, including nine countries in Europe, fve in Latin America and the Caribbean, four in Africa, and one in the Pacifc”; “At the current rate of progress, gender parity in national legislative bodies will not be achieved before 2063”; and In Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Northern America, women hold more than 30 per cent of parliamentary seats. In Northern Africa and Western Asia and Oceania, there are less than 17 per cent of women in national parliaments. Women’s representation is the lowest in the Pacifc Island States as women hold 6 per cent of seats, and they are not represented in parliaments in three countries.35 Sexism has the capacity to permeate any sector of society ranging from education, through employment, to political representation and sport is no exception. Gender discrimination in sport is understood as “a societal and cultural process in which the social construction of femininity and masculinity plays a key role in infuencing behaviours and approaches,” therefore, “women who engage in sports are perceived as ‘masculine’, while men who are not interested in sports are considered ‘unmanly.’”36 In the case of football, the popular game was “‘invented’ by men for men at the beginning of the 19th century” and even though “women began to play football at the beginning of the 20th century […] “it was not until 1970 that women’s football was accepted by national football federations.”37 More recently, an online survey drawing participants from 150 football fan message boards across the United Kingdom, the responses from 1950 male fans revealed a division between one section of fans displaying progressive masculinities and two other groups of fans performing overtly and covertly misogynistic masculinities. The authors concluded that “the 2015 FIFA Women’s World Cup played a crucial role in changing attitudes towards women’s football,”38 although they argued that “Men performing overtly misogynistic masculinities were the most prominent group in our dataset” and “A small number of men in our sample also performed covertly misogynistic masculinities.”39 Inequalities Women’s football is redolent with inequalities. In England, the prize money for the winning team of the FA Cup men’s competition amounts to £1.8

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million, whereas in women’s football the amount is £25,000. Overall, 300 women’s clubs share £309,000, while the 735 men’s clubs share £15.9 million. At international level, prize money at the 2019 FIFA Women’s World Cup was $30 million, whereas the equivalent prize in the 2018 FIFA World Cup (the men’s competition) was $400 million. England, nevertheless, is one of the few countries, together with the United States, Ireland, Spain, and Norway, where women receive equal pay for representing their country. Yet fnancial parity, until recently, was probably not the main issue for women in English football, since the right to maternity benefts was absent from their standard contracts until 2022. England, of course, is not just the place where football was invented and organised but also the frst to ban women’s football from 1921 to 1971, despite the growing popularity of the women’s game and the revenue it generated. The proceeds from attendance were beyond the reach of the FA and government and, therefore, not available to serve the needs of the political and football establishment. Hence, the FA’s Consultative Committee declared: Complaints having been made as to football being played by women, Council felt impelled to express the strong opinion that the game of football is quite unsuitable for females and should not be encouraged. Complaints have also been made as to the conditions under which some of the matches have been arranged and played, and the appropriation of receipts to other than charitable objects. The Council are further of the opinion that an excessive pro-portion of the receipts are absorbed in expenses and an inadequate percentage devoted to charitable objects. For these reasons the Council requests the Clubs belonging to the Association refuse the use of their grounds for such matches.40 Evidently, the FA had no jurisdiction over the women’s game and could only place restrictions indirectly by means of forcibly mobilising the men’s clubs. Only the women in American soccer recently achieved parity with their male colleagues, in terms of World Cup prize money divided between the men’s and women’s national teams, similar to Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway. The four-time World Cup champions and Olympic gold medallists will also have equal access to training facilities, health care, and childcare. For the record, the US women’s national team has won four World Cup titles and four Olympic gold medals; the best performance of the men’s team, by comparison, was advancing straight from the group stage to the semi-fnals of the 1930 FIFA World Cup, owing to a depleted competition that only featured 13 nations. In Italy, women’s top football league became offcially professional on July 1, 2022, even though it was established in 1968, but the gross salary will remain limited to €30,000 per annum. Interestingly, the frst football club in men’s Serie A to launch a women’s side was Fiorentina as late as 2015 and only because

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new regulations dictated so. In Spain, too, women’s football will become professional ahead of the 2022–2023 season, while the internationally renowned La Masia football academy of Futbol Club Barcelona allowed in 2021 entry to girls and women, following the women’s club’s success the season before. In terms of women’s representation in international football, the fndings are disappointing. Lydia Nsekera became the frst ever female in charge of a national football association when she was elected president of the Burundi Football Association in 2004, followed by Izetta Sombo Wesley (elected president of the Liberia Football Association in 2004) and Isha Johansen (elected president of the Sierra Leone Football Association in 2013). Still outside the Western – more democratic – world, Sonia Bien-Aime was elected president of the Turks and Caicos Islands Football Association in 2014, while back in Africa Doris Petra became the frst female president of the Kenya Football Federation in 2021. In the west, Debbie Hewitt became the frst female Chair of the English Football Association in its 157-year history when she was appointed in June 2021; Lise Klaveness was elected the frst female president of the Football Association of Norway in March 2022; and Cindy Parlow Cone was elected in 2022 to head the United States Soccer Federation. The women’s lack of representation in world football is also illustrated elsewhere. At the UEFA Women’s European Championships of 2017 and 2022, only 6 national teams out of 16 had a female head coach, just as at the FIFA Women’s World Cups of 2015 and 2019 only 9 of the 24 head coaches were female. During the 2022 FIFA World Cup, however, three female referees offciated matches for the frst time in the history of the competition – Stephanie Frappart (France), Salima Mukansanga (Rwanda), and Yoshimi Yamashita (Japan). History will dictate that Frappart was the frst female that offciated a men’s match at a World Cup, together with fellow female assistant referees Neuza Back and Karen Díaz Medina and Saíd Martínez (fourth offcial), having taken charge of the match between Germany and Costa Rica on December 1, 2022. But then, there is also the issue of transgender women and their inclusion, or not, in the women’s game. Whether because of biology or issues relating to fairness in performance, the representation of transgender women has generated much debate among sport governing bodies, athletes, scientists, and at least one head of government, in Boris Johnson, when he stated, “I don’t think biological males should be competing in female sporting events.”41 Plain sexism or misogyny? Following accusations relating to sexual harassment against North Carolina Courage head coach Paul Riley, the United States Soccer Federation launched an investigation and appointed former Deputy Attorney General Sally Q.

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Yates, a Partner at King & Spalding LLP, to conduct an independent inquiry. Last season alone, half the coaches at the US National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL) had their employment status terminated due to sexual misconduct. Attorney General Yates led an all-female investigation team comprising former federal prosecutors and former college athletes. The team conducted more than 200 interviews of current and former United States Soccer Federation personnel, players, coaches, club owners, and others from 11 current and former National Women’s Soccer League teams and reviewed more than 89,000 relevant documents and other materials, electronic records, collected all records on NWSL personnel, and examined a signifcant volume of other public sources available. Not all clubs, however, since “the Portland Thorns, the Chicago Red Stars, and Racing Louisville—have taken certain actions that have hindered our investigation.”42 The report stated that “inappropriate and abusive behavior permeated the culture of the League as a whole. […] Women in the League—players, coaches, and front offce staff— reported deep frustration working in a women’s professional league in which misogynistic behavior was widespread.”43 It added that “Over the nearly tenyear history of the League, numerous coaches have verbally or emotionally abused players. Several are also alleged to have committed serious sexual misconduct during and/or before their time in the League,”44 and noted that “some of the misconduct at issue was not behind closed doors—it was on the sidelines at games, videotaped at practices, and, in some cases, already the subject of public reports.”45 The report includes separate chapters devoted exclusively to three coaches, Paul Riley, Rory Dames, and Christy Holly. On Paul Riley, the report stated that his “abuse was prolonged and wide-ranging. It spanned multiple leagues, teams, and players. It included emotional misconduct, abuse of power, and sexual misconduct.”46 Overall, “Riley’s sexual misconduct was considered by many to be an ‘open secret’ in the League.”47 With regard to Rory Dames, the report noted that “Dames created a sexualized team environment and verbally and emotionally abused players and staff. This conduct was no secret but had gone unaddressed for decades.”48 In the case of Christy Holly, his relationship with one of his players, Erin Simon, is telling, “[he] sent her ‘dick pics,’ both in briefs and naked, and a video of himself masturbating,”49 and on one occasion Holly invited her to his house to watch game flm. According to Simon, Holly instead showed her pornography, touched her, and told her he wanted to have a threesome with her and another former player (a fantasy he often described to her); that it would be “epic.” Simon said she tried to leave, but Holly began masturbating in front of her. He grabbed her wrist and forced her to touch his penis.50

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The report noted that Abusive coaches were able to move from team to team, and even to USSF, because the teams, the League, and USSF failed to identify misconduct and inform others when necessary. Further, the teams, the League, and the Federation generally appear to have prioritized avoiding defamation or employment lawsuits from coaches over the safety of players elsewhere in the League.51 The recommendations made in the report concern the need for increased transparency and accountability, so that the hiring process of coaches is based on accurate information, licensing is frmer, and investigations regarding abuse are more vigorous. U.S. Soccer must implement clear policies, procedures, and codes of conduct on all forms of prohibited behaviour; player safety and respect are fundamental and properly safeguarded; establish avenues for player feedback and setting up system to annually solicit and act on player feedback; examine whether additional measures are necessary to protect youth players; the contribution of SafeSport – an organisation empowered by the Congress “to assert exclusive jurisdiction over sexual misconduct allegations of abuse by coaches licensed by USSF”52 – in protecting players was not effective and, therefore, should not be relied upon exclusively; and, fnally, The Federation should determine the most effective structural mechanism, whether through an existing board committee, special committee or task force, to evaluate and implement recommendations, as well as to consider further reforms in support of player safety.53 In response to the report’s fndings, U.S. Soccer President Cindy Parlow Cone stated: This investigation’s fndings are heartbreaking and deeply troubling. The abuse described is inexcusable and has no place on any playing feld, in any training facility or workplace. As the national governing body for our sport, U.S. Soccer is fully committed to doing everything in its power to ensure that all players – at all levels – have a safe and respectful place to learn, grow and compete. We are taking the immediate action that we can today, and will convene leaders in soccer at all levels across the country to collaborate on the recommendations so we can create meaningful, long-lasting change throughout the soccer ecosystem. In the immediate future, U.S. Soccer will Establish a new Offce of Participant Safety to oversee U.S. Soccer’s conduct policies and reporting mechanisms; Publish soccer records from

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SafeSport’s Centralized Disciplinary Database to publicly identify individuals in our sport who have been disciplined, suspended or banned; and Mandate a uniform minimum standard for background checks for all U.S. Soccer members at every level of the game, including youth soccer, to comport with the USOPC standards.54 In a similar case, the Canadian Soccer Association appointed McLaren Global Sport Solutions to conduct an independent review in response to harassment allegations made in 2008 against Bob Birarda, coach of Canada’s Under-20 Women’s national team. The fnal report states that In 2021 in response to a request for information from the FIFA Ethics Committee about Canada Soccer’s handling of the Birarda complaints, the disgraced coach’s departure was characterised as follows by the General Secretary: “On October 9, 2008, Canada Soccer and the Vancouver Whitecaps following proper guidance from legal counsel, informed the news media and the public of the termination of Mr. Birarda.” This statement mischaracterised Birarda’s departure from the CSA which was communicated as a “mutual parting of ways” – not a termination – according to the joint media statement. Players were frustrated and confused as to how Birarda’s departure was communicated as indicated in various player statements made in 2019. Instead of acknowledging Birarda’s abuse and implementing the Executive Committee’s decision to terminate Birarda, Canada Soccer misled players and obfuscated the true reason for his departure: his continued harassment of players and abuse of the power imbalance between Birarda and players on the team. Moreover, the CSA’s failure to terminate Birarda and impose disciplinary sanctions afforded him the opportunity to continue coaching, putting other players at potential risk.55 The report also revealed that the Canadian Soccer Association’s relevant statement “did not acknowledge any of the harassment allegations as the reason for Birarda’s dismissal.”56 It is noteworthy that among the Canada Soccer Association senior members involved in the Birarda case were Victor Montagliani (at the time an Executive Committee member responsible for Canada’s national teams, today president of Concacaf and a FIFA vice-president) and Peter Montopoli (at the time General Secretary of Canada Soccer Association, today Canada’s chief operating offcer for the 2026 FIFA World Cup). Conclusion Discrimination in football persists due to the failure of the game’s governing bodies to implement those anti-discrimination policies available. Although

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anti-discrimination organisations have long exposed that prejudice in the game’s culture is widespread, football’s governing bodies continue to resist any attempt to confront the phenomenon of discrimination with effect. Homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association as late as 1987, while the World Health Organisation removed homosexuality from its International Classifcation of Diseases only fve years later. Perceived as a disorder and a disease, homosexuality is nowadays still ‘treated’ by means of a ‘conversion therapy’ that is illegal in only a few countries around the world. In the male-dominated environment of professional football, homosexuality is not only repressed and condemned but also a serious obstacle to one’s further development and professional career, more so in the men’s game than in women’s football. The death of George Floyd triggered worldwide protests condemning racial inequality, with football players responding by taking a knee before kick-off. Football’s governing bodies have so far failed to address the issue of racial discrimination in football. Whether concerning players, fans, or offcials, the regulations available for reprimanding racist offenders have rarely been employed. Despite the good intentions of anti-racism organisations devoted to eliminating racism from football, it is the inaction of football’s governing bodies that has rendered the popular game defenceless. What was once limited to abuse targeting non-white football players is today clearly manifested in the severe over-representation of white people in managerial roles and in the governing bodies’ membership, as discriminatory practices persist. Football was organised by men and, ever since, is predominantly played and consumed by men. As with homophobia, the male-dominated environment that is football produces the necessary grounds to grow sexism further. Yet sexism is not limited to the low participation of women in football, the widely reported objectifcation of women in football, or the sexist practices relating to the critical under-representation of women in managerial roles and governing bodies. Sexism is nowadays also related to the signifcant issue of gender pay gap and, more disturbingly, sexual harassment. Sexism in football has long been overlooked, addressed for the frst time in the 2019 FIFA Disciplinary Code. While certainly not comparing conditions to the Taliban and Iran’s regime, the Arab countries, or India, it has become evident, nonetheless, that women’s struggle to end sexual abuse and the campaign for justice and equal rights and opportunities is an international phenomenon. Women have yet to earn the place they deserve in society, much like an Ursula von der Leyen (president of the European Commission) standing embarrassed before two seated men, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (president of Turkey) and Charles Michel (president of the European Council), looking for a place to sit herself. Properly addressing the issue of discrimination in football is not an option so long as investment in the popular game, as well as revenue,

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witness considerable growth. Perhaps football’s governing bodies (and sponsors) are dogmatic institutions suffering from a kind of selective myopia that allows them to carefully balance fnancial returns and discriminatory abuse. Notes 1 Human Rights Watch, “No Support Russia’s ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law Imperils LGBT Youth,” https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/11/no-support/russias-gay -propaganda-law-imperils-lgbt-youth, 11 December 2018. 2 United Nations Women, Facts and Figures: Women’s Leadership and Political Participation, https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-fgures. 3 Kathleen Starck, and Birgit Sauer, “Political Masculinities: Introduction,” in A Man’s World? Political Masculinities in Literature and Culture, ed. K. Starck, and B. Sauer, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 6. 4 Meredith L. Weiss, and Michael J. Bosia, Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and the Politics of Oppression. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013, 14. 5 Jonah Bury, “Non-Performing Inclusion: A Critique of the English Football Association’s Action Plan on Homophobia in Football,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 50: 2, 213, 2015. 6 Jamie Cleland, “Sexuality, Masculinity and Homophobia in Association Football: An Empirical Overview of a Changing Cultural Context,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 53: 4, 413, 2018. 7 Mafalda Stasi, and Adrienne Evans, “Glitter (Foot)ball Tactics: Negotiating Mainstream Gender Equality in Iceland,” Men and Masculinities, 16: 5, 562, 2013. 8 Thomas Beattie, Andy Brennan, Josh Cavallo, Jake Daniels, Liam Davis, Justin Fashanu, Matt Hatzke, Thomas Hitzlsperger, Anton Hysén, Collin Martin, Robbie Rogers, Olivier Rouyer, and David Testo. 9 European Commission, Study on gender-based violence in sport, Final report, Written by Yellow Window, Lut Mergaert, Catarina Arnaut, Tine Vertommen and Melanie Lang (2016): 13. 10 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States, Part II-The Social Situation, (2009): 87. 11 UEFA, UEFA Respects the Rainbow, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about -uefa/news/026a-129679d2d1d6-66cada236eab-1000--uefa-respects-the-rainbow/, 23 June 2021. 12 UEFA, Safety and Security Regulations, https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles /Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/61/12/83/2611283_DOWNLOAD.pdf, 2019, 24. 13 Janek Speight, UEFA Denies Request to Light Allianz Arena in Rainbow Colors, Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/uefa-denies-request-to-light-allianz -arena-in-rainbow-colors/a-57984014, 22 June 2021. 14 Joshua Cavallo, https://twitter.com/JoshuaCavallo/status/1453172151914168320, 21 October 2021. 15 Blackpool Football Club, A Message from Jake Daniels, https://www.blackpoolfc.co.uk/news/2022/may/16/a-message-from-jake-daniels/, 16 May 2022. 16 Boris Johnson, https://twitter.com/BorisJohnson/status/1526247363504967680, 16 May 2022.

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17 Gay Football Supporters Network, https://www.gfsn.co.uk/page/who_we_are.html. 18 German Football Association, Regulation on the Gaming Rights of Trans, Inter and Non-Binary Persons, https://www.dfb.de/news/detail/regelung-zum-spielrecht-trans-inter-und-nicht-binaerer-personen-241346/, 23 June 2022. 19 German Football Association, FAQ: Gaming Rights of Trans, Inter and NonBinary People, https://www.dfb.de/news/detail/faq-spielrecht-trans-inter-und -nicht-binaerer-personen-241344/, 28 June 2022. 20 The Guardian, Elite Football in England has 40 Referees – All White. Why Don’t Black Offcials Get Top Jobs? by Jon Ungoed-Thomas, https://www.theguardian .com/world/2021/nov/20/elite-football-in-england-has-40-referees-all-white-why -dont-black-offcials-get-top-jobs, 20 November 2021. 21 Independent, Gary Lineker Claims He Suffered ‘Racist Abuse’ during Career Due to His ‘Darkish Skin’, by Sports Staff, https://www.independent.co.uk/sport /football/gary-lineker-racist-abuse-b2106034.html, 21 June 2022. 22 Frances Lee Ansley, “Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship,” Cornell Law Review, 74: 6, 1024, 1989, 129. 23 Peter Glick, and Susan T. Fiske, “The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 491–512, 1996, 492. 24 Peter Glick, and Susan T. Fiske, “The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 491–512, 1996, 493. 25 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde, and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, New York: Vintage Books, 2011, 283. 26 Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 20. 27 United Nations Offce on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide: GenderRelated Killing of Women and Girls, Vienna, 2018, 10. 28 United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979. 29 Council of Europe, Preventing and Combating Sexism, Recommendation CM/ Rec (2019) 1, 27 March 2019, 11. 30 Catalyst, Women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM): Quick Take, 2022. 31 Catalyst, Women’s Earnings – The Pay Gap: Quick Take, 2022. 32 Catalyst, Women in Management: Quick Take, 2022). 33 Catalyst, Quick Take: Women in Academia, 2020. 34 United Nations, Women and Political Participation, General Assembly 66/130, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2011, 2. 35 United Nations Women, Facts and Figures: Women’s Leadership and Political Participation, https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-fgures. 36 European Institute for Gender Equality, Gender in Sport, 2017, 5. 37 Gertrud Pfster, “Assessing the Sociology of Sport: On Women and Football,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 50: 4–5, 563–569, 2015, 564. 38 Stacey Pope, John Williams, and Jamie Cleland, “Men’s Football Fandom and the Performance of Progressive and Misogynistic Masculinities in a ‘New Age’ of UK Women’s Sport,” Sociology, 56: 4, 730–748, 2022, 744. 39 Stacey Pope, John Williams, and Jamie Cleland, “Men’s Football Fandom and the Performance of Progressive and Misogynistic Masculinities in a ‘New Age’ of UK Women’s Sport,” Sociology, 56: 4, 730–748, 2022, 745. 40 The Guardian, How the FA Banned Women’s Football in 1921 and Tried to Justify It, by Suzane Wrack, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/jun/13/how-the -fa-banned-womens-football-in-1921-and-tried-to-justify-it, 13 June 2021.

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41 BBC, Prime Minister Boris Johnson Says Transgender Women Should Not Compete in Women’s Sport, https://www.bbc.com/sport/61012030, 6 April 2022. 42 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 25. 43 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 41. 44 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 44. 45 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 45. 46 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 49. 47 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 55. 48 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 90. 49 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 130. 50 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 131–132. 51 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 158. 52 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 17. 53 Sally Q. Yates, Report of the Independent Investigation to the U.S. Soccer Federation Concerning Allegations of Abusive Behavior and Sexual Misconduct in Women’s Professional Soccer, King & Spalding, 3 October 2022, 172. 54 U.S. Soccer, U.S. Soccer Releases Full Findings and Recommendations of SallyY Q. Yates’ Independent Investigation and Commits to Meaningful Changes and Immediate Actions, https://www.ussoccer.com/stories/2022/10/sally-q-yates -investigation-fndings, 3 October 2022. 55 McLaren Global Sports Solutions, McLaren Independent Canada Soccer Review, Final Report, 28 July 2022, 89–90. 56 McLaren Global Sports Solutions, McLaren Independent Canada Soccer Review, Final Report, 28 July 2022, 101.

Chapter 6

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Introduction The connection between football and politics is not limited to domestic issues, but it expands over the domain of external affairs as well. Traditionally, two of the issues that dominate the feld of International Relations relate to confict and human rights. Football has the necessary qualities to elevate the popular game to ambassadorial status, as was the case of Madrid Football Club in representing Spain at FIFA and, later, Francisco Franco’s dictatorial regime in European competitions. It is certainly no coincidence that Benito Mussolini, too, employed the popular game to garner international recognition, just as Vladimir Putin’s Russia hosting the 2018 FIFA World Cup was intended to project soft power. The role of football, therefore, can be instrumental in international affairs (whether fctional or not), as in the Christmas Truce of 1914 or in forging West German national identity owing to the Miracle of Bern (when West Germany won the 1954 FIFA World Cup). Of course, one cannot ignore the misconception that football has been associated to confict, as in the case of the 1969 war between Honduras and El Salvador or the 1990 war in former Yugoslavia. By the same token, the inherent values of football – as with any other sport – relate to yet another aspect of world affairs, human rights. The game of football is versatile enough to cater to the needs of democracies, communist regimes, and even dictatorships, although issues pertaining to human rights differ considerably from one political system to another. However, football offers a unique platform for making a collective stand against human rights abuse. Hence, this chapter is divided into two parts; the frst part relates to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and examines the impact of war on football in the two warring states, while the second part focuses on the human rights violations by the state of Qatar, host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the response of some of the competing nations and the international community.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-7

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International Relations International Relations is a feld of study in political science that examines issues relating to confict, human rights, security, and globalisation, to name a few, as part of the interaction of states and organisations within a given international system. Multipolar international systems are better characterised by a profound level of competition and confict as several actors dominate international affairs. One such example could well be the times of imperialism when the major European powers dominated the international system. The end of the Second World War found Europe in ruins, and the power vacuum that emerged soon after was flled by the United States and the Soviet Union. In their attempt to reshape international order and dominate the international system, the two nuclear superpowers maintained spheres of infuence that converted the world into a bipolar system for several decades. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the international system transformed into a unipolar system dominated by the United States alone, despite the emergence of new infuential powers such as the European Union, NATO, and China. Three main theories attempt to provide the necessary framework for analysing the above, namely, Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Further developed in the twentieth century, Realism considers states as the main actors of the international system. It proposes that states must constantly aim at maximising military power to better serve their national selfinterest, but also because the international system is in a state of anarchy. It holds a negative view of human nature, thus creating an environment of suspicion as all states compete for power and security. In the absence of some form of supranational authority to enforce world order, peace, and stability, a state’s main interest is self-preservation. Hence, in the state-centred theory of Realism, there is not much room for morality available. Liberalism, on the other hand, holds a more positive view of human nature and counterargues that it is through cooperation that world order, peace, and stability can be attained. This theory puts less emphasis on the need to accumulate military power and more on the signifcance of international collaboration. Liberalists argue that conficts, or else the consequences of using power/ force, are devastating to the world’s economy, as Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted. Instead, Liberalism argues that only international free trade has the potential to bring about world order, peace, and stability since all states beneft from it. What Realism perceives as anarchic, Liberalism considers as an opportunity for further cooperation and even promotes the need for setting up international organisations like the United Nations. Finally, the Constructivist approach to international relations focuses on the state’s political history and the policies and practices that defne its behaviour in world

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affairs, thus interpreting the international system in terms of a social construct. Although Liberalism and Constructivism are certainly more suitable than Realism when discussing issues pertaining to human rights, Realism’s obsession with power – a crucial aspect of political science – makes it more ftting for discussing international relations. The sheer absence of an international government, coupled with humans’ selfsh nature, accounts for the state of anarchy that best describes the international system. To ensure their survival, the only option available to states is to maximise the power they project in the international system. The threat or actual use of military force has a dual effect, for it can both contribute to the self-preservation of the state and allow it to safeguard its national interests. Since Realism perceives the international community of states as anarchic, states will often fnd themselves engaged in some confict with another state, thus prolonging the state of anarchy. It is for this reason that morality has no place in international relations. Morality is often equated to weakness, a trait no state should project, for it could jeopardise its very existence. Morality shall only be projected by a powerful state, nevertheless, when the need to justify its conduct arises (e.g., a military intervention in the name of democracy or to terminate human rights violations). Niccolò Machiavelli, too, argued in favour of politics parting from morality in The Prince and emphasised the essence of power. Another political thinker in Thomas Hobbes – often portrayed as a Realist – promoted in Leviathan the idea that humans were condemned to a state of nature struggling for power and survival, thus echoing Realism’s core thesis albeit at the level of the individual and not the state as such. Much later, Realism was reborn after Idealism failed to predict two world wars, not to mention the collapse of the League of Nations, the United Nations’ predecessor. By the end of the Second World War, classical Realism had emerged as the only theory better suitable for interpreting international relations, until it was challenged by a new breed of scholars that advanced the existing theory in favour of neoRealism. Neo-Realism differs to Realism in that it acknowledges the infuential role of non-state actors such as international and non-governmental organisations. 2018 FIFA World Cup Hosting an international sporting event such as the World Cup is always a unique opportunity to promote a state’s image abroad. Despite Brazil’s defeat in the fnal, the 1950 World Cup reinforced the idea already formulated in 1938 in the European press that Brazilian footballers were “artists” who had appropriated the beautiful game in a unique and brilliant way. In addition, the foreign reporters dispatched to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo

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attempted to describe to their far-off readers the atmosphere and fervour in the stadiums and streets of the host country. In so doing, they conveyed more general representations about this “young country” called Brazil and its population.1 Several decades later, the capacity of football to project a nation at international level has increased considerably, given the increased popularity of the game and the advancement of technology in marketing a so-called mega sporting event. On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal and his daughter were found unconscious in Salisbury, England. Skripal was a retired Russian military intelligence colonel sentenced to prison accused of spying for the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The Russian nerve agent Novichok was used to poison both, thus the main reason the British government held Russia responsible for the attack. Days later, 23 Russian diplomats were expelled from Britain and another 27 from various other Western countries, despite the Russian government denying any involvement in the incident. Britain and Russia entered a Cold War of their own, the former seeking means of retaliation when it was proposed that England should withdraw from the forthcoming World Cup in Russia. It was during a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, by the end of March, when Labour MP Ian Austin made the proposal while also stating that “Putin is going to use it [the World Cup] in the way Hitler used the 1936 Olympics,” with Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson responding, I think that your characterisation of what is going to happen in Moscow, the World Cup, in all the venues – yes, I think the comparison with 1936 is certainly right. It is an emetic prospect of Putin glorying in this sporting event,2 but resisted the idea of withdrawing the national team. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, intervention in Syria in 2015, and interference in the US presidential elections of 2016, the 2018 FIFA World Cup was an excellent opportunity for Russia to set aside realpolitik and project its soft power instead. More recently, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, UEFA and FIFA banned the Russian national team and clubs from participating in world and European competitions. An appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, fled by the Football Union of Russia and the clubs involved in UEFA’s competitions, was dismissed in July 2022. Ukraine’s new football kit Ahead of the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, the Football Federation of Ukraine unveiled the national team’s new kit with the jersey

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emphasising Ukraine’s claim to Crimea, forcibly annexed by Russia in 2014, by means of featuring an outline of the country’s internationally recognised borders, including those areas controlled by pro-Russia separatists. The jersey’s collar was also decorated with the slogans ‘Glory to Ukraine’ on the outside and ‘Glory to the heroes’ inside the collar; the two slogans were frst used as a rallying cry during the First World War against the Soviet Union’s rule and, again, during the demonstrations that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014. Despite the recent history between Ukraine and Russia, the new kit had been approved by UEFA, though the latter had made certain that the two countries would not be drawn together in the group stage of the competition, neither would it be possible to meet in the subsequent round of 16 (UEFA has previous history of restricted team clashes in drawing procedures3). When Russia complained about the slogans, UEFA asked the Football Federation of Ukraine to remove the ‘Glory to the heroes’ slogan because the combination of the two slogans had political, historical, and military signifcance. Eventually, it was agreed that only the ‘Glory to Ukraine’ slogan would feature on the jersey. Crimea Following a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Peninsula was ceded to the former in 1774 before it was offcially annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783. But when Russia was defeated in the Crimean War by the combined forces of the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Sardinia, Napoleon’s France, and Britain in 1856, the Black Sea became demilitarised. When the Russian Empire collapsed due to the 1917 Revolution, Crimea was self-declared independent; during the Russian Civil War (1917 to 1921), it changed hands several times between the Bolshevik (Red Army) and antiBolshevik (White Army) forces before the former emerged victorious. Hence, Crimea became part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in 1921 as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and, later, part of an enlarged Soviet Union. After the Second World War, Crimea lost its relative autonomy and was downgraded to a region (oblast). In 1954 Crimea was transferred to Ukraine to commemorate the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Agreement, a treaty that had ceded Ukraine to Russia. Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union, handed Crimea to Ukraine as part of the political reforms implemented following the death of Joseph Stalin the year before. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Crimea became, again, an autonomous republic in 1991, but when the former collapsed by the end of the same year, Crimea became part of the newly independent Ukraine. As part of Ukraine, Crimea’s majority population was ethnic Russians, with the independence movement of 1994 highlighting their complex relations with Ukraine. Yet when the Soviet Union disintegrated, Ukraine emerged as an independent state in possession of a vast nuclear arsenal that was agreed to be decommissioned following the Budapest Memorandum, signed by the United States, the United

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Kingdom, Ukraine, and Russia, which also stipulated Ukraine’s borders – including the area of Crimea. In 1997, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership affrmed, once more, that Crimea was part of Ukraine. When pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych was elected President of Ukraine in 2010, his failure to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013 instigated popular protests that forced him to fee to Russia in February 2014. In support of his ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin mobilised his armed forces and annexed Crimea, thus also serving his ambition of reasserting Russia’s infuence in international affairs. The annexation of Crimea has not been recognised by the international community, nevertheless, though Russia even signed a treaty to formalise the annexation. Apart from the humanitarian catastrophe, the confict between Russia and Ukraine impacted football as well, with three clubs from the annexed Crimean region – SC Tavriya, FC Sevastopol, and Zhemchuzhina Yalta – absorbed into Russian football leagues. The Football Federation of Ukraine complained to both FIFA and UEFA, particularly, since the Russian Football Union had failed to inform them accordingly, with FIFA insisting that UEFA was responsible for settling the dispute.4 Soon after, Zhemchuzhina Yalta dissolved due to fnancial issues, SC Tavriya were renamed to TSK Simferopol, and FC Sevastopol changed to SKChF Sevastopol, in order to register with the Russian Football Union, and even removed from their rosters all nonRussian passport holders, effectively creating two new clubs, as only Russian citizenship is allowed in Russia’s lower football leagues.5 UEFA’s response was to ban the Crimean clubs from competing in Russian football leagues: In light of the complex and diffcult factual and political considerations, and until an agreed solution can be found with regard to the situation in Crimea, the UEFA Emergency Panel has today decided that any football matches played by Crimean clubs organised under the auspices of the Russian Football Union (RFS) will not be recognised by UEFA until further notice. UEFA has no wish to prevent clubs from playing football. On the contrary, UEFA recognises that football can have very positive and benefcial effects in bringing people together, especially during times of strife and unrest. Nevertheless, in order for football to take place within an organised sporting and legal framework, such participation has to comply with the terms set out in the UEFA Statutes, which have been agreed by all 54 UEFA member associations.6 Evidently, the annexation of Crimea had a severe impact on the local football clubs. Donbass After Russia secured its foothold in Crimea, pro-Russian separatists supported by Russian military forces seized a large area of Donbass in April

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2014. Soon after, the pro-Russian separatists in the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk self-proclaimed their independence. Once the pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk gained control of government buildings and launched an insurgency, Ukraine deployed military forces to the area, which prompted Russia to invade in August 2014. The war in Donbass escalated in the summer of 2014, when Ukraine’s armed forces reclaimed large areas including the cities of Kramatorsk, Mariupol, and Sloviansk, while also fghting to regain control of the airport at Donetsk. Hostilities between the two ended in August 2018, with the self-proclaimed areas of Donetsk and Luhansk under Russian control. Football Club Shakhtar Donetsk have since been playing all over Ukraine, their stadium and training facilities left behind in the occupied areas, ever since Russian separatists began fghting there long before the February 2022 invasion. Ukraine invaded On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine. At football matches across Europe, a minute of silence was kept, anti-war banners were displayed, and Ukrainian fags were raised in many stadiums as a gesture of solidarity. Football Club Manchester United terminated its sponsorship with Russian airline Aerofot, Fußballclub Gelsenkirchen-Schalke 04 cancelled its partnership with Gazprom, and Everton Football Club suspended all business with USM, MegaFon, and Yota. When the Premier League announced shows of solidarity in support of Ukraine in the second week of matches after Russia’s invasion, iQiyi Sports – the Premier League’s rights holder in China – decided not to broadcast any matches, possibly, because of China’s close relations with Putin’s regime. And when Andriy Yarmolenko scored for West Ham United Football Club in a match against Aston Villa Football Club, the London Stadium PA system announced, “Goal for West Ham and Ukraine.”7 FIFA’s initial position the day before was that Russia should compete in neutral territory under the name Football Union of Russia without raising Russia’s fag or playing its anthem. Poland, expected to face Russia in a World Cup qualifying play-off on March 24, 2022, as well as several other national football associations, including the Czech Republic, England, and Sweden, refused to play football against Russia. FIFA seemed prepared to sanction Russia should the situation in Ukraine fail to improve rapidly, but Poland was determined to boycott the match anyway. Upon FIFA’s decision to allow Russia to compete, the response of the Polish Football Association was critical: The Polish Football Association inform that as a  result of the brutal aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the war that continues there, we do not see any possibility of competing with the

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Russian national team in play-off matches for promotion to the World Cup in Qatar in 2022 regardless of the name of the team consisting of Russian footballers and the place of the match. In the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was condemned almost all over the world, this is the only decision we can make. A performance in a match against the Russian national team would be a shameful act not just for our players but for the entire football community, contrary to solidarity with the Ukrainian nation. As football association, we refuse to participate in play-off matches in which the Russian national team appears. At the same time, we call on the FIFA authorities to react immediately to the brutal violence that we observe daily on the territory of independent Ukraine. If FIFA’s Human Rights Policy is more than just words on a paper now is the time to put it into practice by excluding the Russian Football Association from the qualifers for the World Cup in Qatar in 2022.8 Similar was the response from Sweden and the Czech Republic, the two nations contesting the other play-off semi-fnal, scheduled to play against either Poland or Russia in the play-off fnal. A joint statement issued by the Football Associations of Poland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic read: Based on the current alarming development in the confict between Russia and Ukraine, including the security situation, the Football Associations of Poland, Sweden and Czech Republic express their frm position that the playoff matches to qualify for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, scheduled for 24 and 29 March 2022, should not be played in the territory of the Russian Federation. The signatories to this appeal do not consider traveling to Russia and playing football matches there. The military escalation that we are observing entails serious consequences and considerably lower safety for our national football teams and offcial delegations. Therefore, we expect FIFA and UEFA to react immediately and to present alternative solutions regarding places where these approaching play-off matches could be played.9 Ultimately, FIFA and UEFA banned Russia from all international competitions on the evening of February 28, 2022. A joint statement from FIFA and UEFA stated: Following the initial decisions adopted by the FIFA Council and the UEFA Executive Committee, which envisaged the adoption of additional measures, FIFA and UEFA have today decided together that all Russian teams, whether national representative teams or club teams, shall be suspended from participation in both FIFA and UEFA competitions until further notice. These decisions were adopted today by the Bureau of the

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FIFA Council and the Executive Committee of UEFA, respectively the highest decision-making bodies of both institutions on such urgent matters. Football is fully united here and in full solidarity with all the people affected in Ukraine. Both Presidents hope that the situation in Ukraine will improve signifcantly and rapidly so that football can again be a vector for unity and peace amongst people.10 In effect, Russia’s national teams were suspended from the men’s World Cup play-off qualifers and the 2022 UEFA European Women’s Football Championship in England, just as Football Club Spartak Moscow were eliminated from the UEFA Europa League. UEFA also terminated its sponsorship with the Russian energy company Gazprom and moved the 2022 UEFA Champions League fnal from St. Petersburg to Paris due to security issues. Prior to FIFA and UEFA’s decision, the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee issued earlier the same day the following resolution: 1. In order to protect the integrity of global sports competitions and for the safety of all the participants, the IOC EB recommends that International Sports Federations and sports event organisers not invite or allow the participation of Russian and Belarusian athletes and offcials in international competitions. 2. Wherever this is not possible on short notice for organisational or legal reasons, the IOC EB strongly urges International Sports Federations and organisers of sports events worldwide to do everything in their power to ensure that no athlete or sports offcial from Russia or Belarus be allowed to take part under the name of Russia or Belarus. Russian or Belarusian nationals, be it as individuals or teams, should be accepted only as neutral athletes or neutral teams. No national symbols, colours, fags or anthems should be displayed. Wherever, in very extreme circumstances, even this is not possible on short notice for organisational or legal reasons, the IOC EB leaves it to the relevant organisation to fnd its own way to effectively address the dilemma described above.11 In principle, it was at the initiative of the International Olympic Committee that all international sports federations were encouraged to ban Russian and Belarusian teams and athletes which allowed FIFA and UEFA to adopt a similar position. In the case of FIFA, however, based on the content of the second paragraph of the resolution, FIFA’s original stance was almost excused, thus allowing football’s world governing body to ultimately resolve the issue by banning the Russian national football team from the World Cup qualifying play-off against Poland. Yet banning Russia’s national team and clubs from international competitions was not the end of sanctions. Russia’s involvement in European football runs deep, as many club owners

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were directly associated with Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia. Although a court case determined in December 2021 that Roman Abramovich’s fnancial investment in Chelsea Football Club was not instructed by Putin, for instance, Abramovich was eventually sanctioned by the European Union and the British government and had his assets frozen, same as Alisher Usmanov at Everton Football Club. Other Russian oligarchs linked to Putin’s regime include Maxim Demin at Bournemouth Football Club (England), Valeriy Oyf at SBV Vitesse Arnhem (Netherlands), Dmitry Rybolovlev at AS Monaco (France) and Cercle Brugge (Belgium), and Ivan Savvidis at PAOK (Greece). Football in Ukraine was stopped in mid-December and was expected to resume on February 25, 2022, but the Russian invasion the day before suspended all sporting activities. Defying the norms, as well as Russia’s continuous aggression, football leagues in Ukraine resumed on August 23, 2022. Except for Desna Chernihiv and FC Mariupol – Chernihiv was under siege for six weeks, while the city of Mariupol was devastated by the Russian military – the remaining clubs of the top two divisions were prepared to participate in Ukraine’s new football season, with matches taking place behind closed doors in Kyiv and the western part of the country. Should the sound of air-raid sirens interrupt a match, offcials were instructed to lead the clubs underground to shelters. Obolon Kyiv, a notable example, resumed football in Bucha. Located in the wider administrative area of Kyiv, Bucha is where the Russian armed forces committed horrendous atrocities at the expense of the local civilian population. The resumption of football in Ukraine amidst warring conditions reminds us of the ‘death match’ that took place during the times of Nazi occupation: Several Dynamo players, and three from Lokomotiv Kyiv, ended up working in the same bakery during the occupation, and they entered a re-established Kyivan league as FC Start in 1942. They won every match, beating, among others, Hungarian and Romanian garrison sides. Flakelf, a team representing the Luftwaffe, then challenged them to a game, which Start won 5-0. A rematch, with an SS referee, was hastily arranged, but despite some brutal tackling from the Ger-mans, Start won 5-3, Flakelf’s humiliation being compounded when Oleksiy Klymenko, a young defender, rounded the keeper, dribbled to the line, then, rather than score, ran beyond the ball and hoofed it back towards the middle of the pitch. Gradually, after the game, the eleven Start players were rounded up for interrogation. Mykola Korotkykh, who had served in the NKVD (the forerunner of the KGB), died after twenty days of torture, while the other ten were sent to the prison camp at Syrets, near Babi Yar, the ravine where thousands of Jews and others undesirable to the Third Reich were massacred. Being physically ft, the players survived atrocious conditions for six months, until, in reprisal for an attack on a plant that repaired motorised sleighs, Paul Radomsky, the camp commandant, had

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one in three prisoners executed. Klymenko, Ivan Kuzmenko, the huge centre-forward, and Mykola Trusevych, who still wore his goal-keeper jersey, were shot in quick succession. Another player, Pavlo Komarov, who is believed to have collaborated, simply disappeared. The myth may have been better known than the truth, but the effect was the same: Dynamo became a rallying point in the darkest days of occupation, and, at least until fragmentation, retained a patriotic value as the team of all Ukraine.12 Playing at home is a luxury for most of Ukraine’s football clubs, just as those representing the country in UEFA’s continental competitions are playing in nearby countries to ensure the safety of all those involved – players and fans. On the day of the league’s frst kick-off, Football Club Shakhtar Donetsk played against Football Club Metalist 1925 Kharkiv. The players of the two clubs, along with the match offcials, entered the stadium adorned in Ukrainian fags and holding a banner that read ‘We are of the same courage,’ before they lined up for President Volodymyr Zelensky’s address on a big screen inside the stadium. Only military personnel were present, responsible for evacuating players, club and match offcials in case air-raid sirens were heard. The symbolic signifcance of the game was highlighted when Yaroslav Golyk, an injured soldier, kicked off the match, after a moment of silence was observed to honour the victims of the war. Part of the empty stands at the Olympiysky Stadium in Kyiv featured a large banner relating to the ‘United 24’ fundraising campaign, just as the players had warmed up before the match in T-shirts displaying the ‘Pitch in for Ukraine’ message. At the end of the match, ‘Glory to Ukraine, glory to the armed forces of Ukraine’ was announced by the PA system of the stadium while the players and match offcials were leaving the feld. It was the day after, August 24, 2022, at the match between Football Club Rukh Lviv and Football Club Metalist Kharkiv (Kharkiv’s other major club) when play was suspended twice at the sound of air-raid sirens warning all those present to seek refuge at the bomb shelter. Under these conditions, it becomes obvious that even the popular game of football cannot possibly ignore the signs of war. Human rights In political science, the study of human rights is situated between the felds of comparative politics and international relations, since the former focuses on political institutions, issues pertaining to citizenship, and socio-political movements, while the latter examines inter-state relations, foreign policy, and international organisations. Theorists in these two felds agree on the following two theses: (1) all humans have human rights and (2) human rights are universal. The universality of human rights, or else ‘natural rights,’ stems from the facts that we are all humans by nature, and that the vast majority

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of states are either signatories and/or have ratifed internationally recognised relevant human rights treaties. Human rights are also interrelated, interdependent, and inseparable, as they appear listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are guaranteed by laws and protected by the same states and organisations that safeguard those laws. The frst fve articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are of particular signifcance here: Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty; Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person; Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms; Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.13 While the frst article sets the pace and tone of the document, the second article emphasises the signifcance of non-discrimination, and the third article reiterates the most fundamental of rights – life, liberty, and security. Articles 4 and 5 are a clear reference to humanity’s darkest periods in history – the slave trade and the Holocaust. Today, it is the International Bill of Rights – comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) – that safeguards a very broad range of internationally recognised rights, such as civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. The Human Rights Council, established in 2006 by the General Assembly as the successor of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, is tasked with the protection and promotion of human rights across the world. The Universal Periodic Review is a mechanism that allows the Human Rights Council the opportunity to assess the status of human rights records across all United Nations member states every four years to ensure the universality of human rights. The Offce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights serves as the secretariat of the Human Rights Council. Traces of human rights are evident in all major religions, ancient civilisations, and the period of Enlightenment, before they were consolidated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Terms denoting to equality, justice, and liberty were frst expressed with the installation of democracy in classical Greece, even though women, children, and slaves were excluded

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from any such rights. Close to 2,000 years later, the issue of rights re-emerged in Medieval England through the charter of rights that was Magna Carta Libertarium. Several centuries later, John Locke’s writings on the rights to life, liberty, and property not only infuenced other thinkers of his time like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, but he also inspired the content of the United States Declaration of Independence. The American Civil War, the continuing slave trade, a strong sense of imperialism, and, later, ethnonationalism in Europe left no room for the advocacy of human rights before the Second World War came to an end. Ever since, despite signifcant advances in the protection of women, children, and marginalised communities over matters pertaining to sex, religion, race etc., inequalities have not ceased to exist and, therefore, discrimination remains increasingly prevalent. Since the idea of human rights was developed in the Western world, they are sometimes also perceived as a political tool for Western nations to impose their will upon less developed countries. Clifford Bob in Rights as Weapons: Instruments of Confict, Tools of Power (2019) produces a compelling account of how human rights are employed as a political tool to undermine an adversary and improve the terms of negotiation by means of examining issues related to military interventions, animal rights, blockades, the role of religion, cultural rights, the role of international courts and related instruments, children, and women’s rights. FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board In December 2015, FIFA asked John Ruggie of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at the University of Harvard to advise on how to make respect for human rights an integral part of its operations across the world. In his capacity as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Ruggie also authored the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed unanimously in June 2011 by the United Nations Human Rights Council. In his report to FIFA, Ruggie raises the issue of bribery in connection with the bidding process for the FIFA World Cup and the fact that human rights were not previously included in the selection criteria employing, an as example, FIFA’s decision to hold the under-20 Women’s World Cup in Papua New Guinea, “known as one of the world’s worst places for sexual violence against women – and police are often among the perpetrators.”14 The report also raised issues relating to land acquisition and the possible displacement of people, as the host country aims to appropriate land, e.g., to build stadiums and training centres or accommodate athletes and fans. Obviously, construction is another signifcant aspect of hosting such an international tournament as the FIFA World Cup, whereby the health and safety of workers should be guaranteed by the host country. The same, of course, applies to FIFA’s licensees in supply chains and industries supporting the World Cup. Another sector, often

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overlooked, concerns hospitality, the increase of prices, and, perhaps, the traffcking of sex workers – including children. And, fnally, the all-encompassing issue of security and the involvement of government departments in charge of police forces or the employment of private security companies during the tournament to either guarantee the safety of visiting fans or to defect social unrest and disperse related demonstrations. The report concluded with several recommendations grouped under six categories, all relating to human rights. The frst grouping, Adopt a Clear and Coherent Human Rights Policy, recommended that FIFA should “adopt and make publicly available a human rights policy that applies to its leadership, staff, commercial subsidiaries, and to its relationships with member associations, business partners and other relevant parties”; “align its several Codes with the organization’s commitment to respect all internationally recognized human rights, as expressed in Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes and its human rights policy”; and “ensure that the human rights commitment in Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes is mirrored in the requirements of the Standard Statutes for member associations, and is also extended to the requirements for confederations’ statutes at the earliest opportunity.”15 The second one, Embed Respect for Human Rights, recommended that FIFA should “formally designate a member of top management with accountability for the organization’s human rights performance”; “identify the appropriate department to hold day-to-day responsibility for coordinating, promoting and supporting implementation of FIFA’s human rights commitment”; “establish a cross-functional structure, involving those departments whose decisions and relationships most affect its human rights risks, to deliver on its human rights commitment”; “take full account of its human rights commitments in their decision-making”; “ensure that the individuals with a signifcant role in implementing its human rights”; “establish formal structures for regular engagement with key stakeholders about human rights risks across its activities and events commitment have adequate training, capacity and resources to perform their roles”; while “The independent members of FIFA’s new Governance Committee, which is mandated to address human rights in connection with FIFA and its activities, should include individuals with recognized human rights expertise.” The third group, Identify and Evaluate Human Rights Risks, recommended that FIFA should include “risks to people in its systems for identifying and assessing risks associated with its activities and business relationships”; and “human rights within its criteria for evaluating bids to host tournaments and should make them a substantive factor in host selection.” The fourth group of recommendations, Address Human Rights Risks, recommended that FIFA should set explicit human rights requirements of Local Organising Committees in bidding documents for tournaments and provide guidance

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on them; The government guarantees that FIFA requires the LOC to seek should refect FIFA’s human rights commitment in Article 3 of its revised Statutes; FIFA should work with Local Organising Committees to engage their host governments throughout the tournament cycle in efforts to reduce human rights risks associated with tournaments; FIFA should build leverage into supply chain relationships from the earliest stage possible, in order to maximize its ability to prevent negative impacts on people; FIFA should use its annual member associations’ conferences to raise awareness of member associations’ own human rights responsibilities, and should use its existing mentoring activities to help them understand and implement them; Where FIFA is unable to reduce severe human rights impacts by using its leverage, it should consider suspending or terminating the relationship. Where this is not possible FIFA should at a minimum explain its efforts to mitigate the impacts as transparently as possible. The penultimate group, Track and Report on Implementation, recommended that FIFA should include in its bidding documents for World Cups a requirement for adequate public reporting by Local Organising Committees on human rights risks and their management; In the context of its tournaments, FIFA should task its local staff and operational teams sent from headquarters with monitoring implementation of human rights risk mitigation measures; FIFA should enhance its internal capacity to monitor the implementation of human rights provisions in its contracts with suppliers and licensees; FIFA should provide more in-depth reporting about how it understands and addresses its human rights risks and actual impacts. Finally, to Enable Access to Remedy, the report recommended that FIFA should require Local Organising Committees to establish effective grievance mechanisms for human rights-related complaints, with appropriate thresholds for complaints to be escalated to FIFA itself; review its existing dispute resolution system for football-related issues to ensure that it does not lead in practice to a lack of access to effective remedy for human rights harms; review the expectations it sets of procurement and licensing suppliers as well as member associations with regard to their own processes to identify and address human rights-related complaints, and should promote and support improvements where needed.16

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In response to the report’s recommendations, a FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board was established in 2017 on the initiative of FIFA’s President to enhance its efforts to safeguard human rights, the Board providing FIFA with advice and recommendations on all issues that it considers relevant to the implementation of FIFA’s human rights responsibilities under article 3 of the FIFA Statutes, including with regard to its policy commitments, human rights due diligence processes, and processes for remediation.17 In its frst report, the Board recommended, among other things, that FIFA “strengthen the draft policy’s language regarding the organisation’s expectations of governments that are hosting FIFA tournaments,”18 “prioritise its efforts to develop systems to more consistently identify the greatest risks to people affected by FIFA’s activities and business relationships,”19 and support a thorough examination of the root causes of all fatalities and other serious injuries to date, as well as an analysis of health and safety risks in the fnal phases of construction through the end of 2017 (and potentially into early 2018) in order to help prevent the most severe risks to workers.20 With regard to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, the Board urged FIFA to “actively explore ways to use its leverage to engage with the host government about the impact of the kafala system on migrant workers involved in World Cup-related construction,”21 “include respect for international labour rights standards, including specifc occupational health and safety requirements for the construction phase, in the Stadium Agreement for host countries in the bidding documentation,” “make clear with respect to all its events that it is unacceptable for migrant workers to be burdened with recruitment fees,”22 and stressed that where critical human rights issues arise in connection with its operations, it is important for FIFA to make prompt factual statements about its knowledge of the situation that can be shared with relevant expert and/ or directly involved stakeholders, as well as with the wider public, in order to enable more effective responses and collaborative action where possible.23 In its second report, with regard to the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, the Human Rights Advisory Board recommended that FIFA “should be transparent about the actual number of fatalities on 2018 FIFA World Cup construction sites,” “should take a more proactive stance on investigations of fatalities

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and should use its leverage, together with the LOC, to directly engage the main contractors to seek to ensure that they are providing an adequate response,” and “proactively identify a solution to address any delayed or unpaid wages.”24 With regard to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, FIFA should “engage with the SC to promptly bring in recognized global experts to independently assess the heat stress index being used and the trigger points for remedial action.”25 In its third report, the Human Rights Advisory Board noted: The positive work that has been done by the SC on the stadia sites under its control to improve respect for migrant workers’ rights, particularly in the areas of workplace health and safety, accommodation standards, universal reimbursement of recruitment fees.26 In its fourth report, the Human Rights Advisory Board emphasized the urgent need for FIFA to act on the continuing stakeholder and broader public concern about the number and nature of “non-work-related deaths” occurring in connection with FWC 2022 construction and more broadly in the country. We note that currently the SC is the only major Qatari entity transparently publishing a record of these deaths. The norm in Qatar is that the attending doctor will issue a death certifcate and the body of the loved one will be returned immediately to their family; no autopsies are conducted. This has led to speculation over the possible causes of sudden or unexpected worker deaths and has prompted the SC to pre-screen workers in order to identify, track and treat any underlying chronic medical conditions, such as diabetes.27 In its fnal, ffth, report, the Human Rights Advisory Board raised concerns with FIFA about instances of substantial delays between the identifcation of impacts suffered by migrant workers (particularly late or non-payments of salaries, non-reimbursement of recruitment fees and early termination of contracts), and the actual remediation of those impacts.28 Evidently, the Human Rights Advisory Board repetitively raised the issue of human rights; nevertheless, the response of both FIFA and the host country of Qatar demonstrated little willingness to address them properly. 2022 FIFA World Cup The frst article of FIFA’s Human Rights Policy explicitly states that the world’s governing body of football “is committed to respecting human rights

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in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs),” and, more precisely, FIFA’s commitment embraces all internationally recognised human rights, including those contained in the International Bill of Human Rights (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.29 Article 5, in particular, makes reference to labour rights: FIFA’s operations are labour-intensive. FIFA directly employs several hundred people. Moreover, it is linked to workers through its engagement with other entities and through supply chains as part of, for instance, the construction of stadiums and infrastructure, the provision of accommodation and food and beverages or the production of licensed goods. FIFA strives to uphold and promote the highest international labour standards, in particular the principles enshrined in the eight core International Labour Organization conventions. It implements relevant procedures in relation to its own staff and seeks to ensure respect for labour standards by its business partners and in the various activities directly linked to its operations, including through its supply chains.30 Yet Amnesty International’s reporting from Qatar draws a wholly different picture: Exploitation of migrant workers in Qatar, particularly in the construction sector, has been widely reported by human rights and trades union groups and the international media, particularly since 2010. Amongst the most frequently-reported problems facing migrant workers are: deceptive recruitment practices which see migrant workers promised more favourable conditions of work by recruiters in their home country than they are given on arrival in Qatar; employers compelling workers to live in squalid conditions; employers confscating workers’ passports and denying them the exit visa they need to leave Qatar; late or non-payment of wages; and employers not giving workers proper identity documents, which leaves them exposed to arrest. In extreme, but not exceptional, cases migrants are subjected to forced labour.31 Amnesty International interviewed 234 male migrant workers. All but six reported having been deceived regarding their salary, receiving less than what recruiters had promised them. Amnesty International understands that

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Deceptive recruitment practices increase workers’ vulnerability to traffcking for labour exploitation and forced labour. Having paid fees and, in many cases, taken on debt to move to Qatar they felt they had no option but to accept the lower salaries, although many were then left in very diffcult situations, struggling to repay loans with less money than expected. Upon inspecting the accommodation of workers tasked with the refurbishment of the Khalifa Stadium and the landscaping projects at the Aspire Zone, Amnesty International reported that “In one case the main entrance road to the camp was fooded due to inadequate drainage, and smelled of raw sewage. All of the accommodation sites were clearly in breach of both Qatari law and the Supreme Committee’s Workers’ Welfare Standards.” Also contravening the law in Qatar was the fact that the employers were widely confscating the workers’ passports, a practice that “can stop workers from exercising their right to leave a country and makes them more vulnerable to forced labour.”32 Their passports confscated, workers at the Khalifa Stadium had no negotiating power to address the issue of irregular and delayed payment of salaries, and with their pay being several months in arrears, Amnesty International understands, “the worker is told that if they do not continue working they will not get the pay that is owed to them. Arrears and delays in payment of wages constitute an abuse of labour rights and in particular the right to just and favourable remuneration.”33 From FIFA’s communication with Amnesty International, it becomes evident that fve years after having awarded the 2022 World Cup to Qatar in 2010, FIFA had yet to set up a due diligence process to prevent the exploitation of those workers employed at construction sites related to the infrastructure necessary for the proper hosting of the competition. Worse, the death of thousands of migrant workers remains unaccounted for. Amnesty International claims that despite clear evidence that heat stress has posed huge health risks to workers, it remains extremely diffcult to know exactly how many people have died as a result of their working conditions. This is because Qatari authorities, contrary to international obligations, have failed to investigate these deaths in a way that would make it possible to determine the true underlying causes of death. Instead, death certifcates usually report the deaths as due to “natural causes” or “cardiac arrest” – descriptions that are almost meaningless in certifying deaths – and thus no connection to their working conditions is made.34 A report published by the International Trade Union Confederation highlights the fact that the exact number of fatalities and injuries related to construction at World Cup sites is hampered by “the Qatari government’s

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refusal to publish statistics or allow independent investigations into the reasons why a thousand ft young migrant workers are dying each year.”35 The report notes that migrant labourers work long hours every day for six days a week in Qatar’s extreme heat. Construction sites in Qatar are known for a lack of safety regulation and the government preventing workers from having representation in unions to protect their lives. After their shifts migrant workers return to overcrowded and squalid labour camps with limited facilities, limited or no access to potable water and little escape from the heat.36 For the record, an article in The Guardian revealed in February 2021 that about 6,500 workers had died in Qatar since it was awarded the World Cup, though this fgure does not concern the deaths of migrants working exclusively at World Cup construction sites.37 The number of fatalities reported by The Guardian may not be far from reality given that The 2013 Qatar Health Report, published by Qatar Supreme Council on Health, and publicly available in April 2015, showed that the crude death rate for non-Qataris of working age, i.e. the migrant labour population, was 0.6 per 1,000. Estimating a total migrant population of 2 million of which around 88% (or 1.82 million) are of working age, this gives a fgure of 1,091 fatalities per year. By the time the 2022 World Cup kicks off in seven years’ time, based on new data, more than 7,000 migrant workers could have died in Qatar,38 though it must be stressed that not all workers were employed at construction sites devoted to the World Cup exclusively. Amnesty International proposed that FIFA should allocate some $440 million to compensate migrant workers who suffered abuse while working at construction sites in preparation for the World Cup. Interestingly, the amount proposed matches exactly that of the total prize money divided among the 32 teams that competed in the 2022 FIFA World Cup. A YouGov poll, commissioned by Amnesty International, surveyed more than 17,000 adults from Argentina, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, the United States, and ten European countries and revealed that 73% of the respondents were in favour of FIFA compensating migrant workers. In anticipation of FIFA’s response, Article 6 of its Human Rights Policy stipulates: FIFA is committed to providing for or cooperating in remediation where it has caused or contributed to adverse human rights impacts and will seek to promote or cooperate in access to remediation where it is

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otherwise linked to adverse impacts through its relationships with third parties, including by exploring all options available to it.39 FIFA’s Sustainability Strategy addresses fve important pillars with regard to the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Under the heading Developing Human Capital and Safeguarding Workers’ Rights, FIFA stresses its commitment to defending the rights and welfare of workers involved at various World Cup sites and notes three key objectives: Ensure decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment for workers engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for, FIFA World Cup 2022™ sites; Enable access to effective remedy for workers engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for, FIFA World Cup 2022™ sites; Promote decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment, including effective access to remedy, for workers engaged through other construction projects and supply chain relationships directly linked to the FIFA World Cup 2022™.40 Regarding the frst objective, the workforce may be vulnerable to risks that range from practices amounting to forced or compulsory labour; discrimination; and limitations on their freedom of movement, freedom of association and right to collective bargaining; to threats to their health and safety; the conditions of their work and remuneration and their standard of living; and their access to effective remedy.41 As a safety mechanism, FIFA’s Human Rights Policy is mentioned, along with the relevant conventions of the International Labour Organization, as well as Qatar’s legal and regulatory framework with regard to labour rights. “Decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment practices for these workers” is the main aim of the three objectives above. To this end, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy “piloted various wearable cooling technologies on its sites to reduce body temperature and provide relief during outdoor work in high temperatures,” “activated a new electronic humidex measuring device, which tracks temperature and humidity and issues automatic ‘no work’ alerts when a specifc humidex value is reached,” “entered into a partnership agreement with Weill Cornell Medicine-Qatar to carry out a nutrition initiative,” “delivers training courses, created in partnership with the Qatar International Safety Centre (QISC), to introduce all new workers on its sites to life in Qatar, improve their technical capabilities and enhance job performance, while also increasing productivity and safety,” taught workers “how to use an ATM, key English and Arabic phrases and how to get around Qatar,” “provides advanced occupational health and safety training, with targeted modules for trades such as steel fxers and

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carpenters,” and “regularly releases public progress reports providing details on the SC’s activities, and the successes, challenges and upcoming priorities relating to its workers’ welfare programme.”42 Yet “Even with the best policies and practices,” the report notes, “an organisation may cause or contribute to an adverse human rights impact that it has not foreseen or been able to prevent.”43 The Supreme Committee has, therefore, “formalised grievance policy with associated processes and procedures, and a grievance redress mechanism that includes Workers’ Welfare Forums and a dedicated grievance hotline.”44 Finally, with regard to the third objective, Qatar’s legal and regulatory framework for the protection of labour and human rights has seen important developments that will facilitate our efforts to promote fair recruitment practices and decent working and living conditions for all workers associated with the tournament. Most signifcantly, the Qatari government committed to a range of labour reforms through a technical cooperation programme with the ILO which includes improvement in payment of wages; enhanced labour inspection and occupational safety and health systems; refnement of the employment contract system replacing the kafala system and improvement of labour recruitment procedures; increased prevention, protection and prosecution against forced labour; and promotion of the workers’ voice. Since then, Qatar has abolished the requirement for most expatriate workers to obtain an exit permit from their employer in order to leave Qatar, thereby reducing barriers to freedom of movement for workers, while also “a mechanism called the Wage Protection System (WPS) has operated since 2015, whereby companies are required to transfer the salaries of all employees through an electronic system to the employees’ accounts in one of the country’s recognised fnancial institutions.”45 The year after, FIFA’s First Sustainability Progress Report (2020) stated that the Supreme Committee “carries out specialised accommodation health and safety and site welfare inspections” and, most signifcantly, uses a tailored, web-based system to report site safety and health incidents and occurrences, as per the legal reporting requirements of Qatar and based on the UK’s Reportable Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulation (RIDDOR) system. In this reporting period an accident frequency rate (AFR) of 0.01 and 11 RIDDOR reportable incidents were recorded. Although the SC workforce peaked at 40,000 workers in 2019, and had 23 more million work hours compared to

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2018, the AFR reduced by 68%, and all incidents reduced by 47% in 2019, despite the increased workload and risks.46 The only other item of the report worthy of note concerns the reimbursement of recruitment fees. Recruitment fees are illegal under both international and Qatari law, and “Given that most affected workers are unable to prove that they were made to pay illegal fees,” the Supreme Committee shifted the burden of proof to contractors and OCPs to show that the workers had been hired ethically. The SC has set up a Universal Reimbursement Scheme to compensate both SC workers and legacy workers who were hired prior to the commencement of SC projects, for hardships they may have encountered when moving to Qatar.47 Another dimension of human rights violations is the ill treatment of LGBT people in Qatar. Human Rights Watch reported48 that LGBT people are systematically targeted by the Qatari authorities with the Preventive Security Department forces of the Ministry of the Interior placing them in detention for an indefnite period of time for no reason other than their sexuality. While in police custody, LGBT people are subjected to verbal and sexual harassment, physical abuse, and have their phones searched for ‘incriminating’ evidence to extract forced confessions, with some even forced to attend conversion therapy as a requirement for their release. Article 285 of the Penal Code in Qatar prohibits same-sex relations and serves a penalty of up to seven years in prison. The 2002 Law No.17 on the Protection of Community allows the state to detain people without charge or trial for six months. Although the government in Qatar has stated that all are welcome to visit and no one would be discriminated against, some ten days before the World Cup, Khalid Salman – a former football player and a Qatar World Cup ambassador – stated in a documentary broadcast on German public broadcaster ZDF that homosexuality was “damage in the mind” and “spiritual harm,” thus the reason it is “haram” (prohibited).49 Similarly, Nasser al Khater, Qatar 2022 chief executive, stated that Qatar would not be changing their laws on homosexuality and asked visiting fans to respect their culture. In response, the captains of seven European national teams (Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Wales) had, initially, decided to wear the rainbow-themed armband of the One Love campaign, an idea originated in the Netherlands for promoting inclusion and equality, when FIFA threatened to discipline any captain not wearing the armband provided by FIFA with a yellow card. FIFA’s Equipment and Regulations guidelines state, “For FIFA Final Competitions, the captain of each Team must wear the captain’s armband provided by FIFA.”50 In response to FIFA’s display of power, the players of Germany’s national team posed for the customary photo just before their frst 2022 FIFA World Cup match while covering their mouths with their right hand, thus implying that FIFA had forced them

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into silence. Ultimately, the only German that wore inside the stadium the One Love armband, reserved for Germany’s captain Manuel Neuer, was the German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser. In a letter addressed to the 32 nations that competed in the 2022 FIFA World Cup, signed by President Gianni Infantino and Secretary General Fatma Samoura, FIFA stated that We know football does not live in a vacuum and we are equally aware that there are many challenges and diffculties of a political nature all around the world. But please do not allow football to be dragged into every ideological or political battle that exists. At FIFA, we try to respect all opinions and beliefs, without handing out moral lessons to the rest of the world. One of the great strengths of the world is indeed its very diversity, and if inclusion means anything, it means having respect for that diversity. No one people or culture or nation is “better” than any other. This principle is the very foundation stone of mutual respect and non-discrimination. And this is also one of the core values of football. So, please let’s all remember that and let football take centre stage. Now, at the FIFA World Cup, we have the unique occasion and opportunity to welcome and embrace everyone, regardless of origin, background, religion, gender, sexual orientation or nationality. Let’s take that opportunity and unite the world through the universal language of football.51 In response to FIFA’s letter, a joint statement from members of the UEFA Working Group on Human and Labour Rights, signed by the football associations of Belgium, Denmark, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Wales, stated that signifcant progress has been made by Qatar, particularly with regards to the rights of migrant workers, […] However, embracing diversity and tolerance also means supporting human rights. Human rights are universal and they apply everywhere. We will continue to support the momentum for positive, progressive change and continue to advocate for a conclusive outcome and update on the two key outstanding issues we have been discussing with FIFA for a long time. FIFA has repeatedly committed to deliver concrete answers on these issues – the compensation fund for migrant workers, and the concept of a migrant workers centre to be created in Doha – and we will continue to press for these to be delivered. We believe in the power of football to make further positive and credible contributions to progressive sustainable change in the world.52 The reaction from CONMEBOL was markedly different: The CONMEBOL and its ten Member Associations calls on the Football world to support the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. Qatar is eager to

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display its hospitality and warmth, impressive sports venues with 32 teams prepared and with exceptional talents, thus ensuring a tournament that will remain in history, without a doubt. Like never before, humanity needs the compelling message of sports and football, the most popular sport. The message is captivating because it is universal; it transcends political or ideological disputes, conjunctural disagreements, and confrontations. It is a message overfowing with optimism, tolerance, inclusion, diversity, and unity. The FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 is the unrivalled opportunity to consolidate the values on which football is founded. Given its scope, prestige, and tradition, the World Cup multiplies the positive impact of these values. This is especially true of the new generations, in children and young people, who hope and seek that football is not tarnished or distorted with biased or partial visions. Let us unfold the football feld to these values – effort as a path of self-improvement; the articulation of individual talent and teamwork; appreciation for the rival; loyal competition– and may these values be the heroes during the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. The time has come, for disagreements and fghts to take a back seat, let the games begin for all citizens enjoy an all-embracing celebration, so eagerly awaited by our planet.53 Then, on November 24, 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution relating to the Situation of Human Rights in the Context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar. According to the resolution, FIFA awarded Qatar the World Cup without conducting human rights or environmental due diligence or laying down conditions for the protection of migrant workers, […] Qatar won the FIFA World Cup bidding process amid credible allegations of bribery and corruption that led to judicial investigations, […] worker’s rights have been violated, […] workers were forced into debt by recruitment companies that illegally charged them fees, and many of them suffered wage theft and were subject to gruelling working conditions in extreme heat that exposed them to the risk of illness, injury and death, […] thousands of migrant workers reportedly died and many more were injured during construction works related to the World Cup in Qatar.54 The resolution deplores the lack of transparency and the clear lack of a responsible risk assessment that characterised the awarding of the FIFA World Cup to Qatar in 2010; recalls its long-held view that corruption within FIFA is rampant, systemic and deep-rooted, and continues to believe the organisation has seriously damaged the image and integrity of global football55

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and Calls on the EU Member States, particularly those with large national football leagues, such as Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, to exert pressure on UEFA and FIFA for the latter to engage in fundamental reform, including the introduction of democratic and transparent procedures in the awarding of football World Cups and the strict implementation of human rights and sustainability criteria for hosting countries; urgently calls for violations of fundamental rights and human rights, especially evident systematic gender-based violence, to be made into binding exclusion criterion for the awarding of international sporting events in order to protect athletes and fans and to put an end to.56 With regard to corruption within the ranks of FIFA, US Attorney General Loretta Lynch used the same wording, “rampant, systemic and deep-rooted,” as per an indictment charging nine FIFA offcials in May 2015.57 Response to those abuses from around the world varied considerably. The new third kit of Norwegian football club Tromsø Idrettslag featured a QR code, created in collaboration with Amnesty International, that when scanned redirects the user to a webpage that describes conditions in Qatar. The players of the Norwegian national team wore T-shirts displaying the message ‘Human rights – on and off the pitch’ before their match against Germany in March 2021. The Denmark national team sported toned down shirts that faded the national logo and that of the manufacturer, Hummel, to protest Qatar’s human rights abuses; Denmark’s third kit was black, to represent the sense of mourning related to the workers’ deaths. The Danish Football Association had also requested FIFA to permit the message ‘Human Rights for All’ to be displayed on the training jerseys of the national team, but the request was rejected for it was considered political in nature. In France, Bordeaux, Lille, Marseille, Paris, Reims, and Strasbourg decided on boycotting the competition by means of not setting up fan zones and giant screens, again, to protest Qatar’s poor human rights record. While Strasbourg’s decision makes sense when taking into account the fact that the city is the seat of the European Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights, Paris maintains close relations with Qatar through the Paris Saint-Germain football club, which is owned by Qatar Sports Investments, a subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority. Brussels and Berlin, too, did not set up fan zones either. Finally, the Australian national football team released a video criticising Qatar’s laws prohibiting same-sex relationships and the treatment of migrant workers; the video was accompanied by a similar-in-content statement of Football Australia. The above suggests that instead of projecting soft power, Qatar would have been embroiled in a constant battle to dispose of the negative attention

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it has attracted over the years on matters pertaining to human rights. But Qatar has the world’s third-largest natural gas reserves. With Russia and Iran subject to sanctions, an energy-ridden Europe could afford to openly condemn the government in Qatar. After all, the European Union signed in July 2022 a new agreement with Azerbaijan to double its gas imports in complete disregard for the autocratic regime currently in power or its ongoing confict with Armenia. Interestingly, Qatar’s increased signifcance is the direct result of a war waged by the previous host of the FIFA World Cup, Russia. Conclusion On May 14, 1938, England was scheduled to play Germany in Berlin. Two months earlier, on 12 March 1938, Nazi Germany had annexed Austria, as the Second World War was about to begin. Once the England players lined up before kick-off, they performed the Nazi salute; “a direct order from Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin. He also confrmed that the order had been endorsed by the FA Secretary, Stanley Rous.”58 For the government in England, the match was less about playing football than preserving the policy of appeasement towards the Nazi regime. On the occasion, playing politics was certainly far more signifcant, playing football was merely the pretext. Never had the objectives of foreign policy been so effortlessly facilitated. Likewise, Ukraine made a statement relating to the territorial integrity of the country during the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship by means of a suitably designed jersey, a clear message to Russia’s expansionist strategy – though insuffcient, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine several months later. The issue of human rights, nonetheless, is certainly far more complex. Better known for its vast oil and gas reserves, it was the popularity of football and the prestigious World Cup that drew the attention of the international community to Qatar’s poor human rights record. Even then, the State of Qatar resisted international calls for reform, just as the international community appeared divided over the issue of human rights. While ten European football associations, all representing advanced democracies, stressed the universality of human rights in their response to the FIFA letter, their South American counterparts were seemingly unsympathetic, though only Uruguay qualifed as a full democracy, based on the Democracy Index for 2021. Whether concerning migrant workers or LGBT people, however, the issue of human rights violations in Qatar only surfaced after FIFA decided in December 2010 to award the 2022 FIFA World Cup to the Arab emirate. Yet the most signifcant human rights violation is the fact that the citizens of Qatar have no right to choose their own government in free and fair elections. Constitutional reforms in 2004 paved the way for Qatar’s frst ever legislative elections in October 2021, perhaps, a step towards establishing democracy in the future.

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Notes 1 Clément Astruc, “Beyond the Maracanazo: The World Cup, Diplomacy and the International Exposure of Brazilian Football in 1950,” Soccer & Society, 21: 8, 861–875, 2020, 871. 2 The Guardian, Boris Johnson Compares Russian World Cup to Hitler’s 1936 Olympics, by Patrick Wintour, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/ mar/21/boris-johnson-compares-russian-world-cup-to-hitlers-1936-olympics, 21 March 2018. 3 Michał Marcin Kobierecki, “Politics of the Group Draws in Football: The Case of Restricted Team Clashes,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 14: 2, 321–336, 2022. 4 BBC, Ukraine Crisis: Russia’s Claim on Crimea’s Football Clubs, by Rafael Saakov, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28806786, 16 August 2014. 5 BBC, Crimea Clubs Banned from Playing in Russian League by UEFA, https:// www.bbc.com/sport/football/30337628, 4 December 2014. 6 UEFA, UEFA Emergency Panel Decision on Crimean Clubs, https://www.uefa .com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/0218-0e8bcef94047-cd00477585ec-1000-uefa-emergency-panel-decision-on-crimean-clubs/, 22 August 2014. 7 The Guardian, Andriy Yarmolenko’s Tears Eclipse West Ham’s Win against Aston Villa, by Jonathan Wilson, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022 /mar/13/west-ham-aston-villa-premier-league-match-report?ref=upstract.com &curator=upstract.com, 13 March 2022. 8 Polish Football Association, Statement by the Football Association of Poland on Russia’s Military Invasion of Ukraine, https://www.pzpn.pl/en/association/ news/2022-02-27/statement-by-the-football-associations-of-poland-on-russia-s -military-invasion-of-ukraine, 27 February 2022. 9 Polish Football Association, Statement by the Football Associations of Poland, Sweden and Czech Republic, https://www.pzpn.pl/federacja/aktualnosci/2022-02 -24/oswiadczenie-federacji-pilkarskich-polski-szwecji-i-czech, 24 February 2022. 10 FIFA, FIFA/UEFA Suspend Russian Clubs and National Teams from All Competitions, https://www.ffa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/ media-releases/ffa-uefa-suspend-russian-clubs-and-national-teams-from-all-competitions, 28 February 2022. Also at UEFA, FIFA/UEFA suspend Russian clubs and national teams from all competitions, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/mediaservices/mediareleases/news/0272-148df1faf082-6e50b5ea1f84-1000--ffa-uefa -suspend-russian-clubs-and-national-teams-from-all-com/, 28 February 2022. 11 IOC, IOC EB Recommends No Participation of Russian and Belarusian Athletes and Offcials, https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-eb-recommends-no-participation-of-russian-and-belarusian-athletes-and-offcials, 28 February 2022. 12 Jonathan Wilson, Behind the Curtain: Travels in Eastern European Football, London: Orion Books, 2006, 11–12. 13 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, https://www.un .org/sites/un2.un.org/fles/2021/03/udhr.pdf 14 John G. Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report, No. 68. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2016, 21. 15 John G. Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report, No. 68. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2016, 29. 16 John G. Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report, No. 68. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2016, 29–35.

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17 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 2. 18 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 7. 19 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 14. 20 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 18. 21 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 23. 22 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 27. 23 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA, September 2017, 30. 24 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Including the Board’s Recommendations and FIFA’s Responses, September 2018, 9. 25 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Including the Board’s Recommendations and FIFA’s Responses, September 2018, 19. 26 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Third Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Including the Board’s Recommendations from October 2018– April 2019, May 2019, 8. 27 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Fourth Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Including the Board’s Recommendations from May–December 2019, January 2020, 9. 28 FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Fifth Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board, Including the Board’s Recommendations from March– December 2020, February 2021, 9. 29 FIFA, Human Rights Policy, https://digitalhub.ffa.com/m/1a876c66a3f0498d/ original/kr05dqyhwr1uhqy2lh6r-pdf.pdf, May 2017, 5. 30 FIFA, Human Rights Policy, https://digitalhub.ffa.com/m/1a876c66a3f0498d/ original/kr05dqyhwr1uhqy2lh6r-pdf.pdf, May 2017, 6. 31 Amnesty International, The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup Site, https://www.amnesty.org/en /documents/mde22/3548/2016/en/, March 2016, 4. 32 Amnesty International, The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup Site, https://www.amnesty.org/en /documents/mde22/3548/2016/en/, March 2016, 5. 33 Amnesty International, The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup Site, https://www.amnesty.org/en /documents/mde22/3548/2016/en/, March 2016, 6. 34 Amnesty International, Reality Check 2021: A Year to the 2022 World Cup, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/4966/2021/en/, November 2021, 35. 35 International Trade Union Confederation, Frontlines Report, Counting the Cost of Modern-Day Slavery in Qatar: What Price Is Freedom? 2015, 22. 36 International Trade Union Confederation, Frontlines Report, Counting the Cost of Modern-Day Slavery in Qatar: What Price Is Freedom? 2015, 24. 37 The Guardian, Revealed: 6,500 Migrant Workers Have Died in Qatar since World Cup Awarded, by Pete Pattisson, Niamh McIntyre, Imran Mukhtar, Nikhil

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Eapen, Md Owasim Uddin Bhuyan, Udwab Bhattarai Aanya Piyari, https://www .theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker -deaths-qatar-ffa-world-cup-2022, 23 February 2021. International Trade Union Confederation, Frontlines Report, Counting the Cost of Modern-Day Slavery in Qatar: What Price Is Freedom? 2015, 25. FIFA, Human Rights Policy, https://digitalhub.ffa.com/m/1a876c66a3f0498d/ original/kr05dqyhwr1uhqy2lh6r-pdf.pdf, May 2017, 7. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, October 2019, 22. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, October 2019, 23. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, October 2019, 28. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, October 2019, 29. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, October 2019, 30. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, October 2019, 31. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ First Sustainability Progress Report, October 2020, 13. FIFA, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ First Sustainability Progress Report, October 2020, 18. Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Security Forces Arrest, Abuse LGBT People, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/24/qatar-security-forces-arrest-abuse-lgbt -people, 24 October 2022. Deutsche Welle, Leon Goretzka: Qatar Homophobia ‘from Different Millennium’, by Kyle McKinnon and Kalika Mehta, https://www.dw.com/en /leon-goretzka-qatar-homophobia-from-a-different-millennium/a-63679953 ?utm_source=pocket_saves, 10 November 2022. FIFA, Equipment Regulations, 2022, 54. Sky News, Let’s Focus on the Football! – FIFA Bosses Tell World Cup Teams Not to Lecture on Morality, by Rob Harris, https://news.sky.com/story/lets -focus-on-the-football-ffa-bosses-tell-world-cup-teams-not-to-lecture-on-morality-12737705, 4 November 2022. The FA, A Joint Statement from Members of the UEFA Working Group on Human and Labour Rights, https://www.thefa.com/news/2022/nov/06/ joint-statement-uefa-working-group-on-human-rights-labour-20220611, 6 November 2022. CONMEBOL, CONMEBOL and Its Ten Member Associations Calls on the Football World to Support the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, https://www .conmebol.com/noticias/conmebol-and-its-ten-member-associations-calls-on-the -football-world-to-support-the-ffa-world-cup-qatar-2022/, 7 November 2022. European Parliament, Situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA world cup in Qatar, European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (2022/2948(RSP)), 24 November 2022, 2. European Parliament, Situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA world cup in Qatar, European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (2022/2948(RSP)), 24 November 2022, 4. European Parliament, Situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA world cup in Qatar, European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the situation of human rights in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar (2022/2948(RSP)), 24 November 2022, 4–5. United States Department of Justice, Nine FIFA Offcials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, Offce of

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Public Affairs, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-ffa-offcials-and-fve-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and, 27 May 2015. 58 Macon Benoit, “The Politicization of Football: The European Game and the Approach to the Second World War,” Soccer & Society, 9: 4, 532–550, 2008, 532.

Conclusion

To a group of children kicking a ball around, football is just a game; as is to a team of adults playing amateur football, perhaps, a little more competitive. When professionals play the game, however, football becomes a sport capable of commanding the attention of millions of people the world over. It is precisely this mass appeal of football that converts clubs into party manifestos, national teams into diplomatic missions, and stadiums into political arenas. As well, the everyday fan attending a match transforms into a football afcionado, players of superior ability gain iconic status, and club owners win national elections. The connection between football and politics is no longer an intricate issue, or a matter of perception; it is noticeable to all intents and purposes. Football is about politics, just as the ball is political; a ‘sphere of infuence’ – a term often employed in international politics to signify a state’s control over foreign lands – capable of arousing emotions and causing profound controversy. ‘Did the ball cross the line?’ the Germans must have been asking following their premature elimination from the 2022 FIFA World Cup, though Japan’s second goal against Spain was ruled legitimate after a video assistant referee review; for the record, the same question was raised after Germany conceded the goal that condemned them to defeat at the 1966 FIFA World Cup fnal against England. The video assistant referee (VAR) was introduced at the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia and has remained a contentious matter ever since, yet its main function is to deliver more justice in determining controversial incidents during a match. Accuracy in refereeing decisions has increased considerably following the introduction of VAR, thus making football more democratic. In essence, international governing bodies, such as FIFA and UEFA, and national football associations appoint a team of referees to offciate at every single match, therefore delegating all decision-making to the match offcials. During the match, properly adjudicating controversial incidents with the aid of technology is of paramount signifcance for making impartial decisions, ultimately delivering more justice to the popular game, while also rendering any two opposing teams equal in terms of a referee managing the players’ conduct on

DOI: 10.4324/9781003241034-8

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the pitch. FIFA, too, claims to be democratic in its internal processes and in applying democratic standards to its members. Yet the frst chapter examined the validity of the basis of such claims and challenged the democratic legitimacy of football’s international governing body. FIFA’s structure of governance is certainly not democratic, and, as the 2016 FIFA Reform Committee stressed, considerable structural reform is necessary to make FIFA and its member associations operate in a democratic fashion. FIFA’s reform should also address the nature and scope of elections, since only the president’s term limitations – as imposed by FIFA’s internal regulations – make the international governing body look a little more democratic than an autocracy. At present, the fact alone that the president of FIFA is elected does not necessarily make FIFA a democratic organisation. The current president, twice, won the elections unopposed; therefore, in the absence of a second candidate offering an alternative, elections at FIFA seem like a private matter. As voting rights are reserved for member associations, each member having one vote, perhaps expanding the electorate would help further democratise the international governing body of football. And since FIFA is keen on employing technology to safeguard football’s democratic values, surely the technology available today could facilitate the expansion of FIFA’s electorate. During the recent World Cup in Qatar, the Chinese authorities decided to censor football matches by means of keeping state television cameras away from the maskless crowds that populated the stadiums, since the government in China was still imposing strict pandemic restrictions on its citizens. The enforcement of COVID-related lockdowns had forced thousands of protesters in China to demonstrate against the government’s restrictions, some asking for more liberties and even the removal of President Xi Jinping from power. Daily images of tens of thousands of maskless spectators attending the World Cup matches obviously did not align with China’s fxation on zero-COVID policies. Football’s unique qualities are effortlessly communicated through a variety of broadcasting devices. As more than 3.5 billion viewers watched the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, it suffces to say that the mass appeal of football is certainly instrumental in mobilising the masses. Following Morocco’s win over Belgium, while most of their fans in western Europe were celebrating a famous win, several others engaged in violent acts across cities in Belgium and the Netherlands, with similar scenes of violence also taking place when Morocco eliminated Spain from the competition and, again, in Paris after Morocco defeated Portugal in the quarter fnal. In Spain, football hooligans inclined to neo-Nazi ideology were prepared to battle against Moroccan fans, while local Muslim leaders called for calm, as police presence in Madrid and other Spanish cities increased to prevent the kind of riots witnessed elsewhere in Europe. Violence among the ethnic community of Moroccans in Spain is rare, yet relations between the two countries are often tense owing to issues relating to illegal immigration and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Although violence related

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to World Cup events is, indeed, a rare phenomenon, it was the kind of animosity that often characterises relations between migrants of North African heritage and law enforcement that sparked unrest in several European cities. When spontaneous violence in international football competitions causes so much destruction as to deploy riot police, it suffces to say that the more organised violence in national football competitions warrants the decisive intervention of the state and related law enforcement agencies. Yet football mobilising fans is not always a cause for destruction, since the popular game also has the unique capacity of revitalising national memories. The World Cup in Qatar, the frst ever to be held in the wider region of the Middle East, revived a sense of pan-Arab nationalism that gained momentum, particularly after Morocco’s qualifcation in the semi-fnal. Although Palestine did not compete at the World Cup in Qatar, its fag was often displayed in stadiums – as a sign of support for a free Palestine – and was even raised by the players of Morocco on the pitch while celebrating victory over Canada, Spain, and Portugal. Often perceived as a political symbol, the fag of Palestine also serves to represent a FIFA member (admitted in 1998) that competes under the banner of the Asian Football Confederation and, therefore, its use does not constitute a breach of the international governing body’s regulations (Israel plays football under the auspices of the European governing body to avoid any unwelcome confrontation with the Arab states). The rainbow armband of the One Love campaign, nevertheless, was considered a political statement, since Qatar’s legislation is not favourable towards LGBT rights, and was summarily banned from all 2022 FIFA World Cup venues. The One Love campaign originated in the Netherlands to promote inclusion and equality; hence, having banned the One Love rainbow armband, FIFA became an obstacle to the promotion of inclusion and equality. Homophobia, racism, and gender discrimination have long blemished the popular game of football. While raising awareness against homophobia in non-democratic Qatar proved a daunting task, the England players resumed taking the knee at every match before kick-off and were joined by the players of Wales in the match between them. What some perceived as ‘gesture politics’ (Priti Patel for one), taking the knee seeks to curb racial injustice in society. Ever since the Bosman ruling, the ethnic composition of football clubs and several national teams in Europe and North America has changed to refect change more accurately in the population of those societies. While obviously unethical of Priti Patel to both politicise ‘taking the knee’ and relegate it to a mere gesture, ultimately, she was certainly vindicated in that ‘taking the knee’ proved to be nothing more than a humble gesture for it had no impact on governments and legislation. Gender discrimination, on the other hand, is a wholly different matter, for it is not limited to overt discrimination alone, such as the lack of women’s participation in football or its more sinister aspect of sexual harassment. Gender equality in football will remain an unattainable objective so long as there is a FIFA Women’s World Cup,

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UEFA Women’s Champions League and Women’s European Championship, CONMEBOL Copa América Femenina and Copa Libertadores Femenina, CONCACAF Women’s Championship, OFC Women’s Nations Cup, CAF Africa Women Cup of Nations and Women’s Champions League, and AFC Women’s Asian Cup (emphasis added) running in parallel to the equivalent men’s competitions with one notable difference – there is, for instance, the FIFA World Cup, devoted exclusively to men’s football, and then, there is also a FIFA Women’s World Cup. Despite the obvious need to differentiate between men’s and women’s football competitions, the actual reason why only women’s competitions are gender-defned certainly warrants some justifcation, legal or otherwise. Unless, of course, the FIFA World Cup or the UEFA Champions League are considered more authentic, perhaps even of better quality or worthy of more attention, when compared to the relevant women’s competition. Fan identity is instrumental in understanding fans as unruly masses, loyal voters, or mere consumers since football has become part of the national narrative. As the COVID-19 pandemic clearly demonstrated, football cannot exist without fans. The empty football stadiums across the world, once football resumed, delivered the very same message. Replacing football fans with large banners decorating the stands, fake fan sounds and celebrations, and even mannequins dressed in the club’s colours – as did Football Club Seoul in South Korea – only made unmistakably obvious that fans are irreplaceable. The millions of fans involved in the game of football is the main reason why any state, political party, or formation becomes interested in the most popular sport. No political party or government could possibly ignore the opportunity to control the masses, construct related identities, and evoke a unique sense of national sentiment, all together culminating into the political assimilation of citizens. Fans are one day expected to elect the new club president, and then, they are asked to vote in local and national elections. And just as the loyalty of fans to club and country is almost never questioned, participating in the political affairs of club and country only serves to highlight the political role they often play. The politicisation, if not weaponisation, of football fans became more evident immediately after the plans for setting up the breakaway European Super League were announced. Football fans, politicians, and even national leaders became embroiled in preventing the attempted coup staged by a dozen European football clubs. Driven by the potential for improved fnancial gains, the 12 apostate clubs openly exhibited their complete disregard for football culture and fans alike. Ultimately, it was the fans’ reaction that prompted national associations and governments to resist the proposed closed competition in Europe. From the time when the players of the national team of England were instructed to give the Nazi salute 85 years ago, to Germany’s players covering their mouths at the most recent World Cup in Qatar, football’s inextricable association with politics has been well documented. Whether serving

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a nation’s foreign policy objectives (as in England’s appeasement policy towards Nazi Germany) or promoting inclusion and equality (in raising awareness against homophobia, racism, and gender discrimination), football has long had the capacity to communicate powerful messages to the masses. Despite not always serving the sport’s ideals, of course, the sheer popularity of football has transformed an otherwise simple game to play to an essential political tool. That oppressive regimes and democratic governments alike often manipulate football’s popularity to serve national interests is an undeniable fact, as is having politicians attempt to integrate football into the party’s political apparatus to project a certain ideology. As few other venues are suitable for hosting thousands of loyal government supporters and party members, the availability of football stadiums purposely designed to accommodate tens of thousands of people was identifed early on. The Romans, of course, were pioneers in organising games (panem et circenses, Latin for ‘bread and circuses’) for gaining public approval. More recently, the frst football teams in England were, initially, mostly interested in fnding a suitable feld for playing a football match; only when more ceremonial football matches were arranged, such as the FA Cup fnal, were cricket grounds and stadiums utilised. But when attendance, gradually, surpassed the capacity of the stadiums available, football clubs began erecting their own stadiums. Perhaps the most impressive of all, the famous Maracanã Stadium, in Brazil, was thought to accommodate between 150,000 and 200,000 spectators. At least on one occasion, as per the Guinness World Records, close to 175,000 spectators attended the 1950 FIFA World Cup fnal between Brazil and Uruguay. Hence, it is their sheer size that renders just about any ordinary football stadium suitable for political propaganda, for they provide a platform to address unusually large audiences. Any phenomenon that has the capacity to attract large crowds deserves the attention of political science. Whether examining the relationship between state and sport in terms of advancing the interests of the former or matters pertaining to the governance of sports organisations, the fndings will always reveal that sport and politics are interconnected. Considering that the United States is, indeed, one of the greatest political powers in the world, as well as the fact that American politics interest the global community, is it unusual that the US Department of State – Ministry of Foreign Affairs in other countries – maintains a Sports Diplomacy Division? The mass appeal of, and participation in, sport, the contribution of sport in identity formation, as well as its capacity to generate tension render sport inherently political. Even in political science classrooms, the use of sports references only helps reveal the competitive nature of sport and politics alike, assuming that competition is, of course, a precondition for genuine progress. From a political science perspective, for instance, access to sport is a matter of power relations. Expanding access to sport would complement social integration while also increasing political participation. Political science should, therefore, aim at

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harnessing the power of sport to enhance the participation of citizens in all things societal by means of promoting further inclusion and equality in sport, the guiding principles of sport. Politics have permeated sport at all levels, just as athletes often advocate for their political beliefs and protest inequality. Understanding sport through a political lens could elevate sport policy to a tool for further development and peacebuilding, instead of focusing on physical education alone. Sport is at the very heart of contemporary society, is consumed by billions of people, and, therefore, may well facilitate just about any political process intended for the greater good. Studying football within the context of political science allows political scientists to answer questions about politics from a different perspective. Football has already been employed as a tool for the examination of relations between states (international relations), the governance of sporting organisations (domestic politics), the impact of ideology (political theory), policymaking (public policy), and even multinational studies (comparative politics), thus complying with all relevant requirements imposed by the various felds of political science for conducting research. No doubt the major sport across the world, certainly in terms of popularity, football merits the attention of political science, for it also provides states with an invaluable tool that has the capacity to (re)affrm the political values of society. Yet football is not a mere political tool; football is politics, and political science would do well to examine the popular game from its own viewpoint. Paraphrasing one of Karl Marx’s famous sayings, “football is the opium of the people,” and political science must seek the means to regulate it. That the autocratic ruler of Qatar draped Lionel Messi in a bisht – an item of clothing worn by dignitaries in the Middle East, reserved for ceremonial occasions – before the Argentinian captain lifted the World Cup trophy can only be interpreted in the context of political science. It was an inherently political act for Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani obviously intended to brand the occasion as a Middle Eastern affair, at the same time as the negative response from Western media was politically driven as the most controversial FIFA World Cup ended. The political context of the World Cup’s closing ceremony cannot be disregarded.

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Index

**Page numbers in bold reference tables. 50+1 rule 31 1931 Montevideo Convention 91 1950 World Cup 148, 181 1966 FIFA World Cup 109, 177 1974 UEFA Cup fnal 78 1975 Mediterranean Games 102 1978 World Cup 107 1982 FIFA World Cup 74, 100–101 1996 UEFA European Championship 42–43, 109 1998 FIFA World Cup 103–104, 131 2015 FIFA Women’s World Cup 136 2016 FIFA Reform Committee 178 2018 FIFA World Cup 146, 148–149, 161–162, 177–178 2020 UEFA European Football Championship 122, 131, 172 2022 FIFA World Cup 39–40, 138, 153, 162–172, 179 2023 Women’s World Cup 1 Abramovich, Roman 1, 27, 155 abuse of players by coaches 139–141 AC Milan 22, 30 academia, women in 135 AFA, see Asociación de Fútbol Argentino Ahlawi Ultras 80 Al Ahlawi, in Egypt 79–80 Al Ahly Sporting Club 79 al Khater, Nasser 168 Al Masry Sporting Club 79–80 Algeria 99–102 alpha males 120 Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 132 ambivalent sexism theory 132

American Outlaws 83 Amnesty International, Qatar 163–164 anarchy 148 annexation 91 Appeal Committee, FIFA 19 Arabisation, Algeria 100 Arema Football Club 82 Argentina 80–82, 105–108 Arsenal FC 22, 30 Asian Football Confederation 179 Asociación de Fútbol Argentino (AFA) 106 Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) 11 Associazione Calcio Milan 71 ASOIF, see Association of Summer Olympic International Federations Athletic Club Bilbao 1, 96 Atlético de Madrid 22, 30 Azadegan 103 Azzuri 96 Back, Neuza 138 Bad Blue Boys 99 bad governance 10 badges 92–93 Baker, Gilbert 122 Bale, Gareth (Wales) 5 banners 93 bans on transgender athletes 126 Barcelona Football Club 30 barras bravas 80–81, 107 barras de hinchas 80 Basque Nationalist Party 96 Battle of Camels 79 Bayern Munich 25

198

Index

benevolent sexism 132 Berlin Football Association 126 Bessarabia 112 bidding process (FIFA), bribery 158 Bien-Aime, Sonia 138 Birarda, Bob 141 Black Lives Matter movement 131 black referees 130 Boehly, Todd 27 Bohemians Prague 98 Bolshevik Revolution 43–44 Borussia Dortmund 25 Bosman ruling 179 Boumedienne, Houari 102 bribery, in bidding process 158 Britain: Broadcasting Act 1996 26; death of Queen Elizabeth II 108–110 Broadcasting Act 1996 (Britain) 26 broadcasting rights 26 Brugge, Cercle 155 Budapest Memorandum 150 Bundeskartellamt 31 Burundi Football Association 138 calcio 97 Canadian Soccer Association 141 Carrard, François 33 CAS, see Court of Arbitration for Sport Casillas, Iker 127 Catalan independence 94 Catalanism 94 Cavallo, Josh 124–125 CCTV 71, 79 Celtic Football Club 75 Champions League (Europe) 9 Chelsea Football Club 1, 22, 27, 155 Chicago Fire Football Club 129 China, television coverage of Qatar World Cup 178 citizens, government policies 37 civic culture 38 Clinton, Hillary 120 coaches, sexual misconduct 139–141 coat of arms 92–93; Newcastle United Football Club 111 Cold War 7 Colorado Rapids Football Club 129 coming out 124–126 commercialism 9 committees of FIFA 18–19 communism 97–99, 113 community 48–49

complicit masculinity 120 Cone, Cindy Parlow 138, 140 confict 4, 146 Congress, FIFA 18 CONMEBOL 169–170 Constructivism 147–148 control mechanisms 15–16 corruption, FIFA 40–41, 171 Council, FIFA 16–17 Council of Europe: football violence 68; Preventing and Combating Sexism 133 Council of the European Union, Risk Supporters 77–78 country-specifc symbols 46 Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 20 Covert Human Intelligence Sources 75 COVID pandemic 180; European Super League 23 Crimea 150–151 critical race theory 128 CSKA Sofa (Bulgaria) 43, 98 culture 36; civic culture 38; football culture 3; parochial political culture 38, 40; participant political culture 38–39; political culture 3, 37–41; stadiums 49; subject political culture 38–40 Czech Republic 153 Dames, Rory 139 Daniels, Jake 125 Danish Football Association 171 death match 155–156 Delaunay, Henri 4 Delije 99 Demin, Maxim 155 democracy 13–14 Denmark 171; violence in football 77–78 Desna Chernihiv 155 development 14–15 Development Committee, FIFA 19 dialogue offcers, Denmark 77–78 Dinamo Zagreb 99 Disciplinary Committee, FIFA 19 discrimination 4, 117, 158, 179; homophobia 118–127; racism 127–134; sexism 132–141 distance 45 Donbass 151–152 Dowden, Oliver 32

Index Duckenfeld, David 69 Dukla Prague 98 Dynamo 155–156 Dynamo Berlin 98 Dynamo Prague 98 Dynamo Sofa 98 Egypt, violence in football 79–80 election of President: FIFA 20–21; Football Club United of Manchester 58 England 5; Fan Led Review of Football Governance 10; independent regulators 10; Premier League (England) 9; taking the knee 128–129 English disease 3 English Football Association 138 Ente Autárquico Mundial 107 Estadio Nacional, stampedes 82 Esteghlal Football Club 103 Ethics Committee, FIFA 19 ethnic diversity 131–132 ethno-symbolism 89–90 Europa Conference League 2 European Championship 4 European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and In Particular at Football Matches 68 European Cup 4 European football 30 European Parliament: European Super League 28–29; resolution on World Cup in Qatar 170–171 European Super League 3, 5, 22–32, 39, 180 Event Policing Training Programme (Denmark) 77 Everton Football Club 152 Expressionists 50 Faeser, Nancy 169 Fan Led Review of Football Governance 10, 31 fans 9; football fan card 73; identity 180; maskless spectators 178; peñas (Spanish fan clubs) 74; types of 50; violence 67 fascism 94–97, 113 FC Barcelona 22; see also Football Club Barcelona FC Internazionale Milano 22

199

FC Mariupol 155 FC Sevastopol 151 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 1, 4, 7, 10–15, 33, 178; 2016 FIFA Reform Committee 178; Appeal Committee 19; Code of Ethics 19–20; committees 18–19; Congress 18; corruption 40–41, 171; Council 16–17; Development Committee 19; Disciplinary Code 19; Disciplinary Committee 19; election of President 20–21; Ethics Committee 19; European Super League 26–28; Finance Committee 19; Football Stakeholders Committee 19; governance 15–22; Governance Committee 19; Human Rights Advisory Board 158–162; The IFAB 17; judicial bodies 19–20; Management Board 18; Ordinary Congress 18; Players’ Status Committee 19; position on invasion of Ukraine 152–154; President’s duties 17–18; Qatar 39–40; Referees Committee 19; Statutes 19; Sustainability Strategy 166; voting 19 Federazione Italiana del Giuoco del Calcio 96–97 female referees 138 femicide 133 Feyenoord Rotterdam 78 Fidelity Card 73 FIFA, see Fédération Internationale de Football Association Finance Committee, FIFA 19 FK Budućnost Podgorica 99 FK Sarajevo 99 Flakelf 155 Floyd, George 128, 131, 142 The Football Association 4, 42 Football Association of Moldova 2 Football Association of Norway 138 Football Club Barcelona 96; see also Club de Futbol de Barcelona Football Club Dynamo Kyiv 98 Football Club Manchester United 152 Football Club Metalist 1925 Kharkiv 156 Football Club Metalist Kharkiv 156 Football Club Rukh Lviv 156 Football Club Seoul 180 Football Club Shakhtar Donetsk 151–152, 156

200

Index

Football Club Spartak Moscow 83 Football Club United of Manchester 56–58 football culture 3 football fan card, Italy 73 Football Federation of Ukraine 149–151 football hooligan identity 67 football hooliganism 66 football stadiums 49 Football Stakeholders Committee, FIFA 19 Football Supporters’ Association, death of Queen Elizabeth II 109–110 football wars 6 Fotbal Club Sheriff Tiraspol 2, 112–113 Fotbal Club Steaua Bucureşti (Romania) 43 Founding Clubs of European Super League 22–23 France 171 Frappart, Stephanie 138 Fraser, Robin 129 Fußballclub Gelsenkirchen-Schalke 04 152 Fudbalski Klub Crvena Zvezda 43 Fudbalski Klub Partizan 43 Futbol Club Barcelona 39, 93 Game Changer fans 50 Gay Football Supporters Network 126 gay rights 118 gender 132 gender discrimination 133, 179 gender equality 179–180 gender parity, in national legislative bodies 136 gender socialisation 132 gender wage gap 134 gender-based discrimination 133; see also sexism German Football Association (Deutscher Fußball-Bund) 94–95; transgender football 126–127 German Football League 30–31 Germany, fascism 94–96; see also Nazi Germany gesture politics 2, 128, 179 Glazer, Malcolm 56 Goddess Bia 64 Golyk, Yaroslav 156 good governance 8–10 governance 1, 3, 7–10; control mechanisms 15–16; democracy

13–14; development 14–15; Fan Led Review of Football Governance 10; at FIFA 15–22; integrity 12–13; standards of 11; transparency 12 Governance Committee, FIFA 19 government 8 Grafstorm, Mattias 26 guard of honour 45 Guérin, Robert 4 Haarlemsche Football Club Haarlem 83 Hahn, John 26 Hajduk Split 99 Hajsaf, Ehsan 105 Hanot, Gabriel 4 hard masculinity, football hooligan identity 67 hegemonic masculinity 120–122 Helms, Monica 123 Henderson, Neville 172 Hendrickson, Ezra 129 heraldry 92–94 Herstory 118–119 Hewitt, Debbie 138 Heysel Stadium disaster 72–73 Hillsborough Stadium 69–70 HNK Hajduk Split 99 Hobbes, Thomas 8 Holly, Christy 139–140 Holocaust 95–96; see also Nazi Germany homophobia 118–120, 142, 179; coming out 124–126; hegemonic masculinity 120–122; political homophobia 119; rainbow politics 122–124 homosexuality 121, 142; coming out 124–126; Qatar 168 Honved Budapest 98 hooliganism 3, 40, 63, 65–68; see also violence hostile sexism 132 human nature 8 human rights 4, 46, 146, 156–158, 172; 2022 FIFA World Cup (Qatar) 162–172; Argentina 108; European Super League 29–30; FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board 158–162 Human Rights Advisory Board, FIFA 158–162 Human Rights Council 157 Human Rights Policy, FIFA 162–163 Hungary 98

Index identity 3, 46–47; of fans 180; gender 132; of nations 90–91; political identity 47–50; through symbols 93–94 identity politics 50–56, 123, 130 ideological identity 48 The IFAB 17 imagined community 92 imperialism 147 independent regulators, England 5, 10 Indonesia, violence in football 82 Indonesian Football Association 82 inequalities, sexism 136–138 Infantino, Gianni 82, 169 integrity 12–13 intentionality, violence 64 International Federation of Association Football, see Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) International Football Association Board 32 International Olympic Committee, position on invasion of Ukraine 154 International Relations 147–148; 2018 FIFA World Cup 148–149 International Rugby League, bans on transgender athletes 126 international state 8 International Swimming Federation (Federation internationale de natation – FINA) 126 Internazionale Milano 30 iQiyi Sports 152 Iran 102–105 Iranian Football Federation 105 irredentism 91 Italy: fascism 96–97; homophobia 121; inequalities between men and women 137; violence in football 71–73 Ituarte, José Moscardó 96 Johansen, Isha 138 Johnson, Boris 25, 125, 138, 149 JPMorgan Chase 27 judicial bodies, FIFA 19–20 Juventus Football Club 22, 30, 39; Heysel Stadium disaster 72–73 Kane, Harry (England) 5 Kanjuruhan stadium, violence 82 Kant, Immanuel 8

201

Kenya Football Federation 138 Khalifa 164 King George VI 110 King Jr., Martin Luther 129 Kissinger, Henry 5 Klaveness, Lise 138 Klubi Futboll Partizani Tirana (Albania) 43 Klymenko, Oleksiy 155–156 Komarov, Pavlo 156 Korotkykh, Mykola 155 Kuzmenko, Ivan 156 La Fossa dei Leoni (the Lion’s den) 71 Laghrari, Anas 26 Law No.17 (2002), Qatar 168 League of Nations 7 Lega Nord party 72 Lenin Stadium 83 LGBT people, treatment of (in Qatar) 168 LGBT rights 118 Liberalism 147 Lineker, Gary 130 live media rights, European Super League 24–25 Liverpool Football Club 22, 30; Heysel Stadium disaster 72–73; Hillsborough Stadium 69 Locke, John 158 Lokomotiv Kyiv 155 Lynch, Loretta 171 Macron, Emmanuel 23, 25 Madrid Football Club (Madrid Club de Fútbol) 7, 93 Magna Carta Libertarium 158 Management Board, FIFA 18 Manchester City Football Club 4–5, 9, 22 Manchester United 22, 30, 56 Maracana Stadium 181 marginalised masculinity 120 Martínez, Saíd 138 masculinity: complicity masculinity 120; hegemonic masculinity 120–122; marginalised masculinity 120; political masculinity 119–120; subordinated masculinity 120; (white) masculinity 117 maskless spectators 178 Mass Events Security Act (Poland) 76

202

Index

maternity benefts 137 Medina, Karen Diaz 138 mega events 2 member associations conference, FIFA 15–16 membership, in FIFA 11 Mezzogiorno 72 Mielke, Erich 98 migrant labourers, in Qatar 163–165 militarism, symbols 45–46 military terminology 45–46 misogynist rhetoric 119 misogyny 132–133 modernism 89 Moldova 2 Moldovia 112 Monnet, Jean 4 morality 148 Morocco 178 Mukansanga, Salima 138 Murdoch, Rupert 56 Murray, Zander 126 Mussolini, Benito 146 Nahid 102 Napier, Craig 126 National Commission against Violence at Sporting Events, Spain 74–75 national football associations 10 national identity 91 National Liberation Front, Algeria 101–102 National Mourning, death of Queen Elizabeth II 109 national self-interest 7 National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL), United States 139–140 nationalism 3–4, 7, 88–91; pan-Arab nationalism 179 nation-building 88 Nazi Germany 172; death match 155–156; fascism 94–96; racism 127; symbols 45–46; whiteness 130 Neo-Realism 148 The Netherlands, violence in football 78–79 Newcastle East End Football Club 110 Newcastle Football Club 5 Newcastle United Football Club 110–112 Newcastle West End Football Club 110 Non-risk Supporters 78

North American football 36 Norway 171 Nottingham Forest Football Club, Hillsborough Stadium 69 Nsekera, Lydia 138 Obama, Barack 120 Obolon Kyiv 155 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 75 Oleksiy Klymenko 155 One Love campaign 168–169, 179 Ordinary Congress, FIFA 18 Oyf, Valeriy 155 Ozil, Mesut 131 pan-Arab nationalism 179 Paris Saint-Germain Football Club 4–5, 9, 25, 171 parochial political culture 38, 40 participant political culture 38–39 Partizan Belgrade 2, 99 party identity 48 Patel, Priti 179 patriarchal order 133 patriotism 49 peñas (Spanish fan clubs) 74 Pereyaslav Agreement 150 Perón, Juan Domingo 107 Persatuan Sepakbola Surabaya 82 Persepolis 103 Peru 82 Petra, Doris 138 pink triangle 122 Players’ Status Committee, FIFA 19 Poland: position on invasion of Ukraine 152–153; violence in football 76–77 Polish Football Association 152–153 political culture 3, 37–41 political homophobia 118–120 political identity 47–50 political masculinity 119–120 political science 2; symbols in 41–45 political socialisation 37; political identity 47–50 political symbolism 41–45 populism 119 Port Said massacre 80 Portugal 178 power 1, 2, 90; heraldry 92; racism 128; symbols and 41–42; violence 64

Index Premier League (England) 1, 9, 24; death of Queen Elizabeth II 109; invasion of Ukraine 152; taking the knee 128; whiteness 129 President of FIFA 17–18 Pride fag 122–123 primordialism 89 prize money, inequalities between men and women 136–138 Progress Pride Flag 123 Putin, Vladimir 120, 146, 151, 155 Puyol, Carles 127 Qatar 5, 179, 182; 2022 FIFA World Cup 39–40; homosexuality 168; human rights 162–172 Qatar International Safety Centre (QISC) 166 Qatar Investment Authority 171 Qatar Sports Investment 171 QISC, see Qatar International Safety Centre Quasar, Daniel 123 Queen Elizabeth II, death of 108–110 racial inequality, take the knee 2 racialised societies 128 racism 127–128, 179; ethnic diversity 131–132; taking the knee 128–129; whiteness 129–130 Radomsky, Paul 155 rainbow politics 122–124 Rangers Football Club 75 Real Madrid Club de Fútbol 9, 22, 39, 74 Realism 8, 147–148 recruitment fees, Qatar 168 red star, coat of arms 92–93 Red Star Belgrade (Serbia) 43, 98–99 Red Star Club Français 44 Red Star Football Club 44 refereeing decisions 177–178 Referees Committee, FIFA 19 Reform Committee 33 region 94 regionalism, Italy 72 representative democracy 21 Riley, Paul 138–139 Rimet, Jules 4, 44 Risk Supporters 77–78 rivalries, Italy 97 Robertson, Andrew (Scotland) 5

203

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 8 Royal House of Savoy 96–97 Royal Spanish Football Federation (Real Federación Española de Fútbol) 96 Ruggie, John 158 Russia 2, 44; annexation of Crimea 151; invasion of Ukraine 112, 152–156; poisoning of Sergei Skripal 149; war in Ukraine 7 Russian Football Union 151 Rybolovlev, Dmitry 155 safe and equal sport, European Super League 29 SafeSport 140–141 Salman, Khalid 168 Salman, Mohammed bin 111 Samoura, Fatma 169 Saudi Arabia 1, 5, 111–112 Savvidis, Ivan 155 SC Tavriya 151 Schuman, Robert 4 Scotland, violence in football 75–79 self-interest, human nature 8 senior management positions, women in 134–135 sexism 132–136, 142; inequalities 136–138 sexist rhetoric 119 sexual harassment 138–139 sexual misconduct 139–141 Shahin Tehran 103 Shojaei, Masoud 105 signs 41 Simon, Erin 139–140 SKChF Sevastopol 151 Skripal, Sergei 149 Slavia Prague 98 soccer 36 social learning 132 socialisers 50 Società Sportiva Lazio 1 solidarity payments, European Super League 23, 25 South American football 36 South Yorkshire Police 69–70 Soviet Union 7, 91, 147, 150; coat of arms 93; cover up of violence 83 Spain 178; fascism 96; inequalities between men and women 138; ultras’ groups 73–75 Spanish fan clubs (peñas) 74

204

Index

Sparta Prague 98 Spartak Sokolovo 98 Spartak Stalingrad 98 sport: national identity 91; and politics 2 stadiums 181; Estadio Nacional 82; Heysel Stadium disaster 72–73; Hillsborough Stadium 69–70; Lenin Stadium 82–83; Maracana Stadium 181 stampedes, Estadio Nacional 82 Start 155 state monopoly on violence 64–65 state-owned football clubs 4–5 Statto 50 Steaua Bucharest 98 STEM workforce, sexism 133–134 Straw, Jack 5 structural violence 65 subject political culture 38–40 subordinated masculinity 120 supranationalism 7 Sustainability Strategy, FIFA 166 Sweden, position on invasion of Ukraine 153 symbols: identity through 93–94; pink triangle 122; in political science 41–46; Pride fag 122–123; Progress Pride Flag 123; red star, coat of arms 92–93 Tahrir Square 79 Taj Tehran 103 taking the knee 2, 128–129, 179 tear gas, Indonesia 82 territorial identifcation, football hooligan identity 67 territory benefts 49 third kits 171 Tottenham Hotspur 22, 30, 78 Transdniestria 112 transgender athletes 126–127 transgender community 124 transgender women 138 transparency 12 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership 151 Tromsø Idrettslag 171 Trump, Donald 120 Trusevych, Mykola 156 TSK Simferopol 151 Turkey 1, 91 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 91

UEFA, see Union of European Football Association Ukraine 7, 172; invasion by Russia 112, 152–156; new football kit 149–150 ultras’ groups 3; in Argentina 80–82; in Denmark 77–78; in Egypt 79–80; in Italy 71–73; in Scotland 76; in Spain 73–75 The Ultras Sur 74 under-representation of women 119 Union of European Football Association (UEFA) 4, 23; Champions League (Europe) 9; human rights 169; position on invasion of Ukraine 153– 154; rainbow politics 122; response to annexation of Crimea 151 Unione Calcio Sampdoria 71 Unione Sportiva Livorno 1 United 24 156 United Arab Emirates 5 United Kingdom, homophobia 121–122; see also Britain United Nations (UN) 7; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 133; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 46, 65, 117, 157 United States 7, 147, 181; competing against Iran (1998 World Cup) 103–104; inequalities between men and women 137; National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL) 139–140; violence in football 83–84 United States Football Association 43 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 46, 65, 117, 157 Universal Periodic Review 157 US Soccer Federation, symbols 43 VAR, see video assistant referee Vecchietti, Valentino 123 video assistant referee (VAR) 177 violence 3, 63, 178–179; in Argentina 80–82; in Denmark 77–78; in Egypt 79–80; in football 68–69; Hillsborough Stadium 69–70; in Indonesia 82; in Italy 71–73; in The Netherlands 78–79; in Peru 82; in Poland 76–77; in Scotland 75–79; in Soviet Union 83; state monopoly on 64–65; structural violence 65; in United States 83–84 voting in FIFA 19

Index Wage Protection System (WPS) 167 wages: gender wage gap 134; for workers in Qatar 164 Weill Cornell Medicine-Qatar 166 Wesley, Izetta Sombo 138 (white) masculinity 117 white privilege 128 white supremacy 128, 130 whiteness 129–130 Wilson, Lloyd 126 women: inequalities 136–138; in politics 135–136; under-representation of 119; see also sexism

World Cup 4, 7 world football 30 world government 7–8 world republic 8 WPS see Wage Protection System Yamashita, Yoshimi 138 Yates, Sally Q. 138–139 Yugoslav football 98 Yugoslavia 91, 98–99 Zamalek Sporting Club 79 Zelensky, Volodymyr 156 Zhemchuzhina Yalta 151

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